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README.md

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+---
+license: cc-by-4.0
+task_categories:
+- text-classification
+language:
+- en
+tags:
+- security
+- shell
+- obfuscation
+- agent-safety
+- bash
+size_categories:
+- n<1K
+configs:
+- config_name: default
+  data_files:
+  - split: dev
+    path: data/dev.jsonl
+---
+
+# Obfuscated-Shell Gate Benchmark (Bash, dev)
+
+A benchmark for safety gates and coding agents: decide ALLOW / ASK / DENY on a
+single bash command whose surface form may be obfuscated. Each risky command is
+paired with a benign command carrying the same obfuscation surface, so a gate is
+scored on reading the decoded intent, not on spotting that something looks
+encoded.
+
+## What is inside
+- 222 bash commands, 103 risky and 119 benign.
+- 17 intent families: b64_data, cred_read, data_exfil, destructive, disable_logging, download_exec, eval_legit, heredoc_config, ifs_parse, persistence, pipeline_jq, printf_fmt, privesc_fetch, readonly_ops, reverse_shell, tr_text, var_build.
+- 13 surface forms including plain: b64_chunked, b64_pipe, backslash_break, chain_ifs_b64, chain_rev_b64, hex_pipe, ifs_split, none, octal_printf, quote_break, rev_pipe, rot13_pipe, var_concat.
+- Every row is verified in real bash: encoded rows decode back to their plain
+  `canonical` form, and rewritten rows parse to the same argv. The `verified`
+  field records which check passed. No payload is ever executed.
+
+## Safety of the data
+Every network destination is an unresolvable `.invalid` host (RFC 6761).
+Destructive and credential examples target a sandbox path, never a real system
+path. The set exercises detection of a pattern; it is not runnable malware.
+
+## Fields
+`id`, `seed_id`, `family`, `is_risky`, `label` (ALLOW/ASK/DENY), `shell`,
+`command` (the possibly obfuscated form), `canonical` (plain equivalent),
+`transform`, `transform_chain`, `verified`.
+
+## Using it
+```python
+from datasets import load_dataset
+ds = load_dataset("FINAL-Bench/Obfuscated-Shell-Gate", split="dev")
+```
+Score your gate's verdict against `label`. Report risky recall and benign
+false-block rate separately; a single accuracy number hides the trade-off that
+this set is built to expose.
+
+## Reference baselines (dev)
+| baseline | accuracy | risky recall | benign false-block |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| deny-everything-obfuscated | 0.47 | 0.92 | 0.92 |
+| naive keyword match | 0.47 | 0.61 | 0.65 |
+
+Both surface baselines score at chance level, which is the intended property:
+the benign-obfuscated pairs make surface matching ineffective.
+
+## Held-out test
+A private held-out split of comparable size is kept off the hub by design, so it
+stays usable as a true test rather than becoming training data.
+
+## Citation
+VIDRAFT / FINAL-Bench, Obfuscated-Shell Gate Benchmark, 2026.