Close several bypasses in the cross-domain guard and its crypto layer:
- Signer trust: add TrustStore (anchors, intermediates, CRLs, validity, CA flag,
key usage). A certificate from ds:KeyInfo is trusted only if it chains to a
configured anchor; the guard quarantines untrusted signers by default.
- Payload binding: signed sidecars carry a detached ds:Reference over the data
object's octets; a swapped payload is detected and quarantined.
- Stripped signatures: an unsigned object is never crypto-valid and no longer
satisfies require_signature.
- Signature wrapping: every evaluated MetadataBinding must be covered by a
valid signature; duplicate Ids make a reference ambiguous and invalid.
- Strict algorithms: allow-list for digest, signature, canonicalization and
transform algorithms, no SHA-256 fallback; signer honours the chosen
algorithm and curve size.
- Hostile input: hardened XML parser (no entities, DOCTYPE rejected), sidecar
DataReference URIs may not escape the s…