src/services/mcp/channelPermissions.ts

/**
 * Permission prompts over channels (Telegram, iMessage, Discord).
 *
 * Mirrors `BridgePermissionCallbacks` — when CC hits a permission dialog,
 * it ALSO sends the prompt via active channels and races the reply against
 * local UI / bridge / hooks / classifier. First resolver wins via claim().
 *
 * Inbound is a structured event: the server parses the user's "yes tbxkq"
 * reply and emits notifications/claude/channel/permission with
 * {request_id, behavior}. CC never sees the reply as text — approval
 * requires the server to deliberately emit that specific event, not just
 * relay content. Servers opt in by declaring
 * capabilities.experimental['claude/channel/permission'].
 *
 * Kenneth's "would this let Claude self-approve?": the approving party is
 * the human via the channel, not Claude. But the trust boundary isn't the
 * terminal — it's the allowlist (tengu_harbor_ledger). A compromised
 * channel server CAN fabricate "yes <id>" without the human seeing the
 * prompt. Accepted risk: a compromised channel already has unlimited
 * conversation-injection turns (social-engineer over time, wait for
 * acceptEdits, etc.); inject-then-self-approve is faster, not more
 * capable. The dialog slows a compromised channel; it doesn't stop one.
 * See PR discussion 2956440848.
 */

import { jsonStringify } from '../../utils/slowOperations.js'
import { getFeatureValue_CACHED_MAY_BE_STALE } from '../analytics/growthbook.js'

/**
 * GrowthBook runtime gate — separate from the channels gate (tengu_harbor)
 * so channels can ship without permission-relay riding along (Kenneth: "no
 * bake time if it goes out tomorrow"). Default false; flip without a release.
 * Checked once at useManageMCPConnections mount — mid-session flag changes
 * don't apply until restart.
 */
export function isChannelPermissionRelayEnabled(): boolean {
  return getFeatureValue_CACHED_MAY_BE_STALE('tengu_harbor_permissions', false)
}

export type ChannelPermissionResponse = {
  behavior: 'allow' | 'deny'
  /** Which channel server the reply came from (e.g., "plugin:telegram:tg"). */
  fromServer: string
}

export type ChannelPermissionCallbacks = {
  /** Register a resolver for a request ID. Returns unsubscribe. */
  onResponse(
    requestId: string,
    handler: (response: ChannelPermissionResponse) => void,
  ): () => void
  /** Resolve a pending request from a structured channel event
   *  (notifications/claude/channel/permission). Returns true if the ID
   *  was pending — the server parsed the user's reply and emitted
   *  {request_id, behavior}; we just match against the map. */
  resolve(
    requestId: string,
    behavior: 'allow' | 'deny',
    fromServer: string,
  ): boolean
}

/**
 * Reply format spec for channel servers to implement:
 *   /^\s*(y|yes|n|no)\s+([a-km-z]{5})\s*$/i
 *
 * 5 lowercase letters, no 'l' (looks like 1/I). Case-insensitive (phone
 * autocorrect). No bare yes/no (conversational). No prefix/suffix chatter.
 *
 * CC generates the ID and sends the prompt. The SERVER parses the user's
 * reply and emits notifications/claude/channel/permission with {request_id,
 * behavior} — CC doesn't regex-match text anymore. Exported so plugins can
 * import the exact regex rather than hand-copying it.
 */
export const PERMISSION_REPLY_RE = /^\s*(y|yes|n|no)\s+([a-km-z]{5})\s*$/i

// 25-letter alphabet: a-z minus 'l' (looks like 1/I). 25^5 ≈ 9.8M space.
const ID_ALPHABET = 'abcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz'

// Substring blocklist — 5 random letters can spell things (Kenneth, in the
// launch thread: "this is why i bias to numbers, hard to have anything worse
// than 80085"). Non-exhaustive, covers the send-to-your-boss-by-accident
// tier. If a generated ID contains any of these, re-hash with a salt.
// prettier-ignore
const ID_AVOID_SUBSTRINGS = [
  'fuck',
  'shit',
  'cunt',
  'cock',
  'dick',
  'twat',
  'piss',
  'crap',
  'bitch',
  'whore',
  'ass',
  'tit',
  'cum',
  'fag',
  'dyke',
  'nig',
  'kike',
  'rape',
  'nazi',
  'damn',
  'poo',
  'pee',
  'wank',
  'anus',
]

function hashToId(input: string): string {
  // FNV-1a → uint32, then base-25 encode. Not crypto, just a stable
  // short letters-only ID. 32 bits / log2(25) ≈ 6.9 letters of entropy;
  // taking 5 wastes a little, plenty for this.
  let h = 0x811c9dc5
  for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i++) {
    h ^= input.charCodeAt(i)
    h = Math.imul(h, 0x01000193)
  }
  h = h >>> 0
  let s = ''
  for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
    s += ID_ALPHABET[h % 25]
    h = Math.floor(h / 25)
  }
  return s
}

/**
 * Short ID from a toolUseID. 5 letters from a 25-char alphabet (a-z minus
 * 'l' — looks like 1/I in many fonts). 25^5 ≈ 9.8M space, birthday
 * collision at 50% needs ~3K simultaneous pending prompts, absurd for a
 * single interactive session. Letters-only so phone users don't switch
 * keyboard modes (hex alternates a-f/0-9 → mode toggles). Re-hashes with
 * a salt suffix if the result contains a blocklisted substring — 5 random
 * letters can spell things you don't want in a text message to your phone.
 * toolUseIDs are `toolu_` + base64-ish; we hash rather than slice.
 */
export function shortRequestId(toolUseID: string): string {
  // 7 length-3 × 3 positions × 25² + 15 length-4 × 2 × 25 + 2 length-5
  // ≈ 13,877 blocked IDs out of 9.8M — roughly 1 in 700 hits the blocklist.
  // Cap at 10 retries; (1/700)^10 is negligible.
  let candidate = hashToId(toolUseID)
  for (let salt = 0; salt < 10; salt++) {
    if (!ID_AVOID_SUBSTRINGS.some(bad => candidate.includes(bad))) {
      return candidate
    }
    candidate = hashToId(`${toolUseID}:${salt}`)
  }
  return candidate
}

/**
 * Truncate tool input to a phone-sized JSON preview. 200 chars is
 * roughly 3 lines on a narrow phone screen. Full input is in the local
 * terminal dialog; the channel gets a summary so Write(5KB-file) doesn't
 * flood your texts. Server decides whether/how to show it.
 */
export function truncateForPreview(input: unknown): string {
  try {
    const s = jsonStringify(input)
    return s.length > 200 ? s.slice(0, 200) + '…' : s
  } catch {
    return '(unserializable)'
  }
}

/**
 * Filter MCP clients down to those that can relay permission prompts.
 * Three conditions, ALL required: connected + in the session's --channels
 * allowlist + declares BOTH capabilities. The second capability is the
 * server's explicit opt-in — a relay-only channel never becomes a
 * permission surface by accident (Kenneth's "users may be unpleasantly
 * surprised"). Centralized here so a future fourth condition lands once.
 */
export function filterPermissionRelayClients<
  T extends {
    type: string
    name: string
    capabilities?: { experimental?: Record<string, unknown> }
  },
>(
  clients: readonly T[],
  isInAllowlist: (name: string) => boolean,
): (T & { type: 'connected' })[] {
  return clients.filter(
    (c): c is T & { type: 'connected' } =>
      c.type === 'connected' &&
      isInAllowlist(c.name) &&
      c.capabilities?.experimental?.['claude/channel'] !== undefined &&
      c.capabilities?.experimental?.['claude/channel/permission'] !== undefined,
  )
}

/**
 * Factory for the callbacks object. The pending Map is closed over — NOT
 * module-level (per src/CLAUDE.md), NOT in AppState (functions-in-state
 * causes issues with equality/serialization). Same lifetime pattern as
 * `replBridgePermissionCallbacks`: constructed once per session inside
 * a React hook, stable reference stored in AppState.
 *
 * resolve() is called from the dedicated notification handler
 * (notifications/claude/channel/permission) with the structured payload.
 * The server already parsed "yes tbxkq" → {request_id, behavior}; we just
 * match against the pending map. No regex on CC's side — text in the
 * general channel can't accidentally approve anything.
 */
export function createChannelPermissionCallbacks(): ChannelPermissionCallbacks {
  const pending = new Map<
    string,
    (response: ChannelPermissionResponse) => void
  >()

  return {
    onResponse(requestId, handler) {
      // Lowercase here too — resolve() already does; asymmetry means a
      // future caller passing a mixed-case ID would silently never match.
      // shortRequestId always emits lowercase so this is a noop today,
      // but the symmetry makes the contract explicit.
      const key = requestId.toLowerCase()
      pending.set(key, handler)
      return () => {
        pending.delete(key)
      }
    },

    resolve(requestId, behavior, fromServer) {
      const key = requestId.toLowerCase()
      const resolver = pending.get(key)
      if (!resolver) return false
      // Delete BEFORE calling — if resolver throws or re-enters, the
      // entry is already gone. Also handles duplicate events (second
      // emission falls through — server bug or network dup, ignore).
      pending.delete(key)
      resolver({ behavior, fromServer })
      return true
    },
  }
}