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+ {"id": "1990.10.03DAB1198 Samuel W. Chang, M.D. vs. The Inspector General", "source_path": "DAB PDFs\\1990.10.03DAB1198 Samuel W. Chang, M.D. vs. The Inspector General.pdf", "text": "Samuel W. Chang, M.D., DAB No. 1198\n(1990) \nDepartment of Health and Human Services\nDEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD\nAppellate Division\nIn the Case of: \nSamuel W. Chang, M.D., \nPetitioner , \n- v. -\nThe Inspector General. \nDATE: October 3, 1990 \nDocket No. C-125\nDecision No. 1198 \nFINAL DECISION ON REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE\nDECISION\nDr . Samuel W. Chang (Petitioner) and the Inspector General (I.G.) both\nrequested review by the Appellate Panel of a March 14, 1990 decision by\nAdministrative Law Judge Charles E. Stratton (ALJ). The ALJ's decision\naffirmed the I.G.'s decision to exclude Petitioner from participation in\nthe Medicare program for five years and to direct his exclusion from\nstate health care programs (including Medicaid) for the same length of\ntime. Petitioner's exclusions were based on section 1128(a)(1) of the\nSocial Security Act (Act), which provides as follows:\n(a) Mandatory Exclusion.--The Secretary shall exclude the\nfollowing individuals and entities from participation in any\nprogram under title XVIII and shall direct that the following\nindividuals and entities be excluded from participation in any\nState health care program . . . .\n(1) Conviction of program-related crimes.-- Any individual or\nentity that has been convicted of a criminal offense related to the\ndelivery of an item or service under title XVIII or under any State\nhealth care program.\nSection 1128(c)(3)(B) of the Act further provides:\nIn the case of an exclusion under subsection (a), the minimum\nperiod of exclusion shall be not less than five years . . . .\nWhile the ALJ affirmed the I.G.'s decision, the ALJ nevertheless\ndetermined that the I.G.'s notice to Petitioner was not timely and so\nwas not reasonable within the meaning of the Act and regulations. As a\nresult, instead of allowing the exclusion to begin 20 days from May 18,\n1989, the date of the I.G.'s notice, the ALJ made the five-year\nexclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid programs effective in November\n1988, one year after November 12, 1987, the date that the I.G. received\nnotice of Petitioner's conviction. 1/\nAs discussed below, we reject Petitioner's contentions that the\nexclusion should be overturned. We conclude, moreover , that the ALJ had\nno authority to change the effective date of the exclusion. We\ntherefore modify the ALJ's decision by holding that the five-year\nexclusion which is required by federal law was effective 20 days from\nMay 18, 1989, the date of the I.G.'s notice.\nI. Undisputed findings of fact and conclusions of law\nThe ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law (FFCL) numbers 1\nthrough 18 are not disputed by either party on appeal. Petitioner's\nreview brief, p. 1; I.G.'s request for review, p. 1. We therefore\naffirm and adopt the following FFCL for purposes of our decision:\n1. Petitioner was a licensed medical doctor who had practiced medicine\nin Poolesville, Maryland since 1979.\n2. The Maryland Medicaid Fraud Control Unit discovered a billing\npattern by Petitioner that caused them to initiate an investigation in\nlate 1986.\n3. Petitioner was charged by the State of Maryland with Medicaid fraud\nfor billing for services that were not performed as claimed.\n4. On October 28, 1987, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of\nMedicaid fraud.\n5. Petitioner agreed to pay restitution of $35,540.95, and was given\nfive years probation.\n6. Petitioner was \"convicted\" within the meaning of section 1128(i) of\nthe Act.\n7. On November 5, 1987, the State of Maryland suspended Petitioner from\nparticipation in the State Medicaid program, retroactive to October 28,\n1987; the State's suspension was based on Dr . Chang's October 28, 1987\nconviction on one count of Medicaid fraud.\n8. On November 12, 1987, the I.G. was notified by the State of Maryland\nof Petitioner's conviction.\n9. On January 7, 1988, Petitioner was notified by the I.G. that the\nI.G. was proposing to exclude him for at least five years under the\nminimum mandatory provisions of section 1128 of the Act from Medicare\nand Medicaid because of his October 28, 1987 conviction. The I.G.\nallowed him the opportunity to submit mitigating circumstances before\nthe I.G. made a final determination on the length of the exclusion.\n10. By letter of February 4, 1988, Petitioner requested that the I.G.\nwithdraw the proposed exclusion.\n11. By letter dated May 18, 1989, the I.G. informed Petitioner that he\nhad been excluded for five years under the minimum mandatory provisions\nof section 1128(a)(1) of the Act and that such federal exclusion from\nboth Medicare and Medicaid would begin twenty days from the date of the\nNotice.\n12. By letter dated June 5, 1989, Petitioner requested a hearing before\nan ALJ.\n13. Petitioner admits that he was \"convicted\" of a criminal offense\nwithin the meaning of section 1128(i) of the Act.\n14. Petitioner was convicted of a criminal offense \"related to the\ndelivery of an item or service\" under the Medicaid program within the\nmeaning of section 1128(a)(1) of the Act.\n15. The I.G. properly excluded Petitioner from participation in the\nMedicare and Medicaid programs for a period of five years as required by\nthe minimum mandatory exclusion provisions of section 1128(c)(3)(B) of\nthe Act.\n16. Since the material facts are undisputed in this case, the\nclassification of Petitioner's conviction of a criminal offense as\nsubject to the authority of 1128(a)(1) is a legal issue.\n17. The I.G. is entitled to summary disposition in this proceeding.\n18. The I.G. is not barred by principles of double jeopardy, due\nprocess, or laches from excluding Petitioner in this case.\nALJ Decision, pp. 4-5 (citations to record omitted).\nII. Disputed findings of fact and conclusions of law\nThe I.G. requested review of three of the ALJ's conclusions of law.\nThese conclusions were as follows:\n19. The I.G.'s Notice in this case was not timely and, thus, was\nnot reasonable within the meaning of the Act and Regulations.\n20. The five year exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid programs\nwhich is required by federal law in this case is hereby effective\nbeginning November 22, 1988, which is one year and twenty days from\nNovember 12, 1987, the date that the I.G. received notice of\nPetitioner's conviction (instead of May 18, 1989, the date of the\nI.G.'s notice).\n21. All Medicare reimbursements, if any, received by Petitioner\nfrom November 22, 1988 to May 18, 1989 must be refunded to the\nMedicare carrier because Petitioner was effectively excluded during\nthat period. 2/\nALJ Decision, p. 5.\nIII. Background\nPetitioner was convicted on October 28, 1987 in Maryland State court of\none count of Medicaid fraud. Pursuant to Maryland law, Petitioner was\n(on November 5, 1987) disqualified from further participation in the\nMaryland Medicaid Program, retroactive to October 28, 1987, the date of\nconviction. Ex. E.\nBy letter dated November 12, 1987, the State notified the I.G. of the\nconviction of Dr . Chang and also of the Maryland Medicaid action. Ex.\nF.\nOn January 8, 1988, the I.G. wrote Dr . Chang that as a result of his\nconviction, the Department was required to exclude him from the Medicare\nprogram and any state health care program for a period of at least five\nyears. This exclusion would be in addition to any sanction imposed by a\nstate under the authority of state law. The stated purpose of the\nletter was to give Petitioner an opportunity to furnish any information,\n\"mitigating in nature,\" for the I.G. to consider before determining the\nperiod of exclusion. Petitioner was given 30 days to submit any\ninformation before the I.G. issued the final notice of exclusion. Ex.\nG.\nAn attorney for Petitioner replied within the 30-day period, offering\nnot only mitigating circumstances, but also purported reasons why the\nproposed exclusion should be withdrawn. Ex. H. Unfortunately, nothing\nfurther was done for over 15 months; the delay was admittedly due to\nadministrative error . ALJ Decision, p.9.\nOn May 18, 1989, the I.G. sent Petitioner a letter informing him that he\nwas being excluded from participation in the Medicare program and any\nstate health care program, based on his conviction in state court.\nThese exclusions were effective 20 days from the date of the letter .\nPetitioner was told that since there were no aggravating circumstances,\nthe exclusion would be for the statutory five-year minimum period.\nPetitioner requested a hearing before an ALJ; this was held and a\ndecision rendered without any claimed delay.\nIV. The ALJ's Decision\nPetitioner argued before the ALJ that the I.G.'s exclusion notice was\nnot issued in a timely manner , since it was issued some 17 months after\nthe I.G. was notified of Petitioner's conviction. 3/ This was, claimed\nPetitioner , a violation of section 1128(c) of the Act, which requires\nthe I.G. to \"promptly notify\" an individual of an exclusion. In\naddition, Petitioner contended that the I.G.'s untimely exclusion\nresulted in an \"inequitable tacking on of additional time to the State's\nMedicaid exclusion.\" Petitioner's br ., pp. 7-12. Petitioner also argued\nthat the doctrines of laches, equitable estoppel, and fairness dictated\nrelief, and either there should be a reduction in the number of years\nPetitioner was excluded, or the effective date of the exclusion should\nbe modified.\nThe ALJ concluded that the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel\ndid not apply. ALJ Decision at 9. The ALJ did, however , find that\nissuance of the exclusion notice by the I.G. some 17 months after the\nI.G. became aware of the conviction \"was not timely and not reasonable\nnotice.\" Id. His basis for this finding was that sections 1128(c) and\n1128(f)(1) of the Act and section 1000.123 of the regulations required\n\"reasonable notice and an opportunity for a timely hearing,\" and the\ndelay of 17 months in issuing the notice was \"contrary to those\nprovisions.\" Id.\nThe ALJ went on to say that, while neither the I.G. nor an ALJ had the\nauthority to reduce the minimum five-year exclusion period required by\nthe statute, he did have authority --\nto correct mistakes which impact in such a way so as to deny a\npetitioner due process or fundamental fairness and which are in\ndirect contradiction to the specific requirements of the Act and\nthe Regulations.\nId.\nThe ALJ concluded that \"to correct the mistake made and to insure\ncompliance with the Act,\" the notice to Petitioner should have been\nissued within a reasonable time from the date the I.G. learned of\nPetitioner's conviction. The ALJ then determined that one year from the\ndate of notification of conviction would be \"a reasonable period\" to\neffect an exclusion. Id. at 10. Since the I.G. was notified by letter\non November 12, 1987, the ALJ concluded that the exclusion, to be\nreasonable, should have been effective within one year from that date,\nand he made the effective date of the five-year exclusion November 12,\n1988. Id. (See n. 1 above.)\nV. Analysis\nOn appeal here, Petitioner did not challenge FFCL Nos. 13 through 15,\nregarding why the mandatory exclusion provisions of section 1128(a)(1)\nof the Act applied to Petitioner . 4/ Instead, Petitioner argued that\nthe ALJ erred in not addressing the issue of whether the permissive\nexclusion provisions of section 1128(b) were also applicable.\nThe I.G. argued that the ALJ did not have the authority to make\nPetitioner's exclusion retroactive from the date of the I.G.'s notice of\nexclusion. The I.G. maintained that there is no requirement that the\nI.G. must notify an entity of an exclusion within a certain time from\nthe date the I.G. learns of a criminal conviction.\nA. The ALJ properly found that the five-year mandatory\nexclusion provisions of section 1128(a) of the Act\napplied to Petitioner's conviction.\nPetitioner maintained that the section 1128(a) mandatory exclusion must\nbe construed as a sanction available in addition to, rather than in lieu\nof, the permissive exclusion under section 1128(b). Petitioner cited S.\nRep. No. 109, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code\nCong. & Ad. News 687, as support for his position.\nPetitioner argued that Petitioner was charged by the State of Maryland\nwith Medicaid fraud for billing for services that were not performed as\nclaimed. (FFCL No. 3) Petitioner contended that such a finding should\ninvoke the permissive provisions of section 1128(b)(6) of the Act, which\nare designed to address the specific offense of fraudulent billing.\nWe find no merit in Petitioner's arguments. Petitioner pleaded guilty\nto one count of Medicaid fraud. FFCL No. 4. The permissive exclusion\nprovisions of section 1128(b) apply to convictions for offenses other\nthan those related to the delivery of an item or service under either\nthe Medicare or Medicaid or other covered programs. While it is not\ninconceivable that one of the provisions of section 1128(b) could have\nbeen applied in the absence of section 1128(a), which provides that the\nSecretary \"shall\" exclude individuals where applicable, the permissive\nexclusion provisions of subsection (b) focus on different circumstances\nfrom those raised here, such as where an individual's conviction does\nnot relate to the Medicare or Medicaid programs. See Jack W. Greene,\nDAB App. 1078 (1989), aff'd, 731 F. Supp. 835, 839 (E.D. Tenn. 1990);\nSurabhan Ratanasen, M.D., DAB App. 1138 (1990).\nWe conclude that the ALJ's decision in this case, concerning the use of\nthe mandatory exclusion provisions, was proper based on our analysis in\nthe Greene decision, and we find no reason to reconsider Greene based on\nPetitioner's arguments in this case.\nFinally, we conclude that Petitioner misconstrued the Senate Report.\nWhile Petitioner cited a portion of the Senate Report to support his\nposition, Petitioner failed to consider the Senate Report's explanation\nof the purpose of the section. The 1987 amendment to section 1128 by\nPublic Law 100-93 added section 1128(b). Its purpose was explained as\nfollows:\nUnder current law, the Secretary does not have the authority to\nexclude individuals or entities convicted of criminal offenses\nwhich are not related to Medicare or Medicaid or the other State\nhealth care programs. This provision would permit the Secretary to\nexclude persons and entities who have already been convicted of\noffenses relating to their financial integrity, if the offenses\noccurred in delivering health care to patients not covered by\npublic programs or if they occurred during participation in any\nother governmental program.\nS. Rep. No. 109, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1987 U.S. Code\nCong. & Ad. News 687.\nAccordingly, we uphold the ALJ's conclusion that the mandatory exclusion\nprovisions, and not the permissive exclusion provisions, were\nappropriately used in this case.\nB. The ALJ could not change the effective date of the exclusion.\nWe consider first whether the prescribed duties of the ALJ gave him any\nauthority to decide, as he did, that the I.G. did not give Petitioner\ntimely and reasonable notice, and to attempt to correct this failure by\nchanging the effective date of the exclusion.\nThe duties of the ALJ are stated in 42 C.F.R. 1001.128(a). A hearing\nbefore an ALJ on the exclusion of an individual is on the following\nissues:\n(1) Whether he or she was, in fact, convicted; (2) Whether the\nconviction was related to his or her participation in the delivery\nof medical care of services under the Medicare, Medicaid, or social\nservices program; and (3) Whether the length of the suspension is\nreasonable.\nThe question here is not one of the \"length\" of the suspension. The\nsuspension from Medicare is the mandatory minimum in the statute of five\nyears. The ALJ can not decrease the time, nor can he decide when it is\nto begin. The statute provides the exclusion shall be effective \"at\nsuch time\" as may be specified in regulations. Section 1128(c)(1). 5/\nThe regulation provides that the suspension is to begin 15 days from the\ndate on the I.G.'s notice. 42 C.F.R. 1001.123(a). The ALJ has no power\nto change either the length of the exclusion or its beginning date.\nIn Frank T. W. Chin, Jr . M.D., the Appeals Council of the Social\nSecurity Administration upheld an I.G. exclusion which had the effect of\nmaking the State Medicaid exclusion substantially longer than the\nMedicare exclusion. Docket No. 000-67-0034 (1988), Ex. O. The State\nsuspended Dr . Chin from the Medicaid program for one year based on\nconviction of Medicaid fraud. The I.G. then suspended him from the\nMedicare program for ten years based on the same conviction, and\ndirected that he be excluded form Medicaid programs for the same length\nof time. Dr . Chin contended that the beginning date of the I.G.\nsuspension should coincide with the beginning date of the one-year State\nMedicaid suspension; otherwise, the I.G.'s actions amounted to an\n11-year suspension.\nThe Appeals Council held that the beginning date set by the I.G. was\ncorrect under the law and regulations, even though the practical effect\nof the I.G. action was an 11 year suspension. Section 1902(a)(39) of\nthe Act and 42 C.F.R. 100l.123(b)(5) require the State to suspend the\nperson from participation in the Medicaid program for the same period as\nset for the Medicare suspension. The regulations also provide that the\nMedicare suspension is to begin 15 days from the I.G.'s notice (to which\nthe I.G. has added five days for mailing), 42 C.F.R. 1001.123(a), and\nthe suspension under Medicaid must be effective on the date established\nby the I.G. for the Medicare suspension. 42 C.F.R. 1002.211(a).\nIn holding that the beginning date set by the I.G. was correct, the\nAppeals Council concluded that, under 42 C.F.R. 1002.211(b), \"the State\nmay impose its own sanction which can be effective before, or extend\nbeyond, the mandatory period set by OIG.\" Chin at 14.\nWe agree with the analysis in Chin and conclude that the ALJ erred in\ndisregarding statutory and regulatory provisions on the effective date\nof the exclusion.\nC. Reasonable notice does not require prompt notice.\nEven if we assume that the ALJ could properly decide whether the notice\ngiven Petitioner was reasonable, it was error for him to decide that the\nnotice was not reasonable, and so did not comply with statutory and\nregulatory requirements.\nThe ALJ referred in his decision here to his prior decision in Thomas C.\nChestney, D.M.D., DAB Civ. Rem. C-53 (1989), so we examine Chestney in\nsome detail. Dr . Chestney, a dentist, was convicted of a criminal\noffense related to the delivery of Medicaid services in a Pennsylvania\nState court on January 19, 1988. Pennsylvania law provided for a\nfive-year termination from Medicaid of anyone convicted of a\nprogram-related crime, to begin as of the date of conviction. Chestney\nwas terminated from the State Medicaid program for five years from the\ndate of conviction, or from January 19, 1988 to January 19, 1993.\nThe I.G. then excluded Chestney from the Medicare program for a\nfive-year period beginning August 14, 1988. He also notified\nPennsylvania of Chestney's exclusion from Medicare and directed the\nState to exclude Chestney from the Medicaid program for at least the\n\"same period\" of time as the federal exclusion from Medicare.\nPennsylvania then sent Chestney another notice excluding him from the\nState Medicaid program for five years, beginning this time on August 14,\n1988, the same date as the I.G. exclusion.\nChestney argued that since Pennsylvania had already excluded him from\nMedicaid for five years, beginning seven months prior to the federally\ndirected Medicaid exclusion, this second State exclusion should last\nonly four years and five months, rather than five years. In effect, his\nargument was that the I.G. added seven months to his five-year Medicaid\nexclusion by delaying sending the exclusion notice for seven months.\nThe relief he sought was to have the federally directed Medicare\nexclusion run concurrently with the original State Medicaid termination.\nThe ALJ found that Chestney's being effectively excluded from Medicaid\nfor a period in excess of five years was a result for which there was no\nrelief. The ALJ stated that the Act and regulations provide no\ndiscretion for reducing the five-year minimum period of exclusion or for\naltering the effective dates of the five-year period; the State followed\nthe I.G.'s directive to exclude Chestney for the same period as the I.G\nexclusion.\nThe ALJ found that he had no authority to decide any issues with respect\nto the State-imposed termination. The ALJ then considered whether the\nI.G. acted reasonably. The ALJ found that the timing of the I.G.'s\nnotice was reasonable, considering that \"seven months is a reasonable\namount of time\" for the I.G. to obtain \"conclusive information\" of the\nprogram-related conviction, to make a determination regarding it, and to\nissue his notice of the determination. The ALJ added a footnote to this\nfinding, which he cited in this case:\nA delay in issuing a notice of exclusion much beyond seven months\nfrom the date of conviction in a minimum five year exclusion case,\nlike this one, might result in the necessity of an evidentiary\nhearing to determine if the I.G. issued the notice in a timely\nfashion as required by section 1003.123.\nALJ decision, n.8. 6/\nActually, the situation here is different from Chestney in one important\nrespect. In that case, there were two exclusions from the State\nMedicaid program. The first, dating back to the conviction, was for\nfive years. Then the second was for five years from the date of the\nI.G. exclusion, as required by law. In this case, there was no reason\nfor Maryland to issue a second exclusion. The first exclusion was an\nindefinite one, a termination from the program forever , if not\nreinstated. The I.G. did not make this any longer , by waiting for\nseveral months, because Dr . Chang was already out of the State Medicaid\nprogram.\nThe ALJ in the footnote to the Chestney decision stated that the I.G.\nnotice of exclusion had to be issued in a \"timely fashion\" as required\nby regulation. 7/ The regulation (section 1001.123) does not use this\nlanguage, or , in fact, anything like it. The section states that\nwhenever the OIG has conclusive information of conviction it will \"give\nthe party written notice.\" As Petitioner pointed out in his brief\nbefore the ALJ, \"[n]either the statute nor the regulations spell out a\ntime frame in which the Inspector General should act to exclude nor a\ntime frame as to when notice should be given.\" Petitioner's br ., p. 7.\nSection 1128(d)(2) of the Act does use the word \"promptly\" when it\nprovides that the \"Secretary shall promptly notify each appropriate\nState agency\" of the facts and circumstances of each exclusion by the\nI.G. requiring action by the state for exclusion under state health\ncare programs. (Emphasis added.) In addition, the statute provides\nthat the Secretary shall \"promptly notify\" the appropriate state agency\nhaving responsibility for licensing or certification of the individual\nor entity excluded. Section 1128(e)(1). The statute does not use the\nword \"promptly\" when it speaks of notice to the individual or entity\nbeing excluded. It states only that the individual or entity is\nentitled to \"reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing.\" Section\n1128(f)(1). 8/ It is certainly arguable that the omission of the word\n\"promptly\" in one section of the statute, when it is used in other\nsections in close proximity to it, is not unintentional.\nFurther , the regulation does not use either \"promptly\" or \"timely\" with\nrespect to the notice to be given to the person proposed to be excluded.\nThe reference is merely to \"written notice.\" 42 C.F.R. 1001.123. The\nwords \"reasonable notice\" do not mean the same as \"prompt notice\" or\n\"timely notice.\" They refer to giving the individual such notice as is\nreasonably calculated to reach him in adequate time for him to request a\nhearing, notify him what the proceeding is about, and inform him how he\nis to go about requesting a hearing. Such information is specifically\nrequired by 42 C.F.R. 1001.123.\nIn White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 858 (2d Cir . 1977), the court said\nthat it read the words \"reasonable notice and an opportunity for a\nhearing\" in section 205(b) of the Act \"as giving the claimant a right to\na hearing within a reasonable time.\" Dr . Chang was given notice of his\nright to a hearing as soon as the I.G. gave him final notice of\nexclusion from the Medicare program, and was given a hearing within a\nreasonable time after he requested one. That is all the statute and the\nregulation require. They do not require that the I.G. act promptly\nafter he notifies the person that he intends to exclude him and asks if\nthere are any extenuating circumstances before final exclusion follows.\nThe ALJ relied on the case of Ram v. Heckler , 792 F.2d 444 (4th Cir .\n1986), to support his modification of the effective date of the\nexclusion, as did Petitioner . Dr . Ram pleaded guilty to Medicare\nfraud, and was notified by the Department of Health and Human Services\nthat because of the conviction he would be suspended for one year as a\nMedicare provider , under the version of section 1128 of the Act then in\neffect. Dr . Ram filed his action to stay the suspension pending an\nadministrative hearing, and also filed a request for such a hearing.\nThe statute then in effect provided that a suspended physician was\n\"entitled to reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing,\" the\nsame language now in section 1128(f)(1). As Petitioner pointed out, the\nCourt of Appeals held that an administrative presuspension hearing was\nnot required, but Dr . Ram was entitled to a \"prompt postsuspension\nhearing that should proceed and be concluded without unreasonable\ndelay\", to satisfy the requirements of what is now section 1128(f)(1)\nand the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Ram at 447.\nThe holding in Ram does not support either the ALJ or the Petitioner .\nThere is no contention here that Dr . Chang did not receive a \"prompt\npostsuspension hearing\", nor that the hearing did not proceed without\nunreasonable delay. The interesting fact in Ram, which was not even\nreferred to by the court, is that almost three years elapsed between the\ndoctor's conviction and the notification of his suspension as a Medicare\nprovider . 9/\nThe case of Hall v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 906 (8th Cir . 1987), appears to be\nthe only case which considers whether administrative delay in proceeding\nwith a sanction may be a violation of the statutory right to a hearing\nwithin a reasonable time or a denial of due process. The proceedings\nagainst Dr . Hall for the quality of services furnished by him were\ninitiated by a professional standards review organization (PSRO), as\nprovided for by statute at that time. The PSRO's initial decision to\nrecommend imposition of a sanction was in January 1981. The I.G.\nactually notified Dr . Hall of his exclusion from the Medicare and\nMedicaid programs in July 1983. He requested a hearing before an ALJ,\nand then asked for review by the Appeals Council, with the final\ndecision coming in June 1985. Dr . Hall argued that a delay of more than\nfour years between the PSRO's initial decision to recommend the\nimposition of a sanction and the final administrative decision was a\nviolation of his statutory right to a hearing within a reasonable time\nand a denial of due process.\nThe Court said that neither the specific section of the Social Security\nAct providing for reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing, nor\nsection 205(b) referred to in that section, \"impose a mandatory time\nlimit on administrative review.\" Hall at 909. The court referred to\nHeckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1984), where the Supreme Court reversed\nthe imposition by a district court of a 90-day time limit, under section\n205(b), on the resolution of appeals from denials of Social Security\ndisability benefits. The Court there noted that the failure of Congress\nto specify a time limit in section 205(b) must have been intentional,\nbecause that section was part of a complex statute which sometimes\nimposes a time limit on administrative review, and sometimes does not.\nThe court in Hall went on to say that while section 205(b) did not\nspecify mandatory deadlines, a number of courts have held that this\nsection does require the Secretary \"to provide a hearing within a\nreasonable time.\" Hall at 910. The court then considered whether the\ndelay in that case was reasonable. While the court considered both\npresuspension and postsuspension delay, we consider only the former ,\nsince there is no claim here of any delay after the formal exclusion.\nThe period in Hall between the first recommendation of any sanction and\nthe actual imposition was about two and one-half years. The court said\nthat before any agency action could be set aside for lack of\npunctuality, the person claimed to be aggrieved must show how the delay\nprejudiced him, citing Panhandle Cooperative Association v. EPA, 771\nF.2d 1149, 1153 (8th Cir . 1985). Dr . Hall could not demonstrate any\nprejudice before any adverse administrative action against him, since he\nwas not prohibited from participating in either the Medicare or Medicaid\nprograms. (The court mentioned, but did not rely on the fact that Dr .\nHall apparently refused to cooperate.)\nDr . Chang was similarly not prejudiced by the delay of the I.G. in\nimposing the sanction. During the period between the first notice of\nintent to sanction and the actual exclusion, Dr . Chang was free to\nparticipate in the Medicare program in any state. He was also able to\nparticipate in Medicaid in any state but Maryland, and in fact did have\nMedicaid patients in the District of Columbia. Petitioner's br ., p. 11.\nHe was excluded from Medicaid in Maryland because that State took action\nagainst him under its own laws, based on his conviction, not because of\nany action by the I.G. He may have been inconvenienced by uncertainty,\nbut there was no prejudice in the legal sense.\nD. The ALJ's solution is impractical.\nEven if the ALJ had power to affect the time when the exclusion began,\nit is obvious from the difficulties here that a solution, intended by\nhim to be equitable, has insuperable practical problems. The ALJ\nordered that the Petitioner return any Medicare reimbursements received\nby him from November 22, 1988 to May 18, 1989. Unfortunately, this does\nnot take into account the problems posed. Technically, Medicare is an\ninsurance program to reimburse those insured under Medicare a percentage\nof covered medical bills. While a participating provider agrees to\naccept what Medicare pays as payment in full, not all doctors do so. In\nthat case, the patient has to pay the doctor and then seek reimbursement\nof a percentage of the bill (such as 80%) from Medicare. It would\nobviously be impractical to go through the doctor's records and see\nwhich patients paid him, even possibly in cash. In addition, it would\nalso be a time-consuming task to review records to verify that Medicare\npatients were included.\nFinally, as the I.G. recognized, another problem is that the doctor\ncould be licensed in another state and could be receiving money from\nMedicaid in another state during the period made retroactive by the\nALJ's revision. In this case, Petitioner's attorney admitted that\nPetitioner was in fact practicing in the District of Columbia during the\nretroactive period. Thus, if Petitioner would be required to return any\nMedicaid reimbursements received by him from November 22, 1988 to May\n18, 1989, practical problems, requiring verifying Medicaid payments from\nany state other than Maryland, would also apply to those reimbursements.\nVI. Conclusion\nBased on the foregoing, we modify the ALJ's decision by reversing his\nconclusion to change the effective date of Petitioner's five-year\nexclusion to November 12, 1988; we reverse FFCL No. 19 and FFCL No. 20,\nand delete FFCL No. 21. We uphold Petitioner's five-year exclusion\neffective 20 days from the date of the I.G.'s notice, May 18, 1989.\n_______________________________ Judith A.\nBallard\n_______________________________ Theodore J.\nRoumel U.S. Public Health Service\n_______________________________ Alexander G.\nTeitz Presiding Panel Member\n1. The regulation (42 C.F.R. 1001.123) provides that the exclusion\nwill be effective beginning 15 days from the date on the notice from the\nI.G. to the practitioner . The I.G. has added five days to allow for\nreceipt by mail. The exclusion here would therefore be effective 20\ndays from May 18, 1989, the date of the I.G.'s notice. The ALJ in his\ndecision (page 10) purported to make the exclusion effective November\n12, 1988, one year from the date the I.G. received notice of\nPetitioner's conviction. In FFCL No. 20 the ALJ attempted to make the\nexclusion effective November 22, 1988, which he stated was one year and\ntwenty days from November 12, 1987. Since we reverse the ALJ on his\nchange in the beginning date of the five- year exclusion period, we need\nnot be concerned with any discrepancy in the dates the ALJ set.\n2. The I.G. claimed that any refunds should apply to Medicaid\npayments (from states other than Maryland) as well as to Medicare\npayments. As the I.G. pointed out, however , there was no need to\nconsider FFCL No. 21 if we agreed with the I.G. on FFCL Nos. 19 and 20\nand did not modify the beginning date of the exclusion set by the I.G.\nSince we agree with the I.G. and reverse the ALJ on FFCL Nos. 19 and 20,\nwe need not address the question raised in FFCL No. 21 as to payments\nbetween the modified date set by the ALJ and the original date set for\nthe beginning of the exclusion by the I.G. We therefore modify the ALJ\ndecision by deleting FFCL No. 21.\n3. The I.G. noted that, in fact, Petitioner was not excluded until\n19 months after the date of receiving the notice of conviction and 17\nmonths from the date that the I.G. initially notified Petitioner that he\nwould be excluded. I.G.'s request for review, p. 2, n.3.\n4. In fact, the opening sentence of Petitioner's review brief was:\n\"Petitioner does not dispute the findings of fact of the Administrative\nLaw Judge and adopts them for the purposes of this review.\" Petitioner\nalso did not contest before us the ALJ's conclusions on the laches,\nequitable estoppel, or double jeopardy arguments raised below.\n5. Section 1128(c), as revised in 1987, requires an effective date\nand reasonable notice consistent with paragraph (2) of section 1128(c).\nParagraph (2) merely requires that \"an exclusion shall be effective with\nrespect to services furnished to an individual on or after the effective\ndate of the exclusion.\" The regulations in effect before the 1987\nrevision provide for the timing and the notice of the exclusion in a\nmanner that is fully consistent with the revised statutory provisions.\nSee 42 C.F.R. 1001.123, providing for notice of suspension based upon a\ncriminal conviction related to Medicare or Medicaid and for the effect\nof the suspension.\n6. Section 1001.123 of 42 C.F.R. (cited by the ALJ as 1001.323)\nstates, in part:\n(a) Whenever the OIG has conclusive information that a\npractitioner or other individual has been convicted of a crime\nrelated to his or her participation in the delivery of medical\ncare or services under the Medicare, Medicaid, or the social\nservices program, it will give the party written notice that\nhe or she is suspended from participation in Medicare\nbeginning 15 days from the date on the notice.\n7. The ALJ made no mention in this case of any necessity for the type\nof evidentiary hearing referred to in the Chestney footnote. Presumably\nhe thought the time involved was so long as to be untimely without any\nneed for evidence.\n8. Section 1128(f)(1) of the Act provides for reasonable notice and\nopportunity for a hearing to the same extent as is provided in section\n205(b). Section 205(b) also speaks of \"reasonable notice and\nopportunity for a hearing.\"\n9. The other two cases cited by the ALJ, Federal Deposit Insurance\nCorp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988), and Brock v. Roadway Express,\nInc., 471 U.S. 252 (1987), discuss procedural due process and\npostsuspension remedies generally, but have no pertinence", "num_pages": 16, "num_chars": 36018, "is_b7": false, "b7_matches": 0, "cites_1001_901": false, "ocr_used": false, "category": "excl_b6_quality_care", "excl_b6_quality_care_matches": 1}
2
+ {"id": "1991.11.18DAB1281 Leonard R. Friedman, M.D. vs. The Inspector General", "source_path": "DAB PDFs\\1991.11.18DAB1281 Leonard R. Friedman, M.D. vs. The Inspector General.pdf", "text": "Leonard R. Friedman, M.D., DAB No.\n1281 (1991)\nDEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES\nDepartmental Appeals Board\nAppellate Division\nIn the Case of:        \nLeonard R.\nFriedman, M.D.,\nPetitioner ,\n- v. -\nThe Inspector General.   \nDATE:  November 18, 1991\nDecision No. 1281\n        FINAL DECISION ON REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE\n     DECISION\nPetitioner , Dr . Leonard R. Friedman, appealed the decision of\nAdministrative Law Judge (ALJ) Constance T. O'Bryant affirming the\ndetermination of the Inspector General (I.G.) to exclude Petitioner from\nparticipating in the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  See Leonard R.\nFriedman, M.D., DAB CR125 (1991)(C-269).\nPetitioner's exclusion was based on section 1128(b)(4)(A) of the Social\nSecurity Act (Act), which permits the exclusion of an individual or\nentity--\n whose license to provide health care has been revoked or\n suspended by any State licensing authority, or who otherwise\n lost such a license, for reasons bearing on the individual's or\n entity's professional competence, professional performance, or\n financial integrity.\nThe Inspector General excluded Petitioner from the Medicare and Medicaid\nprograms on the grounds that the Office of Professional Discipline of\nthe State Education Department of New York had revoked Petitioner's\nlicense to practice medicine in the State of New York.  Petitioner's\nexclusion is to remain in effect until he .obtains a valid license to\npractice medicine in either Massachusetts or New York.\nBased on the following analysis, we affirm the ALJ's decision to uphold\nPetitioner's exclusion.\nBackground\nThe ALJ made the following findings and conclusions:\n1.  Petitioner is a physician specializing in forensic psychiatry and\nheld a valid license to practice medicine in the State of Massachusetts\nprior to June 24, 1987 and in the State of New York prior to November\n29, 1989.\n2.  On or about June 24, 1987, the Massachusetts Board of Registration\nin Medicine issued a Final Decision and Order whereby Petitioner's\nlicense to practice medicine in Massachusetts was revoked.  The Board\nfound that Petitioner , a psychiatrist, engaged in sexual activity with\none of his patients, during one or more office visits made by the\npatient.  The Board concluded that Petitioner committed \"gross\nmisconduct in the practice of medicine.\"\n3.  The Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine concluded that\nPetitioner's conduct in engaging in sexual activity with his patient\nduring one or more office visits demonstrated a lack of good moral\ncharacter and undermined public confidence in the integrity of the\nmedical profession.\n4.  The Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine is the duly\nauthorized professional disciplinary agency of that state.\n5.  In November , 1989 the New York State Education Department revoked\nPetitioner's license to practice medicine.\n6.  The New York State revocation was based on its findings that:\n     [Petitioner] has been found guilty, after an administrative hearing\n     in the State of Massachusetts, of improper professional practice\n     and professional misconduct by a duly authorized professional\n     disciplinary agency of another state, which conduct would, if\n     committed in New York State, constitute professional misconduct\n     under New York Education Law section 6509(9) in conjunction with 8\n     NYCRR section 29.1(b)(5) and 8 NYCRR section 29.4(a)(5)(i) --\n     conduct in the practice of a profession which evidences moral\n     unfitness to practice the profession and which conduct includes any\n  ��  physical contact of a sexual nature between physician and patient\n     -- as set forth in the statement of charges and the record herein.\n7.  The New York State Education Department is a state licensing\nauthority within the meaning of section 1128(b)(4)(A).\n8.  Physical conduct of a sexual nature between physician and patient is\na professional activity and is related to Petitioner's professional\ncompetence and professional performance.\n9.  Petitioner's license was revoked by the Massachusetts Board for\nreasons bearing on his professional competence and professional\nperformance.\n10.  Petitioner's license was revoked by the New York State Department\nof Education for reasons bearing on his professional competence and\nprofessional performance within the meaning of section 1128(b)(4)(A) of\nthe Act.\n11.  By letter dated July 5, 1990, the I.G. notified Petitioner that he\nwould be excluded from the Medicare and Medicaid programs until he\nobtained a valid license to practice medicine in New York.\n12.  The I.G. subsequently modified his position and gave notice to\nPetitioner that he would be excluded from the Medicare and Medicaid\nprograms until he obtained a valid license to practice medicine in\neither New York or Massachusetts.\n13.  Section 1128(b)(4)(A) authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human\nServices (and his delegate, the I.G.) to impose and direct exclusions of\nindividuals whose license to provide health care has been revoked by any\nState licensing authority for reasons bearing on professional competence\nor professional performance.  42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(b)(4)(A).\n14.  The I.G. had authority to exclude Petitioner under section\n1128(b)(4)(A) of the Act.\n15.  The I.G.'s exclusion of Petitioner until he obtains a valid license\nto practice medicine in either New York or Massachusetts is reasonable.\nALJ Decision at 2-4.\nIn his appeal, Petitioner did not identify the specific findings and\nconclusions with which he disagreed.\nAnalysis\nIn his Appeal Brief, Petitioner advanced a number of extensively\nresearched arguments in his challenge to this exclusion. 1/  In summary,\nPetitioner argued that the New York revocation was not a basis for a\nsection 1128(b)(4) exclusion because both the New York revocation and\nthe Massachusetts revocation, on which the New York revocation was\nbased, violated constitutional and common law standards and were\ntherefore invalid.  Specifically, Petitioner stated these eight\nsubstantive exceptions to the ALJ Decision:\n     (1)  The acceptance of the New York decision by the Administrative\n     Law Judge reflects unacceptable legal reasoning which violates\n     Anglo-American common law history and republican constitutional\n     guarantees;\n.    (2)  Appropriate judicial interpretation of the case demands the\nuse of constitutional principles of constitutional rights, privileges\nand immunities and of the appropriate constitutional interpretation of\nfundamental fairness;\n     (3)  The Administrative Law Judge's decision based on a New York\n     decision opens up federal questions of whether the pre-Act decision\n     of Massachusetts violated state or federal constitutionally\n     protected rights;\n     (4)  The union of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the\n     same [State licensing] agency is an unconstitutional violation of\n     common law and constitutional principles;\n     (5)  Only total separation of the prosecutorial and judicial\n     functions in an independent hearing officer [in the State licensing\n     proceedings] is the constitutional interpretation of due process\n     rights;\n     (6)  The underlying constitutional issue is a constitutional\n     privilege for an independent tenured hearing examiner to have heard\n     the [State licensing] case at any level for the federal judge to\n     grant full faith and credit to the New York decision;\n     (7)  The New York Decision creates an ex post facto judgment under\n     the Act by bootstrapping the Massachusetts decision onto the New\n     York decision and fails to pass the protections of the Fifth\n     Amendment to the Constitution.\n     (8)  The Massachusetts and New York decisions are flawed by not\n     having a finding of harm to the patient to meet the test of common\n     law harm and the statutory standards of the Act.\nPetitioner's Appeals Brief at 1, 6, 9, 10, 14, 20, 25, 32.\nOn the basis of the following analysis, we reject Petitioner's\nchallenges to the ALJ Decision and affirm and adopt all of the ALJ's\nfindings and conclusions.\n A.  In a section 1128(b)(4) exclusion proceeding, the I.G. is\n entitled to rely on revocation actions of state licensing\n authorities and is not required to examine the fairness of such\n state processes.  Therefore, arguments pertaining to the\n fairness of the state processes are not relevant to this\n exclusion proceeding.\nPetitioner contended that the procedures and standards used in the\nMassachusetts and New York revocations violated constitutional and\ncommon law principles and therefore were not a basis for exclusion under\nsection 1128(b)(4)(A) of the Act.  Petitioner relied extensively on the\nwritings of Sir Edward Coke, particularly in Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.\n638 (K.B. 1609), and other treatises on the development of\nadministrative law.\nIn light of the language and history of section 1128(b)(4)(A), we reject\nPetitioner's arguments and find that Petitioner's challenges to the\nprocedures or standards used by the Massachusetts and New York licensing\nauthorities are not relevant to the I.G.'s authority to exclude him\npursuant to section 1128(b)(4)(A).\nSection 1128(b)(4)(A) was enacted as part of the Medicare and Medicaid\nPatient Protection Act of 1987 in which Congress sought to expand the\nI.G.'s authority to exclude certain individuals and entities from\nparticipating in Medicare and Medicaid.  To achieve this goal, Congress\nauthorized the I.G. to do either of the following:  (A) to rely on the\nresults of other forums such as courts (sections 1128(a) and 1128(b)(1),\n(2), (3)), other federal agencies (section 1128(b)(5)), and state\nlicensing authorities (section 1128(b)(4)); or (B) to make an\nindependent determination of improper conduct (sections 1128(b)(6), (7),\n(8)).\nBy enacting section 1128(b)(4)(A), Congress granted the I.G. authority\nto rely on the fact of a state licensing authority's revocation and did\nnot intend for the I.G. to review the process and standards used by the\nstate licensing authority.  We base this conclusion on the following:\n     o  The basis of an exclusion under section 1128(b)(4)(A) is the\n     fact of a state license revocation \"for reasons bearing on the\n     individual's or entity's professional competence, professional\n     performance, or financial integrity.\"  There is no requirement in\n     that section that the I.G. go behind the state proceeding to review\n     the state process and standards used in the revocation process.\n     o  Rather than burden the I.G. with a de novo review of a state's\n     process and standards, the legislative history indicates that\n     Congress intended to expand and strengthen the I.G.'s authority to\n     exclude practitioners based on the actions of state licensing\n     authorities.  S. Rep. No. 109, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted\n     in 1987 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 682.  The only qualification\n     of the I.G.'s authority in the legislative history concerns \"minor\n     infractions.\"  The Senate Finance Committee report indicated that\n     Congress expected the I.G. not to exclude practitioners for\n     revocations based on \"minor infractions not relating to quality of\n     care, such as failure to pay licensing fees or violations of strict\n     advertising requirements.  In these limited circumstances, the\n     exclusion penalty would, in the Committee's view, be too harsh.\"\n     Id. at 688.  The reason given here for the license revocation\n     certainly cannot be characterized as such a minor infraction.\n     o  This division of responsibilities between the state and federal\n     governments is reasonable since state licensing authorities have a\n     compelling interest in the practice of professions within their\n     boundaries and in insuring that practitioners operating pursuant to\n     state licenses are qualified and honest.  Goldfarb v. Virginia\n     State Bar , 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).  They are the most appropriate\n     authorities to determine whether a license should be revoked\n     because they have a fundamental interest in the practitioner's\n     fitness, better access to the evidence concerning fitness, and more\n     experience and expertise in applying the relevant state licensing\n     standards.\n     o  Construing section 1128(b)(4)(A) to preclude collateral attacks\n     on state licensing authorities' revocations does not infringe on\n     the constitutional rights of practitioners.  Since state licensing\n     proceedings are subject to the due process and equal protection\n     clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (Schware v. Board of Bar\n     Examiners of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 238 (1957)) practitioners\n     can directly attack the validity of the process and substance of\n     state proceedings.  If there are constitutional infirmities,\n     practitioners have appeal rights which include certiorari review by\n     the United States Supreme Court.  28 U.S.C. 1257.  Therefore,\n     practitioners' constitutional rights are adequately and more\n     appropriately protected by direct appeal from state revocation\n     decisions.\n     o  Allowing practitioners to attack collaterally the decisions of\n     state licensing authorities in the exclusion process would\n     unnecessarily encumber that process by granting practitioners a\n     remedy which duplicates a pre-existing remedy.  Such collateral\n     attacks would also be wasteful, because the Departmental Appeals\n     Board would have no power to reform the actions of the offending\n     state licensing authority, and would potentially subject a\n     practitioner's patients to two proceedings concerning a\n     practitioner's offenses.\n     o  Federal and state governments spend hundreds of billions of\n     dollars annually for the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  See Staff\n     of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,\n     Overview of Entitlement Programs 131, 1290 (Comm. Print 1990).  In\n     such immense programs, in which tens of thousands of licensees\n     participate, Congress reasonably sought a variety of methods of\n     identifying and excluding practitioners who are a threat to the\n     programs' integrity.  Reliance on the results of state licensing\n     authorities is such an appropriate method, particularly in light of\n     state authorities' primary jurisdiction over and interest in the\n     conduct of their own licensees.\nThe Departmental Appeals Board has previously determined that claims of\nimpropriety in state license revocation proceedings are not relevant to\ndeciding whether the I.G. acted properly to impose and direct exclusions\npursuant to section 1128(b)(4)(A).  See John W. Foderick, M.D., DAB No.\n1125 (1990); Andy E. Bailey, C.T., DAB No. 1131 (1990); see also Frank\nWaltz, M.D., DAB CR41 (1989) (C-86).  Therefore, an exclusion proceeding\nmay not be used by Petitioner to mount a collateral attack on the state\nboards' decisions.  If Petitioner believes that there are serious flaws\nin either or both state decisions, he must challenge them in the\nappropriate forum. 2/\nFor the foregoing reasons we reject Petitioner's exceptions 1 through 6\nand 8, and we affirm the ALJ's findings and conclusions.\n     B.  Section 1128(b)(4)(A) does not require the state licensing\n     authority or the I.G. to make a finding that a patient was actually\n     \"harmed\" by the conduct which constitutes the basis for the license\n     revocation.\nIn addition to arguing that common law standards require the\nMassachusetts or New York licensing authorities to have made a finding\nof \"harm\" to the patient before revoking his license to practice\nmedicine, Petitioner also argued that a finding of \"harm\" to the patient\nwas required as an element of a section 1128(b)(4)(A) exclusion.\nAccepting for the sake of argument that Petitioner's patient suffered no\nharm in this case, we disagree with Petitioner's construction of section\n1128.  The elements of a section 1128(b)(4)(A) exclusion are a state\nlicense revocation or suspension of a license for \"reasons bearing on\nthe individual's . . . professional competence, professional\nperformance, or financial integrity.\"  There is no requirement that an\nidentifiable patient have actually suffered harm as a result of the\noffending conduct.  In this case, the basis of the revocation,\nPetitioner's \"sexual activity\" with his patient, clearly bears on his\nprofessional competence and performance and therefore the exclusion\nfalls within the terms of section 1128(b)(4)(A). 3/\nThe legislative history of the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program\nProtection Act of 1987 supports this reading of section 1128(b)(4)(A).\nThe purpose of the Act was \". . . to protect the beneficiaries of those\nprograms from incompetent practitioners and from inappropriate or\ninadequate care.\"  S. Rep. No. 109, supra at 688.  There is no\nsuggestion that the I.G. must identify a specific patient who has\nsuffered actual harm, only that the care at issue be incompetent,\ninappropriate, or inadequate.\nTo read \"harm\" into the requirements of section 1128(b)(4)(B) would\ninappropriately hamper the I.G.'s authority to exclude practitioners who\nrepresent a threat to their patients and the federal programs.  In some\ncases, certain proven conduct, while unethical or an improper\nprofessional practice, does not cause actual harm.  However , the mere\nfact of the conduct could evidence such fundamental moral unfitness or\nincompetence that it would be inappropriate and unnecessary for\nlicensing authorities or the I.G. to identify a victim who was actually\n\"harmed.\"  Engaging in \"sexual activity\" with a psychiatric patient\ncertainly falls within the range of substandard care from which the I.G.\nis authorized to protect program beneficiaries and whether any\nparticular patient was proved to be \"harmed\" is irrelevant to the I.G.'s\nauthority to exclude under section 1128(b)(4)(A).\nFor the foregoing reasons we reject Petitioner's exception 8, and we\naffirm the ALJ's findings and conclusions.\n     C.  Section 1128(b)(4)(A) is not being applied retroactively by the\n     I.G. in this case.\nSection 1128(b)(4)(A) of the Act was enacted August 18, 1987 and became\neffective September 1, 1987.  Massachusetts revoked Petitioner's license\nin June of 1987, prior to the enactment of section 1128(b)(4)(A).  New\nYork revoked his license in November of 1989, after the enactment of\nsection 1128(b)(4)(A).  The federal exclusion proceedings were commenced\nin July of 1990 on the basis of the New York revocation.\nIn revoking Petitioner's license, the New York licensing authority\nadopted Massachusetts' findings that Petitioner had engaged in sexual\nactivity with a patient and concluded that such conduct, if committed in\nNew York, would constitute professional misconduct and grounds for\nlicense revocation.  I.G. Ex. 2.  Petitioner argued that section\n1128(b)(4)(A) was being applied retroactively because New York adopted\nthe Massachusetts' findings and did not afford him a second evidentiary\nhearing to contest the original charges that he had engaged in sexual\nactivity with a patient. 4/\nFor the following reasons, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the I.G.\ncould rely on the New York revocation to exclude Petitioner even though\nthe New York decision was based on the findings of the Massachusetts\nboard. 5/\nFirst, there is simply no question that section 1128(b)(4)(A) applies to\nany revocation proceeding commencing after its effective date, September\n1, 1987.  Since the New York proceeding was commenced in 1989, it\npostdates the amendment of section 1128 and is subject to section\n1128(b)(4)(A). 6/\nSecond, as we previously discussed, under the terms of section\n1128(b)(4)(A), the critical element is the fact of a revocation for\nreasons bearing on professional competence, performance or financial\nintegrity.  The nature of the revocation proceeding, the date of the\noffensive conduct or the sequence of any prior proceedings are not\nrelevant to the I.G.'s authority to exclude.  Therefore, the fact that\nNew York adopted the Massachusetts findings of fact and did not afford\nPetitioner a second evidentiary hearing is irrelevant to a section\n1128(b)(4)(A) exclusion. 7/  Similarly, the fact that New York adopted\nthe findings of fact which Massachusetts had adopted prior to September\n1, 1987 is irrelevant to a section 1128(b)(4)(A) exclusion. 8/\nMoreover , allowing Petitioner to avoid the application of section\n1128(b)(4)(A) on the grounds that the New York revocation is derivative\nof the Massachusetts revocation would frustrate one of Congress' primary\ngoals in enacting that section.  The legislative history of section\n1128(b)(4) demonstrates that one of the main problems Congress sought to\naddress with the 1987 amendments was the phenomenon of a doctor losing\nhis license in one state and then using a preexisting license in another\nstate to continue or reestablish his participation in Medicare and\nMedicaid.  S. Rep. No. 109, supra at 684.  In this case, the\nMassachusetts revocation occurred in June 1987, the amendment to section\n1128 occurred in September 1987, and the New York revocation occurred in\nNovember 1989.  By retaining his New York license and the option of\nparticipating in Medicare and Medicaid in New York long after the 1987\namendments, Petitioner brought himself within the terms of 1128(b)(4).\nHaving preserved his option to participate in the these health programs\nwell after the revocation of his Massachusetts license and the amendment\nof section 1128, he cannot now complain that section 1128 is being\nretroactively applied to him.\nFor the foregoing reasons we reject Petitioner's exception 7 and we\naffirm the ALJ's findings and conclusions.\nConclusion\nBased on the analysis above, we affirm the ALJ's April 10, 1990 decision\nsustaining Petitioner's exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid\nprograms.\n _____________________________ Judith A. Ballard\n _____________________________ Theodore J. Roumel\n _____________________________ Cecilia Sparks Ford Presiding\n Board Member\n1.  At the oral argument conducted in this appeal, Petitioner also\nobjected to the participation of the Departmental Appeals Board staff\nattorney in the case.  Transcript of argument conducted August 2, 1991\nat 7.  Petitioner subsequently filed a Supplemental Memorandum\nconcerning this objection and contended that a staff attorney's presence\n\"casts unconstitutional doubts over the judicial nature of the\nproceeding.\"  This objection is overruled.  As the Presiding Panel\nMember explained at the time of the argument, it is the Board's routine\nand standard procedure to use staff attorneys in developing its cases\nand their presence does not constitute ex parte contact.  Id. at 10.\nFurther , the use of staff assistants by administrative hearing officers\nis well accepted.  See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); KFC\nNational Management Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 497 F. 2d 298, 303-305 (2nd Cir .\n1974); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. C.A.B., 379 F.2d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir .\n1967); Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, section 17.8 (2nd ed.).\n2.  The record shows that Petitioner did, in fact, challenge the\ndecision of the Massachusetts licensing authority in the Massachusetts\nSupreme Judicial Court.  His appeal was heard first by a single justice\nof the court and then by four justices.  In the two decisions issued by\nthat court, dated November 14, 1989 and December 18, 1989, the court\naffirmed the license revocation action taken by the Massachusetts Board.\nI.G. Exs. 5 and 6.\nWhile there is no evidence in the record that Petitioner attacked the\nNew York revocation, New York law provides for judicial review of the\ndecisions of the New York licensing authority.  See N.Y. Education Law\nsection 6510-a.4.\n3.  The record clearly supports the ALJ's finding that Petitioner's\nrevocation was for reasons which bear on his professional competence and\nperformance.  For example, the Massachusetts Board of Registration in\nMedicine cited the minimal standards for ethical behavior for\npsychiatrists promulgated by the American Psychiatric Association in\nPrinciples of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to\nPsychiatry.  Those standards state that \"Sexual activity with a patient\nis unethical.\"  I.G. Ex. 4 at 46.  The standards contain explanatory\npassages setting forth why the prohibition on sexual activity between a\npsychiatrist and his patient is particularly critical to the treatment\nrelationship.  Id.  Further , the New York revocation was based on N.Y.\nEduc. Law section 6509(9) pursuant to which such activity constitutes\nprofessional misconduct and 8 NYCRR section 29.1(b)(5) pursuant to which\nsuch activity constitutes conduct in the practice of a profession which\nevidences moral unfitness to practice the profession.  All of these\nstandards go to aspects of Petitioner's competence and performance in\ntreating patients.\n4.  Petitioner makes reference to the term \"ex post facto\" but does not\ncite to the United States Constitution.  The ex post facto clause of the\nUnited States Constitution is found at Article I, Section 9.  It\nprohibits any statute \"which makes more burdensome the punishment for a\ncrime, after its commission . . . .\"  Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167,\n169-170 (1925).  However , the ex post facto clause applies only to\n\"punishments.\"  Whether an exclusion constitutes a \"punishment\" has been\nconsidered by the United States District Court for the Southern District\nof Florida.  In Manocchio v. Sullivan, C.A. No. 90-8114 (S.D. Fla. July\n12, 1991) the court found that the exclusion penalty was remedial and\nits purpose was to protect the Medicare and Medicaid programs rather\nthan to punish the excluded individual.  Because exclusions were not\npunitive, the Court found that the ex post facto clause did not apply to\nexclusions.  Cf.  United States v. Halper , 490 U.S. 435 (1989).  In\nHalper , the Supreme Court found that civil penalties imposed after a\ncriminal conviction could constitute \"punishment\" under the Double\nJeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment where the amount of the penalty\n($130,000) bore no relation to the goal of compensating the government\nfor its estimated loss ($16,000).  However , in exclusion cases, the\nrelationship between the exclusion of a practitioner whose license has\nbeen revoked and the goal of protecting Medicare and Medicaid from\nuntrustworthy or incompetent practitioners is apparent.\n5.  The ALJ addressed the question of whether the fact that the conduct\nat issue occurred prior to the amendment of section 1128(b)(4) prevented\nthe I.G. from relying on section 1128(b)(4) in this case.  We agree with\nthe ALJ that the I.G. has authority to exclude for conduct which\noccurred prior to the amendment of section 1128(b)(4).  See ALJ Decision\nat 7-8.  However , we find that the focus of Petitioner's argument\nconcerns not the date of the conduct but the fact that New York relied\non the Massachusetts decision which pre-dated the amendment of section\n1128(b)(4).\n6.  Note 54 of the Historical and Statutory Notes provides that Pub. L.\n100-93, section 2, which amended section 1128, was effective September\n1, 1987 and would not apply to administrative proceedings commenced\nbefore that date.  Because that note goes on to say that subsection\n(c)(3)(B) shall not apply to exclusions based on convictions occurring\nbefore August 18, 1987, it appears that the term \"administrative\nproceeding\" refers to the federal exclusion proceeding rather than the\nstate revocation proceeding.  However , since the New York revocation\nproceeding commenced after the effective date of the amendment, we do\nnot reach the question of whether the term \"administrative proceeding\"\nrefers to the state revocation proceeding or the federal exclusion\nproceeding.\n7.  We note however that New York specifically found that the\nMassachusetts procedures were constitutionally adequate:  \". . . we do\nnot find any constitutional infirmity in the Massachusetts\nadministrative hearing relied on by petitioner herein that would prevent\nthe Massachusetts decision from being accorded full faith and credit in\nNew York.\"  I.G. Ex. 2 at 3.  If this New York conclusion is erroneous,\nPetitioner was entitled to seek judicial review of the revocation.  See\nn. 2.\n8.  See Vincent Baratta, DAB No. 1171 (1990), in which the Departmental\nAppeals Board sustained an exclusion based on a state revocation which\npost-dated the amendment of section 1128(b)(4)(A) but which stemmed from\na conviction which pre-dated the", "num_pages": 13, "num_chars": 28481, "is_b7": false, "b7_matches": 0, "cites_1001_901": false, "ocr_used": false, "category": "excl_b6_quality_care", "excl_b6_quality_care_matches": 1}
3
+ {"id": "1992.02.14DAB1300 Charles J. Godreau, M.D. vs. The Inspector General", "source_path": "DAB PDFs\\1992.02.14DAB1300 Charles J. Godreau, M.D. vs. The Inspector General.pdf", "text": "Charles J. Godreau, M.D., DAB No. 1300\n(1992)\nDepartment of Health and Human Services\nDEPARTMENTAL APPEALS BOARD\nAppellate Division\nIn the case of:            \nCharles J. Godreau, M.D.,   \nPetitioner ,          \n- v. -            \nThe Inspector General.     \nDATE: February 14, 1992 \nDocket No. 91-152\nDecision No. 1300\nFINAL DECISION ON REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION ON\nFEE AWARD\nThis case is before us on exceptions filed by the Inspector General\n(I.G.) to the September 20, 1991 decision of Robert J. Kelly, an\nadministrative law judge (ALJ) in the Office of Hearings and Appeals,\nSocial Security Administration (ALJ Decision).  The ALJ Decision awarded\nattorney fees and expenses to Charles J. Godreau, M.D. (Petitioner)\nunder the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. .504. 1/  Section\n504 provides for an award of fees and other expenses incurred by a\nprevailing party (other than the United States) in an agency\nadjudication.  Petitioner applied for such an award after the ALJ, in a\ndecision dated November 30, 1990, had reversed the I.G.'s determination\nto exclude Petitioner from participation in the Medicare program and\nstate health care programs for a period of ten years pursuant to section\n1128(b)(6)(B) of the Social Security Act.\nThe I.G. did not dispute that Petitioner was entitled to an award of\nfees and expenses; however , he took exception to the ALJ's decision to\naward attorney fees at a rate in excess of $75 per hour .\nFor the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the ALJ erred in\nawarding attorney fees in excess of $75 per hour and modify the ALJ\nDecision to provide for attorney fees not in excess of $75 per hour . 2/\nWe note that, during the course of the proceedings before the Board,\nPetitioner identified additional fees and expenses for which he\nrequested reimbursement under EAJA.  As discussed in the last section of\nthis decision, however , consideration of this request is outside the\nscope of this proceeding.\nRelevant Statutory and Regulatory Provisions\nCongress enacted EAJA in 1980 as a result of its concern that certain\nindividuals and organizations \"may be deterred from seeking review of,\nor defending against, unreasonable government action because of the\nexpense involved in securing the vindication of their rights.\"  H.R.\nREP. NO. 1418, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1980).  EAJA contains separate\nprovisions authorizing the award of fees and expenses to the prevailing\nparty in administrative adjudications (5 U.S.C. .504) and in civil\nactions (codified at 28 U.S.C. .2412).  As originally enacted, EAJA\nprovided for the repeal of sections 504 and 2412 effective October 1,\n1984.  Public Law 96-481, sections 203(c) and 204(c).  However , in 1985,\nCongress revived EAJA without any provision for automatic repeal.\nPublic Law 99-80, section 6.\nThe provisions of EAJA applicable to agency adjudications state in\npertinent part:\n An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award,\n to a prevailing party other than the United States, fees and\n other expenses incurred by that party in connection with that\n proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds\n that the position of the agency was substantially justified or\n that special circumstances make an award unjust.  Whether or not\n the position of the agency was substantially justified shall be\n determined on the basis of the administrative record, as a\n whole, which is made in the adversary adjudication for which\n fees and other expenses are sought.\n5 U.S.C. .504(a)(1).  \"Fees and other expenses\" are defined as:\n the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses . . . and reasonable\n attorney or agent fees (the amount of fees awarded under this\n section shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind\n and quality of the services furnished, except that . . .\n attorney or agent fees shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per\n hour unless the agency determines by regulation that an increase\n in the cost of living or a special factor , such as the limited\n availability of qualified attorneys or agents for the\n proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.)\n5 U.S.C. .504(b)(1)(A).\nSection 504(c)(1) provides in pertinent part that \"[a]fter consultation\nwith the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States,\neach agency shall by rule establish uniform procedures for the\nsubmission and consideration of applications for an award of fees and\nother expenses.\"\nRegulations implementing EAJA were promulgated by the Department of\nHealth and Human Services (Department) on October 4, 1983.  45 C.F.R.\nPart 13.  Section 13.2 states that the regulations \"apply to adversary\nadjudications pending before the Department between October 1, 1981 and\nSeptember 30, 1984.\"  Section 13.6(b) states in pertinent part that an\naward of fees made under EAJA \"may not exceed $75 per hour , regardless\nof the actual rate charged by the attorney.\"\nOn June 19, 1987, the Department promulgated proposed regulations which\nwould extend the coverage of 45 C.F.R. Part 13 to include adjudications\nthat were pending after September 30, 1984.  52 Fed. Reg. 23311.  While\ncertain other changes in the original regulations were proposed, no\nchange was proposed in the $75 per hour limit on fee awards.  As of the\ndate of this decision, final regulations had not been promulgated.  .The\nALJ Decision To Award Fees\nAs previously indicated, the I.G. challenged only that part of the ALJ\nDecision which pertains to the rate at which attorney fees are to be\nreimbursed.  The ALJ characterized the issue before him as \"whether the\nPetitioner is entitled to reimbursement of fees and expenses at the\n`statutory' or the `market' rate.\"  ALJ Decision, p. 10.  The ALJ noted\nthe I.G.'s argument that any award should be limited to $75 per hour\nbecause the Department has not promulgated regulations authorizing an\naward in excess of that amount and the proposed regulations limit the\naward of fees to $75 per hour .  The ALJ also noted Petitioner's argument\nthat, absent final regulations, an award could properly be made at a\nrate in excess of $75 per hour because the statute specifically\ncontemplates the award of fees in excess of that rate under special\ncircumstances.  The ALJ found the latter argument \"persuasive,\" stating:\n Although the statute clearly delineated the need for\n effectuating regulations which have not yet been promulgated, it\n also clearly enunciated the fact that the statutory rate might\n be inequitable under certain circumstances.  The undersigned\n does not feel that the Petitioner should be penalized because\n the Secretary has not yet finalized regulations proposed more\n than four years ago, especially when the intent of Congress, as\n codified by statute, is clear .\nALJ Decision, p. 10. 3/\nThe ALJ therefore proceeded to consider whether special factors\nwarranted an hourly rate in excess of $75, finding that --\n [i]n fact, several \"special factors\" do exist, not the least of\n which is the behavior of the OIG, which surely cost the\n Petitioner more to prepare his case than he would otherwise have\n had to spend to defend himself had the OIG's actions not been so\n deficient procedurally.  Further , because of the complexities\n created by the OIG's unorthodox methods, and the severity of the\n sanction imposed, Dr . Godreau was justified in seeking special\n counsel to represent him.  The Petitioner originally sought\n local counsel, who advised him to retain a \"specialist.\"\n Unfortunately, the availability of local attorneys qualified to\n handle such a specialized case is limited, and Dr . Godreau was\n referred to Mr . Meals, who has significant, nation-wide\n experience in handling similar claims.  Therefore, the\n Administrative Law Judge concludes that the Petitioner is\n entitled to reimbursement at a higher rate than $75 an hour .\nALJ Decision, pp. 10-11.\nThe I.G. filed three exceptions to the ALJ Decision: (1) to the ALJ's\nfinding that the fee award could be calculated at the \"market\" rate\nrather than the \"statutory\" rate; (2) to the ALJ's finding that \"special\nfactors\" existed in this case; and (3) to the ALJ's finding that the\ngovernment acted in bad faith.  As discussed below, we conclude that the\nI.G.'s first exception is well-taken and that the ALJ had no authority\nto award attorney fees in excess of $75 per hour .  The I.G.'s remaining\nexceptions raise substantial questions as to whether there was a\nreasonable basis for an award of fees in excess of $75 per hour even if\nthe ALJ had the authority to make such an award.  However , we need not\naddress these questions in view of our holding on the first exception.\nThe I.G.'s exception to the ALJ's finding that the fee award could be\ncalculated at the \"market\" rate rather than the \"statutory\" rate\nIn support of this exception, the I.G. argued that the ALJ lacked\nauthority to award fees at a rate in excess of $75 per hour because the\nregulations promulgated by the Department specifically limit fee awards\nto $75 per hour .  The I.G. further argued that the ALJ's view that\nPetitioner had been prejudiced by the Department's failure to issue\nfinal regulations was \"baseless\" since the proposed regulations retained\nthe $75 per hour limit on fee awards and \"there is no reason to believe\nthat the agency's final regulation will be any different.\"  I.G.'s\nmemorandum dated 11/18/91, p. 14.  The I.G. also argued that section 504\nunambiguously provides that an award may not exceed $75 per hour unless\nthe Department \"determines by regulation\" that special factors may exist\nwhich justify such an award.  Finally, the I.G. argued that section 504\nconstitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity and that the statutory\nlanguage must therefore be strictly construed.\nIn response to this exception, Petitioner asserted that Congress\nintended that each agency promulgate rules authorizing fees in excess of\n$75 per hour under specified circumstances.  Petitioner argued that the\nI.G. should not be permitted to undermine Congressional intent by simply\nfailing to promulgate a final rule.  Petitioner also asserted that,\nwhile a rate of $75 per hour might have been reasonable when the\nDepartment's initial rule was promulgated in 1983, in 1991 that rate\n\"would not fully compensate a client for hiring even the most\ninexperienced lawyer at most major urban law firms.\"  Petitioner's\nmemorandum dated 1/7/92, p. 9.  Thus, in Petitioner's view, if\nreimbursement is limited to $75 per hour , the effect would be to \"render\nconsideration of any special factors an exercise in futility . . . .\"\nId. (emphasis in original).\nAt issue here is the proper construction of the language in section\n504(b)(1)(A) which states that \"attorney . . . fees shall not be awarded\nin excess of $75 per hour unless the agency determines by regulation\nthat an increase in the cost of living or a special factor . . .\njustifies a higher fee.\" 4/  In our view, this language is clear on its\nface:  attorney fees are limited to $75 per hour unless the agency\nissues a regulation which permits the award of a higher fee based on an\nincrease in the cost of living or some special factor .  There is nothing\nin this language which requires the agency to issue a regulation\npermitting a higher fee; instead, the general prohibition on fees in\nexcess of $75 per hour stands \"unless\" there is an agency regulation\nwhich permits a higher fee.  Thus, the award of a higher fee in this\ncase cannot reasonably be based on the theory that the Department\ndefaulted on an obligation to provide for higher fees. 5/\nMoreover , although the language in section 504(c)(1) stating that \"each\nagency shall by rule establish uniform procedures for the submission and\nconsideration of applications for an award of fees\" expressly requires\nthat each agency issue implementing regulations, there is no indication\nthat these regulations must provide for the award of fees in excess of\n$75 per hour .  In addition, the legislative history of this section does\nnot indicate that Congress expected the agencies to include such a\nprovision in their regulations. 6/   Moreover , reading the statute to\npermit an ALJ to issue an award in excess of the $75 per hour limit only\nif the agency has authorized such an award by regulation makes sense\nsince the agency has responsibility for administering the appropriated\nfunds involved, as well as the programmatic expertise necessary to\nevaluate potential \"special factors\" which may be present in cases\nbefore the agency.  This approach also prevents arbitrary\ndecisionmaking. 7/\nSince the statute leaves it to the discretion of each agency whether to\npermit awards of attorney fees at a rate in excess of $75 per hour ,\nPetitioner's assertion that he could not have retained even\ninexperienced counsel for $75 per hour is irrelevant.  Moreover ,\ncontrary to Petitioner's argument, our conclusion that the award here is\nlimited to $75 per hour does not make the statutory reference to special\nfactors meaningless since an agency may choose by regulation to\nauthorize higher fees on the basis of special factors.\nEven if there were some ambiguity in the language of the statute, we\nconclude that, under the circumstances, the ambiguity should be resolved\nin the I.G.'s favor .  As the I.G. pointed out, courts have held that\nsection 504 is in effect a waiver of sovereign immunity, and that, as\nsuch, it must be construed as narrowly as possible.  See, e.g.,\nRuckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 678 (1983).  Thus, we must adopt\nany reasonable reading of the statute which limits the amount of the\ngovernment's liability.  Here, the plain wording of the statute\ncontemplates that any determination to pay more than $75 per hour is a\ndiscretionary one, to be exercised by regulation rather than through\ncase-by-case adjudication.\nAdditional Fees and Expenses\nDuring the course of the proceedings before the Board, Petitioner ,\nacting pro se, advised the Board that he had incurred additional legal\nbills as a result of his exclusion from the Medicare program, and in\neffect requested that the Board modify the ALJ's award to cover amounts\nidentified in invoices from two law firms which he provided.  In\nresponse to the Board's request for comment, the I.G. stated that awards\nmay be made for the reasonable expenses incurred by a prevailing party\nin pursuing and defending a fee award.  The I.G. nevertheless took the\nposition that an additional award was not warranted here.  The I.G.\nalleged, among other things, that Petitioner's request (1) was not made\nin the proper format, (2) included amounts which were not related to\nproceedings on the EAJA application and (3) included amounts already\nclaimed and awarded or amounts which could have been claimed in the\napplication submitted to the ALJ but were not. 8/\nWe conclude that the issue of whether additional fees and expenses\nshould be awarded is outside the scope of this proceeding.  The Board's\nauthority extends only to review of ALJ decisions on applications for\nawards under section 504.  Since the ALJ has not considered Petitioner's\nrequest for an additional award, there is nothing for us to review at\nthis point.  If, however , Petitioner applies to the ALJ for an\nadditional award, Petitioner may file exceptions to any decision by the\nALJ denying all or part of the application for award.  Any additional\naward would of course be subject to the $75 per hour limit which we find\ngoverns here.\nConclusion\nFor the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the ALJ erred in\nawarding attorney fees in excess of $75 per hour .  Accordingly, we\nmodify the ALJ Decision to provide for attorney fees only to the extent\nthey do not exceed $75 per hour .\n _____________________________ Donald F. Garrett\n _____________________________ Norval D. (John) Settle\n _____________________________ Judith A. Ballard Presiding Panel\n Member\n1.  The I.G.'s redelegation of authority to the Board to review\ndecisions on fee awards in I.G. proceedings is dated August 26, 1991.\n2.  The ALJ specifically stated that the amount awarded consisted of\n$43,916 in attorney fees and $9,663.82 of expenses.  ALJ Decision, p.\n12.  Petitioner had previously indicated that, if attorney fees were\nlimited to $75 per hour , the award of attorney fees would be $25,850\ninstead of $43,916.  Petitioner's Reply Brief in Response to OIG's\nMemorandum Opposing His Application for an Award of Attorney's Fees and\nExpenses, dated 5/13/91, p. 15.  Subject to verification of this amount\nby the I.G., we therefore conclude that attorney fees should be limited\nto $25,850.\n3.  In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ did not consider the contrary\nholding in the April 30, 1990 decision of the Assistant Inspector\nGeneral for Management and Policy in M.M. Cassim, M.D., Docket No.\nHIP-000-01-0017.\n4.  The language quoted establishes a limit on the general rule in\nsection 504(b)(1)(A) that attorney fees \"shall be awarded at prevailing\nmarket rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished . . . .\"\nNeither party relied on this language in support of its position,\nhowever .\n5.  This view of the statute is supported by model rules issued by the\nAdministrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) for the guidance\nof federal agencies in implementing EAJA.  The preamble to the model\nrules states that the statute \"authorizes fees in excess of $75 per hour\nonly where agencies have so provided by rule.\"  46 Fed. Reg. 32900,\n32904 (June 25, 1981).  The preamble also states that \"agencies have\nauthority to raise the ceiling on hourly rates of attorneys by\nrulemaking . . . . \"  Id. at 32905.  The model rules themselves include\na section which states that an agency \"may adopt regulations providing\nthat attorney fees may be awarded at a rate higher than $75 per hour\"\nand which explains how agency rulemaking may be initiated.  Id. at\n32913.   ACUS's understanding of the statute, reflected in model rules\nin place for more than a decade, is significant since section 504(c)(1)\nrequires that each agency consult with ACUS before issuing a rule\nimplementing EAJA.\n6.  The House report on the Senate bill that was ultimately enacted\nmerely states with respect to this provision that \"[i]t is intended that\nthe rules specify that an award will be made unless the government comes\nforward with a showing that its case was substantially justified or\nspecial circumstances make an award unjust.\"  H.R. REP. NO. 1418, supra,\np. 16.  The conference committee report itself merely states that \"[t]he\nSenate bill directs that uniform implementing regulations with respect\nto application by prevailing parties for an award shall be published by\neach agency . . . .\"   H.R. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 23\n(1980).\n7.  It is arguable that a different result might be warranted in a\nsituation where the Department indicated a preliminary recognition in a\nproposed rule that awards in excess of $75 per hour would be proper if\nspecial factors were present.  Here, however , the proposed regulations\nlimit fees to $75 per hour .  Since the award of higher fees would not\nhave been authorized if these regulations had been issued in final form,\nit can hardly be argued that the failure to issue final regulations was\nthe only barrier to the award of higher fees.\n8.  The I.G. also requested that the January 21, 1992 letter in which\nPetitioner made this request be stricken from the record on the grounds\nthat it \"contains scurrilous accusations which are unsupported by the\nevidence contained in the administrative record\" and that these\naccusations are not relevant to the issue of whether additional fees\nshould be awarded.  I.G. submission dated 2/6/92.  We conclude that it\nis not necessary to strike the letter from the record, however , since\nthe Board accords no weight to statements which are either unsupported\nby the evidence or", "num_pages": 9, "num_chars": 19810, "is_b7": false, "b7_matches": 0, "cites_1001_901": false, "ocr_used": false, "category": "excl_b6_quality_care", "excl_b6_quality_care_matches": 1}
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