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README.md

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+---
+license: cc-by-4.0
+language:
+  - en
+  - zh
+tags:
+  - accounting
+  - corporate-governance
+  - china
+  - supervisory-board
+  - audit-committee
+  - a-share
+  - cninfo
+pretty_name: CSBA - China supervisory board abolition
+size_categories:
+  - 1K<n<10K
+configs:
+  - config_name: transitions
+    data_files: 04_abolition_transitions.csv
+  - config_name: announcements
+    data_files: 03_abolition_announcements.csv
+  - config_name: approval_dates
+    data_files: 05_approval_dates.csv
+  - config_name: sample_flags
+    data_files: 06_sample_flags.csv
+---
+
+# CSBA — Board reform and the abolition of China's supervisory board
+
+Replication data for the paper **"Board reform and the abolition of China's
+supervisory board"** by Xiangdong Liu (Jinan University), Jiahao Chen (Jinan
+University), Zhenyan Liu (University of Manchester) and Jinfeng Pan (Guangdong
+University of Finance).
+
+Code and documentation: https://github.com/ChenJiahaoJNU/CSBA
+
+## What this is
+
+China's revised Company Law, effective 1 July 2024, lets a listed firm abolish its
+supervisory board and vest the statutory oversight functions in the audit
+committee of the board. No existing database records the reform, so the transition
+file was reconstructed from public CNINFO announcements. Within a single year 2,482
+A-share firms announced an abolition.
+
+## Files
+
+| file | rows | what it is |
+|------|------|------------|
+| `01_cninfo_raw_hits.csv` | 2,674 | raw CNINFO search results before classification |
+| `02_classified_candidates.csv` | 2,431 | hits classified as abolition-related |
+| `03_abolition_announcements.csv` | 2,522 | the firm's own abolition announcements |
+| `04_abolition_transitions.csv` | 2,482 | firm level, first and last announcement, cohort |
+| `05_approval_dates.csv` | 2,482 | board proposal date and shareholder approval date |
+| `06_sample_flags.csv` | 4,546 | the risk set, public columns only |
+
+### `04_abolition_transitions.csv`
+
+One row per firm that announced an abolition.
+
+| column | meaning |
+|--------|---------|
+| `secCode` | 6-digit stock code |
+| `secName` | firm name as printed in the filing |
+| `first_ann`, `last_ann` | first and last abolition announcement dates |
+| `n_ann` | number of abolition announcements by that firm |
+| `has_charter` | whether the announcement also amends the articles |
+| `cohort_month`, `cohort_quarter`, `cohort_year` | derived from `first_ann` |
+
+### `05_approval_dates.csv`
+
+The sweep behind the paper's measurement-error section.
+
+| column | meaning |
+|--------|---------|
+| `code` | 6-digit stock code |
+| `ann` | first abolition announcement, which is the board's proposal |
+| `meet` | general meeting date, from the firm's own resolution announcement |
+| `n_res` | resolution announcements found in the 180-day window |
+| `status` | `ok`, `no_date`, `no_orgid`, `query_fail`, `worker_error` |
+
+2,377 of 2,482 resolved. Median gap 102 days, interquartile range 21 to 147. Only
+**35.7 per cent** of firms vote in the same calendar quarter as their proposal,
+which is why the paper makes no timing claim.
+
+### `06_sample_flags.csv`
+
+The 4,546-firm risk set with the licensed covariates stripped out. 2,072 firms
+abolished, or 45.6 per cent, which is the figure the paper reports.
+
+## Licence and what is deliberately absent
+
+Everything here was reconstructed from **public CNINFO disclosures**. A-share
+filings are public documents, and this data is released under CC BY 4.0.
+
+The paper's explanatory variables come from a commercial vendor, whose licence
+permits use for replication but **not redistribution**. They are therefore not
+included. That covers return on assets, leverage, total assets, institutional
+ownership, information asymmetry, risk-disclosure intensity, the CNRDS ESG rating,
+MD&A text similarity, analyst coverage, stock-price crash risk and audit opinion.
+Obtain them under your own licence; the pipeline in the code repository reads them
+from a `vendor/` folder.
+
+You can reproduce the transition file, the sample construction counts, the cohort
+distribution and the approval-date analysis from this data alone.
+
+## Known limitations, stated by the authors
+
+- **The treatment date is the board's proposal, not the shareholder vote.** Across
+  all 2,482 firms the two differ by a median of 102 days.
+- **The approval-date extraction is automated and unvalidated by hand.** Nine of
+  2,377 resolved firms (0.4 per cent) yield an impossible negative gap, so the file
+  is sound distributionally and **not firm-by-firm**. Do not quote an individual
+  firm's gap without checking that firm's filing.
+- **Keyword recall is imperfect.** A single-phrase query would have missed 193
+  genuine announcements; this release uses a nine-keyword union.
+- **The information-asymmetry result does not reproduce with alternative proxies**
+  (crash risk, analyst coverage, |ROA − CFO|). The paper reports this as a failure.
+
+## Citation
+
+If you use this data, please cite the paper, and this dataset:
+
+```
+Liu, X., Chen, J., Liu, Z., and Pan, J. Board reform and the abolition of China's
+supervisory board. China Journal of Accounting Research, forthcoming.
+```
+
+```
+@misc{csba2026,
+  title  = {CSBA: Board reform and the abolition of China's supervisory board},
+  author = {Liu, Xiangdong and Chen, Jiahao and Liu, Zhenyan and Pan, Jinfeng},
+  year   = {2026},
+  url    = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/Changahou/CSBA}
+}
+```