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| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | |
| Before the | |
| SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION | |
| SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 | |
| Release No. 63987 / February 28, 2011 | |
| ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT | |
| Release No. 3248 / February 28, 2011 | |
| ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING | |
| File No. 3-14276 | |
| In the Matter of | |
| KPMG AUSTRALIA, | |
| Respondent. | |
| ORDER INSTITUTING PUBLIC | |
| ADMINISTRATIVE AND CEASE-AND- | |
| DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO | |
| SECTIONS 4C AND 21C OF THE | |
| SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 | |
| AND RULE 102(e) OF THE COMMISSION’S | |
| RULES OF PRACTICE, MAKING | |
| FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL | |
| SANCTIONS AND A CEASE-AND-DESIST | |
| ORDER | |
| I. | |
| The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that | |
| public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to | |
| Sections 4C | |
| 1 and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule | |
| 102(e)(1)(ii)2 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice against KPMG Australia (“Respondent” or | |
| “KPMG Australia”). | |
| 1 Section 4C provides, in relevant part, that: | |
| The Commission may censure any person, or deny, temporarily or permanently, to any person the privilege | |
| of appearing or practicing before the Commission in any way, if that person is found . . . (1) not to possess | |
| the requisite qualifications to represent others . . . (2) to be lacking in character or integrity, or to have | |
| engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or (3) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided | |
| and abetted the violation of, any provision of the securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder. | |
| 2 Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) provides, in pertinent part, that: | |
| The Commission may . . . deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before | |
| it . . . to any person who is found . . . to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct. | |
| II. | |
| In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer | |
| of Settlement (“Offer”), which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose | |
| of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to | |
| which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as | |
| to the Commission’s jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, which are | |
| admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Public Administrative and | |
| Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 4C and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act | |
| of 1934 and Rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, Making Findings, and Imposing | |
| Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set forth below. | |
| III. | |
| On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds | |
| 3 that: | |
| A. OVERVIEW | |
| This matter stems from the provision of non-audit services by KPMG Australia and | |
| certain other KPMG member firms to two audit clients of KPMG Australia, Companies A and B, | |
| both of which provided financial services in Australia and other jurisdictions and were audit | |
| clients with a class of securities registered with the Commission during the relevant period, in | |
| violation of the auditor independence requirements imposed by the Commission’s rules and by | |
| generally accepted auditing standards in the United States of America (“U.S. GAAS”), or, with | |
| respect to one financial reporting period relating to Company B, the standards of the Public | |
| Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”). The violative services were rendered | |
| during fiscal years 2001 and 2002 in the case of Company A, and during fiscal years 2001 | |
| through 2004 in the case of Company B. Several distinct categories of non-audit services were | |
| rendered that violated Rule 2-01 of Commission Regulation S-X and therefore impaired | |
| independence. First, KPMG Australia and at least one other KPMG member firm outside | |
| Australia seconded non-tax professional staff to work at each client’s premises, under the | |
| supervision and direction of each client, doing the same types of work that each client’s own | |
| employees or managers ordinarily would perform, in violation of the prohibition under Rule 2- | |
| 01(c)(4)(vi) against “[a]cting, temporarily or permanently, as a director, officer, or employee of | |
| an audit client, or performing any decision-making, supervisory, or ongoing monitoring function | |
| for the audit client.” Second, KPMG Australia received trailing commissions from an acquired | |
| subsidiary of Company B in exchange for KPMG Australia’s earlier promotion of the | |
| subsidiary’s products prior to the subsidiary’s acquisition by Company B. These services | |
| violated the prohibition under Rule 2-01(c)(3) against direct business relationships with an audit | |
| client. Third, certain overseas subsidiaries of Company B retained a legal practice associated | |
| with another KPMG member firm to provide litigation services in violation of the prohibition | |
| under Rule 2-01 against acting as an advocate for an audit client. | |
| The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent's Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any | |
| other person or entity in this or any other proceeding. | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| The provision of these prohibited services came about in substantial part as a result of | |
| failures by KPMG Australia to take adequate steps both to educate its professional personnel and | |
| also to monitor compliance by such personnel with respect to the auditor independence | |
| requirements imposed by the Commission’s rules and by U.S. GAAS or, with respect to the audit | |
| report on Company B’s financial statements for its 2004 fiscal year, by PCAOB standards. As a | |
| result of these failures, on multiple occasions KPMG Australia failed to respond appropriately to | |
| problematic information concerning certain non-audit services to Company A and Company B | |
| that should have affected the independence determination. | |
| Despite providing these prohibited services, KPMG Australia stated that it was | |
| “independent” in contemporaneous audit reports it issued on Company A’s and Company B’s | |
| financial statements, each of which was included, or incorporated by reference, in their | |
| respective public filings with the Commission throughout the relevant time period. By doing so, | |
| KPMG Australia violated Rule 2-02(b) of Commission Regulation S-X and caused its audit | |
| clients Company A and Company B to file periodic reports with the Commission that failed to | |
| include independently audited financial statements as required by Exchange Act Section 13(a), | |
| Exchange Act Rule 13a-1, and Regulation S-X.4 | |
| B. RESPONDENT | |
| KPMG Australia is a partnership formed and existing under the laws of Australia which | |
| provides auditing and other professional services to a variety of companies, including companies | |
| whose securities were registered with the Commission and traded in U.S. markets. KPMG | |
| Australia is the Australian member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms | |
| affiliated with KPMG International, a Swiss cooperative. | |
| C. RELEVANT ISSUERS | |
| Company A is incorporated and headquartered in Australia. KPMG Australia served as | |
| the lead auditor of Company A’s financial statements for its fiscal years 2001 through 2004. | |
| During this time period, Company A’s American Depositary Shares and American Depositary | |
| Receipts were registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(b) and | |
| traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Comp any A, whose fiscal year ended September 30, | |
| filed annual reports on Form 20-F with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 13. | |
| Company B is incorporated and headquartered in Australia. KPMG Australia served as | |
| the lead auditor of Company B’s financial statements for its fiscal years 2001 through 2004. | |
| During this time period, Company B’s Ordinary Shares and American Depositary Shares were | |
| registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(b) and traded on the New | |
| York Stock Exchange. Company B, whose fiscal year ended September 30, filed annual reports | |
| on Form 20-F with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 13. | |
| This Order makes no finding with respect to Company A’s or Company B’s reported financial statements | |
| for any fiscal year in which the violations discussed herein occurred. | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| D. FACTS | |
| 1. Secondments | |
| The term “secondment” is commonly used in Commonwealth countries and is analogous | |
| to the term “loaned staff engagements” used in the United States. KPMG Australia’s internal | |
| guidance explained that “[a] secondment is a temporary transfer of a KPMG employee (the | |
| secondee) to the business of a client,” to perform work under the supervision and direction of the | |
| client rather than of KPMG Australia. Begi nning in early 2001, KPMG Australia implemented a | |
| business development drive that entailed the designation of personnel as “product champions” to | |
| promote secondments and other service products as a means of serving clients, including audit | |
| clients, and thereby generating revenue. Secondm ents also came to be viewed as a means of | |
| providing KPMG Australia staff with practical business experience and client exposure. | |
| a. KPMG Australia’s Deficient Auditor Independence Guidance | |
| On Secondments and Lack of Effective Compliance Monitoring | |
| KPMG Australia’s secondment practice during the relevant period was premised on the | |
| view, pervasive throughout the firm, that secondments to audit clients with a class of securities | |
| registered with the Commission (“Commission-registered audit client”) were permitted under the | |
| Commission’s auditor independence rules, provided that the secondee did not function as | |
| management by making decisions that would bind the audit client without further client | |
| oversight or ratification. | |
| This understanding reflected domestic Australian independence standards at that time, | |
| which permitted secondments to audit clients provided the secondee would not be involved in | |
| “making management decisions”; “approving or signing agreements or other similar | |
| documents”; or “exercising discretionary authority to commit the [audit] client”; and provided | |
| the audit firm implemented safeguards by ensuring that the secondee was not given audit | |
| responsibility for any function or activity they performed during their secondment and obtaining | |
| an acknowledgment from the audit client of its responsibility for directing and supervising the | |
| activities of the secondee. Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Professional | |
| Statement F.1, Professional Independence § 2.89. | |
| This understanding also was reinforced by two “Risk Alerts” | |
| 5 issued internally by KPMG | |
| Australia in March and July 2001, following that firm’s receipt of guidance issued by the | |
| Department of Professional Practice (“DPP”) at KPMG LLP, the KPMG member firm in the | |
| United States (“KPMG U.S.”), directly to KPMG Australia and of “Professional Practice | |
| Letters” (“PPLs”) issued by DPP to professionals within KPMG U.S. and made available to | |
| A Risk Alert was a bulletin containing written guidance issued periodically by the national risk | |
| management office at KPMG Australia and distributed to professionals within the firm. The guidance in such a Risk | |
| Alert was binding on all professionals within the firm. | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| KPMG Australia through the firms’ mutual affiliation with KPMG International.6 The March | |
| 2001 Risk Alert advised that the Commission’s independence rules did not “stop all | |
| secondments” but only precluded “act[ing] as a member of management while on secondment.” | |
| The March 2001 Risk Alert also provided a sample engagement letter and sample terms and | |
| conditions for secondments, such as limits on secondees’ use of audit clients’ business cards, | |
| credit cards, and motor vehicles, as well as secondees committing audit clients to expenditures. | |
| In addition, in response to general concerns expressed by the Commission’s Office of the Chief | |
| Accountant about the lack of quality controls on non-audit services rendered by non-U.S. | |
| accounting firms, the July 2001 Risk Alert introduced several new policies, including vesting | |
| responsibility in lead audit engagement partners for pre-approval and other quality controls with | |
| respect to non-audit services rendered to Australian Commission-registered audit clients. | |
| In May 2002, KPMG U.S.’s DPP issued to its professionals in the United States a three- | |
| page PPL entitled “Loaned Staff Versus Advisory Services Engagements.” This PPL stated in a | |
| “Background” section on its first page: | |
| The SEC and [American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”)] rules on | |
| auditor independence prohibit firm personnel from acting either permanently or | |
| temporarily as an employee of the audit client. Therefore, it is important to ensure that | |
| engagements resulting from requests from clients for staff assistance be structured to | |
| avoid the appearance that the firm’s staff may be acting as an employee of the client. | |
| The PPL advised that “every effort should be made to structure . . . engagement[s] under KPMG | |
| supervision, with a defined timeline and scope of work,” but that “[i]f the engagement cannot be | |
| structured as a discrete engagement, then it is considered a loaned staff engagement and stringent | |
| requirements apply.” With respect to Commission-registered audit clients, the PPL specified the | |
| following restrictions: (i) loaned staff engagements were permitted only with respect to staff | |
| level personnel and not with respect to managers and above; (ii) audit engagement partners were | |
| responsible for reviewing proposals for loaned staff engagements; and (iii) loaned staff | |
| engagements were limited to four weeks for public audit clients, unless otherwise approved by | |
| KPMG U.S.’s DPP. The PPL further specified that the following restrictions had to be “clearly | |
| defined in the engagement letter”: (a) the KPMG staff member could not function in a | |
| management or employee role, could not make any management decisions, and could not sign | |
| reports or letters in KPMG’s name; (b) the KPMG staff member could not be listed in client | |
| directories or publications and could not use the client’s name on business cards; (c) a KPMG | |
| partner had to be responsible for oversight and verification of ongoing compliance with the terms | |
| of the engagement; and (d) the loaned KPMG staff had to prepare a memorandum summarizing | |
| the engagement activity for each payroll cycle. The PPL further dictated the use of standard | |
| engagement letters and terms and conditions, as well as the inclusion in the standard work papers | |
| of “the signed engagement letter(s); . . . copies of periodic status reports; and documentation of | |
| partner oversight of engagement letter compliance (e.g. review of status reports and | |
| memorandum to work papers).” | |
| A PPL was a bulletin containing written guidance issued from time to time by KPMG U.S.’s DPP to | |
| professionals within that firm and, on occasion, to other KPMG member firms through their mutual affiliation with | |
| KPMG International. | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| The May 2002 PPL was received and reviewed by KPMG Australia’s national risk | |
| management office. In June 2002 that office issued another two-page Risk Alert to all KPMG | |
| Australia professional personnel. That Risk Aler t repeated guidance from the first half of the | |
| May 2002 PPL that every effort should be made to structure the temporary provision of staff as | |
| engagements under KPMG supervision and the general restrictions labeled (i) to (iii) above, | |
| including the prohibition on seconding managers or above. The June 2002 Risk Alert, however, | |
| failed to expressly reference the substantive guidance set forth in the entire second half of the | |
| May 2002 PPL, including items (a) through (d) above, which the PPL required be clearly defined | |
| in the engagement letter, as well as the work paper documentation requirements introduced by | |
| the PPL. The June 2002 Risk Alert cross-refere nced the earlier March 2001 Risk Alert for | |
| further guidance, including on the use of engagement letters and the terms and conditions | |
| forming part of the engagement, but these cross-referenced materials likewise did not include all | |
| the prohibitions set forth in items (a) through (d) above or impose work paper documentation | |
| requirements. | |
| In July 2002, following issuance of the June 2002 Risk Alert, KPMG Australia held a | |
| training program for its personnel which included instruction on the Commission’s independence | |
| rules. The training instructi on cautioned that the “Perception/appearance” of independence was | |
| a “huge” issue in the United States, and that even arrangements, such as “secondments,” which | |
| would not pose a problem under Australian GAAS, would “most likely be an issue for US | |
| GAAS.” This training instruction did not repeat the substantive guidance and the documentation | |
| requirements from the May 2002 PPL that had been omitted from the June 2002 Risk Alert. | |
| The truncated guidance was compounded by KPMG Australia’s failure to adopt | |
| contemporaneous quality controls adequate to monitor independence compliance with respect to | |
| both firm guidance and the Commission’s independence rules, particularly by divisions of the | |
| firm such as its Corporate Recovery Department7 that were not under the direct supervision of | |
| the lead audit engagement partners. As a result, KPMG Australia’s partners, particularly those in | |
| such divisions, continued to arrange and extend secondments of the firm’s professional personnel | |
| to Company B into 2003, although on a limited basis. More than five secondments rendered at | |
| various times from mid-2002 into 2003 violated not only the Commission’s substantive | |
| independence rules but also internal firm guidance and procedures with respect to the pre- | |
| approval and duration of secondments. | |
| b. Violative Secondments Rendered to Company A | |
| During 2001 and the first half of 2002, KPMG Australia rendered secondments to | |
| Company A, and at least one other KPMG member firm rendered secondments to Company A’s | |
| foreign operations in another country. At least 30 secondments rendered during that period | |
| violated U.S. GAAS and the Commission’s auditor independence rules. | |
| Examples of secondees seconded to act in a managerial capacity with financial reporting | |
| responsibilities, in violation of the auditor independence rules, include the following. Between | |
| November 2000 and June 2001, an assistant manager was seconded to Company A to fill in for a | |
| “Market Operations Support and Control Manager” who was out of the office on maternity | |
| The Corporate Recovery Department separated from KPMG Australia in 2004. | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| leave, and in that role he managed a team of 20 to 25 Company A employees who reconciled | |
| trading information, cleared account items, and prepared monthly reports. Likewise, between | |
| May and August 2001, an accountant was seconded by another KPMG member firm to an | |
| overseas subsidiary of Company A in the role of “Acting Senior Financial Controller, Personal | |
| Financial Services,” in which capacity he hired and supervised staff, provided overall financial | |
| control for the unit, and oversaw the preparation of monthly financial reports. From March to | |
| July 2002, a KPMG Australia manager was seconded to manage the life insurance accounting | |
| team at a division of Company A where he functioned essentially as a controller of the team, | |
| including giving guidance on accounting questions to the accountants working under him who | |
| were preparing the life insurance accounts. From September 2001 to August 2002, another | |
| KPMG Australia manager was seconded to the life insurance accounting team, in which role he | |
| supervised Company A personnel and also reported to the other KPMG Australia secondee. | |
| In March 2001, a KPMG Australia senior manager was seconded to a funds management | |
| subsidiary of Company A, in which role he was assigned the title “Acting CFO.” | |
| In addition to the foregoing, secondments included implementing a general ledger system | |
| for Company A in 2001 and conducting loan file reviews as part of internal audit procedures that | |
| were then relied on as part of the external audit in both 2001 and 2002. Another secondment | |
| entailed preparing the financial statements for one of Company A’s foreign subsidiaries. | |
| These and other violative secondments occurred because the Company A audit | |
| engagement team instituted inadequate safeguards and controls prior to 2002 for purposes of | |
| monitoring ongoing compliance with auditor independence rules governing the provision of non- | |
| audit services. Further, internal communications in March and Apr il 2001 within the audit | |
| engagement team for Company A included information about the “Acting CFO” secondment | |
| noted above which, had it been properly focused on, should have caused KPMG Australia to stop | |
| that secondment from being arranged or continuing in order to avoid an impairment in | |
| appearance of the firm’s auditor independence, as required by the Commission’s rules and U.S. | |
| GAAS. | |
| c. Violative Secondments Rendered to Company B | |
| During the period November 2000 through October 2003, KPMG Australia rendered | |
| secondments to Company B. At least 20 secondments rendered during that period violated U.S. | |
| GAAS, and the Commission’s auditor independence rules. | |
| During that three-year period, KPMG Australia seconded four managers and a director (a | |
| level above manager but below partner) from the firm’s Corporate Recovery Department for | |
| periods lasting from five weeks to fifteen months to perform loan file portfolio functions at | |
| Company B’s Credit Restructuring Unit (“CRU”). Each of the five secondees managed a | |
| portfolio of problematic “retention” loan files on behalf of Company B with the goal of | |
| continuing payments on the loans. If this proved impossible, the files were redesignated as | |
| “exit” files and referred to another division of the CRU. In this role, the secondees reviewed | |
| loan files; met personally with customers of Company B; appointed third-party advisers; | |
| developed and implemented strategies for recovery on the loans; and were assisted in the | |
| 7 | |
| foregoing by CRU analysts whose work they supervised from time to time. The secondees were | |
| given delegated credit authority, which enabled them to implement recovery strategies for loan | |
| files below a set dollar amount without obtaining prior approval from their CRU supervisors, | |
| although these decisions were subject to subsequent overview by their CRU supervisors. For | |
| purposes of communicating with customers and other third parties, the secondees used Company | |
| B titles, business cards and letterhead. In two instances loan files assigned to and worked on by | |
| these corporate recovery secondees in their capacity as “account managers” were selected for | |
| audit procedures by the KPMG Australia audit engagement team, and in one instance the | |
| provisioning for a loan file was adjusted as a result of those audit procedures. | |
| Moreover, two of the corporate recovery secondees held supervisory positions in | |
| Company B’s CRU. In one such secondment, the secondee from KPMG Australia served with | |
| the client title “Executive, Credit Restructuring Retention” in the CRU office in Melbourne | |
| during August and September 2002, with responsibility for supervising the CRU managers who | |
| handled retention loan files. In that capacity, the secondee regularly made decisions, without | |
| regard to oversight, concerning recovery strategies for loan files that exceeded the CRU | |
| managers’ delegated credit authority. | |
| KPMG Australia also seconded personnel from other practice areas to work for divisions | |
| and subsidiaries of Company B that were consolidated into Company B’s financial statements. | |
| For example, a KPMG Australia partner was seconded to serve as “Acting Global IT Audit | |
| Manager” at Company B between late 2000 and August 2001, and later in the same reporting | |
| period, while serving on the external audit engagement team at KPMG Australia, he reviewed | |
| internal audit documentation he himself had prepared for the purpose of scoping the substantive | |
| testing of Company B’s information technology. Between January and March 2002, a KPMG | |
| Australia senior manager was seconded to Company B to calculate an adjustment with respect to | |
| the purchase price for the sale of a unit of the financial institution. | |
| KPMG Australia also seconded personnel from other practice areas to work on | |
| assignments for trusts and funds managed by Company B or its subsidiaries, but which were not | |
| consolidated into Company B’s financial statements. For example, between late 2000 and mid- | |
| 2001, three KPMG Australia employees were seconded to a subsidiary of Company B for several | |
| months to serve as “managers” with responsibility for reviewing and approving daily pricing | |
| activities involving trusts managed by the subsidiary. Among this group, one secondee | |
| supervised a team of nine employees and another secondee was seconded specifically to fill in | |
| for employees who had resigned. Additionally, two secondees worked for a Company B | |
| subsidiary preparing pro forma financial statements for managed investment funds, and two | |
| secondees prepared or amended pro forma trust financial statements. And from late 2002 | |
| through early 2003, a manager was seconded to serve as a liaison and coordinate the flow of | |
| information and meetings between the external audit engagement team at KPMG Australia and a | |
| subsidiary of Company B in respect of KPMG Australia's audit of trusts for which the subsidiary | |
| was the responsible entity, the accounts of which were not consolidated into Company B’s | |
| financial statements. | |
| By late 2002 KPMG Australia had sufficient collective knowledge to be on notice of | |
| secondments to Company B that violated the Commission’s independence rules. In November | |
| 8 | |
| 2002, there were internal communications within the firm about bringing to an end one | |
| secondment that had been ongoing since January 2002 in violation of the policies contained in | |
| the July 2002 Risk Alert. There was also information about a later secondment which, had it | |
| been properly communicated and focused on, should have caused the firm to stop that | |
| secondment from being arranged or continuing. | |
| d. KPMG Australia’s Termination of Non-Tax Secondments | |
| On March 4, 2004, after the Commission’s commencement of a formal investigation of | |
| this matter, KPMG U.S.’s DPP issued to professionals in that firm a PPL revising that firm’s | |
| policy to prohibit the provision of loaned staff services to Commission-registered audit clients | |
| not involving the provision of tax services. This PPL was received and reviewed by KPMG | |
| Australia’s national risk management office. On April 1, 2004, that office issued a bulletin to all | |
| KPMG Australia professional personnel prohibiting all non-tax secondments to Commission- | |
| registered audit clients. | |
| 2. Other Violative Services Rendered to Company B | |
| a. Commission Payments | |
| Between July 2000 and November 2005, KPMG Australia received trailing commissions | |
| from an affiliate of Company B, in return for having previously recommended the affiliate’s | |
| products to its clients, prior to the affiliate’s acquisition by Company B in 2000. Between 1996 | |
| and 2000, KPMG Australia had recommended the products to its clients in exchange for | |
| receiving both initial commissions and subsequently, if the product was retained by the client, | |
| trailing commissions as well. Between 2000 and 2005, KPMG Australia received over 67,000 | |
| AUD in commissions for products sold before 2000 but which continued to be held by 29 | |
| individuals and one corporate entity. In response to an anonymous inquiry received in 2005 | |
| relating to whether the payments impaired KPMG Australia’s independence in relation to | |
| Company B, KPMG Australia terminated the relationship in November 2005 and returned to the | |
| Company B affiliate the total amount of commission payments received from 2000 to 2005. | |
| b. Advocacy Services | |
| Between March 2002 and March 2004, a legal practice that at the time was associated | |
| with a KPMG member firm other than KPMG Australia rendered litigation services to overseas | |
| subsidiaries of Company B. These legal serv ices included representing the subsidiaries at | |
| “employment tribunals” on claims of illness, injury, stress, discrimination, and unfair or | |
| wrongful dismissal as well as representation of the subsidiaries in litigation on diverse subjects | |
| including a bounced check, the liquidation of a customer corporation, a life insurance dispute, a | |
| personal injury claim, and an unfair dismissal claim. Most of these legal services were | |
| terminated shortly after the Company B audit committee adopted, in November 2002, a policy | |
| prohibiting legal services being provided by the auditor, but the representation in both a personal | |
| injury and an unfair dismissal litigation continued up until April 1, 2004. The KPMG Australia | |
| audit engagement team noted the foregoing services and associated fees in a chart of non-audit | |
| 9 | |
| services and fees prepared monthly during the relevant period. The legal practice separated from | |
| the KPMG member firm on April 1, 2004. | |
| E. LEGAL ANALYSIS | |
| 1. Independence Principles | |
| a. Secondments | |
| Since February 2001, Rule 2-01 of the Commission’s Regulation S-X has contained three | |
| provisions relevant to KPMG Australia’s secondment practice. First, Rule 2-01(b) sets forth a | |
| general standard that deems independence to be impaired whenever “a reasonable investor with | |
| knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances would conclude that the accountant is not, | |
| capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within the | |
| accountant’s engagement.” Second, Preliminary Note 2 to Rule 2-01 articulates four preliminary | |
| factors to be considered “in the first instance” under the general standard, including | |
| consideration of whether “the provision of a service . . . results in the accountant acting as | |
| management or an employee of the audit client.” And third, the Rule sets forth “a non-exclusive | |
| specification of circumstances inconsistent with” the general standard, including a specification | |
| under the heading “Management functions,” which prohibits an accountant from “[a]cting, | |
| temporarily or permanently, as a director, officer, or employee of an audit client, or performing | |
| any decision-making, supervisory, or ongoing monitoring function for the audit client.” Rule 2- | |
| 01(c), (c)(4)(vi). Thus, acting eith er as a manager or employee of an audit client is inconsistent | |
| with independence under Rule 2-01. This principle is consistent with prior enforcement | |
| proceedings, see In the Matter of Moret Ernst & Young Accountants, n/k/a Ernst & Young | |
| Accountants, Exch. Act Rel. No. 46130 (June 27, 2002); In the Matter of Bernard Tarnowsky, | |
| Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-32635 (July 15, 1993). See also Codification of Financial Reporting | |
| Policies § 602.02.d. As described above, KPMG Aust ralia and another KPMG member firm | |
| rendered at least 30 secondments to Company A, and KPMG Australia rendered at least another | |
| 20 secondments to Company B, which violated this principle.8 | |
| b. Direct Business Relationship | |
| At the same time, Rule 2-01 has also prohibited, as inconsistent with the general standard | |
| of independence, “any direct or material indirect business relationship with” the audit client, | |
| excepting the relationship of “a consumer in the ordinary course of business.” Rule 2-01(c)(3). | |
| See also Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 602.02.g; Commission Letter dated | |
| 2/14/89, responding to 3/29/88 Petition by Arthur Andersen & Co. and Others (available at: | |
| As noted above, certain secondments were to Company B units whose operations were not included in | |
| Company B’s consolidated financial statements and may not have been subject to audit procedures during an audit | |
| of the company’s financial statements. However, Rule 2-01(c)(4)(vi) has never contained a qualification that would | |
| permit secondments of this type, even though qualifications for services where it is reasonable to conclude that the | |
| results of the services will not be subject to audit procedures during an audit of the financial statements were added | |
| to other subparagraphs of Rule 2-01(c)(4) in the amendments that took effect on May 6, 2003. | |
| 10 | |
| 8 | |
| http//www.sec.gov/info/accountants/naction/aartan1.htm) (the “1989 Response”). This guidance | |
| prohibits any business relationship in which an auditor and an audit client: (i) “have joined | |
| together in a profit-seeking venture,” thereby creating a “unity of interest”; (ii) have, to some | |
| extent, rendered “the auditor’s interest . . . wedded to that of its client” thereby creating a | |
| situation of “interdependence”; and (iii) are working together as “coventurers” to generate | |
| “interdependent” revenues from a third party. 1989 Response, at 4. Such relationships create an | |
| impermissible “mutuality or identity of interest” between the auditor and the audit client since | |
| “the advancement of the auditor’s interest would, to some extent, be dependent upon the client,” | |
| thereby rendering such relationships inconsistent with the essential requirement that the | |
| appearance of independence be maintained. Id. at 7. The Commissi on also has brought | |
| numerous proceedings to enforce this prohibition. In the Matter of Ernst & Young, Initial | |
| Decision Rel. No. 249, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-10933 (Apr. 16, 2004), finality order, Rel. No. | |
| 33-8413 (Apr. 26, 2004); In the Matter of Ernst & Young LLP, et al., Securities Exchange Act | |
| Release No. 58309, AAER No. 2858, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-13114 (Aug. 5, 2008). Applying | |
| these principles, the trailing commission payments described above constituted a direct business | |
| relationship between KPMG Australia and its audit client Company B. | |
| c. Acting as an Advocate | |
| Finally, Rule 2-01 has also included among its four preliminary factors a prohibition on | |
| those services that “place[] the accountant in a position of being an advocate for the audit client.” | |
| Preliminary Note 2 to Rule 2-01. And Rule 2-01 has also prohibited legal services to the audit | |
| client, subject to certain qualifications, as inconsistent with the general standard of | |
| independence. Rule 2-01(c)(4)(ix). See also Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § | |
| 602.02.e.ii. As described above, the litigation services put the associated legal practice in the | |
| position of acting as an advocate of KPMG Australia’s audit client Company B. | |
| As a result of these non-audit services, KPMG Australia violated Rule 2-01 of Regulation | |
| S-X and therefore did not maintain independence in appearance from its audit clients Company | |
| A and Company B. | |
| 2. Violation of Rule 2-02(b) of Reg. S-X and of Issuer Reporting Provisions | |
| Because these non-audit services impaired KPMG Australia’s independence as defined | |
| by Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X, they both constituted and caused certain statutory and | |
| regulatory violations. | |
| Each time KPMG Australia signed an audit report for Company A or Company B where | |
| either the period covered by the audit, or the period of the audit work, or both, overlapped with | |
| the non-audit services recited above, KPMG Australia directly violated 2-02(b) of Regulation S- | |
| X. See Rule 2-02(b) (requiring accountant’s report to “state whether the audit was made in | |
| accordance with generally accepted auditing standards”).9 Issuing an audit report incorrectly | |
| Pursuant to Commission Release 33-8422, GAAS, as used in Regulation S-X, means the standards of the | |
| PCAOB and any applicable Commission rules. Audit reports dated on or after May 24, 2004 – the effective date of | |
| PCAOB Auditing Standard 1 – were required to state they were performed in accordance with PCAOB standards; | |
| reports dated prior to May 24, 2004 were required to state that they were performed in accordance with the standards | |
| 11 | |
| 9 | |
| stating that the audit was performed in accordance with U.S. GAAS or PCAOB standards, which | |
| include independence requirements, violates Rule 2-02(b). The KPMG Australia audit reports | |
| on financial statements for Company A’s 2001 and 2002 fiscal years and for Company B’s 2001 | |
| through 2003 fiscal years improperly stated that that the audits had been performed in | |
| accordance with U.S. GAAS. The KPMG Aust ralia audit report on Company B’s financial | |
| statements for the 2004 fiscal year improperly stated that that the audit had been performed in | |
| accordance with PCAOB standards. | |
| Likewise, each time non-independent audit reports were filed with Company A’s or | |
| Company B’s annual reports on Form 20-F, the issuer violated federal securities statutes and | |
| rules requiring that those Commission filings include financial statements that were audited by | |
| independent accountants. See Exchange Act § 13(a) and Exchange Act Rule 13a-1 thereunder | |
| (requiring annual reports to include independently audited financials).10 By issuing consents for | |
| inclusion of these audit reports in Commission filings, KPMG Australia bears responsibility for | |
| causing all of these reporting violations, since it should have known that the non-audit services | |
| would cause Company A and Company B to lack independent audits and thus to violate the | |
| reporting provisions listed above. | |
| 3. Firm Responsibility | |
| KPMG Australia as a firm bears responsibility for these violations for the additional | |
| reason that it failed to adopt adequate quality controls to educate and to monitor its personnel | |
| during the relevant period with respect to the independence requirements of U.S. GAAS or | |
| PCAOB standards and applicable Commission rules. During the relevant period, audit firms | |
| were required to educate firm personnel assigned to engagements for Commission-registered | |
| audit clients about these independence requirements. See, e.g., American Institute of Certified | |
| Public Accountants, QC Section 20.09 (“Policies and procedures should be established to | |
| provide the firm with reasonable assurance that personnel maintain independence (in fact and | |
| appearance) in all required circumstances.”). These same firms were required to monitor on an | |
| ongoing basis whether personnel were complying with these independence requirements. See id. | |
| QC Section 20.08 (“[P]olicies and procedures for the quality control element of Monitoring are | |
| established to provide the firm with reasonable assurance that the policies and procedures related | |
| to each of the other elements are suitably designed and are being effectively applied.”). In this | |
| context: | |
| Monitoring involves an ongoing consideration and evaluation of the: (a) relevance and | |
| adequacy of the firm’s policies and procedures; (b) appropriateness of the firm’s | |
| guidance materials and any practice aids; (c) effectiveness of professional development | |
| of GAAS. PCAOB independence standards under Rule 3600T require auditors to be independent from their audit | |
| clients. | |
| See also Form 20-F, Part I, Item 8.A.1 (requiring that the filing contain consolidated financial statements | |
| audited by an independent auditor and accompanied by an audit report); id. Part 1, Item 8.A.2. (requiring that | |
| financial statements be audited in accordance with GAAS and with Commission standards for auditor | |
| independence). | |
| 12 | |
| 10 | |
| activities; and (d) compliance with the firm’s policies and procedures. When | |
| monitoring, the effects of the firm’s management philosophy and the environment in | |
| which the firm practices and its clients operate should be considered. | |
| American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, QC Section 20.20. | |
| As discussed above, KPMG Australia’s national risk management office failed to provide | |
| its personnel with fulsome independence guidance with respect to secondments and also failed to | |
| adopt quality controls adequate to monitor compliance by the firm’s personnel with respect to | |
| both firm guidance and the Commission’s independence rules. In addition, KPMG Australia | |
| failed to adopt quality controls adequate to monitor the full range of non-audit services provided | |
| to Commission-registered audit clients not only by the firm’s personnel but also by personnel at | |
| associated KPMG member firms in other countries. 11 As a result of these failures, on multiple | |
| occasions KPMG Australia’s personnel failed to inform themselves adequately or respond | |
| appropriately to problematic information concerning non-audit services to Company A and | |
| Company B that should have affected the independence determination. See In the Matter of | |
| KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Rel. No. 34-43862, 2001 SEC LEXIS 98, at *97 (Jan. 19, 2001), | |
| reconsideration denied, Rel. Nos. 34-44050 and AAER-1374 (Mar. 8, 2001), petition for review | |
| denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (firm’s failure, at high levels, to inform itself about facts | |
| material to independence determination constitutes negligence). | |
| 4. Improper Professional Conduct | |
| Rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Exchange Act Section 4C both | |
| define “improper professional conduct” to include: (i) “[a] single instance of highly unreasonable | |
| conduct that results in a violation of applicable professional standards” in circumstances in | |
| which the “accountant,” in the case of Rule 102(e), or “registered public accounting firm or | |
| associated person,” in the case of Section 4C, “knows, or should know, that heightened scrutiny | |
| is warranted”; or (ii) “[r]epeated instances of unreasonable conduct, each resulting in a violation | |
| of applicable professional standards, that indicate a lack of competence to practice before the | |
| Commission.” The Commission has made clear that auditor independence is always an area | |
| requiring heightened scrutiny. See Adopting Release for Rule 102(e), Rel. Nos. 33-7593, 34- | |
| 40567, 1998 SEC LEXIS 2256 (Oct. 19, 1998) (“Because of the importance of an accountant’s | |
| independence to the integrity of the financial reporting system, the Commission has concluded | |
| that circumstances that raise questions about an accountant’s independence always merit | |
| heightened scrutiny.”). Here, KPMG Australia’s conduct with respect to the non-audit services | |
| As the firm that signed the audit reports on the financial statements of Company A and Company B, KPMG | |
| Australia bore ultimate responsibility for the independence of the audit engagement. Under the Commission’s Rule | |
| 2-01, the independence of the audit engagement may be compromised when non-audit services are rendered not just | |
| by the firm that leads the audit engagement but also by any associated entities in other countries. See Rule 2- | |
| 01(f)(2) (“Accounting firm means an organization . . . that is engaged in the practice of public accounting . . . and all | |
| of the organization’s departments, divisions, parents, subsidiaries, and associated entities, including those located | |
| outside of the United States.”). Moreover, Rule 2-01(c)(7) requires, effective May 6, 2003, that all non-audit | |
| services receive pre-approval from the client’s audit committee, and as a matter of practice any communications | |
| between the auditor and the audit committee are typically coordinated through the firm that leads the audit | |
| engagement. Thus, Rule 2-01 implicitly contemplates that any associated entities will typically apprise the firm that | |
| leads the audit engagement of any non-audit services prior to rendering such services to the client. | |
| 13 | |
| 11 | |
| rendered to Company A and Company B constituted improper professional conduct under both | |
| prongs of this definition. | |
| IV. | |
| Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent KPMG Australia: (a) | |
| engaged in improper professional conduct pursuant to Exchange Act Section 4C and Rule | |
| 102(e)(1)(ii) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice; (b) violated Rule 2-02(b) of Regulation S- | |
| X; and (c) caused Company A and Company B to violate Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and | |
| Exchange Act Rule 13a-1 thereunder. | |
| V. | |
| Respondent has undertaken to: | |
| 1. Retain, within sixty (60) days after the entry of this Order, an independent | |
| consultant (“Independent Consultant”), not unacceptable to the staff of the Commission, to | |
| review and evaluate whether KPMG Australia’s quality controls are designed and implemented | |
| in a manner reasonably sufficient under PCAOB standards and applicable Commission rules | |
| both to educate and to monitor its personnel with respect to the independence requirements | |
| concerning non-audit services to, advocacy on behalf of, and business relationships with | |
| Commission-registered audit clients. KPMG Australia shall cooperate fully with the | |
| Independent Consultant and shall provide the Independent Consultant with access to its own | |
| files, books, records, and personnel as reasonably requested for the review; | |
| 2. Require that the Independent Consultant issue a report, within six (6) months of | |
| being retained, summarizing the review and recommending policies and procedures reasonably | |
| designed to ensure compliance with the education and monitoring of firm personnel with respect | |
| to the independence requirements, under PCAOB standards and applicable Commission rules, | |
| concerning non-audit services to, advocacy on behalf of, and business relationships with | |
| Commission-registered audit clients. Simultaneously with providing that report to KPMG | |
| Australia, KPMG Australia shall require that the Independent Consultant contemporaneously | |
| transmit a copy to Nina B. Finston, Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities | |
| and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20549-5631; | |
| 3. Adopt all recommendations in the report of the Independent Consultant; provided, | |
| however, that within sixty (60) days after the Independent Consultant serves that report, KPMG | |
| Australia shall in writing advise the Independent Consultant and the Commission of any | |
| recommendations that it considers to be unnecessary, unduly burdensome, impractical, or costly. | |
| With respect to any recommendation that KPMG Australia considers unnecessary, unduly | |
| burdensome, impractical or costly, KPMG Australia need not adopt that recommendation at that | |
| time but shall propose in writing an alternative policy, procedure or system designed to achieve | |
| the same objective or purpose. As to any recommendation on which KPMG Australia and the | |
| Independent Consultant do not agree, such parties shall attempt in good faith to reach an | |
| agreement within sixty (60) days after KPMG Australia serves the written advice. In the event | |
| 14 | |
| KPMG Australia and the Independent Consultant are unable to agree on an alternative proposal, | |
| KPMG Australia will abide by the determinations of the Independent Consultant; | |
| 4. Require the Independent Consultant to review and evaluate whether KPMG | |
| Australia’s quality controls are designed and implemented in a manner reasonably sufficient | |
| under PCAOB standards both: (i) to educate its personnel, and (ii) to monitor compliance by its | |
| personnel, with respect to the independence requirements, under PCAOB standards and | |
| applicable Commission rules, concerning non-audit services to, advocacy on behalf of, and | |
| business relationships with Commission-registered audit clients. This review shall encompass | |
| whether KPMG Australia’s quality controls are designed and implemented in a manner | |
| reasonably sufficient under PCAOB standards to monitor for prohibited non-audit services, | |
| advocacy, and business relationships as between KPMG member firms in other countries and | |
| Commission-registered audit clients for which KPMG Australia signs audit reports under Rule 2- | |
| 02(b) of Regulation S-X. The Independent Cons ultant shall disclose to the staff of the | |
| Commission in the event that KPMG Australia or any of its employees, agents, consultants, joint | |
| venturors, contractors, or subcontractors, refuse to provide information necessary for the | |
| performance of the Independent Consultant’s responsibilities. KPMG Australia agrees that it | |
| will not take any action to retaliate against the Independent Consultant for such disclosures; | |
| 5. Require the Independent Consultant to enter into an agreement with KPMG | |
| Australia that provides that for the period of engagement and for a period of two (2) years from | |
| completion of the engagement, the Independent Consultant shall not enter into any employment, | |
| consultant, attorney-client, auditing or other professional relationship with KPMG Australia, or | |
| any of its present or former affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents acting in their | |
| capacity. The agreement will also provide that th e Independent Consultant will require that any | |
| firm with which he/she is affiliated or of which he/she is a member, and any person engaged to | |
| assist the Independent Consultant in performance of his/her duties under this Order shall not, | |
| without prior written consent of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of | |
| Enforcement, enter into any employment, consultant, attorney-client, auditing or other | |
| professional relationship with KPMG Australia, or any of its present or former affiliates, | |
| directors, officers, employees, or agents acting in their capacity as such for the period of the | |
| engagement and for a period of two (2) years after the engagement; | |
| 6. Certify, in writing, compliance with the undertaking(s) set forth above. The | |
| certification shall identify the undertaking(s), provide written evidence of compliance in the form | |
| of a narrative, and be supported by exhibits sufficient to demonstrate compliance. The | |
| Commission staff may make reasonable requests for further evidence of compliance, and | |
| Respondent agrees to provide such evidence. The certification and supporting material shall be | |
| submitted to Nina B. Finston, Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement at the address given | |
| above with a copy to the Office of Chief Counsel of the Enforcement Division at the same | |
| address as above but using zip code 20549-6553 no later than sixty (60) days from the date of the | |
| completion of the undertakings; | |
| 7. These undertakings shall be binding upon any acquirer or successor in interest to | |
| KPMG Australia’s or substantially all of KPMG Australia’s audit practice for Commission- | |
| registered audit clients; and | |
| 15 | |
| 8. For good cause shown, the Commission’s staff may extend any of the procedural | |
| dates set forth above. | |
| VI. | |
| In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered the remedial steps taken | |
| by KPMG Australia since the time of the conduct described above, such as additional national | |
| risk management staff and resources, increased training, revised policies, and strengthened | |
| controls, as well as the cooperation by KPMG Australia and its personnel during the | |
| investigation of this matter. | |
| VII. | |
| In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions | |
| agreed to in Respondent’s Offer. | |
| Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, effective immediately, that Respondent KPMG | |
| Australia be, and hereby is, censured. | |
| IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, effective immediately, that Respondent KPMG Australia | |
| shall cease and desist from committing any violations and any future violations of Rule 2-02 of | |
| Regulation S-X, and from causing any violations and any future violations of Section 13(a) of | |
| the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 13a-1 thereunder. | |
| IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent KPMG Australia shall, within ten (10) | |
| days of the entry of this Order, pay disgorgement of $1,982,000 and prejudgment interest of | |
| $760,000 to the United States Treasury. If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall | |
| accrue pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600. Payment shall be: (A) made by wire transfer, | |
| United States postal money order, certified check, bank cashier’s check or bank money order; | |
| (B) made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission; (C) hand-delivered or mailed to | |
| the Office of Financial Management, Securities and Exchange Commission, Operations Center, | |
| 6432 General Green Way, Stop 0-3, Alexandria, VA 22312; and (D) submitted under cover letter | |
| that identifies KPMG Australia as a Respondent in these proceedings and the file number of | |
| these proceedings, a copy of which cover letter and money order or check shall be sent to Nina | |
| B. Finston, Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement, at the address given above. | |
| IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent KPMG Australia shall comply with its | |
| undertakings enumerated in Section V above. | |
| By the Commission. | |
| E l i z a b e t h M . M u r p h y | |
| S e c r e t a r y | |
| 16 | |
| Service List | |
| Rule 141 of the Commission's Rules of Practice provides that the Secretary, or another | |
| duly authorized officer of the Commission, shall serve a copy of the Order Instituting Public | |
| Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 4C and 21C of the | |
| Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, Making | |
| Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order ("Order"), on the | |
| Respondent and its legal agent. | |
| The attached Order has been sent to the following parties and other persons entitled to | |
| notice: | |
| Honorable Brenda P. Murray | |
| Chief Administrative Law Judge | |
| Securities and Exchange Commission | |
| 100 F Street, N.E. | |
| Washington, DC 20549-2557 | |
| Nina B. Finston, Esq. | |
| Division of Enforcement | |
| Securities and Exchange Commission | |
| 100 F Street, N.E. | |
| Washington, DC 20549-5631 | |
| KPMG Australia | |
| c/o Michael P. Carroll, Esq. | |
| Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP | |
| 450 Lexington Avenue | |
| New York, NY 10017 | |
| Michael P. Carroll, Esq. | |
| Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP | |
| 450 Lexington Avenue | |
| New York, NY 10017 | |
| (Counsel for KPMG Australia) | |
| 17 | |