| item_id,item_uid,step,step_name,tier,severity,polarity,weight,question,pass_condition,fail_condition,source_fact,artifact_anchor,source_documents |
| R001,C3:R001,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of USINDOPACOM as the supported command to the USAID-led United States Government response (supported to the Chief of Mission and the USAID DART)?,Names USINDOPACOM as supported GCC and USAID as lead agency,Casts DoD as the lead agency,DoD in support DoS,Higher mission & intent (Fig III-12),07 |
| R003,C3:R003,S1,Higher mission and intent,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: USINDOPACOM intent to act by, with, and through the FRANZ partners, with USAID in the lead and DoD providing only capabilities not reasonably available from civilian responders?",States the by-with-through method and the DoD support construct,Omits either the method or the support boundary,by-with-through |
| R005,C3:R005,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: preservation of Vanuatu sovereignty and partner legitimacy as part of the purpose (not merely relief delivery)?,Captures the sovereignty/legitimacy purpose,Frames the mission as relief logistics only,sovereignty/legitimacy intent,Higher mission & intent (Fig III-12),01 |
| R006,C3:R006,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the instigating event (Category-5 Cyclone RUA struck Efate, devastating Port Vila and damaging Bauerfield Airport and the Lapetasi wharf, with mass casualties and displacement)?","Identifies the cyclone, the damaged ports, and the humanitarian impact",Omits or garbles the instigating event,cyclone landfall and damage,Known facts (III-17),02/05/06 |
| R007,C3:R007,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the directive to prepare foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as requested by the lead agency (USAID)?,Identifies the FHA/HADR directive in support of USAID,Omits the directive,EXORD directive,Known facts (III-17),07 |
| R008,C3:R008,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the fact that DoD support is request-driven, time-bound, cost-reimbursable, and limited to capabilities not reasonably available from civilian responders?","States the unique-capability/last-resort, request-driven limits",Treats DoD as free to act unilaterally or open-endedly,FHA authority limits,Known facts (III-17),07/11/12 |
| R009,C3:R009,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the fact that host-nation consent is not assured and Vanuatu governance is contested, with the Vanua Tasi bloc restricting access?",States the contested-consent fact,Assumes assured host consent,contested consent,Known facts (III-17),05/02 |
| R010,C3:R010,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the fact that apportioned forces are limited and lift, sealift, sea-basing, and ISR are shared, time-phased, and bounded by distance?",Captures limited apportionment and time-phased closure over distance,Assumes full forces immediately available,limited apportionment |
| R011,C3:R011,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: the fact that Bauerfield throughput is degraded and the Lapetasi wharf is partially blocked, requiring sea-based and over-the-shore delivery?",States degraded ports and the sea-basing requirement,Assumes intact ports,degraded ports,Known facts (III-17),06/14 |
| R012,C3:R012,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the fact that a PRC relief flotilla (hospital ship Peace Ark, escorts, China Coast Guard cutter) and PRC police advisors are already present?",Identifies the PRC maritime and ashore presence,Omits the PRC presence,PRC presence,Known facts (III-17),03/02 |
| R013,C3:R013,S10,Known facts,2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: recognition of the FRANZ Arrangement and of New Caledonia, Australia, and Guam as the realistic staging anchors?",Recognizes FRANZ and the staging anchors,Omits the coalition mechanism/staging,FRANZ plus staging,Known facts (III-17),04/06 |
| R014,C3:R014,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: characterization of the PRC posture as a gray-zone relief-legitimacy and access competition rather than a kinetic threat?,Characterizes the competition as below-threshold/legitimacy-and-access,Treats it as a conventional military threat,gray-zone competition,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),03/10/01 |
| R016,C3:R016,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: identification of PRC information operations framing US relief as militarized to degrade US legitimacy with the population?,Identifies the PRC information-operations/narrative effect,Omits the information environment,PRC narrative,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),10/03 |
| R017,C3:R017,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: recognition of degraded communications/PNT and logistics over distance as binding environmental constraints?,Recognizes the degraded-environment and distance constraint,"Assumes a benign, connected environment",degraded EMS plus distance,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),10/06/14 |
| R018,C3:R018,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,SI,positive,2,"Does the mission analysis include: the dispersed, displaced populations and the UN OCHA cluster system and NGOs as defining the civil environment?",Accounts for the dispersed-population and cluster overlay,Omits civil considerations,civil density,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),05/06 |
| R019,C3:R019,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: recognition of the Luganville wharf as both a PRC-leverage node and a potential alternate logistics point?,Recognizes the dual significance of the Luganville wharf,Omits it or treats it one-dimensionally,dual significance,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),06/03 |
| R020,C3:R020,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a friendly center of gravity (legitimacy and acceptance of the US-FRANZ relief effort) with its critical vulnerability of contested access compounded by the PRC narrative?,Derives the friendly COG and a critical vulnerability,Omits the friendly COG or states it without a vulnerability,legitimacy COG,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),01/05/10 |
| R021,C3:R021,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: an adversary center of gravity (the PRC indispensable-provider narrative with privileged access), its critical requirement of first and visible relief with host-bloc cooperation, and its critical vulnerability of perceived coercion and self-interest?",Derives the adversary COG with requirement and vulnerability,Omits the adversary COG or its critical factors,PRC narrative COG,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),03/10/01 |
| R022,C3:R022,S6,Assumptions,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a distinction between the open-source purely-humanitarian framing of the PRC presence and the derived strategic-access assessment?,Distinguishes surface framing from the derived assessment,Adopts the surface framing as fact,surface vs derived,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),03/10 |
| R023,C3:R023,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: the assumption that Vanuatu will permit at least limited relief access once consent is obtained through accepted channels, flagged for confirmation?",States the access assumption and that it is monitored,Omits it or states it without the three-test character,access assumption,Assumptions (III-17),05/01 |
| R024,C3:R024,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the assumption that the PRC maintains a below-threshold posture and does not physically interfere with relief?,States the below-threshold assumption,Omits it,below-threshold continuity,Assumptions (III-17),01/10 |
| R025,C3:R025,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: the assumption that France (New Caledonia) and Australia provide basing, staging, and overflight?",States the allied-basing assumption,Omits it,allied basing,Assumptions (III-17),04 |
| R026,C3:R026,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the fact that USAID/BHA retains the lead and issues requests for assistance and mission taskings?,States the USAID-lead continuity assumption,Omits it,interagency continuity,Assumptions (III-17),07/11 |
| R027,C3:R027,S7,Risk,2,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: recognition that denial of host consent for use of ports would force a shift to sea-based and outer-island relief?,Recognizes the consent-failure sensitivity,Treats consent as guaranteed without sensitivity,consent sensitivity,Assumptions (III-17),05/06 |
| R028,C3:R028,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the specified task to prepare to conduct FHA/HADR on order?,Lists the specified FHA/HADR task,Omits it,specified task,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),07 |
| R029,C3:R029,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the specified task to coordinate the relief effort with the FRANZ partners?,Lists the FRANZ-coordination task,Omits it,specified task,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),07 |
| R030,C3:R030,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the specified task to deconflict with co-located PRC forces and avoid an armed incident?,Lists the deconfliction task,Omits it,specified task,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),07 |
| R031,C3:R031,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the specified task to operate within the USAID lead, the request-for-assistance/mission-tasking process, and FHA authorities and funding limits?",Lists the USAID-lead/authority task,Omits it,specified/authority,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),07/12 |
| R032,C3:R032,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the implied task to establish sea-based logistics and joint logistics over-the-shore to bypass the degraded fixed ports?,Derives the sea-basing/JLOTS task,Omits it,degraded ports,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),06/14 |
| R035,C3:R035,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the implied task to integrate with the UN OCHA cluster system and NGOs through a civil-military/humanitarian coordination element?,Derives the civil-military coordination task,Omits it,civ-mil coordination,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),11/05 |
| R036,C3:R036,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the implied task to conduct information operations countering the PRC narrative while preserving humanitarian neutrality?,Derives the IO task within neutrality discipline,Omits it,contested info env,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),10/03 |
| R037,C3:R037,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the implied task to establish a coordination and command-and-control architecture resilient to disaster-degraded communications?,Derives the resilient-C2 task,Omits it,degraded comms,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),11/10 |
| R038,C3:R038,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the essential task to establish relief throughput by air and sea sufficient to meet critical needs over distance?,Identifies throughput as essential to the end state,Lists it as merely implied or omits its essential character,feasibility-defining,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),06/14 |
| R040,C3:R040,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the restraint that US forces will not engage in an armed clash with PRC forces and will remain below the threshold?,States the below-threshold/no-clash restraint,Omits or contradicts it,no armed clash,Constraints & restraints (III-18),07/01 |
| R041,C3:R041,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the restraint of no relief on Vanuatu sovereign territory without host consent or appropriate tasking?,States the consent/sovereignty restraint,Omits it,sovereignty restraint,Constraints & restraints (III-18),07/12 |
| R042,C3:R042,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the constraint to assist the lead agency (USAID), providing only unique, last-resort, cost-reimbursable capabilities?",States the USAID-support constraint as a must-do,Omits it,support constraint,Constraints & restraints (III-18),07/12 |
| R044,C3:R044,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the constraint to coordinate through the FRANZ Arrangement and avoid unilateral action undercutting the lead nation?,States the FRANZ-coordination constraint,Omits it,coalition constraint,Constraints & restraints (III-18),07/04 |
| R045,C3:R045,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: the restraint not to use basing, staging, or overflight that France, Australia, or the host nation decline to authorize?",States the access-authorization restraint,Omits it,access restraint,Constraints & restraints (III-18),04 |
| R046,C3:R046,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a friendly force information requirement on host-nation consent status and which authority controls access?,Derives the consent PIR tied to the access decision,"Lists it as extracted, untied, or omits it",consent locus,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),05/12 |
| R047,C3:R047,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: a priority intelligence requirement on PRC intent and likely response (shadow, obstruct, or escalate)?",Derives the PRC-intent PIR tied to the escalation/sequencing decision,Omits it or fails to tie it to a decision,PRC intent,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),10/03 |
| R048,C3:R048,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a priority intelligence requirement on Bauerfield and Lapetasi wharf throughput and restoration status?,Derives the throughput PIR tied to the ashore-vs-sea-based decision,Omits it,port status,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),06/10 |
| R049,C3:R049,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: a friendly force information requirement on the location and critical needs of displaced populations, including the outer islands?",Derives the population-needs PIR tied to prioritization,Omits it,population needs,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),05/06 |
| R050,C3:R050,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a friendly force information requirement on available sea-basing and lift capacity and its closure timeline?,Derives the lift/closure FFIR tied to the commit/sequencing gate,Omits it,friendly lift,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),14/04 |
| R051,C3:R051,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a friendly force information requirement on FRANZ partner contributions and France/Australia basing and overflight approvals?,Derives the FRANZ-contribution FFIR tied to the basing decision,Omits it,partner contributions,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),04 |
| R052,C3:R052,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the operational risk that contested consent blocks access, with a mitigation of sea-based and outer-island relief plus diplomacy?",States the operational risk compartmentalized with a mitigation,States risk without compartmentalization or mitigation,access risk,Risk (III-24),05/06 |
| R053,C3:R053,S7,Risk,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the force risk of an incident or escalation with co-located PRC forces, with a mitigation of deconfliction, posture, and disciplined signaling?",States the force risk with mitigation,Omits it,escalation risk,Risk (III-24),03/01 |
| R054,C3:R054,S7,Risk,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the time risk that population needs outpace relief throughput, with a mitigation of prioritized lift and early sea-basing?",States the time risk with mitigation,Omits it,time risk,Risk (III-24),14/06 |
| R055,C3:R055,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: the strategic risk that the PRC wins the legitimacy and access competition if the US is slow, with a mitigation of speed, visible FRANZ partnership, and counter-narrative information operations?",Flags the strategic risk with mitigation,Omits it,strategic risk,Risk (III-24),01/10 |
| R056,C3:R056,S8,Restated mission,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a restated mission containing the purpose to relieve suffering and preserve partner legitimacy and access below the threshold?,Restated mission includes the why,Restated mission omits the why,restated mission,Restated mission (III-20),07/01/12 |
| R058,C3:R058,S8,Restated mission,2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: a restated mission containing who, what, when, where, and why?",Contains all five elements,Missing one or more,mission elements,Restated mission (III-20),07 |
| R059,C3:R059,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: a commit-ashore-versus-sea-based decision point conditioned on consent, throughput, and force protection?",Identifies the commit DP and its gates,Omits it,commit gate,Decision points & NAIs,06/05 |
| R060,C3:R060,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a relief-versus-secure-access sequencing decision point conditioned on consent status and PRC posture?,Identifies the sequencing DP,Omits it,sequencing decision,Decision points & NAIs,05/10 |
| R061,C3:R061,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: a staging-base selection and request-timing decision point among New Caledonia, Australia, Guam, and sea-basing?",Identifies the staging-base DP,Omits it,staging decision,Decision points & NAIs,04/06 |
| R064,C3:R064,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: identification of the apportioned forces (JTF headquarters, amphibious and sea-basing shipping, airlift, engineer/medical/logistics, shared ISR) with time-phased closure?",Identifies the apportioned forces and time-phased closure,Omits it or assumes full availability,force availability,Force & resource analysis (III-20/21),14/04 |
| R065,C3:R065,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of sea-basing and lift as the limiting resources forcing prioritization by need and location?,Identifies lift/sea-basing as the limiter,Omits it,limiting resource,Force & resource analysis (III-20/21),14 |
| R067,C3:R067,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: recognition that ISR is shared and contested by degraded communications and cannot be assumed persistent?,Recognizes shared/contested ISR,Assumes persistent ISR,ISR contested,Force & resource analysis (III-20/21),10/14 |
| R068,C3:R068,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the military objective that the affected population's critical needs (water, medical care, shelter, emergency power) are met?",States the relief objective,Omits it or states a friendly task instead,relief objective,Military objectives & COA eval criteria (III-21/22),07/01 |
| R074,C3:R074,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a risk-to-force and neutrality COA-evaluation criterion for the contested environment?,Offers a force-protection/neutrality criterion,Omits it,risk to force/neutrality,Military objectives & COA eval criteria (III-21/22),11/03 |
| A-01,C3:A-01,S6,Assumptions,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis assume that the People's Republic of China's forces will not seek areas to cooperate with FRANZ and/or U.S. forces?,Assumes PRC will not cooperate with FRANZ and U.S. efforts,does not assume PRC non-cooperation,assumption,Assumptions (III-17),01 |
| A-02,C3:A-02,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis establish a PIR to determine what commodities and services the PRC are providing as part of their relief effort?,Derives intelligence requirement to assess PRC contributions,Does not set information requirement to determine PRC contributions,PIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),01 |
| A-03,C3:A-03,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis make the assumption that the government of Vanuatu will allow for U.S. entities to operate in Vanuatu soverign territory?,Assumes Vanuatu will concede to U.S. presence,Does not make the assumption on Vanuatu acquiesence,assumption,Assumptions (III-17),01/02 |
| A-04,C3:A-04,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis establish an implied task to assess other locales as possible intermediate staging bases (ISB), specifically American possessions of American Samoa and the Marshall Islands?",Establishes implied tasks to find an ISB closer to Vanuatu,Does not set implied tasks,implied task,Implied Tasks (III-19),04/06 |
| A-05,C3:A-05,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis establish a ""be prepared to"" implied task to conduct port opening operations at Lapetasi Port?",Establishes a BPT implied task to coduct port opening,Does not consider implied task of port opening,implied task,Implied Tasks (III-19),06 |
| A-06,C3:A-06,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis establish FFIR to determine the operating status of Bauerfield International Airport and Lapetasi (Port Vila) wharf?,Establsihes FFIR to assess open/closed status of key air and sea ports,does not create information requirement on sea and air ports,FFIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),06 |
| A-07,C3:A-07,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis establish an information requirement to assess the posture of local clan chiefs and their acceptance of aid?,Establishes information requirement to assess clan chiewf influence,Does not account for clan chiefs,FFIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),05 |
| A-08,C3:A-08,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,I,positive,5,Does the analysis address the limitations posed funding authorizations and expenditure limits established by USAID and other appropriate agencies?,"Addresses any authorizations and expenditure limits set by IA, international, and/or NGO partners",Does not address funding limitations,Limitations,Constraints & restraints (III-18),07 |
| A-09,C3:A-09,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis establish an FFIR to monitor the number, type, and capability of IGO and NGOs that have committed to the relief effort?","Establishes an information requirement to determine the number, type, and capability of committed NGOs",Does not set an information requirement on committed NGOs,FFIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),02/07 |
| A-10,C3:A-10,S1,Higher mission and intent,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish commander's guidance to consider logistics options (i.e. breakbulk point and configured load options developed out-of-theater) to allevaite lack of landing sites and distribution challenges?,Establishes ghuidance to consider distribution options,Does not establish guidance on distribution options,Refined Planning Guidance,Refined Planning Guidance (III-31),06/14 |
| A-11,C3:A-11,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis assess the critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities associated with the friendly center of gravity?",Provides an assessment of the friendly COG,Does not assess the friendly COG,Center of Gravity,COGs and Decisive Points (III-37),01/02/04/07/12 |
| A-12,C3:A-12,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis make the assumption that U.S. forces will have access to humanitarian and operational stocks already in theater from partner nations to support Class I, III, and VIII needs?",Makes an assumption on availability of theater stocks,Does not make an assumption on theater stocks access,assumption,Assumptions (III-17),04/07 |
| A-13,C3:A-13,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish a friendly force information requirement to assess water purification needs in Vanuatu?,Establishes a BPT implied tasks to establish water purification units,Does not set an implied task to establish water purification,implied task,Implied Tasks (III-19),02/10 |
| C-01,C3:C-01,S1,Higher mission and intent,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer where the U.S. response to the disaster in Vanuatu is on the competition continuum in relation to the PRC?,"Infers that the U.S. is in competition with PRC, below armed conflict, in the Pacific Region","Fails to infer that the U.S. is in competition with China, below armed conflict, in the Pacific; or infers that the U.S. is in cooperation or armed conflict with China in the Pacific","Strategic context, Regional Intel, and CIPG",Strategic Ends,01/02/12 |
| C-02,C3:C-02,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis describe the strategic military objective as delivery of timely, credible United States relief in support of the civilian-led response?","Identifies and describes the strategic military objective as delivery of timely, credible U.S. relief to Vanuatu","Omits a strategic military objective or fails to correctly describe delivery of timely, credible U.S. relief to Vanuatu",CJCS EXORD,Objective analysis,07 |
| C-03,C3:C-03,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis describe the operational environment using an analytical framework (PMESII-PT, RAFT, ASCOPE)?",Infers the necessity of ASCOPE as the appropriate analytical framework to undertsand the IOE for this situation,Failes to use ASCOPE to analyze this situation and/or omits any analytical framework,JIPOE,Commander's understanding of the OE,10 |
| C-04,C3:C-04,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis infer that the information requirements include the true locus and stability of host-nation consent, People's Republic of China intent and likely response to a United States and allied effort, and the throughput and restoration timeline of the ports of entry, and the location and needs of dispersed populations?","Infers that key gaps in information include the true locus and stability of host-nation consent, People's Republic of China intent and likely response to a United States and allied effort, and the throughput and restoration timeline of the ports of entry, and the location and needs of dispersed populations","Fails to infer information gaps. Omits one or more of information gaps that include the true locus and stability of host-nation consent, People's Republic of China intent and likely response to a United States and allied effort, and the throughput and restoration timeline of the ports of entry, and the location and needs of dispersed populations","JIPOE, Regional Intel",Commander's understanding of the IE,10/12/02 |
| C-05,C3:C-05,S1,Higher mission and intent,3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer the commander's operational problem of having to provide timely and credible relief in an operational environment where host nation consent is not assured and where its main competitor is present and pursuing different aims?,Infers that the operational problem is having to provide timely and credible relief in an operational environment where host nation consent is not assured and where its main competitor is present and pursuing different aims,Omits the operational problem or fails to infer the key elements of providing timely and credible relief in an operational environment where host nation consent is not assured; and where its main competitor is present and pursuing different aims,"JIPOE, Adversary OOB, Strategic Context",Commander's understanding of the Operational Problem,01/03/10 |
| C-06,C3:C-06,S4,Constraints and restraints,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the analysis infer the impacts to the mission from the UN considerations of PACOM avoiding direct delivery of aid, seeking consent prior to assistance, and only delivering aid that is requested in order to maintain credibility?","Infers the impacts to the mission from the UN considerations of PACOM as avoiding direct delivery of aid, seeking consent propr to assistance, and only delivering aid that is requested in order to maintain credibility","Fails to nfer the impacts to the mission from the UN considerations. Omits one or more of the following: avoiding direct delivery of aid, seeking consent propr to assistance, and only delivering aid that is requested in order to maintain credibility","Strategic context, Annexes, CIPG","Facts, Assumptions, and Limitations",01/05/11/12 |
| C-07,C3:C-07,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis infer the impact to Force from the geographic considerations of disaster locations in a mountainous archipelago reachable only by sea or air, with the nearest substantial staging in New Caledonia and Australia?",Infers the impact to Force as bounded by lift and distance,Fails to infer that lift and distance are the primary limits to resources and relief delivery,Critical Geography,Force-Space analysis,06 |
| C-08,C3:C-08,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis infer that Coalition and partner nation capabilities can support U.S. capability gaps using customary authority (chiefs) at the community level, the United Nations humanitarian system, and a range of non-governmental organizations as established partners in Vanuatu disaster response?","Infers that Coalition and partner nation capabilities can support U.S. gaps using customary authority (chiefs) at the community level, the United Nations humanitarian system, and a range of non-governmental organizations as established partners in Vanuatu disaster response","Fails to infer Coalition and partner nation capabilities supporting U.S. gaps. Omits one or more of the following capabilities: using customary authority (chiefs) at the community level, the United Nations humanitarian system, and a range of non-governmental organizations as established partners in Vanuatu disaster response","Strategic Context, Country Fact Sheet",Force analysis,01/05 |
| C-09,C3:C-09,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer an implied task to establish a civil-military operations center to coordinate military response assistance for Vanuatu?,Infers an implied task to establish a civil-military operations center to coordinate military response assistance for Vanuatu,Failsd to infers an implied task to establish a civil-military operations center,"Coalition OOB, Annexes, CIPG",Implied Tasks,04/11/12 |
| C-10,C3:C-10,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,"Does the analysis infer the essential task and purpose of the directed mission as coordinate FHA to deliver timely, credible United States relief in support of the civilian-led response and to reinforce the sovereignty and resilience of the affected state and the standing of its partners?","Infers the essential task and purpose of the directed mission as coordinate FHA to deliver timely, credible United States relief in support of the civilian-led response and to reinforce the sovereignty and resilience of the affected state and the standing of its partners","Fails to infer the essential task and purpose of the directed mission as coordinate FHA to deliver timely, credible United States relief in support of the civilian-led response and to reinforce the sovereignty and resilience of the affected state and the standing of its partners |
| C-11,C3:C-11,S1,Higher mission and intent,3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer that the Commander Joint Force Maritime Component (JFMCC) is designated as COMJTF Coral Sea?,Infers that the Joint Force Maritime Component (JFMCC) is designated as COMJTF Coral Sea,Fails to infer that the JFMCC is designated as COMJTF Coral Sea,Coalition OOB,Command Arrangement,04 |
| C-12,C3:C-12,S8,Restated mission,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the analysis infer a restated mission that includes: On Order, JTF Coral Sea coordinates FHA with civilian-led response agencies in Vanuatu to deliver timely, credible United States relief to reinforce the sovereignty and resilience of the affected state and the standing of its partners?","Infers a restated mission that includes: On Order, JTF Coral Sea coordinates FHA with civilian-led response agencies in Vanuatu to deliver timely, credible United States relief to reinforce the sovereignty and resilience of the affected state and the standing of its partners.","Fails to infer a restated mission. Omits one or more of the following from a restated mission: On Order; JTF Coral Sea coordinates FHA with civilian-led response agencies; in Vanuatu; to deliver timely, credible United States relief to reinforce the sovereignty and resilience of the affected state and the standing of its partners?",CIPG and EXORD,Restated Mission,07/12 |
| C-13,C3:C-13,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer a PIR regarding the location and activity of PRC relief and security elements in Vanuatu?,Infers a PIR regarding the location and activity of PRC relief and security elements in Vanuatu,Omits location/activity of PRC relief and security personnel as a PIR,"CJCS EXORD, JIPOE",PIR,07/10 |
| C-14,C3:C-14,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer the implied task of establishing a coordination mechanism with FRANZ?,Infers the implied task of framing the by-with-through relationship with FRANZ,Fails to infer the implied task of framing the by-with-through relationship with FRANZ,"Situation, EXORD, CIPG",Implied Tasks,01/07/12 |
| C-15,C3:C-15,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer the assumption that PRC will avoid overt actions that could compromise their objective to be seen as the indispensable relief provider which deepens durable access and influence under cover of humanitarian aid?,Infers the assumption that PRC will avoid overt actions that could compromise their objective to be seen as the indispensable relief provider which deepens durable access and influence under cover of humanitarian aid,Fails to infer the assumption that PRC will avoid overt actions that could compromise their objective to be seen as the indispensable relief provider which deepens durable access and influence under cover of humanitarian aid,"Regional Intel, Adversary OOB, JIPOE",Assumptions,03/02/10 |
| D-01,C3:D-01,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include a priority intelligence requirement on the population densities and locations of Efate, Shepherd Islands, and Espiritu Santo?","Develops a PIR for population densities and locations of Efate, Shepherd Islands, and Espiritu Santo",Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),02/05/06/10 |
| D-03,C3:D-03,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis contain a friendly force information requirement on the Information forces supporting the theater?,Develops a friendly force information requirement on the Information forces supporting the ARG/MEU and their capabilities.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),01/02/03/07/10/11/14 |
| D-04,C3:D-04,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis contain a friendly force information requirement on the availability of the USNS Mercy or a similar hospital ship?,Develops a friendly force information requirement on the availability of the USNS Mercy or a similar hospital ship.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),Packet-wide grounding |
| D-05,C3:D-05,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include a priority intelligence requirement on Host Nation TV/Radio broadcast stations and their operating status?,Develops a priority intelligence requirement on Host Nation TV/Radio broadcast stations and their operating status.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),01/02/03/07/10/11/14 |
| D-07,C3:D-07,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis infer an implied task for the establishment of a multi-nation coordination center to support relief efforts?,Develops an implied task for the establishment of a mutli-nation coordination center to support relief efforts.,Omits it,Implied Task,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),Packet-wide grounding |
| D-08,C3:D-08,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis assume UN and NGO/International relief organizations will be allowed access to Vanuatu?,Develops assumption that UN and NGO/International relief organizations will be allowed access to Vanuatu.,Omits it,Assumptions,Assumptions (III-17),03/05/07/12 |
| D-09,C3:D-09,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis assume UN and NGO/International relief organizations will utilize U.S./FRANZ staging areas for their relief aid and personnel supporting the effort?,Develops an assumption that UN and NGO/International relief organizations will utilize U.S./FRANZ staging areas for their relief aid and personnel supporting the effort,Omits it,Assumptions,Assumptions (III-17),01/04/05/07/12 |
| D-10,C3:D-10,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis identify the implied task to assist in evacuating U.S. citizens from Vanuatu?,Develops an implied task to assist in evacuating U.S. citizens from Vanuatu.,Omits it,Implied Task,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),01/04/07/12 |
| D-11,C3:D-11,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include a friendly force information requirement on the status of the U.S. Embassy/Consulate and its personnel?,Develops a friendly force information requirement on the status of the U.S. Embassy/Consulate and its personnel.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),01/04/07/12 |
| D-12,C3:D-12,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include a friendly force information requirement on the key communicators and personnel supportive of U.S. and Partner Nations?,Develops a priority intelligence requirement on the key communicators and personnel supportive of U.S. and Partner Nations.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),02/10 |
| D-13,C3:D-13,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include the authorities for executing the operation?,States the authorities for the operation.,Omits it,Authorities,Risk (III-24),01/04/07/12 |
| D-14,C3:D-14,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include a friendly force information requirement on the primary ways the populace obtains their news/information?,Develops a priority intelligence requirement on the primary ways the populace obtains their news/information.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),02/10 |
| D-15,C3:D-15,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis contain a priority intelligence requirement to identify the PRC military commander?,Develops a priority intelligence requirement to identify the PRC military commander.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),02/10 |
| D-16,C3:D-16,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis include an implied task to coordinate information messaging with France, Australia, and New Zealand?","Develops an implied task to coordinate information messaging with France, Australia, and New Zealand.",Omits it,Implied Task,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),Packet-wide grounding |
| D-17,C3:D-17,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis include a friendly force information requirement for the information capabilities of France, Australia, and New Zealand?","Develops a friendly force information requirement for the information capabilities of France, Australia, and New Zealand.",Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),01/02/04/05/07/12 |
| D-18,C3:D-18,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the analysis include an FFIR for medical capabilities on New Caledonia to support the operation?,Develops an FFIR for medical capabilities on New Caledonia to support the operation.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),Packet-wide grounding |
| D-19,C3:D-19,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the analysis include an FFIR for U.S. civil affairs availability and readiness?,Develops an FFIR for U.S. civil affairs capabilities.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),Packet-wide grounding |
| D-20,C3:D-20,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include a friendly force information requirement for the status of law enforcement and civilian governance ability in the areas affected by the typhoon?,Develops a priority intelligence requirement for the status of law enforcement and civilian governance ability in the areas affected by the typhoon.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),02/03/04/05/07/10 |
| D-21,C3:D-21,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include a friendly force information requirement for the availability of construction units to support the operations?,Includes a friendly force information requirement for the availability of navy seabees stationed on Guam to support the operations.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),04/07/12 |
| D-22,C3:D-22,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include an implied to task to establish a multinational coordination center (MNCC) to resolve command/support relationships?,Includes an implied task to work under a PN coordination authority,Omits it,Implied Task,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),07/12 |
| D-24,C3:D-24,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include a FFIR on the status of Vanuatu critical infrastructure?,Includes a PIR on the status of Vanuatu critical infrastructure.,Omits it,CCIR,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),02/10 |
| S-01,C3:S-01,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the higher intent to deliver timely, credible relief through supporting, enabling, and coordinated action?",States timely and credible relief supporting HN and federal lead organizations.,"Omits either speed, legitimacy, or supporting effort.",Speed and Legitimacy,Higher mission & intent (Fig III-12),01/07 |
| S-02,C3:S-02,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: an end state of a stabilized population with relief transitioned to civilian/UN/host authorities and partner access and legitimacy preserved?,"Articulates the transition, access",Omits the end state or states an unsupported one,end-state conditions,Higher mission & intent (Fig III-12),01/07/12 |
| S-03,C3:S-03,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: Vanua Tasi bloc, a pro-PRC political faction, while maneuvering for advantage will attempt to restrict US access in relief?",Identifies reality of the Vanua Tasi bloc faction and states facts related to possible obstruction to access.,Provides an assessment without acknowledging the pro-PRC affiliation of the Vanua Tasi bloc.,Competitive HN political faction,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),02/05 |
| S-04,C3:S-04,S6,Assumptions,2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: the assumption that France (New Caledonia) and Australia will approve access to basing, staging, and overflight?",States the allied-basing assumption,Omits it,allied basing,Assumptions (III-17),04 |
| S-06,C3:S-06,S7,Risk,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the strategic risk of missing opportunity if slow in action or perceived unilateral?,Flags the strategic risk with mitigation,Omits it,strategic risk,Risk (III-24),01/10 |
| S-07,C3:S-07,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the military objective that the affected population's critical needs (water, medical care, shelter, emergency power) are met through enabling critical capability to DoS/USAID?",States the relief objective,Omits it or states a friendly task instead,relief objective,Military objectives & COA eval criteria (III-21/22),07/01 |
| S-10,C3:S-10,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the requirement for linguists capable of speaking Vanuata language and Chinese to coordinate enabling capability and deconflict resources?,Identifies the need for linguists.,Omits it.,Linguist capability,Resources,01/07/ |
| S-11,C3:S-11,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: JLOTS coordination and capability as critical resource |
| S-12,C3:S-12,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: Resource requirement for airfield maintenance and operational-opening capability for APOE?,Identifies the requirement for APOE establishment/ maintenance.,Omits it.,APOE capability,Resources,6 |
| S-13,C3:S-13,S10,Known facts,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: BIA/ S-PIA airfields are C-130 and/or C-17 capable?,Identifies the assumption that the international airfields are military aircraft capable.,Omits it.,APOE capability,Assumptions,6 |
| S-14,C3:S-14,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: the FFIR on status of APOE/ SPOE establishment, throughput, and status?",Identifies the critical friendly status of APOE/SPOEs for logistics throughput.,Omits it.,APOE/SPOE status,FFIR,02/06/12/14 |
| S-15,C3:S-15,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a time to delivery or speed COA evaluation criterion measuring how fast the joint force is available to support?,Offers a speed COA evaluation criteria.,Omits it.,Speed COA Criteria,COA Evaluation,01/07/12 |
| S-16,C3:S-16,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a credibility COA evaluation criterion determining legitimacy perception?,Offers a credibility COA evaluation criteria.,Omits it.,Credibility COA Criteria,COA Evaluation,01/07/12 |
| CD-01,C3:CD-01,S4,Constraints and restraints,3,CD,negative,-9,"Does the mission analysis recommend, direct, or leave open as a viable course of action any use of force, interdiction, or armed engagement against PRC forces or vessels, beyond self-defense and the defense of designated persons and units?","Any course of action, branch, or recommendation contemplates use of force, interdiction, or armed engagement against PRC forces or vessels for a reason other than self-defense or defense of designated persons/units.","Every course of action excludes force, interdiction, boarding, or coercive posturing against PRC forces or vessels for any reason beyond self-defense; the no-armed-challenge restraint is treated as an absolute boundary, not a risk to be weighed against speed or access.","ROE: no armed challenge to PRC forces, below-threshold restraint",Constraints & restraints (III-18),07/11/12 |
| CD-02,C3:CD-02,S4,Constraints and restraints,3,CD,negative,-9,"Does the mission analysis recommend, direct, or leave open as a viable course of action landing, staging, or conducting relief operations on Vanuatu sovereign territory that presumes or proceeds without confirmed host-nation consent or appropriate tasking?","Any course of action lands, stages, or operates on Vanuatu territory without confirmed consent, or explicitly proceeds despite consent being unresolved or denied.","Every course of action holds host-nation consent (or appropriate tasking) as a precondition for any activity on Vanuatu territory, and treats unresolved consent as a gating decision point rather than an assumption resolved in the analysis's favor.",Restraint: no activity on Vanuatu territory presuming consent not yet granted,Constraints & restraints (III-18),07/11/12 |
| C3-GAP-01,C3:C3-GAP-01,S8,Restated mission,3,D,negative,-5,"Does the restated mission statement cast USINDOPACOM or Joint Task Force CORAL as leading or directing the Vanuatu disaster response, rather than as the supported military command acting for the USAID-led United States Government response?","The restated mission puts the joint force in the lead-agency position, with wording such as USINDOPACOM leads the humanitarian response in Vanuatu or JTF CORAL directs relief operations, and USAID/BHA and the Chief of Mission are absent from the sentence or appear only as participants alongside the military.","The restated mission subordinates military action to the civilian lead, opening with the joint force acting for the USAID-led response and by, with, and through the FRANZ partners, so a reader can tell from that one sentence who owns the response.",The CJCS Execute Order for OPERATION CORAL TEMPEST names USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance the lead federal agency for the United States foreign disaster response at paragraph 1.d and designates USINDOPACOM the supported combatant command for Department of Defense execution at paragraph 5.a; the USAID/BHA Disaster Assistance Response Team validates requirements and requests for Department of Defense assistance.,Restated mission (III-20),07_CJCS_EXORD; 04_Coalition_OOB |
| C3-GAP-03,C3:C3-GAP-03,S10,Known facts,2,SI,positive,2,Do the known facts record Santo-Pekoa International Airport at Luganville as a less-affected secondary airfield offering an alternate aerial point of entry for the northern islands?,"The facts list names Santo-Pekoa at Luganville on Espiritu Santo as an aerial entry point the cyclone left in better condition than Bauerfield, so the air-entry picture extends beyond Port Vila.","Air entry is described only through Bauerfield International Airport, or Espiritu Santo is mentioned solely in connection with the Luganville wharf, leaving the northern airfield out of the stated entry inventory.","Critical Geography lists Santo-Pekoa International Airport at Luganville, Espiritu Santo as a secondary, less-affected field offering an alternate aerial entry point for the north, while Bauerfield International Airport at Port Vila has cyclone damage to airfield surfaces, navigational aids and the terminal |
| C3-GAP-05,C3:C3-GAP-05,S6,Assumptions,3,D,negative,-5,"Does the analysis assert as established fact that Vanuatu's restriction of United States and allied access is a deliberate, directed policy, when the intelligence summary records that it is unconfirmed with moderate confidence?","Deliberate obstruction by Vanuatu authorities is stated as a fact, or stated flatly in the operational-environment narrative, with no confidence qualifier attached and no mention of post-disaster administrative confusion.","The deliberate-restriction judgement is listed as an assumption, its moderate confidence is labelled, and administrative confusion remains open as an explanation that needs to be proven or refuted.","The Regional Intelligence Summary reports that access for United States and allied responders to Port Vila and to certain affected districts has been subject to restriction, and states that whether this reflects a deliberate, directed policy or administrative confusion in the aftermath of Cyclone RUA is not confirmed and is assessed at moderate confidence to be at least partly deliberate.",Assumptions (III-17),02_Regional_Intel_Summary |
| C3-GAP-06,C3:C3-GAP-06,S6,Assumptions,3,D,negative,-5,"Does the analysis treat basing, staging, and overflight from New Caledonia and Australia as already authorized, instead of making it an assumption that still requires diplomatic action?","Staging out of Noumea or eastern Australia is stated as a fact, with no basing, staging, and overflight coordination required and no consequence stated should a partner withhold approval.","Partner basing, staging, and overflight is stated as an assumption, the diplomatic and component channels through which it must be requested are named, and the analysis states what the relief effort loses if the request is refused or delayed.","The Coalition and United States Force Order of Battle states that basing, staging, and overflight from New Caledonia and Australia are potential enablers but are not pre-authorized, and paragraph 4.c of the CJCS Execute Order directs that staging and basing support may be requested from regional partners through the appropriate diplomatic and component channels.",Assumptions (III-17),04_Coalition_OOB |
| C3-GAP-07,C3:C3-GAP-07,S4,Constraints and restraints,3,D,negative,-5,Does the risk analysis mitigate the USAID Lead Agent and Host Nation approval constraints through an on-scene commander's immediate-response authority?,"Immediate-response authority is invoked as a standing workaround, used to justify moving relief ashore, opening a port, or beginning distribution before USAID tasking or host nation consent.","The constraints and restraints section keeps the request-for-assistance and mission-tasking process as the governing gate on Department of Defense action and confines immediate-response authority to its narrow bound, so it never appears in the sustained relief construct.","Annex A of the CORAL TEMPEST annexes states that immediate-response authority by an on-scene commander to save lives or prevent suffering is narrowly bounded and does not substitute for the request-and-tasking process, while paragraph 3.b(4) of the CJCS Execute Order requires all activity to stay within the USAID lead, the request-for-assistance and mission-tasking process, and applicable FHA authorities and funding limits.",Constraints & restraints (III-18),11_Annexes; 07_CJCS_EXORD |
| C3-GAP-08,C3:C3-GAP-08,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,CD,negative,-9,"Does the analysis nominate displacing, out-competing, or discrediting the People's Republic of China relief presence as a military objective or measure of effectiveness in its own right?","An objective or evaluation criterion is written in competitor-defeat terms such as reducing PRC visibility, out-delivering the hospital ship Peace Ark, or winning the narrative against Beijing, so relief becomes the means and competitive advantage the measured end.","Objectives and criteria are written against the affected population and the affected state, and competitor influence is handled as an effect that follows from a credible, affected-state-led multinational relief effort rather than as something to be targeted.","Annex B states that relief is conducted consistent with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and that the use of military assets is intended to preserve, not blur, the distinction between humanitarian and military action |
| C3-GAP-09,C3:C3-GAP-09,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,SI,positive,2,"Does the operational-environment analysis identify that PRC Ministry of Public Security Police Advisors are reported to be working in Port Vila and may attempt to restrict FRANZ, United States, and international aid relief efforts?","The operational-environment analysis identifies that PRC Ministry of Public Security Police Advisors are reported to be working in Port Vila and may attempt to restrict FRANZ, United States, and international aid relief efforts.",The operational-environment analysis does not mention PRC Ministry of Public Security Police Advisors working in Port Vila.,The Adversary OOB and the Regional Intel Summary states that People's Republic of China police advisors associated with the standing policing-cooperation arrangement are reported ashore and are conducting order maintenance activities.,OE/threat (JP 5-0 Ch III),03_Adversary_OOB; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary |
| C3-GAP-10,C3:C3-GAP-10,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,"Does the force and resource analysis identify individual augmentation for civil-military coordination, contracting, and liaison to support the relief effort?","The resource discussion names liaison, contracting, and civil-military coordination manning as a requirement for the relief effort.","Resource shortfalls are cast only in terms of shipping, airlift, sea-basing, and ISR.","The J1 running estimate states that individual augmentation for civil-military coordination, contracting, and liaison to the FRANZ partners and the United Nations is a limiting factor for the coordination architecture.",Force & resource analysis (III-20/21),14_Running_Estimates; 12_CIPG |
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