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| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | |
| Before the | |
| SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION | |
| SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 | |
| Release No. 80370/ April 4, 2017 | |
| ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT | |
| Release No. 3864/ April 4, 2017 | |
| ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING | |
| File No. 3-17898 | |
| In the Matter of | |
| William Joseph Kouser Jr., | |
| CPA, and Ryan James | |
| Dougherty, CPA, | |
| Respondents. | |
| ORDER INSTITUTING PUBLIC | |
| ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS | |
| PURSUANT TO SECTION 4C OF THE | |
| SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 | |
| AND RULE 102(e) OF THE | |
| COMMISSION’S RULES OF PRACTICE, | |
| MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING | |
| REMEDIAL SANCTIONS | |
| I. | |
| The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that public | |
| administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted against William Joseph Kouser Jr., CPA | |
| (“Kouser”) and Ryan James Dougherty, CPA (“Dougherty” and with Kouser, the “Respondents”) | |
| pursuant to Section 4C1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule | |
| 102(e)(1)(ii) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice.2 | |
| 1 Section 4C provides, in relevant part, that: | |
| The Commission may censure any person, or deny, temporarily or permanently, | |
| to any person the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission in | |
| any way, if that person is found . . . (1) not to possess the requisite qualifications | |
| to represent others . . . (2) to be lacking in character or integrity, or to have | |
| engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct; or (3) to have willfully | |
| 2 | |
| II. | |
| In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondents have submitted Offers | |
| of Settlement (the “Offers”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the | |
| purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the | |
| Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings | |
| herein, except as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of these | |
| proceedings, which are admitted, Respondents consent to the entry of this Order Instituting Public | |
| Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 4C of the Exchange Act and Rule 102(e) of the | |
| Commission’s Rules of Practice, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions (“Order”), | |
| as set forth below. | |
| III. | |
| On the basis of this Order and Respondents’ Offers, the Commission finds3 that: | |
| A. SUMMARY | |
| 1. During 2013-2014, the accounting firm of BBD, LLP (“BBD”) and two individuals | |
| at the firm, Respondent Kouser and Respondent Dougherty, served as the auditors for an | |
| investment company called the GL Beyond Income Fund (“The Fund”). The Fund was managed | |
| by Daniel Thibeault (“Thibeault”) and his registered investment adviser firm, GL Capital Partners | |
| LLC (“GL Capital”). From at least 2013 through late 2014, Thibeault and GL Capital committed a | |
| fraud on The Fund and its investors by, among other things, misappropriating at least $16 million | |
| that belonged to The Fund. Kouser and Dougherty were responsible for The Fund’s fiscal year | |
| 2014 audit, and failed to comply with Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s | |
| (“PCAOB”) auditing standards (“PCAOB Standards”) in this audit. Specifically, the | |
| Respondents’ violations of the auditing standards stemmed from their failures to: (1) act with due | |
| professional care and exercise professional skepticism; (2) obtain sufficient appropriate audit | |
| evidence; and, (3) prepare proper audit documentation during the fiscal year 2014 audit (between | |
| violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of, any provision of the | |
| securities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder. | |
| 2 Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) provides, in pertinent part, that: | |
| The Commission may . . . deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of | |
| appearing or practicing before it . . . to any person who is found . . . to have | |
| engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct. | |
| 3 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondents’ Offers of Settlement and are not | |
| binding on any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding. | |
| 3 | |
| February 1, 2013 and January 31, 2014). As a result of these audit failures, Respondents Kouser | |
| and Dougherty did not uncover Thibeault’s and GL Capital’s fraud. | |
| B. RESPONDENTS | |
| 2. Respondent Kouser is an engagement partner at accounting firm BBD who was | |
| responsible for The Fund’s fiscal year 2014 audit. Kouser is still employed by BBD, but he no | |
| longer serves as an engagement partner responsible for audits of registered investment companies | |
| effective January 1, 2016. Respondent Kouser, 51 years old, is licensed to practice as a certified | |
| public accountant (“CPA”) in Pennsylvania. | |
| 3. Respondent Dougherty was an audit manager at accounting firm BBD who was | |
| responsible for executing the audit program, audit planning, and supervising staff as part of The | |
| Fund’s fiscal year 2014 audit. He left BBD in February 2015. Respondent Dougherty, 36 years | |
| old, is licensed to practice as a CPA in Pennsylvania. | |
| C. OTHER RELEVANT ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUAL | |
| 4. BBD, LLP (“BBD”) is a PCAOB-registered public accounting firm with its | |
| headquarters in Philadelphia, PA. BBD was The Fund’s auditor for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and | |
| issued audit reports pursuant to PCAOB Standards. BBD currently has 62 employees and nine | |
| partners. | |
| 5. Daniel Thibeault (“Thibeault”) was the Managing Director of GL Capital and | |
| assisted in the execution of The Fund’s investment strategies and marketing between December | |
| 2011 and December 2014 when he was arrested and charged with securities fraud. In the same | |
| time period, he was also The Fund’s co-portfolio manager. | |
| 6. GL Capital Partners, LLC (“GL Capital”) was a registered investment adviser | |
| firm controlled by Thibeault. It acted as the sole investment manager of The Fund. | |
| 7. GL Beyond Income Fund (“The Fund”) is a registered investment company | |
| created by Thibeault on or about March 23, 2012 and managed by GL Capital. | |
| 8. TAFT Financial Services, LLC (“TAFT”) was a special purpose limited liability | |
| company formed under the laws of the state of South Dakota in December 2011 as a loan | |
| originator. Thibeault controlled TAFT, directed the origination and incorporation of this special | |
| purpose entity, and conducted its business in Massachusetts. | |
| 4 | |
| D. FACTS | |
| Thibeault’s and GL Capital’s Fraud | |
| 9. Since its inception, The Fund pooled investor money to purchase consumer loans. | |
| These loans were considered assets of The Fund and the interest payments on these loans were | |
| intended to provide The Fund’s return on investment. The Fund contained mostly small unsecured | |
| consumer loans each averaging approximately $12,000 in value. By January 31, 2013 (the end of | |
| fiscal year 2013), there were more than 500 individual loans in The Fund. And by January 31, | |
| 2014 (the end of fiscal year 2014), the total number of loans in The Fund grew to more than 1,000. | |
| Starting in February 2013 (the beginning of fiscal year 2014), Thibeault misappropriated his | |
| investors’ money by creating fictitious loans and diverting the disbursement of loan proceeds to his | |
| personal and business bank accounts. Thibeault used the names and personal information of | |
| friends and associates without their knowledge or permission to create these fraudulent loans. | |
| Using these identities, Thibeault prepared forged promissory notes to cover up his | |
| misappropriations. | |
| 10. In the books and records of The Fund, the fraudulent loans Thibeault had created | |
| were designated with a program code “TA,” which indicated that the loans were originated through | |
| TAFT Financial Services, LLC (each a “TA Loan” or together the “TA Loans”). TAFT, a special | |
| purpose vehicle controlled by Thibeault, was used as an intermediary to issue the fraudulent loans. | |
| During the period covered by the fiscal year 2014 audit (February 1, 2013 to January 31, 2014), | |
| The Fund purportedly acquired 22 TA Loans valued at $8,500,000, or $387,000 on average with | |
| the largest being $537,000. Each of the TA Loans was significantly larger than the typical loans | |
| acquired by The Fund, which rarely exceeded $20,000. After the close of fiscal year 2014 | |
| (January 31, 2014), The Fund purportedly acquired additional TA Loans, some of which were | |
| purportedly acquired while the audit for fiscal year 2014 was ongoing. By the end of calendar year | |
| 2014, The Fund’s valuation report reflected 40 TA Loans with an aggregate reported value of | |
| approximately $16 million. All $16 million had, in fact, been misappropriated by Thibeault and | |
| GL Capital. | |
| 11. Throughout fiscal year 2014 (February 1, 2013 to January 31, 2014), The Fund also | |
| “invested” approximately $6 million in private placement promissory notes called LAOH Notes | |
| for factoring transactions with Philippine companies that purportedly had supplied raw materials to | |
| two major conglomerates in the Philippines. Factoring transactions involve the sale of a business’s | |
| accounts receivable to a third party at a discount in order to meet the business’s cash needs. The | |
| factoring transaction here involved the use of two shell companies (one domestic and one in the | |
| Philippines). Money from The Fund was purportedly used to purchase the accounts receivable of | |
| the Philippine suppliers such that, when the two conglomerates made payments, the money would | |
| be transferred back to The Fund. In reality, all of the funds related to the LAOH Notes were | |
| misappropriated. | |
| 5 | |
| 12. On December 11, 2014, Thibeault was arrested and charged with criminal securities | |
| fraud by the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts. On March 3, 2016, | |
| Thibeault pled guilty to one count of securities fraud and one count of obstruction of justice. On | |
| June 16, 2016, he was sentenced to nine years in prison with three years of supervised release, and | |
| was ordered to pay $15,300,403 in restitution. | |
| 13. On January 9, 2015, the Commission filed a civil securities fraud action against | |
| Thibeault, GL Capital, and others. On September 23, 2016, a final judgment was entered against | |
| Thibeault in the Commission’s civil action against him. The final judgment permanently enjoined | |
| Thibeault from violating Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, Section | |
| 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act | |
| of 1940. In addition, the final judgment ordered that Thibeault’s obligation to pay disgorgement of | |
| $15,300,403 and prejudgment interest thereon be deemed satisfied by the order of restitution | |
| entered in the parallel criminal proceeding. | |
| Audit Work Performed by Kouser and Dougherty for The Fund | |
| 14. BBD performed the audits for The Fund for the fiscal years ended January 31, 2013 | |
| (fiscal year 2013) and January 31, 2014 (fiscal year 2014). Kouser was the engagement partner for | |
| both of these audits, and Dougherty was the audit manager for these audits. Both Kouser and | |
| Dougherty had no experience with the kind of factoring transactions in the LAOH Notes. Further, | |
| neither Kouser nor Dougherty ever audited any funds with consumer loans as assets. Numerous | |
| delays in confirming information regarding the LAOH Notes as part of valuation procedures | |
| caused BBD to delay the issuance of its audit report for fiscal year 2014. BBD’s audit report for | |
| the fiscal year 2014 audit was not issued until May 29, 2014, nearly four months after The Fund’s | |
| fiscal year-end. | |
| 15. Kouser only had one meeting with Thibeault over the course of the audits even | |
| though Thibeault was the principal of GL Capital and the co-portfolio manager of The Fund. | |
| During that meeting, Kouser and Thibeault focused on a PowerPoint document Thibeault had | |
| created regarding the LAOH Notes. Dougherty never met with Thibeault. The procedures | |
| performed for GL Capital and The Fund by BBD’s auditing team were not sufficient, even though | |
| Kouser understood that The Fund’s audit was “more involved” than a typical audit because of the | |
| type of assets held by The Fund. | |
| Failure to Act with Due Professional Care and Exercise Professional Skepticism | |
| 16. Under PCAOB Standards, auditors are required to exercise due professional care in | |
| the planning and performance of the audit and the preparation of the audit report.4 AU Section | |
| 230.01. Due professional care requires the engagement partner to know, at a minimum, the | |
| 4 Citations to PCAOB Standards (“AU” or “AS”) are citations to standards in effect at the | |
| time of the relevant conduct. | |
| 6 | |
| relevant professional accounting and auditing standards, as well as to be knowledgeable about the | |
| client. AU Section 230.06. Further, the auditors are required to exercise professional skepticism, | |
| an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence. AU | |
| Section 230.07. | |
| 17. PCAOB Standards further require that auditors evaluate whether matters such as | |
| the subject entity’s business, operating characteristics, extent of recent changes in operations and | |
| internal controls, among others, are important to the company’s financial statements and if so, how | |
| they will affect the auditor’s procedures. AS No. 9.7. Further, “they should perform risk | |
| assessment procedures that are sufficient to provide a reasonable basis for identifying and | |
| assessing the risk of material misstatement, whether due to error or fraud, and designing further | |
| audit procedures.” AS No. 12.4. | |
| Failure to Understand the TA Loans and Their Impact on The Fund | |
| 18. In early 2014, at the outset of the fiscal year 2014 audit, GL Capital informed | |
| Kouser and Dougherty that The Fund had acquired larger loans, which had been originated during | |
| fiscal year 2014, and that these loans were larger because they were purportedly backing | |
| businesses or professional practices. | |
| 19. In actuality, as of January 31, 2014 (the end of fiscal year 2014), The Fund’s | |
| records reflected 22 TA Loans totaling $8.5 million (or $387,000 on average), with the largest loan | |
| valued at $537,000. The TA Loans were significantly different in nature and size from the more | |
| than 1,000 consumer loans ordinarily held by The Fund, which averaged $12,000 each and rarely | |
| exceeded $20,000. The TA Loans represented over 36% of the total consumer loan amounts in | |
| The Fund as of January 31, 2014. Moreover, 18 additional TA Loans had been acquired after | |
| January 31, 2014 (fiscal year 2015), for a total of 40 TA Loans, with a combined value of | |
| approximately $16 million. Because Thibeault was arrested in December 2014, the fiscal year | |
| 2015 audit was never conducted. The TA Loans were all serviced through a loan servicing entity | |
| affiliated with Thibeault, GL Capital, and The Fund. | |
| 20. TAFT, the entity that purportedly originated the TA Loans, was nominally run by a | |
| bartender friend of Thibeault’s with no banking, lending, or investment experience. Thibeault was | |
| not listed in the company’s state filings as an owner of TAFT, but he had the authority to disburse | |
| funds from TAFT bank accounts. Kouser and Dougherty were also aware that The Fund had a | |
| line-of-credit account with TAFT, which had a zero balance as of January 31, 2014. Yet, neither | |
| Kouser nor Dougherty asked about the owner of TAFT. They also did not make sufficient | |
| inquiries to determine whether TAFT was a related-party to The Fund. | |
| 21. Kouser and Dougherty did not pay proper attention to the TA Loans. In fact, they | |
| asked no questions about them even though at the start of the 2014 audit, the TA Loans were brand | |
| 7 | |
| new to The Fund, and represented over 36% of the value of all consumer loans in The Fund.5 | |
| Further, Kouser and Dougherty did not recognize the significance of the TA Loans and failed to | |
| make inquiries about them even though they were significantly different from the historically | |
| smaller unsecured consumer loans made by The Fund. | |
| 22. None of the documents prepared by or for Kouser and Dougherty as part of The | |
| Fund’s fiscal 2014 audit planning even identified that the larger TA Loans were new to the | |
| portfolio and represented a significant portion of the total consumer loan value in The Fund. By | |
| not scrutinizing the TA Loans, not only did they fail to obtain an adequate understanding of The | |
| Fund and its business environment, but Kouser and Dougherty also failed to gain an understanding | |
| of the investments made by The Fund and GL Capital. As a result, Kouser and Dougherty failed to | |
| identify and assess investment risks and fraud risks related to the significantly larger loans as part | |
| of the audit planning process, and thus failed to perform appropriate audit procedures to address | |
| these risks. | |
| 23. Kouser and Dougherty signed off on BBD’s audit planning memo and risk | |
| assessment, which failed to note that the significantly larger TA Loans were purportedly used to | |
| back businesses or professional practices, in contrast to the traditional smaller loans in The Fund | |
| that were unsecured consumer loans. Further, neither Kouser nor Dougherty understood or asked | |
| whether money distributed to these purported borrowers was going to any actual businesses or | |
| professional practices. | |
| Failure to Understand and Properly Confirm Information Related to the LAOH | |
| Notes | |
| 24. Facts about the LAOH Notes, as they were known to Kouser and Dougherty, | |
| required heightened scrutiny. First, the LAOH Notes were substantially different from the | |
| investments The Fund had traditionally made—the LAOH Notes were private placement | |
| promissory notes and not small unsecured consumer loans. Second, the structure of the LAOH | |
| Notes was very different from the direct lending investments that The Fund had historically made | |
| and included the creation of two shell companies to facilitate these transactions. Third, one of the | |
| shell companies that facilitated the LAOH Notes was owned by someone who also had owned | |
| more than 5% of the shares of The Fund in 2012 (in fact, that person owned more than 20%). | |
| Fourth, before investing in the LAOH Notes, the Fund had never entered into either a factoring | |
| transaction or an international investment. | |
| 25. During The Fund’s fiscal year 2014 audit, Kouser and Dougherty should have also | |
| learned additional facts concerning the LAOH Notes. For instance, Thibeault solicited one of his | |
| college friends to create one of the shell companies that facilitated the LAOH Notes. | |
| 5 After January 31, 2014 (close of fiscal year 2014) and while the 2014 audit was being | |
| performed, The Fund continued to acquire TA Loans which grew to be an even larger | |
| percentage of the Fund’s assets. | |
| 8 | |
| 26. Kouser and Dougherty did not ask why either of the shell companies created to | |
| facilitate the LAOH Notes transactions was necessary to the transactions. Further, they failed to | |
| identify and assess the fraud risks of these transactions in the Philippines in the audit work papers. | |
| 27. Auditors “should place emphasis on testing material transactions with parties he | |
| knows are related to the reporting entity.” AU Section 334.07. To determine the existence of | |
| related party transactions, auditors may review material investment transactions to “determine | |
| whether the nature and extent of investments during the period create related parties.” AU Section | |
| 334.07. Despite knowing that one individual currently owned one of the shell companies that | |
| facilitated the LAOH Notes and had owned more than 5% (and in fact owned 20%) of the shares of | |
| The Fund in 2012, Kouser and Dougherty failed to ask anyone at GL Capital or the shell company | |
| about the relationship between the entities. Had Kouser and Dougherty appropriately inquired | |
| about the nature of these transactions, it would have revealed that, in addition to owning a | |
| significant portion of The Fund, the individual who owned that shell company (i) had created the | |
| shell company solely at the direction of Thibeault, and (ii) was listed as a borrower in The Fund | |
| who held a note of approximately $418,000 with an interest rate over 15%. Had the auditors | |
| known this information, they would have been required to perform additional auditing procedures | |
| to determine the legitimacy and valuation of the LAOH Notes. | |
| 28. During the process of confirming information related to the LAOH Notes as part of | |
| valuation procedures, Kouser and Dougherty failed to seek confirmation from the two major | |
| conglomerates in the Philippines that were purportedly the entities ultimately responsible for | |
| payment on the LAOH Notes. Had confirmations been obtained from these two companies, it | |
| would have likely revealed that the factoring transactions did not exist and the funds had been | |
| misappropriated. | |
| 29. PCAOB Standards require auditors to consider the competency and sufficiency of | |
| evidence gathered during the audit, assess the fraud risk throughout the audit, and maintain | |
| professional skepticism throughout the confirmation process. AU Section 230.08, AS No. 14.28, | |
| and AU Section 330.15. Further, in evaluating the assessed fraud risks, auditors should take into | |
| account matters like “documents that appear to have been altered,” “unusual discrepancies between | |
| the company’s records and confirmation responses,” and “unusual delays by management in | |
| providing requested information” such as during the confirmation process, among others. AS No. | |
| 14 (Appendix C). | |
| 30. Kouser and Dougherty failed to exercise heightened scrutiny when several | |
| circumstances surrounding the process of confirming information related to the valuation of the | |
| LAOH Notes called into question the reliability of the purported confirmations. First, as Kouser | |
| and Dougherty were aware, there were significant delays in getting responses from the suppliers in | |
| the Philippines as to the amounts they purportedly received from one of the shell companies. | |
| Indeed, these delays were so significant that they held up the issuance of BBD’s audit report. | |
| Second, when the confirmations were finally sent to BBD, the documents had identical type-face | |
| and dates, even though they purported to come from different businesses in the Philippines. | |
| 9 | |
| Dougherty and Kouser were aware of this anomaly; indeed, Dougherty remarked to Kouser that | |
| everyone in the Philippines “must use the same type-writer.” Third, the purported confirmations | |
| were all sent to BBD within 30 minutes of each other. Lastly, the confirmations contained multiple | |
| errors. With all these unusual circumstances and discrepancies surrounding the confirmation | |
| process, which would have led a reasonably skeptical auditor to question the reliability of those | |
| confirmations, Kouser and Dougherty should have taken additional steps to verify the LAOH | |
| Notes as assets of The Funds. For instance, an internet search would have revealed that the | |
| purported email addresses for these Philippine suppliers provided to Kouser and Dougherty by GL | |
| Capital did not match the public website domain addresses for the actual Philippine companies | |
| with those business names and were thus likely fictitious. Further, Kouser and Dougherty could | |
| have attempted to verify the source of the email responses with a telephone call to the purported | |
| sender. But even these steps were not taken. | |
| Failure to Understand The Fund’s Internal Controls | |
| 31. As the engagement partner who is ultimately responsible for the audit, Kouser | |
| failed to obtain an appropriate understanding of the internal controls for The Fund, as required by | |
| AS No. 12.18. In its planning work papers, BBD determined The Fund’s control environment to | |
| be low risk due to The Fund’s use of third-party service providers, including The Fund’s custodian | |
| (the “custody bank”). As a result, Kouser relied solely on the custody bank to confirm the | |
| existence of The Fund’s assets. But Kouser did not understand, and did not inquire of anyone at | |
| the custody bank or The Fund, what steps, if any, the custody bank undertook to substantiate | |
| ownership of the loans. Kouser also never asked about and thus never understood what loan | |
| documents were verified or maintained by the custody bank, nor did he ask who was providing the | |
| underlying loan documents to the custody bank. Further, Kouser failed to inquire whether the | |
| custody bank actually verified anything with the underlying borrowers of the consumer loans. | |
| Kouser obtained and reviewed a service report from the custody bank for the period covering the | |
| audit; however, the report did not specifically address procedures covering the alternative assets | |
| present in The Fund. | |
| Failure to Select Representative Sample of The Fund’s Assets | |
| 32. PCAOB Standards require that samples used in an audit be “selected in such a way | |
| that the sample can be expected to be representative of the population.” AU Section 350.24. | |
| Though Kouser and Dougherty signed work papers confirming that they tested a representative | |
| sample of loans in The Fund’s portfolio, their method involved a haphazard selection of 40 loans in | |
| The Fund’s portfolio, and did not include any of the (fraudulent) TA Loans. The TA Loans were | |
| more than a third of the portfolio, and were significantly larger in value and made on different | |
| terms than the other loans. These loans purportedly backed businesses or professional practices | |
| and had different interest rate structures and collateral arrangements from the traditional loans in | |
| the portfolio. For instance, collateral arrangements did not exist for the traditional unsecured | |
| consumer loans. Kouser and Dougherty failed to recognize that there were different types of loans | |
| in The Fund’s portfolio and that different samples should have been created for each type of loan | |
| 10 | |
| for testing. As a result, the sample tested was not representative of The Fund’s portfolio of | |
| investments and Kouser and Dougherty did not obtain the loan origination documents for the TA | |
| Loans that were fabricated, with fictitious borrower information and forged signatures. | |
| Failure to Obtain Sufficient Appropriate Audit Evidence | |
| 33. PCAOB Standards require that auditors “plan and perform audit procedures to | |
| obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to provide a reasonable basis for his or her opinion.” | |
| AS No. 15.4. | |
| 34. Kouser and Dougherty failed to obtain sufficient evidence as to the valuation of the | |
| TA Loans. The Fund’s annual report stated that securities it held would be measured at “fair | |
| value.” PCAOB Standards require that auditors obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence that | |
| provides “reasonable assurance that fair value measurements and disclosures are in conformity | |
| with GAAP.” AU Section 328.03. To do so, auditors should gain an understanding of the entity’s | |
| process for determining fair value measurement and disclosures in order to plan the nature, timing, | |
| and extent of the audit procedures. AU Sections 328.11 and 328.12. The unsecured consumer loan | |
| investments historically made by The Fund were $12,000 on average and were valued using GL | |
| Capital’s proprietary valuation model. The model, designed for loans up to $35,000, primarily | |
| used borrower’s credit scores and payment history to value the consumer loans. The TA Loans, | |
| however, were much larger and had an average value of $387,000 as of the end of fiscal year 2014 | |
| (January 31, 2014). Kouser and Dougherty failed to ask about or understand the propriety of using | |
| a valuation model designed for loans up to $35,000 for the much larger TA Loans. The TA Loans | |
| also had different valuation factors from the smaller traditional consumer loans, and Kouser and | |
| Dougherty did not understand or make any inquiries into these valuation factors, which included | |
| the collateral that purportedly secured the TA Loans and the one-year interest deferral on the TA | |
| Loans. Because they had no understanding and made no inquiries into these valuation factors, | |
| Kouser and Dougherty failed to properly assess the TA Loans’ value. | |
| 35. Had Kouser and Dougherty made the necessary inquiries, they would have | |
| recognized that the TA Loans were different in several ways from The Fund’s traditional | |
| unsecured consumer loan investments and these differences made additional audit procedures | |
| necessary. Kouser and Dougherty should have evaluated the value of the collateral by obtaining | |
| evidence of the underlying promissory notes, collateral arrangements, and lending documents. | |
| Instead, Kouser and Dougherty considered only the historical payments on the TA Loans and | |
| performed no analysis or inquiry into the promissory notes or collateral underlying the TA Loans. | |
| 36. Kouser and Dougherty failed to obtain sufficient evidence to confirm information | |
| concerning the valuation of the LAOH Notes with the two Philippine conglomerates that were | |
| purportedly responsible for the payment on the LAOH Notes. Had confirmations been sent to | |
| these entities, it would have likely revealed that the factoring transactions did not exist and that | |
| investor funds had been misappropriated. By failing to assess payment terms with the entities | |
| 11 | |
| holding the “credit risk” to the transactions, Kouser and Dougherty did not properly audit the | |
| valuation of the LAOH Notes. AU Section 328.03. | |
| Failure to Properly Prepare Audit Documentation | |
| 37. Under PCAOB Standards, auditors should prepare audit documentation in sufficient | |
| detail to provide a clear understanding of its purpose, source, and the conclusions reached. AS No. | |
| 3.4. Also, the documentation should be appropriately organized to provide a clear link to the | |
| significant findings or issues. AS No. 3.4. | |
| 38. Kouser repeatedly failed to prepare adequate documentation for numerous aspects | |
| of the audit of The Fund. For instance, he failed to document information concerning the custody | |
| bank’s procedures on the custody and verification of consumer loans in The Fund’s portfolio and | |
| information concerning the two fraud risk discussions he claims he had with The Fund’s co- | |
| portfolio manager and an associate general counsel at GL Capital. | |
| E. Findings | |
| 39. Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that the Respondents engaged in | |
| improper professional conduct under Section 4C(a)(2) of the Exchange Act and Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) | |
| of the Commission’s Rules of Practice. | |
| IV. | |
| In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions | |
| agreed to in Respondents’ Offers. | |
| Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, effective immediately, that: | |
| A. Kouser is denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission as | |
| an accountant. | |
| 1. After three years from the date of this order, Kouser may request that | |
| the Commission consider his reinstatement by submitting an application (attention: | |
| Office of the Chief Accountant) to resume appearing or practicing before the | |
| Commission as: | |
| a. a preparer or reviewer, or a person responsible for the preparation or | |
| review, of any public company’s financial statements that are filed with | |
| the Commission (other than as a member of an audit committee, as that | |
| term is defined in Section 3(a)(58) of the Exchange Act). Such an | |
| application must satisfy the Commission that Kouser’s work in his | |
| practice before the Commission as an accountant will be reviewed either | |
| 12 | |
| by the independent audit committee of the public company for which he | |
| works or in some other acceptable manner, as long as he practices before | |
| the Commission in this capacity; and/or | |
| b. a preparer or reviewer, or a person responsible for the preparation or | |
| review, of any public company’s financial statements that are filed with | |
| the Commission as a member of an audit committee, as that term is | |
| defined in Section 3(a)(58) of the Exchange Act. Such an application | |
| will be considered on a facts and circumstances basis with respect to | |
| such membership, and the applicant’s burden of demonstrating good | |
| cause for reinstatement will be particularly high given the role of the | |
| audit committee in financial and accounting matters; and/or | |
| c. an independent accountant. | |
| Such an application must satisfy the Commission that: | |
| (1) Kouser, or the public accounting firm with which he is | |
| associated, is registered with the PCAOB in accordance | |
| with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and such registration | |
| continues to be effective; | |
| (2) Kouser, or the registered public accounting firm with which | |
| he is associated, has been inspected by the PCAOB and that | |
| inspection did not identify any criticisms of or potential | |
| defects in Kouser’s or the firm’s quality control system that | |
| would indicate that Kouser will not receive appropriate | |
| supervision; | |
| (3) Kouser has resolved all disciplinary issues with the | |
| PCAOB, and has complied with all terms and conditions of | |
| any sanctions imposed by the PCAOB (other than | |
| reinstatement by the Commission); and | |
| (4) Kouser acknowledges his responsibility, as long as he | |
| appears or practices before the Commission as an | |
| independent accountant, to comply with all requirements of | |
| the Commission and the PCAOB, including, but not limited | |
| to, all requirements relating to registration, inspections, | |
| concurring partner reviews and quality control standards. | |
| 2. The Commission will consider an application by Kouser to resume | |
| appearing or practicing before the Commission provided that his state CPA license is | |
| current and he has resolved all other disciplinary issues with the applicable state boards | |
| 13 | |
| of accountancy. However, if state licensure is dependent on reinstatement by the | |
| Commission, the Commission will consider an application on its other merits. The | |
| Commission’s review may include consideration of, in addition to the matters referenced | |
| above, any other matters relating to Kouser’s character, integrity professional conduct, or | |
| qualifications to appear or practice before the Commission as an accountant. Whether an | |
| application demonstrates good cause will be considered on a facts and circumstances | |
| basis with due regard for protecting the integrity of the Commission’s processes. | |
| B. Dougherty is denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Commission | |
| as an accountant. | |
| 1. After two years from the date of this order, Dougherty may request that | |
| the Commission consider his reinstatement by submitting an application (attention: | |
| Office of the Chief Accountant) to resume appearing or practicing before the | |
| Commission as: | |
| a. a preparer or reviewer, or a person responsible for the preparation or | |
| review, of any public company’s financial statements that are filed with | |
| the Commission (other than as a member of an audit committee, as that | |
| term is defined in Section 3(a)(58) of the Exchange Act). Such an | |
| application must satisfy the Commission that Dougherty’s work in his | |
| practice before the Commission as an accountant will be reviewed either | |
| by the independent audit committee of the public company for which he | |
| works or in some other acceptable manner, as long as he practices before | |
| the Commission in this capacity; and/or | |
| b. a preparer or reviewer, or a person responsible for the preparation or | |
| review, of any public company’s financial statements that are filed with | |
| the Commission as a member of an audit committee, as that term is | |
| defined in Section 3(a)(58) of the Exchange Act. Such an application | |
| will be considered on a facts and circumstances basis with respect to | |
| such membership, and the applicant’s burden of demonstrating good | |
| cause for reinstatement will be particularly high given the role of the | |
| audit committee in financial and accounting matters; and/or | |
| c. an independent accountant. | |
| Such an application must satisfy the Commission that: | |
| (1) Dougherty, or the public accounting firm with which he is | |
| associated, is registered with the PCAOB in accordance | |
| with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and such registration | |
| continues to be effective; | |
| 14 | |
| (2) Dougherty, or the registered public accounting firm with | |
| which he is associated, has been inspected by the PCAOB | |
| and that inspection did not identify any criticisms of or | |
| potential defects in Dougherty’s or the firm’s quality | |
| control system that would indicate that Dougherty will not | |
| receive appropriate supervision; | |
| (3) Dougherty has resolved all disciplinary issues with the | |
| PCAOB, and has complied with all terms and conditions of | |
| any sanctions imposed by the PCAOB (other than | |
| reinstatement by the Commission); and | |
| (4) Dougherty acknowledges his responsibility, as long as he | |
| appears or practices before the Commission as an | |
| independent accountant, to comply with all requirements of | |
| the Commission and the PCAOB, including, but not limited | |
| to, all requirements relating to registration, inspections, | |
| concurring partner reviews and quality control standards. | |
| 2. The Commission will consider an application by Dougherty to resume | |
| appearing or practicing before the Commission provided that his state CPA license is | |
| current and he has resolved all other disciplinary issues with the applicable state boards | |
| of accountancy. However, if state licensure is dependent on reinstatement by the | |
| Commission, the Commission will consider an application on its other merits. The | |
| Commission’s review may include consideration of, in addition to the matters referenced | |
| above, any other matters relating to Dougherty’s character, integrity professional conduct, | |
| or qualifications to appear or practice before the Commission as an accountant. Whether | |
| an application demonstrates good cause will be considered on a facts and circumstances | |
| basis with due regard for protecting the integrity of the Commission’s processes. | |
| By the Commission. | |
| Brent J. Fields | |
| Secretary | |