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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 63987 / February 28, 2011
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT
Release No. 3248 / February 28, 2011
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-14276
In the Matter of
KPMG AUSTRALIA,
Respondent.
ORDER INSTITUTING PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATIVE AND CEASE-AND-
DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO
SECTIONS 4C AND 21C OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
AND RULE 102(e) OF THE COMMISSION’S
RULES OF PRACTICE, MAKING
FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL
SANCTIONS AND A CEASE-AND-DESIST
ORDER
I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that
public administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to
Sections 4C
1 and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule
102(e)(1)(ii)2 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice against KPMG Australia (“Respondent” or
“KPMG Australia”).
1 Section 4C provides, in relevant part, that:
The Commission may censure any person, or deny, temporarily or permanently, to any person the privilege
of appearing or practicing before the Commission in any way, if that person is found . . . (1) not to possess
the requisite qualifications to represent others . . . (2) to be lacking in character or integrity, or to have
engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or (3) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided
and abetted the violation of, any provision of the securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.
2 Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) provides, in pertinent part, that:
The Commission may . . . deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before
it . . . to any person who is found . . . to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct.
II.
In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer
of Settlement (“Offer”), which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the purpose
of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Commission, or to
which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as
to the Commission’s jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, which are
admitted, Respondent consents to the entry of this Order Instituting Public Administrative and
Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 4C and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and Rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, Making Findings, and Imposing
Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set forth below.
III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds
3 that:
A. OVERVIEW
This matter stems from the provision of non-audit services by KPMG Australia and
certain other KPMG member firms to two audit clients of KPMG Australia, Companies A and B,
both of which provided financial services in Australia and other jurisdictions and were audit
clients with a class of securities registered with the Commission during the relevant period, in
violation of the auditor independence requirements imposed by the Commission’s rules and by
generally accepted auditing standards in the United States of America (“U.S. GAAS”), or, with
respect to one financial reporting period relating to Company B, the standards of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”). The violative services were rendered
during fiscal years 2001 and 2002 in the case of Company A, and during fiscal years 2001
through 2004 in the case of Company B. Several distinct categories of non-audit services were
rendered that violated Rule 2-01 of Commission Regulation S-X and therefore impaired
independence. First, KPMG Australia and at least one other KPMG member firm outside
Australia seconded non-tax professional staff to work at each client’s premises, under the
supervision and direction of each client, doing the same types of work that each client’s own
employees or managers ordinarily would perform, in violation of the prohibition under Rule 2-
01(c)(4)(vi) against “[a]cting, temporarily or permanently, as a director, officer, or employee of
an audit client, or performing any decision-making, supervisory, or ongoing monitoring function
for the audit client.” Second, KPMG Australia received trailing commissions from an acquired
subsidiary of Company B in exchange for KPMG Australia’s earlier promotion of the
subsidiary’s products prior to the subsidiary’s acquisition by Company B. These services
violated the prohibition under Rule 2-01(c)(3) against direct business relationships with an audit
client. Third, certain overseas subsidiaries of Company B retained a legal practice associated
with another KPMG member firm to provide litigation services in violation of the prohibition
under Rule 2-01 against acting as an advocate for an audit client.
The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent's Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any
other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.
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The provision of these prohibited services came about in substantial part as a result of
failures by KPMG Australia to take adequate steps both to educate its professional personnel and
also to monitor compliance by such personnel with respect to the auditor independence
requirements imposed by the Commission’s rules and by U.S. GAAS or, with respect to the audit
report on Company B’s financial statements for its 2004 fiscal year, by PCAOB standards. As a
result of these failures, on multiple occasions KPMG Australia failed to respond appropriately to
problematic information concerning certain non-audit services to Company A and Company B
that should have affected the independence determination.
Despite providing these prohibited services, KPMG Australia stated that it was
“independent” in contemporaneous audit reports it issued on Company A’s and Company B’s
financial statements, each of which was included, or incorporated by reference, in their
respective public filings with the Commission throughout the relevant time period. By doing so,
KPMG Australia violated Rule 2-02(b) of Commission Regulation S-X and caused its audit
clients Company A and Company B to file periodic reports with the Commission that failed to
include independently audited financial statements as required by Exchange Act Section 13(a),
Exchange Act Rule 13a-1, and Regulation S-X.4
B. RESPONDENT
KPMG Australia is a partnership formed and existing under the laws of Australia which
provides auditing and other professional services to a variety of companies, including companies
whose securities were registered with the Commission and traded in U.S. markets. KPMG
Australia is the Australian member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms
affiliated with KPMG International, a Swiss cooperative.
C. RELEVANT ISSUERS
Company A is incorporated and headquartered in Australia. KPMG Australia served as
the lead auditor of Company A’s financial statements for its fiscal years 2001 through 2004.
During this time period, Company A’s American Depositary Shares and American Depositary
Receipts were registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(b) and
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Comp any A, whose fiscal year ended September 30,
filed annual reports on Form 20-F with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 13.
Company B is incorporated and headquartered in Australia. KPMG Australia served as
the lead auditor of Company B’s financial statements for its fiscal years 2001 through 2004.
During this time period, Company B’s Ordinary Shares and American Depositary Shares were
registered with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(b) and traded on the New
York Stock Exchange. Company B, whose fiscal year ended September 30, filed annual reports
on Form 20-F with the Commission pursuant to Exchange Act Section 13.
This Order makes no finding with respect to Company A’s or Company B’s reported financial statements
for any fiscal year in which the violations discussed herein occurred.
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D. FACTS
1. Secondments
The term “secondment” is commonly used in Commonwealth countries and is analogous
to the term “loaned staff engagements” used in the United States. KPMG Australia’s internal
guidance explained that “[a] secondment is a temporary transfer of a KPMG employee (the
secondee) to the business of a client,” to perform work under the supervision and direction of the
client rather than of KPMG Australia. Begi nning in early 2001, KPMG Australia implemented a
business development drive that entailed the designation of personnel as “product champions” to
promote secondments and other service products as a means of serving clients, including audit
clients, and thereby generating revenue. Secondm ents also came to be viewed as a means of
providing KPMG Australia staff with practical business experience and client exposure.
a. KPMG Australia’s Deficient Auditor Independence Guidance
On Secondments and Lack of Effective Compliance Monitoring
KPMG Australia’s secondment practice during the relevant period was premised on the
view, pervasive throughout the firm, that secondments to audit clients with a class of securities
registered with the Commission (“Commission-registered audit client”) were permitted under the
Commission’s auditor independence rules, provided that the secondee did not function as
management by making decisions that would bind the audit client without further client
oversight or ratification.
This understanding reflected domestic Australian independence standards at that time,
which permitted secondments to audit clients provided the secondee would not be involved in
“making management decisions”; “approving or signing agreements or other similar
documents”; or “exercising discretionary authority to commit the [audit] client”; and provided
the audit firm implemented safeguards by ensuring that the secondee was not given audit
responsibility for any function or activity they performed during their secondment and obtaining
an acknowledgment from the audit client of its responsibility for directing and supervising the
activities of the secondee. Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Professional
Statement F.1, Professional Independence § 2.89.
This understanding also was reinforced by two “Risk Alerts”
5 issued internally by KPMG
Australia in March and July 2001, following that firm’s receipt of guidance issued by the
Department of Professional Practice (“DPP”) at KPMG LLP, the KPMG member firm in the
United States (“KPMG U.S.”), directly to KPMG Australia and of “Professional Practice
Letters” (“PPLs”) issued by DPP to professionals within KPMG U.S. and made available to
A Risk Alert was a bulletin containing written guidance issued periodically by the national risk
management office at KPMG Australia and distributed to professionals within the firm. The guidance in such a Risk
Alert was binding on all professionals within the firm.
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5
KPMG Australia through the firms’ mutual affiliation with KPMG International.6 The March
2001 Risk Alert advised that the Commission’s independence rules did not “stop all
secondments” but only precluded “act[ing] as a member of management while on secondment.”
The March 2001 Risk Alert also provided a sample engagement letter and sample terms and
conditions for secondments, such as limits on secondees’ use of audit clients’ business cards,
credit cards, and motor vehicles, as well as secondees committing audit clients to expenditures.
In addition, in response to general concerns expressed by the Commission’s Office of the Chief
Accountant about the lack of quality controls on non-audit services rendered by non-U.S.
accounting firms, the July 2001 Risk Alert introduced several new policies, including vesting
responsibility in lead audit engagement partners for pre-approval and other quality controls with
respect to non-audit services rendered to Australian Commission-registered audit clients.
In May 2002, KPMG U.S.’s DPP issued to its professionals in the United States a three-
page PPL entitled “Loaned Staff Versus Advisory Services Engagements.” This PPL stated in a
“Background” section on its first page:
The SEC and [American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”)] rules on
auditor independence prohibit firm personnel from acting either permanently or
temporarily as an employee of the audit client. Therefore, it is important to ensure that
engagements resulting from requests from clients for staff assistance be structured to
avoid the appearance that the firm’s staff may be acting as an employee of the client.
The PPL advised that “every effort should be made to structure . . . engagement[s] under KPMG
supervision, with a defined timeline and scope of work,” but that “[i]f the engagement cannot be
structured as a discrete engagement, then it is considered a loaned staff engagement and stringent
requirements apply.” With respect to Commission-registered audit clients, the PPL specified the
following restrictions: (i) loaned staff engagements were permitted only with respect to staff
level personnel and not with respect to managers and above; (ii) audit engagement partners were
responsible for reviewing proposals for loaned staff engagements; and (iii) loaned staff
engagements were limited to four weeks for public audit clients, unless otherwise approved by
KPMG U.S.’s DPP. The PPL further specified that the following restrictions had to be “clearly
defined in the engagement letter”: (a) the KPMG staff member could not function in a
management or employee role, could not make any management decisions, and could not sign
reports or letters in KPMG’s name; (b) the KPMG staff member could not be listed in client
directories or publications and could not use the client’s name on business cards; (c) a KPMG
partner had to be responsible for oversight and verification of ongoing compliance with the terms
of the engagement; and (d) the loaned KPMG staff had to prepare a memorandum summarizing
the engagement activity for each payroll cycle. The PPL further dictated the use of standard
engagement letters and terms and conditions, as well as the inclusion in the standard work papers
of “the signed engagement letter(s); . . . copies of periodic status reports; and documentation of
partner oversight of engagement letter compliance (e.g. review of status reports and
memorandum to work papers).”
A PPL was a bulletin containing written guidance issued from time to time by KPMG U.S.’s DPP to
professionals within that firm and, on occasion, to other KPMG member firms through their mutual affiliation with
KPMG International.
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The May 2002 PPL was received and reviewed by KPMG Australia’s national risk
management office. In June 2002 that office issued another two-page Risk Alert to all KPMG
Australia professional personnel. That Risk Aler t repeated guidance from the first half of the
May 2002 PPL that every effort should be made to structure the temporary provision of staff as
engagements under KPMG supervision and the general restrictions labeled (i) to (iii) above,
including the prohibition on seconding managers or above. The June 2002 Risk Alert, however,
failed to expressly reference the substantive guidance set forth in the entire second half of the
May 2002 PPL, including items (a) through (d) above, which the PPL required be clearly defined
in the engagement letter, as well as the work paper documentation requirements introduced by
the PPL. The June 2002 Risk Alert cross-refere nced the earlier March 2001 Risk Alert for
further guidance, including on the use of engagement letters and the terms and conditions
forming part of the engagement, but these cross-referenced materials likewise did not include all
the prohibitions set forth in items (a) through (d) above or impose work paper documentation
requirements.
In July 2002, following issuance of the June 2002 Risk Alert, KPMG Australia held a
training program for its personnel which included instruction on the Commission’s independence
rules. The training instructi on cautioned that the “Perception/appearance” of independence was
a “huge” issue in the United States, and that even arrangements, such as “secondments,” which
would not pose a problem under Australian GAAS, would “most likely be an issue for US
GAAS.” This training instruction did not repeat the substantive guidance and the documentation
requirements from the May 2002 PPL that had been omitted from the June 2002 Risk Alert.
The truncated guidance was compounded by KPMG Australia’s failure to adopt
contemporaneous quality controls adequate to monitor independence compliance with respect to
both firm guidance and the Commission’s independence rules, particularly by divisions of the
firm such as its Corporate Recovery Department7 that were not under the direct supervision of
the lead audit engagement partners. As a result, KPMG Australia’s partners, particularly those in
such divisions, continued to arrange and extend secondments of the firm’s professional personnel
to Company B into 2003, although on a limited basis. More than five secondments rendered at
various times from mid-2002 into 2003 violated not only the Commission’s substantive
independence rules but also internal firm guidance and procedures with respect to the pre-
approval and duration of secondments.
b. Violative Secondments Rendered to Company A
During 2001 and the first half of 2002, KPMG Australia rendered secondments to
Company A, and at least one other KPMG member firm rendered secondments to Company A’s
foreign operations in another country. At least 30 secondments rendered during that period
violated U.S. GAAS and the Commission’s auditor independence rules.
Examples of secondees seconded to act in a managerial capacity with financial reporting
responsibilities, in violation of the auditor independence rules, include the following. Between
November 2000 and June 2001, an assistant manager was seconded to Company A to fill in for a
“Market Operations Support and Control Manager” who was out of the office on maternity
The Corporate Recovery Department separated from KPMG Australia in 2004.
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leave, and in that role he managed a team of 20 to 25 Company A employees who reconciled
trading information, cleared account items, and prepared monthly reports. Likewise, between
May and August 2001, an accountant was seconded by another KPMG member firm to an
overseas subsidiary of Company A in the role of “Acting Senior Financial Controller, Personal
Financial Services,” in which capacity he hired and supervised staff, provided overall financial
control for the unit, and oversaw the preparation of monthly financial reports. From March to
July 2002, a KPMG Australia manager was seconded to manage the life insurance accounting
team at a division of Company A where he functioned essentially as a controller of the team,
including giving guidance on accounting questions to the accountants working under him who
were preparing the life insurance accounts. From September 2001 to August 2002, another
KPMG Australia manager was seconded to the life insurance accounting team, in which role he
supervised Company A personnel and also reported to the other KPMG Australia secondee.
In March 2001, a KPMG Australia senior manager was seconded to a funds management
subsidiary of Company A, in which role he was assigned the title “Acting CFO.”
In addition to the foregoing, secondments included implementing a general ledger system
for Company A in 2001 and conducting loan file reviews as part of internal audit procedures that
were then relied on as part of the external audit in both 2001 and 2002. Another secondment
entailed preparing the financial statements for one of Company A’s foreign subsidiaries.
These and other violative secondments occurred because the Company A audit
engagement team instituted inadequate safeguards and controls prior to 2002 for purposes of
monitoring ongoing compliance with auditor independence rules governing the provision of non-
audit services. Further, internal communications in March and Apr il 2001 within the audit
engagement team for Company A included information about the “Acting CFO” secondment
noted above which, had it been properly focused on, should have caused KPMG Australia to stop
that secondment from being arranged or continuing in order to avoid an impairment in
appearance of the firm’s auditor independence, as required by the Commission’s rules and U.S.
GAAS.
c. Violative Secondments Rendered to Company B
During the period November 2000 through October 2003, KPMG Australia rendered
secondments to Company B. At least 20 secondments rendered during that period violated U.S.
GAAS, and the Commission’s auditor independence rules.
During that three-year period, KPMG Australia seconded four managers and a director (a
level above manager but below partner) from the firm’s Corporate Recovery Department for
periods lasting from five weeks to fifteen months to perform loan file portfolio functions at
Company B’s Credit Restructuring Unit (“CRU”). Each of the five secondees managed a
portfolio of problematic “retention” loan files on behalf of Company B with the goal of
continuing payments on the loans. If this proved impossible, the files were redesignated as
“exit” files and referred to another division of the CRU. In this role, the secondees reviewed
loan files; met personally with customers of Company B; appointed third-party advisers;
developed and implemented strategies for recovery on the loans; and were assisted in the
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foregoing by CRU analysts whose work they supervised from time to time. The secondees were
given delegated credit authority, which enabled them to implement recovery strategies for loan
files below a set dollar amount without obtaining prior approval from their CRU supervisors,
although these decisions were subject to subsequent overview by their CRU supervisors. For
purposes of communicating with customers and other third parties, the secondees used Company
B titles, business cards and letterhead. In two instances loan files assigned to and worked on by
these corporate recovery secondees in their capacity as “account managers” were selected for
audit procedures by the KPMG Australia audit engagement team, and in one instance the
provisioning for a loan file was adjusted as a result of those audit procedures.
Moreover, two of the corporate recovery secondees held supervisory positions in
Company B’s CRU. In one such secondment, the secondee from KPMG Australia served with
the client title “Executive, Credit Restructuring Retention” in the CRU office in Melbourne
during August and September 2002, with responsibility for supervising the CRU managers who
handled retention loan files. In that capacity, the secondee regularly made decisions, without
regard to oversight, concerning recovery strategies for loan files that exceeded the CRU
managers’ delegated credit authority.
KPMG Australia also seconded personnel from other practice areas to work for divisions
and subsidiaries of Company B that were consolidated into Company B’s financial statements.
For example, a KPMG Australia partner was seconded to serve as “Acting Global IT Audit
Manager” at Company B between late 2000 and August 2001, and later in the same reporting
period, while serving on the external audit engagement team at KPMG Australia, he reviewed
internal audit documentation he himself had prepared for the purpose of scoping the substantive
testing of Company B’s information technology. Between January and March 2002, a KPMG
Australia senior manager was seconded to Company B to calculate an adjustment with respect to
the purchase price for the sale of a unit of the financial institution.
KPMG Australia also seconded personnel from other practice areas to work on
assignments for trusts and funds managed by Company B or its subsidiaries, but which were not
consolidated into Company B’s financial statements. For example, between late 2000 and mid-
2001, three KPMG Australia employees were seconded to a subsidiary of Company B for several
months to serve as “managers” with responsibility for reviewing and approving daily pricing
activities involving trusts managed by the subsidiary. Among this group, one secondee
supervised a team of nine employees and another secondee was seconded specifically to fill in
for employees who had resigned. Additionally, two secondees worked for a Company B
subsidiary preparing pro forma financial statements for managed investment funds, and two
secondees prepared or amended pro forma trust financial statements. And from late 2002
through early 2003, a manager was seconded to serve as a liaison and coordinate the flow of
information and meetings between the external audit engagement team at KPMG Australia and a
subsidiary of Company B in respect of KPMG Australia's audit of trusts for which the subsidiary
was the responsible entity, the accounts of which were not consolidated into Company B’s
financial statements.
By late 2002 KPMG Australia had sufficient collective knowledge to be on notice of
secondments to Company B that violated the Commission’s independence rules. In November
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2002, there were internal communications within the firm about bringing to an end one
secondment that had been ongoing since January 2002 in violation of the policies contained in
the July 2002 Risk Alert. There was also information about a later secondment which, had it
been properly communicated and focused on, should have caused the firm to stop that
secondment from being arranged or continuing.
d. KPMG Australia’s Termination of Non-Tax Secondments
On March 4, 2004, after the Commission’s commencement of a formal investigation of
this matter, KPMG U.S.’s DPP issued to professionals in that firm a PPL revising that firm’s
policy to prohibit the provision of loaned staff services to Commission-registered audit clients
not involving the provision of tax services. This PPL was received and reviewed by KPMG
Australia’s national risk management office. On April 1, 2004, that office issued a bulletin to all
KPMG Australia professional personnel prohibiting all non-tax secondments to Commission-
registered audit clients.
2. Other Violative Services Rendered to Company B
a. Commission Payments
Between July 2000 and November 2005, KPMG Australia received trailing commissions
from an affiliate of Company B, in return for having previously recommended the affiliate’s
products to its clients, prior to the affiliate’s acquisition by Company B in 2000. Between 1996
and 2000, KPMG Australia had recommended the products to its clients in exchange for
receiving both initial commissions and subsequently, if the product was retained by the client,
trailing commissions as well. Between 2000 and 2005, KPMG Australia received over 67,000
AUD in commissions for products sold before 2000 but which continued to be held by 29
individuals and one corporate entity. In response to an anonymous inquiry received in 2005
relating to whether the payments impaired KPMG Australia’s independence in relation to
Company B, KPMG Australia terminated the relationship in November 2005 and returned to the
Company B affiliate the total amount of commission payments received from 2000 to 2005.
b. Advocacy Services
Between March 2002 and March 2004, a legal practice that at the time was associated
with a KPMG member firm other than KPMG Australia rendered litigation services to overseas
subsidiaries of Company B. These legal serv ices included representing the subsidiaries at
“employment tribunals” on claims of illness, injury, stress, discrimination, and unfair or
wrongful dismissal as well as representation of the subsidiaries in litigation on diverse subjects
including a bounced check, the liquidation of a customer corporation, a life insurance dispute, a
personal injury claim, and an unfair dismissal claim. Most of these legal services were
terminated shortly after the Company B audit committee adopted, in November 2002, a policy
prohibiting legal services being provided by the auditor, but the representation in both a personal
injury and an unfair dismissal litigation continued up until April 1, 2004. The KPMG Australia
audit engagement team noted the foregoing services and associated fees in a chart of non-audit
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services and fees prepared monthly during the relevant period. The legal practice separated from
the KPMG member firm on April 1, 2004.
E. LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. Independence Principles
a. Secondments
Since February 2001, Rule 2-01 of the Commission’s Regulation S-X has contained three
provisions relevant to KPMG Australia’s secondment practice. First, Rule 2-01(b) sets forth a
general standard that deems independence to be impaired whenever “a reasonable investor with
knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances would conclude that the accountant is not,
capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within the
accountant’s engagement.” Second, Preliminary Note 2 to Rule 2-01 articulates four preliminary
factors to be considered “in the first instance” under the general standard, including
consideration of whether “the provision of a service . . . results in the accountant acting as
management or an employee of the audit client.” And third, the Rule sets forth “a non-exclusive
specification of circumstances inconsistent with” the general standard, including a specification
under the heading “Management functions,” which prohibits an accountant from “[a]cting,
temporarily or permanently, as a director, officer, or employee of an audit client, or performing
any decision-making, supervisory, or ongoing monitoring function for the audit client.” Rule 2-
01(c), (c)(4)(vi). Thus, acting eith er as a manager or employee of an audit client is inconsistent
with independence under Rule 2-01. This principle is consistent with prior enforcement
proceedings, see In the Matter of Moret Ernst & Young Accountants, n/k/a Ernst & Young
Accountants, Exch. Act Rel. No. 46130 (June 27, 2002); In the Matter of Bernard Tarnowsky,
Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-32635 (July 15, 1993). See also Codification of Financial Reporting
Policies § 602.02.d. As described above, KPMG Aust ralia and another KPMG member firm
rendered at least 30 secondments to Company A, and KPMG Australia rendered at least another
20 secondments to Company B, which violated this principle.8
b. Direct Business Relationship
At the same time, Rule 2-01 has also prohibited, as inconsistent with the general standard
of independence, “any direct or material indirect business relationship with” the audit client,
excepting the relationship of “a consumer in the ordinary course of business.” Rule 2-01(c)(3).
See also Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 602.02.g; Commission Letter dated
2/14/89, responding to 3/29/88 Petition by Arthur Andersen & Co. and Others (available at:
As noted above, certain secondments were to Company B units whose operations were not included in
Company B’s consolidated financial statements and may not have been subject to audit procedures during an audit
of the company’s financial statements. However, Rule 2-01(c)(4)(vi) has never contained a qualification that would
permit secondments of this type, even though qualifications for services where it is reasonable to conclude that the
results of the services will not be subject to audit procedures during an audit of the financial statements were added
to other subparagraphs of Rule 2-01(c)(4) in the amendments that took effect on May 6, 2003.
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http//www.sec.gov/info/accountants/naction/aartan1.htm) (the “1989 Response”). This guidance
prohibits any business relationship in which an auditor and an audit client: (i) “have joined
together in a profit-seeking venture,” thereby creating a “unity of interest”; (ii) have, to some
extent, rendered “the auditor’s interest . . . wedded to that of its client” thereby creating a
situation of “interdependence”; and (iii) are working together as “coventurers” to generate
“interdependent” revenues from a third party. 1989 Response, at 4. Such relationships create an
impermissible “mutuality or identity of interest” between the auditor and the audit client since
“the advancement of the auditor’s interest would, to some extent, be dependent upon the client,”
thereby rendering such relationships inconsistent with the essential requirement that the
appearance of independence be maintained. Id. at 7. The Commissi on also has brought
numerous proceedings to enforce this prohibition. In the Matter of Ernst & Young, Initial
Decision Rel. No. 249, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-10933 (Apr. 16, 2004), finality order, Rel. No.
33-8413 (Apr. 26, 2004); In the Matter of Ernst & Young LLP, et al., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 58309, AAER No. 2858, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-13114 (Aug. 5, 2008). Applying
these principles, the trailing commission payments described above constituted a direct business
relationship between KPMG Australia and its audit client Company B.
c. Acting as an Advocate
Finally, Rule 2-01 has also included among its four preliminary factors a prohibition on
those services that “place[] the accountant in a position of being an advocate for the audit client.”
Preliminary Note 2 to Rule 2-01. And Rule 2-01 has also prohibited legal services to the audit
client, subject to certain qualifications, as inconsistent with the general standard of
independence. Rule 2-01(c)(4)(ix). See also Codification of Financial Reporting Policies §
602.02.e.ii. As described above, the litigation services put the associated legal practice in the
position of acting as an advocate of KPMG Australia’s audit client Company B.
As a result of these non-audit services, KPMG Australia violated Rule 2-01 of Regulation
S-X and therefore did not maintain independence in appearance from its audit clients Company
A and Company B.
2. Violation of Rule 2-02(b) of Reg. S-X and of Issuer Reporting Provisions
Because these non-audit services impaired KPMG Australia’s independence as defined
by Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X, they both constituted and caused certain statutory and
regulatory violations.
Each time KPMG Australia signed an audit report for Company A or Company B where
either the period covered by the audit, or the period of the audit work, or both, overlapped with
the non-audit services recited above, KPMG Australia directly violated 2-02(b) of Regulation S-
X. See Rule 2-02(b) (requiring accountant’s report to “state whether the audit was made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards”).9 Issuing an audit report incorrectly
Pursuant to Commission Release 33-8422, GAAS, as used in Regulation S-X, means the standards of the
PCAOB and any applicable Commission rules. Audit reports dated on or after May 24, 2004 – the effective date of
PCAOB Auditing Standard 1 – were required to state they were performed in accordance with PCAOB standards;
reports dated prior to May 24, 2004 were required to state that they were performed in accordance with the standards
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stating that the audit was performed in accordance with U.S. GAAS or PCAOB standards, which
include independence requirements, violates Rule 2-02(b). The KPMG Australia audit reports
on financial statements for Company A’s 2001 and 2002 fiscal years and for Company B’s 2001
through 2003 fiscal years improperly stated that that the audits had been performed in
accordance with U.S. GAAS. The KPMG Aust ralia audit report on Company B’s financial
statements for the 2004 fiscal year improperly stated that that the audit had been performed in
accordance with PCAOB standards.
Likewise, each time non-independent audit reports were filed with Company A’s or
Company B’s annual reports on Form 20-F, the issuer violated federal securities statutes and
rules requiring that those Commission filings include financial statements that were audited by
independent accountants. See Exchange Act § 13(a) and Exchange Act Rule 13a-1 thereunder
(requiring annual reports to include independently audited financials).10 By issuing consents for
inclusion of these audit reports in Commission filings, KPMG Australia bears responsibility for
causing all of these reporting violations, since it should have known that the non-audit services
would cause Company A and Company B to lack independent audits and thus to violate the
reporting provisions listed above.
3. Firm Responsibility
KPMG Australia as a firm bears responsibility for these violations for the additional
reason that it failed to adopt adequate quality controls to educate and to monitor its personnel
during the relevant period with respect to the independence requirements of U.S. GAAS or
PCAOB standards and applicable Commission rules. During the relevant period, audit firms
were required to educate firm personnel assigned to engagements for Commission-registered
audit clients about these independence requirements. See, e.g., American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, QC Section 20.09 (“Policies and procedures should be established to
provide the firm with reasonable assurance that personnel maintain independence (in fact and
appearance) in all required circumstances.”). These same firms were required to monitor on an
ongoing basis whether personnel were complying with these independence requirements. See id.
QC Section 20.08 (“[P]olicies and procedures for the quality control element of Monitoring are
established to provide the firm with reasonable assurance that the policies and procedures related
to each of the other elements are suitably designed and are being effectively applied.”). In this
context:
Monitoring involves an ongoing consideration and evaluation of the: (a) relevance and
adequacy of the firm’s policies and procedures; (b) appropriateness of the firm’s
guidance materials and any practice aids; (c) effectiveness of professional development
of GAAS. PCAOB independence standards under Rule 3600T require auditors to be independent from their audit
clients.
See also Form 20-F, Part I, Item 8.A.1 (requiring that the filing contain consolidated financial statements
audited by an independent auditor and accompanied by an audit report); id. Part 1, Item 8.A.2. (requiring that
financial statements be audited in accordance with GAAS and with Commission standards for auditor
independence).
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activities; and (d) compliance with the firm’s policies and procedures. When
monitoring, the effects of the firm’s management philosophy and the environment in
which the firm practices and its clients operate should be considered.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, QC Section 20.20.
As discussed above, KPMG Australia’s national risk management office failed to provide
its personnel with fulsome independence guidance with respect to secondments and also failed to
adopt quality controls adequate to monitor compliance by the firm’s personnel with respect to
both firm guidance and the Commission’s independence rules. In addition, KPMG Australia
failed to adopt quality controls adequate to monitor the full range of non-audit services provided
to Commission-registered audit clients not only by the firm’s personnel but also by personnel at
associated KPMG member firms in other countries. 11 As a result of these failures, on multiple
occasions KPMG Australia’s personnel failed to inform themselves adequately or respond
appropriately to problematic information concerning non-audit services to Company A and
Company B that should have affected the independence determination. See In the Matter of
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Rel. No. 34-43862, 2001 SEC LEXIS 98, at *97 (Jan. 19, 2001),
reconsideration denied, Rel. Nos. 34-44050 and AAER-1374 (Mar. 8, 2001), petition for review
denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (firm’s failure, at high levels, to inform itself about facts
material to independence determination constitutes negligence).
4. Improper Professional Conduct
Rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Exchange Act Section 4C both
define “improper professional conduct” to include: (i) “[a] single instance of highly unreasonable
conduct that results in a violation of applicable professional standards” in circumstances in
which the “accountant,” in the case of Rule 102(e), or “registered public accounting firm or
associated person,” in the case of Section 4C, “knows, or should know, that heightened scrutiny
is warranted”; or (ii) “[r]epeated instances of unreasonable conduct, each resulting in a violation
of applicable professional standards, that indicate a lack of competence to practice before the
Commission.” The Commission has made clear that auditor independence is always an area
requiring heightened scrutiny. See Adopting Release for Rule 102(e), Rel. Nos. 33-7593, 34-
40567, 1998 SEC LEXIS 2256 (Oct. 19, 1998) (“Because of the importance of an accountant’s
independence to the integrity of the financial reporting system, the Commission has concluded
that circumstances that raise questions about an accountant’s independence always merit
heightened scrutiny.”). Here, KPMG Australia’s conduct with respect to the non-audit services
As the firm that signed the audit reports on the financial statements of Company A and Company B, KPMG
Australia bore ultimate responsibility for the independence of the audit engagement. Under the Commission’s Rule
2-01, the independence of the audit engagement may be compromised when non-audit services are rendered not just
by the firm that leads the audit engagement but also by any associated entities in other countries. See Rule 2-
01(f)(2) (“Accounting firm means an organization . . . that is engaged in the practice of public accounting . . . and all
of the organization’s departments, divisions, parents, subsidiaries, and associated entities, including those located
outside of the United States.”). Moreover, Rule 2-01(c)(7) requires, effective May 6, 2003, that all non-audit
services receive pre-approval from the client’s audit committee, and as a matter of practice any communications
between the auditor and the audit committee are typically coordinated through the firm that leads the audit
engagement. Thus, Rule 2-01 implicitly contemplates that any associated entities will typically apprise the firm that
leads the audit engagement of any non-audit services prior to rendering such services to the client.
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rendered to Company A and Company B constituted improper professional conduct under both
prongs of this definition.
IV.
Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent KPMG Australia: (a)
engaged in improper professional conduct pursuant to Exchange Act Section 4C and Rule
102(e)(1)(ii) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice; (b) violated Rule 2-02(b) of Regulation S-
X; and (c) caused Company A and Company B to violate Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and
Exchange Act Rule 13a-1 thereunder.
V.
Respondent has undertaken to:
1. Retain, within sixty (60) days after the entry of this Order, an independent
consultant (“Independent Consultant”), not unacceptable to the staff of the Commission, to
review and evaluate whether KPMG Australia’s quality controls are designed and implemented
in a manner reasonably sufficient under PCAOB standards and applicable Commission rules
both to educate and to monitor its personnel with respect to the independence requirements
concerning non-audit services to, advocacy on behalf of, and business relationships with
Commission-registered audit clients. KPMG Australia shall cooperate fully with the
Independent Consultant and shall provide the Independent Consultant with access to its own
files, books, records, and personnel as reasonably requested for the review;
2. Require that the Independent Consultant issue a report, within six (6) months of
being retained, summarizing the review and recommending policies and procedures reasonably
designed to ensure compliance with the education and monitoring of firm personnel with respect
to the independence requirements, under PCAOB standards and applicable Commission rules,
concerning non-audit services to, advocacy on behalf of, and business relationships with
Commission-registered audit clients. Simultaneously with providing that report to KPMG
Australia, KPMG Australia shall require that the Independent Consultant contemporaneously
transmit a copy to Nina B. Finston, Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20549-5631;
3. Adopt all recommendations in the report of the Independent Consultant; provided,
however, that within sixty (60) days after the Independent Consultant serves that report, KPMG
Australia shall in writing advise the Independent Consultant and the Commission of any
recommendations that it considers to be unnecessary, unduly burdensome, impractical, or costly.
With respect to any recommendation that KPMG Australia considers unnecessary, unduly
burdensome, impractical or costly, KPMG Australia need not adopt that recommendation at that
time but shall propose in writing an alternative policy, procedure or system designed to achieve
the same objective or purpose. As to any recommendation on which KPMG Australia and the
Independent Consultant do not agree, such parties shall attempt in good faith to reach an
agreement within sixty (60) days after KPMG Australia serves the written advice. In the event
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KPMG Australia and the Independent Consultant are unable to agree on an alternative proposal,
KPMG Australia will abide by the determinations of the Independent Consultant;
4. Require the Independent Consultant to review and evaluate whether KPMG
Australia’s quality controls are designed and implemented in a manner reasonably sufficient
under PCAOB standards both: (i) to educate its personnel, and (ii) to monitor compliance by its
personnel, with respect to the independence requirements, under PCAOB standards and
applicable Commission rules, concerning non-audit services to, advocacy on behalf of, and
business relationships with Commission-registered audit clients. This review shall encompass
whether KPMG Australia’s quality controls are designed and implemented in a manner
reasonably sufficient under PCAOB standards to monitor for prohibited non-audit services,
advocacy, and business relationships as between KPMG member firms in other countries and
Commission-registered audit clients for which KPMG Australia signs audit reports under Rule 2-
02(b) of Regulation S-X. The Independent Cons ultant shall disclose to the staff of the
Commission in the event that KPMG Australia or any of its employees, agents, consultants, joint
venturors, contractors, or subcontractors, refuse to provide information necessary for the
performance of the Independent Consultant’s responsibilities. KPMG Australia agrees that it
will not take any action to retaliate against the Independent Consultant for such disclosures;
5. Require the Independent Consultant to enter into an agreement with KPMG
Australia that provides that for the period of engagement and for a period of two (2) years from
completion of the engagement, the Independent Consultant shall not enter into any employment,
consultant, attorney-client, auditing or other professional relationship with KPMG Australia, or
any of its present or former affiliates, directors, officers, employees, or agents acting in their
capacity. The agreement will also provide that th e Independent Consultant will require that any
firm with which he/she is affiliated or of which he/she is a member, and any person engaged to
assist the Independent Consultant in performance of his/her duties under this Order shall not,
without prior written consent of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of
Enforcement, enter into any employment, consultant, attorney-client, auditing or other
professional relationship with KPMG Australia, or any of its present or former affiliates,
directors, officers, employees, or agents acting in their capacity as such for the period of the
engagement and for a period of two (2) years after the engagement;
6. Certify, in writing, compliance with the undertaking(s) set forth above. The
certification shall identify the undertaking(s), provide written evidence of compliance in the form
of a narrative, and be supported by exhibits sufficient to demonstrate compliance. The
Commission staff may make reasonable requests for further evidence of compliance, and
Respondent agrees to provide such evidence. The certification and supporting material shall be
submitted to Nina B. Finston, Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement at the address given
above with a copy to the Office of Chief Counsel of the Enforcement Division at the same
address as above but using zip code 20549-6553 no later than sixty (60) days from the date of the
completion of the undertakings;
7. These undertakings shall be binding upon any acquirer or successor in interest to
KPMG Australia’s or substantially all of KPMG Australia’s audit practice for Commission-
registered audit clients; and
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8. For good cause shown, the Commission’s staff may extend any of the procedural
dates set forth above.
VI.
In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered the remedial steps taken
by KPMG Australia since the time of the conduct described above, such as additional national
risk management staff and resources, increased training, revised policies, and strengthened
controls, as well as the cooperation by KPMG Australia and its personnel during the
investigation of this matter.
VII.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions
agreed to in Respondent’s Offer.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, effective immediately, that Respondent KPMG
Australia be, and hereby is, censured.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, effective immediately, that Respondent KPMG Australia
shall cease and desist from committing any violations and any future violations of Rule 2-02 of
Regulation S-X, and from causing any violations and any future violations of Section 13(a) of
the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rule 13a-1 thereunder.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent KPMG Australia shall, within ten (10)
days of the entry of this Order, pay disgorgement of $1,982,000 and prejudgment interest of
$760,000 to the United States Treasury. If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall
accrue pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600. Payment shall be: (A) made by wire transfer,
United States postal money order, certified check, bank cashier’s check or bank money order;
(B) made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission; (C) hand-delivered or mailed to
the Office of Financial Management, Securities and Exchange Commission, Operations Center,
6432 General Green Way, Stop 0-3, Alexandria, VA 22312; and (D) submitted under cover letter
that identifies KPMG Australia as a Respondent in these proceedings and the file number of
these proceedings, a copy of which cover letter and money order or check shall be sent to Nina
B. Finston, Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement, at the address given above.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent KPMG Australia shall comply with its
undertakings enumerated in Section V above.
By the Commission.
E l i z a b e t h M . M u r p h y
S e c r e t a r y
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Service List
Rule 141 of the Commission's Rules of Practice provides that the Secretary, or another
duly authorized officer of the Commission, shall serve a copy of the Order Instituting Public
Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 4C and 21C of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, Making
Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order ("Order"), on the
Respondent and its legal agent.
The attached Order has been sent to the following parties and other persons entitled to
notice:
Honorable Brenda P. Murray
Chief Administrative Law Judge
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, DC 20549-2557
Nina B. Finston, Esq.
Division of Enforcement
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, DC 20549-5631
KPMG Australia
c/o Michael P. Carroll, Esq.
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP
450 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10017
Michael P. Carroll, Esq.
Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP
450 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10017
(Counsel for KPMG Australia)
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