codex-rs/core/tests/suite/exec_policy.rs

#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used)]

use anyhow::Result;
use codex_config::test_support::CloudConfigBundleFixture;
use codex_core::EnvironmentConfig;
use codex_core::TurnInputRequest;
use codex_core::config::Constrained;
use codex_core::windows_sandbox::WindowsSandboxLevelExt;
use codex_execpolicy::Decision;
use codex_execpolicy::Policy;
use codex_execpolicy::RequirementsExecPolicy;
use codex_features::Feature;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ApprovalsReviewer;
use codex_protocol::config_types::CollaborationMode;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ModeKind;
use codex_protocol::config_types::Settings;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use codex_protocol::error::CodexErrorDetails;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfileSnapshot;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::EventMsg;
use codex_protocol::protocol::GranularApprovalConfig;
use codex_protocol::protocol::Op;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ThreadSettingsOverrides;
use codex_protocol::user_input::UserInput;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_assistant_message;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_completed;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_function_call;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_response_created;
use core_test_support::responses::mount_sse_once;
use core_test_support::responses::sse;
use core_test_support::responses::start_mock_server;
use core_test_support::skip_if_target_windows;
use core_test_support::skip_if_wine_exec;
use core_test_support::test_codex::local_selections;
use core_test_support::test_codex::test_codex;
use core_test_support::test_codex::turn_permission_fields;
use core_test_support::wait_for_event;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use serde_json::Value;
use serde_json::json;
use std::fs;

const COMPLEX_FORCED_RM_COMMAND: &str = "for target in \"\"; do rm -rf \"$target\"; done";

fn collaboration_mode_for_model(model: String) -> CollaborationMode {
    CollaborationMode {
        mode: ModeKind::Default,
        settings: Settings {
            model,
            reasoning_effort: None,
            developer_instructions: Some("exercise approvals in collaboration mode".to_string()),
        },
    }
}

async fn submit_user_turn(
    test: &core_test_support::test_codex::TestCodex,
    prompt: &str,
    approval_policy: AskForApproval,
    permission_profile: PermissionProfile,
    collaboration_mode: Option<CollaborationMode>,
) -> Result<()> {
    let session_model = test.session_configured.model.clone();
    let (sandbox_policy, permission_profile) =
        turn_permission_fields(permission_profile, test.config.cwd.as_path());
    test.codex
        .start_or_steer_turn(
            TurnInputRequest::user_input(vec![UserInput::Text {
                text: prompt.into(),
                text_elements: Vec::new(),
            }])
            .with_thread_settings(ThreadSettingsOverrides {
                environments: Some(local_selections(test.config.cwd.clone())),
                approval_policy: Some(approval_policy),
                sandbox_policy: Some(sandbox_policy),
                permission_profile,
                collaboration_mode: collaboration_mode.or({
                    Some(CollaborationMode {
                        mode: ModeKind::Default,
                        settings: Settings {
                            model: session_model,
                            reasoning_effort: None,
                            developer_instructions: None,
                        },
                    })
                }),
                ..Default::default()
            }),
        )
        .await?;
    Ok(())
}

fn assert_no_matched_rules_invariant(output_item: &Value) {
    let output = output_item
        .get("output")
        .and_then(Value::as_str)
        .expect("function call output should include a string output payload");
    assert!(
        !output.contains("invariant failed: matched_rules must be non-empty"),
        "unexpected invariant panic surfaced in output: {output}"
    );
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn git_status_requires_approval_under_unless_trusted() -> Result<()> {
    skip_if_wine_exec!(Ok(()), "command approval requires host-native paths");

    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let mut builder = test_codex().with_model("gpt-5.2").with_config(|config| {
        config
            .features
            .enable(Feature::UnifiedExec)
            .expect("test config should allow feature update");
        config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted);
        config
            .permissions
            .set_permission_profile(PermissionProfile::workspace_write())
            .expect("set workspace-write permissions");
        config.approvals_reviewer = ApprovalsReviewer::User;
    });
    let test = builder.build_with_auto_env(&server).await?;
    let call_id = "git-status-approval";
    let args = json!({"cmd": "git status", "yield_time_ms": 1_000});
    let initial_mock = mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_response_created("resp-git-status-1"),
            ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
            ev_completed("resp-git-status-1"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;
    let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_assistant_message("msg-git-status-1", "done"),
            ev_completed("resp-git-status-2"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;

    test.codex
        .start_or_steer_turn(TurnInputRequest::user_input(vec![UserInput::Text {
            text: "check git status".into(),
            text_elements: Vec::new(),
        }]))
        .await?;
    let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
        matches!(
            event,
            EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
        )
    })
    .await;
    let EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) = event else {
        let output = results_mock.function_call_output_text(call_id);
        panic!(
            "expected git status to request approval before turn completion; output: {output:?}"
        );
    };
    assert_eq!(approval.call_id, call_id);
    test.codex
        .submit(Op::ExecApproval {
            id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
            turn_id: None,
            decision: ReviewDecision::denied("git status was not approved"),
        })
        .await?;
    wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
        matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
    })
    .await;
    assert!(
        initial_mock
            .single_request()
            .message_input_texts("user")
            .iter()
            .any(|text| text == "check git status")
    );
    let output = results_mock
        .single_request()
        .function_call_output_text(call_id)
        .expect("shell command output");
    assert!(output.contains("git status was not approved"), "{output}");

    Ok(())
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn startup_migrates_default_policy_and_honors_ignore_rules() -> Result<()> {
    const LEGACY_POLICY: &str = r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["rm"], decision="allow")
prefix_rule(pattern=["git", "status"], decision="allow")
"#;
    const MIGRATED_POLICY: &str = r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["git", "status"], decision="allow")
"#;
    const MIGRATION_MARKER_FILENAME: &str = ".sandbox_migration";

    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let mut migrated_builder = test_codex().with_config(|config| {
        let policy_path = config.codex_home.join("rules/default.rules");
        fs::create_dir_all(policy_path.parent().expect("rules directory"))
            .expect("create rules directory");
        fs::write(policy_path, LEGACY_POLICY).expect("write legacy policy");
    });
    let migrated = migrated_builder.build_with_auto_env(&server).await?;
    let migrated_policy_path = migrated.codex_home_path().join("rules/default.rules");
    assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&migrated_policy_path)?, MIGRATED_POLICY);
    assert_eq!(
        fs::read_to_string(migrated.codex_home_path().join(MIGRATION_MARKER_FILENAME))?,
        "v1\n"
    );

    let mut ignored_builder = test_codex().with_config(|config| {
        let policy_path = config.codex_home.join("rules/default.rules");
        fs::create_dir_all(policy_path.parent().expect("rules directory"))
            .expect("create rules directory");
        fs::write(policy_path, LEGACY_POLICY).expect("write legacy policy");
        config.config_layer_stack = config
            .config_layer_stack
            .clone()
            .with_user_and_project_exec_policy_rules_ignored(
                /*ignore_user_and_project_exec_policy_rules*/ true,
            );
    });
    let ignored = ignored_builder.build_with_auto_env(&server).await?;
    let ignored_policy_path = ignored.codex_home_path().join("rules/default.rules");
    assert_eq!(fs::read_to_string(&ignored_policy_path)?, LEGACY_POLICY);
    assert!(
        !ignored
            .codex_home_path()
            .join(MIGRATION_MARKER_FILENAME)
            .exists()
    );

    Ok(())
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn granular_complex_forced_rm_denial_explains_why_the_command_was_rejected() -> Result<()> {
    skip_if_target_windows!(Ok(()), "uses a POSIX shell command fixture");

    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let mut builder = test_codex();
    let test = builder.build_with_auto_env(&server).await?;
    let call_id = "forced-rm-denied";
    let args = json!({
        "cmd": COMPLEX_FORCED_RM_COMMAND,
        "yield_time_ms": 1_000,
    });

    mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_response_created("resp-forced-rm-1"),
            ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
            ev_completed("resp-forced-rm-1"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;
    let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_assistant_message("msg-forced-rm-1", "done"),
            ev_completed("resp-forced-rm-2"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;

    submit_user_turn(
        &test,
        "run the forced rm loop",
        AskForApproval::Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
            sandbox_approval: false,
            rules: true,
            skill_approval: true,
            request_permissions: true,
            mcp_elicitations: true,
        }),
        PermissionProfile::read_only(),
        /*collaboration_mode*/ None,
    )
    .await?;

    wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
        matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
    })
    .await;

    let output_item = results_mock.single_request().function_call_output(call_id);
    let output = output_item
        .get("output")
        .and_then(Value::as_str)
        .expect("function call output should include a string output payload");
    assert!(
        output.contains("rm -f style commands are not permitted. Use a safer approach"),
        "unexpected output: {output}"
    );

    Ok(())
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn granular_complex_forced_rm_requests_approval_when_allowed() -> Result<()> {
    skip_if_target_windows!(Ok(()), "uses a POSIX shell command fixture");

    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let mut builder = test_codex();
    let test = builder.build_with_auto_env(&server).await?;
    let call_id = "forced-rm-approval";
    let args = json!({
        "cmd": COMPLEX_FORCED_RM_COMMAND,
        "yield_time_ms": 1_000,
    });

    mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_response_created("resp-forced-rm-approval-1"),
            ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
            ev_completed("resp-forced-rm-approval-1"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;
    mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_assistant_message("msg-forced-rm-approval-1", "done"),
            ev_completed("resp-forced-rm-approval-2"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;

    submit_user_turn(
        &test,
        "run the forced rm loop",
        AskForApproval::Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
            sandbox_approval: true,
            rules: true,
            skill_approval: true,
            request_permissions: true,
            mcp_elicitations: true,
        }),
        PermissionProfile::read_only(),
        /*collaboration_mode*/ None,
    )
    .await?;

    let approval_event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
        matches!(
            event,
            EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
        )
    })
    .await;
    let EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) = approval_event else {
        panic!("expected forced rm to request approval before turn completion");
    };
    assert_eq!(
        approval.command.last().map(String::as_str),
        Some(COMPLEX_FORCED_RM_COMMAND)
    );

    test.codex
        .submit(Op::ExecApproval {
            id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
            turn_id: None,
            decision: ReviewDecision::denied("rejected by user"),
        })
        .await?;
    wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
        matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
    })
    .await;

    Ok(())
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn deeply_nested_forced_rm_is_rejected_before_execution_when_approvals_are_disabled()
-> Result<()> {
    skip_if_target_windows!(Ok(()), "uses a POSIX shell command fixture");

    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let mut builder = test_codex();
    let test = builder.build_with_auto_env(&server).await?;
    let sentinel = test.config.cwd.join("forced-rm-sentinel");
    fs::write(&sentinel, "must not be deleted")?;
    let call_id = "deeply-nested-forced-rm";
    let args = json!({
        "cmd": "env env env env env env env env env rm -rf forced-rm-sentinel",
        "yield_time_ms": 1_000,
    });

    mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_response_created("resp-deeply-nested-forced-rm-1"),
            ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
            ev_completed("resp-deeply-nested-forced-rm-1"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;
    let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_assistant_message("msg-deeply-nested-forced-rm", "done"),
            ev_completed("resp-deeply-nested-forced-rm-2"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;

    submit_user_turn(
        &test,
        "run the deeply nested forced rm",
        AskForApproval::Never,
        PermissionProfile::Disabled,
        /*collaboration_mode*/ None,
    )
    .await?;

    wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
        matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
    })
    .await;

    let output_item = results_mock.single_request().function_call_output(call_id);
    let output = output_item
        .get("output")
        .and_then(Value::as_str)
        .expect("function call output should include a string output payload");
    assert!(
        output.contains("rejected: blocked by policy"),
        "unexpected output: {output}"
    );
    assert!(sentinel.exists(), "the rejected command must not execute");

    Ok(())
}

#[cfg(windows)]
#[tokio::test]
async fn unified_exec_disabled_windows_sandbox_rejects_managed_read_only_command() -> Result<()> {
    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(|config| {
        config
            .features
            .enable(Feature::UnifiedExec)
            .expect("test config should allow feature update");
        config
            .features
            .disable(Feature::WindowsSandbox)
            .expect("test config should allow feature update");
        config
            .features
            .disable(Feature::WindowsSandboxElevated)
            .expect("test config should allow feature update");
        config.set_windows_sandbox_enabled(false);
        config.set_windows_elevated_sandbox_enabled(false);
    });
    let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
    let call_id = "unified-exec-disabled-windows-sandbox-read-only";
    let args = json!({
        "cmd": "cmd.exe /c dir",
        "yield_time_ms": 1_000,
    });

    mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_response_created("resp-disabled-windows-sandbox-1"),
            ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
            ev_completed("resp-disabled-windows-sandbox-1"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;
    let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_assistant_message("msg-disabled-windows-sandbox-1", "done"),
            ev_completed("resp-disabled-windows-sandbox-2"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;

    submit_user_turn(
        &test,
        "run unified exec with disabled Windows sandbox",
        AskForApproval::Never,
        PermissionProfile::read_only(),
        None,
    )
    .await?;

    wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
        matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
    })
    .await;

    let output_item = results_mock.single_request().function_call_output(call_id);
    let output = output_item
        .get("output")
        .and_then(Value::as_str)
        .expect("function call output should include a string output payload");
    assert!(
        output.contains("cmd.exe /c dir") && output.contains("rejected: blocked by policy"),
        "unexpected output: {output}",
    );

    Ok(())
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn execpolicy_blocks_shell_invocation() -> Result<()> {
    let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(|config| {
        let policy_path = config.codex_home.join("rules").join("policy.rules");
        fs::create_dir_all(
            policy_path
                .parent()
                .expect("policy directory must have a parent"),
        )
        .expect("create policy directory");
        fs::write(
            &policy_path,
            r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["echo"], decision="forbidden")"#,
        )
        .expect("write policy file");
    });
    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let test = builder.build(&server).await?;

    let call_id = "shell-forbidden";
    let args = json!({
        "cmd": "echo blocked",
        "yield_time_ms": 1_000,
    });

    mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_response_created("resp-1"),
            ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
            ev_completed("resp-1"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;
    let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_assistant_message("msg-1", "done"),
            ev_completed("resp-2"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;

    let session_model = test.session_configured.model.clone();
    let (sandbox_policy, permission_profile) =
        turn_permission_fields(PermissionProfile::Disabled, test.config.cwd.as_path());
    test.codex
        .start_or_steer_turn(
            TurnInputRequest::user_input(vec![UserInput::Text {
                text: "run shell command".into(),
                text_elements: Vec::new(),
            }])
            .with_thread_settings(ThreadSettingsOverrides {
                environments: Some(local_selections(test.config.cwd.clone())),
                approval_policy: Some(AskForApproval::Never),
                sandbox_policy: Some(sandbox_policy),
                permission_profile,
                collaboration_mode: Some(CollaborationMode {
                    mode: ModeKind::Default,
                    settings: Settings {
                        model: session_model,
                        reasoning_effort: None,
                        developer_instructions: None,
                    },
                }),
                ..Default::default()
            }),
        )
        .await?;

    wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
        matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
    })
    .await;

    let output = results_mock
        .single_request()
        .function_call_output_text(call_id)
        .expect("forbidden command should produce a tool response");
    assert!(
        output.contains("policy forbids commands starting with `echo`"),
        "unexpected output: {output}"
    );

    Ok(())
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn malformed_custom_rules_preserve_managed_forbidden_prefix() -> Result<()> {
    skip_if_target_windows!(
        Ok(()),
        "managed prefix fixture uses POSIX executable semantics"
    );

    let mut builder = test_codex()
        .with_cloud_config_bundle(
            CloudConfigBundleFixture::loader_with_enterprise_requirement(
                r#"
[rules]
prefix_rules = [
    { pattern = [{ token = "echo" }], decision = "forbidden" },
]
"#,
            ),
        )
        .with_config(|config| {
            config
                .features
                .enable(Feature::UnifiedExec)
                .expect("test config should allow feature update");
            let policy_path = config.codex_home.join("rules").join("broken.rules");
            fs::create_dir_all(
                policy_path
                    .parent()
                    .expect("policy directory must have a parent"),
            )
            .expect("create policy directory");
            fs::write(policy_path, "prefix_rule(").expect("write malformed policy file");
        });
    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let test = builder.build_with_auto_env(&server).await?;
    let call_id = "managed-shell-forbidden";
    let args = json!({
        "cmd": "echo blocked",
        "yield_time_ms": 1_000,
    });

    mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_response_created("resp-managed-1"),
            ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
            ev_completed("resp-managed-1"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;
    let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_assistant_message("msg-managed-1", "done"),
            ev_completed("resp-managed-2"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;

    test.submit_turn_with_approval_and_permission_profile(
        "run shell command",
        AskForApproval::Never,
        PermissionProfile::Disabled,
    )
    .await?;

    let output_item = results_mock.single_request().function_call_output(call_id);
    let output = output_item
        .get("output")
        .and_then(Value::as_str)
        .expect("function call output should include a string output payload");
    assert!(
        output.contains("policy forbids commands starting with `echo`"),
        "unexpected output: {output}"
    );

    Ok(())
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn environment_command_restrictions_override_saved_prefix_approvals() -> Result<()> {
    skip_if_target_windows!(
        Ok(()),
        "managed prefix fixture uses POSIX executable semantics"
    );

    let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(|config| {
        config
            .features
            .enable(Feature::UnifiedExec)
            .expect("test config should allow feature update");
        let policy_path = config.codex_home.join("rules").join("approved.rules");
        fs::create_dir_all(policy_path.parent().expect("rules directory"))
            .expect("create rules directory");
        fs::write(
            policy_path,
            r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["echo"], decision="allow")"#,
        )
        .expect("write approved command prefix");
    });
    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let test = builder.build_with_auto_env(&server).await?;
    let selection = test
        .codex
        .environment_selections()
        .await
        .into_iter()
        .next()
        .expect("thread should select its executor environment");
    let mut invalid_policy = Policy::empty();
    invalid_policy.add_prefix_rule(&["echo".to_string()], Decision::Allow)?;
    let error = test
        .codex
        .environment_ready(
            &selection,
            EnvironmentConfig {
                allow_login_shell: true,
                workspace_roots: selection.workspace_roots.clone(),
                permission_profile: PermissionProfileSnapshot::legacy(PermissionProfile::Disabled),
                shell_environment_policy: Default::default(),
                windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&test.config),
                windows_sandbox_private_desktop: test
                    .config
                    .permissions
                    .windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
                use_legacy_landlock: test.config.features.use_legacy_landlock(),
                exec_policy: Some(RequirementsExecPolicy::new(invalid_policy)),
                mcp_policy: None,
                network_policy: None,
                selected_capability_roots: Vec::new(),
            },
        )
        .await
        .expect_err("environment policies must not introduce command allowances");
    assert!(matches!(
        error.details(),
        CodexErrorDetails::InvalidRequest(message)
            if message == "environment command policy cannot contain allow rules"
    ));

    let mut environment_policy = Policy::empty();
    environment_policy.add_prefix_rule(&["echo".to_string()], Decision::Forbidden)?;
    test.codex
        .environment_ready(
            &selection,
            EnvironmentConfig {
                allow_login_shell: true,
                workspace_roots: selection.workspace_roots.clone(),
                permission_profile: PermissionProfileSnapshot::legacy(PermissionProfile::Disabled),
                shell_environment_policy: Default::default(),
                windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&test.config),
                windows_sandbox_private_desktop: test
                    .config
                    .permissions
                    .windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
                use_legacy_landlock: test.config.features.use_legacy_landlock(),
                exec_policy: Some(RequirementsExecPolicy::new(environment_policy)),
                mcp_policy: None,
                network_policy: None,
                selected_capability_roots: Vec::new(),
            },
        )
        .await?;

    let call_id = "environment-managed-command";
    let args = json!({
        "cmd": "echo blocked",
        "yield_time_ms": 1_000,
    });
    mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_response_created("resp-environment-managed-1"),
            ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
            ev_completed("resp-environment-managed-1"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;
    let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_assistant_message("msg-environment-managed", "done"),
            ev_completed("resp-environment-managed-2"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;

    test.submit_turn_with_approval_and_permission_profile(
        "run shell command",
        AskForApproval::Never,
        PermissionProfile::Disabled,
    )
    .await?;

    let output_item = results_mock.single_request().function_call_output(call_id);
    let output = output_item
        .get("output")
        .and_then(Value::as_str)
        .expect("function call output should include a string output payload");
    assert!(
        output.contains("policy forbids commands starting with `echo`"),
        "unexpected output: {output}"
    );

    Ok(())
}

#[tokio::test]
async fn environment_command_policy_changes_invalidate_session_approvals() -> Result<()> {
    skip_if_target_windows!(
        Ok(()),
        "managed prefix fixture uses POSIX executable semantics"
    );

    let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(|config| {
        config
            .features
            .enable(Feature::UnifiedExec)
            .expect("test config should allow feature update");
        config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::OnRequest);
        config
            .permissions
            .set_permission_profile(PermissionProfile::Disabled)
            .expect("test config should allow unrestricted permissions");
        config.approvals_reviewer = ApprovalsReviewer::User;
        let policy_path = config.codex_home.join("rules").join("prompt.rules");
        fs::create_dir_all(policy_path.parent().expect("rules directory"))
            .expect("create rules directory");
        fs::write(
            policy_path,
            r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["echo"], decision="prompt")"#,
        )
        .expect("write prompt command prefix");
    });
    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let test = builder.build_with_auto_env(&server).await?;
    let selection = test
        .codex
        .environment_selections()
        .await
        .into_iter()
        .next()
        .expect("thread should select its executor environment");

    for (attempt, decision) in [
        ("before-owner-policy", ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession),
        ("after-owner-policy", ReviewDecision::Approved),
    ] {
        if attempt == "after-owner-policy" {
            let mut policy = Policy::empty();
            policy.add_prefix_rule(&["echo".to_string()], Decision::Prompt)?;
            test.codex
                .environment_ready(
                    &selection,
                    EnvironmentConfig {
                        allow_login_shell: true,
                        workspace_roots: selection.workspace_roots.clone(),
                        permission_profile: PermissionProfileSnapshot::legacy(
                            PermissionProfile::Disabled,
                        ),
                        shell_environment_policy: Default::default(),
                        windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&test.config),
                        windows_sandbox_private_desktop: test
                            .config
                            .permissions
                            .windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
                        use_legacy_landlock: test.config.features.use_legacy_landlock(),
                        exec_policy: Some(RequirementsExecPolicy::new(policy)),
                        mcp_policy: None,
                        network_policy: None,
                        selected_capability_roots: Vec::new(),
                    },
                )
                .await?;
        }

        let args = json!({ "cmd": "echo approval", "yield_time_ms": 1_000 });
        mount_sse_once(
            &server,
            sse(vec![
                ev_response_created(attempt),
                ev_function_call(attempt, "exec_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
                ev_completed(attempt),
            ]),
        )
        .await;
        mount_sse_once(
            &server,
            sse(vec![
                ev_assistant_message(attempt, "done"),
                ev_completed(attempt),
            ]),
        )
        .await;

        test.codex
            .start_or_steer_turn(TurnInputRequest::user_input(vec![UserInput::Text {
                text: attempt.into(),
                text_elements: Vec::new(),
            }]))
            .await?;
        let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
            matches!(
                event,
                EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
            )
        })
        .await;
        let EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) = event else {
            panic!("expected a fresh command approval {attempt}");
        };
        test.codex
            .submit(Op::ExecApproval {
                id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
                turn_id: None,
                decision,
            })
            .await?;
        wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
            matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
        })
        .await;
    }

    Ok(())
}

#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn unified_exec_empty_script_with_collaboration_mode_does_not_panic() -> Result<()> {
    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let mut builder = test_codex().with_model("gpt-5.2").with_config(|config| {
        config
            .features
            .enable(Feature::UnifiedExec)
            .expect("test config should allow feature update");
        config
            .features
            .enable(Feature::CollaborationModes)
            .expect("test config should allow feature update");
    });
    let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
    let call_id = "unified-exec-empty-script-collab";
    let args = json!({
        "cmd": "",
        "yield_time_ms": 1_000,
    });

    mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_response_created("resp-empty-unified-1"),
            ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
            ev_completed("resp-empty-unified-1"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;
    let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_assistant_message("msg-empty-unified-1", "done"),
            ev_completed("resp-empty-unified-2"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;

    let collaboration_mode = collaboration_mode_for_model(test.session_configured.model.clone());
    submit_user_turn(
        &test,
        "run empty unified exec command",
        AskForApproval::OnRequest,
        PermissionProfile::Disabled,
        Some(collaboration_mode),
    )
    .await?;

    wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
        matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
    })
    .await;

    let output_item = results_mock.single_request().function_call_output(call_id);
    assert_no_matched_rules_invariant(&output_item);

    Ok(())
}

#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn unified_exec_whitespace_script_with_collaboration_mode_does_not_panic() -> Result<()> {
    let server = start_mock_server().await;
    let mut builder = test_codex().with_model("gpt-5.2").with_config(|config| {
        config
            .features
            .enable(Feature::UnifiedExec)
            .expect("test config should allow feature update");
        config
            .features
            .enable(Feature::CollaborationModes)
            .expect("test config should allow feature update");
    });
    let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
    let call_id = "unified-exec-whitespace-script-collab";
    let args = json!({
        "cmd": " \n \t",
        "yield_time_ms": 1_000,
    });

    mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_response_created("resp-whitespace-unified-1"),
            ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &serde_json::to_string(&args)?),
            ev_completed("resp-whitespace-unified-1"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;
    let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
        &server,
        sse(vec![
            ev_assistant_message("msg-whitespace-unified-1", "done"),
            ev_completed("resp-whitespace-unified-2"),
        ]),
    )
    .await;

    let collaboration_mode = collaboration_mode_for_model(test.session_configured.model.clone());
    submit_user_turn(
        &test,
        "run whitespace unified exec command",
        AskForApproval::OnRequest,
        PermissionProfile::Disabled,
        Some(collaboration_mode),
    )
    .await?;

    wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
        matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
    })
    .await;

    let output_item = results_mock.single_request().function_call_output(call_id);
    assert_no_matched_rules_invariant(&output_item);

    Ok(())
}