| item_id,item_uid,step,step_name,tier,severity,polarity,weight,question,pass_condition,fail_condition,source_fact,artifact_anchor,source_documents |
| GG-S1-01v1,C5:GG-S1-01v1,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the higher purpose: stop the Cuban regime's killing of civilians and prevent further loss of life at sea?,Names both stopping the atrocities and preventing loss of life at sea as the purpose.,States only a generic 'help migrants' purpose without the stop-the-killing and safety-of-life-at-sea aims.,POTUS directs the US to stop the killing of Cuban civilians and prevent loss of life at sea (EXORD; Strategic Context).,07_Department_of_War_EXORD.docx — SITUATION/MISSION,07_DoW_EXORD;01_Strategic_Context |
| GG-S1-02v1,C5:GG-S1-02v1,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify that the President declared a No-Fly Zone over the Cuban coast and warned further killings would be met forcefully?,States the declared NFZ and the forceful-response warning.,Omits the NFZ declaration or treats it as merely proposed/optional.,"After the vetoed UNSCR, POTUS declared an NFZ over the Cuban coast and warned further killings would be dealt with forcefully (Strategic Context; EXORD para 3).",07_Department_of_War_EXORD.docx — SITUATION (para 3),01_Strategic_Context;07_DoW_EXORD |
| GG-S1-04v1,C5:GG-S1-04v1,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify operations ashore and regime change as decisions authorized by NCA?,States that ashore ops and regime change are planning-only pending an NCA decision.,Treats regime change or a ground operation as already authorized/executable.,Operations ashore and regime change are planning tasks requiring an NCA decision (EXORD; WARNORD).,07_Department_of_War_EXORD.docx — Tasks,07_DoW_EXORD;07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| GG-S1-05v1,C5:GG-S1-05v1,S1,Higher mission and intent,3,I,positive,5,Does the response surface the tension between protecting civilians now and the still-restricted regime-change tasker?,Explicitly frames the protection/regime-change tension and the need to keep them separate in fact and perception.,Ignores the tension or merges regime change into the base operation.,The civilian-protection operation and the regime-change tasker pull against each other and must be kept apart (CIPG §2).,12_CIPG.docx — Commander's Initial Analysis,12_CIPG |
| GG-S1-06v1,C5:GG-S1-06v1,S1,Higher mission and intent,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the response derive the commander's endstate (killing stopped, NFZ/blockade upheld, no deaths at sea, no return to Cuba, GTMO secure, no wider war, options ashore preserved)?","States an endstate covering stopping the killing, no loss of life at sea, lawful disposition with no return to Cuba, GTMO security, avoiding wider war, and preserving options ashore.",Gives a vague 'restore stability' endstate missing the no-return-to-Cuba and no-wider-war conditions.,Commander's endstate per CIPG §Desired National End State / Intent.,12_CIPG.docx — End State,12_CIPG |
| GG-S1-01,C5:GG-S1-01,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the higher purpose: stop the Cuban regime's killing of civilians and prevent further loss of life at sea?,Names both stopping the atrocities and preventing loss of life at sea.,States only a generic 'help migrants' purpose without both aims.,EXORD/Strategic Context state the purpose as stopping the killing and preventing loss of life at sea.,07_Department_of_War_EXORD.docx — SITUATION/MISSION,07_Department_of_War_EXORD;01_Strategic_Context |
| GG-S1-02,C5:GG-S1-02,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the declared No-Fly Zone and the warning that further killings would be met forcefully?,States the declared NFZ and the forceful-response warning.,Omits the NFZ declaration or treats it as merely proposed.,The EXORD (SITUATION para 3) and Strategic Context state the President declared an NFZ and warned of a forceful response.,07_Department_of_War_EXORD.docx — SITUATION (para 3),07_Department_of_War_EXORD;01_Strategic_Context |
| GG-S1-03,C5:GG-S1-03,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the response identify the command construct: Navy-led operation in support of DHS/USCG, which lead disposition; ashore/regime-change planning-only, authorized by NCA?","States the Navy leads enforcement/interception, DHS/USCG lead disposition, and ashore/regime-change are planning-only pending NCA.","Casts the effort as USCG-led or DoW-led throughout, or treats regime change as authorized.",WARNORD Command Relationships and EXORD state the Navy-led/DHS-supported split and the NCA-restricted branches.,07b_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — Command Relationships / Tasks,07b_CJCS_WARNORD;07_Department_of_War_EXORD |
| GG-S1-04,C5:GG-S1-04,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the response identify the commander's endstate (killing stopped, NFZ/blockade upheld, no loss of life at sea, none returned to Cuba, GTMO secure, no wider war, options ashore preserved)?","States an endstate covering the killing stopped, no loss of life at sea, no return to Cuba, GTMO secure, no wider war, and options ashore preserved.",Gives a vague 'restore stability' endstate missing the no-return and no-wider-war conditions.,The CIPG states the desired end state and the commander's-intent end state.,12_CIPG.docx — Desired National End State / Intent,12_CIPG |
| R001,C5:R001,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of United States Southern Command as the supported combatant command for the operation?,Names USSOUTHCOM as the supported combatant command,"Names a different command as supported, or does not establish which command is supported",USSOUTHCOM supported CCMD,Higher mission & intent (Fig III-12),04/07b |
| R002,C5:R002,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: identification of Joint Task Force-Southern Spear (built on U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command and the U.S. Fourth Fleet) as the supported command for no-fly-zone enforcement, maritime interception, and blockade enforcement?",Names JTF-Southern Spear as the supported command / executor for the enforcement missions,"Fails to name JTF-Southern Spear as the executor, or assigns the enforcement missions to another command",JTF-Southern Spear is the executor,Higher mission & intent (Fig III-12),04/07b |
| S-01,C5:S-01,S1,Higher mission and intent,3,I,positive,5,"Does the response infer that, with no UN mandate, preserving legitimacy of civilian protection is the priority and use of force cannot jeopardize that legitimacy?",Reasons that higher intent is protective/limited and legitimacy-dependent because the US acts without UN authorization over a great-power veto.,Treats the operation as an unconstrained military campaign or ignores the legitimacy driver.,"The packet states the vetoed UNSCR and the legitimacy contest, but not this framing of higher intent; the planner infers it.",01_Strategic_Context.docx — §4-5 (planner inference),01_Strategic_Context;12_CIPG |
| S-02,C5:S-02,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response include regime change as part of the humanitarian-protection operation?,Merges regime change into the base operation or treats the protection mission as a regime-change operation.,Keeps protection and regime-change execution distinct.,"The EXORD/CIPG keep regime change a separate, NCA-restricted planning branch.",12_CIPG.docx — Commander's Initial Analysis,07_Department_of_War_EXORD;12_CIPG |
| GG-S2-01v1,C5:GG-S2-01v1,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the response derive the adversary strategic COG as regime survival through coercive control of the population and coast?,Names regime survival through coercive control as the adversary strategic COG.,Gives a generic 'Cuban military' COG or omits the adversary COG.,JIPOE assesses the regime COG as survival through coercive control (JIPOE §2).,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Adversary COG,10_JIPOE_Brief;03_Adversary_OOB |
| GG-S2-02v1,C5:GG-S2-02v1,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,Does the response identify regime critical vulnerabilities (economic/food/energy collapse; eroding legitimacy; dependence on repression that generates the evidence it denies)?,"Names specific vulnerabilities including the collapse and the self-defeating repression, not a generic 'weak regime'.","Only says the regime is weak, or lists no specific vulnerability.",Regime critical vulnerabilities per JIPOE §2 / RIS.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Adversary COG,10_JIPOE_Brief;02_RIS |
| GG-S2-03v1,C5:GG-S2-03v1,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the response derive the friendly strategic COG as the legitimacy of the civilian-protection case plus interagency/coalition/domestic unity?,"Names the legitimacy of the civilian-protection case (and unity) as the friendly COG, tied to the missing UN mandate.",Gives a generic 'US military power' COG or omits the legitimacy dimension.,"With no UNSC mandate and a RU/CN veto, legitimacy of the civilian-protection case is a friendly COG (JIPOE §3).",10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Friendly Legitimacy,10_JIPOE_Brief;01_Strategic_Context |
| GG-S2-05v1,C5:GG-S2-05v1,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,"Does the response characterize Cuban forces as a degraded legacy force unable to contest the Straits, NFZ, or fleet?","States that Cuba cannot contest the open Straits, the NFZ, or US forces.",Overstates Cuban conventional capability or implies a fleet/air threat to US forces.,Cuba cannot contest sea or air; degraded legacy force (Adversary OOB; RIS §5).,03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx — Assessment,03_Adversary_OOB;02_RIS |
| GG-S2-06v1,C5:GG-S2-06v1,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the response identify the lethal instruments: armed drones and a coastal patrol craft (Havana sinking), plus PNR/Border Guard ashore?","Names the armed drones and the coastal patrol craft (Havana sinking) as the lethal reach, and the police/border guard ashore.",Refers to generic 'Cuban forces' without identifying the drones/coastal craft or the internal-security role.,Armed drones and a Havana-coast naval craft did the killing; PNR/Border Guard repress ashore (RIS §4-5; Adversary OOB).,03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx — §2-5,03_Adversary_OOB;02_RIS |
| GG-S2-07v1,C5:GG-S2-07v1,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the response frame the provenance of the armed drones (and any external support) as an unresolved intelligence question?,"Explicitly flags drone/craft provenance and possible Russian/Chinese material support as an intelligence gap, not a fact.","Asserts the drones are indigenous/sponsor-supplied as settled, or ignores provenance.",Drone/coastal-craft provenance unconfirmed; possible external hand — a PIR (RIS §5/§9; Adversary OOB §5).,03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx — §5 UAS,02_RIS;03_Adversary_OOB |
| GG-S2-08v1,C5:GG-S2-08v1,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,Does the response frame deliberate escalation vs reactive collapse as unresolved?,Explicitly treats deliberate escalation vs reactive collapse as an open question.,Assumes one Cuban intent as fact or omits the ambiguity.,Whether the regime escalates deliberately or reacts to collapse is unresolved (RIS §6; JIPOE §4).,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §6,02_RIS;10_JIPOE_Brief |
| GG-S2-09v1,C5:GG-S2-09v1,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the response characterize the great-power/information contest (RU/CN veto + 'imperialist propaganda'; Cuban denial; leaking evidence)?,Names the RU/CN veto and propaganda and the Cuban denial/internet restriction as the information contest.,Ignores the great-power/information dimension or treats the atrocities as uncontested fact.,RU/CN vetoed the UNSCR and call it imperialist propaganda; Cuba denies and restricts internet (Strategic Context; RIS §7).,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §7,01_Strategic_Context;02_RIS |
| C-01v1,C5:C-01v1,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis describe the operational environment using an analytical framework (PMESII-PT, RAFT, ASCOPE)?",The OE is analyzed using the appropriate analytical tool of PMESII-PT,Omits the use of an analytical framework,"The USSOUTHCOM J2 Country Fact Sheet characterizes Cuba across political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure lines: a one-party socialist republic controlled by the Communist Party with coercive power held by the FAR, MININT, PNR, and Border Guard; a collapsed economy with rolling 16-hour blackouts and broken food and water distribution; and a state-controlled information environment restricting internet access. This is the operational-environment data an analytical framework (PMESII-PT/ASCOPE) organizes. (05_Country_Fact_Sheet, paras 2-5)",05_Country_Fact_Sheet,05_Country_Fact_Sheet |
| C-02v1,C5:C-02v1,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis identify the Cuban strategic objective as regime survival?,The analysis infers the Cuban strategic objective as regime survival,Fails to infer the Cuban strategic objective as regime survival,"The commander assesses the regime's overriding aim to be its own survival, pursued by sealing the coast to halt the exodus, deterring organized opposition through terror, and shifting the blame for Cuban suffering onto the United States. (12_CIPG, 'Likely Regime Objectives'; corroborated in 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary, para 6)",12_CIPG,12_CIPG |
| C-06v1,C5:C-06v1,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis describe how the commander's operational approach of protecting civilians will weaken the Cuban COG (Raul Castro's communist regime)?,The analysis describes how protecting civilians weakens the Cuban communist regime,Omits weakening of the Cuban COG in the operational approach,"The CIPG frames the regime's aim as survival pursued through terror and sealing the coast, sets the operational approach as protecting civilians (interception, rescue, and no-fly-zone enforcement), and names the legitimacy of the civilian-protection case as a center of gravity in its own right — so protecting civilians and exposing the atrocities directly undercuts the regime's coercive control and blame-shifting narrative. (12_CIPG, 'Likely Regime Objectives', Commander's Initial Analysis, and Operational Approach)",12_CIPG,12_CIPG |
| GG-S2-03,C5:GG-S2-03,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response state the fact of the failed UNSCR (Russian/Chinese veto) and the resulting unilateral NFZ?,States the veto and the unilateral NFZ.,Omits the veto or implies UN authorization exists.,Strategic Context §4 states the UNSCR was vetoed by Russia and China and the President then declared the NFZ.,01_Strategic_Context.docx — §4,01_Strategic_Context |
| GG-S2-04,C5:GG-S2-04,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response state that Cuba's forces are degraded and cannot contest the Straits/NFZ/US fleet, with lethal reach limited to coastal craft and armed drones of unconfirmed provenance?",States Cuba cannot contest sea/air and that lethal reach is coastal craft + armed drones (provenance unconfirmed).,"Overstates Cuban capability, or omits the drones/coastal craft, or asserts provenance as known.","Adversary OOB and RIS state the degraded force, the coastal craft/drones, and unconfirmed provenance.",03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle.docx — Assessment / §5,03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle;02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary |
| GG-S2-05,C5:GG-S2-05,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,SI,positive,2,Does the response state the geography facts (Cuba ~90 nm from Key West; Florida Current NE 2-4 kt) and the Nimitz CSG's in-theater presence?,"States the ~90 nm distance, the NE current, and the in-theater Nimitz CSG.",Omits the geography facts or the Nimitz.,Fact Sheet / Critical Geography state the distance and current; Coalition OOB §5 states the Nimitz CSG is in theater.,06_Critical_Geography.docx — §1/§7; 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx — §5,05_Country_Fact_Sheet;06_Critical_Geography |
| GG-S2-06,C5:GG-S2-06,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response capture the directed planning assumption that the blockade/relisting persist and the flow continues/grows?,States the assumption that the blockade and relisting persist and the flow grows.,Omits the assumption or its driver.,CIPG/WARNORD planning assumptions state the blockade and relisting persist and the flow continues.,07b_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — §5 Planning Assumptions,07b_CJCS_WARNORD;12_CIPG |
| GG-S2-08,C5:GG-S2-08,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,"Does the response capture the assumptions that reception can be established OCONUS and partners/UN share the burden, and that authority for operations ashore/regime-change resides with NCA?",States the reception/partner-burden-sharing and NCA decision-authority-on-branch assumptions.,"Assumes reception/partner access as given without terms, or omits the NCA gate.","WARNORD planning assumptions state OCONUS reception, partner/UN burden-sharing, and NCA-gated branches.",07b_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — §5 Planning Assumptions,07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| R036,C5:R036,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the adversary critical requirement to seal the coast and sustain internal control?,Identifies sealing the coast and sustaining internal control as the adversary critical requirement,Omits the adversary critical requirement,adversary CR: seal coast / control,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),10 |
| R044,C5:R044,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the threat posed by armed drones as the single Cuban capability of operational concern?,Identifies armed drones as the principal Cuban capability of concern,Omits the armed-drone threat or dismisses it as negligible,threat: armed drones,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),03/10 |
| R045,C5:R045,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the threat of coastal patrol-craft incidents near Cuban ports?,Identifies coastal patrol-craft incidents near ports as a threat,Omits the coastal patrol-craft threat,threat: coastal-craft incidents,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),03/02 |
| R050,C5:R050,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: the adversary most likely course of action: continued repression and drone attacks, occasional coastal interceptions near ports, a sustained denial-and-blame information campaign, and probing of the Guantanamo perimeter, while avoiding a deliberate clash with United States forces?",Describes a most-likely course of action centered on continued repression and gray-zone activity below a deliberate clash,Omits the adversary most likely course of action,adversary MLCOA,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),10 |
| R051,C5:R051,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the adversary most dangerous course of action: deliberate escalation by driving or weaponizing the flow to cause a mass-casualty event at sea, a provocation at Guantanamo Bay, or, if externally enabled, more capable drones or revived air defenses to contest the no-fly zone?",Describes a most-dangerous course of action involving deliberate escalation,Omits the adversary most dangerous course of action,adversary MDCOA,OE/threat & COG (JP 5-0 Ch III/IV),10 |
| S-03,C5:S-03,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the response capture the assumption that reception can be established OCONUS and partners/UN will share the burden?,States the reception/partner-burden-sharing.,Assumes reception/partner access as given without terms.,"WARNORD planning assumptions state OCONUS reception, partner/UN burden-sharing",07b_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — §5 Planning Assumptions,07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| S-04,C5:S-04,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,"WARNORD planning assumptions state OCONUS reception, partner/UN burden-sharing, and NCA-restricted branches.","WARNORD planning assumptions state OCONUS reception, partner/UN burden-sharing, and NCA-gated branches.",Omits the NCA gate.,WARNORD planning assumption states operations ashore and regime change remain planning tasks only pending a decision by the National Command Authority.,07b_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — §5 Planning Assumptions,07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| GG-S3-01v1,C5:GG-S3-01v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response list the specified task to enforce the No-Fly Zone and protect civilians from attacks in progress?,States NFZ enforcement and civilian protection (engaging drones/craft in the act) as a specified task.,Omits the NFZ/civilian-protection task or leaves it generic 'deter Cuba'.,EXORD/WARNORD direct NFZ enforcement and protection of civilians in progress (EXORD para 7; WARNORD Tasks).,07b_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — Tasks,07_DoW_EXORD;07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| GG-S3-02v1,C5:GG-S3-02v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response list the specified task to conduct maritime interception and at-sea rescue?,States maritime interception (board/search) and at-sea rescue as a specified task.,Describes a generic maritime patrol without the interception/rescue task.,EXORD directs MIO (OP 1.4.4) and mass at-sea rescue (EXORD Tasks; WARNORD).,07_Department_of_War_EXORD.docx — Tasks,07_DoW_EXORD |
| GG-S3-03v1,C5:GG-S3-03v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,I,positive,5,Does the response list the specified task to enforce the arms and oil blockade?,States blockade enforcement (deny passage to arms/oil) as a specified task.,Omits the blockade or conflates it with migrant interception.,EXORD directs blockade enforcement (OP 1.4.3) (EXORD Tasks).,07_Department_of_War_EXORD.docx — Tasks,07_DoW_EXORD |
| GG-S3-04v1,C5:GG-S3-04v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response list the specified task to protect the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay?,States protection of Guantanamo Bay as a specified task.,Mentions generic force protection without naming Guantanamo.,EXORD directs protection of GTMO after the gate killing (EXORD Tasks).,07_Department_of_War_EXORD.docx — Tasks,07_DoW_EXORD |
| GG-S3-05v1,C5:GG-S3-05v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,"Does the response derive the distinction between interdiction (arms/oil, deny passage) and interception (migrants, board/search)?",Explicitly distinguishes interdiction of arms/oil from interception of migrants.,Uses 'interdiction' loosely for the migrant mission or conflates the two.,Interdict arms/oil (blockade) vs intercept migrants (boarding/rescue) are distinct tasks (CIPG §2).,12_CIPG.docx — Commander's Initial Analysis,12_CIPG |
| GG-S3-09v1,C5:GG-S3-09v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the response derive the implied task to establish rules for the use of force (SROE + supplemental for NFZ/civilian protection)?,"Derives establishing ROE/supplemental measures for NFZ enforcement, civilian protection, self-defense, and blockade compliance.",Only says 'establish ROE' without the NFZ/civilian-protection and blockade-compliance distinctions.,No approved supplemental measures yet; three UOF regimes needed (CIPG; Running Estimates J3; Annexes §2).,11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §2,11_Annexes;14_Running_Estimates |
| GG-D-02v1,C5:GG-D-02v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,D,negative,-5,Does the response treat the Department of War as the lead for migrant disposition?,Casts the military as the disposition lead.,"Recognizes DHS/USCG as the lead for migrant disposition, with the military supporting.",DHS/USCG lead disposition; military supports (WARNORD; 09b).,07b_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — Command Relationships,07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| C-03v1,C5:C-03v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer the implied task of collecting METOC information in support of GULF GUARDIAN?,The analysis infers the implied task of METOC collection to support JFC decision-making,Fails to infer the implied task of METOC collection,"The critical-geography note stresses that the Florida Current sets northeast at two to four knots and that sea state and spring afternoon thunderstorms add hazard to small craft while making drifting craft hard to detect and shortening rescue time — meteorological and oceanographic conditions that drive detection, rescue timing, and the interception belt. (06_Critical_Geography, paras 1 and 7)",06_Critical_Geography,06_Critical_Geography |
| C-04v1,C5:C-04v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer the implied task of employing sealift in support of GULF GUARDIAN?,The analysis infers the implied task of employing sealift in support of GULF GUARDIAN,Fails to infer the implied task of employing sealift,"The packet directs reception and processing outside the continental United States at Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico and notes the distances involved make strategic and intratheater lift a limiting factor, with the CIPG treating basing, lift, and sustainment as a defining requirement — implying sealift to move people and materiel across the theater. (06_Critical_Geography, 'Puerto Rico and Reception Basing' and 'Distances and Lines'; 12_CIPG, Commander's Initial Analysis)",02_Regional_Intel_Summary; 06_Critical_Geography; 12_CIPG,02_Regional_Intel_Summary; 06_Critical_Geography; 12_CIPG |
| C-05v1,C5:C-05v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer the implied task of establishing liason/coordination with UNHCR Coordination Center?,The analysis infers the implied task of coordinating with UNHCR for dispostion of Cuban IDPs,Fails to infer the implied task of coordinating with UNHCR,"The Warning Order places coordination with the United Nations for reception and processing on the command, stating that coalition partners and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees participate by coordination on terms to be arranged; the order of battle lists UNHCR for supervision of reception and processing — implying a task to establish liaison with UNHCR. (07b_CJCS_WARNORD, Command Relationships; 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle, Coalition Partners)",07_CJCS_WARNORD,07_CJCS_WARNORD |
| GG-S3-01,C5:GG-S3-01,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response list the specified tasks: enforce the NFZ and protect civilians; conduct maritime interception and rescue; enforce the blockade; protect Guantanamo Bay?,"Lists NFZ/civilian-protection, interception/rescue, blockade, and GTMO protection as specified tasks.",Omits one of the four specified tasks or states them only generically.,The EXORD/WARNORD Tasks explicitly direct these.,07b_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — Tasks,07_Department_of_War_EXORD;07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| GG-S3-02,C5:GG-S3-02,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,I,positive,5,"Does the response list the specified tasks to be prepared, on order, to operate ashore and to develop regime-change plans (planning only), and to conduct MA and submit the brief?",Lists the on-order ashore/regime-change planning tasks and the MA/brief task.,Omits the on-order tasks or treats them as executable now.,The EXORD/WARNORD Tasks direct the on-order branches and the MA product.,07_Department_of_War_EXORD.docx — Tasks,07_Department_of_War_EXORD;07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| GG-S3-08,C5:GG-S3-08,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the response derive the implied task to establish an interagency coordination construct (Navy/USCG/DHS/State/DOJ) and partner/UN reception arrangements?,Derives establishing the interagency coordination construct and obtaining partner/UN reception arrangements.,Only says 'work with the interagency/allies' without the construct or reception arrangements.,The packet names the players and the DHS-lead/State-diplomacy roles but does not state 'establish an interagency construct'; the planner derives it.,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx — §6-8 (planner-derived),04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle;07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| GG-S3-10,C5:GG-S3-10,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,"Does the response identify preserving the lives of intercepted people (mass rescue / safety of life at sea) as an essential, mission-defining task?",Selects safety-of-life-at-sea / mass rescue as an essential task tied to the endstate.,"Treats rescue as incidental rather than essential, or omits it.",The packet stresses loss of life at sea and mass rescue but does not label an essential task; the planner selects it.,14_Running_Estimates.docx — Surgeon (planner selection),01_Strategic_Context;14_Running_Estimates |
| R071,C5:R071,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the implied task to secure the basing and aerial tanking required to hold the no-fly zone continuously?,Derives a basing-and-tanking task to sustain continuous no-fly-zone coverage,Omits the basing/tanking task,implied: basing/tanking for NFZ,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),06/14 |
| R073,C5:R073,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the implied task to conduct defensive counter-air and counter-unmanned-aircraft operations against drones or aircraft attacking civilians?,Derives a counter-air and counter-unmanned-aircraft task,Omits the counter-air/counter-UAS task,implied: counter-air / counter-UAS,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),04/03 |
| R076,C5:R076,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the implied task to document the atrocities and rapidly release evidence in order to sustain the legitimacy of the civilian-protection case?,Derives a document-and-release-evidence task,Omits the evidence-documentation task,implied: document/release evidence,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),14/10 |
| R079,C5:R079,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: the implied task to provide mass-casualty and public-health medical capacity for at-sea rescue (hypothermia, near-drowning, dehydration, and vulnerable populations)?",Derives a mass-casualty and public-health medical task tied to at-sea rescue,Omits the mass-casualty medical task,implied: mass-casualty medical,Specified/implied/essential tasks (III-19/20),14 |
| A-02v1,C5:A-02v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish the implied task to request mobilization of the Puerto Rico National Guard to assist in establishment of migrant camps on Puerto Rico?,Establishes an implied task to seek NCA authority/action or submit request for forces that includes mobilization of the Puerto Rican National Guard.,Does not establish an implied tasl to request mobilization of the Puerto Rican national Guard at presidential directive or RFF.,"The order of battle directs reception and processing to be established outside the continental United States at Guantanamo Bay and in Puerto Rico, and the running estimates flag manning of those sites as a binding personnel demand to be filled by request for forces — grounding an implied task to mobilize the Puerto Rico National Guard to help establish migrant reception on Puerto Rico. (04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle, Interagency; 14_Running_Estimates, J1 Personnel)",04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle |
| A-04v1,C5:A-04v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish the implied task to recommend Mortuary Affairs support at migrant camp locations?,Establishes implied task to submit request for mortuary affairs supported in the RFF.,Does not set an implied task to request mortuary affairs in the RFF.,"The mass drownings and killings documented in the regional intelligence summary, together with the mass-casualty and public-health demand the running estimates project from at-sea rescue, ground an implied task to provide Mortuary Affairs support at migrant reception sites. (02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary, para 4; 14_Running_Estimates, Surgeon/Medical)",02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary,"02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary, 14_Running_Estimates" |
| A-05v1,C5:A-05v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish an implied task to request Role 3 medical capability to support operations at migrant camps?,Establishes implied task to submit request for Role 3 medical support in the RFF.,Does not set an implied task to request Role 3 medical in the RFF.,"The regional intelligence summary describes a severe and worsening humanitarian condition and a mass seaborne exodus in unseaworthy craft producing casualties, and the running estimates size medical capacity at Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico against projected flow — grounding an implied task to request Role 3 medical capability to support reception and processing of intercepted migrants. (02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary, paras 1-4; 14_Running_Estimates, Surgeon/Medical)",02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary |
| A-06v1,C5:A-06v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis identify an implied task to establish an Intermediate Staging Base in Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, CONUS or other suitable location to support operations?","Identifies an implied taks to establish an Intermediate Staging Base to receive, organize, and employ forces.",Does not identify a implied task to establish an ISB.,"The order of battle establishes reception and processing basing outside the continental United States at Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico, lists the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago as willing to receive Cubans, and makes USTRANSCOM responsible for lift and sustainment of reception basing (with Puerto Rico's Roosevelt Roads port and airfield noted in the geography) — grounding an implied task to establish an intermediate staging base to support the operation. (04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle, Interagency and Command Relationships; 06_Critical_Geography, para 6)",04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle |
| A-08v1,C5:A-08v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish an implied task to request engineer capability to support operations at migrant camps and conduct logistics hub opening?,Establishes implied tasks to submit RFF for engineer capability to support migrant camps and logistical hub construction.,Does not establish an implied task to submit RFF for engineers.,"The Warning Order directs establishing reception and processing capacity at Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico and identifying the basing, lift, and sustainment it requires, and the running estimates make logistics the pacing function — berthing and life support for large numbers and theater lift — grounding an implied task to request engineer capability to build reception sites and open logistics hubs. (07b_CJCS_WARNORD, Planning Guidance and Tasks; 14_Running_Estimates, J4 Logistics)",07b_CJCS_WARNORD,"07b_CJCS_WARNORD, 14_Running_Estimates" |
| A-10v1,C5:A-10v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis identify an implied task to establish migrant handover procedures with Coast Guard?,Identifies an implied task to establish migrant handover procedures with the Coast Guard.,Does not identify the implied task to establish migrant handover procedures with the Coast Guard.,"The CIPG states the Coast Guard is integral to interception and to the handling of those brought aboard, with the Department of Homeland Security the lead for their immigration disposition — grounding an implied task to establish migrant-handover procedures with the Coast Guard. (12_CIPG, Commander's Initial Analysis; 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle, Command Relationships)",12_CIPG,12_CIPG |
| A-11v1,C5:A-11v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish an implied task to request interpretter and consular capability to support reception and shelter of migrants aboard ship?,Identified implied task to submit RFF for interpretters and interagency support to assist in reception and shelter of migrants taken aboard ships.,Does not establish implied task to rquest interpreter and consular support for migrants taken aboard ship.,"The running estimates identify interpreters and consular/processing personnel as a shortfall to be filled by request for forces and interagency support, and afloat reception aboard the amphibious force as a binding personnel demand — grounding an implied task to request interpreter and consular capability to support reception of migrants aboard ship. (14_Running_Estimates, J1 Personnel)",14_Running_Estimates,14_Running_Estimates |
| A-12v1,C5:A-12v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish an implied task to request water purification and storage capability to support reception of migrants?,Identified implied task to submit RFF for water purification and storage capability to assist in reception of migrants.,Does not establish implied task to rquest interpreter and consular support for migrants taken aboard ship.,"The running estimates make logistics the pacing function and list potable water and life support for large numbers among the OCONUS reception and processing requirements, with dehydration among the projected medical demands — grounding an implied task to request water purification and storage capability to support reception of migrants. (14_Running_Estimates, J4 Logistics and Surgeon/Medical)",14_Running_Estimates,14_Running_Estimates |
| D-02v1,C5:D-02v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the response include an implied task to Coordinate ISR to locate migrant boats?,Includes an implied task to Coordinate ISR to locate migrant boats,Omits it,"The running estimates, geography note, and intelligence summary identify persistent, wide-area maritime domain awareness across the ninety-nautical-mile strait against small, night-departing, hard-to-detect craft as the hardest collection problem — grounding an implied task to coordinate ISR to locate migrant boats. (14_Running_Estimates, J2 Intelligence; 06_Critical_Geography, paras 1 and 7; 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary, para 3)",14_Running_Estimates; 06_Critical_Geography; 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary,14_Running_Estimates; 06_Critical_Geography; 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary |
| D-07v1,C5:D-07v1,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis contain an implied task to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance?,Contains an implied task to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.,Omits it,"The packet documents a severe and worsening humanitarian condition — collapsed food, water, medical care, and sanitation — and a mass seaborne exodus requiring care of vulnerable populations — grounding an implied task to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. (05_Country_Fact_Sheet, para 3; 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary, paras 1-2)",05_Country_Fact_Sheet; 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary,05_Country_Fact_Sheet; 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary |
| S-05,C5:S-05,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,Does the response derive the implied task to establish persistent maritime domain awareness across the ~90 nm strait?,"Derives persistent, wide-area MDA across the strait as an implied task.",Only says 'conduct ISR' without the wide-area detection problem.,Running Estimates (J2) and JIPOE identify wide-area MDA against small night craft as the hard problem.,14_Running_Estimates.docx — J2 Intelligence,14_Running_Estimates;10_JIPOE_Brief |
| S-06,C5:S-06,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,Does the response include the specified information task to sustain legitimacy and counter the invasion narrative?,Includes an information task that documents the atrocities and counters the invasion narrative without legitimizing the regime.,Only says 'conduct IO' without the counter-narrative/legitimacy substance.,WARNORD and Running Estimates (IO) direct an information effort to sustain legitimacy and counter the invasion narrative.,14_Running_Estimates.docx — Information Operations,07b_CJCS_WARNORD;14_Running_Estimates |
| S-07,C5:S-07,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the essential task: protect Cuban civilians and conduct MIO?,Includes essential tasks directed in WARNORD,Omits essential tasks directed in WARNORD,CIPG/Running Estimates establish that feasibility turns on throughput vs the flow; naming THE essential task is a planner selection (JP 5-0 III-20 ¶8c).,12_CIPG.docx — Commander's Initial Analysis (planner selection),07b_CJCS_WARNORD;12_CIPG;14_Running_Estimates |
| GG-S4-01v1,C5:GG-S4-01v1,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state force is authorized now to enforce the NFZ and stop atrocities in progress?,States that NFZ enforcement and stopping atrocities in progress are authorized now.,"Treats all force as still requiring a future authorization, contradicting the declared NFZ.",Force authorized now for NFZ/civilian protection; broad war/ashore/regime change NCA-restrictions (WARNORD AMPN; Annexes §2).,11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §2,07b_CJCS_WARNORD;11_Annexes |
| GG-S4-02v1,C5:GG-S4-02v1,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the NFZ covers the coastal approaches plus a belt of Cuban sovereign airspace along the northern coast?,"States the NFZ extends over a belt of Cuban sovereign airspace, a deliberate sovereignty step.","Describes the NFZ as international airspace only, or omits the sovereign-airspace scope.",NFZ scope includes a belt of Cuban sovereign airspace (WARNORD Coordinating; Critical Geography §4).,07b_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — Coordinating Instructions,07b_CJCS_WARNORD;06_Critical_Geography |
| GG-S4-03v1,C5:GG-S4-03v1,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the escalation boundary: no strikes on Cuban soil / no territorial-sea engagement absent self-defense; no ashore ops or regime change absent NCA?,"States the boundary: no strikes ashore, no territorial-sea engagement absent self-defense, no ashore/regime-change absent NCA.",Omits the boundary or permits offensive action against Cuban territory.,Escalation boundary per Annexes §2 / CIPG §Intent.,11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §2,11_Annexes;12_CIPG |
| GG-S4-04v1,C5:GG-S4-04v1,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the disposition restraints: no return to Cuba; process OCONUS; onward CONUS movement is a national decision?,"States no return to Cuba, OCONUS processing, and CONUS movement as a national decision.","Permits return to Cuba, or treats bringing Cubans to the US as automatic/decided.",No return to Cuba; OCONUS processing; CONUS = national decision (Annexes §3; CIPG).,11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §3,11_Annexes;12_CIPG |
| GG-S4-06v1,C5:GG-S4-06v1,S4,Constraints and restraints,3,I,positive,5,"Does the response state non-refoulement is honored as policy (no return to Cuba), not a case-by-case dilemma?",States non-refoulement is satisfied by the no-return-to-Cuba policy.,"Frames non-refoulement as an unresolved dilemma weighed against ship safety, or ignores it.",Non-refoulement honored as policy; no return to Cuba (Annexes §3).,11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §3,11_Annexes |
| GG-D-03v1,C5:GG-D-03v1,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response recommend returning any intercepted Cuban to Cuba?,Proposes repatriating/turning back Cubans to Cuba.,Excludes return to Cuba as a disposition option.,No return to Cuba (Annexes §3).,11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §3,11_Annexes |
| GG-S4-02,C5:GG-S4-02,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the NFZ covers the coastal approaches plus a belt of Cuban sovereign airspace along the northern coast?,"States the NFZ extends over a belt of Cuban sovereign airspace, a deliberate sovereignty step.","Describes the NFZ as international airspace only, or omits the sovereign-airspace scope.",WARNORD (Coordinating) and Critical Geography (§4) state the NFZ includes a belt of Cuban sovereign airspace.,07b_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — Coordinating Instructions,07b_CJCS_WARNORD;06_Critical_Geography |
| GG-S4-04,C5:GG-S4-04,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the disposition constraints/restraints: none returned to Cuba; process OCONUS; onward CONUS movement is a national decision?,"States no return to Cuba, OCONUS processing, and CONUS movement as a national decision.","Permits return to Cuba, or treats bringing Cubans to the US as automatic/decided.","Annexes (§3) and CIPG state no return to Cuba, OCONUS processing, and CONUS movement as a national decision.",11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §3 Disposition,11_Annexes_and_References;12_CIPG |
| GG-S4-07,C5:GG-S4-07,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,I,positive,5,"Does the response state that non-refoulement is honored as policy (no return to Cuba), not a case-by-case dilemma?",States non-refoulement is satisfied by the no-return-to-Cuba policy.,"Frames non-refoulement as an unresolved dilemma weighed against ship safety, or ignores it.",Annexes (§3) state non-refoulement is honored as policy via the no-return line.,11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §3,11_Annexes_and_References |
| R094,C5:R094,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the restraint that onward movement of migrants to the continental United States requires a national decision and may not be undertaken on the commander's authority?,States that onward movement to the continental United States requires a national decision,Treats onward movement to the continental United States as a command decision,restraint: onward movement is national,Constraints & restraints (III-18),07/12 |
| S-08,C5:S-08,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the restraint: no strikes on Cuban soil?,States the no-strikes-ashore,Omits the boundary or permits offensive action against Cuban territory.,Annexes (§2) and CIPG state the escalation boundary.,11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §2 Use of Force,11_Annexes_and_References;12_CIPG |
| S-09,C5:S-09,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the restraint: no territorial-sea engagement absent self-defense?,States the no-territorial-sea-engagement,Omits the boundary or permits offensive action against Cuban territory.,Annexes (§2) and CIPG state the escalation boundary.,11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §2 Use of Force,11_Annexes_and_References;12_CIPG |
| S-10,C5:S-10,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the restraint: no ashore ops or regime change absent an NCA decision?,States the no-ashore-or-regime-change-absent-NCA boundary.,Omits the boundary or permits offensive action against Cuban territory.,Annexes (§2) and CIPG state the escalation boundary.,11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §2 Use of Force,11_Annexes_and_References;12_CIPG |
| S-11,C5:S-11,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the disposition restraints: none returned to Cuba?,States no return to Cuba,"Permits return to Cuba, or treats bringing Cubans to the US as automatic/decided.","Annexes (§3) and CIPG state no return to Cuba, OCONUS processing, and CONUS movement as a national decision.",11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §3 Disposition,11_Annexes_and_References;12_CIPG |
| GG-S5-02,C5:GG-S5-02,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify a PIR on the provenance/inventory of the armed drones and coastal craft and any external support?,Produces a PIR on drone/coastal-craft provenance and possible external support.,Omits the provenance PIR or treats provenance as known.,RIS §9 and Adversary OOB §5 flag drone/craft provenance and external support as a priority requirement.,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §9,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary;03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle |
| GG-S5-04,C5:GG-S5-04,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the response derive an FFIR on interception/rescue/reception throughput versus the flow and the closure timeline?,Produces an FFIR on throughput vs the flow tied to a decision.,"Produces a generic readiness FFIR not tied to capacity-vs-flow, or none.","Running Estimates (J4) discuss throughput/feasibility, but the FFIR framing (a friendly-status requirement tied to a decision) is a planner product (JP 5-0 III-27).",14_Running_Estimates.docx — J4 (planner-derived FFIR),14_Running_Estimates;12_CIPG |
| GG-S5-05,C5:GG-S5-05,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,"Does the response derive FFIRs on NFZ/counter-UAS capacity, ROE/supplemental-measure approval status, and reception basing/lift/medical status?","Produces FFIRs on NFZ/counter-UAS, ROE approval, and reception basing/lift/medical.","Omits these friendly-status requirements, or frames them only as generic logistics.",Running Estimates discuss these functions/limiting factors; the FFIR framing is a planner product.,14_Running_Estimates.docx — J3/J4 (planner-derived FFIRs),14_Running_Estimates;11_Annexes_and_References |
| GG-S5-06,C5:GG-S5-06,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the response derive an FFIR on branch readiness (ashore / regime-change) and Nimitz CSG availability?,Produces an FFIR on branch readiness and Nimitz availability tied to the NCA-recommendation decision.,Omits branch-readiness as a friendly-information requirement.,"The packet states the branches and Nimitz availability but not an FFIR; the planner derives it, tied to the NCA-recommendation decision.",04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx — §5 (planner-derived FFIR),07b_CJCS_WARNORD;04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle |
| R113,C5:R113,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: a priority intelligence requirement on the status of threats to Guantanamo Bay, tied to the force-protection decision?",Derives a Guantanamo-threat priority intelligence requirement tied to force protection,Omits the Guantanamo-threat requirement,PIR: Guantanamo threats,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),02/03 |
| R115,C5:R115,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: a friendly force information requirement on the status of strategic and intratheater lift and the establishment of the reception basing, tied to the feasibility and request-for-forces decision?",Derives a lift-and-basing friendly force information requirement tied to a decision,Omits the lift/basing requirement,FFIR: lift / basing status,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),14/06 |
| R116,C5:R116,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: a friendly force information requirement on partner and United Nations reception consent and capacity, tied to the disposition decision?",Derives a partner-capacity friendly force information requirement tied to a decision,Omits the partner-capacity requirement,FFIR: partner capacity,CCIRs: PIRs/FFIRs (III-25/27),04/12 |
| A-07v1,C5:A-07v1,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish the FFIR to determine the location and capability of migrant camps located in the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago?,Establishes FFIR to ascertain location and condition of migrant camps offered by partners.,Does not establsih FFIR to ascertain position and location of offered camps.,"The order of battle records that the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago are willing to receive Cubans until conditions on the island change, but that partner terms, consent, and capacity remain to be arranged — grounding a friendly force information requirement to determine the location and capacity of migrant reception in the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago. (04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle, Coalition Partners and para 8)",04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle |
| D-01v1,C5:D-01v1,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the response include an FFIR for the availibility of additional HUMINT/CI capabilities at the processing centers?,Includes an FFIR or RFF for increased HUMINT/CI capabilities at the processing centers.,Omits it,"The running estimates make maritime domain awareness and the provenance of Cuban drones and coastal craft the hardest collection problems, while reception and processing of large migrant populations at Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico creates a screening and force-protection burden — grounding an FFIR for additional HUMINT/CI capability at the processing centers. (14_Running_Estimates, J2 Intelligence and J1 Personnel; 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle, Interagency)",14_Running_Estimates; 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle,14_Running_Estimates; 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle |
| D-03v1,C5:D-03v1,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the response contain a PIR to identify cell phone towers and Cuban telecommunications networks for messaging purposes?,Contains a PIR to identify cell phone towers and Cuban telecommunications networks.,Omits it,"The packet describes a state-controlled information environment in which Cuba throttles internet access to suppress evidence, and directs an information effort to reach the population and sustain the legitimacy of the civilian-protection case — grounding a PIR to identify Cuban cell-phone towers and telecommunications networks for messaging. (05_Country_Fact_Sheet, para 5; 14_Running_Estimates, J6 Communications and Information Operations)",05_Country_Fact_Sheet; 14_Running_Estimates,05_Country_Fact_Sheet; 14_Running_Estimates |
| D-04v1,C5:D-04v1,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the response contain a PIR to identify Cuban broadcasts stations and frequencies to jam/overpower with messages?,Contains a PIR to identify Cuban broadcasts stations and frequencies,Omits it,"The packet frames a contested information environment with an adversary invasion narrative to be countered and a directed information effort — grounding a PIR to identify Cuban broadcast stations and frequencies to counter or override with friendly messaging. (05_Country_Fact_Sheet, para 5; 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary, para 7; 14_Running_Estimates, Information Operations)",05_Country_Fact_Sheet; 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary; 14_Running_Estimates,05_Country_Fact_Sheet; 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary; 14_Running_Estimates |
| D-05v1,C5:D-05v1,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the response contain an FFIR for the estimated capacities that Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico can hold for processing migrants?,Contains an FFIR for the estimated capacities that Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico can hold for processing migrants.,Omits it,"The packet treats reception and processing at Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico as a defining requirement whose feasibility turns on whether throughput can keep pace with the flow — grounding an FFIR for the migrant-processing capacity Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico can hold. (12_CIPG, Commander's Initial Analysis; 14_Running_Estimates, J4 Logistics)",12_CIPG; 14_Running_Estimates,12_CIPG; 14_Running_Estimates |
| D-06v1,C5:D-06v1,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the Mission analysis contain an FFIR on the availability of additional Military Police units (active and reserve) to support processing centers?,Contains an FFIR on the availability of additional Military Police units (active and reserve).,Omits it,"The running estimates make the manning of reception and processing at Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico a binding personnel demand to be filled by request for forces — grounding an FFIR on the availability of additional Military Police units (active and reserve) to support the processing centers. (14_Running_Estimates, J1 Personnel and J4 Logistics)",14_Running_Estimates,14_Running_Estimates |
| D-08v1,C5:D-08v1,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis contain an FFIR on the status of Class I, IV, VI and VIII supplies at Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico for the migrants?","Contains an FFIR on the status of Class I, IV, VI and VIII supplies at Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico.",Omits it,"The running estimates make logistics the pacing function, requiring berthing and life support for large numbers, potable water, and medical throughput at the OCONUS reception sites — grounding an FFIR on the status of Class I, IV, VI, and VIII supplies at Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico for the migrants. (14_Running_Estimates, J4 Logistics and Surgeon/Medical)",14_Running_Estimates,14_Running_Estimates |
| D-09v1,C5:D-09v1,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the Mission analysis contain an FFIR on the ability to contract security and subsistence support for the processing centers?,Contains an FFIR on the ability to contract security and subsistence support for the processing centers.,Omits it,"The running estimates make establishing and sustaining OCONUS reception and processing capacity the pacing logistics function, dependent on basing, life support, and sustainment — grounding an FFIR on the ability to contract security and subsistence support for the processing centers. (14_Running_Estimates, J4 Logistics and J1 Personnel)",14_Running_Estimates,14_Running_Estimates |
| S-12,C5:S-12,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify a PIR on regime intent / deliberate escalation?,Produces a PIR on deliberate escalation.,"Produces a generic 'enemy intent' PIR, or none.",RIS §9 lists regime intent / deliberate escalation as a priority intelligence question.,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §9,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary;10_JIPOE_Brief |
| S-13,C5:S-13,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify a PIR on the inventory/location of the armed drones and coastal craft?,Produces a PIR on drone/coastal-craft.,Omits the PIR.,RIS §9 and Adversary OOB §5 flag drone/craft provenance and external support as a priority requirement.,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §9,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary;03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle |
| S-14,C5:S-14,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the response derive an FFIR on forces' status and Nimitz CSG availability?,Produces an FFIR on force status and Nimitz availability.,Omits FFIR.,"The packet states the branches and Nimitz availability but not an FFIR; the planner derives it, tied to the NCA-recommendation decision.",04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx — §5 (planner-derived FFIR),07b_CJCS_WARNORD;04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle |
| GG-S6-01v1,C5:GG-S6-01v1,S6,Assumptions,2,I,positive,5,Does the response capture the assumption that the blockade/relisting persist and the flow continues/grows?,States the assumption that the blockade and relisting persist and the flow continues/accelerates.,Omits the assumption or its driver.,"Blockade+relisting persist, flow grows (CIPG Assumptions).",12_CIPG.docx — Assumptions,12_CIPG |
| GG-S6-02v1,C5:GG-S6-02v1,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the response capture the assumption that Cuba cannot contest the Straits/NFZ/fleet though coastal incidents/drones continue?,States the assumption that Cuba cannot contest the NFZ/fleet while coastal incidents and drone attacks continue.,Omits the assumption or assumes a conventional Cuban threat.,Cuba cannot contest sea/air; coastal incidents/drones likely (CIPG Assumptions).,12_CIPG.docx — Assumptions,12_CIPG |
| GG-S6-04v1,C5:GG-S6-04v1,S6,Assumptions,2,I,positive,5,Does the response capture the assumption that reception can be established OCONUS and partners/UN share the burden?,States the assumption that OCONUS reception can be established and partners/UN provide burden-sharing once terms are set.,"Assumes reception capacity as given without terms, or omits it.",Reception establishable at GTMO/PR; partners/UN share (WARNORD Assumptions).,07b_CJCS_WARNORD.docx — Planning Assumptions,07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| GG-S6-01,C5:GG-S6-01,S6,Assumptions,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the adversary strategic center of gravity as regime survival through coercive control?,Names regime survival through coercive control as the adversary strategic COG.,Gives a generic 'Cuban military' COG or omits it.,The JIPOE brief states the regime COG as survival through coercive control of the population and coast.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Adversary Center of Gravity,10_JIPOE_Brief |
| GG-S6-02,C5:GG-S6-02,S6,Assumptions,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the response assemble the adversary COG's critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities (security services + narrative; sealing the coast + internal control; collapse, eroding legitimacy, self-defeating repression, inability to contest sea/air)?",Correctly assembles CC/CR/CV for the adversary COG using scenario specifics.,"Lists a COG without CC/CR/CV, or misclassifies them.",JIPOE states the COG and its critical factors; organizing them into CC/CR/CV is the demand (JP 5-0 Ch IV).,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Adversary Center of Gravity,10_JIPOE_Brief;02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary |
| GG-S6-03,C5:GG-S6-03,S6,Assumptions,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the friendly strategic COG as the legitimacy of the civilian-protection case plus interagency/coalition/domestic unity?,"Names the legitimacy of the civilian-protection case (and unity) as the friendly COG, tied to the missing mandate.",Gives a generic 'US military power' COG or omits legitimacy.,JIPOE names legitimacy of the civilian-protection case (given the missing UN mandate) as a friendly COG.,10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Friendly Legitimacy as a Center of Gravity,10_JIPOE_Brief;01_Strategic_Context |
| A-01v1,C5:A-01v1,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis make the assumption that the joint force can expend on-hand Class VIII supplies on a reimbursable basis to treat intercepted migrants even for non-life threatening conditions?,Makes the assumption the joint force can expend Class VIII supplies on a reimbursable basis to treat migrants even for non-life threatening conditions.,Does not make the assumption that the joint force can expend Class VIII supplies on intercepted migrants.,"The running estimates project a mass-casualty and public-health demand from at-sea rescue of migrants — hypothermia, near-drowning, dehydration, and care of vulnerable populations — with afloat and shore medical capacity a limiting factor and medical throughput a J4 driver, grounding the assumption that the joint force may expend on-hand medical (Class VIII) supplies to treat intercepted migrants. (14_Running_Estimates, Surgeon/Medical and J4 Logistics)",07b_CJCS_WARNORD,"07b_CJCS_WARNORD, 14_Running_Estimates" |
| A-03v1,C5:A-03v1,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis make the assumption that all remains of deceased migrants will be processed at OCONUS locations and not interred at sea?,Establishes assumption that remains of any discovered deceased migrants will be processed at OCONUS locations and not interred at sea.,Does not make the assumption that deceased migratnts doscovered at sea will be processed at OCONUS locations.,"The regional intelligence summary documents mass loss of life — a Cuban naval vessel sank a boat carrying twenty-five migrants off Havana, fourteen killed at Carbonera, five at the Guantanamo landward gate — and preventable death at sea as central to the crisis, grounding the assumption that remains of deceased migrants are processed at OCONUS locations rather than interred at sea. (02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary, paras 3-4)",02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary |
| GG-S7-02v1,C5:GG-S7-02v1,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,Does the response state escalation risk (NFZ enforcement over sovereign airspace or a GTMO incident) with a mitigation?,"States the escalation risk from NFZ enforcement over Cuban sovereign airspace or a GTMO incident, with a mitigation.",States a generic escalation risk without the sovereign-airspace/GTMO specifics or a mitigation.,Enforcing NFZ over sovereign airspace / GTMO incident could escalate (CIPG Risk).,12_CIPG.docx — Risk,12_CIPG |
| GG-S7-04v1,C5:GG-S7-04v1,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,Does the response state the legitimacy/political risk (loss of legitimacy or the disposition politics) with a mitigation?,"States the risk to legitimacy and the two-sided domestic disposition politics, with a mitigation.",Omits legitimacy/disposition-politics risk.,Legitimacy loss / disposition politics could fracture support (CIPG Risk; Strategic Context §6).,12_CIPG.docx — Risk,12_CIPG;01_Strategic_Context |
| C-08v1,C5:C-08v1,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer the political impact to mission from domestic and intgernational media coverage of the MIO?,The analysis infers the political impact to mission from domestic and intgernational media coverage of the MIO,Omits the political impact to mission by non-military friendly networks (such as media),"The packet frames the information and political environment as decisive: the CIPG names the legitimacy of the civilian-protection case a center of gravity, warns the adversary information campaign or a misstep could turn the operation into the 'invasion narrative,' and assesses that the disposition of intercepted Cubans (above all onward movement to CONUS) divides domestic opinion sharply whichever way it goes — establishing the political impact of domestic and international media coverage of the interception operation. (12_CIPG, Risk; 07b_CJCS_WARNORD, Higher Commander's Intent)",07_CJCS_WARNORD; 12_CIPG,07_CJCS_WARNORD; 12_CIPG |
| GG-S7-01,C5:GG-S7-01,S7,Risk,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the mission risk (capacity outpaced by the flow to preventable drownings) with a mitigation?,"States the capacity-outpaced risk WITH a mitigation (early sea-basing, partner/UN throughput, prioritized rescue).","States the risk without a mitigation, or gives a generic risk.",The CIPG Risk paragraph states the capacity-outpaced risk; the packet supplies mitigations to assemble.,12_CIPG.docx — Risk,12_CIPG;14_Running_Estimates |
| GG-S7-02,C5:GG-S7-02,S7,Risk,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the escalation risk (NFZ enforcement over sovereign airspace or a GTMO incident) with a mitigation?,"States the escalation risk from NFZ enforcement over sovereign airspace or a GTMO incident, with a mitigation.",States a generic escalation risk without the sovereign-airspace/GTMO specifics or a mitigation.,The CIPG Risk paragraph states the escalation risk.,12_CIPG.docx — Risk,12_CIPG |
| GG-S7-05,C5:GG-S7-05,S7,Risk,2,I,positive,5,"Does the response state the legal basis and that the operation proceeds WITHOUT a UN Security Council mandate (vetoed), under customary international law / UNCLOS and Presidential authority?",States the operation proceeds without a UNSC mandate under customary international law and Presidential authority.,"Implies UN authorization exists, or omits the legal basis.",Annexes (§1) state the legal basis and the absence of a UNSC mandate.,11_Annexes_and_References.docx — §1 Legal Basis,11_Annexes_and_References |
| GG-S9-02,C5:GG-S9-02,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,2,I,positive,5,Does the response capture the commander's guidance/priorities (save lives first; act lawfully and in support; keep the effort at sea and clear of US waters; give the regime no pretext)?,"Captures the priority guidance including save-lives-first, lawful/support, keep-clear-of-US-waters, and no-pretext.",Gives generic 'follow the commander's intent' without the specific priorities.,The CIPG method/intent states these priorities.,12_CIPG.docx — Method / Intent,12_CIPG |
| GG-S9-07,C5:GG-S9-07,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,3,I,positive,5,"Does the response derive named areas of interest from the geography (embarkation beaches, mid-strait, NFZ airspace, GTMO fenceline, alternate vectors) and links them to the decision points?",Derives NAIs from the geography and ties them to the decision points they inform.,"Lists no NAIs, or lists them without decision linkage.",Critical Geography/JIPOE describe the terrain; deriving the NAI set and its decision linkage is a planner product.,06_Critical_Geography.docx (planner-derived NAIs),06_Critical_Geography;10_JIPOE_Brief |
| R132,C5:R132,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: a decision point on where to process migrants (afloat, Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, or partner facilities) as throughput fills?",Identifies the processing-sequencing decision point,Omits the processing-sequencing decision point,DP: processing sequencing,Decision points & NAIs,14/06 |
| R136,C5:R136,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: a named area of interest over the no-fly-zone belt of Cuban coastal-approach and northern-coast airspace?,Nominates the no-fly-zone airspace named area of interest,Omits the no-fly-zone airspace named area of interest,NAI: no-fly-zone airspace,Decision points & NAIs,06/11 |
| R138,C5:R138,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,3,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: a named area of interest along alternate seaborne vectors through the Windward Passage and toward partner littorals?,Nominates the alternate-vector named area of interest,Omits the alternate-vector named area of interest,NAI: alternate vectors,Decision points & NAIs,06/10 |
| GG-S10-01v1,C5:GG-S10-01v1,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the response state the precursor: US oil blockade + SST relisting collapsed Cuban fuel/power/food?,States the oil-blockade + relisting cause of the fuel/power/food collapse.,Only says 'Cuba is in crisis' without the US-policy cause.,Blockade + relisting → collapse (Strategic Context; RIS §2).,01_Strategic_Context.docx — §1,01_Strategic_Context;02_RIS |
| GG-S10-02v1,C5:GG-S10-02v1,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the atrocities with figures: Carbonera 14; Havana-coast sinking of 25; GTMO gate 5; armed-drone killings in northern coastal towns?,"States all four incidents with figures, including the Havana-coast sinking of 25 and the armed-drone killings.","Omits or garbles one of the incidents (e.g., relocates the sinking to Key West) or its figures.",The four incidents (RIS §4; Strategic Context §3).,02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary.docx — §4,02_RIS;01_Strategic_Context |
| GG-S10-04v1,C5:GG-S10-04v1,S10,Known facts,1,SI,positive,2,Does the response state key geography (Cuba ~90 nm from Key West; Florida Current NE 2-4 kt)?,States Cuba ~90 nm from Key West and the NE-setting Florida Current.,Omits the distance/current facts.,Geography facts (Fact Sheet §1; Critical Geography §1).,06_Critical_Geography.docx — §1/§7,05_Country_Fact_Sheet;06_Critical_Geography |
| GG-S10-05v1,C5:GG-S10-05v1,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the response note the Nimitz CSG is in theater for the annual exercise (apportionable combat power)?,Notes the Nimitz CSG is in theater and apportionable for the NFZ or the ashore branch.,Omits the Nimitz or its availability.,"Nimitz CSG in theater, apportionable (Coalition OOB §5).",04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx — §5,04_Coalition_OOB |
| GG-S10-06v1,C5:GG-S10-06v1,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response state partner offers (UK, Jamaica, DR, Colombia, Mexico) and host nations (Trinidad & Tobago, Bahamas) + UNHCR?","Names the partners, the host nations willing to receive Cubans, and UNHCR.",Refers to generic 'allies' without naming partners/host nations.,Partners/host nations/UNHCR (Coalition OOB §8).,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx — §8,04_Coalition_OOB |
| R011,C5:R011,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the fact that a mass seaborne exodus is under way from the northern Cuban coast at a level not seen since the 1994 balsero crisis, mostly in unseaworthy craft?","States that a mass seaborne exodus is under way, largely in unseaworthy craft",Omits the exodus or materially understates its scale,mass seaborne exodus,Known facts (III-17),01/02/06 |
| R012,C5:R012,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: the fact that the principal embarkation points are the northern coastal towns of Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, and Carbonera?",Identifies the northern-coast embarkation towns,Omits the embarkation geography,embarkation towns,Known facts (III-17),02/05/06 |
| R021,C5:R021,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: the fact that Cuba has no navy able to operate in the open Straits and no armed air force able to contest United States air power?,States that Cuba cannot operate in the open Straits or contest United States air power,Overstates Cuban naval or air capability,no blue-water navy / no contesting air,Known facts (III-17),03/05/02 |
| R022,C5:R022,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: the fact that Cuba's residual maritime capability is a small number of coastal patrol craft operating near its own ports, one of which sank the boat off Havana?",Identifies the limited coastal patrol craft as Cuba's residual maritime capability,Omits the coastal-craft capability or overstates it as a fleet,residual coastal patrol craft,Known facts (III-17),03/05/02 |
| R026,C5:R026,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: the fact that Guantanamo Bay holds a Migrant Operations Center used to shelter and process migrants in earlier contingencies, notably 1994?",Identifies the Guantanamo Migrant Operations Center as an available reception/processing site,Omits the Migrant Operations Center,Guantanamo Migrant Operations Center,Known facts (III-17),05/06 |
| R028,C5:R028,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the fact that Puerto Rico (including former Naval Station Roosevelt Roads) offers United States territory outside the continental United States with port and airfield infrastructure for reception and processing?,Identifies Puerto Rico as an OCONUS reception/processing base with port and airfield infrastructure,Omits Puerto Rico's role as a reception base,Puerto Rico reception infrastructure,Known facts (III-17),6 |
| R029,C5:R029,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include: the fact that the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group is present in theater for the annual round-South-America exercise and is apportionable by request for forces?,Identifies the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group as apportionable additional combat power,Omits the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group's availability,Nimitz CSG apportionable,Known facts (III-17),04/07b |
| GG-S11-01v1,C5:GG-S11-01v1,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,"Does the response analyze available forces (JTF-Southern Spear, Ford CSG 12, Iwo Jima ARG/22 MEU, AFSOUTH, SOCSOUTH, USCG D7, DOJ, + Nimitz)?",Names the available force list and the Nimitz CSG.,Gives a vague force picture or omits major elements/the Nimitz.,Available forces (Coalition OOB; CIPG).,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx,04_Coalition_OOB;12_CIPG |
| GG-S11-02v1,C5:GG-S11-02v1,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the response identify the limiting resources: reception/processing throughput, lift, medical, cutters, and counter-UAS?","Names the specific limiting resources (reception throughput, lift, medical, cutters, counter-UAS).",Treats logistics generically without naming the binding limiters.,"Reception throughput, lift, medical, cutters, counter-UAS are finite (Running Estimates J1/J4/Surgeon).",14_Running_Estimates.docx — J4/Surgeon,14_Running_Estimates |
| GG-S11-03v1,C5:GG-S11-03v1,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,"Does the response note the carrier/amphibious force is right-sized here by the NFZ and the ashore branch, not by a surface/air threat?","States the CSG/ARG is right-sized by NFZ enforcement and the ashore branch, not an anti-surface/air threat.","Calls the carrier overkill without the NFZ/ashore justification, or assumes a naval threat.",CSG/ARG justified by NFZ + ashore branch (CIPG; Gold Brief Step 11).,12_CIPG.docx — Available Forces,12_CIPG;04_Coalition_OOB |
| GG-S11-04v1,C5:GG-S11-04v1,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the shortfalls and requests for forces (reception/medical/lift/counter-UAS/interpreters) against fielded inventory?,"Names specific shortfalls and RFFs matched to the mission (reception, medical, lift, counter-UAS, interpreters).",Only says 'more forces needed' without specific shortfalls/RFFs.,"Shortfalls/RFFs for reception, medical, lift, counter-UAS, interpreters (Running Estimates; Gold Brief Step 11).",14_Running_Estimates.docx — J1/J4,14_Running_Estimates |
| GG-S11-01,C5:GG-S11-01,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the available forces (JTF-Southern Spear; Ford CSG 12; Iwo Jima ARG/22 MEU; AFSOUTH; SOCSOUTH; USCG District Seven cutters/aviation + MSRT; DOJ) and the apportionable Nimitz CSG?,Names the available force list and the Nimitz CSG.,Gives a vague force picture or omits major elements/the Nimitz.,Coalition OOB and CIPG state the available force list and the Nimitz CSG.,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle;12_CIPG |
| GG-S11-02,C5:GG-S11-02,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,SI,positive,2,Does the response identify the non-force resources currently available (GTMO Migrant Operations Center; partner facilities; UNHCR reception)?,"Names the currently-available non-force resources (GTMO MOC, partner facilities, UNHCR).",Omits non-force resources or lists capabilities not currently available.,Coalition OOB / Fact Sheet name GTMO's MOC and partner/UNHCR reception (JP 5-0 III-21 ¶10b: currently available).,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle.docx — §8; 05_Country_Fact_Sheet.docx — §6,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle;05_Country_Fact_Sheet |
| GG-S11-03,C5:GG-S11-03,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the response identify the limiting/binding resources: reception-processing throughput, strategic/intratheater lift, medical/mass-care, cutters, and counter-UAS?","Names the specific binding resources (reception throughput, lift, medical, cutters, counter-UAS).",Treats logistics generically without naming the binding limiters.,Running Estimates identify these as finite/limiting.,14_Running_Estimates.docx — J4 / Surgeon,14_Running_Estimates |
| GG-S11-04,C5:GG-S11-04,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the response perform a rough force-to-requirement match and derives the requests for forces / shortfalls (reception, medical, lift, counter-UAS, interpreters) against fielded inventory?",Matches required capability to fielded forces and names specific shortfalls/RFFs.,"Only says 'more forces needed' without a match or specific RFFs, or invents unfielded capability.",Running Estimates flag limiting factors; converting them into a force-to-requirement match and specific RFFs is a planner product (JP 5-0 III-20 ¶10a).,14_Running_Estimates.docx — J1/J4 (planner-derived RFFs),14_Running_Estimates;04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle |
| R139,C5:R139,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of Joint Task Force-Southern Spear (on U.S. Naval Forces South and the Fourth Fleet) as the executing force?,Identifies JTF-Southern Spear as the executing force,Omits the executing force,force: JTF-Southern Spear,Force & resource analysis (III-20/21),04/12 |
| R140,C5:R140,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of Carrier Strike Group 12 (Gerald R. Ford) and its air wing as the instrument of no-fly-zone enforcement?,Identifies Carrier Strike Group 12 and its air wing as the no-fly-zone instrument,Omits the carrier air wing's no-fly-zone role,force: CSG-12 air wing (NFZ),Force & resource analysis (III-20/21),04/12 |
| R141,C5:R141,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis include: identification of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group with the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit as the instrument of any operation ashore and of afloat reception and medical support?,Identifies the Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit as the ashore and afloat-reception instrument,Omits the Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit,force: ARG / 22 MEU,Force & resource analysis (III-20/21),04/12 |
| R142,C5:R142,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: identification of Air Forces South as the provider of land-based air, tanking, command and control, and counter-air and counter-unmanned-aircraft capability?",Identifies Air Forces South and its counter-air / counter-unmanned-aircraft role,Omits Air Forces South,force: Air Forces South,Force & resource analysis (III-20/21),04/12 |
| R143,C5:R143,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis include: identification of United States Coast Guard District Seven cutters, aviation, and the Maritime Security Response Team as the workhorses of interception and rescue?",Identifies the Coast Guard forces as central to interception and rescue,Omits the Coast Guard's interception/rescue role,force: USCG District Seven,Force & resource analysis (III-20/21),04/12 |
| R144,C5:R144,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis include: identification of Special Operations Command South for reconnaissance and the compartmented branches?,Identifies Special Operations Command South's role,Omits Special Operations Command South,force: SOCSOUTH,Force & resource analysis (III-20/21),04/12 |
| GG-S12-01v1,C5:GG-S12-01v1,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the objective (end-condition): the killing of civilians is stopped and the NFZ is upheld?,States as an end-condition that the killing is stopped and the NFZ is upheld.,"Phrases it as a task ('enforce the NFZ') rather than an end-condition, or omits stopping the killing.",Objective per Gold Brief Step 10 / CIPG.,12_CIPG.docx — Objectives,12_CIPG |
| GG-S12-02v1,C5:GG-S12-02v1,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the response state the objective (end-condition): intercepted persons are protected and lawfully processed OCONUS, none returned to Cuba?","States as an end-condition that intercepted persons are protected, processed OCONUS, and none returned to Cuba.",Omits the no-return-to-Cuba/OCONUS condition or states it as a task.,Objective per Gold Brief Step 10 / Annexes §3.,12_CIPG.docx — Objectives,12_CIPG;11_Annexes |
| GG-S12-03v1,C5:GG-S12-03v1,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the objective (end-condition): a wider armed conflict is avoided and Guantanamo Bay remains secure?,States as an end-condition that a wider war is avoided and GTMO remains secure.,Omits either condition or frames as a task.,Objective per Gold Brief Step 10 / CIPG.,12_CIPG.docx — Objectives,12_CIPG |
| GG-S12-04v1,C5:GG-S12-04v1,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the response state the objective (end-condition): the legitimacy of the civilian-protection effort is preserved and options ashore remain available for national decision?,States as end-conditions preserving legitimacy and keeping options ashore available without commitment.,Omits legitimacy or treats the ashore option as committed.,Objective per Gold Brief Step 10 / CIPG.,12_CIPG.docx — Objectives,12_CIPG |
| GG-S12-05v1,C5:GG-S12-05v1,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,I,positive,5,Does the response frame regime change as a decision withheld by NCA and not a co-equal COA?,"Frames regime change as a compartmented, NCA-gated branch distinct from the base operation.",Merges regime change into the base COA or treats it as authorized.,Regime change is a separate branch (CIPG §3; EXORD).,12_CIPG.docx — Operational Approach,12_CIPG |
| GG-S12-01,C5:GG-S12-01,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the response state as an end-condition, that the killing of civilians is stopped and the NFZ is upheld?",States as an end-condition that the killing is stopped and the NFZ is upheld.,"Phrases it as a task ('enforce the NFZ') rather than an end-condition, or omits stopping the killing.",CIPG states the objectives as end-conditions; classifying this one as an end-condition (not a task) is the demand (JP 5-0 III-21 ¶11).,12_CIPG.docx — Objectives,12_CIPG |
| GG-S12-02,C5:GG-S12-02,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the response state as an end-condition, that intercepted persons are protected and lawfully processed OCONUS, none returned to Cuba?","States as an end-condition that intercepted persons are protected, processed OCONUS, none returned to Cuba.",Omits the no-return/OCONUS condition or states it as a task.,CIPG states this objective as an end-condition; the Annexes fix the no-return/OCONUS content.,12_CIPG.docx — Objectives,12_CIPG;11_Annexes_and_References |
| GG-S12-03,C5:GG-S12-03,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the response state as end-conditions, that a wider armed conflict is avoided and Guantanamo Bay remains secure, and that legitimacy is preserved and options ashore remain available for national decision?","States as end-conditions avoiding a wider war, GTMO secure, legitimacy preserved, and options ashore available.","Omits one, or frames the objectives as tasks.",CIPG states these objectives as end-conditions.,12_CIPG.docx — Objectives,12_CIPG |
| R164,C5:R164,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,SI,positive,2,"Does the mission analysis include: a course-of-action evaluation criterion for risk to force and to legitimacy in the contested, below-threshold environment?",Offers a force-protection and legitimacy evaluation criterion,Omits the risk-to-force / legitimacy criterion,COA criterion: risk to force/legitimacy,Military objectives & COA eval criteria (III-21/22),12/11 |
| R165,C5:R165,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis include: proposed termination criteria expressed as measurable, observable conditions (killing stopped and no-fly zone uncontested; preventable deaths at sea halted; the flow managed to a sustainable level; migrants safe and lawfully processed; no wider war and Guantanamo secure; options ashore preserved)?","Offers measurable, observable termination criteria tied to the end state","Omits termination criteria, or states them in unmeasurable terms",termination criteria,Military objectives & COA eval criteria (III-21/22),12 |
| C5-GAP-01,C5:C5-GAP-01,S8,Restated mission,3,CD,negative,-9,"Does the restated mission statement name USSOUTHCOM or Joint Task Force-Southern Spear as the lead or supported authority for the disposition of intercepted Cuban migrants, displacing the Department of Homeland Security and the United States Coast Guard from that role?","The restated mission casts USSOUTHCOM or JTF-Southern Spear as owning migrant disposition — wording such as processes, adjudicates, or resettles intercepted Cubans — while DHS and the Coast Guard are demoted to assisting agencies or dropped from the mission statement altogether.","The restated mission places USSOUTHCOM in support of the Department of Homeland Security, leaves DHS and the Coast Guard as the supported authority for disposition, and limits the military task to interception, at-sea rescue, and standing up and running reception and processing capacity on their behalf.","Department of War EXORD 140100ZAPR26 paragraph 8 states the Secretary of Homeland Security is the lead for the disposition of migrants and the Department of War supports; CJCS WARNORD 141000ZAPR26 paragraph 7 makes DHS and the United States Coast Guard the supported authority for migrant disposition, with USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Southern Spear supporting that line of effort while the Coast Guard retains its Title 14 statutory authorities.",Restated mission statement and the command-relationships line of the mission analysis brief,07_Department_of_War_EXORD; 07b_CJCS_WARNORD; 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle |
| C5-GAP-02,C5:C5-GAP-02,S8,Restated mission,3,CD,negative,-9,"Does the restated mission statement present operations ashore on Cuban soil or regime change as a task USSOUTHCOM will execute, rather than as compartmented planning tasks restricted by a National Command Authority decision?","An ashore or regime-change task sits inside the list of things the command will do — for example conducts operations ashore to protect Cuban civilians, or sets conditions for a transition of power — with no wording anywhere in the mission statement holding execution behind a National Command Authority decision.","The restated mission is bounded to no-fly-zone enforcement, maritime interception and rescue, blockade enforcement, and protection of Guantanamo Bay; ashore and regime-change work surfaces only as a be-prepared planning task explicitly conditioned on a National Command Authority decision.","The Department of War EXORD amplification paragraph states the order does not authorize operations ashore or the execution of regime change, which require a subsequent National Command Authority decision; CJCS WARNORD paragraph 6 directs both only as closely compartmented branch planning tasks, and paragraph 8 bars disclosure outside the compartment established by CDR USSOUTHCOM.",Restated mission statement; be-prepared / on-order task list,07_Department_of_War_EXORD; 07b_CJCS_WARNORD; 01_Strategic_Context |
| C5-GAP-03,C5:C5-GAP-03,S8,Restated mission,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response carry protection of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in the restated mission?,Carries protection of the Guantanamo Bay naval base as a task of the restated mission.,"Omits protection of Guantanamo Bay from the restated mission, or carries the base only as a reception and processing site.","Department of War EXORD paragraph 5 directs USSOUTHCOM, employing Joint Task Force-Southern Spear, to protect the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay; Cuban soldiers fired on a crowd at the base's landward gate and killed five people, and the country fact sheet describes the base as an enclave on the southeastern coast surrounded by Cuban territory and a Cuban military screen.","Restated mission statement, the 'what tasks' element of the mission analysis brief",07_Department_of_War_EXORD; 07b_CJCS_WARNORD; 05_Country_Fact_Sheet |
| C5-GAP-04,C5:C5-GAP-04,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the brief place any part of the maritime interception effort inside United States territorial waters or the waters off the Florida Keys?,"Interception, boarding, screening, or rescue stations are sited in United States territorial waters or off the Florida Keys, or a landing-and-processing scheme inside Florida is proposed, with the geographic boundary read as a preference and no recognition that crossing it converts the effort into a domestic law-enforcement matter reached by border law and Posse Comitatus considerations.","The brief fixes the interception belt in the international waters of the Straits and the Cuban approaches, records staying south of and clear of United States territorial waters and the Florida Keys as a binding restraint, and explains that the boundary exists to keep this a military operation conducted abroad.","The USSOUTHCOM Staff Judge Advocate annex paragraph 4 states the operation is kept in international waters and the Cuban approaches, south of and clear of United States territorial waters and the Florida Keys, so that domestic law-enforcement, border, and Posse Comitatus considerations do not attach; EXORD paragraph 8 lists the same geographic limit as a constraint, and the strait is roughly ninety nautical miles wide.",Constraints and restraints list; operational-area and boundaries paragraph,11_Annexes_and_References; 07_Department_of_War_EXORD; 06_Critical_Geography |
| C5-GAP-05,C5:C5-GAP-05,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CD,negative,-9,"Does the mission analysis brief present return of intercepted Cubans to Cuba as an available disposition, for example by reading Executive Order 12807 interdiction authority as permitting it?",The mission analysis brief presents return of intercepted Cubans to Cuba as an available disposition.,"The mission analysis brief does not present return to Cuba as available; it records the no-return direction as an absolute restraint, names non-refoulement as its policy basis, and confines disposition to processing outside the continental United States and third-country burden-sharing.","The Staff Judge Advocate annex paragraph 3 and EXORD paragraph 8 both state that no intercepted Cuban will be returned to Cuba and that the customary prohibition on returning persons to persecution is honored as a matter of policy, even though Executive Order 12807 on interdiction of illegal aliens is carried as reference C of the 140100ZAPR26 EXORD.",Constraints and restraints list; migrant-disposition paragraph,11_Annexes_and_References; 07_Department_of_War_EXORD; 07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| C5-GAP-06,C5:C5-GAP-06,S4,Constraints and restraints,3,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis brief present targets on Cuban sovereign territory or inside Cuban territorial seas as engageable under the Presidential no-fly-zone declaration?,The mission analysis brief presents targets on Cuban sovereign territory or inside Cuban territorial seas as engageable under the no-fly-zone declaration.,"The mission analysis brief does not present them as engageable; it holds no-fly-zone enforcement inside the declared airspace belt distinct from self-defense and from the minimum force used to compel blockade compliance, and bars strikes on Cuban sovereign territory.","The Staff Judge Advocate annex paragraph 2 sets a firm escalation boundary of no strikes on Cuban sovereign territory and no engagement of Cuban forces inside Cuban territorial seas except in self-defense or to stop an attack on civilians in progress, while separately authorizing no-fly-zone enforcement inside the declared belt of Cuban sovereign airspace along the northern coast under the 131800ZAPR26 Presidential declaration.",Constraints and restraints list; use-of-force and rules-of-engagement paragraph,11_Annexes_and_References; 07b_CJCS_WARNORD; 06_Critical_Geography |
| C5-GAP-07,C5:C5-GAP-07,S6,Assumptions,2,D,negative,-5,Does the brief record the directed judgment that Russia and China stay limited to diplomatic and information measures as an established fact rather than as an assumption owing confirmation or refutation?,"The Russian and Chinese posture is carried into the facts, threat assessment, or intelligence estimate as settled — for example asserting that Moscow and Beijing will not provide material support — and it is absent from the assumptions list, so no confirm-or-refute obligation attaches to it anywhere in the brief.","Limited Russian and Chinese involvement appears in the assumptions list, is marked as the decisive assumption the WARNORD directed, and is tied to a monitoring obligation such that a shift toward material support would force the assumption to be revisited.","CJCS WARNORD 141000ZAPR26 paragraph 5 directs, as a planning assumption to be confirmed or refuted during mission analysis, that the provenance of Cuban armed drones and coastal craft is unconfirmed and that Russia and China remain limited to diplomatic and information measures rather than material intervention, and labels this the decisive assumption to be monitored as a priority intelligence requirement.",Assumptions list; great-power / adversary support paragraph,07b_CJCS_WARNORD; 10_JIPOE_Brief; 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary |
| C5-GAP-08,C5:C5-GAP-08,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the brief state the origin of the Cuban armed drones as known, for example as Russian-supplied or Chinese-supplied, instead of carrying drone provenance as a priority intelligence requirement?","The drones used against civilians in the northern coastal towns are attributed to a named supplier, programme, or state sponsor, and the CCIR list contains no corresponding priority intelligence requirement on their provenance.","Drone type, numbers, control, and origin are left unresolved in the assessment, and the brief derives an explicit priority intelligence requirement covering drone provenance and any external military hand behind it.","The USSOUTHCOM J2 adversary order of battle paragraph 5 records that Cuban security forces employed armed drones to kill civilians in the northern coastal towns and that their type, numbers, control, and origin — indigenous, grey-market, or externally supplied — are not established and are a priority intelligence requirement; the J2 regional intelligence summary paragraph 9 lists the same item first among key intelligence gaps.",CCIR / priority intelligence requirement list; adversary capability paragraph,03_Adversary_Order_of_Battle; 02_Regional_Intelligence_Summary; 10_JIPOE_Brief |
| C5-GAP-09,C5:C5-GAP-09,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,SI,positive,2,Does the force and resource analysis separate the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group as combat power obtainable only through a request for forces from the units already available to Joint Task Force-Southern Spear?,"Nimitz is described as in theater for the annual round-South-America exercise and apportionable by request for forces to the Joint Staff, and it is kept outside the pool of forces already available for planning.","Nimitz is counted next to Carrier Strike Group 12, the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, and Coast Guard District Seven as though already allocated, or the request-for-forces step needed to obtain it goes unmentioned in the shortfalls and requirements.","The USSOUTHCOM J3 coalition and interagency order of battle paragraph 5 and its notice-to-move table record the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group as present in theater for the annual round-South-America exercise and available on order, apportionable by request for forces, while Carrier Strike Group 12 (Gerald R. Ford) is on station or immediate; CJCS WARNORD paragraph 9 routes that request to the Joint Staff.",Force and resource analysis / forces-available table; request-for-forces and shortfalls list,04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle; 07b_CJCS_WARNORD |
| C5-GAP-10,C5:C5-GAP-10,S7,Risk,3,SI,positive,2,Does the response derive the risk that protracted displacement shifts the legal status of intercepted Cubans and narrows where they may lawfully be sent?,"Derives that migrant status hardens toward refugee status over time, narrowing onward movement and third-country transfer.","Uses migrant and refugee interchangeably, or frames disposition purely as a throughput and basing problem with no legal-status risk recorded.","The Staff Judge Advocate annex paragraph 3 states that the term migrant is used deliberately, does not by itself confer the protected legal status of refugee, and that the distinction and its evolution over protracted displacement bear on where and how interdicted persons may lawfully be sent; the political advisor running estimate names the protracted-displacement problem of Cubans who cannot go home.",Risk assessment section; legal considerations paragraph,11_Annexes_and_References; 14_Running_Estimates |
| C5-GAP-11,C5:C5-GAP-11,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the response derive reception and processing throughput at Guantanamo Bay and Puerto Rico, rather than combat power, as the binding limitation on feasibility?","Derives reception and processing throughput, not combat power, as the limitation that bounds feasibility.","Measures sufficiency in ships, aircraft and sorties, or treats reception and processing as a task to be assigned rather than the capacity that bounds the operation.","The USSOUTHCOM J4 running estimate states that logistics is the pacing function, that establishing and sustaining reception and processing capacity outside the continental United States at Guantanamo Bay and in Puerto Rico drives berthing, life support, medical throughput, potable water, and lift, and that the feasibility of the whole operation turns on whether interception, rescue, and reception throughput can keep pace with the flow.",Force and resource analysis; logistics and feasibility paragraph,14_Running_Estimates; 06_Critical_Geography; 04_Coalition_Order_of_Battle |
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