| item_id,item_uid,step,step_name,tier,severity,polarity,weight,question,pass_condition,fail_condition,source_fact,artifact_anchor,source_documents |
| PH-S1-01,C6:PH-S1-01,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the mission purpose as restoring Philippine territorial integrity over the Pag-asa cluster following the 22 August PRC armed attack?,Names restoration of Philippine territorial integrity over the Pag-asa cluster as the operation's purpose.,States only a generic 'deter China' or 'defend the Philippines' purpose without the restore-Pag-asa objective.,The EXORD mission directs USINDOPACOM to restore Philippine sovereignty over the Pag-asa cluster after the 22 Aug 2026 PRC armed attack (CJCS EXORD para 5; CIPG para 2).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — MISSION (para 5),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S1-02,C6:PH-S1-02,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the response identify the legal basis as the President's determination that MDT Article V conditions are satisfied, triggering Article IV obligations?",Cites the MDT Article V determination (and Article IV obligation) as the legal basis for US action.,Omits the MDT/Article V basis or treats the operation as discretionary power projection.,"POTUS determined on 23 Aug 2026 that the conditions of Article V of the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty are satisfied, triggering Article IV obligations to act (EXORD para 1; Strategic Context 2.2; Regional Intel BLUF).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — SITUATION (para 1),15_CJCS_EXORD; 01_Strategic_Context; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary |
| PH-S1-03,C6:PH-S1-03,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,SI,positive,2,Does the response identify that the President approved COA-2 (Shaping-and-Negotiate) as the primary course of action?,States that COA-2 (Shaping-and-Negotiate) is the approved/primary COA.,"Treats COA-1 or a generic 'attack the outposts' plan as the approved COA, or omits which COA is approved.","Per Presidential approval of 071800ZSEP26, COA-2 (Shaping-and-Negotiate) is the approved primary COA (EXORD para 1, para 7A).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (para 7A),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S1-04,C6:PH-S1-04,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,SI,positive,2,Does the response identify COA-1 (Isolate-and-Restore) as the on-order branch held at 96-hour executability?,States COA-1 is the on-order branch maintained at 96-hour executability.,Omits the COA-1 branch or treats it as the current operation rather than an on-order branch.,"COA-1 (Isolate-and-Restore) is approved as the on-order branch, to be executable within 96 hours of direction and maintained throughout Phases II-III (EXORD para 7A, para 8A(2)).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (para 7A),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S1-05,C6:PH-S1-05,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,D,negative,-5,"Does the response frame the operation as primarily a war-fighting campaign with the State-led diplomatic off-ramp as an afterthought, rather than subordinating the military effort to it?",Frames the operation as primarily a war-fighting campaign with diplomacy as an afterthought.,Explicitly subordinates the military effort to the State-led diplomatic off-ramp (military as instrument of diplomacy).,"The Chairman's intent states every deployment, FONOP, and ISR line is an instrument of the diplomatic effort, and military actions are synchronized in support of the DOS-led off-ramp (EXORD para 6, para 15; CIPG LOE 4).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — COMMANDER'S INTENT (para 6),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S1-06,C6:PH-S1-06,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the response derive the commander's end state (restored Philippine sovereignty over Pag-asa, PRC armed presence eliminated, alliance credibility reinforced, INDOPACOM posture preserved for Korea and Taiwan deterrence)?","States an end state covering restored Pag-asa sovereignty, eliminated PRC armed presence, reinforced alliance credibility, and preserved Korea/Taiwan deterrent posture.",Gives a vague 'restore stability' end state that omits the eliminate-PRC-presence or preserve-Korea/Taiwan-posture conditions.,"The end state is restored Philippine territorial integrity over the Pag-asa cluster, PRC armed presence eliminated, reinforced alliance credibility, and preserved INDOPACOM posture for continued Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait deterrence (EXORD para 6; CIPG Initial Intent).",12_CIPG.docx — Initial Commander's Intent (End State),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S1-07,C6:PH-S1-07,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify USINDOPACOM as the supported command and COMUSPACFLT as COMJTF-PACIFIC HARRIER?,Names USINDOPACOM as supported command and COMUSPACFLT as COMJTF-PACIFIC HARRIER.,"Misassigns the supported command or the JTF commander (e.g., names PACAF or a component as COMJTF).",USINDOPACOM is the supported CCDR and COMUSPACFLT is designated COMJTF-PACIFIC HARRIER (EXORD para 30A/30E; CIPG C2; Running Estimates C2).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — COMMAND AND CONTROL (para 30),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG; 13_Running_Estimates |
| PH-S1-08,C6:PH-S1-08,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the response treat INDOPACOM as free to draw from USFK, or omit that USFK/CINCUNC retains priority of effort in any force-allocation conflict with Pacific Harrier?","Treats INDOPACOM as free to draw from USFK, or omits the USFK priority-of-effort rule.",States USFK retains priority of effort / peninsular posture is protected in force-allocation conflicts.,"CDR USFK/CINCUNC retains priority of effort in any force-allocation conflict with COMJTF-PH, and peninsular posture is not to be degraded below current levels without CJCS approval (EXORD para 8G(1), para 30B).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — TASKS (para 8G) / C2 (para 30B),15_CJCS_EXORD; 01_Strategic_Context |
| PH-S1-09,C6:PH-S1-09,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response identify the Chairman's requirement to carefully manage escalation of force (no expansion beyond the JOA, no PRC mainland targeting, not first to escalate to attrition)?","States the requirement to manage escalation (no JOA expansion, no mainland targeting, no first escalation to attrition).",Omits the intent to manage escalation or proposes expanding the conflict beyond the JOA.,"The Chairman's intent directs no expansion beyond the JOA, no targeting of the PRC mainland, and not being first to escalate into attrition, while holding the amphibious option visible and ready (EXORD para 6).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — COMMANDER'S INTENT (para 6),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-D-06,C6:PH-D-06,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response recommend military actions that materially undermine the State-led diplomatic off-ramp without CJCS coordination?,Recommends actions that would foreclose the diplomatic off-ramp without coordination.,Keeps recommended actions synchronized with (not undermining) the State-led off-ramp.,No military operations that materially undermine the State-led off-ramp effort will be executed without CJCS coordination (EXORD para 15).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — DIPLOMATIC INTEGRATION (para 15),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| C-05,C6:C-05,S1,Higher mission and intent,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the analysis describe the appointment of a CJTF, determination of the military forces and other |
| national means required to accomplish the mission, and establish the command relationship between CJTF and other subordinate commanders?","The analysis describe the appointment of a CJTF, determination of the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission, and establish the command relationship between CJTF, component commanders, and coalition partners",Omits establishment of the CJTF command arrangement,Tasks to supported commander; execute COA-2 PACIFIC HARRIER,15_CJCS_EXORD,15_CJCS_EXORD; 13_Running_Estimates |
| PH-S2-01,C6:PH-S2-01,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the response identify the PRC operational center of gravity as the militarized 'Big Three' Spratly outposts (Mischief, Subi, Fiery Cross)?",Names the militarized Spratly outposts (Mischief/Subi/Fiery Cross) as the PRC operational center of gravity.,"Names Pag-asa Island, the PLAN fleet, or 'the PLA' generically as the operational center of gravity.","The CIPG and JIPOE assess the PRC operational center of gravity as the militarized Spratly outposts (Mischief, Subi, Fiery Cross), which provide forward A2/AD, sustainment, and ISR fusion (CIPG 3.3 and para 12 conclusion; JIPOE slides 13/19).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — CoG Analysis (Slide 19) / Adversary Operational CoG,11_CIPG; 09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-S2-03,C6:PH-S2-03,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the PRC strategic center of gravity as CCP regime legitimacy / the PLA's role as guarantor of national rejuvenation?,Names CCP regime legitimacy (PLA as guarantor of national rejuvenation) as the PRC strategic CoG.,Gives a generic 'the Chinese military' strategic CoG or omits it.,The adversary strategic center of gravity is CCP regime legitimacy and the PLA's role as guarantor of national rejuvenation (CIPG 3.3; JIPOE slide 19).,09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — CoG Analysis (Adversary Strategic CoG),11_CIPG; 09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-S2-04,C6:PH-S2-04,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the friendly strategic center of gravity as alliance credibility and coalition cohesion?,Names alliance credibility / coalition cohesion as the friendly strategic CoG.,Omits the friendly strategic CoG or reduces it to raw US military capability.,"The friendly strategic center of gravity is alliance credibility, coalition cohesion, and the rule-based international order (CIPG 3.3; JIPOE slide 19).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — CoG Analysis (Friendly Strategic CoG),11_CIPG; 09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-S2-05,C6:PH-S2-05,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the friendly operational center of gravity as coalition sea-control and air-superiority capability?,Names coalition sea-control/air-superiority capability as the friendly operational CoG.,Omits the friendly operational CoG or names an unrelated capability.,The friendly operational center of gravity is the coalition sea-control plus air-superiority capability (CIPG 3.3; JIPOE slide 19).,12_CIPG.docx — Centers of Gravity (Friendly Operational CoG),11_CIPG; 09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-S2-06,C6:PH-S2-06,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify single-point-of-failure outpost logistics (sea-line resupply from Hainan) as a PRC critical vulnerability?,Names the outposts' Hainan sea-line logistics as an interdictable single-point-of-failure vulnerability.,Omits the logistics vulnerability or treats the outposts as self-sustaining.,"The outposts' logistic flow from Hainan is a single point of failure interdictable over roughly 30-60 days, a principal PRC critical vulnerability (JIPOE slides 13/19; CIPG 3.3).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Adversary Operational CoG (Critical Vulnerabilities),09_JIPOE_Brief; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S2-07,C6:PH-S2-07,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify finite outpost air-defense magazine depth as a PRC critical vulnerability?,Names finite outpost air-defense (HQ-9B) magazine depth as a critical vulnerability.,Omits magazine-depth vulnerability or assumes unlimited outpost air defense.,"Each outpost holds a finite HQ-9B magazine (approx. 4 launchers / 32 missiles), a critical vulnerability to sustained coalition pressure (JIPOE slides 13/19).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — PLA Spratly Outposts (Critical Vulnerabilities),09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-S2-08,C6:PH-S2-08,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response characterize each militarized outpost's capability (3,000m runway, HQ-9B SAM, YJ-12B ASCM, Type 366 radar, ~400-500 garrison)?","Describes the outpost capability set (runway, HQ-9B, YJ-12B, radar, garrison).",Treats the outposts as lightly defended or omits their air-defense/ASCM capability.,"Each of Mischief, Subi, Fiery Cross has a 3,000m runway with HAS for ~24 fighters, an HQ-9B SAM battery, a YJ-12B mobile ASCM battery, Type 366 radar, an ISR-fusion node, a deep-water harbor, and a ~400-500 personnel garrison (JIPOE slide 13).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — PLA Spratly Outposts (Slide 13),09_JIPOE_Brief; 03_Adversary_OOB |
| PH-S2-09,C6:PH-S2-09,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response characterize the PLAN South Sea Fleet surface/subsurface threat (Type 055/052D/054A combatants, Type 093 SSN, Type 039 SSK, YJ-18 ASCM)?",Describes the PLAN South Sea Fleet combatant and submarine threat with ASCM reach.,Omits the PLAN surface/subsurface threat or treats the maritime domain as uncontested.,"The PLAN South Sea Fleet fields Type 055/052D/054A combatants, Type 093 SSN and Type 039 SSK, with YJ-18 ~540 km ASCM from major surface combatants (JIPOE slides 7/12).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — J2 Adversary Assessment: PLAN South Sea Fleet,09_JIPOE_Brief; 03_Adversary_OOB |
| PH-S2-10,C6:PH-S2-10,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the response identify the Pag-asa garrison as a reinforced PLAMC battalion (~370-400 personnel) with SHORAD, ATGM, and mobile ASCM?",States the Pag-asa garrison is a reinforced PLAMC battalion (~370-400) with SHORAD/ATGM/ASCM.,Omits or grossly misstates the Pag-asa garrison strength/composition.,"The Pag-asa garrison is a reinforced PLA Marine Corps battalion (~400, reduced to ~370 effective after the 22 Aug fighting) with HQ-17 SHORAD, HJ-10/HJ-12 ATGM, and an assessed YJ-12B battery (JIPOE slide 14).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — PLAMC and Pag-asa Garrison (Slide 14),09_JIPOE_Brief; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary |
| PH-S2-11,C6:PH-S2-11,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the assessed PRC reinforcement projection (to ~1.5 battalions / ~600 with an added YJ-12B battery within 14 days)?,States the 14-day reinforcement projection to ~600 personnel / added YJ-12B battery.,Omits the reinforcement timeline or treats the garrison as static.,The MLCOA projects PRC reinforcement of Pag-asa to ~1.5 battalions (~600 personnel) with one additional YJ-12B battery within 14 days (JIPOE slide 14).,09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Reinforcement projection (Slide 14),09_JIPOE_Brief; 03_Adversary_OOB |
| PH-S2-12,C6:PH-S2-12,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the response omit the PRC most-likely course of action, or state a full-invasion MLCOA unsupported by the assessment rather than seizure of the islands as a demonstration of military force capabilities?",Omits the MLCOA or states a full-invasion MLCOA unsupported by the assessment.,Names demonstrated military force capabilities with a diplomatic off-ramp as the PRC MLCOA.,JIPOE assesses the PRC MLCOA as seizure of islands as a demonstration of military force capabilities followed by a withdrawal based on receipt of diplomatic concessions (JIPOE slide 17; CIPG para 2).,09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Adversary MLCOA (Slide 17),09_JIPOE_Brief; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S2-13,C6:PH-S2-13,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the PRC most-dangerous course of action is seizure and deliberate defense of islands to test US public will (not strategic escalation)?,Names seizure and defense as the MDCOA and notes it is not strategic escalation.,"States the MDCOA is a Taiwan invasion / nuclear escalation, contradicting the assessment.","The MDCOA is seizure and defense of islands (e.g., ASCM warning shot, deniable submarine engagement, cable interdiction, or an allied-target strike) designed to test US public will, explicitly NOT strategic escalation (JIPOE slide 18).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Adversary MDCOA (Slide 18),09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-S2-14,C6:PH-S2-14,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response recognize that the PRC operates from Hainan/mainland sanctuary with interior lines while coalition forces operate at distance under mainland-targeting restraint?,Notes the sanctuary/interior-lines vs distance/restraint asymmetry.,Ignores the sanctuary asymmetry or assumes symmetric freedom of action.,The PRC operates from Hainan/mainland sanctuary with interior lines while coalition forces operate at distance with strategic restraint on mainland targeting — an asymmetry shaping every operational calculation (CIPG para 9; JIPOE).,12_CIPG.docx — Description of the Operational Environment,11_CIPG; 09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-S2-15,C6:PH-S2-15,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,SI,positive,2,"Does the response characterize Pag-asa Island's physical setting (~37 hectares, ~3.4 m elevation sand cay, 1,300 m runway, ~250 civilians)?",Describes Pag-asa's size/elevation/runway and civilian population.,Omits the physical/civilian setting or treats Pag-asa as unpopulated.,"Pag-asa is a ~37-hectare, ~3.4 m-elevation sand cay with a 1,300 m runway (Rancudo Airfield) and ~250 civilian residents (JIPOE slides 6/11; Critical Geography 2.3; EXORD para 17A).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Domain Analysis: Land / Pag-asa OAKOC,09_JIPOE_Brief; 06_Critical_Geography; 05_Country_Fact_Sheet |
| PH-S2-16,C6:PH-S2-16,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,SI,positive,2,Does the response identify degraded GPS/PNT and intermittent SATCOM (PRC counter-space and jamming) as an environmental condition to plan for?,States that degraded GPS/PNT and intermittent SATCOM must be planned for.,Assumes assured GPS/SATCOM or omits the counter-PNT condition.,"PRC counter-space and counter-PNT capability means coalition forces must plan for degraded GPS and intermittent SATCOM in contested phases, while Beidou gives the PRC robust PNT (JIPOE slide 9; CIPG 8.7).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Domain Analysis: Space and Cyberspace,09_JIPOE_Brief; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S2-17,C6:PH-S2-17,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the response identify PRC cyber pre-positioning (Volt/Salt Typhoon TTPs) in Philippine/US/coalition critical infrastructure?,Notes PRC cyber pre-positioning in critical infrastructure as a threat.,Omits the cyber pre-positioning threat.,PRC has pre-positioned cyber access in PH/US/coalition critical infrastructure using Volt/Salt Typhoon TTPs and is assessed to continue probing and possible disruption (JIPOE slides 9/16; Regional Intel 2.2).,09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — PLA Cyber/Space/Information Forces,09_JIPOE_Brief; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary |
| PH-S2-19,C6:PH-S2-19,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,SI,positive,2,Does the response note that the northern approach to Pag-asa passes within 12 nm of Subi Reef's HQ-9B coverage while the eastern approach is longer but lower-threat?,"Contrasts the northern (Subi HQ-9B) and eastern (lower-threat, longer) approaches to Pag-asa.",Omits approach analysis or ignores the Subi HQ-9B exposure on the northern approach.,The northern approach to Pag-asa passes within 12 nm of Subi Reef (HQ-9B coverage); the eastern approach via Mindoro/Sibutu is longer but has lower direct A2/AD exposure; the western approach is not viable (Vietnamese waters) (Critical Geography 2.4).,06_Critical_Geography.docx — Approaches to Pag-asa (2.4),06_Critical_Geography; 09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-S2-20,C6:PH-S2-20,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the PRC 'lawful enforcement of sovereign waters' narrative as the dominant information-environment framing to be countered?,Names the PRC 'lawful enforcement' narrative as the framing to be countered (with the PCA/UNCLOS counter).,Omits the information environment or the PRC narrative.,"The PRC 'lawful enforcement' narrative dominates the Mandarin information space (with AI-generated disinformation), and the coalition counter-narrative rests on the 2016 PCA Award and UNCLOS (JIPOE slides 5/16; Strategic Context 2.5; CIPG 8.7).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Information (PMESII) / Information Support Force,02_Regional_Intel_Summary; 05_Country_Fact_Sheet; 09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-D-01,C6:PH-D-01,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response treat Pag-asa Island as the operational center of gravity rather than the outposts (with Pag-asa as the political objective)?,Treats Pag-asa itself as the operational center of gravity.,Treats the outposts (not Pag-asa) as the operational CoG; Pag-asa framed as the political objective.,The CIPG's single most important check is that Pag-asa is the political/strategic objective while the militarized outposts are the operational center of gravity; treating Pag-asa as the operational CoG is explicitly wrong (CIPG para 12 conclusion).,12_CIPG.docx — Conclusion and Direction to Planners,11_CIPG |
| PH-CD-02,C6:PH-CD-02,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CD,negative,-9,"Does the response collapse the PRC most-likely and most-dangerous courses of action into one, or treat either as a certainty?","Collapses MLCOA and MDCOA into one, or treats either as a certainty.","Preserves MLCOA and MDCOA as distinct, with the range represented.",The MLCOA (calibrated defense with off-ramp) and MDCOA (calibrated kinetic demonstration) are distinct assessments; collapsing them or treating one as certain is an analytic failure (JIPOE slides 17/18).,09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — MLCOA / MDCOA,09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-CD-03,C6:PH-CD-03,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CD,negative,-9,"Does the response merely name the centers of gravity without analyzing their critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities?",Names centers of gravity with no critical-factor (CC/CR/CV) analysis.,Ties at least the operational CoG to its critical capabilities/requirements/vulnerabilities.,"Doctrinal CoG analysis pairs each center of gravity with its critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities; naming a CoG without critical-factor analysis is a doctrinal failure (JIPOE slide 19; CIPG 3.3).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — CoG Analysis (Slide 19),09_JIPOE_Brief; 11_CIPG |
| C-01,C6:C-01,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis infer the impact that relationships, alliances, friction, and tensions among the regional actors will have on U.S./Fillipino operational freedom of action?",Infers that PRC-leaning Cambodia and Laos will create friction with U.S./Fillipino operations in the region and hamper freedom of action,Fails to infer the friction created by ASEAN members which are pro-PRC,ASEAN consensus. PRC has co-opted Cambodia and Laos; remaining ASEAN members lean US-aligned in this crisis.,03_Adversary_OOB,03_Adversary_OOB |
| C-02,C6:C-02,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis derive the operational problem as what constitutes credible coalition capability sufficient to compel PRC acceptance of a diplomatic off-ramp restoring Philippine territorial integrity?,Derives the operational problem as what constitutes credible coalition capability sufficient to compel PRC acceptance of a diplomatic off-ramp restoring Philippine territorial integrity,Fails to derive the correct operational problem of credible coalition capability or omits derivation of an operational problem,Mission directive to demonstrate credible coalition capability sufficient to compel PRC acceptance of a diplomatic off-ramp restoring Philippine territorial integrity,12_CIPG,15_CJCS_EXORD; 12_CCIRs |
| C-03,C6:C-03,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the analysis infer that cyberspace operations in the information environment related to Spratley's multi-layer C2, will weaken PRC's operational center of gravity?",The analysis infers that cyberspace operations in the information environment related to Spratley's multi-layer C2 provide a visible US capability to significantly impact Spratley outpost logisitcs which will weaken PRC's operational center of gravity yet preserve PRC off-ramp,Fails to infer US cyberoperations capability related to weakening of operational COG,"USCYBERCOM — supporting; offensive cyber requires Presidential release. C2 architecture. |
| Outpost-mainland link depends on satellite, undersea cable, and HF; degradation impairs coordination |
| PRC has signaled non-escalation; visible US capability + strategic communication can preserve PRC off-ramp.",03_Adversary_OOB,03_Adversary_OOB; 04_Coalition_OOB; 12_CCIRs |
| C-04,C6:C-04,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the analysis describe the commander's intent using a unifying concept of operation as establishment of sea control and air superiority in the JOA through coalition operations followed by isolation and degradation of the PRC militarized Spratly outposts as the operational center of gravity?,The analysis describes the unifying concept of operation as establishment of sea control and air superiority in the JOA through coalition operations followed by isolation and degradation of the PRC militarized Spratly outposts as the operational center of gravity,Fails to describe the unifying concept of the Commander's initial Intent,Method. Establish sea control and air superiority in the JOA through coalition operations; isolate and degrade the PRC militarized Spratly outposts as the operational center of gravity,12_CIPG,12_CCIRs |
| PH-S3-01,C6:PH-S3-01,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the specified task to maintain the COA-1 branch plan at 96-hour executability throughout Phases II and III?,Lists maintaining COA-1 at 96-hour executability as a specified task.,Omits the COA-1 readiness task.,EXORD tasks CDR USINDOPACOM to maintain the COA-1 branch plan at 96-hour executability throughout Phases II and III (EXORD para 8A(2)).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — TASKS (para 8A(2)),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S3-02,C6:PH-S3-02,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the specified task to publish supplemental ROE for maritime forces protecting shipping and offshore energy infrastructure NLT D+10?,Lists publishing supplemental maritime ROE NLT D+10 as a specified task.,Omits the supplemental-ROE task or its deadline.,EXORD tasks USINDOPACOM to publish supplemental ROE for maritime forces protecting shipping and offshore energy infrastructure NLT D+10 (EXORD para 8A(9)).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — TASKS (para 8A(9)),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S3-03,C6:PH-S3-03,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the specified task to establish the Bilateral Coordination Center (BCC) at WESCOM Puerto Princesa NLT D+3?,Lists establishing the BCC at WESCOM Puerto Princesa NLT D+3 as a specified task.,Omits the BCC task.,EXORD tasks USINDOPACOM to establish a Bilateral Coordination Center at WESCOM Puerto Princesa NLT D+3 (EXORD para 8A(11); CIPG C2).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — TASKS (para 8A(11)),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S3-04,C6:PH-S3-04,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the specified task to publish a NEO plan for US and allied citizens NLT D+7?,Lists publishing the NEO plan NLT D+7 as a specified task.,Omits the NEO-plan task.,"EXORD tasks USINDOPACOM to publish the Pacific Harrier NEO plan for US and allied citizens NLT D+7, coordinated with AMEMB Manila and USAID (EXORD para 8A(13)).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — TASKS (para 8A(13)),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S3-05,C6:PH-S3-05,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the specified task to establish a Joint Personnel Recovery Center NLT D+5 with ICRC liaison for AFP/PCG detainee repatriation?,Lists establishing the JPRC NLT D+5 (with ICRC liaison) as a specified task.,Omits the JPRC / detainee-repatriation task.,EXORD tasks USINDOPACOM to establish a Joint Personnel Recovery Center NLT D+5 and coordinate ICRC liaison for AFP/PCG detainee repatriation (EXORD para 8A(12); para 17C).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — TASKS (para 8A(12)),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S3-06,C6:PH-S3-06,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,I,positive,5,"Does the response identify the specified task to recommend NLT D+75 whether to continue COA-2, transition to COA-1, or initiate Phase IV?",Lists the NLT D+75 COA-continuation/transition recommendation as a specified task.,Omits the D+75 decision recommendation.,"EXORD requires CDR USINDOPACOM to recommend to CJCS NLT D+75 whether to continue COA-2, transition to COA-1, or initiate Phase IV (EXORD para 8A(8); para 7C(3)).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — TASKS (para 8A(8)),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S3-07,C6:PH-S3-07,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the specified task to establish the Joint Information Operations Task Force (JIOTF-PH) under J39?,Lists establishing JIOTF-PH under J39 as a specified task.,Omits the JIOTF/information-operations task.,"EXORD tasks USINDOPACOM to establish JIOTF-Pacific Harrier under J39, coordinating with DDGO, OSD-PA, and the Philippine AFP/PCG Transparency Initiative (EXORD para 8A(10)).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — TASKS (para 8A(10)),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S3-08,C6:PH-S3-08,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CD,negative,-9,Does the response treat presence or amphibious assault in the JOA as achievable without first establishing sea control and air superiority as the prerequisite essential task?,Treats presence or amphibious assault as achievable without first establishing sea/air control.,Identifies establishing JOA sea control and air superiority as the prerequisite essential task.,"LOE 1 (sea control and air superiority in the JOA) is the prerequisite that permits coalition force flow, force protection, and amphibious operations (CIPG 3.2 LOE 1; EXORD para 7D(1); JIPOE slides 7/8).",12_CIPG.docx — Operational Approach (LOE 1),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG; 09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-S3-09,C6:PH-S3-09,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,CI,positive,9,Does the response derive the implied task to isolate and degrade the PRC outposts by NON-KINETIC means under COA-2 (interdiction reserved absent Presidential release)?,"States that outpost isolation under COA-2 is non-kinetic/demonstrative, with kinetic interdiction reserved for Presidential release.",Proposes kinetically striking or interdicting the outposts under COA-2 as if authorized.,"Under COA-2, LOE 2 demonstrates the capability to interdict outpost resupply but conducts no actual kinetic interdiction absent Presidential release (EXORD para 7D(2), para 11C; CIPG LOE 2).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — CONOPS (LOE 2) / ROE (para 11C),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S3-11,C6:PH-S3-11,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the response derive the specified task to conduct a NEO for US and allied citizens?,Identifies planning/executing a NEO for US and allied citizens as an implied/essential task.,Omits the NEO requirement.,"The CIPG lists NEO as a constraint (must-do) and the EXORD directs a NEO plan; coalition forces must plan and be prepared to execute a NEO for at-risk US and allied citizens (CIPG 6.1; EXORD para 8A(13), para 17B).",12_CIPG.docx — Planning Limitations (Constraints),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S3-12,C6:PH-S3-12,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,I,positive,5,Does the response derive the implied task to protect the ~250 Philippine civilians on Pag-asa (proportionality/civilian-casualty constraint)?,Identifies protection of the ~250 Pag-asa civilians (proportionality constraint) as an implied/essential task.,Omits civilian protection or plans fires without the proportionality constraint.,Pag-asa hosts ~250 civilian residents whose presence imposes a proportionality constraint on fires and requires civilian-protection planning (EXORD para 17A; JIPOE slides 6/11).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — HUMANITARIAN AND CIVILIAN PROTECTION (para 17A),15_CJCS_EXORD; 09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-D-05,C6:PH-D-05,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,D,negative,-5,Does the response propose kinetic engagement or interdiction of the PRC Spratly outposts under COA-2 (authority rescinded absent Presidential release)?,Proposes striking or interdicting the outposts under COA-2 as if authorized.,Keeps outpost isolation non-kinetic/demonstrative under COA-2.,Under COA-2 the authority to engage the militarized outposts is rescinded; kinetic action against them is reserved for COA-1 / Presidential release (EXORD para 11C; End-of-Order Notes).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ROE (para 11C),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| A-01,C6:A-01,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Does the response identify an implied task to establish an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Yokosura, Singapore, Tindall, Darwin, Antonio Bautista, Hickam, Anderson, Yokota, Kadena, EDCA Site or other suitable location?",Identifies at least one ISB location,Does not identify an ISB location,"ISBs allow for the reception, staging, onward movement and integration of force arriving from out of theater.",05;,05_Country_Fact_Sheet |
| A-02,C6:A-02,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response set as a specified task to access/release of pre-positioned stocks at Diego Garcia and Japan to support theater sustainment to include provision of NEO-specific logistics?,Sets implied task to access pre-positioned stocks,Does not establish an implied task to access pre-positioned stocks,Prepositioned stocks at Diego Garcia have been tentatively reserved for commitment to USINDOPACOM.,06;15,06_Critical_Geography; 15_CJCS_EXORD |
| C-07,C6:C-07,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer the implied task of Conduct Cyberspace Operations?,Infers the implied task to conduct cyberspace operations,Fails to infer the implied task of conduct cyberspace operations,USCYBERCOM — supporting; offensive cyber outside JOA requires Presidential release. Strategic narrative. PRC is vulnerable to disciplined US-allied counter-narrative on factual record. Running Estimate: C2 analysis,13_Running_Estimates,03_Adversary_OOB; 04_Coalition_OOB; 13_Running_Estimates |
| C-08,C6:C-08,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer the implied task of Manage Intelligence Information Technology (IT) Architecture?,Infers the implied task of Manage Intelligence Information Technology (IT) Architecture,Fails to infer the implied task to manage IT architecture,"Running Estimates (C2) analysis: ATCOM bandwidth constraint will affect time-synchronized C2 (Link 16, JREAP-C); Japanese forces national-command retention limits integrated operations. Coalition CENTRIXS classification management is a friction point.",13_Running_Estimates,13_Running_Estimates |
| C-09,C6:C-09,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer the implied task to Employ Fires?,Infers the implied task to Employ Fires,Fails to infer the implied task to employ fires,Runnning Estimates (Fires); CIPG Commander's Intent Method,12_CIPG,13_Running_Estimates; 12_CCIRs |
| C-10,C6:C-10,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer the implied task to Establish Maritime Superiority?,Infers the implied task to Eastablish Maritime Superiority,Fails to infer the implied task to establish maritime superiority,Runnning Estimates (M2); CIPG Commander's Intent Method,12_CIPG,15_CJCS_EXORD; 12_CCIRs; 13_Running_Estimates |
| C-11,C6:C-11,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer the implied task to Integrate Combat Camera?,Infers the implied task to Integrate Combat Camera,Fails to infer the implied task to integrate combat camera,Runnning Estimates (Information); CIPG Commander's Intent Method - Information advantage,12_CIPG,13_Running_Estimates; 12_CCIRs |
| C-12,C6:C-12,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the analysis infer the implied task to Execute Military Public Information Activities?,Infers the implied task to Execute Military Public Information Activities,Fails to infer the implied task to execute military public information activities,Runnning Estimates (Information); CIPG Commander's Intent Method,12_CIPG,15_CJCS_EXORD; 12_CCIRs; 13_Running_Estimates |
| S-04,C6:S-04,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response extract the essential tasks to compel the PRC to accept a diplomatic off-ramp and preserve force posture for transition to COA 1?,Identifies the essentials tasks provided in the CJCS EXORD mission statement.,Omits,"The CJCS EXORD mission statement directs that, effective on receipt, USINDOPACOM (supported) executes Operation PACIFIC HARRIER under COA-2 (Shaping-and-Negotiate) to impose cost on PRC aggression through continuous ISR, freedom-of-navigation operations, coalition maritime and air presence, and economic pressure; to demonstrate credible coalition capability sufficient to compel PRC acceptance of a diplomatic off-ramp restoring Philippine territorial integrity; and to preserve the forward posture, options, and readiness necessary to transition to COA-1 (Isolate-and-Restore) upon decision by the President if negotiation fails (15_CJCS_EXORD, para 5, GENTEXT/MISSION). The purpose clause of that mission statement is to restore Philippine sovereignty over the Pag-asa cluster, defend the Philippines from additional armed attack, deter further PRC aggression in the South China Sea, and reinforce the credibility of US Indo-Pacific alliances, consistent with Article IV obligations under the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (15_CJCS_EXORD, para 5, GENTEXT/MISSION). The commander's Line of Effort 4 restates the compellence task as creating, through information operations, allied coordination, strategic communications, and operational tempo, the political conditions for PRC acceptance of an off-ramp consistent with restored Philippine sovereignty and US strategic interests (11_CIPG, Line of Effort 4 - Diplomatic Conditions for Termination).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — Mission,15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S4-01,C6:PH-S4-01,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the restraint that there is no targeting of PRC mainland territory or infrastructure absent Presidential release?,States the no-mainland-targeting restraint (absent Presidential release).,Omits the restraint or proposes mainland strikes without noting Presidential release.,"No offensive operations against PRC mainland territory or forces outside the JOA, and no targeting of PRC mainland infrastructure, are permitted absent Presidential release (EXORD para 11D; CIPG 6.2).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ROE (para 11D),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S4-02,C6:PH-S4-02,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the response treat engaging the militarized Spratly outposts under COA-2 as currently authorized, when that standing authority is rescinded absent Presidential release?",Treats engaging the outposts as currently authorized under COA-2.,States the outpost-engagement authority is rescinded under COA-2 (reserved for Presidential release / COA-1).,"Under COA-2, engagement of PRC militarized Spratly outposts is reserved: the standing authority under WARNORD para 9G(4) is rescinded for the duration of COA-2 and re-issued only on transition to COA-1 (EXORD para 11C; End-of-Order Notes).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ROE (para 11C),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S4-03,C6:PH-S4-03,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,D,negative,-5,"Does the response propose drawing USFK forces, or omit the restraint that USFK peninsular posture will not be reduced to support Pacific Harrier?",Proposes drawing USFK forces or omits the restraint.,States that USFK posture cannot be reduced to source Pacific Harrier.,No reduction of USFK posture to support Pacific Harrier is permitted; peninsular deterrent posture is preserved (CIPG 6.2; EXORD para 30B).,12_CIPG.docx — Restraints (6.2),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S4-04,C6:PH-S4-04,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the constraint to maintain a standing Taiwan Strait deterrent posture (continuous CSG presence in the Western Pacific)?,States the requirement to maintain continuous Western Pacific CSG presence for Taiwan Strait deterrence.,Omits the Taiwan deterrence constraint or proposes pulling the standing CSG.,"Maintaining standing Taiwan Strait deterrence via continuous CSG presence in the Western Pacific is a must-do constraint not to be degraded in support of Pacific Harrier (CIPG 6.1; EXORD para 7B, para 30C).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — CONOPS (para 7B) / C2 (para 30C),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S4-05,C6:PH-S4-05,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,I,positive,5,Does the response state the restraint against interdicting merchant shipping bound for PRC mainland ports absent Presidential release?,States the no-merchant-interdiction (to PRC mainland ports) restraint absent Presidential release.,Proposes a blockade/interdiction of PRC-bound merchant shipping as if authorized.,No interdiction of merchant shipping transiting to PRC mainland ports is permitted absent Presidential release; PRC military logistics vessels destined for the outposts may be queried/observed but not interdicted absent release (EXORD para 11F).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ROE (para 11F),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S4-06,C6:PH-S4-06,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CD,negative,-9,"Does the response omit the restraint against combat operations against Vietnamese, Malaysian, Indonesian, or Bruneian forces or within their sovereign waters absent self-defense, or propose such operations?",Omits the restraint or proposes operating against/within other claimants' forces/waters.,States the restraint protecting other-claimant forces/waters (absent self-defense).,"No combat operations against Vietnamese, Malaysian, Indonesian, or Bruneian forces or in their sovereign waters/airspace are permitted absent self-defense (CIPG 6.2).",12_CIPG.docx — Restraints (6.2),11_CIPG |
| PH-S4-07,C6:PH-S4-07,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the response ignore the constraint to operate within Standing ROE and USINDOPACOM-issued supplemental ROE (including the Pag-asa declared-hostile provision), or assume unrestricted engagement authority?",Ignores ROE or assumes unrestricted engagement authority.,States operations are governed by Standing plus supplemental ROE (with the Pag-asa declared-hostile provision).,"Operations are bound by Standing ROE (CJCSI 3121.01B) plus USINDOPACOM supplemental ROE, with PRC forces on Pag-asa engaged in hostile acts declared hostile (EXORD para 11; CIPG 6.1).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ROE (para 11),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S4-08,C6:PH-S4-08,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,SI,positive,2,Does the response state the restraint that JOA expansion requires USINDOPACOM approval (and Presidential release for PRC sovereign airspace/waters)?,States the JOA-expansion restraint (USINDOPACOM approval; Presidential release for PRC sovereign space).,Omits the restraint or expands the JOA freely.,"No expansion of the JOA is permitted absent USINDOPACOM approval, and expansion into PRC sovereign airspace/waters requires Presidential release (CIPG 6.2; EXORD para 10).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — JOA (para 10),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-D-02,C6:PH-D-02,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response recommend targeting of the PRC mainland or actions requiring Presidential release as though already authorized?,Recommends mainland strikes or other restrained actions as if already authorized.,Keeps mainland/Presidential-release actions clearly restricted (not proposed as authorized).,"Mainland targeting, OCO outside the JOA, JOA expansion into PRC sovereign space, and merchant interdiction all require Presidential release; recommending them as authorized is a discipline failure (EXORD para 11D/E/F; CIPG 6.2).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ROE (para 11),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S5-02,C6:PH-S5-02,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the response derive a PIR on indicators of strategic escalation (Taiwan second axis, PRC mainland mobilization, or nuclear posture change)?",Produces a PIR on strategic-escalation indicators (Taiwan/mainland-mobilization/nuclear).,Omits the strategic-escalation-indicator PIR.,"A top PIR is indicators of strategic escalation: Taiwan Strait second axis, PRC mainland mobilization, and PRC nuclear posture changes (CIPG 8.2; JIPOE slide 18 indicators).",12_CIPG.docx — Intelligence (PIRs),11_CIPG; 09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-S5-04,C6:PH-S5-04,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the response derive a PIR on the Type 075 Hainan amphibious embark status and PLAN South Sea Fleet sortie patterns (Pag-asa reinforcement indicators)?,Produces a PIR/collection requirement on Type 075 embark status / PLAN sortie (reinforcement indicators).,Omits the reinforcement-indicator PIR.,"Tier-1 collection priorities include PRC Type 075 Hainan embark status and PLAN South Sea Fleet sortie patterns, which indicate Pag-asa reinforcement (CIPG 8.2 Collection Priorities; JIPOE MLCOA indicators).",12_CIPG.docx — Intelligence (Collection Priorities),11_CIPG; 09_JIPOE_Brief |
| PH-S5-06,C6:PH-S5-06,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response derive an FFIR on coalition force closure against the D-Day window (TOA status of AU/UK/JP/NZ forces)?,Produces an FFIR on coalition TOA / force closure against the D-Day window.,Omits a coalition-closure FFIR.,"Coalition partners must complete national authorization for OPCON/TOA (expected N+5-N+10), and force closure against the D-Day window drives sequencing — a friendly-force information requirement (Running Estimates C2; Coalition OOB 3; EXORD para 30F).",13_Running_Estimates.docx — C2 (Coalition C2 / Assumptions),13_Running_Estimates; 04_Coalition_OOB |
| PH-S5-07,C6:PH-S5-07,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the response derive an FFIR on SATCOM bandwidth sufficiency and tanker/SPOD/APOD throughput?,Produces an FFIR on SATCOM bandwidth and/or tanker/SPOD/APOD throughput.,Omits the bandwidth/throughput FFIR.,SATCOM bandwidth is ~75% of requirement and tanker/SPOD/APOD throughput is a limiting factor — friendly-force information requirements affecting C2 and force flow (Running Estimates C2; CIPG 11.2; JIPOE slide 8).,13_Running_Estimates.docx — C2 (Comms architecture),13_Running_Estimates; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S5-08,C6:PH-S5-08,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the response derive an FFIR on amphibious-lift readiness and precision-munition magazine depth (TLAM/LRASM/AGM-158/JSM) for COA-1 executability?,Produces an FFIR on amphibious-lift readiness and/or precision-munition magazine depth for COA-1.,Omits the lift/magazine FFIR.,"The reconstitution-posture assessment for COA-1 must address amphibious-lift readiness and magazine depth of TLAM, LRASM, AGM-158, and JSM — a recurring friendly-force information requirement (EXORD para 19; CIPG 8.6).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — RECONSTITUTION AND READINESS (para 19),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S5-09,C6:PH-S5-09,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the response derive an FFIR on the status of detained AFP/PCG personnel and the three captured US citizens?,Produces an FFIR on detained AFP/PCG personnel and captured US citizens.,Omits the detainee/hostage FFIR.,"The 22 Aug action left 25 AFP/PCG captured and 3 US citizens assessed captured; their status is a friendly-force information requirement tied to PR and ICRC coordination (EXORD para 1, para 17C; Regional Intel Pag-asa action).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — HUMANITARIAN AND CIVILIAN PROTECTION (para 17C),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| D-01,C6:D-01,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,"Does the response provide a PIR on what PRC narratives are resonating with the Filipino, Coalition, ASEAN, and U.S. leaders and populations?","Includes a PIR on what PRC narratives are resonating with the Filipino, Coalition, ASEAN, and U.S. leaders and populations.",Omits it,CIPG Narrative guidance and counter narrative Direction,12_CIPG.docx — Information (Narrative Alignment / Counter-Narrative Direction),11_CIPG; 13_Running_Estimates; 15_CJCS_EXORD |
| D-02,C6:D-02,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,"Does the response provide an FFIR on what Friendly messages are resonating with the Filipino, Coalition, ASEAN, and U.S. leaders and populations?","Includes an FFIR on what Friendly messages are resonating with the Filipino, Coalition, ASEAN, and U.S. leaders and populations.",Omits it,CIPG Narrative guidance and counter narrative Direction,12_CIPG.docx — Information (Narrative Alignment / Counter-Narrative Direction),11_CIPG; 13_Running_Estimates; 15_CJCS_EXORD |
| D-03,C6:D-03,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the response provide a PIR on when and where there will be gaps in continuous ISR coverage of Pang-Asa and or PRC sea lines of communication?,Includes a PIR on when and where there will be gaps in continuous ISR coverage of Pang-Asa and or PRC sea lines of communication.,Omits it,Running Estimates assesses medium risk for ISR degradation during contested phases,13_Running_Estimates.docx — Intelligence Analysis (Risks: ISR degradation),02_Regional_Intel_Summary; 09_JIPOE_Brief; 13_Running_Estimates |
| PH-S6-01,C6:PH-S6-01,S6,Assumptions,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response carry the assumption that the PRC will not initiate cross-strait military action during the execution window?,States the no-cross-strait-action assumption.,Omits it or treats a cross-strait war as a planning certainty.,The EXORD assumes the PRC will not initiate cross-strait military action during the execution window (EXORD para 4A).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ASSUMPTIONS (para 4A),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S6-02,C6:PH-S6-02,S6,Assumptions,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response carry the assumption that the PRC will not elevate nuclear posture or employ strategic weapons?,States the no-nuclear-elevation assumption.,Omits the no-nuclear-posture-elevation assumption.,The EXORD assumes the PRC will not elevate nuclear posture or employ strategic weapons (EXORD para 4B).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ASSUMPTIONS (para 4B),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S6-03,C6:PH-S6-03,S6,Assumptions,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response carry the assumption that the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok remain open?",States the open-straits assumption.,Omits the open-straits (Malacca/Sunda/Lombok) assumption.,"The EXORD assumes the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok remain open (EXORD para 4D).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ASSUMPTIONS (para 4D),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S6-04,C6:PH-S6-04,S6,Assumptions,1,I,positive,5,Does the response carry the assumption that the DPRK will not initiate a provocation requiring draw-down of USFK combat power?,States the DPRK-quiescence assumption.,Omits the DPRK-quiescence assumption.,The EXORD assumes DPRK will not initiate a provocation sufficient to require USFK draw-down (EXORD para 4E).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ASSUMPTIONS (para 4E),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S6-05,C6:PH-S6-05,S6,Assumptions,1,I,positive,5,Does the response carry the assumption that coalition domestic political support remains sufficient through D+90?,States the coalition-support-through-D+90 assumption.,Omits the coalition-domestic-support-through-D+90 assumption.,The EXORD assumes coalition domestic political support remains sufficient through D+90 (EXORD para 4F).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ASSUMPTIONS (para 4F),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S6-06,C6:PH-S6-06,S6,Assumptions,1,I,positive,5,Does the response carry the assumption that the Philippine government sustains public consent for coalition operations from Philippine territory?,States the Philippine-consent assumption.,Omits the Philippine-public-consent assumption.,The EXORD assumes the Philippine government will sustain public consent for coalition operations from Philippine territory (EXORD para 4G).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — ASSUMPTIONS (para 4G),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| A-06,C6:A-06,S6,Assumptions,1,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis make the assumption that Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei will continue to provide quiet logistics, intelligence, and transit support?","Identifies assumption on the degree of support expected from Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei.","Does not identify assumption on the degree of support expected from Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei.",Establsihes assumptions about degree of partner support.,15,15_CJCS_EXORD |
| A-07,C6:A-07,S6,Assumptions,1,I,positive,5,Does the analysis make the assumption that monsoon season and possible typhoons will cause disruptions to deployment of forces and routine sustainment operations?,Makes assumption about possible impacts presented by monsoon and typhoons.,Does not make assumption about impact of monsoon and typhoons.,Monsoons and typhoons are prevalent during time of year operation will be conducted.,09,09_JIPOE_Brief |
| C-13,C6:C-13,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis infer the planning assumption that DoS coordinates with the UN to organize a broad coordination forum comprised of NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, private donors, and other international organizations, that help coordinate humanitarian relief in the region?","Infers the planning assumption that DoS coordinates with the UN to organize a broad coordination forum that helps coordinate humanitarian relief in the region, including ICRC",Fails to infer the planning assumption that DoS coordinates with the UN to organize a broad coordination forum that helps coordinate humanitarian relief in the region. Omits ICRC.,"Runnning Estimates (Protection); ICRC involvement estimated as ""critical""",13_Running_Estimates,13_Running_Estimates |
| PH-S7-01,C6:PH-S7-01,S7,Risk,1,D,negative,-5,"Does the response omit the commander's acceptable-risk guidance (moderate risk to force in sea control/air superiority; no risk of strategic escalation), or accept strategic-escalation risk?",Omits acceptable-risk guidance or accepts strategic-escalation risk.,States the acceptable-risk framing including the no-strategic-escalation red line.,"The commander accepts moderate risk to force in sea-control/air-superiority operations against A2/AD and moderate risk to timeline for civilian-casualty avoidance, but does not accept risk of strategic escalation (mainland targeting, nuclear posture change, Taiwan war) (CIPG 4 Acceptable Risk).",12_CIPG.docx — Initial Commander's Intent (Acceptable Risk),11_CIPG |
| PH-S7-02,C6:PH-S7-02,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the response state the risk to force from the PRC MDCOA (calibrated kinetic demonstration) with a mitigation (dispersed posture, IAMD, submarine awareness, cable/SLOC protection)?",States the MDCOA force risk with a concrete mitigation.,"States the risk with no mitigation, or omits the MDCOA risk.","The MDCOA is the most-impactful tactical risk to coalition forces and requires dispersed force posture, integrated IAMD, submarine awareness, and SLOC/cable protection (JIPOE slides 18/21; CIPG 8.5).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — MDCOA / BLUF (force-protection priority),09_JIPOE_Brief; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S7-03,C6:PH-S7-03,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,"Does the response state the risk that typhoon/weather disrupts force flow and the amphibious window, with a mitigation (abort posture, weather-window planning)?",States the weather/typhoon risk with a mitigation (abort posture / weather window).,Omits weather risk or gives no mitigation.,"Peak typhoon season is a force in itself; planning must include typhoon abort posture and identified refuge ports, and the amphibious window depends on sea state <=3 (CIPG 11.1; JIPOE slide 10).",12_CIPG.docx — Threats and Vulnerabilities (Environmental),09_JIPOE_Brief; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S7-05,C6:PH-S7-05,S7,Risk,3,D,negative,-5,Does the response fail to state the Korean Peninsula opportunity-cost risk (USFK forces off-limits) with a mitigation (identify/report coverage gaps)?,Omits the Korea opportunity-cost risk.,States the Korea opportunity-cost risk with a mitigation (report coverage gaps).,"USFK forces are off-limits to Pacific Harrier, creating a Korean Peninsula opportunity-cost risk; the CIPG directs identifying and reporting coverage gaps to J5 (CIPG 11.2; Strategic Context 3.2).",12_CIPG.docx — Systemic Vulnerabilities (Korean Peninsula opportunity cost),01_Strategic_Context; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S9-01,C6:PH-S9-01,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,3,CD,negative,-9,"Does the response fail to derive the COA-2-to-COA-1 transition decision point with its triggers (additional armed attack, substantial reinforcement, diplomatic failure by D+75, or Presidential direction)?",Omits the transition decision point or its triggers.,Produces the COA-2-to-COA-1 transition decision point with its named triggers.,CDR USINDOPACOM recommends transition to COA-1 on any of: an additional PRC armed attack; substantial reinforcement of Pag-asa beyond current levels; diplomatic failure per the D+75 assessment; or Presidential direction (EXORD para 12).,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — COA TRANSITION CRITERIA (para 12),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S9-03,C6:PH-S9-03,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,2,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the sea-line interdiction zone (Hainan-Spratly) as a decisive point / principal submarine operating area?,Names the Hainan-Spratly sea-line interdiction zone as a decisive point / key submarine operating area.,Omits the sea-line interdiction decisive point.,The Hainan-Spratly sea-line interdiction zone is a candidate decisive point and the principal high-payoff submarine operating area for isolating the outposts (CIPG 3.4).,12_CIPG.docx — Decisive Points (3.4),11_CIPG |
| PH-S9-05,C6:PH-S9-05,S9,Decision points and named areas of interest,2,SI,positive,2,Does the response recommend named areas of interest for reinforcement/escalation indicators (Type 075 at Yulin/Hainan; outpost air-defense emissions; Eastern Theater movement toward the Bashi Channel)?,"Designates NAIs covering reinforcement/escalation indicators (Yulin/Hainan, outpost emissions, Bashi movement).",Omits NAIs or lists locations with no tie to an indicator/decision.,"Collection priorities and MDCOA indicators define NAIs including Type 075 embark at Yulin/Hainan, outpost air-defense emissions, and PLA Eastern Theater repositioning toward the Bashi Channel (CIPG 8.2; JIPOE slide 18).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — MDCOA Indicators / Collection,09_JIPOE_Brief; 03_Adversary_OOB |
| PH-S10-01,C6:PH-S10-01,S10,Known facts,1,SI,positive,2,Does the response state the 22 August attack facts (PRC seized Pag-asa; ~25 Philippine KIA including 11 on BRP Teresa Magbanua; ~25 captured; 3 US citizens captured)?,States the core 22 Aug casualty/capture facts including the loss of BRP Teresa Magbanua.,Omits or materially misstates the 22 Aug attack facts.,"On 22 Aug 2026 PRC forces assaulted Pag-asa, killing ~25 AFP/PCG (14 ashore plus 11 on BRP Teresa Magbanua, sunk by a YJ-12B from Subi), wounding ~35, and capturing ~25, with 3 US citizens assessed captured (Regional Intel 2.3; EXORD para 1).",02_Regional_Intel_Summary.docx — The Pag-asa Action (2.3),15_CJCS_EXORD; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary |
| PH-S10-02,C6:PH-S10-02,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response recount the graduated escalation arc (HIDDEN TIDE at Sandy Cay in May, three Maritime Police Action incidents, MSRPZ expansion, Joint Sword 2026B rehearsal, and the August PLA surge)?",Recounts the graduated escalation arc leading to 22 Aug.,Treats the attack as a bolt-from-the-blue with no escalation context.,"The 22 Aug attack followed a graduated 90-day escalation: the May 2026 Sandy Cay fait accompli (HIDDEN TIDE), three Maritime Police Action incidents, the MSRPZ legal expansion, the Joint Sword 2026B amphibious rehearsal, and the 14-18 Aug PLA surge (Regional Intel 2.2; Strategic Context 2.2).",02_Regional_Intel_Summary.docx — May-August 2026 Indicators (2.2),02_Regional_Intel_Summary; 01_Strategic_Context |
| PH-S10-03,C6:PH-S10-03,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the response state the key operational dates (N-Day 22 Aug; C-Day 31 Aug; D-Day NLT 152300ZSEP26; D+75 decision; Phase III D+60-D+90)?,States the key dates including D-Day and the D+75 decision.,Omits the operational timeline or the D-Day/D+75 anchors.,"N-Day is 22 Aug 26, C-Day 31 Aug 26, D-Day NLT 152300ZSEP26, with the Phase III assessment window D+60-D+90 and the D+75 COA recommendation (EXORD para 9; para 8A(8)).",15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — KEY DATES (para 9),15_CJCS_EXORD |
| PH-S10-04,C6:PH-S10-04,S10,Known facts,1,SI,positive,2,"Does the response state the JOA boundaries, to include the JOA exclusion of Taiwan Strait operations and PRC mainland territorial waters?",States the JOA scope and its exclusion of the Taiwan Strait and PRC mainland waters.,Omits the JOA definition or its exclusions.,The JOA covers the central/southern Spratlys and western Philippine archipelago per the boundary coordinates and expressly excludes Taiwan Strait operations and PRC mainland territorial waters (Critical Geography 1; JIPOE slide 4).,06_Critical_Geography.docx — JOA Boundaries (1),06_Critical_Geography |
| PH-S10-05,C6:PH-S10-05,S10,Known facts,1,SI,positive,2,Does the response state the operationally relevant distances (Pag-asa to Subi 12 nm; to Mischief 90 nm; to Hainan ~620 nm; to Palawan ~280 nm)?,States the key Pag-asa distances bounding approach and resupply.,Omits the distance facts.,"Pag-asa lies 12 nm from Subi, 90 nm from Mischief, ~620 nm from Hainan, and ~280 nm from Puerto Princesa, Palawan (Critical Geography 2.2/2.3).",06_Critical_Geography.docx — Reefs and Islands (2.2),06_Critical_Geography |
| PH-CD-01,C6:PH-CD-01,S10,Known facts,2,CD,negative,-9,"Does the response invent forces, authorities, or facts not present in the provided packet?","Invents forces, authorities, or facts not present in the packet.",All claims are traceable to the provided documents.,"A valid MA is grounded in the provided packet; inventing forces, authorities, or facts is an input-grounding failure that caps the element (all packet documents).",Whole packet (input-grounding check — no single anchor),01_Strategic_Context; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary; 03_Adversary_OOB; 04_Coalition_OOB; 05_Country_Fact_Sheet; 06_Critical_Geography; 09_JIPOE_Brief; 11_CIPG; 13_Running_Estimates; 15_CJCS_EXORD |
| D-04,C6:D-04,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the response provide the fact that Yokosuka, Sasebo, Kadena, Iwakuni, and Misawa are available for expanded operations/use?","Provide the fact that Yokosuka, Sasebo, Kadena, Iwakuni, and Misawa are available for expanded operations/use.",Omits it,CIPG intent is to utilize bases for operation,15_CJCS_EXORD.docx — TASKS (para 8H(1)) / 12_CIPG.docx — Sustainment (HNS Guidance),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S11-02,C6:PH-S11-02,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,"Does the response recognize that USFK, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM forces are NOT apportioned to Pacific Harrier?",States that USFK/EUCOM/CENTCOM forces are not apportioned to the operation.,Draws on USFK/EUCOM/CENTCOM forces as if available.,USFK forces (Korea commitment) and USEUCOM/USCENTCOM forces are not apportioned to Pacific Harrier (Coalition OOB 1; Strategic Context 3.2).,04_Coalition_OOB.docx — Apportionment vs Allocation (1),04_Coalition_OOB |
| PH-S11-03,C6:PH-S11-03,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Does the response reason whether I MEF is required or whether 31st MEU plus 3d MEB is sufficient (I MEF apportioned but potentially not allocated)?,Reasons explicitly about the I MEF vs 31st MEU + 3d MEB force-sizing decision.,"Assumes I MEF is committed, or omits the force-sizing reasoning.","I MEF is apportioned but PACFLT planners may judge it not required for the initial sea-control phase (Borneo case-study reasoning); the JFC must reason whether 31st MEU + 3d MEB suffices (Coalition OOB 1, 2.3).",04_Coalition_OOB.docx — Apportionment vs Allocation / Land Forces,04_Coalition_OOB |
| PH-S11-04,C6:PH-S11-04,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,"Does the response account for the specific coalition contributions and their availability (e.g., HMAS Hobart N+5; HMAS Adelaide LHD N+10; RAAF F-35 at Tindal; NZ P-8A TACON)?",Accounts for specific coalition contributions and their timing/command status.,Treats coalition forces generically or omits their availability/command relationships.,"Australia offers HMAS Hobart (N+5), HMAS Adelaide LHD with an amphibious group (N+10), RAAF P-8A and F-35A (Tindal), with JMSDF in association and NZ P-8A in TACON (Coalition OOB 3; EXORD para 30F).",04_Coalition_OOB.docx — Allied/Partner Forces (3),04_Coalition_OOB |
| PH-S11-05,C6:PH-S11-05,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the assessed time to establish sea control (~5-7 days) and air superiority (~5 days including SEAD/DEAD) in the JOA?,States the assessed sea-control (~5-7 day) and air-superiority (~5 day) timelines.,Omits the sea-control/air-superiority establishment timelines.,Sea control will require ~5-7 days of focused operations and JOA air superiority ~5 days including SEAD/DEAD against outpost air defense (JIPOE slides 7/8).,09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Domain Analysis: Maritime / Air,09_JIPOE_Brief; 13_Running_Estimates |
| PH-S11-06,C6:PH-S11-06,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Does the response identify tanker capacity and SPOD/APOD throughput as the binding force-flow constraint?,Identifies tanker/SPOD/APOD throughput as the binding force-flow constraint.,Treats sustainment/lift as unconstrained.,Tanker capacity is limiting and SPOD/APOD throughput is a force-flow bottleneck; the JFC must submit RFFs and develop branch plans (JIPOE slide 8; CIPG 11.2; Running Estimates Sustainment).,13_Running_Estimates.docx — Sustainment / C2,13_Running_Estimates; 11_CIPG |
| PH-D-03,C6:PH-D-03,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response recommend any reduction of USFK posture to source Pacific Harrier forces?,Proposes drawing USFK forces to source Pacific Harrier.,Sources forces without drawing down USFK; respects USFK priority of effort.,No reduction of USFK posture to support Pacific Harrier is permitted; USFK retains priority of effort (CIPG 6.2; EXORD para 30B).,12_CIPG.docx — Restraints (6.2),15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-D-04,C6:PH-D-04,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the response treat apportioned forces (e.g., I MEF or USFK) as allocated combat power in hand?",Counts apportioned forces (I MEF/USFK) as available combat power.,Keeps apportioned forces distinct from allocated/assigned combat power.,"Apportionment is a planning pool, not forces in hand; treating apportioned forces as allocated/available is a recurring planning error the OOB warns against (Coalition OOB 1).",04_Coalition_OOB.docx — Apportionment vs Allocation (1),04_Coalition_OOB |
| A-03,C6:A-03,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,I,positive,5,Does the analysis establish as a fact that the PACAF tanker fleet is finite with aerial refueling demand from F-22 / F-35 / B-1B / P-8A operations plus coalition demand will exceed standing capacity by approximately 30 percent?,Establishes fact of insufficient fuel capacity.,Does not list fact of limitted fuel capacity.,Establishes clear operational impact of limitted fueling capacity.,04,04_Coalition_OOB |
| A-04,C6:A-04,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,I,positive,5,"Does the analysis establish as a fact that Clark, Subic, Kadena, Iwakuni, and Andersen airfields are all near saturation under sustained operations and that Singapore (Paya Lebar / Tengah) and Brunei provide additional capacity?","Establishes a fact of limitted airfield capacity at Clark, Subic, Kadena and Iwakuni while establishing Singapore and Brunai as having excess capacity.",Does dot establish fact of limitted airfoeld capacities and does not provide fact of excess capacity at other locations.,Establsihes fact of airfield limitations and locations of excess capacity.,04,04_Coalition_OOB |
| A-05,C6:A-05,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,SI,positive,2,"Does the analysis identify the fact that Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) fleet is committed to global requirements and force-closure will depend on lift availability?",Establishes fact that LMSRs are committed to other requiremenrs and force closure may depend on their availability.,Does not name fact that highlights LSMR availability and resulting impacts.,Establishes fact on availability of sea transport.,04,04_Coalition_OOB |
| C-06,C6:C-06,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,Does the analysis infer that Singapore (partner) capabilities supports U.S. gaps in logisitics capability by providing port access for US and coalition vessels and air base access for tankers and ISR?,The analysis infers that Singapore (partner) capabilities supports U.S. gaps in logisitics capability by providing maritime port access and air base access for ISR and tankers,Omits how partner nation Singapore capabiities supports U.S. gaps in logistics,Allied_Partners Force Contributions; Friendly COG - CVs,04_Coalition_OOB,04_Coalition_OOB; 12_CCIRs |
| PH-S12-01,C6:PH-S12-01,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the military objective to eliminate PRC armed presence from Pag-asa Island and the Pag-asa cluster?,States eliminating PRC armed presence from the Pag-asa cluster as a military objective.,Omits this objective or replaces it with a vague 'defeat China' aim.,The military end state requires PRC armed presence eliminated from Pag-asa Island and the Pag-asa cluster and Philippine sovereign administration restored (CIPG 3.5; EXORD para 6).,12_CIPG.docx — Termination Criteria / Military End State,15_CJCS_EXORD; 11_CIPG |
| PH-S12-02,C6:PH-S12-02,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,1,I,positive,5,Does the response state the military objective to preserve INDOPACOM posture for continued Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait deterrence?,States preserving INDOPACOM posture for Korea/Taiwan deterrence as a military objective.,Omits the preserve-posture objective.,A military end-state element is coalition/INDOPACOM force posture sufficient to deter near-term PRC re-escalation while preserving capacity for Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait standing missions (CIPG 3.5).,12_CIPG.docx — Termination Criteria / Military End State,11_CIPG |
| PH-S12-03,C6:PH-S12-03,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response propose measurable termination criteria (e.g., zero verifiable PRC armed personnel on Pag-asa for >=7 days; detained AFP/PCG released via ICRC; zero kinetic incidents for >=14 days)?","Proposes specific, measurable termination criteria tied to end-state elements.",Gives vague termination language with no measurable conditions.,"Termination criteria include zero verifiable PRC armed personnel on Pag-asa for >=7 consecutive days, resumed PCG/AFP presence operations, release of all detained AFP/PCG via ICRC, and zero kinetic incidents for >=14 days (CIPG 3.5).",12_CIPG.docx — Termination Criteria,11_CIPG |
| PH-S12-04,C6:PH-S12-04,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,"Does the response omit a feasibility COA-evaluation criterion, or propose one that ignores the force-closure window, tanker/lift, weather window, and roughly 5-7 day sea control?","Omits feasibility, or proposes a feasibility criterion that ignores the closure window, tanker/lift, weather, or the ~5-7 day sea control timeline.","Proposes a feasibility criterion tied to the force-closure window, tanker/lift, weather window, and ~5-7 day sea control timeline.","Feasibility turns on force closure against the D-Day window, tanker/SPOD/APOD throughput, the typhoon weather window, and the ~5-7 day sea-control / ~5 day air-superiority timelines (JIPOE slides 7/8/10; Coalition OOB; Running Estimates).",09_JIPOE_Brief.docx — Domain Analysis / Climatology,15_CJCS_EXORD; 09_JIPOE_Brief; 13_Running_Estimates |
| S-01,C6:S-01,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the response recommend a COA-evaluation criterion related to the Rapid Response (time to establish sea control and air superiority)?,Proposes a COA-evaluation criterion related to the organization's ability to rapidly close and meet the CDR's intent.,Omits,CDR's Intent is to rapidly close and establish sea control and air superiority.,12_CIPG,12_CCIRs |
| S-02,C6:S-02,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the response recommend a COA-evaluation criterion related to the effectiveness of isolating and degrading the PRC militarized Spratly outposts?,Proposes a COA-evaluation criterion related to effectiveness to isolate and degrade.,Omits,CDR's intent to isolate and degrade PRC militarized outpots.,12_CIPG,12_CCIRs |
| S-03,C6:S-03,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the response recommend a COA-evaluation criterion related to the restoring Philippine sovereignty and create conditions for a PRC diplomatic off-ramp?,Proposes a COA-evaluation criterion related to restoration of PH sovereignty and PRC diplomatic off-ramp.,Omits,CDR's intent to restore sovereignty while establishing conditions for a PRC diplomatic off-ramp.,12_CIPG,12_CCIRs |
| C6-GAP-01,C6:C6-GAP-01,S8,Restated mission,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the restated mission express the essential task as compelling PRC acceptance of a negotiated restoration of Philippine sovereignty through sustained coalition pressure, rather than as retaking Pag-asa Island by amphibious assault?","The mission statement's task and purpose track the approved COA-2 construct in the CJCS EXORD of 081800ZSEP26 - continuous ISR, FONOPs, coalition maritime and air presence and economic pressure aimed at a diplomatic off-ramp - and treats physical restoration of the Pag-asa cluster as the outcome that pressure is meant to produce.","The brief carries forward the earlier WARNORD-derived formulation quoted in the 27 August JIPOE brief, in which the force conducts sea-control, air-superiority and amphibious operations to restore the cluster, or it prints both formulations without saying which one governs after the 7 September Presidential COA approval.","The CJCS EXORD of 081800ZSEP26 records Presidential approval of COA-2 (SHAPING-AND-NEGOTIATE) at 071800ZSEP26 and directs USINDOPACOM to compel PRC acceptance of a diplomatic off-ramp, while the JTF-PACIFIC HARRIER J2 JIPOE brief of 27 August 2026 still states the mission as coalition sea-control, air-superiority and amphibious operations to restore Philippine territorial integrity over the Pag-asa cluster.",Restated mission statement paragraph of the mission analysis brief,15_CJCS_EXORD;09_JIPOE_Brief |
| C6-GAP-02,C6:C6-GAP-02,S8,Restated mission,2,I,positive,5,Does the restated mission carry the transition to COA-1 (ISOLATE-AND-RESTORE) as an on-order or be-prepared-to element that is separated from the task being executed now?,"The mission statement, or the task-and-purpose breakdown immediately supporting it, phrases the restoration branch as on-order and binds it to the 96-hour executability standard the Chairman imposes throughout Phases II and III, so a reader can tell which obligation is current and which is conditional.","The 96-hour branch obligation appears nowhere in the mission statement and survives only as a coordinating detail with no stated owner, or the brief writes the pressure campaign and the restoration branch as two present-tense tasks of equal standing.","CJCS EXORD para 7A directs that COA-1 (ISOLATE-AND-RESTORE) be maintained as the on-order branch at a readiness level allowing transition within 96 hours of direction, and para 8A(2) tasks CDR USINDOPACOM to maintain the COA-1 branch plan at 96-hour executability throughout Phases II and III, with transition directed by SECDEF EXORD on CJCS recommendation with Presidential approval.",Restated mission statement and supporting task-purpose breakdown,15_CJCS_EXORD;01_Strategic_Context |
| C6-GAP-03,C6:C6-GAP-03,S8,Restated mission,3,D,negative,-5,"Does the restated mission enlarge the operation's object beyond the Joint Operations Area, for instance by making defeat of the PLAN South Sea Fleet or removal of PRC presence from the wider South China Sea part of the task or purpose?","The mission statement names an object that reaches past the JOA boundary - defeating the PLAN South Sea Fleet, neutralising PRC forces across the South China Sea, or compelling PRC withdrawal from the Paracels or from Sandy Cay - none of which the CJCS EXORD assigns to USINDOPACOM.","The stated object stays inside the JOA and the Pag-asa cluster, matching the Chairman's declaration that the conflict will not be widened past the Joint Operations Area and that any JOA expansion is a CJCS decision.","CJCS EXORD para 6 states the Chairman's intent that the conflict will not be expanded beyond the Joint Operations Area and that the PRC mainland will not be targeted, and para 10 requires CJCS approval for JOA expansion with Presidential release for expansion into PRC sovereign airspace or waters; Critical Geography fixes the JOA by eight corner points and expressly excludes Taiwan Strait operations and PRC mainland territorial waters.","Restated mission statement paragraph, task and purpose clauses",15_CJCS_EXORD;06_Critical_Geography |
| C6-GAP-04,C6:C6-GAP-04,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CD,negative,-9,"Does the mission analysis brief present engagement of Mischief, Subi, and Fiery Cross as an available action under the approved course of action?","The mission analysis brief presents engagement of Mischief, Subi, and Fiery Cross as currently available.","The mission analysis brief does not present outpost engagement as available; it records the standing authority as rescinded for the duration of COA-2 and held at Presidential release, and marks the 25 August guidance as overtaken by the 8 September order.","CJCS EXORD para 11C provides that under COA-2 engagement of the PRC militarized Spratly outposts at Mischief, Subi and Fiery Cross is reserved absent Presidential release and that the standing authority at REF E para 9G(4) is rescinded for the duration of COA-2, while the Fires running estimate of 261800Z AUG 26 still lists as an assumption that ROE will permit engagement of the Spratly outposts subject to proportionality.","Constraints and restraints list, and any authorities or ROE summary in the brief",15_CJCS_EXORD;13_Running_Estimates;11_CIPG |
| C6-GAP-06,C6:C6-GAP-06,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Does the response derive which coalition forces have not closed the JOA on D-Day (Boxer ARG with 11th MEU and HMS Defender at N+25 against D-Day at N+24)?,Converts the closure table onto the D-Day clock and names Boxer ARG and HMS Defender as absent on D-Day.,"Reprints closure dates in N-plus notation only, or presents the second amphibious ready group's arrival as satisfied force flow.","CJCS EXORD para 9 sets N-Day at 22 AUG 26 and D-Day at 152300Z SEP 26, and the Coalition Order of Battle states D-Day execution is NET N+24 while its force-closure table shows USS Boxer ARG with 11th MEU arriving in the JOA from San Diego at N+25 and UK Type 45 HMS Defender arriving from Bahrain at N+25.","Force and resource analysis section, force-closure or troop-to-task table",15_CJCS_EXORD;04_Coalition_OOB |
| C6-GAP-07,C6:C6-GAP-07,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the response derive the risk that withholding sea-line interdiction leaves outpost logistics degrading over 30 to 60 days, past the D+75 recommendation?","Derives that outpost logistics cannot be degraded before the NLT D+75 recommendation, risking a decision taken without effect.","Records outpost logistics as an adversary critical vulnerability and D+75 as a reporting suspense in separate sections, or presents the logistics vulnerability as currently actionable.","CJCS EXORD para 7D(2) confines LOE 2 to demonstrating coalition capability to interdict sea-line resupply to Mischief, Subi and Fiery Cross without actual interdiction absent Presidential release, para 8A(8) requires the CCDR recommendation to CJCS NLT D+75, and the JIPOE and J2 regional summary assess outpost logistics as a single-point-of-failure vulnerability that sea-line interdiction degrades only over 30 to 60 days.","Risk section of the mission analysis brief, and any adversary critical-vulnerability discussion",15_CJCS_EXORD;09_JIPOE_Brief;02_Regional_Intel_Summary |
| C6-GAP-09,C6:C6-GAP-09,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the CCIR set derive a priority intelligence requirement with a stated numeric threshold that separates the forecast PRC reinforcement of Pag-asa from the substantial reinforcement that triggers a COA-1 transition recommendation?,"A named PIR ties reporting on the Pag-asa garrison to a specific figure or capability increment - manning above the roughly 600-personnel level the MLCOA already forecasts, or emplacement of a further YJ-12B battery beyond the projected second - so the intelligence answer maps onto the EXORD transition criterion.","The CCIR list carries a general requirement to report PRC reinforcement at Pag-asa, which the assessed most-likely course of action says will happen anyway, so nothing in the requirement can discriminate the expected build-up from the trigger condition.","CJCS EXORD para 12B makes substantial PRC reinforcement of the Pag-asa garrison beyond current levels a COA-1 transition criterion, while the JIPOE brief and the Adversary OOB assess the garrison at roughly 400 PLAMC personnel ashore (about 370 effective after 22 August losses) growing under the MLCOA to about 600 personnel with one additional YJ-12B battery within 14 days.","CCIR section, PIR list of the mission analysis brief",15_CJCS_EXORD;09_JIPOE_Brief;03_Adversary_OOB |
| C6-GAP-10,C6:C6-GAP-10,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,Does the operational environment analysis identify that the authorized routine FONOP cadence inside 12 nm of PRC-occupied features runs coalition units through the engagement envelope of an outpost they are not permitted to engage?,"The brief places Subi Reef 12 nautical miles from Pag-asa Island, notes the HQ-9B battery and YJ-12B launchers sited there with coverage of roughly 250 km and 400 km respectively, and states the force-protection consequence of sustaining the authorized 12 nm FONOP cadence past a feature reserved from engagement under the approved course of action.","FONOPs are described as routine presence activity and outpost air defence is described as a general A2/AD characteristic of the Spratlys, with no point in the brief where the two are joined at Subi Reef.","CJCS EXORD para 11G authorizes routine FONOPs within 12NM of PRC-occupied features while para 11C reserves engagement of those outposts absent Presidential release; Critical Geography gives Pag-asa to Subi as 12 nm, and the Adversary OOB credits Subi with an HQ-9B battery of four launchers and about 32 ready missiles at roughly 250 km reach plus a YJ-12B mobile ASCM detachment at roughly 400 km.","Operational environment and threat section, maritime or air domain analysis",15_CJCS_EXORD;06_Critical_Geography;03_Adversary_OOB |
| C6-GAP-12,C6:C6-GAP-12,S10,Known facts,2,SI,positive,2,Does the facts section give one reconciled figure for Philippine personnel held by the PRC and flag the disagreement between the source inputs on that number?,"The brief states a single working figure for detained AFP and PCG personnel, notes that the Country Fact Sheet civil-considerations entry cites approximately 30 captured against the 25 recorded in the J2 regional summary and in the same document's Pag-asa status paragraph, and treats the count as a fact to be confirmed for ICRC notification.","Both figures appear in different parts of the brief, or one is chosen silently, so the number supporting the Joint Personnel Recovery Center and ICRC notification requirement is not traceable to a decision.","The J2 Regional Intelligence Summary of 240600Z AUG 26 and the Country Fact Sheet Pag-asa status paragraph both record 25 AFP and PCG personnel captured on 22 August 2026, while the Country Fact Sheet civil-considerations paragraph states ICRC is engaging on the POW question for approximately 30 captured AFP personnel; CJCS EXORD para 25 requires ICRC notification for all detainees within 14 days of capture.",Known facts section and any personnel recovery or detainee accountability discussion,05_Country_Fact_Sheet;02_Regional_Intel_Summary;15_CJCS_EXORD |
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