Download electron/lib/window-url-policy.mjs from SaylorTwift/openhands: direct link, hf CLI and curl.
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https://huggingface.co/SaylorTwift/openhands/resolve/main/electron/lib/window-url-policy.mjs
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curl -L -o window-url-policy.mjs https://huggingface.co/SaylorTwift/openhands/resolve/main/electron/lib/window-url-policy.mjs
2.19 kB
| /** | |
| * URL classification for window.open() and popup navigation in the Electron | |
| * shell. | |
| * | |
| * The renderer renders untrusted links (chat / agent markdown) with | |
| * `target="_blank"`, which routes through `setWindowOpenHandler` in | |
| * main.mjs. Classifying those URLs by string prefix | |
| * (`url.startsWith("http://localhost")`) lets attacker-controlled hosts | |
| * through as "app URLs" — `http://localhost.evil.com` satisfies the prefix, | |
| * and so does `http://localhost@evil.com` (userinfo). Either one would open | |
| * remote content in a chromeless native window that visually belongs to the | |
| * app. Schemes outside a small allowlist must also never be handed to | |
| * `shell.openExternal`, which forwards them to OS protocol handlers. | |
| * Both classifications therefore go through URL parsing, not prefixes. | |
| */ | |
| const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "[::1]"]); | |
| // Schemes `shell.openExternal` may be given. Kept in sync with the `href` | |
| // protocols the renderer's markdown sanitizer accepts | |
| // (`MARKDOWN_SANITIZE_SCHEMA` in | |
| // src/components/features/markdown/markdown-renderer.tsx) — a link the | |
| // renderer is willing to render but this policy denies becomes a click that | |
| // silently does nothing. `mailto:` and `tel:` reach the mail/dialer handler; | |
| // `file:`, `smb:` and custom scheme handlers stay denied. | |
| const EXTERNAL_PROTOCOLS = new Set(["http:", "https:", "mailto:", "tel:"]); | |
| /** | |
| * True for http(s) URLs whose host is the loopback app server — the only | |
| * URLs that may open inside an Electron window. | |
| */ | |
| export function isLoopbackAppUrl(rawUrl) { | |
| try { | |
| const url = new URL(rawUrl); | |
| return ( | |
| (url.protocol === "http:" || url.protocol === "https:") && | |
| LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(url.hostname) | |
| ); | |
| } catch { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * True for URLs that may be handed to the OS via `shell.openExternal` — the | |
| * allowlisted schemes above. Everything else (file:, smb:, custom scheme | |
| * handlers, unparsable strings) must be denied, not delegated to the OS. | |
| */ | |
| export function isExternalBrowsableUrl(rawUrl) { | |
| try { | |
| return EXTERNAL_PROTOCOLS.has(new URL(rawUrl).protocol); | |
| } catch { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| } | |