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5778794 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 | """Read-only code-inspection tools over one source file, for agents on both
sides: the fix loop (harness/generate.py) and the evidence agent
(eval/evidence_agent.py).
A leaf module, like status.py, and the second deliberate exception to "eval
never imports harness": this is a security boundary, and a boundary kept in
two copies drifts apart. It imports nothing from either side.
The boundary, outermost first:
- The agent never sees the real file. ReadOnlySource writes a *copy* into a
fresh temp directory outside the repo, then makes the file and the
directory read-only. inputs/<name>/world.html is not reachable through
these tools at all, and nothing here can write — the model-generated file
being inspected is untrusted, and so is whatever an agent decides to run.
- `shell` is not a shell. No interpreter is started (no `shell=True`), so
`;`, `&&`, `$(…)`, backticks, globbing and redirection have no meaning;
the ones that look like control operators are refused outright rather
than passed through as literal text. `|` pipelines are built by hand.
- Every stage's program is on an allowlist of text readers, and the
flags that would make one write (`sed -i`, `sort -o`, …) are refused.
- Path arguments may not escape the temp directory (`/…`, `~…`, `..`).
- The environment is scrubbed (fixed PATH, no HOME, no API keys).
There is deliberately no way to *run* the inspected JavaScript: evaluating
untrusted generated code is a different risk class from reading it.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import re
import shlex
import shutil
import stat
import subprocess
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS = 12_000 # per call; the agent pages with read_lines / head / sed ranges
MAX_READ_LINES = 400 # per read_lines call, same reason
SHELL_TIMEOUT_S = 15
FILE_NAME = "world.html"
_ALLOWED = {"grep", "egrep", "head", "tail", "wc", "nl", "cut", "sort", "uniq", "tr", "cat", "sed"}
_CONTROL = {";", "&", "&&", "||", ">", ">>", "<", "<<", "(", ")", "&>", ">&", "|&"}
_SED_SCRIPT = re.compile(r"^(\d+|\$)(,(\d+|\$))?p$")
_SAFE_ENV = {"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin", "LC_ALL": "C"}
DEPS_DIR = "deps"
def dep_path(url: str) -> str:
"""deps/<host>/<path> for a fetched module URL — readable, and never able
to climb out of the copy's directory whatever the URL contains."""
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
parts = urlsplit(url)
segments = [parts.netloc, *parts.path.split("/")]
safe = [re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._@-]", "_", seg) for seg in segments if seg and seg not in (".", "..")]
return "/".join([DEPS_DIR, *safe]) or f"{DEPS_DIR}/module.js"
class ReadOnlySource:
"""A read-only temp copy of one source text (as world.html), plus any
extra files (the modules the page imported, under deps/), and the tools
over them.
Line numbers in every tool's output are the files' own, so a quote an
agent finds can be checked against the real file afterwards.
"""
def __init__(self, text: str, extra: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> None:
self._dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="wb-source-"))
self._files: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
self._unlock()
for rel, body in (extra or {}).items():
self._put(rel, body)
self._put(FILE_NAME, text)
self._lock()
# -- lifecycle ---------------------------------------------------------
def _unlock(self) -> None:
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(self._dir):
Path(root).chmod(stat.S_IRWXU)
for f in files:
(Path(root) / f).chmod(stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IWUSR)
def _lock(self) -> None:
for root, dirs, files in os.walk(self._dir, topdown=False):
for f in files:
(Path(root) / f).chmod(stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IRGRP | stat.S_IROTH)
Path(root).chmod(stat.S_IRUSR | stat.S_IXUSR)
def _put(self, rel: str, text: str) -> None:
path = self._dir / rel
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")
self._files[rel] = text.split("\n")
@property
def extra_paths(self) -> list[str]:
return [rel for rel in self._files if rel != FILE_NAME]
def refresh(self, text: str) -> None:
"""Replace world.html's contents (the fix loop, after an edit lands)."""
self._unlock()
self._put(FILE_NAME, text)
self._lock()
def close(self) -> None:
if self._dir.exists():
self._unlock()
shutil.rmtree(self._dir, ignore_errors=True)
def __enter__(self) -> ReadOnlySource:
return self
def __exit__(self, *exc) -> None:
self.close()
# -- tools -------------------------------------------------------------
def grep(self, pattern: str, ignore_case: bool = False, context: int = 0, file: str = FILE_NAME) -> str:
"""Python regex over one file (or every file with file="*"); matches as
`N: line` for world.html and `path:N: line` for anything else."""
try:
rx = re.compile(pattern, re.I if ignore_case else 0)
except re.error as exc:
return f"ERROR: bad regex ({exc})"
targets = list(self._files) if file == "*" else [file]
missing = [t for t in targets if t not in self._files]
if missing:
return f"ERROR: no file {missing[0]!r} (files: {', '.join(self._files)})"
context = max(0, min(int(context), 20))
blocks, total = [], 0
for rel in targets:
lines = self._files[rel]
hits = [i for i, line in enumerate(lines) if rx.search(line)]
total += len(hits)
shown: dict[int, None] = {}
for i in hits:
for j in range(max(0, i - context), min(len(lines), i + context + 1)):
shown.setdefault(j, None)
prefix = "" if rel == FILE_NAME else f"{rel}:"
blocks.extend(f"{prefix}{j + 1}: {lines[j]}" for j in sorted(shown))
if not total:
return "no matches"
return _clip(f"{total} matching line(s)\n" + "\n".join(blocks))
def read_lines(self, start: int, end: int, file: str = FILE_NAME) -> str:
"""Lines start..end (1-based, inclusive) of one file as `N: line`."""
if file not in self._files:
return f"ERROR: no file {file!r} (files: {', '.join(self._files)})"
lines = self._files[file]
total = len(lines)
start = max(1, int(start))
end = min(total, int(end), start + MAX_READ_LINES - 1)
if start > total:
return f"ERROR: {file} has only {total} lines"
body = "\n".join(f"{n}: {lines[n - 1]}" for n in range(start, end + 1))
return _clip(f"{file} lines {start}-{end} of {total}\n{body}")
def shell(self, command: str) -> str:
"""Run an allowlisted read-only pipeline in the copy's directory."""
try:
stages = _parse_pipeline(command)
except ValueError as exc:
return f"REFUSED: {exc}"
procs: list[subprocess.Popen] = []
try:
prev = None
for argv in stages:
proc = subprocess.Popen(
argv,
cwd=self._dir,
env=_SAFE_ENV,
stdin=prev.stdout if prev else subprocess.DEVNULL,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
text=True,
)
if prev and prev.stdout:
prev.stdout.close() # so an early-exiting reader (head) ends the writer
procs.append(proc)
prev = proc
out, _ = procs[-1].communicate(timeout=SHELL_TIMEOUT_S)
for proc in procs[:-1]:
proc.wait(timeout=SHELL_TIMEOUT_S)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
for proc in procs:
proc.kill()
return f"ERROR: timed out after {SHELL_TIMEOUT_S}s"
except FileNotFoundError as exc:
return f"ERROR: {exc}"
code = procs[-1].returncode
out = out or ""
if code not in (0, 1) or (code == 1 and out): # grep exits 1 on "no match": not an error
out = f"{out}\n[exit {code}]"
return _clip(out.strip() or "(no output)")
def tools(self) -> list:
"""The three tools as LangChain tools bound to this copy."""
from langchain_core.tools import tool
source = self
@tool
def grep(pattern: str, ignore_case: bool = False, context: int = 0, file: str = FILE_NAME) -> str:
"""Search a file with a Python regex; every match as `N: line`, with `context`
lines around each. `file` defaults to world.html; pass a deps/... path to search an
imported module, or "*" to search every file."""
return source.grep(pattern, ignore_case, context, file)
@tool
def read_lines(start: int, end: int, file: str = FILE_NAME) -> str:
"""Read lines start..end (1-based, inclusive) of a file (default world.html, or a
deps/... path) as `N: line`. Page through long ranges with several calls."""
return source.read_lines(start, end, file)
@tool
def shell(command: str) -> str:
"""Run a read-only command pipeline in the directory holding world.html (and deps/,
the modules the page imported). Allowed programs: grep, egrep, head, tail, wc, nl,
cut, sort, uniq, tr, cat, and `sed -n 'A,Bp'`. Pipes `|` work; redirection, `;`,
`&&` and subshells don't. Example: grep -rn "from 'three'" deps | head"""
return source.shell(command)
return [grep, read_lines, shell]
def _clip(text: str) -> str:
if len(text) <= MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS:
return text
return text[:MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS] + f"\n… [truncated at {MAX_OUTPUT_CHARS} chars — narrow the search or page]"
def _parse_pipeline(command: str) -> list[list[str]]:
lexer = shlex.shlex(command, posix=True, punctuation_chars="|;&<>()")
lexer.whitespace_split = True
try:
tokens = list(lexer)
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValueError(f"could not parse command ({exc})") from exc
if not tokens:
raise ValueError("empty command")
stages: list[list[str]] = [[]]
for tok in tokens:
if tok == "|":
stages.append([])
elif tok in _CONTROL or tok.startswith(("|", ";", "&", ">", "<")):
raise ValueError(f"{tok!r} is not allowed — only `|` pipelines of allowed programs")
else:
stages[-1].append(tok)
for argv in stages:
_check_stage(argv)
return stages
def _check_stage(argv: list[str]) -> None:
if not argv:
raise ValueError("empty pipeline stage")
prog = argv[0]
if prog not in _ALLOWED:
raise ValueError(f"{prog!r} is not allowed (allowed: {', '.join(sorted(_ALLOWED))})")
for arg in argv[1:]:
if arg.startswith(("/", "~")) or arg == ".." or arg.startswith("../") or "/../" in arg:
raise ValueError(f"path {arg!r} is outside the source directory")
if prog == "sed":
flags = [a for a in argv[1:] if a.startswith("-")]
scripts = [a for a in argv[1:] if not a.startswith("-") and a != FILE_NAME]
scripts = [a for a in scripts if not a.startswith(DEPS_DIR + "/")]
if flags != ["-n"] or len(scripts) != 1 or not _SED_SCRIPT.match(scripts[0]):
raise ValueError("sed is only allowed as: sed -n 'A,Bp' world.html")
if prog == "sort" and any(a.startswith(("-o", "--output")) for a in argv[1:]):
raise ValueError("sort -o writes a file")
if prog == "uniq" and len([a for a in argv[1:] if not a.startswith("-")]) > 1:
raise ValueError("uniq with an output file writes a file")
if prog in ("grep", "egrep") and any(a.startswith(("-f", "--file")) for a in argv[1:]):
raise ValueError("grep -f is not needed here; pass the pattern directly")
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