[ { "case_id": "CS33", "chunk_index": 0, "section": "urban_flood_risk_relocation_programs_colombo_city_sri_lanka", "location": "Colombo City, Western Province", "country": "Sri Lanka", "country_normalized": "Sri Lanka", "continent": "Asia", "admin_area": "Western Province", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Colombo City", "source_links": [ { "title": "Funder, M., Mweemba, C., & Nyambe, I. (2018). The Politics of Climate Change Adaptation in Development: Authority, Resource Control and State Intervention in Rural Zambia. The Journal of Development Studies, 54(1), 30-46. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021", "doi": "10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021" } ], "text": "Case study: Colombo City (Colombo City, Western Province, Sri Lanka)\nSection: Urban Flood Risk Relocation Programs, Colombo City, Sri Lanka\n\n**Case ID:** CS33\n**Version:** 2 (produced from source documents directly, informed by Check 1 audit)\n**Primary Source:** Fernando, N. (2018). Procedia Engineering, 212, 1026–1033.\n**Supplemental Source:** Herath, D., Lakshman, R.W.D., & Ekanayake, A. (2017). Journal of Refugee Studies, 30(4), 554–579.\n**Note on sources:** The Zambia paper (Funder et al., 2017) included in the source bundle is not relevant to CS33 and has been excluded from all factual claims and coding.\n\n---\n\n# CASE STUDY OVERVIEW\n\n**Case Name and Location:** Urban Flood Risk Relocation Programs, Colombo City, Western Province, Sri Lanka\n\n**Hazard(s):** Urban flooding — driven by a combination of factors including unauthorized constructions (slums and shanties) obstructing water flow, clogging and lack of regular maintenance of drainage canals, backwater build-up in the main canal system, and commercial development in wetland reservations [Fernando, 2018, citing Project Insights, 2013]. The flooding is best characterized as pluvial/drainage-related urban flooding rather than strictly riverine flooding.\n\n**Type of Retreat:** Government-led resettlement and relocation of informal settler communities (slum and shanty dwellers) from flood-prone canal embankments and low-lying areas to designated relocation sites. The programs vary from largely top-down, involuntary resettlement (FPHEP, STP, URP) to a more consultative model with limited opt-out options (LEI & CDP). No voluntary property buyout in the conventional sense was involved; the settlers did not hold market-recognized ownership of the land they occupied.\n\n**Scale:** Multiple programs collectively affecting thousands, and potentially tens of thousands, of households. Key figures:\n- FPHEP: Squatters relocated from canal embankments in and around the CMC area to seven suburban locations; exact household count not specified in sources.\n- LEI & CDP: Project objectives included upgrading the living conditions of resettled 870 households and underserved communities in the inundated area [Fernando, 2018].\n- STP: Originally expected to relocate 66,000 urban underserved people in six different places around Colombo [Fernando, 2018]. The Sahaspura complex alone has 671 apartments (Fernando, 2018) / 670 housing units across 14 floors [Herath et al., 2017].\n- URP: Plans underway to relocate 70,000 households within six years (30,000 low-cost housing within three years, another 40,000 before 2015) in ten locations [Fernando, 2018].\n- Overall context: A 2012 survey jointly conducted by Sevanatha and the CMC identified a total of 123,185 families living in 1,735 underserved settlements within the CMC area [Fernando, 2018, citing CMC, 2014].\n\n**Key Actors:** Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL); National Housing Development Authority (NHDA); Sri Lanka Land Reclamation and Development Board (SLLRDB); Urban Development Authority (UDA); Urban Resettlement Development Authority (USDA); Ministry of Housing and Urban Development; Colombo Municipal Council (CMC). International funders: Government of Japan (FPHEP); Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) for LEI & CDP. NGOs acted as community liaisons in LEI & CDP. The UDA implemented the URP from 2011; during the 2009–2015 period, the UDA was placed under the Ministry of Defense, and top military officials were posted to high positions within the UDA [Herath et al., 2017].\n\n**Timeline:** FPHEP initiated in the early 1990s; STP began in 1998; LEI & CDP began in 2000; URP commenced in 2011 and was ongoing during the study period covered by the reviewed literature (approximately 2013–2018).\n\n**Key Outcomes:** The programs produced mixed outcomes. Fernando (2018) concludes that the projects \"managed to somehow control floods in the Colombo city to some extent,\" but raises \"grave concern about relocated people's situation in their new locations.\" The FPHEP is assessed negatively: authorities were not completely involved in the selection of relocatees or in the relocation process, leaving residents poorly informed and lacking monitoring or follow-up support, with some taking ten or more years to adapt [Fernando, 2018]. The LEI & CDP is assessed as comparatively more successful — people adapted to their new environment in less than five years — as a result of people-centered relocation policies, community participation, NGO liaison, and proximity to original residences [Fernando, 2018]. However, problems were not absent even in LEI & CDP. The STP and URP are characterized as top-down and forced: active participation was very limited, authorities did not revise plans to accommodate residents' concerns, and the programs are described as \"a clear sign of forced relocation\" [Fernando, 2018]. Herath et al. (2017) find that material wellbeing unambiguously improved for the majority of resettled households, but relational and subjective wellbeing showed inconsistent results. Approximately 50 per cent of resettled households had no legal title to their replacement houses [Herath et al., 2017]. Breakup of social networks, loss of access to prestigious schools, dissatisfaction with apartment design, inadequate post-resettlement services, and tenure insecurity were significant ongoing problems [Herath et al., 2017].\n\n---\n\n**Narrative Summary:**\n\nColombo, Sri Lanka's commercial capital with a population of 5.8 million in the wider metropolitan region, has for about 30 years been prone to regular floods affecting approximately 1.2 million people annually [Fernando, 2018, citing Project Insights, 2013]. The burden of flooding falls disproportionately on the urban poor — slum and shanty dwellers living in unauthorized settlements on canal banks and in low-lying areas. Since the early 1990s, the Sri Lankan government has implemented a series of relocation programs to clear these flood-prone settlements, repair urban drainage canals, and improve the living conditions of displaced communities. These programs have moved thousands of families from informal settlements into formal housing, ranging from small land plots with construction support to high-rise apartment complexes.\n\nThree programs are examined in the reviewed literature. The earliest — the FPHEP — relocated squatters to suburban plots in the early 1990s with minimal community engagement, inadequate financial support, and no post-relocation monitoring, leaving many residents socially marginalized and economically vulnerable for a decade or more. The LEI & CDP, initiated in 2000 with JBIC funding, adopted a more people-centered model: communities were informed and consulted on preferred relocation sites, placed within 5 km of their original homes, supported by NGO liaisons, and given the opportunity to construct their own homes — producing faster adaptation and greater satisfaction. The later STP (beginning 1998) and the URP (from 2011) reverted to a top-down model with forced evictions, minimal consultation, design-insensitive high-rise apartments, incomplete provision of title documents, and poor post-resettlement service delivery [Fernando, 2018; Herath et al., 2017].\n\nOverall, the Colombo case illustrates both the potential and the pitfalls of government-led urban relocation for flood risk reduction. While material living standards improved for the majority of resettled households [Herath et al., 2017], the failure to adequately consult communities, ensure tenure security, maintain social networks, provide accessible services, and follow through with post-relocation support has substantially undermined wellbeing gains across most programs. The case highlights the importance of people-centered, participatory approaches, legal tenure protection, and sustained post-relocation support — and stands as a cautionary lesson about treating relocation as a purely physical and infrastructural exercise.\n\n---\n\n# CODING QUESTIONS\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS33", "chunk_index": 1, "section": "general_information", "location": "Colombo City, Western Province", "country": "Sri Lanka", "country_normalized": "Sri Lanka", "continent": "Asia", "admin_area": "Western Province", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Colombo City", "source_links": [ { "title": "Funder, M., Mweemba, C., & Nyambe, I. (2018). The Politics of Climate Change Adaptation in Development: Authority, Resource Control and State Intervention in Rural Zambia. The Journal of Development Studies, 54(1), 30-46. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021", "doi": "10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021" } ], "text": "Case study: Colombo City (Colombo City, Western Province, Sri Lanka)\nSection: GENERAL INFORMATION\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Direct answer:** **Proactive** is the primary classification. The programs were planned interventions to reduce ongoing, chronic flood risk rather than responses to a single catastrophic event.\n\n**Narrative:** All three programs were explicitly initiated as planned flood risk reduction strategies. The FPHEP was initiated in the early 1990s by the NHDA and SLLRDB \"to relocate the shanty dwellers living in the embankments of canals in and around the CMC area with the intention of repairing the canals (to control flooding)\" [Fernando, 2018]. The STP began in 1998 under a new Urban Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan. The LEI & CDP began in 2000 as a planned flood control and community development project. The URP, implemented from 2011, continued the same pattern of planned urban regeneration and flood risk reduction.\n\nThe underlying hazard context — Colombo has been prone to regular floods for about 30 years, affecting approximately 1.2 million people annually [Fernando, 2018, citing Project Insights, 2013] — is one of chronic, recurring flooding rather than a discrete triggering event. This reinforces the proactive framing: the programs sought to reduce future flood risk and improve living conditions rather than respond to a single disaster. Herath et al. (2017) note that the URP was \"accelerated\" following the end of Sri Lanka's civil war in 2009, and the URP is described as \"a post-war development project\" managed by the defense establishment. This suggests that political opportunity following the war may have accelerated URP implementation, but the flood risk rationale was preexisting and proactive.\n\n**Coding rationale:** The codebook defines **Proactive** as \"planned in advance to reduce future risk before major impacts occur.\" The evidence supports this as the primary trigger. There is no documented evidence of a specific catastrophic flood event that directly triggered any of the three programs. **Proactive** only is coded; a reactive element is not directly documented in the source materials.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of Households Affected, Number of Population Affected, Total Funding\n\n**Direct answer:**\n\n- **Date:** FPHEP initiated early 1990s; STP began 1998; LEI & CDP began 2000; URP commenced 2011 and ongoing during the study period (approximately 2013–2018) covered by reviewed literature.\n\n- **Number of households affected (program targets):**\n - FPHEP: Exact number not specified. Squatters from canal embankments across seven suburban locations; Owita (largest FPHEP settlement) has 877 plots across four stages (136 + 364 + 284 + 93) [Fernando, 2018].\n - LEI & CDP: The project objectives included upgrading living conditions of resettled 870 households (and underserved communities) in the inundated area [Fernando, 2018]. Research sample: 102 heads of households interviewed.\n - STP/Sahaspura: 671 apartments (Fernando, 2018) / 670 housing units [Herath et al., 2017] in Sahaspura alone; STP originally planned for 66,000 urban underserved people in six locations.\n - URP: Plans for 70,000 households in ten locations [Fernando, 2018].\n - Total underserved context: 123,185 families in 1,735 settlements across the CMC area (2012 survey) [Fernando, 2018, citing CMC, 2014].\n - Research survey (Herath et al., 2017): 852 households surveyed — 401 DFDR cases and 451 control cases — across six resettlement complexes. This represents a research sample, not total program scale.\n\n- **Population affected:** Not precisely quantified per program. Colombo city population: 555,031 (CMC, 2014, cited in Fernando, 2018); Colombo metropolitan region: 5.8 million [Fernando, 2018]. Approximately 1.2 million people affected annually by flooding in Colombo [Fernando, 2018, citing Project Insights, 2013].\n\n- **Total funding:** Not reported in the reviewed sources. FPHEP funded by the Japanese government; LEI & CDP funded by JBIC. No specific monetary amounts are given for any program. Research funding for Herath et al. (2017) came from IDRC (Canada) and DfID (UK) — this is research funding, not program funding.\n\n**Uncertainty:** Precise household counts per program and funding totals are not consistently reported in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Direct answer:** **Single Hazard** — urban flooding is the sole hazard driving the relocation programs.\n\n**Narrative:** All three programs are explicitly justified as flood risk reduction strategies. Fernando (2018) states: \"Relocation has been adopted as a vulnerability reduction strategy to reduce the risk of floods of those who live in flood prone areas.\" The flooding in Colombo is caused by a combination of interacting factors — unauthorized constructions blocking drainage, clogged canals, backwater build-up, and commercial encroachment on wetlands [Fernando, 2018, citing Project Insights, 2013] — but these are all contributing causes to a single hazard type: urban flooding. No other distinct hazard type (earthquake, landslide, coastal erosion, tsunami, wildfire, etc.) is mentioned in the reviewed sources in relation to the relocation programs.\n\n**Coding rationale:** The codebook defines **Single Hazard** as \"one specific hazard impacting the area.\" Urban flooding is the single hazard. Its compound causation does not make it a multiple-hazard scenario under the codebook definition.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Direct answer:** **Natural Hazard**, with significant anthropogenic amplification.\n\n**Narrative:** The baseline hazard is rainfall-driven urban flooding — a natural hazard. However, Fernando (2018) explicitly identifies anthropogenic factors that amplify the flooding: \"unauthorized constructions (slums and shanties) obstructing the water flow, clogging and lack of regular maintenance of drainage canals, backwater build-up in the main canal system, and commercial development in wetland reservations.\" This makes it a natural hazard substantially worsened by human activity, but not a technological hazard in the codebook sense (which refers to the built environment and human technologies such as industrial accidents or dam collapses).\n\nClimate change is not cited as a driver of flooding in the Colombo case in either Fernando (2018) or Herath et al. (2017).\n\n**Coding rationale:** **Natural Hazard** is the appropriate code. The anthropogenic amplification is noted as context but does not change the fundamental origin classification.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process? (Select all that apply)\n\n**Direct answer:** **Riverine/Pluvial Flooding**\n\n**Narrative:** All programs are framed as responses to urban flooding. Fernando (2018) describes floods caused by drainage canal obstruction, backwater build-up, and wetland encroachment — consistent with pluvial/drainage-related flooding in an urban context. No coastal flooding, erosion, wildfire, earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, landslide, land subsidence, or other hazard types are mentioned as considerations in any of the programs.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes, A few streets, Neighbourhood, Entire community, Sub-watershed, Watershed region)\n\n**Direct answer:** **Neighbourhood** and **Entire community** scales, with implementation at the individual household level.\n\n**Narrative:** The programs operated across multiple scales. The FPHEP relocated squatters from canal embankments across the CMC area to seven suburban locations — a multi-neighbourhood, city-scale intervention [Fernando, 2018]. The LEI & CDP targeted unplanned settlements around the Lunawa lagoon in the Dehiwala-Mount Lavinia and Moratuwa municipal council areas — a specific geographic community/neighbourhood scale [Fernando, 2018]. The STP targeted six locations across Colombo (Minikelanipura, Kochchikade, Slave Island, Borella, Narehenpita, Wellawatta) [Fernando, 2018] — effectively city-wide. The URP planned to relocate 70,000 households in ten locations across Colombo [Fernando, 2018] — also city-wide in scope. Individual household-level resettlement was the implementation mechanism, but the geographic planning scope operated at neighbourhood and broader community/city levels.\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals, Groups/Neighbourhoods, Communities, Critical infrastructure, Hazard protection structures, Industrial assets)\n\n**Direct answer:** **Individuals**, **Groups/Neighbourhoods**, and **Communities**\n\n**Narrative:** The programs retreated poor and marginalized families living in unauthorized settlements. These were neighbourhood-scale communities relocated as groups, though implementation was household by household. The FPHEP relocated squatter households from canal embankments across seven locations [Fernando, 2018]. LEI & CDP relocated households from around the Lunawa lagoon area [Fernando, 2018]. The STP/URP relocated slum dwellers from across Colombo to high-rise apartment complexes [Herath et al., 2017]. The retreat was of people and their dwellings; the clearing of canal embankments enabled infrastructure repair as a co-benefit but was not itself the primary object of retreat.\n\n---\n\n### Other Notes (General Information)\n\nThe case is located in the **Global South** (Sri Lanka). The programs represent an early wave of government-led urban relocation in a developing country context. The GoSL adopted a National Involuntary Resettlement Policy in 2001 [Fernando, 2018], but this policy was not consistently applied across all programs: FPHEP predated it; LEI & CDP was the first project to exercise the policy in practice; and the URP appears to have operated without consistent adherence to it [Herath et al., 2017]. The source documents use the language of \"relocation,\" \"resettlement,\" and \"involuntary resettlement\" — not \"managed retreat\" as a formal policy concept.\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS33", "chunk_index": 2, "section": "institutional_environment", "location": "Colombo City, Western Province", "country": "Sri Lanka", "country_normalized": "Sri Lanka", "continent": "Asia", "admin_area": "Western Province", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Colombo City", "source_links": [ { "title": "Funder, M., Mweemba, C., & Nyambe, I. (2018). The Politics of Climate Change Adaptation in Development: Authority, Resource Control and State Intervention in Rural Zambia. The Journal of Development Studies, 54(1), 30-46. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021", "doi": "10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021" } ], "text": "Case study: Colombo City (Colombo City, Western Province, Sri Lanka)\nSection: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat, Community buyout/retreat, Leasebacks/easements/buffers, Other acquisition tools, Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Direct answer:** **Community buyout/retreat** (with the important caveat that this was government-directed involuntary acquisition/eviction, not a voluntary market buyout) and elements of **Other acquisition tools** (involuntary resettlement, eviction, provision of replacement housing).\n\n**Narrative:** The programs involved government eviction and resettlement of informally occupied public/canal land. The settlers did not hold market-recognized private ownership — they were squatters or occupants of public/government land, with informal tenure evidenced by conditional deeds or green-cards [Herath et al., 2017]. Government acquisition was through eviction rather than property purchase. The programs operated at the neighbourhood and community scale (collective relocation of settlement areas), making **Community buyout/retreat** the closest codebook fit, but this is an approximate match: there was no voluntary buyout, no market transaction, and no individual property purchase in the conventional sense. **Other acquisition tools** (involuntary resettlement) better describes the legal mechanism.\n\nNo evidence of leasebacks, conservation easements, buffers, or managed realignment of infrastructure as primary program mechanisms.\n\n**Coding rationale:** **Community buyout/retreat** is coded as the closest available codebook category for the collective, neighbourhood-scale relocation. **Other acquisition tools** should be noted alongside it, given the involuntary, non-market character of the acquisition. The **Managed realignment of infrastructure** category is not coded because canal repair/drainage improvement was a co-benefit of clearing the embankments, not the primary purpose from a people-movement perspective.\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Direct answer:** **Relevant regulations/acts**, **Land acquisition**, **Home acquisition**, **Title(s) transfer**, **Retreat land development**, **Compliance & enforcement**, **Legal authority over retreat**\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Relevant regulations/acts:** The GoSL adopted a National Involuntary Resettlement Policy in 2001. The LEI & CDP was the first project to exercise this policy in practice [Fernando, 2018]. The FPHEP predated this policy and operated without a formal national framework. The UDA held implementing authority for the URP.\n- **Land acquisition:** The land involved was primarily informally occupied public/government land (canal embankments, lagoon margins). The process involved eviction of informal settlers rather than market purchase. Some settlers held \"conditional deeds\" or \"green-cards\" as informal tenure proof, which government disputed as not preventing state repossession [Herath et al., 2017].\n- **Home acquisition:** The government did not purchase homes at market value; it evicted informal settlers and provided replacement housing. Residents were required to hand over their deeds or green-cards to qualify for interim support during the transition period [Herath et al., 2017].\n- **Title(s) transfer:** A significant finding is the failure to transfer legal title to replacement housing. Herath et al. (2017) found that approximately 50 per cent of resettled households had no legal title to their replacement apartments. The government's practice of collecting original deeds and green-cards as eligibility conditions was criticized as removing residents' bargaining power. Officials indicated that deeds for new houses would only be issued after residents completed full payment [Herath et al., 2017].\n- **Retreat land development:** Cleared land was used for canal repair and drainage improvement. The URP aimed to free up approximately half of 1,000 acres of slum land for \"development\" purposes, while the remainder would be used for re-housing [Herath et al., 2017].\n- **Legal authority over retreat:** The UDA held primary implementing authority. During 2009–2015, the UDA was placed under the Ministry of Defense and top military officials were posted to high positions within the UDA [Herath et al., 2017]. The USDA also had supervisory roles over some housing schemes [Herath et al., 2017].\n- **Compliance & enforcement:** The STP/URP enforced relocation through mandatory eviction with little opt-out. Fernando (2018) describes the URP's approach as \"a clear sign of forced relocation.\"\n- **Litigation:** No evidence of litigation found in reviewed sources.\n- **Land rezoning:** Not explicitly discussed in the sources.\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Direct answer:** **Federal/National** (Government of Sri Lanka) and **International aid** (Government of Japan, JBIC). Across programs: **Multiple funders** applies at the overall case level.\n\n**Narrative:**\n- FPHEP: Funded by the Government of Japan; implemented by NHDA and SLLRDB [Fernando, 2018].\n- LEI & CDP: Funded by JBIC as an extension of the Colombo Flood Control and Environmental Improvement Project assisted by the Government of Japan [Fernando, 2018].\n- STP: Funded by GoSL through the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development [Fernando, 2018].\n- URP: Funded by GoSL; implemented by UDA [Fernando, 2018; Herath et al., 2017]. Herath et al. (2017) note that since there was no donor funding for the URP, \"principally, the government rules and regulations governing displacement and resettlement have been applied.\"\n- Research funding (Herath et al., 2017): IDRC (Canada) and DfID (UK) — this is research funding, not program funding.\n\nNGOs played a supporting liaison role in LEI & CDP but were not primary funders. No evidence of local/municipal-only funding, insurance, or individual self-funding as primary program mechanisms.\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Direct answer:** This question is largely **not directly addressed** in the reviewed sources. **Redevelopment of retreat lands** is partially applicable for the URP context only, with important caveats.\n\n**Narrative:** The reviewed sources do not discuss tax base maintenance as an explicit goal of the relocation programs. However, Herath et al. (2017) note that \"by evicting and re-housing the urban slum dwellers, the government expected to free up some prime lands in Colombo for 'development' purposes\" — approximately half of 1,000 acres identified for development. This implies an interest in land value and development revenue, but the sources do not characterize this in tax base terms, nor do they discuss new industry attraction, livelihood support for tax base purposes, or other explicit tax base strategies. This item should be coded as **Other / not directly addressed**, with a note that land freeing for development was an explicit URP goal per Herath et al. (2017).\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Direct answer:** **Free supports and services** (land allocation and construction support — FPHEP, LEI & CDP); **Other** (interest-free construction loans with installment delivery — FPHEP, LEI & CDP; paid apartments with installment payment obligations — STP, URP).\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **FPHEP:** Residents received one to two perches of land and Rs. 20,000 as an interest-free loan to build their houses, delivered in four installments (Rs. 6,000; Rs. 4,000; Rs. 4,000; Rs. 6,000). This was considered inadequate by many residents [Fernando, 2018].\n- **LEI & CDP:** Residents received plots of land and Rs. 224,000 (in four installments), with the opportunity to construct their own homes. Additional relocation sites also provided two perches of land and Rs. 400,000 in four installments to accommodate families displaced from the tsunami [Fernando, 2018].\n- **STP/Sahaspura:** Residents received apartments but had to pay Rs. 25,000 as a maintenance fee and were expected to give up their previously occupied land upon moving in. A deed of ownership was to be provided upon occupancy [Fernando, 2018]. However, many households did not receive deeds [Herath et al., 2017].\n- **URP:** Apartments provided with installment payment requirements. Herath et al. (2017) report that all 401 surveyed DFD households received a replacement house for which they must pay in installments; most respondents were not paying, citing insufficient incomes or objecting in principle.\n- **Market value** and **post-disaster value** compensation do not apply — the settlers were informal occupants of public land without formal market ownership rights.\n- **Additional incentives/bonuses:** No formal incentive bonuses described.\n\n**Key tension:** Many residents felt that since the government had acquired their (informally held) lands, it was unjust to ask them to pay for replacement apartments [Herath et al., 2017]. Some had conditional deeds or green-cards which they considered equivalent to legal ownership [Herath et al., 2017].\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS33", "chunk_index": 3, "section": "planning_processes", "location": "Colombo City, Western Province", "country": "Sri Lanka", "country_normalized": "Sri Lanka", "continent": "Asia", "admin_area": "Western Province", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Colombo City", "source_links": [ { "title": "Funder, M., Mweemba, C., & Nyambe, I. (2018). The Politics of Climate Change Adaptation in Development: Authority, Resource Control and State Intervention in Rural Zambia. The Journal of Development Studies, 54(1), 30-46. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021", "doi": "10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021" } ], "text": "Case study: Colombo City (Colombo City, Western Province, Sri Lanka)\nSection: PLANNING PROCESSES\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Direct answer:** **Pre-retreat planning** (present in all programs, though variable in quality); **Immediate risks: 1–5 years** (inferred from the chronic flooding context); **Post-retreat follow-up** (inadequate in most programs; comparatively better in LEI & CDP)\n\n**Narrative:**\n- All programs involved some pre-retreat planning — site identification, infrastructure preparation, and community notification — though quality varied substantially [Fernando, 2018].\n- The programs addressed chronic, ongoing flood risk (recurring annually), suggesting an immediate-risk time horizon rather than a long-term projected risk. The 1–5 year timeframe is inferred from the chronic flooding context rather than explicitly specified in the sources.\n- Post-retreat follow-up was minimal in FPHEP. Fernando (2018) states that \"authorities were only concerned on the pre-relocation stage and did not head attention to the socio-economic conditions after relocation.\" LEI & CDP is identified as more successful partly because it invested in \"careful relocation planning, implementation, short and long term monitoring\" [Fernando, 2018].\n- No evidence of long-term climate projections (10–100 year horizon) or formal adaptation pathways being considered. **Anticipated future risks (10–100 years)** is not coded.\n- Herath et al. (2017) describe the URP as ongoing in 2013–2016, indicating that post-retreat monitoring and follow-up continued to be a concern through the study period.\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Direct answer:** **Top-down** (primary, all programs); **Bottom-up/Participatory** (LEI & CDP only, limited); **Multi-sectoral** (partial); **Degree of transparency** (limited); **Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions** (partial, often poorly organized); **Single stage retreat** (most programs, though URP was phased by construction stage)\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Top-down:** The dominant planning mode across all programs. Herath et al. (2017) state: \"Decisions regarding displacement and resettlement were mostly top-down initiatives of high government officials.\" Fernando (2018) notes that in the URP, \"authorities did not want to revise the relocation plan to accommodate at least some of the people's concerns.\"\n- **Bottom-up/Participatory:** The LEI & CDP is identified as relatively more participatory. 65% of residents indicated a preferred settlement and 62% received it; approximately 70% independently decided to relocate to preferred locations [Fernando, 2018]. NGOs acted as liaisons between relocated families, the project team, and local authorities [Fernando, 2018]. Herath et al. (2017) confirm that \"only the Lunawa project involved some consultation with the beneficiaries and other projects involved only marginal consultation and informed consent was not obtained.\"\n- **Multi-sectoral:** Multiple government agencies were involved (NHDA, SLLRDB, UDA, USDA, Water Board, municipal council), and NGOs participated in LEI & CDP. However, coordination was often poor — post-resettlement maintenance responsibilities were unclear, with UDA, USDA, and municipal council passing responsibility to each other [Herath et al., 2017].\n- **Degree of transparency:** Limited. Residents frequently lacked information about the complete relocation process [Fernando, 2018]. In the STP/URP, authorities did not revise plans to accommodate residents' concerns.\n- **Single stage retreat:** The FPHEP and LEI & CDP appear to have been implemented through a phased construction/relocation approach at specific sites, but each program was structured as a single planned intervention rather than a staged adaptive process. The URP was phased by construction (30,000 units within three years, then 40,000 more before 2015) [Fernando, 2018].\n- **Adaptive management:** Present in LEI & CDP via short- and long-term monitoring [Fernando, 2018]. Largely absent in other programs.\n- **Cost-benefit analysis (CBA):** No evidence.\n- **Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA):** No evidence.\n- **Public-private partnerships:** No evidence described in sources.\n- **Bureaucracy reduction:** No evidence; bureaucratic complexity was identified as a problem in post-resettlement service delivery [Herath et al., 2017].\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Direct answer:** **Process guidance** (National Involuntary Resettlement Policy from 2001, applied to LEI & CDP); **Housing assessment** (implicit, in identifying settlements for targeting). **Hazard maps & models** are not explicitly described in the sources and should not be coded.\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Process guidance:** The National Involuntary Resettlement Policy (2001) provided process guidance. Fernando (2018) notes that LEI & CDP \"is the first project that exercised Sri Lanka's National Involuntary Resettlement Policy into practice.\" The policy was not consistently applied to other programs. Herath et al. (2017) note that the Lunawa project was implemented as per the guidelines of the National Involuntary Resettlement Policy (NIRP).\n- **Housing assessment:** Settlement targeting implies some form of assessment of informal settlements to identify priority areas, but no formal housing assessment methodology is described in the sources.\n- **Hazard maps & models:** Not explicitly described. Flood-prone areas are clearly identified in general terms, but the use of formal hazard mapping tools is not documented in the sources reviewed. This code is not applied.\n- **CBA, MCDA, CC projection models, demographic projections, social vulnerability assessments, socioeconomic projections:** No evidence in the reviewed sources.\n- **New site evaluation process:** Government agencies identified and prepared relocation sites (e.g., LEI & CDP prepared four sites with basic infrastructure; STP identified six locations), but no formal documented evaluation process/criteria is described.\n\n---\n\n### What planning measures were taken for receiving areas in the MR decision process?\n\n**Direct answer:** **Construction of new housing** (STP, URP); **Identifying priority areas** (partial, all programs); **Individuals vs. neighbourhoods/communities** (mixed — lottery in STP/URP dispersed communities; LEI & CDP attempted to maintain proximity); **Social carrying capacity** (implicitly considered in research but not formally assessed by planners)\n\n**Narrative:**\n- **Construction of new housing:** The primary receiving-area strategy for STP and URP was high-rise apartment complexes. Sahaspura: 13 stories, 671 apartments, 300–600 sq ft each [" } ]