[ { "case_id": "CS45", "chunk_index": 0, "section": "overview", "location": "Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town, Ankang City Shaanxi Province", "country": "China", "country_normalized": "China", "continent": "Asia", "admin_area": "Ankang City Shaanxi Province", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town", "source_links": [ { "title": "Xiao, Q., Liu, H., & Feldman, M. W. (2021). Is change of natural capital essential for assessing relocation policies? A case from Baihe county in western China. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 39(6), 441-449. https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805", "doi": "10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805" }, { "title": "Shi, J., Hu, X., Guo, X., & Lian, C. (2020). Risk Information Seeking Behavior in Disaster Resettlement: A Case Study of Ankang City, China. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(19), 7352. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197352", "doi": "10.3390/ijerph17197352", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197352" }, { "title": "Xiao, Q., Liu, H., & Feldman, M. (2018). Assessing Livelihood Reconstruction in Resettlement Program for Disaster Prevention at Baihe County of China: Extension of the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model. Sustainability, 10(8), 2913. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082913", "doi": "10.3390/su10082913", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082913", "pdf_url": "https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/8/2913/pdf?version=1534566173" } ], "text": "Case study: Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town (Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town, Ankang City Shaanxi Province, China)\nSection: Case Study Overview (Briefing Note)\n\n**Case name and location:** Resettlement of South Shaanxi (RSS), also referred to as the Disaster-Preventive Resettlement Engineering (DPRE) program. The program covers the cities of Ankang, Hanzhong, and Shangluo, located in the hinterland of the Qinling and Daba Mountains in southern Shaanxi Province, China. Sub-case areas examined in the reviewed sources include Ziyang County (within Ankang City) and Baihe County (in eastern Ankang City).\n\n**Hazard(s):** Multiple natural hazards, primarily riverine/pluvial flooding and geological hazards (landslides, debris flows, and collapses). Earthquakes are cited as part of the broader regional hazard context. Storms and mudslides are also referenced.\n\n**Type of retreat:** Government-initiated, large-scale community resettlement program. The dominant mode involves the permanent relocation of rural households from hazard-prone mountain villages to consolidated resettlement communities in towns or newly constructed sites. The program is explicitly framed as combining disaster prevention with poverty alleviation and urbanization. Multiple relocation modes are available, ranging from individual scattered relocation to collective village consolidation.\n\n**Scale:** According to the original RSS plans, about 380,000 local households (approximately 1.4 million people) were to be resettled by the end of 2015, and about 600,000 local households (2.44 million residents) by the end of 2020. The program involves people from 6,253 villages, representing 26.38% of the population in southern Shaanxi Province. In Ziyang County, 37,200 households and 129,000 people were targeted; by 2018, 26,817 households and 93,226 people had been relocated, and the employment resettlement rate had reached 80%. In Baihe County, approximately 12,600 people in 107 villages were identified as requiring resettlement under the DPRE plan.\n\n**Key actors:** The program was launched as a Chinese government initiative. The Shaanxi provincial government is the primary implementing authority, having issued a formal notice on implementing measures for the program. Local governments at city and county levels manage day-to-day implementation. Village committees and village officials play a critical role as primary information channels and community-level intermediaries. The reviewed sources do not describe significant NGO or international involvement.\n\n**Timeline:** The program was formally launched in May 2011, with an operational period of ten years (2011–2020). Field research reviewed in the sources covers conditions observed in 2018 and 2019, indicating the program was ongoing at the time of publication. The reviewed sources do not describe a formal retreat-land post-retreat governance stage.\n\n**Key outcomes:** The sources describe RSS/DPRE as the largest disaster resettlement in China's history. Reported outcomes include: a reduction in disaster-related mortality (the sources report that annual disaster death rates in southern Shaanxi declined after 2011 to about 20–30% of their pre-program level, citing LODRP 2015); poverty alleviation (the sources report that resettlers' annual income rose from about USD 610 in 2010 to about USD 1,395 in 2015, alongside broader poverty reduction — 410,000 people overcame poverty in the three project cities); and improved physical infrastructure and services at resettlement sites. However, the program remains contested. Persistent challenges include: increased unemployment following loss of farmland; social conflicts (petitions, sit-ins, demonstrations) documented in Ziyang County; insufficient and mismatched risk communication; loss of natural capital; and persistent livelihood insecurity. In Xiao et al.'s (2018) survey, 52.0% of Baihe County respondents said they would refuse displacement or move back if they had difficulties.\n\n**Narrative summary:**\n\nThe RSS/DPRE program is a large-scale, government-initiated managed retreat, relocating millions of rural residents from geologically hazardous and flood-prone mountain areas in southern Shaanxi Province, China, to newly developed resettlement communities. Launched in May 2011 by the Shaanxi provincial government, the program is explicitly framed as serving two simultaneous goals: disaster prevention and poverty alleviation. Rather than responding to a single catastrophic event, the program is proactive — identifying chronic risks from flooding, landslides, and earthquakes and systematically relocating exposed populations before further disaster losses occur. The sources describe it as the largest disaster resettlement in China's history.\n\nThe program operates through a top-down government structure, though the state formally requires that relocated populations be \"actually willing to move\" and provides flexible choices about timing and relocation mode. In practice, researchers have described voluntarism as falling along a spectrum from \"induced voluntarism\" to \"coercive voluntarism,\" reflecting tensions between stated principles and implementation realities. Multiple relocation modes are available — from individual scattered relocation to collective village consolidation — and the majority of households in Baihe County chose modes that maintained proximity to existing social networks. Rather than following a traditional land-for-land replacement model, the program is framed as income-based resettlement, providing compensation in the form of money and houses alongside employment training and support services.\n\nDespite measurable achievements in disaster risk reduction and poverty alleviation, the program faces persistent challenges. Residents have lost farmland and natural capital that previously supported livelihoods, and alternative employment opportunities at resettlement sites have not fully compensated for these losses. Risk communication is inadequate: the sources find a mismatch between the main information channel used (village committees and officials) and the most trusted channel (news broadcasts), which likely reduces information dissemination efficiency. Social conflicts, including sit-ins and petitions, have been documented where perceived unfairness in compensation, livelihood disruption, and inadequate services remain unaddressed. These tensions illustrate the difficulty of executing large-scale, government-led managed retreat at scale and underscore the importance of livelihood restoration, transparent communication, and adaptive post-resettlement support.\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS45", "chunk_index": 1, "section": "coding_questions", "location": "Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town, Ankang City Shaanxi Province", "country": "China", "country_normalized": "China", "continent": "Asia", "admin_area": "Ankang City Shaanxi Province", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town", "source_links": [ { "title": "Xiao, Q., Liu, H., & Feldman, M. W. (2021). Is change of natural capital essential for assessing relocation policies? A case from Baihe county in western China. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 39(6), 441-449. https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805", "doi": "10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805" }, { "title": "Shi, J., Hu, X., Guo, X., & Lian, C. (2020). Risk Information Seeking Behavior in Disaster Resettlement: A Case Study of Ankang City, China. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(19), 7352. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197352", "doi": "10.3390/ijerph17197352", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197352" }, { "title": "Xiao, Q., Liu, H., & Feldman, M. (2018). Assessing Livelihood Reconstruction in Resettlement Program for Disaster Prevention at Baihe County of China: Extension of the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model. Sustainability, 10(8), 2913. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082913", "doi": "10.3390/su10082913", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082913", "pdf_url": "https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/8/2913/pdf?version=1534566173" } ], "text": "Case study: Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town (Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town, Ankang City Shaanxi Province, China)\nSection: Coding Questions\n\n---\n\n### Is there any evidence of a proactive or reactive trigger in the MR decision process? (Reactive/Proactive)\n\n**Answer:** Proactive.\n\n**Narrative:** The RSS/DPRE program was launched in May 2011 as a deliberate, forward-looking disaster mitigation and preparedness initiative, not as a direct response to a single catastrophic event. Shi et al. (2020) describe it as \"a disaster mitigation and preparedness program.\" Xiao et al. (2018) describe it as \"a proactive plan for disaster-preventive resettlement engineering (DPRE) in southern Shaanxi to operate from 2011 to 2020.\" The program systematically identifies populations at persistent chronic risk from floods, landslides, and earthquakes and relocates them before further loss of life occurs.\n\nAlthough the broader regional context includes prior disaster experience — including the Wenchuan earthquake (2008) and Jiuzhaigou earthquake (2017), referenced in Shi et al. (2020) as making surveys highly relevant to residents' daily lives — the program itself is not a direct post-disaster recovery response to any single event. The Codebook definition of \"Proactive\" — planned in advance to reduce future risk before major impacts occur — applies clearly here.\n\n---\n\n### Date, Number of households affected, Number of population affected, Total funding\n\n**Date:** Program formally launched May 2011; operational period 2011–2020.\n\n**Number of households affected (program-wide targets):**\n- Original RSS plan: approximately 380,000 local households to be resettled by end of 2015; approximately 600,000 local households by end of 2020 (Shi et al. 2020).\n- Ziyang County sub-case: 37,200 households targeted; 26,817 households relocated by 2018 (Shi et al. 2020).\n- Baihe County sub-case: approximately 12,600 people in 107 villages (approximately 83.6% of the county) identified as requiring resettlement under the DPRE plan (Xiao et al. 2018).\n\n**Number of people affected:**\n- Original RSS plan: approximately 1.4 million people by end of 2015; approximately 2.44 million residents by end of 2020 (Shi et al. 2020).\n- People from 6,253 villages — representing 26.38% of the population in southern Shaanxi Province — are involved in the program (Shi et al. 2020).\n- Ziyang County: 129,000 people targeted; 93,226 relocated by 2018 (Shi et al. 2020).\n\n**Total funding:** No specific total funding figure is reported in the reviewed sources. Shi et al. (2020) state that \"the state provides support policies and commercial loans\" and encourages flexible choices about relocation timing and method. The program was initiated and overseen by the Shaanxi provincial government. Research funding for the individual academic studies is noted (provincial and national science foundations) but does not reflect program-level funding.\n\n**Uncertainty:** The total financial investment in the RSS/DPRE program and a breakdown of funding streams are not reported in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What is the occurrence of the hazard(s) considered in the MR decision process? (Single Hazard/Multiple Hazards)\n\n**Answer:** Multiple Hazards.\n\n**Narrative:** The reviewed sources consistently identify multiple co-occurring natural hazards. Shi et al. (2020) state that the program area \"has experienced serious flood- and earthquake-related disasters.\" Xiao et al. (2018) note that \"local residents are threatened by storms, floods, and geological disasters\" and that the DPRE program relocates populations due to both geological hazards (60.58% of relocatees) and flood disasters (39.44%). Xiao & Liu (2021) document 281 geological hazard sites in Baihe County alone, including 258 landslide sites, 11 debris flow sites, and 12 collapse sites. Earthquakes are part of the broader regional hazard context. These hazards co-occur in the same mountainous terrain and in some cases may act as cascading hazards, satisfying the codebook definition of Multiple Hazards.\n\n---\n\n### What is the origin of the hazards considered in the MR decision process? (Technological Hazard/Natural Hazard)\n\n**Answer:** Natural Hazard.\n\n**Narrative:** All hazards referenced — flooding, landslides, debris flows, collapses, earthquakes, and storms — are natural in origin. Technological hazards are not mentioned in the reviewed sources. The Codebook defines natural hazards as naturally occurring events such as earthquakes, floods, and geological disasters, which precisely describes the hazard context here.\n\n---\n\n### Was this hazard considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Riverine/Pluvial Flooding:** Yes. Flooding from rivers and heavy rainfall in the mountainous Qinling/Daba region is a primary driver. The DPRE program attributes 39.44% of relocations to flood disasters (Xiao et al. 2018). Shi et al. (2020) describe \"serious flood- and earthquake-related disasters\" in the program area.\n\n**Landslide/Debris Flow:** Yes. Geological hazards — landslides, debris flows, and collapses — are the single largest driver, accounting for 60.58% of DPRE relocations (Xiao et al. 2018). Baihe County alone had 258 landslide sites, 11 debris flow sites, and 12 collapse sites documented by local government (Xiao et al. 2018; Xiao & Liu 2021).\n\n**Earthquake:** Yes. The region is located in a plate fault zone and has experienced significant earthquakes. The Wenchuan (2008) and Jiuzhaigou (2017) earthquakes are referenced by Shi et al. (2020) as part of the regional hazard context that makes resettlement highly salient to residents. Earthquakes are cited as part of the broader regional hazard context rather than a directly measured trigger for individual relocations.\n\n**Other (Storms/Mudslides):** Storms and mudslides are referenced in Xiao et al. (2018) and Shi et al. (2020) as additional hazards threatening the program area.\n\n**Not applicable:** Coastal Flooding/Erosion, Lake Flooding/Erosion, Wildfire, Volcano, Land Subsidence, Tsunami, Hurricane.\n\n---\n\n### What was the geographic scale of the MR project? (Individual homes), (A few streets), (Neighbourhood), (Entire community), (Sub-watershed), (Watershed region)\n\n**Answer:** Entire Community and Watershed Region.\n\n**Narrative:** The RSS/DPRE program operates at a massive geographic scale, encompassing three cities (Ankang, Hanzhong, Shangluo), multiple counties, and thousands of villages across the Qinling and Daba Mountain watersheds. People from 6,253 villages — 26.38% of the southern Shaanxi population — are involved (Shi et al. 2020). Individual sub-cases (Baihe County, Ziyang County) each involve entire county-scale communities. The program spans watershed regions as well as entire communities within those watersheds. Both \"Entire Community\" and \"Watershed Region\" categories apply.\n\n---\n\n### Who or what was retreated? (Individuals), (Groups/Neighbourhoods), (Communities), (Critical infrastructure), (Hazard protection structures), (Industrial assets)\n\n**Answer:** Individuals, Groups/Neighbourhoods, and Communities.\n\n**Narrative:** The program primarily retreats individual rural households, but the dominant relocation mode documented in Baihe County is collective — either rebuilding new villages based on original villages or merging small villages into larger ones. More than 72.44% of households in Baihe County chose these collective modes (Xiao & Liu 2021). This reflects both individual-level relocation decisions and group/community-level resettlement. At the program scale, entire village communities are effectively relocated. No evidence of infrastructure realignment, hazard protection structures, or industrial asset relocation is reported in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### Other notes (General Information)\n\nThe program is explicitly linked to poverty alleviation alongside disaster prevention — a dual framing that distinguishes it from purely hazard-driven retreats. Integration of urbanization goals (turning farmers into non-agricultural citizens through income-based rather than land-based compensation) is a distinctive feature. The sources describe RSS as the largest disaster resettlement in China's history, though this characterization appears in the academic papers as a contextual statement rather than an independently verified ranking.\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS45", "chunk_index": 2, "section": "institutional_environment", "location": "Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town, Ankang City Shaanxi Province", "country": "China", "country_normalized": "China", "continent": "Asia", "admin_area": "Ankang City Shaanxi Province", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town", "source_links": [ { "title": "Xiao, Q., Liu, H., & Feldman, M. W. (2021). Is change of natural capital essential for assessing relocation policies? A case from Baihe county in western China. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 39(6), 441-449. https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805", "doi": "10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805" }, { "title": "Shi, J., Hu, X., Guo, X., & Lian, C. (2020). Risk Information Seeking Behavior in Disaster Resettlement: A Case Study of Ankang City, China. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(19), 7352. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197352", "doi": "10.3390/ijerph17197352", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197352" }, { "title": "Xiao, Q., Liu, H., & Feldman, M. (2018). Assessing Livelihood Reconstruction in Resettlement Program for Disaster Prevention at Baihe County of China: Extension of the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model. Sustainability, 10(8), 2913. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082913", "doi": "10.3390/su10082913", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082913", "pdf_url": "https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/8/2913/pdf?version=1534566173" } ], "text": "Case study: Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town (Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town, Ankang City Shaanxi Province, China)\nSection: Institutional Environment\n\n---\n\n### What is the focus or scope of the MR project? (Individual buyout/retreat), (Community buyout/retreat), (Leasebacks, easements and buffers), (Other acquisition tools), (Managed realignment of infrastructure)\n\n**Answer:** Community buyout/retreat, with elements of Individual buyout/retreat.\n\n**Narrative:** The dominant mode is community-level collective resettlement. In Baihe County, over 72.44% of households chose modes involving rebuilding new villages based on original villages or merging villages — reflecting coordinated community-level planning (Xiao & Liu 2021). However, individual-level modes (independently scattered relocation, autonomous emigration, relocation to towns) are also available and used by a minority of households. The program involves government-organized construction of resettlement communities and compensation for housing. There is no evidence in the reviewed sources of leasebacks, easements, or managed infrastructure realignment without population movement.\n\n---\n\n### What legal constraints or requirements were identified during the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Relevant regulations/acts; Compliance & enforcement (with caution, see below). The sources do not explicitly support Home acquisition, Land acquisition, Title(s) transfer, or Land rezoning as documented legal processes in this case.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Relevant regulations/acts:** The People's Government of Shaanxi Province issued a formal \"Notice of the General Office of the People's Government of Shaanxi Province on Printing and Distributing Measures for the Implementation of the Resettlement in Southern Shaanxi,\" establishing the legal and policy basis for the program (cited in Shi et al. 2020 as reference [54]). The state formally requires that \"governments at all levels ensure that relocated people are actually willing to move\" (Shi et al. 2020).\n\n- **Compliance & enforcement:** Social conflicts including shangfang (petitioning high-level government authorities), jingzuo (sit-ins), demonstrations, and refusals to resettle are documented in Shi et al. (2020). Some confrontations between peasants and local governments resulted in injury and even death. Researchers describe voluntarism along a spectrum from \"induced voluntarism\" to \"coercive voluntarism\" (citing Liu et al. 2020; Xue et al. 2013; Wu et al. 2016, as referenced in Shi et al. 2020). This implies implementation pressure and enforcement challenges, though formal legal enforcement mechanisms are not explicitly described.\n\n- **Home acquisition, Land acquisition, Titles transfer, Land rezoning:** The reviewed sources do not explicitly describe formal legal processes for home acquisition, land acquisition, title transfer, or rezoning. Compensation for housing is a central element of the program, but the specific legal procedures involved are not detailed in the reviewed sources. These categories are therefore not coded as present.\n\n**Uncertainty:** Specific legal statutes, property law provisions, and detailed land transaction procedures are not described in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What were the funding sources for the MR project? (Local/Municipal only), (Provincial/State only), (Federal only), (Multiple funders), (International aid), (Local/Municipal), (Provincial/State), (Federal), (Individual), (NGOs), (Lenders), (Insurance)\n\n**Answer:** Multiple funders — Provincial/State and Lenders (commercial loans). Federal funding is not separately documented in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Narrative:** Shi et al. (2020) state that \"the state provides support policies and commercial loans, and encourages people to make flexible choices with respect to the time and method of relocation.\" The program was initiated and is overseen by the Shaanxi provincial government (Provincial/State). Commercial loans are mentioned as part of the support package available to resettlers (Lenders), though the sources do not specify the exact terms or use of these loans. Local government co-funding is implied by the multi-level governance structure, but is not explicitly described as a distinct funding stream. The sources do not provide evidence of a separate federal/national funding stream distinguishable from the provincial/state level in the codebook sense. No evidence of international aid, NGO funding, or insurance mechanisms is found in the reviewed sources.\n\n**Uncertainty:** Specific funding amounts, proportions, and detailed financing structures are not reported in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What was considered to maintain (or improve) the tax base in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** The reviewed sources do not explicitly discuss tax base planning as a goal of the RSS/DPRE program. No tax-base-specific category is clearly supported.\n\n**Narrative:** The program includes employment training, pre-job training, and reemployment support — components that sustain economic activity in resettlement areas (Xiao et al. 2018; Xiao & Liu 2021). The construction of new concentrated resettlement communities creates settled populations in receiving areas. However, the reviewed sources frame these elements as livelihood restoration and poverty alleviation measures, not as deliberate tax base planning. The reviewed sources do not describe any explicit government intent to maintain or enhance local tax revenue as a planning goal. Coding this category as present would require inferring beyond what the sources state.\n\n---\n\n### What level/type of compensation mechanisms were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Other (income/livelihoods-based compensation replacing land-for-land model); Free supports and services (employment training, pre-job training); partial evidence of compensation for housing (assessed value, not explicitly market or tax value).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Compensation for housing:** Cash compensation is provided for house relocation. Xiao et al.'s (2018) survey includes an item asking whether resettlers are \"satisfied with the current compensation standard for house purchase\" (X9), suggesting a standardized assessed value is applied. The specific valuation methodology is not described.\n\n- **Income-based compensation replacing land-for-land:** Xiao et al. (2018) explicitly note that the program modifies the IRR model's \"land-based resettlement\" to \"income-based resettlement,\" providing money or houses as compensation for lost farmland rather than land-for-land replacement. This reflects a deliberate policy departure from traditional land compensation models under urbanization trends.\n\n- **Free supports and services:** Employment training, pre-job training, and government-organized knowledge and skills training are components of the program (Xiao et al. 2018; Xiao & Liu 2021). The program also provides new housing and improved infrastructure at resettlement sites.\n\n- **Commercial loans:** Shi et al. (2020) note commercial loans are part of the support package, though their specific terms are not described.\n\n- **Natural capital compensation:** Xiao & Liu (2021) note that \"natural capital compensation commonly falls short of resettlers' expectations\" and that resettlers are \"dissatisfied with the reduction in natural assets,\" even when satisfied with other aspects of relocation. This suggests compensation does not fully replace natural capital losses.\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS45", "chunk_index": 3, "section": "planning_processes", "location": "Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town, Ankang City Shaanxi Province", "country": "China", "country_normalized": "China", "continent": "Asia", "admin_area": "Ankang City Shaanxi Province", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town", "source_links": [ { "title": "Xiao, Q., Liu, H., & Feldman, M. W. (2021). Is change of natural capital essential for assessing relocation policies? A case from Baihe county in western China. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 39(6), 441-449. https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805", "doi": "10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805" }, { "title": "Shi, J., Hu, X., Guo, X., & Lian, C. (2020). Risk Information Seeking Behavior in Disaster Resettlement: A Case Study of Ankang City, China. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(19), 7352. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197352", "doi": "10.3390/ijerph17197352", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197352" }, { "title": "Xiao, Q., Liu, H., & Feldman, M. (2018). Assessing Livelihood Reconstruction in Resettlement Program for Disaster Prevention at Baihe County of China: Extension of the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model. Sustainability, 10(8), 2913. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082913", "doi": "10.3390/su10082913", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082913", "pdf_url": "https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/8/2913/pdf?version=1534566173" } ], "text": "Case study: Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town (Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town, Ankang City Shaanxi Province, China)\nSection: Planning Processes\n\n---\n\n### What is the time horizon considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Pre-retreat planning; Immediate risks (1–5 years); Emerging risks (5–10 years); Post-retreat follow-up (limited evidence).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Pre-retreat planning:** The program involved formal planning prior to implementation, including the issuance of a provincial government notice, identification of hazard areas, selection of resettlement sites, and construction of resettlement communities (Shi et al. 2020; Xiao et al. 2018).\n\n- **Immediate and emerging risks:** The program responds to documented existing chronic hazard exposure (281 geological hazard sites in Baihe County; chronic flood and earthquake risk). The 10-year program window (2011–2020) with staged targets (2015 and 2020 benchmarks) reflects both immediate and emerging risk horizons.\n\n- **Post-retreat follow-up:** Some post-resettlement monitoring is evident. Employment resettlement rates are tracked (80% in Ziyang County by 2018; Shi et al. 2020). Academic research surveying resettlers in 2018 and 2019 provides data on livelihood outcomes. However, formal post-retreat follow-up frameworks or systematic monitoring programs are not described in detail in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What planning elements were considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Top-down; Multi-sectoral (partial); Multi-stage retreat; Degree of transparency (stated but inadequate in practice); Coordination with other sectors and jurisdictions; Participatory/collaborative (very limited/constrained).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Top-down:** The program is clearly government-initiated and government-led at provincial, city, and county levels. Planning and implementation authority rests with governments at all levels (Shi et al. 2020; Xiao et al. 2018).\n\n- **Multi-sectoral:** The program integrates disaster prevention, poverty alleviation, urbanization, housing, employment, and — according to local authorities — environmental restoration goals (Shi et al. 2020). Cross-sectoral coordination mechanisms are not described in detail.\n\n- **Multi-stage retreat:** The program operates over a 10-year horizon with staged targets (2015 and 2020 benchmarks), implying phased implementation.\n\n- **Degree of transparency:** Transparency is a stated goal — the state formally requires willingness to move — but in practice, Shi et al. (2020) document significant information insufficiency among resettlers. Respondents reported insufficient understanding of resettlement scope, site pros and cons, and supporting policies. This suggests limited transparency in implementation.\n\n- **Participatory/collaborative:** Very limited. The state formally requires that residents be \"actually willing to move,\" and multiple relocation modes are offered. Village committees serve as engagement intermediaries. However, researchers describe the process as ranging from \"induced\" to \"coercive\" voluntarism, suggesting participation is constrained (Shi et al. 2020, citing Liu et al. 2020; Xue et al. 2013; Wu et al. 2016).\n\n- **Cost-benefit analysis, MCDA, Adaptive management, Bottom-up, Public-private partnerships, Bureaucracy reduction:** Not documented in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What decision support tools were used in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Hazard maps & models (inferred from documented hazard sites, not explicitly stated); Process guidance (provincial implementing notice). Social vulnerability assessments are not explicitly documented as formal tools.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Hazard maps & models:** The local government of Baihe County documented 281 geological hazard sites, including 258 landslide sites, 11 debris flow sites, and 12 collapse sites (Xiao et al. 2018; Xiao & Liu 2021). The DPRE plan categorizes relocations by hazard type (60.58% geological hazards, 39.44% flood disasters; Xiao et al. 2018), suggesting systematic hazard identification. However, the reviewed sources do not explicitly describe the use of hazard maps or spatial modeling tools as planning instruments. The county's documented hazard sites imply some form of hazard assessment, but the specific tools used are not described.\n\n- **Process guidance:** The Shaanxi provincial government notice on implementing measures for the RSS constitutes a form of process guidance for multi-level government implementation (Shi et al. 2020, reference [54]).\n\n- **Social vulnerability assessments:** The targeting of high-poverty, high-hazard areas (Ziyang County, Baihe County) for priority resettlement suggests some form of socioeconomic prioritization. However, the reviewed sources do not describe a formal vulnerability assessment tool or scoring methodology. Coding this as present would be inferential.\n\n- **Housing assessment, CC projection models, Demographic projections, MCDA, CBA, New site evaluation process, Socioeconomic projections:** Not documented in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What planning measures were taken for receiving areas in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Construction of new housing; Identifying priority areas; Individuals vs. neighbourhoods/communities.\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Construction of new housing:** The program involves construction of new concentrated resettlement communities with public facilities and community management agencies. Towns in Baihe County were required to have \"large concentrated relocation communities\" (Xiao & Liu 2021). Resettlement sites such as Songba, Jingjia, Lanjiaping, and Xiangyang in Ziyang County are described as having \"well-constructed public facilities and community management agencies\" (Shi et al. 2020).\n\n- **Identifying priority areas:** High-poverty, high-hazard counties (Ziyang, Baihe) were identified as key implementation areas. Baihe County was explicitly \"deemed as the key area for the program\" (Xiao & Liu 2021).\n\n- **Individuals vs. neighbourhoods/communities:** Multiple modes are offered — from individually scattered relocation to collective village consolidation — allowing planning at both levels (Xiao & Liu 2021). The majority of households in Baihe County chose collective modes.\n\n- **Social carrying capacity, Availability of existing housing:** Not explicitly addressed in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What uses were planned for retreat lands?\n\n**Answer:** No evidence found in reviewed sources.\n\n**Narrative:** The reviewed sources focus entirely on resettlers' livelihoods, information-seeking behaviour, and post-resettlement outcomes at destination sites. None of the reviewed sources provides information about what happens to the original hazard-prone lands after resettlement — whether they are restored, rezoned, left vacant, used for ecological purposes, or formally decommissioned. This is a significant evidence gap for this case study. Local authorities are described as believing that \"the RSS restores key ecosystem services in these areas\" (Shi et al. 2020), but this is an attributed belief about anticipated outcomes, not a documented planning measure for retreat land use.\n\n---" }, { "case_id": "CS45", "chunk_index": 4, "section": "community_engagement", "location": "Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town, Ankang City Shaanxi Province", "country": "China", "country_normalized": "China", "continent": "Asia", "admin_area": "Ankang City Shaanxi Province", "source": "Pipeline Ver2 — Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town", "source_links": [ { "title": "Xiao, Q., Liu, H., & Feldman, M. W. (2021). Is change of natural capital essential for assessing relocation policies? A case from Baihe county in western China. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 39(6), 441-449. https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805", "doi": "10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2020.1748805" }, { "title": "Shi, J., Hu, X., Guo, X., & Lian, C. (2020). Risk Information Seeking Behavior in Disaster Resettlement: A Case Study of Ankang City, China. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(19), 7352. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197352", "doi": "10.3390/ijerph17197352", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197352" }, { "title": "Xiao, Q., Liu, H., & Feldman, M. (2018). Assessing Livelihood Reconstruction in Resettlement Program for Disaster Prevention at Baihe County of China: Extension of the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) Model. Sustainability, 10(8), 2913. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082913", "doi": "10.3390/su10082913", "url": "https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082913", "pdf_url": "https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/8/2913/pdf?version=1534566173" } ], "text": "Case study: Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town (Songjia Town, Cangshang Town, and Lengshui Town, Ankang City Shaanxi Province, China)\nSection: Community Engagement\n\n---\n\n### What degree of choice was provided to affected people in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Voluntary with incentives or future restrictions, with strong elements of Voluntary with strong persuasion. The true degree of voluntarism is contested.\n\n**Narrative:** The program formally requires that \"relocated people are actually willing to move,\" and multiple relocation modes and flexible timing are offered (Shi et al. 2020). Commercial loans and support policies provide financial incentives. However, researchers describe voluntarism as occupying a spectrum of \"induced voluntarism\" to \"coercive voluntarism\" (Shi et al. 2020, citing Liu et al. 2020; Xue et al. 2013; Wu et al. 2016). Social conflicts — including shangfang (petitioning government authorities), jingzuo (sit-ins), demonstrations, and refusals to resettle — are documented (Shi et al. 2020). Some confrontations resulted in injury and death. In Xiao et al.'s (2018) survey, 52.0% of respondents said they would refuse displacement or move back if they had difficulties — this is a survey response measuring attitude, not a direct behavioral outcome, but it signals significant resistance. This evidence supports coding between \"Voluntary w/ incentives or future restrictions\" and \"Voluntary w/ strong persuasion,\" with meaningful uncertainty about the effective degree of voluntarism in practice.\n\n---\n\n### What land user groups were involved or considered in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Homeowners (primary); Government.\n\n**Narrative:** The affected populations are predominantly rural households who hold land use rights over farmland, forest land, and residential plots under China's collective land ownership system. The program targets these rural residents, and housing compensation is central to the relocation package, indicating homeowner-equivalent treatment. Government is a key actor in identifying relocation populations, managing resettlement sites, and providing compensation. Renters, commercial landowners, and NGOs are not mentioned in the reviewed sources. First Nations/Indigenous groups are not applicable in this context. The collective land tenure system means farmland is technically collectively owned with use rights held by individual households; the sources do not discuss this dimension explicitly in terms of compensation eligibility.\n\n---\n\n### What actors participated in the governance structure of the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Government agencies (central/provincial/county); Funders (government at multiple levels); Political champions (Shaanxi provincial government); Affected community (constrained/intermediated).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Government agencies and Funders:** The Chinese government launched the program; the Shaanxi provincial government is the primary implementing authority, overseeing city and county governments. Governments at all levels are described as required to ensure willingness to move (Shi et al. 2020).\n\n- **Political champions:** The Shaanxi provincial government is the initiating political champion, having issued the formal implementing notice.\n\n- **Affected community:** Village committees and village officials serve as intermediaries between government and resettlers, and are the primary information channel (Shi et al. 2020). However, community participation in governance is constrained; protest behaviour (petitions, sit-ins) is the primary documented form of community resistance when engagement fails.\n\n- **Private sector:** House developers and local entrepreneurs are mentioned as information sources that resettlers consult (Shi et al. 2020), but they are not described as formal governance actors.\n\n- **Receiving communities, NGOs/CBOs, Academics/researchers, General public:** Not documented as governance participants in the reviewed sources. Academic researchers studied the program but are not described as program governance participants.\n\n---\n\n### Who ultimately made decisions in the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Government (primary decision-maker); Property owners (limited input on mode and timing).\n\n**Narrative:** Decision-making authority over which populations are resettled, where they are relocated, and what compensation is provided rests with provincial, city, and county governments (Shi et al. 2020; Xiao et al. 2018). Individual households have some agency over the mode and timing of relocation — flexible choices are formally encouraged — but the decision to relocate entire villages is made by government authorities. The \"induced voluntarism\" to \"coercive voluntarism\" spectrum described in the literature suggests government decisions are primary, with household input constrained in practice.\n\n---\n\n### Was this engagement approach explicitly incorporated into the MR decision process?\n\n**Answer:** Community engagement (limited, intermediated); Transparency (stated but inadequate in practice); Ongoing updates (not formally documented).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Community engagement:** Village committees and officials serve as the primary engagement mechanism. However, Shi et al. (2020) document significant gaps: information sufficiency is low across all three measured dimensions — understanding of resettlement scope (IS1), pros and cons of resettlement sites (IS2), and supporting policies (IS3) — all below the sufficient threshold. This means the primary engagement channel is not effectively transferring the information residents need.\n\n- **Transparency:** Transparency is a stated goal (government formally requires willingness to move), but in practice information gaps and conflicts suggest limited transparency in implementation. Residents are described as seeking information actively through multiple channels, suggesting the absence of proactive information dissemination (Shi et al. 2020).\n\n- **Ongoing updates:** No formal ongoing update mechanism is described in the reviewed sources.\n\n- **Visualization, Mapping:** Not documented in the reviewed sources.\n\n---\n\n### What community resources supported the transition during the MR process?\n\n**Answer:** Relocation assistance (housing compensation, commercial loans); Livelihood restoration support (employment training, reemployment support); Community capacity building (new physical infrastructure at resettlement sites, limited evidence).\n\n**Narrative:**\n\n- **Relocation assistance:** Cash compensation is provided for house relocation. Commercial loans are part of the support package, though specific terms are not described (Shi et al. 2020). Survey items in Xiao et al. (2018) include satisfaction with house purchase compensation standards" } ]