| item_id,item_uid,step,step_name,tier,severity,polarity,weight,question,pass_condition,fail_condition,source_fact,artifact_anchor,source_documents |
| SS2-S1-004,C7:SS2-S1-004,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,Is the Presidential statement that the United States will honor the 2023 Agreement on Defense Cooperation with Papua New Guinea recorded in the mission analysis brief?,The Presidential confirmation that the United States will honor the 2023 Agreement on Defense Cooperation is recorded as national direction.,The 2023 Agreement on Defense Cooperation is not identified as the instrument the President has confirmed the United States will honor.,,,Strategic Context;CJCS Warning Order;Annexes and References |
| SS2-S1-005,C7:SS2-S1-005,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,Is CDRUSPACOM identified in the mission analysis brief as the supported commander for SOUTHERN SHIELD planning?,CDRUSPACOM is stated to be the supported commander for the planning effort.,,,,CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S1-006,C7:SS2-S1-006,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,,,,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Commander's intent,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S1-007,C7:SS2-S1-007,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Is the commander's stated end state - return to peaceful resolution of the border issues and a negotiated solution to the Free Papua Movement issue - recorded in the mission analysis brief?,"The commander's end state is recorded in the terms stated, covering both the border issue and the Free Papua Movement issue.No commander's end state is recorded, or the end state is stated only as military defeat or expulsion of Indonesian forces.","Commander's initial intent, endstate: return to peaceful resolution of the border issues and negotiated solution to the OPM issue. |
| Commander's initial intent, method: establish air superiority over the border and Komavi area at earliest possible time. The directed operational concept states that obtaining and maintaining air superiority over the international border is decisive.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Commander's intent,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S1-009,C7:SS2-S1-009,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,"Is the commander's envisaged construct of an Australian and Papua New Guinean led ground operation supported by air, cyberspace and space capabilities provided by JTF SOUTHERN SHIELD recorded in the mission analysis brief?The partner-led ground construct with United States air, cyberspace and space support is recorded as the commander's envisaged construct.","The construct is recorded as a United States-led ground operation, or the partner-led framing is omitted.","Commander's initial intent, method: I envision an Australian-PNG led ground operation supported by air, cyber, and space provided by JTF SOUTHERN SHIELD. |
| The posture requirement is omitted, or United States ground forces are presented as the lead ground element without reference to the stated posture.Commander's initial intent, method: however, U.S. ground forces must be postured to follow and support or follow and assume the defense mission as well as build and protect bases and infrastructure.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Commander's intent,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S1-011,C7:SS2-S1-011,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,"Is the directed decisive operation - rapid forward deployment of at least a brigade of ground troops, coordinated with Papua New Guinea armed forces, to the defence of the Komavi area - recorded in the mission analysis brief as higher commander's guidance?The directed decisive operation is recorded with the brigade-scale floor, the coordination with Papua New Guinea armed forces, and the Komavi area as the object.The directed decisive operation is omitted, or the brigade-scale floor is dropped or silently altered.Directed operational concept: the decisive operation is the rapid forward deployment of at least a brigade of ground troops, coordinated with PNG armed forces, to the defense of the Komavi area, supported by air.JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Higher commander's objectives, mission and guidance",Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S1-012,C7:SS2-S1-012,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,Are the proposed conflict termination criteria - Papua New Guinea defended from Indonesian invasion and Indonesian armed forces returned to their side of the international border - reproduced in the mission analysis brief?,Both proposed termination criteria are reproduced as the criteria the staff has been directed to evaluate.,,,,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S1-013,C7:SS2-S1-013,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,Is the USPACOM theater-strategic objective of de-escalating the crisis and returning Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to a negotiated settlement of the border and the disposition of the Free Papua Movement recorded in the mission analysis brief?,"The theater-strategic objective is recorded, including its reliance on all instruments of national power.","The theater-strategic objective is omitted, or military objectives are presented with no theater-strategic objective above them.","USPACOM Theater-strategic objective, using all instruments of national power, is to de-escalate the crisis and return Indonesia and PNG to a negotiated settlement of the border and disposition of OPM.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Higher commander's objectives, mission and guidance |
| Each operational objective is linked to protection of United States personnel and non-combatants, containment of the situation, or de-escalation of the conflict.Operational objectives are presented with no linkage to the stated national authorization, leaving objectives unbounded by the authorized purposes.National authorization is limited to three purposes - protect United States personnel and non-combatants, contain the situation to the immediate area, de-escalate the conflict - while the four USPACOM operational objectives include build-up of ground forces in Western Province, defence of the border adjacent to Komavi, building partner counter-insurgency capacity, and establishment of forward bases.JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Objectives and effects |
| The end-state condition that Papua New Guinea, with international assistance, repatriates West Papuan refugees and begins expelling Free Papua Movement separatists from Papua New Guinea territory is recorded as part of the strategic end state.That condition is omitted from the strategic end state, or no strategic end state is stated.The strategic end state is that Indonesia does not successfully invade PNG territory and that American citizens, military personnel currently in PNG, contractors, and their physical property will be protected. PNG, with international assistance, repatriates West Papuan refugees and begins expelling OPM separatists from PNG territory. The three conditions appear together only in the paragraph headed Strategic Environment / desired state and are not carried in the commander's end-state line.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Higher commander's objectives, mission and guidance |
| A United States obligation to defend Papua New Guinea territory is asserted, or the 2023 Agreement is equated with the Australia to Papua New Guinea mutual defence treaty of October 2025.Article 5 commits the United States to protect and secure United States personnel in Papua New Guinea and thus provides the United States the ability to cooperate in the defence of Papua New Guinea territory from foreign invasion. The Strategic Context records that the United States is only obligated to protect U.S. citizens and their property, while Australia is a treaty ally of Papua New Guinea obligated to defend its sovereignty. |
| Mission analysis presents force flow, deployment, or posture change as authorised by this order, or writes the mission at 2.A as a task in execution.Mission analysis presents no deployment decision, force movement, or posture change as already authorised, and any such action is shown as contingent on further national direction.Paragraph 2.A is prefaced 'Upon direction'; paragraph 2.B withholds execution, deployment and posture-change authority; four of the eight tasks at paragraph 3.B are prefaced 'When directed'. Nothing in the order releases execution authority. |
| No strategic center of gravity is identified, or an Indonesian military formation or capability is named as the strategic center of gravity.The strategic Center of Gravity of Indonesia is their formidable diplomatic leverage as the world's largest Muslim-majority democracy and as one of the most influential diplomatic players in Asia, sustained by the strict active alignment policy, the geostrategic position bridging the Indian and Pacific oceans, resource abundance providing defence against sanctions, governance of the Lombok, Sunda and Malacca chokepoints through which 90 percent of Pacific maritime traffic passes, and a large global share of electric-vehicle components.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Situation overview: Enemy, including centers of gravity, and objectives",Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S2-002,C7:SS2-S2-002,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Is the Indonesian Army identified in the mission analysis brief as an operational center of gravity?,,,There are two Operational Centers of Gravity. The Indonesian Army is quite capable and acclimated to the region and is well supported by air and fires. The second is local support to OPM.,,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S2-003,C7:SS2-S2-003,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,Is Indonesian sustainment dependent on air and ground transport and on intermediate bases identified in the mission analysis brief as a critical vulnerability of the Indonesian Army center of gravity?,"Sustainment is classified as a critical vulnerability of the Indonesian Army center of gravity, not merely listed as a general weakness.","Indonesian sustainment is described without being tied to the Indonesian Army center of gravity, or no critical vulnerability is identified for that center of gravity.","The Indonesian Army is vulnerable in areas of sustainment, which require air and ground transport and air and ground-based bases along the way. Forward outposts are supported by air and by coastal and riverine movement rather than by road, and no forward bulk fuel installation is assessed east of Timika.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Situation overview: Enemy, including centers of gravity, and objectives | Friendly assessment: Vulnerabilities",Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;Adversary Order of Battle |
| SS2-S2-004,C7:SS2-S2-004,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Is local Papua New Guinean sympathy and material support to the Free Papua Movement identified in the mission analysis brief as an operational center of gravity?,,,,,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S2-005,C7:SS2-S2-005,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,Is force protection of unacclimatised personnel and equipment identified in the mission analysis brief as the critical vulnerability of the friendly center of gravity of force projection to remote areas?,"The friendly center of gravity is stated as the ability to project forces to remote areas, and force protection of unacclimatised troops and equipment is classified as its critical vulnerability.","The friendly center of gravity is not stated, or its critical vulnerability is asserted without reference to acclimatisation and environmental degradation.","Our own operational COG is our ability to project forces to remote areas: a key strength relying on air capabilities, specialized forces, and logistics, to include construction capabilities. We are vulnerable, however, in the area of force protection: our troops and equipment simply are not well-acclimated to the region and there is little time in which to get them acclimated.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Vulnerabilities | Situation overview: Enemy, including centers of gravity, and objectives",Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S2-006,C7:SS2-S2-006,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Is coercive demonstration with limited cross-border raiding identified in the mission analysis brief as the Indonesian most likely course of action?,,,,,JIPOE Brief |
| SS2-S2-007,C7:SS2-S2-007,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,,,,,,JIPOE Brief |
| SS2-S2-008,C7:SS2-S2-008,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Is deliberate escalation to provoke open armed conflict between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia identified in the mission analysis brief as the Free Papua Movement most dangerous course of action?,,,,,JIPOE Brief;Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S2-009,C7:SS2-S2-009,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record that the assessed Mi-35P combat radius is insufficient to reach the Komavi area from Timika without forward basing or refuelling?,"The brief states that the assessed Mi-35P combat radius of approximately 85 nautical miles at full weapon load is short of the 210 nautical miles from Mozes Kilangin airport at Timika to the Komavi area, and draws the implication for Indonesian rotary-wing employment.","Indonesian attack helicopter employment over the Komavi area is assumed from Timika without reference to combat radius, or the radius shortfall is not identified.","Assessed Mi-35P combat radius is approximately 85 nautical miles at full weapon load, ferry range approximately 590 nautical miles. At least four Mi-35P are assessed based at Timika. Timika to Komavi is 210 nautical miles. Indonesian air refuelling capacity is small and not assessed forward-deployed to the Papua provinces.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Situation overview: Operational environment and threat overview,Adversary Order of Battle;Critical Geography |
| SS2-S2-014,C7:SS2-S2-014,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Is the absence of any road across the 190 air miles between Daru and the Komavi area recorded in the mission analysis brief as a defining feature of the operational area?,The road gap between Daru and the Komavi area is recorded and its consequence for movement and sustainment into Komavi is stated.,"The road gap is not recorded, or Komavi is treated as reachable by surface movement from Daru or Kiunga.","Daru to Komavi is 190 air miles with no roads at all. The absence of any road across the 190 air miles between Daru and Komavi is the most consequential terrain feature in the joint operations area. Surface routes from the Komavi settled area to any other populated place: none, foot tracks and river only. Any route between the Komavi area and Kiunga: none.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Situation overview: Operational environment and threat overview,JIPOE Brief;Critical Geography;DIA Country Fact Sheet |
| SS2-S2-016,C7:SS2-S2-016,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record that armed personnel within the Komavi displaced-persons concentration are not visually separable from protected civilians?,The brief records the discrimination problem posed by the displaced-persons concentration and treats it as an operational environment factor bearing on the use of force.,"The displaced population is described only as a humanitarian requirement, with no statement of the discrimination problem it creates.","The displaced-persons concentration is concealment of a different order, within which armed personnel are not visually separable from protected civilians. OPM and NLA elements are assessed to avoid eradication by both Indonesian and Papua New Guinea security forces and to blend in with the displaced population.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Situation overview: Neutral assessment; Nonmilitary threat networks,JIPOE Brief;Adversary Order of Battle |
| SS2-S2-017,C7:SS2-S2-017,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record that air operations into the Komavi area are confined to a limited daily visual meteorological window?,"The brief states that the reliable visual window at Komavi is 1000 to 1500 local on approximately 60 percent of days, at a strip with no lighting and no navigation aid, and treats this as a throughput constraint.","Air access to the Komavi area is treated as continuously available, or the weather window is mentioned without linkage to throughput or to the absence of night capability.","Cloud base in the Fly headwaters lies below 1,500 feet above ground level on approximately 60 percent of mornings; the reliable visual meteorological conditions window at Komavi is 1000 to 1500 local. Below-minima conditions persist for the whole day on an average of 62 days per year. Komavi has no lighting and no navigation aids, and the operator reports the surface unserviceable for 24 to 72 hours after heavy rainfall.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Situation overview: Operational environment and threat overview,Critical Geography;JIPOE Brief;Initial Staff Running Estimates |
| SS2-S2-018,C7:SS2-S2-018,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record that the absence of Free Papua Movement man-portable air defence holdings is assessed at low confidence?,"The brief states that no man-portable air defence holding has been identified but that the assessment of absence is held at LOW confidence, and treats the air threat to friendly aviation as unresolved.","Absence of Free Papua Movement man-portable air defence is asserted as established, or the air threat to friendly rotary-wing and slow-moving aircraft is dismissed.","OPM armament is small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and light mortars at MODERATE confidence. No man-portable air defence holding identified; the assessment of absence is LOW. Confirmation or refutation of man-portable air defence holdings is carried as an outstanding intelligence gap.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Situation overview: Nonmilitary threat networks,Adversary Order of Battle |
| SS2-S2-020,C7:SS2-S2-020,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,SI,positive,2,Does the mission analysis brief record the air surveillance and airspace coordination gap over Western Province?,"The brief records that no radar coverage exists west of Port Moresby below 24,000 feet, that separation is procedural only, and that no direct controller-to-controller circuit exists with the adjoining Indonesian flight information region.","Airspace control over Western Province is assumed to be radar-supported, or the absence of a coordination circuit with the adjoining Indonesian region is not addressed.","Port Moresby Flight Information Region covers Papua New Guinea to the 141st meridian. No radar coverage exists west of Port Moresby below 24,000 feet. Procedural separation only. Indonesian Ujung Pandang Flight Information Region abuts at the meridian; there is no direct controller-to-controller coordination circuit between the two.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Situation overview: Operational environment and threat overview,Critical Geography |
| SS2-S2-N02,C7:SS2-S2-N02,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record that the Komavi displaced-persons concentration and the objective area of the directed decisive operation are the same ground?,"The brief states that approximately 10,000 West Papuan refugees are located in the Komavi area, states that the Komavi area is the objective area of the directed decisive operation, and treats the collocation as governing fires, screening and rules of engagement. All three statements are present.","The refugee concentration and the objective area are described separately with no statement that they occupy the same ground, the collocation is recorded with no consequence for fires, screening or rules of engagement, or either the refugee concentration at Komavi or the identification of the Komavi area as the objective area is omitted.","Approximately 10,000 refugees crossed the international border into Papua New Guinea and settled in the Komavi area of Western Province. The directed decisive operation is the rapid forward deployment of at least a brigade of ground troops, coordinated with Papua New Guinea armed forces, to the defense of the Komavi area. The Free Papua Movement is assessed likely to avoid eradication by blending in with the thousands of internally displaced persons in the Komavi area. No single source document states the collocation.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Situation overview: Neutral assessment; Operational environment and threat overview,Strategic Context;DIA Regional Intelligence Summary;Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| S-03,C7:S-03,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Is local Papua New Guinean sympathy and material support to the Free Papua Movement identified in the mission analysis brief as an OPM operational center of gravity?,,,,,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| S-04,C7:S-04,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the mission analysis brief reconcile the unit-level Indonesian infantry battalion strengths as one aggregrate number, and remove the single-unit reported strengths out?","A single reconciled battalion figure is presented with no note of the disagreement, or one of the two reported figures is dropped without explanation.","Both figures are carried as reported, with the disagreement between approximately 1,400 per battalion across six battalions and an aggregate reported at 8,000 noted.","Aggregate strength of the six battalions is reported at 8,000 personnel. The unit-level figures of approximately 1,400 each and the aggregate figure in the DIA Regional Intelligence Summary are not in agreement; both are reproduced as reported. Garrison association is also inconsistent between the two reporting streams and both accounts are carried at MODERATE confidence.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Situation overview: Operational environment and threat overview,Adversary Order of Battle;DIA Regional Intelligence Summary |
| S-05,C7:S-05,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis brief present the Free Papua Movement camps or weapons caches on Papua New Guinea territory as established fact?,"Camps or caches on Papua New Guinea territory are presented as confirmed, or a location, strength or organisational identity is asserted for them without the unconfirmed qualification.","The camp and cache reporting is carried as unconfirmed, with the brief noting that no location, strength or organizational identity on Papua New Guinea territory has been validated by any collection discipline.","There are unconfirmed reports that large numbers of well-equipped insurgents crossed with the refugee flow and have established numerous camps and weapons caches in the outlying hills on the Papua New Guinea side of the border. This reporting is UNCONFIRMED. No camp or cache location, strength or organisational identity on Papua New Guinea territory has been validated by any collection discipline; the reporting is carried for awareness only.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Situation overview: Nonmilitary threat networks,Adversary Order of Battle;CJCS Warning Order;DIA Regional Intelligence Summary |
| SS2-S3-003,C7:SS2-S3-003,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Is the directed task to plan for the establishment of forward basing in Papua New Guinea and for coordination of access with the Governments of Papua New Guinea and Australia captured as a specified task in the mission analysis brief?,"The forward basing task is captured as a specified task with the coordination element and both named partners, Australia and Papua New Guinea, preserved.","The forward basing task is omitted, or the requirement to coordinate forward basing presence with Australia and Papua New Guinea is dropped.",Tasks to CDRUSPACOM: coordinate forward basing presence with Australia and PNG to facilitate deployment and flow of forces. The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance directs the same task in the same words and lists as an operational objective the establishment and provision of forward bases for the support of further military operations.,,CJCS Warning Order;Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S3-004,C7:SS2-S3-004,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,I,positive,5,Is the directed task to plan for security assistance to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force captured as a specified task in the mission analysis brief?,The security assistance task is captured as a specified task traced to higher direction.,"The security assistance task is omitted, or is presented as an inferred requirement rather than a directed one.","Tasks to CDRUSPACOM: when directed, provide security assistance to PNG armed forces. The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance directs security assistance to PNG armed forces as a directed task to USPACOM, stated without the conditional phrase.JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Specified tasks |
| Specified, implied and essential tasksThe information environment task is omitted, or is reduced to public affairs handling.Tasks to CDRUSPACOM: plan operations in the information environment supporting the national objectives. The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance directs USPACOM to manage operations in the information environment, and the commander's method includes managing operations in the information environment to control the narrative.JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Specified tasks | Communication synchronization: Communication synchronization |
| Specified, implied and essential tasksProtection of United States persons and property is selected as an essential task, consistent with the Presidential designation of protection as a top priority and with the assigned planning task.Protection of United States persons and property is treated only as a supporting or branch activity, or is absent from the essential task set.The assigned planning task names the protection of United States persons and property in Papua New Guinea as its first object. The President stated that protection of U.S. military personnel, contractors, citizens and their property is a top priority. More than 2,000 United States citizens reside in Papua New Guinea.JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Essential tasks |
| Specified, implied and essential tasksAn air line of communication into the Komavi area is derived as an implied task, traced to the directed forward deployment of a brigade and to the absence of any road or navigable water access to Komavi.Force flow into the Komavi area is assumed without an air line of communication being derived, or the requirement is asserted with no traceable root in the directed concept and the terrain.The directed decisive operation is rapid forward deployment of at least a brigade of ground troops to the defence of the Komavi area. The commander's analysis states that infrastructure must be constructed to increase coalition flow of troops and equipment and that this will require an air bridge to Komavi to rapidly deploy ground troops. Komavi is 190 air miles from Daru with no roads at all and 42 air miles from Kiunga with no road, and the Fly River is not navigable within 20 miles of the settled area.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Implied tasks",Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;Critical Geography;JIPOE Brief |
| SS2-S3-018,C7:SS2-S3-018,S3,,3,CI,positive,9,Is improvement of the Komavi landing surface to accept the intended airlift type derived in the mission analysis brief as an implied task?,,,,,Critical Geography;Initial Staff Running Estimates;Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S3-N02,C7:SS2-S3-N02,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Is establishment of an intermediate staging base and aerial port of debarkation at Nadzab Airfield, Lae, derived in the mission analysis brief as an implied task?","An implied task is stated to establish an intermediate staging base and aerial port of debarkation at Nadzab Airfield, Lae, traced to Nadzab being the only airfield in Papua New Guinea able to receive strategic airlift and to Lae being the only port able to discharge a brigade set.","No reception node is derived, or a reception node is asserted without reference to the strategic-airlift and brigade-discharge limits that make Nadzab and Lae the only candidates.","Nadzab Airfield at Lae is the only airfield in Papua New Guinea capable of receiving strategic airlift, and Lae is the only port able to discharge a brigade set. Lae is 297 air miles from Daru with no direct road and 200 air miles from Port Moresby with no direct road. Recorded throughput at Nadzab is two wide-body aircraft on ground at 260 short tons per day with C-17 weight restricted.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Implied tasks",DIA Country Fact Sheet;Critical Geography;Initial Staff Running Estimates |
| SS2-S3-N03,C7:SS2-S3-N03,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Is opening and securing a surface line of communication up the Fly River from Daru to Kiunga derived in the mission analysis brief as an implied task?,"An implied task is stated to open and secure a Fly River surface line of communication from Daru to Kiunga, traced to it being the only means of moving bulk sustainment toward the Komavi area that does not consume airlift.","The river route is not derived as a task, or bulk sustainment into Western Province is planned by air alone with no statement that the river is the only surface alternative.","There are no roads at all between Daru and the Komavi area, a distance of 190 air miles, and travel between the provincial capital and the Komavi area is by river or air only. The Fly River carries a June controlling depth of 2.4 metres to Kiunga, and Kiunga lies 42 air miles from the Komavi area with no road between the two.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Implied tasks",Critical Geography;DIA Country Fact Sheet |
| SS2-S3-N05,C7:SS2-S3-N05,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Is conduct of reception, staging, onward movement and integration at Lae and Port Moresby derived in the mission analysis brief as an implied task?","An implied task is stated to conduct reception, staging, onward movement and integration of United States and coalition forces at Lae and Port Moresby.","No reception, staging, onward movement and integration task is derived, or force flow is planned with no statement of where arriving forces are received and integrated.","The directed operational concept requires the establishment of bases at Lae, Nadzab Airfield, and Daru to facilitate force flow and build critical logistics for sustainment. Jacksons International, Port Moresby, supports three wide-body aircraft on ground at 400 short tons per day and Nadzab two at 260 short tons per day. No forward logistics node exists in Western Province and no United States engineer, airfield or port reconnaissance has been conducted there since 2024.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Implied tasks",Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;DIA Country Fact Sheet;Initial Staff Running Estimates |
| SS2-S3-N07,C7:SS2-S3-N07,S3,,3,SI,positive,2,Is provision or coordination of humanitarian assistance for the Komavi displaced population and the Port Moresby internally displaced persons derived in the mission analysis brief as an implied task?,,,,,CJCS Warning Order;Strategic Context;US Force List for Planning |
| SS2-S3-N08,C7:SS2-S3-N08,S3,,3,I,positive,5,Is establishment of a combined coordination mechanism with the Australian Defence Force and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force derived in the mission analysis brief as an implied task?,An implied task is stated to establish a combined coordination mechanism with the Australian Defence Force and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force that achieves unity of effort in the absence of unity of command.,,,,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;Annexes and References |
| S-06,C7:S-06,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,D,negative,-5,"Does the implied task list in the mission analysis brief include routine, inherent, and standing-operating-procedure actions?","Routine actions such as maintaining force protection, conducting liaison, or coordinating with higher headquarters appear as implied tasks.","No entry in the implied task list is a routine, inherent or standing-operating-procedure action; every entry carries a meaningful burden in time, force, coordination or commander attention.","Implied tasks are inferred from the operational environment, the operational approach and subject-matter expertise, and are never routine or standing-operating-procedure actions. The packet content generating genuine implied tasks includes the absence of engineer reconnaissance since 2024, the absence of an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement with Papua New Guinea, and customary land tenure over 97 percent of the country.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Implied tasks",CJCS Warning Order;Initial Staff Running Estimates;Annexes and References |
| S-07,C7:S-07,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis brief include any explicitly directed task re-labelled as an implied task or reworded so that its origin in the planning directive is lost?,"A task explicitly directed by higher headquarters appears in the implied task list, or a directed task is reworded so that its origin in the planning directive is lost.",Every task explicitly directed in the CJCS Warning Order or the Commander's Initial Planning Guidance appears in the specified category; no directed task appears in the implied task list and no directed task is reworded so that its origin in the planning directive is lost.,,,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;CJCS Warning Order |
| S-09,C7:S-09,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis include any assignment of diplomatic engagement to USPACOM as a military task?,Mission analysis lists diplomatic engagement among USPACOM tasks or objectives without the supporting-role qualifier.,Mission analysis assigns no diplomatic lead to USPACOM.,"Paragraph 3.D assigns the humanitarian lead to USAID and the diplomatic lead to the Department of State, with Department of War planning in support. Paragraph 1.F records that the Government of Papua New Guinea has requested international assistance and that State, USAID and nongovernmental and international organizations are engaged. Paragraph 1.G directs that planning proceed on the basis that diplomatic and economic efforts continue in parallel and that military planning supports rather than displaces them.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: USG interagency objectives",CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S4-005,C7:SS2-S4-005,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Is the national limitation prohibiting the planning of any offensive operation against the sovereign territory of the Republic of Indonesia captured as a restraint in the mission analysis brief?,"The prohibition is captured as a restraint, sourced to the national-level limitations in the CJCS Warning Order, and is expressed as a cannot-do.","The prohibition is omitted, or is recorded as a constraint or as a general de-escalation preference rather than as a prohibition.",Limitations directed at the national level: no offensive operation is to be planned against the sovereign territory of the Republic of Indonesia.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints,CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S4-006,C7:SS2-S4-006,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Is the national limitation that no United States force is to be planned for employment against the Free Papua Movement except in self-defence or in direct support of Papua New Guinea Defence Force operations captured as a restraint in the mission analysis brief?,The prohibition is captured as a restraint with both stated exceptions preserved.,"The prohibition is omitted, or one or both exceptions are dropped or broadened.",Limitations directed at the national level: no United States force is to be planned for employment against the Free Papua Movement except in self-defense or in direct support of Papua New Guinea Defence Force operations.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints,CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S4-009,C7:SS2-S4-009,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,"Is the limitation that force apportionment is for planning only and does not constitute allocation, assignment or authority to deploy captured in the mission analysis brief?",The apportionment limitation is captured and the apportioned force list is treated as a planning basis rather than as available forces.,"Apportioned forces are treated as allocated or assigned, or the limitation is not recorded.","Force apportionment: forces apportioned for planning are at the US Force List for Planning. Apportionment is for planning only and does not constitute allocation, assignment, or authority to deploy.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints; Capabilities allocated,CJCS Warning Order;US Force List for Planning |
| SS2-S4-010,C7:SS2-S4-010,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Is the directed limitation that the United States will not directly command Papua New Guinea or Australian armed forces or their operations captured as a restraint in the mission analysis brief?,"The prohibition on direct United States command of partner forces is captured as a restraint, alongside the directed dual command structure.","Command arrangements are recommended that place Papua New Guinea or Australian forces under direct United States command, or the prohibition is not recorded.","Assume a Dual Command Structure. COM7FLT will command JTF SOUTHERN SHIELD, United States only, and a combined command structure of ADF and PNG armed forces. The United States will not directly command PNG or Australian armed forces or their operations. No trilateral command instrument exists among the United States, Australia and Papua New Guinea.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints; Command relationships,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;Annexes and References |
| S-12,C7:S-12,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis brief include any constraint or restraint recorded at the wrong polarity?,,Every entry stating a required action is placed under constraints and every entry stating a prohibited action is placed under restraints; no entry is recorded at the opposite polarity.,Must-do directions in the packet include the escalation-reading assessment for every option and the pre-execution reporting of observable deployment preparations. Cannot-do prohibitions include the ban on planning offensive operations against Indonesian sovereign territory and the ban on employing United States force against the Free Papua Movement outside the two stated exceptions.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints,CJCS Warning Order |
| S-13,C7:S-13,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,D,negative,-5,Does the limitations list in the mission analysis brief include always-true prohibitions and standing obligations that direct no scenario-specific action?,A standing obligation such as compliance with the law of war or observance of necessity and proportionality is listed as a scenario constraint or restraint.,,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints,Annexes and References |
| S-14,C7:S-14,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis brief include any reading of the directed forward-basing purpose as authority to plan offensive operations against Indonesian sovereign territory?,,,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints; Legal considerations,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;CJCS Warning Order |
| S-15,C7:S-15,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis brief include any reading of the directed special operations task as authority for unilateral United States action against the Free Papua Movement?,"Unilateral United States action against the Free Papua Movement is planned or implied, or the directed sanctuary-denial task is recorded without its national-level boundary.","Special operations activities in Western Province are bounded by the national limitation confining employment against the Free Papua Movement to self-defence or direct support of Papua New Guinea Defence Force operations, and the boundary is stated.",The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance directs conduct of Special Operations Activities in the Western Province of PNG to deny OPM and NLA sanctuary. The CJCS Warning Order directs at national level that no United States force is to be planned for employment against the Free Papua Movement except in self-defense or in direct support of Papua New Guinea Defence Force operations. The Free Papua Movement is not a United States-designated foreign terrorist organization.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints; Legal considerations,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;CJCS Warning Order;Annexes and References |
| S-17,C7:S-17,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CD,negative,-9,"Does the mission analysis include any option or termination condition that depends on tariffs, sanctions, or other economic measures as a USPACOM lever?","Mission analysis builds an option, effect or termination condition on tariff or sanction action as though it were a USPACOM means.","No option, effect or termination condition in the mission analysis relies on an economic measure as a means available to the command","Paragraph 1.G places economic measures at the national level and outside the purview of the order. The Strategic Context separately records that tariffs on 45 billion dollars of Indonesian exports stand at 19 per cent with stated presidential intent to raise them to 100 per cent should Indonesia violate Papua New Guinea territory, and that sanctions on mining machinery and petroleum products to Papua New Guinea are held in reserve. Those are national instruments, not command means.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints | COA evaluation criteria: COA evaluation criteria,CJCS Warning Order;Strategic Context |
| SS2-S5-001,C7:SS2-S5-001,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief carry a priority intelligence requirement for indications and warning of an Indonesian national decision to cross the international border?,A priority intelligence requirement addresses indicators of a Jakarta-level decision to cross the border and names the commander decision it supports.,,Indonesian decision timeline: indicators and warning for a national decision in Jakarta to cross the border. No validated indicator set held. Release authority for cross-border kinetic action is assessed at HIGH confidence to be retained in Jakarta rather than delegated to the Military Area Command in Papua. This is listed among the requirements that limit the fidelity of the order of battle.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - CCIRs: Priority intelligence requirements,Adversary Order of Battle;JIPOE Brief |
| SS2-S5-002,C7:SS2-S5-002,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the mission analysis brief carry a priority intelligence requirement addressing Indonesian munitions, fuel and engineer stockage on the Tanah Merah and Merauke axis?",A priority intelligence requirement addresses forward stockage on the Tanah Merah and Merauke axis and is identified as the discriminator between the Indonesian most likely and most dangerous courses of action.,"Forward stockage is not carried as a priority intelligence requirement, or the requirement is stated with no linkage to discriminating between adversary courses of action.","Indonesian munitions, fuel, and engineer stockage at Tanah Merah, Merauke, and the outpost line is the discriminator between Indonesian COA 1 and COA 2. Collection focus is storage-area imagery and transport counts on the Merauke to Tanah Merah axis. Confidence LOW. Indicators of COA 1 include drummed fuel and ammunition moving forward to Tanah Merah; indicators of COA 2 include medical and engineer support concentrating at Tanah Merah.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - CCIRs: Priority intelligence requirements,JIPOE Brief |
| SS2-S5-003,C7:SS2-S5-003,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief carry a priority intelligence requirement addressing Indonesian air activity at Sentani Air Base as a warning indicator?,,,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - CCIRs: Priority intelligence requirements,Adversary Order of Battle;JIPOE Brief;Initial Staff Running Estimates |
| SS2-S5-004,C7:SS2-S5-004,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief carry a priority intelligence requirement addressing movement of Indonesian amphibious shipping from Surabaya toward the Arafura Sea?,"A priority intelligence requirement addresses movement of amphibious shipping from Surabaya, and is tied to the decision it informs regarding the Indonesian most dangerous course of action.","Amphibious movement from Surabaya is not carried as an information requirement, or is listed without decision linkage.","The Indonesian Marine Corps fields three brigades, the nearest at Surabaya, East Java, approximately four days away by amphibious ship. No Marine Corps brigade is assessed forward-based in the Papua provinces. Indicators of the Indonesian most dangerous course of action include amphibious shipping moving from Surabaya toward the Arafura Sea; an indicator of the most likely course of action is no movement of the Surabaya Marine brigade.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - CCIRs: Priority intelligence requirements,Adversary Order of Battle;JIPOE Brief |
| SS2-S5-005,C7:SS2-S5-005,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief carry a priority intelligence requirement to validate or refute the reported Free Papua Movement camps and caches east of the international border?,,,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - CCIRs: Priority intelligence requirements,JIPOE Brief;Adversary Order of Battle |
| SS2-S5-006,C7:SS2-S5-006,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief carry a priority intelligence requirement addressing the armed proportion of the Komavi displaced population?,A priority intelligence requirement addresses the number of armed Free Papua Movement personnel who crossed with the February 2026 refugee movement and the armed proportion of the Komavi population.,"The armed proportion of the displaced population is not carried as an information requirement, despite the discrimination problem it creates.","Number of armed OPM personnel who crossed with the February 2026 refugee movement, and the armed proportion of the Komavi population. Collection focus is registration and screening reporting and human sources. Confidence LOW. Armed personnel within the displaced-persons concentration are not visually separable from protected civilians.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - CCIRs: Priority intelligence requirements,JIPOE Brief |
| SS2-S5-008,C7:SS2-S5-008,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief carry a priority intelligence requirement seeking confirmation or refutation of Free Papua Movement man-portable air defence holdings?,A priority intelligence requirement addresses man-portable air defence holdings and is tied to a decision on air line of communication routing or rotary-wing employment.,,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - CCIRs: Priority intelligence requirements,Adversary Order of Battle;Critical Geography |
| SS2-S5-009,C7:SS2-S5-009,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief carry a friendly force information requirement addressing the status of Papua New Guinea consent for the introduction of United States forces?,"A friendly force information requirement addresses host-nation consent and is tied to the decision to flow forces, consent being carried only as an assumption.","Host-nation consent is carried as an assumption with no monitoring requirement, or is treated as a settled fact.","Directed strategic assumption: the Government of Papua New Guinea will consent to the introduction of United States forces onto its territory. The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance carries as assumptions, not as concluded arrangements, that PNG will allow and facilitate US basing and operations in Papua New Guinea. Site-specific implementing arrangements for Nadzab, Jacksons International, Daru, Kiunga and Komavi are not recorded as in force. |
| A friendly force information requirement addresses Komavi subgrade bearing capacity and serviceability state, and is tied to the decision on air line of communication use or movement of expeditionary airfield matting.Komavi surface condition is not carried as a commander-level information requirement, despite the absence of bearing ratio data and the recorded post-rainfall unserviceability.Ground surface at Komavi is laterite over weathered mudstone with no California bearing ratio testing conducted. The operator reports the surface unserviceable for 24 to 72 hours after heavy rainfall. Pavement classification number not held. A grass or unsurfaced laterite runway loses an assessed 30 to 50 percent of dry-condition bearing ratio within 24 hours of heavy rainfall. AM-2 matting holdings are 92,000 square feet at Guam and one complete package of 96,000 square feet at Port Hueneme, with a planned installation rate of 9,000 square feet per day and movement not currently scheduled. |
| A friendly force information requirement addresses evacuation readiness, including accountability of United States citizens and activation of the noncombatant tracking arrangements, and is tied to the short-notice execution decision.Evacuation readiness is not carried as a commander-level information requirement, despite the directed short-notice execution posture and the N+7 suspense.More than 2,000 United States citizens reside in Papua New Guinea, with 1,180 traveller enrolment registrations. Non-combatant accountability runs on the Noncombatant Tracking System; no instance is activated for Papua New Guinea. A standing concept plan for noncombatant evacuation operations was last reviewed 2024 and has not been exercised since. Suspense N+7: noncombatant evacuation branch plan complete and ready for execution. |
| No submarine requirement is carried, or the sea line of communication into Daru is planned with no collection requirement against the assessed subsurface threat.One CAKRA-class submarine is assessed operating in the Arafura Sea at LOW confidence, with position, patrol box and time on station not established. The Daru approach carries 6.0 metres over the delta bar at all states of tide and is the entry point for the shallow-draft sealift serving Western Province; the Prince of Wales Channel in the Torres Strait is the routing constraint on maritime approach. |
| No Australian requirement is carried, or Australian participation is planned against with no reporting requirement on its timing or composition.Australian Defence Forces will deploy to and assist in the defense of PNG is carried as an assumption for initial planning. Australia and Papua New Guinea concluded a mutual defence treaty in October 2025. The US Force List for Planning carries Australian 1st Brigade at Darwin, 3rd Brigade at Townsville, Headquarters 1st Division, 17th Sustainment Brigade and 16th Aviation Brigade with no notice-to-move data stated. |
| No priority intelligence requirement addresses clan support, or the requirement is stated with no reference to the conditions under which support would end.Extent and durability of Papua New Guinea clan support to OPM at Komavi, and the conditions under which that support would end. Collection focus is atmospherics collection through humanitarian and church networks. Confidence LOW. Local support to OPM is identified as an operational center of gravity: if support dries up, OPM will have to return to West Papua. |
| Clan support is described as a center of gravity with no corresponding information requirement linked to it, or the requirement is carried with no center-of-gravity linkage.Extent and durability of Papua New Guinea clan support to OPM at Komavi, and the conditions under which that support would end. Collection focus is atmospherics collection through humanitarian and church networks. Confidence LOW. Local support to OPM is identified as an operational center of gravity: if support dries up, OPM will have to return to West Papua. |
| No friendly force information requirement addresses force closure, or the requirement omits either the notice-to-move dates or the status of lift allocation.Apportioned notice to move includes 11 ABN 1BCT in Alaska at N+1, NMCB FIVE at Okinawa at N+7, and HQ 25 INF DIV, 25 IN 1BCT and 84 EN BN in Hawaii at N+14. Intratheater airlift and sealift allocation is pending USTRANSCOM tasking. The directed decisive operation is rapid forward deployment of at least a brigade of ground troops to the Komavi area. |
| The consent assumption is dropped, buried, or converted into a statement of fact.Assumptions for strategic-level planning, directed for use at the strategic level: the Government of Papua New Guinea will consent to the introduction of United States forces onto its territory. |
| The assumption is dropped, or Australian basing access is presented as an established arrangement. |
| The assumption is dropped, or a Security Council authorization is contemplated as available within the planning horizon. |
| The assumption is dropped, or Chinese non-involvement is presented as an assessed fact rather than as an assumption. |
| The characterisation assumption is stated as an inherited assumption, with its bearing on treaty triggers and escalation framing noted.The assumption is dropped, or Indonesian framing of a cross-border action is treated as unpredictable with no assumption recorded.Assumptions for strategic-level planning: the Government of Indonesia will continue to characterize any action across the border as a limited counter-insurgent operation rather than as war with Papua New Guinea. Throughout the assessed Indonesian courses of action, Jakarta frames the operation as counter-insurgency within a claimed treaty gap. |
| The assumption is dropped, or the N+14 date is presented as an intelligence assessment rather than as an assumption.Assumptions for initial planning, adversary forces: Indonesian military forces will not be postured for invasion of PNG until N+14 at the earliest. |
| The Australian deployment assumption is stated as an assumption, notwithstanding the near-certainty language in the intelligence reporting.The assumption is dropped, or Australian deployment is recorded in the facts register on the strength of the near-certainty language.Assumptions for initial planning, friendly forces: Australian Defence Forces will deploy to and assist in the defense of PNG. The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance and the Regional Intelligence Summary both record Australia as a near certainty or a certainty to honour the October 2025 mutual defence treaty and deploy forces in defence of Papua New Guinea sovereignty.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;DIA Regional Intelligence Summary;Annexes and References |
| SS2-S6-009,C7:SS2-S6-009,S6,Assumptions,1,I,positive,5,,The dual command structure is stated as an assumption for initial planning rather than as an established command arrangement.,,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions; Command relationships,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;Annexes and References;CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S6-N02,C7:SS2-S6-N02,S6,Assumptions,1,I,positive,5,Is the commander's assumption that Indonesia will engage coalition troops upon hostilities surfaced in the mission analysis brief?,,,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S6-N04,C7:SS2-S6-N04,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Is a new assumption recorded in the mission analysis brief covering Fly River navigability and the availability of commercial barge capacity?,A new assumption is stated that the Fly River remains navigable to Kiunga at the June controlling depth and that commercial barge capacity can be contracted or requisitioned for military sustainment.,"No such assumption is stated, or riverine sustainment is planned with no assumption declared on depth or on barge availability.",The Fly River carries a June controlling depth of 2.4 metres to Kiunga. Ok Tedi Mining Limited operates the only commercial fleet on the Fly River. The critical-geography compilation reports the fleet as fully committed to mine inbound consumables and outbound concentrate on a cycle of approximately eleven days; the logistics running estimate reports utilisation against mine resupply at approximately 85 percent. The two originators are not reconciled and both characterizations are carried as reported. Charter terms for non-commercial use are not established.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions,Critical Geography;Initial Staff Running Estimates |
| S-20,C7:S-20,S6,Assumptions,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis include any treatment of Australian participation as an established fact?,"Mission analysis lists Australian deployment among the facts, or relies on it without assumption status.","Australian participation appears only as an assumption, with the certainty language in the intelligence reporting and the commander's guidance treated as assessment rather than fact.The Warning Order carries Australian conduct only as an assumption at paragraph 1.I. The DIA Regional Intelligence Summary states 'It is a certainty that Australia will honor their defense treaty' and the Commander's Initial Planning Guidance states 'It is near certainty that Australia will honor their defense treaty'. Neither is a United States-controlled fact; the Australia and Papua New Guinea mutual defence treaty of October 2025 binds Australia and Papua New Guinea only, the United States not being a party.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions,CJCS Warning Order;DIA Regional Intelligence Summary;Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;Annexes and References |
| SS2-S7-004,C7:SS2-S7-004,S7,Risk,1,I,positive,5,Are the three mitigations named by the Commander carried as mitigations in the risk section?,,One or more of the three named mitigations is absent from the risk section.,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Risk: Risk to mission,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S7-005,C7:SS2-S7-005,S7,Risk,1,I,positive,5,Is the strategic risk that United States forces are perceived as taking sides in a dispute between two United States partners carried in the risk section?,"The brief carries the perception risk with its stated consequences, including negative impact on United States interests in the Pacific and the possibility of Chinese intervention or a Chinese peace-broker role.",The perception risk is absent or is reduced to a generic diplomatic caveat with no consequence stated.,"The Strategic Context states that United States military forces capable of repelling an Indonesian invasion place those forces at risk of being perceived as taking sides in a regional dispute between United States regional partners, which would have a negative impact on United States interests in the Pacific and perhaps open the possibility of Chinese intervention on one side or the other, or even as a peace-deal broker, which is unacceptable to POTUS.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Risk: Risk to mission,Strategic Context |
| SS2-S7-006,C7:SS2-S7-006,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,Is a risk to force derived from the historical non-battle casualty record and the endemic disease environment rather than the environment being treated only as a medical matter?,"A risk to force is stated that ties the endemic disease and climate environment to force protection, citing the historical casualty record or the recorded disease incidence.","Environmental and health threats appear only under health service support, or no risk to force is derived from them.","The CJCS Warning Order directs that environmental and health threats be treated as force protection matters and not solely as medical ones; the 1942 to 1944 campaign in Papua New Guinea produced more casualties from weather and terrain than from combat; malaria is holoendemic below 1,500 m throughout Western Province with annual parasite incidence in the Middle and North Fly districts of approximately 180 cases per 1,000 population.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Risk: Risk to force,CJCS Warning Order;Critical Geography;Initial Staff Running Estimates |
| SS2-S7-007,C7:SS2-S7-007,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,Is a risk to force derived from the acclimatisation shortfall of the deploying force against the time available?,A risk to force is stated that names the unacclimatised condition of the force and the absence of time to acclimatise before employment.,No acclimatisation risk is carried or acclimatisation is asserted to be achievable without any time cost stated.,The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance records that the friendly force is vulnerable in the area of force protection because troops and equipment are not well acclimated to the region and there is little time in which to get them acclimated; personnel not acclimatised to a sustained wet-bulb globe temperature in the range experienced in the Fly lowland require a phased acclimatisation period during which work-rest cycles and water intake requirements are substantially more restrictive than in temperate conditions.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Risk: Risk to force,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;Critical Geography |
| SS2-S7-008,C7:SS2-S7-008,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,Is a risk to time derived from the interval between the earliest closure of a brigade-sized ground force and the earliest assessed Indonesian offensive readiness?,A risk to time is stated that compares a computed earliest brigade closure date against the N+14 earliest posture assumption and the mid-July 2026 earliest assessed readiness for the Indonesian ground offensive.,No comparison of friendly closure against adversary readiness is made or notice-to-move dates are used as closure dates.,"The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance assumes Indonesian military forces will not be postured for invasion of PNG until N+14 at the earliest; the JIPOE assesses that earliest readiness for the Indonesian ground offensive to seize a border security zone is not before mid-July 2026; the only apportioned brigade at notice earlier than N+14 is 11 ABN 1BCT at Alaska on N+1, with 25 IN 1BCT and HQ 25 INF DIV at Hawaii on N+14. |
| A risk to mission is stated that names the Komavi airstrip shortfall against the contingency airfield criteria as a threat to the directed air bridge, with a consequence for the ground scheme.The Komavi airstrip has a landing distance available of 760 m against the staff contingency criterion of 1,065 m by 18 m at California bearing ratio 6 minimum for a C-130 semi-prepared assault strip, reducible to 915 m only for a single-ship emergency delivery at restricted gross weight; the Commander's Initial Planning Guidance states that an air bridge to Komavi is required to rapidly deploy ground troops.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Risk: Risk to mission,Critical Geography;Initial Staff Running Estimates;Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S7-011,C7:SS2-S7-011,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,Is a risk carried that progress toward the political objective triggers the most dangerous OPM course of action?,,No such risk is carried or OPM escalation is treated as independent of friendly and partner political progress.,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Risk: Risk to mission,JIPOE Brief |
| SS2-S7-012,C7:SS2-S7-012,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,Is a risk of harm to the displaced and host populations derived from the inseparability of armed elements from protected civilians?,,No civilian-harm risk is carried or the displaced population is treated only as a humanitarian requirement.,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Risk: Risk to mission,JIPOE Brief;Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| S-21,C7:S-21,S7,Risk,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis brief include any risk characterised at a confidence the unconfirmed camp and cache reporting does not support?,A risk is characterised at moderate or high confidence on the basis of the unconfirmed camp and cache reporting alone.,"Any risk drawing on the camp and cache reporting is annotated as resting on unconfirmed reporting, and the risk level reflects that limitation.","The Adversary Order of Battle records that no camp or cache location, strength or organisational identity on Papua New Guinea territory has been validated by any collection discipline and that the reporting is carried for awareness only.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Risk: Risk to mission,Adversary Order of Battle |
| SS2-S8-003,C7:SS2-S8-003,S8,Restated mission,1,CI,positive,9,Does the proposed restated mission state the deterrence of an Indonesian offensive across the Papua New Guinea international border as a task?,The proposed restated mission contains deterrence of an Indonesian offensive across the Papua New Guinea international border as a stated task.,The deterrence task is absent or is replaced by a defeat or repel formulation not carried in the planning task.,The CJCS Warning Order directs a Commander's Estimate for the deterrence of an Indonesian offensive across the Papua New Guinea international border.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Recommended restated mission,CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S8-005,C7:SS2-S8-005,S8,Restated mission,1,CI,positive,9,Does the proposed restated mission state a purpose of containing and de-escalating the crisis and enabling a negotiated settlement between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea?,The proposed restated mission carries an in-order-to clause naming containment and de-escalation of the crisis and the enabling of a negotiated settlement between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.,No purpose clause is present or the purpose clause names only a military condition without the settlement objective.,The CJCS Warning Order states the planning task as being in order to contain and de-escalate the crisis and enable a negotiated settlement between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Recommended restated mission,CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S8-007,C7:SS2-S8-007,S8,Restated mission,2,I,positive,5,Does the proposed restated mission carry a time element anchored to N-day or to a directed suspense?,The proposed restated mission carries a stated commencement or readiness time expressed against N-day or against a directed suspense.,No time element appears in the proposed restated mission.,N-day is 26 June 2026 and the packet effective date-time group is 260500Z JUN 2026; the CJCS Warning Order sets the Commander's Estimate at N+5 and the noncombatant evacuation branch plan complete and ready for execution at N+7.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Recommended restated mission,Packet README;CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S8-008,C7:SS2-S8-008,S8,Restated mission,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the proposed restated mission recite the directed operational concept as the method?,"The proposed restated mission recites elements of the directed operational concept, such as forward deployment of a brigade to Komavi, air superiority over the border, or the establishment of bases at Nadzab and Daru.","The proposed restated mission states what is to be done and why, and does not recite the directed operational concept.","The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance directs an operational concept in which the decisive operation is the rapid forward deployment of at least a brigade of ground troops to the defence of the Komavi area supported by air, with bases established at Lae (Nadzab Airfield) and Daru and special operations forces conducting activities in the Komavi area. |
| The proposed restated mission remains inside protection of United States personnel and non-combatants, containment of the situation to the immediate area, and de-escalation of the conflict.The CJCS Warning Order limitation directed at the national level states that United States military activity is to remain within the three purposes at paragraph 1.H; the annex set records the authorised scope as protect United States personnel and non-combatants, contain the situation to the immediate area, and de-escalate the conflict. |
| Recommended restated mission substitutes a different purpose, drops the why, or nests under the commander's objectives instead of the higher headquarters mission.","JP 5-0 requires the restated mission to contain who, what, when, where and why, with the why mandatory, and to nest under the higher headquarters mission. Paragraph 2.A supplies both the tasks and the purpose. Paragraph 3.A directs that the Commander's Estimate be submitted with a recommendation for review by the Chairman, the Secretary of War and the President. |
| The proposed restated mission contains no offensive task against the Free Papua Movement, and any OPM-related task is expressed as support to Papua New Guinea Defence Force operations or as self-defence. |
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| The JIPOE records Indonesian munitions, fuel and engineer stockage at Tanah Merah, Merauke and the outpost line as the discriminator between Indonesian course of action 1 and course of action 2, with collection focus on storage-area imagery and transport counts on the Merauke to Tanah Merah axis; the course of action 2 indicator set includes medical and engineer support concentrating at Tanah Merah. |
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| |
| A named area of interest covering amphibious movement from Surabaya toward the Arafura Sea is stated, with the four-day transit recorded as the warning interval.The Indonesian ground offensive indicator set includes amphibious shipping moving from Surabaya toward the Arafura Sea; the nearest of three Indonesian Marine Corps brigades is at Surabaya approximately four days away by amphibious ship; one CAKRA-class submarine is assessed operating in the Arafura Sea at LOW confidence with position, patrol box and time on station not established. |
| Three rotational border battalions of aggregate approximately 2,200 personnel operate under Kostrad Perbatasan on border outpost duty; the Indonesian ground offensive indicator set includes the three Satgas Pamtas battalions consolidating to static frontage, while the coercive demonstration course of action method is continued fortification of the outpost line. |
| Three ground avenues lead into the Komavi area from the west and northwest, all foot and trail movement through forest and swamp, none trafficable to wheeled vehicles; the JIPOE carries trafficability of the three assessed cross-border ground avenues into Komavi as an outstanding LOW-confidence collection gap. |
| The OPM most likely course of action indicators include small groups moving from the Komavi settlement into the outlying hills, absence of the Morning Star flag in the displaced area and increased food purchase at Kiunga and in upper Fly villages, while the most dangerous course of action indicator is concentration rather than dispersal of armed elements near the displaced area. |
| The facts register records 11 military personnel permanently assigned and 34 Department of Defense contractors, with the Port Moresby location.Military personnel permanently assigned in country number 11, at the Office of Defense Cooperation and Defense Attache Office, Port Moresby; Department of Defense contractors number 34. |
| The facts register records more than 2,000 United States citizens resident with 1,180 traveller enrolment registrations.Only the population figure appears with no enrolment figure, or neither appears.United States citizens in Papua New Guinea number more than 2,000, concentrated in Port Moresby, Lae and the mining districts, with 1,180 traveller enrolment registrations; Embassy Port Moresby holds the consular population and evacuation planning report of record dated 21 JUN 2026. |
| No United States engineer, airfield or port reconnaissance has been conducted in Western Province since 2024; pavement classification numbers and California bearing ratio data are not held for any airfield in Western Province. |
| An acquisition and cross-servicing agreement is in force with Australia and none with Papua New Guinea; logistic cross-servicing with Papua New Guinea for fuel, subsistence, transport, port and airfield services and construction materials is not recorded as concluded. |
| No supplemental rules of engagement have been requested or approved for this operation and a draft package is in preparation covering self-defence of United States persons and property, protection of designated persons, and convoy security; supplemental measures required for the planned operation are to be identified and submitted for approval with the Commander's Estimate.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Legal considerations,Initial Staff Running Estimates;Annexes and References;CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S10-009,C7:SS2-S10-009,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Is the prima facie refugee status of the displaced West Papuan population at Komavi recorded as a fact with the state on which Convention obligations fall?,"The facts register records prima facie refugee status for the approximately 10,000 West Papuans and records that Convention obligations attach to Papua New Guinea.","Refugee status is omitted, or the obligation is attributed to the United States, or the obligation is left unattributed.","Papua New Guinea is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol subject to reservations; the approximately 10,000 West Papuans who crossed in February 2026 and settled in the Komavi area hold prima facie refugee status recognised on a group basis; the principal consequence is Article 33 non-refoulement and Convention obligations attach to the contracting state, which for the Komavi population is Papua New Guinea.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions; Legal considerations,Annexes and References |
| SS2-S10-011,C7:SS2-S10-011,S10,Known facts,2,CI,positive,9,Is the Defense Intelligence Agency judgement that Indonesian forces are preparing a limited offensive recorded as an assessment rather than as a fact?,"The judgement appears under assessments with its stated confidence, and not in the facts register.",The judgement appears in the facts register or is stated as established Indonesian intent without a confidence annotation.,"The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses that Indonesian forces are preparing for a limited offensive into Papua New Guinea to eliminate OPM and NLA strongholds and camps, carried at MODERATE confidence in the order of battle; national intelligence agencies in consultation with the USPACOM J2 hold the same assessment.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions,Adversary Order of Battle;DIA Regional Intelligence Summary;Initial Staff Running Estimates |
| SS2-S10-017,C7:SS2-S10-017,S10,Known facts,1,SI,positive,2,Is the absence of any road connection between Daru and the Komavi area recorded as a fact?,"The facts register records that no road connects Daru and the Komavi area, with the 190 air mile separation stated.",The absence of a road is not recorded or overland movement between Daru and Komavi is treated as available.,"Daru to Komavi is 190 air miles with no roads at all; the pairs Lae to Port Moresby, Lae to Daru, Port Moresby to Daru, and Daru to the Komavi area all have no direct road connection; the JIPOE records the absence of any road across the 190 air miles between Daru and Komavi as the most consequential terrain feature in the joint operations area.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions,Critical Geography;DIA Country Fact Sheet;JIPOE Brief |
| SS2-S10-N01,C7:SS2-S10-N01,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Is the arrival and settlement of the West Papuan refugee population in the Komavi area recorded in the mission analysis brief as a fact?,"The fact is recorded that approximately 10,000 West Papuan refugees crossed the international border into Papua New Guinea in February 2026 and settled in the Komavi area of Western Province along the Fly River.","The refugee population is omitted from the facts register, or is recorded without its approximate size or without its location.","Approximately 10,000 refugees crossed the international border into Papua New Guinea and settled in the Komavi area of Western Province following the declaration of war by the National Liberation Army in February 2026. The Komavi area lies along the Fly River.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions,Strategic Context;DIA Regional Intelligence Summary;CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S10-N04,C7:SS2-S10-N04,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Is the Australia and Papua New Guinea mutual defence treaty of October 2025 recorded in the mission analysis brief as a fact?,The fact is recorded that Australia and Papua New Guinea signed a mutual defence treaty in October 2025 under which each is to come to the other's aid in defence of sovereignty.,,Australia and Papua New Guinea concluded a mutual defence treaty in October 2025 that secured their mutual defence and security interests and affirmed that each would come to the other's aid in defence of sovereignty.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions; Legal considerations,DIA Regional Intelligence Summary;CJCS Warning Order;Annexes and References |
| SS2-S10-003a,C7:SS2-S10-003a,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Is the Article 5 commitment to protect and secure United States personnel in Papua New Guinea recorded as a fact in the mission analysis brief?,The facts register records that Article 5 of the 2023 Agreement on Defense Cooperation commits the United States to protect and secure United States personnel in Papua New Guinea.,"That limb of Article 5 is omitted, or the Agreement is recorded with no statement of the personnel-protection commitment.",Article 5 of the 2023 Agreement on Defense Cooperation commits the United States to protect and secure United States personnel in Papua New Guinea and thus provides the United States the ability to cooperate in the defence of Papua New Guinea territory from foreign invasion; the geographic frame of both subjects is the territory of Papua New Guinea and the Agreement is bilateral with no third state a party.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions; Legal considerations,Annexes and References;Strategic Context |
| SS2-S10-003b,C7:SS2-S10-003b,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Is the Article 5 ability to cooperate in the defence of Papua New Guinea territory from foreign invasion recorded as a fact in the mission analysis brief?,The facts register records that Article 5 of the 2023 Agreement on Defense Cooperation provides the United States the ability to cooperate in the defence of Papua New Guinea territory from foreign invasion.,"That limb of Article 5 is omitted, or the ability to cooperate is recorded as an obligation to defend Papua New Guinea territory.",Article 5 of the 2023 Agreement on Defense Cooperation commits the United States to protect and secure United States personnel in Papua New Guinea and thus provides the United States the ability to cooperate in the defence of Papua New Guinea territory from foreign invasion; the geographic frame of both subjects is the territory of Papua New Guinea and the Agreement is bilateral with no third state a party.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions; Legal considerations,Annexes and References;Strategic Context |
| SS2-S10-003c,C7:SS2-S10-003c,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Is the bilateral scope of the 2023 Agreement on Defense Cooperation recorded in the mission analysis brief?,"The brief records that the 2023 Agreement on Defense Cooperation is bilateral, with no third state a party, and that the geographic frame of both Article 5 subjects is the territory of Papua New Guinea.","The bilateral scope is not recorded, or the Agreement is described as extending to a third state or as a mutual defence obligation.",Article 5 of the 2023 Agreement on Defense Cooperation commits the United States to protect and secure United States personnel in Papua New Guinea and thus provides the United States the ability to cooperate in the defence of Papua New Guinea territory from foreign invasion; the geographic frame of both subjects is the territory of Papua New Guinea and the Agreement is bilateral with no third state a party.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions; Legal considerations,Annexes and References;Strategic Context |
| SS2-S10-N06,C7:SS2-S10-N06,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Is the Department of State travel advisory for Papua New Guinea and the encouragement of voluntary departure recorded as a fact in the mission analysis brief?,The facts register records that the Department of State has issued a travel advisory for Papua New Guinea and has encouraged the resident United States citizens to leave voluntarily for their own safety.,"The travel advisory is omitted, the encouragement of voluntary departure is omitted, or departure is recorded as ordered or authorised rather than encouraged.","The Department of State has issued a travel advisory for Papua New Guinea and encouraged the more than 2,000 American citizens living in Papua New Guinea to voluntarily leave for their own safety.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions,Strategic Context |
| S-10,C7:S-10,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,"Is the interagency lead arrangement, under which the Department of State retains the lead for evacuation and diplomatic engagement and the United States Agency for International Development retains the lead for humanitarian response, captured as a fact in the mission analysis brief?",The interagency lead arrangement is captured and Department of War planning is recorded as being in support.,"Department of War planning is presented as the lead for noncombatant evacuation, diplomatic engagement or humanitarian response, or the arrangement is not recorded.",Interagency coordination: the Department of State retains the lead for the evacuation of noncombatants and for all diplomatic engagement. The United States Agency for International Development retains the lead for the humanitarian response. Department of War planning is in support.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints; Nonmilitary friendly networks,CJCS Warning Order |
| S-11,C7:S-11,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Is the releasability restriction under which nothing in the higher order is releasable to Indonesia captured as a fact in the mission analysis brief?,The releasability restriction concerning Indonesia is captured as a limitation on information sharing.,"The releasability restriction is omitted, or information sharing with Indonesia is contemplated without recording the restriction.",Classification and releasability: this order is releasable to Australia. It is not releasable to Papua New Guinea in its entirety. Nothing in this order is releasable to Indonesia.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints,CJCS Warning Order |
| S-16,C7:S-16,S10,Known facts,2,I,positive,5,Is the absence of an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement with Papua New Guinea captured in the mission analysis brief as a fact?,"Logistic cross-servicing with Papua New Guinea is assumed to be available, or the absence of the instrument is not recorded as a fact.","The absence of an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement with Papua New Guinea is recorded as a fact, and is distinguished from the agreement in force with Australia.","No acquisition and cross-servicing agreement with Papua New Guinea is recorded as in force. An acquisition and cross-servicing agreement is in force with Australia, with annual order and transfer ceilings. No host-nation support arrangement exists with Papua New Guinea, no LOGCAP task order is active, and no Defense Logistics Agency Energy contract or fuel support point exists in country.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints; Legal considerations,CJCS Warning Order;Annexes and References;Initial Staff Running Estimates |
| S-18,C7:S-18,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis record the fact that combined planning, namely that planning with the Australian Defence Force is authorised at the classification of the order while planning with the Papua New Guinea Defence Force is authorised only through the Defense Attache, Port Moresby?",Mission analysis records both authorisations with their differing channels and limits.,"Mission analysis omits the limits, or treats combined planning with the PNGDF as unrestricted.","CJCS Warning Order paragraph 3.D: 'Combined planning with the Australian Defence Force is authorized at the classification of this order. Combined planning with the Papua New Guinea Defence Force is authorized through the Defense Attache, Port Moresby.' Paragraph 5.D adds that the order is not releasable to Papua New Guinea in its entirety.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Limitations - constraints and restraints,CJCS Warning Order |
| S-19,C7:S-19,S10,Known facts,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis identify the fact that the security assistance task has no unobligated funding authority and requires identification of statutory limits and approval timelines?,"Mission analysis states that the funding authority for security assistance to Papua New Guinea is fully obligated, and records the requirement to identify statutory limits, approval timelines and any requirement exceeding an existing authority. Both the obligation statement and the identification requirement are present.","Mission analysis plans security assistance without addressing funding authority, asserts funding availability, or states that the authority is fully obligated with no requirement recorded to identify statutory limits and approval timelines.","CJCS Warning Order paragraph 4.A: 'Operation is to be resourced from existing operation and maintenance funds. No supplemental appropriation is available. Funding authorities available for security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and support to foreign forces are to be identified in the Commander's Estimate with their statutory limits and their approval timelines. Any requirement that would exceed an existing authority is to be identified as such.' The Initial Staff Running Estimates record the 10 USC 333 Papua New Guinea maritime security programme at 4.6 million dollars as fully obligated, with changes requiring congressional notification, and record no acquisition and cross-servicing agreement with Papua New Guinea. |
| The camp and cache reporting is carried as unconfirmed reporting, annotated as such, and is not entered in the facts register.Unconfirmed reports state that large numbers of well-equipped insurgents crossed with the refugee flow and established numerous camps and weapons caches in the outlying hills on the Papua New Guinea side; no camp or cache location, strength or organisational identity on Papua New Guinea territory has been validated by any collection discipline and the reporting is carried for awareness only; the packet states that reporting expressly annotated unconfirmed is not to be promoted to fact. |
| Mission analysis states an imminent invasion as fact, or builds the timeline on imminence rather than on the assessed readiness.The Warning Order attributes imminence to the Prime Minister via the Ambassador. The DIA assessment is preparation for a limited offensive, the directed assumption set contains no imminence assumption, the Commander's Initial Planning Guidance assumes no invasion posture before N plus 14 at the earliest, and the JIPOE assesses earliest readiness for a ground offensive as not before mid-July 2026.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Facts and assumptions | Risk: Risk to mission | Risk: Risk to mission and force,CJCS Warning Order;Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;JIPOE Brief |
| SS2-S11-012,C7:SS2-S11-012,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Is the Komavi airstrip assessed as unable to receive C-17 aircraft on both the length and the width criteria?,,C-17 delivery to Komavi is assumed possible or the width criterion is not tested.,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Capabilities allocated; Vulnerabilities,Critical Geography;Initial Staff Running Estimates |
| SS2-S11-022,C7:SS2-S11-022,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,Is the absence of a bulk fuel support point in Papua New Guinea identified with the commercial tankage available and its replenishment cycle?,The brief records the absence of any Defense Logistics Agency Energy contract or fuel support point in country and states the commercial tankage held at Jacksons International and Nadzab with the 14-day coastal tanker cycle.,Fuel is assumed available in country or the commercial tankage is cited without the days-of-offtake or replenishment cycle.,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Vulnerabilities,Initial Staff Running Estimates;Critical Geography |
| SS2-S11-023,C7:SS2-S11-023,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Is the absence of Class V and Class VIII and Class IX holdings in country carried as a sustainment shortfall against the notional force?,,Sustainment is asserted to be adequate or the class-of-supply positions are omitted.,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Vulnerabilities,Initial Staff Running Estimates |
| SS2-S11-024,C7:SS2-S11-024,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Is the absence of aeromedical evacuation and en-route care capability from the apportioned force list identified as a shortfall?,The brief identifies the absence of aeromedical evacuation crews and en-route care teams as a capability shortfall requiring a request for forces.,The absence is not identified or aeromedical evacuation is assumed available in the operational area.,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Vulnerabilities,Initial Staff Running Estimates;US Force List for Planning |
| SS2-S11-028,C7:SS2-S11-028,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Is the capacity of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force stated in terms of what it can and cannot provide in Western Province?,,Partner capacity is stated as a national total only or partner performance is assumed without a capability statement.,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Capabilities allocated,Initial Staff Running Estimates;DIA Regional Intelligence Summary;CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S11-029,C7:SS2-S11-029,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Is the Australian contribution treated as a coalition capability outside United States command rather than as apportioned United States force?,,Australian formations are aggregated into the United States force total or are treated as available to United States tasking.,,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Capabilities allocated,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance;Annexes and References;US Force List for Planning |
| SS2-S11-030,C7:SS2-S11-030,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,SI,positive,2,Is the absence of notice-to-move data for the Australian entries on the force list identified as an unresolved planning input?,The brief records that Australian entries carry location without notice to move and that Australian closure cannot therefore be computed from the list.,Australian closure dates are asserted or the data gap is not noted.,"The Australian Defence Force section of the US Force List for Planning states unit and location for HQ 1st Division at Brisbane, 17th Sustainment Brigade at Sydney, 1/1 Brigade at Darwin, 3/1 Brigade at Townsville, Army Aviation Command and Special Operations Command at Canberra, 16th Aviation Brigade at Brisbane, No. 452 Squadron at Darwin and No. 75 Squadron at Tindal, without the notice-to-move column carried against the United States entries.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Capabilities allocated,US Force List for Planning |
| SS2-S11-002a,C7:SS2-S11-002a,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,CI,positive,9,Is the naval force apportioned at Yokosuka on notice to move N captured in the mission analysis brief?,The brief records USS BLUE RIDGE and the REAGAN carrier strike group at Yokosuka on notice to move N.,"The Yokosuka package is omitted, or is recorded without its Yokosuka location or its notice to move N.","USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC 19) and REAGAN CSG are apportioned at Yokosuka on notice N, the strike group comprising COMSTRKGRU FIVE, COMDESRON FIFTEEN, USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN 76), CVW 5 with F/A-18 and F-35C, USS PREBLE, USS MCCAMPBELL, USS DEWEY, USS JOHN FINN, USS RALPH JOHNSON, USS LOUISVILLE (SSN 724) and USNS GUADALOUPE (T-AO-200).",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Capabilities allocated,US Force List for Planning |
| SS2-S11-002b,C7:SS2-S11-002b,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,CI,positive,9,Is the composition of the Yokosuka naval package captured in the mission analysis brief?,"The brief identifies the carrier air wing, destroyer, submarine and oiler elements of the REAGAN carrier strike group.","The package is recorded as a single unnamed carrier strike group with no composition, or one or more of the carrier air wing, destroyer, submarine and oiler elements is omitted.","USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC 19) and REAGAN CSG are apportioned at Yokosuka on notice N, the strike group comprising COMSTRKGRU FIVE, COMDESRON FIFTEEN, USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN 76), CVW 5 with F/A-18 and F-35C, USS PREBLE, USS MCCAMPBELL, USS DEWEY, USS JOHN FINN, USS RALPH JOHNSON, USS LOUISVILLE (SSN 724) and USNS GUADALOUPE (T-AO-200).",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Capabilities allocated,US Force List for Planning |
| SS2-S11-N05,C7:SS2-S11-N05,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,I,positive,5,Is the amphibious shipping for 31 MEU captured at Sasebo on notice to move N+1?,"The brief records COMPHIBRON ELEVEN and its amphibious shipping at Sasebo on notice to move N+1, distinct from the Okinawa location and notice to move N of 31 MEU.","The amphibious shipping is omitted, is recorded without its Sasebo location or without its notice to move N+1, or is treated as collocated with 31 MEU at Okinawa.","COMPHIBRON ELEVEN, comprising USS TRIPOLI (LHD 7), USS NEW ORLEANS (LPD 18), USS RUSHMORE (LSD 47) and USS SAN DIEGO (LPD 22), with TACRON TWELVE and FLEET SURGICAL TEAM NINE, is apportioned at Sasebo on notice to move N+1, while 31 MEU is apportioned at Okinawa on notice to move N and is recorded as ashore on Okinawa.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Capabilities allocated,US Force List for Planning |
| S-08,C7:S-08,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,"Is requesting strategic airlift, air refueling, and rotary-wing lift derived in the mission analysis brief as an RFF arising from their absence on the apportioned force list?","An RFF is recommended to request strategic airlift, air refueling, and rotary-wing lift as force-flow shortfalls, and the basis given is that none of the three appears on the apportioned force list.","No lift request task is derived, or lift is treated as available without any statement that it is absent from the apportionment.","The US Force List for Planning carries no C-17 or C-5 strategic airlift, no KC-135 or KC-46 air refueling aircraft, and no Army aviation brigade or assault or heavy-lift helicopter battalion. Rotary lift is limited to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit aviation combat element and Australian 16th Aviation Brigade. The CJCS Warning Order establishes a reporting channel for requests for forces and capabilities, as generated, to Joint Staff J3 with information to CDRUSTRANSCOM.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Implied tasks",US Force List for Planning;CJCS Warning Order |
| S-26,C7:S-26,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis brief include any apportioned force capability carried without its stated location and its stated notice to move?,One or more apportioned capabilities are listed by title alone without location or without notice to move.,Every apportioned capability named in the brief appears with both its stated location and its stated notice to move.,"The US Force List for Planning states unit, location and notice to move for each United States entry, for example 11 ABN 1BCT (INFANTRY) at Alaska on N+1, NMCB FIVE at Okinawa on N+7, and 84 EN BN at Hawaii on N+14.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Friendly assessment: Capabilities allocated,US Force List for Planning |
| S-27,C7:S-27,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,D,negative,-5,"Is the Australian contribution treated as an apportioned United States force, rather than a coalition capability outside United States command?",Australian formations are aggregated into the United States force total or are treated as available to United States tasking.,"Australian formations are carried separately from the United States apportionment, with the dual command structure recorded.","The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance assumes a dual command structure in which COM7FLT commands JTF SOUTHERN SHIELD as a United States-only headquarters alongside a combined command of Australian and Papua New Guinea armed forces, and states that the United States will not directly command Papua New Guinea or Australian armed forces or their operations; no trilateral command instrument exists among the three states. |
| Does the mission analysis brief include any treatment of the apportionment at the force list as an allocation, an assignment, or an authority to deploy?The CJCS Warning Order states that forces apportioned for planning are for planning only and that apportionment does not constitute allocation, assignment, or authority to deploy; the packet repeats that the apportionment is not an allocation, an assignment, or an authority to deploy. |
| The CJCS Warning Order tasks CDRUSPACOM to determine the forces, capabilities and time required and to identify all shortfalls against the forces apportioned at the US Force List for Planning, and establishes a reporting channel for requests for forces and capabilities, as generated, to Joint Staff J3 with information to CDRUSTRANSCOM. JP 5-0 initial force analysis is a rough-order match of required capability against available fielded inventory. |
| JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Objectives and effects |
| JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Objectives and effects |
| JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Objectives and effects |
| The theater-strategic objective of de-escalating the crisis and returning Indonesia and Papua New Guinea to a negotiated settlement is stated separately from the military objectives, with the instruments of national power noted.The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance states that the USPACOM theater-strategic objective, using all instruments of national power, is to de-escalate the crisis and return Indonesia and PNG to a negotiated settlement of the border and the disposition of OPM.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Objectives and effects; USG interagency objectives",Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S12-005,C7:SS2-S12-005,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,1,SI,positive,2,Is the operational objective of a rapid build-up of credible ground forces in Western Province carried into the objectives set?,The objectives set contains the rapid build-up of credible ground forces in the province of Western Papua New Guinea.,The operational objective is absent from the objectives set.,The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance states as a USPACOM operational objective the rapid build-up of credible ground forces in the province of Western Papua New Guinea.,"JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - Objectives, effects and task analysis: Objectives and effects",Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S12-006,C7:SS2-S12-006,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,1,SI,positive,2,Is the operational objective of defending the international border adjacent to the Komavi area carried into the objectives set?,The objectives set contains defence of the international border adjacent to the Komavi area.,The operational objective is absent from the objectives set.,,,Commander's Initial Planning Guidance |
| SS2-S12-017,C7:SS2-S12-017,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,CI,positive,9,Is an evaluation criterion derived that measures the escalatory or de-escalatory signature of each option?,"An evaluation criterion is stated that scores how each option would be read in Jakarta and in Port Moresby and in the wider region, distinguishing options whose effect depends on visibility from those whose value depends on discretion.",No signature or escalation criterion appears among the evaluation criteria.,"The CJCS Warning Order directs that every option developed be accompanied by an assessment of how it would be read in Jakarta, in Port Moresby, and in the wider region, and that options whose deterrent effect depends on visibility be distinguished from those whose value depends on discretion.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 - COA evaluation criteria,CJCS Warning Order |
| SS2-S12-018,C7:SS2-S12-018,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,CI,positive,9,Is an evaluation criterion derived that measures force closure time against the assessed adversary timeline?,"An evaluation criterion is stated that scores each option on the time required to place forces where they are needed measured against the time available, referencing the assessed adversary readiness.",No time or closure criterion appears among the evaluation criteria.,"The CJCS Warning Order directs that the estimate address the time required to place forces where they are needed, measured against the time available; the Commander's Initial Planning Guidance assumes Indonesian forces will not be postured for invasion until N+14 at the earliest and the JIPOE assesses earliest readiness for the ground offensive as not before mid-July 2026. |
| The CJCS Warning Order directs planning for the sustainment of committed forces at operating distance from established infrastructure and directs that the estimate address the infrastructure required to receive, move and sustain those forces and its present state. |
| An existing concept plan, country plan annex or noncombatant evacuation concept plan is adapted as the basis of the analysis.Planning products held by the staff are used as reference only, and the analysis addresses the full range of options available to the command as required by the CJCS Warning Order, rather than adapting the standing plans recorded in the Initial Staff Running Estimates.The CJCS Warning Order requires the Commander's Estimate to address the full range of options available to the command, to identify what the command can and cannot accomplish with the forces apportioned, and to state plainly the capability and time shortfalls that would attend each option. The Commander's Initial Planning Guidance directs the staff to examine and evaluate the directed operational concept against force requirements, capability shortfalls, time and risk, and to evaluate the proposed termination criteria. The Initial Staff Running Estimates record that the staff holds a theater campaign plan and Papua New Guinea country plan annex revised 2025, a standing concept plan for noncombatant evacuation operations last reviewed 2024 and not exercised since, and a 2024 infrastructure and access assessment. |
| Does the mission analysis capture the assumption that Indonesia would confine military activity to the border region adjacent to and including the Komavi area, despite its Indonesian maritime reach into the Arafura Sea and the Fly delta approaches?The mission analysis captures the assumption that Indonesia will confine military activity to the border region adjacent to and including the Komavi area, despite its Indonesian maritime reach into the Arafura Sea and the Fly delta approaches.The mission analysis fails to record the geographic limitation of Indonesian military activity as a planning assumption, OR captures the border confinement assumption without explicitly contextualizing it against Indonesia's operational maritime reach into the Arafura Sea and Fly delta approaches.","12_CIPG carries the initial-planning assumption that upon hostilities Indonesia will confine all military activities to the border region adjacent and including the Komavi area, while 03_Adversary_OOB assesses one CAKRA-class Type 209 submarine at sea in the Arafura Sea, three corvettes and six frigates based at Manokwari Naval Base, and over 100 armed fast boats of 80 to 100 tons suitable for the shallow Arafura littoral and the Fly River delta approaches.","Assumptions list of the mission analysis brief, cross-referenced to the operational environment and threat paragraph",12_CIPG; 03_Adversary_OOB; 06_Critical_Geography |
| C7-GAP-02,C7:C7-GAP-02,S10,Known facts,3,SI,positive,2,"Does the response reconcile varying Indonesian ground strength estimates and establish Indonesian strength as a clear, supportable fact?","The response reconciles varying Indonesian ground strength estimates and establish Indonesian strength as a clear, supportable fact.","The response fails to resolve discrepancies between conflicting Indonesian ground strength estimates, OR presents troop counts as ambiguous, contradictory, or unverified without establishing a definitive, supportable baseline fact.","03_Adversary_OOB lists Yonif 751 through 756 at approximately 1,400 personnel each while reporting the aggregate strength of the same six battalions at 8,000, and states both are reproduced because unit-level and aggregate reporting are not in agreement; 10_JIPOE records that approximately 2,000 to 2,400 personnel of the 20,000 assessed in West Papua are unaccounted for at unit level.","Known facts paragraph, threat strength sub-paragraph of the mission analysis brief",03_Adversary_OOB; 10_JIPOE; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary |
| C7-GAP-03,C7:C7-GAP-03,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the response establish as a fact that the existing Komavi airstrip cannot receive C-130 aircraft without engineer work, rather than counting it as an available fixed-wing point of debarkation?","The response states that the 760-metre grass-over-laterite strip at Komavi falls short of the contingency C-130 assault-strip criteria held by the staff, and names lengthening the runway, surfacing, or California bearing ratio testing as a prerequisite before C-130 delivery can be planned.","The response counts Komavi among the airfields usable by C-130 or larger fixed-wing aircraft, or proposes an air line of communication into Komavi with no mention of the runway length, surface, or bearing-ratio shortfall.","06_Critical_Geography records the Komavi airstrip at 760 m landing distance available, 18 m usable width, grass over compacted laterite, 1.8 percent gradient, no apron, no fuel, no lighting and no pavement classification number held, while 14_Running_Estimates gives the staff contingency criterion for a C-130 semi-prepared assault strip as 1,065 m by 18 m at California bearing ratio 6 minimum, reducible to 915 m only for a single-ship emergency delivery at restricted gross weight.","Force and resource analysis, reception and onward-movement sub-paragraph",06_Critical_Geography; 14_Running_Estimates; 12_CIPG |
| C7-GAP-04,C7:C7-GAP-04,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,Does the response identify that the apportioned Hawaii-based brigade combat team and engineer battalion carry an N+14 notice to move and therefore cannot be established in Western Province by the date Indonesian forces are assumed able to invade?,"The response separates notice to move from closure, states that HQ 25 Infantry Division, 25 IN 1BCT and 84 EN BN only begin movement at N+14, and identifies 11 ABN 1BCT at N+1 from Alaska as the only apportioned brigade able to start moving ahead of the assumed Indonesian readiness date.","The response reads the N+14 entries on the force list as arrival or closure dates, or reports the apportioned ground force as adequate to the assumed Indonesian timeline with no treatment of movement and closure time.","04_Forces_Available_for_Planning gives HQ 25 INF DIV, 25 IN 1BCT and 84 EN BN a notice to move of N+14 from Hawaii and 11 ABN 1BCT a notice to move of N+1 from Alaska, and 12_CIPG carries the initial planning assumption that Indonesian military forces will not be postured for invasion of Papua New Guinea until N+14 at the earliest.","Force and resource analysis paragraph, and the time-available discussion",04_Forces_Available_for_Planning; 14_Running_Estimates; 12_CIPG |
| C7-GAP-05,C7:C7-GAP-05,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,CI,positive,9,Does the response recognise that the specified special operations task to deny Free Papua Movement sanctuary in Western Province depends on partnership and presence of Papua New Guinea Defence Forces presence in the Komavi area?,The response establishes that the specified special operations task to deny Free Papua Movement sanctuary in Western Province depends on partnership and presence of Papua New Guinea Defence Forces presence in the Komavi area.,"The response treats the specified special operations task to deny Free Papua Movement sanctuary in Western Province as a unilateral capability, or fails to explicitly link its feasibility to PNGDF partnership and physical presence in the Komavi area.","07_CJCS_WARNORD paragraph 3.B directs CDRUSPACOM, when directed, to conduct Special Operations Activities in the Western Province of Papua New Guinea to deny OPM/NLA sanctuary, while paragraph 1.J limits employment of United States force against the Free Papua Movement to self-defense or direct support of Papua New Guinea Defence Force operations; 06_Critical_Geography records no permanent Papua New Guinea presence on the Western Province border, the nearest element being the Kiunga company of approximately 110 personnel.","Specified and implied task list, with the linked entry in the restraints list",07_CJCS_WARNORD; 06_Critical_Geography; 14_Running_Estimates |
| C7-GAP-06,C7:C7-GAP-06,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify that the stated end-state condition of repatriating the West Papuan population at Komavi runs against Papua New Guinea's non-refoulement obligation under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention?,,,,Military objectives and proposed termination criteria paragraph,11_Annexes; 12_CIPG; 02map_Situational_Map |
| C7-GAP-07,C7:C7-GAP-07,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,I,positive,5,Does the response record as a limitation that the directed provision of security assistance to Papua New Guinea armed forces has no funding authority available in the current fiscal year?,,,,,07_CJCS_WARNORD; 14_Running_Estimates |
| C7-GAP-08,C7:C7-GAP-08,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,,The response names the OLGETA WARRIOR 26 element of 62 personnel at Lae and the Pacific Partnership 26 detachment of 41 personnel at Wewak.,,,,14_Running_Estimates; 07_CJCS_WARNORD; 01_Strategic_Context |
| C7-GAP-09,C7:C7-GAP-09,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,SI,positive,2,Does the response conclude that the Mi-35P detachment at Timika cannot support operations over the Komavi area at full weapon load from its present basing?,,,,Threat capability sub-paragraph of the operational environment assessment,03_Adversary_OOB; 02map_Situational_Map; 10_JIPOE |
| C7-GAP-10,C7:C7-GAP-10,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the response derive a priority intelligence requirement aimed at border crossing sites to identify indications of a border incursion?,The response derive a priority intelligence requirement aimed at border crossing sites to identify indications of a border incursion.,"The response fails to derive a Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR) specifically focused on border crossing sites, OR formulates a broad threat PIR that omits the specific objective of detecting indications of a border incursion.","03_Adversary_OOB assesses at HIGH confidence that release authority for cross-border kinetic action is retained in Jakarta rather than delegated to the Military Area Command in Papua, and lists the Indonesian decision timeline among its intelligence gaps with no validated indicator set held; 14_Running_Estimates records that no collection plan has been published by the Joint Intelligence Operations Center Pacific.","CCIR paragraph, priority intelligence requirements list",03_Adversary_OOB; 14_Running_Estimates; 10_JIPOE |
| C7-GAP-11,C7:C7-GAP-11,S6,Assumptions,3,CD,negative,-9,"Does the response carry the June dry season at Daru and Port Moresby inland to the Komavi area, describing the objective area as seasonally dry?","The response describes the Komavi area or the Fly headwaters as being in a dry season, or bases trafficability, airstrip serviceability, construction rates or river depth at the objective on dry-season conditions drawn from the southern coastal plain.","The response separates the Aw coastal regime at Daru and Port Moresby from the Af regime at Komavi and states that the Fly headwaters have no dry season, citing the June rainfall of roughly 520 millimetres across 22 rain days.","06_Critical_Geography states that in June Daru, Port Moresby and the southern coastal plain are in their driest months while the Fly headwaters and the Komavi area are not, that June rainfall at Komavi averages 520 millimetres across 22 rain days, and that the distinction between the coastal and headwater regimes is the single largest source of error in seasonal planning for the Western Province.","Operational environment paragraph, weather and climate effects sub-paragraph",06_Critical_Geography; 10_JIPOE; 05_Country_Fact_Sheet |
| C7-GAP-12,C7:C7-GAP-12,S10,Known facts,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response present the reported Free Papua Movement camps and weapons caches in the outlying hills on the Papua New Guinea side of the border as validated fact?,"The response asserts the existence, number, location or strength of camps or caches on Papua New Guinea territory as established, or builds a fact, task or force requirement on them, with no record that the reporting is unconfirmed.","The response classifies the camp and cache reporting as unconfirmed by any collection discipline and carries it as an assumption or an information requirement, keeping it out of the known-facts list.","03_Adversary_OOB states that reporting of large numbers of well-equipped insurgents crossing with the February 2026 refugee flow and establishing camps and weapons caches in the outlying hills on the Papua New Guinea side of the border is UNCONFIRMED, that no camp or cache location, strength or organisational identity on Papua New Guinea territory has been validated by any collection discipline, and that it is carried for awareness only; 07_CJCS_WARNORD paragraph 1.A repeats the same caveat.",Known facts list and assumptions list of the mission analysis brief,03_Adversary_OOB; 07_CJCS_WARNORD; 10_JIPOE |
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