output stringlengths 64 73.2k | input stringlengths 208 73.3k | instruction stringclasses 1
value |
|---|---|---|
#fixed code
@SuppressWarnings({"unchecked", "rawtypes"})
@Override
public void onServiceContextReceived(ServiceContext serviceContext) throws Throwable {
FlowMessage flowMessage = serviceContext.getFlowMessage();
if (serviceContext.isSync()) {
CacheManager.get(serviceActo... | #vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings({"unchecked", "rawtypes"})
@Override
public void onServiceContextReceived(ServiceContext serviceContext) throws Throwable {
FlowMessage flowMessage = serviceContext.getFlowMessage();
if (serviceContext.isSync()) {
CacheManager.get(servi... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Override
public void doStartup(String configLocation) throws Throwable {
Class<?> applicationContextClazz =
Class.forName("org.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext", true, getClassLoader());
Object flowerFactory = applicationContextC... | #vulnerable code
@Override
public void doStartup(String configLocation) {
ClassPathXmlApplicationContext applicationContext = null;
try {
applicationContext = new ClassPathXmlApplicationContext(configLocation);
applicationContext.start();
} catch (Exception e) {... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public static List<Pair<String, String>> readFlow(String path) throws IOException {
InputStreamReader fr = new InputStreamReader(FileUtil.class.getResourceAsStream(path),Constant.ENCODING_UTF_8);
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr);
String line;
List<Pair... | #vulnerable code
public static List<Pair<String, String>> readFlow(String path) throws IOException {
InputStreamReader fr = new InputStreamReader(FileUtil.class.getResourceAsStream(path));
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr);
String line = "";
List<Pair<String, Stri... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
FunctionTypeBuilder(String fnName, AbstractCompiler compiler,
Node errorRoot, String sourceName, Scope scope) {
Preconditions.checkNotNull(errorRoot);
this.fnName = fnName == null ? "" : fnName;
this.codingConvention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
this... | #vulnerable code
FunctionTypeBuilder inferThisType(JSDocInfo info,
@Nullable Node owner) {
ObjectType maybeThisType = null;
if (info != null && info.hasThisType()) {
maybeThisType = ObjectType.cast(
info.getThisType().evaluate(scope, typeRegistry));
}
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private EnvTypePair analyzeLooseCallNodeBwd(
Node callNode, TypeEnv outEnv, JSType retType) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(callNode.isCall());
Preconditions.checkNotNull(retType);
Node callee = callNode.getFirstChild();
TypeEnv tmpEnv = outEnv;
Function... | #vulnerable code
private EnvTypePair analyzeLooseCallNodeBwd(
Node callNode, TypeEnv outEnv, JSType retType) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(callNode.isCall());
Preconditions.checkNotNull(retType);
Node callee = callNode.getFirstChild();
TypeEnv tmpEnv = outEnv;
Fu... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() {
try {
return CommandLineRunner.getDefaultExterns();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new BuildException(e);
}
} | #vulnerable code
private List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() {
try {
InputStream input = Compiler.class.getResourceAsStream(
"/externs.zip");
ZipInputStream zip = new ZipInputStream(input);
List<JSSourceFile> externs = Lists.newLinkedList();
for (... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private Node tryOptimizeSwitch(Node n) {
Preconditions.checkState(n.getType() == Token.SWITCH);
Node defaultCase = tryOptimizeDefaultCase(n);
// Removing cases when there exists a default case is not safe.
if (defaultCase == null) {
Node next = null;
... | #vulnerable code
private Node tryOptimizeSwitch(Node n) {
Preconditions.checkState(n.getType() == Token.SWITCH);
Node defaultCase = findDefaultCase(n);
if (defaultCase != null && isUselessCase(defaultCase)) {
NodeUtil.redeclareVarsInsideBranch(defaultCase);
n.remo... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void writeResult(String source) {
if (this.outputFile.getParentFile().mkdirs()) {
log("Created missing parent directory " +
this.outputFile.getParentFile(), Project.MSG_DEBUG);
}
try {
OutputStreamWriter out = new OutputStreamWriter(
... | #vulnerable code
private void writeResult(String source) {
if (this.outputFile.getParentFile().mkdirs()) {
log("Created missing parent directory " +
this.outputFile.getParentFile(), Project.MSG_DEBUG);
}
try {
FileWriter out = new FileWriter(this.outputF... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private Writer fileNameToOutputWriter(String fileName) throws IOException {
if (fileName == null) {
return null;
}
if (testMode) {
return new StringWriter();
}
return streamToOutputWriter(filenameToOutputStream(fileName));
} | #vulnerable code
private Writer fileNameToOutputWriter(String fileName) throws IOException {
if (fileName == null) {
return null;
}
if (testMode) {
return new StringWriter();
}
return streamToOutputWriter(new FileOutputStream(fileName));
}
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public List<INPUT> getSortedDependenciesOf(List<INPUT> roots) {
return getDependenciesOf(roots, true);
} | #vulnerable code
public List<INPUT> getSortedDependenciesOf(List<INPUT> roots) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(inputs.containsAll(roots));
Set<INPUT> included = Sets.newHashSet();
Deque<INPUT> worklist = new ArrayDeque<INPUT>(roots);
while (!worklist.isEmpty()) {
INPUT... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Override
public boolean shouldTraverse(NodeTraversal t, Node n, Node parent) {
return true;
} | #vulnerable code
@Override
public boolean shouldTraverse(NodeTraversal t, Node n, Node parent) {
if (n.isScript()) {
this.inExterns = n.getStaticSourceFile().isExtern();
}
return true;
}
#location 4
#vulnerabi... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public Set<String> getOwnPropertyNames() {
return getPropertyMap().getOwnPropertyNames();
} | #vulnerable code
public Set<String> getOwnPropertyNames() {
return ImmutableSet.of();
}
#location 1
#vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
scopeNeedsInit = true;
} | #vulnerable code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
new GraphReachability<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch>(
t.getControlFlowGraph(), new ReachablePredicate()).compute(
t.getControlFlowGraph().getEntry().getValue());
}
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void initEdgeEnvsFwd() {
// TODO(user): Revisit what we throw away after the bwd analysis
DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entry = cfg.getEntry();
DiGraphEdge<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entryOutEdge =
cfg.getOutEdges(entry.getValue()).g... | #vulnerable code
private void initEdgeEnvsFwd() {
// TODO(user): Revisit what we throw away after the bwd analysis
DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entry = cfg.getEntry();
DiGraphEdge<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entryOutEdge =
cfg.getOutEdges(entry.getValu... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = codingConvention;
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Remove calls to inheritance-defining functions where the unreferenced
... | #vulnerable code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Regardless of what happens to the original declarati... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node... | #vulnerable code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void outputTracerReport() {
JvmMetrics.maybeWriteJvmMetrics(this.err, "verbose:pretty:all");
OutputStreamWriter output = new OutputStreamWriter(this.err);
try {
int runtime = 0;
int runs = 0;
int changes = 0;
int diff = 0;
int ... | #vulnerable code
private void outputTracerReport() {
OutputStreamWriter output = new OutputStreamWriter(this.err);
try {
int runtime = 0;
int runs = 0;
int changes = 0;
int diff = 0;
int gzDiff = 0;
// header
output.write("Summary:\n");
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void escapeParameters(MustDef output) {
for (Iterator<Var> i = jsScope.getVars(); i.hasNext();) {
Var v = i.next();
if (isParameter(v)) {
// Assume we no longer know where the parameter comes from
// anymore.
output.reachingDef.pu... | #vulnerable code
private void escapeParameters(MustDef output) {
for (Iterator<Var> i = jsScope.getVars(); i.hasNext();) {
Var v = i.next();
if (v.getParentNode().getType() == Token.LP) {
// Assume we no longer know where the parameter comes from
// anymore... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {} | #vulnerable code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
Scope scope = t.getScope();
// Computes the control flow graph.
ControlFlowAnalysis cfa = new ControlFlowAnalysis(compiler, false, false);
cfa.process(null, scope.getRootNode());
cfgStack.push(curC... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private String getFunctionAnnotation(Node fnNode) {
Preconditions.checkState(fnNode.getType() == Token.FUNCTION);
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder("/**\n");
JSType type = fnNode.getJSType();
if (type == null || type.isUnknownType()) {
return "";
... | #vulnerable code
private String getFunctionAnnotation(Node fnNode) {
Preconditions.checkState(fnNode.getType() == Token.FUNCTION);
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder("/**\n");
JSType type = fnNode.getJSType();
if (type == null || type.isUnknownType()) {
return ""... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, ... | #vulnerable code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new n... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
FunctionTypeBuilder(String fnName, AbstractCompiler compiler,
Node errorRoot, String sourceName, Scope scope) {
Preconditions.checkNotNull(errorRoot);
this.fnName = fnName == null ? "" : fnName;
this.codingConvention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
this... | #vulnerable code
FunctionTypeBuilder inferThisType(JSDocInfo info,
@Nullable Node owner) {
ObjectType maybeThisType = null;
if (info != null && info.hasThisType()) {
maybeThisType = ObjectType.cast(
info.getThisType().evaluate(scope, typeRegistry));
}
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private FlowScope traverse(Node n, FlowScope scope) {
switch (n.getType()) {
case Token.ASSIGN:
scope = traverseAssign(n, scope);
break;
case Token.NAME:
scope = traverseName(n, scope);
break;
case Token.GETPROP:
s... | #vulnerable code
private FlowScope traverse(Node n, FlowScope scope) {
switch (n.getType()) {
case Token.ASSIGN:
scope = traverseAssign(n, scope);
break;
case Token.NAME:
scope = traverseName(n, scope);
break;
case Token.GETPROP:
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, ... | #vulnerable code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new n... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private UndiGraph<Var, Void> computeVariableNamesInterferenceGraph(
NodeTraversal t, ControlFlowGraph<Node> cfg, Set<Var> escaped) {
UndiGraph<Var, Void> interferenceGraph =
LinkedUndirectedGraph.create();
// For all variables V not in unsafeCrossRange,
... | #vulnerable code
private UndiGraph<Var, Void> computeVariableNamesInterferenceGraph(
NodeTraversal t, ControlFlowGraph<Node> cfg, Set<Var> escaped) {
UndiGraph<Var, Void> interferenceGraph =
LinkedUndirectedGraph.create();
Scope scope = t.getScope();
// First cr... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public Symbol getSymbolForInstancesOf(FunctionType fn) {
Preconditions.checkState(fn.isConstructor() || fn.isInterface());
ObjectType pType = fn.getPrototype();
return getSymbolForName(fn.getSource(), pType.getReferenceName());
} | #vulnerable code
public Symbol getSymbolForInstancesOf(FunctionType fn) {
Preconditions.checkState(fn.isConstructor() || fn.isInterface());
ObjectType pType = fn.getPrototype();
String name = pType.getReferenceName();
if (name == null || globalScope == null) {
return... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {} | #vulnerable code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
Scope scope = t.getScope();
// Computes the control flow graph.
ControlFlowAnalysis cfa = new ControlFlowAnalysis(compiler, false, false);
cfa.process(null, scope.getRootNode());
cfgStack.push(curC... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node... | #vulnerable code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = codingConvention;
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Remove calls to inheritance-defining functions where the unreferenced
... | #vulnerable code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Regardless of what happens to the original declarati... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node... | #vulnerable code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public static List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() throws IOException {
InputStream input = CommandLineRunner.class.getResourceAsStream(
"/externs.zip");
ZipInputStream zip = new ZipInputStream(input);
Map<String, JSSourceFile> externsMap = Maps.newHashMap... | #vulnerable code
public static List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() throws IOException {
InputStream input = CommandLineRunner.class.getResourceAsStream(
"/externs.zip");
ZipInputStream zip = new ZipInputStream(input);
Map<String, JSSourceFile> externsMap = Maps.newH... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
AbstractCommandLineRunner() {
this(System.out, System.err);
} | #vulnerable code
int processResults(Result result, List<JSModule> modules, B options)
throws FlagUsageException, IOException {
if (config.computePhaseOrdering) {
return 0;
}
if (config.printPassGraph) {
if (compiler.getRoot() == null) {
return 1;
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
Node tryOptimizeBlock(Node n) {
// Remove any useless children
for (Node c = n.getFirstChild(); c != null; ) {
Node next = c.getNext(); // save c.next, since 'c' may be removed
if (!mayHaveSideEffects(c)) {
// TODO(johnlenz): determine what this is ... | #vulnerable code
Node tryFoldFor(Node n) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(n.getType() == Token.FOR);
// This is not a FOR-IN loop
if (n.getChildCount() != 4) {
return n;
}
// There isn't an initializer
if (n.getFirstChild().getType() != Token.EMPTY) {
retu... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
List<String> outputManifests = config.outputManifests;
if (outputManifests.isEmpty()) {
return;
}
for (String outputManifest : outputManifests) {
if (outputManifest.isEmpty()) {
continue;
... | #vulnerable code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
String outputManifest = config.outputManifest;
if (Strings.isEmpty(outputManifest)) {
return;
}
JSModuleGraph graph = compiler.getModuleGraph();
if (shouldGenerateManifestPerModule()) {
//... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, ... | #vulnerable code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new n... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Override
public void process(Node externs, Node root) {
CollectTweaksResult result = collectTweaks(root);
applyCompilerDefaultValueOverrides(result.tweakInfos);
boolean changed = false;
if (stripTweaks) {
changed = stripAllCalls(result.tweakInfos);
... | #vulnerable code
@Override
public void process(Node externs, Node root) {
Map<String, TweakInfo> tweakInfos = collectTweaks(root);
applyCompilerDefaultValueOverrides(tweakInfos);
boolean changed = false;
if (stripTweaks) {
changed = stripAllCalls(tweakInfos);
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private Node fuseIntoOneStatement(Node parent, Node first, Node last) {
// Nothing to fuse if there is only one statement.
if (first.getNext() == last) {
return first;
}
// Step one: Create a comma tree that contains all the statements.
Node commaTree... | #vulnerable code
private Node fuseIntoOneStatement(Node parent, Node first, Node last) {
// Nothing to fuse if there is only one statement.
if (first == last) {
return first;
}
// Step one: Create a comma tree that contains all the statements.
Node commaTree = f... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
FunctionTypeBuilder(String fnName, AbstractCompiler compiler,
Node errorRoot, String sourceName, Scope scope) {
Preconditions.checkNotNull(errorRoot);
this.fnName = fnName == null ? "" : fnName;
this.codingConvention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
this... | #vulnerable code
FunctionTypeBuilder inferReturnType(@Nullable JSDocInfo info) {
if (info != null && info.hasReturnType()) {
returnType = info.getReturnType().evaluate(scope, typeRegistry);
returnTypeInferred = false;
}
return this;
}
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
AbstractCommandLineRunner() {
this(System.out, System.err);
} | #vulnerable code
int processResults(Result result, List<JSModule> modules, B options)
throws FlagUsageException, IOException {
if (config.computePhaseOrdering) {
return 0;
}
if (config.printPassGraph) {
if (compiler.getRoot() == null) {
return 1;
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void ensureTyped(NodeTraversal t, Node n, JSType type) {
// Make sure FUNCTION nodes always get function type.
Preconditions.checkState(!n.isFunction() ||
type.isFunctionType() ||
type.isUnknownType());
// TODO(johnlenz): this seems l... | #vulnerable code
private void ensureTyped(NodeTraversal t, Node n, JSType type) {
// Make sure FUNCTION nodes always get function type.
Preconditions.checkState(!n.isFunction() ||
type.isFunctionType() ||
type.isUnknownType());
JSDocInfo info = n.getJSD... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
List<String> outputManifests = config.outputManifests;
if (outputManifests.isEmpty()) {
return;
}
for (String outputManifest : outputManifests) {
if (outputManifest.isEmpty()) {
continue;
... | #vulnerable code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
String outputManifest = config.outputManifest;
if (Strings.isEmpty(outputManifest)) {
return;
}
JSModuleGraph graph = compiler.getModuleGraph();
if (shouldGenerateManifestPerModule()) {
//... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Override
public boolean isEquivalentTo(JSType otherType) {
FunctionType that =
JSType.toMaybeFunctionType(otherType.toMaybeFunctionType());
if (that == null) {
return false;
}
if (this.isConstructor()) {
if (that.isConstructor()) {
... | #vulnerable code
@Override
public boolean isEquivalentTo(JSType otherType) {
if (!(otherType instanceof FunctionType)) {
return false;
}
FunctionType that = (FunctionType) otherType;
if (!that.isFunctionType()) {
return false;
}
if (this.isConstructor... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() {
try {
return CommandLineRunner.getDefaultExterns();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new BuildException(e);
}
} | #vulnerable code
private List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() {
try {
InputStream input = Compiler.class.getResourceAsStream(
"/externs.zip");
ZipInputStream zip = new ZipInputStream(input);
List<JSSourceFile> externs = Lists.newLinkedList();
for (... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public Symbol getSymbolDeclaredBy(FunctionType fn) {
Preconditions.checkState(fn.isConstructor() || fn.isInterface());
ObjectType instanceType = fn.getInstanceType();
return getSymbolForName(fn.getSource(), instanceType.getReferenceName());
} | #vulnerable code
public Symbol getSymbolDeclaredBy(FunctionType fn) {
Preconditions.checkState(fn.isConstructor() || fn.isInterface());
ObjectType instanceType = fn.getInstanceType();
String name = instanceType.getReferenceName();
if (name == null || globalScope == null) {... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void toDebugString(StringBuilder builder, Symbol symbol) {
SymbolScope scope = symbol.scope;
if (scope.isGlobalScope()) {
builder.append(
String.format("'%s' : in global scope:\n", symbol.getName()));
} else if (scope.getRootNode() != null) {... | #vulnerable code
private void toDebugString(StringBuilder builder, Symbol symbol) {
SymbolScope scope = symbol.scope;
if (scope.isGlobalScope()) {
builder.append(
String.format("'%s' : in global scope:\n", symbol.getName()));
} else {
builder.append(
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public void setSqlSource(MappedStatement ms) {
MapperTemplate mapperTemplate = getMapperTemplate(ms.getId());
try {
if (mapperTemplate != null) {
mapperTemplate.setSqlSource(ms);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
... | #vulnerable code
public void setSqlSource(MappedStatement ms) {
MapperTemplate mapperTemplate = getMapperTemplate(ms.getId());
try {
mapperTemplate.setSqlSource(ms);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new RuntimeException("调用方法异常:" + e.getMessa... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
protected String read(InputStream inputStream) throws IOException {
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(inputStream, encoding));
StringBuffer stringBuffer = new StringBuffer();
String line = reader.readLine();
while... | #vulnerable code
protected String read(InputStream inputStream) throws IOException {
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(inputStream));
StringBuffer stringBuffer = new StringBuffer();
String line = reader.readLine();
while (li... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) {
example();
} | #vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) {
@SuppressWarnings("resource")
ApplicationContext context = new ClassPathXmlApplicationContext("exampleContext.xml");
SpringCacheExample example = context.getBean(SpringCacheExample.class);
example.getBook(0);
example.getBo... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) {
example();
} | #vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) {
Cache<Integer, Integer> cache = CacheBuilder.transactionalHeapCache()
.transactionCommitter(new TransactionCommitter<Integer, Integer>() {
int counter = 0;
public void doPut(Integer key, Integer value) {
if (c... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) {
example();
} | #vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) {
@SuppressWarnings({ "resource", "unused" })
ApplicationContext context = new ClassPathXmlApplicationContext("exampleContext.xml");
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESO... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) {
example();
} | #vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) {
Cache<Integer, Integer> cache = CacheBuilder.transactionalHeapCache()
.transactionCommitter(new TransactionCommitter<Integer, Integer>() {
int counter = 0;
public void doPut(Integer key, Integer value) {
if (c... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
static void installDependencies(PrintStream logger, Launcher launcher,
AndroidSdk sdk, EmulatorConfig emuConfig) throws IOException, InterruptedException {
// Get AVD platform from emulator config
String platform = getPlatformForEmulator(launcher, ... | #vulnerable code
static void installDependencies(PrintStream logger, Launcher launcher,
AndroidSdk sdk, EmulatorConfig emuConfig) throws IOException, InterruptedException {
// Get AVD platform from emulator config
String platform = getPlatformForEmulator(laun... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void writeAvdConfigFile(File homeDir, Map<String,String> values) throws IOException {
final File configFile = getAvdConfigFile(homeDir);
ConfigFileUtils.writeConfigFile(configFile, values);
} | #vulnerable code
private void writeAvdConfigFile(File homeDir, Map<String,String> values) throws FileNotFoundException {
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
for (String key : values.keySet()) {
sb.append(key);
sb.append("=");
sb.a... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Test
public void testTargetName() {
assertEquals("Some:Addon:11", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Some:Addon:11").getTargetName());
assertEquals("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23").getTargetName());
assertE... | #vulnerable code
@Test
public void testTargetName() {
assertEquals("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23").getTargetName());
assertEquals("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:24").g... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Test
public void testSystemImageName() {
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-android-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("android-23").getSystemImageName("x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-google_apis-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23").getSystemIma... | #vulnerable code
@Test
public void testSystemImageName() {
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-android-23", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs:23").getSystemImageName("x86"));
assertEquals("sys-img-x86-android-24", AndroidPlatform.valueOf("Google Inc.:Google APIs... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Test
public void determinesItemBSourceSetter() {
Target target = new Target();
target.setKeyOfAllBeings( new KeyOfAllBeings() );
Child source = new Child();
GenericsHierarchyMapper.INSTANCE.updateSourceWithKeyOfAllBeings( target, source ... | #vulnerable code
@Test
public void determinesItemBSourceSetter() {
Target target = new Target();
target.setItemB( new ItemB() );
SourceWithItemB source = new SourceWithItemB();
GenericsHierarchyMapper.INSTANCE.intoSourceWithItemB( target, source );
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public boolean isIterableMapping() {
return getSingleSourceParameter().getType().isIterableType() && getResultType().isIterableType();
} | #vulnerable code
public boolean isIterableMapping() {
return getSingleSourceType().isIterableType() && resultType.isIterableType();
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private Mapping getMapping(MappingPrism mapping) {
return new Mapping( mapping.source(), mapping.target() );
} | #vulnerable code
private Mapping getMapping(MappingPrism mapping) {
Type converterType = typeUtil.retrieveType( mapping.converter() );
return new Mapping(
mapping.source(),
mapping.target(),
converterType.getName().equals( "NoOpConverter" ) ? null : converterType
);
}
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asEl... | #vulnerable code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
Element returnTypeElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
Element parameterElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Override
public boolean process(
final Set<? extends TypeElement> annotations,
final RoundEnvironment roundEnvironment) {
for ( TypeElement oneAnnotation : annotations ) {
//Indicates that the annotation's type isn't on the class path of the compiled
//project.... | #vulnerable code
@Override
public boolean process(
final Set<? extends TypeElement> annotations,
final RoundEnvironment roundEnvironment) {
for ( TypeElement oneAnnotation : annotations ) {
//Indicates that the annotation's type isn't on the class path of the compiled
//pr... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Override
public Mapper process(ProcessorContext context, TypeElement mapperTypeElement, Mapper mapper) {
String componentModel = MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( mapperTypeElement ).componentModel();
String effectiveComponentModel = OptionsHelper.getEffectiveCo... | #vulnerable code
@Override
public Mapper process(ProcessorContext context, TypeElement mapperTypeElement, Mapper mapper) {
String componentModel = MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( mapperTypeElement ).componentModel();
if ( !componentModel.equals( "cdi" ) ) {
r... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asEl... | #vulnerable code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
Element returnTypeElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
Element parameterElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private List<Method> retrieveMethods(TypeElement element, boolean implementationRequired) {
List<Method> methods = new ArrayList<Method>();
MapperPrism mapperPrism = implementationRequired ? MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( element ) : null;
for ( Executab... | #vulnerable code
private List<Method> retrieveMethods(TypeElement element, boolean implementationRequired) {
List<Method> methods = new ArrayList<Method>();
MapperPrism mapperPrism = implementationRequired ? MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( element ) : null;
//TODO E... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private PropertyMapping getPropertyMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences, List<Method> methods,
Method method, Parameter parameter, ExecutableElement sourceAccessor,
Executa... | #vulnerable code
private PropertyMapping getPropertyMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences, List<Method> methods,
Method method, Parameter parameter, ExecutableElement sourceAccessor,
E... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public boolean isMapMapping() {
return getSingleSourceParameter().getType().isMapType() && getResultType().isMapType();
} | #vulnerable code
public boolean isMapMapping() {
return getSingleSourceType().isMapType() && resultType.isMapType();
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void deleteDirectory(File path) {
if ( path.exists() ) {
File[] files = path.listFiles();
for ( File file : files ) {
if ( file.isDirectory() ) {
deleteDirectory( file );
}
... | #vulnerable code
private void deleteDirectory(File path) {
if ( path.exists() ) {
File[] files = path.listFiles();
for ( int i = 0; i < files.length; i++ ) {
if ( files[i].isDirectory() ) {
deleteDirectory( files[i] );
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private List<Method> retrieveMethods(TypeElement element, boolean mapperRequiresImplementation) {
List<Method> methods = new ArrayList<Method>();
for ( ExecutableElement executable : methodsIn( element.getEnclosedElements() ) ) {
Method method = g... | #vulnerable code
private List<Method> retrieveMethods(TypeElement element, boolean mapperRequiresImplementation) {
List<Method> methods = new ArrayList<Method>();
MapperPrism mapperPrism = mapperRequiresImplementation ? MapperPrism.getInstanceOn( element ) : null;
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asEl... | #vulnerable code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtil... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Test
public void determinesItemCSourceSetter() {
Target target = new Target();
target.setAnimalKey( new AnimalKey() );
Elephant source = new Elephant();
GenericsHierarchyMapper.INSTANCE.updateSourceWithAnimalKey( target, source );
... | #vulnerable code
@Test
public void determinesItemCSourceSetter() {
Target target = new Target();
target.setItemC( new ItemC() );
SourceWithItemC source = new SourceWithItemC();
GenericsHierarchyMapper.INSTANCE.intoSourceWithItemC( target, source );
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private MappingMethod getBeanMappingMethod(List<Method> methods, Method method,
ReportingPolicy unmappedTargetPolicy) {
List<PropertyMapping> propertyMappings = new ArrayList<PropertyMapping>();
Set<String> mapped... | #vulnerable code
private MappingMethod getBeanMappingMethod(List<Method> methods, Method method,
ReportingPolicy unmappedTargetPolicy) {
List<PropertyMapping> propertyMappings = new ArrayList<PropertyMapping>();
Set<String> ... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public boolean matches() {
// check & collect generic types.
List<? extends VariableElement> candidateParameters = candidateMethod.getExecutable().getParameters();
if ( candidateParameters.size() != 1 ) {
typesMatch = false;
}
... | #vulnerable code
public boolean matches() {
// check & collect generic types.
List<? extends VariableElement> candidateParameters = candidateMethod.getExecutable().getParameters();
if ( candidateParameters.size() == parameters.length ) {
for ( int i ... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private PropertyMapping getConstantMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences,
List<SourceMethod> methods,
SourceMethod method,
Str... | #vulnerable code
private PropertyMapping getConstantMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences,
List<SourceMethod> methods,
SourceMethod method,
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private void reportErrorIfPropertyCanNotBeMapped(Method method, PropertyMapping property) {
if ( property.getSourceType().isAssignableTo( property.getTargetType() ) ||
property.getMappingMethod() != null ||
property.getConversion() != null ||
... | #vulnerable code
private void reportErrorIfPropertyCanNotBeMapped(Method method, PropertyMapping property) {
if ( property.getSourceType().equals( property.getTargetType() ) ||
property.getMappingMethod() != null ||
property.getConversion() != null ||
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asEl... | #vulnerable code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
TypeElement returnTypeElement = (TypeElement) typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
TypeElement parameterElement = (TypeElement) typeUtil... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private PropertyMapping getPropertyMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences,
List<SourceMethod> methods,
SourceMethod method,
Par... | #vulnerable code
private PropertyMapping getPropertyMapping(List<MapperReference> mapperReferences,
List<SourceMethod> methods,
SourceMethod method,
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private Type getType(TypeMirror mirror, boolean isLiteral) {
if ( !canBeProcessed( mirror ) ) {
throw new TypeHierarchyErroneousException( mirror );
}
ImplementationType implementationType = getImplementationType( mirror );
boolea... | #vulnerable code
private Type getType(TypeMirror mirror, boolean isLiteral) {
if ( !canBeProcessed( mirror ) ) {
throw new TypeHierarchyErroneousException( mirror );
}
ImplementationType implementationType = getImplementationType( mirror );
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
Element returnTypeElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
Element parameterElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType() );
... | #vulnerable code
private List<MappedProperty> getMappedProperties(ExecutableElement method, Map<String, Mapping> mappings) {
Element returnTypeElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getReturnType() );
Element parameterElement = typeUtils.asElement( method.getParameters().get( 0 ).asType... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
case V8Va... | #vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
cas... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public static V8 createV8Runtime(final String globalAlias, final String tempDirectory) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
synchronized (lock) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
load(tempDirectory);
}
}
... | #vulnerable code
public static V8 createV8Runtime(final String globalAlias, final String tempDirectory) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
synchronized (lock) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
load(tempDirectory);
}
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
releaseResources();
shutdownExecutors(forceTerminateExecutors);
if (executors != null) {
executors.clear... | #vulnerable code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
if (debugEnabled) {
disableDebugSupport();
}
releaseResources();
shutdownExecutors(forceTe... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
checkThread();
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
if (debugEnabled) {
disableDebugSupport();
}
synchronized (lock) {
runtimeCounter--;
... | #vulnerable code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
checkThread();
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
if (debugEnabled) {
disableDebugSupport();
}
runtimeCounter--;
_releaseRuntime(v8RuntimePt... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
case V8V... | #vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
ca... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public static V8 createV8Runtime(final String globalAlias, final String tempDirectory) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
synchronized (lock) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
load(tempDirectory);
}
}
... | #vulnerable code
public static V8 createV8Runtime(final String globalAlias, final String tempDirectory) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
synchronized (lock) {
if (!nativeLibraryLoaded) {
load(tempDirectory);
}
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
case V8Va... | #vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
cas... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
try {
notifyReleaseHandlers(this);
} finally {
releaseResources();
shutdownExecutors(for... | #vulnerable code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
try {
notifyReleaseHandlers(this);
} finally {
releaseResources();
shutdownExecuto... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
case V8Va... | #vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Array array, final int index, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = array.getType(index);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return array.getInteger(index);
cas... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Test
public void testTypedArrayGetValue_Float32Array() {
V8Array floatsArray = v8.executeArrayScript("var buf = new ArrayBuffer(100);\n"
+ "var floatsArray = new Float32Array(buf);\n"
+ "floatsArray[0] = 16.2;\n"
+ ... | #vulnerable code
@Test
public void testTypedArrayGetValue_Float32Array() {
V8Array floatsArray = v8.executeArrayScript("var buf = new ArrayBuffer(100);\n"
+ "var floatsArray = new Float32Array(buf);\n"
+ "floatsArray[0] = 16.2;\n"
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
case V8V... | #vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
ca... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
releaseResources();
shutdownExecutors(forceTerminateExecutors);
if (executors != null) {
executors.clear... | #vulnerable code
public void release(final boolean reportMemoryLeaks) {
if (isReleased()) {
return;
}
checkThread();
if (debugEnabled) {
disableDebugSupport();
}
releaseResources();
shutdownExecutors(forceTe... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Test
public void testTypedArrayGetValue_Float64Array() {
V8Array floatsArray = v8.executeArrayScript("var buf = new ArrayBuffer(80);\n"
+ "var floatsArray = new Float64Array(buf);\n"
+ "floatsArray[0] = 16.2;\n"
+ "... | #vulnerable code
@Test
public void testTypedArrayGetValue_Float64Array() {
V8Array floatsArray = v8.executeArrayScript("var buf = new ArrayBuffer(80);\n"
+ "var floatsArray = new Float64Array(buf);\n"
+ "floatsArray[0] = 16.2;\n"
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
case V8V... | #vulnerable code
private static Object getValue(final V8Object object, final String key, final V8Map<Object> cache) {
int valueType = object.getType(key);
switch (valueType) {
case V8Value.INTEGER:
return object.getInteger(key);
ca... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public boolean enableDebugSupport(final int port, final boolean waitForConnection) {
V8.checkDebugThread();
debugEnabled = enableDebugSupport(getV8RuntimePtr(), port, waitForConnection);
return debugEnabled;
} | #vulnerable code
public boolean enableDebugSupport(final int port, final boolean waitForConnection) {
V8.checkDebugThread();
debugEnabled = enableDebugSupport(getHandle(), port, waitForConnection);
return debugEnabled;
}
#location... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public CommandLine parse(final String[] args) throws ParseException, IllegalArgumentException {
final CommandLine cmd = super.parse(args);
final String[] files = cmd.getArgs();
if (files.length > 1) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Only one dump file path may be ... | #vulnerable code
public CommandLine parse(final String[] args) throws ParseException, IllegalArgumentException {
final CommandLine cmd = super.parse(args);
final Report report = ReportFactory.createReport(cmd, ReportType.REDIS);
ExtractionResult match = null;
if (cmd.hasOption("r... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Override
public void run() {
// restart the clock.
this.rowMerger = new RowMerger(rowObserver);
adapter = new CallToStreamObserverAdapter();
synchronized (callLock) {
super.run();
// pre-fetch one more result, for ... | #vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Override
public void run() {
// restart the clock.
lastResponseMs = clock.currentTimeMillis();
this.rowMerger = new RowMerger(rowObserver);
synchronized (callLock) {
super.run();
// pre-fetch one more result,... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Test
public void testMutation() throws IOException, InterruptedException {
when(mockClient.mutateRowAsync(any(MutateRowRequest.class)))
.thenReturn(mockFuture);
BigtableBufferedMutator underTest = createMutator(new Configurati... | #vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Test
public void testMutation() throws IOException, InterruptedException {
final ReentrantLock lock = new ReentrantLock();
final Condition mutateRowAsyncCalled = lock.newCondition();
when(mockClient.mutateRowAsync(any(Mutate... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
public static Credentials getCredentialFromPrivateKeyServiceAccount(
String serviceAccountEmail, String privateKeyFile, List<String> scopes)
throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
PrivateKey privateKey =
SecurityUtils.loadPrivateKeyFromKeyStore(... | #vulnerable code
public static Credentials getCredentialFromPrivateKeyServiceAccount(
String serviceAccountEmail, String privateKeyFile, List<String> scopes)
throws IOException, GeneralSecurityException {
PrivateKey privateKey =
SecurityUtils.loadPrivateKeyFromKey... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Test
public void testRefresh() throws IOException {
Mockito.when(mockCredentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenReturn(
new AccessToken("", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1)));
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(MoreExecutors.... | #vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRefresh() throws IOException {
Mockito.when(credentials.refreshAccessToken()).thenReturn(
new AccessToken("", new Date(HeaderCacheElement.TOKEN_STALENESS_MS + 1)));
underTest = new RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor(MoreExecutor... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh ... | #vulnerable code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for re... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for refresh ... | #vulnerable code
@Test
/**
* Test that checks that concurrent requests to RefreshingOAuth2CredentialsInterceptor refresh
* logic doesn't cause hanging behavior. Specifically, when an Expired condition occurs it
* triggers a call to syncRefresh() which potentially waits for re... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#fixed code
@Test
public void testCBC_UserAgentUsingPlainTextNegotiation() throws Exception{
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(0);
final int availablePort = serverSocket.getLocalPort();
serverSocket.close();
//Creates non-ssl server.
createServer(available... | #vulnerable code
@Test
public void testCBC_UserAgentUsingPlainTextNegotiation() throws Exception{
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(0);
final int availablePort = serverSocket.getLocalPort();
serverSocket.close();
//Creates non-ssl server.
createServer(ava... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
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