hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
|---|---|---|---|
389f9b67c003a620147a83200e3331ae | 36.851 | 7.2.7.1.1 Channel bandwidths per operating band for CA | Table 7.2.7.1.1-1: Supported E-UTRA bandwidths per CA configuration for inter-band CA
CA operating / channel bandwidth
E-UTRA CA Configuration
E-UTRA Bands
1.4 MHz
3 MHz
5 MHz
10 MHz
15 MHz
20 MHz
CA_3A-38A
3
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
38
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes |
389f9b67c003a620147a83200e3331ae | 36.851 | 7.2.7.1.2 UE cCo-existence studies for 1UL/2DL | Table 7.2.7.1.2-1 presents the harmonic analysis for UE with single uplink. There are no harmonic frequency products interfering own downlink bands but Band 3 second harmonic will fall into band 42 frequency range.
Table 7.2.7.1.2-1: 1UL B3 + B38 harmonic products
UE UL carriers
f1_low
f1_high
f2_low
f2_high
UL frequen... |
389f9b67c003a620147a83200e3331ae | 36.851 | 7.2.8 LTE Advanced Carrier Aggregation of Band 19 and Band 42 (1 UL) | Table 7.2.8-1: Inter-band CA operating bands
E-UTRA CA Band
E-UTRA Band
Uplink (UL) band
Downlink (DL) band
Duplex
mode
BS receive / UE transmit
Channel BW (MHz)
BS transmit / UE receive
Channel BW (MHz)
FUL_low – FUL_high
FDL_low – FDL_high
CA_19-42
19
830 MHz
–
845 MHz
5, 10, 15
875 MHz
–
890 MHz
5, 10, 15
FDD
... |
389f9b67c003a620147a83200e3331ae | 36.851 | 7.2.8.1.2 Co-existence studies for CA_19-42 | The harmonic frequencies do not fall into the frequency ranges of both bands as observed in table 7.2.8.1.2-1. Therefore we can conclude that there is no issue on harmonic interference.
Table 7.2.8.1.2-1: Impact of UL/DL Harmonic Interference
2nd Harmonic
3rd Harmonic
2nd Harmonic
3rd Harmonic
Band
UL Low Band Edge
... |
389f9b67c003a620147a83200e3331ae | 36.851 | 7.2.7.1.2 Co-existence studies for 1UL/2DL | Table 7.2.7.1.2-1 presents the harmonic analysis for UE with single uplink. There are no harmonic frequency products interfering own downlink bands but Band 3 second harmonic will fall into band 42 frequency range.
Table 7.2.7.1.2-1: 1UL B3 + B38 harmonic products
UE UL carriers
f1_low
f1_high
f2_low
f2_high
UL frequen... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 1 Scope | The present document contains the up-to-date SA5 Work Item Descriptions (WIDs) and captures the status of all SA5 work items in the current Release.
This TR is used as a mean to provide input to the 3GPP work plan handled by MCC. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
• References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• Fo... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3 Feature: Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning (OAM8) UID_340063 | |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3.1 BB: Network Infrastructure Management | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#36(07)0296
Meeting #36, 4 – 7 June 2007, Busan, KOREA
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: WID Telecom Management Methodology - Unique_ID 35051
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.4x (OAM8) - OAM&P Rel 8
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-070672
Mee... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 10 Expected Output and Time scale (to be updated at each plenary) | New specifications
[If Study Item, one TR is anticipated]
Spec No.
Title
Prime rsp. WG
2ndary rsp. WG(s)
Presented for information at plenary#
Approved at plenary#
Comments
32.275
MMTel Charging
SA5
SA#41 Sep 2008
SA#43 Mar 2009
Affected existing specifications
[None in the case of Study Items]
Spec No.
CR
Subject
Appr... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14c The WI is a Work Task: parent Building Block | UID_390010 EPC Data Definitions |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 9 Impacts | Affects:
UICC apps
ME
AN
CN
Others
Yes
No
X
X
X
X
X
Don't know |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 1 3GPP Work Area | Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services
2 Linked work items
OAM&P 8 (Operations, Administration, Maintenance & Provisioning), Feature: OAM8
3 Justification
Circuit is a logic link between two exchange network nodes which bear the user data such as voice, e.g. 64K slot of one 2M E1. Traffic route represents the route via ... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14a The WI is a Feature: List of building blocks under this feature | (list of Work Items identified as building blocks) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14b The WI is a Building Block: parent Feature | UID_370059 IMS Multimedia Telephony and Supplementary Services (Acronym: IMSTSS) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 1 3GPP Work Area * | X
Radio Access
X
Core Network
Services |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 2 Classification of WI and linked work items | |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 2.0 Primary classification * | This work item is a … *
Study Item (go to 2.1)
Feature (go to 2.2)
Building Block (go to 2.3)
X
Work Task (go to 2.4) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 2.1 Study Item | Related Work Item(s) (if any]
Unique ID
Title
Nature of relationship
Go to §3. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 2.2 Feature | Related Study Item or Feature (if any) *
Unique ID
Title
Nature of relationship
Go to §3. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 2.3 Building Block | Parent Feature (or Study Item)
Unique ID
Title
TS
340064
OAM Network Infrastructure Management (OAM8-NIM)
This work item is … *
Stage 1 (go to 2.3.1)
Stage 2 (go to 2.3.2)
Stage 3 (go to 2.3.3)
Test spec (go to 2.3.4)
Other (go to 2.3.5)
2.3.1 Stage 1
Source of external requirements (if any) *
Organization
Document
Re... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3 Justification * | The XML definitions for the IRPs below were not specified in Rel-8. These definitions are required for implementation of a Rel-8 Notification Log IRP. It is not possible to log the notifications generated by Rel-8 implementations of these IRPs. Furthermore, these XML definitions are needed in the specification of SO... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 4 Objective * | The objective is to create the missing specifications listed below. These specifications are needed to support a Rel-8 Notification Log implementation. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 5 Service Aspects | None. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 6 MMI-Aspects | None. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 7 Charging Aspects | None. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 8 Security Aspects | None. |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 9 Impacts * | Affects:
UICC apps
ME
AN
CN
Others
Yes
X
X
No
X
X
X
Don't know |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 10 Expected Output and Time scale * | New specifications *
[If Study Item, one TR is anticipated]
Spec No.
Title
Prime rsp. WG
2ndary rsp. WG(s)
Presented for information at plenary#
Approved at plenary#
Comments
TS 32.125
“Telecommunication management; Advanced Alarm Management (AAM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); ”
SA5
SA#46
SA#46
TS 32.355
“Telecomm... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3.2 BB: Performance Management | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#36(07)0301
Meeting #36, 4 – 7 June 2007, Busan, KOREA
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: WID IP bearer network Performance measurement definitions - Unique_ID 35061
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.4x (OAM8) - OAM&P Rel 8
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Ma... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3.3 BB: Trace Management | This BB has been created in the 3GPP Work Plan in order to host the CT1 Work Task
UID_11067 Service Level Tracing in IMS (OAM8-Trace) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3.4 OAM&P Studies (OAM8-Study) UID_340067 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#36(07)0307
Meeting #36, 4 – 7 June 2007, Busan, KOREA
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: WID Study of Element Operations Systems Function (EOSF) definition - Unique_ID 35065
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 11.28 (OAM-Study) - OAM&P Studies
3GPP TSG... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 4 Feature: Charging Management small Enhancements (CH8) UID_350016 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#35(07)0077
Meeting #35, 12 - 15 March 2007, Lemesos, Cyprus
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: R8 WID Online charging correlation
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 13 Proposed New WIDs (not part of an existing feature)
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Managemen... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14c The WI is a Work Task: parent | Feature UID_370059 IMS Multimedia Telephony and Supplementary Services (Acronym: IMSTSS)
BB: UID_370062 IMS Multimedia Telephony Service (Acronym: IMS-MMTel) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 11 Work item rapporteurs | Gavin WONG, Vodafone (gavin.wong (at) vodafone.com) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 12 Work item leadership | SA5 |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 13 Supporting Companies | Vodafone, Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson, Huawei, Nokia Siemens Networks, Orange |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14 Classification of the WI (if known) | Study Item (no further information required)
Feature (go to 14a)
Building Block (go to 14b)
X
Work Task (go to 14c) |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 5 Feature: 3G Long Term Evolution - Evolved Packet System RAN part UID_20068 | |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 5.1 BB: E-UTRAN Data Definitions UID_390001 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#37(07)0617
Meeting #37, 17 - 20 September 2007, Riga, LATVIA
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: WID on Subscriber and Equipment Trace for eUTRAN and EPC (OAM8) - OAM&P Rel 8
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.22 (OAM8) - OAM&P Rel 8
3GPP TSG-SA5 (T... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 6 Feature: 3GPP System Architecture Evolution Specification - Evolved Packet System (non RAN aspects) UID_320005 | |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 6.1 BB: EPC Data Definitions UID_390010 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#38(07)0737
Meeting #38, 03 - 06 December 2007, Cancun, MEXICO
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: New WID on EPC NRM IRP
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.21 (SAES) - 3GPP System Architecture Evolution Specification - Evolved Packet System (non RAN... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 6.2 BB: EPC Charging | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#38(07)0736
Meeting #38, 03 - 06 December 2007, Cancun, MEXICO
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: New WID on EPC Charging
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.21 (SAES) - 3GPP System Architecture Evolution Specification - Evolved Packet System (non RA... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 7 Feature: IMS Multimedia Telephony and Supplementary Services UID_370059 | |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 7.1 BB: AoC support in IMS Charging | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#38(07)0739
Meeting #38, 03 - 06 December 2007, Cancun, MEXICO
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: New WID on Advice of Charge (AoC) support in IMS Charging
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.26 (CH8) - Charging Management small Enhancements
3GPP TSG... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 7.2 BB: IMS Multimedia Telephony Service UID_370062 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#38(07)0749
Meeting #38, 03 - 06 December 2007, Cancun, MEXICO
Source: SA5 (Telecom Management)
Title: New WID on Multimedia Telephony Service and Supplementary Services (MMTel) Charging
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 10.26 (CH8) - Charging Management s... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 8 Feature: UTRA HNB UID_390033 | |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 8.1 BB: 3G Home NodeB OAM&P (type 1 definition) (HNB-3G_OAM) UID_420037 | Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects TSGS#42(08)0708
Meeting #42, 8 - 11 December 2008,
Athens, Greece
3GPP TSG-SA5 (Telecom Management) S5-082488
Meeting SA5#62, 17~21 November 2008, Miami, USA
Source: Huawei Technologies, Nokia Siemens Network, Ericsson
Title: New WT-level WID on 3G Home NodeB OA... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 3 Justification | In order to complement the work done in RAN, it’s SA5 responsibility to provide corresponding OAM solution for 3G Home NodeB. SA5 will need to standardize management services that are specific to Home NodeB because of the following Home NodeB characteristics:
• The quantity of Home NodeB is likely to be large
• There m... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 4 Objective | This work Item is to define corresponding OAM solution for 3G Home NodeB on interface type 1 management. The workitem will include (but not necessarily limited to):
4.1 Management on Standard Interfaces type 1 for 3G Home NodeB:
• Investigate what management standardization work are needed for management of 3G Home No... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 10 Expected Output and Time scale | New specifications
[If Study Item, one TR is anticipated]
Spec No.
Title
Prime rsp. WG
2ndary rsp. WG(s)
Presented for information at plenary#
Approved at plenary#
Comments
32.581
Home NodeB OAM&P concepts and requirements(for interface type1)
SA5
SA#43 Mar 2009
SA#43 Mar 2009
32.582
Home NodeB OAM&P Stage2(for interfa... |
75b0bc4f802ad76b9632a25b25224d00 | 30.818 | 14b The WI is a Building Block: parent | Feature UID_390033 UTRA HNB (Acronym: HNB)
Annex A:
List of SA5 Release 8 specifications
Type
Number
Title
rapporteur
TR
30.818
Project scheduling and open issues for SA5, Release 8
ZOICAS, Adrian
TS
32.121
Advanced alarming on Itf-N Integration Reference Point (IRP); Requirements
SUERBAUM, Clemens
TS
32.122
Advanced ... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 1 Scope | This document studies the security architecture, i.e. the security features and the security mechanisms for inter-access mobility between 3GPP access system and non-3GPP access systems. For the general architecture for inter-access mobility cf. TR 23.882. This report is meant to provide more detail on the security aspe... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
• References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• Fo... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following apply:
Access network: one of following access network: GPRS IP access, WLAN 3GPP IP access, WLAN Direct IP access LTE, WiMax, etc.
Data origin authentication: The corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed.
WLAN 3GPP IP Access: Access to an IP n... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
Gi Reference point between GPRS and an external packet data network
Wi Reference point is similar to the Gi reference point, applies to WLAN 3GPP IP Access
Wm Reference point is located between 3GPP AAA Server and Packet Data Gateway respectively b... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
AAA Authentication Authorisation Accounting
AN Access network
APN Access Point Name
BSF Bootstrapping Function
DS-MIPv6 Dual stack MIP
FA Foreign Agent
GBA Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
GGSN Gateway GPRS Support Node
HA Home agency
HN Ho... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4 Authentication protocols across access systems | Editor’s note: it will be decided later if this section is needed in the final report.
It is assumed that an SAE user has a USIM which is used as user credential in authentication.
Authentication protocols are assumed to be run between the UE and an authentication server in the home network. It is likely there will alw... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4.1 UMTS AKA | UMTS AKA will be used across UTRAN. It is still to be decided by SA3 whether UMTS AKA or EAP-AKA will be used over LTE. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4.2 EAP-AKA | EAP-AKA may be used across I-WLAN and for WiMAX. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 4.3 Others | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 5 Establishment of security contexts in the target access system | Each type of access system may require there own security contexts, which may need to be available to protect the access network. An example is an MSK key in a WLAN access system using an EAP method for authentication and key agreement. The MSK is then used to derive further keys.
An example of an access system more co... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 5.1 Establishment of security contexts with the support of SAE | In this case, the credentials the UE shares with the 3G AAA server are used to establish security contexts in the access system. An example of this case is I-WLAN Direct IP access, where the SIM or USIM are used to establish MSK required to protect the WLAN link layer. Another example is likely WiMAX: the WiMAX Forum i... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 5.2 Establishment of security contexts without the support of SAE | In this case, credentials other than those available in 3G networks are used to establish security contexts in the non-3GPP access system. An example of this case is WiMAX when WiMAX-specific credentials are used to set up IP connectivity across WiMAX. SAE plays no role in this set up, so the establishment of these sec... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 6 Establishment of IPsec tunnel between UE and PDG across the target non-3GPP access system (if required) | One of the two variants of the S2 interface in the SAE architecture, cf. TR 23.882, allows to connect an access system to the evolved SAE packet core via an IPsec tunnel between the UE and a PDG. WLAN 3GPP IP access is an example of the use of such a tunnel, but WLAN is not the only access system which may be connected... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 6.1 The source access system has a UE-PDG tunnel | An example of this case is mobility between two I-WLAN 3GPP IP access systems. The problem to be solved is to retain the IPsec tunnel even when the IP address of the UE changes due to mobility.
There are two cases here: the PDG remains the same or the PDG changes.
If PDG remains the same, the existing IPsec tunnel coul... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 6.2 The source access system does not have a UE-PDG tunnel | An example of this case is mobility between a 3GPP access system, such as LTE or UTRAN, and an I-WLAN 3GPP IP access system. The problem to be solved is to set up the IPsec tunnel in the target system in an efficient way.
Neither MOBIKE nor an additional layer of Mobile IP will help here. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7 Security for IP based mobility | There may be several layers of Mobile IP being used in a complete SAE system, including access networks. E.g. there is a WiMAX-internal Mobile IP layer. The considerations in this section are concerned with the outermost such layer, where the related Home Agent 3GPP HA resides in the 3G network. It is still to be decid... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.1 General requirement | Major security threats related to IP mobility, when the procedures are not properly secured, are:
- IP address ownership needs to be verified else redirection attacks will happen
- Traffic sent to a target redirected elsewhere
- Attacker can blackhole traffic to a victim
- Attacker can insert itself on-path as a Man-in... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.2 Host based Mobility | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.2.1 Security associations used with Mobile IP | Figure 1 gives an overview of the MIP security associations which need to be present irrespective of the version of Mobile IP used. More security associations may be required for certain versions of Mobile IP. E.g. for Mobile IP v4 with a Foreign Agent, security associations between MN and FA, and FA and HA are needed.... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.2.2 Security protocols used with Mobile IP | 1. The security association between the MN and 3GPP AAA is used for (mutual) authentication. In our context, the authentication protocol may be e.g. EAP-AKA. This protocol is independent of Mobile IP, but keys derived from a run of this protocol may be used for Mobile IP purposes.
2. The security association between th... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3 Bootstrapping of Mobile IP parameters | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.1 General | It would be undesirable for SAE if the UE had to obtain security credentials to be used specifically for Mobile IP signalling security. Rather, the security associations required for Mobile IP should be able to be derived from security credentials already available. In the case of SAE, this means that it should be poss... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.2 RFC3957 used in conjunction with GBA | NOTE: this subsection applies only to MIPv4.
MN-HA key generation & distribution based on RFC 3957. This method uses pre-shared secret between MS and AAA server to establish a shared secret between MS and HA and / or MS and FA.
Figure 2: MN-HA key generation & distribution
1. During initial MIPv4 registration, MS inclu... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.3 Use GBA to generate MN-HA key | NOTE: This subsection applies to MIPv4and MIPv6.
In this alternative authentication method, HA is associated with NAF.
Home Agent (HA) is associated with a NAF, and Ks_(ext/int)_NAF would be used as MN-HA key: the MN performs a bootstrapping procedure with the BSF and generates a (master) shared secret, Ks. After that,... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.4 Use partial GBA to derive MN-HA Keys | NOTE: This subsection applies to MIPv4 and MIPv6.
GBA was designed for a situation where a UE wants to securely access potentially many application servers (NAFs), while having to be authenticated to the home network (and consume authentication vectors) in the Ub protocol run only once. Furthermore, the NAFs the UE wan... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.5 Using IKEv2 | Authentication between the MN and the network and IPsec SA setup between the MN and the HA for MIPv6 shall be performed using IKEv2 as defined in the IETF draft [draft-ietf-mip6-bootstrapping-split-02.txt]. In SAE, the home agent communicates with the AAA server to perform mutual authentication. The IKEv2 authenticatio... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.3.6 Security bootstrapping for DS MIPv6 using MIP options | (From S3-070748)
This procedure uses the MIP authentication options defined in RFC4285 [8] to provide authentication of Binding Update and Binding Acknowledgement messages, namely the
• MN-HA Mobility Message Authentication Option and the
• MN-AAA Mobility Message Authentication Option.
The AAA Mobility Message Authent... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4 Network based Mobility | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1 PMIP | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.1 Introduction | This section looks at how PMIP messages need to be protected within the Evolved Packet Core and how PMIP protection needs to be handled if the PMIP messages originate from a trusted non-3GPP network node.
This analysis is based on draft-ietf-netlmm-proxymip6-06.txt [11] from which in particular the sections 4 and 11 ha... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.2 Overview of PMIP usage in 3GPP | (From S3-070756)
PMIPv6 defines a MAG (Mobile Access Gateway) and an LMA (Local Mobility Anchor) from which the LMA will be integrated in the PDN Gateway or Serving Gateway (for the roaming case).
Figure 9: Protocols for MM control and user planes of S2a for the PMIPv6 option
TS 23.402v130 section 5 is relevant in this... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.3 PMIP trust model | PMIPv6 is an IETF based network-based mobility management mechanism, and has applied the same trust model properties as the use of GTP for mobility management in UMTS and the EPC (for the S5 and S2b reference points). This means the MAG i.e. the Serving Gateway (S5) or ePDG (S2b), is sufficiently trusted by the LMA to ... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.4 Security measures on the Reference points between the LMA and the MAG that have a trust relation | PMIPv6 draft [11] section 4 recommends the use of IPsec ESP in Transport Mode (RFC4303) as default security mechanism for integrity protection and data origin authentication for PMIP messages and IKEv2 end-to-end between the MAG and the LMA to establish IPsec security associations. Confidentiality protection of PMIP me... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.5 The need for using strong access authentication with Proxy Mobile IP | Clause 7.4.1.3 discusses the need for trust of the LMA in the correct operation of the MAG. Trust in the MAG means that the LMA can be ensured that the operation of MAG is not somehow influenced by an attacker. Clause 7.4.1.4 discusses the security on the reference point between the MAG and the LMA. Security on this re... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.6 No trust relation between LMA and MAG on S2a | NOTE：This section describes the case when there is no trust relation between the MAG and the LMA. However, what this section describes is not aligned with the assumption of TS33.402v100 section 9.3.1.2. |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.6.1 Security risks | MAG lies in the trusted non-3gpp IP access system in S2a. There may be no trust relation between the MAG and the LMA since they may belong to different operators. In this case, a compromised MAG may make an attack to UE in other MAG’s domain. Also, a compromised MAG may send fake PBU message to update the binding of UE... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.1.6.2 Possible measures | One possible way is to have the mapping between the UE and the serving MAG in one of network servers. When a MAG sends a PBU to a LMA, the LMA can ask this server to check whether this MAG is currently serving the UE. In this way, it will be avoided that a compromised MAG represents UE served by other MAGs to send the ... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 7.4.2 NetLMM | In Network based Localized Mobility Management (NetLMM) the Localized Mobility Anchor (LMA) is configured with a globally routable network prefix which the IP address assigned to UE is composed of, and packets to/from the UE are tunnelled between LMA and Mobile Access Gateways (MAGs). MAG shares the same network prefix... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8 Specific aspects of security for mobility between 3GPP access systems and non-3GPP access systems | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.1 Security for mobility between pre-SAE 3GPP access systems and non-3GPP access systems | It needs to be clarified in the course of the work on SAE mobility to what extent mobility, and, in particular the related security aspects involving pre-SAE 3GPP access systems require a different handling. The goal is, of course, to minimise or completely avoid the differences, but it is currently not clear in how fa... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.2 Security context transfer between 3GPP and trusted non-3GPP access networks | Security context is the information on the current state of a UE in the serving system required to re-establish the security association in the target system. Security context includes
1. Agreed security algorithms between the UE and the serving network,
2. Agreed/derived encryption and/or integrity protection keys and... |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.3 ANDSF Security | |
f1b0a2c921a1d71d732d8ab589640b1a | 33.922 | 8.3.1 General | ANDSF (Access Network Discovery and Selection Function) is a mechanism of access network discovery and selection. It is provided in order to control the UE's inter-system handover decisions and in order to reduce the battery consumption for inter-system mobility. See TS23.402 for more details. However, the privacy of ... |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 1 Scope | The purpose of this document is to contain the updated Work Item Descriptions (WIDs) and capture status of all TSG SA WG5 work items of the current 3GPP Release in order for the group to get an overview of current ongoing work.
This TR is used as a mean to provide input to the complete 3GPP work plan that is handled by... |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 2 References | The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
• References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• Fo... |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 9 Impacts | Affects:
UICC apps
ME
AN
CN
Others
Yes
X
X
No
X
X
Don't know
X |
566267d8c54c8da6ca65b0a2ce396207 | 32.807 | 10 Expected Output and Time scale (to be updated at each plenary) | New specifications
Spec No.
Title
Prime rsp. WG
2ndary rsp. WG(s)
Presented for information at plenary#
Approved at plenary#
Comments
32.4xy
Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace Management Integration Reference Point (IRP): Requirements
SA5
3GPPSA#31
13 - 15 Mar 200625 - 27 Sep 2006
3GPPSA#34
Dec 2006
32.4xy
Subscribe... |
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