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| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | |
| Before the | |
| SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION | |
| SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 | |
| Release No. 10037 / February 9, 2016 | |
| SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 | |
| Release No. 77087 / February 9, 2016 | |
| ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT | |
| Release No. 3741 / February 9, 2016 | |
| ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING | |
| File No. 3-17107 | |
| In the Matter of | |
| MONSANTO COMPANY, | |
| SARA M. BRUNNQUELL, CPA, | |
| ANTHONY P. HARTKE, CPA, AND | |
| JONATHAN W. NIENAS, | |
| Respondents. | |
| ORDER INSTITUTING | |
| ADMINISTRATIVE AND CEASE-AND- | |
| DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO | |
| SECTION 8A OF THE SECURITIES ACT | |
| OF 1933, SECTIONS 4C AND 21C OF | |
| THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF | |
| 1934, AND RULE 102(e) OF THE | |
| COMMISSION’S RULES OF PRACTICE, | |
| MAKING FINDINGS AND IMPOSING | |
| REMEDIAL SANCTIONS AND A CEASE- | |
| AND-DESIST ORDER | |
| I. | |
| The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate cease- | |
| and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act | |
| of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange | |
| Act”) against Monsanto Company (“Monsanto”), Sara M. Brunnquell, Anthony P. Hartke, and | |
| Jonathan W. Nienas; and that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted | |
| against Brunnquell and Hartke pursuant to Exchange Act Section 4C and Rule 102(e)(1)(iii) of | |
| the Commission’s Rules of Practice. | |
| II. | |
| In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondents have submitted Offers | |
| of Settlement (the “Offers”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the | |
| purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the | |
| Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the | |
| 2 | |
| findings herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of | |
| these proceedings, which are admitted, Respondents consent to the entry of this Order, as set | |
| forth below. | |
| III. | |
| On the basis of this Order and Respondents’ Offers, the Commission finds1 that: | |
| SUMMARY | |
| 1. Monsanto is an agricultural seed and chemical company that manufactures and | |
| sells glyphosate, a herbicide, under the trade name “Roundup.” During fiscal years 2009, 2010, | |
| and 2011,2 Monsanto improperly accounted for millions of dollars of rebates offered to Roundup | |
| distributors and retailers in the U.S. and Canada to incent them to purchase Roundup. Monsanto | |
| also improperly accounted for rebate payments to Roundup customers in Canada, France, and | |
| Germany as selling, general, and administrative expenses (“SG&A”) rather than rebates, which | |
| boosted Roundup gross profit in those countries. Monsanto did not have sufficient internal | |
| accounting controls to identify and properly account for rebate payments promised to customers. | |
| 2. As a result, Monsanto materially misstated its consolidated earnings, and its | |
| revenues and earnings for its Roundup business lines,3 in its periodic reports filed with the | |
| Commission for fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011.4 As a result of the improper accounting, | |
| Monsanto met consensus earnings-per-share analyst estimates for fiscal year 2009. | |
| 3. On November 14, 2011, Monsanto restated its 2009 and 2010 annual reports on | |
| Form 10-K and its 2011 quarterly reports on Form 10-Q (collectively “the Restatement”). | |
| 4. As a result of the conduct described herein, Monsanto violated Securities Act | |
| Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), the reporting provisions of Exchange Act Section 13(a) and Rules | |
| 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13, the books and records provisions of Exchange Act Section | |
| 13(b)(2)(A), and the internal accounting control provisions of Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B). | |
| 5. Sara M. Brunnquell, Monsanto’s External Reporting Lead, Anthony P. Hartke, a | |
| U.S. Business Analyst at Monsanto, and Jonathan W. Nienas, Monsanto’s former U.S. Strategic | |
| Account Lead, caused Monsanto to violate Securities Act Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), | |
| Exchange Act Sections 13(a) and 13(b)(2)(A), and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13. | |
| These individuals also violated Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1, and Nienas violated Exchange Act | |
| Section 13(b)(5). | |
| 1 The findings herein are made pursuant to the Respondents’ Offers of Settlement and are not binding on | |
| any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding. | |
| 2 Monsanto’s fiscal year runs from September 1 to August 31. | |
| 3 Monsanto’s periodic filings report the results of its Roundup business as part of the Agricultural | |
| Productivity segment. | |
| 4 Monsanto filed earnings releases for 2009, 2010, and 2011 on Forms 8-K, which were also misstated. | |
| 3 | |
| RESPONDENTS | |
| 6. Monsanto Company is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business | |
| in St. Louis, Missouri. Monsanto’s common stock is registered with the Commission under | |
| Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and trades on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker | |
| symbol “MON.” Monsanto produces seeds and chemicals, such as Roundup, that are used in the | |
| agricultural industry. | |
| 7. Sara M. Brunnquell, 45, is a resident of St. Louis, Missouri. Brunnquell was the | |
| External Reporting Lead at Monsanto from April 2009 through October 2015. In that capacity, | |
| she reported to the Controller of Monsanto. Brunnquell currently holds the title of Global | |
| Commercial Operations Lead, Climate. She is a Certified Public Accountant in the state of | |
| Missouri and maintained an active license from 1995 to 2004 and 2014 to 2015. | |
| 8. Jonathan W. Nienas, 54, is a resident of Ballwin, Missouri. Nienas, who had been | |
| an employee of Monsanto since 1980, was the U.S. Strategic Account Lead for the Roundup | |
| Division from September 1, 2009 until he retired in January 2014. | |
| 9. Anthony P. Hartke, 46, is a resident of Chesterfield, Missouri. Hartke held the | |
| title of U.S. Business Analyst in the Roundup Division from July 2008 to August 2010. He is | |
| currently Regional FP&A Analysis Lead at the company. Hartke is a Certified Public | |
| Accountant and maintained an active license in Missouri from 1994 to 2010. | |
| ACCOUNTING STANDARDS | |
| 10. The accounting standard governing Monsanto’s rebate programs is set forth in | |
| Emerging Issues Task Force (“EITF”) Issue No. 01-9, “Accounting for Consideration Given by a | |
| Vendor to a Customer (Including a Reseller of the Vendor’s Products),” codified as ASC 605- | |
| 50.5 Specifically, Issue 6 of EITF 01-9 (ASC 605-50-25-7) requires a vendor like Monsanto to | |
| recognize a rebate obligation as a reduction of revenue based on a systematic or rational | |
| allocation of the cost of honoring the rebate offer to each underlying transaction that results in | |
| progress by the customer towards earning the rebate. Issue 4 of EITF 01-9 (ASC 605-50-25-3) | |
| requires a vendor to recognize the cost of certain sales incentives at the later of the date at which | |
| the related revenue is recognized or the date at which the sales incentive is offered. | |
| 11. Issue 1 of EITF 01-9 (ASC 605-50-45-1) addresses the circumstances in which a | |
| vendor may record payments to customers as a cost or expense (e.g., under the SG&A | |
| accounting classification) rather than as a reduction of revenue. EITF 01-9 (ASC 605-50-45-1) | |
| requires a vendor like Monsanto to recognize payments to customers to perform services on its | |
| behalf (and which provide an identifiable benefit to the vendor) as a reduction of revenue for the | |
| amount of the payments that exceeds the estimated fair value of the services rendered. If the | |
| services provided by customers do not provide a benefit to the vendor, it should recognize the | |
| total amount as a reduction of revenue. | |
| 5 EITF 01-9 was the applicable accounting guidance during Monsanto’s fiscal year 2009 and was codified | |
| into the Accounting Standards Codification (“ASC”) within ASC 605-50 for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. | |
| 4 | |
| FACTS | |
| Monsanto Loses Roundup Market Share to Generic Producers in Fiscal Year 2009 | |
| 12. Roundup historically was one of Monsanto’s most profitable products, and the | |
| company sells it to both retailers and distributors.6 After the patent expired in 2000, competition | |
| from generic glyphosate producers began to erode Monsanto’s profit margins. By fiscal year | |
| 2009, generic competitors were undercutting Monsanto’s prices in the U.S. and Canada by more | |
| than 70%. Monsanto was losing share in these markets as customers – concerned that they could | |
| not profitably sell high-priced Roundup – shifted their purchases to generic brands. By the end | |
| of fiscal year 2009, Monsanto had lost more than half of its share of the glyphosate market | |
| (dropping from 55% market share to less than 25%). | |
| 13. Monsanto faced significant glyphosate price competition in fiscal year 2009. | |
| Instead of lowering Roundup prices in the U.S., the company rolled out several price protection | |
| programs in the second and third fiscal quarters to address customers’ concerns about the | |
| relatively high price of Roundup. Customers believed that Monsanto would soon lower | |
| Roundup prices and were concerned that their high-priced Roundup inventories would be | |
| unprofitable. The price protection programs were intended to persuade customers to purchase | |
| more Roundup. By the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009, Monsanto was well short of its annual | |
| gross profit goals for Roundup in the U.S., and many of its retailers held significant volumes of | |
| Roundup purchased at uncompetitive price levels. | |
| The 2010 U.S. Loyalty Bonus Program | |
| 14. To address the channel inventory problem for retailers while still meeting | |
| Monsanto’s earnings goals for fiscal year 2009, Monsanto’s marketing group began developing a | |
| sales incentive program to provide rebates to customers to lower their inventory costs while | |
| encouraging them to purchase Roundup in fiscal year 2009. | |
| 15. In late May 2009, Monsanto’s sales force began telling retailers in the U.S. that, if | |
| they “maximized” their Roundup purchases during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009, | |
| Monsanto would allow them to participate in a loyalty program to be released in the first quarter | |
| of fiscal year 2010. The sales force told retailers that this program, officially known as the 2010 | |
| U.S. Loyalty Bonus Program (“LBP”), would make their inventories profitable despite | |
| anticipated Roundup price cuts. In making these communications to retailers, Monsanto’s sales | |
| force used talking points on the LBP that Tony Hartke, an accountant working in the Roundup | |
| Division, had helped to develop and that Sara Brunnquell, the company’s External Reporting | |
| Lead at that time, had approved. | |
| 16. Telling retailers about the LBP incented them to purchase Roundup in the fourth | |
| quarter of fiscal year 2009, despite the fact that generic alternatives were significantly less | |
| expensive at the time. Customers purchased approximately 8.7 million Roundup Equivalent | |
| 6 Monsanto does not sell Roundup directly to growers. | |
| 5 | |
| Gallons (“REGs”)7 in the fourth quarter, which represented approximately 33% of the Roundup | |
| that Monsanto sold in the U.S. in fiscal year 2009. | |
| 17. Monsanto did not officially release the written details of the LBP in the U.S. until | |
| August 20 and September 10, 2009.8 Under the LBP, if retailers achieved a 2010 sales target, | |
| they would be entitled to a rebate for each REG of Roundup held in their inventory at the end of | |
| fiscal year 2009. The amount of the rebate was equal to the difference between the price retailers | |
| paid for Roundup in fiscal year 2009 and the new fiscal year 2010 prices, which Monsanto | |
| released in late August and early September 2009. The Roundup prices released at the beginning | |
| of fiscal year 2010 were approximately 50% lower than they had been in fiscal year 2009. The | |
| program documents for the LBP required retailers to complete certain activities in order to | |
| receive payments under the program (hereinafter “the LBP Requirements”). For example, the | |
| LBP required retailers to fill their tanks with Roundup in the first quarter of fiscal year 2010 and | |
| to make Roundup their lead recommendation to growers. | |
| 18. Monsanto prepaid the LBP rebates to retailers in the second quarter of fiscal year | |
| 2010, well before they met their volume targets, if retailers had made “substantial progress” | |
| toward completing the LBP Requirements. These payments totaled approximately $194 million. | |
| The program included a clawback mechanism by which Monsanto could recover any rebates | |
| from retailers that missed their annual volume targets by August 31, 2010. Nevertheless, in May | |
| 2010, Monsanto announced that it was waiving the LBP Requirements and would not clawback | |
| any unearned payments under the LBP. | |
| 19. Monsanto improperly accounted for the LBP under EITF 01-9 (Issue 4) by | |
| recognizing the related revenue reductions in fiscal year 2010 and ignoring the fact that the | |
| company used the program to incent sales in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2009. | |
| 20. Hartke helped to prepare the program documents and obtain approval for the | |
| LBP, and Brunnquell approved the improper accounting methodology for the program. In | |
| justifying this accounting treatment, Brunnquell indicated to the company’s outside auditor that | |
| the company had not communicated the LBP to customers until August 20, 2009. That | |
| statement influenced the auditor’s conclusion that the LBP did not incent more than a de minimis | |
| amount of sales during fiscal year 2009, which ended on August 31, 2009. | |
| 21. Brunnquell and Hartke knew or should have known that Monsanto’s sales force | |
| had used the LBP to incent retailers to purchase material amounts of Roundup in the fourth | |
| quarter of fiscal year 2009 and that EITF 01-9 (Issue 4) required Monsanto to record the portion | |
| of LBP costs related to those sales in fiscal year 2009.9 | |
| 7 The Roundup Equivalent Gallon is a benchmark to compare glyphosate products that have different | |
| concentration levels. | |
| 8 Monsanto released a version of the LBP for a small customer base of its lowest quality of Roundup on | |
| August 20, 2009, and then it released another version of the LBP for the bulk of its Roundup products on September | |
| 10, 2009. The two different versions of the LBP were virtually identical. | |
| 9 In the Restatement, Monsanto treated the LBP as a five quarter program starting in the fourth quarter of | |
| fiscal year 2009 and, allocating the program costs based on actual and estimated sales, recognized $24 million i n | |
| additional rebate costs during fiscal year 2009. | |
| 6 | |
| The 2010 Earnback Program | |
| 22. In fiscal year 2009, Monsanto offered distributors a rebate on their total purchases | |
| of Roundup if they met agreed-upon volume targets. Monsanto offered these rebates pursuant to | |
| separate agreements with each distributor called Long Term Agreements (“LTAs”). LTAs | |
| generally contained a three-tiered volume target that allowed distributors to earn a progressively | |
| larger rebate percentage as their volume of purchases increased. Distributors generally needed | |
| the LTA rebates in order to sell Roundup profitably. | |
| 23. Throughout fiscal year 2009, Monsanto accrued substantial amounts pursuant to | |
| EITF 01-9 (Issue 6) to allocate LTA rebates to the underlying revenue transactions reflecting the | |
| distributors’ progress toward earning the LTA rebates. It planned to recognize the rebates as a | |
| reduction in Roundup revenue generated in fiscal year 2009 consistent with a systematic and | |
| rational allocation required by GAAP. | |
| 24. In the last few months of fiscal year 2009, Monsanto reversed approximately | |
| $57.3 million of these accruals because seven customers did not achieve their LTA targets and | |
| did not qualify for the LTA rebates. The accrual reversal boosted Monsanto’s reported revenues | |
| and gross profit reported on a consolidated and segment basis for fiscal year 2009. | |
| 25. Monsanto created the “2010 Earnback Program” to allow the seven distributors to | |
| “earn back” their LTA rebates in fiscal year 2010. On paper, the program required these | |
| distributors to meet fiscal year 2010 volume targets and to complete a series of activities, such as | |
| promoting Roundup to retailers. As with the LBP, Monsanto made prepayments to several of | |
| these distributors in the second quarter of fiscal year 2010 (December 2009), which were subject | |
| to clawback if the customers failed to meet their volume targets by the end of that fiscal year. As | |
| with the LBP, Monsanto later waived the Earnback Program requirements in May 2010, | |
| including its right to clawback the prepayments. | |
| 26. In fiscal year 2009, Monsanto’s second largest customer, Customer A, had a | |
| three-tiered LTA target, with minimum and maximum targets of 5.0 million and 5.7 million | |
| REGs. The minimum rebate percentage was 6.5% and the maximum percentage was 10.5%. | |
| Customer A was approximately 200,000 REGs short of meeting its minimum LTA target (5.0 | |
| million REGs) in August 2009, and it had submitted orders for enough additional REGs to meet | |
| the top-tier target (5.7 million REGs) and earn the 10.5% rebate. | |
| 27. On August 10, 2009, Jon Nienas10 offered Customer A the opportunity to be paid | |
| an amount calculated with the maximum LTA rebate percentage of 10.5%, if it agreed to | |
| purchase less than the minimum target of 5.0 million REGs. As recorded in the | |
| contemporaneous notes of the Customer A negotiator, Nienas asked Customer A to “not trigger | |
| [the] LTA” and indicated that “4,980[,000 REGs] will pay [the] LTA in full [at] 10.5%” with | |
| “[p]ayment by end of calendar year.” He asked Customer A to hold its pending orders for | |
| Roundup to “appear as if [it] didn't make” its minimum LTA volume target for fiscal year 2009. | |
| He told Customer A that the 10.5% rebate payment would be tied to “activities” but that it should | |
| 10 At the time, Nienas was transitioning into the role of U.S. Strategic Account Lead in the Roundup | |
| Division. | |
| 7 | |
| easily achieve them. | |
| 28. Customer A accepted Monsanto’s offer and earned the top-tier LTA rebate of | |
| 10.5%, for a total payment of $20.2 million, while missing its minimum LTA target by less than | |
| 100,000 REGs. This rebate was paid under the Earnback Program. | |
| 29. Monsanto prepaid the Earnback payment to Customer A in the second quarter of | |
| fiscal year 2010. At the time of payment, Nienas sent a confirmation letter to Customer A | |
| stating that it had earned the payment (even though it had not met any fiscal year 2010 volume | |
| targets under the Earnback Program). The purpose of the confirmation letter was to enable | |
| Customer A to record the payment in its fiscal year 2009. Nienas knew that as of the date of the | |
| confirmation letter Customer A had not yet met any fiscal year 2010 volume targets under the | |
| Earnback Program. | |
| 30. Similarly, at the end of fiscal year 2009, Monsanto’s largest Roundup customer, | |
| Customer B, was approximately 621,000 REGs from its minimum LTA target and about 2.5 | |
| million REGs from its maximum target. To achieve its maximum LTA rebate, Customer B | |
| requested, and Monsanto initially agreed, to a “bill and hold” transaction,11 because Customer B | |
| lacked the capacity to store the volume of Roundup needed to qualify for the maximum LTA | |
| rebate. During the last week of the fiscal year, Nienas informed Customer B that the transaction | |
| would not be necessary. Nienas said that Monsanto would pay Customer B its LTA rebate using | |
| the maximum percentage rate of 9.1% (resulting in a rebate of $24.3 million). | |
| 31. Customer B asked for a written confirmation of Monsanto’s commitment to pay | |
| the maximum LTA rebate. Upon learning of the request, Nienas told Hartke that Monsanto had | |
| agreed to pay Customer B at its maximum LTA rebate rate. Hartke informed Nienas that the | |
| confirmation was not in accordance with the company’s delegation of authority policy, but did | |
| not take further action to ensure that the payment was properly recorded. | |
| 32. On October 7, 2009, Customer B provided a draft confirmation letter to Nienas. | |
| Nienas executed the letter the following day promising that Monsanto would pay Customer B the | |
| maximum LTA rebate rate on fiscal year 2009 purchases of Roundup. The rebate totaled $24.3 | |
| million, and Monsanto later paid it in December 2009 under the Earnback Program. | |
| 33. Monsanto relied upon the failures of Customers A and B to meet their minimum | |
| LTA volume targets as the basis for reversing LTA accruals in the fourth quarter of fiscal year | |
| 2009. Hartke participated in recording the reversal of these accruals. The oral and written side | |
| agreements to pay Customers A and B their 2009 LTA rebates created rebate obligations for | |
| Monsanto in fiscal year 2009 and contradicted the basis for reversing the accruals, which Nienas | |
| and Hartke should have known. Monsanto improperly increased its fiscal year 2009 revenues | |
| and gross profits by approximately $44.5 million when it deferred recording these liabilities until | |
| 11 In a “bill and hold” transaction, the vendor agrees to a customer request to store product s that the | |
| customer has purchased. The customer receives the risks and rewards of owning the products, despite the fact that | |
| they remain with the vendor for a certain period of time. | |
| 8 | |
| fiscal year 2010.12 | |
| The 2011 Earnback Program | |
| 34. The next year, Monsanto offered a second iteration of the Earnback Program for | |
| fiscal year 2011 to Customer B and its third-largest Roundup distributor, Customer C. Both | |
| companies missed their 2010 LTA targets, but received their maximum LTA rebates in the form | |
| of Earnback payments in fiscal year 2011 (December 2010). Monsanto reversed fiscal year 2010 | |
| LTA accruals for these customers, which increased its reported revenues and gross profits on a | |
| consolidated and segment basis for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010. | |
| 35. As with the 2010 Earnback Program, Monsanto prepaid the 2011 Earnback | |
| rebates to Customers B and C more than eight months before the program was scheduled to end. | |
| Although the 2011 Earnback program obligated the distributors to perform certain activities and | |
| to purchase Roundup in the future, Nienas provided confirmations to Customers B and C, at the | |
| time of prepayment, stating that they had met all program requirements necessary to earn the | |
| payments. Nienas knew that the customers had not met the requirements of the 2011 Earnback | |
| Program in December 2010 when he signed the confirmations. The 2011 Earnback payments to | |
| Customers B and C totaled approximately $48 million. | |
| 36. The manner in which Monsanto administered the previous Earnback Program in | |
| 2010 – by using side agreements with the customers and subsequently waiving the clawback | |
| provisions – demonstrated that Monsanto also lacked the intent to enforce the terms of the 2011 | |
| Earnback Program. By the end of fiscal year 2010, competitive pressures in the Roundup | |
| business also made it highly unlikely that Monsanto would deny LTA payments to large | |
| distributors that relied upon the LTA payments to sell Roundup profitably (as they would likely | |
| shift their glyphosate purchases to generic manufacturers if Monsanto actually withheld their | |
| LTA payments). In these circumstances, all $48 million of the rebate costs for the “2011” | |
| Earnback Program should have been recorded in fiscal year 2010, as Monsanto lacked an | |
| appropriate basis under ASC 605-50 to recognize any of these costs to fiscal year 2011.13 | |
| The 2010 Loyalty Bonus Program in Canada | |
| 37. Low-priced generic glyphosate had the same effect in Canada in early 2009 as it | |
| had in the U.S., and Monsanto responded similarly by announcing a price protection program in | |
| April 2009 without actually lowering prices. The program was called the Price Risk Protection | |
| Program (“PRPP”), and it covered Roundup purchased in Canada through the end of calendar | |
| year 2009 (spanning fiscal years 2009 and part of 2010) that remained in a customer’s inventory | |
| at the time of any price decrease that year. | |
| 38. When Monsanto lowered U.S. prices in September 2009, it did not immediately | |
| follow suit in Canada because the PRPP would have triggered significant payment obligations | |
| 12 In the Restatement, Monsanto recognized the costs of the 2010 Earnback Program over fiscal years 2009 | |
| and 2010, based upon actual and projected sales volume. Monsanto recorded approximately $20 million in | |
| Earnback rebates in fiscal year 2009 and approximately $41 million in fiscal year 2010. | |
| 13 In its Restatement, Monsanto recorded the $48 million as a reduction of revenue in fiscal year 2010. | |
| 9 | |
| that year. Under EITF 01-9 and ASC 605-50-25-1, Monsanto would have been required to | |
| accrue for payment obligations under the PRPP if it expected to lower prices in 2009. Monsanto | |
| represented to its auditor that it did not intend to lower Roundup prices in Canada during | |
| calendar year 2009 (the term of the PRPP). Before the end of fiscal year 2009, Monsanto began | |
| planning to cancel the PRPP so it could lower Canadian prices without triggering the accrual | |
| obligation. Monsanto, however, could not cancel the PRPP unilaterally – it needed customers to | |
| surrender their rights under the program as they had relied on the PRPP in purchasing Roundup | |
| during fiscal year 2009. Monsanto thus offered them an inducement to cancel the PRPP. | |
| Specifically, Monsanto’s sales and marketing employees promised customers that, if they signed | |
| cancellation forms, it would pay them amounts equivalent to the amounts payable under the | |
| PRPP through a sales incentive program similar to the U.S. LBP (hereinafter “the LBP Canada”). | |
| Customers responsible for purchasing approximately 89% of the Roundup that Monsanto sold in | |
| Canada agreed to the program switch and executed written cancellation forms in late September | |
| 2009. | |
| 39. Shortly thereafter, Monsanto’s External Reporting Lead, Sara Brunnquell, asked | |
| the company’s auditor what the effect of cancelling the PRPP would be, without disclosing that | |
| certain customers had already signed the cancellation forms. The lead client service partner for | |
| the audit firm told Brunnquell that there could be accounting consequences in fiscal year 2009, | |
| because presumably Monsanto would have to pay customers consideration for their agreement to | |
| cancel the PRPP. After this discussion with the company’s auditor, she decided to treat the | |
| cancellations as being ineffective for accounting purposes. Brunnquell later made written | |
| representations to the auditor that the PRPP was still in effect several weeks after certain | |
| customers had signed the cancellation forms. | |
| 40. Monsanto rolled out the LBP Canada to customers in late September 2009 and | |
| began paying rebates under the program in January 2010. Monsanto calculated these rebates by | |
| multiplying the number of gallons in each customer’s ending inventory as of September 9, 2009 | |
| by the difference between the prices customers originally paid for Roundup and the new prices | |
| that Monsanto expected to release in January 2010. | |
| 41. Monsanto improperly recorded approximately $43 million in rebates under the | |
| LBP Canada as a reduction of revenue in fiscal year 2010. Brunnquell approved this accounting | |
| treatment, even though she knew or should have known that customers had signed the PRPP | |
| cancellations and that Monsanto had offered the LBP Canada to induce them to do so. She | |
| should have known that EITF 01-9 and ASC 605-50-25 required Monsanto to record the rebate | |
| obligations under the LBP Canada as a reduction in revenue during fiscal year 2009.14 | |
| The 2010 SG&A Program in Canada | |
| 42. When Monsanto eventually lowered Roundup prices in Canada in January 2010, | |
| it had to lower them further than it had originally planned when it released the LBP Canada. The | |
| reason was that the price of competitors’ glyphosate had fallen further than Monsanto had | |
| expected. But lowering Roundup prices by an additional increment meant that the fixed rebates | |
| under the LBP Canada were insufficient to make the Roundup volumes held by customers | |
| 14 Monsanto did not address the LBP Canada in its Restatement. | |
| 10 | |
| competitive. To bridge this unexpected gap, Monsanto offered and paid a second round of | |
| rebates to Canadian customers through a program it called the “LBP2.” | |
| 43. In early March 2010, executives at Monsanto approved the LBP2, which was | |
| budgeted to rebate customers approximately $18 million. Monsanto planned to account for the | |
| LBP2 as a reduction in revenue which would have decreased its net sales and gross profits in | |
| Canada. Monsanto began paying the LBP2 rebates to customers by issuing them credits on | |
| account or, in some cases, checks. | |
| 44. In April 2010, Monsanto’s executives, with assistance from Brunnquell, decided | |
| to convert the LBP2 from a rebate program to a program where the payments would be recorded | |
| as SG&A expenses. Certain expenses related to SG&A programs, in which a vendor pays its | |
| customers to perform marketing services on its behalf, are not recorded as reductions of revenue | |
| and therefore do not affect gross profit. | |
| 45. Monsanto’s employees in Canada created program documents that detailed | |
| certain marketing services that customers were supposed to perform for Monsanto. They | |
| internally set the value of the services at approximately $18 million, with a pre-determined | |
| amount for each customer that exactly equaled the rebates that the approved LBP2 had already | |
| paid them. | |
| 46. Monsanto obtained a fair value estimate of the services from an independent | |
| marketing company, and it showed the services were worth approximately $6 million. Monsanto | |
| did not use the estimate and instead its employees created an internal cost estimate to set the | |
| amount at approximately $18 million. There is no evidence that the internal cost estimate | |
| accurately reflected the fair value of the services. | |
| 47. To obtain payments under the SG&A program, customers had to certify that they | |
| performed the marketing services described in the program documents. Customers signed the | |
| certifications, but there is no other evidence that they performed these marketing services for | |
| Monsanto. | |
| 48. To account for the SG&A payments, Monsanto reversed the LBP2 rebate credits | |
| on customer accounts and then re-posted these same amounts to the customer accounts as SG&A | |
| payments consistent with the amounts in the unsupported internal cost estimate. | |
| 49. In the end, the SG&A program in Canada cost approximately $14 million, and not | |
| $18 million, because one customer refused to sign the program certification.15 Monsanto | |
| improperly accounted for these program costs as SG&A expenses in fiscal year 2010. | |
| Brunnquell approved the accounting treatment, even though she should have known that the | |
| payments were rebates and that Monsanto did not receive an identifiable benefit from the | |
| customers under ASC 605-50-45-2. Monsanto was required to record these rebate payments as a | |
| 15 At the time, Monsanto nevertheless paid the rebate to the customer and recorded the payment as a | |
| reduction of revenue in fiscal year 2010. | |
| 11 | |
| reduction of revenue in fiscal year 2010.16 | |
| The 2010 SG&A Programs in France and Germany | |
| 50. In France and Germany, Monsanto’s customers had large inventories of Roundup | |
| bought at the high fiscal year 2009 prices that they could not profitably sell in fiscal year 2010. | |
| Without some form of rebate, these customers were unlikely to purchase more Roundup. | |
| 51. Monsanto decided to make payments to customers in France and Germany | |
| through an SG&A program.17 Monsanto’s employees drafted a program in which customers | |
| received $5 for each liter of Roundup that they sold from inventory. The program’s budget was | |
| $24 million for France and $8.5 million for Germany. Customers were supposed to treat 25% of | |
| the payments as compensation for providing marketing services to Monsanto. Monsanto | |
| expected customers to use the other 75% of the money for “price supports,” which were | |
| essentially rebates. | |
| 52. Monsanto offered the same SG&A program in Germany in fiscal year 2011 | |
| (approximately $10 million). | |
| 53. There is no evidence that customers performed any marketing services on | |
| Monsanto’s behalf. | |
| 54. Monsanto improperly accounted for the payments in France and Germany as | |
| SG&A expenses. Monsanto knew or should have known that it did not receive an identifiable | |
| benefit from the customers under ASC 605-50-45-2. Therefore, it was required to record these | |
| rebate costs as a reduction of revenue in the fiscal years in which the payments were made (i.e., | |
| 2010 and 2011).18 | |
| Monsanto Offered Securities During the Relevant Time Period | |
| 55. Monsanto offered securities in fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011 pursuant to a | |
| Form S-8 that it originally filed on January 21, 2005. The Form S-8 incorporated by reference | |
| all subsequent periodic filings under the Exchange Act for securities sold under this registration | |
| statement. Thus, it incorporated Monsanto’s Forms 10-K for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and its | |
| Forms 10-Q for fiscal year 2011. | |
| 56. Monsanto also filed a Form S-3ASR (automatic shelf registration) on October 31, | |
| 2008, which incorporated by reference subsequent periodic filings under the Exchange | |
| Act. When Monsanto filed a Form 424B2 prospectus supplement on April 13, 2011, it | |
| incorporated by reference the company’s Form 10-K for fiscal year 2010. | |
| 16 In its Restatement, Monsanto recorded the payments under this program as a reduction of revenue in | |
| fiscal year 2010 and not as SG&A. | |
| 17 Monsanto could not use a rebate program like the U.S. LBP because of concerns that it might violate | |
| antitrust laws in the European Union. | |
| 18 Monsanto’s Restatement did not address the programs in France or Germany. | |
| 12 | |
| VIOLATIONS | |
| 57. Securities Act Section 17(a)(2) prohibits any person from obtaining money or | |
| property in the offer or sale of securities by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or | |
| any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of | |
| the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. | |
| 58. Securities Act Section 17(a)(3) prohibits any person from engaging in any | |
| transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit | |
| upon the purchaser in the offer or sale of securities. | |
| 59. Exchange Act Section 13(a) and Rules 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder | |
| require that every issuer of a security registered pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12 file with | |
| the Commission, among other things, annual, quarterly, and current reports as the Commission | |
| may require. | |
| 60. Rule 12b-20 under the Exchange Act requires that, in addition to the information | |
| expressly required to be included in a statement or report filed with the Commission, there shall | |
| be added such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required | |
| statements, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading. | |
| 61. Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(A) requires reporting companies to make and | |
| keep books, records and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect | |
| transactions and dispositions of their assets. | |
| 62. Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B) requires all reporting companies to devise and | |
| maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that | |
| transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in accordance | |
| with GAAP. | |
| 63. Exchange Act Section 13(b)(5) prohibits any person from knowingly | |
| circumventing or knowingly failing to implement a system of internal accounting controls or | |
| knowingly falsifying any book, record, or account described in Section 13(b)(2). | |
| 64. Rule 13b2-1 under the Exchange Act prohibits any person from, directly or | |
| indirectly, falsifying or causing to be falsified, any book, record, or account subject to Exchange | |
| Act Section 13(b)(2)(A). | |
| 65. As a result of the conduct described above, Monsanto violated Securities Act | |
| Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) and Exchange Act Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) | |
| and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder. | |
| 66. As a result of the conduct described above, Nienas caused Monsanto to violate | |
| Securities Act Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), Exchange Act Sections 13(a) and 13(b)(2)(A), and | |
| Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder. Nienas also directly violated Exchange Act | |
| Section 13(b)(5) and Rule 13b2-1. | |
| 67. As a result of the conduct described above, Brunnquell caused Monsanto to | |
| 13 | |
| violate Securities Act Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), Exchange Act Sections 13(a) and | |
| 13(b)(2)(A), and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder. Brunnquell also | |
| willfully19 violated Rule 13b2-1. | |
| 68. As a result of the conduct described above, Hartke caused Monsanto to violate | |
| Securities Act Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), Exchange Act Sections 13(a) and 13(b)(2)(A), and | |
| Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder. Hartke also willfully20 violated Rule 13b2- | |
| 1. | |
| MONSANTO’S REMEDIAL EFFORTS | |
| In determining to accept Monsanto’s Offer, the Commission considered remedial acts | |
| undertaken by Monsanto and cooperation afforded the Commission staff in connection with its | |
| investigation. | |
| IV. | |
| Respondent Monsanto has undertaken to: | |
| A. Retain, at Monsanto’s expense within 30 days of issuance of this Order, a qualified | |
| independent ethics and compliance consultant (the “Consultant”) with extensive | |
| experience in developing, implementing and overseeing organizational compliance and | |
| ethics programs, not unacceptable to the staff, to conduct an ethics and compliance | |
| program assessment of Monsanto’s Crop Protection business focused on the components | |
| of the program delineated in (1)-(2) below. The Consultant shall also have expertise in, | |
| or retain someone with expertise in, internal accounting controls and public company | |
| financial reporting as well as vendor rebate and market funding programs. Taking into | |
| account the Company’s remedial actions to date, Monsanto shall cause the Consultant to | |
| analyze whether the components of Monsanto’s ethics and compliance program for its | |
| Crop Protection business as they relate to the areas described in (1)-(2) below have been | |
| implemented successfully and are having the desired effects. The Consultant will | |
| determine whether the culture is supportive of ethical and compliant conduct, including | |
| strong, explicit, and visible support and commitment by the Board and senior | |
| management. In discharging this undertaking, the Consultant shall: | |
| 1. evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the internal accounting controls and | |
| financial reporting policies and procedures with respect to Monsanto’s rebate and | |
| market funding programs for its Crop Protection business, including but not | |
| limited to: | |
| 19 This use of the word “willfully” does not reflect a finding that Respondent acted with the intent to violate | |
| the law or knowledge that she was doing so. A willful violation of the securities laws means “‘that the person | |
| charged with the duty knows what he is doing.’” Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting | |
| Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1949)). There is no requirement that the actor “‘also be aware that he | |
| is violating one of the Rules or Acts.’” Id. (quoting Gearhart & Otis, Inc. v. SEC, 348 F.2d 798, 803 (D.C. Cir. | |
| 1965)). | |
| 20 See fn. 19, supra. | |
| 14 | |
| a. whether Monsanto’s internal accounting controls with respect to | |
| Monsanto’s rebate and market funding programs for its Crop Protection | |
| business are sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that the | |
| company is maintaining fair and accurate books, records and accounts, | |
| with particular emphasis on whether they are designed to address the | |
| integrity of its revenue accounting and ensure consistent accuracy and | |
| integrity given the global nature of Monsanto’s business; and | |
| b. whether Monsanto has specific accounting and financial reporting | |
| controls and procedures sufficient to ensure that all rebate and/or market | |
| funding programs for its Crop Protection business comply with | |
| applicable accounting rules and policies. | |
| 2. evaluate whether there are proper resources, oversight and independence of the | |
| compliance and ethics function for the Crop Protection business, including | |
| seniority of corporate executives responsible for implementation and oversight, | |
| reporting lines, autonomy and independence, compensation and rewards, | |
| consistent discipline, resources, and access to information and personnel. The | |
| review shall consider the sufficiency of training and guidance overall as well as | |
| specifically related to anti-retaliation and whistleblowing policies. | |
| B. Provide the Consultant with complete access and resources to review key documents | |
| (e.g., business principles, Code of Conduct, policies and procedures, risk assessments, | |
| performance evaluation forms, relevant internal training materials and internal | |
| communications). In reviewing the creation, administration and implementation of the | |
| compliance and ethics program as it relates to the areas addressed in paragraph A, the | |
| Consultant shall conduct an assessment survey and interview relevant personnel. The | |
| assessment need not be a comprehensive review of all business lines, activities and | |
| markets, but may use a risk-based approach. The Consultant shall consider, however, the | |
| breakdown of internal controls in multiple markets in which the Crop Protection business | |
| operated during the relevant time period of this action; | |
| C. Provide a report to Commission staff and Monsanto’s General Counsel and Chief Ethics | |
| and Compliance Officer, as described below, regarding the Consultant’s findings and | |
| recommendations; | |
| D. Provide a copy of the engagement letter detailing the Consultant’s responsibilities to | |
| Brian O. Quinn, Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and | |
| Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20549; | |
| E. Cooperate fully with the Consultant, including providing the Consultant with access to its | |
| files, books, records and personnel as reasonably requested for the above-described | |
| review except to the extent such files, books, or records are protected from disclosure by | |
| any applicable protection or privilege such as the attorney-client privilege or the attorney | |
| work product doctrine. To the extent that the Consultant believes that documents are | |
| being withheld unreasonably, Monsanto shall work cooperatively with the Consultant to | |
| resolve the matter, and if they are unable to reach agreement, the Consultant shall | |
| 15 | |
| promptly notify Commission staff. To ensure the independence of the Consultant, | |
| Monsanto shall not have the authority to terminate the Consultant without prior written | |
| approval of Commission staff and shall compensate the Consultant and persons engaged | |
| to assist the Consultant for services rendered pursuant to this Order at their reasonable | |
| and customary rates; | |
| F. Require the Consultant to report to Commission staff on his/her activities as the staff | |
| shall request; | |
| G. Permit the Consultant to engage such assistance, clerical, legal or expert, as necessary | |
| and at reasonable cost, to carry out his/her activities, and the cost, if any, of such | |
| assistance shall be borne exclusively by Monsanto; | |
| H. Require, within 120 days of the issuance of this Order (unless otherwise extended by | |
| Commission staff for good cause), the Consultant to complete the review and report to | |
| Commission staff and Monsanto’s General Counsel and Chief Ethics and Compliance | |
| Officer concerning: | |
| 1. the scope and methodologies used by the Consultant in order to complete the | |
| review; | |
| 2. Monsanto’s compliance with the review; | |
| 3. the adequacy of Monsanto’s existing policies, practices and procedures regarding | |
| the matters assessed; and | |
| 4. the Consultant’s recommendations, if necessary, regarding modification or | |
| supplementation of Monsanto’s policies, practices and procedures related to the | |
| matters assessed (the “Recommendations”). | |
| I. Adopt and implement, within 120 days of Monsanto’s receipt of the Recommendations, | |
| all of the Recommendations; provided, however, that as to any Recommendation that | |
| Monsanto considers to be, in whole or in part, unduly burdensome or impractical, | |
| Monsanto may submit in writing to the Consultant and Commission staff (at the address | |
| set forth above), within 60 days of receiving the Recommendations, an alternative policy, | |
| practice or procedure designed to achieve the same objective or purpose. Monsanto and | |
| the Consultant shall then attempt in good faith to reach an agreement relating to each | |
| Recommendation that Monsanto considers to be unduly burdensome or impractical and | |
| the Consultant shall reasonably evaluate any alternative policy, practice or procedure | |
| proposed by Monsanto. Such discussion and evaluation shall conclude within 90 days | |
| after Monsanto’s receipt of the Recommendations, whether or not Monsanto and the | |
| Consultant have reached an agreement. Within 14 days after the conclusion of the | |
| discussion and evaluation by Monsanto and the Consultant, Monsanto shall require that | |
| the Consultant inform Monsanto and Commission staff (at the address set forth above) of | |
| his/her final determination concerning any Recommendation that Monsanto considers to | |
| be unduly burdensome or impractical. Monsanto shall abide by the determinations of the | |
| Consultant and, within 60 days after final agreement between Monsanto and the | |
| 16 | |
| Consultant or final determination by the Consultant, whichever occurs first, Monsanto | |
| shall adopt and implement all of the Recommendations that the Consultant deems | |
| appropriate; | |
| J. Require the Consultant to enter into an agreement that provides that, for the period of | |
| engagement and for a period of two years from completion of the engagement, the | |
| Consultant shall not enter into any employment, consultant, attorney-client, auditing or | |
| other professional relationship with Monsanto or any of its present or former affiliates, | |
| directors, officers, employees or agents acting in their capacity as such. The agreement | |
| will also provide that the Consultant will require that any firm with which he/she is | |
| affiliated or of which he/she is a member, and any person engaged to assist the | |
| Consultant in the performance of his/her duties under this Order shall not, without the | |
| prior written consent of Commission staff, enter into any employment, consultant, | |
| attorney-client, auditing or other professional relationship with Monsanto, or any of its | |
| present or former affiliates, directors, officers, employees or agents acting in their | |
| capacity as such, for the period of the engagement and for a period of two years after the | |
| engagement; | |
| K. Certify, in writing, compliance with the undertakings set forth above, including | |
| implementation of all Recommendations. The certification shall identify the | |
| undertakings, provide written evidence of compliance in the form of a narrative, and be | |
| supported by exhibits sufficient to demonstrate compliance. The Commission staff may | |
| make reasonable requests for further evidence of compliance, and Respondent agrees to | |
| provide such evidence. The certification and supporting material shall be submitted to | |
| Brian O. Quinn, with a copy to the Office of Chief Counsel of the Enforcement Division, | |
| no later than sixty (60) days from the date of the completion of the undertakings. | |
| Monsanto may apply to Commission staff for an extension of the deadlines described above | |
| before their expiration, and upon a showing of good cause by Monsanto, Commission staff may, | |
| in its sole discretion, grant such extensions for whatever time period it deems appropriate. | |
| V. | |
| In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions | |
| agreed to in Respondents’ Offers. | |
| Accordingly, pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act, Section 21C of the Exchange | |
| Act, and Rule 102(e)(1)(iii) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice, it is hereby ORDERED, | |
| effective immediately, that: | |
| A. Respondent Monsanto cease and desist from committing or causing any violations | |
| and any future violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, | |
| Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, and Rules 12b- | |
| 20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder; | |
| B. Respondent Brunnquell cease and desist from committing or causing any | |
| violations and any future violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the | |
| 17 | |
| Securities Act, Sections 13(a) and 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, and Rules | |
| 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, 13a-13, and 13b2-1 thereunder; and | |
| C. Brunnquell is denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the | |
| Commission as an accountant. | |
| D. After two years from the date of this Order, Brunnquell may request that the | |
| Commission consider her reinstatement by submitting an application (attention: | |
| Office of the Chief Accountant) to resume appearing or practicing before the | |
| Commission as: | |
| 1. a preparer or reviewer, or a person responsible for the preparation or | |
| review, of any public company’s financial statements that are filed with | |
| the Commission. Such an application must satisfy the Commission that | |
| Brunnquell’s work in her practice before the Commission will be reviewed | |
| either by the independent audit committee of the public company for | |
| which she works or in some other acceptable manner, as long as she | |
| practices before the Commission in this capacity; and/or | |
| 2. an independent accountant. Such an application must satisfy the | |
| Commission that: | |
| a. Brunnquell, or the public accounting firm with which she is | |
| associated, is registered with the Public Company Accounting | |
| Oversight Board (“Board”) in accordance with the Sarbanes-Oxley | |
| Act of 2002, and such registration continues to be effective; | |
| b. Brunnquell, or the registered public accounting firm with which she | |
| is associated, has been inspected by the Board and that inspection | |
| did not identify any criticisms of or potential defects in the | |
| respondent’s or the firm’s quality control system that would indicate | |
| that the respondent will not receive appropriate supervision; | |
| c. Brunnquell has resolved all disciplinary issues with the Board, and | |
| has complied with all terms and conditions of any sanctions imposed | |
| by the Board (other than reinstatement by the Commission); and | |
| d. Brunnquell acknowledges her responsibility, as long as she appears | |
| or practices before the Commission as an independent accountant, to | |
| comply with all requirements of the Commission and the Board, | |
| including, but not limited to, all requirements relating to registration, | |
| inspections, concurring partner reviews and quality control | |
| standards. | |
| E. The Commission will consider an application by Brunnquell to resume appearing | |
| or practicing before the Commission provided that her state CPA license is | |
| current and she has resolved all other disciplinary issues with the applicable state | |
| boards of accountancy. However, if state licensure is dependent on reinstatement | |
| 18 | |
| by the Commission, the Commission will consider an application on its other | |
| merits. The Commission’s review may include consideration of, in addition to the | |
| matters referenced above, any other matters relating to Brunnquell’s character, | |
| integrity, professional conduct, or qualifications to appear or practice before the | |
| Commission. | |
| F. Respondent Hartke cease and desist from committing or causing any violations | |
| and any future violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, | |
| Sections 13(a) and 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, | |
| 13a-11, 13a-13, and 13b2-1 thereunder; and | |
| G. Hartke is denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission | |
| as an accountant. | |
| H. After one year from the date of this Order, Hartke may request that the | |
| Commission consider his reinstatement by submitting an application (attention: | |
| Office of the Chief Accountant) to resume appearing or practicing before the | |
| Commission as: | |
| 1. a preparer or reviewer, or a person responsible for the preparation or | |
| review, of any public company’s financial statements that are filed with | |
| the Commission. Such an application must satisfy the Commission that | |
| Hartke’s work in his practice before the Commission will be reviewed | |
| either by the independent audit committee of the public company for | |
| which he works or in some other acceptable manner, as long as he | |
| practices before the Commission in this capacity; and/or | |
| 2. an independent accountant. Such an application must satisfy the | |
| Commission that: | |
| a. Hartke, or the public accounting firm with which he is associated, is | |
| registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board | |
| (“Board”) in accordance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and | |
| such registration continues to be effective; | |
| b. Hartke, or the registered public accounting firm with which he is | |
| associated, has been inspected by the Board and that inspection did | |
| not identify any criticisms of or potential defects in the respondent’s | |
| or the firm’s quality control system that would indicate that the | |
| respondent will not receive appropriate supervision; | |
| c. Hartke has resolved all disciplinary issues with the Board, and has | |
| complied with all terms and conditions of any sanctions imposed by | |
| the Board (other than reinstatement by the Commission); and | |
| d. Hartke acknowledges his responsibility, as long as he appears or | |
| practices before the Commission as an independent accountant, to | |
| comply with all requirements of the Commission and the Board, | |
| 19 | |
| including, but not limited to, all requirements relating to registration, | |
| inspections, concurring partner reviews and quality control | |
| standards. | |
| I. The Commission will consider an application by Hartke to resume appearing or | |
| practicing before the Commission provided that his state CPA license is current | |
| and he has resolved all other disciplinary issues with the applicable state boards of | |
| accountancy. However, if state licensure is dependent on reinstatement by the | |
| Commission, the Commission will consider an application on its other merits. The | |
| Commission’s review may include consideration of, in addition to the matters | |
| referenced above, any other matters relating to Hartke’s character, integrity, | |
| professional conduct, or qualifications to appear or practice before the | |
| Commission. | |
| J. Respondent Nienas cease and desist from committing or causing any violations | |
| and any future violations of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, | |
| Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, and Rules 12b-20, | |
| 13a-1, 13a-11, 13a-13, and 13b2-1 thereunder. | |
| K. Within 7 days of the entry of this Order, Monsanto shall pay a civil money | |
| penalty of $80,000,000; Brunnquell shall pay a civil money penalty of $55,000; | |
| Hartke shall pay a civil money penalty of $30,000; Nienas shall pay a civil money | |
| penalty of $50,000, to the Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the | |
| general fund of the United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section | |
| 21F(g)(3). If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue | |
| pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3717. | |
| L. Payments must be made in one of the following ways: | |
| (1) Respondents may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, | |
| which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon | |
| request; | |
| (2) Respondents may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov | |
| through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or | |
| (3) Respondents may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United | |
| States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange | |
| Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to: | |
| Enterprise Services Center | |
| Accounts Receivable Branch | |
| HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341 | |
| 6500 South MacArthur Boulevard | |
| Oklahoma City, OK 73169 | |
| M. Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter | |
| 20 | |
| identifying the Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these | |
| proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to | |
| Brian O. Quinn, Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and | |
| Exchange Commission, 100 F St., NE, Washington, DC 20549. | |
| N. Respondent Monsanto shall comply with the undertakings enumerated above in | |
| Section IV. | |
| O. It is further Ordered that, solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth | |
| in Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, the findings in this Order | |
| are true and admitted by Respondents Brunnquell, Hartke and Nienas, and further, | |
| any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts | |
| due by these Respondents under this Order or any other judgment, order, consent | |
| order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, | |
| is a debt for the violation by these Respondents of the federal securities laws or | |
| any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)(19) | |
| of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(19). | |
| By the Commission. | |
| Brent J. Fields | |
| Secretary | |