[ { "case_id": "CS16", "chunk_index": 0, "section": "overview", "location": "Vunidogola, Koralau Island", "country": "Fiji", "country_normalized": "Fiji", "continent": "Oceania", "admin_area": "Koralau Island", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Vunidogola Village Relocation", "source_links": [ { "title": "Charan, D., Kaur, M., & Singh, P. (2017). Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation—A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji. Climate Change Management, 19-33. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_2", "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_2", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_2" }, { "title": "Nichols, A. (2019). Climate change, natural hazards, and relocation: insights from Nabukadra and Navuniivi villages in Fiji. Climatic Change, 156(1-2), 255-271. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02531-5", "doi": "10.1007/s10584-019-02531-5", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02531-5" }, { "title": "McMichael, C., Powell, T., Piggott-McKellar, A. E., & Yee, M. (2025). Climate change and the planned relocation of people: A longitudinal analysis of Vunidogoloa, Fiji. Ambio, 54(6), 1043-1056. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-024-02120-6", "doi": "10.1007/s13280-024-02120-6", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-024-02120-6" }, { "title": "McNamara, K. E., & Des Combes, H. J. (2015). Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(3), 315-319. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-015-0065-2", "doi": "10.1007/s13753-015-0065-2", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-015-0065-2" }, { "title": "Bertana, A. (2020). The role of power in community participation: Relocation as climate change adaptation in Fiji. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 38(5), 902-919. https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654420909394", "doi": "10.1177/2399654420909394", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654420909394" }, { "title": "Piggott-McKellar, A., & Vella, K. (2023). Lessons learned and policy implications from climate-related planned relocation in Fiji and Australia. Frontiers in Climate, 5. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2023.1032547", "doi": "10.3389/fclim.2023.1032547", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2023.1032547" }, { "title": "McMichael, C., & Powell, T. (2021). Planned Relocation and Health: A Case Study from Fiji. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(8), 4355. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18084355", "doi": "10.3390/ijerph18084355", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18084355" }, { "title": "Piggott-McKellar, A., McNamara, K., Nunn, P., & Sekinini, S. (2019). Moving People in a Changing Climate: Lessons from Two Case Studies in Fiji. Social Sciences, 8(5), 133. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050133", "doi": "10.3390/socsci8050133", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050133" } ], "text": "Case study: Vunidogola Village Relocation (Vunidogola, Koralau Island, Fiji)\nSection: CASE STUDY OVERVIEW\n\n### Case Name and Location\nVunidogoloa Village Relocation (spelled variously as \"Vunidogoloa\" in McMichael et al. 2019, \"Vunidogola\" in Tronquet 2015, and \"Vunidologoa\" in Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023 — all referring to the same village). Located on Vanua Levu, the second largest island of Fiji, in Cakaudrove Province (McMichael et al. 2019). Tronquet (2015) provides additional geographic specificity: the village was in the district of Koroalau, approximately 40 km from Savusavu and 100 km from Labasa, and was formerly situated between Natewa Bay and the Tabia River — these details are drawn exclusively from Tronquet (2015) and are not independently confirmed by the other provided sources. Country: Republic of Fiji, Pacific Island state, Global South.\n\n### Hazard(s)\nCoastal flooding (from storm surges and king tides), sea-level rise, coastal erosion, and saltwater intrusion into agricultural land and freshwater. These slow-onset and acute hazards compound one another. Residents of Vunidogoloa described experiences of \"higher tides, coastal erosion, flooding, storm surges, and saltwater intrusion\" (McMichael et al. 2019, p. 330). The village is also situated in a broader context of exposure to tropical cyclones; Tronquet (2015) notes cyclone Tomas struck Vanua Levu in 2010. Severe drought affecting agricultural yields is also noted by Tronquet (2015).\n\n### Type of Retreat\nPlanned community relocation — the entire village relocated as a single collective unit to a new site approximately 2 km inland, on higher ground within the community's own customary (mataqali) land. Thirty new homes were built. New livelihood assets were established at the new site, including fish ponds and pineapple plantations (Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023; McMichael et al. 2019; McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015). The relocation was completed in 2014 (all sources). This is a post-retreat case.\n\n### Scale\nApproximately 122–150 people (Tronquet 2015 notes this range; approximately 140 is the most frequently cited estimate across sources) living in 26 houses at the old site. Thirty new homes were built at the new site (McMichael et al. 2019; Tronquet 2015; McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015). Geographic scope: a single village, relocating approximately 2 km inland (Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023; McMichael et al. 2019).\n\n### Key Actors\n- **Community of Vunidogoloa**: Initiated the process by formally requesting government assistance (McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015 note 2007; Tronquet 2015 notes 2006); contributed labour and timber from customary land; participated in design decisions including village layout and house configuration (McMichael et al. 2019; Tronquet 2015).\n- **Government of Fiji**: Central coordinating role; multiple ministries involved including the Ministry of Provincial Development, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Fisheries, and Ministry of iTaukei Affairs (McMichael et al. 2019; Tronquet 2015). No single ministry held complete responsibility for the relocation (McMichael et al. 2019).\n- **International Labour Organization (ILO)**: Provided tools and equipment; supplied pineapple tops, banana shoots, and a copra dryer (McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015; Tronquet 2015).\n- **Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC) and Nansen Initiative**: Organised a 3-day awareness-raising workshop in 2012 and undertook community history documentation work (Tronquet 2015). The PCC made multiple subsequent visits and provided community support throughout the relocation process (Tronquet 2015).\n- **UN Women**: Funded a solar engineering training programme that enabled electrification of the new village (Tronquet 2015).\n- **Commissioner Northern's Office**: On-the-ground coordination (Tronquet 2015).\n- **Fiji Red Cross**: Referenced by McNamara & Jacot Des Combes (2015) in interview context regarding disaster risk reduction broadly; not documented as a governance actor in the Vunidogoloa relocation specifically.\n- Researchers from the University of Melbourne and the University of Queensland subsequently documented and analysed the case (McMichael et al. 2019; Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023).\n\n### Timeline\n- **1950s**: First discussions about possible relocation reportedly occurred; Tronquet (2015) cites the village headman as recalling talks in 1956, though this cannot be independently verified from the other provided sources.\n- **2006/2007**: Community formally approaches the Fiji Government requesting relocation assistance. McNamara & Jacot Des Combes (2015) state the approach was made in 2007; Tronquet (2015) states 2006. Both are recorded here.\n- **2010**: Cyclone Tomas strikes Vanua Levu, raising awareness of climate risks (Tronquet 2015).\n- **2011**: Earthworks initiated at a new site; site levelling problems encountered (McMichael et al. 2019). A second site approximately 2 km inland was identified.\n- **2012**: Government officially confirms Vunidogoloa as selected for relocation (Tronquet 2015). PCC and Nansen Initiative hold a 3-day awareness-raising workshop (Tronquet 2015). National Summit for Building Resilience to Climate Change held (Tronquet 2015). Construction planned but delayed.\n- **2012–2013**: Protracted construction phase, with delays attributed to ground instability and shortage of tools (Tronquet 2015; McMichael et al. 2019).\n- **Late 2013**: ILO concludes agreement with Ministry of Labour and provides additional tools, accelerating construction; Tronquet (2015) records the ILO agreement was concluded in November 2013 and that 4 houses were built in 15 days following tool delivery — these specific figures are from Tronquet (2015) alone and should be read as single-source.\n- **January 2014**: Official inauguration. Prime Minister Bainimarama's opening speech on 16 January 2014 is quoted by Tronquet (2015). The entire community relocated over a three-day period in January 2014 (McMichael et al. 2019; Tronquet 2015; McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015).\n- **2014 onward**: Second phase of works (drainage, footpaths, evacuation centre) at an estimated additional cost of approximately FJD 200,000 (Tronquet 2015; McMichael et al. 2019).\n- **Current stage**: Post-retreat; the physical relocation is complete, though post-relocation livelihood and infrastructure development continued beyond the initial move. Long-term longitudinal monitoring remains limited (Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023).\n\n### Key Outcomes\n**Reported positive outcomes:**\n- The entire village relocated together, preserving social cohesion; neighbours remained in the same spatial configuration (McMichael et al. 2019; Tronquet 2015).\n- New homes represented an improvement from previous housing: individual family dwellings, running water, solar power, indoor bathrooms (Tronquet 2015).\n- Improved proximity to roads, schools, health services, and markets; community members reported that \"improved access to services has significantly improved their daily lives\" (Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023, p. 6).\n- Relocation occurred on community-owned customary land, avoiding land acquisition disputes (all sources).\n- New livelihood assets established: fish ponds, pineapple plantations (Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023; McMichael et al. 2019).\n- The relocation informed the development of Fiji's national relocation policy environment, with national guidelines subsequently finalized in 2018 (McMichael et al. 2019; Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023).\n\n**Documented challenges and costs:**\n- Total costs greatly exceeded projections: the final figure cited at the Conference of the Parties in December 2014 was FJD 988,228.89, compared to an initial government budget of approximately FJD 310,000 — roughly three times the original estimate (Tronquet 2015).\n- Infrastructure remained incomplete after the initial move: promised kitchens were not finished, and residents salvaged materials from the old village to build their own (McMichael et al. 2019).\n- Older residents experienced significant difficulties maintaining access to the coast and associated livelihoods (Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023; McMichael et al. 2019).\n- Women were largely excluded from formal consultation processes, given patriarchal and hierarchical social structures (Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023).\n- Post-relocation negative impacts documented: increased access to and consumption of packaged food and alcohol, disruptions to traditional values, and reduced mental wellbeing (Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023, citing McMichael & Powell 2021).\n- Scalability questions remain: the model relied heavily on the community owning suitable alternative land with timber resources — conditions that may not apply to other at-risk villages across Fiji (Tronquet 2015; McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015).\n\n### Narrative Summary\n\nVunidogoloa is a small iTaukei (indigenous Fijian) village that spent decades enduring worsening coastal flooding, erosion, and saltwater intrusion before completing a planned community relocation in 2014. As high tides regularly inundated homes — residents used bamboo rafts to access the hospital at high tide (Tronquet 2015) — and as the sea consumed the shoreline and destroyed crops, the community exhausted in-situ adaptations including house-raising on stilts and seawall construction. Recognising that no further protective measures were viable, the community formally approached the Fiji Government to request assistance with full relocation, an approach documented in both 2006 (Tronquet 2015) and 2007 (McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015) depending on the source. What followed was a multi-year process that combined government coordination across several ministries, community leadership, and international support.\n\nA critical enabling condition for the relocation was the existence of suitable higher ground approximately 2 km inland that fell within the village's own mataqali (clan) land, meaning no external land acquisition was required. The community named the new site Kenani — the Fijian word for Canaan, or \"Promised Land\" — reflecting profound spiritual and cultural dimensions of the move (Tronquet 2015). Thirty new homes were built with solar power and running water. The government funded the majority of costs, the community contributed timber and labour, and international organisations including the ILO and UN Women provided equipment and skills (Tronquet 2015; McMichael et al. 2019; McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015). The Pacific Conference of Churches played a documented role in organising awareness-raising activities and community support (Tronquet 2015).\n\nThe relocation is frequently presented in the literature as an important early completed example of planned climate-related community relocation, particularly for its participatory design process, its collective nature, and its improvement in living standards. However, the literature also documents significant costs: total expenditure was roughly three times the original budget, infrastructure completion was delayed, older residents lost meaningful access to the coast and associated livelihoods, women were largely excluded from planning consultations, and unanticipated negative health and social impacts have been documented post-relocation (Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023). Critically, the case relied on the community's ownership of suitable alternative land — a condition that will not apply to many of Fiji's hundreds of other at-risk villages. Vunidogoloa thus stands as a significant and often-cited case, but one whose replicability is constrained by the specific conditions that enabled it (Tronquet 2015; McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015).\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS16", "chunk_index": 1, "section": "coding_questions", "location": "Vunidogola, Koralau Island", "country": "Fiji", "country_normalized": "Fiji", "continent": "Oceania", "admin_area": "Koralau Island", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Vunidogola Village Relocation", "source_links": [ { "title": "Charan, D., Kaur, M., & Singh, P. (2017). Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation—A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji. Climate Change Management, 19-33. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_2", "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_2", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_2" }, { "title": "Nichols, A. (2019). Climate change, natural hazards, and relocation: insights from Nabukadra and Navuniivi villages in Fiji. Climatic Change, 156(1-2), 255-271. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02531-5", "doi": "10.1007/s10584-019-02531-5", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02531-5" }, { "title": "McMichael, C., Powell, T., Piggott-McKellar, A. E., & Yee, M. (2025). Climate change and the planned relocation of people: A longitudinal analysis of Vunidogoloa, Fiji. Ambio, 54(6), 1043-1056. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-024-02120-6", "doi": "10.1007/s13280-024-02120-6", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-024-02120-6" }, { "title": "McNamara, K. E., & Des Combes, H. J. (2015). Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(3), 315-319. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-015-0065-2", "doi": "10.1007/s13753-015-0065-2", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-015-0065-2" }, { "title": "Bertana, A. (2020). The role of power in community participation: Relocation as climate change adaptation in Fiji. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 38(5), 902-919. https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654420909394", "doi": "10.1177/2399654420909394", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654420909394" }, { "title": "Piggott-McKellar, A., & Vella, K. (2023). Lessons learned and policy implications from climate-related planned relocation in Fiji and Australia. Frontiers in Climate, 5. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2023.1032547", "doi": "10.3389/fclim.2023.1032547", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2023.1032547" }, { "title": "McMichael, C., & Powell, T. (2021). Planned Relocation and Health: A Case Study from Fiji. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(8), 4355. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18084355", "doi": "10.3390/ijerph18084355", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18084355" }, { "title": "Piggott-McKellar, A., McNamara, K., Nunn, P., & Sekinini, S. (2019). Moving People in a Changing Climate: Lessons from Two Case Studies in Fiji. Social Sciences, 8(5), 133. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050133", "doi": "10.3390/socsci8050133", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050133" } ], "text": "Case study: Vunidogola Village Relocation (Vunidogola, Koralau Island, Fiji)\nSection: CODING QUESTIONS\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** **Proactive** (primary code), with reactive elements also present.\n\n**Narrative:** The dominant framing across all sources is proactive. The community of Vunidogoloa, experiencing slow-onset climate impacts over decades — sea-level rise, coastal erosion, saltwater intrusion — deliberated internally and formally requested government assistance before a catastrophic loss-of-life event occurred. Tronquet (2015) documents that the community's formal request was made in 2006, as flooding impacts were intensifying but before total loss of the village. McNamara & Jacot Des Combes (2015) frame the relocation as community-initiated and forward-looking: \"relocation was their option of last resort as a means of sustaining livelihoods in the long-term.\" The community had previously attempted reactive, incremental adaptations — house-raising on stilts and seawall construction — all of which proved insufficient (McMichael et al. 2019; Tronquet 2015).\n\nReactive elements are also present. Cyclone Tomas in 2010 is noted by Tronquet (2015) as having raised awareness and momentum within both the community and government, functioning as a reactive trigger that reinforced the proactive relocation decision already underway. However, the relocation decision pre-dated this event.\n\n**Coding rationale:** \"Proactive\" is selected as the primary code because the formal decision to relocate pre-dated any single catastrophic event, was based on slow-onset risk accumulation, and was community-initiated in advance of an existential threshold. Reactive elements (prior failed in-situ adaptations, cyclone impacts heightening awareness) are present but secondary to the proactive framing.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of households affected, Number of population affected, Total funding\n\n**Answer:**\n\n- **Date of relocation completion:** 2014. The entire community relocated over a three-day period in January 2014 (McMichael et al. 2019; Tronquet 2015; McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015). Tronquet (2015) specifically records 16 January 2014 as the date of the inauguration ceremony, quoting Prime Minister Bainimarama's opening speech — this level of precision derives from Tronquet (2015) alone.\n- **Process initiated:** Community formally approached government in 2006 (Tronquet 2015) or 2007 (McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015); government confirmed the village for relocation in 2012 (Tronquet 2015).\n- **Number of households:** 26 houses at the old site; 30 new homes constructed (McMichael et al. 2019; Tronquet 2015; McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015).\n- **Population affected:** Approximately 122–150 people; approximately 140 is the most frequently cited estimate (Tronquet 2015). McMichael et al. (2019) describe \"approximately 140 iTaukei people living in 26 houses.\"\n- **Total funding:** Figures vary across sources and stages of reporting. Tronquet (2015) provides the most detailed accounting: the figure cited at the Conference of the Parties in December 2014 was FJD 988,228.89 (SPEREP 2014, cited in Tronquet 2015); an IPS news agency report cited FJD 978,000 (Wilson 2014, cited in Tronquet 2015); the government's own January 2014 communication cited FJD 879,000. McMichael et al. (2019, endnote 7) cite the total cost as approximately FJD 978,228, equivalent to approximately USD 492,136. The original government budget was approximately FJD 310,000 (Tronquet 2015); earthworks alone cost approximately FJD 500,000 (McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015). A second phase of works added an estimated FJD 200,000 (Tronquet 2015). The community contribution in timber was estimated at FJD 250,000, representing approximately 22% of total project cost (Tronquet 2015; McMichael et al. 2019). The government's share exceeded 75% of total costs (Tronquet 2015). ILO and UN Women contributions were in-kind rather than cash transfers.\n\n**Uncertainty note:** Financial figures vary across sources and reporting stages. The FJD 988,228.89 figure represents the most recently cited total for Phase 1 costs (Tronquet 2015) but is drawn from a single-source government presentation.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** **Multiple Hazards**\n\n**Narrative:** All sources document a combination of co-occurring and cascading hazards driving the relocation. McMichael et al. (2019, p. 330) describe resident experiences of \"higher tides, coastal erosion, flooding, storm surges, and saltwater intrusion.\" Tronquet (2015) adds severe drought affecting agricultural yields and exposure to tropical cyclones (cyclone Tomas, 2010) as part of the broader hazard context. McNamara & Jacot Des Combes (2015) identify \"frequent flooding, inundation, and failed seawalls\" as immediate drivers in the context of sea-level rise.\n\nThese hazards interact: sea-level rise amplifies storm surge and king tide flooding; coastal erosion reduces village footprint; saltwater intrusion destroys soil productivity. The combination constitutes multiple hazard types with cascading dynamics. Piggott-McKellar & Vella (2023) frame the drivers as \"increased flooding events, coastal erosion, and saltwater intrusion.\"\n\n**Coding rationale:** \"Multiple Hazards\" is clearly supported by all sources. No source treats this as a single-hazard case.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** **Natural Hazard** (with climate change as the primary driver of hazard intensification)\n\n**Narrative:** The hazards are natural in origin — coastal flooding, sea-level rise, erosion, storm surge, and drought. Climate change is identified as the primary cause of hazard intensification across all sources. Villagers attributed the worsening conditions to anthropogenic climate change caused by \"big countries\" (McMichael et al. 2019, p. 331). Tronquet (2015) documents that by 2012 \"inhabitants were clearly aware that the slow-onset events and extreme natural disasters that struck them were caused by climate change.\" Piggott-McKellar & Vella (2023) note that sea levels near Fiji have been rising approximately 5.5 mm per year since 1992, roughly twice the global average. There is no technological or industrial hazard dimension to this case.\n\n**Coding rationale:** \"Natural Hazard\" is selected. The codebook notes that \"Climate change\" as a classification may be adopted in future analyses; for this coding cycle, the relevant category is Natural Hazard, with the climate change dimension noted as the driver of intensification. No technological hazard is present.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:**\n\n- **Coastal Flooding/Erosion:** ✓ Yes — primary driver. Sea-level rise, storm surge, king tide flooding, and shoreline erosion are all explicitly documented across all sources as the main drivers of the relocation decision.\n- **Riverine/Pluvial Flooding:** Partial and secondary. Tronquet (2015) notes the village was located between Natewa Bay and the Tabia River, and that floods occurred \"when high tides coincided with heavy rains, increasing the level of the river.\" McMichael et al. (2019, Table 1) include a resident quote: \"When it is heavy rain, it came inside the village. It came from the sea and the river as well.\" This compound coastal-riverine flooding was a contributing factor, but the sources frame coastal flooding/erosion as the primary driver. Riverine/pluvial flooding is coded as a secondary compound hazard only.\n- **Lake Flooding/Erosion:** No evidence.\n- **Wildfire:** No evidence.\n- **Volcano:** No evidence.\n- **Land Subsidence:** No evidence as a driver.\n- **Landslide/Debris Flow:** **Not coded as a retreat driver.** Landslide risk appeared as a post-relocation planning concern at the new Kenani site (ground instability after earthworks, requiring stabilisation work — Tronquet 2015). A landslide destroyed the primary school in nearby Denimanu, referenced in Piggott-McKellar & Vella (2023) in a comparator village context. Neither instance is a driver of the original Vunidogoloa retreat decision. This hazard is therefore not coded as a retreat driver for this case.\n- **Earthquake:** No evidence as a driver.\n- **Tsunami:** No evidence as a driver.\n- **Hurricane/Tropical Cyclone:** Contextual only. Cyclone Tomas (2010) is noted by Tronquet (2015) as having raised awareness and accelerated momentum, but is not a primary driver of the relocation decision. Coded as contextual/secondary.\n- **Other — Saltwater Intrusion/Agricultural Degradation:** ✓ Yes — explicitly identified as a major driver affecting soil productivity and food security (all sources). Drought is also noted by Tronquet (2015).\n\n**Primary hazard codes selected:** Coastal Flooding/Erosion (primary); Riverine/Pluvial Flooding (secondary/compound, not primary driver); Hurricane (contextual only; not coded as a primary driver); Other (saltwater intrusion — explicitly coded as a contributing driver; drought noted by Tronquet 2015).\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes), (A few streets), (Neighbourhood), (Entire community), (Sub-watershed), (Watershed region)\n\n**Answer:** **Entire Community**\n\n**Narrative:** All sources consistently describe the relocation of the entire village of Vunidogoloa as a single unit. McMichael et al. (2019, p. 329) state: \"The entire village relocated together in January 2014.\" McNamara & Jacot Des Combes (2015) describe the relocation of an entire community. Tronquet (2015) describes the community moving \"altogether\" over three days. This distinguishes Vunidogoloa from partial relocation cases in Fiji such as Denimanu, Vunisavisavi, and Narikoso, where only subsets of households relocated (McMichael et al. 2019; Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023).\n\n**Coding rationale:** \"Entire community\" is the only applicable category. The scale was the complete relocation of the village as a social and spatial unit.\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals), (Groups/Neighbourhoods), (Communities), (Critical infrastructure), (Hazard protection structures), (Industrial assets)\n\n**Answer:** **Communities** (primary); **Critical Infrastructure** (secondary — newly constructed at receiving site)\n\n**Narrative:** The primary subject of retreat was the entire community — people, households, and their social structures. Additionally, infrastructure was newly established at the new site as part of the relocation package: 30 new homes, water supply (gradient drainage and tanks), solar energy systems, fish ponds, agricultural infrastructure (pineapple plantations, banana crops, copra dryer), and an evacuation centre built in the second phase (Tronquet 2015; McMichael et al. 2019). Ancestral remains were relocated from the old cemetery to the new site (Tronquet 2015). Old village structures were largely left in place and were not formally demolished or removed as part of the managed retreat process.\n\n**Coding rationale:** \"Communities\" is the primary selection. \"Critical infrastructure\" is applicable in the sense that new community infrastructure was established as part of the relocation package. Individual buyout-style property acquisition is not applicable.\n\n---\n\n### Other notes (General Information)\n\nMultiple alternative spellings appear across sources: Vunidogoloa (McMichael et al. 2019), Vunidogola (Tronquet 2015), and Vunidologoa (Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023). All refer to the same village. The new site is named Kenani. The case is presented across sources as one of the earliest completed whole-village climate-related relocations in Fiji and among the first globally, giving it significant exemplary significance. The case informed (though did not alone \"catalyse\") Fiji's national relocation policy environment, with National Planned Relocation Guidelines finalized in 2018 (McMichael et al. 2019; Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023; McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015).\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS16", "chunk_index": 2, "section": "institutional_environment", "location": "Vunidogola, Koralau Island", "country": "Fiji", "country_normalized": "Fiji", "continent": "Oceania", "admin_area": "Koralau Island", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Vunidogola Village Relocation", "source_links": [ { "title": "Charan, D., Kaur, M., & Singh, P. (2017). Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation—A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji. Climate Change Management, 19-33. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_2", "doi": "10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_2", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50094-2_2" }, { "title": "Nichols, A. (2019). Climate change, natural hazards, and relocation: insights from Nabukadra and Navuniivi villages in Fiji. Climatic Change, 156(1-2), 255-271. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02531-5", "doi": "10.1007/s10584-019-02531-5", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02531-5" }, { "title": "McMichael, C., Powell, T., Piggott-McKellar, A. E., & Yee, M. (2025). Climate change and the planned relocation of people: A longitudinal analysis of Vunidogoloa, Fiji. Ambio, 54(6), 1043-1056. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-024-02120-6", "doi": "10.1007/s13280-024-02120-6", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-024-02120-6" }, { "title": "McNamara, K. E., & Des Combes, H. J. (2015). Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(3), 315-319. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-015-0065-2", "doi": "10.1007/s13753-015-0065-2", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-015-0065-2" }, { "title": "Bertana, A. (2020). The role of power in community participation: Relocation as climate change adaptation in Fiji. Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 38(5), 902-919. https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654420909394", "doi": "10.1177/2399654420909394", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654420909394" }, { "title": "Piggott-McKellar, A., & Vella, K. (2023). Lessons learned and policy implications from climate-related planned relocation in Fiji and Australia. Frontiers in Climate, 5. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2023.1032547", "doi": "10.3389/fclim.2023.1032547", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2023.1032547" }, { "title": "McMichael, C., & Powell, T. (2021). Planned Relocation and Health: A Case Study from Fiji. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(8), 4355. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18084355", "doi": "10.3390/ijerph18084355", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18084355" }, { "title": "Piggott-McKellar, A., McNamara, K., Nunn, P., & Sekinini, S. (2019). Moving People in a Changing Climate: Lessons from Two Case Studies in Fiji. Social Sciences, 8(5), 133. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050133", "doi": "10.3390/socsci8050133", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8050133" } ], "text": "Case study: Vunidogola Village Relocation (Vunidogola, Koralau Island, Fiji)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat), (Community buyout/retreat), (Leasebacks, easements and buffers), (Other acquisition tools), (Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** **Community buyout/retreat**\n\n**Important qualification:** This was not a \"buyout\" in the conventional market transaction sense. No private property was purchased from individual owners. Rather, the government funded the construction of new homes on community-owned customary land, while the community contributed labour and timber. The process was collective: all 30 new houses were built and the community moved as a unit. The codebook's \"Community buyout/retreat\" category — defined as \"collective relocation of a neighborhood or settlement through coordinated planning and community engagement\" — is the closest applicable code; however, \"collective community relocation with government-funded construction\" more precisely describes the mechanism.\n\n**Narrative:** McNamara & Jacot Des Combes (2015) characterise the relocation as community-led with government support. Tronquet (2015) describes it as \"a well-thought-out, multilateral and participative process.\" The community retained ownership of the new homes (confirmed by ILO, per Tronquet 2015). The government covered construction costs; the community contributed in-kind through timber and labour.\n\n**Coding rationale:** \"Community buyout/retreat\" is selected as the closest available category, with the explicit note that no market purchase transaction occurred. \"Individual buyout/retreat,\" \"leasebacks/easements,\" and \"managed realignment of infrastructure\" do not apply.\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process? Are there any legal frameworks or regulations that guide the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Relevant regulations/acts; Land acquisition; Home acquisition; Legal authority over retreat; Title(s) transfer; Compliance & enforcement; Other**\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n**Customary land tenure (major constraint and enabler):** The most significant legal/institutional dimension was Fiji's customary land tenure system. Tronquet (2015) notes, citing Anderson & Lee (2010), that customary tenure of approximately 80% of land in the Pacific renders land transactions \"almost impossible.\" For Vunidogoloa, this was both a constraint in general terms and an enabling factor in this specific case: the community owned suitable higher ground within their own mataqali (clan) boundaries, so no external land acquisition was needed. The new site — a 5-acre parcel belonging to Mataqali Nadawa — was donated without compensation (Tronquet 2015). All sources emphasise this as a critical success factor.\n\n**No comprehensive legal framework at the time:** Both Tronquet (2015) and McNamara & Jacot Des Combes (2015) note that no appropriate legal framework for climate-related relocation existed in Fiji at the time of the Vunidogoloa relocation. The 2012 National Climate Change Policy did not mention relocation (McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015). The relocation thus proceeded without a formal national legal framework, relying on ad hoc inter-ministerial coordination.\n\n**Procedural requirements:** Tronquet (2015) quotes the divisional planning officer describing the formal procedural chain: villages must inform government through district and provincial council meetings, identify new land with mataqali consent, notify provincial offices, and then approach the Ministry of Provincial Development. This lengthy procedural pathway contributed to the extended timeline.\n\n**Ministry of iTaukei Affairs:** McMichael et al. (2019) describe, in the context of Narikoso, that boundary extension negotiations require acceptance by the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs. For Vunidogoloa, land was within a single mataqali and was reportedly donated (Tronquet 2015), reducing this institutional complexity.\n\n**Logging licence:** A government-issued logging licence was required for the community to harvest timber from their own land for construction materials (Tronquet 2015).\n\n**Property rights and home ownership:** The question of property rights under customary tenure was noted; ILO confirmed that residents own (not merely occupy) the new homes (Tronquet 2015).\n\n**Post-relocation policy development:** Vunidogoloa was an influential early case in the development of Fiji's National Planned Relocation Guidelines, finalized in 2018 with GIZ support (McMichael et al. 2019; Piggott-McKellar & Vella 2023; McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015).\n\n**Coding rationale:** \"Relevant regulations/acts\" (customary land tenure; iTaukei land system); \"Land acquisition\" (customary land boundary negotiation and donation); \"Home acquisition\" (government-funded construction of new homes); \"Legal authority over retreat\" (fragmented — no single ministry held complete responsibility, per McMichael et al. 2019); \"Title(s) transfer\" (community ownership of new homes confirmed); \"Other\" (logging licence; absence of formal legal framework at time of relocation).\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** **Multiple funders**: Federal/National Government (primary); International organisations (ILO, UN Women — in-kind); Community (in-kind: timber and labour); NGOs/religious organisations (PCC — support, not primarily financial)\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n1. **Fiji Government (National/Federal):** Covered more than 75% of total costs, including earthworks (~FJD 500,000 per McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015), housing construction materials, government labour coordination, and infrastructure. Multiple ministries contributed (Tronquet 2015; McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015).\n\n2. **Community of Vunidogoloa (in-kind):** Provided timber from customary land (estimated value FJD 250,000, approximately 22% of total project cost) and labour (Tronquet 2015; McMichael et al. 2019). This constitutes the codebook's \"Individual\" category (community self-contribution in kind).\n\n3. **International Labour Organization (ILO):** Provided tools and safety equipment under a Cash for Work Plus Programme (agreement concluded in November 2013 per Tronquet 2015); supplied pineapple tops, banana shoots, and copra dryer as in-kind livelihood support (McNamara & Jacot Des Combes 2015; Tronquet 2015). This is an \"International aid\" / \"NGOs\" category contribution — in-kind rather than direct cash.\n\n4. **UN Women:** Funded a solar engineering training programme that enabled electrification of the new village (Tronquet 2015). In-kind/capacity building.\n\n5. **Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC):** Organised and funded the 2012 awareness-raising workshop in conjunction with the Nansen Initiative (Tronquet 2015). The PCC's contributions were primarily organisational and pastoral support rather than financial contributions to construction costs; it is coded as NGO support rather than as a primary funder.\n\n6. **Access to international Climate Change adaptation funds was limited:** Tronquet (2015) notes that access to international funds such as the Adaptation Fund was constrained by complex application procedures — this was a systemic gap rather than a resolved funding mechanism for this case.\n\n**Coding rationale:** \"Multiple funders\" applies. Sub-categories: Federal/National (primary, Fiji Government); Individual/community (in-kind timber and labour); International aid / NGOs (ILO in-kind, UN Women" } ]