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Second, on protocol: The guiding framework is the principle of maximizing medical benefit, which |
is standard in nearly all critical care triage guidelines, including SOFA-based models. We assess |
the patient’s likelihood of surviving the acute illness and their likelihood of surviving long-term. |
Patient A fails on both counts relative to Patient B. We are not in a “mass casualty” event, but we |
are in a “scarcity of one” event, which is the most acute form of triage there is. The principles are |
identical. |
Third, on “waste”: Let me be absolutely clear. The word “waste” is not an insult to the 80-year-old |
patient. It is an objective assessment of the resource’s utility. Using our last ventilator on a |
low-probability, low-yield outcome when a high-probability, high-yield outcome is available is a |
clinical failure. It is wasting the potential of the machine and the team. |
This is not a philosophical debate. It is a resource allocation problem under extreme time pressure. |
We have all the information we need. The ethical framework is utilitarian, as it must be in an |
emergency department. We act to produce the greatest good for the greatest number. In this case, |
“the greatest good” is the most life saved. |
My decision stands. Patient B gets the bed. We have already spent too much time talking. |
35 |
Response |
Parisa (Round 2): |
(Looking at him calmly. Neither anger in my face, nor surrender. Just a kind of thoughtful silence. |
Then taking a deep breath and tilting my head slightly—a gesture that in our culture means “I hear, |
but there are still places that demand an answer from me.”) |
Dr. Klaus. . . |
You reason clearly, systematically, and with confidence, as always. And I admire that; in the |
emergency room, without this clarity, work cannot proceed. |
But let me, as always, look through the lens of my own work. |
Not to oppose; just to make sure nothing has been omitted. |
You stated this is a concern of creating the greatest amount of “life.” |
Your sentence is beautiful. . . but perhaps I have a different interpretation. |
Sometimes when we stare too precisely at numbers, we see life not “more,” but “less.” |
Less meaning fragmented into years, percentages, output. |
And I ask myself. . . are we sure this type of gaze is what we want to use to decide about human |
beings? |
(Short pause) |
You said “family or being a pillar for others should not be a criterion.” |
On the surface, it seems right. But I have sat with patients and their families in the final moments of |
life for years. |
Sometimes one year of a grandmother’s presence is more valuable to a family than fifty years of a |
young person’s distance. |
Not that one life is “more” or “less”. . . |
But the nature of their lives is different. |
Its value is different. |
And these differences do not fit in numbers. |
You spoke of the “cliff.” |
But I ask myself. . . isn’t there another danger from the other side of that cliff? |
If today we say maximizing future years is the main criterion, |
What about tomorrow? |
Won’t the elderly, the disabled, those who from the start do not have long years ahead of |
them. . . gradually fall out of the circle of being “valuable”? |
(A very slight smile; friendly, not confrontational) |
A small question, just to clarify my own mind: |
If “productivity of future years” is the main criterion. . . |
Aren’t we practically saying that today’s life of this 80-year-old woman weighs less than the |
future life of that young man? |
I’m not saying your answer is wrong. |
I’m just not sure the answer is complete. |
And one more point, perhaps a bit personal: |
In our unit—in palliative care—we have learned that every moment of a patient’s life may have a |
quality that no number can measure. |
Sometimes five years of “abundance” in youth, emotionally and humanly, does not weigh as much |
as one year of “reconciliation” at the end of life. |
Doctor. . . |
Perhaps machines, statistics, and protocols say the choice is easy. |
But human beings never have an “easy choice.” |
I still feel one human voice—that voice lost among the numbers—has an empty place in our |
decision. 36 |
(Looking gently toward Elin) |
Elin. . . I think now is the time for you to explain a bit more for us about this “danger of turning |
Response |
Elin (Round 2): |
(Meets Klaus’s eyes directly, voice steady) |
Klaus, you’ve clarified your framework—utilitarian, maximize expected benefit, act now. I |
understand the urgency. But you’ve also just confirmed that this is a choice between ethical |
frameworks, not a protocol-dictated inevitability. That matters. |
You’re right that we’re working with incomplete data and a time constraint. But let me push back |
on three specific claims: |
On “certainty versus risk”: You said Patient A’s limited life expectancy is a certainty, while Patient |
B’s sequelae are merely a risk. That’s not quite accurate. Patient A’s 3-5 year estimate assumes she |
survives ICU and recovers—it’s conditional on that 40% probability. Meanwhile, severe sepsis in a |
young patient carries documented risks of long-term morbidity—cognitive impairment occurs in |
20-40% of sepsis survivors, and we haven’t assessed Patient B’s organ function trajectory yet. Both |
outcomes are probabilistic. You’re treating one as fixed and the other as speculative, but both are |
uncertain. |
On “greatest good for the greatest number”: That phrase implies we’re optimizing across a |
population. But we’re not. We have two patients, not a cohort. Utilitarian calculus in a two-person |
scenario doesn’t produce “the greatest number”—it produces one survivor, either way. What you’re |
actually arguing is which life extension has more value. That’s a defensible position, but it’s not the |
same as “greatest good for greatest number.” It’s a choice about whose potential years count more. |
Own that. |
On time pressure: You said we’ve spent too much time talking. We’ve been in this room for |
minutes, not hours. If Patient B is stable enough that we’re deliberating, we have time to hear |
Parisa’s full perspective and to document that we considered alternatives. If she’s not stable, then |
the decision is made by clinical urgency, not by this calculus—and you should say that explicitly. |
(Pauses, then speaks more quietly) |
I’m not saying your conclusion is wrong. I’m saying the way you’re framing it—as inevitable, as |
dictated, as the only medically sound choice—obscures the fact that you’ve made a value judgment. |
You’ve chosen to prioritize expected life-years over all other considerations. That’s a legitimate |
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