[ { "case_id": "CS42", "chunk_index": 0, "section": "overview", "location": "Kinston, North Carolina", "country": "United States", "country_normalized": "United States", "continent": "North America", "admin_area": "North Carolina", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Kinston", "source_links": [ { "title": "Siders, A. R. (2019). Social justice implications of US managed retreat buyout programs. Climatic Change, 152(2), 239-257. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5" }, { "title": "McCann, M. (2006). Case Study of Floodplain Acquisition/Relocation Project in Kinston, NC after Hurricane Fran (1996) and Hurricane Floyd (1999). University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill master's paper", "doi": "10.17615/rhp8-te06", "url": "https://doi.org/10.17615/rhp8-te06" }, { "title": "de Vries, D., & Shmelev, S. (2017). Historical waterscape trajectories that need care: the unwanted refurbished flood homes of Kinston's devolved disaster mitigation program. Journal of Political Ecology, 24(1). https://doi.org/10.2458/v24i1.20976", "doi": "10.2458/v24i1.20976", "url": "https://doi.org/10.2458/v24i1.20976" }, { "title": "FEMA (n.d.). Innovative Floodplain Management Case Studies: Kinston, North Carolina. Federal Emergency Management Agency.", "url": "https://www.fema.gov/pdf/casestudys/kinston_cs.pdf" }, { "title": "NOAA Office for Coastal Management (n.d.). Out of Harm's Way: Relocation Strategies to Reduce Flood Risk. NOAA Digital Coast Peer-to-Peer Case Study.", "url": "https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/training/kinston-flood-risk.html" } ], "text": "Case study: Kinston (Kinston, North Carolina, United States)\nSection: Case Study Overview\n\n**Case Name and Location:** Kinston-Lenoir County Floodplain Acquisition and Relocation Program, City of Kinston, Lenoir County, North Carolina, United States of America.\n\n**Hazard(s):** Riverine flooding of the Neuse River floodplain, triggered by hurricanes and tropical storms. Hurricane Fran (September 1996) and Hurricane Floyd (September 1999) were the primary triggering events. Hurricane Bertha (July 1996) preceded Fran and caused minor wind damage and localized flooding; Hurricane Dennis (September 1999) saturated the drainage basin in the days before Floyd and contributed to the severity of that flood. Flooding was compounded by a technological hazard dimension: the Peachtree Wastewater Treatment Plant adjacent to Lincoln City flooded during both storms, releasing raw and partially treated sewage into the Neuse River, and six junkyards in the floodplain spilled oils, chemicals, and other toxic compounds into floodwaters.\n\n**Type of Retreat:** Voluntary individual property buyout and relocation program. Individual homeowners in the 100-year floodplain were offered pre-disaster fair market value for their homes, primarily through FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), supplemented by North Carolina's State Acquisition and Relocation Fund (SARF) to assist residents in purchasing replacement housing within city limits. The program operated as voluntary acquisition; officials did not pursue eminent domain, noting it was not a viable option and would have disqualified the city from HMGP funds.\n\n**Scale:** Approximately 775 individual property acquisitions within the city of Kinston, totaling an estimated 1,500–2,000 people displaced from the floodplain, representing approximately 7% of Kinston's total population at the time. The FEMA case study reports that Kinston and Lenoir County together acquired over 1,000 properties with HMGP funds, with approximately 225 remaining to be acquired at the time of that publication. The buyout area was concentrated in the southern portion of Kinston, including Lincoln City and adjacent floodplain neighborhoods. Virtually all of the residents bought out were African American, with large concentrations of low-income and elderly populations.\n\n**Key Actors:** City of Kinston planning department (led by Floodplain Administrator Tommy Lee); Lenoir County government; the County Hazard Mitigation Planning Team (COHMIT); North Carolina Division of Emergency Management (administering HMGP); North Carolina Division of Community Assistance (administering SARF and Community Development Block Grants); U.S. FEMA; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD, via CDBG); the Greater Kinston Community Development Corporation (GKCDC), a local non-profit; the Conservation Fund; the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; the Kinston Area Recovery Effort (KARE) volunteer organization; and real estate professionals who helped residents find replacement housing.\n\n**Timeline:** Hurricane Fran struck September 1996. COHMIT was formed within 30 days. HMGP applications were submitted December 1996, but the first grant was not processed until 14 months later. The first property acquisition occurred April 1998. Hurricane Floyd struck September 1999. The Greater Kinston Urban Growth Plan was formally adopted October 1999. After Floyd, a pre-disaster application package was submitted and approved within one week. The buyout program continued through approximately 2004. A Clean Water Management Trust Fund grant to acquire remaining vacant lots in the floodplain was received around 2005. Green infrastructure planning continued through at least 2005–2006. By the time of the reviewed sources, the bulk of acquisitions were complete, though vacant-lot acquisition and Green Infrastructure Plan implementation were still ongoing.\n\n**Key Outcomes:** The program achieved a 97% participation rate among eligible homeowners. Approximately 90% of participants relocated within Kinston city limits; according to McCann (2006), this created a net tax gain for the city because equity on new homes was generally substantially higher than on the flooded properties. The first 101 acquired buildings avoided an estimated $6,387,000 in flood losses during Hurricane Floyd (McCann 2006, Table 1). Over $100 million in grant money was administered overall (McCann 2006), though the precise breakdown across funding streams is not fully reconciled in the available sources. Beyond the buyout itself, the city used disaster recovery funding to advance broader smart-growth goals: construction of 170 single-family homes on infill lots; rehabilitation of an abandoned high school into 57 units of senior housing (Grainger Place) plus 100 additional multi-family units; a downtown business incubator (Kinston Enterprise Center); removal of five of six floodplain junkyards; and decommissioning of the Peachtree Wastewater Treatment Plant. A Green Infrastructure Plan was developed for the acquired open space in partnership with Lenoir County, the Conservation Fund, and UNC Chapel Hill. However, the program carries critical equity dimensions: buyouts were concentrated almost entirely in historically Black, low-income neighborhoods. A post-buyout episode — in which some homes acquired after Floyd were refurbished and relocated into other African-American neighborhoods without notifying original homeowners or, according to the Johnsons, nearby residents — revealed major gaps in notification, accountability, and care in the program's devolved governance structure (de Vries and Fraser 2017).\n\n---\n\n**Narrative Summary**\n\nKinston, North Carolina, a small city of approximately 20,000 people in Lenoir County, experienced two devastating hurricanes within three years — Fran in 1996 and Floyd in 1999. Both storms caused the Neuse River to overflow its banks and flood significant portions of the city's southern neighborhoods, which were predominantly low-income, African-American areas located in the floodplain. Floyd, which deposited over 13 inches of rain in 24 hours and caused the Neuse to crest more than 10 feet above flood stage, compounded damage from a still-incomplete recovery from Fran. A key factor in both floods was a compound hazard: the Peachtree Wastewater Treatment Plant, located adjacent to the Lincoln City neighborhood, flooded during both storms, releasing raw and partially treated sewage, and six junkyards in the floodplain spilled oils and other toxic compounds into floodwaters. The fecal contamination that entered Lincoln City homes during Floyd was described by de Vries and Fraser (2017) as a defining factor in residents' willingness to participate in the buyout.\n\nIn response, the City of Kinston — with state and federal partners — implemented a voluntary floodplain buyout and relocation program funded primarily through FEMA's HMGP (75% of acquisition costs), Community Development Block Grants (HUD), and North Carolina's SARF. The program achieved a 97% participation rate among eligible homeowners, moving approximately 1,500–2,000 residents out of the floodplain, approximately 90% of whom relocated within the city. Kinston distinguished itself from comparable communities by integrating the buyout not merely as a risk-reduction measure but as the implementation vehicle for a broader urban growth plan, incorporating affordable housing, downtown revitalization, environmental hazard removal, and green infrastructure planning. The acquired floodplain is now largely open space, with forest regrowth across much of the area, though some vacant lots, remaining structures, and utilities are still present.\n\nDespite these widely cited achievements, the case carries important critical dimensions. The buyout was concentrated almost entirely in historically Black, low-income neighborhoods that had been confined to flood-prone land since the early twentieth century due to racial segregation. De Vries and Fraser (2017) document a post-buyout episode in which some homes acquired after Floyd — which had been contaminated with sewage — were refurbished by the Greater Kinston Community Development Corporation and relocated into other African-American neighborhoods in Kinston, without notifying the original homeowners or, according to the Johnsons, nearby residents in receiving areas. Residents who raised concerns found no accountability at the city, state, or federal level, with FEMA indicating the matter was outside its jurisdiction. This episode illustrates how the program's devolved governance structure and its \"logic of choice\" — where responsibilities were demarcated contractually — perpetuated rather than remedied the discriminatory waterscape dynamics that originally produced the hazard conditions in Lincoln City. The Kinston case thus stands simultaneously as a frequently cited model of successful floodplain acquisition and as a critical case study in the equity limitations of devolved managed retreat governance.\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS42", "chunk_index": 1, "section": "coding_questions", "location": "Kinston, North Carolina", "country": "United States", "country_normalized": "United States", "continent": "North America", "admin_area": "North Carolina", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Kinston", "source_links": [ { "title": "Siders, A. R. (2019). Social justice implications of US managed retreat buyout programs. Climatic Change, 152(2), 239-257. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5" }, { "title": "McCann, M. (2006). Case Study of Floodplain Acquisition/Relocation Project in Kinston, NC after Hurricane Fran (1996) and Hurricane Floyd (1999). University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill master's paper", "doi": "10.17615/rhp8-te06", "url": "https://doi.org/10.17615/rhp8-te06" }, { "title": "de Vries, D., & Shmelev, S. (2017). Historical waterscape trajectories that need care: the unwanted refurbished flood homes of Kinston's devolved disaster mitigation program. Journal of Political Ecology, 24(1). https://doi.org/10.2458/v24i1.20976", "doi": "10.2458/v24i1.20976", "url": "https://doi.org/10.2458/v24i1.20976" }, { "title": "FEMA (n.d.). Innovative Floodplain Management Case Studies: Kinston, North Carolina. Federal Emergency Management Agency.", "url": "https://www.fema.gov/pdf/casestudys/kinston_cs.pdf" }, { "title": "NOAA Office for Coastal Management (n.d.). Out of Harm's Way: Relocation Strategies to Reduce Flood Risk. NOAA Digital Coast Peer-to-Peer Case Study.", "url": "https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/training/kinston-flood-risk.html" } ], "text": "Case study: Kinston (Kinston, North Carolina, United States)\nSection: Coding Questions\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** Primarily **Reactive**, with elements of **Proactive** planning that developed after the first hurricane.\n\n**Narrative:** The acquisition and relocation program was initiated in direct response to Hurricane Fran (September 1996), a post-disaster reactive trigger. Prior to Fran, Kinston had no meaningful hazard mitigation planning, had not implemented a significant buyout program, and had been denied prior funding for floodplain structure elevation (McCann 2006). The program was therefore fundamentally reactive in its origins.\n\nHowever, proactive elements emerged over the course of the program. Within 30 days of Fran, COHMIT was formed and had a strategy in place. HMGP applications were submitted within 90 days. Most significantly, after Floyd struck in 1999, Kinston's experience with the Fran-era program enabled rapid response: the NOAA Digital Coast source notes that a pre-disaster project application package had been developed and was submitted and approved within one week of Floyd. The Greater Kinston Urban Growth Plan was formally adopted October 1999, integrating mitigation as the implementation tool for broader smart-growth objectives — evidence of proactive strategic framing. After Floyd, the city also used access restrictions and a six-month moratorium to reduce re-occupation and rebuilding before buyouts could be completed (McCann 2006), reflecting deliberate proactive governance to manage the transition.\n\nBoth codes are appropriate: the trigger was reactive (post-disaster), but Kinston's subsequent approach incorporated proactive planning that went beyond conventional disaster response.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of households affected, Number of population affected, Total funding\n\n**Answer:**\n\n- **Date of initiation:** September 1996 (Hurricane Fran); formal program underway from December 1996 (HMGP applications submitted); first acquisition April 1998; program expanded after Hurricane Floyd, September 1999; buyout program continued through approximately 2004; vacant-lot acquisition and green infrastructure planning ongoing through at least 2005–2006.\n\n- **Number of households/properties:** Approximately 775 direct buyout acquisitions within the City of Kinston (McCann 2006; Siders 2019). The FEMA case study reports that Kinston and Lenoir County together had acquired over 1,000 properties with HMGP funds, with approximately 225 remaining at the time of that publication.\n\n- **Number of population affected:** Approximately 1,500–2,000 people (McCann 2006), representing approximately 7% of Kinston's total population of about 20,000 (NOAA Digital Coast; McCann 2006).\n\n- **Total funding:** McCann (2006) reports over $100 million in grant money administered overall, but the precise breakdown across HMGP, CDBG, SARF, and other streams is not fully reconciled in the available sources and different figures refer to different scopes (city vs. county), different purposes (acquisition vs. relocation vs. housing construction), and different stages (applications vs. funds disbursed). Key figures that are individually supported: the largest HMGP housing application sought over $23.5 million (state responsible for $7.8 million of this; McCann 2006); total HMGP applications from Kinston after Fran totalled over $36.5 million (McCann 2006); CDBG funding was approximately $24.9 million (McCann 2006); HMGP contributed approximately $30 million county-wide, with the state balance approximately $10 million (FEMA case study); the Governor's relief fund provided $1.5 million for housing construction materials; and a $1.05 million EDA grant funded the business incubator (McCann 2006). These figures should not be simply added together as they describe different components at different scales.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** **Multiple Hazards.**\n\n**Narrative:** The primary hazard was riverine flooding from the Neuse River triggered by hurricanes and tropical storms. However, multiple hazard dimensions are documented: (1) flooding from multiple successive storms — Bertha (July 1996, minor), Fran (September 1996, major), Dennis (September 1999, contributed to basin saturation before Floyd), and Floyd (September 1999, catastrophic); (2) contaminated floodwaters from the Peachtree Wastewater Treatment Plant, which flooded during both Fran and Floyd, releasing raw and partially treated sewage into the Neuse River (McCann 2006); and (3) flooding of six junkyards in the floodplain, which spilled oils and chemicals into floodwaters (McCann 2006). De Vries and Fraser (2017) characterize the hazard as a compound toxic event — not purely hydrological — noting that fecal contamination entering homes during Floyd was a defining factor in participation decisions. These compound hazard conditions were relevant to both the retreat decision process and the scale of resident participation.\n\nThe \"Multiple Hazards\" code applies because two or more hazards (riverine flooding plus technological/contamination hazard) impacted the same area in a cascading fashion.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** **Natural Hazard** (primary) and **Technological Hazard** (secondary/compound).\n\n**Narrative:** The flooding itself was a natural hazard driven by hurricane activity and riverine dynamics. However, the technological hazard component — the Peachtree Wastewater Treatment Plant and floodplain junkyards — substantially exacerbated harm to residents and was explicitly part of the rationale for retreat (both to move people out and to remove the environmental hazards). McCann (2006) and de Vries and Fraser (2017) both describe the toxic contamination of floodwaters as integral to the case. The decommissioning of the wastewater plant and removal of five junkyards were direct outcomes of the buyout program. Both origins are therefore coded.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process? (Coastal Flooding/Erosion), (Riverine/Pluvial Flooding), (Lake Flooding/Erosion), (Wildfire), (Volcano), (Land Subsidence), (Landslide/Debris Flow), (Earthquake), (Tsunami), (Hurricane), (Other)\n\n**Answer:** **Riverine/Pluvial Flooding** and **Hurricane** (as the triggering mechanism). **Other** may also apply for the compound toxic contamination hazard.\n\n**Narrative:** The primary hazard was riverine flooding of the Neuse River floodplain, which is clearly the central driver of the buyout. Hurricanes (Fran and Floyd primarily, with Bertha and Dennis as contributing factors) were the proximate causes of the flooding and are accordingly relevant. The flooding described is riverine/floodplain flooding, not direct coastal storm surge — Kinston is an inland city. The toxic contamination from the wastewater plant and junkyards constitutes an \"Other\" compound hazard dimension, though it is not a standard separate hazard category in the codebook.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes), (A few streets), (Neighbourhood), (Entire community), (Sub-watershed), (Watershed region)\n\n**Answer:** **Individual homes** (mechanism) and **Neighbourhood** (geographic outcome), with community-scale impacts.\n\n**Narrative:** The program operated through individual property acquisitions — each buyout was negotiated separately with individual homeowners on a parcel-by-parcel basis (McCann 2006; FEMA case study). However, acquisitions were geographically concentrated in specific neighborhoods — most notably Lincoln City and adjacent southern Kinston floodplain neighborhoods — and the city's explicit goal was to remove all residential structures from the 100-year floodplain (FEMA case study). The 97% participation rate and the access restrictions and construction moratorium effectively transformed entire neighborhoods into open space. \"Entire community\" is not selected because the buyout affected approximately 7% of the city's population and did not relocate the entire city.\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals), (Groups/Neighbourhoods), (Communities), (Critical infrastructure), (Hazard protection structures), (Industrial assets)\n\n**Answer:** **Individuals**, **Groups/Neighbourhoods**, **Critical infrastructure**, and **Industrial assets**.\n\n**Narrative:** The core of the program was individual homeowners participating in voluntary buyouts (McCann 2006). The geographic concentration of buyouts in Lincoln City and surrounding floodplain neighborhoods effectively resulted in the retreat of entire neighborhoods. Additionally, the city explicitly used the disaster recovery process to remove industrial hazards: five of six floodplain junkyards were bought out, and the Peachtree Wastewater Treatment Plant was decommissioned — the latter falling under both \"Critical infrastructure\" and \"Industrial assets\" (McCann 2006). The FEMA case study also mentions mobile home parks among acquired properties.\n\n---\n\n### Other notes (General Information)\n\nSiders (2019) includes the Kinston program among eight well-documented US buyout programs analyzed for social justice implications, noting approximately 775 buyouts with a 97% participation rate and that major participants were low-income minorities. The Siders paper uses McCann (2006) and other UNC Chapel Hill research as its primary source for the Kinston case. Note that Siders (2019) is included in the provided source documents (the paper \"Social justice implications of US managed retreat buyout programs,\" Climatic Change), so this citation is verifiable.\n\nThe NOAA Digital Coast source states \"A total of 1,600 homes have been purchased, leaving 73 percent of the city's floodplain as open space.\" These figures (1,600 homes and 73% of floodplain) are not corroborated by the McCann thesis or FEMA case study provided, and may refer to a broader or later scope than the primary sources cover. These figures are noted here for completeness but are not used in factual claims elsewhere in this memo, as their basis cannot be independently verified from the other provided sources.\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS42", "chunk_index": 2, "section": "institutional_environment", "location": "Kinston, North Carolina", "country": "United States", "country_normalized": "United States", "continent": "North America", "admin_area": "North Carolina", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Kinston", "source_links": [ { "title": "Siders, A. R. (2019). Social justice implications of US managed retreat buyout programs. Climatic Change, 152(2), 239-257. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5" }, { "title": "McCann, M. (2006). Case Study of Floodplain Acquisition/Relocation Project in Kinston, NC after Hurricane Fran (1996) and Hurricane Floyd (1999). University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill master's paper", "doi": "10.17615/rhp8-te06", "url": "https://doi.org/10.17615/rhp8-te06" }, { "title": "de Vries, D., & Shmelev, S. (2017). Historical waterscape trajectories that need care: the unwanted refurbished flood homes of Kinston's devolved disaster mitigation program. Journal of Political Ecology, 24(1). https://doi.org/10.2458/v24i1.20976", "doi": "10.2458/v24i1.20976", "url": "https://doi.org/10.2458/v24i1.20976" }, { "title": "FEMA (n.d.). Innovative Floodplain Management Case Studies: Kinston, North Carolina. Federal Emergency Management Agency.", "url": "https://www.fema.gov/pdf/casestudys/kinston_cs.pdf" }, { "title": "NOAA Office for Coastal Management (n.d.). Out of Harm's Way: Relocation Strategies to Reduce Flood Risk. NOAA Digital Coast Peer-to-Peer Case Study.", "url": "https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/training/kinston-flood-risk.html" } ], "text": "Case study: Kinston (Kinston, North Carolina, United States)\nSection: Institutional Environment\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat), (Community buyout/retreat), (Leasebacks, easements and buffers), (Other acquisition tools), (Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** **Individual buyout/retreat** (primary mechanism) and **Managed realignment of infrastructure** (secondary outcome).\n\n**Narrative:** The program operated through individual voluntary property acquisitions — homeowners each made individual decisions to participate (McCann 2006; FEMA case study). This is the standard HMGP acquisition model. However, the density and geographic concentration of buyouts in specific neighborhoods produced community-scale outcomes in practice. Additionally, the decommissioning of the Peachtree Wastewater Treatment Plant and the removal of five junkyards constitute managed realignment of infrastructure out of the floodplain; these were explicitly pursued through the same disaster recovery funding framework (McCann 2006). \"Managed realignment of infrastructure\" is therefore coded as a secondary element.\n\n\"Community buyout/retreat\" is not selected as the primary code, as the program operated through individual voluntary agreements rather than a coordinated community relocation process with collective decision-making.\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Legal authority over retreat**, **Relevant regulations/acts**, **Home acquisition**, **Land acquisition**, **Title(s) transfer**, **Compliance & enforcement**, and **Other** (heir property complications; duplication of benefits rule; House Bill 1783 controversy).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Legal authority over retreat:** FEMA's HMGP program prohibits use of eminent domain; acquisitions must be voluntary and communities must notify property owners in writing that eminent domain will not be used if a voluntary agreement is not reached (McCann 2006, citing FEMA 1998). Kinston officials acknowledged they could theoretically have used eminent domain but did not see it as a viable option, particularly given it would disqualify the city from HMGP funds (McCann 2006).\n\n- **Relevant regulations/acts:** HMGP regulations required that acquired land be maintained as open space in perpetuity and that structures be demolished within 90 days of closing (McCann 2006). FEMA's 100-year floodplain mapping determined eligibility, but inaccurate floodplain maps created obstacles when homes outside the mapped floodplain were flooded (McCann 2006). The Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 (cited in de Vries and Fraser 2017) mandated that property owners with repetitive losses were held responsible for damage if they chose not to leave the 100-year floodplain.\n\n- **Home acquisition / Land acquisition / Title(s) transfer:** The process required property appraisals, title searches, legal surveys, and deed transactions. \"Heir property\" — properties passed down without legal wills — was among the most time-consuming tasks; in some cases requiring sign-off from up to 30–40 heirs for a single property (McCann 2006).\n\n- **Compliance & enforcement:** After Floyd, the city used security checkpoints to restrict access to flooded areas for over a month, and then passed a six-month moratorium on any new construction or additions — an act that was never officially rescinded — to reduce re-occupation and rebuilding before buyouts could be completed (McCann 2006).\n\n- **Other (duplication of benefits):** FEMA's \"duplication of benefits\" rule required that flood insurance payouts be subtracted from buyout compensation, which insured owners perceived as a penalty and which generated resistance among some participants (McCann 2006).\n\n- **Other (House Bill 1783):** De Vries and Fraser (2017) document that the City Attorney invoked House Bill 1783 of the 1999 NC General Assembly (Section 2.2) to permit rehabilitation of condemned homes for flood victims, creating a legal ambiguity about the meaning of \"condemnation\" that was central to the refurbished-homes controversy.\n\n\"Land rezoning\" is not coded because the sources do not document formal rezoning of floodplain parcels. The construction moratorium restricted new development but is not the same as a rezoning of land use classifications.\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project?\n\n**Answer:** **Multiple funders** — **Federal**, **State/Provincial**, **Local/Municipal**, and **NGOs**.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Federal (FEMA HMGP):** Provided 75% of acquisition costs; approximately $30 million county-wide per the FEMA case study; largest single HMGP housing application sought over $23.5 million (McCann 2006).\n- **Federal (HUD CDBG):** Community Development Block Grants, approximately $24.9 million, for relocation housing and community development components (McCann 2006).\n- **State (NC — SARF):** State Acquisition and Relocation Fund provided supplemental relocation assistance (~$35,000 per household), enabling residents to purchase replacement homes; administered by NC Division of Community Assistance (McCann 2006).\n- **State (NC Division of Emergency Management):** Administered HMGP at the state level; provided the balance of HMGP match (~$10 million county-wide, FEMA case study).\n- **State (Governor's relief fund):** $1.5 million for construction materials for replacement housing under the NC Permanent Housing Initiative (McCann 2006; FEMA case study).\n- **Local/Municipal:** Kinston advanced funds for the program and was later reimbursed — a critical flexibility that distinguished it from other communities (McCann 2006).\n- **Clean Water Management Trust Fund:** Grant for acquiring remaining vacant lots post-2005 (McCann 2006).\n- **NGOs / non-profit:** GKCDC received land grants from the NC Community Development Initiative for the refurbishment initiative (de Vries and Fraser 2017). Conservation Fund partnered on the Green Infrastructure Plan. EDA grant ($1.05 million) funded the Kinston Enterprise Center (McCann 2006).\n- **Private sector (tax credits):** Low-income housing tax credits and historic preservation tax credits used for Grainger Place (McCann 2006).\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Assisting BO recipients to find housing in community**, **New housing for BO recipients**, **Redevelopment of retreat lands** (partially), and **New industry**.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Assisting BO recipients to find housing in community:** A central explicit objective. SARF funds were conditioned on residents relocating within Kinston city limits. Approximately 90% of participants relocated within city limits; McCann (2006) describes this as creating a net tax gain because equity on new homes was generally substantially higher than on the flooded homes. Simultaneous closings ensured smooth transitions. The FEMA case study states that \"97 percent of those residents\" relocated within the tax district.\n\n- **New housing for BO recipients:** The \"Call Kinston Home\" initiative and NC Permanent Housing Initiative built 170 single-family homes on infill lots and approximately 100 homes through the inmate-panel program (McCann 2006; FEMA case study). Grainger Place created 57 units of senior housing and 100 additional multi-family units.\n\n- **Redevelopment of retreat lands:** The acquired floodplain was maintained as open space per FEMA requirements; the Green Infrastructure Plan proposed recreational, educational, and economic uses that could generate future value, though this remained in early implementation stages at the time of the sources. This element is therefore partial.\n\n- **New industry:** The Kinston Enterprise Center (business incubator, $1.05 million EDA grant) was explicitly framed as economic development to stimulate entrepreneurship and revitalize the downtown tax base (McCann 2006).\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Market value** (pre-disaster), **Additional incentives/bonuses/top-ups**, and **Free supports and services**.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Market value (pre-disaster):** HMGP requires pre-disaster fair market value as determined by a licensed appraiser; this was the base compensation offered (McCann 2006; FEMA case study).\n\n- **Additional incentives/bonuses/top-ups:** A relocation allowance of approximately $35,000 (SARF) was provided on top of the home purchase price, conditioned on purchasing replacement housing within Kinston city limits (McCann 2006).\n\n- **Free supports and services:** The city paid all closing costs and real estate transaction costs (appraisals, title searches, surveys). A real estate agent helped relocated families find new homes. The city administered simultaneous closings to facilitate smooth transitions. A video was produced explaining the entire process to residents. Counseling sessions were held to prepare residents for higher bills in new homes and to advise against home equity loan risk (McCann 2006).\n\n- **Note on duplication of benefits:** Residents who had flood insurance had the insurance payment subtracted from their purchase price under FEMA's \"duplication of benefits\" rule, which was a source of conflict and perceived inequity (McCann 2006). Post-disaster value was not used; the program maintained pre-disaster FMV.\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS42", "chunk_index": 3, "section": "planning_processes", "location": "Kinston, North Carolina", "country": "United States", "country_normalized": "United States", "continent": "North America", "admin_area": "North Carolina", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Kinston", "source_links": [ { "title": "Siders, A. R. (2019). Social justice implications of US managed retreat buyout programs. Climatic Change, 152(2), 239-257. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", "doi": "10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-018-2272-5" }, { "title": "McCann, M. (2006). Case Study of Floodplain Acquisition/Relocation Project in Kinston, NC after Hurricane Fran (1996) and Hurricane Floyd (1999). University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill master's paper", "doi": "10.17615/rhp8-te06", "url": "https://doi.org/10.17615/rhp8-te06" }, { "title": "de Vries, D., & Shmelev, S. (2017). Historical waterscape trajectories that need care: the unwanted refurbished flood homes of Kinston's devolved disaster mitigation program. Journal of Political Ecology, 24(1). https://doi.org/10.2458/v24i1.20976", "doi": "10.2458/v24i1.20976", "url": "https://doi.org/10.2458/v24i1.20976" }, { "title": "FEMA (n.d.). Innovative Floodplain Management Case Studies: Kinston, North Carolina. Federal Emergency Management Agency.", "url": "https://www.fema.gov/pdf/casestudys/kinston_cs.pdf" }, { "title": "NOAA Office for Coastal Management (n.d.). Out of Harm's Way: Relocation Strategies to Reduce Flood Risk. NOAA Digital Coast Peer-to-Peer Case Study.", "url": "https://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/training/kinston-flood-risk.html" } ], "text": "Case study: Kinston (Kinston, North Carolina, United States)\nSection: Planning Processes\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Pre-retreat planning**, **Immediate risks: 1–5 years**, **Anticipated future risks: 10–100 years**, and **Post-retreat follow-up**.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Pre-retreat planning:** COHMIT was created within 30 days of Fran to develop a hazard mitigation plan (McCann 2006). After Floyd, Kinston's experience allowed preparation and submission of a pre-disaster application package that was approved within one week (NOAA Digital Coast). The Greater Kinston Urban Growth Plan was adopted to guide long-term recovery.\n\n- **Immediate risks (1–5 years):** Given repeated hurricane strikes, the city treated flood risk as immediate and acted urgently to move residents out quickly, in part to prevent re-occupation (McCann 2006).\n\n- **Anticipated future risks (10–100 years):** The goal of permanently removing all residential structures from the 100-year floodplain, and the FEMA requirement that acquired land remain open space in perpetuity, reflect a multi-generational time horizon. GIS was used to map 100- and 500-year floodplains (FEMA case study; McCann 2006).\n\n- **Post-retreat follow-up:** Ongoing maintenance of acquired open space, continued acquisition of remaining vacant lots (Clean Water Management Trust Fund grant, ~2005), Green Infrastructure Plan development, and housing counseling for relocated residents all reflect post-retreat follow-up (McCann 2006).\n\n\"Emerging risks: 5–10 years\" is not separately coded as the sources do not explicitly discuss a distinct 5–10 year horizon; the planning addressed both immediate and long-term timeframes.\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Top-down** (primary governance structure), with elements of **Multi-sectoral**, **Participatory/collaborative**, **Adaptive management**, **Cost-benefit analysis**, **Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions**, **Bureaucracy reduction** (as implementation strategy), and **Multi-stage retreat**.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Top-down:** The program was initiated and administered by city and county government in coordination with state and federal agencies. Decisions were government-led (McCann 2006).\n\n- **Multi-sectoral:** The recovery integrated housing, environmental, economic development, and infrastructure sectors. COHMIT brought together city, county, emergency management, community development, and other agencies (McCann 2006).\n\n- **Participatory/collaborative:** Community meetings were held; a video was produced to educate residents; the KARE volunteer network mobilized community support; the Conservation Fund and UNC Chapel Hill participated in green infrastructure planning (McCann 2006; FEMA case study). However, de Vries and Fraser (2017) note significant gaps in genuine community participation — notably, no community notification or input regarding the refurbishment and relocation of flood-contaminated homes into receiving neighborhoods.\n\n- **Adaptive management:** After Fran, the city learned from mistakes (e.g., failure to prevent re-occupation) and implemented more effective strategies after Floyd, including the construction moratorium and access restrictions (McCann 2006).\n\n- **CBA:** HMGP eligibility required a FEMA-approved cost-benefit analysis. Losses avoided ($6,387,000 from the first 101 acquisitions) were explicitly calculated (McCann 2006, Table 1).\n\n- **Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions:** Extensive coordination between city, county, state, and federal levels; GIS used to manage information across levels (McCann 2006; FEMA case study).\n\n- **Bureaucracy reduction:** Kinston advanced funds locally rather than waiting for federal reimbursement — a deliberate strategy to cut through bureaucratic delays (McCann 2006). This is better characterized as an implementation tactic than a formal planning element, but it was intentional and significant.\n\n- **Multi-stage retreat:** The program operated in phases: Fran-era acquisitions began in 1998, Floyd-era acquisitions were rolled into the same program in 1999, and vacant lot acquisition continued through 2005+ (McCann 2006).\n\n\"Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA)\" and \"Bottom-up\" are not coded as the sources do not clearly document use of formal MCDA tools or a community-led bottom-up planning process.\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** **Hazard maps and models**, **CBA**, **Housing assessment**, **Social vulnerability assessments**, **Demographic projections**, and **Process guidance**.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Hazard maps and models:** GIS was central to the program. Kinston used GIS to display 100- and 500-year floodplains, track acquisitions, and illustrate flood risk. Existing floodplain maps were found to be inaccurate — homes outside the mapped 100-year floodplain were flooded — creating eligibility complications; GIS was used to remap (McCann 2006; FEMA case study).\n\n- **CBA:** Required for HMGP eligibility; losses-avoided calculations were documented (McCann 2006, Table 1).\n\n- **Housing assessment:** GIS was used to develop a demographic profile of the floodplain and determine how many homes were needed and at what price ranges to enable relocation within city limits (FEMA case study; McCann 2006).\n\n- **Social vulnerability assessments:** GIS databases included information on special needs populations (elderly, infants, handicapped), socio-economic data (renters, homeowners, annual incomes), and repetitive loss data (FEMA case study).\n\n- **Demographic projections:** GIS was used to develop relocation needs projections (FEMA case study; McCann 2006).\n\n- **Process guidance:** FEMA's Property Acquisition Handbook for Local Communities (FEMA 1998) provided guidance; COHMIT workshops brought state and federal guidance to local planners (McCann 2006).\n\nClimate change projection models," } ]