| item_id,item_uid,step,step_name,tier,severity,polarity,weight,question,pass_condition,fail_condition,source_fact,artifact_anchor,source_documents |
| SM-MA-O2-014,C8:SM-MA-O2-014,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify USAFRICOM as the supported command and NAVAF as the lead component?,Identifies USAFRICOM as supported command and NAVAF as the designated lead component.,Assigns the supported role to another command |
| SM-MA-O2-015,C8:SM-MA-O2-015,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the response state the commander's intent elements the CIPG supplies — purpose, method and end state?","States the commander's purpose, method and end state as distinct elements of intent.",Merges purpose and method |
| SM-MA-O2-016,C8:SM-MA-O2-016,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the response's restated mission commit the joint force to on-shore kinetic action as a US or coalition task?,The restated mission or its supporting tasks commit US or coalition forces to on-shore kinetic action outside those three authorised bases.,NO part of the restated mission commits US or coalition forces to on-shore kinetic action; EVERY on-shore action referenced rests on host-nation lead or one of the three authorised bases.,"Direct kinetic action against pirate on-shore infrastructure is conducted only by host-nation forces or with explicit host-nation request (07_CJCS_EXORD, method; 12_CIPG v2 para 1.2), and Annex A.5 permits no on-shore action in coastal-state territory except by coastal-state invitation, under an NCA-authorised hostage rescue, or under separate NEO authority.",07_CJCS_EXORD.docx — Method; 11_Annexes.docx — Annex A.5,07;12;11 |
| SM-MA-O2-017,C8:SM-MA-O2-017,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response produce a restated mission that omits the hostage-recovery purpose?,The restated mission addresses maritime security or coalition presence without carrying hostage recovery as a purpose.,The restated mission carries BOTH the maritime-security purpose and the hostage-recovery purpose; NEITHER is dropped.,"The CIPG's purpose and end state both carry hostage recovery as a co-equal element alongside restoring the maritime security regime, and the CJCS EXORD establishes LOE 2 as military support to hostage recovery (12_CIPG v2 paras 1.1, 1.3 |
| SM-MA-O3-025,C8:SM-MA-O3-025,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the approved strategic communication themes by count and content?,States the five approved themes.,States fewer than five themes |
| SM-MA-O3-026,C8:SM-MA-O3-026,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response restate the commander's approach without carrying forward the constraint that host-nation forces lead ashore?,"Presents the operational approach without the host-nation-lead-ashore constraint, or presents coalition forces as the acting force ashore.",EVERY statement of the operational approach carries the host-nation-lead constraint for on-shore action; NONE omits it.,"Both the CJCS EXORD method and CIPG para 1.2 restrict direct kinetic action against on-shore pirate infrastructure to host-nation forces with coalition enabling support, and this is a defining feature of the approach rather than an incidental detail.",12_CIPG v2.docx — Method (para 1.2); 07_CJCS_EXORD.docx — Method,12;07 |
| SM-MA-O4-126,C8:SM-MA-O4-126,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response state the strategic preference for partner-led architectures, and that the regional architecture is the test case for it?","States the partner-led preference and identifies the Yaounde Architecture as the test case, or states the direction not to build parallel structures.",Presents the operation as US-led; or omits the partner-led preference; or proposes a parallel coordination structure.,"The 2024 US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa emphasizes African-led, African-owned security architectures over US-led intervention, and the Yaounde Architecture is the test case for that approach in the maritime domain; the strategy directs coordinating US engagement with the Yaounde Architecture rather than building parallel structures, and weights presence visits, exercises and capacity-building above kinetic operations (01_Strategic_Context sections 2.4, 4).",01_Strategic_Context.docx — Partner Development (section 2.4),01;12 |
| SM-MA-O2-130,C8:SM-MA-O2-130,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the operation's authorising legal basis for counter-piracy action on the high seas?,Identifies UNCLOS Articles 100 to 107 as the legal basis and notes the customary-international-law application.,Asserts a treaty obligation the annex does not support |
| SM-MA-O4-028,C8:SM-MA-O4-028,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the three concurrent end-state conditions and note that they are concurrent rather than alternative?,States all three end-state conditions and identifies them as concurrent.,States fewer than three |
| SM-MA-O4-029,C8:SM-MA-O4-029,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the three disjunctive termination criteria?,States all three termination paths and that they are alternatives to one another.,States fewer than three paths |
| SM-MA-O4-031,C8:SM-MA-O4-031,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response distinguish the military end state from the termination criteria?,States the military end state as a set of conditions distinct from the termination criteria.,Conflates the military end state with the termination criteria |
| SM-MA-O8-087,C8:SM-MA-O8-087,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the requirements and vulnerabilities associated with the adversary operational centre of gravity?,States both the requirements and the vulnerabilities of the adversary operational COG.,States the COG without its requirements or vulnerabilities |
| SM-MA-O8-090,C8:SM-MA-O8-090,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,"Does the response derive why the friendly operational centre of gravity is vulnerable, given the packet's contradictory assessments of the coordination node?","Derives that the friendly operational COG depends on a node the packet assesses inconsistently, and states the implication for redundancy or for the assumption.",Accepts the pass-through assumption without noting the contradiction |
| SM-MA-O8-091,C8:SM-MA-O8-091,S2,Operational environment and threat,3,I,positive,5,Does the response derive why coalition political will is the strategic centre of gravity rather than a supporting condition?,"Derives that the operation's feasibility rests on partner contributions the United States cannot generate itself, which is what makes political will a centre of gravity.",Restates the COG designation without deriving why it is decisive |
| SM-MA-O8-092,C8:SM-MA-O8-092,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response present a friendly capability or a key terrain feature as a center of gravity?,"Presents a platform, a port, a corridor or a discrete capability as a centre of gravity in place of a source of strength or will.","EVERY centre of gravity the response states is a source of strength, freedom of action or will to act; NONE is a platform, place or discrete capability.","JP 5-0 defines a centre of gravity as ""the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act"" (glossary, GL-6), and at IV-22 as the source of power or strength that enables a military force to achieve its objective. The packet's COGs are accordingly coalition political will, a coordination capability, surface presence, the on-shore hide network, and skiff and mother-ship operations — not platforms or places (12_CIPG v2 para 2.6; 10_JIPOE_Brief COG analysis).",12_CIPG v2.docx — para 2.6 |
| SM-MA-O8-093,C8:SM-MA-O8-093,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response state the adversary's assessed capacity for coordinated operations and the reserve that could augment it?,States the 2 to 4 operations per quarter capacity and identifies the reserve cells that could augment it.,States capacity without the reserve augmentation; or gives a figure the packet does not carry.,"The network can sustain 2 to 4 major coordinated kidnap-and-ransom operations per quarter at current capacity, and reserve cells DELTA, ECHO and FOXTROT could augment to support a sustained-campaign tempo consistent with the most likely adversary course of action (10_JIPOE_Brief; 03_Adversary_OOB).",10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — capacity assessment,10;03 |
| SM-MA-O8-094,C8:SM-MA-O8-094,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response identify which adversary cell is assessed to hold the vessel, and distinguish it from the others?",Names Cell BRAVO as holding AURORA STAR and distinguishes it from Cells ALPHA and CHARLIE.,Attributes the vessel to the wrong cell; or treats the network as undifferentiated by sector.,"Cell BRAVO operates in the Calabar-Cameroon border sector in the eastern Niger Delta and Cameroon EEZ border region, is attributed the MV AURORA STAR attack of 09 February 2027, and the vessel is assessed currently held in the Cell BRAVO hide network; Cell ALPHA operates at Bonny and Cell CHARLIE conducts mother-ship operations (03_Adversary_OOB section 2.2).",03_Adversary_OOB.docx — Cell BRAVO (section 2.2),03;02 |
| SM-MA-O8-095,C8:SM-MA-O8-095,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response state the mother-ship capability and the offshore reach it confers?,States the mother-ship capability and the approximately 200 nautical mile offshore reach it confers.,Omits the mother-ship reach; or gives a reach the packet does not carry; or attributes the capability to the wrong cell.,"Cell CHARLIE holds a mother-ship trawler capability extending operations to approximately 200 nautical miles offshore, alongside 15 to 25 modified skiffs at roughly 30 knots with about 300 nautical miles range and 4 to 6 captured speedboats at 35 to 45 knots (10_JIPOE_Brief, small-boat operations).",10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — small-boat operations,10;03 |
| SM-MA-O8-097,C8:SM-MA-O8-097,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the response state an adversary intent assessment at a confidence the estimate does not support?,"Asserts adversary intent or vessel location as established fact, or at a confidence higher than the estimate carries.",EVERY statement of adversary intent and of vessel location carries the confidence level the estimate assigns; NONE is elevated to fact.,"The intelligence baseline assesses adversary intent at LOW-TO-MODERATE confidence and records pirate network intent as a binding J2 ambiguity with multiple plausible interpretations; AURORA STAR current location is LOW confidence with the specific hide not identified (14_Running_Estimates, Intelligence; 10_JIPOE_Brief, I&W).",10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — I&W; 14_Running_Estimates.docx — Intelligence,10;14 |
| SM-MA-O4-099,C8:SM-MA-O4-099,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response state the four planning sub-sectors the operating area is divided into?,States all four planning sub-sectors.,States fewer than four sectors; or renames a sector; or treats the operating area as undivided.,"The operating area is divided into four planning sub-sectors: Sector A Niger Delta Approaches (Bonny-Forcados), Sector B Cameroon EEZ and Bioko Approaches, Sector C Gabon EEZ and Sao Tome approach, and Sector D Open-Ocean Transit beyond 300 nautical miles (06_Critical_Geography section 2).",06_Critical_Geography.docx — Planning sub-sectors (section 2),06 |
| SM-MA-O4-100,C8:SM-MA-O4-100,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response identify which sector the vessel was boarded in, and distinguish it from the primary pirate operating area?",States that the vessel was boarded in Sector B while the hide network and primary operating area are in Sector A.,Places the boarding in the Niger Delta sector; or treats boarding location and holding location as the same sector.,"MV AURORA STAR was boarded in Sector B, the Cameroon EEZ and Bioko approaches, which is the secondary pirate operating area and a transit zone; Sector A, the Niger Delta approaches, is the primary pirate operating area and holds the hide network (06_Critical_Geography sections 2.1, 2.2).",06_Critical_Geography.docx — Sector B (section 2.2),06;02 |
| SM-MA-O4-101,C8:SM-MA-O4-101,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response state the scale of the hide-site problem in the primary sector?,States that there are 40 or more potential hide sites in the named river sector.,States the hide network without the site count; or gives a count the document does not carry.,"The coastal hide network is extensive in the swamps between the Brass and Forcados rivers with an estimated 40 or more potential hide sites for skiffs and captured vessels, in a delta of roughly 70,000 square kilometres where mangrove swamps extend some 30 nautical miles inland (06_Critical_Geography section 2.1).",06_Critical_Geography.docx — Sector A (section 2.1),06 |
| SM-MA-O4-106,C8:SM-MA-O4-106,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response state the electromagnetic and communications conditions, including that the spectrum is uncontested?",States that the spectrum is uncontested and identifies encrypted messaging as the attribution constraint.,Asserts a contested electromagnetic environment; or omits the attribution constraint while planning against pirate communications.,"The electromagnetic spectrum is uncontested in the state-actor sense, pirate networks employ neither electronic warfare nor GPS denial, satellite phone coverage is comprehensive and SATCOM is not contested, commercial AIS coverage is better coastal within 30 nautical miles than open-ocean, and cyber attribution is limited primarily by encrypted-messaging applications with HUMINT-driven device access the primary attribution mechanism (06_Critical_Geography section 5).",06_Critical_Geography.docx — Electromagnetic Spectrum and Communications (section 5),06 |
| SM-MA-O4-107,C8:SM-MA-O4-107,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,"Does the response identify the critical infrastructure at highest threat exposure, and the operator of each?",Identifies Bonny Island LNG and Forcados as the High-exposure infrastructure and names their operators.,Identifies the infrastructure without exposure ratings; or omits the US-owned Punta Europa facility from consideration.,"Bonny Island LNG (Nigeria LNG consortium, 22 MTPA installed) and the Forcados Crude Terminal (Shell Nigeria EP, approximately 200,000 barrels per day, recurring sabotage history) are both rated High threat exposure; Punta Europa LNG (Marathon Oil, approximately 4 MTPA) is rated Medium and is US-owned and high-value (06_Critical_Geography section 6).",06_Critical_Geography.docx — Critical infrastructure (section 6),06;05 |
| SM-MA-O4-108,C8:SM-MA-O4-108,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response treat the operating area as a uniform environment across the four sectors?,"Treats the operating area as environmentally uniform, applying one set of operating assumptions across all four sectors.",EVERY sector-specific conclusion the response draws reflects that sector's stated geography |
| SM-MA-O4-109,C8:SM-MA-O4-109,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state that three vessels were attacked and identify how many hostages remain held?,"States that three vessels were attacked, that two crews were released, and that 16 remain held aboard AURORA STAR including 4 US persons.",Reports all 47 as still held |
| SM-MA-O4-110,C8:SM-MA-O4-110,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the response state the four coordination indicators that distinguish the attacks from opportunistic piracy?,States all four coordination indicators.,States fewer than four |
| SM-MA-O4-112,C8:SM-MA-O4-112,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response state the adversary network's structure, including the cell count and the coordinating figures?",States the 4 to 6 cell federation structure and the 2 to 3 senior coordinating figures controlling ransom infrastructure.,States the cells without the coordinating figures |
| SM-MA-O4-115,C8:SM-MA-O4-115,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,"Does the response state the regional coordination bodies' respective capabilities, including which is a coordination hub rather than a tasking authority?","States that ICC Yaounde is a coordination hub and not a tasking authority, and distinguishes MMCC Douala's capability from Pointe-Noire's.",Treats any of the bodies as a tasking authority |
| SM-MA-O8-235,C8:SM-MA-O8-235,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the response state the AURORA STAR hide location with more precision than LOW confidence supports?,"The response names or implies a specific hide location, or treats the location as fixed to a degree the LOW-confidence assessment does not support.",EVERY statement of AURORA STAR's location carries the LOW confidence and the not-identified qualifier; NONE narrows to a specific hide the packet has not identified.,"The JIPOE assesses AURORA STAR current location as LOW confidence, estimated coastal hide network with the specific hide not identified, and the intelligence estimate carries on-shore HUMINT access as limited at HIGH risk to location identification. Sector A holds an estimated 40 or more potential hide sites between the Brass and Forcados rivers (10_JIPOE_Brief, I&W; 14_Running_Estimates, Intelligence; 06_Critical_Geography section 2.1).",10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — I&W; 06_Critical_Geography.docx — section 2.1,10;14;06 |
| SM-MA-O4-260,C8:SM-MA-O4-260,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response treat the three end-state conditions as alternatives that can be traded against one another?,"The response trades one end-state condition against another, or presents attainment of some conditions as sufficient.",EVERY treatment of the end state carries all three conditions as concurrent requirements; NONE trades one against another or treats a subset as sufficient.,The CIPG sets three end-state conditions and states they are concurrent: coalition patrol density restored with a six-month partner commitment; hostages recovered or accounted for with the situation closed; and pirate-network tempo returned to controlled-baseline levels with Yaounde relationships preserved (12_CIPG v2 para 1.3).,12_CIPG v2.docx — End-state (para 1.3),12 |
| SM-MA-O4-276,C8:SM-MA-O4-276,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the response carry 47 as the current hostage figure rather than the 16 still held aboard MV AURORA STAR?,"The response uses 47 as the number of hostages currently held, or otherwise treats the released crews as still in captivity.","EVERY statement of the current hostage situation uses the 16 held aboard AURORA STAR, with the 47 figure appearing only as the total crew across the three vessels; NO released crew is counted as still held.","The three vessels boarded on 09 February 2027 carried 47 crew in total, but the 18 aboard MV BENEDICT GALLOWAY and the 13 aboard MV KINIPELA HOPE were released and all accounted for. The net hostage situation is the 16 aboard the unlocated MV AURORA STAR, of whom 4 are US persons (02_Regional_Intel_Summary section 2). The 47 figure appears in the summary's own framing of the coalition planning challenge, which makes it the easy number to carry forward incorrectly.",02_Regional_Intel_Summary.docx — Threat Pattern of Life (section 2),02;05 |
| SM-MA-O7-068,C8:SM-MA-O7-068,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify establishing a joint special operations task force for the personnel recovery mission as a specified task?,Identifies establishing the JSOTF under SOCAFRICA as a specified task.,Presents it as implied; or omits the SOCAFRICA relationship; or attributes the task to NAVAF.,"The CJCS EXORD directs CDR USAFRICOM to establish a JSOTF under SOCAFRICA for the PR/HR mission, and under LOE 2 to establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force with theatre ISR developing on-shore pattern of life to fix AURORA STAR location (07_CJCS_EXORD paras 3.b, tasks to subordinate commands).",07_CJCS_EXORD.docx — Tasks to Subordinate and Supporting Commands,07;04 |
| SM-MA-O7-069,C8:SM-MA-O7-069,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify integrating the lead federal agency liaison and hostage-affairs envoy representation into planning as a specified task?,Identifies the integration of FBI HRFC liaison and SPEHA representation as a specified task.,Presents it as implied; or omits the lead-federal-agency relationship; or reverses the supported and supporting roles.,"The CJCS EXORD directs that AFRICOM J3 and the JSOTF integrate the FBI HRFC liaison and SPEHA representation in PR/HR planning, with FBI HRFC retaining lead federal agency authority and the Department of War providing military support (07_CJCS_EXORD, FBI HRFC integration).",07_CJCS_EXORD.docx — FBI HRFC integration,07;11 |
| SM-MA-O7-070,C8:SM-MA-O7-070,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the supporting task assigned to the neighbouring combatant command?,Identifies USEUCOM's supporting task including the requirement to resolve apportionment competition with SIXTH Fleet.,Omits the USEUCOM supporting task; or states the force-flow task without the apportionment-competition element.,"CDR USEUCOM is assigned supporting: coordinate force-flow from the Mediterranean and from European basing (Sigonella, Souda Bay, Naples) to the USAFRICOM area of responsibility, and resolve apportionment competition with SIXTH Fleet standing Mediterranean presence requirements (07_CJCS_EXORD, tasks to subordinate and supporting commands).",07_CJCS_EXORD.docx — Tasks to Subordinate and Supporting Commands,07 |
| SM-MA-O7-071,C8:SM-MA-O7-071,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,CI,positive,9,Does the response derive the implied task to establish a coalition rules-of-engagement deconfliction mechanism?,Derives the requirement to establish a coalition ROE deconfliction mechanism as an implied task.,Presents it as a specified task; or omits it; or names the risk without deriving the task.,"Coalition partner ROE caveats are assessed as aligned for standard counter-piracy operations but partner ROE variance may constrain joint fires coordination in specific tactical situations at LOW-MEDIUM risk to coalition tempo, and the packet records a coalition ROE deconfliction matrix as a planned action (14_Running_Estimates, Fires). No document directs the mechanism be created.",14_Running_Estimates.docx — Fires (assumptions and planned actions),14 |
| SM-MA-O7-073,C8:SM-MA-O7-073,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,CI,positive,9,Does the response derive the implied task to establish a jurisdictional handoff protocol for pursuits crossing maritime boundaries?,Derives the requirement to draft a jurisdictional handoff protocol for boundary-crossing pursuits.,Notes the jurisdictional complexity without deriving the protocol task; or treats disposition as uniform across zones.,"Annex A.7 identifies the straddling-pursuit case — a pirate skiff transiting from coastal-state EEZ to the high seas during pursuit — as requiring handoff protocols drafted in coordination with defence attache offices and host-nation navies, and marks it a designed-in inference point. Detainee disposition differs by zone, with 24-hour transfer required for EEZ apprehensions (Annex A.6).",11_Annexes.docx — Annex A.7,11 |
| SM-MA-O7-074,C8:SM-MA-O7-074,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,Does the response derive the implied task to establish coalition liaison embeds at the maritime operations centre?,"Derives the LNO embed requirement as an implied task, with its D+7 timeline.",Omits the embed task; or states it without the timeline; or presents it as specified in the directing order.,"The C2 estimate records establishing coalition partner LNO embeds at NAVAF MOC by D+7 as a planned action, with CTF-100 LNOs en route from partner commands and 2 to 4 Cameroonian LNOs assigned by D+7 (14_Running_Estimates, C2 planned actions and current status).",14_Running_Estimates.docx — Command and Control (planned actions),14 |
| SM-MA-O7-084,C8:SM-MA-O7-084,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,D,negative,-5,Does the response present a routine military activity as an implied task?,"Presents a routine or inherent activity such as maintaining force protection, conducting reconnaissance or sustaining communications as an implied task.",EVERY implied task the response derives is specific to this operation and traceable to a packet condition; NONE is a routine or inherent activity.,"JP 5-0 III-20 names conducting reconnaissance and protecting a flank as examples of what an implied task is not: routine, inherent or standing activities do not become implied tasks. The packet's implied tasks are specific — coalition ROE deconfliction, wear management, jurisdictional handoff protocols.",JP 5-0 III-20 para 8,JP5-0 |
| SM-MA-O7-226,C8:SM-MA-O7-226,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,CD,negative,-9,Does the response assign the hostage-negotiation track to a military element despite the PPD-30 lead-agency architecture?,"The response assigns negotiation, ransom handling or family liaison to a military command, or treats the military as running the negotiation track.",EVERY negotiation and family-liaison function is assigned to its designated civilian agency with military elements in support; NO military command holds the negotiation track.,"PPD-30 (24 June 2015) establishes the FBI Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell as Lead Federal Agency running the negotiation track, with the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs coordinating senior engagement, the NSC Hostage Response Group as senior policy body, and the Department of War in support (11_Annexes Annex E.1, F.1; 07_CJCS_EXORD).",11_Annexes.docx — Annex E.1 and F.1,11;07;12 |
| SM-MA-O8-216,C8:SM-MA-O8-216,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the response use the adversary operational centre of gravity's stated requirement of corrupt local-official support to identify a line of attack available within the on-shore restraint?,Uses the COG's requirements rather than the COG itself to identify a line of attack consistent with the on-shore restraint.,Addresses the COG only as a physical target; or lists its requirements without converting any into a line of attack.,"The JIPOE records the operational COG's critical requirements as continued Niger Delta on-shore impunity and corrupt local-official support, with vulnerabilities to Nigerian Navy Special Boat Service-led hide raids and persistent HUMINT and ISR (10_JIPOE_Brief, COG analysis). Impunity and official support are attackable by host-nation law enforcement and financial-intelligence means that do not require US on-shore action.",10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — COG analysis,10;11 |
| SM-MA-O7-077,C8:SM-MA-O7-077,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the constraint requiring coordination for boarding and search inside a coastal-state exclusive economic zone?,"Identifies the EEZ coordination requirement as a constraint, naming MMCC Douala or the host-nation navy as the coordination channel.",Presents the EEZ coordination as optional; or treats boarding authority as uniform across zones; or omits the coordination channel.,"Annex A.5 grants mission-accomplishment authority for boarding and search of vessels suspected of piracy in international waters, but imposes a coordination requirement for boarding and search in coastal-state EEZ, which must be coordinated via MMCC Douala or directly with the host-nation navy.",11_Annexes.docx — Annex A.5,11 |
| SM-MA-O7-078,C8:SM-MA-O7-078,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the constraint requiring transfer of personnel apprehended in a coastal-state exclusive economic zone to host-nation custody within a stated period?,Identifies the 24-hour transfer requirement for EEZ apprehensions as a constraint.,"Omits the timeline |
| SM-MA-O7-079,C8:SM-MA-O7-079,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the restraint prohibiting engagement that risks hostage casualties absent explicit authorization?,"Identifies the prohibition on engagement risking hostage casualties as a restraint, noting the explicit-authorization exception.",States it as a general concern rather than a restraint |
| SM-MA-O7-080,C8:SM-MA-O7-080,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the restraint on on-shore action in coastal-state territory and state the three authorised exceptions?,Identifies the restraint and names all three authorised exceptions.,Names fewer than three exceptions |
| SM-MA-O7-081,C8:SM-MA-O7-081,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify that execution authority for the military hostage-rescue option is withheld at the national level?,"Identifies NCA-retained execution authority and distinguishes it from the delegated planning, rehearsal and positioning authorities.",Treats execution as delegated to CDR USAFRICOM or the JSOTF |
| SM-MA-O7-082,C8:SM-MA-O7-082,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CD,negative,-9,"Does the response treat constraints and restraints as interchangeable, or classify a prohibition as a constraint?","The response uses constraint and restraint interchangeably, or classifies a prohibition as a constraint or a requirement as a restraint.","EVERY limitation the response classifies is correctly assigned — requirements as constraints, prohibitions as restraints; NONE is mislabelled.","JP 5-0 III-18 defines a constraint as a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action — a must-do that restricts freedom of action — while a restraint prohibits action, a cannot-do. The packet contains both: the EEZ coordination requirement is a constraint; the prohibition on on-shore action is a restraint.",JP 5-0 III-18 para 7,JP5-0 |
| SM-MA-O7-118,C8:SM-MA-O7-118,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the response identify that the evacuation contingency for resident US citizens is outside baseline scope, and state what would bring it in?",States that the evacuation contingency is out of baseline scope and identifies host-nation security deterioration as what would bring it into scope.,Plans the evacuation as an in-scope mission |
| SM-MA-O7-119,C8:SM-MA-O7-119,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the host nation's jurisdictional insistence and the coordination channels it requires?,Identifies Nigerian primary jurisdiction as a constraint and names the required coordination channels.,Treats coalition operations in the Nigerian EEZ as unconstrained; or omits the coordination channels; or omits the optics sensitivity.,Nigeria welcomes coalition support but is insistent on Nigerian Navy primary jurisdiction in its exclusive economic zone and is sensitive to the public optics of foreign naval forces in Nigerian waters; foreign naval forces operating in the Nigerian EEZ must coordinate via MMCC Douala or directly with Eastern Naval Command (05_Country_Fact_Sheet section 1; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary section 4).,05_Country_Fact_Sheet.docx — Nigeria posture (section 1),05;02 |
| SM-MA-O7-120,C8:SM-MA-O7-120,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the access-approval requirement and turnaround for the third coastal state?,Identifies the case-by-case Foreign Ministry approval requirement and its 24 to 72 hour turnaround.,Treats access as standing; or omits the turnaround; or attributes the requirement to a different state.,"Equatorial Guinea will permit coalition naval presence in its exclusive economic zone with case-by-case Foreign Ministry approval, typically a 24 to 72 hour turnaround, and has a strong interest in preserving Punta Europa operations (05_Country_Fact_Sheet section 3; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary section 4).",05_Country_Fact_Sheet.docx — Equatorial Guinea posture (section 3),05;02 |
| SM-MA-O7-225,C8:SM-MA-O7-225,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the response use the contested MMCC Douala tasking assumption as though pass-through coordination were assured for EEZ boarding?,The response relies on MMCC Douala pass-through for boarding coordination without acknowledging that the packet contradicts itself on that node's tasking authority.,"EVERY reliance on MMCC Douala coordination acknowledges the contested tasking authority, or provides the direct host-nation-navy alternative Annex A.5 permits; NONE treats pass-through as assured.","Boarding and search in coastal-state EEZ carries a coordination requirement via MMCC Douala or directly with the host-nation navy (11_Annexes Annex A.5). The CJCS EXORD assumes MMCC Douala is functional and will support coalition tasking pass-through, while CIPG v2 para 6 states it is essential but limited in tasking authority and that NAVAF MOC should expect to perform most fused-picture coordination directly, and 04_Coalition_OOB records that coordination quality varies across MMCCs with the Yaounde Code of Conduct voluntary and lacking enforcement.",11_Annexes.docx — Annex A.5 |
| SM-MA-O5-047,C8:SM-MA-O5-047,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the three initial priority intelligence requirements the commander issued?,States all three PIRs as issued.,States fewer than three PIRs; or substitutes a requirement the commander did not issue; or presents an FFIR as a PIR.,"The CIPG issues three initial PIRs: PIR 1 pirate network intent (which of MLCOA, MDCOA or Alt COA); PIR 2 AURORA STAR location; and PIR 3 coalition partner sustained-presence commitment trajectory (12_CIPG v2 para 5).",12_CIPG v2.docx — CCIRs (para 5),12 |
| SM-MA-O5-048,C8:SM-MA-O5-048,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the three initial friendly force information requirements the commander issued?,States all three FFIRs as issued.,States fewer than three FFIRs |
| SM-MA-O5-049,C8:SM-MA-O5-049,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,SI,positive,2,Does the response treat the commander's critical information requirements as comprising priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements only?,"Presents CCIRs as consisting of PIRs and FFIRs, with no third category.",Introduces a third CCIR category such as essential elements of friendly information or host-nation information requirements |
| SM-MA-O5-054,C8:SM-MA-O5-054,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the response derive why allocation residual time is a friendly force information requirement rather than a routine readiness report?,"Derives that allocation residual time drives a specific command decision on extension, replacement or accepting reduced patrol density.",Treats the requirement as routine status reporting; or states the figure without the decision it informs.,"FFIR 3 is FORREST SHERMAN allocation residual time (12_CIPG v2 para 5). The destroyer is allocated 21 days against a 30-day apportionment (04_Coalition_OOB section 2) and arrives D+7 (14_Running_Estimates), while termination requires patrol density sustained 60 days (12_CIPG v2 para 2.2) — so residual time drives a decision about extension, replacement or acceptance of reduced density.",12_CIPG v2.docx — para 5; 04_Coalition_OOB.docx — section 2,12;04;14 |
| SM-MA-O5-056,C8:SM-MA-O5-056,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the response present a friendly force information requirement that reports adversary status, or a priority intelligence requirement that reports friendly status?","One or more requirements face the wrong way — an FFIR reporting adversary disposition or intent, or a PIR reporting friendly force status.",EVERY PIR the response states faces the adversary or the operational environment and EVERY FFIR faces friendly force status |
| SM-MA-O5-139,C8:SM-MA-O5-139,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the response derive a friendly force information requirement on the coalition contributions the end state depends on?,"Derives a friendly force information requirement on coalition partner force status or on-station availability, distinct from the existing intent-facing PIR.",Duplicates PIR 3 as an FFIR without distinguishing partner intent from partner force status; or omits partner contributions from the friendly information requirements.,"The end state requires a sustained six-month presence commitment from the five named coalition partners (12_CIPG v2 para 1.3), coalition political will is the friendly strategic centre of gravity (para 2.6), coalition disengagement is an unacceptable risk (para 2.8), and partner commitment trajectory is already PIR 3 (para 5) — but partner force status, as distinct from partner intent, is friendly-force information.","12_CIPG v2.docx — paras 1.3, 2.6, 5; JP 5-0 III-26 Figure III-11",12;04;JP5-0 |
| SM-MA-O5-220,C8:SM-MA-O5-220,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response use the four conjunctive NCA rescue triggers to derive the information requirements that would let the commander recommend execution?,"Derives an information requirement for each of the four conditions, so the commander can know when the threshold is met.",Restates the four conditions without converting them into information requirements |
| SM-MA-O5-231,C8:SM-MA-O5-231,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,"Does the response use the reserve cells DELTA, ECHO and FOXTROT as an indicator that discriminates the sustained-campaign course of action?",Uses reserve-cell activity as a discriminating indicator tied to the sustained-campaign course of action.,Names the reserve cells without tying their activity to a course of action; or omits them from the indicator set.,"The network can sustain 2 to 4 major coordinated operations per quarter at current capacity, and reserve cells DELTA, ECHO and FOXTROT could augment to support a sustained-campaign tempo consistent with the most likely adversary course of action; reserve-cell observable activity is listed among the most-likely-course-of-action indicators (10_JIPOE_Brief; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary section 3).",10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — capacity and MLCOA indicators,10;02 |
| SM-MA-O5-234,C8:SM-MA-O5-234,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,2,I,positive,5,Does the response use the most-dangerous-course-of-action indicator of weapons upgrades inconsistent with kidnap-for-ransom economics to derive a discriminating requirement?,Uses the economics-inconsistency logic to frame a requirement that would discriminate a shift toward higher-value targeting.,Lists the indicators without using the economics logic |
| SM-MA-O5-238,C8:SM-MA-O5-238,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,I,positive,5,Does the response use the requirement to confirm hostage location within the hide to derive an information requirement distinct from locating the vessel?,"Distinguishes locating the vessel or hide from confirming hostage location within it, and derives a separate information requirement for the second.",Treats vessel location and hostage location as one requirement; or omits the within-hide confirmation.,"Annex E.5 sets hostage-location-within-hide confirmation as a very high-confidence requirement to avoid hostage casualties, separate from developing the hide location itself, and Annex A.5 prohibits engagement risking hostage casualties without explicit authorization. AURORA STAR location is separately the intelligence and warning priority (10_JIPOE_Brief).",11_Annexes.docx — Annex E.5,11;10 |
| SM-MA-O1-008,C8:SM-MA-O1-008,S6,Assumptions,2,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the assumed approval timeline for the port-call access the sustainment concept rests on?,States the assumption that Kribi access is approved within 72 hours of request.,States the Kribi dependency without the 72-hour approval assumption; or presents the access as already granted.,"The sustainment estimate assumes Kribi port-call access is approved within 72 hours of request, coordinated by DAO Yaounde (14_Running_Estimates, Sustainment assumptions and current status).",14_Running_Estimates.docx — Sustainment (assumptions),14 |
| SM-MA-O8-096,C8:SM-MA-O8-096,S6,Assumptions,1,SI,positive,2,Does the response identify the confidence asymmetry between adversary capability and adversary intent?,"States that capability is HIGH confidence while intent is LOW-TO-MODERATE, and identifies intent as the binding ambiguity.",Reports a single confidence level across both; or reverses the two; or omits the ambiguity.,"Pirate-network capabilities are assessed HIGH confidence while intent is LOW-TO-MODERATE confidence, and pirate network intent is recorded as a binding J2 ambiguity with multiple plausible interpretations (14_Running_Estimates, Intelligence; 10_JIPOE_Brief, I&W).",14_Running_Estimates.docx — Intelligence (baseline),14;10 |
| SM-MA-O4-123,C8:SM-MA-O4-123,S6,Assumptions,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the host-nation political transition and assess its bearing on the operation?,Identifies the transition and assesses its bearing on the durability of host-nation cooperation or on the six-month partner commitment.,Omits the transition; or notes it without assessing any bearing on the operation.,"A new Nigerian presidential administration took office 29 May 2027 in the scenario timeline while STEADFAST MARINER planning is occurring under the outgoing administration with input from the incoming team, and the incoming administration inherits Yaounde commitments and Nigerian Navy modernization (05_Country_Fact_Sheet section 1; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary section 4).",05_Country_Fact_Sheet.docx — Political dynamics (section 1),05;02 |
| SM-MA-O4-044,C8:SM-MA-O4-044,S7,Risk,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the response state a risk without pairing it to a mitigation, where the packet supplies one?",One or more risks in the response are stated without the mitigation the packet supplies for them.,EVERY risk the response states carries either the mitigation the packet supplies or an explicit statement that none is supplied.,"JP 5-0 III-24 characterizes military risk as an integration of probability and consequence, and each running estimate in the packet pairs its key risks with planned actions — access limits with activated collection priorities, hostage-safety constraints with training and rehearsal, coalition wear with sequel planning, messaging pressure with counter-narrative preparation (14_Running_Estimates, key risks and planned actions across functions).",14_Running_Estimates.docx — key risks and planned actions; JP 5-0 III-24 para 13,14;JP5-0 |
| SM-MA-O4-102,C8:SM-MA-O4-102,S7,Risk,2,I,positive,5,"Does the response derive that the February sea state sits at the margin of the boarding-operation limit, and state the consequence?",Derives that boarding operations sit at the sea-state limit for the operation window and states the consequence for opportunistic VBSS availability.,States the sea state without relating it to the boarding limit; or asserts boarding is unconstrained.,"February 2027 is late Harmattan with expected sea state 1.5 to 2.5 metres, and the document states that the visit-board-search-and-seizure sea-state limit of 2.5 metres significant wave height is at margin in February (06_Critical_Geography sections 4.1, 4.2).",06_Critical_Geography.docx — Operational implications (section 4.2),06 |
| SM-MA-O4-103,C8:SM-MA-O4-103,S7,Risk,2,I,positive,5,Does the response derive the asymmetry that Harmattan visibility degrades friendly sensing but not adversary operations?,"Derives that the environment degrades friendly visual sensing while leaving adversary small-boat operations unconstrained, and identifies thermal sensing as the mitigation.",States the visibility figures without the asymmetry; or asserts the weather constrains both sides equally.,"February visibility is 3 to 6 nautical miles with periodic dust-haze degradation, visual ISR is degraded by Harmattan dust with thermal sensors recommended, and the document states that small-boat operations by pirate skiffs are not constrained by Harmattan conditions because pirates operate effectively in degraded visibility (06_Critical_Geography sections 4.1, 4.2).",06_Critical_Geography.docx — Operational implications (section 4.2),06;03 |
| SM-MA-O4-203,C8:SM-MA-O4-203,S7,Risk,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response use the destroyer's D+7 arrival and 21-day allocation together to compute when surface-combatant coverage lapses?,"Combines the arrival date and the allocation length to reach a lapse point around D+28, and states the consequence for sustained presence.",Cites the 21-day allocation without anchoring it to the D+7 arrival |
| SM-MA-O4-213,C8:SM-MA-O4-213,S7,Risk,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response use the 30-day destroyer apportionment as the available planning window in place of the 21-day allocation?,"The response plans or reasons against a 30-day destroyer availability, or uses the apportionment figure where the allocation figure governs.","EVERY planning judgment about destroyer availability uses the 21-day allocation, or explicitly notes where the 30-day apportionment is being used and why; NONE substitutes apportionment for allocation.","04_Coalition_OOB section 1.1 lists the destroyer as apportioned 30 days, while section 2 records the NAVAF assessment that it can be allocated for only 21 without disrupting SIXTH Fleet. Apportionment is what may be planned against; allocation is what is actually available.",04_Coalition_OOB.docx — section 1.1 and section 2,04 |
| SM-MA-O4-268,C8:SM-MA-O4-268,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,Does the response use Cell CHARLIE's roughly 200-nautical-mile mother-ship reach to bound where the maritime threat extends beyond coastal patrol coverage?,Uses the mother-ship reach to bound the threat envelope and identifies the coverage gap between host-nation reach and adversary reach.,States the mother-ship reach without relating it to patrol coverage or host-nation limits.,"Cell CHARLIE holds a mother-ship trawler capability extending operations to approximately 200 nautical miles offshore (10_JIPOE_Brief), Sector D open-ocean transit lies beyond 300 nautical miles and has seen mother-ship-supported operations in 2024-2025 (06_Critical_Geography section 2.4), and the Cameroonian fleet cannot operate beyond roughly 120 nautical miles (05_Country_Fact_Sheet section 2).",10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — small-boat operations; 06_Critical_Geography.docx — section 2.4,10;06;05 |
| SM-MA-O4-269,C8:SM-MA-O4-269,S7,Risk,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response apply a single set of operating assumptions across the four planning sub-sectors?,"The response reasons about patrol, boarding or threat using one uniform set of assumptions across all four sectors.",EVERY sector-specific judgment reflects that sector's stated geography and threat level |
| SM-MA-O2-011,C8:SM-MA-O2-011,S8,Restated mission,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the response produce a restated mission statement containing all five elements of who, what, when, where and why?","Produces a restated mission statement in which all five elements — who, what, when, where and why — are separately identifiable.",Omits one or more of the five elements |
| SM-MA-O4-116,C8:SM-MA-O4-116,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the composition of the US hostage group and how identification was confirmed?,States that there are four US persons and identifies how their identification was confirmed.,States a different count |
| SM-MA-O4-117,C8:SM-MA-O4-117,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the third-country nationals aboard and the coordination channel for each group?,Identifies both third-country-national groups and their respective coordination channels.,Addresses only the US persons |
| SM-MA-O4-121,C8:SM-MA-O4-121,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the host-nation partner command and the reason it is the primary partner?,Identifies Eastern Naval Command at Calabar as the primary host-nation partner and ties the designation to its area of responsibility over the primary pirate operating area.,Names Western Naval Command |
| SM-MA-O1-004,C8:SM-MA-O1-004,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the sustainment estimate's planned duration and the extension it is built to support?,States the 60-day initial sustainment commitment and the six-month extension capability.,States only the initial commitment without the extension; or gives a duration other than 60 days and six months.,"The sustainment estimate is built to sustain CTF-100 operations for a 60-day initial commitment with capability to extend to six months if sequel 1 or 2 is selected (14_Running_Estimates, Sustainment purpose).",14_Running_Estimates.docx — Sustainment (purpose),14 |
| SM-MA-O1-006,C8:SM-MA-O1-006,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the sustainment throughput constraint and the duration beyond which it becomes a risk?,Identifies Sigonella throughput at sustained tempo as a risk and states that it bites beyond 60 days.,Names the throughput constraint without the 60-day threshold; or attaches the threshold to a different node than Sigonella.,"Sigonella throughput capacity at sustained tempo carries MEDIUM risk if the operation extends beyond 60 days (14_Running_Estimates, Sustainment key risks).",14_Running_Estimates.docx — Sustainment (key risks),14 |
| SM-MA-O1-007,C8:SM-MA-O1-007,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response name the port-call access locations the sustainment concept depends on?,"Names Kribi, Walvis Bay and Sao Tome as the port-call access locations, with Sigonella as forward-staging.",Names fewer than the three port-call locations; or substitutes a port the packet does not list; or omits Sigonella as the forward-staging node.,"Port-call access for fuel and resupply is planned at Kribi (Cameroon), Walvis Bay (Namibia, for through-routing) and Sao Tome harbour, with Sigonella as US forward-staging and Souda Bay supporting the ESB's standing presence (14_Running_Estimates, Sustainment |
| SM-MA-O4-032,C8:SM-MA-O4-032,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the response state the apportionment windows for the destroyer, the amphibious ready group and the theatre ISR assets?","States the 30-day destroyer apportionment, the 60-day ARG apportionment, and the 30-day theatre ISR apportionment.",States some but not all three |
| SM-MA-O4-033,C8:SM-MA-O4-033,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response identify the gap between the destroyer's apportionment and its actual allocation?,"States that the destroyer is allocated 21 days against a 30-day apportionment, and identifies the 9-day shortfall or the competing SIXTH Fleet requirement.",Uses the 30-day apportionment as though it were the allocation; or states the 21-day figure without identifying it as less than the apportionment.,"NAVAF assesses that the destroyer can be allocated for 21 days against a 30-day apportionment without disrupting SIXTH Fleet's standing Mediterranean requirement (04_Coalition_OOB section 2, planner annotation).",04_Coalition_OOB.docx — Apportionment vs Allocation Delta (section 2),04 |
| SM-MA-O4-034,C8:SM-MA-O4-034,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the response derive that the destroyer's allocated coverage ends well before the 60-day sustained-presence condition can be met, and state the consequence?","Derives that destroyer coverage ends at approximately D+28 against a 60-day sustainment requirement, and states the coverage consequence or the mitigation required.",Notes the 21-day allocation without relating it to the 60-day condition; or performs the arithmetic without stating a consequence.,"USS FORREST SHERMAN arrives in the operating area at D+7 (14_Running_Estimates, Movement and Maneuver current status) and is allocated 21 days (04_Coalition_OOB section 2), so its coverage ends near D+28, while the termination criteria require patrol density sustained for 60 days (12_CIPG v2 para 2.2).",04_Coalition_OOB.docx — section 2; 14_Running_Estimates.docx — Movement and Maneuver,04;14;12 |
| SM-MA-O4-035,C8:SM-MA-O4-035,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,"Does the response derive that theatre ISR apportionment expires before the AURORA STAR location requirement is likely satisfied, and state the implication?","Derives that ISR apportionment closes around D+32 against an unresolved location requirement, and states the implication for extension, reprioritisation or acceptance of risk.",States the ISR apportionment without relating it to the location requirement; or asserts the location will be resolved without addressing the coverage window.,"The 2 x P-8A and 1 x MQ-9B are apportioned 30 days (04_Coalition_OOB section 1.1) with sortie generation beginning D+2 (14_Running_Estimates, Movement and Maneuver), while AURORA STAR location is the I&W priority at LOW confidence with specific hide not identified (10_JIPOE_Brief) and on-shore HUMINT access is limited at HIGH risk (14_Running_Estimates, Intelligence).",04_Coalition_OOB.docx — section 1.1; 10_JIPOE_Brief.docx — I&W,04;10;14 |
| SM-MA-O4-036,C8:SM-MA-O4-036,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the arrival timeline for the three principal US surface units?,"States the D+5, D+7 and D+11 arrivals against the correct units.",States arrivals for only some units; or assigns an arrival date to the wrong unit.,"USS HERSHEL ""WOODY"" WILLIAMS arrives D+5 from Souda Bay, USS FORREST SHERMAN arrives D+7 from the Mediterranean, and USS FORT LAUDERDALE arrives D+11 having departed Norfolk on D-Day (14_Running_Estimates, Movement and Maneuver current status).",14_Running_Estimates.docx — Movement and Maneuver (current status),14 |
| SM-MA-O4-038,C8:SM-MA-O4-038,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,I,positive,5,Does the response identify the outstanding requests for forces and what each seeks?,Identifies the outstanding requests for forces and what each seeks.,Identifies fewer than the outstanding requests; or treats a requested capability as already assigned.,"Four requests for forces are outstanding: RFF-AF-001 additional MPA coverage for the Niger Delta sector via Norwegian and Brazilian contacts; RFF-AF-002 cryptologic support group augmentation for Lagos-area intermediary monitoring; RFF-AF-003 Treasury OFAC FinCEN augmentation for hawala-network financial intelligence; and RFF-AF-004 PR/HR rotary lift augmentation of 2 x CH-53K, conditional on an NCA shift toward military rescue (04_Coalition_OOB, RFF table).",04_Coalition_OOB.docx — Requests for Forces,04 |
| SM-MA-O4-039,C8:SM-MA-O4-039,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the response count a request-for-forces capability as available to the plan?,"Treats an RFF-requested capability, or the 160th SOAR reach-back, as an assigned or allocated force available to the plan.","EVERY reference to an RFF-requested capability and to the 160th SOAR element identifies it as requested or conditional, NOT as available; NONE is counted in available force strength.","The four RFFs at 04_Coalition_OOB are requests, not allocations, and RFF-AF-004 is explicitly conditional on an NCA shift toward military rescue. The 160th SOAR element is liaison only with no forward-deployed force at D-Day and its force-flow is conditional on an NCA decision (04_Coalition_OOB section 1.2).",04_Coalition_OOB.docx — Requests for Forces; section 1.2,04 |
| SM-MA-O4-104,C8:SM-MA-O4-104,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,Does the response use the stated distances to assess whether the sea base can cover the primary sector?,"Uses the stated distances to reason about coverage or transit within the operating area, consistent with the stated lift radius.",Reasons about coverage without reference to the stated distances; or asserts a distance the packet does not carry.,"Stated distances include Bonny to Punta Europa 145 nautical miles, Bonny to Sao Tome 340, Forcados to Bonny 85, Calabar to Douala 120, and Lagos to Calabar 470 (06_Critical_Geography section 1). Annex E.5 puts the sea base 150 to 250 nautical miles from the assessed hide network, within the MH-60S and MV-22 envelope without aerial refuelling.",06_Critical_Geography.docx — Distances (section 1),06;11 |
| SM-MA-O1-135,C8:SM-MA-O1-135,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Does the response begin logistics supportability analysis by relating sustainment reach to the operating distances?,"Relates the sustainment nodes and their capacity to the operating distances or duration, producing a supportability judgement rather than a list of nodes.",Lists sustainment nodes without a supportability judgement; or omits logistics supportability from the analysis.,"JP 5-0 Figure III-6 makes beginning logistics supportability analysis the first mission analysis activity. The packet supplies the elements: Sigonella forward-staging with augmentation requested for 30 days and onboarding at D+5, afloat sustainment from the expeditionary sea base, port-call access at Kribi, Walvis Bay and Sao Tome, Mediterranean Sealift Command commercial sustainment, and throughput at MEDIUM risk beyond 60 days (14_Running_Estimates, Sustainment; 06_Critical_Geography section 1 distances).",14_Running_Estimates.docx — Sustainment; JP 5-0 III-15 Figure III-6,14;06;JP5-0 |
| SM-MA-O1-136,C8:SM-MA-O1-136,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response omit logistics supportability analysis from the mission analysis products?,"The response contains no logistics supportability analysis, or mentions sustainment only as a list of ports without assessing whether the operation can be supported.",The response contains a logistics supportability judgement addressing whether the operation can be sustained at the planned duration and distance; NO treatment of sustainment is left as a bare list of nodes without a supportability conclusion.,"Beginning logistics supportability analysis is the first activity listed in JP 5-0 Figure III-6 (III-15). It is the activity most frequently absent from mission analysis products, and the packet supplies ample material for it across the sustainment running estimate and the geography document.",JP 5-0 III-15 Figure III-6,JP5-0;14 |
| SM-MA-O4-137,C8:SM-MA-O4-137,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Does the response identify potential resource shortfalls as a conclusion of the analysis?,"Identifies specific resource shortfalls as a conclusion, drawn from the apportionment, allocation and unavailable-forces material.",Concludes without identifying resource shortfalls; or lists forces without identifying any shortfall.,"JP 5-0 Figure III-12 closes the briefing with a conclusion on potential resource shortfalls. The packet supplies them: the destroyer allocated 21 days against 30 apportioned, theatre ISR at 30 days, no dedicated AFRICOM surface combatant force, four outstanding requests for forces, Sigonella throughput at risk beyond 60 days, and forces explicitly unavailable for competing-priority reasons (04_Coalition_OOB sections 1.1, 2, 6 and the RFF table; 14_Running_Estimates, Sustainment).",JP 5-0 III-30 Figure III-12; 04_Coalition_OOB.docx — sections 2 and 6,JP5-0;04;14 |
| SM-MA-O4-214,C8:SM-MA-O4-214,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,D,negative,-5,"Does the response use the D+11, D+7 and D+5 arrivals as though the force were present from D-Day?","The response reasons about capability, coverage or readiness in the first days of the operation without accounting for the arrival sequence.","EVERY judgment about early-period capability accounts for the arrival sequence, or explicitly identifies which forward and coalition assets carry the first days; NO judgment assumes the full force from D-Day.","USS HERSHEL ""WOODY"" WILLIAMS arrives D+5, USS FORREST SHERMAN D+7 and USS FORT LAUDERDALE D+11, with theatre ISR sorties beginning D+2 (14_Running_Estimates, Movement and Maneuver current status). No US surface unit is on station before D+5.",14_Running_Estimates.docx — Movement and Maneuver (current status),14 |
| SM-MA-O1-270,C8:SM-MA-O1-270,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Does the response use the fact that USS FORT LAUDERDALE provides both the special operations platform and Role 2 surgical care to identify a single-platform dependency?,"Identifies that one platform carries the special operations force, the rescue lift and the surgical capability, and states the consequence of its loss or unavailability.",Lists the platform's roles without identifying the concentration of dependency.,"USS FORT LAUDERDALE is the JSOTF special operations forces berthing and integration platform, embarks part of the MEU ground combat element, carries Role 2 medical, hosts the 4 x MH-60S rescue lift detachment, and is the extraction destination with embarked surgical capability providing Role 2 in the casualty chain (04_Coalition_OOB section 1.1, 1.2; 11_Annexes Annex E.4, E.5).",04_Coalition_OOB.docx — section 1.1 |
| SM-MA-O1-275,C8:SM-MA-O1-275,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response plan sustainment beyond 60 days without addressing the Sigonella throughput risk?,The response contemplates operations beyond 60 days without addressing the throughput risk or the partner self-sufficiency variance.,EVERY judgment about operations beyond 60 days addresses the Sigonella throughput risk or the partner self-sufficiency variance |
| SM-MA-O6-059,C8:SM-MA-O6-059,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,I,positive,5,Does the response propose course of action evaluation criteria as standards for comparing courses of action against one another?,Proposes evaluation criteria framed as standards for comparing courses of action relative to one another.,Proposes criteria that measure a single course of action against a fixed threshold rather than comparatively |
| SM-MA-O6-060,C8:SM-MA-O6-060,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the response derive evaluation criteria from the commander's stated operational-design tension?,"Derives at least one evaluation criterion from the recovery-versus-deterrence tension, so that courses of action can be separated on it.",Proposes criteria unrelated to the commander's stated tension |
| SM-MA-O6-063,C8:SM-MA-O6-063,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the response derive an evaluation criterion from the force-endurance constraint?,Derives an evaluation criterion on endurance or sustainability under the stated apportionment windows.,Proposes no endurance criterion despite the packet's explicit window constraints.,"Apportionment and allocation windows bound endurance: destroyer 21 days allocated against 30 apportioned, theatre ISR 30 days, ARG 60 days, sustainment 60 days extensible to six months, against a 60-day sustained-presence termination condition (04_Coalition_OOB sections 1.1 and 2; 14_Running_Estimates, Sustainment; 12_CIPG v2 para 2.2).",04_Coalition_OOB.docx — sections 1.1 and 2,04;14;12 |
| SM-MA-O6-064,C8:SM-MA-O6-064,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,D,negative,-5,Does the response defer evaluation criteria to course of action comparison rather than proposing them now?,"States that evaluation criteria will be developed during course of action comparison, or omits them from the mission analysis products entirely.",The response proposes evaluation criteria as a mission analysis output; NO statement defers them to a later step.,JP 5-0 III-23 places development of evaluation criteria in mission analysis or the commander's planning guidance precisely because doing so helps to eliminate a source of bias prior to COA analysis and comparison. Deferring them to comparison reintroduces the bias the timing is designed to remove.,JP 5-0 III-23 para 12,JP5-0 |
| SM-MA-O6-065,C8:SM-MA-O6-065,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,1,CI,positive,9,Does the response state the strategic objectives the operation serves?,States the four strategic objectives.,States fewer than four |
| SM-MA-O6-066,C8:SM-MA-O6-066,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,CI,positive,9,"Does the response present military objectives as defined, decisive and attainable goals rather than as tasks or activities?","Presents objectives as goals the operation is directed toward, distinguishable from the tasks performed to reach them.",States activities or tasks in place of objectives |
| SM-MA-O6-255,C8:SM-MA-O6-255,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the response use the commander's stated pros and cons of the two postures to build evaluation criteria that would separate courses of action on that axis?,Converts the stated pros and cons into evaluation criteria that would distinguish courses of action on the recovery-versus-deterrence axis.,Restates the pros and cons without converting them into criteria; or proposes criteria unrelated to the stated axis.,"The CIPG sets out the aggressive-recovery posture's pros — maximum probability of US-person recovery, demonstrated commitment — against its cons — network relocation, hostage-casualty risk on engagement, pre-empting ransom closure — and the conservative posture's pros of lowest hostage-casualty risk, preserved ransom path and sustained coalition presence against cons of longer time to resolution and family and political pressure (12_CIPG v2 para 3).",12_CIPG v2.docx — para 3,12 |
| SM-MA-O6-257,C8:SM-MA-O6-257,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,I,positive,5,Does the response use the strategic objective of recovering US persons without precipitating broader US military commitment to bound the scale of proposed military objectives?,Uses the without-broader-commitment qualifier to bound the scale or kinetic content of the military objectives proposed.,States the objective without its qualifier; or proposes objectives whose scale would constitute the broader commitment the guidance excludes.,"The second strategic objective is to recover US persons in distress without precipitating broader US military commitment to West African counter-piracy (12_CIPG v2 para 2.1), and the regional strategy directs maintaining the ability to recover US persons overseas without precommitting to direct kinetic engagement and weights presence, exercises and capacity-building above kinetic operations (01_Strategic_Context sections 3, 4).",12_CIPG v2.docx — para 2.1; 01_Strategic_Context.docx — section 4,12;01 |
| C8-GAP-01,C8:C8-GAP-01,S1,Higher mission and intent,3,CI,positive,9,Does the brief include the twelve third-country mariners and the four US persons still aboard MV AURORA STAR in its Personnel recovery/hostage rescue planning?,The brief includes U.S. and Partner Nation hostages in its PR/HR planning.,The brief deos not include the twelve third country mariners in its hostage rescue planning.,CIPG End state conditions includes partner nation hostage recovery with the U.S. personnel.,Mission Analysis Brief - Higher Headquarters Mission and Intent (one and two levels up),12_CIPG v2; 05_Country_Fact_Sheet |
| C8-GAP-02,C8:C8-GAP-02,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,D,negative,-5,Does the brief contain an implied task to Coordinate hostage Rescue activities directly with the Nigerian Navy Special Boat Service?,The brief contains an implied task to coordinate Histage Rescue directly with the Nigerian Navy Special Boat Service.,The brief does not contain an implied task to coordinate hostage rescue directly with the Nigerian Navy Special Boat Service.,CJCS EXORD SER 027-27 states FBI HRFC retains LFA authority for hostage recovery; DoW provides military support.,"Mission Analysis Brief - Specified, Implied and Essential Tasks",07_CJCS_EXORD; 12_CIPG v2 |
| C8-GAP-03,C8:C8-GAP-03,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,"Does the brief derive a military information support operations requirement to counter pirate-network messaging, even though the planning guidance records that none is contemplated?","Countering pirate-network social-media messaging appears in the brief as an implied task, with the MISO capability, approval authority or supporting force needed to execute it named, and the brief reconciles that requirement with the counter-narrative preparation already directed in the strategic guidance.","The brief transcribes the CIPG joint-function line stating no MISO into its own task or capability list, so that the adversary's documented use of hostage videos and grievance messaging generates no information requirement anywhere in the analysis.","11 Annex C.2 records that pirate-network messaging has used social media to pressure shipping companies with hostage video releases, claim political grievance to legitimise ransom demands and attract additional financial backers |
| C8-GAP-04,C8:C8-GAP-04,S4,Constraints and restraints,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis include a constraint to coordinate with the Department of the Treasury to disrupt and target the pirate network financial enablers?,The mission analysis contains a constraint to coordinate with the Department of the Treasury to disrupt and target the pirate network financial enablers.,The mission analysis omits any coordination with the Department of the Treasury to disrupt and target the pirate network financial enablers.,CJCS EXORD has network disruption as its third line of effort and states that the Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and a JIATF-S like entity will target pirate network financial enablers.,"Mission Analysis Brief - Constraints, Restraints and Operational Limitations",10_JIPOE_Brief |
| C8-GAP-05,C8:C8-GAP-05,S5,Commander's critical information requirements,3,CI,positive,9,Does the brief include a commander's critical information requirement covering the Government of Nigeria's consent for US entry into Nigerian territory?,A new PIR or FFIR on Nigerian Government and Nigerian Navy consent for US assistance and entry is added.,"The brief carries forward the three initial PIRs and three FFIRs from the CIPG unchanged, leaving the host-nation acceptance assumption in the CJCS EXORD with no reporting channel and no threshold that would tell the commander it had broken.","CJCS EXORD paragraph 1(f) assumes Nigeria will accept US military assistance to the hostage-recovery effort upon request through diplomatic channels, and 11 Annex E.3 makes Government of Nigeria coordination plus an assessment of Nigerian Navy SBS capacity a precondition for the military rescue option; CIPG v2 section 5 carries only PIR 1 on network intent, PIR 2 on AURORA STAR location, PIR 3 on coalition commitment, and FFIRs 1 to 3.",Mission Analysis Brief - Recommended CCIRs (PIRs and FFIRs),07_CJCS_EXORD; 11_Annexes; 12_CIPG v2 |
| C8-GAP-06,C8:C8-GAP-06,S6,Assumptions,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis contain an assumption that the restoration of Coalition patrol density in the Bonny–Forcados–Cameroon EEZ corridor (highest-threat zone) to pre-drawdown levels will not be impacted by any national command OPCON renegotiations?,The mission analysis contains an assumption that the restoration of Coalition patrol density in the Bonny–Forcados–Cameroon EEZ corridor (highest-threat zone) to pre-drawdown levels will not be impacted by any national command OPCON renegotiations.,The mission analysis does not contain an assumption that the restoration of Coalition patrol density in the Bonny–Forcados–Cameroon EEZ corridor (highest-threat zone) to pre-drawdown levels will not be impacted by any national command OPCON renegotiations.,"CJCS EXORD paragraph 1(f) assumes UK, FRA, ESP, ITA and PRT contributions integrate with STEADFAST MARINER tasking without national-level renegotiation, while 14 section 1.5 carries partner-nation OPCON renegotiation as a live C2 risk; CJCS EXORD paragraph 3(b) LOE 1 and CIPG v2 section 2.5 both require patrol density restored in the Bonny-Forcados-Cameroon EEZ corridor within 14 days of execution.",Mission Analysis Brief - Assumptions,07_CJCS_EXORD; 14_Running_Estimates; 12_CIPG v2 |
| C8-GAP-07,C8:C8-GAP-07,S7,Risk,3,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis highlight as a risk Yaoundé Architecture coordination and mitigates it with a 50% unilateral violation rate as acceptable?,The mission analysis highlights as a risk Yaoundé Architecture coordination and mitigates it with a 50% unilateral violation rate as acceptable.,The mission analysis highlights as a risk Yaoundé Architecture coordination and mitigates it with a strict adherence to host nation approval of activities in their respective EEZs.,"CIPG v2 section 2.8 divides risk into acceptable and unacceptable categories, listing hostage casualties during attempted rescue, coalition disengagement during the operation, Yaounde Architecture damage and inadvertent escalation with host-nation military forces as unacceptable, with no probability judgement attached to any of the four and no linkage to the three end-state conditions in section 1.3.",Mission Analysis Brief - Risk Assessment,12_CIPG v2; 14_Running_Estimates |
| C8-GAP-08,C8:C8-GAP-08,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis mitigate the risk of hostage casualties with ISR and/or HUMINT Positive Identification and the host nation concurrence to allow U.S. forces to conduct the operation?,The mission analysis mitigates the risk of hostage casualties with ISR and/or HUMINT Positive Identification and the host nation concurrence to allow U.S. forces to conduct the operation.,The mission analysis does not mitigate the risk of hostage casualties with ISR and allows the host nation to execute the rescue unilaterally.,CDR USAFRICOM direction: Posture is conditional deterrence with prepared aggressive recovery. Default posture is conservative deterrence (LOE 1 + LOE 3 sustained; LOE 2 limited to ISR development and JSOTF PR/HR ready-posture in support of the FBI HRFC LFA-led negotiation track); aggressive-recovery posture (NCA-authorized military hostage rescue executed by JSOTF–STEADFAST MARINER under JP 3-50) is held in reserve and authorized only by the NCA via a separate CJCS EXORD or Presidential Decision Memorandum following the NSC HRG process under PPD-30.,Mission Analysis Brief - Risk Assessment,12_CIPG v2; 14_Running_Estimates |
| C8-GAP-09,C8:C8-GAP-09,S8,Restated mission,3,SI,positive,2,Does the restated mission name USAFRICOM as the executing joint force headquarters rather than a joint task force?,"USAFRICOM, or CDR USAFRICOM, is the actor in the restated mission statement, consistent with the source inputs recording that the combatant command is acting as the joint force headquarters and that the constituted subordinate headquarters are CTF-100 under NAVAF and JSOTF-STEADFAST MARINER under SOCAFRICA.","The restated mission is written with a joint task force as the acting headquarters, following the template wording carried in the CIPG, or it leaves the executing headquarters unnamed altogether.","CIPG v2 section 2.4 directs that the mission statement be put in WHEN, JTF-X conducts, IN ORDER TO form, but 04 section 1.2 and 11 Annex E.2 both place the JPRC at AFRICOM J3 with the CCMD acting as JFC HQ and no separate JTF stood up for this operation; the headquarters actually constituted are CTF-100 under COMUSNAVAF and JSOTF-STEADFAST MARINER under COMSOCAFRICA.",Mission Analysis Brief - Restated Mission Statement,12_CIPG v2; 04_Coalition_OOB; 11_Annexes |
| C8-GAP-11,C8:C8-GAP-11,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis state that the theater ISR apportioned to the operation is insufficient and additional HUMINT will be required to support operations?,The mission analysis states that the theater ISR apportioned to the operation is insufficient and additional HUMINT will be required to support operations?,"The apportioned ISR platforms are listed as adequate for the location task, or AURORA STAR location is carried as a priority requirement with no accompanying statement of the collection capacity needed to satisfy it and no shortfall recorded.","04 section 1.1 apportions 2 x P-8A Poseidon and 1 x MQ-9B Sea Guardian for 30 days; 06 section 2.1 records 40-plus candidate hide sites in the swamps between the Brass and Forcados rivers that imagery alone cannot resolve because of vegetation cover; 14 section 2.5 rates HUMINT access in the on-shore network as HIGH risk to AURORA STAR location identification, and 03 section 4.4 puts the ransom negotiation cycle at 30 to 90 days.",Mission Analysis Brief - Force and Resource Analysis / Capability Shortfalls,04_Coalition_OOB; 06_Critical_Geography; 14_Running_Estimates; 03_Adversary_OOB |
| C8-GAP-12,C8:C8-GAP-12,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,SI,positive,2,Does the brief identify that the aviation the hostage-recovery concept depends on is embarked in a different ship of the BATAAN ARG than the special operations force it would lift?,"The brief notes that the 26th MEU aviation combat element is embarked in USS BATAAN while the JSOTF SOF element and the planned rotary insertion are tied to USS FORT LAUDERDALE, and derives a ship-positioning, mutual-support or cross-decking requirement for the amphibious ready group.","The amphibious ready group is treated as one platform for force-availability purposes, or MH-60S and MV-22 lift is listed as resident in USS FORT LAUDERDALE, with nothing in the brief showing where those aircraft are actually embarked.","04 section 1.1 embarks the 26th MEU Aviation Combat Element (MV-22B, CH-53E, AH-1Z, UH-1Y, MH-60S, F-35B det) in USS BATAAN (LHD-5) and makes USS FORT LAUDERDALE (LPD-28) the JSOTF SOF berthing and integration platform embarking half the MEU ground combat element, while 11 Annex E.4 and E.5 plan rotary insertion from USS FORT LAUDERDALE using MEU ACE assets.",Mission Analysis Brief - Force and Resource Analysis / Task Organization,04_Coalition_OOB; 11_Annexes |
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