| item_id,item_uid,step,step_name,tier,severity,polarity,weight,question,pass_condition,fail_condition,source_fact,artifact_anchor,source_documents |
| BR-S1-01,C4:BR-S1-01,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the national strategic objective of diplomatic resolution of cross-strait issues while protecting Taiwan's security, social, and economic systems?",Names diplomatic resolution + protection of Taiwan systems as a national objective.,Omits or garbles the diplomatic-resolution objective.,National obj 1.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶3–5 (Mission/Execution),07/12 |
| BR-S1-02,C4:BR-S1-02,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the national strategic objective of preventing escalation with the PRC via a flexible-response option?,Names escalation prevention / flexible response.,Omits the escalation-prevention objective.,National obj 2.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶3–5 (Mission/Execution),07/12 |
| BR-S1-03,C4:BR-S1-03,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the national strategic objective of restoring long-range regional stability in the Western Pacific?,Names restoration of regional stability.,Omits regional-stability objective.,National obj 3.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶3–5 (Mission/Execution),07/12 |
| BR-S1-04,C4:BR-S1-04,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) as the legal basis for United States assistance?,Cites the TRA/PL 96-8 as the basis.,Fails to cite the TRA basis.,Legal basis.,11a_Taiwan_Relations_Act_PL96-8.docx — §2–3 (Policy; Implementation),11a/07 |
| BR-S1-06,C4:BR-S1-06,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the commander's desired endstate (Taiwan secure; conditions for amicable resolution)?,Describes the endstate incl. Taiwan security and amicable resolution.,Omits or misstates the endstate.,Intent/endstate.,12_CIPG.docx — §4 (Commander's Initial Intent),12 |
| BR-S1-07,C4:BR-S1-07,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: inclusion of the return of Quemoy and Matsu to Taiwan control as an endstate condition?,Names island return as an endstate/termination condition.,Omits island return.,Endstate condition.,12_CIPG.docx — §4 (Commander's Initial Intent),12 |
| BR-S1-08,C4:BR-S1-08,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: inclusion of restoration of freedom of navigation in the Strait as an endstate condition?,Names freedom-of-navigation restoration.,Omits FON restoration.,Endstate condition.,12_CIPG.docx — §4 (Commander's Initial Intent),12 |
| BR-S1-09,C4:BR-S1-09,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of USPACOM as the supported command?,States USPACOM supported.,Misidentifies the supported command.,Command relationship.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶3–5 (Mission/Execution),07 |
| BR-S1-10,C4:BR-S1-10,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: identification of Commander, Seventh Fleet as Commander, Joint Task Force–Western Pacific?",Names C7F as CJTF-WESTPAC.,Omits/misassigns the JTF commander.,Command relationship.,12_CIPG.docx — §4 (Commander's Initial Intent),12/07 |
| BR-S2-01,C4:BR-S2-01,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: identification of the PLAN Eastern Sea Fleet (Ningbo), specifically amphibious forces, as the PRC operational center of gravity?",Names ESF amphibious forces as operational COG.,Fails to identify the operational COG.,Operational COG.,12_CIPG.docx — §1 (Operational Center of Gravity) + 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx ¶2,12/03 |
| BR-S2-02,C4:BR-S2-02,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of PRC economic interdependence with Taiwan/global economy as the PRC strategic center of gravity?,Names economic interdependence as strategic COG.,Fails to identify the strategic COG.,Strategic COG.,12_CIPG.docx — §1 (Strategic COG) + 10_JIPOE_Brief.docx Table 6 (PRC Strategic COG),12/10 |
| BR-S2-03,C4:BR-S2-03,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the cohesion of United States Pacific partners as the friendly strategic center of gravity?,Names partner cohesion as friendly strategic COG.,Fails to identify the friendly COG.,Friendly COG.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 10 (Friendly Strategic COG),10 |
| BR-S2-04,C4:BR-S2-04,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: linkage of the PRC amphibious critical requirement (an undamaged port) to the operational COG as a vulnerability?,Links the undamaged-port requirement to the amphibious COG.,Names the COG without its critical requirement/vulnerability.,CC/CR/CV linkage.,12_CIPG.docx — §1 (Situation / COG),12/10 |
| BR-S2-05,C4:BR-S2-05,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: characterization of the PRC anti-access/area-denial advantage (interior/short lines, higher speed of concentration)?",Describes A2/AD + interior-lines advantage.,Omits the A2/AD characterization.,A2/AD.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Tables 1/5/6 (OE & Threat),10/12 |
| BR-S2-06,C4:BR-S2-06,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a note of PRC land-based short/medium-range missiles range Okinawa (~400 nm) and Guam?,States missiles range Okinawa/Guam.,Omits the missile-range threat to bases.,Missile reach.,12_CIPG.docx — §2 (Commander's Initial Analysis) + 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx ¶5,12/03 |
| BR-S2-07,C4:BR-S2-07,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: a note of the PRC robust electronic-warfare, cyberspace, and counter-space capability?",Identifies EW/cyber/counter-space threat.,Omits EW/cyber/space threat.,Multi-domain threat.,12_CIPG.docx — §1 (Situation / COG),12/10 |
| BR-S2-08,C4:BR-S2-08,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: identification of PRC submarines (Kilo/Song) as a critical strength/threat in the Strait?,Names the submarine threat.,Omits submarine threat.,PRC strength.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Strengths) + 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx ¶3–4,03/10 |
| BR-S2-09,C4:BR-S2-09,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: identification of PRC mining capability as a threat to sea lines and ports?,Names mining threat.,Omits mining threat.,PRC strength.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Strengths) + 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx ¶3–4,10 |
| BR-S2-10,C4:BR-S2-10,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: identification of PRC integrated air defenses / littoral IADS as a signifcant threat to US/multinational access?,Names IADS threat.,Omits IADS.,PRC strength.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Strengths) + 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx ¶3–4,10 |
| BR-S2-11,C4:BR-S2-11,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: enumeration of the PRC lack of joint-operations experience and proficiency below the operational level as a critical vulnerability?,Names joint-ops inexperience as a CV.,Omits this vulnerability.,PLA CV.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Critical Strengths/Weaknesses),10 |
| BR-S2-12,C4:BR-S2-12,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: enumeration of PRC weakness in night actions as a critical vulnerability?,Names night-fighting weakness.,Omits it.,PLA CV.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Critical Strengths/Weaknesses),10/12 |
| BR-S2-13,C4:BR-S2-13,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: enumeration of PRC weakness in underway replenishment / blue-water sustainment?,Names UNREP/sustainment weakness.,Omits it.,PLA CV.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Critical Strengths/Weaknesses),10/12 |
| BR-S2-14,C4:BR-S2-14,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: enumeration of PRC weakness in anti-submarine warfare as an exploitable vulnerability?,Names ASW weakness.,Omits ASW weakness.,PLA CV.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Critical Strengths/Weaknesses),10 |
| BR-S2-15,C4:BR-S2-15,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: enumeration of scarce PRC amphibious lift (requires an undamaged port) as a vulnerability?,Names lift shortfall/port dependence.,Omits lift shortfall.,PLA CV.,12_CIPG.docx — §1 (Situation / COG),12/10 |
| BR-S2-16,C4:BR-S2-16,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a note of the PRC centralized command-and-control is vulnerable to decapitation?,Names C2 decapitation vulnerability.,Omits it.,PLA CV.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Critical Strengths/Weaknesses),10 |
| BR-S2-17,C4:BR-S2-17,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a note of the PRC conscript force with high annual turnover (~33%) as a readiness weakness?,Names conscript-turnover weakness.,Omits it.,PLA CV.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Critical Strengths/Weaknesses),10 |
| BR-S2-18,C4:BR-S2-18,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a note of the PRC has no international support / weak legitimacy?,Names lack of international support.,Omits it.,PLA CV / friendly opportunity.,12_CIPG.docx — §1 (Situation / COG),12/10 |
| BR-S2-19,C4:BR-S2-19,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a note of PRC limited air-refueling and over-the-horizon-targeting capability?,Names air-refueling / OTH-T limits.,Omits both.,PLA CV.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Critical Strengths/Weaknesses),10 |
| BR-S2-20,C4:BR-S2-20,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: treatment of the west-coast landing beaches / east-coast none geography and its effect on amphibious analysis?,States beaches/ports are west-coast; east coast unsuitable.,Omits the geography-amphibious link.,Terrain.,05_Country_Fact_Sheet_and_Critical_Geography.docx — (Critical Geography / Oceanography) + 10_JIPOE_Brief.docx Table 1,05/10 |
| BR-S2-21,C4:BR-S2-21,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a note of confined Strait waters imperil US submarines while the Luzon (Bashi) Strait and waters east of Taiwan favor US forces?,States the subsurface risk/advantage split.,Omits the oceanography factor.,Oceanography.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Strengths) + 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx ¶3–4,10 |
| BR-S2-22,C4:BR-S2-22,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: characterization of the PRC information narrative (Taiwan as renegade-province disrupter; US as weak/colonial)?,Describes the PRC narrative.,Omits the information environment.,Info environment.,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §1–3 (Strategic setting),02/12 |
| BR-S2-23,C4:BR-S2-23,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a restatement of enemy course of action 1: de-escalate (most likely)?,Names ECOA1 de-escalate.,Omits ECOA1.,ECOA.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Tables 13–14 (Enemy Courses of Action),10 |
| BR-S2-24,C4:BR-S2-24,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a restatement of enemy course of action 2: interdict maritime commerce to pressure Taiwan?,Names ECOA2 interdiction.,Omits ECOA2.,ECOA.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Tables 13–14 (Enemy Courses of Action),10 |
| BR-S2-25,C4:BR-S2-25,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a restatement of enemy course of action 3: full-scale invasion cascading to regional war (most dangerous)?,Names ECOA3 invasion / most dangerous.,Omits ECOA3.,ECOA.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Tables 13–14 (Enemy Courses of Action),10 |
| BR-S2-26,C4:BR-S2-26,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis address whether the analysis establishes a PIR to gauge progress of PRC consolidation operations of the seized islands and readiness for a cross-strait assault on Taiwan proper?,Frames consolidation-vs-invasion as an unresolved intelligence question.,Assumes one course as fact.,Central ambiguity.,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §1–3 (Strategic setting),02/03/10 |
| BR-S2-27,C4:BR-S2-27,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the semiconductor/economic stake (TSMC ~54% foundry share; exports ~US$190B) as material to the strategic COG?,Links Taiwan's chip economy to the strategic COG.,Omits the economic stake.,Economic COG evidence.,05_Country_Fact_Sheet_and_Critical_Geography.docx — (Economy / Trade),05 |
| BR-S2-28,C4:BR-S2-28,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a note of the 14% mainland-Chinese population as an infiltration/influence risk?,Identifies the demographic influence risk.,Omits it.,Civil/demography.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Tables 1/5/6 (OE & Threat),10/05 |
| BR-S3-01,C4:BR-S3-01,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a list of the specified task to deploy multinational forces to deter PRC use of force?,States the deter-by-deployment task.,Omits it.,Specified.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶7 (Tasks),07/12 |
| BR-S3-02,C4:BR-S3-02,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a list of the specified task to protect US and friendly maritime and air traffic in the South and East China Seas?,States the protect-traffic task.,Omits it.,Specified.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶7 (Tasks),07/12 |
| BR-S3-03,C4:BR-S3-03,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a list of the specified task to evacuate American citizens from Taiwan (noncombatant evacuation)?,States the NEO task.,Omits NEO.,Specified.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Directed Tasks – NEO) + 07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx ¶7,07/12 |
| BR-S3-04,C4:BR-S3-04,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a list of the specified task to prepare contingency plans to seize Quemoy and Matsu?,States the counter-seizure planning task.,Omits it.,Specified.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶7 (Tasks),07/12 |
| BR-S3-05,C4:BR-S3-05,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: a list of the specified task to establish a forward operating base at Clark Air Base, Philippines?",States the Clark FOB task.,Omits it.,Specified.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Directed Tasks) + 07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx ¶7,07/12 |
| BR-S3-06,C4:BR-S3-06,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a list of the specified reporting task (OPREP-1 and requirements/options proposal NLT 260400Z JUN 2026)?,States the OPREP-1/proposal task and deadline.,Omits the reporting requirement.,Specified.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶7 + 12_CIPG.docx §3 (Directed Tasks),07/12 |
| BR-S3-07,C4:BR-S3-07,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: a list of the specified task to, when directed, defend Taiwan in accordance with US law and allied terms?",States the conditional defend-Taiwan task.,Omits it.,Specified (conditional).,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶7 (Tasks),07 |
| BR-S3-08,C4:BR-S3-08,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of the implied task to develop a multinational rules of engagement (none currently exist)?,Identifies the ROE-request implied task.,Omits the ROE task.,Derived from ROE absence.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Friendly Forces – no combined ROE) + 07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx ¶8,12/07 |
| BR-S3-11,C4:BR-S3-11,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: derivation of the implied task to harden and defend forward bases (Okinawa, Guam, Philippines, Singapore) against missile/drone/cyber strike?",Names base-defense/hardening implied task.,Omits base defense.,Derived.,12_CIPG.docx — §2 (Commander's Initial Analysis) + 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx ¶5,12/10 |
| BR-S3-12,C4:BR-S3-12,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of the implied task to manage navigation warfare in response to cyber/space degradation on PNT?,Names the PNT-resilience implied task.,Omits PNT resilience.,Derived.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Directed Tasks / Operational Concept),12/10 |
| BR-S3-16,C4:BR-S3-16,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of denying the cross-strait approach to Taiwan landing sites in order to build forces at Kadena/Guam/Philippines as essential?,Names the deny-approach-while-building essential task.,Omits it.,Essential (CIPG concept).,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Directed Tasks / Operational Concept),12 |
| BR-S3-17,C4:BR-S3-17,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: derivation of the implied task to establish theater reception, staging, onward movement, and integration for closing forces?",Names RSOI/theater sustainment enabling task.,Omits RSOI.,Derived enabler.,14_Running_Estimates.docx — (see cited section),14/04 |
| BR-S3-18,C4:BR-S3-18,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of the implied task to establish sea control in the Luzon (Bashi) Strait?,Names Luzon-Strait/east sea-control task.,Omits it.,Derived from oceanography advantage.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 1 (Oceanography — Strait of Taiwan / Luzon Strait),10 |
| BR-S3-19,C4:BR-S3-19,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of the implied task to provide theater air and missile defense integrated with Taiwanese and allied systems?,Names integrated AMD task.,Omits AMD integration.,Derived.,14_Running_Estimates.docx — (see cited section),14/04 |
| BR-S3-20,C4:BR-S3-20,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of the implied task to plan personnel recovery / combat search and rescue for the contested environment?,Names PR/CSAR implied task.,Omits PR/CSAR.,Derived enabler.,14_Running_Estimates.docx — (see cited section),14 |
| BR-S4-01,C4:BR-S4-01,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis incorrectly state escalation as a restraint (avoid provoking general war; keep action tied to the single issue of Taiwan's defense)?,Incorrectly states avoiding general-war/keeping actions to a single-issue as an escalation restraint.,"Omits stating escalation as a restraint, or escalation restraint.",Central restraint.,12_CIPG.docx — §3–4 (Assumptions / Intent / Risk),12/07 |
| BR-S4-02,C4:BR-S4-02,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of that the joint force cannot deploy forces into or operate from Taiwan without POTUS approval?,Captures the POTUS-retained authority.,Omits the retained authority.,Restraint.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶8 (Coordinating Instructions – POTUS authority),07 |
| BR-S4-03,C4:BR-S4-03,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the low-collateral-damage restraint on rapid-response options?,Captures low-collateral-damage guidance.,Omits it.,Restraint.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶8 (Coordinating Instructions),07/12 |
| BR-S4-04,C4:BR-S4-04,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: capture of the Japan caveat (defense/maritime-trade protection only; no offensive operations against the PRC) as a fact?,States the Japan no-offensive caveat.,Omits or misstates the Japan caveat.,Coalition caveat.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Friendly Forces – Japan caveat),12/07 |
| BR-S4-05,C4:BR-S4-05,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: capture of the Republic of Korea caveat (basing yes; no engagement of PRC beyond defense of Korea) as a fact?,States the ROK caveat.,Omits it.,Coalition caveat.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Friendly Forces – Korea caveat),12 |
| BR-S4-06,C4:BR-S4-06,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: capture of the Australian maritime OPCON-to-PACFLT/C7F relationship as a fact?,States Australian maritime OPCON.,Omits it.,Command caveat.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶15 + 12_CIPG.docx §3 (Friendly Forces),07/12 |
| BR-S4-07,C4:BR-S4-07,S10,Known facts,1,SI,positive,2,"Does the mission analysis include: a note of Taiwan, JSDF, and Philippine forces remain under national command as a fact?",States national-command status of partners.,Omits it.,Command caveat.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶8 (Coordinating Instructions),07 |
| BR-S4-08,C4:BR-S4-08,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the absence of combined Taiwan–United States rules of engagement as a fact?,Flags the no-combined-ROE constraint.,Omits it.,Quiet — stated once.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Friendly Forces – no combined ROE) + 07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx ¶8,12 |
| BR-S4-09,C4:BR-S4-09,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the noncombatant evacuation as a precondition to offensive military options?,States NEO precedes offensive options.,Omits the precondition.,Sequencing constraint.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Directed Tasks – NEO) + 07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx ¶7,12 |
| BR-S4-10,C4:BR-S4-10,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,SI,positive,2,"Does the mission analysis include: a note of the constraint to operate within coalition national guidance (Philippines/Japan/Australia/Singapore agreed under US political guidance, forces TBD)?",Captures the coalition political-guidance constraint.,Omits it.,Constraint.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶8 (Coordinating Instructions),07 |
| BR-S5-01,C4:BR-S5-01,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of a PIR on PRC cross-strait invasion preparation / PLAN amphibious-sortie indicators at Ningbo?,Produces the invasion-prep/sortie PIR.,No PIR on invasion prep.,Derived PIR.,03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx — (derived CCIR; verify against 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx + 10_JIPOE_Brief.docx),03/10/02 |
| BR-S5-02,C4:BR-S5-02,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of a PIR on PLAN submarine locations and readiness?,Produces the submarine PIR.,No submarine PIR.,Derived PIR.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Strengths) + 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx ¶3–4,03/12 |
| BR-S5-03,C4:BR-S5-03,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of a PIR on PRC missile/drone readiness against theater bases?,Produces the missile/drone PIR.,No missile/drone PIR.,Derived PIR.,03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx — (derived CCIR; verify against 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx + 10_JIPOE_Brief.docx),03/12 |
| BR-S5-06,C4:BR-S5-06,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: derivation of a PIR on third-party posturing (DPRK, Russian Federation) that could open a second theater?",Produces a third-party/second-theater PIR.,No third-party PIR.,Derived PIR.,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — (see cited section),02/07 |
| BR-S5-07,C4:BR-S5-07,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of an FFIR on carrier/amphibious/airlift closure timeline and combat-power arrival?,Produces the force-closure FFIR.,No closure FFIR.,Derived FFIR.,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx — (derived FFIR; verify against 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx),04/12/14 |
| BR-S5-08,C4:BR-S5-08,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of an FFIR on noncombatant-evacuation status?,Produces the NEO-status FFIR.,No NEO FFIR.,Derived FFIR.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — (see cited section),07/12 |
| BR-S5-09,C4:BR-S5-09,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: derivation of an FFIR on coalition commitments, basing approvals, and national caveats?",Produces the coalition FFIR.,No coalition FFIR.,Derived FFIR.,12_CIPG.docx — (derived CCIR; verify against 12_CIPG.docx §3 + 14_Running_Estimates.docx),12/04 |
| BR-S5-10,C4:BR-S5-10,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of an FFIR on supplemental/combined rules-of-engagement approval status?,Produces the ROE-status FFIR.,No ROE FFIR.,Derived FFIR.,12_CIPG.docx — (derived CCIR; verify against 12_CIPG.docx §3 + 14_Running_Estimates.docx),12 |
| BR-S5-11,C4:BR-S5-11,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: derivation of an FFIR on theater air-and-missile-defense and mine-countermeasures readiness?,Produces the AMD/MCM FFIR.,No AMD/MCM FFIR.,Derived FFIR.,14_Running_Estimates.docx — (derived FFIR; verify against 14_Running_Estimates.docx),14/10 |
| BR-S5-13,C4:BR-S5-13,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,SI,positive,2,"Does the mission analysis include: identification of essential elements of friendly information (e.g., force-closure timelines; NEO routes; submarine operating areas)?",Names at least one EEFI to protect.,No EEFI identified.,EEFI.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Strengths) + 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx ¶3–4,14 |
| BR-S6-01,C4:BR-S6-01,S6,Assumptions,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: capture of the assumption that the PRC will interfere with shipping and activate a more restrictive ADIZ over the Strait?,States the interference/ADIZ assumption.,Omits it.,Stated assumption.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶2 (Assumptions),07 |
| BR-S6-02,C4:BR-S6-02,S6,Assumptions,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: capture of the assumption that the PRC will strike coalition bases with missiles/drones on hostilities?,States the base-strike assumption.,Omits it.,Stated assumption.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Assumptions for Initial Planning),12 |
| BR-S6-03,C4:BR-S6-03,S6,Assumptions,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: capture of the assumption that the PRC will use cyberspace/space to degrade USPACOM positioning, navigation, and timing?",States the cyber/space PNT assumption.,Omits it.,Stated assumption.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Assumptions for Initial Planning),12 |
| BR-S6-04,C4:BR-S6-04,S6,Assumptions,2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: capture of the assumption that the PRC will act to neutralize coalition capabilities in Okinawa, Philippines, Guam, and Singapore?",States the neutralize-bases assumption.,Omits it.,Stated assumption.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Assumptions for Initial Planning),12 |
| BR-S6-05,C4:BR-S6-05,S6,Assumptions,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: capture of the assumption that the DPRK/PRC will not cross the 38th parallel unless mainland China is threatened?,States the Korea-restraint assumption.,Omits it.,Stated assumption.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶2 (Assumptions),07 |
| BR-S6-06,C4:BR-S6-06,S6,Assumptions,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: capture of the assumption that the Panama Canal and Strait of Malacca remain open?,States the chokepoint-open assumption.,Omits it.,Stated assumption.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶2 (Assumptions),07 |
| BR-S6-07,C4:BR-S6-07,S6,Assumptions,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: capture of the assumption that the Philippines will not restrict US forces to non-combatant personnel/equipment/supplies?,States the Philippines-access assumption.,Omits it.,Stated assumption.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Assumptions for Initial Planning),12 |
| BR-S6-09,C4:BR-S6-09,S6,Assumptions,2,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: capture of the assumption that the Carl Vinson CSG is available at N+7 (noting Enclosure 1 lists N+14)?,States the Vinson-availability assumption and the discrepancy.,Omits it or ignores the discrepancy.,Stated assumption + discrepancy.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Assumptions for Initial Planning),12/04 |
| BR-S7-01,C4:BR-S7-01,S7,Risk,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the risk to mission (force disparity + PRC proximity) with a mitigation?,Risk-to-mission stated WITH a mitigation.,"Risk without mitigation, or omitted.",CIPG risk paragraph.,12_CIPG.docx — §4 (Risk),12 |
| BR-S7-02,C4:BR-S7-02,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the risk to force (forward bases as high-value targets) with a mitigation?,Risk-to-force stated WITH a mitigation.,Omits or no mitigation.,Derived.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — §2 + Tables 5/9 (verify risk basis),10/12 |
| BR-S7-03,C4:BR-S7-03,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the time risk (the ~15-day Taiwan-hold limit versus the 7–10-day closure window) with a mitigation?,Time risk stated WITH a mitigation.,Omits or no mitigation.,Decisive tension.,12_CIPG.docx — §2 (Commander's Initial Analysis) + 10_JIPOE_Brief.docx §2 (Time/Warning),12/10 |
| BR-S7-04,C4:BR-S7-04,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the escalation risk of offensive/pre-emptive action (protracted missile war / general conflict) with a mitigation?,Escalation risk stated WITH a mitigation.,Omits or no mitigation.,From Option 4 caution.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Option 4),12 |
| BR-S7-05,C4:BR-S7-05,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the coalition-legitimacy/cohesion risk (partner goals not aligning; PRC veto; hostile media) with a mitigation?,Legitimacy risk stated WITH a mitigation.,Omits or no mitigation.,Tied to friendly COG.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — §2 + Tables 5/9 (verify risk basis),10/12 |
| BR-S7-06,C4:BR-S7-06,S7,Risk,2,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: treatment of risk of PRC counter-space/cyber degradation to command-and-control with a mitigation?,Cyber/space C2 risk stated WITH a mitigation.,Omits it.,Derived.,12_CIPG.docx — §4 (Risk),12/10 |
| BR-S8-01,C4:BR-S8-01,S8,Restated mission,2,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis produce a restated mission that lacks one or more of who/what/when/where/why?,Restated mission is missing one or more of the 5 elements.,Restated mission contains who/what/when/where/why,Restated mission quality.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶3 (Mission) — restated by staff,07/12 |
| BR-S8-02,C4:BR-S8-02,S8,Restated mission,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis address whether the analysis embeds the purpose (deny Strait / protect trade / enable resolution) in the mission statement?,Restated mission embeds purpose + restraint.,Purpose/restraint absent from mission statement.,Mission quality.,12_CIPG.docx — §2–4 — restated by staff,12/07 |
| BR-S9-01,C4:BR-S9-01,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: a recommendation of the decision point to commit to Strait denial/defense versus continued build-up, restricted by closure, NEO completion, and sortie indicators?",Produces the commit-vs-build-up DP with restrictions.,No commit DP or no restrictions logic.,Derived DP.,12_CIPG.docx — (derived DP/NAI; verify against §3 Options + 10_JIPOE_Brief.docx),12/10 |
| BR-S9-03,C4:BR-S9-03,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a recommendation of the escalation-response decision point if the PRC strikes bases or attacks PNT?,Produces the escalation-response DP.,No escalation DP.,Derived DP.,12_CIPG.docx — (derived DP/NAI; verify against §3 Options + 10_JIPOE_Brief.docx),12/10 |
| BR-S9-06,C4:BR-S9-06,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,2,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a recommendation of Ningbo/Zhoushan bases as a named area of interest?,Names NAI at Ningbo/Zhoushan.,Omits.,NAI.,03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx — (derived NAI; verify against 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx),03/10 |
| BR-S9-07,C4:BR-S9-07,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,2,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a recommendation of Xiamen and the Quemoy/Matsu approaches as a named area of interest?,Names NAI at Xiamen/approaches.,Omits.,NAI.,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — (see cited section),02/05 |
| BR-S9-08,C4:BR-S9-08,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,2,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a recommendation of submarine transit lanes (Strait / east of Taiwan / Bashi) as a named area of interest?,Names submarine-lane NAI.,Omits.,NAI.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Strengths) + 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx ¶3–4,10/03 |
| BR-S9-09,C4:BR-S9-09,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,2,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a recommendation of Taiwan west-coast beaches/ports as named areas of interest?,Names west-coast beach/port NAI.,Omits.,NAI.,05_Country_Fact_Sheet_and_Critical_Geography.docx — (derived NAI; verify against 05_Country_Fact_Sheet_and_Critical_Geography.docx),05 |
| BR-S9-10,C4:BR-S9-10,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,2,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a recommendation of the Luzon (Bashi) Strait chokepoint as a named area of interest?,Names Luzon-Strait NAI.,Omits.,NAI.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 1 (Oceanography — Strait of Taiwan / Luzon Strait),10 |
| BR-S10-01,C4:BR-S10-01,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the instigating seizures (Quemoy ~10 JUN; Matsu 18 JUN) as known facts?,States both island seizures with the canonical dates.,Omits or misstates the seizures.,Instigating event.,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §3 (Escalation Arc),02/07 |
| BR-S10-02,C4:BR-S10-02,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the PRC 'by force' announcement (13 JUN) and Taiwan's request under PL 96-8?,States announcement + Taiwan request.,Omits either.,Trigger.,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §3 (Escalation Arc),02/07 |
| BR-S10-03,C4:BR-S10-03,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of N-Day (261800Z JUN 2026) and anticipated operation length (>180 days)?,States N-Day and duration.,Omits either.,Planning data.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶1/¶8 (Situation; N-Day),07 |
| BR-S10-05,C4:BR-S10-05,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: a statement of key distances bounding force flow (Okinawa ~410 nm; Guam ~1,525; San Diego ~6,610 ≈ 12-day transit)?",States representative distances.,Omits the distance facts.,Distance facts.,05_Country_Fact_Sheet_and_Critical_Geography.docx — (Geography / Distances),05/10 |
| BR-S10-06,C4:BR-S10-06,S10,Known facts,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: capture of the time-distance gap (bulk closure 7–10 days vs ~15-day Taiwan hold)?,States the closure-vs-hold gap explicitly.,Omits the decisive gap.,"Quiet, scattered, decisive.",12_CIPG.docx — §2 (Commander's Initial Analysis) + 10_JIPOE_Brief.docx §2 (Time/Warning),12/10 |
| BR-S10-07,C4:BR-S10-07,S6,Assumptions,1,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a recommendation of the proposed Joint Operations Area boundary coordinates?,"Reproduces the JOA corners (using 119-00E, not the CIPG typo).",Omits the JOA or repeats the 19-00E typo uncritically.,JOA definition; typo reconciliation.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — §1 (JOA coordinates) + 12_CIPG.docx §3 (Friendly Forces),10/12 |
| BR-S10-09,C4:BR-S10-09,S6,Assumptions,1,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a note of the assumption that the PLAN Eastern Sea Fleet is preparing an amphibious sortie from Ningbo?,States the sortie-preparation fact.,Omits it.,Known fact / trigger.,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §3 (Escalation Arc),02/12 |
| BR-S10-10,C4:BR-S10-10,S10,Known facts,2,SI,positive,2,"Does the mission analysis include: a note of the failed UN Security Council resolution (PRC veto, Russian abstention) as a diplomatic fact?",States the failed UNSCR.,Omits it.,Diplomatic fact.,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §3 (Escalation Arc),02 |
| BR-S11-01,C4:BR-S11-01,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis address whether the analysis analyzes immediate force availability (Reagan N; Nimitz N+3; ARG/31 MEU N+1; B-52 Guam N; F-35A Kadena N)?,States the immediately available forces.,Omits the immediate force picture.,Force analysis.,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx — 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx + 12_CIPG.docx Enclosure 1,04/12 |
| BR-S11-02,C4:BR-S11-02,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis address whether the analysis analyzes time-phased closure of follow-on forces (Lincoln N+7; Carl Vinson N+7/N+14; Army/USAF by notice-to-move)?,States the phased closure and the Vinson discrepancy.,Ignores phasing or the discrepancy.,Closure analysis.,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx — 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx + 12_CIPG.docx Enclosure 1,04/12 |
| BR-S11-03,C4:BR-S11-03,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of throughput over long lines of communication (few APODs; contested SPODs) as the binding sustainment constraint?,Names throughput/LOC as the limiter.,Treats sustainment as unconstrained.,Derived resource analysis.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — §2 (Logistics/Force Protection) + Table 9,10/14 |
| BR-S11-04,C4:BR-S11-04,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the mine-countermeasures capacity shortfall?,Names MCM shortfall.,Omits it.,Friendly weakness.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — §2 (Logistics/Force Protection) + Table 9,10/14 |
| BR-S11-05,C4:BR-S11-05,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the shortfall in detection against conventionally-powered submarines?,Names sub-detection shortfall.,Omits it.,Friendly weakness.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Table 5 (PRC Strengths) + 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx ¶3–4,10 |
| BR-S11-06,C4:BR-S11-06,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the precision-guided-munition stock shortfall?,Names PGM stock shortfall.,Omits it.,Friendly weakness.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — §2 (Logistics/Force Protection) + Table 9,10/14 |
| BR-S11-07,C4:BR-S11-07,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the shortfall in defense against small missile-armed surface combatants?,Names small-combatant-defense shortfall.,Omits it.,Friendly weakness.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — §2 (Logistics/Force Protection) + Table 9,10 |
| BR-S11-08,C4:BR-S11-08,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the Taiwan force role and its limits (denies Strait/defends island; cannot retake islands or hold beyond ~15 days unaided)?,States Taiwan role + limits.,Omits Taiwan role or its limits.,Host force.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Available Forces) + Enclosure 1,12/10 |
| BR-S11-09,C4:BR-S11-09,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a note of the directed establishment of Clark Air Base as a strategic-lift forward operating base in the force flow?,Incorporates Clark FOB in force flow.,Omits Clark FOB.,Basing.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Directed Tasks) + 07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx ¶7,07/12 |
| BR-S11-11,C4:BR-S11-11,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a note of Singapore ship-repair-facility support and combat-logistics-force availability in sustainment analysis?,Incorporates Singapore SRF / CLF.,Omits sustainment enablers.,Sustainment.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — (see cited section),07/14 |
| BR-S11-12,C4:BR-S11-12,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis address whether the analysis assesses coalition force contributions and access as a force-availability factor (Australia/Japan/UK; ROK/Singapore/Vietnam/Philippines)?,Incorporates coalition contributions/access.,Ignores coalition contributions.,Coalition force analysis.,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx — 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx + 12_CIPG.docx Enclosure 1,04/12 |
| BR-S12-01,C4:BR-S12-01,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the military objective to prevent the forcible unification of Taiwan?,States objective 1.,Omits it.,Military objective.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶5 + 12_CIPG.docx §3 (Objectives),07/12 |
| BR-S12-02,C4:BR-S12-02,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the military objective to deny PRC control of the Taiwan Strait and its approaches?,States objective 2.,Omits it.,Military objective.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶5 (Military Objectives),07/12 |
| BR-S12-03,C4:BR-S12-03,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: a statement of the military objective to defend and protect maritime trade in the South China Sea?,States objective 3.,Omits it.,Military objective.,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶5 (Military Objectives),07/12 |
| BR-S12-12,C4:BR-S12-12,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: refinement of the proposed termination criteria (islands returned; readiness restored; FON/commerce assured; forces to garrison)?,Engages and refines the termination criteria.,Ignores/parrots termination criteria without analysis.,Termination refinement.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Proposed Termination Criteria),12 |
| BR-S12-13,C4:BR-S12-13,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: refinement of the proposed post-conflict considerations (security force-in-place; disputes to the diplomatic arena; HA/reconstruction)?,Engages and refines post-conflict considerations.,Ignores post-conflict considerations.,Post-conflict refinement.,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Theater Post-Conflict Considerations),12 |
| A-01,C4:A-01,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis propose a priority intelligence requirement to determine the composition and disposition of PRC forces on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu Islands?,Establishes a PIR to determine the composition and disposition of PRC forces currenty on Quemoyt and Matsu Islands.,Does not establish a PIR to determine composition and disposition of forces on Quemoy and Matsu Islands.,PIR — composition/disposition of PRC forces on Quemoy & Matsu,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §3 (Escalation Arc),02 |
| A-02,C4:A-02,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis address whether the analysis makes the assumption that U.S. forces deployed for this operation can draw from War Reserve Stocks, prepositioned war reserve materiel, and other prepositioned stocks in Korea and Japan?",Makes assumption that forces deployed can draw on stocks in Japan and Korea,Does not make the assumption that deployed forces can draw from prepositioned stocks in Japan and Korea.,Assumption — access to prepositioned war reserve materiel (Japan/Korea),04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx; 14_Running_Estimates.docx (Sustainment),04/14 |
| A-03,C4:A-03,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis address whether the analysis establishes an implied task to submit request for release of prepositioned war stocks from Diego Garcia to provide reliable sources of supply near the operational theater?,Establishes implied task to submit requests for prepositioned stocks release from Diego Garcia.,Does not establish implied task to request release prepositioned stocks at Diego Garcia.,Implied task — request release of prepositioned stocks (Diego Garcia),04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx (Carl Vinson CSG / Diego Garcia),04 |
| A-04,C4:A-04,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis address whether the analysis establishes an assumption that POTUS will approve limited force presence on Taiwan to facilitate NEO operations?,Establsihes assumption that POTUS will approve imitted forces on Taiwan to assist in NEO.,Does not establish assumption for limitted force presence approved for NEO.,Assumption — POTUS approval of limited presence on Taiwan for NEO,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶8 (POTUS-retained authority),07 |
| A-05,C4:A-05,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish a friendly force information requirement to determine the current stockage of critical Class V items currently held by Taiwanese forces?,Establishes FFIR to determine current Class V stockage levels of Taiwanese critical munitions.,Does not establish an FFIR to determine Taiwanese stockage levels of critical Class V items.,FFIR — Taiwan Class V (munitions) stockage,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx (ROC forces),07/04 |
| A-06,C4:A-06,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis make the assumption that eastern Taiwanese ports, particulalry the ports of Hualien and Su'ao, can accomodate the receipt of bulk petroleum and other critical classes of supply?",Makes the assumption that eastern Taiwanese ports can accept limitted supplies.,Does not make the assumption that eatsern Taiwanese ports can accpet limitted supplies.,Assumption — eastern ports (Hualien/Su'ao) can accept limited bulk supply,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx (Oceanography/ports); 05_Country_Fact_Sheet_and_Critical_Geography.docx,10/05 |
| A-07,C4:A-07,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish an implied task to be prepared to (BPT) conduct joint logisitcs over the shore (JLOTS) to provide critical supplies to Taiwan?,Establishes an implied tasks to BPT conduct JLOTS.,Does not establish a BPT implied tasks to conduct JLOTS.,Implied task — be prepared to conduct joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS),10_JIPOE_Brief.docx (Logistics),10 |
| A-08,C4:A-08,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish a friendly force information requirement (FFIR) that addresses requests by other nations to include their citizens in the non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO)?,Establsihes an FFIR to ascertain any requests by other countries to evacuate their citizens in a NEO.,Does not establish an FFIR to track requests by other nations to evacuate their citizens in a U.S.-led NEO.,FFIR — third-nation requests to include citizens in the NEO,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶7 (NEO task),07 |
| A-09,C4:A-09,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis make the assumption that the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force will adjust LOC protection parameters to assist in extending the multinational forces' reach?,Makes the assumption that Japanese Maritime SDF will be flexible in adjusting LOC protection parameters.,Does not make the assumption that Japan's Maritime Defense Force will expand LOC protection parameters.,Assumption — JMSDF flexibility on line-of-communication protection,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Friendly Forces — Japan),12 |
| C-01,C4:C-01,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis identify/recommend force requirements in support of CIPG Options #1-4 for SEA TIGER?,"The analysis identifies whether the force requirements for Option #1-4 could be sourced within the designated time horizons in order to support Level 3 or 4 planning, as directed by the CIPG",Fails to indentify force provider estimates on force generation in support of Option guidance.,Force Indentification for Options,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Opn Approach) ¶d.ii. Options,12 |
| C-02,C4:C-02,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer the essential task of establishing maritime superiority in the South China Sea upon direction from national command authority?,The analysis infers the task of establishing maritime superiority in the South China Sea upon direction from national command authority,Fails to infer the theater strategic maritime task to achieve and maintain freedom of action,Task Analysis - Essential Task when directed,07_CJCS_WARNORD— ¶4 (Directed Tasks to USPACOM),07 |
| C-03,C4:C-03,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,SI,positive,2,Does the analysis infer the implied task of collecting METOC information in support of SEA TIGER?,The analysis infers the implied task of METOC collection to support JFC decision-making,Fails to infer the implied task of METOC collection,Task Analysis tied to OE Understanding (Maritime),12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Opn Approach) ¶d.ii. Options,12/10 |
| C-04,C4:C-04,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer the implied task of employing sealift in support of SEA TIGER?,The analysis infers the implied task of employing sealift in support of SEA TIGER,Fails to infer the implied task of employing sealift,Task Analysis - Force Flow,07_CJCS_WARNORD— ¶4 (Directed Tasks to USPACOM),07 |
| C-05,C4:C-05,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer the implied task of employing IADS to provide for theater cruise missile defense in support of SEA TIGER?,The analysis infers the implied task of employing aircraft and integrated air defense systems (IADS) to provide for theater cruise missile defense in support of SEA TIGER?,Fails to infer the implied tasks of employing IADS o provide for theater cruise missile defense,Task Analysis - Joint Protection,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Tables 5/6 (Threat),12 |
| C-06,C4:C-06,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis infer the implied task for COMPACFLT to provide forces listed in Task Organization (TBP), provide NALE to TFACC, designate CJFMCC/MCC?","The analysis infer the implied task for COMPACFLT to provide forces listed in Task Organization (TBP), provide NALE to TFACC, designate CJFMCC/MCC",Omits one or more of the implied tasks,Task Analysis - Components,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Opn Approach) ¶d.ii. Options,12/04 |
| C-07,C4:C-07,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis infer the implied task for COMUSARPAC to provide forces listed in Task Organization (TBP), staff augmentation to COMJTF-SEA TIGER, and nominate COMJFLCC/Land Component Commander?","The analysis infers the implied task for COMARPAC to provide forces listed in Task Organization (TBP), staff augmentation to COMJTF-SEA TIGER, and nominate COMJFLCC/Land Component Commander",Omits one or more of the implied tasks,Task Analysis - Components,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Opn Approach) ¶d.ii. Options,12/04 |
| C-08,C4:C-08,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis infer the implied task for COMPACAF to provide forces listed in Task Organization (TBP), provide ACCE to COMJTF-SEA TIGER, and provide protection of US/Friendly air traffic outside of the likely JOA?","The analysis infers the implied task for COMPACAF to provide forces listed in Task Organization (TBP), provide ACCE to COMJTF-SEA TIGER, and provide protection of US/Friendly air traffic outside of the likely JOA",Omits one or more of the implied tasks,Task Analysis - Components,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Opn Approach) ¶d.ii. Options,12/04 |
| C-09,C4:C-09,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis infer the implied task for COMSOCPAC to provide forces listed in Task Organization (TBP), provide SOCCE to COMJTF-SEA TIGER, provide SOLE to Air Force component, provide CJFSOCC/CJSOTF as appropriate?","The analysis infers the implied task for COMSOCPAC to provide forces listed in Task Organization (TBP), provide SOCCE to COMJTF-SEA TIGER, provide SOLE to Air Force component, provide CJFSOCC/CJSOTF as appropriate",Omits one or more of the implied tasks,Task Analysis - Components,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Opn Approach) ¶d.ii. Options,12/04 |
| C-10,C4:C-10,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis infer the implied task for COMMARFORPAC to provide forces listed in Task Organization (TBP), staff augmentation to COMJTF-SEA TIGER, and staff augmentation to JFLCC/LCC?","The analysis infers the implied task for COMMARFORPAC to provide forces listed in Task Organization (TBP), staff augmentation to COMJTF-SEA TIGER, and staff augmentation to JFLCC/LCC",Omits one or more of the implied tasks,Task Analysis - Components,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Opn Approach) ¶d.ii. Options,12/04 |
| C-11,C4:C-11,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis FAIL to analyze the availability of SRF (Sembawang Dry Dock), Singapore for combat damaged (less CVN) ships that retain steerage?","The analysis fails to assume the availability of SRF (Sembawang Dry Dock), Singapore for combat damaged (less CVN) ships that retain steerage",The analysis infers a planning assumption that Singapore is available for SRF,Planning Assumptions,07_CJCS_WARNORD— ¶10 (Admin/Coord),07/02 |
| C-12,C4:C-12,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer the assumption that USCYBERCOM will maintain COCOM of CPTs and CMTs employed in support of SEA TIGER?,The analysis infers the assumption that USCYBERCOM will maintain COCOM of CPTs and CMTs employed in support of SEA TIGER (Options 1-4),Omits assumption about C2 of cyberforces,Planning Assumptions,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Opn Approach) ¶d.ii. Options,12/10/02 |
| C-13,C4:C-13,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer the assumption that USPACOM will maintain OPCON of CPTs and CMTs in support of SEA TIGER?,The analysis infers the assumption that USPACOM has OPCON of CPTs and CMTs employed in support of SEA TIGER (Options 1-4),Omits assumption about C2 of cyberforces,Planning Assumptions,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Opn Approach) ¶d.ii. Options,12/10/02 |
| C-14,C4:C-14,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer a PIR of I&W of movement and track of PLAN East Sea Fleet (ECOG)?,The analysis infers a PIR of I&W of movement and track of PLAN East Sea Fleet (ECOG),Omits PIR of movement and track of PLAN ESF,PIR,12_CIPG.docx — §1 (ECOG),12/10 |
| C-15,C4:C-15,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer a PIR of I&W of PLAN sea mining of Taiwan ports (Friendly CW)?,The analysis infers a PIR of I&W of PLAN sea mining of Taiwan ports,Omits PIR of PLAN sea mining of Taiwan ports,PIR,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Tables 5/6 (Threat),10/02 |
| D-01,C4:D-01,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include a Friendly force Information Requirement on the number of U.S. citizens on Taiwan?,Contains an FFIR on the number of U.S. citizens,Omits it,FFIR — number of United States citizens on Taiwan,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶7 (NEO); 12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Directed Tasks),07/12 |
| D-02,C4:D-02,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis contain a PIR on the Taiwainese leaders/key communicators sympathetic to unification?,Contains an PIR on key leaders,Omits it,PIR — pro-unification key leaders / communicators,05_Country_Fact_Sheet_and_Critical_Geography.docx (Politics); 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx,05/02 |
| D-03,C4:D-03,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis contain a PIR on the location of PRC ground station satellite communications sites and sensors?,Contains an PIR on satelite ground stations,Omits it,PIR — PRC satellite ground-station / sensor sites,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx (Intelligence — space/sensors),10 |
| D-04,C4:D-04,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis contain an FFIR on Force Protection Conditions across all PACOM locations?,Contains an FFIR on FPCON,Omits it,FFIR — Force Protection Conditions across theater bases,14_Running_Estimates.docx (Protection),14 |
| S-01,C4:S-01,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: a recommendation of sequencing as a COA evaluation criterion: Order, timing, and priority impact of force-to-task (NEO, deter, deny)?","Recommends sequencing (order, timing, and priority of force-to-task across NEO, deter, and deny) as a COA evaluation criterion.",Omits sequencing as a COA evaluation criterion.,COA evaluation criterion — sequencing,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Options; COA evaluation),12 |
| S-02,C4:S-02,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a recommendation of deterrance perception as a COA evaluation criterion: Force posture and placement?,Recommends deterrence perception (force posture and placement) as a COA evaluation criterion.,Omits deterrence perception as a COA evaluation criterion.,COA evaluation criterion — deterrence perception,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Options; COA evaluation),12 |
| S-03,C4:S-03,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a recommendation of time-to-impact as a COA evaluation criterion: Ability to employ force based on priority requirement?,Recommends time-to-impact (ability to employ force based on priority requirement) as a COA evaluation criterion.,Omits time-to-impact as a COA evaluation criterion.,COA evaluation criterion — time-to-impact,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Options; COA evaluation),12 |
| S-04,C4:S-04,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the essential task: USPACOM employs multinational forces in the Western Pacific to deter PRC aggression towards Taiwan?,Identifies the essential task of employing multinational forces in the Western Pacific to deter PRC aggression toward Taiwan.,Omits the deter-aggression essential task.,Essential task — deter PRC aggression toward Taiwan,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶3 (Mission),07 |
| S-05,C4:S-05,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the essential task: provide for the defense of Taiwan as called for by US Law and IAW terms agreed between participant allies?,"Identifies the essential task of providing for the defense of Taiwan, when directed, in accordance with United States law and allied agreements.",Omits the defend-Taiwan essential task.,Essential task — defend Taiwan when directed,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶7 (Tasks),07 |
| S-06,C4:S-06,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the restraint of deploying forces into or operating from Taiwan without POTUS authorization?,Identifies the restraint that forces may not deploy into or operate from Taiwan without Presidential authorization.,Omits the Presidential-authorization restraint.,Restraint — POTUS-retained authority for forces into/from Taiwan,07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶8 (Coordinating Instructions),07 |
| BR-D-01,C4:BR-D-01,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis recommend a single course of action at the mission-analysis stage?,A single course of action is selected or recommended during mission analysis.,No course of action is selected or recommended within the mission-analysis brief.,Discipline — no premature COA selection at MA,12_CIPG.docx — §5 (J5 leads development of the Commander's Estimate),12 |
| BR-D-02,C4:BR-D-02,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis treat 'de-escalate' as certain and ignore the most-dangerous invasion course of action?,Collapses the enemy-COA range (treats de-escalation as certain and/or omits the invasion course of action).,Carries all three assessed enemy courses of action without fixating on one.,Discipline — preserve full ECOA range,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Tables 13–14 (Enemy Courses of Action),10 |
| BR-D-03,C4:BR-D-03,S6,Assumptions,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis present assumptions as confirmed facts?,One or more assumptions are presented as established fact.,Assumptions are labeled as assumptions and flagged for confirmation.,Discipline — assumptions kept provisional,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Assumptions for Initial Planning),12 |
| BR-D-04,C4:BR-D-04,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the mission analysis propose courses of action that violate a coalition national caveat (for example, Japanese offensive action) or the President's retained authority over forces into or from Taiwan?",A proposed action violates a coalition caveat or the President's retained authority.,All proposed actions respect coalition caveats and the President's retained authority.,Discipline — respect coalition caveats and retained authority,12_CIPG.docx — §3 (Friendly Forces — caveats); 07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶8 (POTUS authority),07/12 |
| BR-D-05,C4:BR-D-05,S7,Risk,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis treat the approximately 15-day Taiwan-hold and 7-10-day force-closure figures as fixed guarantees?,The analysis treats the hold/closure timelines as precise guarantees.,The timelines are treated as estimates or assumptions requiring confirmation.,Discipline — avoid false precision on time-distance estimates,12_CIPG.docx — §2 (Commander's Initial Analysis); 10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — §2 (Time/Warning),12/10 |
| BR-CD-01,C4:BR-CD-01,S10,Known facts,2,CD,negative,-9,"Does the mission analysis derive forces, authorities, or facts outside of the reference material?","The analysis invents forces, authorities, or facts not present in the reference material.",Every claim is traceable to a provided document.,Grounding — claims traceable to the reference material,Whole packet (input-grounding check — no single anchor),all |
| BR-CD-03,C4:BR-CD-03,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CD,negative,-9,"Does the mission analysis identify centers of gravity without providing their critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities?",Centers of gravity are named without critical-factor analysis.,"Centers of gravity are analyzed with critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities.",Method — COG analyzed with CC/CR/CV,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Tables 6/10 (COG); 12_CIPG.docx — §1 (COG),10/12 |
| BR-CD-04,C4:BR-CD-04,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis recommend proposed actions that broaden the conflict outside of the defense of Taiwan?,The analysis recommends action that broaden the conflict beyond Taiwan's defense or provokes general war.,Proposed action stays tied to Taiwan's defense and respects the no-general-war restraint.,Grounding — escalation restraint (single-issue focus; avoid general war),12_CIPG.docx — §3 (escalation restraint); 07_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — ¶6,12/07 |
| C4-GAP-01,C4:C4-GAP-01,S8,Restated mission,3,CD,negative,-9,"Does the restated mission statement commit USPACOM to executing the defense of Taiwan, dropping the 'When directed' condition that governs that task in paragraph 3 of the CJCS Warning Order?","The mission statement reads as an execution mission for the defense of Taiwan, with no on-order, be-prepared or 'when directed' qualifier attached to that task, so the error is present in the brief.","The defense of Taiwan is worded as conditional or on-order in the mission statement, and the brief separately records that the Warning Order initiates planning only and confers no execution authority on the command.","The CJCS Warning Order (DTG 230500ZJUN26) describes itself as a planning directive that directs the initiation of planning but does not authorize execution, and its paragraph 3 mission reads 'When directed, USPACOM employs multinational forces in the Western Pacific to deter PRC aggression towards Taiwan and to provide for the defense of Taiwan as called for by US Law and IAW terms agreed between participant allies', while three separate paragraph 7 tasks are prefixed 'Immediately'.",Restated mission statement,07_CJCS_WARNORD; 12_CIPG |
| C4-GAP-02,C4:C4-GAP-02,S8,Restated mission,3,CD,negative,-9,"Does the restated mission statement or list of essential direct the recapture of Quemoy and Matsu as an action USPACOM will conduct, when the order directs only that contingency plans for seizing those islands be prepared and submitted for review?","Retaking, seizing, liberating or restoring the Quemoy and Matsu island groups appears as a USPACOM action inside the mission statement or the essential-task set, so the error is present in the brief.","The Quemoy and Matsu work is booked as a planning deliverable to be submitted for review, and the return of the islands to Taiwan control is discussed only under endstate or termination criteria rather than as a mission task.","WARNORD paragraph 7 and the CIPG Directed Tasks both read 'Prepare and submit for review contingency plans for seizing Quemoy and Matsu islands, currently occupied by PRC military forces', while the Strategic Context lists the return of Quemoy and Matsu to Taiwan control only as part of the desired endstate, and the CIPG termination criteria require PRC withdrawal from both island groups.",Restated mission statement; essential tasks list,07_CJCS_WARNORD; 01_Strategic_Context; 12_CIPG |
| C4-GAP-03,C4:C4-GAP-03,S8,Restated mission,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis capture the noncombatant evacuation of American citizens from Taiwan as an essential USPACOM task and include it in the mission statement?,The mission analysis captures the NEO of American citizens from Taiwan as an essential task and includes it in the mission statement.,"The mission analysis omits the noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) of American citizens from Taiwan as an essential task, OR identifies it as an essential task but fails to include it in the final mission statement.",WARNORD paragraph 7 lists 'Immediately evacuate AMCITS from Taiwan' among the CDR USPACOM tasks; the Strategic Context states that the safe evacuation of American citizens from Taiwan is a precondition to any military option; the CIPG repeats that evacuation is preliminary to any military option; and the Running Estimates Protection paragraph lists the same requirement as a shortfall.,Restated mission statement; specified and implied tasks,01_Strategic_Context; 07_CJCS_WARNORD; 14_Running_Estimates; 12_CIPG |
| C4-GAP-04,C4:C4-GAP-04,S10,Known facts,3,CD,negative,-9,Does the brief fix a single date for the PRC amphibious seizure of the Matsu island group without recording that the Regional Intelligence Summary dates it 21 June while the Warning Order and Strategic Context date it 18 June?,"One assault date is stated as settled fact, whether 18 June or 21 June, and no line anywhere in the brief notes that the source inputs disagree on it, so the error is present.","Both dates are carried forward with their originating documents named, and the discrepancy is logged as an open item for resolution or as a caveat on any timeline, N-Day relationship, or warning-time calculation built from it.","The CJCS Warning Order and the Strategic Context both place the multi-brigade amphibious assault that secured the Matsu group in the early morning of Thursday 18 June 2026, while the DIA Regional Intelligence Summary (DTG 220400Z JUN 2026) places the identical barrage and assault on Sunday 21 June 2026 Hong Kong Time; the CIPG independently dates the Quemoy and Matsu seizures to 10 June and 18 June respectively.",Known facts; situation timeline,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary; 07_CJCS_WARNORD; 01_Strategic_Context; 12_CIPG |
| C4-GAP-05,C4:C4-GAP-05,S1,Higher mission and intent,3,CD,negative,-9,"Does the brief describe Public Law 96-8 as an authority obligating or committing the United States to defend Taiwan, when the statute only commits the United States to support Taiwanese self-defense and maintain the capacity to assist in the event of coercion?","The brief explicitly frames or misinterprets Public Law 96-8 (the Taiwan Relations Act) as a treaty or binding legal obligation that commits U.S. forces to directly defend Taiwan, rather than a commitment to supply defensive goods/services and maintain U.S. capacity to resist coercion.","The brief accurately characterizes Public Law 96-8 as limiting U.S. commitments to supporting Taiwanese self-defense capability and capacity, OR fails to assert that Public Law 96-8 legally obligates or commits the United States to directly defend Taiwan.","Section 2 of the Taiwan Relations Act reproduced at 11a declares United States policy to consider non-peaceful determination of Taiwan's future a threat to Western Pacific peace, to provide defense articles and services for self-defense, and to maintain the capacity to resist force or coercion; the WARNORD situation paragraph instead states that the Act 'iterates a U.S. commitment to defend the island from military aggression, regardless of its origin', and the JIPOE repeats the same defend-the-island characterization.",Higher intent and legal authority paragraph,11a_Taiwan_Relations_Act_PL96-8; 07_CJCS_WARNORD; 10_JIPOE_Brief; 11_Annexes_and_References |
| C4-GAP-07,C4:C4-GAP-07,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the brief record the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group's N+14 availability as a planning assumption contingent on a Fifth Fleet directive rather than as allocated combat power?,"The brief explicitly categorizes the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group's N+14 availability timeline as a planning assumption dependent on a Fifth Fleet release directive, explicitly distinguishing it from currently assigned or allocated combat power.","The brief lists the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group as currently allocated combat power, OR fails to identify the N+14 readiness timeline and Fifth Fleet authorization directive as a required planning assumption.","The CIPG lists 'USS CARL VINSON CSG (CVN 70), DIEGO GARCIA, will be outchopped by C5F and available at N+14' under Assumptions for Initial Planning; CIPG Enclosure 1 then lists CARL VINSON CSG at DGAR marked C5F OUTCHOP at N+14 inside the force list itself; and the consolidated coalition force list shows the Vinson strike group with no availability day at all, the only carrier strike group there without an explicit N-day.",Assumptions list; forces available,12_CIPG; 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle |
| C4-GAP-08,C4:C4-GAP-08,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Does the force analysis identify that USS Dewey (DDG-105) is listed simultaneously in the Reagan Carrier Strike Group and the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group?,"The brief flags the duplicate listing of USS Dewey across two strike groups and states that available destroyer strength is therefore overstated by one hull, or requests confirmation of that allocation before force totals are used.","Destroyer strength is totalled straight from the force lists so the same hull is counted twice, and no request to clarify the Dewey allocation appears in the force, shortfall or request-for-information discussion.","The consolidated coalition force list and CIPG Enclosure 1 both place USS Dewey (DDG 105) in the Reagan Carrier Strike Group at Yokosuka available at N and again in the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group at Diego Garcia at N+14; USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115) is likewise double-listed, in the Reagan strike group and as a Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group escort.",Forces available; force shortfall analysis,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle; 12_CIPG |
| C4-GAP-09,C4:C4-GAP-09,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis identify as a fact that the west-coast Taiwanese ports are a requirement for both PLAN amphibious force access and as the sea ports of debarkation available to United States forces?,"The mission analysis explicitly categorizes the strategic role of west-coast Taiwanese ports as a fact, specifically identifying them as a dual requirement: necessary access points for PLAN amphibious forces and available Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPODs) for U.S. forces.","The mission analysis fails to record this dual infrastructure requirement as an established fact, misidentifies it as a planning assumption, or addresses port utility through only one operational lens (capturing PLAN access while omitting U.S. SPOD availability, or vice versa).","The Country Fact Sheet records that although Taiwan has a 1,448 km coastline, the ports for debarking and beaches suitable for landing are on the west side of the island, naming Kaohsiung, Keelung and Taichung; the Adversary Order of Battle assesses that limited organic landing-craft and logistics-over-the-shore capacity make an undamaged port the PLAN critical requirement; the Running Estimates call contested sea ports of debarkation and few operational aerial ports of debarkation the limiting factor on throughput.",Risk to mission; operational environment analysis,05_Country_Fact_Sheet_and_Critical_Geography; 03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle; 14_Running_Estimates; 10_JIPOE_Brief |
| C4-GAP-10,C4:C4-GAP-10,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the brief list the Philippine national caveat as a limitation confining United States forces to non-combatant personnel, equipment and supplies?","The restraints list shows the Philippines restricting United States presence to non-combatant personnel, equipment or supplies, or otherwise treats Philippine basing as closed to combat forces, so the error is present.","The brief reads the caveat as imposing no such restriction and keeps Clark Air Base usable for the strategic-lift forward operating base the Warning Order directs, reserving the true limits to the Japanese and Republic of Korea caveats.","The CIPG assumption list and the consolidated coalition force list both state that the Republic of the Philippines will not restrict United States forces to non-combatant personnel, equipment and supplies, while WARNORD paragraph 7 directs USPACOM to establish a forward operating base in the Philippines at Clark AFB for strategic lift, and the genuine restrictive caveats are Japan conducting no offensive operations and the Republic of Korea not engaging PRC forces beyond the defense of Korea.",Constraints and restraints list,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle; 07_CJCS_WARNORD; 12_CIPG |
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