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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Release No. 77005 / February 1, 2016
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT
Release No. 3736 / February 1, 2016
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING
File No. 3-17080
In the Matter of
SAP SE,
Respondent.
ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND-
DESIST PROCEEDINGS, PURSUANT
TO SECTION 21C OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, MAKING FINDINGS, AND
IMPOSING A CEASE-AND-DESIST
ORDER
I.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that
cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) against SAP SE (“SAP” or
“Respondent”).
II.
In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer
of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the
purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the
Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, Respondent admits the Commission’s
jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, and consents to the entry of this
Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (the “Order”),
as set forth below.
III.
On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds1 that:
1 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent’s Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any
other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.
2
Summary
1. This matter concerns violations of the books and records and internal controls
provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”) by SAP SE (“SAP”), a
European Union corporation headquartered in Waldorf, Germany. The violations occurred due
to deficient internal controls, which allowed SAP’s former Vice-President of Global and
Strategic Accounts, Vicente E. Garcia, to discount the software price to a former SAP local
partner at a level sufficient to permit Garcia and the local partner to pay $145,000 in bribes to
one senior Panamanian government official, and offer bribes to two others. Through these
bribes, Garcia secured government sales contracts of approximately $3.7 million for SAP, and
also self-profited through kickbacks. By excessively discounting the SAP software, Garcia
created a slush fund that the partner used to pay the bribes and kickbacks. Garcia concealed his
scheme from others at SAP, circumvented SAP’s internal controls, and justified the excessive
discounts by falsifying SAP’s internal approval forms.
2. The deep discounts that Garcia used to create the slush fund were falsely recorded
as legitimate discounts on the books of SAP’s Mexican subsidiary, which were subsequently
consolidated into SAP’s financial statements. In addition, SAP failed to devise and maintain an
adequate system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that
these improper payments to government officials did not occur.
Respondent
3. SAP SE (“SAP”) is a European Union corporation headquartered in Waldorf,
Germany. SAP’s American Depository Shares are registered with the Commission pursuant to
Section 12(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, and listed on the New York Stock Exchange. SAP
markets its software all over the world through various country subsidiaries.
Related Individual and Entities
4. Vicente E. Garcia is a U.S. citizen residing in Miami, Florida. Garcia was SAP’s
Vice-President of Global and Strategic Accounts, responsible for sales in Latin America for SAP
from February 2008 until April 2014, when SAP terminated Garcia for his misconduct described
herein.
5. SAP International, Inc. (“SAPI”), a Miami, Florida-based wholly-owned
subsidiary of SAP, is engaged in selling software in the Latin American and Caribbean markets.
SAPI does not enter into direct or indirect software or software-related services deals with end
customers. Instead, SAPI employs some of the members of the Latin America and Caribbean
(“LAC”) regional leadership team and provides some back office operational support for some of
the LAC regional subsidiaries. Garcia was on the payroll of SAPI.
6. SAP Mexico S.A. de C.V. (“SAP Mexico”) is a Mexico City, Mexico-based
wholly-owned subsidiary of SAP engaged in selling software in the Mexican and Central
American markets. SAP Mexico is authorized by SAP to distribute, sell, license, and sublicense
software directly and indirectly to end customers. Garcia negotiated the Panamanian contracts
on behalf of SAP Mexico. SAP Mexico’s financial statements are consolidated and reported in
SAP’s financial statements.
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Facts
A. Background
7. SAP, through its 272 subsidiaries, sells software licenses and related services to
263,000 customers in 188 countries. SAP’s global business is directed and operated from its
headquarters in Waldorf, Germany and executed through its numerous subsidiaries. SAP’s
business is conducted through a network of more than 11,500 partners worldwide that provide an
additional workforce of 380,000 individuals skilled in SAP software solutions and technology.
SAP’s sales using a local partner can be either (i) a direct sale to a customer with a sales
commission paid to a partner that provides assistance, (ii) an indirect sale through a partner that
purchases the software license and resells it to a customer at an independently determined
increased price, or (iii) a direct sale to the partner, which acts as a distributor and independently
resells the software licenses to customers in the future.
8. From 2008 to April 2014, Garcia served as SAP’s Vice-President of Global and
Strategic Accounts and was responsible for sales in Latin America for SAP. Although Garcia
was technically employed by SAPI, SAP presented him to customers as an SAP employee and
his supervisors included employees of SAPI (from January 16, 2010 to April 10, 2014), SAP’s
Brazilian subsidiary (from February 25, 2008 to January 15, 2010), and indirectly SAP
(throughout the relevant time period).
9. In June 2009, SAP conducted an internal investigation and found that Garcia
violated its internal Code of Business Conduct when he invited an executive of Petroleos
Mexicanos (“PEMEX”), the Mexican national oil company, to an SAP marketing event at the
Monaco Grand Prix. SAP did not find any attempt to improperly influence any government
official in connection with the 2008 PEMEX sale. As a result of the internal investigation, SAP
revised its policies prohibiting government officials or employees from attending any
“hospitality” event, which it defined as any event where business constitutes less than 80% of the
event.
B. Garcia Bribed Government Officials in Panama to Obtain Business for SAP
10. Garcia continued working for SAP, and from at least June 2009 to November
2013, he along with others outside of SAP, planned and executed a bribery scheme in Panama, as
described below.
11. In June 2009, Garcia’s business associate, a Panamanian lobbyist (the
“Lobbyist”), informed Garcia about potential software sales opportunities with the government
of Panama and that he had an existing relationship with the newly elected government, including
a high ranking Government Official A, who was tasked with improving technology solutions
across multiple government agencies in Panama and had significant influence over Panama’s
software purchasing decisions. Around the same time, SAP independently began investigating
possible software sales to the Panamanian government. Initially the overall SAP endeavor was
led by local SAP sales employees in Mexico and Panama. Garcia, however, took over the
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business opportunity by recommending that SAP designate the Panama government as part of
the Premier Customer Network – a group of large, strategically important, regional customers –
that Garcia headed.
12. Garcia and others outside of SAP were informed by the Lobbyist that in order to
obtain contracts from the government of Panama, they needed to bribe three Panamanian
government officials that had significant influence in the Panamanian government’s award of
contracts to purchase software.
13. In anticipation of the sales to the government of Panama, Garcia and others
outside of SAP began planning the details of the bribery scheme. On June 9 and 10, 2010,
Garcia discussed with others, including via personal e-mail, their plans to pay bribes to
Government Official A (2% of the value of the contract) and Government Official B (10%), and
receive kickbacks for themselves (2%). Also, on October 26, 2010, e-mails were exchanged
with two attached spreadsheets referencing planned payments to Government Officials A and C
of approximately $100,000 and $300,000, respectively.
14. One of the four contracts was a software license sale to the Panamanian social
security agency, which was initially proposed to be a direct sale with the assistance of local
partners. In order to facilitate the bribery scheme, the existing partners were replaced with a new
local Panamanian partner. This last-minute change, and other red flags, triggered an SAP
compliance review which resulted in SAP rejecting Garcia’s request to pay a commission to the
local partner. Therefore, Garcia and others began looking for other ways to advance the bribery
scheme. Finally, in the fall of 2010, Garcia finalized an indirect sale of the software license to
the agency through the local partner, who, with Garcia’s assistance, ultimately sought and
obtained an 82% discount on SAP’s sale price to the local partner. Garcia caused various
approval forms to be submitted that misstated the reasons for the large discount. Garcia stated
that the discounts were necessary to compete with other software companies in establishing a
relationship with the government of Panama when, in fact, the discounts were necessary to fund
and pay bribes to government officials. Garcia and others planned to sell SAP software to the
local partner at an 82% discount, who in turn would sell the software at significantly higher
prices to the Panamanian government and use part of the profits from the sale to pay bribes.
15. Garcia, as a senior vice-president of SAP responsible for sales in Latin America,
used his knowledge of the availability of discounts to push through large discounts in order to
create a slush fund from which the local partner was able to pay the bribes. SAP routinely
provides large discounts to local partners for legitimate reasons that Garcia used to justify the
illegitimate discounts. Once Garcia obtained approval of the discounts based on his falsified
justification forms, the bribes were then paid from the local partner.
16. SAP agreed to sell the software licenses for the Panamanian social security
agency to the local partner for approximately $2.1 million, an 82% discount. In November 2010,
the local partner successfully bid $14.5 million for a contract, which included SAP software. On
January 31, 2011, the Panamanian government awarded the contract to the local partner. Garcia,
along with others, planned to pay bribes to Panamanian government officials from the proceeds
of the software sale to the government of Panama.
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17. Thereafter, between June 2012 and December 2013, the Panamanian government
awarded three additional contracts that included SAP software products valued at approximately
$13.5 million, which were also sold at deep discounts by SAP to its local partner. For these
contracts also, Garcia and others outside of SAP agreed to pay bribes to Panamanian officials
from the proceeds of the software sales.
18. As a result of Garcia’s conduct in the bribery scheme, SAP, with its local partner,
was able to sell software to the Panamanian government through four contracts from 2010 to
2013. These contracts generated revenues of approximately $3.7 million to SAP.
19. The deep discounts that Garcia used to create the slush fund were falsely recorded
as legitimate discounts on the books of SAP Mexico, which were subsequently consolidated into
SAP’s financial statements.
SAP’s Insufficient Internal Controls
20. SAP lacked adequate internal controls to ensure that discounts to local partners
were not improperly used. SAP’s system required employees to electronically submit requests
within SAP to obtain approval of discounts to local partners. SAP employees, however, had
wide latitude in seeking and approving discounts to local partners, and employees’ explanations
for the discounts were accepted without verification. There were also no requirements for
heightened anti-corruption scrutiny for large discounts. Garcia was therefore able to evade the
basic approval procedures by taking advantage of his position and his knowledge of how
discounts were approved. Furthermore, the nature of Garcia’s reporting structure made it easy
for him to implement the bribery scheme. Although Garcia was located in Miami and employed
by SAPI, he variously reported to supervisors employed by other regional subsidiaries and used
employees from other subsidiaries such as SAP Mexico to execute the sales to the Panamanian
government. This indirect reporting structure at SAP created gaps in supervising Garcia that
provided him the opportunity to use the large discounts for creating a slush fund for bribes.
Because of the deficient controls, Garcia was able to provide the partner with deep enough
discounts to enable him to implement the bribery scheme, which continued unabated for over
four years.
SAP’s Cooperation and Remediation
21. When SAP learned of the conduct as a result of the SEC’s inquiry, SAP
conducted a thorough internal investigation and extensively cooperated with the SEC’s
investigation by, among other things: (i) conducting an internal investigation; (ii) voluntarily
producing approximately 500,000 pages of documents and other information quickly, identifying
significant documents and translating documents from Spanish; (iii) conducting witness
interviews, sharing Power-Point presentations and timelines; (iv) facilitating an interview of
Garcia at work at SAPI offices in Miami without alerting him to the investigation into his
conduct; and (v) initiating a third party audit of the local partner.
22. After being alerted to Garcia’s misconduct, SAP terminated Garcia and undertook
remediation efforts to uncover any other possible misconduct and to improve its FCPA
compliance. Specifically, SAP audited all recent public sector Latin American transactions,
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regardless of Garcia’s involvement, to analyze partner profit margin data especially in
comparison to discounts so that any trends could be spotted and high profit margin transactions
could be identified for further investigation and audit. SAP also implemented new policies and
procedures to detect and prevent similar issues from recurring in the future. For example, SAP
elevated the status of its Chief Compliance Officer (“CCO”) by having that person now report
directly to the CFO, who is a member of the Executive Board, and gave the CCO authority to
independently terminate employees and partner contracts. SAP conducted, and continues to
conduct, regular anti-corruption training, as well as anti-corruption audits through its internal
audit function.
23. In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered remedial acts
undertaken by Respondent and cooperation afforded the Commission staff.
Legal Standards and Violations
24. Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act requires every issuer with a class of
securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act “to make and keep books,
records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”
25. Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act requires every issuer with a class of
securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act to devise and maintain a system
of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that, among other
things, transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific
authorization; transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other applicable
criteria; transactions are recorded as necessary to maintain accountability for assets; and access
to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization.
26. As a result of the conduct described above, the discounts used to fund the bribe
payments were misrecorded in SAP Mexico’s books and records as legitimate discounts to a
local partner. SAP Mexico’s books and records were consolidated into SAP’s books and
records. Based on the foregoing, SAP violated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act.
27. SAP also violated Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act by failing to devise
and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls relating to approving and
granting discounts to local partners. As described herein, SAP lacked effective internal controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that discounts provided to local partners were not
being used to pay bribes.
Findings
28. Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that SAP violated Sections
13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act.
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IV.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions
agreed to in Respondent SAP’s Offer.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, effective immediately, that:
A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondent SAP cease and desist
from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and
13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act.
B. Respondent shall pay disgorgement of $3,700,000, representing ill-gotten gains
received in connection with the bribery scheme, and prejudgment interest of $188,896 to the
Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the general fund of the United States
Treasury subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3). Payment shall be made within ten (10)
days of the date of this Order. If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue
pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600.
Payments must be made in one of the following ways:
(1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which shall
provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request;
(2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through
the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or
(3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States
postal money order, payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or
mailed to:
Enterprise Services Center
Accounts Receivable Branch
HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341
6500 South MacArthur Boulevard
Oklahoma City, OK 73169
Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying SAP as
the Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy of the
cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Alka N. Patel, Assistant Regional
Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 444 South
Flower Street, Suite 900, Los Angeles, California 90071.
C. Respondent acknowledges that the Commission is not imposing a civil penalty
based upon its cooperation in a Commission investigation and related enforcement action. If at
any time following the entry of the Order, the Division of Enforcement (“Division”) obtains
information indicating that Respondent knowingly provided materially false or misleading
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information or materials to the Commission, or in a related proceeding, the Division may, at its
sole discretion and with prior notice to the Respondent, petition the Commission to reopen this
matter and seek an order directing that the Respondent pay a civil money penalty. Respondent
may contest by way of defense in any resulting administrative proceeding whether it knowingly
provided materially false or misleading information, but may not: (1) contest the findings in the
Order; or (2) assert any defense to liability or remedy, including, but not limited to, any statute of
limitations defense.
By the Commission.
Brent J. Fields
Secretary