File size: 3,312 Bytes
ed3fb60 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 | # Contributing to CAIO
Thanks for your interest. CAIO is a reference prototype synthesizing ideas
validated separately across several sibling projects (see the README's
"Relationship to other projects" section) — contributions that strengthen
the actual security properties (lineage integrity, capability conservation,
divergence detection, audit tamper-evidence) are especially valuable.
## Getting set up
```bash
git clone https://github.com/kaymyg/caio.git
cd caio
pip install -r requirements-dev.txt
pip install -e .
python -m caio.demo # see it work end to end
pytest -q --cov=caio --cov-report=term-missing # 10 tests, 100% on core.py
```
## Before opening a PR
CI runs the test suite with coverage and the demo script, across Python
3.10–3.12, on every push and PR. Please run that locally first.
If you add a new branch or status code to `Gateway.transact()`, add a test
that exercises it through `gw.transact()` itself, not just the underlying
helper it calls — `test_transact_level_status_mapping` exists specifically
because the original test suite covered `EvidenceGraph.evaluate()` directly
but never asserted what `transact()` actually mapped that result to.
## What especially matters here
- **This is a reference prototype, not a deployable network protocol.** The
agent key-binding check in `Gateway.transact()` is a local
sign/verify-with-a-fresh-nonce consistency check, not a real challenge
issued over an untrusted wire — be precise about this distinction in any
docs or code you touch, don't let it get oversold.
- **`Lease.expires_at` is checked; `Lease.issued_at` is not.** A lease
"valid" from a future timestamp still passes `Gateway.valid()`. This is a
known, documented gap (see README "Known Limitations"), not an oversight
to silently patch — if you fix it, make sure you understand why it was
left out (clock-skew tolerance) before tightening it.
- **The host-divergence detector checks two specific action strings**
(`CRITICAL_TAMPER`, `UNSANCTIONED_EXEC`), not general anomaly detection.
A generic claim/host mismatch only reaches `CAPABILITY_REDUCTION`, not
`QUARANTINE` — that's intentional graduated response, not a bug, but
don't describe it as catching "any divergence" in docs.
- **Nonce replay protection burns the nonce only after key-binding
succeeds** — preserve that ordering if you touch `transact()`; marking a
nonce used before authentication would let an attacker burn a legitimate
agent's nonce with a failed forged request.
## Good places to start
- A real network-level challenge-response protocol to replace the local
key-binding consistency check
- `issued_at` validation (with configurable clock-skew tolerance)
- Persisting `Ledger`/`Audit`/`EvidenceGraph` state instead of in-memory only
- Expanding the host-action taxonomy beyond the current two hardcoded
"bad" actions, ideally via a configurable policy rather than more
hardcoded strings
- A real transport binding (HTTP middleware, gRPC interceptor) around
`Gateway.transact()`
For anything larger, please open an issue first to discuss the approach.
## Commit style
Small, focused commits with a clear one-line summary. No strict format
enforced beyond that.
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