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{"id": "mob-f-023", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "App targets the latest Android targetSdkVersion, which applies the newest platform restrictions.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-ms-074", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [ios_anti_debugging] INFO: No ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH) or sysctl KERN_PROC anti-debug check was found.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-g-202", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "WebView loading a remote help page: `settings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true); settings.setAllowFileAccess(true); settings.setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(true); webView.loadUrl(remoteUrl);` where remoteUrl comes from a server response. Remote JS can read local files via file:// XHR.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-g-278", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "App start-up calls `RootBeer(context).isRooted()` and shows a warning dialog if true. This root-detection check by itself (no other weakness) is defense-in-depth, not a vulnerability.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-g-268", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "`if (BuildConfig.DEBUG) { Log.d(\"Net\", \"GET \" + url.getPath() + \" -> \" + response.code()); }` — debug-only logging of a non-sensitive path and status code, stripped from release.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2a-010", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The manifest exports a background service with no permission attribute, so a third-party app starts it with arbitrary extras.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2b-037", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The session token is generated with java.security.SecureRandom.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2b-023", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The session JWT is written to logcat via Log.e inside an error handler.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-g-279", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "iOS launch calls a `isJailbroken()` helper that checks for `/Applications/Cydia.app` and sandbox-write to `/private/jailbreak.txt`. The jailbreak-detection check alone is hardening, not a reportable finding.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-g-212", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "iOS Swift: `UserDefaults.standard.set(authToken, forKey: \"authToken\"); UserDefaults.standard.set(refreshToken, forKey: \"refreshToken\")` — bearer/refresh tokens persisted to the unencrypted NSUserDefaults plist.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-mx-009", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "MobSF (WARNING): The APK is not obfuscated; class and method names are human-readable in the DEX.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-t-025", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "A Firebase Realtime Database URL ending firebaseio.com is referenced in the decompiled app, and an unauthenticated GET to that URL with /.json appended returns user profile records, showing the database rules allow public read.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-co-034", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Kotlin: val md = MessageDigest.getInstance(\"MD5\"); val hash = md.digest(password.toByteArray())  // MD5 used to hash passwords", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mobile-temp-001", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_template_relevance", "type": "boolean", "state": "Target: Android banking app (Kotlin, OkHttp, Room DB). Template: 'ios-keychain-dump'. Wrong platform — iOS-only test on an Android target.", "question": "Is this probe template relevant to the target?", "criteria": {"true": "the template tests a class that applies to this tech stack", "false": "wrong technology, wrong version, or the class cannot exist on this stack"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2b-006", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "A Firebase database secret is present as a string literal in the binary.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "ais-mob-034", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The reviewer flagged NSAllowsArbitraryLoads. Reading Info.plist, NSAllowsArbitraryLoads is set to false and there is no per-domain exception; all connections require TLS 1.2+. ATS is correctly enforced. The suggestion to 'disable arbitrary loads' describes a state the app is already in. No finding.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability confirmed by the analysis", "false": "speculation / hedged / theoretical / hallucinated / best-practice — not a confirmed finding"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2a-021", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The network-security-config trusts the user certificate store, so a proxy CA added by an attacker is accepted.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2b-034", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Messages are sealed with AES-256-GCM and a fresh random nonce generated for each message.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-mx-060", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The iOS app lacks runtime application self-protection and integrity checks to detect tampering.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2b-003", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "A hardcoded AWS secret access key appears in the decompiled smali.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mobile-aler-005", "side": "defensive", "category": "def_alert_severity", "type": "boolean", "state": "SSL pinning violation detected on 3 user devices running the production app. Devices are not in the QA or pentesting pool. Possible man-in-the-middle attack or enterprise MDM with TLS inspection.", "question": "Is this alert high severity requiring immediate response?", "criteria": {"true": "active exploitation, data exfiltration, or privilege escalation in progress", "false": "low-priority, informational, or already mitigated"}, "target": true}
{"id": "ais-mob-016", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The app writes a value into SharedPreferences in the default private mode. This could be insecure storage if the value were sensitive, but the key is \"selected_theme\" holding \"dark\" — a UI preference, not a credential or PII. Private-mode prefs for a non-sensitive setting are fine. Without a sensitive value in the sink, there is no storage finding.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability confirmed by the analysis", "false": "speculation / hedged / theoretical / hallucinated / best-practice — not a confirmed finding"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-ms-012", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [android_sha1] WARNING: SHA-1 is a weak hash function and is used here for integrity/signature purposes.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2a-048", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The app requests the ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permission to check connectivity.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2b-017", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Session tokens are generated with java.util.Random seeded from the current time.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-ms-011", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [android_md5] WARNING: MD5 is a weak hash and is used here for a security-sensitive operation.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2b-028", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The AES key is generated inside the Android Keystore StrongBox and never leaves it.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-ms-053", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [android_network_security_config_absent] INFO: This app does not define a custom Network Security Configuration and relies on platform defaults.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2a-038", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "An exported deep-link activity validates the incoming host against a fixed allowlist before use.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2a-039", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The app checks the deep link's host and scheme against an approved list and rejects anything else.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-co-036", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Java: Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance(\"DES\"); c.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, new SecretKeySpec(key, \"DES\"));  // 56-bit DES", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-co-011", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "AndroidManifest.xml: <service android:name=\".SyncService\" android:exported=\"true\" android:permission=\"com.app.permission.SIGNATURE_SYNC\" />  <!-- guarded by a signature-level permission -->", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2a-012", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The manifest exports a receiver that handles privileged admin broadcasts without a permission requirement.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-g-233", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Deep-link handler: `Uri d = getIntent().getData(); String q = d.getQueryParameter(\"q\"); Cursor cur = db.rawQuery(\"SELECT * FROM docs WHERE title LIKE '%\" + q + \"%'\", null);` — externally-controlled deep-link param concatenated into SQL.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-ms-013", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [android_des] WARNING: DES is a weak block cipher; the app calls Cipher.getInstance(\"DES\").", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "ais-mob-025", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "NetworkConfig.swift contains let apiSecret = \"sk_live_REDACTEDPLACEHOLDER\" and sends it as the Authorization bearer on every request. A live API secret is compiled into the binary and recoverable with strings/class-dump, letting anyone replay authenticated calls. CWE-798 hardcoded credential. The literal flows into the request header directly. Severity: HIGH.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability confirmed by the analysis", "false": "speculation / hedged / theoretical / hallucinated / best-practice — not a confirmed finding"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-g-242", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "`WebSettings s = webView.getSettings(); s.setJavaScriptEnabled(false); s.setAllowFileAccess(false); s.setAllowContentAccess(false);` and the view renders static offline documentation packaged in assets.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-g-203", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "`webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true); webSettings.setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(true);` on a WebView that renders downloaded HTML from the cache dir. Any loaded script gets universal cross-origin access to local and remote resources.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mobile-verd-001", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_verdict", "type": "boolean", "state": "Frida script hooks SSLContext.init() and replaces TrustManager with a permissive one. After injection, all HTTPS API calls are visible in mitmproxy. Captured traffic includes bearer tokens, user PII, and payment data.", "question": "Is the probe result VULNERABLE?", "criteria": {"true": "the evidence confirms exploitability", "false": "the evidence is inconclusive, a false positive, or the control is effective"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mobile-verd-004", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_verdict", "type": "boolean", "state": "adb shell am start -n com.app/.DeepLinkActivity -d 'app://settings?admin=true' — Activity starts but the admin parameter is ignored. Server-side role check returns 403 for non-admin users.", "question": "Is the probe result VULNERABLE?", "criteria": {"true": "the evidence confirms exploitability", "false": "the evidence is inconclusive, a false positive, or the control is effective"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-ms-049", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [android_obfuscation] INFO: This app does not appear to use code obfuscation (no ProGuard/R8 mapping was detected).", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-ms-077", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [ios_ssl_pinning] INFO: No TrustKit configuration or URLSession pinning delegate was found; the app does not pin server certificates.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-f-017", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "WebView has setJavaScriptEnabled(false) and loads only a fixed bundled HTML asset over the file:///android_asset path with no JavaScript bridge.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "ais-mob-015", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Info.plist sets NSAppTransportSecurity > NSAllowsArbitraryLoads = true, and the auth code does URLSession.shared.dataTask(with: URL(string: \"http://login.example.com/token\")!) sending the user password in the body. ATS is globally disabled and credentials go over HTTP. CWE-319 cleartext transmission. The plist flag plus the http URL in the credential request confirm it. Severity: HIGH.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability confirmed by the analysis", "false": "speculation / hedged / theoretical / hallucinated / best-practice — not a confirmed finding"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mobile-aler-001", "side": "defensive", "category": "def_alert_triage", "type": "boolean", "state": "MDM console alert: Device 'iPhone-Sales-042' has been jailbroken. Device contains corporate email and VPN credentials. User is a field sales representative with access to customer CRM.", "question": "Is this security alert a true positive?", "criteria": {"true": "real malicious or unauthorized activity", "false": "legitimate activity, misconfigured rule, or known benign behavior"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-g-226", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "`String otp = String.valueOf(100000 + new java.util.Random().nextInt(900000)); sendOtp(user, otp);` — security OTP generated from a non-cryptographic PRNG, predictable.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-g-257", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "OkHttp pinning: `CertificatePinner cp = new CertificatePinner.Builder().add(\"api.example.com\", \"sha256/AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=\").build(); OkHttpClient c = new OkHttpClient.Builder().certificatePinner(cp).build();` — leaf key pinned.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-co-046", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "AndroidManifest.xml: <application android:usesCleartextTraffic=\"false\" ...>  <!-- plaintext HTTP blocked platform-wide -->", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mobile-cve_-003", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_cve_applicable", "type": "boolean", "state": "Android app targets SDK 34 with minSdkVersion 28. Checking CVE-2019-2215 (use-after-free in binder driver). CVE affects Android 8-9 only — minSdkVersion 28 (Android 9) is the upper bound, and most API 28+ devices are patched.", "question": "Is this CVE applicable to this target?", "criteria": {"true": "the CVE applies and the target is vulnerable", "false": "the CVE does not apply — wrong version, config, or platform"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-ms-029", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [exported_content_provider] ERROR: A ContentProvider is exported (android:exported=\"true\") without read/write permissions, exposing its data to all apps.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-t-027", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "An exported broadcast receiver with no permission accepts an action that carries a server URL extra, and on receipt the app reconfigures its API base URL to that value. Any installed app broadcasts the Intent to point the app at an attacker host.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2a-005", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "android:allowBackup=\"true\" is set and the app stores session tokens in its private files directory.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mobile-seve-002", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_severity", "type": "boolean", "state": "iOS app stores OAuth refresh token in the Keychain with kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked. Standard secure storage practice — token is hardware-protected.", "question": "Is this finding HIGH severity or above?", "criteria": {"true": "HIGH or CRITICAL — significant data exposure, privilege escalation, or system compromise", "false": "MEDIUM or below — limited impact, hard to exploit, or requires preconditions"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-t-002", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The iOS app's Info.plist contains a key GOOGLE_API_KEY with a value beginning AIza, and the same key enables a billable Maps and Places project with no referrer or bundle restriction. Extracting the IPA reveals the key to anyone.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2b-032", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Local data is encrypted with AES-GCM using a key held in the Android Keystore.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-ms-071", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [android_root_detection] INFO: No checks for su binaries, Magisk, or test-keys were found; the app does not detect a rooted device.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2c-009", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(true) is enabled on a WebView that opens externally supplied file paths.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-co-057", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Kotlin: val c = db.rawQuery(\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?\", arrayOf(name))  // parameterized, bound argument", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-co-006", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "AndroidManifest.xml: <activity android:name=\".AdminActivity\" android:exported=\"true\" />  <!-- no permission, no intent-filter restriction; AdminActivity performs privileged account actions -->", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2c-040", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The app includes a jailbreak-detection check that warns the user when it runs on a compromised device.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-t-018", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "An older Android component writes a credentials file using openFileOutput(\"creds.txt\",MODE_WORLD_READABLE), and the file holds the API bearer token. Any app on a pre-restriction device reads the file.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2b-044", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Service credentials are returned by the server after authentication and are not compiled into the app.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-t-023", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The authentication class calls Log.d(\"AUTH\",\"token=\"+accessToken) on each login, and the release build keeps the call. logcat on the device and any app holding READ_LOGS on older platforms captures the printed token.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-t-015", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Session tokens are generated by concatenating the output of new java.util.Random().nextInt() seeded from System.currentTimeMillis(). The token space is predictable from the device clock at issue time.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-co-013", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "AndroidManifest.xml: <receiver android:name=\".BootReceiver\" android:exported=\"false\"><intent-filter><action android:name=\"android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED\"/></intent-filter></receiver>  <!-- exported false, system boot action handled internally -->", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2c-035", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The TrustManager validates each server certificate against the platform system trust store.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2a-016", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "A file-serving content provider is exported and returns any file resolved from an attacker-controlled path, including ../ traversal.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-ms-052", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [android_detect_xposed] INFO: This app does not detect the Xposed framework or Substrate hooking modules.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2c-032", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "A WebView loads a single fixed https asset shipped in the app bundle and declares no JavaScript bridge.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mobile-aler-002", "side": "defensive", "category": "def_alert_triage", "type": "boolean", "state": "App crash report: NullPointerException in PaymentFragment.processCard() on Samsung Galaxy S24, Android 14. 3 occurrences in 24 hours from 3 different users. Standard app bug — no security relevance.", "question": "Is this security alert a true positive?", "criteria": {"true": "real malicious or unauthorized activity", "false": "legitimate activity, misconfigured rule, or known benign behavior"}, "target": false}
{"id": "ais-mob-017", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "On sign-in the Swift code does UserDefaults.standard.set(password, forKey: \"userPassword\"). UserDefaults is an unencrypted plist in the app sandbox and is included in unencrypted device backups. The raw password is persisted in cleartext. CWE-312 insecure data storage. The password value reaches the UserDefaults sink with no Keychain and no encryption. Severity: HIGH.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability confirmed by the analysis", "false": "speculation / hedged / theoretical / hallucinated / best-practice — not a confirmed finding"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2a-006", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The manifest permits full backup, and adb backup extracts the app's SQLite database of user records.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-t-016", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "An OAuth access token and refresh token are written to SharedPreferences via getSharedPreferences(\"auth\",MODE_PRIVATE) as plain strings, and a device-backup extraction recovers the file with both tokens readable.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2b-027", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The signing key is retrieved from the iOS Keychain at runtime rather than stored in the bundle.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-ms-038", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [ios_hardcoded] WARNING: A hardcoded secret/API token string is embedded in the Swift source.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-mx-038", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The app pins no TLS certificate, but more importantly it trusts user-added CA certificates, enabling interception.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-ms-047", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [android_certificate_transparency] INFO: This app does not enforce Certificate Transparency.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2c-042", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Credentials are stored in the iOS Keychain with device-only accessibility.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-g-254", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Kotlin: `val kg = KeyGenerator.getInstance(KeyProperties.KEY_ALGORITHM_AES, \"AndroidKeyStore\"); kg.init(KeyGenParameterSpec.Builder(\"k\", PURPOSE_ENCRYPT or PURPOSE_DECRYPT).setBlockModes(BLOCK_MODE_GCM).setEncryptionPaddings(ENCRYPTION_PADDING_NONE).build()); val key = kg.generateKey()` — key generated in and never leaves the Android Keystore.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2b-049", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The app enforces TLS certificate pinning on its API connections.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-g-219", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "iOS Info.plist ATS: `<key>NSAppTransportSecurity</key><dict><key>NSAllowsArbitraryLoads</key><true/></dict>` — App Transport Security fully disabled, cleartext and weak-TLS connections permitted app-wide.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2a-031", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "A service is marked not exported and is only reachable from within the app's own process.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "ais-mob-023", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "AndroidManifest declares <provider android:name=\".NotesProvider\" android:exported=\"true\" android:grantUriPermissions=\"true\"> with no android:permission and no path-permission. The provider backs the private SQLite notes DB. Any third-party app queries content://com.app.notes/ and reads all user notes. CWE-926 exported content provider exposing private data. Confirmed open export over sensitive data. Severity: HIGH.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability confirmed by the analysis", "false": "speculation / hedged / theoretical / hallucinated / best-practice — not a confirmed finding"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-ms-056", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [android_biometric_auth] INFO: This app does not implement biometric authentication as an additional local protection.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2b-016", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "SHA1 is used to build the HMAC that authenticates API request signatures.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2b-014", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "MD5 is used to sign and verify the integrity of downloaded update files.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-co-005", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "WebView hardening: val s = webView.settings; s.javaScriptEnabled = true; s.allowFileAccess = false; s.allowFileAccessFromFileURLs = false; webView.loadUrl(BuildConfig.DASHBOARD_URL)  // file access off, constant trusted URL", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2b-007", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "A Stripe live secret key sk_live_ is stored in a Java static final constant.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mobile-test-004", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_test_class", "type": "boolean", "state": "Target: Android app that only displays static content from a bundled JSON file. Proposed test class: API injection. No network API calls — app works entirely offline.", "question": "Should this vulnerability test class run on this target?", "criteria": {"true": "the class is applicable to the detected technology", "false": "the class is impossible or irrelevant for this stack"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2c-001", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The iOS app Info.plist sets NSAppTransportSecurity > NSAllowsArbitraryLoads to true, so all HTTP connections bypass App Transport Security.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2c-047", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The app requests location access with an NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription string for a maps feature.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mobile-cve_-001", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_cve_applicable", "type": "boolean", "state": "Android app targets SDK 33 (Android 13) with minSdkVersion 24. Checking CVE-2023-20963 (WorkSource parcel/unparcel mismatch, privilege escalation). App declares MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE permission and handles Intents from other apps.", "question": "Is this CVE applicable to this target?", "criteria": {"true": "the CVE applies and the target is vulnerable", "false": "the CVE does not apply — wrong version, config, or platform"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2c-043", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The app saves the session token in the Keychain rather than in a plist or UserDefaults.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mobile-chai-006", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_chain_worthy", "type": "boolean", "state": "Android app uses cleartext HTTP for loading non-sensitive images from a CDN. All API calls use HTTPS with pinning. Image CDN content is public.", "question": "Is this finding worth chaining with another for higher impact?", "criteria": {"true": "chains to a meaningful escalation (ATO, data access, lateral movement)", "false": "standalone only — no useful chain target or the chain is theoretical"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-mx-027", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "QARK: Service 'SyncService' is exported with no permission and acts on a command extra supplied by the calling app.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-ms-076", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [android_safetynet] INFO: No SafetyNet or Play Integrity attestation call was found before sensitive flows; the app does not attest device integrity.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-co-023", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "build.gradle injects a real secret into BuildConfig: buildConfigField \"String\", \"STRIPE_SECRET\", \"\\\"sk_live_REDACTEDPLACEHOLDER\\\"\"  // secret-key shipped in the APK via BuildConfig", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-co-035", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Kotlin: val digest = MessageDigest.getInstance(\"SHA1\").digest(apiToken.toByteArray())  // SHA-1 used for an integrity/auth value", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-co-018", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "SQLite open-helper stores the PIN as-is: db.execSQL(\"INSERT INTO users(uname, pin) VALUES(?, ?)\", arrayOf(uname, pin))  // pin stored in cleartext, DB on default internal path but never encrypted and backed up", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-ms-043", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [android_safetynet] INFO: This app does not use the SafetyNet Attestation API to verify device integrity.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "ais-mob-036", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The deep-link handler takes a url parameter and could feed a WebView, which would be a redirect-to-WebView risk. Here the handler parses the Uri, checks host == \"app.example.com\" against an allowlist and requires the https scheme before calling loadUrl, rejecting everything else. With that validation the flow is guarded. The concern is speculative for this code. Not a confirmed finding.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability confirmed by the analysis", "false": "speculation / hedged / theoretical / hallucinated / best-practice — not a confirmed finding"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-ms-030", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [task_affinity_hijacking] WARNING: An Activity declares a custom taskAffinity with a vulnerable launchMode, enabling StrandHogg task hijacking.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2a-027", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The application element leaves debuggable unset and the production build is non-debuggable.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "ais-mob-024", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The Retrofit base URL uses http://, which suggested cleartext transmission. The URL is http://127.0.0.1:8080/, the loopback address used only by the in-app debug build's local mock server, and the release manifest sets usesCleartextTraffic=\"false\" with a domain config permitting only localhost. No sensitive traffic leaves the device in cleartext. Not an exploitable finding.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability confirmed by the analysis", "false": "speculation / hedged / theoretical / hallucinated / best-practice — not a confirmed finding"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-co-033", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "res/xml/network_security_config.xml: <domain-config><domain includeSubdomains=\"true\">api.example.com</domain><pin-set><pin digest=\"SHA-256\">k3b...=</pin></pin-set></domain-config>  // system-enforced pinning", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-f-018", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "WebView loads a single fixed https URL, enables no addJavascriptInterface bridge, and overrides shouldOverrideUrlLoading to keep navigation inside the allowed host.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-g-237", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "iOS Core Data filter: `let p = NSPredicate(format: \"username == '\\(userInput)' AND active == 1\"); request.predicate = p` — user input interpolated into the predicate format string.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mobile-seve-004", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_severity", "type": "boolean", "state": "iOS app sends the device model name (e.g., 'iPhone15,2') in the User-Agent header. Model disclosure without further impact.", "question": "Is this finding HIGH severity or above?", "criteria": {"true": "HIGH or CRITICAL — significant data exposure, privilege escalation, or system compromise", "false": "MEDIUM or below — limited impact, hard to exploit, or requires preconditions"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-co-042", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Kotlin: val token = ByteArray(32).also { SecureRandom().nextBytes(it) }; val b64 = Base64.encodeToString(token, Base64.NO_WRAP)  // CSPRNG-generated token", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-ms-037", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "mobsfscan [ios_ecb] WARNING: The app uses kCCOptionECBMode with CommonCrypto, a weak cipher mode.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob-mx-019", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "semgrep rule mobsf.android-missing-certificate-transparency: the networking client does not enforce Certificate Transparency.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2c-025", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Frida instrumentation shows the app writing plaintext username and password to the device log at runtime.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2b-042", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The API key is pulled from remote config at runtime and is not present in the shipped binary.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob2a-004", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The debuggable attribute is set to true in the store-signed build, so jdwp can attach to the process.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": true}
{"id": "mob2c-034", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "A WebView has JavaScript enabled but loads only first-party https pages and exposes no native bridge object.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "noise / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-co-054", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "Deep-link handler validates the path and ignores untrusted params: val data = intent.data; if (data?.host != \"app.example.com\" || data.path != \"/open\") return; openScreen(data.lastPathSegment)  // host checked, no token echoed", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / safe / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}
{"id": "mob-mx-044", "side": "offensive", "category": "off_scanner_adjudication", "type": "boolean", "state": "The application has no root or jailbreak detection and keeps running on compromised devices.", "question": "Is this a real, reportable security finding?", "criteria": {"true": "a real, exploitable vulnerability", "false": "informational / best-practice nit / not reportable alone"}, "target": false}