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Adversarial tests for L9 (autonomous kill system).
Governing question: can an adversary who has READ THIS FILE either avoid the
kill switch or turn it against the operator?
"""
import pytest
from ames.events import Capability, Event, EventType, NO_PARENT
from ames.canonical import payload_capability_request
from containment.broker import Broker, DenialTracker
from containment.envstate import (
EnvironmentBaseline, EnvironmentMonitor, MutationObservation,
)
from containment.killswitch import (
ABSOLUTE_REASONS, Evidence, KillReason, KillSwitch, KillVerdict, kill_payload,
)
from containment.policy import CapabilityPolicy, CapabilityRequest
from containment.vmspec import HOST_ACTOR_ID, VM_ACTOR_ID
from ames.events import FileOp
from ames.commit import ZERO_DIGEST
def d(b): return bytes([b]) * 32
def sealed(**files):
b = EnvironmentBaseline()
for k, v in files.items():
b.add(k.replace("__", "/"), d(v))
b.seal()
return b
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Absolute rules: one occurrence is proof
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_clean_run_is_not_killed():
assert not KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence()).kill
@pytest.mark.parametrize("evidence,reason", [
(Evidence(containment_failed=True), KillReason.CONTAINMENT_FAILURE),
(Evidence(privilege_escalation_granted=True), KillReason.PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION),
(Evidence(fatal_gate1_codes=("UNATTRIBUTED_ACTION",)), KillReason.UNATTRIBUTED_ACTION),
(Evidence(dormant_actors=1), KillReason.DORMANT_PROCESS),
])
def test_absolute_rules_fire_on_a_single_occurrence(evidence, reason):
"""No threshold to pace under, no window to wait out."""
v = KillSwitch().evaluate(evidence)
assert v.kill and reason in v.reasons and v.absolute
def test_containment_failure_is_absolute_not_scored():
"""A write to a read-only region is not 'a lot of risk'. It is an invariant
that did not hold."""
v = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(containment_failed=True))
assert KillReason.CONTAINMENT_FAILURE in ABSOLUTE_REASONS
assert v.absolute
def test_multiple_reasons_accumulate_in_one_verdict():
v = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(
containment_failed=True, dormant_actors=2,
fatal_gate1_codes=("ORPHAN_SPAWN",)))
assert len(v.reasons) == 3
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The pacing evasion the original flat-threshold design invited
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_patient_mutation_probing_still_trips():
"""An adversary who can read the rules paces one event under every burst
limit. The EWMA is what makes that fail."""
k = KillSwitch(mutation_burst=1000, mutation_window_s=1e-9,
mutation_ewma_threshold=0.30)
v = None
for _ in range(40):
v = k.evaluate(Evidence(unexplained_mutations=1))
assert KillReason.MUTATION_SUSTAINED in v.reasons
assert KillReason.MUTATION_BURST not in v.reasons, "should not look like a burst"
def test_mutation_burst_trips_immediately():
k = KillSwitch(mutation_burst=3)
v = k.evaluate(Evidence(unexplained_mutations=3))
assert KillReason.MUTATION_BURST in v.reasons
def test_denial_signal_from_l2_is_honoured():
t = DenialTracker(burst_threshold=3)
sig = None
for i in range(3):
sig = t.record(denied=True, now=float(i))
v = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(denial_signal=sig))
assert KillReason.DENIAL_BURST in v.reasons
def test_a_single_unexplained_mutation_does_not_kill():
"""Accumulating rules must actually accumulate, or they are absolute rules
with extra words."""
assert not KillSwitch(mutation_burst=5, mutation_ewma_threshold=0.9).evaluate(
Evidence(unexplained_mutations=1)).kill
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The guest must be unable to cause OR prevent a kill
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def ev(etype, seq, actor, payload=b""):
return Event(etype, seq, 1000 + seq, actor, NO_PARENT, payload)
def test_guest_claims_cannot_trigger_a_kill():
"""Otherwise a compromised guest fabricates claims and denies service to the
operator by killing legitimate runs."""
guest_priv = ev(EventType.CAPABILITY_REQUEST, 0, 0x1000,
payload_capability_request(Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE, True, "granted"))
e = Evidence.from_run(ledger_events=[guest_priv])
assert not e.privilege_escalation_granted
assert e.guest_claims_seen == 1
assert not KillSwitch().evaluate(e).kill
def test_the_same_claim_from_the_host_does_trigger_a_kill():
"""Proves the filter is provenance, not content."""
host_priv = ev(EventType.CAPABILITY_REQUEST, 0, HOST_ACTOR_ID,
payload_capability_request(Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE, True, "granted"))
e = Evidence.from_run(ledger_events=[host_priv])
assert e.privilege_escalation_granted
assert KillReason.PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION in KillSwitch().evaluate(e).reasons
def test_guest_flooding_cannot_suppress_a_kill():
"""Padding the log with benign claims must not dilute host evidence."""
events = [ev(EventType.TOOL_CALL, i, 0x1000 + i) for i in range(5000)]
events.append(ev(EventType.CAPABILITY_REQUEST, 5000, HOST_ACTOR_ID,
payload_capability_request(Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE, True, "x")))
e = Evidence.from_run(ledger_events=events)
assert e.guest_claims_seen == 5000
assert KillSwitch().evaluate(e).kill
def test_vm_actor_counts_as_host_observed():
"""The microVM's lifecycle is observed by the host, not claimed by the guest."""
e = Evidence.from_run(ledger_events=[
ev(EventType.CAPABILITY_REQUEST, 0, VM_ACTOR_ID,
payload_capability_request(Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE, True, "x"))])
assert e.privilege_escalation_granted
def test_guest_claim_count_is_recorded_but_never_evaluated():
a = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(guest_claims_seen=0))
b = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(guest_claims_seen=10**6))
assert a.kill == b.kill == False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fail closed
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class ExplodingEvidence:
"""Stands in for evidence whose source has failed -- e.g. the L7 monitor
became unreachable mid-run.
Deliberately NOT an Evidence subclass: Evidence is a frozen dataclass, so a
subclass cannot shadow a field with a raising property. That freezing is
itself the point -- evidence cannot be mutated after construction, including
by a test.
"""
@property
def containment_failed(self):
raise RuntimeError("monitor unavailable")
def test_evaluator_failure_kills_rather_than_passes():
"""An exception in the safety system must never mean 'carry on'. That is how
a monitoring bug becomes a containment bypass."""
v = KillSwitch().evaluate(ExplodingEvidence())
assert v.kill
assert KillReason.EVALUATOR_FAILURE in v.reasons
assert "failing closed" in v.detail
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# No escape hatches
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
"disable", "override", "reset", "clear", "set_threshold", "add_rule",
"remove_rule", "bypass", "allow", "acknowledge",
])
def test_kill_switch_exposes_no_escape_hatch(name):
"""An adversary who can add a rule can add one that never fires."""
assert not hasattr(KillSwitch(), name)
def test_a_trip_is_never_reconsidered():
"""'It stopped happening' is exactly what a successful attacker produces."""
k = KillSwitch()
k.evaluate(Evidence(containment_failed=True))
assert k.tripped
k.evaluate(Evidence()) # clean evidence afterwards
assert k.tripped, "a kill must not be undone by later quiet"
def test_verdict_is_frozen():
v = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(containment_failed=True))
with pytest.raises(Exception):
v.kill = False
def test_evidence_is_frozen():
e = Evidence()
with pytest.raises(Exception):
e.containment_failed = True
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Integration with the layers below
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_l7_containment_failure_flows_through_to_a_kill():
m = EnvironmentMonitor(sealed(__rootfs__libc=1))
m.observe(MutationObservation("/rootfs/libc", FileOp.WRITE, d(1), d(2), 1, 100))
e = Evidence.from_run(monitor=m)
v = KillSwitch().evaluate(e)
assert v.kill and KillReason.CONTAINMENT_FAILURE in v.reasons
def test_l7_unexplained_mutations_flow_through_as_accumulating():
m = EnvironmentMonitor(sealed(__workspace__a=1, __workspace__b=1, __workspace__c=1))
for p, i in (("a", 1), ("b", 2), ("c", 3)):
m.observe(MutationObservation(f"/workspace/{p}", FileOp.WRITE, d(i), d(i + 10), i, 100),
granted_write_paths=frozenset())
e = Evidence.from_run(monitor=m)
assert e.unexplained_mutations == 3
assert not e.containment_failed
assert KillSwitch(mutation_burst=3).evaluate(e).kill
def test_l2_granted_privilege_escalation_flows_through():
"""L2 lists PRIVILEGE_RAISE as never grantable, so a granted one means the
policy engine was bypassed or replaced -- itself the emergency."""
class FakeVerdict: granted = True
class FakeReq: capability = Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE
class FakeDecision: request, verdict = FakeReq(), FakeVerdict()
e = Evidence.from_run(broker_history=[FakeDecision()])
assert KillReason.PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION in KillSwitch().evaluate(e).reasons
def test_real_broker_never_produces_that_condition():
"""The corollary: with L2 intact, the trigger above is unreachable."""
b = Broker(CapabilityPolicy())
for _ in range(50):
b.request(CapabilityRequest(Capability.PRIVILEGE_RAISE, "root"))
e = Evidence.from_run(broker_history=b.history)
assert not e.privilege_escalation_granted
def test_gate1_dormant_process_is_separated_from_lineage_breaks():
e = Evidence.from_run(gate1_violation_codes=["UNTERMINATED_ACTOR"])
assert e.dormant_actors == 1 and e.fatal_gate1_codes == ()
assert KillReason.DORMANT_PROCESS in KillSwitch().evaluate(e).reasons
def test_non_fatal_gate1_codes_do_not_kill():
"""SEQ_GAP and TIME_REGRESSION are recorded by L8 but are not, alone,
evidence that attribution is broken."""
e = Evidence.from_run(gate1_violation_codes=["SEQ_GAP", "TIME_REGRESSION"])
assert not KillSwitch().evaluate(e).kill
def test_kill_is_recordable_as_a_host_observed_event():
v = KillSwitch().evaluate(Evidence(containment_failed=True))
payload = kill_payload(v)
assert payload[1] == 0, "a kill records granted=0"
assert b"KILL[" in payload
def test_verdict_is_deterministic_for_identical_evidence():
e = Evidence(containment_failed=True, dormant_actors=1)
first = KillSwitch().evaluate(e)
for _ in range(20):
v = KillSwitch().evaluate(e)
assert v.reasons == first.reasons and v.kill == first.kill
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