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Turns out that there are already at least three applications that can
interact with the RSU server that these units run. They are available
for both Android & iOS and are called "Kapsch TrafficAssist, Kapsch V2X
Assist, Kapsch V2X Insight." There is also a "GeauxPass" application I
haven't looked at all. The one I found especially interesting is the
Insight application as it allows you to view or modify some aspects of
the RSU server. It also displays logs and it nice to use to confirm that
the RSU stack is running at least. It also gives you insight to the sheer
amount of data this RSU can collect. [18]
I haven't gone much deeper than throwing the Android apps into MobSF but
it is definitely high on my list to start to take a peek at.
--[ 6.3 - RSU Server Stack
Another at the tippity top of my TODO list is to start testing the RSU
Server Stack. Or at this point, just reverse engineer it enough to
understand it confidently. There are so many components within V2X like
WAVE, IPANet, CW-LLC, DSRC, ITS-G5, SAE J2735/XX, 11p, 3GPP LTE-V2X, etc,
that the RSU supports and that doesn't include other intelligent traffic
systems like crosswalks, bridges, tolls, lights, etc.. I did mention some
of the notable binaries, but there are many more I didn't get to mention in
Phase 1. Hopefully the OBUs I acquired will make this easier for me as well.
--[ 6.4 - Remote/Wireless Exploits
Obviously the creme de la creme would be an over the air exploit to get an
initial foothold. Although some of the protocol components have had some
vulnerabilities in the past, there is still definitely a lot of empty space
that needs to be researched and tested. The fact that these devices are
used in critical infrastructure, are mounted onto poles where thousands of
cars will pass and broadcast V2X by design, there's definitely an itch in
my brain saying there's something there. But as of yet, I will continue to
take one step forward at a time with a over the air exploit as the
destination.
--[ 7 - Random Nuggets
--[ 7.1 - Sniffing, Outdated Components, Certificates & Keys, External
(Web Services) Oh my!
Here is some information that I couldn't get to in this paper but I found
interesting, valuable or just plain cool. Don't expect any rhyme or reason
please, just enjoy.
Most of the units ran a version of ssh that is vulnerable to user
enumeration. When I acquired the first unit, I spent probably close to 6
hours attempting to gain access to the rescue EOS that it was by booting
into by default. I must've tried half a million or more possible usernames,
but besides root, only ended up getting discovering the user 'kapsch' by
adding it to a small wordlist I just created off the top of my head.
While focusing first on the rescue EOS, I gained root access by modifying
the custom bash script that is executed upon boot. So I was super excited
when I saw:
[ OK ] Started watchdog daemon.
Creating user 'gainsec' ...
cp: cannot stat '/etc/eeprom-cb/s.publickey.gainsec': No such file or
directory
chmod: cannot access '/home/gainsec/.ssh/authorized_keys':
No such file or directory
User 'gainsec' created with SSH access.
Adding 'gainsec' to sudo group for root privileges...
Granting
'gainsec' root privileges...
Copyright (c) Kapsch Traffic COM AG 2016
GainSec was Here
LEO RESCUE system version 4.6.0.1211.28
useradd: user 'kapsch'
already exists
INFO: Updating /etc/shadow
[ 0.000000] DMI:
N/A N/A/COMe-mBTi10, BIOS MVV1976 X64 10/10/2017
Kontron Board found,
ready to go
[ 25.082404] FAT-fs (mmcblk1p1): Volume was not properly unmounted. Some
data may be corrupt. Please run fsck.
[ 25.082404] FAT-fs (mmcblk1p1): Volume was not properly unmounted. Some
data may be corrupt. Please run fsck.
boot-counter was set to 2
Debian
GNU/Linux 9 PEM00076 ttyS0
PEM000XX login: [ 26.153799] random: crng init done
[ 26.153799] random: crng init done
[ 26.160642] random: 7 urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting
[ 26.160642] random: 7 urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting
Little did I know, the EOS is configured with the SUID bits set incorrectly.
So, sudo is not possible. Since it’s a squashfs, it's mounted as read-only
and without root access you can't remount with write access so... yeah