Upload SECURITY.md with huggingface_hub
Browse files- SECURITY.md +185 -0
SECURITY.md
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
# Security Guide — Sentinel-AI
|
| 2 |
+
|
| 3 |
+
This project is a hackathon/demo system that performs face recognition and
|
| 4 |
+
biometric attribute search. Treat it as **sensitive infrastructure**, not a
|
| 5 |
+
normal web app.
|
| 6 |
+
|
| 7 |
+
The default configuration is intentionally convenient for a local demo. It is
|
| 8 |
+
**not** safe to expose to a network as-is.
|
| 9 |
+
|
| 10 |
+
---
|
| 11 |
+
|
| 12 |
+
## 1. Deployment profiles
|
| 13 |
+
|
| 14 |
+
| Profile | Auth | Rate limit | TLS | Suitable for |
|
| 15 |
+
|---------|------|------------|-----|--------------|
|
| 16 |
+
| Local demo (default) | Off (`SENTINEL_API_KEY` empty) | On, loopback only | No | Your own machine |
|
| 17 |
+
| Shared / internal | Bearer token | On | Reverse proxy | Trusted team network |
|
| 18 |
+
| Public | Bearer token + SSO/WAF | On (proxy + app) | Required | Not recommended |
|
| 19 |
+
|
| 20 |
+
The local demo binds to `127.0.0.1` unless you deliberately use `--host 0.0.0.0`.
|
| 21 |
+
If you bind to all interfaces, set `SENTINEL_API_KEY` first.
|
| 22 |
+
|
| 23 |
+
---
|
| 24 |
+
|
| 25 |
+
## 2. Secrets
|
| 26 |
+
|
| 27 |
+
### Where keys live
|
| 28 |
+
|
| 29 |
+
- `E:\AI Infra\.env` and `E:\AI Infra\backend\.env` (gitignored; backend wins).
|
| 30 |
+
- Provider console keys: `GEMINI_API_KEY` / `GOOGLE_API_KEY`, `GROQ_API_KEY`,
|
| 31 |
+
`COHERE_API_KEY`.
|
| 32 |
+
- The dashboard never receives provider keys. `VITE_API_KEY` is only an
|
| 33 |
+
application access token and is visible in the browser bundle; never put a
|
| 34 |
+
provider key there.
|
| 35 |
+
|
| 36 |
+
### Rotation
|
| 37 |
+
|
| 38 |
+
The audit found plaintext keys in `.env` files. Because those files may have
|
| 39 |
+
been copied or archived, **rotate all three keys** before sharing the folder:
|
| 40 |
+
|
| 41 |
+
1. **Gemini** — <https://aistudio.google.com/app/apikey> → revoke the old key,
|
| 42 |
+
create a new one.
|
| 43 |
+
2. **Groq** — <https://console.groq.com/keys> → delete, create a new key.
|
| 44 |
+
3. **Cohere** — <https://dashboard.cohere.com/api-keys> → revoke, create a new
|
| 45 |
+
key.
|
| 46 |
+
|
| 47 |
+
Then update **both** `.env` files (or remove the duplicate and keep one),
|
| 48 |
+
restart the backend, and verify `/health` plus one live alert.
|
| 49 |
+
|
| 50 |
+
```powershell
|
| 51 |
+
# Check nothing secret is staged for sharing
|
| 52 |
+
python scripts/check_secrets.py
|
| 53 |
+
```
|
| 54 |
+
|
| 55 |
+
Do not paste keys into chat, issues, screenshots, logs, or commits. If a key
|
| 56 |
+
leaks, rotate it; deleting the file is not enough because the value may already
|
| 57 |
+
be in history or a backup.
|
| 58 |
+
|
| 59 |
+
---
|
| 60 |
+
|
| 61 |
+
## 3. API access control
|
| 62 |
+
|
| 63 |
+
Enable the built-in Bearer-token check:
|
| 64 |
+
|
| 65 |
+
```dotenv
|
| 66 |
+
SENTINEL_API_KEY=change-me-to-a-long-random-demo-key
|
| 67 |
+
RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE=60
|
| 68 |
+
RATE_LIMIT_BURST=20
|
| 69 |
+
```
|
| 70 |
+
|
| 71 |
+
Every `/api/v1/*` request must then send either:
|
| 72 |
+
|
| 73 |
+
```http
|
| 74 |
+
Authorization: Bearer <key>
|
| 75 |
+
```
|
| 76 |
+
|
| 77 |
+
or:
|
| 78 |
+
|
| 79 |
+
```http
|
| 80 |
+
X-API-Key: <key>
|
| 81 |
+
```
|
| 82 |
+
|
| 83 |
+
`/health`, `/docs`, `/redoc`, and `/openapi.json` stay open for probes and
|
| 84 |
+
documentation. `OPTIONS` preflight requests bypass auth so CORS works.
|
| 85 |
+
|
| 86 |
+
Generate a key with:
|
| 87 |
+
|
| 88 |
+
```powershell
|
| 89 |
+
# PowerShell
|
| 90 |
+
-join ((48..57) + (65..90) + (97..122) | Get-Random -Count 48 | ForEach-Object { [char]$_ })
|
| 91 |
+
```
|
| 92 |
+
|
| 93 |
+
The rate limiter is an in-process token bucket keyed by API key (authenticated)
|
| 94 |
+
or client IP (anonymous). It is per-worker: if you run multiple uvicorn workers,
|
| 95 |
+
enforce a shared limit at the reverse proxy as well.
|
| 96 |
+
|
| 97 |
+
---
|
| 98 |
+
|
| 99 |
+
## 4. TLS and reverse proxy
|
| 100 |
+
|
| 101 |
+
Terminate TLS in front of uvicorn. A sample nginx configuration is in
|
| 102 |
+
[`deploy/nginx.conf.example`](deploy/nginx.conf.example). Minimum requirements:
|
| 103 |
+
|
| 104 |
+
- HTTPS only, HSTS enabled.
|
| 105 |
+
- `client_max_body_size` slightly above `MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES` (default 10 MiB).
|
| 106 |
+
- Forward `X-Forwarded-For` / `X-Forwarded-Proto`.
|
| 107 |
+
- Set `TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=1` only when the proxy is trusted and overwrites
|
| 108 |
+
those headers.
|
| 109 |
+
- Do not expose port 8000 directly when a proxy is in use.
|
| 110 |
+
|
| 111 |
+
```powershell
|
| 112 |
+
# Backend behind nginx
|
| 113 |
+
cd backend
|
| 114 |
+
python -m uvicorn main:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
|
| 115 |
+
```
|
| 116 |
+
|
| 117 |
+
---
|
| 118 |
+
|
| 119 |
+
## 5. CORS
|
| 120 |
+
|
| 121 |
+
`CORS_ORIGINS` is a comma-separated allow-list. The default includes the local
|
| 122 |
+
Vite dev server on ports 8080/5173 and the preview server on 4173. Add your real
|
| 123 |
+
frontend origin for a deployment. Avoid `CORS_ORIGINS=*`; it is incompatible
|
| 124 |
+
with credentialed deployments and makes every site able to call the API.
|
| 125 |
+
|
| 126 |
+
Allowed headers include `Content-Type`, `Authorization`, and `X-API-Key`.
|
| 127 |
+
|
| 128 |
+
---
|
| 129 |
+
|
| 130 |
+
## 6. Input handling
|
| 131 |
+
|
| 132 |
+
- `/analyze-frame` rejects empty uploads (422), oversized uploads (413), and
|
| 133 |
+
undecodable images (422). The size cap is `MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES`.
|
| 134 |
+
- Uploaded bytes are decoded in memory and are not written to disk.
|
| 135 |
+
- `/images/{id}` accepts only zero-padded six-digit `.jpg` names inside
|
| 136 |
+
`CELEBA_IMAGES_DIR`; traversal attempts are rejected before filesystem access.
|
| 137 |
+
- `/generate-person` returns sanitised errors and preserves meaningful HTTP
|
| 138 |
+
status codes. It does not echo provider internals.
|
| 139 |
+
- Error responses never include stack traces or absolute paths.
|
| 140 |
+
|
| 141 |
+
Keep `MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES` aligned with the proxy limit, and keep the image
|
| 142 |
+
directory outside any path served by the proxy.
|
| 143 |
+
|
| 144 |
+
---
|
| 145 |
+
|
| 146 |
+
## 7. Dependency isolation
|
| 147 |
+
|
| 148 |
+
The project pins a tested environment in `requirements.lock` and targets Python
|
| 149 |
+
3.11. Use a virtual environment; do not install into a global interpreter that
|
| 150 |
+
contains unrelated packages.
|
| 151 |
+
|
| 152 |
+
```powershell
|
| 153 |
+
.\scripts\bootstrap.ps1 # CUDA 12.6 (verified environment)
|
| 154 |
+
.\scripts\bootstrap.ps1 -Cpu # CPU-only
|
| 155 |
+
```
|
| 156 |
+
|
| 157 |
+
The bootstrap script creates `.venv`, installs the lock/requirements, runs the
|
| 158 |
+
secret check, and warns about missing AdaFace assets. It never overwrites an
|
| 159 |
+
existing `.env`.
|
| 160 |
+
|
| 161 |
+
---
|
| 162 |
+
|
| 163 |
+
## 8. Logging and incident response
|
| 164 |
+
|
| 165 |
+
- The API logs provider failures (exception text) but not prompts containing
|
| 166 |
+
biometric attributes at INFO level.
|
| 167 |
+
- Access logs contain client IPs. Treat them as personal data; shorten retention.
|
| 168 |
+
- If a key is exposed: revoke it at the provider, issue a replacement, restart
|
| 169 |
+
the backend, and search logs/archives for the old value.
|
| 170 |
+
- If a biometric image or report is exposed: follow the incident process in
|
| 171 |
+
[PRIVACY.md](PRIVACY.md).
|
| 172 |
+
|
| 173 |
+
---
|
| 174 |
+
|
| 175 |
+
## 9. Pre-sharing checklist
|
| 176 |
+
|
| 177 |
+
- [ ] Gemini, Groq, and Cohere keys rotated.
|
| 178 |
+
- [ ] `.env` files contain the new keys and are gitignored.
|
| 179 |
+
- [ ] `python scripts/check_secrets.py` exits 0.
|
| 180 |
+
- [ ] `SENTINEL_API_KEY` set if the API is reachable by anyone else.
|
| 181 |
+
- [ ] `CORS_ORIGINS` limited to the real frontend origin.
|
| 182 |
+
- [ ] TLS/reverse proxy configured; port 8000 not public.
|
| 183 |
+
- [ ] `Data/`, `backend/index_artifacts/`, and `backend/models_cache/` excluded
|
| 184 |
+
from the shared archive.
|
| 185 |
+
- [ ] Privacy notice and lawful basis reviewed for your jurisdiction.
|