[ { "case_id": "CS32", "chunk_index": 0, "section": "managed_retreat_case_study_systematic_review_coding_document", "location": "Nono District, Oromiya National Region State", "country": "Ethiopia", "country_normalized": "Ethiopia", "continent": "Africa", "admin_area": "Oromiya National Region State", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Nono District", "source_links": [ { "title": "Tefera, Messay Mulugeta. \"Challenges and opportunities of voluntary resettlement schemes in Ethiopia: A case from Jiru Gamachu resettlement village, Nonno district, Central Ethiopia.\" Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 11, no. 3 (2009): 93-102.", "url": "https://www.academia.edu/97793460/Challenges_and_Opportunities_of_Voluntary_Resettlement_Schemes_in_Ethiopia_A_Case_from_Jiru_Gamachu_Resettlement_Village_Nonno_District_Central_Ethiopia" } ], "text": "Case study: Nono District (Nono District, Oromiya National Region State, Ethiopia)\nSection: Managed Retreat Case Study — Systematic Review Coding Document\n\n### Version 2\n\n---\n\n> **IMPORTANT METHODOLOGICAL NOTE FOR THE REVIEWER**\n>\n> The three source documents provided for CS32 are:\n> 1. A 2009 journal article on the Jiru Gamachu resettlement village in Nonno District, West Shewa Zone, Oromia Region, Ethiopia (voluntary resettlement, EPRDF era): Tefera, M.M. (2009). \"Challenges and Opportunities of Voluntary Resettlement Schemes in Ethiopia: A Case from Jiru Gamachu Resettlement Village, Nonno District, Central Ethiopia.\" *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 11(3), 83–102. [Cited below as **Tefera (2009)**]\n> 2. A 2020 policy brief on COVID-19 and food security in Ethiopia, authored by Dr Messay Muguleta (a different author from a different institution, despite some name similarity): Muguleta, M. (2020). \"The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Food Security in Ethiopia.\" *CACS Policy Brief No. 9*. UJ Centre for Africa-China Studies, Johannesburg. [Cited below as **Muguleta (2020)**]\n> 3. A 2025 journal article on the Dhaadallee-Harroollee resettlement sites and the Ethio-Yemen State Farm (Derg era, 1974–1991): Erko, H.G., Wayessa, T.T., & Tuffa, T.Z. (2025). \"Resettlement and state farm in central Ethiopia: analyzing the Dhaadallee-Harroollee resettlements and the Ethio-Yemen state farm (1974–1991).\" *Cogent Arts & Humanities*, 12(1), 2469458. [Cited below as **Erko et al. (2025)**]\n>\n> **The 2020 COVID-19 policy brief (Muguleta 2020) contains no information relevant to this managed retreat case study.** It is a general policy document about pandemic food security impacts in Ethiopia and is excluded from all substantive analysis below.\n>\n> **This case file covers two related but historically distinct state-directed rural resettlement programs in central Ethiopia**, separated by roughly two decades and occurring under different political regimes:\n> - *Program 1:* The Derg-era Dhaadallee-Harroollee resettlement sites (1974–1991), analyzed in Erko et al. (2025).\n> - *Program 2:* The EPRDF-era Jiru Gamachu resettlement village in Nonno District (2003–2009 study period), analyzed in Tefera (2009).\n>\n> These are not a single continuous project. They share geographic proximity and a common logic (moving food-insecure households from overpopulated highlands to underutilized lowland areas), but they differ in period, political context, motivations, implementing agencies, and outcomes.\n>\n> **These programs are best categorized as state-planned rural resettlement, only loosely comparable to managed retreat** as conventionally understood in disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation contexts. The primary drivers are poverty, food insecurity, land scarcity, and agrarian land pressure — not retreat from a defined spatial hazard zone in the manner of flood buyouts or coastal retreat programs. Coding is applied as faithfully as possible to the available evidence, with explicit flags wherever the case does not map cleanly onto the questionnaire's intended categories.\n\n---\n\n# CASE STUDY OVERVIEW\n\n**Composite file:** Dhaadallee-Harroollee Resettlement Sites (Goro and Ameya Districts, Southwest Shewa) and Jiru Gamachu Resettlement Village (Nonno District, West Shewa Zone, Oromia Regional State), Central Ethiopia.\n\n**Hazard(s):** Recurrent drought and famine; land degradation and soil erosion; population pressure and land scarcity; food insecurity. Minor flooding was reported in one sending woreda (Meta) but was not a primary driver across the broader program (Tefera, 2009). These are natural and anthropogenic stressors rather than a single discrete technological hazard.\n\n**Type of Retreat:** State-planned rural resettlement — the relocation of farming households, former soldiers, and unemployed urban residents from drought-prone, overpopulated, and land-degraded sending areas to agriculturally underutilized lowland receiving areas. This is best understood as large-scale government-directed population redistribution, only loosely fitting the classic managed retreat definition.\n\n**Scale:**\n- *Derg-era (national program):* Approximately 187,000 people relocated nationally between 1974 and 1984. In October 1984, an emergency program targeted the relocation of approximately 300,000 families (roughly 1.5 million individuals) from famine-affected northern regions — this was a target figure, not a confirmed achieved relocation (Erko et al., 2025). In historical Shewa Province, 6,999 resettled household families were recorded across 15 resettlement units by 1980 (Erko et al., 2025, Table 1). Between 1976 and 1982, 40,319 settlers nationally abandoned resettlement sites (Erko et al., 2025).\n- *Dhaadallee-Harroollee sites:* Ten resettlement units (Hudads), each approximately 1,280 ha, across two districts. The Harroollee site had a 73% evacuation rate between 1978 and 1982 (Erko et al., 2025).\n- *EPRDF-era Jiru Gamachu:* Jiru Gamachu village itself had approximately 234 households at the time of the 2009 study. Nonno woreda as a whole received over 1,734 households in 2003–2004: 234 households from Arsi Zone in 2003, and 1,500 households from Hararge Zones in 2004 (Tefera, 2009).\n\n**Key Actors:** Ethiopian central government (Derg military regime, 1974–1991; EPRDF government from 2003); the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC); the Population Resettlement Authority; the Kulit Coordinating Settlement Office; the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD); the Oromiya Food Security Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission; local woreda and awraja administrative offices (Tefera, 2009; Erko et al., 2025). The Ethio-Yemen State Farm (a bilateral agricultural venture between Ethiopia and South Yemen, established following the Ethio-Somalia War of 1977–1978) also shaped the land use and resettlement history of the Nonno area (Erko et al., 2025).\n\n**Timeline:**\n- **Imperial era (1958–1974):** Small-scale, poorly coordinated resettlement schemes; approximately 20,000 families relocated 1960–1974 (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **1974:** Derg seizes power; Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) established. The 1974 famine was a major factor in this establishment (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **1975:** Land Reform Proclamation (No. 31/1975) nationalizes all rural land (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **1976:** Dhaadallee low-cost resettlement site established (Goro District); first resettlement units operational (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **1978:** Harroollee resettlement site established (Ameya District); Ethio-Yemen State Farm established in proximity to Nonno District following the Ethio-Somalia War (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **1980:** Approximately 6,999 resettled household families recorded across 15 units in historical Shewa Province (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **1983–1984:** RRC halts resettlement and conducts internal review; review recommends scaled-down approach but recommendations are not implemented (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **1984–1985:** Ethiopian famine; mass resettlement surge. Approximately 300,000 families targeted nationally (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **1985–1986:** Revised resettlement directives issued (*Sefafi Sefera*, *Melestegna Sefera*, *Sigsega Sefera*) (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **1991:** Derg regime falls; collective farming dismantled; each settler receives approximately 2–2.5 ha; Ethio-Yemen State Farm eventually closes (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **Post-1991:** Former Ethio-Yemen State Farm land transferred to private organization \"Twenty-Twenty\" for investment; agricultural activities did not follow; government later terminated the contract (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **2003–2004:** EPRDF government launches new resettlement wave; Jiru Gamachu, Biftu Jalala, Hallo Dinki, and Gololle sites established in Nonno District. Over 1,734 households resettled in Nonno woreda (Tefera, 2009; Erko et al., 2025).\n- **2009:** Tefera study conducted on Jiru Gamachu; settlers reported as food-secure and adapted to their new environment (Tefera, 2009).\n- **2025:** Erko et al. historical study of Dhaadallee-Harroollee and the Ethio-Yemen State Farm published (Erko et al., 2025).\n\n**Key Outcomes:**\n- *Derg-era Dhaadallee-Harroollee:* High desertion rates (73% evacuation rate at Harroollee, 1978–1982); low agricultural productivity; inadequate infrastructure; endemic malaria; administrative failures; coercive and forced elements especially for urban unemployed and former soldiers; ongoing food dependency rather than self-sufficiency (Erko et al., 2025).\n- *EPRDF-era Jiru Gamachu (2009 findings):* More positive outcomes. Settlers reported food self-reliance; over 90% of sampled households obtained well above the national minimum caloric requirement (2,100 kcal/day/person, compared to an average of approximately 4,726 kcal/day/person available). Settlers reported peaceful relations with host communities and access to schools, water, health, and veterinary services (Tefera, 2009).\n- *Environmental:* Significant deforestation in the receiving areas, including the Gaangoo forest near Harroollee, driven by resettlement, informal settler expansion, and population growth (Erko et al., 2025; Tefera, 2009).\n- *Land conflicts:* Conflicts emerged post-2003 between informal occupants of former Ethio-Yemen State Farm land and newly resettled EPRDF-era populations (Erko et al., 2025).\n\n**Narrative Summary:**\n\nThis case file covers a series of state-directed rural resettlement programs in central Ethiopia spanning from the Derg military regime (1974–1991) through the EPRDF government era (2003 onward). In both periods, the core rationale was the same: relocate food-insecure, land-poor households from drought-prone, overpopulated highland areas to agriculturally underutilized lowland areas with more fertile soils and lower population density. In practice, the two eras produced sharply different outcomes due to differences in governance, planning quality, the degree of settler agency, and program design.\n\nThe Derg-era programs at Dhaadallee and Harroollee (established 1976 and 1978 respectively) were characterized by centralized control, coercive selection of settlers — particularly for urban unemployed persons and former soldiers — communal farming mandates that conflicted with settlers' backgrounds and interests, severe management failures, and inadequate infrastructure. Settlers were responsible for building their own dwellings from local materials, received food and tool support that was often delayed or insufficient, and faced endemic malaria. An advance payment of Birr 37.50 provided to former soldiers and urban settlers until 1980 was suddenly cancelled, triggering large-scale desertion: the Harroollee site saw a 73% evacuation rate between 1978 and 1982, and nationally 40,319 settlers abandoned resettlement sites between 1976 and 1982. The devastating 1984–85 famine prompted a surge in resettlement, with approximately 300,000 families targeted for relocation — though this was a government target, not a documented achieved figure. The resettlement program encountered substantial criticism from national and international stakeholders, including NGOs involved in famine relief, who documented human rights violations, inadequate planning, inhumane transport conditions, family separations, and increased mortality (Erko et al., 2025).\n\nThe post-2003 EPRDF-era Jiru Gamachu resettlement, conducted under an explicitly \"voluntary\" framework and studied by Tefera in 2009, produced markedly better outcomes for settlers on food security and social integration dimensions. Households reported producing well above the national caloric minimum, integrating peacefully with host communities, and accessing schools, water, and health services. A government-established health station — though not yet well equipped or staffed at the time of the 2009 study — was noted as adequate in coverage for over 25,000 inhabitants (Tefera, 2009). However, even this relatively successful case faced sustainability concerns: lack of irrigation confining agriculture to rain-fed systems, woodland vegetation destruction from population growth and settlement expansion, large household sizes, and land conflicts arising from informal occupants on former Ethio-Yemen State Farm land. Across both periods, the programs were fundamentally top-down and state-driven, with minimal to no meaningful community participation in planning or decision-making. The cumulative environmental harm — particularly the documented decline of the Gaangoo forest — represents a significant and ongoing negative legacy (Erko et al., 2025; Tefera, 2009).\n\n---\n\n# CODING QUESTIONS\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS32", "chunk_index": 1, "section": "general_information", "location": "Nono District, Oromiya National Region State", "country": "Ethiopia", "country_normalized": "Ethiopia", "continent": "Africa", "admin_area": "Oromiya National Region State", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Nono District", "source_links": [ { "title": "Tefera, Messay Mulugeta. \"Challenges and opportunities of voluntary resettlement schemes in Ethiopia: A case from Jiru Gamachu resettlement village, Nonno district, Central Ethiopia.\" Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 11, no. 3 (2009): 93-102.", "url": "https://www.academia.edu/97793460/Challenges_and_Opportunities_of_Voluntary_Resettlement_Schemes_in_Ethiopia_A_Case_from_Jiru_Gamachu_Resettlement_Village_Nonno_District_Central_Ethiopia" } ], "text": "Case study: Nono District (Nono District, Oromiya National Region State, Ethiopia)\nSection: General Information\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** Primarily **Reactive**, with limited **Proactive** elements in planning phases.\n\n**Narrative:** The Derg-era programs (1974–1991) were predominantly reactive. The 1974 famine was a major factor in the establishment of the RRC and the subsequent resettlement program (Erko et al., 2025). The devastating famine of 1984–85 prompted the Derg regime to accelerate its existing resettlement program (Erko et al., 2025, citing Dessalegn, 2003). These are reactive responses to acute crises — drought, famine, and food insecurity — rather than anticipatory risk management.\n\nSome proactive elements are nonetheless present. Before establishing the Dhaadallee site, \"experts deployed to Chebo and Gurage Awraja carefully evaluated factors, such as existing settlements, rainfall patterns, soil fertility, and accessibility\" (Erko et al., 2025). The Third Five-Year Plan (1968–1973) under the imperial government had already identified resettlement as a strategy for addressing population imbalances and improving agricultural productivity, predating famine triggers. The post-2003 EPRDF Jiru Gamachu resettlement was formally framed as a proactive food security and poverty reduction strategy — Nonno was \"selected by the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) in 2003 as an area for voluntary resettlement for farmers from overpopulated areas\" (Tefera, 2009) — though it was still responding to chronic conditions (land scarcity, drought, degradation) rather than a novel acute hazard.\n\n**Coding:** Primarily **Reactive** (famine, drought, food crisis as immediate triggers); limited **Proactive** elements (pre-resettlement site assessments, strategic planning frameworks). Proactive elements are secondary and should not be weighted equally with the reactive drivers.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of households affected, Number of population affected, Total funding\n\n**Answer:**\n\n**Dates:**\n- Derg era: 1976 (Dhaadallee established), 1978 (Harroollee established), 1984–85 (emergency surge). Program ended with fall of Derg in 1991.\n- EPRDF era: 2003–2004 (Jiru Gamachu and other Nonno sites established). Tefera study conducted approximately 2004–2009.\n\n**Households and population:**\n- Derg-era (national): Approximately 187,000 people relocated nationally between 1974 and 1984 (Erko et al., 2025).\n- Emergency 1984–85 program: Approximately 300,000 families targeted nationally — this was a government target, not a confirmed achieved relocation figure (Erko et al., 2025).\n- Historical Shewa Province (1980): 6,999 resettled household families across 15 resettlement units, based on historical Shewa Province administrative boundaries (Erko et al., 2025, Table 1).\n- National desertion (1976–1982): 40,319 settlers abandoned resettlement sites (Erko et al., 2025).\n- Harroollee evacuation rate: 73% between 1978 and 1982 (Erko et al., 2025).\n- EPRDF-era Jiru Gamachu village: Approximately 234 households settled there at the time of the 2009 study (Tefera, 2009).\n- EPRDF-era Nonno woreda (broader): Over 1,734 households resettled in 2003–2004 — 234 from Arsi Zone (2003) and 1,500 from Hararge Zones (2004) (Tefera, 2009). The Jiru Gamachu village figure (234 households) refers specifically to one of three resettlement villages in Nonno woreda, not to the woreda as a whole.\n\n**Total funding:** No specific funding figures are provided in any reviewed source. The Derg-era program was described as incurring \"substantial expenses,\" leading the RRC to halt activities in 1983 for an internal review (Erko et al., 2025). Settlers received food support, agricultural tools, and an advance payment of Birr 37.50 (provided until 1980), but no monetary program totals are reported. No funding breakdown is available for the EPRDF-era program.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** **Multiple Hazards**\n\n**Narrative:** The sending areas were characterized by a combination of interacting hazards and stressors: recurrent drought, low and highly variable rainfall, land degradation and soil erosion, deforestation, population pressure, and food insecurity (Tefera, 2009; Erko et al., 2025). Minor flooding was reported in one sending woreda (Meta) during rainy seasons, but was not a primary driver across the program (Tefera, 2009). The Derg-era program also responded to famine as a cascading consequence of compounding drought and degradation. These are co-occurring and interacting hazards rather than a single discrete event.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** **Natural Hazard** (primarily), with significant anthropogenic amplification.\n\n**Narrative:** The primary drivers — drought, variable rainfall, land degradation, and famine — are natural hazard phenomena, substantially amplified by human land use practices (deforestation, overgrazing, overuse of fragile highland soils) and governance failures. The sources describe natural and anthropogenic stressors interacting, rather than technological or industrial hazard causation. There is no evidence of a technological or industrial hazard. Climate change is not framed as a driver in any of the reviewed sources; these programs predate or are contemporaneous with early climate change discourse in Ethiopia.\n\nThe Muguleta (2020) COVID-19 policy brief references food insecurity drivers in Ethiopia generally but contains no information relevant to this resettlement case and is excluded from this analysis.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process? (Coastal Flooding/Erosion, Riverine/Pluvial Flooding, Lake Flooding/Erosion, Wildfire, Volcano, Land Subsidence, Landslide/Debris Flow, Earthquake, Tsunami, Hurricane, Other)\n\n**Answer:**\n- **Riverine/Pluvial Flooding:** Minor and limited. One sending woreda (Meta) had been suffering from recurrent flooding during rainy seasons, according to resettlers — but this was not a primary driver of resettlement across the broader program (Tefera, 2009).\n- **Wildfire:** A devastating wildfire erupted in 1985 at Dhaadallee, causing significant crop damage, but this was an event occurring *within* the receiving site after resettlement, not a hazard in the sending areas that triggered relocation (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **Other:** Drought, famine, food insecurity, land degradation/soil erosion, and population pressure were the dominant triggers in both eras. These do not map to any single standard hazard category in the codebook.\n\n**Selected categories:**\n- **Riverine/Pluvial Flooding** (minor, one sending woreda only; not a primary driver)\n- **Other:** Drought, famine, food insecurity, land degradation, soil erosion, population pressure\n\n**Categories not selected:** Coastal flooding/erosion, lake flooding/erosion, volcano, land subsidence, landslide/debris flow, earthquake, tsunami, hurricane — no evidence found in reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** **Entire community** (at the sending-area level, in some cases whole community groups were relocated); **Neighbourhood** (at the receiving-site level, purpose-built resettlement units); **Individual homes** (individual household allocations within units).\n\n**Narrative:** At the national program level, the Derg program was a large-scale population redistribution affecting multiple regions and entire communities from specific woredas. Individual resettlement units (Hudads) of approximately 1,280 ha each functioned as neighbourhood-scale settlements. The Jiru Gamachu site accommodated approximately 234 households in a defined village. The resettlement was not limited to individual parcels but involved the movement of groups to purpose-built collective settlements. In some cases, settlers from the same sending woredas were settled together.\n\n**Selected categories:** **Entire community** (sending-area level); **Neighbourhood** (receiving-site level); **Individual homes** (household-level land allocations within units).\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated?\n\n**Answer:** **Individuals** and **Groups/Neighbourhoods**\n\n**Narrative:** The programs moved individual households and, in some instances, broader groups from specific sending woredas. Former soldiers were relocated as a group; urban unemployed were collectively targeted. In the Jiru Gamachu case, all 234 settlers came from specific drought-prone woredas and arrived through a coordinated government scheme (Tefera, 2009). There is no evidence of critical infrastructure relocation, industrial asset relocation, or hazard protection structure retreat.\n\n**Selected categories:** **Individuals**, **Groups/Neighbourhoods**\n\n---\n\n### Other notes\n\nThe programs analyzed in this case file fall at the boundary between \"managed retreat\" as understood in disaster risk reduction practice and \"planned rural resettlement\" as practiced in development policy. The primary motivation is agrarian poverty, food insecurity, and land scarcity — not spatial retreat from a defined hazard zone. Reviewers using this file for comparative analysis should note this distinction carefully.\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS32", "chunk_index": 2, "section": "institutional_environment", "location": "Nono District, Oromiya National Region State", "country": "Ethiopia", "country_normalized": "Ethiopia", "continent": "Africa", "admin_area": "Oromiya National Region State", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Nono District", "source_links": [ { "title": "Tefera, Messay Mulugeta. \"Challenges and opportunities of voluntary resettlement schemes in Ethiopia: A case from Jiru Gamachu resettlement village, Nonno district, Central Ethiopia.\" Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 11, no. 3 (2009): 93-102.", "url": "https://www.academia.edu/97793460/Challenges_and_Opportunities_of_Voluntary_Resettlement_Schemes_in_Ethiopia_A_Case_from_Jiru_Gamachu_Resettlement_Village_Nonno_District_Central_Ethiopia" } ], "text": "Case study: Nono District (Nono District, Oromiya National Region State, Ethiopia)\nSection: Institutional Environment\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** **Other acquisition tools**\n\n**Narrative:** The programs involved collective relocation of households to purpose-built resettlement villages (Hudads), organized and financed entirely by the state. There were no individual or community property buyouts, easements, leasebacks, or market compensation mechanisms. The state nationalized all rural land under the 1975 Land Reform Proclamation (No. 31/1975) and allocated resettlement sites administratively, without purchasing land from departing households or making market-based acquisitions. The codebook category \"Community buyout/retreat\" implies coordinated planning with community engagement and property acquisition, which does not apply here.\n\n**Selected category:** **Other acquisition tools** — state-directed resettlement on nationalized land, without buyout or market acquisition mechanism. Note: \"Community buyout/retreat\" is not selected because there was no buyout process; the state exercised administrative authority over nationalized land.\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Legal authority over retreat**, **Relevant regulations/acts**, **Land acquisition**, **Title(s) transfer**, **Compliance & enforcement**, and **Other** (state land nationalization).\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Legal authority over retreat:** The Derg regime derived authority from the 1975 Land Reform Proclamation (No. 31/1975), which declared all rural land public property and gave the state authority to direct population resettlement (Erko et al., 2025). The RRC and Population Resettlement Authority were the key implementing bodies explicitly named in the sources.\n- **Relevant regulations/acts:** The 1975 Proclamation; the 1985/86 Revised Resettlement Directives (*Sefafi Sefera*, *Melestegna Sefera*, *Sigsega Sefera*); and RRC guidelines structured the program (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **Land acquisition:** Land was nationalized rather than purchased. Former private estates (Birhanemeskel Farm Station and Bedilu Farm Station) were nationalized and converted to resettlement sites (Erko et al., 2025). No market land acquisition process is described.\n- **Title(s) transfer:** After the fall of the Derg in 1991, each settler typically received approximately 2–2.5 ha of land — a de facto transfer of use rights from collective to individual tenure (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **Compliance & enforcement:** Settlers who abandoned sites were subject to government pressure; evacuation was tracked and in some cases resulted in detention. Trainees who dissented at the Dhaadallee training center faced detention, reassignment, or return to home areas depending on their level of opposition (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **Other:** State land nationalization is the overarching legal mechanism. This is not a standard zoning, buyout, or easement process.\n- **Litigation:** No litigation is described in the sources reviewed.\n- **Land rezoning:** The codebook defines land rezoning as legal adjustments to zoning classifications. The sources describe nationalization and administrative reclassification of land use, not formal zoning in the planning sense. This category is not selected.\n- **Retreat land development:** The codebook defines this as regulations governing redevelopment or restoration of vacated lands. The sources describe infrastructure construction at receiving sites (schools, clinics, roads, workshops), not regulatory frameworks for vacated sending-land redevelopment. This category is not applied.\n- **Home acquisition:** No evidence of home purchase compensation.\n\n**Note:** The post-2003 EPRDF-era program operated under a different legal framework. The sources do not detail the specific legislation for that era beyond identifying MoARD and the Oromiya commission as implementing agencies.\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** **Federal only** (Derg era, confirmed). **Insufficient evidence** for EPRDF-era funding breakdown.\n\n**Narrative:** The Derg-era resettlement was a centrally funded state program administered by the RRC and Population Resettlement Authority (Erko et al., 2025). International donors and NGOs were active in famine relief during 1984–85 but the sources describe them as critics of the resettlement program, not confirmed co-funders of it (Erko et al., 2025). No evidence of NGO, insurance, or individual primary funding is present in the sources.\n\nThe post-2003 EPRDF program was administered through MoARD and the Oromiya Food Security Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (Tefera, 2009), suggesting possible federal and regional co-administration, but no specific funding structure or financial breakdown is provided in the reviewed sources. This cannot be coded reliably.\n\n**Selected categories:**\n- **Federal only** (Derg era, based on RRC and central government administration)\n- **Insufficient evidence** for EPRDF-era funding breakdown — no specific monetary information or source breakdown confirmed in sources\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **No evidence found in reviewed sources.**\n\n**Narrative:** Tax base considerations are not mentioned in any of the three sources. The programs were framed entirely in terms of food security, agricultural productivity, and political control — not municipal tax revenue or fiscal sustainability. This category is not applicable to the Ethiopian rural resettlement context as described in the sources.\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Free supports and services** (food, agricultural tools, temporary shelter materials, and agricultural services); **Additional incentives, bonuses and top-ups** (advance payment of Birr 37.50 to former soldiers and urban settlers, provided until 1980).\n\n**Narrative:**\n- Settlers received food support from the government for the first years (planned for two crop years; in practice dependency continued longer in many cases) (Erko et al., 2025; Tefera, 2009).\n- Agricultural tools were provided: \"sickle, plough, ax, hoe and farm-oxen\" (Tefera, 2009).\n- At Dhaadallee/Harroollee: \"settlers were provided with vital essentials: food, clothing, shelter, and a range of amenities, such as roads, clinics, workshops, cooperative shops, and tractor services\" (Erko et al., 2025). Settlers were required to construct their own dwellings from local materials.\n- An advance payment of Birr 37.50 was provided to former soldiers and urban settlers until 1980; its sudden cessation triggered mass desertion (Erko et al., 2025).\n- **These are government support provisions, not compensation for lost property.** Land nationalization meant former landholders received no market-value payment for lost land or assets. No property purchase or market-value compensation mechanism is described.\n\n**Selected categories:** **Free supports and services**; **Additional incentives, bonuses and top-ups** (the Birr 37.50 advance payment, noting this was discontinued in 1980 and is not characterized in the sources as a pre-move inducement but rather as an ongoing support payment). **Market value**, **Tax value**, and **Post-disaster value** categories do not apply.\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS32", "chunk_index": 3, "section": "planning_processes", "location": "Nono District, Oromiya National Region State", "country": "Ethiopia", "country_normalized": "Ethiopia", "continent": "Africa", "admin_area": "Oromiya National Region State", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Nono District", "source_links": [ { "title": "Tefera, Messay Mulugeta. \"Challenges and opportunities of voluntary resettlement schemes in Ethiopia: A case from Jiru Gamachu resettlement village, Nonno district, Central Ethiopia.\" Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 11, no. 3 (2009): 93-102.", "url": "https://www.academia.edu/97793460/Challenges_and_Opportunities_of_Voluntary_Resettlement_Schemes_in_Ethiopia_A_Case_from_Jiru_Gamachu_Resettlement_Village_Nonno_District_Central_Ethiopia" } ], "text": "Case study: Nono District (Nono District, Oromiya National Region State, Ethiopia)\nSection: Planning Processes\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Pre-retreat planning** (limited); **Immediate risks: 1–5 years** (emergency famine response framing); **Post-retreat follow-up** (present but inadequate).\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Pre-retreat planning:** Before establishing Dhaadallee, government experts evaluated factors including rainfall patterns, soil fertility, existing settlements, and accessibility in the Chebo and Gurage Awraja (Erko et al., 2025). The post-2003 EPRDF program involved site selection by MoARD before settlers arrived (Tefera, 2009). These constitute limited pre-retreat planning.\n- **Immediate risks: 1–5 years:** The emergency 1984–85 resettlement surge was driven by immediate crisis response, with no evident long-term planning horizon. Government food support was planned for approximately two crop years (Tefera, 2009; Erko et al., 2025).\n- **Post-retreat follow-up:** Follow-up was present but widely described as inadequate. The RRC conducted an internal review in 1983–84 but recommendations were not implemented (Erko et al., 2025). Settlers remained dependent on food aid well beyond the planned two-year horizon. Evacuation tracking occurred, but remediation was insufficient (Erko et al., 2025). The Tefera (2009) study itself is a form of post-resettlement evaluation.\n- **Emerging risks (5–10 years)** and **Anticipated future risks (10–100 years):** No evidence in reviewed sources.\n\n**Selected categories:** **Pre-retreat planning** (limited); **Immediate risks: 1–5 years** (famine emergency framing); **Post-retreat follow-up** (inadequate in Derg era; somewhat stronger in EPRDF era).\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Top-down**; limited **Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions** (multi-ministry involvement); **Single-stage retreat** (within each resettlement wave).\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Top-down:** All resettlement decisions were made centrally by the state and its agencies. Settlers had no meaningful decision-making power, particularly in the emergency phases." } ]