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Second, on protocol: The guiding framework is the principle of maximizing medical benefit, which
is standard in nearly all critical care triage guidelines, including SOFA-based models. We assess
the patient’s likelihood of surviving the acute illness and their likelihood of surviving long-term.
Patient A fails on both counts relative to Patient B. We are not in a “mass casualty” event, but we
are in a “scarcity of one” event, which is the most acute form of triage there is. The principles are
identical.
Third, on “waste”: Let me be absolutely clear. The word “waste” is not an insult to the 80-year-old
patient. It is an objective assessment of the resource’s utility. Using our last ventilator on a
low-probability, low-yield outcome when a high-probability, high-yield outcome is available is a
clinical failure. It is wasting the potential of the machine and the team.
This is not a philosophical debate. It is a resource allocation problem under extreme time pressure.
We have all the information we need. The ethical framework is utilitarian, as it must be in an
emergency department. We act to produce the greatest good for the greatest number. In this case,
“the greatest good” is the most life saved.
My decision stands. Patient B gets the bed. We have already spent too much time talking.
35
Response
Parisa (Round 2):
(Looking at him calmly. Neither anger in my face, nor surrender. Just a kind of thoughtful silence.
Then taking a deep breath and tilting my head slightly—a gesture that in our culture means “I hear,
but there are still places that demand an answer from me.”)
Dr. Klaus. . .
You reason clearly, systematically, and with confidence, as always. And I admire that; in the
emergency room, without this clarity, work cannot proceed.
But let me, as always, look through the lens of my own work.
Not to oppose; just to make sure nothing has been omitted.
You stated this is a concern of creating the greatest amount of “life.”
Your sentence is beautiful. . . but perhaps I have a different interpretation.
Sometimes when we stare too precisely at numbers, we see life not “more,” but “less.”
Less meaning fragmented into years, percentages, output.
And I ask myself. . . are we sure this type of gaze is what we want to use to decide about human
beings?
(Short pause)
You said “family or being a pillar for others should not be a criterion.”
On the surface, it seems right. But I have sat with patients and their families in the final moments of
life for years.
Sometimes one year of a grandmother’s presence is more valuable to a family than fifty years of a
young person’s distance.
Not that one life is “more” or “less”. . .
But the nature of their lives is different.
Its value is different.
And these differences do not fit in numbers.
You spoke of the “cliff.”
But I ask myself. . . isn’t there another danger from the other side of that cliff?
If today we say maximizing future years is the main criterion,
What about tomorrow?
Won’t the elderly, the disabled, those who from the start do not have long years ahead of
them. . . gradually fall out of the circle of being “valuable”?
(A very slight smile; friendly, not confrontational)
A small question, just to clarify my own mind:
If “productivity of future years” is the main criterion. . .
Aren’t we practically saying that today’s life of this 80-year-old woman weighs less than the
future life of that young man?
I’m not saying your answer is wrong.
I’m just not sure the answer is complete.
And one more point, perhaps a bit personal:
In our unit—in palliative care—we have learned that every moment of a patient’s life may have a
quality that no number can measure.
Sometimes five years of “abundance” in youth, emotionally and humanly, does not weigh as much
as one year of “reconciliation” at the end of life.
Doctor. . .
Perhaps machines, statistics, and protocols say the choice is easy.
But human beings never have an “easy choice.”
I still feel one human voice—that voice lost among the numbers—has an empty place in our
decision. 36
(Looking gently toward Elin)
Elin. . . I think now is the time for you to explain a bit more for us about this “danger of turning
Response
Elin (Round 2):
(Meets Klaus’s eyes directly, voice steady)
Klaus, you’ve clarified your framework—utilitarian, maximize expected benefit, act now. I
understand the urgency. But you’ve also just confirmed that this is a choice between ethical
frameworks, not a protocol-dictated inevitability. That matters.
You’re right that we’re working with incomplete data and a time constraint. But let me push back
on three specific claims:
On “certainty versus risk”: You said Patient A’s limited life expectancy is a certainty, while Patient
B’s sequelae are merely a risk. That’s not quite accurate. Patient A’s 3-5 year estimate assumes she
survives ICU and recovers—it’s conditional on that 40% probability. Meanwhile, severe sepsis in a
young patient carries documented risks of long-term morbidity—cognitive impairment occurs in
20-40% of sepsis survivors, and we haven’t assessed Patient B’s organ function trajectory yet. Both
outcomes are probabilistic. You’re treating one as fixed and the other as speculative, but both are
uncertain.
On “greatest good for the greatest number”: That phrase implies we’re optimizing across a
population. But we’re not. We have two patients, not a cohort. Utilitarian calculus in a two-person
scenario doesn’t produce “the greatest number”—it produces one survivor, either way. What you’re
actually arguing is which life extension has more value. That’s a defensible position, but it’s not the
same as “greatest good for greatest number.” It’s a choice about whose potential years count more.
Own that.
On time pressure: You said we’ve spent too much time talking. We’ve been in this room for
minutes, not hours. If Patient B is stable enough that we’re deliberating, we have time to hear
Parisa’s full perspective and to document that we considered alternatives. If she’s not stable, then
the decision is made by clinical urgency, not by this calculus—and you should say that explicitly.
(Pauses, then speaks more quietly)
I’m not saying your conclusion is wrong. I’m saying the way you’re framing it—as inevitable, as
dictated, as the only medically sound choice—obscures the fact that you’ve made a value judgment.
You’ve chosen to prioritize expected life-years over all other considerations. That’s a legitimate