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| 1 | |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | |
| Before the | |
| SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION | |
| SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 | |
| Release No. 77005 / February 1, 2016 | |
| ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT | |
| Release No. 3736 / February 1, 2016 | |
| ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING | |
| File No. 3-17080 | |
| In the Matter of | |
| SAP SE, | |
| Respondent. | |
| ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND- | |
| DESIST PROCEEDINGS, PURSUANT | |
| TO SECTION 21C OF THE | |
| SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF | |
| 1934, MAKING FINDINGS, AND | |
| IMPOSING A CEASE-AND-DESIST | |
| ORDER | |
| I. | |
| The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that | |
| cease-and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the | |
| Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) against SAP SE (“SAP” or | |
| “Respondent”). | |
| II. | |
| In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer | |
| of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the | |
| purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the | |
| Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, Respondent admits the Commission’s | |
| jurisdiction over it and the subject matter of these proceedings, and consents to the entry of this | |
| Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities | |
| Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (the “Order”), | |
| as set forth below. | |
| III. | |
| On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds1 that: | |
| 1 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent’s Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any | |
| other person or entity in this or any other proceeding. | |
| 2 | |
| Summary | |
| 1. This matter concerns violations of the books and records and internal controls | |
| provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”) by SAP SE (“SAP”), a | |
| European Union corporation headquartered in Waldorf, Germany. The violations occurred due | |
| to deficient internal controls, which allowed SAP’s former Vice-President of Global and | |
| Strategic Accounts, Vicente E. Garcia, to discount the software price to a former SAP local | |
| partner at a level sufficient to permit Garcia and the local partner to pay $145,000 in bribes to | |
| one senior Panamanian government official, and offer bribes to two others. Through these | |
| bribes, Garcia secured government sales contracts of approximately $3.7 million for SAP, and | |
| also self-profited through kickbacks. By excessively discounting the SAP software, Garcia | |
| created a slush fund that the partner used to pay the bribes and kickbacks. Garcia concealed his | |
| scheme from others at SAP, circumvented SAP’s internal controls, and justified the excessive | |
| discounts by falsifying SAP’s internal approval forms. | |
| 2. The deep discounts that Garcia used to create the slush fund were falsely recorded | |
| as legitimate discounts on the books of SAP’s Mexican subsidiary, which were subsequently | |
| consolidated into SAP’s financial statements. In addition, SAP failed to devise and maintain an | |
| adequate system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that | |
| these improper payments to government officials did not occur. | |
| Respondent | |
| 3. SAP SE (“SAP”) is a European Union corporation headquartered in Waldorf, | |
| Germany. SAP’s American Depository Shares are registered with the Commission pursuant to | |
| Section 12(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, and listed on the New York Stock Exchange. SAP | |
| markets its software all over the world through various country subsidiaries. | |
| Related Individual and Entities | |
| 4. Vicente E. Garcia is a U.S. citizen residing in Miami, Florida. Garcia was SAP’s | |
| Vice-President of Global and Strategic Accounts, responsible for sales in Latin America for SAP | |
| from February 2008 until April 2014, when SAP terminated Garcia for his misconduct described | |
| herein. | |
| 5. SAP International, Inc. (“SAPI”), a Miami, Florida-based wholly-owned | |
| subsidiary of SAP, is engaged in selling software in the Latin American and Caribbean markets. | |
| SAPI does not enter into direct or indirect software or software-related services deals with end | |
| customers. Instead, SAPI employs some of the members of the Latin America and Caribbean | |
| (“LAC”) regional leadership team and provides some back office operational support for some of | |
| the LAC regional subsidiaries. Garcia was on the payroll of SAPI. | |
| 6. SAP Mexico S.A. de C.V. (“SAP Mexico”) is a Mexico City, Mexico-based | |
| wholly-owned subsidiary of SAP engaged in selling software in the Mexican and Central | |
| American markets. SAP Mexico is authorized by SAP to distribute, sell, license, and sublicense | |
| software directly and indirectly to end customers. Garcia negotiated the Panamanian contracts | |
| on behalf of SAP Mexico. SAP Mexico’s financial statements are consolidated and reported in | |
| SAP’s financial statements. | |
| 3 | |
| Facts | |
| A. Background | |
| 7. SAP, through its 272 subsidiaries, sells software licenses and related services to | |
| 263,000 customers in 188 countries. SAP’s global business is directed and operated from its | |
| headquarters in Waldorf, Germany and executed through its numerous subsidiaries. SAP’s | |
| business is conducted through a network of more than 11,500 partners worldwide that provide an | |
| additional workforce of 380,000 individuals skilled in SAP software solutions and technology. | |
| SAP’s sales using a local partner can be either (i) a direct sale to a customer with a sales | |
| commission paid to a partner that provides assistance, (ii) an indirect sale through a partner that | |
| purchases the software license and resells it to a customer at an independently determined | |
| increased price, or (iii) a direct sale to the partner, which acts as a distributor and independently | |
| resells the software licenses to customers in the future. | |
| 8. From 2008 to April 2014, Garcia served as SAP’s Vice-President of Global and | |
| Strategic Accounts and was responsible for sales in Latin America for SAP. Although Garcia | |
| was technically employed by SAPI, SAP presented him to customers as an SAP employee and | |
| his supervisors included employees of SAPI (from January 16, 2010 to April 10, 2014), SAP’s | |
| Brazilian subsidiary (from February 25, 2008 to January 15, 2010), and indirectly SAP | |
| (throughout the relevant time period). | |
| 9. In June 2009, SAP conducted an internal investigation and found that Garcia | |
| violated its internal Code of Business Conduct when he invited an executive of Petroleos | |
| Mexicanos (“PEMEX”), the Mexican national oil company, to an SAP marketing event at the | |
| Monaco Grand Prix. SAP did not find any attempt to improperly influence any government | |
| official in connection with the 2008 PEMEX sale. As a result of the internal investigation, SAP | |
| revised its policies prohibiting government officials or employees from attending any | |
| “hospitality” event, which it defined as any event where business constitutes less than 80% of the | |
| event. | |
| B. Garcia Bribed Government Officials in Panama to Obtain Business for SAP | |
| 10. Garcia continued working for SAP, and from at least June 2009 to November | |
| 2013, he along with others outside of SAP, planned and executed a bribery scheme in Panama, as | |
| described below. | |
| 11. In June 2009, Garcia’s business associate, a Panamanian lobbyist (the | |
| “Lobbyist”), informed Garcia about potential software sales opportunities with the government | |
| of Panama and that he had an existing relationship with the newly elected government, including | |
| a high ranking Government Official A, who was tasked with improving technology solutions | |
| across multiple government agencies in Panama and had significant influence over Panama’s | |
| software purchasing decisions. Around the same time, SAP independently began investigating | |
| possible software sales to the Panamanian government. Initially the overall SAP endeavor was | |
| led by local SAP sales employees in Mexico and Panama. Garcia, however, took over the | |
| 4 | |
| business opportunity by recommending that SAP designate the Panama government as part of | |
| the Premier Customer Network – a group of large, strategically important, regional customers – | |
| that Garcia headed. | |
| 12. Garcia and others outside of SAP were informed by the Lobbyist that in order to | |
| obtain contracts from the government of Panama, they needed to bribe three Panamanian | |
| government officials that had significant influence in the Panamanian government’s award of | |
| contracts to purchase software. | |
| 13. In anticipation of the sales to the government of Panama, Garcia and others | |
| outside of SAP began planning the details of the bribery scheme. On June 9 and 10, 2010, | |
| Garcia discussed with others, including via personal e-mail, their plans to pay bribes to | |
| Government Official A (2% of the value of the contract) and Government Official B (10%), and | |
| receive kickbacks for themselves (2%). Also, on October 26, 2010, e-mails were exchanged | |
| with two attached spreadsheets referencing planned payments to Government Officials A and C | |
| of approximately $100,000 and $300,000, respectively. | |
| 14. One of the four contracts was a software license sale to the Panamanian social | |
| security agency, which was initially proposed to be a direct sale with the assistance of local | |
| partners. In order to facilitate the bribery scheme, the existing partners were replaced with a new | |
| local Panamanian partner. This last-minute change, and other red flags, triggered an SAP | |
| compliance review which resulted in SAP rejecting Garcia’s request to pay a commission to the | |
| local partner. Therefore, Garcia and others began looking for other ways to advance the bribery | |
| scheme. Finally, in the fall of 2010, Garcia finalized an indirect sale of the software license to | |
| the agency through the local partner, who, with Garcia’s assistance, ultimately sought and | |
| obtained an 82% discount on SAP’s sale price to the local partner. Garcia caused various | |
| approval forms to be submitted that misstated the reasons for the large discount. Garcia stated | |
| that the discounts were necessary to compete with other software companies in establishing a | |
| relationship with the government of Panama when, in fact, the discounts were necessary to fund | |
| and pay bribes to government officials. Garcia and others planned to sell SAP software to the | |
| local partner at an 82% discount, who in turn would sell the software at significantly higher | |
| prices to the Panamanian government and use part of the profits from the sale to pay bribes. | |
| 15. Garcia, as a senior vice-president of SAP responsible for sales in Latin America, | |
| used his knowledge of the availability of discounts to push through large discounts in order to | |
| create a slush fund from which the local partner was able to pay the bribes. SAP routinely | |
| provides large discounts to local partners for legitimate reasons that Garcia used to justify the | |
| illegitimate discounts. Once Garcia obtained approval of the discounts based on his falsified | |
| justification forms, the bribes were then paid from the local partner. | |
| 16. SAP agreed to sell the software licenses for the Panamanian social security | |
| agency to the local partner for approximately $2.1 million, an 82% discount. In November 2010, | |
| the local partner successfully bid $14.5 million for a contract, which included SAP software. On | |
| January 31, 2011, the Panamanian government awarded the contract to the local partner. Garcia, | |
| along with others, planned to pay bribes to Panamanian government officials from the proceeds | |
| of the software sale to the government of Panama. | |
| 5 | |
| 17. Thereafter, between June 2012 and December 2013, the Panamanian government | |
| awarded three additional contracts that included SAP software products valued at approximately | |
| $13.5 million, which were also sold at deep discounts by SAP to its local partner. For these | |
| contracts also, Garcia and others outside of SAP agreed to pay bribes to Panamanian officials | |
| from the proceeds of the software sales. | |
| 18. As a result of Garcia’s conduct in the bribery scheme, SAP, with its local partner, | |
| was able to sell software to the Panamanian government through four contracts from 2010 to | |
| 2013. These contracts generated revenues of approximately $3.7 million to SAP. | |
| 19. The deep discounts that Garcia used to create the slush fund were falsely recorded | |
| as legitimate discounts on the books of SAP Mexico, which were subsequently consolidated into | |
| SAP’s financial statements. | |
| SAP’s Insufficient Internal Controls | |
| 20. SAP lacked adequate internal controls to ensure that discounts to local partners | |
| were not improperly used. SAP’s system required employees to electronically submit requests | |
| within SAP to obtain approval of discounts to local partners. SAP employees, however, had | |
| wide latitude in seeking and approving discounts to local partners, and employees’ explanations | |
| for the discounts were accepted without verification. There were also no requirements for | |
| heightened anti-corruption scrutiny for large discounts. Garcia was therefore able to evade the | |
| basic approval procedures by taking advantage of his position and his knowledge of how | |
| discounts were approved. Furthermore, the nature of Garcia’s reporting structure made it easy | |
| for him to implement the bribery scheme. Although Garcia was located in Miami and employed | |
| by SAPI, he variously reported to supervisors employed by other regional subsidiaries and used | |
| employees from other subsidiaries such as SAP Mexico to execute the sales to the Panamanian | |
| government. This indirect reporting structure at SAP created gaps in supervising Garcia that | |
| provided him the opportunity to use the large discounts for creating a slush fund for bribes. | |
| Because of the deficient controls, Garcia was able to provide the partner with deep enough | |
| discounts to enable him to implement the bribery scheme, which continued unabated for over | |
| four years. | |
| SAP’s Cooperation and Remediation | |
| 21. When SAP learned of the conduct as a result of the SEC’s inquiry, SAP | |
| conducted a thorough internal investigation and extensively cooperated with the SEC’s | |
| investigation by, among other things: (i) conducting an internal investigation; (ii) voluntarily | |
| producing approximately 500,000 pages of documents and other information quickly, identifying | |
| significant documents and translating documents from Spanish; (iii) conducting witness | |
| interviews, sharing Power-Point presentations and timelines; (iv) facilitating an interview of | |
| Garcia at work at SAPI offices in Miami without alerting him to the investigation into his | |
| conduct; and (v) initiating a third party audit of the local partner. | |
| 22. After being alerted to Garcia’s misconduct, SAP terminated Garcia and undertook | |
| remediation efforts to uncover any other possible misconduct and to improve its FCPA | |
| compliance. Specifically, SAP audited all recent public sector Latin American transactions, | |
| 6 | |
| regardless of Garcia’s involvement, to analyze partner profit margin data especially in | |
| comparison to discounts so that any trends could be spotted and high profit margin transactions | |
| could be identified for further investigation and audit. SAP also implemented new policies and | |
| procedures to detect and prevent similar issues from recurring in the future. For example, SAP | |
| elevated the status of its Chief Compliance Officer (“CCO”) by having that person now report | |
| directly to the CFO, who is a member of the Executive Board, and gave the CCO authority to | |
| independently terminate employees and partner contracts. SAP conducted, and continues to | |
| conduct, regular anti-corruption training, as well as anti-corruption audits through its internal | |
| audit function. | |
| 23. In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered remedial acts | |
| undertaken by Respondent and cooperation afforded the Commission staff. | |
| Legal Standards and Violations | |
| 24. Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act requires every issuer with a class of | |
| securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act “to make and keep books, | |
| records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions | |
| and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.” | |
| 25. Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act requires every issuer with a class of | |
| securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act to devise and maintain a system | |
| of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that, among other | |
| things, transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific | |
| authorization; transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial | |
| statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other applicable | |
| criteria; transactions are recorded as necessary to maintain accountability for assets; and access | |
| to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization. | |
| 26. As a result of the conduct described above, the discounts used to fund the bribe | |
| payments were misrecorded in SAP Mexico’s books and records as legitimate discounts to a | |
| local partner. SAP Mexico’s books and records were consolidated into SAP’s books and | |
| records. Based on the foregoing, SAP violated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act. | |
| 27. SAP also violated Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act by failing to devise | |
| and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls relating to approving and | |
| granting discounts to local partners. As described herein, SAP lacked effective internal controls | |
| sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that discounts provided to local partners were not | |
| being used to pay bribes. | |
| Findings | |
| 28. Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that SAP violated Sections | |
| 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. | |
| 7 | |
| IV. | |
| In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions | |
| agreed to in Respondent SAP’s Offer. | |
| Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, effective immediately, that: | |
| A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondent SAP cease and desist | |
| from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and | |
| 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. | |
| B. Respondent shall pay disgorgement of $3,700,000, representing ill-gotten gains | |
| received in connection with the bribery scheme, and prejudgment interest of $188,896 to the | |
| Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the general fund of the United States | |
| Treasury subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3). Payment shall be made within ten (10) | |
| days of the date of this Order. If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue | |
| pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600. | |
| Payments must be made in one of the following ways: | |
| (1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which shall | |
| provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request; | |
| (2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through | |
| the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or | |
| (3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States | |
| postal money order, payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or | |
| mailed to: | |
| Enterprise Services Center | |
| Accounts Receivable Branch | |
| HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341 | |
| 6500 South MacArthur Boulevard | |
| Oklahoma City, OK 73169 | |
| Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying SAP as | |
| the Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy of the | |
| cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Alka N. Patel, Assistant Regional | |
| Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 444 South | |
| Flower Street, Suite 900, Los Angeles, California 90071. | |
| C. Respondent acknowledges that the Commission is not imposing a civil penalty | |
| based upon its cooperation in a Commission investigation and related enforcement action. If at | |
| any time following the entry of the Order, the Division of Enforcement (“Division”) obtains | |
| information indicating that Respondent knowingly provided materially false or misleading | |
| 8 | |
| information or materials to the Commission, or in a related proceeding, the Division may, at its | |
| sole discretion and with prior notice to the Respondent, petition the Commission to reopen this | |
| matter and seek an order directing that the Respondent pay a civil money penalty. Respondent | |
| may contest by way of defense in any resulting administrative proceeding whether it knowingly | |
| provided materially false or misleading information, but may not: (1) contest the findings in the | |
| Order; or (2) assert any defense to liability or remedy, including, but not limited to, any statute of | |
| limitations defense. | |
| By the Commission. | |
| Brent J. Fields | |
| Secretary |