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| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | |
| Before the | |
| SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION | |
| SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 | |
| Release No. 77145 / February 16, 2016 | |
| ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT | |
| Release No. 3743 / February 16, 2016 | |
| ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING | |
| File No. 3-17118 | |
| In the Matter of | |
| PTC INC., | |
| Respondent. | |
| ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-AND- | |
| DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO | |
| SECTION 21C OF THE SECURITIES | |
| EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING | |
| FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING A CEASE- | |
| AND-DESIST ORDER | |
| I. | |
| The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that cease- | |
| and-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities | |
| Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), against PTC Inc. (“PTC” or “Respondent”). | |
| II. | |
| In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondent has submitted an Offer | |
| of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the | |
| purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the | |
| Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, Respondent admits the Commission’s | |
| jurisdiction over Respondent and the subject matter of these proceedings, and consents to the entry | |
| of this Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities | |
| Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set | |
| forth below. | |
| III. | |
| On the basis of this Order and Respondent’s Offer, the Commission finds1 that: | |
| 1 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondent's Offer of Settlement and are not binding | |
| on any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding. | |
| 2 | |
| Summary | |
| 1. This matter concerns violations of the anti-bribery, books and records and internal | |
| accounting controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by PTC. From at | |
| least 2006 into 2011, two wholly-owned PTC subsidiaries (collectively, “PTC-China”) provided | |
| improper payments totaling nearly $1.5 million to government officials (“Chinese government | |
| officials” or “officials”) who were employed by Chinese state owned entities (“SOEs”) that were | |
| PTC customers. These payments were made to obtain or retain business from the SOEs. | |
| Specifically, PTC-China provided non-business travel, primarily sightseeing and tourist activities, | |
| as well as improper gifts and entertainment, to the Chinese government officials. PTC earned | |
| approximately $11.85 million in profits from sales contracts with SOEs whose officials received | |
| the improper payments. | |
| 2. PTC-China made these improper payments in two primary ways: 1) by providing at | |
| least $1,179,912 to third party agents, disguised as commission payments or sub-contracting fees, | |
| which were then used to pay for non-business related foreign travel for Chinese government | |
| officials; and 2) by allowing its sales staff to provide Chinese government officials with gifts and | |
| excessive entertainment of over $274,313. The payments were recorded as legitimate | |
| commissions and business expenses in PTC-China’s books and records, when in fact they were | |
| improper payments designed to benefit the Chinese government officials. PTC-China’s books and | |
| records were consolidated into PTC’s books and records, thereby causing PTC’s books and records | |
| to be inaccurate. PTC failed to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting | |
| controls sufficient to prevent and detect these improper payments that occurred over several years. | |
| Respondent | |
| 3. PTC Inc. (formerly Parametric Technology Corporation) is a Massachusetts | |
| corporation with its headquarters in Needham, Massachusetts. PTC designs, manufactures, and | |
| sells Product Lifecycle Management Systems software (i.e., software that manages a company’s | |
| products from design through manufacturing and distribution) and maintains operations in the | |
| Americas, Europe, and Asia Pacific, including China. PTC manages its China operations through | |
| two wholly-owned subsidiaries, Parametric Technology (Shanghai) Software Company Limited | |
| and Parametric Technology (Hong Kong) Limited. PTC’s common stock is registered with the | |
| Commission pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and is listed on the NASDAQ Global | |
| Select Market (ticker: PTC). | |
| Facts | |
| A. PTC Exercised Substantial Control Over PTC-China | |
| 4. During the relevant period, although PTC-China was structured as two entities, it | |
| conducted business as a single unit. Until July 2008, all China local employees were assigned to | |
| the Hong Kong subsidiary; in August 2008, they all became direct employees of the Shanghai | |
| 3 | |
| subsidiary. And throughout this period, both the Hong Kong and Shanghai subsidiaries shared | |
| common directors, all of whom were senior members or officers of PTC’s legal and finance | |
| departments. | |
| 5. PTC exercised substantial control over PTC-China. The employees of PTC’s | |
| subsidiaries, including PTC-China, had global functional reporting lines to PTC, rather than an | |
| independent management structure. The functional reporting lines provided PTC with control over | |
| PTC-China’s activities, including its sales process. PTC-China’s senior sales staff reported to a | |
| Division Vice President of Sales, who was a PTC employee based in China. For most of the | |
| relevant period, this Division Vice President either reported to the General Manager of the Asia | |
| Pacific Region, or directly to PTC’s Executive Vice President of Sales, who was based in | |
| Needham, Massachusetts. For other functions, including sales operations and global services, | |
| various PTC-China employees reported up to PTC employees, both based in China and the United | |
| States. Consistent with the functional reporting structure, PTC often moved its key employees to | |
| various subsidiaries throughout the world. | |
| 6. For the sales, sales operations, and global services functions, the review of | |
| proposed transactions followed a hierarchical approach through PTC-China and, if needed, to | |
| employees at other PTC entities, including the parent company. PTC employees approved pricing | |
| discounts above certain thresholds for PTC-China and reviewed certain PTC-China contract | |
| documents. PTC, not PTC-China, was the counter party on most of the contracts with PTC- | |
| China’s SOE customers. | |
| 7. Further, PTC set the business and financial goals for its subsidiaries, including | |
| PTC-China. Each PTC function (including sales, marketing and finance) received a worldwide | |
| budget from PTC to allocate among its various subsidiaries. PTC also set regional sales targets | |
| (i.e., for the Pacific Rim, in which China was included) and had regional managers who allocated | |
| the sales targets among the countries and subsidiaries. | |
| B. PTC-China Used Business Partners to Pay Bribes to | |
| Chinese Government Officials ___________________ | |
| 8. For sales to Chinese SOEs, PTC-China routinely hired third parties – called | |
| “business partners” – both to find deals, for which PTC-China paid a commission or “success fee,” | |
| as well as to provide information technology and other services, which PTC-China subcontracted | |
| to the business partner. Business partners were generally Chinese companies, purportedly with | |
| specific knowledge of, and relationships with, PTC-China’s customers. | |
| 9. PTC employees knew that many of PTC-China’s customers were SOEs whose | |
| employees were Chinese government officials. Certain business partners had long standing | |
| relationships with these Chinese government officials. Generally, the business partners provided | |
| PTC-China with lobbying or “influence services” (i.e., arranging seminars and meetings with | |
| officials of the SOEs) and information technology services. Often the Chinese government | |
| officials chose the business partner with whom they wished to collaborate. | |
| 4 | |
| 10. Despite the routine use of business partners in many deals, and the risk of | |
| corruption inherent in paying for influence services, PTC failed to conduct a sufficient review of | |
| the business capabilities or ethics programs of these business partners. | |
| 11. Senior PTC-China sales staff had wide discretion in setting the fee arrangements | |
| with business partners. PTC-China did not have a fixed success fee arrangement with its business | |
| partners, instead negotiating the fee for each particular deal. When PTC-China initially engaged | |
| the business partner, its sales team generally agreed to a price range for the business partners’ | |
| commission – from as low as 15% to as high as 30% of the contract price – if the deal was | |
| successful. PTC-China’s senior sales staff finalized the commission with the business partner at or | |
| about the time a deal closed. PTC-China’s senior sales staff reported to a PTC employee who had | |
| authority over the commission approval process. | |
| 12. For information technology and other subcontracted services, PTC-China relied on | |
| sign offs provided by the SOE’s officials as evidence that the agreed upon services had been | |
| performed. Once the business partner and/or the Chinese government officials confirmed that the | |
| business partner had completed the services, PTC-China made the agreed-upon payments to the | |
| business partner. PTC-China did not independently verify the extent to which, if at all, the | |
| business partners in fact performed the subcontracted services. | |
| 13. Beginning in 2005, PTC-China recorded the commission and information | |
| technology subcontracting payments to business partners as “Complete Outsourced Deals” or | |
| “COD” expenses. After 2008, PTC-China began paying commissions to business partners as it | |
| received customer payment on the deals. PTC-China sales staff tracked the payments to business | |
| partners on spreadsheets that they kept on their computers, and which were separate from PTC- | |
| China’s electronic accounting records. | |
| 14. During contract negotiations with SOEs, Chinese government officials, in | |
| conjunction with a business partner, often requested that PTC-China provide them with overseas | |
| “training,” which involved primarily tourist and sightseeing visits. The three parties would settle | |
| on a travel budget and the Chinese government officials would typically agree to “gross up” the | |
| SOE’s contract price by the amount of the anticipated travel costs. PTC-China sales staff itemized | |
| the overseas travel costs in the initial contract documents for approval by senior PTC-China sales | |
| staff. Once approved, however, PTC-China employees removed the line item for overseas travel | |
| from the final contract documents that were signed by PTC and the SOEs. Instead, the funds | |
| budgeted for the overseas travel were disguised by PTC-China personnel as COD expenses related | |
| to success fees or subcontracting payments for business partners. | |
| 15. Because PTC-China employees negotiated success fees with a business partner on a | |
| deal by deal basis, they were able to include the costs of the overseas travel as part of a business | |
| partner’s fees without raising suspicion. In turn, the business partner used part of its success fee to | |
| pay for the overseas sightseeing trips. Alternatively, PTC-China employees sometimes disguised | |
| the overseas travel payments as a payment purportedly for providing information technology or | |
| 5 | |
| other subcontracted services. The business partner (or customer) then provided PTC-China with | |
| documents indicating that it had performed the subcontracted services, and used a part of the | |
| subcontract fee to pay for the Chinese government officials’ sightseeing trips. For certain more | |
| expensive trips, PTC-China employees spread the overseas travel payments over several contracts, | |
| each with its own COD budget. Because many deals with SOEs involved long term contracts that | |
| took several years to complete, the actual sightseeing trip sometimes occurred up to two to three | |
| years after the deal was negotiated. | |
| 16. PTC-China sales staff tracked on spreadsheets kept separate from PTC-China’s | |
| regularly maintained books and records the overseas travel payments made by business partners to | |
| or for the benefit of PTC’s SOE customers. Senior PTC-China sales staff used the spreadsheets to | |
| understand the composition of, and negotiate, the success and other fees with the business partners. | |
| C. PTC-China Improperly Funded Leisure Travel for Chinese | |
| Government Officials______________________________ | |
| 17. PTC-China employees and the business partners typically arranged the overseas | |
| sightseeing trips in conjunction with a visit to a PTC facility. Most often, PTC-China sales staff | |
| arranged for Chinese government officials to visit PTC’s corporate headquarters in Massachusetts, | |
| for PTC to market and demonstrate the company’s products and services. The trips typically | |
| consisted of one day of business activities at PTC’s facility, followed or preceded by additional | |
| days of sightseeing visits that lacked any business purpose, all of which were paid for by the | |
| business partners using funds from their grossed up success fees and subcontracting payments. | |
| Some PTC employees in the United States generally understood that SOE officials were spending | |
| additional days in the country, including for tourist activities. And certain PTC employees based | |
| in China were aware that PTC-China employees were accompanying Chinese government officials | |
| to tourist destinations. | |
| 18. Typical travel destinations in the United States included New York, Las Vegas, San | |
| Diego, Los Angeles, and Honolulu, and involved guided tours, golfing, and other leisure activities. | |
| PTC-China sales staff usually accompanied the Chinese government officials on these trips. The | |
| Chinese government officials who went on the trips in turn were often signatories on the purchase | |
| agreements with PTC. | |
| 19. Examples of these overseas trips are described below: | |
| In April 2008, six officials of an SOE (“SOE Customer A”) and a senior PTC- | |
| China salesperson visited PTC’s Massachusetts office for a one-day meeting. The | |
| PTC-China salesperson further arranged for a business partner to pay $51,495 for | |
| sightseeing visits to New York, Boston, Los Angeles and Honolulu for the Chinese | |
| government officials (and himself). The ten day trip included lodging at five star | |
| hotels; tours of Rockefeller Center, the Statue of Liberty, the United Nations, and | |
| the Empire State Building, along with tickets to a professional basketball game | |
| while in New York; tours of MIT, Harvard, and Faneuil Hall while in Boston; a | |
| 6 | |
| tour of the Grand Canyon while in Las Vegas; a city tour while in Los Angeles; and | |
| a city tour, a tour of Pearl Harbor, a visit to the Polynesian Cultural Center, golfing, | |
| and a sunset dinner cruise while in Honolulu. As a result, during 2008, PTC and | |
| PTC-China received an improper benefit of at least three contracts, signed by PTC, | |
| worth $1.2 million, from SOE Customer A. | |
| In December 2007, during contract negotiations with an SOE (“SOE Customer B”), | |
| a PTC-China employee agreed to provide its officials with over $84,000 for future | |
| overseas travel expenses. The PTC-China employee emailed his supervisor at | |
| PTC-China the terms of a deal with SOE Customer B that included $84,429 for the | |
| overseas travel, which he initially recorded as “overseas training.” Later, the PTC- | |
| China employee disguised “overseas training” as COD costs, stating: “I replace the | |
| ‘oversea training’ in the sheet to the ‘COD1’ …. As you know, the customers just | |
| want sightseeing instead of oversea training.” Subsequently, the PTC-China | |
| employee disguised the overseas travel costs as COD expenses in three deals, | |
| signed by PTC, worth nearly $1.7 million, with SOE Customer B. | |
| PTC-China provided SOE Customer B with the agreed-upon overseas travel in | |
| 2010, when it arranged for nine of its officials to visit PTC’s Massachusetts office | |
| for a one-day meeting. PTC-China employees concurrently had a business partner | |
| provide these Chinese government officials with sightseeing visits to New York, | |
| Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Honolulu, including among the activities, | |
| tours of West Point Academy, Rockefeller Center, and the Statue of Liberty while | |
| in New York; Universal Studios while in Los Angeles; and Pearl Harbor while in | |
| Honolulu. | |
| In December 2007, while negotiating a $3.4 million deal with an SOE (“SOE | |
| Customer C”), a PTC-China salesperson emailed his supervisors at PTC-China | |
| contract documents that included overseas travel expenses of $173,400. In July | |
| 2008, while negotiating a $1.2 million deal with SOE Customer C, another PTC- | |
| China salesperson emailed the same supervisors contract documents that included | |
| overseas travel expenses of $104,000. When completing both deals, PTC-China | |
| employees excluded the overseas travel expenses from the final contract documents | |
| that were signed by PTC and SOE Customer C. | |
| PTC-China provided SOE Customer C with the agreed-upon overseas travel in May | |
| 2010, when it arranged for five of its officials to visit PTC’s Massachusetts office | |
| for a one-day meeting. PTC-China employees concurrently had a business partner | |
| provide these Chinese government officials with a sightseeing visit to New York, | |
| Las Vegas, and Los Angeles, including among other activities, tours of the United | |
| Nations, the Statue of Liberty, and West Point while in New York; the Grand | |
| Canyon while in Las Vegas; and Universal Studios while in Los Angeles. | |
| 7 | |
| In May 2010, a PTC-China salesperson accompanied two officials of an SOE | |
| (“SOE Customer D”) on a visit to PTC’s Massachusetts office for a one-day | |
| meeting. PTC-China sales staff concurrently had a PTC-China business partner | |
| provide these Chinese government officials with sightseeing visits to New York, | |
| Boston, Atlanta, Las Vegas, and Los Angeles, including among other activities, | |
| tours of the Grand Canyon while in Las Vegas; Universal Studios while in Los | |
| Angeles; and shopping excursions. In July 2010, another PTC-China salesperson | |
| accompanied seven officials of SOE Customer D on a second visit to PTC’s U.S. | |
| offices. Once again, PTC-China sales staff had one of its business partners provide | |
| these Chinese government officials with sightseeing visits to New York, Boston, | |
| New London, Connecticut, Washington, D.C., Las Vegas, San Diego and Los | |
| Angeles, including among other activities, tours of Niagara Falls, the Statue of | |
| Liberty, the Empire State Building, and the Intrepid Sea, Air & Space Museum | |
| Complex while in New York; the Submarine Force Library & Museum while in | |
| New London; the Grand Canyon while in Las Vegas; Universal Studios while in | |
| Los Angeles; and shopping excursions. These trips influenced SOE Customer D to | |
| purchase over $9 million of products from PTC and PTC-China. | |
| 20. Overall, from 2006 into 2011, PTC-China, through its business partners, paid at | |
| least $1,179,912 to fund at least 10 trips for Chinese government officials that included significant | |
| non-business travel. The costs of these trips were improperly recorded in PTC’s books and records | |
| as COD or business partner related commissions or subcontracting payments, without any | |
| indication that they were primarily for sightseeing and other non-business related activities. PTC | |
| improperly profited by at least $11,858,000 from contracts obtained from the SOEs whose | |
| government officials participated on these trips. | |
| D. PTC-China Improperly Provided Officials of SOEs | |
| with Gifts and Excessive Entertainment____________ | |
| 21. From 2009 through 2011, PTC-China sales staff corruptly provided at least | |
| $274,313 in improper gifts and entertainment directly to Chinese government officials. The value | |
| of the gifts and entertainment generally ranged from $50 to $600, and often included small | |
| electronics (e.g., cell phones, iPods, and GPS systems), gift cards, wine, and clothing. PTC-China | |
| sales staff’s long standing practice of providing the gifts to Chinese government officials was done | |
| at least in part to obtain or retain SOE business. | |
| 22. By providing these gifts, PTC-China violated PTC’s corporate governance and | |
| internal controls policies. These policies included: $50 monetary limits on the provision of gifts | |
| and business entertainment to government officials; requiring PTC-China sales staff to obtain pre- | |
| approvals for business expenses over $500; and requiring that PTC-China sales staff document the | |
| date, place, attendees, and purpose of business entertainment and the recipient. These gifts were | |
| improperly recorded as legitimate business expenses. | |
| 8 | |
| E. PTC-China Failed to Devise and Maintain a System | |
| of Internal Accounting Controls ________________ | |
| 23. From at least 2006 through 2011, PTC failed to devise and maintain an adequate | |
| internal accounting controls system to address the potential FCPA problems posed by its | |
| ownership of, and control over, PTC-China. Notably, during 2006, 2008, and 2010, PTC | |
| investigated compliance issues at PTC-China, including possible corruption involving its business | |
| partners. However, PTC failed to identify and stop the ongoing and systemic illicit payments to | |
| Chinese government officials by PTC-China personnel as described above and did not undertake | |
| effective remedial actions. | |
| 24. Despite these compliance issues, PTC failed to undertake periodic comprehensive | |
| risk assessments for PTC-China and to ensure that its internal accounting controls procedures were | |
| suited to PTC-China’s particular circumstances (in particular, its ongoing dealings with Chinese | |
| government officials). PTC’s Code of Ethics and Anti-Bribery policies for the provision of | |
| business entertainment were vague (i.e., stating that employees should use “good taste” and | |
| consider the “customary business standards in the community” when providing business | |
| entertainment) and not risk-based to China. And PTC did not have independent compliance staff | |
| or an internal audit function that had authority to review and test its internal accounting controls | |
| processes or intervene into management decisions and, if appropriate, take remedial actions. | |
| 25. As a result, PTC failed to identify and correct corporate governance and compliance | |
| breakdowns at PTC-China. Notably, PTC failed to: properly vet PTC-China’s business partners, | |
| which played a significant role for PTC-China as described above; police for corrupt payments by | |
| its business partners; monitor and supervise PTC-China’s senior sales staff to ensure that they | |
| enforced anti-corruption policies and kept accurate records concerning gifts to Chinese government | |
| officials; properly scrutinize travel related expenses to prevent reimbursement for employees’ | |
| airfare, lodging, and other expenses that were either personal in nature or gifts for customers; limit | |
| the number or total value of gifts PTC-China’s sales staff could provide to any single individual or | |
| entity; and provide sufficient FCPA training for its employees. | |
| Legal Standards and Violations | |
| 26. Under Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act, the Commission may impose a cease- | |
| and-desist order upon any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision | |
| of the Exchange Act or any regulation thereunder, and upon any other person that is, was, or would | |
| be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known would | |
| contribute to such violation. | |
| Violations of the Anti-Bribery Provisions of the FCPA | |
| 27. Under Section 30A of the Exchange Act it is unlawful for any issuer, officer, | |
| director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of the issuer | |
| to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in | |
| 9 | |
| furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or | |
| offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to any foreign | |
| official or any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be | |
| offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official for the purposes of (i) | |
| influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such | |
| foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) | |
| securing any improper advantage in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for | |
| or with, or directing business to, any person. [15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1]. | |
| 28. PTC-China used third party business partners to pay bribes in the form of travel, | |
| gifts and entertainment to Chinese government officials to obtain and retain business. PTC | |
| exercised substantial control over PTC-China by, among other things, creating functional reporting | |
| lines, approving PTC-China’s key decisions, and setting PTC-China’s business and financial goals. | |
| PTC entered into contracts directly with the SOEs as a result of the bribes paid through PTC- | |
| China’s business partners, and earned significant income from these contracts. Under applicable | |
| agency principles, PTC-China and its employees acted as agents of PTC during the relevant time | |
| and were acting within the scope of their authority and for the benefit of PTC when participating in | |
| the bribery scheme. | |
| Violations of the Recordkeeping and Internal | |
| Accounting Controls Provisions of the FCPA | |
| 29. Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act requires reporting companies to make and | |
| keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the | |
| transactions and disposition of the assets of the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). | |
| 30. Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act requires reporting companies to devise | |
| and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances | |
| that the transactions: (i) are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific | |
| authorization; and (ii) are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in | |
| conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) or any other criteria | |
| applicable to such statements, and to maintain accountability for assets. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). | |
| 31. PTC-China made payments, directly and indirectly, to Chinese government | |
| officials that were improperly recorded on its books and records as legitimate commissions and | |
| business expenses. The books and records of PTC-China were consolidated into PTC’s books and | |
| records. As a result of the misconduct of its China subsidiaries, PTC failed to make and keep | |
| books and records which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflected its transactions and | |
| the disposition of its assets as required by Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act. | |
| 32. The improper payments by PTC-China described above took place over several | |
| years. During the relevant period, PTC failed to implement an adequate system of internal | |
| controls, including an appropriate FCPA compliance and training program at PTC-China, which | |
| was commensurate with the risks of doing business in China, and particularly the risks of | |
| 10 | |
| businesses that regularly sold products to SOEs. Accordingly, in violation of Section 13(b)(2)(B) | |
| of the Exchange Act, PTC failed to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls | |
| sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that it maintained accountability for its assets, and that | |
| its transactions were executed in accordance with management’s authorization. | |
| PTC’s Self-Disclosure and Remedial Efforts | |
| 33. PTC only discovered the improper payments to or for the benefit of Chinese | |
| government officials in 2011, while investigating complaints concerning a senior PTC-China | |
| salesperson. Upon learning this information, PTC, with the oversight of the Audit Committee of | |
| the Board of Directors, engaged independent counsel and an independent forensic consulting firm | |
| to undertake an investigation. PTC voluntarily self-reported the results of its internal investigation | |
| to the Commission and responded to information requests from the Commission staff. PTC did | |
| not, however, uncover or disclose the full scope and extent of PTC-China’s FCPA issues until | |
| 2014. | |
| 34. As part of its internal review and investigation, PTC undertook significant remedial | |
| measures including terminating the senior staff at PTC-China implicated in the FCPA violations. | |
| PTC also revised its pre-existing compliance program, updated and enhanced its financial | |
| accounting controls and its compliance protocols and policies worldwide, and implemented | |
| additional specific enhancements in China. These steps included: (1) reviewing and enhancing its | |
| anti-bribery policy, code of ethics, and gifts and entertainment policies to correct previous | |
| deficiencies; (2) establishing a dedicated compliance team, including a chief compliance officer | |
| and a new compliance director in China; (3) expanding its other compliance resources in China, | |
| including hiring a new vice president of finance for Asia and adding additional legal staff in China; | |
| (4) hiring a new management team in China, including a new China President; (5) enhancing its | |
| FCPA training for employees; (6) severing its relationships with the business partners that were | |
| implicated in the FCPA violations and discontinuing the use of COD partners or business referral | |
| partners generally; (7) implementing a comprehensive due diligence program for all other business | |
| partners that includes a risk-scoring system operated by a third party vendor and that includes | |
| FCPA training as part of the onboarding process; (8) obtaining quarterly anti-corruption | |
| certifications from sales staff; and (9) undertaking periodic compliance audits. | |
| Non-Prosecution Agreement | |
| 35. Respondent’s subsidiaries have entered into non-prosecution agreements that | |
| acknowledge responsibility for criminal conduct relating to the findings in the Order. Specifically, | |
| Respondent’s subsidiaries acknowledge responsibility for violating Section 104A of the Foreign | |
| Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. | |
| 11 | |
| Non-Imposition of a Civil Penalty | |
| 36. Respondent acknowledges that the Commission is not imposing a civil penalty | |
| based upon its payment of a $14,540,000 criminal fine as part of Respondent’s subsidiaries’ | |
| settlement with the United States Department of Justice. | |
| IV. | |
| In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions | |
| agreed to in Respondent PTC’s Offer. | |
| Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: | |
| A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondent PTC cease and desist | |
| from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 30A, 13(b)(2)(A) | |
| and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. | |
| B. Respondent shall, within ten (10) days of the entry of this Order, pay disgorgement | |
| of $11,858,000, which represents profits gained as a result of the conduct described herein, and | |
| prejudgment interest of $1,764,000 to the Securities and Exchange Commission for transfer to the | |
| general fund of the United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 21F(g)(3). If timely | |
| payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice 600 and 31 | |
| U.S.C. § 3717. Payment must be made in one of the following ways: | |
| (1) Respondent may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will | |
| provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request; | |
| (2) Respondent may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov through | |
| the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or | |
| (3) Respondent may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States | |
| postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange Commission and hand- | |
| delivered or mailed to: | |
| Enterprise Services Center | |
| Accounts Receivable Branch | |
| HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341 | |
| 6500 South MacArthur Boulevard | |
| Oklahoma City, OK 73169 | |
| Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying PTC | |
| as a Respondent in these proceedings, and the file number of these proceedings; a copy of the | |
| 12 | |
| cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Paul G. Block, Assistant Director, Foreign | |
| Corrupt Practices Act Unit, Boston Regional Office, Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 | |
| Arch Street, Suite 2300, Boston, Massachusetts 02110. | |
| By the Commission. | |
| Brent J. Fields | |
| Secretary |