| item_id,item_uid,step,step_name,tier,severity,polarity,weight,question,pass_condition,fail_condition,source_fact,artifact_anchor,source_documents |
| RH-MA-S1-01,C9:RH-MA-S1-01,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record USEUCOM |
| RH-MA-S1-02,C9:RH-MA-S1-02,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief carry the in-order-to purpose clause of USEUCOM |
| RH-MA-S1-03,C9:RH-MA-S1-03,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record national retention of attribution of Russian activity issued by the national level as national strategic direction?,"The mission analysis brief states that public attribution of Russian activity and the disclosure of related intelligence are decided at the national level and not by the combatant command, as stated in Strategic Context paragraph 10 and CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.",The mission analysis brief does not state that public attribution of Russian activity and the disclosure of related intelligence are decided at the national level and not by the combatant command.,"01_Strategic_Context para 10: ""Constraint: public attribution and intelligence disclosure are national-level decisions.""","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Higher commander's objectives/mission/guidance",01;07_CJCS_EXORD |
| RH-MA-S1-05,C9:RH-MA-S1-05,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief use partner-led defence of Moldova |
| RH-MA-S1-07,C9:RH-MA-S1-07,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record the 10 September 2027 concept of operations deadline directed by 07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM as a directed planning timeline?,"The mission analysis brief states that a concept of operations is due to the Joint Staff not later than 10 September 2027, as stated in CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.",The mission analysis brief does not state that a concept of operations is due to the Joint Staff not later than 10 September 2027.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM: ""Establish a joint task force to plan and conduct the operation; complete mission analysis and submit a concept of operations to the Joint Staff NLT 10 SEP 2027.""","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Higher commander's objectives/mission/guidance",07_CJCS_EXORD |
| RH-MA-S1-13,C9:RH-MA-S1-13,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record staging cyberspace options against Russian networks without executing them as a limitation on what the order authorizes?,"The mission analysis brief states that offensive cyberspace options are to be staged but not executed, and that the baseline cyberspace posture is defensive and conducted at Moldovan invitation, as stated in CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.","The mission analysis brief does not state that offensive cyberspace options are to be staged but not executed, and that the baseline cyberspace posture is defensive and conducted at Moldovan invitation.","07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM: ""Stage — but do not execute — offensive cyberspace options; the baseline cyber posture is defensive and at Moldovan invitation.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Limitations - constraints/restraints,07_CJCS_EXORD;11 |
| RH-MA-S1-14,C9:RH-MA-S1-14,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis brief include 07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM characterized as authority to execute or to deploy forces?,The mission analysis brief states that the CJCS EXORD authorises execution or the movement of forces.,The mission analysis brief does not state that the CJCS EXORD authorises execution or the movement of forces.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM directs planning and a concept of operations, and separately directs that offensive cyberspace options be staged but not executed. No paragraph authorises execution. Correct treatment: the brief states that the order directs planning and the submission of a concept of operations, and authorises neither execution nor the deployment of forces, as stated in CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Limitations - constraints/restraints,07_CJCS_EXORD |
| RH-MA-S1-15,C9:RH-MA-S1-15,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis brief include Moldova |
| RH-MA-S1-16,C9:RH-MA-S1-16,S1,Higher mission and intent,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis brief include a priority from the JTF-RESOLUTE HERALD commander |
| RH-MA-S1-17,C9:RH-MA-S1-17,S1,Higher mission and intent,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief use action in Moldova below the armed-conflict threshold to bound the range of military action considered?,"The mission analysis brief states that all United States action is to be conducted below the threshold of armed conflict, and that this bounds the military action available, as stated in CJCS EXORD Coordinating Instructions.","The mission analysis brief does not state that all United States action is to be conducted below the threshold of armed conflict, and that this bounds the military action available.","07_CJCS_EXORD Coordinating instructions: ""All United States actions will be conducted below the threshold of armed conflict.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Limitations - constraints/restraints,07_CJCS_EXORD;01 |
| RH-MA-S2-01,C9:RH-MA-S2-01,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief identify the perceived credibility of the Russian narrative as the threat center of gravity at operational level?,"The mission analysis brief states that the threat operational centre of gravity is the coherence and perceived credibility of the Russian narrative within targeted Moldovan and diaspora audiences, as stated in JIPOE Brief, centre-of-gravity analysis.",The mission analysis brief does not state that the threat operational centre of gravity is the coherence and perceived credibility of the Russian narrative within targeted Moldovan and diaspora audiences.,"10_JIPOE_Brief, Center-of-gravity analysis: ""the coherence and perceived credibility of the Russian narrative within targeted Moldovan and diaspora audiences.""","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Centers of gravity",10;03 |
| RH-MA-S2-02,C9:RH-MA-S2-02,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief pair the perceived credibility of the Russian narrative with its critical vulnerability inauthenticity?,"The mission analysis brief states that authenticity is a critical requirement of the Russian narrative's credibility, and that inauthenticity is therefore the critical vulnerability open to attack, as stated in JIPOE Brief, critical requirements.","The mission analysis brief does not state that authenticity is a critical requirement of the Russian narrative's credibility, and that inauthenticity is therefore the critical vulnerability open to attack.","10_JIPOE_Brief names authenticity, deniability and synchronisation as the critical requirements of the adversary centre of gravity. A critical vulnerability is the requirement that can be attacked, and authenticity is the one exposure of the cloned-media network removes.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Centers of gravity",10;03 |
| RH-MA-S2-06,C9:RH-MA-S2-06,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record a sustained Russian perception campaign as the adversary |
| RH-MA-S2-07,C9:RH-MA-S2-07,S2,Operational environment and threat,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record election-day disruption of the results chain as the adversary |
| RH-MA-S2-11,C9:RH-MA-S2-11,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the assessed effect of its position on the mission?,"The mission analysis brief states that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is a neutral actor whose observation timing the command does not control but whose findings bear on the perceived legitimacy of the election, as stated in Running Estimates, coalition risk.",The mission analysis brief does not state that the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is a neutral actor whose observation timing the command does not control but whose findings bear on the perceived legitimacy of the election.,"14_Running_Estimates records that the EU, OSCE and Romania are expected to diverge on timing and sequencing, requiring a synchronised but not unitary posture. An observer organisation whose timing the command cannot set, but whose findings bear on electoral legitimacy, is a neutral actor with mission relevance.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Situation overview > Neutral assessment (vulnerabilities and protection),04;14 |
| RH-MA-S3-01,C9:RH-MA-S3-01,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record establish a joint task force to CDRUSEUCOM in the task analysis?,"The mission analysis brief states that USEUCOM is directed to establish a joint task force to plan and conduct the operation, as stated in CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.",The mission analysis brief does not state that USEUCOM is directed to establish a joint task force to plan and conduct the operation.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM: ""Establish a joint task force to plan and conduct the operation.""","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Specified/implied/essential tasks",07_CJCS_EXORD |
| RH-MA-S3-02,C9:RH-MA-S3-02,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record the coordination requirement with USCYBERCOM as a specified task?,"The mission analysis brief states that USEUCOM is directed to integrate cyberspace operations with USCYBERCOM, as stated in CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.",The mission analysis brief does not state that USEUCOM is directed to integrate cyberspace operations with USCYBERCOM.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM: ""Integrate cyberspace operations with USCYBERCOM and space operations with USSPACECOM as integral participants.""","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Specified/implied/essential tasks",07_CJCS_EXORD;04 |
| RH-MA-S3-04,C9:RH-MA-S3-04,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief derive establishment of a coordination mechanism with Moldovan and European Union institutions as an implied task?,"The mission analysis brief states an implied task to establish a standing coordination mechanism with Moldovan and European Union institutions, which the order requires to remain the visible principals but does not direct the command to coordinate with, as stated in CJCS EXORD Coordinating Instructions.","The mission analysis brief does not state an implied task to establish a standing coordination mechanism with Moldovan and European Union institutions, which the order requires to remain the visible principals but does not direct the command to coordinate with.","07_CJCS_EXORD Coordinating instructions require that ""Moldovan and European institutions are the visible principals; United States activity enables in support and is calibrated to partner consent."" Operating in support of a partner who must remain the visible principal cannot be done without a standing coordination mechanism, which the order does not itself direct.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Specified/implied/essential tasks",07_CJCS_EXORD;01;04 |
| RH-MA-S3-07,C9:RH-MA-S3-07,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief designate conduct operations in the information environment in Moldova as an essential task drawn from the specified or implied task sets?,"The mission analysis brief states that conducting operations in the information environment is the essential task, drawn from the mission stated in the CJCS EXORD, as stated in CJCS EXORD paragraph 2.","The mission analysis brief does not state that conducting operations in the information environment is the essential task, drawn from the mission stated in the CJCS EXORD.","07_CJCS_EXORD para 2: ""When directed, USEUCOM conducts operations in the information environment."" Per the 7 August ruling, an essential task is drawn from the directing order's mission statement and from the specified and implied task sets, never newly authored.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Specified/implied/essential tasks",07_CJCS_EXORD |
| RH-MA-S3-08,C9:RH-MA-S3-08,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief state the purpose attached to conduct operations in the information environment in Moldova?,"The mission analysis brief states that the purpose of conducting operations in the information environment is to deny the Russian Federation a coerced reversal of Moldova's sovereign trajectory without providing a pretext for escalation, as stated in CJCS EXORD paragraph 3.",The mission analysis brief does not state that the purpose of conducting operations in the information environment is to deny the Russian Federation a coerced reversal of Moldova |
| RH-MA-S3-09,C9:RH-MA-S3-09,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record staging offensive cyberspace options against Russian networks directed for the pre-execution period as a specified task?,"The mission analysis brief states that USEUCOM is directed to stage offensive cyberspace options in advance of execution, as stated in CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.",The mission analysis brief does not state that USEUCOM is directed to stage offensive cyberspace options in advance of execution.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM: ""Stage — but do not execute — offensive cyberspace options.""","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Specified/implied/essential tasks",07_CJCS_EXORD;11 |
| RH-MA-S3-11,C9:RH-MA-S3-11,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record developing recommendations for attributing Russian activity as a task supporting communication synchronization?,"The mission analysis brief states that USEUCOM is directed to develop and maintain recommendations for public attribution and intelligence disclosure for national-level decision, as stated in CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.",The mission analysis brief does not state that USEUCOM is directed to develop and maintain recommendations for public attribution and intelligence disclosure for national-level decision.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM: ""Develop and maintain recommendations for public attribution and intelligence disclosure for national-level decision; do not execute public attribution at the combatant-command level.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Communication synchronization,07_CJCS_EXORD |
| RH-MA-S3-13,C9:RH-MA-S3-13,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",2,I,positive,5,"Does the mission analysis brief separate the specified, implied and essential task sets into three distinct lists?","The mission analysis brief states specified tasks, implied tasks and essential tasks as three separately labelled lists, as stated in JP 5-0 III-19 to III-20.","The mission analysis brief does not state specified tasks, implied tasks and essential tasks as three separately labelled lists.","JP 5-0 III-19 to III-20 treats specified, implied and essential tasks as three distinct categories, with essential tasks drawn from the first two.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Specified/implied/essential tasks",JP5-0 |
| RH-MA-S4-02,C9:RH-MA-S4-02,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record offensive cyberspace effects against Russian networks absent national approval as a restraint?,"The mission analysis brief states that offensive cyberspace effects are prohibited absent national approval, as stated in Annexes, Annex A.4.",The mission analysis brief does not state that offensive cyberspace effects are prohibited absent national approval.,"11_Annexes, Annex A.4: ""Restraint: no offensive cyberspace effects absent national approval.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Limitations - constraints/restraints,11;01;07_CJCS_EXORD |
| RH-MA-S4-03,C9:RH-MA-S4-03,S4,Constraints and restraints,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record the limitation confining military activity to action in Moldova below the armed-conflict threshold?,"The mission analysis brief states that military activity is confined to action below the threshold of armed conflict, as stated in CJCS EXORD Coordinating Instructions.",The mission analysis brief does not state that military activity is confined to action below the threshold of armed conflict.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Coordinating instructions: ""All United States actions will be conducted below the threshold of armed conflict.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Limitations - constraints/restraints,07_CJCS_EXORD;01 |
| RH-MA-S4-16,C9:RH-MA-S4-16,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis brief include the direction to stage cyberspace options read as authority to conduct offensive cyberspace effects against Russian networks?,The mission analysis brief states the direction to stage offensive cyberspace options read as authority to employ offensive cyberspace effects.,The mission analysis brief does not state the direction to stage offensive cyberspace options read as authority to employ offensive cyberspace effects.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM: ""Stage — but do not execute — offensive cyberspace options; the baseline cyber posture is defensive and at Moldovan invitation."" Correct treatment: the brief states that offensive cyberspace options are to be staged and not executed, as stated in CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Limitations - constraints/restraints,07_CJCS_EXORD;11 |
| RH-MA-S4-17,C9:RH-MA-S4-17,S4,Constraints and restraints,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis brief include Moldovan consent for expanded activity treated as already granted?,The mission analysis brief states Moldovan consent for expanded activity treated as already granted.,The mission analysis brief does not state Moldovan consent for expanded activity treated as already granted.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Assumptions: ""The Government of Moldova continues to consent to support while constraining visible US activity."" Consent is carried as an assumption, not as a granted permission. Correct treatment: the brief states that Moldovan consent for expanded in-country activity is an outstanding requirement carried as an assumption, as stated in CJCS EXORD Assumptions.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Limitations - constraints/restraints,07_CJCS_EXORD;01;05 |
| RH-MA-S5-01,C9:RH-MA-S5-01,S5,Commander |
| RH-MA-S5-03,C9:RH-MA-S5-03,S5,Commander |
| RH-MA-S5-05,C9:RH-MA-S5-05,S5,Commander |
| RH-MA-S5-11,C9:RH-MA-S5-11,S5,Commander |
| RH-MA-S6-01,C9:RH-MA-S6-01,S6,Assumptions,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record that the 18 March 2027 ceasefire holds as a planning assumption?,"The mission analysis brief states the assumption that the 18 March 2027 Russia-Ukraine ceasefire holds, as stated in CJCS EXORD Assumptions.",The mission analysis brief does not state the assumption that the 18 March 2027 Russia-Ukraine ceasefire holds.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Assumptions: ""The 18 March 2027 Russia–Ukraine ceasefire holds.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,07_CJCS_EXORD;01;02 |
| RH-MA-S6-04,C9:RH-MA-S6-04,S6,Assumptions,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief separate assumptions from known facts in the friendly assessment?,"The mission analysis brief states known facts and planning assumptions under two separate headings, as stated in JP 5-0 III-17.",The mission analysis brief does not state known facts and planning assumptions under two separate headings.,"JP 5-0 III-17: ""A fact is a statement of information known to be true."" An assumption substitutes for a fact that is not available and must be labelled as such.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,JP5-0 |
| RH-MA-S6-05,C9:RH-MA-S6-05,S6,Assumptions,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief distinguish that Russian objectives stay below the armed-conflict threshold received from higher headquarters from assumptions the command developed?,"The mission analysis brief states that the assumption that Russian objectives remain below the armed-conflict threshold was issued by higher headquarters rather than developed by the command, as stated in CJCS EXORD Assumptions.",The mission analysis brief does not state that the assumption that Russian objectives remain below the armed-conflict threshold was issued by higher headquarters rather than developed by the command.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Assumptions: ""The Russian Federation seeks objectives below the armed-conflict threshold."" The assumption is issued by higher headquarters, not developed by the command.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,07_CJCS_EXORD;01 |
| RH-MA-S6-12,C9:RH-MA-S6-12,S6,Assumptions,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis brief include the 5 December 2027 election date listed as a planning assumption?,The mission analysis brief states the 5 December 2027 election date listed as a planning assumption.,The mission analysis brief does not state the 5 December 2027 election date listed as a planning assumption.,"05_Country_Fact_Sheet para 2: ""The 5 December 2027 parliamentary election is the central event."" A stated date is a fact, not an assumption. Correct treatment: the brief states the 5 December 2027 election date in the facts register, as stated in Country Fact Sheet paragraph 2.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,05;06 |
| RH-MA-S6-13,C9:RH-MA-S6-13,S6,Assumptions,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis brief include any assumption that adds scope beyond what planning requires?,The mission analysis brief states an assumption that widens the scope of the operation rather than enabling planning.,The mission analysis brief does not state an assumption that widens the scope of the operation rather than enabling planning.,"JP 5-0 III-17 admits an assumption only where it is necessary for planning to continue. An assumption that widens scope adds requirement rather than enabling planning. Correct treatment: the brief states only those assumptions without which planning cannot continue, as stated in JP 5-0 III-17.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,JP5-0 |
| RH-MA-S6-21,C9:RH-MA-S6-21,S6,Assumptions,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record the directed strategic assumption that the Russian Federation will seek objectives below the armed-conflict threshold as a planning assumption?,"The mission analysis brief states the directed assumption that the Russian Federation seeks objectives below the armed-conflict threshold, as stated in CJCS EXORD Assumptions.",The mission analysis brief does not state the directed assumption that the Russian Federation seeks objectives below the armed-conflict threshold.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Assumptions: ""The Russian Federation seeks objectives below the armed-conflict threshold.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,07_CJCS_EXORD;01 |
| RH-MA-S6-23,C9:RH-MA-S6-23,S6,Assumptions,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record the directed strategic assumption that the Government of Moldova will continue to consent while constraining visible activity as a planning assumption?,"The mission analysis brief states the directed assumption that the Government of Moldova continues to consent to support while constraining visible United States activity, as stated in CJCS EXORD Assumptions.",The mission analysis brief does not state the directed assumption that the Government of Moldova continues to consent to support while constraining visible United States activity.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Assumptions: ""The Government of Moldova continues to consent to support while constraining visible US activity.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,07_CJCS_EXORD;01;05 |
| RH-MA-S7-01,C9:RH-MA-S7-01,S7,Risk,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief carry a risk to mission arising from United States action read as election interference?,"The mission analysis brief states a risk to mission that United States action is perceived as foreign interference in a partner's election, damaging the government it is meant to support and validating the Russian narrative of Western militarisation, as stated in Strategic Context paragraph 11.","The mission analysis brief does not state a risk to mission that United States action is perceived as foreign interference in a partner's election, damaging the government it is meant to support and validating the Russian narrative of Western militarisation.","01_Strategic_Context para 11: ""The principal strategic risks are: (a) that US action is perceived as foreign interference in a partner's election, damaging the very government it is meant to support and validating the Russian narrative of Western militarization.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Operational protection > Operational risk,01;05 |
| RH-MA-S7-03,C9:RH-MA-S7-03,S7,Risk,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief state the probability assessed for the risk arising from United States action read as election interference?,"The mission analysis brief states a probability for the risk that United States action is read as election interference, as stated in JP 5-0 III-24 and Strategic Context paragraph 11.",The mission analysis brief does not state a probability for the risk that United States action is read as election interference.,"JP 5-0 III-24 characterises military risk as an integration of probability and consequence. 01_Strategic_Context states the risks topically, without either term.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Operational protection > Operational risk,JP5-0;01 |
| RH-MA-S7-04,C9:RH-MA-S7-04,S7,Risk,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief state the consequence assessed for the risk arising from United States action read as election interference?,"The mission analysis brief states a consequence for the risk that United States action is read as election interference, as stated in JP 5-0 III-24 and Strategic Context paragraph 11.",The mission analysis brief does not state a consequence for the risk that United States action is read as election interference.,JP 5-0 III-24 characterises military risk as an integration of probability and consequence assessed against the ability to achieve objectives.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Operational protection > Operational risk,JP5-0;01 |
| RH-MA-S7-11,C9:RH-MA-S7-11,S7,Risk,3,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief derive a risk to time from approval latency against the 5 December 2027 election?,"The mission analysis brief states a risk to time from approval latency measured against the fixed 5 December 2027 election date, as stated in Annexes, Annex C product timelines.",The mission analysis brief does not state a risk to time from approval latency measured against the fixed 5 December 2027 election date.,"11_Annexes, Annex C product timelines: ""Product timelines planned against 5 December; approval latency is a binding planning constraint.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Operational protection > Operational risk,11;14;05 |
| RH-MA-S7-12,C9:RH-MA-S7-12,S7,Risk,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief separate risk to mission from risk to force as distinct populated categories?,"The mission analysis brief states risk to mission and risk to force under two separate headings, each with entries, as stated in JP 5-0 III-24.","The mission analysis brief does not state risk to mission and risk to force under two separate headings, each with entries.",JP 5-0 III-24 distinguishes risk to mission from risk to force as separate assessments.,JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Operational protection > Operational risk,JP5-0 |
| RH-MA-S7-14,C9:RH-MA-S7-14,S7,Risk,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis brief include any risk entry stated without both a probability and a consequence?,The mission analysis brief states a risk entry carrying neither a probability nor a consequence.,The mission analysis brief does not state a risk entry carrying neither a probability nor a consequence.,"JP 5-0 III-24 characterises military risk as an integration of probability and consequence. A risk entry missing either term states a concern rather than a risk. Correct treatment: the brief states each risk with both a probability and a consequence, as stated in JP 5-0 III-24.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Operational protection > Operational risk,JP5-0 |
| RH-MA-S7-18,C9:RH-MA-S7-18,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief use hunt-forward coverage on election day from the force analysis to inform a stated risk?,"The mission analysis brief states a risk arising from the absence of hunt-forward cyber coverage on election day, which is the day the most dangerous course of action would fall on, as stated in Coalition Order of Battle paragraph 10 and Regional Intelligence Summary paragraph 7.","The mission analysis brief does not state a risk arising from the absence of hunt-forward cyber coverage on election day, which is the day the most dangerous course of action would fall on.","04_Coalition_OOB para 10 records the hunt-forward extension to cover 5 December as pending, and 02_Regional_Intel_Summary para 7 assesses election-day disruption as the most dangerous course of action. The gap and the threat coincide in time.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Operational protection > Operational risk,04;14;02 |
| RH-MA-S8-01,C9:RH-MA-S8-01,S8,Restated mission,1,CI,positive,9,Does the proposed restated mission state conduct operations in the information environment in Moldova as a task?,"The proposed restated mission states conducting operations in the information environment as the task, as stated in CJCS EXORD paragraph 2.",The proposed restated mission does not state conducting operations in the information environment as the task.,"07_CJCS_EXORD para 2: ""When directed, USEUCOM conducts operations in the information environment.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Mission > Proposed mission statement,07_CJCS_EXORD |
| RH-MA-S8-02,C9:RH-MA-S8-02,S8,Restated mission,1,CI,positive,9,Does the proposed restated mission state the purpose as denying a coerced reversal of Moldova |
| RH-MA-S8-03,C9:RH-MA-S8-03,S8,Restated mission,1,CI,positive,9,Does the proposed restated mission name USEUCOM as the who of the mission statement?,"The proposed restated mission states USEUCOM as the acting command, as stated in CJCS EXORD paragraph 2.",The proposed restated mission does not state USEUCOM as the acting command.,"07_CJCS_EXORD para 2 addresses the mission to USEUCOM, and 04_Coalition_OOB para 1 records ""Supported command: USEUCOM.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Mission > Proposed mission statement,07_CJCS_EXORD;04 |
| RH-MA-S8-04,C9:RH-MA-S8-04,S8,Restated mission,1,CI,positive,9,"Does the proposed restated mission state Moldova, with presence held in Romania as the where of the mission statement?","The proposed restated mission states Moldova as the operational area, with visible ground presence held in Romania, as stated in Strategic Context paragraph 10.","The proposed restated mission does not state Moldova as the operational area, with visible ground presence held in Romania.","01_Strategic_Context para 10: ""no visible US military activity inside Moldovan territory beyond the noncombatant-evacuation sequel; visible ground presence held in Romania.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Mission > Proposed mission statement,01;07_CJCS_EXORD;06 |
| RH-MA-S8-05,C9:RH-MA-S8-05,S8,Restated mission,1,I,positive,5,Does the proposed restated mission state through the 5 December 2027 election as the when of the mission statement?,"The proposed restated mission states that the operation runs through the 5 December 2027 parliamentary election, as stated in Country Fact Sheet paragraph 2.",The proposed restated mission does not state that the operation runs through the 5 December 2027 parliamentary election.,"05_Country_Fact_Sheet para 2: ""The 5 December 2027 parliamentary election is the central event.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Mission > Proposed mission statement,05;07_CJCS_EXORD;04 |
| RH-MA-S8-07,C9:RH-MA-S8-07,S8,Restated mission,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief present the restated mission as proposed for commander approval?,"The mission analysis brief states the restated mission as proposed for the commander's approval, as stated in JP 5-0 Figure III-12.",The mission analysis brief does not state the restated mission as proposed for the commander |
| RH-MA-S8-12,C9:RH-MA-S8-12,S8,Restated mission,2,I,positive,5,Does the proposed commander |
| RH-MA-S8-13,C9:RH-MA-S8-13,S8,Restated mission,2,D,negative,-5,Does the proposed restated mission include executing public attribution belonging to a command other than USEUCOM?,"The proposed restated mission states execution of public attribution, which is retained at the national level, as a USEUCOM task.","The proposed restated mission does not state execution of public attribution, which is retained at the national level, as a USEUCOM task.","07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM: ""do not execute public attribution at the combatant-command level."" Attribution is retained at the national level. Correct treatment: the brief states only tasks assigned to USEUCOM, as stated in CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Mission > Proposed mission statement,07_CJCS_EXORD |
| RH-MA-S8-15,C9:RH-MA-S8-15,S8,Restated mission,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the proposed restated mission include designating Treasury financial-measure targets as a task for the command?,"The proposed restated mission states designation of financial-measure targets, which belongs to the Department of the Treasury, as a task for the command.","The proposed restated mission does not state designation of financial-measure targets, which belongs to the Department of the Treasury, as a task for the command.","07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM directs the command to ""Coordinate targeted financial-measure nominations with the Department of the Treasury."" Treasury designates; the command nominates. Correct treatment: the brief states nomination of financial-measure targets as the command's role, as stated in CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Mission > Proposed mission statement,07_CJCS_EXORD |
| RH-MA-S8-10_ADDED,C9:RH-MA-S8-10_ADDED,S8,Restated mission,1,D,negative,-5,Does the proposed restated mission include the sequencing of information activities that belongs to course of action development?,"The proposed restated mission does not state who, what, when, where and why, and anchors on how the activities are sequenced.","The proposed restated mission states who, what, when, where and why, and nothing on how the activities are sequenced, as stated in JP 5-0 III-20.","JP 5-0 III-20 confines the mission statement to who, what, when, where and why. Phasing and decisive points are course of action development products and appear only in 12_CIPG, which is subordinate guidance.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Mission > Proposed mission statement,JP5-0;12_CIPG |
| RH-MA-S10-01,C9:RH-MA-S10-01,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record the Russian campaign tracked as EMBER LATTICE as a fact?,"The mission analysis brief states that the Russian campaign against Moldova is tracked as EMBER LATTICE, as stated in Regional Intelligence Summary paragraph 1.",The mission analysis brief does not state that the Russian campaign against Moldova is tracked as EMBER LATTICE.,"02_Regional_Intel_Summary para 1: ""The campaign — tracked as EMBER LATTICE.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,02;07_CJCS_EXORD |
| RH-MA-S10-02,C9:RH-MA-S10-02,S10,Known facts,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record the absence of a mutual-defence treaty obligation to Moldova as a fact?,"The mission analysis brief states that no mutual-defence treaty obligation exists between the United States and Moldova, as stated in CJCS EXORD paragraph 1.",The mission analysis brief does not state that no mutual-defence treaty obligation exists between the United States and Moldova.,"07_CJCS_EXORD para 1: ""There is no mutual-defense treaty obligation; United States action is at the request of the Government of Moldova.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,07_CJCS_EXORD;05 |
| RH-MA-S10-04,C9:RH-MA-S10-04,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record Russian ownership and majority right-bank supply about the Cuciurgan power plant as a fact?,"The mission analysis brief states that the Cuciurgan power plant is Russian-owned and supplies the majority of right-bank electricity, as stated in Country Fact Sheet paragraph 3.",The mission analysis brief does not state that the Cuciurgan power plant is Russian-owned and supplies the majority of right-bank electricity.,"05_Country_Fact_Sheet para 3: ""Hosts the Cuciurgan/MGRES power plant (Russian-owned), which supplies the majority of right-bank electricity.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,05;06;03 |
| RH-MA-S10-14,C9:RH-MA-S10-14,S10,Known facts,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis brief include any fact carried without a named originating document?,The mission analysis brief states a fact carried with no originating document named.,The mission analysis brief does not state a fact carried with no originating document named.,"JP 5-0 III-17: ""Commanders and planners must use caution in characterizing information as facts, as some may prove erroneous."" A fact with no named origin cannot be checked. Correct treatment: the brief states each fact with the document it came from, as stated in JP 5-0 III-17.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,JP5-0 |
| RH-MA-S10-15,C9:RH-MA-S10-15,S10,Known facts,2,CD,negative,-9,"Does the mission analysis brief include an unsourced figure, name or date stated as a fact from the source inputs?","The mission analysis brief states a specific figure, name or date that no source document supports.","The mission analysis brief does not state a specific figure, name or date that no source document supports.","JP 5-0 III-17 defines a fact as a statement of information known to be true. A specific figure with no source is not a fact. Correct treatment: the brief states only facts traceable to a named source document, as stated in JP 5-0 III-17.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,JP5-0 |
| RH-MA-S10-20,C9:RH-MA-S10-20,S10,Known facts,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record the fixed 5 December 2027 election date governing the operating period as a fact?,"The mission analysis brief states that the 5 December 2027 parliamentary election is the fixed date the adversary campaign is synchronised to, as stated in Country Fact Sheet paragraph 2 and Regional Intelligence Summary paragraph 3.",The mission analysis brief does not state that the 5 December 2027 parliamentary election is the fixed date the adversary campaign is synchronised to.,"05_Country_Fact_Sheet para 2: ""The 5 December 2027 parliamentary election is the central event."" 02_Regional_Intel_Summary para 3 records that synchronisation ""against a fixed date is what makes the campaign decisive-phase.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Facts and assumptions,05;02;06 |
| RH-MA-S11-01,C9:RH-MA-S11-01,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief record the JTF-RESOLUTE HERALD information support task force among the capabilities available to the operation?,"The mission analysis brief states that a military information support task force is apportioned to the operation, as stated in Coalition Order of Battle paragraph 9.",The mission analysis brief does not state that a military information support task force is apportioned to the operation.,"04_Coalition_OOB para 9: ""USEUCOM apportioned to JTF-RH a three-company MISTF, a 90-day hunt-forward cyber team, and dedicated theater ISR for the election period.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Capabilities allocated,04 |
| RH-MA-S11-03,C9:RH-MA-S11-03,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief identify the absence of the third information support company from the apportioned force as a shortfall?,"The mission analysis brief states that the third military information support company is unfilled, leaving the task force short of the three companies apportioned, as stated in Coalition Order of Battle paragraph 10.","The mission analysis brief does not state that the third military information support company is unfilled, leaving the task force short of the three companies apportioned.","04_Coalition_OOB para 10: ""RFF-RH-001: Third MISO company to complete the MISTF — pending; competes with other theater MISO tasking.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Conclusion - potential resource shortfalls,04;14 |
| RH-MA-S11-13,C9:RH-MA-S11-13,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record European Union and Romanian contributions separately from apportioned United States forces?,"The mission analysis brief states European Union and Romanian contributions under a heading separate from apportioned United States forces, as stated in Coalition Order of Battle.",The mission analysis brief does not state European Union and Romanian contributions under a heading separate from apportioned United States forces.,"04_Coalition_OOB separates apportioned United States forces from partner contributions, and the order requires partner institutions to remain the visible principals, so the two cannot be counted as one pool.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Capabilities allocated,04;01 |
| RH-MA-S11-15,C9:RH-MA-S11-15,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis brief include a pending RESOLUTE HERALD request for forces counted as available to the operation?,The mission analysis brief states a pending request for forces counted as a capability available to the operation.,The mission analysis brief does not state a pending request for forces counted as a capability available to the operation.,"04_Coalition_OOB para 10 records RFF-RH-001, 002 and 003 as pending, and 14_Running_Estimates records that ""the RFFs (001–003) may not be filled in time."" Correct treatment: the brief states that requests for forces 001, 002 and 003 are pending and may not be filled in time, as stated in Coalition Order of Battle paragraph 10 and Running Estimates, Sustainment.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Capabilities allocated,04;14 |
| RH-MA-S11-16,C9:RH-MA-S11-16,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CD,negative,-9,"Does the mission analysis brief include the JTF-RESOLUTE HERALD information support task force described as assigned, allocated or deployable on order?","The mission analysis brief states the apportioned task force described as assigned, allocated or deployable on order.","The mission analysis brief does not state the apportioned task force described as assigned, allocated or deployable on order.","04_Coalition_OOB para 9 records what USEUCOM apportioned, and separately lists ""The forces actually allocated and reflected in the component directives (08, 09a, 09b)"". Apportionment is for planning and is not allocation. Correct treatment: the brief states that the information support task force is apportioned for planning, as stated in Coalition Order of Battle paragraph 9.",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Capabilities allocated,04 |
| RH-MA-S11-18,C9:RH-MA-S11-18,S11,Force and resource analysis,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief carry hunt-forward coverage on election day into the conclusion as a potential resource shortfall?,"The mission analysis brief states the absence of hunt-forward cyber coverage on election day among the potential resource shortfalls in the conclusion, as stated in Coalition Order of Battle paragraph 10.",The mission analysis brief does not state the absence of hunt-forward cyber coverage on election day among the potential resource shortfalls in the conclusion.,"04_Coalition_OOB para 10: ""RFF-RH-002: Extension of the hunt-forward team from 60 to 90 days to cover election day (5 Dec) and the post-election window — pending.""",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Conclusion - potential resource shortfalls,04;14 |
| RH-MA-S11-20,C9:RH-MA-S11-20,S11,Force and resource analysis,1,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record the quantity of the JTF-RESOLUTE HERALD information support task force stated in the force list?,"The mission analysis brief states that three information support companies were apportioned, as stated in Coalition Order of Battle paragraph 9.",The mission analysis brief does not state that three information support companies were apportioned.,"04_Coalition_OOB para 9: ""a three-company MISTF"".",JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Friendly assessment > Capabilities allocated,04 |
| RH-MA-S12-01,C9:RH-MA-S12-01,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief state degraded reach and deniability of EMBER LATTICE as an objective expressed as a condition to be achieved?,"The mission analysis brief states a military objective that the reach and deniability of the Russian coercion campaign are degraded, expressed as a condition to be achieved rather than an activity, as stated in CJCS EXORD paragraph 3 and JIPOE Brief.","The mission analysis brief does not state a military objective that the reach and deniability of the Russian coercion campaign are degraded, expressed as a condition to be achieved rather than an activity.","07_CJCS_EXORD para 3 sets the purpose as denying a coerced reversal of Moldova's trajectory, and 10_JIPOE_Brief identifies deniability as a critical requirement of the adversary centre of gravity. An objective is the condition that purpose requires, and doctrine expects it to be derived rather than quoted.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Objectives and effects",07_CJCS_EXORD;01;10 |
| RH-MA-S12-02,C9:RH-MA-S12-02,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief keep degraded reach and deniability of EMBER LATTICE distinct from the stated end state?,"The mission analysis brief states the objective of degraded campaign reach and deniability separately from the end state of partner-led information defence, as stated in JP 5-0 IV-6 and Strategic Context paragraph 8.",The mission analysis brief does not state the objective of degraded campaign reach and deniability separately from the end state of partner-led information defence.,"JP 5-0 IV-6 distinguishes the end state, the set of conditions that defines achievement, from the objectives that lead to it.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Objectives and effects",JP5-0;01 |
| RH-MA-S12-05,C9:RH-MA-S12-05,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief keep evaluation criteria distinct from the screening criteria?,"The mission analysis brief states evaluation criteria separately from the screening criteria that test whether a course of action is valid at all, as stated in JP 5-0 III-23.",The mission analysis brief does not state evaluation criteria separately from the screening criteria that test whether a course of action is valid at all.,JP 5-0 III-23 distinguishes the screening criteria that test whether a course of action is valid from the evaluation criteria that compare valid courses of action against one another.,"JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Objectives and effects",JP5-0 |
| RH-MA-S12-07,C9:RH-MA-S12-07,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief state the close of the post-election contested-legitimacy window as a condition ending the operation?,"The mission analysis brief states a termination criterion that the operation ends when Moldovan and European institutions carry the information-resilience effort unaided past the post-election contested-legitimacy window, as stated in Strategic Context paragraph 8.",The mission analysis brief does not state a termination criterion that the operation ends when Moldovan and European institutions carry the information-resilience effort unaided past the post-election contested-legitimacy window.,"01_Strategic_Context para 8 sets the end state as partner-led information defence, and 05_Country_Fact_Sheet para 2 fixes the election at 5 December 2027. The operation ends when partner institutions carry the effort unaided past the contested-legitimacy window, not on election day itself.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Objectives and effects",01;05;04 |
| RH-MA-S12-12,C9:RH-MA-S12-12,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,CI,positive,9,Does the mission analysis brief derive the criterion of pretext given to Moscow from the risk arising from action read as election interference?,"The mission analysis brief states an evaluation criterion of how much pretext for escalation each course of action gives Moscow, as stated in CJCS EXORD paragraph 3 and Strategic Context paragraph 11.",The mission analysis brief does not state an evaluation criterion of how much pretext for escalation each course of action gives Moscow.,"01_Strategic_Context para 11 names perceived interference as a principal strategic risk, and 07_CJCS_EXORD para 3 requires acting ""without providing a pretext for escalation"". Options differ in how much pretext they give.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Objectives and effects",01;02 |
| RH-MA-S12-14,C9:RH-MA-S12-14,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis brief include any military objective expressed as a friendly task?,The mission analysis brief states a military objective written as a task the friendly force performs.,The mission analysis brief does not state a military objective written as a task the friendly force performs.,"JP 5-0 IV-6 expresses objectives as conditions to be achieved. A friendly task states what the force does, not the condition that results. Correct treatment: the brief states each military objective as a condition to be achieved, as stated in JP 5-0 IV-6.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Objectives and effects",JP5-0 |
| RH-MA-S12-15,C9:RH-MA-S12-15,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,D,negative,-5,Does the mission analysis brief include any evaluation criterion that would not distinguish between plausible courses of action?,The mission analysis brief states an evaluation criterion that every plausible course of action satisfies equally.,The mission analysis brief does not state an evaluation criterion that every plausible course of action satisfies equally.,"JP 5-0 III-23: developing evaluation criteria during mission analysis ""helps to eliminate a source of bias prior to COA analysis and comparison."" A criterion every option satisfies equally eliminates nothing. Correct treatment: the brief states only evaluation criteria that would separate one plausible course of action from another, as stated in JP 5-0 III-23.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Objectives and effects",JP5-0 |
| RH-MA-S12-16,C9:RH-MA-S12-16,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,CD,negative,-9,Does the mission analysis brief include Treasury targeted financial measures as a military objective or termination condition for the command?,The mission analysis brief states Treasury targeted financial measures set as a military objective or termination condition for the command.,The mission analysis brief does not state Treasury targeted financial measures set as a military objective or termination condition for the command.,"07_CJCS_EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM: ""Coordinate targeted financial-measure nominations with the Department of the Treasury."" The lever belongs to Treasury and cannot be a military objective for the command. Correct treatment: the brief states that targeted financial measures are a Treasury lever the command nominates targets for, as stated in CJCS EXORD Tasks to CDRUSEUCOM.","JP 5-0 Fig III-12 > Objectives, effects, and task analysis > Objectives and effects",07_CJCS_EXORD;01 |
| RH-MA-S12-20,C9:RH-MA-S12-20,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,2,I,positive,5,Does the mission analysis brief record partner-led defence of Moldova |
| C9-GAP-02,C9:C9-GAP-02,S8,Restated mission,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the restated mission statement describe the WHAT as conditions-based, based on the post-election contested-legitimacy window?","The restated mission statement describes the WHAT as conditions-based, based on the post-election contested-legitimacy window, which is anticipated to last up to 30 days beyond the day of voting.","The restated mission statement describes the WHAT as time-based, such as the 5 December election or a D+ end date.","07_CJCS_EXORD describes RESOLUTE HERALD as a sustained campaign through and beyond election day; 10_JIPOE_Brief times the assessed election-day disruption and perception attack from D to D+3, the 5 December 2027 vote through the results-publication window; 12_CIPG sets termination when the post-election contested-legitimacy window closes at about D+30.","Restated mission statement, time element",07_CJCS_EXORD; 10_JIPOE_Brief; 12_CIPG |
| C9-GAP-04,C9:C9-GAP-04,S7,Risk,3,CI,positive,9,"Does the risk assessment identify the risk to mission, without mitigation, as initially LOW probability of failure but increasing to MODERATE or SIGNIFICANT probability of failure based on weakening partner consent over time as well as increased Russian influence as the election draws near in time?","The risk assessment identifiesthe risk to mission, without mitigation, as initially LOW probability of failure but increasing to MODERATE or SIGNIFICANT probability of failure based on weakening partner consent over time as well as increased Russian influence as the election draws near in time.","The risk assessment identifiesthe risk to mission, without mitigation, as initially LOW probability of failure but does not address how the probability of mission failure increases over time due to weakening partner consent and increased Russian influence.",05_Country_Fact_Sheet paragraph 8 states that partner consent is dynamic and can narrow as the election nears and is tracked as a friendly-force information requirement; 10_JIPOE_Brief times the assessed staged Security-Zone provocation to the T-21 to T-7 window before the 5 December 2027 vote; 06_Critical_Geography places peak heating demand in the same final weeks.,"Risk paragraph of the MA brief, partner and escalation risk discussion",05_Country_Fact_Sheet; 10_JIPOE_Brief; 06_Critical_Geography |
| C9-GAP-05,C9:C9-GAP-05,S6,Assumptions,3,SI,positive,2,"Does the analysis review the Russia-Ukraine ceasfire as an assumption that, if invalid, will require an alteration to the plan in the areas of Russian information operations?","The analysis reviews the Russia-Ukraine ceasfire as an assumption that, if invalid, requires an alteration to the plan in the areas of Russian information operations.","The analysis does not address the Russia-Ukraine ceasfire as an assumption and/or, does not consider its invalidation as requiring an alteration to the plan.",01_Strategic_Context paragraph 9 makes the holding of the 18 March 2027 Russia-Ukraine ceasefire a key assumption to monitor; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary paragraph 2 assesses that assets previously committed to the Ukraine fight shifted toward the Moldova line and that a ceasefire breakdown would likely pull that capacity back.,Assumptions paragraph of the MA brief,01_Strategic_Context; 02_Regional_Intel_Summary; 14_Running_Estimates |
| C9-GAP-06,C9:C9-GAP-06,S5,Commander |
| C9-GAP-07,C9:C9-GAP-07,S3,"Specified, implied and essential tasks",3,I,positive,5,Does the task analysis derive an implied task to synchronize Joint Force Commander (JFC) communications with European media stakeholders prior to executing the operation?,The task analysis derives an implied task to synchronize JFC communications with European media stakeholders prior to executing the operation.,The task analysis does not derive an implied task to synchronize JFC communications with European media stakeholders prior to executing the operation.,02_Regional_Intel_Summary paragraph 10 records that EEAS East StratCom assesses the cloned-media network with higher confidence from open-source and platform reporting while technical cyber attribution is held more tightly by national agencies; 11_Annexes E.2 lists EU attribution ahead of US technical confidence as a divergence scenario the JTF must manage.,"Specified, implied and essential tasks paragraph, implied task list",02_Regional_Intel_Summary; 11_Annexes; 04_Coalition_OOB |
| C9-GAP-09,C9:C9-GAP-09,S12,Military objectives and COA evaluation criteria,3,SI,positive,2,Does analysis derive evaluation criteria as the observability/assessability of U.S. actions shaping the operational environment?,"The analysis derives evaluation criteria as the observability/assessability of U.S. actions shaping the operational environment, specifically the actions of Russian media proxies and Moldovan civilian responses.","The analysis does not derive an evaluation criteria as the observability/assessability of U.S. actions shaping the operational environment, even though it is aligned with theater-strategic objectives, which is to deter Russian involvement in Moldovan free elections.",12_CIPG sets the LOE 4 objective as Moscow perceiving escalation as higher-cost than continued campaigning; 10_JIPOE_Brief rates escalation triggers and de-escalation conditions in the adversary decision-making model at LOW confidence and lists observable proxies for a decision shift including cloned-media tempo change and OGRF/PMR posture change.,"Military objectives and evaluation criteria paragraph, deterrence objective and its measure",12_CIPG; 10_JIPOE_Brief; 11_Annexes |
| C9-GAP-10,C9:C9-GAP-10,S11,Force and resource analysis,3,I,positive,5,Does the force analysis show that the unfilled third MISO company degrades audience coverage unevenly across the five segments rather than reducing coverage proportionally?,"The brief maps the two allocated MISO companies against the segment table's lead voices and concludes that the shortfall does not fall evenly, since the Russia-resident diaspora is led by State public diplomacy and separately reach-constrained and the general right-bank electorate is already carried by Moldovan institutions, so the loss lands on the contested EU-resident diaspora and persuadable Russian-speaking segments.","The shortfall is reported as a flat one-third reduction in reach, or as a general statement that simultaneous coverage of five segments is no longer possible, with no attempt to work out which specific segments the two remaining companies can and cannot serve given the assigned lead voices and language and platform requirements.","04_Coalition_OOB shows MISTF-EUROPE allocated two of three apportioned MISO companies at about 120 personnel with RFF-RH-001 pending; 11_Annexes C.3 assigns each of five audience segments a different lead voice, including EU StratCom for the EU-resident diaspora and State public diplomacy for the Russia-resident diaspora; 14_Running_Estimates records constrained reach into the Russia-resident diaspora.","Force and resource analysis paragraph, MISO segment coverage",04_Coalition_OOB; 11_Annexes; 14_Running_Estimates |
| C9-GAP-11,C9:C9-GAP-11,S2,Operational environment and threat,2,D,negative,-5,Does the brief treat Gagauzia or Bashkan Irina Cazacu as a Russian-directed adversary actor?,"The error is present: the brief places Gagauzia, its autonomous institutions or Bashkan Cazacu inside the adversary order of battle, on an exposure or countering list, or describes the region as Russian-controlled terrain to be worked against.","The brief handles Gagauzia as a lawful autonomous unit whose grievances over budget transfers, language policy and foreign-policy orientation are genuine and locally rooted, notes that the Russian campaign amplifies rather than directs them, and routes any engagement through Moldovan institutions and voices.","03_Adversary_OOB paragraph 12 lists Bashkan Irina Cazacu of Gagauzia among key personalities but rates her as a platform for lawful influence and expressly not a Russian-directed actor; 05_Country_Fact_Sheet paragraph 4 describes the autonomous unit of about 135,000 people at Comrat and warns against treating it as Russian-directed.","Operational environment and threat paragraph, actor and audience characterization",03_Adversary_OOB; 05_Country_Fact_Sheet |
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