Safetensors
GGUF
qwen3
cybersecurity
agentic
red-team
blue-team
distillation
glm-5.2
kimi-k3
function-calling
tool-calling
tool-use
conversational
Instructions to use bebrws/security-8b with libraries, inference providers, notebooks, and local apps. Follow these links to get started.
- Notebooks
- Google Colab
- Kaggle
- Local Apps Settings
- llama.cpp
How to use bebrws/security-8b with llama.cpp:
Install (macOS, Linux)
curl -LsSf https://llama.app/install.sh | sh # Start a local OpenAI-compatible server with a web UI: llama serve -hf bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M # Run inference directly in the terminal: llama cli -hf bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M
Install from WinGet (Windows)
winget install llama.cpp # Start a local OpenAI-compatible server with a web UI: llama serve -hf bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M # Run inference directly in the terminal: llama cli -hf bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M
Build from source code
git clone https://github.com/ggml-org/llama.cpp.git cd llama.cpp cmake -B build cmake --build build -j --target llama-app # Start a local OpenAI-compatible server with a web UI: ./build/bin/llama serve -hf bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M # Run inference directly in the terminal: ./build/bin/llama cli -hf bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M
Use Docker
docker model run hf.co/bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M
- Llama new
- LM Studio
- Jan
- Ollama
How to use bebrws/security-8b with Ollama:
ollama run hf.co/bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M
- Unsloth Desktop
- Pi
How to use bebrws/security-8b with Pi:
Start the llama.cpp server
# Install llama.cpp: brew install llama.cpp # Start a local OpenAI-compatible server: llama serve -hf bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M
Configure the model in Pi
# Install Pi: npm install -g @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent # Add to ~/.pi/agent/models.json: { "providers": { "llama-cpp": { "baseUrl": "http://localhost:8080/v1", "api": "openai-completions", "apiKey": "none", "models": [ { "id": "bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M" } ] } } }Run Pi
# Start Pi in your project directory: pi
- Docker Model Runner
How to use bebrws/security-8b with Docker Model Runner:
docker model run hf.co/bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M
- Lemonade
How to use bebrws/security-8b with Lemonade:
Pull the model
# Download Lemonade from https://lemonade-server.ai/ lemonade pull bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M
Run and chat with the model
lemonade run user.security-8b-Q4_K_M
List all available models
lemonade list
- Hermes Agent
How to use bebrws/security-8b with Hermes Agent:
Start the llama.cpp server
# Install llama.cpp: brew install llama.cpp # Start a local OpenAI-compatible server: llama serve -hf bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M
Configure Hermes
# Install Hermes: curl -fsSL https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/install.sh | bash hermes setup # Point Hermes at the local server: hermes config set model.provider custom hermes config set model.base_url http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1 hermes config set model.default bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M
Run Hermes
hermes
- Atomic Chat
- OpenClaw
How to use bebrws/security-8b with OpenClaw:
Start the llama.cpp server
# Install llama.cpp: brew install llama.cpp # Start a local OpenAI-compatible server: llama serve -hf bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M
Configure OpenClaw
# Install OpenClaw: npm install -g openclaw@latest # Register the local server and set it as the default model: openclaw onboard --non-interactive --mode local \ --auth-choice custom-api-key \ --custom-base-url http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1 \ --custom-model-id "bebrws/security-8b:Q4_K_M" \ --custom-provider-id llama-cpp \ --custom-compatibility openai \ --custom-text-input \ --accept-risk \ --skip-health
Run OpenClaw
openclaw agent --local --agent main --message "Hello from Hugging Face"
Model card: add v6 MCQ results + v6cti CTI-round experiment note
Browse files
README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -62,12 +62,15 @@ Foundation-Sec-8B is a *base* model and was evaluated with 3-shot raw completion
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(its intended usage per Cisco's model card); k3-sec-8b was evaluated zero-shot
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chat (Qwen3 template, non-thinking). Identical question sets for every model.
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| Benchmark (n) | Foundation-Sec-8B | k3-sec-8b v4 | k3-sec-8b v5 |
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| CyberMetric-500 | 84.20% | **86.80%** | **86.80%** |
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| CTI-Bench-MCQ (500) | **66.00%** | 59.20% | 59.80% |
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| SecQA v1+v2 (210) | 98.10% | 98.10% | 98.10% |
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| **Overall (1,210)** | **79.09%** | 77.36% | 77.60% |
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Parse failures: 0 for all models in native modes.
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structured markdown answers (~264/~307 words avg) with finer-grained precision
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(e.g. LSASS dumping → T1003.001 sub-technique + detection methods, vs T1003 only).
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**Takeaways.** k3-sec-8b (v4/v5) is stronger on broad general security knowledge
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(CyberMetric) and far more usable interactively; Foundation-Sec-8B is stronger on
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MITRE ATT&CK / threat-intel mapping (CTI-Bench) — the clearest data target for
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(its intended usage per Cisco's model card); k3-sec-8b was evaluated zero-shot
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chat (Qwen3 template, non-thinking). Identical question sets for every model.
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| Benchmark (n) | Foundation-Sec-8B | k3-sec-8b v4 | k3-sec-8b v5 | k3-sec-8b v6 |
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| CyberMetric-500 | 84.20% | **86.80%** | **86.80%** | **86.80%** |
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| CTI-Bench-MCQ (500) | **66.00%** | 59.20% | 59.80% | 58.80% |
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| SecQA v1+v2 (210) | 98.10% | 98.10% | 98.10% | 98.10% |
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| **Overall (1,210)** | **79.09%** | 77.36% | 77.60% | 77.44% |
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*v5 → v6 is knowledge-neutral on MCQ (r6 targeted agentic robustness). Few-shot
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completion mode (base-model style) lifts all k3 versions: v6 scores 87.6/62.8/98.1.*
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Parse failures: 0 for all models in native modes.
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structured markdown answers (~264/~307 words avg) with finer-grained precision
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(e.g. LSASS dumping → T1003.001 sub-technique + detection methods, vs T1003 only).
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**CTI round experiment (v6cti branch, 2026-08-01):** a 2,521-trace ATT&CK-STIX-derived
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MCQ seed factory (decontaminated vs all three benchmarks, GLM-5.2 + Foundation-Sec
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teachers, deepseek-v4-flash judge) was trained on top of the r6 mix. Result: large
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CTI-Bench churn (+34/−37 flips) but no net gain and ~1.5 pt chat-mode regression —
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format conflict between justification-style traces and letter-only prompting was the
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main diagnosed cause. Negative result documented in the eval report; v2 plan is
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format-matched MCQ training + failure-targeted DPO. The `v6cti` branch remains
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available for inspection.
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**Takeaways.** k3-sec-8b (v4/v5) is stronger on broad general security knowledge
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(CyberMetric) and far more usable interactively; Foundation-Sec-8B is stronger on
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MITRE ATT&CK / threat-intel mapping (CTI-Bench) — the clearest data target for
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