ARTICLE 3
The Universal Criterion of Truth
Abstract
The cornerstone of the epistemology of any philosophical system or doctrine
is the question of truth.
Based on the analysis of the work of Vladimir I. Lenin "Materialism and
Empiriocriticism", it is shown that the criterion of truth or of the truthfulness
of the forms of developing reality is not practice, erroneously considered as
such to this day, but the contentfulness (substantive richness, pithiness) of
these forms; practice, in its turn, is a method or procedure of evaluating the
fullness or the "quantity" of the contentfulness of the forms of reality.
Moreover, practice represents only a particular case of a more developed
technology of establishing the truth β interpretation.
The criterion of truth put forward in the present article makes it possible to
evaluate quantitatively the significance of the forms of reality, which, in its
turn, gives the possibility to rank the forms and, on this basis, to outline
more meaningfully the directions of promising investigations.
In the same connection it is noted that there do not exist two or more
equally contentful truths (ideas, representations, statements, theories,
concepts, models, opinions, points of view, etc.) with respect to one and the
same investigated question or subject of judgment, just as there cannot in
principle exist two or more equivalent approximations to objective truth
(absolute truth). At every given moment of development, the truth in the
indicated sense is always one.
In addition, it is shown that the concept of "reflection" ("copy", "mapping") of
reality, used by dialectical materialism and other philosophical doctrines for
the description of the principle of the functioning of human thinking or
consciousness, serves as a limitation or barrier on the path of understanding
the essence of the processes of development and cognition of reality;
objective reality represents the movement and change of forms in the
direction of the possession of the highest contentfulness (i.e., of the
maximally achievable content), and all processes of development and
cognition of reality are to be studied and considered through the prism of
content-form
transitions,
conversions,
transformations
of
unitary
directionality.
Β§ 1. Questions of the theory of cognition
In October 1908, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin finished, on the whole, the work on
the book "Materialism and Empiriocriticism". A good half of this work is
devoted to the critical analysis of the theory of cognition of empiriocriticism
(a subjectively idealistic trend in philosophy, fashionable at the beginning of
the XX century) and to the exposition of views on the same questions of the
theory of cognition from the position of dialectical materialism (for brevity:
diamat) [11].
Beginning with antiquity and up to the present time, the "central category" of
the theory of cognition and the "most important, irreplaceable concept of
science" is considered to be the category of truth [4, p. 6].
The ancient dispute of philosophers concerning the cognizability of the world
and the truthfulness of the knowledge obtained, extracted, acquired, it would
seem, was resolved there, in this Lenin's work, in general outline in favor of
the point of view of the Marxists, to whose number the author himself
belonged [19, p. 352β353]. And nevertheless, again and again generations
of investigators of the surrounding world come, who do not tire of "stepping
on the same rake" and continue to fill their own bumps at the price of their
own delusions.
Thus, the long-standing philosophical dispute does not subside to this day,
and, in all probability, a more complete solution of the same problem, as
always, is impossible outside a fresh look at the established state of affairs
and without reliance on a worldview requiring periodic refinement.
With regard to the indicated considerations, the present work (article) is
called upon:
a) to show that the representations of diamat about truth in the main are
nevertheless more correct and stand closer to the truth than the
representations of other philosophical systems and doctrines;
b) and then, already on this basis, to develop and supplement somewhat the
representations of diamat.
The first question, actual at all times, considered by V.I. Lenin in his book on
behalf of dialectical materialism and in connection with the mentioned
analysis of the theory of cognition, is the question of the principled
cognizability of the surrounding world in the course of the acquisition of
knowledge about it.
The second question, following from the first, is the question of the criteria of
truthfulness, reliability, authenticity of the forms of the acquired knowledge.
The first question is resolved in the work of V.I. Lenin positively by the
recognition as real of a series (chain) of objective "contents" or the so-called
relative truths, represented by different cognitive forms, as well as by the
indication of the movement and change of these forms or relative truths in
the course of cognition in the direction of the achievement of absolute truth.
The positive solution of the second question is connected with the reasonable
(rational) sufficiency of the criterion of practice (as the criterion of truth),
which is "so 'indefinite' as not to allow man's knowledge to turn into an
'absolute', and at the same time so definite as to wage a merciless struggle
against all varieties of idealism and agnosticism" [11, p. 138].
Β§ 2. How diamat answers the questions of the theory of cognition
Let us dwell in more detail on how dialectical materialism answers the
questions about the possibility of cognition (i.e., of the cognizability) of the
surrounding world and about the evaluation of the truthfulness of the
acquired knowledge.
From the position of diamat there exists an external world or object,
containing in itself some objective content, on the one hand, and a subject
cognizing (sensing and realizing) this world, on the other hand. The fact that
the diverse forms of the surrounding world (objects, bodies, things,
processes, phenomena, etc.) are bearers of a certain objective content,
independent of the cognizing subject, raises no doubt from the point of view
of diamat, since the results of the millennial practical activity of man testify
to this. The question remains β how correctly the representations of the
cognizing subject about these forms of the surrounding world correspond to
the content of these forms independent of the subject. In the words of V.I.
Lenin: "The objects of our representations differ from our representations,
the thing in itself differs from the thing for us, for the latter is only a part or
one side of the former, just as man himself is only a small particle of the
nature reflected in his representations." But if for Kant the "thing in itself" is
an "abstraction without reality", then for Feuerbach the "thing in itself" is an
"abstraction with reality", i.e., the world existing outside us is quite
cognizable and in nothing principally different from the "phenomenon" [11, p.
115].
Further, the presence of objective content in the feelings, sensations, and
perceptions (i.e., in the "experience" β according to the terminology
widespread at that time [11, p. 123, 327]) of the cognizing subject is sought
out and confirmed.
And, finally, the "objective content... of concepts, ideas, judgments, theories,
doctrines, and of the integral picture of the world in the dialectics of its
development" [19, p. 226] is established, i.e., the presence of objective
content in the abstract forms (products) of human thinking is proved. The
fact that objective content must be present and is present in the abstract
forms and products of thinking of the cognizing subject is, from the position
of diamat, again beyond doubt. The question reduces only to the manner in
which this can be confirmed. In other words, in order to establish the
truthfulness of the obtained or acquired knowledge (judgments, statements,
theories, concepts, formulations of laws and regularities, doctrines,
paradigms, models, etc.), it is necessary again to understand β whether the
given knowledge (more precisely, its subjectively ideal forms) is likewise a
bearer of objective content.
Β§ 3. A review of the existing criteria of the truthfulness of knowledge
The ruler of today's representations about the criteria of the evaluation of the
authenticity or reliability of knowledge occupies the range from vulgarobjective objectivism to extremely idealistic subjectivism. Let us enumerate
briefly the most known and vivid of these representations [7].
Objectivism considers the phenomena of reality as historically necessary
irrespective of the subject of activity and cognition, and therefore truth here
is almost identified with objectivity [13, p. 418]. In other words, the speech
here goes, as it were, not even about knowledge (a theoretical-abstract
form), the truthfulness or reliability of which is necessary to establish, but
about representations identical with or "coinciding" with the object itself.
The founders of the already mentioned empirio-criticism considered that the
correctness or truthfulness of thinking is conditioned by the principles of the
"economy of thinking" (according to E. Mach) and of the "least expenditure of
forces" (according to R. Avenarius) [11, p. 165-167]; these same principles
they laid also into the foundation of their theory of cognition.
R. Descartes assumed clarity and obviousness as the criterion of truth: if
something is understood clearly and obviously, then it is true.
By different thinkers there were proposed as criteria of truth, for example,
the internal consistency of thoughts, their value, etc.
Pragmatism puts forward the following criterion: true is that which is useful
or advantageous to people.
By the flows of information of modern mass media there is unprecedentedly
agitated and imposed on man the justice of the following point of view with
respect to the evaluation or choice of the criterion of truth: whoever is
stronger (whoever wins) β that one is right. In other words, if one succeeds
by force, by pressure, by "impudence", by unexampled insolence, cunning,
and rigging to push through and implant into the consciousness of some
multitude of people (laymen) any doubtful judgment, statement, conclusions,
or inference (and in the limiting case β even a whole system of world-
understanding), then the result of such an action is identified with truth or
verity; in many cases it is precisely such a path that is chosen today by
different subjects for the assertion of the rightness of their position or point
of view.
A number of known philosophers see the criterion of truth in "universal
significance". From the point of view of this criterion, truth is that which is
"universally significant", i.e., that with which all people agree, or the
overwhelming majority of them, or simply the majority.
A variety of this point of view is yet another one, which was adhered to by
the French mathematician A. PoincarΓ©. According to the concept put forward
by him (this is the so-called conventionalism), scientific concepts and
theories do not reflect objective reality, but are the result of an agreement of
scientists or arbitrarily established rules. The quintessence of his views is
expressed by the following phrase: "The only true objective reality is the
internal harmony of the world" [11, p. 161].
Kindred to the views of A. PoincarΓ© there exists also such a point of view: the
criterion of truth is beauty (as a manifestation of the internal and external
harmony of the world).
It must be said that the variant of appointing as the criterion of truth the
"universally significant" (generally accepted, generally obligatory, etc.) is
analyzed in detail by V.I. Lenin in this same book of his, where it is shown
that in many cases the "universally significant" is a synonym or equivalent of
collective human delusions, if this "universally significant" is deprived of
objective content, given to man in experience, i.e., acquired or established
by the empirical path in the course of the cognition of the surrounding world
(or, what is the same, in the course of the object-practical activity of man).
Β§ 4. The subjectivism of the majority of the criteria of truth
It is not difficult to see that the majority of the above-enumerated criteria is,
to one degree or another, imbued with the spirit of subjectivism. With all the
importance of the signs or indicators of the truthfulness of knowledge
contained in them, there is absent the main one, which would emphasize or
point to the objectivity of knowledge, i.e., would tie it to the objectivity of the
content of the forms of the external world. Certainly, no more or less integral
or balanced philosophical system (doctrine) will consider the truthfulness of
knowledge outside the connection with objective reality, and in the first place
β with that objective world in which such a system abides (whether it
"wants" it or not).
Hence grows the need for a complex criterion which would establish and take
into account the presence of that very objective content in all abstract and
subjective forms of knowledge. To this day, such a more or less balanced
system of views is recognized to be the dialectical-materialistic philosophy,
which does not deny the significance of the clarity of thoughts, their
consistency, their universal significance, their rationality, economy,
obviousness, usefulness, pragmaticality, harmony, etc., etc., but at the same
time is fully aware of the fact that the above-enumerated indicators (signs),
because of the absence of a sufficiently solid and stable natural connection of
theirs with the external world, cannot be recognized as fundamental criteria
of truth. Proceeding from such an understanding, dialectical materialism sees
as the most suitable sought-for criterion of truth practice or the objectpractical activity of man as a subject of cognition.
Thus, under the vaults of the soundly built edifice of dialectical-materialistic
philosophy, as its core there is discovered a seemingly quite harmonious
system of views on the fundamental questions of the theory of cognition.
Β§ 5. Peculiarities of the interpretation by diamat of the nature of the
subjectively ideal forms of cognition (forms of the representation of
knowledge)
And here I would like to draw attention to one peculiarity of the just
mentioned system of views. If the subjectively idealistic philosophy turns the
sensations of the subject cognizing the external world into a certain
"partition, wall separating consciousness from the external world", then
contrary to these representations diamat considers that "sensation is indeed
the direct connection of consciousness with the external world, is the
transformation of the energy of external irritation into a fact of
consciousness" [11, p. 49].
As we see, according to the views of diamat, in defiance of the views
criticized by it of the idealistic (it should be said, both subjectively and
objectively idealistic) doctrines, no barrier separating the objective (including
the three-dimensional world of objects habitual for us) world, firstly, from the
sensual world (sensations, experience) and, secondly, from the ideal world of
the cognizing subject, seemingly does not exist. We look further: "These
facts of consciousness are not merely some conventional signs, symbols,
hieroglyphs, but represent copies, images of real things and processes
taking place in nature, and cognition itself is a dialectical process of the
reflection by consciousness of the objective world" [19, p. 352]. In other
words, we see that the level of sensations here is still recognized as the
"direct connection of consciousness with the external world". But what about
consciousness itself? β and here it is, it has turned into a "fact", and the
facts of consciousness represent already certain "copies", "images",
"reflections" of real things and natural processes.
According to these representations, the objective content of thinking exists in
reality only in the form of a copy, in the form of some reflection of reality. At
first, it would seem, one got rid of one "partition" between the forms of
objectivity and the forms of thinking, but exactly to the extent of then
coming to another "partition" β cognition turns into a dialectical process of
the reflection by consciousness of the objective world. Thereby an
involuntary start is given to the process of the "multiplication of entities",
with which even a thoroughly religious consciousness cannot agree: willynilly there comes to mind the saying of the English monk known under the
name of "Occam's razor": "Entities should not be multiplied without
necessity." Denying in words the idealistic doctrines with their religious core,
in fact we go into religion, for every religion is precisely the earthly
embodiment (reflection, copying "in image and likeness") of some unearthly
entity.
Marxism, diamat, and indeed any materialism of any worth stand on the
positions of the rigid opposition and separation by a "partition" or "wall" of
everything objective and empirical (material) from everything ideal, which
represents a certain ephemeral "copy" or "reflection" of everything material
(read: real). At that, into what category this very "reflection" should be
assigned, nobody still knows properly: on "this side" it does not take root in
any way (for it is not material), whereas "otherworldliness" is ridiculed and
rejected by the materialistic doctrines in the most resolute and merciless
manner.
The presence of such an inconsistency (according to the terminology given
above β a "partition" or "wall") violates, in our opinion, the harmonious
system of representations about the transformation or transfer of objective
content from form to form in the process of cognition and leaves no chances
for the correct interpretation and correct forecasting of the direction of
further transformations of the forms of cognition.
Meanwhile, in the course of the accumulation of knowledge and the
improvement of representations about the world surrounding us, the
circumstance is realized ever more distinctly and clearly that our
environment, just as we ourselves, is a changing, moving, developing
multilevel reality, "being made" and "reproducing itself" in the real-time
mode and manifesting itself at every moment in a single, unrepeatable,
unique copy. In such an aspect, the well-known to us sayings about a certain
"copying", "photographing", "mapping" and in the general case β "reflection"
of objectively existing reality [11, p. 125] β somehow no longer "get along"
very well with the actual state of affairs.
Β§ 6. Description of the process of the "ascent" of contentfulness by
successive forms
But, perhaps, one should not approach the interpretation of the process of
cognition, as well as the perception and interpretation of the motion,
development, evolution of nature, man, and society, so straightforwardly and
"head-on", so mechanistically and trivially?
Why not consider this same process from a somewhat different position or in
a somewhat different light, namely: some deep essence or objective content
of the developing reality "ascends" and manifests itself in separate
successive and mutually conjugated concrete forms β by the conventionallyinitial form of thingness (the world of things), further by the form of
sensations (the vegetable and animal world, including man) and, finally, by
the form of thinking (subjective abstract human thinking).
Being objective content, initially represented by the thing form (about any
initiality of representation one can speak here very conditionally, since
about the forms preceding the thing ones, including various physical fields,
we cannot yet say anything definite here at all), the mentioned
contentfulness in the process of its motion-development changes the form for
a more flexible and capacious one, which turns out to be, from the point of
view of human consciousness, the form of sensations, which then, in its turn,
is replaced by a form still more capacious and embracing, and therefore more
abstracted, called by us the form of thinking.
For this reason, each of the indicated forms, as merely different shells of the
same single, but transforming at the transition from level to level, objective
content, must easily conjugate with the forms preceding and following it,
which would testify to the succession (and, in the final analysis, to the
truthfulness) of all these forms.
The objective content independent of the subject (by analogy with the
above-mentioned "thing in itself"), present in any and every object of the
surrounding world, "ascends" (like the "ascent" of some deep essence of the
surrounding world) first into the subjective and abstract contentful forms of
the vegetable and animal world (including the form of human experience, to
which the sensuous, or sensations, belongs) and then β into the ever more
abstract forms of human thinking. In other words, the process "begins" to
develop from the moment of the conditional start of the most "coarse",
mechanistic-materialistic thing forms, further continues with the forms
endowed with sensuousness (to which belong the sensations and reactions of
the living β the vegetable and animal world), then is "taken over" by the
forms-carriers of the images of consciousness and representations already in
combination with the forms-carriers of sensations and the forms-carriers of
thingness (higher animals and "early" man) and further continues with the
forms-carriers of ever more abstract intellectual-spiritual contentfulness
(which are "late", i.e., modern man and society) again in combination with all
the preceding forms.
Thanks to the ability to conjugate the separate forms of the single
"ascending" objective content, following one after another as continuations of
the preceding forms, there arises a generalized (aggregate) multilevel form
(of man with his thinking), consisting, like a pyramid, of interconnected and
unimaginably interwoven layers-levels-forms, the summit part of which (of
the pyramid) is crowned by the form-carrier of an extremely abstract (the
most abstracted of those reliably known to us) content (theoretical
knowledge).
Having before our eyes the just drawn image of the pyramid, it remains only
to make sure that the contents of the mutually linked layers-forms-levels of
this pyramid are indeed successive, and, consequently, objective, i.e.,
represent separate links of the single objective content of reality developing
in a through manner (by means of the above-indicated forms). The latter, in
its turn, is proved with the help of a very well-known procedure, from time
immemorial called practice (about which we will speak much and in detail
below).
Thus, the "hidden essence" of reality being revealed, or its objective content,
"marches" in a through manner in the process of its ascent-development by
means of different, growing one out of another and therefore mutually linked
forms.
The distinct visibility and confident ascertainment of this circumstance is
hindered by the closest interweaving of the forms of the motion of objective
content passing one into another. At the same time, one can notice that,
being represented by different forms, the fragments of this general objective
content differ from one another by some of their peculiarities, which are
introduced into them in the course of their development from the initial
objective, but still to some extent, uncertainty.
So, in accordance with our representations, separate objects (bodies, things,
objects) are the forms of existence and "acquiring" of the objective content
of reality at the level of the inanimate, manifested by means of the formslevels of the living, i.e., of "sensations" and "thinking".
Further, plants and animals are the forms of the motion of that same
objective content at the level and through the levels of the living inanimate,
growing out of the forms (and being the continuation of the forms) of the
inanimate and, like the preceding thing forms, expressed and manifested by
means of the forms-levels of "sensations" and "thinking".
Finally, man with his thinking (mankind and society) is an even more specific
form of the motion of again that same objective content at the level and
through the levels of subjective thinking (consciousness), connected even
more closely by direct and feedback connection with the forms of the living
and the inanimate and being the immediate continuation of the latter. This
form is also expressed and manifested by means of the forms-levels of
"sensations" and "thinking".
And since the whole just enumerated set of forms is the continuation of the
thing form, there is no need at that to introduce some intermediate gaskets
in the form of the notions and terms "reflection" or "copy" only in order to
emphasize once again the peculiar character of such forms. In other words,
the chain of the above-enumerated forms is the same expression,
manifestation, motion, "march", development of the objective content, only
in the most specific, called subjective, forms, which are the continuations
of the preceding thing forms. The root of the erroneousness of the
representations about such, in particular, a form as the form of thinking (as
about some ephemeral formation β the "ideal reflection" of reality), and the
problem of the interpretation of such a form lie in the artificial separation of
the highest ("thinking") layer from the general single bundle or aggregate of
all the levels-forms available in the "human" structure and the subsequent
absolutization and opposition of it (of this most specific form) to all the
preceding forms.
Of course, it is undoubted that the objective contentfulness, which manifests
itself and can manifest itself only through subjective forms, will never get rid
of the shade of some subjectivity, but at the same time it remains objective
by its nature, by its origin, by its roots, which lie in the foundation of the
whole chain of forms ensuring the transformation of this objectivity into
some specific subjectivity in the course of the motion-development of reality.
The objective content simultaneously ascends through the subject, and
moves in this form of its in the direction of the achievement of its "final"
expression in this same or another more perfect form, as the most perfect of
all the forms. The difference of the forms of the representation of the
objective contentfulness in the course of its motion-development is
conditioned and characterized by different values or magnitudes of the
intensity of the contentful-formal transformations at different levels of the
representation and acquiring of these forms. The change of the intensity of
the contentful-formal transformations at the transition from level to level in
the final analysis turns out to be the main factor determining the
development of the forms of reality. [In this work this aspect is practically
not considered and not disclosed.]
By every fragment, episode, act of its existence objects (if the speech goes
about the inanimate), by every breath and step an animal, by every deed or
phrase man extract the hidden essence of their nature from inside outward
and make it a phenomenon (make it visible), which (the phenomenon) in
fact turns out every time to be only some next approximation to the full and
all-round expression of this very essence.
The subject with his consciousness does not "reflect" reality, i.e., does not
duplicate and does not multiply entities, but continues by himself the
search for a more contentful form (correcting and supplementing the
contentfulnesses of the preceding forms-levels in their aggregate) of the
reality developing in such a way. And this new sought-for refined form is
realized as a superstructure over the preceding aggregate of forms,
absorbing, including into itself in the main features, in a concentrated
("sublated") form the contents of the preceding forms.
From the thing forms β to the subjectively ideal forms (which are
simultaneously the constituent parts of the general aggregate of forms,
entering into "engagement" or conjugating with those same thing forms), β
this is, in accordance with our representations, the direction of the
development of reality at the present stage in the cluster of the forms known
to us.
Let us show and analyze the process of the "ascent" and transformation of
the objective content by the example of a concrete object β a certain
spherical boulder-stone, the definiteness of the form, dimensions, and
internal structure of which forces one to "reckon" with these peculiarities of
its:
β firstly, the inanimate objects surrounding it, running into it under the
influence of diverse external forces as into an objectively present obstacle
and interacting with it as with an obstacle;
β secondly, the moving living bodies, interacting with it and "taking into
account" it already not only as an obstacle, but reproducing or generating in
this connection some simplest abstract images of it;
β thirdly, the living animate organisms, which along with the results of the
thing interactions with it and the sensuous representations about it, manifest
its essence also in the form of developed abstract images and
representations, extending from the abstract formula description of its
spherical surface to the descriptions of the physical, chemical, and quantummechanical properties of its material in the guise of even more abstracted
symbolic-formula expressions, mathematical equations, and theoretical
computations.
By the example of a spherical boulder (such specimens are also encountered
in nature), rounded from all sides by a glacier and subjected to the long-term
influence of squall winds, stormy waters, raging fires, as well as of similar
stone blocks (by virtue of collisions with the latter), one can trace the
"ascent" of the contentful essence of a separate object by means of the
forms changing in the course of such an "ascent".
An object of finite, limited dimensions, fixed and imprinted ("perceived") by
the neighboring objects as an obstacle, passes with time into the stage of the
sensuous perception and the simplest figurative description of it by living
organisms as streamlined, hard, solid, massive... and further passes to the
stage of the perception of it by human thinking and the description by
abstract means in the form of complicated images, symbols, and formulas:
as a spherical object of radius R with the surface approximately calculated by
the formula 4ΟRΒ²; as an object with the volume approximately calculated by
the formula (4/3)ΟRΒ³; as an object with the ultimate strength of the material
for rupture (or compression), calculated as the ratio of the ultimate
admissible load on the object to the area of its cross-section; as an object
with hardness determined in conventional units, say, by Brinell; as an object
with wear resistance and other properties and characteristics determined by
formulas and mathematical dependences known from the courses of
mathematics, physics, chemistry, strength of materials... quantum
mechanics, etc., etc. And all this complex description can be qualified as the
manifested contentful essence of one and the same something, represented
by the forms of different degrees of abstractness and subjectivity, β in the
course of the ascent of this essence successively through the forms-carriers
of thingness, the forms-carriers of sensations and, finally, through the formscarriers of thinking.
To express the strength and hardness of the material of the boulder through
the forms of standards found by the empirical path and established at that,
such as the limits of the strength of its material (say, for rupture and shear),
and through the empirically established conventional units of hardness (say,
by Rockwell, Brinell, or Vickers), β this means to find the expression of new
abstract knowledge about the stone (i.e., to find the expression of its
objective content, developing by new and ever more abstract forms) through
the contents of the concrete thing and sensuous forms-standards formed or
shaped "in experience". The same concerns the knowledge about the other
properties of the stone, such, say, as wear resistance, density, thermal
conductivity, electrical conductivity, etc., etc.
Let us now return to the above-cited words of V.I. Lenin regarding the cognition
of the world as a process of the sequential transformation of the "thing-in-itself"
into the "thing-for-us", and see what emerges if we reinterpret Lenin's words in
light of the concept of the "ascent" of the objective content of reality (its deep
essence) through forms transforming from objective substantial to subjective
abstract ones, which has just been expounded. Then, the initial Lenin quote with
our addition will read approximately as follows: "The objects of our
representations differ from our representations, the thing-in-itself differs from
the thing-for-us, for the latter is only a part or one side of the former, just as
man himself..." β is merely a continuation of the content-based development of
the "thing-in-itself" into the "thing-for-us" through the aggregate of specific
forms manifested by it, which grow sequentially one out of another, such as the
form of sensations and the form of thought, which have transformed in the
course of the aforementioned content-based development from the form of
substantiality.
In the course of the described "ascent" of the content-based component of
developing reality β initially through non-living substantial forms, then through
living forms of sensations, and further through the intellectual and spiritual forms
of human thought β all the aforementioned forms emerge as products of the
"demonstration" of the accumulating contentfulness, which products then
manifest themselves in the form of successive technologies and ideologies.
Reality, as can be seen from our examples, remains the same general,
continuous, unified changing substance, but it manifests itself differently at
different stages of its movement-development, that is, in different forms: from
forms that are concrete and objective (independent of our consciousness,
according to the assessment of our own consciousness) β to forms that are
increasingly abstract and subjective...
Here it is very important to understand that there is no ready (once and for
all) essence of the world, which somewhere "hides" from man and which man
has only to cognize in small portions and steps, just as there is no ready
(completely exhausting itself and existing independently of anything)
objective world: the essence of the world "ascends" by contentful forms
sprouting one out of another, thanks to which the objective world is "made"
every moment, is recreated and reproduced from itself by the build-up of
layer-by-layer changes on the available and simultaneously changing in such
a way basis.
The neighboring external object is not simply "reflected" in me (in my
consciousness), but exists through me by its content, which changes
together with me and my consciousness (as the continuation of the relation
of the components {I/object} or of the more capacious relation
{subject/object}) in the course of the deepening of the knowledge about this
object.
The essence of the changes taking place or occurring in the objective world
"ascends" through me and by means of me, in direct connection or in relation
with me (as well as in relation with another individual, and in relation with an
animal, and in relation with an inanimate object). Without me this will be
already a somewhat different form of the manifestation of the essence, and
with another "I" β this will be a third form of the manifestation of the
essence, etc. And only the generalized form as the aggregate of the aboveenumerated forms exposes, reproduces some generalized collective
contentfulness, which only can be called the objective content. In other
words, about a separate and independent of anyone or anything absolute
essence there is nothing to speak here at all β such does not exist in nature.
The essence is "extracted outward", i.e., manifests itself only in the process
of the interaction of something one with something other.
In accordance with such representations about development, the
changeability of the forms (from the concrete forms of thingness to the
abstract forms of thinking) corresponds to the habitual natural (from the
position of human consciousness) course of events. Now, in the light of and
on the basis of these representations, one can come to a more exact
understanding and conclusion about the actual relation of the components of
the subjective and the objective in the process of the described motion of the
forms (from the thing ones β to thinking).
Man is a multilevel formation, consisting of a hierarchical sequence
(transformed with time into an inseparable aggregate) of conjugating formslevels characterized by their succession (it is precisely this that, first of all,
should catch the eye, but is taken into account by few). The aggregate or
bundle of levels, beginning from the atomic and molecular (forming the thing
level), further β to the cellular, organ-tissue, and organismic (forming the
animal level or the level of the "living inanimate") and further β to the
biospheric, subjective, and social (forming the level of the "living animate
and socially organized"), β represents a specimen of the "cohesive"
organization of the forms-levels transforming one into another and therefore
contentfully successive (including in themselves also even more numerous
subforms-sublevels).
On the basis of the adduced reasonings one can come to the following, not
unimportant, in our opinion, conclusion: the consciousness of man is not
some passive "reflection" of reality, but it is reality itself, the reality itself or,
more exactly, the next form of the manifestation of the latter at the next
stage of its (of the reality) "ascent", development. At this stage of its motiondevelopment the reality appears before us, as well as before itself, in the
specific form of man and his thinking. In this case, consciousness should be
accepted not as a dead passive reflection or copy of everything preceding
and existing inanimate and living, but as the next form of the manifestation
of the contentfulness of the ascending, developing reality, continuing and
uniting by itself the whole row of the preceding forms of this same reality.
With such an approach, the living chain of development (and its logic) is not
interrupted, growing by ever more capacious, contentful and therefore ever
more abstracted links-forms. Such a research approach gets rid of the
artificial restriction from above on any development and, in particular,
liquidates the known barrier erected by diamat. The succession of the
changing forms of reality is not blocked and does not end with the form of
man and his thinking, but goes ever more in depth, into an ever more
abstracting reality... Thereby the process of cognition is also not restricted to
the comprehension of the form of thinking as the most "summit" form of the
forms of reality reliably known to us so far, but presupposes the presence
and appearance of even more developed forms of it with a greater intensity
of the contentful-formal transformations (transformations). But, what is more
essential, such an approach makes it possible to forecast the further course
of development (and, correspondingly, of cognition) and to anticipate with an
increasing degree of accuracy the appearance of new forms of the changing
reality.
Β§ 7. A model of reality from the position of our representations. The
principle of self-development
But what, at least in the first and the roughest approximation, is this
developing reality that serves as the subject of our discussion? Let us try to
determine a more or less integral model of it, answering to our views.
Let us imagine some "traveling" two-component, but single integral
formation or construction of the kind {content/form} β a very abstract
one (in its most general configuration), but in the course of its "travel"
always appearing in a concrete form, changing in the direction or towards the
side of an ever greater and greater predominance in the composition of this
construction of the component "content" and the acquisition thereby by the
"numerator" of this relation of an ever greater specific weight within the
scales of the integral relation [2, 8, 23].
The changeability of this abstract relation {content/form}, directed in a
definite way, is conditioned by the simultaneous unity and non-identity
(dissimilarity) of its components, by virtue of which both components are in a
state of interaction and inexhaustible motion towards rapprochement with
each other and the acquisition of equilibrium (balance) or mutual
expressiveness by each other (which means: to become maximally contentful
β for the form, and to determine itself with its perfect form β for the
content). The presence in one integral relation of two components with
different types of activity gives rise to a vortex, a whirlwind, a circulation, a
"self-winding" spiral, i.e., a change (motion, development) of a specific
character both of both constituents of this relation and of the relation itself as
a whole.
"Empirical experience" and abstract thinking make it possible to reveal the
deep essence of this motion, clothing it in the formulation of a certain
universal principle of self-development [2, p. 10; 8, p. 53-54; 23, p. 4]:
the development of content is carried out in the direction of the
exhaustive expression by the developing content of the very same
developing content. Applied to the surrounding world, this means
approximately the following: everything that exists and develops has as the
direction of its development and existence the expression by itself of the
existing and developing itself existing and developing.
The abstract relation {content/form} with a quite unambiguous directedness
of the change-motion-development of the components or constituents of this
relation, as well as of the whole relation as a whole, β this is what exists
initially, everywhere, objectively and independently of any concreteness
whatsoever; this is what, by virtue of its omnipresence, permeates through
itself all the available and arising concrete forms-levels-relations. It is
precisely the contentful-formal transformations of the above-described
directedness (i.e., the changes of the components of the relation in a strictly
definite side, in a strictly definite direction) that lie in the foundation of the
development of the forms of reality, which are, in their turn, merely the
concrete attire and embodiment of the abstract model presented above. And
it is precisely this initial model that, by virtue of its solidity, is, in our opinion,
the most acceptable and effective for the in-depth study, research, and
penetration into the essence of the surrounding world (the changing reality)
at the present stage of its development.
The noted dual-unity with a very strict and definite directedness of the
contentful-formal transformations (transformations) explains the everymoment uniqueness of the world being acquired (the Universe, nature, life,
etc.), as well as the uniqueness and diversity of the existing and nascent
forms as separate elements of this world.
Being a strictly abstract formation, the indicated relation {content/form} is in
principle not manifestable in its most general kind or image, but at the same
time constitutes the core or the very essence of any and every real concrete
form.
The historical path of the abstract construction {content/form}, likened to
the "travel" of it in concrete images, runs through a great multitude of all
sorts of concrete forms (including also such kindred to it, but still more
concrete forms-relations as {subject/object}, {subjective/objective},
{abstract/concrete}, etc.). It is not the task of the present article to trace
the contentful-formal transformations of this relation in the course of its
historical motion-development, β and therefore we shall note only that the
initial, as, probably, and the final points of its "travel" are lost in the hazy
mists of the past and the future, in parallel coexisting in a single bundle or
aggregate of concrete forms growing one out of another and transforming in
the course of the "travel" under consideration.
Under the "control" of the mentioned principle of self-development, internally
inherent in all formations-forms and conditioning the existence (on its basis)
of all forms without exception, from the form of thingness, accepted by us as
the conditional beginning of the development of all the other forms of the
surrounding world, there developed the next new form of sensations, united
with the first form into one whole. This second form differs from the first by a
greater intensity of content-form transformations, that is, it ensures feedback, or
return to itself, and the "cognition" (reproduction, self-organization) of itself with
a greater "velocity" than the substantial form. Under the pressure and control of
the same principle, the second form has developed over time into an even more
capacious and, accordingly, more abstract form of thought, uniting within itself,
as it were, three interrelated forms β the substantial, the sensory, and the
cognitive; and this third form is characterized by an even greater intensity of
content-form transformations in comparison with the two preceding forms. Thus,
all three indicated forms "operate" as if in a single bundle, in a unified aggregate,
ensuring an ever more intensive "unwinding" of the processes of development
and cognition of the surrounding world under the "control" of the universal
principle of self-development common to all forms.
Man, who appears primarily as the "carrier" of the form of thought, in fact
represents a tight knot of all three forms, characterized by the harmonious unity
of these individual forms within their formed aggregate, crowned by the most
abstracted, powerful, and capacious form of thought. Man is a "pyramid" of the
above-listed interlinked forms of developing reality in the thus "equipped" next
"advanced" form of the same developing reality.
Under the "diktat" of the principle of self-development, the content of any form
moves beyond its own form in the direction of possessing a form of even greater
contentfulness, that is, a form of greater capacity and receptacle for the
"accommodation" of this self-developing, "self-making" content. Thus, the
process of the content "coiling" onto itself while existing β with the formation of
a hierarchical chain of forms that are ever more content-capacious and,
therefore, ever more abstracted β is incessantly carried out.
The very formulation of the principle of self-development indicates that the
process of cognition is carried out by the expression or replacement of the
incomprehensible by the comprehended, of the unknown by the known and
well-familiar, i.e., by the circles of self-expression; and such a way of motion
(cognition) most exactly fits the interpretation of the term "interpreting"
(about which we will speak below). All the constructions of new forms,
including the formation of the cognitive forms, go by the expression of the
forms through themselves. In essence, the process of cognition, being at first
a separate twig standing out on the general trunk of development, closes up
in the further course with the latter, turning out to be simply its continuation
identical to it.
Since in nature there is no other building material than nature itself or the
surrounding world, everything is built and superstructed from itself, by "selfmaking", β everything "dances from the stove", from the basis, by means of
the unceasing self-expression, i.e., the expression of the changing through
the existing and the available.
Everywhere, universally, and every moment there functions and is realized
the single principle of self-development, which conditions the motion of all
the forms. The impelling causes, "mechanisms", forces, and motives of any
change, motion, development should be considered as manifestations of
different intensity of the contentful-formal transformations of the
components in the relation {content/form} under the control of the universal
principle of self-development. In the opinion of F. Engels, "in any field of
natural science, even in mechanics, one makes a step forward every time
when somewhere one gets rid of the word force" [20, p. 130].
Every change-motion-development is explained by the presence of two
unequal, non-identical principles in their single naturally-conditioned
relation, endowed, on the one hand, with an inexhaustible natural striving
for unification and mutual expressiveness and, on the other hand, with no
less natural incompatibility and opposition. As has already been noted earlier,
it is precisely such a dual-unity and confrontation of the two principles in
their natural striving for identity, which they never attain, that determines
the diversity and uniqueness of the forms of the surrounding world.
The relation {content/form} in combination with the formulation of the
principle of self-development gives a sufficiently exhaustive representation
about the directedness of all the processes, both on the gnoseological and on
the ontological levels of reality, and therefore can serve as a naturallyobjective foundation for the unification of the sciences that have taken shape
over the period of the gnoseological activity of human thinking.
One can speak about some connection between the components in the
relations,
such,
say,
as
{content/form},
{subjective/objective},
{abstract/concrete}, {man/nature}, etc., only when the presence of one
component in the other is established, when these components are mutually
penetrated and expressed through each other, when some correlation is
established between them. The formulation of the principle of selfdevelopment in the most compact form simply "manifests" and "fixes" such a
representation about the dynamic interconnection of the componentsconstituents of reality: the development of anything whatsoever is directed
at the absorption, assimilation, and reproduction of itself developing in such
a way, as well as at the establishment every time of a new correlation
between the investigated components "content" and "form" in their
investigated relation {content/form}. As a particular case of development, as
its separate branch, human cognition is also oriented at the comprehension
of itself cognizing and thus developing.
The objective process of the increase of the contentfulness of the forms on
the gnoseological level (as a result of the active "work" of the principle of
self-development on the level of thinking) is perceived and evaluated by
thinking itself as the increase of the degree of its (of thinking) adequacy,
which is equivalent to the perfection of the forms and ways of its
representation and existence on this level (in the form) of notions,
categories, theories, speculative models, etc.
On the other levels the results of the "work" of the same principle are,
correspondingly, different. So, say, on the level of the living inanimate (the
vegetable and animal world, including man as an animal) the process of the
accumulation of contentfulness is clothed in the following forms: the
extraction of nutritive substances from the soil and the surrounding
environment (in plants); gathering, search, hunting, and the eating of prey
(in animals); the taking of food (in man). The motion and enrichment of the
contentfulness by means of the reproduced and changing hereditary
(inherited) forms, i.e., by means of the reproduction of offspring, β is also in
the row of the contentful development on the vegetable and animal levels. In
other words, at the more primitive (from the standpoint of human
consciousness) animal and vegetative levels, content-based accumulations are
realized, respectively, in more primitive forms β less encompassing and less
contentful than at the level of thought. An indicator for assessing the results of
the "work" of the same principle at these levels, similar to the indicator of
adequacy for the level of thought, is the effectiveness with which an animal or a
plant solves the tasks of survival and ensuring its own stable development.
It follows from what has been said in the two preceding paragraphs that there is
no insurmountable chasm between the content-based movement at the level of
the "living inanimate" and at the level of "thought." This chasm is easily
overcome if we regard thought with its forms and modes of existence (in the
form of concepts, categories, speculative models, theories, doctrines, teachings,
etc.) not as a kind of "ideal reflection" of something material in the human brain,
but as a continuation of the realization of the same mechanism, the same
algorithm of content-based movement, but in other (specific) forms and at
another level β with a bias, a shift towards ever more encompassing, ever more
contentful forms of developing reality, which the aforementioned conceptual
forms are. Thus, the key moment in the awareness of the essence of the
transition of the contentful motion from level to level is the understanding or
representation about the change of the forms of the contentful motion
(towards the increase of the degree of the abstraction of the forms), but
without the change of the principle (mechanism or algorithm) of this
motion.
Neither nature nor matter is endowed with the "universal property of
reflecting", but act only as the forms of the manifestation of the action of the
single universal dynamic principle of self-development, conditioning the
"self-winding" or spiral-cyclic motion of everything existing, which in statics
is perceived by human thinking as the reflection of itself in itself or as selfreflection.
It should be noted that the forecast about the emergence and appearance of
even more abstracted forms, following the form of thinking, is made here
already not on an empty place, but on the basis of and with the account of
the principle of self-development, conditioning the spiral-cyclic contentfulformal transformations with a bias towards the increment of the
contentfulness of the next new forms. It would be the "height of
superficiality" not to see that by the form of man and his thinking the
contentful motion (or the motion of the contentful constituent of reality) does
not end and is not exhausted. How, in what new abstracted forms this
motion continues after the contentful-formal "transition" or "leap" from the
form of man with his consciousness β is still to be investigated and
ascertained. However, with all definiteness one can say that these next
prospective forms have no bearing on any eternal paradise or hell under the
patronage of a "supreme deity". The Absolute is impossible, is
unrealizable in principle! Every subsequent form partly contains in a
concentrated ("sublated") form (and to some extent even "surpasses" by
itself) the content of the preceding form, but is by no means final and allembracing. The contentful motion is inexhaustible and at its next stages
appears by means of ever new and ever more contentful (and precisely
therefore ever more abstracting) forms.
In this connection let us allow ourselves to adduce a small exampleillustration to what has been said. On a clear sunny morning you "walk" your
dog on a forest edge. The curious animal will not fail, perhaps, to thrust its
paw or nose into a forest anthill, should such turn out to be nearby. As a true
lover and guardian of wild nature, or perhaps for some other considerations,
you will hasten to drag the dog away from the anthill by the leash. Now put
yourself in the place of the ant and imagine that anxiety and horror which
take possession of you every time when an incomprehensible something, by
your standards omnipotent, but alien to all your ant essence, suddenly
collapses from somewhere "above" onto your measured ant life.
And then one fine day the veil falls from your eyes and it is discovered that
this very most horrifying and omnipotent something sits on a short leash at
another "deity" β an even more "supreme" and even more "commander-inchief", which does not let the first "all-holder" and arbiter of ant destinies run
wild. For every "master" of the first level there is found its own "master" of
the second level, for the chain of the forms of the contentful motion is
infinite. It is not excluded that the "master" of the first level in some way
"interferes" in your ant life, but it is true, however, also that he is dependent
not only on the "masters" of other "supreme" or more summit levels of
development, but also on your ant level. And the name of this whole
structure of nested (more exactly, conjugated successive) forms and of the
process generating it β is the spiral-like "self-winding" content-formal
infinity.
Let us hope that this extremely simplified example will at least somehow help
to understand the essence of the content-formal motion. If, however, even
after such an illustration you do not cease to consider that the omnipotent
"deity on a leash" remains for you the most "supreme commander-in-chief",
to whom, as before, one must bow in the hope of his patronage and
protection, then nothing will be able to prevent you from continuing to abide
in peace in the captivity of your sweet dreams and delusions.
[By the way, to seek the traces of the presence of a more highly organized
(i.e., gone ahead in its development) level-form, proceeding from the
primitive representations about the extraterrestrial "mind" and other forms of
"life", is absurd and fruitless. So far, with confidence one can assert only that
this next level of the development of reality differs from the forms-levels of
our cluster of reality by a substantial leap in the intensity of the contentformal transformations. To say something definite about the forms in which
reality is acquired at that next level of its existence is still extremely
problematic.]
Β§ 8. The problem of the objectivity and independence of the object
from the subject from the position of our representations
The problem of the independence-dependence of the object from the subject
in the course of the establishment of the objectivity of the contentfulness in
the developing forms of reality was tried to be solved and is being solved by
many researchers. Here the following variant of its solution is proposed, or,
more exactly, merely the next approximation to its "exhaustive" (i.e., "full
and final") solution.
The acute moment with which all philosophical currents in one way or
another collide is the necessity of the acceptance of one or the other side in
the reasonings about the independence or, on the contrary, the
interdependence of the object and the subject. Diamat, as is known, solves
this task in favor of the visible and thinkable independence of the object from
the subject. From our position, the question about the independence of the
object from the subject or of the objective from the subjective in their
corresponding relations {subject/object} and {subjective/objective} is akin
to the question about the attempt of the separation and isolation of the
contentful and formal components in the initial, most general (abstract)
relation {contentfulness/form}. Applied to this relation, the sources of the
distinction of the indicated components go back into the latent (hidden)
syncretic unity. The justice of such an assessment and such a conclusion is
confirmed by the point of view of G.W.F. Hegel: "In the consideration of the
opposition between form and content it is essentially important not to lose
sight of the fact that the content is not formless, the form at one and the
same time is both contained in the content itself and represents something
external to it"; and even more definitely: "The form is the content" [3, p.
298].
Supposing that the relations {subject/object} and {subjective/objective} are
merely more concrete manifestations of the abstract relation {content/form},
that high rank of subjectivity [5] with which the "numerators" of the first two
above-indicated relations are endowed, in our opinion, in no way excludes
the deep inseparability and dependence of them on the corresponding
"denominators", β except that the noted inseparability and dependence
become even more latent and implicit when compared with the
unambiguously manifesting interdependence of the components in the
relation {content/form}. The latter circumstance (the increasing hiddenness)
and serves as the source of the assertions about the independence of the
components of the objective and the subjective (of the object and the
subject) from each other, categorically and endlessly reproduced (the speech
goes about the assertions) by the adherents of this opinion.
Proceeding from our position, it is necessary to state that, exactly the
opposite, the visible isolation, autonomy, self-sufficiency, and independence
of the components of the objective and the subjective from each other are
only relative, since subjectivity (as an active acting principle, as selfsufficiency, as selfhood, as individuality, as competence [15]) is
characteristic of the contentful components (i.e., of the "numerators") of all
the concrete relations of this type, and this subjectivity or greater activity of
one component with respect to the other by no means abolishes their
interdependence and deep inseparability, and, consequently, the feedback
connection or the influence on each other.
A known example of the demonstration of the presence of that same hidden
syncretic inseparability of the components in the relations of this type serves
also the ancient paradox concerning the establishment of the primacy of the
hen or the egg.
By the way, the activity and the leading principle of the component of
content in comparison with the passivity and conservatism of the component
of form in the very relation {content/form}, as the forerunner of the clearly
manifesting subjectivity of the "numerators" of the derivative relations
{subject/object} and {subjective/objective}, likewise is not an obstacle for
the deep syncretism of the components-constituents of this abstract relation.
Summing up what has been said, let us muster the courage to declare that,
applied to all the above-considered relations, such a question about the
establishment of the primacy and the assertion of the complete
independence of the components of these relations from each other is not
solvable and is meaningless in principle, since in the very content or
contentful component of the initial (for all the concrete relations) relation
{content/form} there is already initially present the subjectivity of the
content with respect to the form, as in the component with a clearly
expressed sign of the active leading principle in comparison with the more
passive conservative component of the form, and nevertheless the sources of
the qualitative difference of one component of this relation from the other
(the sources of the distinction of the components of this relation) go back
into the inseparable syncretic unity.
In the inanimate (thing) nature this, so to say, "subjectivity of the thing"
manifests itself episodically and therefore in an explicit way is expressed
rather weakly, indistinctly, veiledly, but meanwhile even there already serves
as the underlay of all sorts of interactions, manifesting themselves in the
form of collisions, impacts, destructions, explosions and, in the general case,
of all sorts of changes (winds, hurricanes, fires, downpours, floods,
earthquakes...).
As the intensity of content-form transitions intensifies within a series and
through a series of highly specific relations, the indicated subjectness of the
content-based component "fortifies" and increasingly confidently and distinctly
"steps" outward, thereby revealing the obvious confrontation and antagonism of
the two constituents, the two components of a certain unified relation, until,
finally, it takes shape as an allegedly separate, autonomous, and content-based
subject (man or, in some cases, a higher animal) existing independently of the
form (i.e., the object, nature), which has in fact lost only the clearly (visually)
expressed connection with the object (nature).
The notorious active principle, latently present in any element of reality
(manifesting itself, for example, through the movement of electrons in atoms
and molecules, or in the form of the so-called forces of gravity between celestial
objects, or through streams of solar (cosmic) rays and the influence of
electromagnetic fields, or in the form of earthly tornadoes, cyclones, volcanoes,
etc.) β is the primordial prototype of that active content-based (subject)
component of all inanimate and living matter, which subsequently, after passing
through numerous intermediate forms, transforming and modifying beyond
recognition, finally appears before us in the image or guise of the human
personality as a creator, a maker, a subject, while, however, being at the same
time latently bound to the form-based passive (object) component in a single
and integral {subject/object} relation. Thus, the mutual independence of form
and content, as well as of object and subject in the cases examined, is highly
relative β greater in some aspects, lesser in others; however, in any case, the
reverse side of this apparent independence is their hidden, deep, essential unity
and interdependence.
The subjective has grown out of the so-called objective, is its continuation,
but only by other forms, and already for this very reason alone they (the
objective and the subjective) cannot be considered completely independent
from each other. The subjective includes in itself the developed content of
the objective, β in some sense the initial (source) content of the object
"refracted" by the subject. The subject β this is precisely the new form of
the "ascending" essence of the object. But if the subjective contains in itself
the sources and the developed part of the objective, does this not mean that
same latent unity with the objective after the manner of the syncretism of
the constituents in the relation {content/form}? And the fact that in the
guise of the feedback connection the subject is capable of exerting an
influence on the object also proves their single nature and basis. Thereby the
independence of the object from the subject can be recognized as purely
nominal, relative, and by no means absolute.
The historically accomplished and visually ascertainable separation or
isolation of the subject from the object testifies only to the fact that by some
part of itself the object is still contained and present in the subject and,
consequently, represents also a part of their common system and therefore
is dependent on it, β which, in essence, is confirmed by the possibility of the
reverse influence on the object from the side of the subject.
Under the objective content of reality in its ultimate expression (like the
notion of the absolute truth as the motion from the relative truth in the
direction of the achievement of the absolute truth) is understood the
motion-development of its (of reality) contentfulness by means of the
forms of different levels in the direction of the acquisition of a single
generalized form of the highest (maximally possible) contentfulness. In the
course of such a motion-development, registered and fixed by the human
organs of sense and thinking, there takes place the change of the forms of
the representation and acquisition of the content on different levels: from the
inanimate, further to the living-inanimate and, then, to the living-thinkinganimate, differing by different correlations of the components of
{subjective/objective} in their multilevel relations-forms. At that, each of the
forms successively grows out of the preceding one, being, as it were, its
continuation and remaining in the bundle (with the indispensable presence
of the direct and feedback connection) with all the preceding forms-levels
involved in the general spiral-cyclic content-formal motion.
Being most closely interwoven in one bundle, these forms of the motiondevelopment of the objective content nevertheless (and precisely by virtue of
the mutual connectedness) are permeated and mediated by the subjective
form of the conditionally finite and highest (of those reliably revealed at
the given moment) level, which is the form of human thinking
(consciousness). This kind of mediation cannot but tell on the assessment of
the objectivity itself (of the objective content) through the prism of
subjectivity, i.e., conditions the impossibility of the separation and isolation
of the properly objective content from the "admixture" of the subjective
content, from the presence of the component of the subjective and the
impossibility of the conduct of the assessment of the objectivity outside the
presence of the constituent of subjectivity.
By virtue of the inevitability of the conduct of the assessment of the
objectivity through the prism of subjectivity, the objective itself is penetrated
by the subjective and is clothed in the form of the generally accepted and
universally significant, which, however, does not prevent this form from
being the continuation of the objective and at the same time being this
same objective. The separate subjects or individuals are precisely for that
reason similar to each other, for that very reason are like each other (both
externally and internally), that in fact they represent the generalized
(aggregate) form of the acquisition of the single objective content of
reality, represented by uniform fragments at a quite definite level of its (of
reality) motion-development.
However, the set of subjective contents realized through the aggregate or
row of similar to each other subjects (individuals) acquires the status of the
objective content not at once and not always. The subjective contents,
represented by the abstract subjectively ideal forms, can be considered
objective only then, when their objectivity is verified and confirmed by the
succession of the contents of all the layers-forms of the generalized pyramid
(see Β§ 6-7) and, in the first place, by the possibility and admissibility of the
expression ("substitution") of the superstructural contents of the summit
forms of the pyramid by the contents of the primary material-thing forms
lying in the foundation of that same pyramid. Outside such a verification, the
contentfulness of the previously accepted universally significant (with a
"touch" of the subjective) may turn out to be an ordinary lie, approved and
affirmed by the collective majority in the expectation of its momentary gains
and preferences. About the ways and methods of the establishment of the
objectivity of the content of the subjective forms we will speak below.
Thus, the objective content β this is also, by and large, always only a
relation of the type {subjective/objective}; in a pure form there is neither
the one nor the other. About what form of the object can one speak outside
its mediation by the subject? Outside the relations with the subject β this is
merely an indeterminacy. The replenishing aggregate of the separate
subjective perceptions of one and the same something and demonstrates by
itself the approximation to the ever more complete expression of the
objective content of this something. The criterion of the completeness of the
expression or comprehension of the objective in such a case can be only the
volume (or the "quantity") of the objective contentfulness, which gives the
"go-ahead" for the becoming and the success of the existence of this or that
form.
Let us emphasize here once again that the subjective image of the object is
not the reflection of the object, but the continuation in a specific form of its
(of the object) developing content (like the continuing "ascent" of the
essence of the object in other, different from the thing, forms).
So that complete independence of the object from the subject, as well as of
the subject from the object, does not happen, β precisely by virtue of the
syncretism of the connection of the contentful and formal components in the
relations {subject/object}, {subjective/objective}.
The simplest and most illustrative example from everyday life in confirmation
of what has been said β is the relation {child/mother}.
The "numerator" and "denominator" of the indicated relation correlate with
each other as the components subject-object, change-basis, content-form in
the
corresponding
relations
{subject/object},
{change/basis},
{content/form}. With respect to its child, the mother, undoubtedly, acts in
this case both as the basis, and as the form, and as the object β whoever,
whatever might say on this account. However far from each other in space
and in time the mother and her child might be, the mutual connection and
interdependence are preserved forever β in the genes, in the tissues, in the
thoughts, habits, behavior, way of life, preferences, etc., etc. Even by the
modern, not so perfect, means of objective control to establish this kinship
(or the existence of the common ineradicable objective unifying basis)
presents no difficulties whatsoever.
Β§ 9. The point of view of diamat on the role of abstractions and
subjectively abstract forms in the course of cognition. The
interpretation of the term "interpretation"
In order to advance further in the exposition of our views and approach, one
will have to stop for a while on the representations of dialectical materialism
about the role of abstractions and the necessity of the recourse in the course
of cognition to subjectively abstract forms.
The method of abstractions (or of abstracting) by the definition of the
"Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary" [19, p. 7] β is a universal method of
cognition, the logical foundation of the understanding of nature and social
life, β both in the subjective sense, since by means of abstraction "we turn
every thing into a logical category" [14, p. 131], and in the objective sense,
since abstractions (categories of thinking) are the "expression of the
regularity both of nature and of man" [12, p. 83].
The significance and depth of the elaboration of this method is testified by
the following its characteristic: "Abstractions applied to the immediate sense
data are called abstractions of the first order; the abstraction from the
abstraction of the first order gives the abstraction of the second order, etc.
Cognitive significance can be possessed by abstractions of any order, but
special trust is deserved by abstractions whose results can be comprehended
on material models. Such abstractions are called real, the rest β ideal
(idealizations). The most important task of scientific methodology is the
comprehension of the abstractions of a high order through the abstractions of
a lower order or the replacement of the ideal abstractions by real ones.
...The most developed system of abstractions is possessed by mathematics,
which itself in essence is the science about abstractions: they constitute its
premise, method, and subject" [19, p. 7]. Here is also adduced one more
extremely important, in our opinion, judgment concerning the fact that the
ordinary comprehension, say, of abstract theories goes, as a rule, by way of
interpretation.
The need for the analysis and systematization of the abstract constructions
elaborated by thinking, as well as the above-listed diversity and hierarchy of
the latter, show how important it is for man (the cognizing subject, the
researcher) to be able to correctly assess the truthfulness of these
constructions and to have at his disposal reliable criteria and ways of such
an assessment.
As we see, diamat approaches the analysis of the purpose and role of
abstractions quite seriously. What main thought is traced in the description of
the method of abstractions? That one, that the understanding and
interpretation of abstractions requires the expression of them through each
other (the higher through the lower, and further both of those through the
most thing-like and concrete β material ones). And the second important
circumstance, noted here as well, points to the fact that the comprehension
of abstractions goes, as a rule, by way of interpretation.
In the indicated connection it is necessary also, in passing, to ascertain what
contentfulness diamat puts into the notion of interpretation. In the broad
sense interpretation means "explication, explanation, translation into a more
comprehensible language" [17, p. 502]. In science and logic this notion is
treated as "the aggregate of the values (meanings) attached in some way
to the elements of a certain theory (to expressions, formulas, and separate
symbols)". And further: "The interpretation of the theoretical constructions of
the developed fields of scientific knowledge bears, as a rule, a mediated
character and includes in itself multistage [compare: multilevel, β Author's
note] hierarchical systems of intermediate interpretations. The connection
of the initial and final links of such hierarchies is ensured by the fact that the
interpretation of the interpretations of a certain theory gives its
immediate interpretation. Thus, interpretation is an instrument of scientific
modeling. ...In the contentful natural-scientific and mathematical theories
there is always implied a certain interpretation: such theories use only the
meaningful expressions, i.e., the meaning of each expression is presupposed
from the very beginning to be known" [19, p. 215].
In continuation of the list of the adduced quotations one cannot but agree
also with the following interpretation: "Contentful knowledge β this is such
knowledge whose terms and statements have some value and meaning, i.e.,
a definite interpretation. To be contentful and means nothing other than
to have an interpretation" [10].
And, finally, completing the quotation of the treatments of the term
"interpretation", let us adduce one more judgment, according to which the
interpreting of notions means nothing other than the revelation in them of
the presence of objective content [7].
Β§ 10. The role of abstractions and subjectively abstract forms from
the position of our representations
In view of the importance of the above-indicated questions let us speak
thoroughly about what the subjective abstract forms represent, what is their
role and what are, in the end, the criteria of the truthfulness of these forms
β now already from the position of our representations.
As the row of the above-adduced (see Β§ 9) interpretations and definitions
shows, the process of cognition is not reduced to the necessity of the
expression of the abstract forms exclusively or only through the thing forms,
but solves the task of the successive revelation and confirmation of the
objectivity of the contentfulnesses of all the forms present in the cognitive
chain (from the thing forms, through the forms of sensations to the forms of
thinking and within the framework of these latter β of the whole ramified
hierarchy of abstract constructions and structures) by way of the expression
of them through each other. In the final result this device or way of the
mutual expression of the forms through each other and should lead to the
establishment of the truthfulness or falsity of the "summit" subjective
abstract forms.
Such a device or way in its broadest sense is called interpreting. In the
most general case the main proof of the truthfulness of the hierarchical chain
of the abstract forms turns out to be their interpretability (i.e., the possibility
and admissibility of the interpreting of the abstract forms by more concrete
forms). As one can already guess, the particular case of the technology of
interpreting, known and applied since time immemorial, is the procedure of
practice, reducing to the interpreting of the abstract forms by the forms in
the overwhelming majority thing-like, mediated by the forms of sensations
(or by the so-called empirical experience).
What, in the end, is the speech about here? In essence, about the intentions
to have a substantiated possibility to express one through the other: the
incomprehensible through the comprehended, the particular through the
general, the abstract through the concrete β and then this concrete, in its
turn already, to replace by the successive contentful abstract, in order to
operate in the further investigations precisely with the verified
abstract as with the next, more productive and effective means of
cognition.
In distinction from the contentfulness of the form-level of the sensual (the
subjects of which can serve man and the animal) the content of the formlevel of the ideal (the subject of which serves man with his thinking) within
the framework, say, of the process of cognition of the above-mentioned
object (the stone-boulder, see Β§ 6) constitute the following abstractions (in
the order of the increase of the degree of abstracting): the dimensions of the
object (length, width, height); the form of the object (cylinder, cube, sphere,
etc.); the weight (mass) of the object; the color of the object (the
wavelength of the reflected light and its intensity); the hardness of the
material of the object (by Rockwell, Brinell, Vickers); the strength of the
object (for rupture, shear, bending, impact, etc.); the radioactivity of the
material, etc., etc. All this by the animals (from the ant to the dog and
further β up to the anthropoid) is simply not assessed; the knowledge of the
above-listed properties of the object β this is from the field of the contentful
ideal, having significance only for man as an "advanced" subject of cognition.
In the establishment of the truthfulness of the abstract forms (i.e., of the
presence in them of objective contentfulness) it is necessary in fact to
answer the question: does the found abstract construction or structure (as
the product of the form of thinking) admit the replacement or expression by
means of the concrete form of thingness and/or by means of the less
concrete (than the thing) form of sensations, and to what degree is such a
replacement possible and admissible? For example, in order to ascertain in
the simplest way the truthfulness or justice of the abstract formula describing
the notorious law of Boyle-Mariotte (PV = const: the volume V of gases is
inversely proportional to the pressure P [11, p. 131]), it is necessary
empirically or mentally to "replace" ("substitute" or "fill") this abstraction
with concrete sensations; i.e., in the change of the position of the piston in
the cylinder, for instance, by pressing on the piston rod by hand, to put in
correspondence to every its position (which is registered in a visual way as
visual sensations) the magnitude of the response force or of the back
pressure of the piston on the hand (which again is registered by the organs
of touch as tactile and muscular-motor sensations). If under a certain
standard set of initial conditions (constant temperature and invariable mass
of the gas in the cylinder), limiting the field of applicability or justice of this
law, such a replacement is possible and admissible repeatedly, then this
abstract product of the form of thinking can be considered true. And in this
same case, as is seen, the practical actions and their results serve as the
measure or way certifying the possibility of the replacement (of one or
another degree of completeness) of the found abstract form (formula) by the
concrete form of another, more "down-to-earth", more "low" level (i.e., by
the measurement of the displacements of the piston and of the efforts
corresponding to them). Moreover, for the increase of the mentioned degree
of the completeness of the replacement (for the purpose of the expansion of
the boundaries of the applicability of the abstract form) the description of the
abstract form (in this case of the formula) requires, as is customary,
refinement and improvement, as a result of which the initial simple abstract
form (the formula description of the law of Boyle-Mariotte) under other sets
of the fixed initial conditions and parameters of the surrounding environment
can take the form of the laws of Gay-Lussac, Charles, Avogadro and, in the
end, under the corresponding set of initial conditions can be replaced by the
universal abstract form with maximally expanded boundaries of its
application. As a consequence of the produced refinements and the
refinement of the initial form of the law, there appears the equation of
Mendeleev β Clapeyron [22].
In other words, the essence of the practical actions or the verification by
practice reduces to the establishment of the possibility and admissibility of
the replacement or substitution of the content of a certain abstract form (in
this case of the formula description of the law of Boyle-Mariotte) by the
content of the form again more concrete (in this case by the content of the
form of sensations). If the possibility of such a replacement is ensured and
confirmed, then there is confirmed or certified thereby also the truthfulness
of the abstract form. In the final result (let us note once again) the
verification by practice in fact turns out to be the particular case or variety of
the broader, generalized procedure of the establishment of the truthfulness
of knowledge, which is the assessment of the possibility or admissibility of
the interpreting of the contents of the abstract forms by the contents of the
more concrete forms, i.e., by similar kindred practical examples and by the
factual material being obtained (obtained). If the abstract form admits
interpreting (i.e., the filling with concrete thing content, the conjugation and
succession of the contents of the compared forms with the transition of them
into each other), then such an abstract form can be qualified as contentful
and true.
The establishment of truth includes the coordination of the contentfulnesses
of the forms (the sensual and the ideal), the finding of the correspondence of
the contents of the same forms and, as a perspective, the determination of
the quantitative correlations between the volumes of the conjugated
contents...
The question of the establishment and assessment of the truthfulness of
knowledge and of the presence of objective content in the abstract forms by
which this knowledge is represented β is always extremely actual, and not
only for the scientific and highly intellectual spheres of human activity, but
also for everyday life.
In the final result the most important in the process of cognition turns out to
be the contentful linkage of the abstract forms with the concrete ones,
admitting the interpreting or the expression of these abstract forms through
the preceding more concrete (including also the thing) forms-levels with the
aim, in the future, to operate with this abstract, as with a more
powerful instrument of cognition in place of the concrete forms used
with the same purpose.
Β§ 11. Development as the trajectory of transformations in the course
of contentful movement. The ways of the establishment of the
presence and completeness of objective content
Thus, the trajectory of the contentful-formal transformations in the course of
the "through" contentful movement looks as follows.
Taking for the conditional beginning of the contentful movement (and of the
transformations of the forms) the form of thingness, we note the first
transition of the content of this form (by virtue of the inevitability of the
contentful-formal transformations, conditioned by the principle of selfdevelopment) into the content of the form of sensations; further we observe
the transition of the content of the form of sensations (by way of the
contentful-formal transformations, conditioned by the same principle of selfdevelopment) into the content of the form of thinking. Herewith the
objectivity of the contents of the forms of the presented chain is assessed
only in a mediated way β with the indispensable participation of the form of
sensations and the form of thinking.
For the establishment of the presence of objective content in the thing forms
of the surrounding world serve, in the end, not only the forms of sensations
(the sense organs) of man, but also the sense organs of other
representatives of the animal world. Therefore not only the thing-practical
activity of man or practice turns out to be the way of the assessment of the
contentfulness of the thing forms; in the case of the expression of the
content of the indicated thing forms by means of the content of the forms of
sensations of the animal world the similar means is the behavioral reaction of
the animals.
The presence of objective content in the thing forms in the most simple cases
is more impartially and reliably proved precisely by the comparison of the
behavioral reactions (habits, grimaces, emotions, sets of sounds, etc.) of the
other, besides man, representatives of the animal world. If people can agree
among themselves as to the coordination of the reactions to one and the
same object (which would mean the "dragging through" as objectivity of
the notorious general validity of the opinions about the object as the result
of a certain agreement between people), then to imagine a similar
agreement between the animals in relation to the similar reactions to the
investigated object is simply impossible.
On the stage of the transformation of the objective content of the thing
forms into the content of the forms of sensations of the representatives of
the animal world, including man, there occurs the filling and saturation of the
forms of sensations with the content (contents) of the thing forms. This is
the stage of the accumulation by the forms of sensations of the so-called
empirical experience. The establishment of the presence of objective content
in the forms of sensations and the verification (assessment) of the content of
the forms of sensations for the objectivity of this content is carried out by the
procedure of practice.
The establishment of the objectivity of the content of the thing forms is
performed by the comparison of the contents of as large as possible a
number of the forms of sensations. In the coincidence or sameness of the
contents of a row or a multitude of the forms of sensations there is made the
conclusion about the objectivity of the content of the thing forms. If the
consequences and results of the interactions of the forms of sensations with
the thing forms (and of the thing forms among themselves) turn out to be
approximately the same, then by such a coincidence of the contentfulnesses
of the multitude of the forms of sensations of the representatives of the
animal world, including man, there is proved the relatively independent of
the separate forms of sensations uniformity of the content of the thing world,
i.e., the objectivity of this content.
Besides, by the coincidence or identity of the contents of the forms of
sensations (for a row or a multitude of the representatives of the animal
world, including man) there is proved not only the presence of the common
objective content in the thing forms, but also the objectivity of the contents
in the compared forms of sensations.
Thus, at a certain stage of the movement-development of reality the content
of its thing forms is transformed into the content of the more mobile and
"advanced" forms, which become the forms of sensations of the
representatives of the animal world, including man; in other words, the
mentioned content of the thing forms "ascends", so to say, to a new level of
its representation by the forms of sensations. The objectivity of the content
of the thing forms, as well as of the contents of the forms of sensations, is
established in a practical way (by the procedure of practice) β by the
assessment of the possibility and admissibility of the replacement of the
contents of some forms of sensations by the contents of other forms of
sensations (i.e., by the carrying out of the indicated assessment as if
"horizontally"), about which and should testify the sameness (coincidence) of
the contents of these forms in their comparison. Even the very presence of
the similar to each other or identical forms-carriers of sensations in the plural
(for example, of human individuals) proves the succession of the contents of
the form of sensations and the form of thingness and, in the final result, the
objectivity of the contents of these forms.
This is that which concerns the linkage of the forms of thingness and
sensations. Now β about the linkage of the forms of thingness, sensations,
and thinking.
The objectivity of the contents of the abstract forms of thinking is verified
and confirmed by way of the comparison and the establishment of the
presence in these abstract forms of the concrete content, one and common
to a certain degree for the whole linkage of the forms of thingness,
sensations, and thinking.
The objectivity of the content of the more abstracted (in relation to the forms
of thingness and sensations) forms of thinking is proved by the possibility
and admissibility of the approximate expression or replacement of the
content of the abstract forms by the contents of the more concrete thing
forms, mediated by the forms of sensations. Besides, at the level of thinking
itself, for the confirmation of the truthfulness of the purely (highly) abstract
forms-products of thinking there can be attracted the less abstract formsproducts of the same thinking, already having or having received the status
of genuine knowledge (the carriers of objective content) at the preceding
stages of human activity. In this case the speech is about the carrying out of
the assessment of the contentfulness of the forms as if "vertically".
Further, to reveal the objective contentfulness of a certain abstract formproduct of thinking β this means to establish (by way of comparison) the
presence in this form of the content common with the contentfulnesses of the
more concrete conjugated forms, and on this basis to make the conclusion
about whether the content of the abstract form "fits" into the chain of the
contents of the preceding concrete forms and whether it continues by itself
this chain; the positive answer to these questions means the positive answer
also to the question of whether the content of the investigated abstract form
can in such a way lay claim to objectivity.
Science is considered a skeptical method of cognition, asserting itself over
the course of 400 years in the conditions of the most severe competition of
the views on this or that phenomenon (in the sense of the explanation of its
foundations and the forecasting of its consequences). What, in such a case,
ensured the prerogative of the scientific approach and the superiority of the
way of scientific thinking (and of the obtaining of knowledge) in relation to
the other methods? The installation and aim exclusively at the objectivity of
the contents of the obtained knowledge, certified by the succession of the
conjugated and passing into each other objective contents of the forms
interpreting this knowledge.
The procedure of the establishment of the presence and volume ("quantity")
of objective content in this or that aggregate form, which is, say, the
multilevel form of man himself, requires the assessment of the presence of
the obligatory direct and reverse connection between the levels in their
aggregate (aggregate form). Practice or the thing-practical activity of man
precisely and acts in the role of the way or device confirming or certifying the
presence of such a connection. The presence of the immediate connection
between the levels testifies to their succession.
One way or another the process or procedure of the establishment of truth or
of the truthfulness of the subjectively abstract forms is always carried out in
a spiral-cyclic way of the return to the sources (to the foundation β to the
thing forms and the forms of sensations) and thereby of the return "to
oneself at a new level" (in which, in fact, is seen the essence both of the
reverse connection, and of the contentful enrichment, and of the changemovement-development in the direction of the acquisition of the highest
contentfulness β i.e., of objective content β by the whole aggregate of the
forms).
If in the course of the carrying out of such a procedure there is observed the
absence or instability of the direct and reverse connections between the
subjective and objective levels (the components in the relation
{subject/object}), then precisely on this basis and should follow the
unambiguous
conclusion
about
the
untruthfulness,
incorrectness,
incorrectness, inaccuracy of the verified subjective form β the product of
thinking (knowledge, judgment, assertion, definition, notion, formula, theory,
conception, teaching, model, etc.).
In this connection it would be appropriate to add also that by virtue of the
peculiarities of such a reciprocating movement (in which on any section of
the path the very course or the natural spiral-like character of the
development of reality presupposes the return to the foot-foundation of the
pyramid, the "feeding" or enrichment of the acquired content by the
primordial life-giving sources, as well as its "reverse" movement to the reforming summit, to the re-forming contentful abstractions), not only
evolution, but also revolutions, and crises, and conflicts, and other upheavals
are not excluded, not finished, and not completed (as this might be desired
by the uninitiated and uninformed man as to the "mechanism" of the
realization of the dialectical movement).
Β§ 12. The criterion of truth β contentfulness. Development as the
movement of the forms of reality in the direction of the possession of
the highest contentfulness
As it was already possible to notice, the central notion on the basis of which
our narration is built up and which will be even more persistently woven into
the canvas of the further reasonings is the notion "content" and its derivative
β "contentfulness" [soderzhatel'nost'].
In accordance with the point of view reproduced above, development
represents the "ascent" of objective content by the multilevel, but conjugated
one with another successive forms, which in the measure of the mentioned
ascent become ever more abstract and capacious, shifting or displacing into
the field of the ever more contentful subject forms, i.e., in the direction of
the "numerators" of the known relations {contentfulness/form},
{subject/object},
{subjective/objective},
{abstract/concrete},
{change/foundation}, etc.
Correspondingly to our approach the development of reality is carried out in
the direction of the increase of the contentfulness of its forms, which,
occupying new informative levels, become also ever more abstract.
Let us now set ourselves the following question, actual for us: in what
relation with the contentfulness of the forms is their truthfulness?
According to diamat, truth β this is the objective content of the sensual,
empirical experience, notions, ideas, judgments, theories, teachings, and of
the integral picture of the world in the dialectics of its development [19, p.
226]. Since content is not formless, and form is not contentless (see Β§ 8),
every content, including also that answering to truth, appears in reality or is
realized only through form and not otherwise, β to which, in fact, and is
pointed in the very definition of truth. In other words, truth does not
manifest itself in reality otherwise than through the forms (including also
the forms enumerated in the definition, such as: notions, judgments, ideas,
theories, teachings, empirical experience, etc.), and in the indicated aspect
the question of whether truth is the form of the manifestation of objective
content is a rhetorical question.
By what sign (indicator, quality, property, component, constituent, etc.),
proceeding from the adduced definition, should one assess the truthfulness
of the forms, and including also the abstract forms of knowledge (notions,
ideas, judgments, theories, teachings, etc.)? Obviously, by the presence in
these forms of objective content. In other words, the contentfulness of the
forms is subject to assessment, and, it seems, precisely this indicator (sign,
quality, property, component, constituent, etc.) and will serve as the
criterion of the assessment of the truthfulness of this or that form.
Taking into account the syncretic inseparability of content and form, about
which was said above, every form "from birth" is endowed with a certain
contentfulness, but for human thinking the orientation serves and arouses
interest, as a rule, the maximal contentfulness and, correspondingly, the
form of the expression of the highest contentfulness. Therefore it is most
logical to suppose that the most contentful form (i.e., the form maximally
"filled" with objective content or the form possessing the highest
contentfulness) and will be the true form. Thus, truth, from the position of
our representations, β this is the form of the expression of objective
content (i.e., the form of the expression of the highest, maximally
achievable contentfulness) of reality or of its separate element at every
definite stage of its (of reality) development.
How, by what path, way, by what means, procedures, technologies can one
assess the volume or "quantity" of the contentfulness of this or that
investigated abstract form? By way of the expression or "substitution" (at
least mental) of the content of the investigated abstract form by the already
assessed, verified, approved, and affirmed by man (i.e., endowed with the
status of true) contents of the more concrete forms. Such a procedure is
named practice, and within the framework of the broader application of such
a procedure or technology β interpreting. In both cases the mentioned
procedures reduce to the assessment of the possibility and admissibility of
the expression or substitution of the content of the investigated abstract
forms by the contents of the more concrete and already verified forms (after
the manner of the above-described in Β§ 10 way or procedure of the
assessment of the truthfulness of the abstract form-formula of the law of
Boyle-Mariotte).
Here is one more example of the assessment of the contentfulness and
truthfulness of the forms. Simply speaking, if the volume of a spherical
vessel of radius R is expressed, according to the "machinations" of abstract
thinking, by the formula (4/3)ΟRΒ³, then it does not constitute any difficulties
to verify or assess the volume calculated in such a way, pouring into the
vessel water or pouring river sand. By the assessment of the contentfulness
of the form of thinking (i.e., of the above-indicated formula), carried out in
this case by the way or procedure of the substitution of the content of the
abstract form of thinking by the content of the concrete form of sensations
(filling the vessel with the then measured quantity of water or sand), one can
ascertain the truthfulness of the formula, i.e., the truthfulness of the formproduct of abstract thinking. And further, this abstract form (the formula for
the computation of the volume of the sphere), verified a million times for the
correspondence or "coincidence" of its content with the content of the form of
sensations, can, in its turn, be used for the verification and assessment of
the contentfulness of the other forms, to refer to it and to use it in the
further investigations as the foundation with the confirmed and certified
truthfulness.
Thus, that criterion (sign, indicator, quality, property, component, etc.) by
which one should assess truth or in the general case the truthfulness of
the arising, existing, and disappearing forms β this is by no means practice,
but the contentfulness of the forms. Practice, however, β this is merely
the procedure (process) of the carrying out of such an assessment, and
moreover limited mainly by the thing field of the activity of man. In relation
to the broader field of application, including the assessment of the
truthfulness of the abstract constructions, structures, and edifices of various
hierarchy and nesting, such a procedure is named interpretation (see Β§ 9)
or interpreting. In this connection practice turns out to be merely the
particular case, the narrow layer of the more extensive procedure or
technology of the establishment of the truthfulness of the forms β
interpreting. Thereby practice β this is also interpreting, i.e., the
replacement (often mental) of some forms, as a rule more abstract, by the
more concrete and verified forms (in this same row is found also the process
of modeling).
[Practice β this is, above all, a process, and therefore in a certain sense an
indeterminacy, which in itself is not very suitable for the definition of a
criterion. From the position of our reasonings the criterion of truth is not
practice itself or the thing-practical activity of the subject with its results, but
the presence and volume or "quantity" of objective content in the
investigated abstract forms, which and is established with the help of the
procedure of practice or in the general case of the technology of
interpreting.]
The genuine criterion of the assessment of the truthfulness of the abstract
forms-products of thinking is the contentfulness of these forms. Practice,
however, or interpreting β this is the technology (procedure, way, process,
means, etc.) of the establishment of the presence and "quantity" of
contentfulness (i.e., of the presence and "quantity" of objective content) in
the investigated forms, and hence, in the final result, also of truth or of the
truthfulness of the investigated forms.
On the first stage of the realization of the mentioned technology there is
established the presence of objective content (contentfulness) in the
investigated forms by way of the assessment or verification of the possibility
and admissibility of the as complete as possible substitution (expression,
replacement) of the contents of the investigated forms by the contents of the
more concrete forms (already verified and with the confirmed truthfulness),
i.e., there is established the admissibility of the replacement of one by the
other (the unknown by the known, the incomprehensible by the
comprehended, the irrational by the rational, etc.). By the results of such a
verification there is made the conclusion about the interpretability of the
investigated forms, i.e., about the succession of the substituting and
substituted contents. The interpretability of the investigated forms in such a
case means the confirmation of the presence of a certain "quantity" of
objective content (contentfulness) in the investigated forms.
On the second stage there is assessed the completeness of such a
substitution (i.e., there is determined the "quantity" of the contentfulness of
the investigated forms) by way of the finding or establishment of the as large
as possible number of the concrete forms (already verified and with the
confirmed truthfulness) suitable for the carrying out of the above-indicated
replacement. By the results of the performed assessment there is made the
conclusion about the completeness of the contentfulness, and then also
about the truthfulness of the investigated forms.
Both stages can be united into one and realized simultaneously. Thus, the
interpretability of the investigated forms and the number of interpretations
give a more or less complete representation about the status (truthfulness or
untruthfulness) of the investigated forms.
On the basis of the above-adduced reasonings one can come to that
conclusion that the genuine criterion of the truthfulness of the forms
serves their contentfulness, and the status of the true form or of truth
answers to the form with the maximally achievable (at this or that stage of
the development of reality) contentfulness.
What, then, is the contentfulness of this or that form? One should suppose
that in application to the concrete objects and other material elements of
reality the contentfulness (as the predominantly internal hidden component
or constituent) of the concrete forms must nevertheless be represented from
outside by means of some concrete external attributes of these objects or
elements. Can the manifestation of contentfulness be, for instance, the
beauty of the form? Probably, it can. Beauty may well turn out to be one of
the attributes suitable for the assessment of contentfulness, and
consequently, also for the assessment of the truthfulness of a certain
concrete form. The same thing, obviously, can be said also about such
manifestations of the contentfulness of the concrete forms as simplicity (or,
on the contrary, complexity), economy (economicalness), usefulness,
pragmaticalness, rationality, systemicity, integrity, originality, etc.
Now as to the contentfulness of the abstract forms: theories, conceptions,
paradigms, plans, schemes, formulas, projects, diagrams, models, teachings,
etc. Beauty (for instance, mathematical beauty and the elegance of the
formula) also can turn out to be the external manifestation suitable for the
assessment of the contentfulness of this or that abstract form. The external
embodiment of the contentfulness of the abstract forms may well be also the
clarity of the judgment, and the harmony of the exposition, and the
demonstrativeness of the assertion, and the laconism of the thought (idea),
and the logicality of the conclusions, and the non-contradictoriness of the
theory, and the general validity of the results, and the informativeness of the
diagram, and the simplicity of the scheme, and the compactness of the
planning, etc., etc.
However, in whatever clothes the contentfulness of the concrete and abstract
forms may dress itself, in both cases the contentfulness in the person of its
above-indicated manifestations must be confirmed by the interpreting of the
assessed forms either by the results of the thing-practical activity (practice),
or by the repeatedly verified and approved results (products) of the
theoretical (mental, subjectively ideal) activity of man. The procedure of
interpreting, however, presupposes under itself the as complete as possible
expression, replacement, or substitution (at least mental) of the content of
the investigated (verified) abstract form by the contents of the more
concrete forms. Then by the interpretability of the forms (i.e., by the
possibility and admissibility of the contents of the investigated forms to be
expressed or substituted by the contents of the more concrete and verified
forms) there is proved the presence of objective content in the investigated
abstract forms.
The maximal or highest contentfulness, and hence also the truthfulness of
the investigated forms, in its turn, is proved by the possibility and
admissibility of the expression or substitution of the content of the abstract
form by the concrete contents of the maximally possible number of the
concrete forms of different levels of concreteness (by the practical examples,
the factual material, the results of the numerous experiments, the repeatedly
verified and affirmed by the scientific community results of the theoretical
investigations, etc.). Only then the form with the contentfulness assessed in
such a way can lay claim to a place in the list of the maximally contentful
abstract forms, and, consequently, also of the true forms. In other words,
the truthfulness, i.e., the maximal or in the extreme case the sufficient
contentfulness of the abstract form, must be certified and confirmed by its
interpretability (the possibility and admissibility of being expressed) by the
contents of the other forms:
β the more concrete, i.e., of the more "low" (by hierarchy) level of the
forms;
β of the abstract forms whose truthfulness is confirmed earlier and does not
arouse doubts,
which and would testify to the succession of the contents of all these forms of
different levels, and, consequently, also to their objectivity.
Here it is appropriate to return to the criterion of truthfulness proposed by A.
PoincarΓ© (see Β§ 3). Analyzing in detail the statement of the French scientist,
one can see that from his point of view the "internal harmony of the world"
and is the objective contentfulness conditioning the truthfulness of this (real)
world.
Can the harmony of the world be the manifestation of its contentfulness?
Obviously, it can, as also beauty. The matter remains only for the small β to
decide how to assess this contentfulness (i.e., the internal harmony of the
world or of reality), in what conventional units or standards one should
express it, in order to reveal the highest degree (level) of this contentfulness,
which and will answer to the true form of reality.
And with all this the assessment of the contentfulness of the investigated
form (the internal harmony of the world by A. PoincarΓ©) must be conducted,
as was noted above, in full correspondence with the technology of
interpreting (i.e., with the establishment of the admissibility and
completeness of the substitution of the content of the investigated form by
the contents of the possibly larger number of the concrete forms, as well as
of the abstract forms whose truthfulness is confirmed earlier and does not
arouse doubts).
In view of the special importance of the considered question let us
reproduce once again the substantiation of the above-advanced
criterion of truth (of the truthfulness of the forms of reality).
Since the multitude of the dictionaries, including also the philosophical ones,
interpret the criterion as the sign on the basis of which there is produced the
assessment of something [16, p. 130; 17, p. 664] and by which one can
determine the truthfulness or falsity of the judgment [21], as well as as the
"distinctive mark by means of which we can recognize it (truth)" [6], then
with all confidence one can say that such a sign or indicator in the case of the
assessment of the truthfulness of the forms (i.e., in the process of the search
and establishment of truth) is by no means practice.
Here, for example, is what is reported in the "Encyclopedic Dictionary" of F.
A. Brockhaus and I. A. Efron [21]: "The formal criterion of truth serve the
logical laws: everything that does not contain in itself an internal
contradiction is logically possible, but in order to be true, it must correspond
also to the material criterion, i.e., to the factual content of the thought."
As we see, in the final account and here as the criterion of the truthfulness of
the forms there is advanced their factual (objective) contentfulness, which
by no means diverges from our representations and our position. After all, to
the most correct and appropriate in this connection question β by what
uniform sign or indicator one should assess the truthfulness of the abstract
forms, what quality or property of the abstract form is subject to assessment
for the revelation and certification of its truthfulness β the answer suggests
itself the following: the different forms can be correctly compared,
juxtaposed, assessed only by the sign inherent to any and every form and
named contentfulness (i.e., by the completeness or filledness of the form
with content). The most true, genuine, and actual is the form possessing the
highest contentfulness at the given moment of its (of the form)
development; the less contentful form is both less true, and less reliable, and
less effective, and less actual.
The filledness of the abstract form with internal content is assessed,
established, verified by the external manifestations of the form, such, say, as
beauty, rationality, simplicity, obviousness, laconism, etc. But how, in what
manner, by what path, way, with the help of what procedure is such an
assessment performed β this is already a question of technology. By practice
is meant the procedure of the assessment of the truthfulness of the abstract
forms, connected with the determination of the possibility and admissibility of
the substitution of the content of the abstract form by the contents of the
concrete forms, namely β by the contents of the thing forms, mediated by
the forms of sensations. From the heights of the present day this procedure
is somewhat "narrow" in order to embrace by itself the whole broadest
spectrum of the fields of the activity of the modern researchers. Therefore for
the assessment of the truthfulness of the forms in all the fields of the activity
of modern man there is applied the procedure named interpreting.
The technology of interpreting is connected with the determination of the
possibility and admissibility of the as complete as possible substitution of the
content of the abstract form not only by the contents of the forms of
sensations and of the thing forms, mediated by the human sensations (as in
the case of the procedure of practice), but also by the contents of such
abstract forms-products of thinking whose truthfulness is preliminarily
verified and repeatedly confirmed in the course of the preceding activity of
man (the speech is about the practical examples, the empirical data, the
factual material, the formula expressions and computations, the schemes,
the models, the theories, the teachings, the axioms, the postulates, etc.,
etc., whose truthfulness and actuality does not arouse doubt, above all, in
the scientific circles or in the milieu of the learned public). In such a
connection the procedure of practice turns out to be the particular case of the
technology of interpreting; i.e., practice also belongs to the technology of
interpreting, but with that only difference that here the procedure of the
assessment of the truthfulness of the forms is carried out by the substitution
(possibly mental) of the contents of the abstract forms by the contents
mainly of such concrete forms as the forms of thingness, mediated by the
forms of sensations.
Let us emphasize, thus, once again, that not practice or in the general case
the technology of interpreting serve as the criteria of the truthfulness of the
abstract forms, but such an omnipresent component or constituent of all the
forms as their internal contentfulness (filledness or the degree of the
filledness with content). The procedure of practice or the technology of
interpreting allow only to assess the presence and completeness (i.e., the
"quantity") of the contentfulness (and hence, also the degree or level of the
truthfulness) of the investigated forms. And now on the basis of the
understanding of the essence of the criterion of the truthfulness of the
forms there appears the possibility to meaningfully develop its (of the
criterion) numerical standards β to build, say, scales, diagrams, nomograms,
rating systems, etc. for the numerical (quantitative) assessment, firstly,
of the contentfulness and, secondly, of the truthfulness of the all possible
forms.
The criterion of the assessment of the truthfulness of the form β this is its
contentfulness, and the level of the truthfulness or genuineness of the form
is determined by the completeness of the content or by the "quantity" of this
very contentfulness. Hence truth β this is the form of the highest
contentfulness or of the maximally achievable completeness of the content at
every definite moment of the development of this form. Any form of the
highest contentfulness (i.e., the form maximally filled with content) at every
given moment of its (of the form) development and is the true form. In such
a context it is easily understood that in its essence absolute truth β this is
an iterative process of the infinite approximations to the exhaustive (final
and complete) expression of the objective content of the developing reality
by the diverse its (of reality) forms of the highest contentfulness.
If practice (as a procedure, as a technology, as a way, as a process, etc.),
erroneously acting until now in the role of the criterion of truth, does not
yield to the quantitative assessment and therefore cannot serve as the
informative criterion in the establishment of the truthfulness of the forms,
then the contentfulness of the forms β this is such a sign or indicator which
organically, in a natural way is suitable and adapted for such an assessment.
Someone, surely, will say what nonsense is being carried on here β how can
one measure the contentfulness and the more so the truthfulness of
something? The answer is simple: man from time immemorial is engaged
only in that he assesses and measures the contentfulness of the all possible
forms of reality. From now on he will do this more meaningfully.
In every sphere of human activity there exist their own rating systems,
scales, graphs, tables, diagrams, nomograms, etc. for the assessment of the
contentfulness of the diverse forms. The metric system of measures, the
systems SI, CGS, etc. with their conventional units and standards (kilograms,
meters, seconds, etc.), the monetary system, the virtual system Bitcoin (or
something similar crypto-currency, coming to replace and as the continuation
of money), the indices IQ, Hirsch, RSCI, etc. (as the attempts of the
expression in conventional units of the level of the intellect of man), the
humanistic systems of the assessment of spirituality (as the attempts of the
assessment in conventional units of the spiritual potential of man) β all this
is the examples of the rating systems allowing to assess the contentfulness
of the all possible forms of reality, abiding at its different levels and in
different fields. The "quantity" of the measured contentfulness of the forms
and answers to the different approximations of these forms to the absolute
truth or to the form of the "exhaustive" expression of the objective content of
reality (in this or that its field).
Man as one of the multitude of the forms of the multilevel reality, in his turn,
represents a multilevel formation. But from the ancient times and until now
the contentfulness of man is determined mainly by the level of the material
accumulations, present and, unfortunately, dominating (for now) among the
other levels in their hierarchical aggregate. Money, herewith, and is the
quantitative measure of the contentfulness of this dominant (i.e., of the
dominating level in the composition of the aggregate of all the other levels of
man), why they and occupy a special place and are the most widespread
rating system among the other systems and scales of the quantitative
assessment of the contentfulness of the forms. Being, however, the measure
of the contentfulness mainly of the "down-to-earth" material levels and
sublevels in the composition of the multilevel form of man, the rating
monetary system by virtue of the indicated circumstance is not so universal
as it seems, and is "powerless" in relation to the assessment, say, of the
spiritual and other summit spheres and levels of the "abiding" of the true
contentfulness of the human "I". Spirituality or morality, being the aggregate
of the deep human feelings, mediated by the human thinking
(consciousness), in general poorly yields to the quantitative assessment with
the use of the existing "down-to-earth" standards. For the assessment of the
spiritual potential of man there is required a special filigree-refined scale.
Money β this is a primitive "measurer" of the volumes of the content or
potential of the forms mainly of the material-thing level (and not a certain
"universal equivalent"; the incorrect or outdated basic representations
sometimes seriously hinder the understanding of the essence of the
problem), behind the "monumental" facade of which is hidden the
unpretentious essence of this "gasket" as one more superfluous intermediate
element (similar to the notions "reflection" or "copy" in the known
epistemological theories), the need for which will fall away in the measure of
the perfection of the organization of the social structure.
In the same way as the scales, the clocks, the various kinds of counters
(electric, gas, water) and other counting devices serve as the simple
measurers of the volumes of the content or of the contentful resource of
these or those forms of different levels (of electric energy, heat, water, gas,
oil, air, time, etc.), money β this is also a "mechanical" measurer of the
contentful potential of the all possible forms-levels, assessed again by the
substitution of the contents both of the concrete and of the abstract forms by
the content of the very concrete material form. In other words, money β this
is also a trivial (with the claim to universality) rating system for the
measurement of the "quantity" of the contentfulness of the forms.
As is known, every movement forward consists in that a step is made from
the achieved, and all the perspective forms (such, say, as the plans, the
projects, the programs, etc.), before receiving the approval for their
embodiment and application, are verified by way of the replacement (at least
mental) by the existing (achieved) and already applied by man forms. If the
contents of the investigated (verified) forms can be substituted (as
completely as possible) by the contents of the already used forms (i.e., of
the forms endowed with objective contents β of the true forms), then there
is made the conclusion both about the sufficient contentfulness of the
investigated forms, and about their suitability for the further application.
"The success of human practice", consider the Marxists, proves the
correspondence of the representations of man "to the objective nature of
things" which he perceives [11, pp. 134-135]. The speech here is about the
correspondence of the content of the products of human thinking (of these or
those abstract subjectively ideal constructions and edifices) to the content of
the thing world, i.e., about the truthfulness of the abstract forms produced
by human thinking, which for man as the subject of cognition is the most
interesting, valuable, and important in the first place. The condition of the
"success" of the application, and hence, also the sign (criterion) of the
truthfulness of the abstract form-product of thinking will be the
correspondence of its content to the content of the form of thingness, or, in
other words, the possibility and admissibility of the as complete as possible
substitution of the content of the abstract form of thinking by the content of
the thing forms, mediated by the forms of sensations. In the final result the
presence of objective content in the investigated abstract form β here is the
criterion of the truthfulness of this form, and hence, also of the "success" of
its application in practice. As we see, neither "human practice" nor "success"
are the key words in the above-adduced assertion; the determining factor of
the success of the practical application or of the truthfulness of this or that
abstract form turns out to be its objective contentfulness.
Thus, as to the recognition of the special role and significance of practice in
the assessment process of the establishment of truth there are no objections
with that only difference, however, that practice in this case is not the
criterion of the truthfulness or of the success of the application of the
investigated abstract constructions, but serves only as the device or way of
such an assessment. The genuine criterion of truth or of the success of the
application of the abstract forms turns out to be the contentfulness of the
verified forms, and more precisely β the "quantity" of this contentfulness, on
the basis of which it becomes possible, finally, to consciously assess the
truthfulness of the investigated forms quantitatively, i.e., by number or by
"digit".
If the sense of practice reduces to the assessment of the possibility and
admissibility of the substitution of the content of the abstract forms by the
contents of the forms mainly thing (and more precisely, by the contents of
the forms of sensations), then the technology of interpreting is represented
by a more expanded set of the means and devices of the establishment and
verification of the truthfulness of the abstract forms: and by the forms of
sensations, and by the already verified, approved, and recognized (affirmed)
in their truthfulness abstract forms of different levels and constructions. The
multilevel abstractions with the established and confirmed truthfulness β this
is also the steps of the "ascent" of the essence or of the objective content of
reality.
In the former times the appeal to the procedure of practice was sufficient;
today this procedure must be expanded by way of the conscious inclusion in
its assessment arsenal of the set of the modern and more effective means β
otherwise man, relying on the false or unskillfully and erroneously chosen
orientations ("untrue" truths), risks losing the adequacy of the perception of
the world and disappearing as a species or a certain form-level of reality.
The well-known expression (the prototypes of which with great probability
are found in the works of G. W. F. Hegel): "Truth is always concrete", β is
completely correct from that point of view that truth at every given moment
β this is merely the concrete limited form of the next approximation to the
all-embracing expression of the moving, developing content (as the
equivalent of the "extracted" from the depth of the abstract essence) of
reality. Besides, the truthfulness of the contents (i.e., the completeness or
the "quantity" of the contentfulness) of the investigated abstract formsproducts of thinking (notions, judgments, projects, theories, conceptions,
philosophical systems, teachings, etc.) is established by the admissibility of
the interpreting and by the number of the interpretations of these
investigated forms by the known point finite examples: by the factual
material, by the results of the thing-practical and theoretical activity, as well
as by the already verified and confirmed abstract forms. In such a section it
is easily understood that all the perspective forms laying claim to the
acquisition of the status of the true forms also subsequently will turn out to
be the concrete relative truths by virtue of the interpreting of them by the
concrete finite examples-results of the preceding practical and theoretical
activity in the process of the establishment of their truthfulness.
The "success" of the existence (i.e., the truthfulness, actuality,
viability) of any real form is determined by its contentful resource or
again by the "quantity" of its contentfulness. The contentful resource, in
its turn, is made up of the multitude of the constituents; for such a form as,
for example, the state β this is by no means only the developed economy,
but also the intellectual-spiritual potential of the population, the reserves of
the natural resources and the defense potential, the self-sufficiency, the high
adaptability of the population to the changing conditions with the
preservation of the adequacy of thinking, etc. In application, say, to the
living forms β this is and the endurance of the organism, and its
survivability, and its energy-arming or energy potential, and the duration of
life (without the loss of quality), and the adequate reaction to the influences
and the ability to adapt to the changing conditions of the external
environment, and again the self-sufficiency, etc.
Good-bad, better-worse, higher-lower, wide-narrow, much-little, more-less,
deep-shallow, useful-harmful β the origin and the wide use of these and of
the multitude of the similar pairs of comparisons is also conditioned by the
need in the assessment of the completeness of the contentfulness or of the
contentful resource of the all possible forms of reality mainly at the everyday
level.
Analogously the success of the actions or the successfulness of the activity of
man is determined by the contentful resource of the form of man (in the
general case β of mankind) and of his thinking.
Any form-level lives or exists, enriching itself in a natural way, until such
time as any of the subforms-sublevels entering into the composition of the
whole aggregate of the subforms-sublevels of the form does not express by
itself the maximally achievable for this subform-sublevel contentfulness. With
the onset of the moment of the expressedness of the maximal contentfulness
by some subform-sublevel in the composition of the existing form (which
answers to the achievement of the peak of the activity of the whole form)
there begins to prevail the progressive taking away of its contentfulness by
the neighboring forms-levels. For this reason the form stagnates and
regresses, being "dragged apart" into parts and assimilated by the other
more active forms-levels by virtue of the most severe competition between
them and of the inexhaustible "demand" for contentfulness. Every "gaping"
form, having stopped in the increase of its content (contentful potential) and
having slowed down the development, the competitors immediately drag
apart into the constituents, replenishing thereby the reserves of their
contentfulness correspondingly to the omnipresent principle of self-
development. The boundaries, the resource, the quality of every form are
conditioned by the volume of the contentfulness accumulated in it.
All the forms-levels have to prove their viability (i.e., the ability to increase
and multiply their potential-contentfulness) in the hard competitive struggle.
Man β is not an exception, but a specimen of the typical form submitting to
the action of the universal "mechanism" of the development of reality β the
principle of self-development.
The very existence of any form takes place only thanks to the increase and
preservation of the rates of the growth of its contentfulness, and the very
fact of its existence testifies to the presence in it of the sufficient volume of
contentfulness. On the other hand, the highest contentfulness of this or that
level is demonstrated, confirmed, and certified by the stability of its form.
Thus, the "success" or the duration of the stable existence of the form is the
consequence and the indicator of the presence in this form of the sufficient
volume of contentfulness, and this subject-to-assessment contentfulness (of
the ever-increasing degree of abstractness) of the forms must be tied up
with the concreteness of the preceding forms, i.e., admit the interpreting by
the preceding more concrete forms-levels.
What advantages promises such, it would seem, insignificant refinement
concerning the advancement and substantiation of the correct and genuine
criterion of truth?
In the "guise" of the newly advanced criterion the researcher receives at his
disposal an effective instrument for the carrying out of the conscious
comparative quantitative assessment of the contentfulness (and hence, also
of the truthfulness) of the diverse forms and, correspondingly, of the building
of them by rank. And already on this basis there opens the possibility to take
the more competent and weighed decisions concerning the determination of
the direction of the further investigations of reality with the reliance on the
meaningfully selected true its forms.
Β§ 13. The technology of interpretation as a universal way of the
assessment of the contentfulness of forms
Let us examine in greater detail the technology of interpretation applied in
the assessment and establishment of the contentfulness and truthfulness of
the investigated forms.
As it has already been clarified above (see Β§ 9), "to interpret" β means to
express something abstract and insufficiently definite through the thorough,
definite, and concrete; to translate the incomprehensible into the language of
the comprehensible; to present the new and unusual by means of the known
and habitual. In an analogous way to interpret a notion or to give a definition
β this means to express the particular through the more general, or, in the
words of V. I. Lenin, "this means, first of all, to bring the given notion under
another, broader one" [11, p. 142]. In the indicated cases one thing is
expressed through another: something that is only just taking shape, unclear
and vague β through the established and definite preceding one. In this
sense the technology of interpretation fits into the channel of the principle of
self-development (and submits to this principle), which determines and
prescribes the unitary directionality of development to all real processes.
In other words, interpretation β this is both the elucidation (explication) of
abstract constructions by way of the recourse to the content of concrete
forms; and the expression of the irrational through the rational; and the
assignment of concrete sense-values to abstract elements: images, notions,
judgments, expressions, computations, schemes, formulas, symbols, etc.
All the scientific devices of the establishment of truth, including the
explanation and forecasting of the results of investigations (among which
there turn out to be: the modeling of processes, the reproduction of real
situations, the simulation of behavior, the anticipation of consequences,
etc.), relate one way or another to the technology (method, way, procedure)
of interpretation.
The most marketable and widespread way of the confirmation of the
contentfulness of abstract forms β this is the interpretation of these forms
by the habitual and accepted (accepted by reason, by the everyday
consciousness, or by the so-called common sense) particularities and
concretions.
The recourse to facts (examples, empirical data, approved results of
theoretical activity) with the aim of the expression of the contents of the
investigated abstract forms by the contents of more concrete forms β there
is the interpretation of the abstract by the concrete (such a practice is
applied in relation to all subjectively ideal forms from different spheres of
human activity, and not only to the products and results of theoretical
investigations).
The ability or suitability of an abstract form to interpretation by other, more
concrete forms (i.e., the interpretability of the abstract form) by no means
yet speaks of and does not testify to the sufficient contentfulness of this
form, but nevertheless β this is the first obligatory condition on the path of
the certification of the truthfulness of this or that form. The second obligatory
condition in the establishment of the truthfulness of a form β the
determination of the completeness of its contentfulness and, consequently, of
the level of its truthfulness depending on the "quantity" of this
contentfulness, conditioned by the number (and as large as possible) of the
interpretations of the content of the investigated form by the contents of
more concrete forms.
By the admission and conclusion of the Marxists themselves, the criterion of
truth adopted by them in the theory of cognition, built on the basis of
practice, is to a certain extent indefinite, i.e., is not exhaustive (necessary
and sufficient). But the point here is by no means in the perfectionimperfection of the procedure (practice) as a criterion; the indefiniteness of
any of the possible criteria of truth in any case is conditioned by the fact
that, firstly, none of the investigated (tested for truthfulness) real forms can
be contentfully exhaustive or absolutely contentful and, secondly, the highest
contentfulness of none of the forms can be confirmed by an infinite number
of interpretations. Here the principle of reasonable sufficiency comes into
force, on which one should orient oneself in practice in the establishment of
truth with the use of the technology of interpretation.
The same thing relates to the process of cognition in the first place. In the
order of the decrease of the degree of concreteness and the increase of the
abstractness of forms the trust in the method of interpretation as a
procedure or technology of the assessment of the contentfulness of forms is
distributed in the following way: first the preference is given to the
substituting forms of "empirical experience", then to the practical examples
and factual material and further β to the already in advance verified,
accepted, and approved in the quality of true abstract (theoretical)
constructions and structures.
Why does the factual, concrete material of the thing world (i.e., the form of
thingness) dominate in relation to the superstructural, abstract subjectively
ideal forms? Firstly, this level of the development of forms is historically
primary; the thing forms and the forms of sensations belong to the sphere of
the so-called everyday "empirical experience" of man. After all, we walk and
run on the earth by no means only and not so much thanks to the mind or
intellect, not owing to the presence of abstract thinking and its potential
readiness to the construction and comprehension of abstract schemes and
models, but in the first place, by virtue of the presence in the general linkage
or aggregate of the forms of the "human" nature of the earlier in time of
their origin foundation-forming forms-levels β precisely of those forms which
are defined as "living", but so far without the accompanying prefixes:
thinking, animate, highly organized, intellectual, spiritual, etc. Secondly, in
the process of the cognitive activity of man everything unknown and
unexplored is always expressed through the already known and
comprehended. And since the general process of development (as well as its
specific form of a quite definite level β cognition) represents the infinite
movement of the contentful constituent through the ever more and more
contentful forms-levels, characterized by their uniqueness, unrepeatability,
and irreversibility, β it is easily realized that the only possible way
(procedure, algorithm, or technology) of the realization of such a movementdevelopment, as well as of cognition, β this is "the making of oneself
from oneself while changing" with the reliance on the achieved and with
the indispensable use of the contents of the forms of the preceding levels.
Hence, by virtue of the striving to the ever more contentfully capacious
abstract forms there naturally takes shape also the hierarchy of the formslevels, manifesting itself through their branching aggregate (from the thing
forms to the forms of thinking). And all this diversity is determined by the
unidirectionality of the movement-development (see the formulation of the
principle of self-development, Β§ 7). In this and consists the sense of the
movement in the direction of the irreversible "height": the new content
grows out of the available, out of the accumulated, out of the already
achieved by way of "the making of oneself from oneself" and simultaneously
turns out to be different from itself. [Even a simple external comparison
shows that the technology of interpretation as an unalterable element of the
cognition of the changing reality turns out to be the embodiment of the same
universal principle of self-development].
And again let us turn to the verified system of views of dialectical
materialism.
"The practical activity of man billions of times had to bring the consciousness
of man to the repetition of different logical figures, so that these figures
could acquire the significance of axioms" [12, p. 172], β these well-known
words of V. I. Lenin give an unambiguous representation of how long a path
(in the course of everyday observations and routine actions, contributing to
the accumulation of "empirical experience") the true abstract logical
constructions, filled with concrete contentful sense (the speech is about the
initial forms of sensations and thinking), take shape. Becoming ever more
contentful, the mentioned logical figures with time themselves can serve as
the foundations or axiomatic basis, as well as the landmarks and indicators of
the directionality of the subsequent activity of man, both practical and
theoretical. In such an uncomplicated trivial way the multilevel reality is
built.
Here I would like to note without fail that the moment of the latent contentful
form-formation is disclosed by our greatest native dialectician V. I. Lenin so
masterfully and conveyed by such a filigree-precise formulation that nothing
can be taken away from it or added to it, however much one would like to.
Thus, the ever more abstracting itself in the course of the development of
reality contentfulness of its forms indicates at the same time also the
perspective direction of the variability of the forms of the representation of
this reality. The maximally achievable (highest) contentfulness β here is the
guiding star for all the changing forms on all possible levels of development.
The different logical figures, about which V. I. Lenin speaks, are nothing else
but the labor skills, habits, customs, traditions, rites, principles, convictions,
ideals, preferences, cultural codes, values, rules, and laws of the behavior of
people, taking shape in different human communities over the course of
millennia. These are those abstract constructions and structures which, being
filled with contentful sense, lead through life from birth to death both the
separate individual and the numerous their groupings, not letting them stray
from the path β from the road, in its essence, righteous and true, with the
course on the acquisition of the highest contentfulness by the human forms
following this road.
Since the sensuous in the multilevel human nature takes the upper hand
over the "supersensuous" (mental), the level of thinking (consciousness)
tries in a natural and most obvious, primitive way (for the most part, by the
"mechanical" path) to rationalize everything contentful (especially of the
abstract kind), i.e., to express it through quite concrete forms of sensations,
which turn out to be for the human consciousness closer, "dearer", and more
comprehensible (more thorough) than all the other forms. The technology of
interpretation β this is the universal way of the assessment of the
contentfulness of all possible forms of reality, but since in our cluster of
reality the first-born foundation-forming forms are the thing, material,
substantial forms, then in the calculation, in the first place, are taken and the
emphasis for the most part is placed on these fundamental "down-to-earth"
levels-forms.
In order to establish the truthfulness, reliability, authenticity, actuality of this
or that abstract form, it is necessary to reveal and "extract" from the
compared abstract and concrete forms the common ("as the one in the many
or the likeness of the many" [18, p. 351]) for them content.
The confirmation of the contentfulness of a theory, conception, or any other
abstract form is ensured by the realization of the procedure of the
comparison of the contents of different concrete forms with the content of
the abstract form with the aim of the revelation of the common or coinciding
"shares" of the contents of the compared forms and the establishment
thereby of the possibility of the replacement (substitution) of the content of
the abstract form by the contents of the concrete forms.
In the quality of the common content of all the compared forms there may
turn out to be some single universal principle, "mechanism", postulate, or
algorithm, common for all the forms engaged in the indicated procedure. In
the approximate coincidence of the contents of the forms of sensations and
the abstract forms of thinking there is made the conclusion about the
contentfulness precisely of the abstract form (since the most interesting for
man is the moment of the as large as possible coincidability and succession
of the contents of the abstract and thing-sensuous forms). In the opposite
case (without the carrying out of the verification of the possibility of the
replacement of the contents of the indicated forms), giving free rein to one's
subjective abstract fantasies, one can fantasize god knows what. Therefore
from time immemorial man is engaged in the search of the criteria for the
determination of the truthfulness, in the first place, of the subjective abstract
constructions and structures.
The inadequate perception of the world, conditioned by the abstract
inventions, false premises, and conclusions, can bring and brings, in the final
result, harm to man and mankind. For this reason man must pay heightened
attention to the assessment and verification for contentfulness and reliability
of all without exception abstract forms produced in his head, of all human
suppositions, hypotheses, inventions, creative ideas, and fantasies (including
and especially the publications in the mass media, see Β§ 17). The inaccuracy
and negligence in this respect, the excessive credulity to the unverified
fabrications brings to man, as well as to the whole of mankind as a whole,
immeasurably more harm than the benefit from the momentary gain built on
the foundation of false representations and conclusions. The untruthfulness
of the abstract forms of thinking means their low-contentfulness (i.e., the
insufficient filling of these forms with objective content), about which and
should testify the non-succession and non-conjugacy of them with the
preceding concrete forms of sensations and thingness. Thus, the abstract
forms as the products of human thinking β these are the special, specific
forms of the representation, the same thing, of the objective content of
reality at the next definite stage of the movement-development of this very
reality.
The establishment of the true knowledge about the object is equivalent to
the procedure of the mental revelation and "extraction" of the objective
content from the thing form and the correlation of it with the transformed
contents of the more abstracted forms of other levels, namely: the form of
sensations and the form of thinking.
It goes without saying that after the transformation into other forms and
representations in other forms of other levels, this thing objective content
does not remain identical to itself or equal to the content of the formscarriers of thingness, β otherwise it would not change its form. The changes
of the contents accompanying such transformations of the mentioned chain
of forms and represent by themselves the peculiarities or the "highlights" of
those forms into which the objective content is transformed in the measure
of its movement-development or "ascent" from the thing forms. Every
subsequent form of the indicated chain includes in itself in the "folded",
compressed form the contents of the preceding forms and something else
special, different from them β a certain "weight" of novelty and
unrepeatability.
The thing form β this is the source and forerunner of the human sensations.
However, to compare the content of this form with the content of the form of
thinking does not present itself possible, since the content of the form of
thingness is not manifestable outside the form of sensations. Consequently,
to compare and contrast correctly there always remain only the contents of
the forms of thinking and the forms of sensations. The form of thinking must
be verified for the possibility and admissibility of the replacement
(substitution) of its content by the verified objective content of the form of
sensations. Then the form of thinking lays claim to the presence in it of the
same objective content. Practice, embracing all the diversity of the thing
activity of man, including the theoretical devices of the approbation of
knowledge, is the procedure of the verification of the possibility of the
replacement (substitution) of the contents of the abstract forms by the
contents of the concrete forms of any worth, and in particular and first of all
by the content of the form of sensations. However, practice does not
embrace such kinds of the verification and establishment of the
contentfulness of the abstract forms as the substitution (replacement) of
them by the forms also abstract, but of other levels, or by other, already
verified abstractions with the confirmed truthfulness. Such a task is solved by
the procedure of a more developed character, called interpretation. With the
account of this circumstance we have at our disposal the complete set of the
instruments or procedures of the establishment and verification of the
contentfulness of the abstract constructions and structures of different kinds
and levels (storiedness).
As this becomes ever more evident, what is interesting is not the truthfulness
of the abstract form in itself (which, it seems, is not the final aim of the
human investigations and researches), but the ability of the content of this
form to be expressed most completely by means of the contents of the more
habitual for man forms of thingness, mediated by the forms of sensations,
and the suitability of this content for the further "use". If such is observed,
then the found abstract form, pushing apart for man the horizons of the
perception and understanding of reality, is built into the general aggregate of
the forms, replenishing thereby the contentful accumulations of this
aggregate and contributing to the progressive cognition of reality, which
"gropes" simultaneously by means of man and his thinking the most optimal
contentful path of its own further development.
The criterion of the truthfulness of the forms β their contentfulness. The
truthfulness of the forms is assessed by the presence and "quantity" of this
component. The status of the true acquires or obtains the form possessing
the highest contentfulness of the possible and achievable at this definite
stage of the development of reality. The assessment of the completeness,
volume, or "quantity" of the contentfulness of this or that form is carried out
by means of the procedure of interpretation (the expression or substitution,
at times mental, of the content of the investigated form by the contents of
the more concrete forms). The volume, quantity, reliability of the factual
material, and indeed of the concrete forms in general, participating in the
assessment procedure, and will determine in the final result the
completeness of the contentfulness, and hence, also the truthfulness of the
investigated form.
Only those newly forming forms "are layered" and "are held" on the summit
of the pyramid of the forms of reality which carry in themselves the content
conjugating with the objective contents of the forms (constituting the
foundation of the pyramid) and continuing by itself the chain of their
objective contents. The pyramid of reality acquires stability if it is
superstructed by the forms "stuffed" with objective content.
The replacement of the abstract forms by the more concrete forms (and
more precisely, the replacement of the contents of the abstract forms by the
contents of the more concrete forms) answers to the procedure of the filling
of the abstract forms with senses or the endowing of them with objective
content.
By the return "to oneself at a new level" there is carried out the constant
refinement of the content of the ever more abstracting summit form of the
pyramid by way of the correlation of it with the objective content of the
multilevel foundation of this same pyramid.
The assessment of the contentfulness of the theoretical knowledge by
practice is equivalent to the procedure of the representation of the content of
the abstract forms by the replacing contents of the concrete thing forms,
mediated by the forms of sensuousness and sensations (i.e., by the forms of
empirical experience).
The truthfulness or reliability of the abstract subjectively ideal forms (i.e., of
knowledge: axioms, postulates, assertions, judgments, representations,
theories, conceptions, teachings, paradigms, etc.), laying claim to the status
of the carriers of objective content, is proved not by practice, but by the
"quantity" or volume of the contentfulness of these generalizing forms. By
the procedures of practice or interpretation there are established the
presence and "quantity" of the contentfulness of the investigated forms. The
presence of the contentfulness of the forms is determined by the possibility
and admissibility of their interpretation by the factual material or concrete
examples, and the "quantity" of the contentfulness is assessed by the
number of such interpretations. The greater the number of the known
concrete examples interpreting the investigated subjectively ideal abstract
form, the with greater foundation this form can lay claim to the status of the
carrier of objective content.
In other words, the process of the search and establishment of truth is
reduced to the procedure of the maximally complete expression of the
uncognized irrational through the cognized rational (i.e., of the unknown
through the known) and the return thereby to one's rational sources or
foundations, but already at a new level β with the admixture of something
special, as the supplemented rational.
Thus, the criterion of truth is not practice in itself (the thing-practical and
theoretical activity of the subject with its results), but the presence and
completeness of the objective content in the investigated forms, which is
established with the help of the procedure of practice or the technology of
interpretation.
Correctly generated and reproduced by thinking abstract forms turn out to be
more contentful, since they include in themselves in the "removed" or
"folded" (i.e., compact, concentrated) form the data or contentful volumes of
a whole multitude of concrete forms.
The presence of a certain common in the particularities and concretions must
be confirmed by the as large as possible number of such particularities and
concretions. If this condition is fulfilled, then the "extracted" common
acquires the status of objective content.
After all, what in reality represents by itself this or that theory or conception
or some foundation-laying principle which requires either the confirmation
and acceptance, or the refutation? This is something common (which
someone managed to "spy out" or notice accidentally or deliberately),
correctly "extracted" from a certain number of particularities and concretions
and concentratedly presented in the form of a generalized abstract theory
(conception, model) for the explanation and comprehension of the essence of
an even greater number of particularities and concretions (both existing and
supposed to existence), as well as for the forecasting and anticipation of the
emergence of the new forms of reality on the basis of the knowledge about
this concentrated common.
The truthfulness or reliability of this or that conception (theory, model) is
proved by the presence in it of the objective content admitting the
interpretation (i.e., the substitution, at least mental) of its content by the
contents of the particular and concrete forms (examples, facts). If something
abstractly common, constituting the essence of the conception (theory,
model), is discovered in the particularities and concretions of the thing world
and thereby admits the possibility of the interpretation of it by these
particular and concrete forms of the thing world, then this abstractly common
is viable and endowed with objective content, i.e., is true and reliable.
Such a path of the establishment of truth fits into the single channel of the
general contentful movement (from the "incomplete" truth to the ever more
embracing and contentful truth), determined by the formulation of the
principle of self-development. Thus are carried out both the process of
cognition, and the processes of the development of anything whatsoever;
another path simply does not exist!
Proceeding from the fact that every just, true theory (conception, model) is
interpreted or can be interpreted by the factual material, the admissibility
and suitability of the newly advanced conception to the interpretation by the
numerous facts serves as the unalterable condition requiring the verification
for feasibility in the establishment of its reliability or truthfulness (or at least
scientificity). In the channel of this approach this means that the possibility
of the effective interpretation of any conception by an infinite number (or at
least by a multitude) of facts endows this conception with the status of
reliability (truthfulness); in other words, the greater the number of the
correctly interpreting this or that theory facts is established, the more
reliable (truer) is the "invented" or generated by thinking theory (conception,
model).
As it has already been said earlier, every principle β this is something
common, extracted from a whole row of particular separate examples and
manifestations. The successful reverse "return" of the common into every
new separate concrete particular (if such is possible, admissible, and
achievable) and there is the way of the proof of the unity and commonness
of the whole row of particularities and concretions, as well as the way of the
proof of the presence of the objective content in all the investigated forms
(i.e., in the compared particularities and concretions).
The general principle (conception, theory) collects and unites by itself the
separate particularities and concretions. By the gathering into one of the
many particularities is determined the essence of the way of interpretation. If
the interpretation (the gathering into one of the many particularities)
succeeds, then the found or extracted earlier general principle can be
recognized as objectively contentful and presented to the interpretation by
an even greater number of particularities. The truthfulness of the principle is
established if this principle is just and common in relation to some in advance
given multitude of particularities and concretions. The greater the number of
particularities and concretions is united by the commonness of the principle,
the greater the foundation to consider it the truth (true).
The more completely and large-scale the abstract is expressed by means of
the concrete, the greater the number of concretions it embraces and unites
β the more contentful it is, the more truly it is endowed with objective
content.
If the form growing by the abstract content does not include in itself the
contents of the more concrete forms, is not expressed by them and by their
aggregate in the most complete volume, is not substituted (at least mentally)
by them, then it is not endowed with objective content and, consequently, is
not true.
The purpose of the technology of interpretation, in essence, and consists in
the verification and proof of the presence of the objective content in all
possible abstract forms.
Β§ 14. The differentiation of the forms by the volume of
contentfulness. The volume of the contentfulness of a form as the
indicator of the approximation to the expression of the objective
content of reality
In connection with the fact that the criterion of truth advanced here (that is,
the contentfulness of the forms) turns out to be suitable for the quantitative
assessment of the forms, it becomes possible to build the diverse forms by
rank depending on the completeness or "quantity" of their contentfulness
(truthfulness). Such an approach opposes the myth of the possible
equivalence of the different abstract forms (theories, conceptions, models,
teachings, plans, etc.), including the identical truthfulness of the different
points of view on one and the same question or subject of judgment. The
true model, assessed as the most "close approximation" to the absolute truth
at any given moment of development, β is always one; that is why it is
important to be able to recognize such a model, in order to rely in one's
further perspective movement-development precisely on it.
As in any set (in any aggregate) of the forms of any level, exactly the same
way at the level of the subjectively ideal forms there are encountered, in our
opinion, both the less contentful forms, and the more contentful forms (the
most "suitable" to the expression of the maximally achievable volume of
content at the "summit" levels of the abstracted forms).
Proceeding from such representations, the answer to the question β whether
all the abstract constructions and structures, all the judgments (points of
view, opinions, positions, decisions, conclusions, inferences, etc. in relation
to any subject of judgment) are equal-righted, equal-powered, equal-sized,
equal-valued, equivalent, and, finally, adequate, β is expectedly predictable
and unambiguous: there is not and cannot be in principle equally adequate
points of view on one and the same subject of judgment, since any and each
of them represents by itself only the next approximation to the exhaustive
expression of the objective content of the subject of judgment (i.e., only the
approximation to a certain absolute truth). From all the judgments in such a
case it is necessary, using for this the most complex criterion of the
assessment of the truthfulness of the judgments, to choose the one whose
contentful filling is maximal and most close to the expression of the objective
content of reality (of the objective truth). All the other judgments represent
by themselves even more coarse and inexact approximations.
The task of the choice from two and more points of view of the most true or
correct one at any moment of the choice will stand before man always, since
the freedom of choice, proceeding from the indefiniteness and ambiguity of
the course of events and the perspectives of development, with which the
subject of cognition encounters and will always encounter, β is objective and
conditioned by the dialectical nature of the world (of the developing reality).
The choice from the row of the approximations of the most "close
approximation" to the form of the highest contentfulness will always be the
most responsible and dramatic moment in the destinies of mankind and of
the separate individuals; and never will this decision be simple. One can only
achieve the ever more meaningful striving to the increase of the
contentfulness of such a decision.
By virtue of the contentful-formal (dialectical) nature of the world and its
development and of the resulting from here impossibility of the repetition or
repeated reproduction of anything whatsoever in details and the smallest
particulars, β there is not and cannot be even two (not to mention a
multitude) of equally true, identically equal-sized opinions, judgments, or
points of view on one and the same subject (question, problem). One of the
points of view (or judgments) will always be closer to the truth than the
others. Precisely from this one must proceed, precisely this moment one
must take into account in the determination of the truthfulness of this or that
form and in the choice thereby of the landmark and foundation for the
further investigations and development.
When in application to this or that conception (theory) it is said wholesale
that this is only one of the numerous equal-valued points of view or opinions
in relation to this or that subject of cognition, one must, firstly, be informed
about the principal unattainability of the equivalence or equal-valuedness of
the different points of view on the subject of investigation and, secondly,
remember about the necessity of the following of the certain rules or devices
(procedures, technology) of the establishment of the truthfulness of the
theoretical forms with the help of the complex criterion of their
interpretability (by the verification by the factual material, concrete
examples, reliable logical constructions and structures, etc.).
Naturally, few people will believe only on the word in the fact that such-andsuch a conception is or can become an alternative knowledge in relation to
the existing theories. Only by the presentation of the sufficient volume of the
confirming factual material can one convince the interested public (or side) in
the fact that this or that approach is at present the most "close
approximation" to the true one.
Proceeding from these considerations, one should expect that the special and
heightened interest will always be presented by the assessment of the
"contentfulnesses" of the above-mentioned forms by way of their comparison
and, correspondingly, the determination of their priority by way of the
ranking. Since each of the compared and ranked forms is in essence the next
approximation to the form of the highest contentfulness, about the identity
or equivalence of the compared and ranked forms there can be no speech.
All the established, comprehended, and preparing to the comprehension
truths β only the next approximations to the exhaustive expression of the
content by the most perfect form, the next approximations to the absolute
truth. But among these approximations there is always such which
represents by itself the most close at any given moment to the "aim"
approximation. Precisely it and must be able to find, precisely on it and must
one orient oneself in one's investigations and in the adoption of the
decisions. This is that present, that actual, that true which acquires the right
to the long-term and stable existence, β on which and accentuates the
attention G. W. F. Hegel, remarking: "Usually we call truth the agreement of
the object with our representation... In the philosophical sense β on the
contrary, truth in its abstract expression generally means the agreement of a
certain content with itself... The untrue means... the bad, the non-
corresponding to itself... The examination of truth in the sense explained
here, in the sense of the agreement with itself, constitutes the genuine task
of logic" [3, p. 126β127].
To find such a form which would express the whole fullness of the content of
reality at the given moment, i.e., to find the most contentful form, the form
of the highest contentfulness, signifying by itself the identity of the
components of the relation {content/form}, and, correspondingly, the
degeneration of the latter into the indivisible wholeness β here is the
genuine sense (from the position of our representations), enclosed in the
cited words of Hegel.
Truth is always expressed by the form most contentful at any given moment
in comparison with all the other competing and accompanying forms.
Supposing that the exhaustive expression of the content by the form is
possible, admissible, and achievable only in god and through god: "Only God
is the true correspondence of the notion and reality" [3, p. 126], β Hegel
intuitively clothes the contentful movement of reality and its contentfulformal transformations into the attire of the iteration process of the infinite
approximations to the expression of this very "truth in the last instance"
(more laconically than Hegel in the light of his representations about this,
perhaps, and one cannot say).
In science (as, however, and in life) the objective (content) cannot be
bypassed without consequences; in the quality of the "given from the age"
there is the common, the foundation, the reproducible basis, on which
something from the changing and subjective is layered, until this something
acquires the status of the supplemented and developed objective.
The particularities, peculiarities, and individualities all the same "dance from
the stove", push off from the common, on which with time and are layered.
The common and objective (content) takes place beyond any doubts, and all
of us, willingly or unwillingly, strive to see and manifest to the world this
objective content by means of the different forms.
Everything that is "creative" subjective β this is only the approximations of
different degrees (the multilevel models, fragments, or integral pictures),
fixed in their striving to the "complete and final" expression and
comprehension of the infinite contentful movement, i.e., of the development
of this very common, foundation, objective. In the context of the considered
material philosophy (as, however, and literature, and painting, and music,
etc.) β this is the art of the subjective to see (discover) and manifest the
objective (content). For the understandable reasons the successful one here
turns out to be the one who manages to do this (such an approach easily and
unerringly reveals the true subtext of the depth and greatness, say, of the
Russian literature of the XIX century, etc.).
The present approach has as its aim also to give the representation of that
common, unifying objective which so far is not "grasped" by the modern
sciences (the latter, as in the parable with the elephant, each separately see
either the legs, or the trunk, or the tail, not having the possibility to make up
the representation about the whole). Without the single common objective
foundation neither science, nor philosophy have the chances for the
acceleration or the leap in their development.
Β§ 15. The "winding" of content as the essence of the principle of selfdevelopment
What has been set forth in the preceding paragraphs fits into the channel of
the concept of development, the main provisions of which and the description
of the "mechanism" of the change-movement-development of reality are
contained in the works [2, 8, 23].
At any given and arbitrary moment the world is unique and unrepeatable
(which has already been noted above). But the unrepeatability or uniqueness
of the changing and newly forming forms of reality is possible and realizable
only thanks to the "winding", the "making of oneself from oneself", i.e., to
the special specific character or way of the movement-development of the
forms. This specific peculiarity of the development of reality must never fall
out of the field of vision of the analysts engaged in theoretical investigations
and the modeling of the changeability of the surrounding world. Under the
"dictate" of the algorithm of the principle of self-development the correlation
of the components-constituents in the known relation {change/basis}
constantly changes, as a result of which at every moment there is realized
the "changing basis", reproducing itself thanks to ever new and new
contentful layers, β which is why it does not become exhausted, which is
why the very development of reality does not cease.
At every moment the "lived-through" becomes the "building material" for the
"coming" present, "winding" and layering onto the still more distant past (the
"lived-through"). Only such a way of movement-development as "the making
of oneself from oneself", such a course of events, similar to "winding",
insures and delivers the future from the detailed repetitions of the past. By
the simple "copying" or "reflection" no single process is realized in full
measure; the contrary β is from the category of delusions and chimeras. In
reality there takes place the permanent movement in the direction of novelty
and unrepeatability on the basis of the uniqueness of everything
"accomplishing itself". The very character, type, and way of the movementself-development excludes the repeatability and reversibility of the forms.
The appearance of new content in new forms cannot be explained in any way
by the "copying" or "reflection" of the external world by the organs of sense
(sensations) and by the thinking of the cognizing subject [11, p. 125, 151].
The new content arises and is realized in new forms because it "winds" one
layer onto another with the accompanying changes of all the layers (by virtue
of the absorption by the layers of these changes) and, correspondingly, with
the differences of the content of the subsequent forms from the content of
the preceding ones.
Man, animal, plant breathes, drinks, eats, interacts with the external world,
and precisely in such a way β by the path of the layering of changes onto
the basis β there is carried out the feeding, replenishment, renewal of the
developing content of the living forms (including the subjectively ideal forms
of human thinking). On the simplest things, on the ordinary and everyday
examples one can be convinced of this again and again. In particular, the
organism in the state of sleep is precisely that basis, that foundation onto
which the changes and new volumes of content accumulated by the organism
in the period of its activity are "mounted", into which they are built in. On the
example of sleep it is well noticeable that the layers are attached to the basis
not evenly and uninterruptedly, but by diverse portions, alternating with
pauses, rest, "repose", etc.
In what is seen the "sense" of the life or existence of the plant, animal, man?
In that, by the different levels of their multilevel formations, to assimilate,
express, comprehend the contentful accumulations in the calculation (with
anticipation) of the subsequent assimilation, expression, and comprehension
of new, still greater volumes of diverse contentful accumulations.
Copying and photographing does not give true representations of the current
processes in the multilevel reality (including at the level of self-cognition). As
reflection or copying this can be perceived and carried out only in immobility,
in statics, in the form of a particular case of the universal movement; in
dynamics, in development β this is always "winding", "making from
oneself"... The development-movement-change of actuality is the generation
and embodiment of the objectively realizing principle of self-development
(initially present in any "something", in any element of reality), which gives
the representation and testifies about the intensifying movement of the
content (of reality) onto the coverage and comprehension of the very same
moving content in its ever more and more "embryonic" state. In the same
way there is carried out also the process of cognition as the movement of the
specific (gnoseological) form of reality at the level and in the terms of human
thinking.
As for the question of the cognizability of the surrounding world, then in the
final account it will inevitably be necessary to come to the understanding of
the circumstance that the world β this is not a book and all the more not a
rock or a boulder-stone in its immutability, but something unceasingly
"making itself", reproducing itself, changing itself in the regime of real time;
and a similar question in a correct formulation must be posed not in relation
to the cognizability of something given and existing from the age in its
constancy, but in relation to the possibility of the foresight and anticipation of
the newly arising forms (including the consequences, results, events,
configurations, situations) of the developing reality.
The levels of development are often inseparable, undetachable from each
other for the reason that the contentful constituent, say, of one level can at
one and the same time (in interconnection) turn out to be the formal
constituent for another level and vice versa. And also for the reason that the
contentful constituent of one level necessarily represents a new relation
{content/form} for another level. The same thing should be said also about
any formal constituent. But the main obstacle on the path of the clear
understanding of the course of the process of development and of its exact
formulations consists in the fact that the natural boundary between the
components-constituents "content" and "form" in their relation is hardly
distinguishable, and at times simply not perceptible (for the time being).
Thus, the ingrowing of the levels-forms into each other and their growing out
of one another is precisely the cause of the impossibility of their separation in
a "pure" form, as well as of the intricacy of the processes and of the difficulty
of the expression (explanation) of the unexplored, and in some sense
irrational, through the comprehended rational.
In such a connection one must always take into account the dual nature of
the world, and especially in the cases when the matter concerns the
examination and investigation of intricate (and precisely therefore complex)
questions. This thought is far from new, we simply often forget about it. And
in order to come out onto the correct solution of the fundamental problems,
without the dialectical approach it is already in no way possible to get by.
The striving to express the new abstract content through the preceding more
concrete forms by virtue of the effect of the winding of content, described
and conditioned (the speech is about the effect of winding) by the
formulation of the principle of self-development, leads to the search of a new
form for the new content, which is the continuation of all the other contentful
forms present in the linkage or in the aggregate. This form includes in itself
in the "sublated", concentrated form the preceding manifestations of the
essence of the object and simultaneously is their continuation, expansion,
and superstructure with the "inclusions" of some peculiarities (differences)
not present until then in the preceding forms. Therefore the main thing that
one should catch in this process is not the "reflection" of one in the other
(not the doubling or multiplication of essences), but the transformation, the
transformation of the available linkage of the preceding forms into a new
aggregate form, and moreover not equivalent to the simple sum of the
forms, but qualitatively different from it.
The life and existence of man as the subject of cognition β this is the
movement of the contentful constituent through the forms-levels in the
direction of the acquisition of the most contentful form of such a movement,
which is precisely what is affirmed by the formulation of the principle of selfdevelopment. In words we, as the embodiment of the predominantly
conservative component-constituent of the relation {change/basis}, i.e., of
the "basis", of course, can deny that at every moment by each our action, by
each breath in and out, by each word and deed (being simultaneously the
personification also of the second component-constituent of the relation, i.e.,
of the "change") we participate in the search and creation of the most
contentful forms of our existence and development; however, in fact
everything indicates that there is no alternative to this process.
Β§ 16. The systematization and refinement of some notions and
definitions in the light of our representations about the development
and cognition of reality
Let us attempt to systematize what has been set forth above, breaking
through, as before, through the veil of delusions and confusion in the notions
and representations about the subject of our conversation.
The truthfulness of a form is determined by its contentfulness; hence the
criterion of truth or of the truthfulness of the forms is served by their
contentfulness. The more contentful the form, the more truthful it is. The
internal contentfulness of a form reveals itself by diverse external
manifestations, executions, embodiments.
From time immemorial man observes and fixes the multitude of
manifestations of the internal contentfulness of the forms, such as: beauty
and elegance, simplicity, harmony, laconism, systemicity, economy, noncontradictoriness, self-sufficiency, etc. For the establishment and
confirmation of the truthfulness of any form all these manifestationsexecutions of its contentfulness must pass one and the same procedure of
assessment β interpretation, β consisting in the determination of the
possibility and admissibility of the substitution of the contents of the
investigated forms by the contents of as large as possible a number of
concrete and abstract forms, the truthfulness of which has already been
confirmed and does not raise doubts.
The matter remains only for the fact that with respect to each concrete
manifestation or execution of contentfulness one should find (reveal, select)
its own specific standards for the correct determination of the "quantity" of
this contentfulness and the expression of it in conventional units. The more
such manifestations falling into the field of vision of the human
consciousness, the more complex, all-embracing, and informative the
criterion of the assessment of the truthfulness of the forms turns out to be;
in other words, if all the manifestations of contentfulness are gathered
together, then there will be obtained the combined criterion of the all-round
assessment of the truthfulness of any form, β by the aggregate of the
manifestations of the contentfulness of this form.
Hence, apparently, proceeds also the intuitive striving of a number of
researchers to introduce a certain complex criterion of the assessment of
truth; the striving itself is quite natural and justified, all the more so that in
many fields of human activity, conditioned and generated by the different
manifestations of the contentfulness of all possible forms, the criteria of the
assessment of the truthfulness of the forms have already been worked out
and exist, in others β they are still to be worked out. But with all the
perspectiveness of the indicated idea one should nevertheless stop on the
peculiarities of its interpretation and embodiment.
"We suppose, β write the authors, β that the synthesis of the existing
conceptions of truth is possible. The core of the general theory of truth can
become the conception of correspondence, in connection with the fact that
only it discloses the essence of true knowledge. According to the words of
Descartes, who clearly and most briefly formulated the main idea of the
theory of correspondence, "truth... means the correspondence of the thought
to the object". ... Without the correlation with the object the notion of truth
has no sense, there is no objectless truth, no truth about nothing" [4, p. 6β
7].
On the example of the cited quotation let us examine the confusion in the
representations, about which we have declared above. The matter is that in
this fragment of the article (as also in the multitude of publications on this
theme) there is compared the not quite comparable, similar, say, to the
attempt of the establishment of the correspondence between meters and
seconds. Despite the fact that both the one and the other "grow" from one
root as the components-constituents of the integral relation {time/space},
nevertheless they are not equivalent and not identical to each other, just as
the components of the primordial relation {content/form} are not identical
and not interchangeable. Here there is evident the attempt to correlate and
identify the "formal" and "contentful" beginnings of reality, which by and
large is incorrect by virtue of their natural incompatibility.
The truthfulness of knowledge is determined by its contentfulness. The fuller,
the higher the contentfulness of knowledge, the more truthful, more reliable
it is. As we see, the objectness here is generally beside the point.
The necessity of the "correlation with the object" appears not in connection
with the assessment of the truthfulness of knowledge, but in connection with
the assessment of the fullness or the "quantity" of its contentfulness, which
(the assessment) is carried out, as has been said above, by means of the
procedure of practice or the technology of interpretation, i.e., by the
comparison and substitution (as complete as possible) of the content of the
abstract form of knowledge by the contents of the more concrete forms of
sensations and/or by the contents of the abstract forms of thinking, the
truthfulness of which has already been confirmed and does not raise doubts.
And only on the basis of the established contentfulness of knowledge can
one speak about its truthfulness. The truthfulness of this or that form, thus,
has no direct relation to objectness (if only for the reason that the
confirmations of truthfulness are equally required by both the abstract and
the empirical forms or the forms of sensations, closely connected with the
thing forms). The truthfulness of the abstract forms is correlated with
objectness only indirectly β through the procedure of the assessment and
establishment of the fullness of the contentfulness of the abstract forms.
For this same reason the verbal turns of speech of the type "the
correspondence of the thought to the object" (in the formulation of
Descartes) or "the correlation of the notion with the object" (in the modern
formulation) from ancient times and up to this day are used incorrectly with
respect to the procedure of the search of truth or the establishment of the
truthfulness of knowledge. One should not forget that the subjective human
knowledge about a real object serves as the expression of the objective
content of the form of the object, already mediated by the form of human
sensations and by the form of human thinking. Therefore only the contents of
the form of sensations and of the form of thinking can be compared,
correlated, tested for correspondence. And only on the basis of the revealed
(in the process of comparison and correlation) to some extent conjugacy,
correspondence, equivalence, or "coincidence" of these contents, only then
can one make the conclusion about some commonality and continuity of their
forms, and, consequently, about the objectivity of the contents of the forms
of sensations and thinking, supplementing, deepening, and developing the
objective content of the form of the object itself. By virtue of the
indicated circumstance the objective content of the form of the object
appears already in the quality of the objective content of the generalized
multilevel aggregate (symbiosis) of all the three conjugated successive
forms of the different levels (the form of thingness, the form of sensations,
and the form of thinking). Finally, the content of the above-mentioned
aggregate of forms, manifested by means of the form of thinking, with the
objectivity certified (with the help of the procedure of practice or the
technology of interpretation) (i.e., with the highest contentfulness) can lay
claim to the status of true knowledge about the object.
Thus, the content of the abstract form (of knowledge, thought, etc.) requires
the "correlation" or "correspondence" not with the object (objectness, being,
etc.), but with the content of the thing form, and moreover mediated by the
form of sensations. And already on the basis of the mentioned correlation
and the discovered correspondence (correspondence) or continuity of the
compared contents the conclusion is made about the presence in the
abstract form of objective content, and, consequently, about the truthfulness
of the abstract form.
In connection with the remarks expressed here in the address of the
fragment of the article [4] I would like nevertheless to note that the article,
in our opinion, is still topical, but there are some typical inaccuracies which
cannot but be paid attention to in the context of the questions under
consideration. Continuing to think straightforwardly and ignoring without
exaggeration the leading role and significance of the content-form relations
in the development (and cognition) of reality, we shall never separate the
wheat from the chaff and shall be marking time still unforgivably long. In
order to truly penetrate into the essence of any question and to make it out
thoroughly, one must consider this question necessarily through the prism of
the content-form transformations (unfortunately, this appeal so far is a voice
crying in the wilderness). This is all the more necessary for the reason that
we live in conditions when the time for the anticipation of the development of
events and the correct response reaction to the so-called challenges is
catastrophically shrinking. Equally there is no doubt in the fact that the
prepared and uncompromising reader will discover in the text of the present
article also the inevitable flaws, which would be very good and absolutely
normal, for only by the path of the successive approximations can one
approach the ever more exact and "exhaustive" expression of the objective
(true) content of the developing reality.
Further one should necessarily once again emphasize that, despite the
difference of the external manifestations of the contentfulness of the forms,
the technology (or procedure, or way) of the assessment of the truthfulness
of any forms remains universal and standard β this is interpretation, the
particular case of which is practice. This technology consists in the revelation
of the possibility and admissibility of the substitution of the contents of the
investigated forms by the contents of as large as possible a number of
concrete and abstract forms (with the already established and confirmed
truthfulness); i.e., the technology of interpretation is reduced in the final
account to the search or working out of the so-called standards or
conventional units, by means of which one can express or present the
"quantity" or the fullness of the assessed contentfulness of the investigated
forms.
The essence of this technology is always one β the expression of the
unknown through the known, of the unusual through the habitual, of
the uncognized through the cognized, of the incomprehensible
through the comprehended, of the irrational through the rational, of
the indefinite through the definite, of the more abstract and less
concrete through the less abstract and more concrete, etc., etc.
Everything uncognized and unexplored is assessed, tested, and expressed
through the already available and existing, the truthfulness of which is
established and tested by time. Nothing new here neither man nor nature will
be able to "invent" any more, since both the process of development (of
anything whatsoever) and the process of cognition (of anything whatsoever)
have always submitted, submit, and will submit to the universal principle of
self-development. Herewith it has no essential significance whether the
particular is expressed through the general or vice versa, β the main thing is
that as the result of the described procedure everything until then
unexplored and indefinite acquires a more or less finished (balanced for the
time being) form of something tested, proved, achieved, and comprehended.
However, there are also other points of view [9].
The impossibility to wholly or all-embracingly and exhaustively cover the
"making and developing" by the existing and achieved both conditions and
generates the approximateness, inexactness or, so to say, the "chronic"
unfinishedness of the expression or coverage of the content by the form in
the course of the interaction of these two constituents. There necessarily
remains something contentful (or some its share), uncovered and not
yielding to the coverage by any form, with whatever "zeal" the latter would
lay claim to the very perfection. The spiral, as also the comma β this is a
circle "with development" or a point "with a tail", foretelling always a new
turn of events and a step into the insufficiently definite and not fully
explored.
It is also necessary to note that with the described approach to the
assessment and establishment of truth or the truthfulness of the different
forms of knowledge it has no significance whatsoever β whether this is
humanitarian knowledge (from the field of literature, journalism, politics, art,
etc.) or natural-scientific (technical, physical, mathematical, etc.), since
falsehood and falsity are objective categories, the essence of which consists
in the low contentfulness (and, consequently, in the untruthfulness) of the
contents of their forms, which one way or another, sooner or later will be
refuted and rejected by the principle of self-development, indicating the
objective movement-striving to the highest contentfulness (and hence, also
to the truthfulness) of all without exception the developing forms. The sooner
man realizes this, the farther from the edge of the abyss (i.e., from the
threat of the disappearance of humanity as a definite level-form of reality) he
will (re)move.
Thus, the truthfulness of any form is determined by its contentfulness; the
most truthful are the forms possessing the highest contentfulness.
Proceeding from this, the criterion of the truthfulness of the forms is served
by their contentfulness, whereas practice or in the broader sense
interpretation β this is only the universal technology, procedure, or way of
the assessment of the fullness or the "quantity" of the contentfulness of the
investigated forms.
If one unites just what has been said into one phrase, then there will be
obtained such a more or less compact expression: the criterion of truth or of
the truthfulness of the investigated forms β this is the contentfulness of
these forms, the fullness or the "quantity" of which is established by the
possibility and admissibility of the substitution (at least mental) of the
contents of the investigated forms by the contents of as large as possible (in
the limit β infinite) a number of concrete and abstract forms with the
already established and confirmed truthfulness.
With respect to the determination of the criterion of the scientificity of
knowledge (i.e., of the objectivity of the content of the abstract forms of
knowledge) one can say the following.
The criterion of the scientificity of knowledge (or the criterion of the
objectivity of the content of the abstract forms of knowledge) β this is again
the contentfulness of these forms, the fullness or the "quantity" of which is
established by the possibility and admissibility of the substitution (at least
mental) of the contents of the abstract forms by the contents of a certain
conditionally-limited number of concrete and abstract forms with the already
established and confirmed truthfulness.
From the position of our approach the main functions of science β the
explanatory and the prognostic β can be approximately determined and
characterized in the following way.
Explanation β this is the interpretation (expression, substitution,
replacement) of the contents of the unknown, incomprehensible, unusual,
non-standard abstract forms (judgments, constructions, structures, theories,
conceptions, formulas, etc.) by the contents of the known concrete,
comprehensible, habitual, standard forms.
Forecasting β this is the anticipation of the formation, appearance, or
discovery of the new forms of reality (as well as the foretelling of the
direction of the changes of the existing its forms) with the help of and on the
basis of the "invented", generated, created, formulated generalized abstract
forms (judgments, theories, conceptions, hypotheses, constructions,
structures, formulas, etc.), the objectivity of the contents (i.e., the
contentfulness) of which either has already been established and confirmed,
or is in the stage of the assessment and confirmation by the technology of
interpretation.
The very important criteria of the scientificity of knowledge β the
reproducibility and repeatability of the results of the empirical investigations
β in the terms of our approach mean the admissibility of the multiple
interpretation (expression, substitution, replacement) with the identical result
of the contents of the investigated empirical forms by the contents of the
similar empirical forms, the truthfulness of which has already been
established and does not raise doubts.
The logic of the exposition of the research approach expounded here requires
also the corresponding interpretation and refinement of the term "adequacy"
from the position of our representations about the development and
cognition.
And again we "dance from the stove". The philosophical dictionaries
determine adequacy in the following way: "In the theory of cognition the
term 'adequate' serves for the designation of the correct reproduction in the
representations, notions, and judgments of the objective connections and
relations of actuality. In this sense truth is determined as the adequacy of
thinking to being" [19, p. 13].
By this definition we are again attempted to be convinced of the correctness
of the comparison of the incomparable and the comparison of the
incomparable. Contrary to the cited definition, adequacy has no direct
relation to being, just as truth has no direct relation to objectness (as has
been indicated above). The adequacy of thinking in the given case means the
high contentfulness of the forms-products of this very thinking, which has
already passed the assessment or test by interpretation, as a result of which
the mentioned forms-products are recognized as true.
Thereby the term adequate designates and characterizes the content of the
true form of thinking, maximally corresponding (i.e., successive and
continuing by itself) to the objective content of the form of thingness (or
to the objective content of being), mediated by the form of sensations.
And truth, as has been determined earlier, β this is the form (but the form
as the aggregate of the forms of thingness, sensations, and thinking),
fulfilled with the highest (objective) contentfulness.
And the one and the other β deeply interconnected notions. The inadequate
thinking, operating with the content of the untrue forms, is punished by
"non-being" ahead of time and prematurely.
The adequate notion, the adequate image, the adequate representation, the
adequate theory, the adequate doctrine, etc. β this is all about the objective
content of the diverse true abstract forms-products of thinking.
As we see, the term "adequate" is applicable only for the assessment,
designation, and statement of the fullness of the contentfulness of the
uppermost layer or the summit of the pyramid (i.e., of the human
consciousness), in the foundation of which lie the more primitive materialthing and plant-animal levels; at the same time, one should clearly realize
that without the linkage and interengagement with these more "down-toearth" fundamental levels that "summit" level of the human consciousness
simply does not exist.
The adequate thinking β this is the thinking operating with the content of
the true forms (the most contentful abstract constructions and structures),
tested for the fullness of contentfulness by the procedure (technology) of
interpretation. The latter means that the highest contentfulness (and hence,
also the truthfulness) of such forms has already been confirmed and certified
by the numerous concrete examples and factual material (including the
abstract forms tested and approved for the use).
The inadequacy of thinking is punished by the premature (early) termination
of the development of the form of man and humanity (by the retardation of
development, the "tearing apart" of the form into parts, the absorption and
assimilation by the competitors). One of the signs of the inadequacy of the
thinking of the modern man is the neglect of dialectics.
The regress of a form β this is already the indicator that it is "torn apart",
both from within and from without, into parts by the other, more active
levels. The form that has stopped in its development is "picked up" by the
neighboring levels, assimilated (wholly or in parts) and acquires thereby a
new impulse for its own further development.
Integrally, harmoniously, capably, effectively, actually, and truly is that
which is filled with objective content, which is the most contentful at the
given moment and under the given circumstances.
The continuity of the forms presupposes the smooth docking, the smooth
ingrowing, the smooth transition from the contents of the forms of the thingpractical level to the contents of the forms-products of the level of thinking
(which are the abstract representations and images).
However, the determining here all the same, in the final account, turns out to
be the objective content of the thing-practical activity, i.e., the contents of
the forms of the thing level (mediated by the forms of sensations), since they
are more fundamental in the multilevel structures of the forms of man and
humanity.
The abstract forms-products of the subjective thinking (i.e., knowledge in the
form of representations, images, notions, theories, doctrines, etc.) and the
more concrete forms preceding them are capable of being built and are built
into the non-contradictory-successive sequence or chain of forms only then,
when they are endowed with objective content, when they are united by the
common component, which is the objective content of the developing reality.
In the indicated sense the objective content of the developing reality β this
is the identity to the infinite movement to the exhaustive expression of the
content of reality by the developing forms of this very same reality.
In its turn, the highest contentfulness of knowledge and of its forms (i.e., the
filledness of the abstract forms with objective content) and, correspondingly,
the adequacy of the perception of reality (the approximate, but as complete
as possible coincidence or correspondence of the contents of the abstract
forms of thinking and of the forms of sensations) ensure the success of the
human activity and serve as the condition of the survival and stable
development of humanity.
In the modern literature (and all the more in the publications of the past) the
notion of adequacy is very weakly, or more precisely, practically in no way
tied up with the contentfulness of the forms. Meanwhile the solution of the
task of the establishment and detailing of such a connection will inevitably
lead to the numerous discoveries in the field of medicine, biology,
cybernetics, and other spheres of the scientific activity. With respect to man
the contentfulness in the face of such manifestations of the organism as
health, longevity, adaptation abilities and possibilities, resource, intellect,
etc., must be investigated in the closest interconnection with the adequacy of
the thinking, perception, behavior of man (and of the other higher
representatives of the animal world), if the researcher is set on the obtaining
of the original (breakthrough) results in the course of his investigations.
Β§ 17. The truth about lies
The present section is devoted to the illustration of the material set forth
above by some concrete examples and considerations.
As has already been noted in Β§ 3, the modern mass media, controlled by the
collective West, are devoid of doubts as to the "exceptional" justice of their
endless attempts to attain unseemly goals by deliberate injections of false
information, by force pressure, and by the manipulation of the consciousness
of the man in the street, and by all possible means to push through the
superiority of their own contentfulness, i.e., of their own "unsurpassed"
understanding of truth or verity, mixed with false premises and foundations.
In confirmation of what has been said let us cite the frankly cynical opinion
on this score (in an article with the derisive title "The Rabies of Russia") of
one of the modern propagandists of such opinions, who has "settled" on the
screens of Russian TV:
"... Recently we saw the manifestation of the American 'right of the strong' in
all its glory β the murder of the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani.
... Yes, such an application of the 'right of the strong' is outrageous,
dishonest, and often unlawful. ... But the fact remains a fact: the 'right of the
strong' is an inevitable, even natural, I would say, part of world politics.
Whether anyone likes it or not, one must accept such a phenomenon as a
given. Similar to the Darwinian natural selection, the 'international order' has
existed from time immemorial, and so it will always be to one degree or
another. The right of the strong β this is one of the most vivid and harsh
manifestations of 'realpolitik'" [1].
From time immemorial the Anglo-Saxon world has been consistent in its
main goals β to impose its own scenario of the development of events
contrary to their objective course and adequate perception. The AngloSaxons are obsessed with the belief that by a simple "wishing", by pressing,
by the inculcation of a certain oversimplification (i.e., by the refusal to take
into account the multitude of interacting factors) one can artificially break the
naturally developing contentful process. By their standards, the thing-objectmaterial in its monetary expression will always prevail and overcome
everything else.
For the assessment of the weight and authority of the position occupied in
the cited article one must answer a simple question: is the contentfulness of
the theory of "social Darwinism" high at the present stage of development?
Undoubtedly, something "long-playing" remains from this theory to this very
day (man, for example, will never fully free himself from the animal principle
present in him, if only because he has "come out" of this principle). At the
same time, any schoolboy today knows that "wild" nature is represented by
only a narrow stratum, an intermediate level in the universal human nature,
alongside a whole series of newly superstructured levels, based on the taking
into account of such qualities of the developed man as his dignity, readiness
for cooperation and mutual aid, humanism, etc. Undoubtedly, the level of
"wildness" is also represented in the linkage of all the other levels of the
multilevel structure of man and at times tramples under itself the less
aggressive by their nature "intellectual" ("herbivorous") levels, but it is also
beyond doubt that its specific weight in the general aggregate of levels at the
present stage of development is considerably smaller than in the epoch of
Ch. Darwin. And to reduce the whole objective contentfulness of the existing
linkage-aggregate of levels in the general structure of the modern man and
his thinking to this separate, very "down-to-earth" ("carnivorous") level β
this is a simple-minded delusion or a deliberate lie.
The justice of this point of view is confirmed by the centuries-old wisdom of
our people (or by the somewhat paraphrased saying of Alexander Nevsky):
not in force is god (victory, success, perspective, goal, etc.), but in truth, in
verity ...
But to the above-named cohort of people with colonial thinking this cannot
be explained. The speech is about people not simply of another discourse and
not even of another civilizational order, but about "offspring" and exponents
of another (opposite) principle of reality, with whom to speak about the
priority of harmony or of the objectively existing tendency to the
achievement of a certain balance of the constituents-levels in the multilevel
human nature is so far meaningless. They are convinced that the
hypertrophied technological constituent in their state structure guarantees
them complete success and victory over the whole world. What nonsense! On
this soil they absolutize their significance and greatness; in reality, however,
they are sick with their imaginary exclusivity and see nothing further than
their own nose. All the more problematic for themselves. The low-contentful
(primitive) consciousness has a chance never to reach the critically necessary
level and to turn out to be a dead-end branch of the development of
humanity: gentlemen Neanderthals, where are you? Hello!
Fortunately or unfortunately, but the objective truth exists; at any given
moment it is one (out of the multitude of similar approximations to the
absolute truth), and ever more insistently the requirement to determine
oneself with this question "in an adult way" shows through. The neglect of
the objective truth is fraught with the loss of humanity as a species or as one
of the levels of reality; at stake is the fate of humanity, no more and no less.
The main stake of today's "masters of life" and of the mass media subject to
them β on the low "down-to-earth" instincts of man, i.e., on his
"dehumanization": the accent is made on the stimulation and increase of the
contentfulness of only the most primitive forms-levels (in the composition of
the whole aggregate of the levels-constituents of the modern man), and, in
particular, of the simplest forms of sensations and behavioral reactions of the
animal level. The artless content of the indicated forms is "sewn" into the
brain of man by repeated hammering as axioms (the so-called unproved
truths). The main mass of undemanding philistine minds, by virtue of their
ignorance, "falls for" the cheap installation and propaganda of following the
imposed way and mode of life. The capitalist world, saturated through and
through with lies, hypocrisy, double standards, simply does not know how to
live otherwise (i.e., without taking "cream" under cover). And as for the
mass media, they always take the position of the one from whose hands they
are fed, which by no means testifies in favor of their independence; the mass
media are still "party", as they were a hundred and two hundred years ago.
The question of the purification of today's mass media from the filth of lies
and half-truths is not solvable, apparently, outside the clarification of the
personal positions of the representatives of these mass media. This question
must be posed approximately in this way: will you be able, are you
vouchsafed personally, as a subject form (as a journalist, correspondent,
commentator, political scientist, etc.), to be a form-carrier and continuer of
the developing objective content in opposition to the "fake", lying, venal
subject forms that are present and rooted here today? Of course, this
question makes sense only in conjunction with the solution of the problem of
the proper upbringing of young cadres. Journalistic cadres, like medical ones,
must be brought to an oath or a certain vow, proceeding from the
understanding β of how serious a weapon against humanity the
propagandized lies and inadequacy of thinking can be.
The collective West, in the person of the overseas "hegemon" and its
henchmen, has in fact already "played out" to the conviction that no
objective content, no truth or verity exists in principle; everything is
exhausted by general validity and by what can be imposed on the
undemanding majority by the manipulation of human consciousness and by
frankly force pressure. The manipulation of the consciousness of man β this
is a crime against the person and against humanity. And the deliberate lie,
and the sincere delusion, and all the more the manipulation of consciousness
β are equally ruinous for the fates of humanity.
The Western mass media seriously discuss the question of the onset of the
epoch of the so-called "post-truth". The "post-truth" of an infinite number of
subjective opinions and utterances (fictions, hardly distinguishable from
truth; unfounded assertions, "appointed" to be truth; retold rumors and idle
conjectures) must be urgently refuted by the proof of the absence of a stable
direct and reverse connection, of succession and conjugacy of the contents of
the injected subjective abstract forms with the objective content of the thing
reality, of concrete facts, of reliably verified abstract logical forms with
confirmed truthfulness.
One cannot arbitrarily and unceremoniously deal with truth (with verity), and
not because it is punishable by a certain "supreme deity" or "providence",
but because the world is arranged dialectically. The return to the initially
rejected forms of greater contentfulness will take place sooner or later, and
all the false, momentarily advantageous orientations together with their
propagandists and customers will be rejected and overthrown. Such is the
dialectical nature of the world, implying the inevitable return to itself, but
every time at a more and more contentful (genuine, true, actual) level. The
universal principle of self-development "governs" everything and everyone,
manages all processes without exception, and so simply, on any crooked
goat, it can no longer be bypassed. Everyone is free to choose himself β to
accept this principle and follow it in life, or to deny and ignore it with the
inevitable consequences for himself.
The real state of affairs is such that, by virtue of this very dialectical nature
of the surrounding world, everything sooner or later has the habit of
returning "to the starting point", but not in its former form, but in other,
more weighty and more contentful forms. In case of non-understanding or
ignoring of such a layout, or in case of unskillful and imprudent dealing with
the mentioned renewed forms β the impacts, and even the blows of these
"weighted" returning forms may fall not where it is below the belt, but where
it is above the neck.
The growing contentlessness of the collective West will ruin it. And this will
happen not by reason of God's punishment, God's providence, or the
execution of a certain "law of karma", but because the exhausting
contentfulness of their main everyday forms (of the way of life), based on
human vices, provokes the absorption of these forms by considerably more
contentful stable forms. Too many empty (low-contentful) form-formations at
all levels have been generated by their mercantile aim and rampant
individualism (sham post-industrial "economies"; the unsecuredness of the
Fed currency; lying mass media; fruitless same-sex marriages; pretentious
idle celebrations; the perverted "post-truth" "appointed as truth";
ostentatious values;
pharisaical juvenile
justice;
the hypocritical
multiculturalism, tolerance, political correctness that appeared out of
nowhere, etc.). When a society (or a state) pursues low-contentful goals,
then it is absorbed by more contentful and balanced social arrangements.
The form-formations enumerated above (in parentheses) belong to abstract
constructions and structures, invented by an extremely subjectivized
consciousness and erected on shaky (false) unnatural foundations. These
constructions and structures, generated by the subjective imagination in the
minds of a few individuals, do not belong to the number of those tested by
time and confirmed by customs and traditions, but have in their arsenal only
a limited number of more or less successfully realized examples. Here we
directly encounter the manifestation of voluntarism, with the arbitrary
absolutization of the subjective component in the known systemic relation
{subjective/objective}, which is fraught with the violation of the balance or
equilibrium of the whole relation as a whole. Too small a volume of factual
material is at the disposal of man to verify and confirm the truthfulness of
the abstract constructions of the indicated type and to admit them then as
new foundations for mass application by humanity. Without a thorough
assessment of the contentfulness of the fruits of the inflamed brain and
unbridled fantasies by the procedures of practice and interpretation, the
truthfulness of these forms, to put it mildly, raises doubts, and the stubborn
universal inculcation β is certainly dangerous.
In every relation similar to the relation {change/basis}, a typical
representative of which is also the relation {subjective/objective} examined
by us, there is present a definite correlation of the components "change" and
"basis" in their relation, guaranteeing the stability and steady development of
the relation itself as a whole at one or another stage of the development of
reality. The finding of such a correlation of the components-constituents in
the indicated relations, corresponding to a certain averaged balanced value,
determined and conditioned by every given stage of the development of
reality, always has been and will be the most important priority task standing
both before individual subjects and before their communities.
As soon as the immature subjective thinking begins to ignore its connection
with the "down-to-earth" levels of the basis, so it goes into an extreme, into
a one-sidedness, into the absolutization of this one-sidedness. Thinking
speculatively and practically boundlessly can manipulate everything
whatsoever, which it does, and obtains any "results", and achieves
"outstanding" successes. But much of these "achievements" is acquired at
the price of the loss of the adequacy of the representations about reality. And
in this case the individual or community, recklessly and "crazy-headedly"
using the huge potential of thinking (characterized by the high intensity of
content-form transformations), fall into a trap.
Quite in the spirit of the Anglo-Saxon subjectivized tradition β by force to
drive into "paradise" and to "cultivate" (civilize, democratize, etc.) all the
disagreeing and resisting. Such, from time to time repeated, neglect of the
objectively taking-shape situation will inevitably return to the Anglo-Saxons
as a boomerang of punishments for their new generations, which will have to
"reverse gear", paying for the inadequacy and low-contentfulness of their
ancestors. Unfortunately, the majority (and, first of all, the youth) does not
see this yet, naively believing that the technocratic policy and technological
"advancement" will automatically ensure primacy and advantage in all
spheres of human activity. In reality, however, the ugly one-sidedness or
imbalance in the development of different sides-constituents of individual
civilizations leads the latter to degeneration into their opposite and to
inevitable collapse. [As a result of the excessive rocking or loss of
equilibrium, the "ship of civilization", speaking figuratively, capsizes upside
down, i.e., the situation turns into its opposite: in the place where man was
(the so-called crown of nature, according to the very widespread opinion
nowadays), there turns out to be a bottom soaked with tar, and the crown of
nature is swallowed by the abyss, i.e., returns into the wild (thing) nature
and is assimilated by it.]
After all, what mainly distinguishes the modern Western ideology from the
Eastern one (in particular, within the framework of the antagonism USA vs
Russia)? These are different representations about the necessary and
sufficient correlation of the components in the relation {change/basis} (or in
the most general relation {content/form}). The Western world makes the
accent on the prevalence of the constituent of change (transcendent
enterprise, infinite freedom, unlimited individualism and egoism, etc.),
whereas the East gives preference to the component of the basis β stability,
experience, common sense, justified conservatism, collectivism. And already
from here, on the part of the West, follows the neglect of morality, ethics,
humanism. Here two different approaches meet and compete, relying on
different specific weights (including in digital expression) of the abovementioned components-constituents in their inseparable integrity. For the
finding of the balance or the golden mean between the indicated
components, of course, both a reserve of patience and an ever more
meaningful loyalty of the West and the East with respect to each other are
needed. However, no less significant is also the understanding that at times
it is simply necessary to actively counteract aggression (both in the air, and
at sea, and on land, and, especially, in space). In the trenches, alternately
turning the cheeks for blows, one cannot sit out. One should more boldly and
energetically bloc with like-minded people and by collective efforts control
the balance of the system {West/East}. In particular, all the "iron" of opaque
and doubtful purpose, launched into space by the "hegemon", must find its
rest at the bottom of the world ocean.
There must be no illusions; one cannot fail to see that in this case the West
represents not so much an active as an aggressive component of the relation
{change/basis}, opposing the moderately-active component of the East. The
West is "commanded" by a quite different principle of reality than the East,
and the full compatibility or coincidence of both principles is not achievable in
principle. That is why the unsafe algorithms "swarming" in the heads of the
collective West must be neutralized at the earliest stages. The known
inadequacy of a monkey with a grenade can lead to the collapse of the whole
system {West/East} and to the departure "into non-being" of such a formlevel of reality as humanity. It goes without saying that the development of
reality and the natural universal course of events under the "control" of the
principle of self-development cannot be stopped by this single act β simply a
separate link in the general chain of development will be transformed into a
new form, which will continue its contentful movement at a new level, but
already without man. However, to man himself his fate, perhaps, is not so
indifferent.
The procedure of finding the balance of the above-mentioned componentsconstituents is complicated also by the fact that the components are subject
to the permanent influence of numerous external and internal factors (i.e., of
the same components of other relations), which makes them very mobile
within the framework of a single relation and, in its turn, leads to the
sporadic variability of the relation itself as a whole.
Changes without a basis (i.e., the denial and reduction to a minimum of the
significance and role of the basis) in the known relation {change/basis} β
this is absurd. The basis directs the changes, preserves them in the form of
layers and thereby sets the vector of the subsequent changes (i.e., of
development). The changes that become isolated and "tear away" from the
basis liquidate the relation as a whole as such, since something, being
deprived of the basis and "not remembering kinship", is transformed into its
opposite. The vector of development is to a considerable degree determined
by the basis, i.e., by the past, by the "lived-through", by the preceding
accumulations.
The role of Russia as the main stabilizing component or counterbalance in the
system {West/East}, threatening at times to go to pieces, β is indisputable.
True, the most effectively this counterbalance will function only on the basis
of the renewed social structure with the socialist order, which, undoubtedly,
is our national priority and pride for centuries.
The absence (especially among politicians) of adherence to such, for
example, qualities of man and indicators of the developed harmonious
society as honor, conscience, decency, morality, ethics, philanthropy, mutual
respect β is a direct path "into non-being" for those human communities
which refuse such humanistic acquisitions, ideals, and convictions.
The inadequate behavior of the majority of individuals (of society), as a
reaction to the movement into nowhere, "sanctified" by contentless goals, is
punished by "non-being", i.e., by the absorption and assimilation of the lowcontentful forms by the healthy adequate forms. Russia, with its considerably
more adequate than that of the collective West representations about reality,
has every chance for leadership with a humanistic orientation, provided that
a way is found to transform the ugly and defective capitalist forms imposed
on it into other harmonious forms of development.
As time and the course of the developing events show, the subjective, it
would seem, question of the justice of the social structure [Roman law, for
example, refers the notion of justice to the subjective categories] turns out
to be a question not at all subjective, but exclusively objective. Taking into
account the striving and craving for justice originally inherent in our people,
the following ideological scheme or chain of contentful transformations has
quite matured for embodiment at a new level: truth (verity) => justice
=>law =>equality => (social) equilibrium =>balance =>harmony ... Any
human community or civilization in one way or another (explicitly and
implicitly) strives for the realization of such a chain, conditioned by the
dialectical nature of the surrounding world. In reality β this is a
question of life and death for all the human communities presently existing.
It is worth, perhaps, to dwell separately on the role and significance of
modern advertising.
Today's aggressive advertising on TV β this is, as a rule, well-paid lie and
deliberately distorted representation of the true state of affairs. In the
language of advertising, from the tenderest nails, a signal is sent to man:
one can lie a lot and with impunity, from a high tribune and to a multi-million
audience. Advertising almost always peremptorily hypertrophies the limited
positive and advantage of the goods, services, and all sorts of "brands",
hiding in the backyard their negative features and shortcomings. In this
consists its lie, by this it perniciously influences the unformed young minds.
The lying advertising from morning till evening teaches the youth also to
treat easily and undemandingly their own unfulfilled promises and empty
assurances.
Advertising must be removed from TV unambiguously. The most "creative"
liars cry out that without advertising there will be no TV. They lie,
shamelessly lie, for the principles of the functioning of TV are deliberately
distorted and disfigured by the dealers from TV. Those lie who have a
relation to the huge money that revolves in this backstage and that can be
uncontrollably stuffed into pockets. In the conditions of the social character
of production and the private-capitalist mode of appropriation, the throwing
of dust in the eyes of the respectable public β is an inalienable element of all
television shows and attractions. When the matter concerns the distribution
and appropriation of the product worked out under capitalism, everyone
must immediately forget about the transparency of these procedures β
otherwise by no forces will it be possible to gather on relatively tiny patches
the transcendent number of crooks and other odious individuals.
Meanwhile, the way around these "naturally" organized difficulties is quite
well-known and artless β to create an accumulation fund, public
consumption funds and to feed with them the vital and demanded directions,
and not only on TV; this is, perhaps, so far the most effective and tested way
of the development of human initiatives in the conditions of the coming
socialist order.
Let us touch upon the background of the origin and rooting of false premises.
A lie β this is also a certain contentful form, but with an extremely low
degree of objective contentfulness, i.e., a form of a very distant (rough)
approximation to the expression of the objective content of reality (a lowcontentful, and therefore untruthful form).
A shameless lie β this is a factual refusal of the moral-ethical norms and
categories in favor of a temporary, momentary, as a rule, material gain (with
its single measure β the volume of the money supply). To such a choice is
brought by the cultivation of the vividly expressed individualism in opposition
to collectivism and the priority of public interests.
The inability and unwillingness to distinguish the inessential or little-essential
from the essential, firstly, and the arbitrary absolutization of this little-
essential to the detriment of the essential, secondly, β is akin to an
impudent shameless lie. Using such a device one can for a long time
effectively make mountains out of molehills, deliberately belittling the
contentfulness of the essential forms. The conscious belittling of the essential
and the exaltation of the inessential is equivalent to the mixing of lie with
half-truth, and therefore this is the most refined, vile, and disgusting variety
of lie. However, sooner or later the natural installation on the growth of the
contentfulness of the forms will take its toll and will arrange the forms in
their places according to the level of their contentfulness.
Every lie β this is a deliberate attempt to lead aside and to evade the
adequate thinking.
When we are tried to be convinced that black is white, referring to the
truthfulness of the generally valid (i.e., to the opinion of a certain "little
collective" that has gathered under its banners a limited number of
individuals), then these propagandists of the generally valid to the detriment
of the objective must bear in mind that the answer for the imposition of a
failed opinion may, as it may turn out, have to be held not before the
hoodwinked "little collective", but before the deceived humanity.
Virtual reality β this is a lie based on the unsupported and unconfirmed by
the content of concrete forms admissibility of the prevalence of the
subjective constituent in the relation {subjective/objective} to the detriment
of the objective constituent. The modern cinematography of the "overseas"
Hollywood type (which has splendidly mastered the "Solzhenitsyn" motives
and devices of inflating the less essential to scales surpassing everything
essential) is saturated with fictions, tricks, and special effects, hindering the
adequate perception of reality. The indulgence of the "overseas" inadequacy
again is fraught with consequences for the whole world.
In the final account, this is the right of every individual to choose β in which
direction and to what extent one should shift the dividing line in the relation
{subjective/objective}, but, fortunately, the criterion of the correctness and
admissibility of such "shifts" nevertheless exists; this is the adequacy of the
content of thinking to the content of being. In the case of the absolutization
of the component "subjective", the harmless, at first glance, inadequacy of
thinking and of the formed representations about reality can lead to serious
consequences. The above-mentioned "little collective" or a certain limited
community and its collective consciousness is capable of existing in the
"fake" regime of the inadequate perception of reality only for a very limited
time as well, but even in a short period it can create a global threat to the
survival of humanity as a whole, and even destroy it ...
Let us cite a somewhat hyperbolized and therefore quite obvious for
comprehension example. Suppose, from the apartment of the seventh floor
there are two exits outside: through the door and through the window.
Everyone knows that one can go out both through the door and through the
window, but the overwhelming majority habitually uses the door, since it
knows that the exit through the window is fraught with grave consequences.
And nevertheless there are separate individuals who, following obsessive
ideas, leave the apartment through the window, and for one reason or
another their number will never be reduced to zero. The realization of such
an alternative possibility on the scale of the whole humanity would threaten
the disappearance of humanity as a species. The loss of the adequacy of the
representations about reality in this case could turn out to be critical and be
expressed in the loss of humanity as a definite level of reality. The speech
here is precisely about such a "can" which "cannot" from the point of view of
the adequately thinking man (and of humanity as a whole). [Deliberately
exaggerated examples sometimes help to feel the real danger of flirting with
inadequacy].
Another example. The Ptolemaic picture of the world proceeded from the
primacy of the geocentric representations. Was this inadequacy of
representations critical for those times? Probably, no. But with time, little by
little, it became such. In any case, no accuracy of the calculation of the
trajectory of the flight of space vehicles on the basis of the Ptolemaic model
(because of the transcendent cumbersomeness and error of the calculations)
could be out of the question today.
Thinking easily shifts the boundary in the relation {subjective/objective} in
the direction of the prevalence of the subjective (for itself, as for the most
abstracted level of reality, this is not critical), but at the same time it can, to
the detriment of adequacy, provoke the "exit" of the values of the whole
relation beyond the limits of the range admissible by this definite stage of
development. In other words, for "proper" thinking some inadequate
preferences and unbridled internal activity (while they are localized in the
head, without exit outside) can remain and without consequences, but for
the whole linkage-aggregate of the levels of man (dwelling in the thing world
and including in itself the form of thingness, the form of sensations, and the
form of thinking) β the arbitrary choice of thinking with the subsequent exit
of the inadequate reactions outside can turn out to be critical, which is shown
by the examples cited above.
A lie is often dictated by the striving to adapt to the external conditions and
influences in the name of the survival and prosperity of some separate formlevel in isolation from the remaining levels of the general aggregate in the
composition of the structure of man (say, the exaltation of the flesh and
material acquisitions to the detriment or bypass of morality and ethics). At
the same time, at the mental level there "reigns" a factual "dual power"
(split): something more formal collides with something more contentful. As a
result, a conflict arises: the contentful constituent "supervises", as a rule,
directly the straightforward, artless path of the achievement of the goal; the
formal constituent, however, for the sake of the achievement of the goal, as
it seems, by a more sure-fire path, is ready to go roundabout, i.e., to lie.
Truth and lie β forms of deliberately different degrees of approximation to
the expression of the fullness of the moving (objective) content. By virtue of
the perniciousness of the influence of even the smallest public "fakes" and
fictions on the minds and consciousness of people, one must fight against lie
harshly, resolutely, and mercilessly β to suppress, not leaving without
attention a single serious attempt of the rooting of falsity. When the question
arises about the survival of humanity or of its separate communities, the
orientation to the inadequate thinking, false premises, and "values" not
approved by life is categorically inadmissible.
In order not to find oneself on the sidelines of development, the
contentfulness of all without exception forms (ideas, perspective plans,
projects, programs, directions, etc.) planned on the state scale for
development and embodiment must be analyzed and ranked at the state and
public levels in a permanent and uninterrupted regime.
However, not only mean, petty, or mercenary motives and goals are the
background of the fake injections and the spread of lies. Their "feasible"
contribution of confusion to the public life is made by the humanitarians,
who, by virtue of their professional orientation to the world of people and the
sphere of psychology, live in isolation from the physical world and are easily
intoxicated by the ruling "top", poorly imagining how bread grows, steel is
boiled, and energy is released at the fission of the uranium nucleus. The
widening illiteracy in the questions of natural science β also one of the
causes of the false representations about the world, of the spread and
tenacity of myths.
The unprincipledness of the position and the absence of firm convictions
among the statesmen and ordinary citizens in a similar way is akin to the
renunciation of truth and the patronage of lie.
The "comprador guts" of the powers that be and of the so-called business β
again from the same series.
The very widespread opinion on that score that the market allegedly will put
everything in its places, both in the sphere of production and consumption,
β also a lie or at least a dense delusion. If already by chance, unexpectedly
(well, they overlooked, "missed", with whom it does not happen!) there
arose man with his thinking (and, correspondingly, everything connected
with him, the so-called "artificial"), then, most likely, he in one way or
another consciously and unconsciously will interfere and in the nature of all
things (or this is already generally beyond the limits of understanding?).
Getting burned and making mistakes and learning on them, man will
constantly correct both his own life and the influence of the external
environment β another path of development, except for the "making of
oneself from oneself", simply does not exist. For this reason both the state
planning, and the state support, and the state regulation in various fields of
production and consumption are quite regular and will certainly be present as
a consequence of the vision of the processes of development by the eyes of
the subject (the initiator of everything "artificial"). Another matter is that
with all this the question remains as before topical, which also no one is able
to cancel and which the subjective consciousness will have to solve
permanently in the name of the provision of the steady contentful
development β the finding of the optimal correlation or balance of the
mutually complementary components of the "invisible hand of the market"
and the "state regulation" (i.e., the balance or optimal correlation of the
artificial and the natural).
And, finally, one cannot fail to see today how destructive a weapon (a
weapon of mass destruction) the information pandemic can turn out to be
and how important it is to be able to verify and establish the truthfulness of
the information injections. In such a connection, the significance and role of
the technology of interpretation (in solving the problem of the establishment
of truth) as a means of counteracting the threat of the infliction on humanity
of all kinds of damage of a global scale by means of cunningly planned
information attacks increase immeasurably.
Unfortunately, we do not have the possibility to develop this theme further
here.
Everywhere, at all levels of the development of reality, between all its forms
of all levels without exception there takes place a harsh competitive struggle
for the possession of the highest contentfulness or the struggle for the
contentful resource, which turns out to be a direct consequence of the
universality of the principle of self-development. The striving to the
expression of truth and verity, determined by this same principle, is originally
inherent, including, in the very "mechanism" of human thinking
(consciousness). And if today a certain lie is considered an ordinary and
habitual matter and is accepted "with a bang" by undemanding collectives
and communities, then tomorrow there will certainly be found a subject (or
subjects) who, obeying the immanent principle of self-development present
in him, will "dig up" the truth about this falsity, and all the constructions
erected on lying premises will collapse in an instant, and even with the
attendant consequences for those who erected the lie on a pedestal.
Moreover, such a scenario is realized by no means by reason of the
intervention of "higher forces", but under the "pressure" of the objectively
everywhere present universal, unconditional, blind, and relative principle of
self-development with its "installations" on the possession of the maximally
achievable contentfulness by all forms-levels of the changing reality.
Conclusions
The above set forth we consider a sufficient basis for the following
conclusions.
1. The objective reality represents the movement and change of its forms in
the direction of the possession by the mentioned forms of the highest
contentfulness. The cognitive process can be more effective if the
development of reality is examined from the position of the content-form
transformations of unitary directionality.
2. The human consciousness (thinking) β this is the most abstracted (of the
reliably known today) form of the representation of the content of reality,
continuing by itself the series of the preceding forms, such as the form of
thingness and the form of sensations. Getting rid of the representations
about consciousness as an "reflection" or "copy" of reality, human thinking
acquires the possibility to see the development of reality as a single
("through") movement of its content by means of ever more abstracting
contentful forms; thereby the artificial gnoseological barrier is eliminated,
erected by the human consciousness itself on the path of the cognition of the
contentfully infinite (multilevel) movement of reality.
3. The genuine criterion of truth or of the truthfulness of the forms of
the developing reality is established. The truthfulness of this or that
form of reality is determined by the fullness or the "quantity" of its
contentfulness. Hence, the criterion of the truthfulness of the forms
of reality is served by their contentfulness.
4. The above-mentioned criterion makes it possible to quantitatively assess
the contentfulness of the forms of reality, which gives the possibility to
arrange them by rank and thereby more precisely and more meaningfully
determine the direction of the perspective investigations.
5. Practice is not the criterion of truth, but serves as a procedure
(technology, way) of the assessment of the fullness or the "quantity" of the
contentfulness of all sorts of forms of reality. In the indicated sense practice
represents a particular case of the more general technology, named
interpretation.
6. The essence of the process of cognition is reduced to the fact that
everything investigated and uncognized is assessed, verified, and expressed
through the available and existing, the truthfulness of which has already
been established and verified by time.
7. There do not exist two or more equally contentful truths (ideas,
representations, assertions, theories, conceptions, models, opinions, points
of view, etc.) with respect to one and the same investigated question or
subject of judgment, just as there cannot be in principle two or more
equivalent approximations to the objective truth or to the absolute truth. At
any given moment of development among the forms of different
approximations there exists only one form, the most approximated to the
form of the objective (absolute) contentfulness. This is precisely the form on
which one should orient oneself as on the true one.
References
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https://subscribe.ru/digest/economics/news/n272917707.html
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[Text]. β St. Petersburg: Super Publishing House, 2016. β 68 p.
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ARTICLE 3
The Universal Criterion of Truth
Abstract
The cornerstone of the epistemology of any philosophical system or doctrine
is the question of truth.
Based on the analysis of the work of Vladimir I. Lenin "Materialism and
Empiriocriticism", it is shown that the criterion of truth or of the truthfulness
of the forms of developing reality is not practice, erroneously considered as
such to this day, but the contentfulness (substantive richness, pithiness) of
these forms; practice, in its turn, is a method or procedure of evaluating the
fullness or the "quantity" of the contentfulness of the forms of reality.
Moreover, practice represents only a particular case of a more developed
technology of establishing the truth β interpretation.
The criterion of truth put forward in the present article makes it possible to
evaluate quantitatively the significance of the forms of reality, which, in its
turn, gives the possibility to rank the forms and, on this basis, to outline
more meaningfully the directions of promising investigations.
In the same connection it is noted that there do not exist two or more
equally contentful truths (ideas, representations, statements, theories,
concepts, models, opinions, points of view, etc.) with respect to one and the
same investigated question or subject of judgment, just as there cannot in
principle exist two or more equivalent approximations to objective truth
(absolute truth). At every given moment of development, the truth in the
indicated sense is always one.
In addition, it is shown that the concept of "reflection" ("copy", "mapping") of
reality, used by dialectical materialism and other philosophical doctrines for
the description of the principle of the functioning of human thinking or
consciousness, serves as a limitation or barrier on the path of understanding
the essence of the processes of development and cognition of reality;
objective reality represents the movement and change of forms in the
direction of the possession of the highest contentfulness (i.e., of the
maximally achievable content), and all processes of development and
cognition of reality are to be studied and considered through the prism of
content-form
transitions,
conversions,
transformations
of
unitary
directionality.
Β§ 1. Questions of the theory of cognition
In October 1908, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin finished, on the whole, the work on
the book "Materialism and Empiriocriticism". A good half of this work is
devoted to the critical analysis of the theory of cognition of empiriocriticism
(a subjectively idealistic trend in philosophy, fashionable at the beginning of
the XX century) and to the exposition of views on the same questions of the
theory of cognition from the position of dialectical materialism (for brevity:
diamat) [11].
Beginning with antiquity and up to the present time, the "central category" of
the theory of cognition and the "most important, irreplaceable concept of
science" is considered to be the category of truth [4, p. 6].
The ancient dispute of philosophers concerning the cognizability of the world
and the truthfulness of the knowledge obtained, extracted, acquired, it would
seem, was resolved there, in this Lenin's work, in general outline in favor of
the point of view of the Marxists, to whose number the author himself
belonged [19, p. 352β353]. And nevertheless, again and again generations
of investigators of the surrounding world come, who do not tire of "stepping
on the same rake" and continue to fill their own bumps at the price of their
own delusions.
Thus, the long-standing philosophical dispute does not subside to this day,
and, in all probability, a more complete solution of the same problem, as
always, is impossible outside a fresh look at the established state of affairs
and without reliance on a worldview requiring periodic refinement.
With regard to the indicated considerations, the present work (article) is
called upon:
a) to show that the representations of diamat about truth in the main are
nevertheless more correct and stand closer to the truth than the
representations of other philosophical systems and doctrines;
b) and then, already on this basis, to develop and supplement somewhat the
representations of diamat.
The first question, actual at all times, considered by V.I. Lenin in his book on
behalf of dialectical materialism and in connection with the mentioned
analysis of the theory of cognition, is the question of the principled
cognizability of the surrounding world in the course of the acquisition of
knowledge about it.
The second question, following from the first, is the question of the criteria of
truthfulness, reliability, authenticity of the forms of the acquired knowledge.
The first question is resolved in the work of V.I. Lenin positively by the
recognition as real of a series (chain) of objective "contents" or the so-called
relative truths, represented by different cognitive forms, as well as by the
indication of the movement and change of these forms or relative truths in
the course of cognition in the direction of the achievement of absolute truth.
The positive solution of the second question is connected with the reasonable
(rational) sufficiency of the criterion of practice (as the criterion of truth),
which is "so 'indefinite' as not to allow man's knowledge to turn into an
'absolute', and at the same time so definite as to wage a merciless struggle
against all varieties of idealism and agnosticism" [11, p. 138].
Β§ 2. How diamat answers the questions of the theory of cognition
Let us dwell in more detail on how dialectical materialism answers the
questions about the possibility of cognition (i.e., of the cognizability) of the
surrounding world and about the evaluation of the truthfulness of the
acquired knowledge.
From the position of diamat there exists an external world or object,
containing in itself some objective content, on the one hand, and a subject
cognizing (sensing and realizing) this world, on the other hand. The fact that
the diverse forms of the surrounding world (objects, bodies, things,
processes, phenomena, etc.) are bearers of a certain objective content,
independent of the cognizing subject, raises no doubt from the point of view