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import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { isRecord } from "@openclaw/normalization-core/record-coerce";
import { isPathInside } from "../../infra/path-guards.js";
import { execContainer, type SandboxContainerEngine } from "./container-engine.js";
import { isSandboxHostPathAbsolute, normalizeSandboxHostPath } from "./host-paths.js";
import {
normalizeMountContainerPath,
sandboxMountOptionsReadOnly,
type ManagedWorkspaceMount,
} from "./workspace-mounts.js";
export type InspectedSandboxMount = {
type: string;
source: string;
destination: string;
writable: boolean;
};
const SELF_INSPECT_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000;
const MAX_SELF_CANDIDATES = 8;
const SELF_IDENTITY_PROBE =
'const fs=require("node:fs");process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify([fs.readFileSync("/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id","utf8").trim(),fs.readlinkSync("/proc/self/ns/mnt")]));';
let sourceNamespace:
| { key: string; mounts: Promise<readonly InspectedSandboxMount[] | undefined> }
| undefined;
export function parseInspectedSandboxMounts(
value: unknown,
tmpfs?: unknown,
): InspectedSandboxMount[] {
if (!Array.isArray(value)) {
throw new Error("Container inspect did not return a mount table.");
}
const mounts = value.map((mount: unknown) => {
if (
!isRecord(mount) ||
typeof mount.Type !== "string" ||
typeof mount.Destination !== "string" ||
!path.posix.isAbsolute(mount.Destination) ||
typeof mount.RW !== "boolean" ||
(mount.Type === "bind" &&
(typeof mount.Source !== "string" || !isSandboxHostPathAbsolute(mount.Source)))
) {
throw new Error("Container inspect returned an invalid mount entry.");
}
return {
type: mount.Type,
source: typeof mount.Source === "string" ? normalizeSandboxHostPath(mount.Source) : "",
destination: normalizeMountContainerPath(mount.Destination),
writable: mount.RW,
};
});
if (tmpfs != null && !isRecord(tmpfs)) {
throw new Error("Container inspect returned invalid tmpfs destinations.");
}
// Docker --tmpfs is stored separately and hides any bind at the same target.
// Include it so neither source translation nor retained-container checks see
// the obscured host files instead of the Gateway's effective filesystem.
for (const [destination, options] of Object.entries(tmpfs ?? {})) {
if (!path.posix.isAbsolute(destination) || typeof options !== "string") {
throw new Error("Container inspect returned an invalid tmpfs destination.");
}
mounts.push({
type: "tmpfs",
source: "",
destination: normalizeMountContainerPath(destination),
writable: !sandboxMountOptionsReadOnly(options),
});
}
return [...new Map(mounts.map((mount) => [mount.destination, mount])).values()];
}
function readOptionalProcFile(file: string): string {
try {
return fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8");
} catch {
return "";
}
}
async function discoverSourceNamespace(
engine: SandboxContainerEngine,
): Promise<readonly InspectedSandboxMount[] | undefined> {
if (engine.id !== "docker" || process.platform !== "linux") {
return undefined;
}
const cgroup = readOptionalProcFile("/proc/self/cgroup");
const ids: string[] = [];
for (const match of cgroup.matchAll(/(?:\/docker\/|docker-)([a-f0-9]{64})(?:\/|\.scope|$)/gm)) {
const id = match[1];
if (id) {
ids.push(id);
}
}
// Host mount tables also contain other containers' IDs. Only Docker's mounts
// of this process's own hostname/resolver files identify a self candidate.
for (const line of readOptionalProcFile("/proc/self/mountinfo").split("\n")) {
const fields = line.split(" ");
if (!/^\/etc\/(?:hosts|hostname|resolv\.conf)$/.test(fields[4] ?? "")) {
continue;
}
const id = fields[3]?.match(
/\/containers\/([a-f0-9]{64})\/(?:hosts|hostname|resolv\.conf)$/,
)?.[1];
if (id) {
ids.push(id);
}
}
if (!fs.existsSync("/.dockerenv") && !fs.existsSync("/run/.containerenv") && ids.length === 0) {
return undefined;
}
const candidates = [...new Set([os.hostname(), ...ids])].slice(0, MAX_SELF_CANDIDATES);
const signal = AbortSignal.timeout(SELF_INSPECT_TIMEOUT_MS);
let lastError: unknown;
try {
const identity = JSON.stringify([
fs.readFileSync("/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id", "utf8").trim(),
fs.readlinkSync("/proc/self/ns/mnt"),
]);
// A hostname or cgroup ID is only a candidate. Prove the selected daemon's
// container shares this process's kernel and mount namespace before trusting
// its host paths; private cgroup-v2 namespaces often contain no container ID.
for (const candidate of candidates) {
try {
const result = await execContainer(
engine,
[
"inspect",
"--type",
"container",
"--format",
// Docker templates use the Go field ID. The JSON spelling Id forces
// raw-map fallback, where an omitted Tmpfs field fails inspection.
'{"Id":{{json .ID}},"Mounts":{{json .Mounts}},"Tmpfs":{{json .HostConfig.Tmpfs}}}',
candidate,
],
{
signal,
},
);
const container: unknown = JSON.parse(result.stdout);
if (
!isRecord(container) ||
typeof container.Id !== "string" ||
!/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(container.Id)
) {
throw new Error("Container inspect did not return a full container ID.");
}
const probe = await execContainer(
engine,
["exec", container.Id, process.execPath, "-e", SELF_IDENTITY_PROBE],
{ signal },
);
if (probe.stdout !== identity) {
throw new Error("The selected Docker daemon did not identify this Gateway container.");
}
return parseInspectedSandboxMounts(container.Mounts, container.Tmpfs);
} catch (error) {
lastError = error;
if (signal.aborted) {
break;
}
}
}
} catch (error) {
lastError = error;
}
throw new Error(
"Cannot resolve sandbox bind sources from this Gateway container. Connect Docker to the daemon that runs the Gateway and make its container inspectable, then restart the Gateway. A hostname alone cannot establish container identity.",
{ cause: lastError },
);
}
export async function resolveDockerSourceNamespace(
engine: SandboxContainerEngine,
): Promise<readonly InspectedSandboxMount[] | undefined> {
if (engine.id !== "docker" || process.platform !== "linux") {
return undefined;
}
const key = JSON.stringify([engine, process.env.DOCKER_HOST, process.env.DOCKER_CONTEXT]);
if (sourceNamespace?.key === key) {
return await sourceNamespace.mounts;
}
const pending = { key, mounts: discoverSourceNamespace(engine) };
sourceNamespace = pending;
try {
return await pending.mounts;
} catch (error) {
// A temporary daemon failure must not become a permanent identity mapping.
if (sourceNamespace === pending) {
sourceNamespace = undefined;
}
throw error;
}
}
export function translateSandboxMountSources(params: {
source: string;
containerPath: string;
allowedRoots: readonly string[];
mounts: readonly InspectedSandboxMount[];
readOnly: boolean;
shadowedTargets: readonly string[];
}): ManagedWorkspaceMount[] {
const source = fs.realpathSync(params.source);
if (!params.allowedRoots.some((root) => isPathInside(fs.realpathSync(root), source))) {
throw new Error(`Sandbox mount source ${params.source} escapes its Gateway workspace roots.`);
}
const mount = params.mounts
.filter((entry) => isPathInside(entry.destination, source))
.toSorted((a, b) => b.destination.length - a.destination.length)[0];
if (!mount || mount.type !== "bind") {
throw new Error(
`Sandbox mount source ${params.source} ${mount ? `uses an unsupported ${mount.type} mount` : "is not backed by a Gateway bind mount"}. Bind-mount the workspace and OpenClaw state directories from the Docker host into the Gateway, then restart the Gateway.`,
);
}
if (!mount.writable && !params.readOnly) {
throw new Error(
`Sandbox mount source ${params.source} is read-only in the Gateway. Use workspaceAccess=ro or make the Gateway bind writable before requesting a writable sandbox.`,
);
}
const containerPath = normalizeMountContainerPath(params.containerPath);
const translated = [
{
// Only the Gateway namespace is locally resolvable. Inspect's Source is
// authoritative; local realpath/stat would check an unrelated host path.
hostPath: path.posix.join(mount.source, path.posix.relative(mount.destination, source)),
containerPath,
readOnly: params.readOnly,
},
];
// Gateway-only submounts do not propagate through a sibling's host bind.
// Project visible children too, except where another final mount takes over.
for (const child of params.mounts.toSorted((a, b) =>
a.destination < b.destination ? -1 : a.destination > b.destination ? 1 : 0,
)) {
if (child.destination === source || !isPathInside(source, child.destination)) {
continue;
}
const target = normalizeMountContainerPath(
path.posix.join(containerPath, path.posix.relative(source, child.destination)),
);
if (params.shadowedTargets.some((shadow) => isPathInside(shadow, target))) {
continue;
}
if (child.type !== "bind") {
throw new Error(
`Sandbox mount source ${child.destination} uses an unsupported nested ${child.type} mount. Use Gateway bind mounts for this subtree or replace its sandbox destination with an explicit Docker bind, then restart the Gateway.`,
);
}
if (!isPathInside(source, fs.realpathSync(child.destination))) {
throw new Error(
`Sandbox mount source ${child.destination} escapes its Gateway workspace root.`,
);
}
translated.push({
hostPath: child.source,
containerPath: target,
readOnly: params.readOnly || !child.writable,
});
}
return translated;
}
|