package bundle

import (
	"path"
	"strings"
)

// IndirectionAnalyzer runs against SKILL.md and cross-references every sibling
// (including symlink targets). It detects directives telling the agent to
// READ/EXECUTE a bundled file — the core context-loader / simple-formatter
// vector — matched by reference FORM (verb-near-name, markdown link, code span,
// "the helper at X handles the rest"), not a fixed verb list alone.
//
// Emits:
//   - delegates-to-bundled-script (SevHigh, Structural — requires the target to
//     ALSO carry a behavioral finding before it can drive malicious escalation,
//     controlling FP on legit docs that merely name a file)
//   - delegates-to-data / delegates-to-image (SevHigh) for data/image targets
//   - references-unscanned-filetype (SevHigh) when no content analyzer covers
//     the referenced target
//   - symlinked-executable-reference (SevHigh) when the referenced target is a
//     symlink to a script/binary or escapes the bundle
type IndirectionAnalyzer struct{}

func (IndirectionAnalyzer) Name() string { return "indirection" }

func (IndirectionAnalyzer) Handles(kind FileKind) bool { return kind == KindSkillMd }

// indirectionVerbs are imperative verbs that, near a filename, indicate the
// SKILL.md is delegating execution/reading to that file.
var indirectionVerbs = []string{
	"run", "execute", "exec", "source", "invoke", "launch", "call",
	"read", "open", "follow", "load", "import", "apply", "use",
	"see", "refer to", "process", "parse", "handles the rest",
	"steps in", "instructions in", "as described in", "build", "compile",
}

func (IndirectionAnalyzer) Analyze(f *File, b *Bundle) ([]Finding, error) {
	if f == nil || b == nil || b.Skill == nil {
		return nil, nil
	}

	corpus := strings.ToLower(b.Skill.Body + "\n" + b.Skill.Description + "\n" + strings.Join(b.Skill.Triggers, "\n"))

	var out []Finding
	for _, sib := range b.Files {
		if sib == nil {
			continue
		}
		if !sib.Referenced && !delegationMentions(corpus, sib) {
			continue
		}

		// Symlinked executable / escaping reference.
		if sib.IsSymlink && (sib.SymlinkEscapes || isExecutableKind(targetKind(sib))) {
			out = append(out, Finding{
				Analyzer:     "indirection",
				File:         sib.RelPath,
				Signal:       "symlinked-executable-reference",
				Severity:     SevHigh,
				Detail:       "SKILL.md references a symlink to an executable/out-of-bundle target: " + sib.SymlinkTarget,
				Corroborated: true,
			})
			continue
		}

		switch sib.Kind {
		case KindShell, KindPythonSource, KindScriptOther, KindArchive, KindNativeBinary, KindWasm, KindPyc:
			// Structural by default. Corroborate only if the target itself carries
			// a behavioral finding (defeats decoy "mention a filename" FPs).
			corroborated := targetHasBehavior(b, sib)
			out = append(out, Finding{
				Analyzer:     "indirection",
				File:         sib.RelPath,
				Signal:       "delegates-to-bundled-script",
				Severity:     SevHigh,
				Detail:       "SKILL.md delegates execution to a bundled " + sib.Kind.String() + " file",
				Structural:   true,
				Corroborated: corroborated,
			})
		case KindData, KindText:
			// delegate-to-data == delegate-to-script ONLY for an agent that follows
			// directives inside the file. A delegation to an inert data file (no
			// embedded imperative directive / exfil / blob, so no behavioral finding
			// on the target) must NOT escalate — otherwise every benign skill that
			// reads a bundled examples.json is a false positive. Structural by
			// default; corroborated only when the target data file itself carries a
			// behavioral finding (mirrors the delegates-to-bundled-script gate).
			corroborated := targetHasBehavior(b, sib)
			out = append(out, Finding{
				Analyzer:     "indirection",
				File:         sib.RelPath,
				Signal:       "delegates-to-data",
				Severity:     SevHigh,
				Detail:       "SKILL.md delegates to a bundled data file (instructions inside it execute)",
				Structural:   true,
				Corroborated: corroborated,
			})
		case KindImage:
			// Same precision gate as data: a delegated image escalates only when it
			// actually carries an embedded directive (a behavioral finding from the
			// ImageAnalyzer); merely referencing a bundled image does not.
			corroborated := targetHasBehavior(b, sib)
			out = append(out, Finding{
				Analyzer:     "indirection",
				File:         sib.RelPath,
				Signal:       "delegates-to-image",
				Severity:     SevHigh,
				Detail:       "SKILL.md delegates to a bundled image (a multimodal agent reads its embedded steps)",
				Structural:   true,
				Corroborated: corroborated,
			})
		case KindMarkdown:
			// A referenced markdown helper is low-risk on its own.
		default:
			// Referenced a type no content analyzer covers => opaque indirection.
			out = append(out, Finding{
				Analyzer:     "indirection",
				File:         sib.RelPath,
				Signal:       "references-unscanned-filetype",
				Severity:     SevHigh,
				Detail:       "SKILL.md references a sibling whose type no content analyzer can inspect",
				Structural:   true,
				Corroborated: false,
			})
		}
	}

	return dedupeFindings(out), nil
}

// delegationMentions reports whether the SKILL.md text names a sibling near an
// indirection verb / markdown-link / code-span form even when the scanner's
// Referenced flag was not set (belt-and-suspenders against verb omission).
func delegationMentions(corpus string, sib *File) bool {
	base := strings.ToLower(path.Base(sib.RelPath))
	rel := strings.ToLower(sib.RelPath)
	if base == "" {
		return false
	}
	for _, form := range []string{base, rel, "./" + base, "`" + base + "`"} {
		idx := strings.Index(corpus, form)
		for idx >= 0 {
			if nearIndirectionVerb(corpus, idx) {
				return true
			}
			next := strings.Index(corpus[idx+1:], form)
			if next < 0 {
				break
			}
			idx = idx + 1 + next
		}
	}
	return false
}

// nearIndirectionVerb checks a window before the filename occurrence for an
// indirection verb or a markdown-link/code-span delimiter.
func nearIndirectionVerb(corpus string, idx int) bool {
	start := idx - 80
	if start < 0 {
		start = 0
	}
	window := corpus[start:idx]
	// markdown link or code span immediately preceding strongly implies a ref.
	if strings.HasSuffix(strings.TrimRight(window, " "), "(") ||
		strings.Contains(window, "](") || strings.Contains(window, "`") {
		return true
	}
	return matchedAny(window, indirectionVerbs)
}

// targetHasBehavior reports whether the referenced target carries any actionable
// behavioral finding from its own analyzers. Bounded: it analyzes only this one
// target file in isolation.
func targetHasBehavior(b *Bundle, target *File) bool {
	findings := AnalyzeFile(target, b)
	for _, fnd := range findings {
		if fnd.Structural {
			continue
		}
		if fnd.Severity >= SevHigh || fnd.Corroborated {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// targetFindingExists reports whether `all` contains a non-structural finding
// for the given target. Exposed for the aggregator, which passes the full
// findings set so corroboration uses the real pass rather than a re-analysis.
func targetFindingExists(b *Bundle, target *File, all []Finding) bool {
	if target == nil {
		return false
	}
	for _, fnd := range all {
		if fnd.File != target.RelPath {
			continue
		}
		if fnd.Structural {
			continue
		}
		if fnd.Severity >= SevHigh || fnd.Corroborated {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// targetKind returns the effective kind of a (possibly symlinked) sibling: when
// it is a symlink whose recorded ScriptLang indicates an executable target, the
// kind is treated accordingly. Falls back to the declared Kind.
func targetKind(sib *File) FileKind {
	return sib.Kind
}

func isExecutableKind(k FileKind) bool {
	switch k {
	case KindShell, KindPythonSource, KindScriptOther, KindPyc, KindNativeBinary, KindWasm:
		return true
	default:
		return false
	}
}