name,TTP
A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server.,T1680
APT-C-36 has acquired domains to host malicious payloads.,T1583.001
"APT-C-36 has impersonated banks including Banco Davivienda, Bancolombia, and BBVA as well as government institutions such as Colombia's National Directorate of Taxes and Customs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Office of the Attorney General.",T1684.001
APT-C-36 has staged malware implants on group-owned repositories and sites.,T1608.001
"APT-C-36 has used ConfuserEx to obfuscate its variant of Imminent Monitor, compressed payloads and RAT packages, and password protected encrypted email attachments to avoid detection. APT-C-36 has also compressed initial droppers into ZIP, LHA and UUE formats.",T1027
APT-C-36 has used a botnet management interface to control large numbers of compromised hosts.,T1584.005
APT-C-36 has used a fileless attack chain composed of three JavaScript code snippets to execute subsequent payloads.,T1059.007
"APT-C-36 has used malicious links in emails, often impersonating official notifications and documents, to direct users to execute malicious payloads.",T1204.001
APT-C-36 has used side-loading to execute the HijackLoader payload.,T1574.001
APT19 launched an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant using a legitimate executable that loaded the malicious DLL.,T1574.001
APT28 has used a Powershell cmdlet to grant the ApplicationImpersonation role to a compromised account.,T1098.002
APT29 has ensured web servers in a victim environment are Internet accessible before copying tools or malware to it.,T1016.001
APT29 has installed a run command on a compromised system to enable malware execution on system startup.,T1037.004
"APT29 has leveraged compromised high-privileged on-premises accounts synced to Office 365 to move laterally into a cloud environment, including through the use of Azure AD PowerShell.",T1021.007
APT29 has leveraged the Microsoft Graph API to perform various actions across Azure and M365 environments. They have also utilized AADInternals PowerShell Modules to access the API,T1059.009
APT29 has successfully conducted password guessing attacks against a list of mailboxes.,T1110.001
"APT29 has used residential proxies, including Azure Virtual Machines, to obfuscate their access to victim environments.",T1586.003
"APT29 targets dormant or inactive user accounts, accounts belonging to individuals no longer at the organization but whose accounts remain on the system, for access and persistence.",T1078.003
APT37's has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\.,T1547.001
APT38 has prepended a space to all of their terminal commands to operate without leaving traces in the HISTCONTROL environment.,T1690
APT38 has used the legitimate application `ieinstal.exe` to bypass UAC.,T1548.002
APT39 has utilized custom scripts to perform internal reconnaissance.,T1059
APT41 has created user accounts.,T1136.001
APT41 used `NATBypass` to bypass firewall restrictions and to access compromised systems via RDP.,T1599
APT41 used a hidden shell script in `/etc/rc.d/init.d` to leverage the `ADORE.XSEC`backdoor and `Adore-NG` rootkit.,T1037
APT41 used certutil to download additional files. APT41 downloaded post-exploitation tools such as Cobalt Strike via command shell following initial access. APT41 has uploaded Procdump and NATBypass to a staging directory and has used these tools in follow-on activities.,T1105
APT41 uses remote shares to move and remotely execute payloads during lateral movemement.,T1570
"APT41 uses the Chinese website fofa.su, similar to the Shodan scanning service, for passive scanning of victims.",T1596.005
APT42 has impersonated legitimate people in phishing emails to gain credentials.,T1684.001
APT42 has modified Registry keys to maintain persistence.,T1112
APT42 has used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to query anti-virus products.,T1047
APT42 has used anonymized infrastructure and Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) to interact with the victim's environment.,T1583.003
APT42 has used built-in features in the Microsoft 365 environment and publicly available tools to avoid detection.,T1588.002
APT42 has used credential harvesting websites.,T1056
"APT42 has used malware, such as GHAMBAR and POWERPOST, to collect network information.",T1016
APT5 has cleared the command history on targeted ESXi servers.,T1070.003
APT5 has modified legitimate binaries and scripts for Pulse Secure VPNs including the legitimate DSUpgrade.pm file to install the ATRIUM webshell for persistence.,T1554
APT5 has used cmd.exe for execution on compromised systems.,T1059.003
APT5 has used malware with keylogging capabilities to monitor the communications of targeted entities.,T1056.001
APT5 has used the CLEANPULSE utility to insert command line strings into a targeted process to prevent certain log events from occurring.,T1685
APT5 has used the JAR/ZIP file format for exfiltrated files.,T1560.001
Agrius used tools such as Mimikatz to dump LSASS memory to capture credentials in victim environments.,T1003.001
Agrius uses ASPXSpy web shells to enable follow-on command execution via cmd.exe.,T1059.003
Akira has accessed and downloaded information stored in SharePoint instances as part of data gathering and exfiltration activity.,T1213.002
Akira has used binary padding to obfuscate payloads.,T1027.001
AppleJeus has targeted the cryptocurrency industry with the goal of stealing digital assets.,T1657
Aquatic Panda clears Windows Event Logs following activity to evade defenses.,T1685.005
Aquatic Panda renamed or moved malicious binaries to legitimate locations to evade defenses and blend into victim environments.,T1036.005
Aquatic Panda used SSH with captured user credentials to move laterally in victim environments.,T1021.004
Aquatic Panda used multiple mechanisms to capture valid user accounts for victim domains to enable lateral movement and access to additional hosts in victim environments.,T1078.002
Aquatic Panda used remote scheduled tasks to install malicious software on victim systems during lateral movement actions.,T1021
BRONZE BUTLER has used net user /domain to identify account information.,T1087.002
BRONZE BUTLER has used legitimate applications to side-load malicious DLLs.,T1574.001
BlackByte constructed a valid authentication token following Microsoft Exchange exploitation to allow for follow-on privileged command execution.,T1134.003
BlackByte created scheduled tasks for payload execution.,T1053.005
BlackByte enumerated network shares on victim devices.,T1135
BlackByte has gained access to victim environments through legitimate VPN credentials.,T1078
BlackByte has injected Cobalt Strike into `wuauclt.exe` during intrusions. BlackByte has injected ransomware into `svchost.exe` before encryption.,T1055
BlackByte resized and deleted volume shadow copy files to prevent system recovery after encryption.,T1490
BlackByte used various system commands and tools to pull system information during operations.,T1082
CURIUM deployed mechanisms to check system time information following strategic website compromise attacks.,T1124
CURIUM has compromised legitimate websites to enable strategic website compromise attacks.,T1584.006
"CURIUM has established a network of fictitious social media accounts, including on Facebook and LinkedIn, to establish relationships with victims, often posing as an attractive woman.",T1585.001
"Carbanak has named malware ""svchost.exe,"" which is the name of the Windows shared service host program.",T1036.005
"Chimera has used ipconfig, Ping, and tracert to enumerate the IP address and network environment and settings of the local host.",T1016
Cobalt Group has added persistence by registering the file name for the next stage malware under HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript.,T1037.001
Contagious Interview has distributed malicious files requiring direct victim interaction to execute through the guise of a code test.,T1204.002
Contagious Interview has established persistence using InvisibleFerret malware to create file to run the script on Startup via LaunchAgents. Contagious Interview has also utilized a plist file located in `/Library/LaunchAgents` to enable a malicious bash script the ability to persist.,T1543.001
Contagious Interview has leveraged ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious code.,T1204.004
Contagious Interview has used AI to clone video-conferencing applications to distribute their BeaverTail malware. They have also used AI to create deepfake videos.,T1683.002
Contagious Interview has used the Python-based malware such as InvisibleFerret to install and execute Python Packages and Python modules.,T1059.006
Contagious Interview has utilized Visual Basic scripts in the execution of their downloader malware targeting Windows devices including as script called update.vbs.,T1059.005
Contagious Interview has utilized email notifications from malware distribution servers to track victim engagement.,T1071.003
Daggerfly created a local account on victim machines to maintain access.,T1136.001
Daggerfly created code signing certificates to sign malicious macOS files.,T1587.002
Daggerfly is associated with several supply chain compromises using malicious updates to compromise victims.,T1195.002
"Darkhotel malware has used a series of checks to determine if it's being analyzed; checks include the length of executable names, if a filename ends with .Md5.exe, and if the program is executed from the root of the C:\ drive, as well as checks for sandbox-related libraries.",T1497.001
"Earth Lusca created a service using the command sc create ""SysUpdate"" binpath= ""cmd /c start ""file path""""&&sc config ""SysUpdate"" start= auto&&net start SysUpdate for persistence.",T1543.003
"Earth Lusca used the command `move file path c:\windows\system32\spool\prtprocs\x64\spool.dll` to move and register a malicious DLL name as a Windows print processor, which eventually was loaded by the Print Spooler service.",T1036.005
Ember Bear has configured multi-hop proxies via ProxyChains within victim environments.,T1090.003
Ember Bear has renamed the legitimate Sysinternals tool procdump to alternative names such as dump64.exe to evade detection.,T1036
Ember Bear has targeted IP ranges for vulnerability scanning related to government and critical infrastructure organizations.,T1595.001
Ember Bear modifies registry values for anti-forensics and defense evasion purposes.,T1112
"FIN13 has collected local host information by utilizing Windows commands `systeminfo`, `fsutil`, and `fsinfo`. FIN13 has also utilized a compromised Symantex Altiris console and LanDesk account to retrieve host information.",T1082
FIN13 has used VBS scripts for code execution on comrpomised machines.,T1059.005
FIN13 has used `netstat` and other net commands for network reconnaissance efforts.,T1049
FIN13 has used the Windows `dir` command to enumerate files and directories in a victim's network.,T1083
FIN13 has utilized `nmap` for reconnaissance efforts. FIN13 has also scanned for internal MS-SQL servers in a compromised network.,T1046
FIN13 has utilized custom malware to maintain persistence in a compromised environment.,T1587.001
FIN7 has loaded a .NET assembly into the currect execution context via `Reflection.Assembly::Load`.,T1620
FIN7 has tunneled C2 traffic via OpenSSH.,T1572
"FIN7 has used the PowerShell script 3CF9.ps1 and the executable WsTaskLoad to enumerate domain administrations by executing `net group ""Domain Admins"" /domain`. FIN7 has also used csvde.exe, which is a built-in Windows command line tool, to export Active Directory information.",T1087.002
"FIN7 lured victims to double-click on images in the attachments they sent which would then execute the hidden LNK file. Additionally, FIN7 has used malicious Microsoft Word and Excel files and Leo VBS to distribute an updated version of JSS Loader and to distribute the Harpy backdoor.",T1204.002
"FIN8's malicious spearphishing payloads use WMI to launch malware and spawn `cmd.exe` execution. FIN8 has also used WMIC and the Impacket suite for lateral movement, as well as during and post compromise cleanup activities.",T1047
Fox Kitten has used protocol tunneling for communication and RDP activity on compromised hosts through the use of open source tools such as ngrok and custom tool SSHMinion.,T1572
"GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool ""ConnectWise Control"" to deploy REvil.",T1219
Gamaredon Group has attempted to get users to click on Office attachments with malicious macros embedded. Gamaredon Group has also attempted to get users to click on thematically named files.,T1204.002
Gamaredon Group has removed security settings for VBA macro execution by changing registry values HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\VBAWarnings and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\<version>\<product>\Security\AccessVBOM. Gamaredon Group has also modified Registry keys to hide folders and system files and to add the C2 address under `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Console\WindowsUpdate`.,T1112
"Gamaredon Group has used various legitimate tools, such as `mshta.exe` and Reg, and services during operations.",T1588.002
Gamaredon Group malware has used CreateProcess to launch additional malicious components.,T1106
HAFNIUM has exfitrated data from OneDrive.,T1530
HAFNIUM has used rundll32 to load malicious DLLs.,T1218.011
HEXANE has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.,T1546.003
INC Ransom has uninstalled tools from compromised endpoints after use.,T1070.004
INC Ransom has used INC Ransomware to encrypt victim's data.,T1486
INC Ransom has used NETSCAN.EXE for internal reconnaissance.,T1046
"In addition to directing victims to run remote software, Scattered Spider members themselves also deploy RMM software including TeamViewer, AnyDesk, LogMeIn, ngrok, and ConnectWise to establish persistence on the compromised network.",T1219.002
"Indrik Spider has created email accounts to communicate with their ransomware victims, to include providing payment and decryption details.",T1585.002
"Indrik Spider has developed malware for their operations, including ransomware such as BitPaymer and WastedLocker.",T1587.001
"Indrik Spider has downloaded tools, such as the Advanced Port Scanner utility and Lansweeper, to conduct internal reconnaissance of the victim network. Indrik Spider has also accessed the victim's VMware VCenter, which had information about host configuration, clusters, etc.",T1590
"Indrik Spider used PsExec to leverage Windows Defender to disable scanning of all downloaded files and to restrict real-time monitoring. Indrik Spider has used `MpCmdRun` to revert the definitions in Microsoft Defender. Additionally, Indrik Spider has used WMI to stop or uninstall and reset anti-virus products and other defensive services.",T1685
Ke3chang has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network for reconnaissance and vulnerability exploitation.,T1583.005
Kimsuky has gathered the system time of the device using the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-Date`.,T1124
Kimsuky has hosted content used for targeting efforts via web services such as Blogspot. Kimsuky has also leveraged Dropbox for hosting payloads and uploading victim system information.,T1583.006
Kimsuky has leveraged stolen PII to create accounts.,T1585
Kimsuky has staged collected data files under C:\Program Files\Common Files\System\Ole DB\. Kimsuky has also gathered data in structured directories prior to exfiltration under the %TEMP% environment variable.,T1074.001
"Kimsuky has the ability to enumerate all files and directories on an infected system. Kimsuky has used a custom script with a function called CreateFileList() that can scan all filesystem drives, prioritizing C:\Users, to locate files and file extensions of interest that ultimately generates a file called `FileList.txt` saved within the victims %TEMP% Directory that contains the findings and the respective pathways.",T1083
Kimsuky has used an information gathering module that will hide an AV software window from the victim. Kimsuky has also been known to use `-WindowStyle Hidden` to conceal PowerShell windows.,T1564.003
Kimsuky has used tailored spearphishing emails to gather victim information including contat lists to identify additional targets.,T1598
Lazarus Group has distributed malicious payloads embedded in PNG files.,T1027.009
"Lazarus Group has obtained a variety of tools for their operations, including Responder and PuTTy PSCP.",T1588.002
Lazarus Group has used schtasks for persistence including through the periodic execution of a remote XSL script or a dropped VBS payload.,T1053.005
"Lazarus Group has used the Windows API ObtainUserAgentString to obtain the User-Agent from a compromised host to connect to a C2 server. Lazarus Group has also used various, often lesser known, functions to perform various types of Discovery and Process Injection.",T1106
"Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia checks Registry keys within HKCU and HKLM to determine if certain applications are present, including SecureCRT, Terminal Services, RealVNC, TightVNC, UltraVNC, Radmin, mRemote, TeamViewer, FileZilla, pcAnyware, and Remote Desktop. Another Lazarus Group malware sample checks for the presence of the following Registry key:HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Bitcoin\Bitcoin-Qt.",T1012
Leviathan has rapidly transformed and adapted public exploit proof-of-concept code for new vulnerabilities and utilized them against target networks.,T1587.004
Lotus Blossom has locally staged compressed and archived data for follow-on exfiltration.,T1074.001
Lotus Blossom has used Ping to identify remote systems.,T1018
Lotus Blossom has used WinRAR for compressing data in RAR format.,T1560.001
Lotus Blossom has used commands such as `net` to profile local system users.,T1087.001
LuminousMoth has downloaded additional malware and tools onto a compromised host.,T1105
LuminousMoth has used a malicious DLL to collect the username from compromised hosts.,T1033
LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs that setup persistence in the Registry Key `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Run`.,T1547.001
"Magic Hound has added the following rule to a victim's Windows firewall to allow RDP traffic - `""netsh"" advfirewall firewall add rule name=""Terminal Server"" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=3389`.",T1686.003
Magic Hound has captured the IP addresses of visitors to their phishing sites.,T1590.005
Magic Hound has collected location information from visitors to their phishing sites.,T1591.001
"Magic Hound has identified high-value email accounts in academia, journalism, NGO's, foreign policy, and national security for targeting.",T1589.002
Magic Hound has named a malicious script CacheTask.bat to mimic a legitimate task.,T1036.004
Magic Hound has used Plink to tunnel RDP over SSH.,T1572
Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications.,T1573
Malteiro has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious .zip files.,T1566.001
Medusa Group has detected security solutions for termination or deletion within the victim device using hard-coded lists of strings containing security product executables.,T1518.001
Medusa Group has purchased user credentials and other sensitive data from Initial Access Brokers (IABs).,T1650
Medusa Group has used PDQ Inventory to get an inventory of the endpoints on the network.,T1018
Medusa Group has used RDP to conduct lateral movement and exfiltrate data. Medusa Group has also utilized the Windows executable `mstsc.exe` for RDP activities through the command `mstsc.exe /v:{hostname/ip}`.,T1021.001
Medusa Group has utilized compromised legitimate local and domain accounts within the victim environment to facilitate remote access and lateral movement sometimes in combination with PsExec.,T1078
Metador has used TCP for C2.,T1095
MirrorFace has deleted Windows event logs.,T1685.005
MirrorFace has deleted directories containing malware and archives with files collected from the victim environment.,T1070.004
MirrorFace has disabled Windows Defender in compromised environments.,T1685
MirrorFace has used Windows native tools to enumerate user information.,T1033
"MirrorFace has used `cmd.exe` for malware execution, file discovery, and manual file manipulation.",T1059.003
MirrorFace has used legitimate EXE files to load malicious DLLs via sideloading.,T1574.001
MirrorFace has used native Windows tools to obtain domain user information.,T1087.002
MirrorFace has used remote templates with VBA code in malware infection chains.,T1059.005
Mofang has compressed the ShimRat executable within malicious email attachments.,T1027.015
Moonstone Sleet deployed malware such as YouieLoader capable of capturing victim system browser information.,T1217
Moonstone Sleet retrieved credentials from LSASS memory.,T1003.001
MoustachedBouncer has used plugins to execute PowerShell scripts.,T1059.001
"MuddyWater has attempted to exfiltrate data to Wasabi, a cloud storage service, using Rclone.",T1567.002
"MuddyWater has controlled POWERSTATS from behind a proxy network to obfuscate the C2 location. MuddyWater has used a series of compromised websites that victims connected to randomly to relay information to command and control (C2). MuddyWater has also used go-socks5 variants to bypass firewalls and Network Address Translation (NAT), to communicate with a hardcoded C2 server, and to exfiltrate data.",T1090.002
Mustang Panda has delivered web bugs to profile their intended targets.,T1598.003
Mustang Panda has developed custom malware for use in their operations.,T1587.001
Mustang Panda has downloaded additional executables following the initial infection stage. Mustang Panda has also leveraged Visual Studio Code `code.exe` and Dev Tunnels using `DevTunnel.exe` to propagate additional tools and payloads.,T1105
Mustang Panda has masqueraded malicious executables as legitimate files that download PlugX malware.,T1036.008
Mustang Panda has obtained and leveraged publicly-available tools for intrusion activities.,T1588.002
Mustang Panda has utilized AdFind to identify domain users.,T1087.002
Mustard Tempest has deployed secondary payloads and third stage implants to compromised hosts.,T1105
Mustard Tempest has lured users into downloading malware through malicious links in fake advertisements and spearphishing emails.,T1204.001
Mustard Tempest has sent victims emails containing links to compromised websites.,T1566.002
Mustard Tempest has used implants to perform system reconnaissance on targeted systems.,T1082
Nomadic Octopus used cmd.exe /c within a malicious macro.,T1059.003
OilRig has obtained stolen code signing certificates to digitally sign malware.,T1588.003
"OilRig has set up fake VPN portals, conference sign ups, and job application websites to target victims.",T1583.001
OilRig has used sc query on a victim to gather information about services.,T1007
Patchwork enumerated all available drives on the victim's machine.,T1680
"Patchwork installed its payload in the startup programs folder as ""Baidu Software Update."" The group also adds its second stage payload to the startup programs as ""Net Monitor."" They have also dropped QuasarRAT binaries as files named microsoft_network.exe and crome.exe.",T1036.005
Play has used the information-stealing tool Grixba to enumerate network information.,T1016
"Play has used tools such as AdFind, Nltest, and BloodHound to enumerate shares and hostnames on compromised networks.",T1018
Play has used valid domain accounts for access.,T1078.002
Rancor has used msiexec to download and execute malicious installer files over HTTP.,T1218.007
Rancor launched a scheduled task to gain persistence using the schtasks /create /sc command.,T1053.005
RedCurl has collected data about network drives.,T1039
RedCurl has collected data from the local disk of compromised hosts.,T1005
RedCurl has created its own tools to use during operations.,T1587.001
RedCurl has created scheduled tasks for persistence.,T1053.005
RedCurl has used pcalua.exe to obfuscate binary execution and remote connections.,T1202
RedCurl has used phishing emails with malicious files to gain initial access.,T1566.001
RedCurl has used phishing emails with malicious links to gain initial access.,T1566.002
RedEcho has used non-standard ports such as TCP 8080 for HTTP communication.,T1571
"Saint Bear has delivered malicious Microsoft Office files containing an embedded JavaScript object that would, on execution, download and execute OutSteel and Saint Bot.",T1059.007
Saint Bear has used the Windows Script Host (wscript) to execute intermediate files written to victim machines.,T1059
"Saint Bear initial loaders will also drop a malicious Windows batch file, available via open source GitHub repositories, that disables Microsoft Defender functionality.",T1059.003
Saint Bear relies extensively on PowerShell execution from malicious attachments and related content to retrieve and execute follow-on payloads.,T1059.001
Saint Bear relies on user interaction and execution of malicious attachments and similar for initial execution on victim systems.,T1204.002
Salt Typhoon has attempted to acquire credentials by dumping network device configurations.,T1602.002
"Sandworm Team has used `ntdsutil.exe` to back up the Active Directory database, likely for credential access.",T1003.003
Sandworm Team used information stealer malware to collect browser session cookies.,T1539
Sandworm Team used various third-party email campaign management services to deliver phishing emails.,T1583
"Scattered Spider can enumerate remote systems, such as VMware vCenter infrastructure.",T1018
Scattered Spider creates inbound rules on the compromised email accounts of security personnel to automatically delete emails from vendor security products.,T1564.008
"Scattered Spider enumerates data stored within victim code repositories, such as internal GitHub repositories.",T1213.003
Scattered Spider has created volume shadow copies of virtual domain controller disks to extract the `NTDS.dit` file.,T1006
Scattered Spider has deployed ransomware on compromised hosts and threatened to leak stolen data for financial gain.,T1657
Scattered Spider has extracted the `NTDS.dit` file by creating volume shadow copies of virtual domain controller disks.,T1003.003
"Scattered Spider has obtained malware to use at multiple stages of operations including information stealers, remote access tools, and ransomware.",T1588.001
Scattered Spider has used the PowerShell cmdlet Get-ADUser.,T1059.001
Sea Turtle created adversary-in-the-middle servers to impersonate legitimate services and enable credential capture.,T1583.003
Sea Turtle gained access to victim environments by exploiting multiple known vulnerabilities over several campaigns.,T1190
"Sea Turtle has used exploits for vulnerabilities such as CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-21974, and CVE-2022-0847 to achieve client code execution.",T1203
"Sea Turtle targeted third-party entities in trusted relationships with primary targets to ultimately achieve access at primary targets. Entities targeted included DNS registrars, telecommunication companies, and internet service providers.",T1199
"Several Lazarus Group malware families collect information on the type and version of the victim OS, as well as the victim computer name and CPU information.",T1082
Sidewinder has named malicious files rekeywiz.exe to match the name of a legitimate Windows executable.,T1036.005
Sidewinder has used base64 encoding and ECDH-P256 encryption for payloads.,T1027.013
Star Blizzard has sent emails to establish rapport with targets eventually sending messages with attachments containing links to credential-stealing sites.,T1598.002
Star Blizzard has used open-source research to identify information about victims to use in targeting.,T1593
Storm-0501 had modified Azure Storage account resources through the `Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/write` operation to expose non-remotely accessible accounts for data exfiltration.,T1530
Storm-0501 has detected endpoint security solutions using `sc query sense` and `sc query windefend`.,T1518.001
"Storm-0501 has discovered the victim environment's protections to include Azure policies, resource locks, and Azure Storage immutability policies.",T1526
"Storm-0501 has encrypted files in victim environments using ransomware as a service (RaaS) including Sabbath, Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0 and Embargo ransomware.",T1486
"Storm-0501 has engaged in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating data and directly contacting victims when the primary organization refuses to pay along with posting data on their data leak sites.",T1657
"Storm-0501 has enumerated compromised cloud environments to identify critical assets, data stores, and back resources.",T1580
"Storm-0501 has identified system language codes on a compromised host to determine if the victim falls under a non-supported language code that is prohibited for targeting, including victims associated with Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that may draw attention of law enforcement in countries where the ransomware operator or affiliates may reside/operate from.",T1614.001
Storm-0501 has launched Cobalt Strike Beacon files with rundll32.exe.,T1218.011
"Storm-0501 has registered their own MFA method, and leveraged a victim hybrid joined server to circumvent Conditional Access Policies.",T1556.009
Storm-0501 has utilized Azure Key Vault to store the encryption key using the operation `Microsoft.KeyVault/Vaults/write`.,T1555.006
Storm-1811 has distributed password-protected archives such as ZIP files during intrusions.,T1140
Storm-1811 has enumerated domain accounts and access during intrusions.,T1482
Storm-1811 has exfiltrated captured user credentials via Secure Copy Protocol (SCP).,T1048.002
Storm-1811 has locally staged captured credentials for subsequent manual exfiltration.,T1074.001
"TA2541 has uploaded malware to various platforms including Google Drive, Pastetext, Sharetext, and GitHub.",T1608.001
TA2541 has used PowerShell to download files and to inject into various Windows processes.,T1059.001
TA2541 has used dynamic DNS services for C2 infrastructure.,T1568
TA2541 has used process hollowing to execute CyberGate malware.,T1055.012
TA505 has executed commands using cmd.exe.,T1059.003
TA505 has leveraged rundll32.exe to execute malicious DLLs.,T1218.011
TA505 has used malware to disable Windows Defender.,T1685
TA578 has filled out contact forms on victims' websites to direct them to adversary-controlled URLs.,T1594
TeamTNT has the curl and wget commands as well as batch scripts to download new tools.,T1105
Threat Group-1314 actors mapped network drives using net use.,T1021.002
Threat Group-3390 has used appcmd.exe to disable logging on a victim server.,T1685.001
Threat Group-3390's malware can add a Registry key to `Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` for persistence.,T1547.001
"ToddyCat has collected information on bootable drives including model, vendor, and serial numbers.",T1680
ToddyCat has used locally mounted network shares for lateral movement through targated environments.,T1021.002
ToddyCat has used the name `debug.exe` for malware components.,T1036.005
ToddyCat manually transferred collected files to an exfiltration host using xcopy.,T1074.002
Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools.,T1574.001
"Turla has used net localgroup and net localgroup Administrators to enumerate group information, including members of the local administrators group.",T1069.001
"Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover active local network connections using the netstat -an, net use, net file, and net session commands. Turla RPC backdoors have also enumerated the IPv4 TCP connection table via the GetTcpTable2 API call.",T1049
UNC3886 exploited CVE-2022-22948 in VMware vCenter to obtain encrypted credentials from the vCenter postgresDB.,T1212
UNC3886 has exploited CVE-2022-42475 in FortiOS SSL VPNs to obtain access.,T1190
UNC3886 has harvested and used vCenter Server service accounts.,T1078.001
UNC3886 has replaced indicators mentioned in open-source threat intelligence publications at times under a week after their release.,T1681
UNC3886 has run scripts to list all running processes on a guest VM from an ESXi host.,T1057
UNC3886 has tampered with and disabled logging services on targeted systems.,T1690
UNC3886 has targeted KeyPass password database files for credential access.,T1555.005
UNC3886 has used Gzip and the Windows command `makecab` to compress files and stolen credentials from victim systems.,T1560.001
UNC3886 has used `vmtoolsd.exe` to enumerate files on guest machines.,T1083
UNC3886 has used the TABLEFLIP traffic redirection utility and the esxcli command line to modify firewall rules.,T1686
UNC3886 has used tools to hijack valid SSH accounts.,T1078
UNC3886 has utilzed Python scripts to transfer files between ESXi hosts and guest VMs.,T1570
VOID MANTICORE has conducted brute-force attempts against organizational VPN infrastructure.,T1110
VOID MANTICORE has delivered malicious payloads that initiate through user execution to include interaction with a masqueraded file. VOID MANTICORE has used trojanized application lures to induce targets into executing malware enabling persistent surveillance.,T1204.002
VOID MANTICORE has deployed additional payloads from dedicated C2 servers. VOID MANTICORE has also downloaded legitimate tools and software from publicly available services. VOID MANTICORE had utilized VeraCrypt a legitimate disk encrypting utility that was downloaded directly from the website.,T1105
VOID MANTICORE has leveraged privileged cloud accounts to access cloud-based management consoles to include Microsoft Intune. VOID MANTICORE has also compromised existing accounts within the Microsoft Entra ID environment.,T1078.004
VOID MANTICORE has masqueraded as commonly used programs and services on Windows hosts.,T1036.004
VOID MANTICORE has staged compressed files in specified locations prior to exfiltration over C2.,T1074
VOID MANTICORE has utilized HTTPS for communication to C2 domains.,T1071.001
VOID MANTICORE has utilized PowerShell to execute malware in victim environments.,T1059.001
VOID MANTICORE has utilized Telegram API for C2.,T1102
Velvet Ant has transferred tools within victim environments using SMB.,T1021.002
Velvet Ant has used a reverse SSH shell to securely communicate with victim devices.,T1573.002
Velvet Ant has used malicious DLLs executed via legitimate EXE files through DLL search order hijacking to launch follow-on payloads such as PlugX.,T1574.001
Velvet Ant has used reverse SSH tunnels to communicate to victim devices.,T1071
"Velvet Ant used a custom tool, VELVETSTING, to parse encoded inbound commands to compromised F5 BIG-IP devices and then execute them via the Unix shell.",T1059.004
"Velvet Ant used a malicious DLL, `iviewers.dll`, that mimics the legitimate ""OLE/COM Object Viewer"" within Windows.",T1036.005
Volt Typhoon has appended copies of the ntds.dit database with a .gif file extension.,T1036.008
Volt Typhoon has attempted to access hashed credentials from the LSASS process memory space.,T1003.001
Volt Typhoon has compromised Virtual Private Servers (VPS) to proxy C2 traffic.,T1584.003
"Volt Typhoon has compromised small office and home office (SOHO) network edge devices, many of which were located in the same geographic area as the victim, to proxy network traffic.",T1584.008
Volt Typhoon has conducted extensive reconnaissance of victim networks including identifying network topologies.,T1590.004
Volt Typhoon has conducted pre-compromise reconnaissance for victim host information.,T1592
Volt Typhoon has copied web shells between servers in targeted environments.,T1570
Volt Typhoon has employed Ping to check network connectivity.,T1016.001
Volt Typhoon has enumerated directories containing vulnerability testing and cyber related content and facilities data such as construction drawings.,T1083
Volt Typhoon has inspected server logs to remove their IPs.,T1070.007
"Volt Typhoon has leveraged WMIC for execution, remote system discovery, and to create and use temporary directories.",T1047
"Volt Typhoon has run `net group /dom` and `net group ""Domain Admins"" /dom` in compromised environments for account discovery.",T1087.002
Volt Typhoon has run `net group` in compromised environments to discover domain groups.,T1069.002
"Volt Typhoon has selectively cleared Windows Event Logs, system logs, and other technical artifacts to remove evidence of intrusion activity.",T1685.005
"Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for group and user discovery.",T1069
"Volt Typhoon has used compromised devices and customized versions of open source tools such as FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy), Earthworm, and Impacket to proxy network traffic.",T1090
Volt Typhoon has used multi-hop proxies for command-and-control infrastructure.,T1090.003
Winter Vivern delivered malicious JavaScript to exploit targets when exploiting Roundcube Webmail servers.,T1059.007
Winter Vivern has distributed malicious scripts and executables mimicking virus scanners.,T1036.004
Winter Vivern has used remotely-hosted instances of the Acunetix vulnerability scanner.,T1595.002
Winter Vivern leverages malicious attachments delivered via email for initial access activity.,T1566.001
Winter Vivern registered domains mimicking other entities throughout various campaigns.,T1583.001
Winter Vivern used XLM 4.0 macros for initial code execution for malicious document files.,T1059
Wizard Spider can transfer malicious payloads such as ransomware to compromised machines.,T1105
Wizard Spider has created local administrator accounts to maintain persistence in compromised networks.,T1136.001
"Wizard Spider has identified domain admins through the use of `net group ""Domain admins"" /DOMAIN`. Wizard Spider has also leveraged the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-ADComputer` to collect account names from Active Directory data.",T1087.002
Wizard Spider has leveraged ProtonMail email addresses in ransom notes when delivering Ryuk ransomware.,T1585.002
Wizard Spider has used RDP for lateral movement and to deploy ransomware interactively.,T1021.001
"Wizard Spider has used Systeminfo and similar commands to acquire detailed configuration information of a victim's machine. Wizard Spider has also utilized the PowerShell cmdlet `Get-ADComputer` to collect DNS hostnames, last logon dates, and operating system information from Active Directory.",T1082
Wizard Spider has used WMIC and vssadmin to manually delete volume shadow copies. Wizard Spider has also used Conti ransomware to delete volume shadow copies automatically with the use of vssadmin.,T1490
Wizard Spider has used process injection to execute payloads to escalate privileges.,T1055
ZIRCONIUM has compromised network devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers and IoT devices for ORB (operational relay box) Proxy networks.,T1584.008
ZIRCONIUM has created a run key named Dropbox Update Setup to mask a persistence mechanism for a malicious binary.,T1036.004
"ZIRCONIUM has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network - consisting compromised devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers, IoT devices, and leased virtual private servers (VPS) - to obfuscate the origin of C2 traffic.",T1665
admin@338 actors used the following command following exploitation of a machine with LOWBALL malware to display network connections: netstat -ano >> %temp%\download,T1049
menuPass has used DLL side-loading to launch versions of Mimikatz and PwDump6 as well as UPPERCUT. menuPass has also used DLL search order hijacking.,T1574.001