\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jon GILES, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-3126\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nJON GILES,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 CR 00112-1 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 28, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. After Jon Giles’s DNA was found at\\nthe scene of the robbery of North Community Bank, FBI agents\\ninterrogated him at the Pontiac Correctional Center where he\\nwas serving a prison term for two other bank robberies. Giles\\nconfessed to the robbery. Giles argues the district court erred\\n\\f2 No. 18-3126\\n\\nin denying his motion to suppress the confession, because his\\nprolonged solitary confinement prior to the interview rendered\\nhim incapable of exercising a voluntary and knowing waiver\\nof his Fifth Amendment rights. Giles also argues that the\\ndistrict court failed to properly address his mitigating argu-\\nments at sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we reject these\\narguments and affirm the orders of the district court.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In 2010, Jon Giles pleaded guilty to state robbery charges.\\nGiles spent the next two years in solitary confinement at\\nTamms Correctional Center. When Tamms was shuttered,\\nGiles was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center. He spent\\none month in general population before returning to isolation\\nfrom January 2013 until January 2014.\\n On August 30, 2013, during this period of solitary confine-\\nment, FBI agents Timothy Bacha and Michael Lovernick\\nquestioned Jon Giles. They were investigating a bank robbery\\nat North Community Bank that took place in 2009. DNA\\nrecovered from a glove found near the crime scene matched\\nGiles’s DNA. The glove was found next to dye-stained money\\nstolen from the bank.\\n At first, Giles refused to meet with the agents. Robin\\nLopeman, a Pontiac correctional officer, approached Giles’s cell\\nwith Bacha’s business card. Giles requested that she show the\\ncard to Robert Hall, a fellow inmate and former gang associate,\\nfollowing a “home-grown” prison custom of letting other\\ninmates know where you are going and who you are talking\\nto. Hall shouted his consent and Giles agreed to speak to the\\nagents.\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 3\\n\\n Bacha and Lovernick read Giles his Miranda rights, and he\\nagreed in writing to be questioned without an attorney present.\\nGiles initially denied his involvement in the North Community\\nBank robbery until he was shown the DNA report and photo-\\ngraphs of the dyed money. Giles then confessed to the robbery\\nand agreed to a cheek swab after being advised of his right to\\nrefuse. The swab matched the DNA found on the glove.\\n Giles was indicted on March 4, 2014, on one count of bank\\nrobbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 and one count of using a\\nfirearm in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(c). He moved to suppress the confession, arguing that\\nneither his Miranda waiver nor his confession were made\\nvoluntarily. In support of this claim, Giles cited his long-term\\nconfinement in a “small windowless cell” which provided little\\nopportunity for human interaction. Giles said his mental state\\nwas “precarious” and that he had experienced symptoms of\\n“acute anxiety attacks, insomnia … uncontrollable rage” and\\n“hallucinations.”\\n At an evidentiary hearing, Giles called psychiatrist\\nDr. Silberberg who testified that he conducted a forensic\\npsychiatric evaluation of Giles on November 4, 2014, and had\\nreviewed administrative and medical records. Dr. Silberberg\\nstated that prolonged isolation could result in impaired\\nmemory, attention, and concentration. Isolation could also\\naffect the ability to make rational decisions, and cause mood\\ndisorders. He testified that the effects could be temporary, and\\nthat a person might be competent at one point in time but not\\nanother. Dr. Silberberg recited Giles’s medical history, which\\nincluded treatment for psychological disorders and repeated\\nhead trauma, and concluded that Giles would be particularly\\n\\f4 No. 18-3126\\n\\nvulnerable to the effects of isolation. He concluded that Giles\\ndid not appreciate the significance of the Miranda warning and\\nthat his confession was not voluntary.\\n Lopeman described Giles’s initial refusal to speak with the\\nFBI agents; and how she showed Hall Bacha’s business card as\\nGiles requested. Hall testified that he knew Giles for 17 years,\\nthat both were members of the Four Corner Hustlers gang, and\\ncorroborated Lopeman’s testimony regarding Bacha’s business\\ncard. He said he spoke to Giles regularly, and had no difficulty\\ncommunicating with him.\\n Bacha corroborated the statements of Lopeman and Hall.\\nHe testified that Giles read a form informing him of his\\nMiranda rights, recited the consent portion back to Bacha\\nwithout any difficulty, and then signed the form agreeing to be\\ninterviewed without an attorney present. Giles denied involve-\\nment with the robbery until being shown the DNA evidence;\\nGiles then described the robbery, providing details such as the\\ngender of the teller he robbed and details about his getaway.\\n When Bacha asked whether Giles had information about\\nany other criminal activity, Giles indicated that he could\\nprovide information about money and drugs in exchange for\\na lenient sentence. When asked whether he had information\\nabout any murders, Giles stated that if the agents wanted to\\n“talk about bodies” that he would have to think about it. Giles\\nthen signed a consent form and gave a sample of his DNA.\\nBacha testified that Giles showed no signs of mental distress,\\ndid not appear disoriented, and appeared to be rational.\\n The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding\\nDr. Silberberg’s conclusions about Giles’s mental state on the\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 5\\n\\ndate of the interrogation and confession to be unsupported.\\nThe district court gave great weight to the testimony of\\nLopeman, Hall, and Bacha, all of whom were present on\\nAugust 30, 2013. The court concluded that Giles’s “conduct\\nand statements [reflected] a clear, intelligent, and knowledge-\\nable thought process for anyone in the defendant's difficult\\nsituation” and that his statements and actions were “contrary\\nto those of a person who is unable to appreciate either his\\nrights or the effect of waiving his rights” or who lacked free\\nwill. United States v. Giles, No. 14 CR 112, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\\n137232, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2015).\\n Giles was found guilty of the robbery. At sentencing, he\\nargued that the mental health effects of prolonged isolation\\nwarranted a reduced sentence. Other arguments in favor of\\nmitigation included Giles’s age upon release and the effect of\\ncontinued imprisonment on his mental health.\\n The district court sentenced Giles to a total term of 30 years’\\nimprisonment. Because Giles was given credit for time served,\\nand imprisonment was ordered to be served concurrently with\\nthe sentence for his other two robberies, Giles’s sentence was\\neffectively an additional 18 years of imprisonment for the\\nrobbery.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n A. The Confession and Conviction\\n This court considers whether a Miranda waiver was made\\nknowing and voluntarily de novo, but reviews the district\\ncourt’s findings of fact and credibility determinations under\\nthe clear error standard. United States v. Shabaz, 579 F.3d 815,\\n\\f6 No. 18-3126\\n\\n819–820 (7th. Cir 2009). “The evaluation of whether a confes-\\nsion is coerced involves consideration of the totality of the\\ncircumstances to determine whether the suspect confessed\\nvoluntarily, of his own free will, or whether the police over-\\nrode his volition.” Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 265 (7th Cir.\\n2018).\\n The district court received extensive briefing and held an\\nevidentiary hearing prior to denying Giles’s motion to sup-\\npress. Giles presented Dr. Silberberg’s testimony that Giles did\\nnot appreciate the significance of the Miranda warning given to\\nhim before the confession. The district court found Dr. Silber-\\nberg’s testimony was unsupported, and credited multiple fact\\nwitnesses who were actually present the day of the confession.\\n Bacha testified about the interview itself, stating that he\\nnoticed no signs of mental distress or anything else that would\\ncause him concern about the defendant's mental health. The\\ncourt concluded that “the totality of the evidence establishes\\nthat at the time in question, the defendant was a rational\\nperson who was in touch with reality, able to consider his\\noptions, and make intelligent, rational choices” and that his\\nconfession was the “product of a free and voluntary mind.”\\nUltimately, Giles failed to present evidence that the govern-\\nment obtained his confession through coercion.\\n Furthermore, Giles was identified as the major contributor\\nof DNA on a glove found outside the bank, and a DNA expert\\ntestified that the odds of the DNA coming from someone else\\nwas one in six trillion. Giles took the stand and offered an\\nimplausible explanation for the presence of his DNA—that his\\ngang took gloves from a shared box and his DNA may have\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 7\\n\\ngotten on it while he grabbed a different pair of gloves. In\\naddition to the compelling DNA evidence, two eyewitnesses\\ndescribed the bank robber as matching the general description\\nof Giles. There was sufficient evidence to convict Giles, even in\\nthe absence of the confession.\\n B. Sentencing\\n This court reviews claims of procedural error at sentencing\\nde novo. United States v. Banks, 828 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nThe district court must “consider a defendant's principal,\\nnonfrivolous arguments for lenience.” United States v. Martin,\\n718 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). In considering\\nsuch arguments, the district court must demonstrate it\\n“considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis\\nfor exercising [its] own legal decision making authority.” Rita\\nv. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).\\n Giles asked the court to consider reducing his sentence\\nbased on the effects of his solitary confinement. As he did in\\nhis motion to suppress, Giles relied on general literature about\\nthe effects of solitary confinement and Dr. Silberberg’s opinion\\nwhich the court already found to be unsupported.\\n Giles argues that the district court did not address his\\nargument that a longer prison sentence would fail as a deter-\\nrent because he would be 45 at the end of his sentence for the\\ntwo other robberies. The filings only contained a general\\ndiscussion of “aging out” and did not make any argument\\npersonal to Giles. Nevertheless, the district court did address\\nand reject this argument, stating that the court would “like to\\ngive a great deal of credit to his statement that he has reached\\nan age of maturity where he can look back at what he has done\\n\\f8 No. 18-3126\\n\\nand realize the many mistakes he has made” but found very\\nlittle likelihood of rehabilitation based on Giles’s extensive\\ncriminal background and continued misconduct in prison.\\n Giles also argues that the district court failed to discuss the\\nnegative consequences of continued incarceration on his\\nmental health. The district court did address this argument by\\ngranting Giles’s request that he be placed at a facility with a\\nmental health treatment program.\\n Lastly, Giles argues the district court failed to ask whether\\nhe was satisfied that the court had addressed his main argu-\\nments in mitigation. While we have encouraged such a specific\\ninquiry in the past, we have not required it. United States v.\\nGarcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We encourage\\nsentencing courts to inquire of defense counsel whether they\\nare satisfied that the court has addressed their main arguments\\nin mitigation.”) (emphasis added). While it didn’t use the\\nspecific format we articulated in Garcia-Segura, the district\\ncourt invited comments from the parties four separate times\\nduring the sentencing hearing. Giles raised no objections at\\nthat time as to the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation\\nfor its sentencing decision.\\n The district court set forth a well-reasoned explanation for\\nGiles’s sentence, and considered all of Giles’s non-frivolous\\narguments. The objections he raises now do not show other-\\nwise.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Giles failed to show that his solitary confinement rendered\\nhim incapable of voluntarily waiving his Fifth Amendment\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 9\\n\\nrights. He also failed to show any error in the court’s sentenc-\\ning. The district court’s orders are hereby affirmed.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3865,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4648755,"string":"4,648,755"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael CLARK, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Michael Clark"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2604"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Hamilton, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2604\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL CLARK,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cr-53-JDP-1 — James D. Peterson, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Michael\\nClark was convicted of possessing a mixture containing fen-\\ntanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Clark had been\\nfound in a hotel room with more than 80 grams of a mixture\\nof heroin and fentanyl, a digital scale, and cellophane bags.\\nHe does not appeal any aspect of his jury trial, but he chal-\\nlenges the denial of his motion for a Franks hearing challeng-\\ning the issuance of the search warrant for the hotel room. He\\n\\n2 No. 18-2604\\n\\nalso challenges the denial of his motion to suppress without\\nan evidentiary hearing. And he challenges two aspects of his\\nsentence: the guideline treatment of his conviction for drug\\ndistribution that occurred in Illinois seven months after his\\nWisconsin arrest and one condition of supervised release. We\\nvacate Clark’s conviction and remand for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on his Franks challenge. We affirm on the denial of his mo-\\ntion to suppress without a hearing. We also affirm on the\\nguideline issue and determine that the supervised release\\nchallenge was waived. We address in Part I the need for a\\nFranks hearing and in Part II the need for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on the motion to suppress. We address the sentencing is-\\nsues in Part III.\\nI. The Need for a Franks Hearing\\n The Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for the use of\\nsearch warrants calls for probable cause determinations by a\\n“neutral and detached magistrate” as opposed to “officer[s]\\nengaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out\\ncrime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The ap-\\nplication for a warrant “must provide the magistrate with a\\nsubstantial basis for determining the existence of probable\\ncause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).\\n The ability of the neutral and detached magistrate to de-\\ntermine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the infor-\\nmation the police submit. “[A] search warrant is not valid if\\nthe police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting\\nfalse, material information,” or by omitting material infor-\\nmation from the affidavit provided to the issuing judge.\\nUnited States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013),\\nciting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 15556 (1978). To inval-\\nidate a warrant on this basis, a defendant at a so-called Franks\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 3\\n\\nhearing must prove by a preponderance of the evidence either\\nfalsity or recklessness, as well as materiality. McMurtrey, 704\\nF.3d at 509.\\n Merely to obtain a Franks hearing, however, a defendant\\ndoes not need to prove the Franks violation. A defendant must\\nonly make a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the war-\\nrant application contained a material falsity or omission that\\nwould alter the issuing judge’s probable cause determination,\\nand (2) that the affiant included the material falsity or omitted\\ninformation intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the\\ntruth. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014);\\nsee also, e.g., United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702, 708 (7th\\nCir. 2016); United States v. Mullins, 803 F.3d 858, 861–62 (7th\\nCir. 2015); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 887–88 (7th\\nCir. 2008). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not\\nrequired until the Franks hearing itself.” Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n820.\\n Clark asserted in the district court that the police investi-\\ngator who applied for the search warrant of the hotel room\\ndeliberately or recklessly omitted critical information affect-\\ning the credibility of the unidentified informant who told the\\nofficer about drug distribution at the hotel where Clark was\\narrested. The district court denied the motion for an eviden-\\ntiary hearing on the question. The court agreed that the police\\nhad provided no information about the informant’s credibil-\\nity. The court found, however, that the police had provided\\nsufficient corroboration for the informant’s tip so that the war-\\nrant did not depend on the informant’s credibility. That\\nmeant the omitted credibility information was not material\\nfor Franks purposes. We disagree and find that a hearing is\\nneeded. “[W]e review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear\\n\\n4 No. 18-2604\\n\\nerror, but any legal determinations that factored into the rul-\\ning are reviewed de novo.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 815; see also Han-\\ncock, 844 F.3d at 70708.\\n A. The Warrant Application\\n Investigator Todd Maas is a police officer in Superior, Wis-\\nconsin. He prepared the warrant application and signed the\\nsupporting affidavit. Maas said that a confidential informant\\ncontacted him on October 14, 2015 and told him that earlier\\nthat day, he had driven someone to a parking lot adjacent to\\nthe Baywalk Inn in Superior to buy heroin from a black male\\ncalled “Big Mike,” the brother of “Toonchie.” Maas said he\\nand another officer then performed their own investigations,\\nincluding surveillance of the parking lot. Maas observed a\\nblack male leave the hotel and enter and then exit at least five\\ncars in the hotel parking lot. He also learned that the guest\\nstaying in Room 203 was the only hotel guest who both had\\npaid in cash and was staying only one night, all behavior that\\nMaas said was typical of drug trafficking, based on his train-\\ning and experience. Maas also said he had spoken to a woman\\n(referred to in this case as the “mom on a mission”) who said\\nthat her daughter was a heroin addict and that she (the\\nmother) had followed a man she suspected of drug-dealing to\\nRoom 203.\\n Maas included all of this information in his affidavit,\\nwhich convinced a state trial judge to issue a search warrant\\nfor Room 203. Maas did not include any damaging infor-\\nmation about the credibility of his confidential informant,\\nwho was the only source of information specifically about\\ndrug trafficking. The informant was being paid for his ser-\\nvices. He also had two pending criminal charges against him,\\nfifteen prior convictions, and a history of opiate and cocaine\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 5\\n\\nabuse, and he was hoping to receive a reduced sentence in ex-\\nchange for his cooperation.\\n B. Materiality\\n Where an affidavit is based primarily on tips from an in-\\nformant, probable cause can be shown based on the totality of\\nthe circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n816. In cases based on informants’ tips, we have identified five\\nfactors of particular relevance: (1) the level of detail the in-\\nformant provided; (2) the extent to which the informant’s in-\\nformation is based on his or her own first-hand observations;\\n(3) the degree to which police have corroborated the inform-\\nant’s information; (4) the time elapsed between the events re-\\nported and the warrant application; (5) and “whether the in-\\nformant appeared or testified before the magistrate.” Glover,\\n755 F.3d at 816, citing United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594,\\n600 (7th Cir. 2011). Information omitted from a warrant appli-\\ncation is material when its omission affects the probable cause\\ndetermination. Glover, 755 F.3d at 820.\\n In performing this probable cause inquiry, courts must\\nkeep in mind that a search warrant for a home, business, or\\neven hotel room can authorize highly intrusive and even de-\\nstructive actions by the police, and that informants, especially\\nin drug cases, can be unreliable and motivated by rivalries or\\nrevenge. United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.\\n2018), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1617 (1968) (“What\\nwe blandly call ‘Terry stops’ can be highly intrusive.” They are\\n“not just ‘a “petty indignity,”’ wrote the Supreme Court, but\\n‘a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a person, which may\\ninflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is\\nnot to be undertaken lightly’”); United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d\\n1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2009) (“For all we know, [the informant]\\n\\n6 No. 18-2604\\n\\ncould have been a rival drug dealer, an angry customer, or\\nhad some other beef” with the defendant).\\n Our cases do not hold that a Franks hearing is required\\nevery time some substantial adverse information about an in-\\nformant’s credibility is omitted from a probable cause affida-\\nvit. Hancock, 844 F.3d at 709. We have said generally that\\nwhere a warrant is obtained based on an informant’s tip, “in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility or potential bias\\nis crucial.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 816; see, e.g., United States v.\\nBradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018). That being said,\\nwe also have upheld warrants tainted by police omission of\\nadverse informant credibility information. Our Franks hearing\\ncases show that when police have sufficiently corroborated an\\ninformant’s tip, the omission of facts pertaining to the inform-\\nant’s credibility may not be material.\\n In United States v. Musgraves, for example, the police omit-\\nted from the affidavit important and damaging credibility in-\\nformation about one informant. 831 F.3d 454, 45960 (7th Cir.\\n2016). We affirmed the denial of a Franks hearing because a\\nsecond affidavit included information from a second inform-\\nant without credibility problems who had provided the police\\nwith specific and timely information about the suspect’s drug\\ntrafficking to support the warrant. Id. at 46061.\\n In United States v. Bradford, we also held that the affidavit’s\\nomission of facts damaging to an informant’s credibility did\\nnot require suppression of evidence seized with a search war-\\nrant for drug and weapons trafficking. 905 F.3d at 50305. In\\nBradford, the application failed to disclose that the informant\\nhad three felony convictions, was on probation, and was be-\\ning paid for his help. Id. at 502. But his information was fresh,\\nspecific, and corroborated by his having carried out\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 7\\n\\ncontrolled drug buys from the target and by specific infor-\\nmation from another informant without his credibility prob-\\nlems. Id. at 504\\n In United States v. Hancock, we affirmed the denial of a\\nFranks hearing in similar circumstances. 844 F.3d at 710. An\\ninformant provided fresh, detailed information about a sus-\\npect’s drug sales, but the affidavit for the warrant left out in-\\nformation about the informant’s own criminal history and the\\nfact that he was in custody when he provided the information.\\nId. at 70506. We found that the omissions were not material\\nbecause the warrant application included extensive corrobo-\\nration of the suspect’s drug trafficking and intimidation of\\nwitnesses. That corroboration came from other informants, a\\nsearch of a cellular telephone showing texts referring to drug\\ndeals, and from an earlier interview with the suspect himself.\\nThe quantity and quality of corroborating information meant\\nthat the omitted adverse credibility information about one in-\\nformant did not require a Franks hearing. Id. at 70710.\\n This case is readily distinguishable. This warrant applica-\\ntion did not include any of the substantial adverse information\\nMaas had about the informant’s credibility. The government\\ndoes not try to justify Maas’s omissions, but it argues that the\\ninformant’s credibility was not material to the warrant appli-\\ncation because Maas and his colleague investigated and cor-\\nroborated the informant’s tip sufficiently to provide probable\\ncause independent of that tip. We disagree.\\n The corroboration in this case was much weaker than in\\nthe cases where we upheld warrants’ validity in the face of\\ncredibility omissions. This case is more akin to Glover, where\\nthe warrant application depended so heavily on the credibil-\\nity of the informant. Here, the police had no controlled buys.\\n\\n8 No. 18-2604\\n\\nThey never saw money or drugs change hands. Even the in-\\nformant did not claim to have seen drugs or money change\\nhands. If his tip did not pan out, he had plenty of deniability.\\nHe claimed only that his passenger had met with “Big Mike”\\noutside his presence to buy heroin. And the “mom on a mis-\\nsion” had no track record of credibility and provided no spe-\\ncifics to support her suspicions of the man she had followed\\nto Room 203. In sum, the foundation for probable cause inde-\\npendent of the credibility of the informant was so meager in\\nthis case that the credibility of the informant was material for\\nFranks purposes.\\n C. Deliberate or Reckless Omissions?\\n To obtain a Franks hearing, Clark needed to “offer direct\\nevidence of [Maas’s] state of mind or circumstantial evidence\\nthat [Maas] had a subjective intent to deceive based on the na-\\nture of [his] omissions.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. In his report\\nand recommendation to the district court, we must note, the\\nmagistrate judge in Clark’s case incorrectly read our decision\\nin Glover to “mandate that … court[s] infer recklessness from\\nthe fact that an officer omitted known and substantial adverse\\ninformation from a search warrant affidavit….” That is not\\ncorrect. In Glover, we held that “credibility omissions them-\\nselves, even in the absence of more direct evidence of the of-\\nficer’s state of mind, provide sufficient circumstantial evi-\\ndence to support a reasonable and thus permissible inference\\nof reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. (emphasis added). In\\nother words, credibility omissions do not require courts to in-\\nfer recklessness. Such omissions are matters for a trier of fact\\nto weigh, just as when a witness testifies incorrectly or falsely\\nabout one or a few matters, and the trier of fact must weigh\\nthe rest of the witness’s testimony.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 9\\n\\n In this case, the questions of materiality and the police af-\\nfiant’s state of mind are intertwined. To the extent that cor-\\nroboration might have avoided the need for a Franks hearing\\nin this case, the reliability of the corroboration all depended,\\nfrom the issuing judge’s point of view, on the same officer\\nwhose credibility is at issue: Maas omitted all adverse infor-\\nmation he had about the credibility of the informant who pro-\\nvided the most specific (but still second-hand) information\\nabout drug trafficking. As noted, the omission of so much im-\\nportant information permits (but does not require) an infer-\\nence that the omissions were deliberate or reckless. If the\\nshowing of probable cause in the warrant application de-\\npended on the credibility of the informant, that permissible\\ninference should be enough to obtain a Franks hearing.\\n The district court’s and government’s rationale for deny-\\ning a Franks hearing is that Maas’s own observations supply\\nprobable cause, independent of the informant. We assume\\nthat if Maas’s own observations are credited, they could lead\\na reasonable judge to find probable cause, though the appli-\\ncation would have been much weaker without the inform-\\nant’s tip to Maas. The problem is that Maas’s credibility can\\nlegitimately be questioned here based on what could have\\nbeen deliberate or reckless omissions of information about the\\ncredibility of the informant.\\n This is where materiality and intent become intertwined.\\nIf the omissions were deliberate or reckless, it would not be\\nunreasonable to take seriously the prospect that other por-\\ntions of the same warrant application may have been deliber-\\nately or recklessly false. Judges often instruct jurors that if\\nthey believe a witness has lied intentionally about a material\\nmatter, they may (but are not required to) discount the\\n\\n10 No. 18-2604\\n\\nwitness’s testimony on other matters. See United States v.\\nWeinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1971) (no positive rule\\nof law excludes witness’s testimony entirely based on willful\\nfalsehood, but such falsification presents issue for jury to con-\\nsider in weighing rest of testimony), quoting Knowles v. People,\\n15 Mich. 408, 412 (1867); Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E, Grenig, and\\nWilliam C. Lee, 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. §§ 15:0106 (6th ed.\\n2019).\\n The same point is at the heart of the Supreme Court’s ju-\\nrisprudence on impeachment evidence in Brady cases. Brady\\nv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny establish that\\ngovernment-suppressed evidence is material “if there is a rea-\\nsonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the\\nresult of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles v.\\nWhitely, 514 U.S. 419, 43334 (1995), quoting United States v.\\nBagley, 473 U.S. 657, 682 (1985). Strong, non-cumulative evi-\\ndence that undermines the credibility of an important govern-\\nment witness satisfies that definition. Sims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d\\n1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The reason is simple. Evidence in-\\ndicating that a witness whose testimony “may well be deter-\\nminative of guilt or innocence” is unreliable might prompt a\\njury to distrust everything the witness says. Giglio v. United\\nStates, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The same logic applies in this\\ncontext. Maas’s potentially intentional or reckless omission\\ncompromises his credibility, which determines whether prob-\\nable cause for the warrant existed or not.\\n To be clear, we are not saying or finding here that Maas\\nwas in fact deliberately or recklessly deceptive. The issue on\\nappeal is only whether Clark was entitled to a hearing, one\\nwhere Maas’s credibility could be addressed with evidence\\nfrom both sides. The informant was the only source of\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 11\\n\\ninformation (and again, that was only second-hand) who said\\nthe person in Room 203 was actually dealing drugs. All of the\\nother information in the warrant application indicated\\ngrounds for suspicion, but we can assume that Maas had a\\ngood reason for including the informant’s more specific infor-\\nmation. The complete omission of the available damaging in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility permits an infer-\\nence that Maas was not being honest and careful with the is-\\nsuing court. Whether he in fact was honest and careful about\\nthe facts is an appropriate subject for the Franks hearing on\\nremand.1\\nII. The Timing of the Warrant and Search\\n Defendant Clark was in Room 203 when police executed\\nthe warrant. Also in the room were cellophane bags, a digital\\nscale, and approximately 82 grams of a mixture of heroin and\\nfentanyl. The police photographed the hotel room during\\ntheir search. In a photograph of suspected drugs on a\\nnightstand, a digital clock is visible, reading 8:15 p.m. If the\\nclock was correct, the search was executed at least 25 minutes\\nbefore the judge issued the warrant.\\n\\n\\n 1 Maas’s application also did not explain why the informant would\\nknow heroin if he saw it. See United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 75657 (7th\\nCir. 2003) (no probable cause for search warrant where affidavit was based\\non informant’s report of seeing drugs in defendant’s house, but according\\nto affidavit, informant failed to give details about specific location and\\namount of drugs, or any explanation as to how informant knew that what\\nshe saw were controlled substances). Nor did Maas provide the kind of\\ndetail about his own training and experience that is needed to justify reli-\\nance upon them. See generally, e.g., United States v. Scott, 901 F.3d 842, 845\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (“Details … are vital when an officer proposes his own\\ntraining and experience as the basis of a warrant”).\\n\\n12 No. 18-2604\\n\\n The police of course are not permitted to rely on a search\\nwarrant that has not yet been approved by a judge. The dis-\\ntrict court denied Clark’s motion to suppress without a hear-\\ning. The issue here is whether the photograph of the clock was\\nsufficient evidence for Clark to have an evidentiary hearing\\non his motion to suppress.\\n A defendant who requests a suppression hearing must\\npresent “definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural facts\\n… demonstrat[ing] that there is a disputed material issue of\\nfact.” United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1995);\\nsee United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n“Reliance on vague, conclusory allegations is insufficient.”\\nUnited States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n In response to Clark’s motion to suppress, the government\\nsubmitted the “metadata” from the digital camera. The\\nmetadata showed a host of data about each photograph, in-\\ncluding the time each was taken. The metadata showed that\\nall of the search photographs were taken between 10:36 and\\n10:52 p.m., well after the judge issued the search warrant.\\nClark responded in turn not with an affidavit from any wit-\\nness to the search but with results of Google searches about\\nhow to edit metadata for photographs. In light of the\\nmetadata, and in the absence of any specific indications that\\ndata had been altered, the district court decided that there was\\nno need for a hearing and denied Clark’s motion to suppress.\\n The situation here is similar to United States v. Woods, 995\\nF.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1993).2 In Woods, the police conducted a\\n\\n 2 Another portion of the Woods opinion was abrogated by the Supreme\\n\\nCourt’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), as we noted\\nin United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 13\\n\\nsearch on February 12th. The problem was that both the war-\\nrant and the supporting affidavit bore handwritten dates of\\nFebruary 14th, though both were also date-stamped February\\n11th. The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the\\nsearch had been executed two days before the warrant was\\nissued. The government responded with an affidavit from a\\nprosecutor testifying that the application and warrant were\\nboth prepared and signed on February 11th and that the Feb-\\nruary 14th dates were mistakes. Using language associated\\nwith civil motions for summary judgment—“disputed issues\\nof material fact” and “genuine factual dispute”—we affirmed\\nthe district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress\\nwithout a hearing. Because the defendant had failed to re-\\nspond to the government’s explanation, we agreed that he\\nhad failed to show a genuine factual dispute and a need for\\nan evidentiary hearing. Id. at 715–16.\\n One might argue that in Woods the government submitted\\nan affidavit to explain the discrepancy, while the government\\nhere submitted letters and copies of documents, without any\\naffidavits. Both parties here submitted various documents to\\nthe district court with this less formal approach. But the bur-\\nden is on the defendant to support his motion to suppress.\\nMissing from this record is an assertion by any witness—de-\\nfendant Clark or anyone else—to the effect that the search ac-\\ntually occurred at 8:15 p.m. and that the clock was correct.\\nWithout such an assertion, whether in an affidavit or other-\\nwise (given the less formal procedures being used in the dis-\\ntrict court), the Google search results about how to alter\\nmetadata merely invite speculation. The district court did not\\nerr by denying the motion to suppress, to the extent it was\\nbased on the photograph of the clock, without a hearing.\\n\\n14 No. 18-2604\\n\\nIII. Sentencing Issues\\n A. Relevant Conduct Under the Guidelines\\n Clark also challenges two aspects of his sentence. The first\\nis a Sentencing Guidelines issue concerning the scope of his\\nrelevant conduct and criminal history, which are two sides of\\nthe same coin here. The U.S. Probation Office prepared a Pre-\\nSentence Report for Clark. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)\\nand (c)(8) of the 2016 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the PSR\\ncalculated Clark’s base offense level as 24 because he pos-\\nsessed between 40 and 160 grams of a substance containing\\nfentanyl. No other adjustments applied, so his total offense\\nlevel remained 24. The PSR also determined that Clark had 11\\ncriminal history points and was in criminal history category\\nV. Three of those 11 points were from a 2017 federal convic-\\ntion for drug distribution stemming from events that occurred\\nin Illinois after Clark was arrested in this Wisconsin federal\\ncase. Clark also received three points for a prior felony drug\\nconviction in Minnesota. Because of the Minnesota convic-\\ntion, Clark faced a 120-month mandatory minimum pursuant\\nto 21 U.S.C. § 851. (If not for the enhancement, Clark would\\nhave had an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months.)\\n Both the government and Clark argued for the 120-month\\nmandatory minimum sentence. The district court adopted the\\nfacts of the PSR and determined that the PSR had calculated\\ncorrectly Clark’s offense level, criminal history, and guideline\\nrange. The court sentenced Clark to 120 months in prison to\\nbe served consecutively to the 71-month sentence he had re-\\nceived in the Illinois case.\\n On appeal, Clark argues that his later drug offense in the\\nIllinois conviction should be treated under the Sentencing\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 15\\n\\nGuidelines as “relevant conduct” for this case rather than as\\npart of his criminal history. That means, he contends, his 120-\\nmonth sentence in this case should run concurrently with the\\n71-month sentence he received in Illinois. Clark did not raise\\nthis argument in the district court. At sentencing, the govern-\\nment asked that Clark’s sentence run consecutively to his Illi-\\nnois sentence. Clark did not object. He requested only that\\nthis sentence run concurrently with any state sentence. The\\ngovernment argues that Clark therefore waived this issue.\\n Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right,\\nwhereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant “negligently fails\\nto assert a right in a timely fashion.” United States v. Brodie,\\n507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 733 (1993). Concurrent sentences would reduce sig-\\nnificantly the time Clark spends in prison. There is no reason\\nfor us to draw the inference here that Clark intentionally\\nwaived this argument. “Waiver principles should be con-\\nstrued liberally in favor of the defendant,” and we are hesi-\\ntant, without more, to construe a defendant’s failure to object\\nto a PSR as an intentional relinquishment of a known right.\\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 84849 (7th Cir.\\n2005). This is especially the case where, as here, the defendant\\nhad no strategic reason to forgo this sentencing argument. See\\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Plain-error review, however, does not win relief for Clark\\non this issue. Plain-error review allows reversal where: (1)\\nthere was an error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error af-\\nfected the substantial rights of the defendant; and (4) the error\\nseriously impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation\\nof the proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 73238; United States v.\\nDuran, 407 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, we need not\\n\\n16 No. 18-2604\\n\\naddress the third and fourth elements. If any error occurred\\nat all, it was not “plain.”\\n Under § 5G1.3(b) of the Guidelines, where a defendant has\\nan undischarged term of imprisonment, and where the con-\\nduct that led to the undischarged sentence\\n is relevant conduct to the instant offense of con-\\n viction under the provisions of subsections\\n (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Con-\\n duct), the sentence for the instant offense shall\\n be imposed as follows:\\n (1) The court shall adjust the sentence for\\n any period of imprisonment already\\n served on the undischarged term of im-\\n prisonment if the court determines that\\n such period of imprisonment will not be\\n credited to the federal sentence by the\\n Bureau of Prisons; and\\n (2) the sentence for the instant offense\\n shall be imposed to run concurrently to\\n the remainder of the undischarged term\\n of imprisonment.\\nSection 5G1.3(d) further advises that “in any other case in-\\nvolving an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence\\nfor the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently,\\npartially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undis-\\ncharged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable pun-\\nishment for the instant offense.” So if Clark’s Illinois offense\\nwas relevant conduct here, the Guidelines would recommend\\nconcurrent sentences. If his Illinois offense was not relevant\\nconduct here, the choice of consecutive or concurrent\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 17\\n\\nsentences is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge, and\\nthere is no reason to find an abuse of discretion here.\\n As for the scope of relevant conduct, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) pro-\\nvides that “relevant conduct” is based on “all acts and omis-\\nsions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, in-\\nduced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.” “Sec-\\ntion 1B1.3(a)(2) applies to grouped offenses and includes ‘all\\nacts and omissions described in subdivisions 1(A) and 1(B)\\nthat were part of the same course of conduct or common\\nscheme or plan as the offense of conviction.’” United States v.\\nSchrode, 839 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting U.S.S.G.\\n§ 1B1.3(a)(2).\\n “In assessing whether offenses are part of the same course\\nof conduct, we focus on whether the government has demon-\\nstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and temporal prox-\\nimity.” United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(internal citations omitted). In considering whether an offense\\nis relevant within the meaning of § 1B1.3, our court has em-\\nphasized several factors that should guide courts’ analysis.\\n“Sufficient factual overlap exists where the past and present\\noffenses involve the same victims, stem from the same under-\\nlying conduct, or are in fact similar offenses.” United States v.\\nOrozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2016); see also\\nUnited States v. Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2003) (in\\ndeciding relevant conduct in drug cases, courts look for “a\\nstrong relationship between the uncharged conduct and the\\nconvicted offense, focusing on whether the government has\\ndemonstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and tem-\\nporal proximity”), quoting United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275,\\n279 (7th Cir. 1996). The relevant conduct issue is similar to the\\nissue in calculating criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2\\n\\n18 No. 18-2604\\n\\n(defining “prior sentence”), where two similar prior convic-\\ntions separated by an intervening arrest are counted sepa-\\nrately. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.\\n2003); United States v. Bradley, 218 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n The district court did not plainly err in not treating Clark’s\\nlater offense in Illinois as relevant conduct for his Wisconsin\\nconviction. To support his argument, Clark points to facts set\\nforth in his Wisconsin PSR. The PSR explained that Clark trav-\\neled to Chicago to obtain the drugs that he would then sell in\\nWisconsin. This fact, Clark asserts, establishes that his drug\\nactivities in both states were part of the same course of con-\\nduct, his fentanyl-trafficking enterprise.\\n Under our precedents, this argument faces obvious “tem-\\nporal proximity” and “similarity” problems. First, Clark was\\narrested in Wisconsin seven months before he was arrested\\nfor selling a fentanyl mixture in Illinois. Further, the offenses\\nwere dissimilar. In Wisconsin, Clark possessed more than 80\\ngrams of fentanyl, most of which was packaged in retail pack-\\nages of 0.5 grams. In Illinois, by contrast, he was arrested for\\nselling a confidential informant more than 65.2 grams of fen-\\ntanyl. And even if the offenses had been more similar, “the\\nfact that a defendant commits a certain type of offense on mul-\\ntiple occasions does not inevitably mean that each separate\\noffense is part of the same course of conduct.” Schrode, 839\\nF.3d at 552. There is not enough here to have required the dis-\\ntrict court to have found such strong connections between\\nthese two drug offenses, especially without an objection by\\nthe defense to that effect. The offenses involved different buy-\\ners, in different cities, in different types of quantities, months\\napart, and with an intervening arrest for the Wisconsin of-\\nfense.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 19\\n\\n “An error is ‘plain’ if the law at the time of appellate re-\\nview shows clearly that it was an error.” United States v.\\nPierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Henderson v.\\nUnited States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013). Clark cannot establish\\nwith precedent or otherwise that the district court should\\nhave acted sua sponte to treat his Illinois offense as conduct\\nrelevant to his Wisconsin charge. Even if there might have\\nbeen an error, it was not plain error to run Clark’s two federal\\nsentences consecutively.\\n B. Supervised Release Condition\\n Finally, the district court imposed a supervised release\\ncondition that Clark “Not meet, communicate or spend time\\nwith any persons known by defendant to be a member of or\\naffiliate of any known street gang.” On appeal, Clark argues\\nthat the term “affiliate” is unconstitutionally vague. He did\\nnot object to this condition at sentencing.\\n In at least scores of appeals over the past five years, in the\\nwake of United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014),\\nUnited States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), and\\nUnited States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015), this court\\nhas wrestled with how best to handle appellate challenges to\\nsupervised release conditions that were not raised in the dis-\\ntrict court. Our recent opinion in United States v. Flores, 929\\nF.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019), should bring some order to our\\ncaselaw in this niche of waiver law, particularly since it was\\ncirculated to the entire court under Circuit Rule 40(e), and no\\njudge voted to hear the case en banc. Special considerations\\napply to our handling of supervised release conditions both\\nbecause they are usually the least salient concern at the time\\nof sentencing and, more important, because a defendant may\\nchallenge them in the district court at any time. See Flores, 929\\n\\n20 No. 18-2604\\n\\nF.3d at 451, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); see also United States\\nv. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant waived\\nchallenge to supervised release condition: “sentencing in the\\ndistrict court is the main event”).\\n This case meets the standards of waiver set forth in Flores:\\nClark had prior notice of the proposed conditions, including\\nthe “affiliate” condition. He had a meaningful opportunity to\\nobject, and his lawyer told the judge that the proposed condi-\\ntions were acceptable. Clark even raised other objections to\\nthe PSR prior to sentencing but did not challenge this condi-\\ntion, which signals an intentional decision not to object. See\\nFlores, 929 F.3d at 449.\\n We REVERSE the district court’s denial of Clark’s motion\\nfor a Franks hearing without an evidentiary hearing. We\\nVACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for a\\nFranks hearing and appropriate action based on the outcome\\nof that hearing, either granting Clark’s motion to suppress or,\\nif his motion is denied, reinstating the convictions and sen-\\ntence. If the judgment is reinstated, the denial of Clark’s mo-\\ntion to suppress and the district court’s sentence are\\nAFFIRMED.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 21\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426008/\", \"author_raw\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. The panel opin-\\nion is well done, and I join all parts of it except the conclusion\\nthat the district court should have granted Michael Clark’s\\nmotion for a Franks hearing. In my view, Investigator Todd\\nMaas’s affidavit supporting the search warrant, while omit-\\nting facts damaging to the confidential informant’s credibil-\\nity—facts that unquestionably should have been included—\\nadequately corroborated the information supplied by the in-\\nformant. The district judge reached this precise conclusion,\\nand under the deferential standard that guides our review on\\nappeal, we should affirm. There was no clear error here.\\n I\\n The majority’s opinion correctly articulates the standard\\nfor obtaining a Franks hearing: a defendant must make a sub-\\nstantial preliminary showing that an officer intentionally or\\nrecklessly omitted information from a search warrant affida-\\nvit and the omissions were material to the probable cause de-\\ntermination. See United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th\\nCir. 2014). The majority also rightly observes that the omis-\\nsion of adverse information about an informant’s credibility\\ndoes not automatically warrant a hearing. See United States v.\\nHancock, 844 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2016). Instead the proper\\nquestion is whether the affidavit would have established\\nprobable cause if the omitted information had been included.\\nSee id. at 708. To make this determination, we consider the\\ntotality of the circumstances, including “the extent to which\\nthe police have corroborated the informant’s statements.”\\nUnited States v. Sutton, 742 F.3d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n All agree that Investigator Maas failed to disclose critical\\nfacts about the informant’s background. In my judgment,\\nthough, the warrant application had sufficient corroboration\\n\\n22 No. 18-2604\\n\\nto overcome this omission and establish the requisite proba-\\nble cause to search hotel room 203 at the Baywalk Inn. Maas\\ntook care to include three key pieces of corroborating evi-\\ndence in his affidavit:\\n In response to the informant’s tip about possible drug\\n dealing at the Baywalk Inn, Investigator Maas sur-\\n veilled the hotel and observed a black male exit the\\n hotel and quickly enter and exit at least five cars.\\n Drawing on his experience as a narcotics investigator,\\n Maas characterized this conduct as “textbook behav-\\n ior to dealing narcotics.”\\n Maas discovered that only two of the hotel’s 25 rooms\\n had been rented with cash, with only one of the two—\\n room 203—being rented for one night, which Maas\\n explained was consistent with drug trafficking be-\\n cause “drug dealers usually pay in cash and only stay\\n one or two nights so to throw off police.”\\n Maas also reported that, upon arriving at the hotel, he\\n had a conversation with a woman he identified by\\n name in the warrant application, who said her 20-\\n year-old daughter was addicted to heroin. The\\n woman added that, before the officer arrived, she was\\n “also watching the black male who [was] suspected to\\n be dealing” and she followed him to room 203.\\n The majority’s analysis discounts this information, reason-\\ning that Investigator Maas’s omission of material facts about\\nthe informant’s background compromised his credibility on\\nall other portions of the warrant application. Put another way,\\nif Maas omitted critical information about the informant’s re-\\nliability, nothing else he included in his affidavit deserved to\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 23\\n\\nbe credited as part of the probable cause analysis. But our case\\nlaw does not require such broad discounting and distrust. See,\\ne.g., United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–05. The district\\ncourt was not required to view as worthless the entirety of the\\ncorroborating information provided by Maas.\\n To be sure, a court faced with a reckless or intentional\\nomission of material information may consider whether (and\\nto what extent) the omission bears on the officer’s credibility\\nas part of its probable cause analysis. But I cannot say that the\\ndistrict court clearly erred, in light of other corroborating ev-\\nidence, by choosing to credit Maas’s affidavit despite his\\nomission. So I would affirm the court’s denial of Clark’s mo-\\ntion for a Franks hearing.\\n ***\\n A final observation seems worthwhile. When this case en-\\ntered federal court, a magistrate judge reviewed the state-\\ncourt warrant application and noted that it, like many others\\nprepared by law enforcement officers in Wisconsin, omitted\\ninformation about the confidential informant’s criminal his-\\ntory. The panel’s opinion, aligned with our precedent, rein-\\nforces that this information is essential to a proper probable\\ncause analysis under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016). Given the\\nfrequency with which search warrants sought and executed\\nat the state level result in federal prosecutions, Wisconsin law\\nenforcement would do well to revisit its warrant application\\npractices. Omitting information about an informant’s credi-\\nbility creates real yet avoidable peril. Today’s decision proves\\nthe point.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426008/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648755/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2604\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMICHAEL CLARK,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:17-cr-53-JDP-1 — James D. Peterson, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Michael\nClark was convicted of possessing a mixture containing fen-\ntanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Clark had been\nfound in a hotel room with more than 80 grams of a mixture\nof heroin and fentanyl, a digital scale, and cellophane bags.\nHe does not appeal any aspect of his jury trial, but he chal-\nlenges the denial of his motion for a Franks hearing challeng-\ning the issuance of the search warrant for the hotel room. He\n\n2 No. 18-2604\n\nalso challenges the denial of his motion to suppress without\nan evidentiary hearing. And he challenges two aspects of his\nsentence: the guideline treatment of his conviction for drug\ndistribution that occurred in Illinois seven months after his\nWisconsin arrest and one condition of supervised release. We\nvacate Clark’s conviction and remand for an evidentiary hear-\ning on his Franks challenge. We affirm on the denial of his mo-\ntion to suppress without a hearing. We also affirm on the\nguideline issue and determine that the supervised release\nchallenge was waived. We address in Part I the need for a\nFranks hearing and in Part II the need for an evidentiary hear-\ning on the motion to suppress. We address the sentencing is-\nsues in Part III.\nI. The Need for a Franks Hearing\n The Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for the use of\nsearch warrants calls for probable cause determinations by a\n“neutral and detached magistrate” as opposed to “officer[s]\nengaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out\ncrime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The ap-\nplication for a warrant “must provide the magistrate with a\nsubstantial basis for determining the existence of probable\ncause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).\n The ability of the neutral and detached magistrate to de-\ntermine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the infor-\nmation the police submit. “[A] search warrant is not valid if\nthe police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting\nfalse, material information,” or by omitting material infor-\nmation from the affidavit provided to the issuing judge.\nUnited States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013),\nciting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 15556 (1978). To inval-\nidate a warrant on this basis, a defendant at a so-called Franks\n\nNo. 18-2604 3\n\nhearing must prove by a preponderance of the evidence either\nfalsity or recklessness, as well as materiality. McMurtrey, 704\nF.3d at 509.\n Merely to obtain a Franks hearing, however, a defendant\ndoes not need to prove the Franks violation. A defendant must\nonly make a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the war-\nrant application contained a material falsity or omission that\nwould alter the issuing judge’s probable cause determination,\nand (2) that the affiant included the material falsity or omitted\ninformation intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the\ntruth. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014);\nsee also, e.g., United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702, 708 (7th\nCir. 2016); United States v. Mullins, 803 F.3d 858, 861–62 (7th\nCir. 2015); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 887–88 (7th\nCir. 2008). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not\nrequired until the Franks hearing itself.” Glover, 755 F.3d at\n820.\n Clark asserted in the district court that the police investi-\ngator who applied for the search warrant of the hotel room\ndeliberately or recklessly omitted critical information affect-\ning the credibility of the unidentified informant who told the\nofficer about drug distribution at the hotel where Clark was\narrested. The district court denied the motion for an eviden-\ntiary hearing on the question. The court agreed that the police\nhad provided no information about the informant’s credibil-\nity. The court found, however, that the police had provided\nsufficient corroboration for the informant’s tip so that the war-\nrant did not depend on the informant’s credibility. That\nmeant the omitted credibility information was not material\nfor Franks purposes. We disagree and find that a hearing is\nneeded. “[W]e review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear\n\n4 No. 18-2604\n\nerror, but any legal determinations that factored into the rul-\ning are reviewed de novo.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 815; see also Han-\ncock, 844 F.3d at 70708.\n A. The Warrant Application\n Investigator Todd Maas is a police officer in Superior, Wis-\nconsin. He prepared the warrant application and signed the\nsupporting affidavit. Maas said that a confidential informant\ncontacted him on October 14, 2015 and told him that earlier\nthat day, he had driven someone to a parking lot adjacent to\nthe Baywalk Inn in Superior to buy heroin from a black male\ncalled “Big Mike,” the brother of “Toonchie.” Maas said he\nand another officer then performed their own investigations,\nincluding surveillance of the parking lot. Maas observed a\nblack male leave the hotel and enter and then exit at least five\ncars in the hotel parking lot. He also learned that the guest\nstaying in Room 203 was the only hotel guest who both had\npaid in cash and was staying only one night, all behavior that\nMaas said was typical of drug trafficking, based on his train-\ning and experience. Maas also said he had spoken to a woman\n(referred to in this case as the “mom on a mission”) who said\nthat her daughter was a heroin addict and that she (the\nmother) had followed a man she suspected of drug-dealing to\nRoom 203.\n Maas included all of this information in his affidavit,\nwhich convinced a state trial judge to issue a search warrant\nfor Room 203. Maas did not include any damaging infor-\nmation about the credibility of his confidential informant,\nwho was the only source of information specifically about\ndrug trafficking. The informant was being paid for his ser-\nvices. He also had two pending criminal charges against him,\nfifteen prior convictions, and a history of opiate and cocaine\n\nNo. 18-2604 5\n\nabuse, and he was hoping to receive a reduced sentence in ex-\nchange for his cooperation.\n B. Materiality\n Where an affidavit is based primarily on tips from an in-\nformant, probable cause can be shown based on the totality of\nthe circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Glover, 755 F.3d at\n816. In cases based on informants’ tips, we have identified five\nfactors of particular relevance: (1) the level of detail the in-\nformant provided; (2) the extent to which the informant’s in-\nformation is based on his or her own first-hand observations;\n(3) the degree to which police have corroborated the inform-\nant’s information; (4) the time elapsed between the events re-\nported and the warrant application; (5) and “whether the in-\nformant appeared or testified before the magistrate.” Glover,\n755 F.3d at 816, citing United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594,\n600 (7th Cir. 2011). Information omitted from a warrant appli-\ncation is material when its omission affects the probable cause\ndetermination. Glover, 755 F.3d at 820.\n In performing this probable cause inquiry, courts must\nkeep in mind that a search warrant for a home, business, or\neven hotel room can authorize highly intrusive and even de-\nstructive actions by the police, and that informants, especially\nin drug cases, can be unreliable and motivated by rivalries or\nrevenge. United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.\n2018), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1617 (1968) (“What\nwe blandly call ‘Terry stops’ can be highly intrusive.” They are\n“not just ‘a “petty indignity,”’ wrote the Supreme Court, but\n‘a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a person, which may\ninflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is\nnot to be undertaken lightly’”); United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d\n1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2009) (“For all we know, [the informant]\n\n6 No. 18-2604\n\ncould have been a rival drug dealer, an angry customer, or\nhad some other beef” with the defendant).\n Our cases do not hold that a Franks hearing is required\nevery time some substantial adverse information about an in-\nformant’s credibility is omitted from a probable cause affida-\nvit. Hancock, 844 F.3d at 709. We have said generally that\nwhere a warrant is obtained based on an informant’s tip, “in-\nformation about the informant’s credibility or potential bias\nis crucial.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 816; see, e.g., United States v.\nBradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018). That being said,\nwe also have upheld warrants tainted by police omission of\nadverse informant credibility information. Our Franks hearing\ncases show that when police have sufficiently corroborated an\ninformant’s tip, the omission of facts pertaining to the inform-\nant’s credibility may not be material.\n In United States v. Musgraves, for example, the police omit-\nted from the affidavit important and damaging credibility in-\nformation about one informant. 831 F.3d 454, 45960 (7th Cir.\n2016). We affirmed the denial of a Franks hearing because a\nsecond affidavit included information from a second inform-\nant without credibility problems who had provided the police\nwith specific and timely information about the suspect’s drug\ntrafficking to support the warrant. Id. at 46061.\n In United States v. Bradford, we also held that the affidavit’s\nomission of facts damaging to an informant’s credibility did\nnot require suppression of evidence seized with a search war-\nrant for drug and weapons trafficking. 905 F.3d at 50305. In\nBradford, the application failed to disclose that the informant\nhad three felony convictions, was on probation, and was be-\ning paid for his help. Id. at 502. But his information was fresh,\nspecific, and corroborated by his having carried out\n\nNo. 18-2604 7\n\ncontrolled drug buys from the target and by specific infor-\nmation from another informant without his credibility prob-\nlems. Id. at 504\n In United States v. Hancock, we affirmed the denial of a\nFranks hearing in similar circumstances. 844 F.3d at 710. An\ninformant provided fresh, detailed information about a sus-\npect’s drug sales, but the affidavit for the warrant left out in-\nformation about the informant’s own criminal history and the\nfact that he was in custody when he provided the information.\nId. at 70506. We found that the omissions were not material\nbecause the warrant application included extensive corrobo-\nration of the suspect’s drug trafficking and intimidation of\nwitnesses. That corroboration came from other informants, a\nsearch of a cellular telephone showing texts referring to drug\ndeals, and from an earlier interview with the suspect himself.\nThe quantity and quality of corroborating information meant\nthat the omitted adverse credibility information about one in-\nformant did not require a Franks hearing. Id. at 70710.\n This case is readily distinguishable. This warrant applica-\ntion did not include any of the substantial adverse information\nMaas had about the informant’s credibility. The government\ndoes not try to justify Maas’s omissions, but it argues that the\ninformant’s credibility was not material to the warrant appli-\ncation because Maas and his colleague investigated and cor-\nroborated the informant’s tip sufficiently to provide probable\ncause independent of that tip. We disagree.\n The corroboration in this case was much weaker than in\nthe cases where we upheld warrants’ validity in the face of\ncredibility omissions. This case is more akin to Glover, where\nthe warrant application depended so heavily on the credibil-\nity of the informant. Here, the police had no controlled buys.\n\n8 No. 18-2604\n\nThey never saw money or drugs change hands. Even the in-\nformant did not claim to have seen drugs or money change\nhands. If his tip did not pan out, he had plenty of deniability.\nHe claimed only that his passenger had met with “Big Mike”\noutside his presence to buy heroin. And the “mom on a mis-\nsion” had no track record of credibility and provided no spe-\ncifics to support her suspicions of the man she had followed\nto Room 203. In sum, the foundation for probable cause inde-\npendent of the credibility of the informant was so meager in\nthis case that the credibility of the informant was material for\nFranks purposes.\n C. Deliberate or Reckless Omissions?\n To obtain a Franks hearing, Clark needed to “offer direct\nevidence of [Maas’s] state of mind or circumstantial evidence\nthat [Maas] had a subjective intent to deceive based on the na-\nture of [his] omissions.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. In his report\nand recommendation to the district court, we must note, the\nmagistrate judge in Clark’s case incorrectly read our decision\nin Glover to “mandate that … court[s] infer recklessness from\nthe fact that an officer omitted known and substantial adverse\ninformation from a search warrant affidavit….” That is not\ncorrect. In Glover, we held that “credibility omissions them-\nselves, even in the absence of more direct evidence of the of-\nficer’s state of mind, provide sufficient circumstantial evi-\ndence to support a reasonable and thus permissible inference\nof reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. (emphasis added). In\nother words, credibility omissions do not require courts to in-\nfer recklessness. Such omissions are matters for a trier of fact\nto weigh, just as when a witness testifies incorrectly or falsely\nabout one or a few matters, and the trier of fact must weigh\nthe rest of the witness’s testimony.\n\nNo. 18-2604 9\n\n In this case, the questions of materiality and the police af-\nfiant’s state of mind are intertwined. To the extent that cor-\nroboration might have avoided the need for a Franks hearing\nin this case, the reliability of the corroboration all depended,\nfrom the issuing judge’s point of view, on the same officer\nwhose credibility is at issue: Maas omitted all adverse infor-\nmation he had about the credibility of the informant who pro-\nvided the most specific (but still second-hand) information\nabout drug trafficking. As noted, the omission of so much im-\nportant information permits (but does not require) an infer-\nence that the omissions were deliberate or reckless. If the\nshowing of probable cause in the warrant application de-\npended on the credibility of the informant, that permissible\ninference should be enough to obtain a Franks hearing.\n The district court’s and government’s rationale for deny-\ning a Franks hearing is that Maas’s own observations supply\nprobable cause, independent of the informant. We assume\nthat if Maas’s own observations are credited, they could lead\na reasonable judge to find probable cause, though the appli-\ncation would have been much weaker without the inform-\nant’s tip to Maas. The problem is that Maas’s credibility can\nlegitimately be questioned here based on what could have\nbeen deliberate or reckless omissions of information about the\ncredibility of the informant.\n This is where materiality and intent become intertwined.\nIf the omissions were deliberate or reckless, it would not be\nunreasonable to take seriously the prospect that other por-\ntions of the same warrant application may have been deliber-\nately or recklessly false. Judges often instruct jurors that if\nthey believe a witness has lied intentionally about a material\nmatter, they may (but are not required to) discount the\n\n10 No. 18-2604\n\nwitness’s testimony on other matters. See United States v.\nWeinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1971) (no positive rule\nof law excludes witness’s testimony entirely based on willful\nfalsehood, but such falsification presents issue for jury to con-\nsider in weighing rest of testimony), quoting Knowles v. People,\n15 Mich. 408, 412 (1867); Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E, Grenig, and\nWilliam C. Lee, 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. §§ 15:0106 (6th ed.\n2019).\n The same point is at the heart of the Supreme Court’s ju-\nrisprudence on impeachment evidence in Brady cases. Brady\nv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny establish that\ngovernment-suppressed evidence is material “if there is a rea-\nsonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the\nresult of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles v.\nWhitely, 514 U.S. 419, 43334 (1995), quoting United States v.\nBagley, 473 U.S. 657, 682 (1985). Strong, non-cumulative evi-\ndence that undermines the credibility of an important govern-\nment witness satisfies that definition. Sims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d\n1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The reason is simple. Evidence in-\ndicating that a witness whose testimony “may well be deter-\nminative of guilt or innocence” is unreliable might prompt a\njury to distrust everything the witness says. Giglio v. United\nStates, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The same logic applies in this\ncontext. Maas’s potentially intentional or reckless omission\ncompromises his credibility, which determines whether prob-\nable cause for the warrant existed or not.\n To be clear, we are not saying or finding here that Maas\nwas in fact deliberately or recklessly deceptive. The issue on\nappeal is only whether Clark was entitled to a hearing, one\nwhere Maas’s credibility could be addressed with evidence\nfrom both sides. The informant was the only source of\n\nNo. 18-2604 11\n\ninformation (and again, that was only second-hand) who said\nthe person in Room 203 was actually dealing drugs. All of the\nother information in the warrant application indicated\ngrounds for suspicion, but we can assume that Maas had a\ngood reason for including the informant’s more specific infor-\nmation. The complete omission of the available damaging in-\nformation about the informant’s credibility permits an infer-\nence that Maas was not being honest and careful with the is-\nsuing court. Whether he in fact was honest and careful about\nthe facts is an appropriate subject for the Franks hearing on\nremand.1\nII. The Timing of the Warrant and Search\n Defendant Clark was in Room 203 when police executed\nthe warrant. Also in the room were cellophane bags, a digital\nscale, and approximately 82 grams of a mixture of heroin and\nfentanyl. The police photographed the hotel room during\ntheir search. In a photograph of suspected drugs on a\nnightstand, a digital clock is visible, reading 8:15 p.m. If the\nclock was correct, the search was executed at least 25 minutes\nbefore the judge issued the warrant.\n\n\n 1 Maas’s application also did not explain why the informant would\nknow heroin if he saw it. See United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 75657 (7th\nCir. 2003) (no probable cause for search warrant where affidavit was based\non informant’s report of seeing drugs in defendant’s house, but according\nto affidavit, informant failed to give details about specific location and\namount of drugs, or any explanation as to how informant knew that what\nshe saw were controlled substances). Nor did Maas provide the kind of\ndetail about his own training and experience that is needed to justify reli-\nance upon them. See generally, e.g., United States v. Scott, 901 F.3d 842, 845\n(7th Cir. 2018) (“Details … are vital when an officer proposes his own\ntraining and experience as the basis of a warrant”).\n\n12 No. 18-2604\n\n The police of course are not permitted to rely on a search\nwarrant that has not yet been approved by a judge. The dis-\ntrict court denied Clark’s motion to suppress without a hear-\ning. The issue here is whether the photograph of the clock was\nsufficient evidence for Clark to have an evidentiary hearing\non his motion to suppress.\n A defendant who requests a suppression hearing must\npresent “definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural facts\n… demonstrat[ing] that there is a disputed material issue of\nfact.” United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1995);\nsee United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2011).\n“Reliance on vague, conclusory allegations is insufficient.”\nUnited States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1992).\n In response to Clark’s motion to suppress, the government\nsubmitted the “metadata” from the digital camera. The\nmetadata showed a host of data about each photograph, in-\ncluding the time each was taken. The metadata showed that\nall of the search photographs were taken between 10:36 and\n10:52 p.m., well after the judge issued the search warrant.\nClark responded in turn not with an affidavit from any wit-\nness to the search but with results of Google searches about\nhow to edit metadata for photographs. In light of the\nmetadata, and in the absence of any specific indications that\ndata had been altered, the district court decided that there was\nno need for a hearing and denied Clark’s motion to suppress.\n The situation here is similar to United States v. Woods, 995\nF.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1993).2 In Woods, the police conducted a\n\n 2 Another portion of the Woods opinion was abrogated by the Supreme\n\nCourt’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), as we noted\nin United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1995).\n\nNo. 18-2604 13\n\nsearch on February 12th. The problem was that both the war-\nrant and the supporting affidavit bore handwritten dates of\nFebruary 14th, though both were also date-stamped February\n11th. The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the\nsearch had been executed two days before the warrant was\nissued. The government responded with an affidavit from a\nprosecutor testifying that the application and warrant were\nboth prepared and signed on February 11th and that the Feb-\nruary 14th dates were mistakes. Using language associated\nwith civil motions for summary judgment—“disputed issues\nof material fact” and “genuine factual dispute”—we affirmed\nthe district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress\nwithout a hearing. Because the defendant had failed to re-\nspond to the government’s explanation, we agreed that he\nhad failed to show a genuine factual dispute and a need for\nan evidentiary hearing. Id. at 715–16.\n One might argue that in Woods the government submitted\nan affidavit to explain the discrepancy, while the government\nhere submitted letters and copies of documents, without any\naffidavits. Both parties here submitted various documents to\nthe district court with this less formal approach. But the bur-\nden is on the defendant to support his motion to suppress.\nMissing from this record is an assertion by any witness—de-\nfendant Clark or anyone else—to the effect that the search ac-\ntually occurred at 8:15 p.m. and that the clock was correct.\nWithout such an assertion, whether in an affidavit or other-\nwise (given the less formal procedures being used in the dis-\ntrict court), the Google search results about how to alter\nmetadata merely invite speculation. The district court did not\nerr by denying the motion to suppress, to the extent it was\nbased on the photograph of the clock, without a hearing.\n\n14 No. 18-2604\n\nIII. Sentencing Issues\n A. Relevant Conduct Under the Guidelines\n Clark also challenges two aspects of his sentence. The first\nis a Sentencing Guidelines issue concerning the scope of his\nrelevant conduct and criminal history, which are two sides of\nthe same coin here. The U.S. Probation Office prepared a Pre-\nSentence Report for Clark. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)\nand (c)(8) of the 2016 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the PSR\ncalculated Clark’s base offense level as 24 because he pos-\nsessed between 40 and 160 grams of a substance containing\nfentanyl. No other adjustments applied, so his total offense\nlevel remained 24. The PSR also determined that Clark had 11\ncriminal history points and was in criminal history category\nV. Three of those 11 points were from a 2017 federal convic-\ntion for drug distribution stemming from events that occurred\nin Illinois after Clark was arrested in this Wisconsin federal\ncase. Clark also received three points for a prior felony drug\nconviction in Minnesota. Because of the Minnesota convic-\ntion, Clark faced a 120-month mandatory minimum pursuant\nto 21 U.S.C. § 851. (If not for the enhancement, Clark would\nhave had an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months.)\n Both the government and Clark argued for the 120-month\nmandatory minimum sentence. The district court adopted the\nfacts of the PSR and determined that the PSR had calculated\ncorrectly Clark’s offense level, criminal history, and guideline\nrange. The court sentenced Clark to 120 months in prison to\nbe served consecutively to the 71-month sentence he had re-\nceived in the Illinois case.\n On appeal, Clark argues that his later drug offense in the\nIllinois conviction should be treated under the Sentencing\n\nNo. 18-2604 15\n\nGuidelines as “relevant conduct” for this case rather than as\npart of his criminal history. That means, he contends, his 120-\nmonth sentence in this case should run concurrently with the\n71-month sentence he received in Illinois. Clark did not raise\nthis argument in the district court. At sentencing, the govern-\nment asked that Clark’s sentence run consecutively to his Illi-\nnois sentence. Clark did not object. He requested only that\nthis sentence run concurrently with any state sentence. The\ngovernment argues that Clark therefore waived this issue.\n Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right,\nwhereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant “negligently fails\nto assert a right in a timely fashion.” United States v. Brodie,\n507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Olano, 507\nU.S. 725, 733 (1993). Concurrent sentences would reduce sig-\nnificantly the time Clark spends in prison. There is no reason\nfor us to draw the inference here that Clark intentionally\nwaived this argument. “Waiver principles should be con-\nstrued liberally in favor of the defendant,” and we are hesi-\ntant, without more, to construe a defendant’s failure to object\nto a PSR as an intentional relinquishment of a known right.\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 84849 (7th Cir.\n2005). This is especially the case where, as here, the defendant\nhad no strategic reason to forgo this sentencing argument. See\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014).\n Plain-error review, however, does not win relief for Clark\non this issue. Plain-error review allows reversal where: (1)\nthere was an error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error af-\nfected the substantial rights of the defendant; and (4) the error\nseriously impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation\nof the proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 73238; United States v.\nDuran, 407 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, we need not\n\n16 No. 18-2604\n\naddress the third and fourth elements. If any error occurred\nat all, it was not “plain.”\n Under § 5G1.3(b) of the Guidelines, where a defendant has\nan undischarged term of imprisonment, and where the con-\nduct that led to the undischarged sentence\n is relevant conduct to the instant offense of con-\n viction under the provisions of subsections\n (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Con-\n duct), the sentence for the instant offense shall\n be imposed as follows:\n (1) The court shall adjust the sentence for\n any period of imprisonment already\n served on the undischarged term of im-\n prisonment if the court determines that\n such period of imprisonment will not be\n credited to the federal sentence by the\n Bureau of Prisons; and\n (2) the sentence for the instant offense\n shall be imposed to run concurrently to\n the remainder of the undischarged term\n of imprisonment.\nSection 5G1.3(d) further advises that “in any other case in-\nvolving an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence\nfor the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently,\npartially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undis-\ncharged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable pun-\nishment for the instant offense.” So if Clark’s Illinois offense\nwas relevant conduct here, the Guidelines would recommend\nconcurrent sentences. If his Illinois offense was not relevant\nconduct here, the choice of consecutive or concurrent\n\nNo. 18-2604 17\n\nsentences is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge, and\nthere is no reason to find an abuse of discretion here.\n As for the scope of relevant conduct, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) pro-\nvides that “relevant conduct” is based on “all acts and omis-\nsions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, in-\nduced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.” “Sec-\ntion 1B1.3(a)(2) applies to grouped offenses and includes ‘all\nacts and omissions described in subdivisions 1(A) and 1(B)\nthat were part of the same course of conduct or common\nscheme or plan as the offense of conviction.’” United States v.\nSchrode, 839 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting U.S.S.G.\n§ 1B1.3(a)(2).\n “In assessing whether offenses are part of the same course\nof conduct, we focus on whether the government has demon-\nstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and temporal prox-\nimity.” United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015)\n(internal citations omitted). In considering whether an offense\nis relevant within the meaning of § 1B1.3, our court has em-\nphasized several factors that should guide courts’ analysis.\n“Sufficient factual overlap exists where the past and present\noffenses involve the same victims, stem from the same under-\nlying conduct, or are in fact similar offenses.” United States v.\nOrozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2016); see also\nUnited States v. Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2003) (in\ndeciding relevant conduct in drug cases, courts look for “a\nstrong relationship between the uncharged conduct and the\nconvicted offense, focusing on whether the government has\ndemonstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and tem-\nporal proximity”), quoting United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275,\n279 (7th Cir. 1996). The relevant conduct issue is similar to the\nissue in calculating criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2\n\n18 No. 18-2604\n\n(defining “prior sentence”), where two similar prior convic-\ntions separated by an intervening arrest are counted sepa-\nrately. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.\n2003); United States v. Bradley, 218 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2000).\n The district court did not plainly err in not treating Clark’s\nlater offense in Illinois as relevant conduct for his Wisconsin\nconviction. To support his argument, Clark points to facts set\nforth in his Wisconsin PSR. The PSR explained that Clark trav-\neled to Chicago to obtain the drugs that he would then sell in\nWisconsin. This fact, Clark asserts, establishes that his drug\nactivities in both states were part of the same course of con-\nduct, his fentanyl-trafficking enterprise.\n Under our precedents, this argument faces obvious “tem-\nporal proximity” and “similarity” problems. First, Clark was\narrested in Wisconsin seven months before he was arrested\nfor selling a fentanyl mixture in Illinois. Further, the offenses\nwere dissimilar. In Wisconsin, Clark possessed more than 80\ngrams of fentanyl, most of which was packaged in retail pack-\nages of 0.5 grams. In Illinois, by contrast, he was arrested for\nselling a confidential informant more than 65.2 grams of fen-\ntanyl. And even if the offenses had been more similar, “the\nfact that a defendant commits a certain type of offense on mul-\ntiple occasions does not inevitably mean that each separate\noffense is part of the same course of conduct.” Schrode, 839\nF.3d at 552. There is not enough here to have required the dis-\ntrict court to have found such strong connections between\nthese two drug offenses, especially without an objection by\nthe defense to that effect. The offenses involved different buy-\ners, in different cities, in different types of quantities, months\napart, and with an intervening arrest for the Wisconsin of-\nfense.\n\nNo. 18-2604 19\n\n “An error is ‘plain’ if the law at the time of appellate re-\nview shows clearly that it was an error.” United States v.\nPierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Henderson v.\nUnited States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013). Clark cannot establish\nwith precedent or otherwise that the district court should\nhave acted sua sponte to treat his Illinois offense as conduct\nrelevant to his Wisconsin charge. Even if there might have\nbeen an error, it was not plain error to run Clark’s two federal\nsentences consecutively.\n B. Supervised Release Condition\n Finally, the district court imposed a supervised release\ncondition that Clark “Not meet, communicate or spend time\nwith any persons known by defendant to be a member of or\naffiliate of any known street gang.” On appeal, Clark argues\nthat the term “affiliate” is unconstitutionally vague. He did\nnot object to this condition at sentencing.\n In at least scores of appeals over the past five years, in the\nwake of United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014),\nUnited States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), and\nUnited States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015), this court\nhas wrestled with how best to handle appellate challenges to\nsupervised release conditions that were not raised in the dis-\ntrict court. Our recent opinion in United States v. Flores, 929\nF.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019), should bring some order to our\ncaselaw in this niche of waiver law, particularly since it was\ncirculated to the entire court under Circuit Rule 40(e), and no\njudge voted to hear the case en banc. Special considerations\napply to our handling of supervised release conditions both\nbecause they are usually the least salient concern at the time\nof sentencing and, more important, because a defendant may\nchallenge them in the district court at any time. See Flores, 929\n\n20 No. 18-2604\n\nF.3d at 451, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); see also United States\nv. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant waived\nchallenge to supervised release condition: “sentencing in the\ndistrict court is the main event”).\n This case meets the standards of waiver set forth in Flores:\nClark had prior notice of the proposed conditions, including\nthe “affiliate” condition. He had a meaningful opportunity to\nobject, and his lawyer told the judge that the proposed condi-\ntions were acceptable. Clark even raised other objections to\nthe PSR prior to sentencing but did not challenge this condi-\ntion, which signals an intentional decision not to object. See\nFlores, 929 F.3d at 449.\n We REVERSE the district court’s denial of Clark’s motion\nfor a Franks hearing without an evidentiary hearing. We\nVACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for a\nFranks hearing and appropriate action based on the outcome\nof that hearing, either granting Clark’s motion to suppress or,\nif his motion is denied, reinstating the convictions and sen-\ntence. If the judgment is reinstated, the denial of Clark’s mo-\ntion to suppress and the district court’s sentence are\nAFFIRMED.\n\nNo. 18-2604 21\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2604\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL CLARK,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cr-53-JDP-1 — James D. Peterson, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Michael\\nClark was convicted of possessing a mixture containing fen-\\ntanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Clark had been\\nfound in a hotel room with more than 80 grams of a mixture\\nof heroin and fentanyl, a digital scale, and cellophane bags.\\nHe does not appeal any aspect of his jury trial, but he chal-\\nlenges the denial of his motion for a Franks hearing challeng-\\ning the issuance of the search warrant for the hotel room. He\\n\\n2 No. 18-2604\\n\\nalso challenges the denial of his motion to suppress without\\nan evidentiary hearing. And he challenges two aspects of his\\nsentence: the guideline treatment of his conviction for drug\\ndistribution that occurred in Illinois seven months after his\\nWisconsin arrest and one condition of supervised release. We\\nvacate Clark’s conviction and remand for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on his Franks challenge. We affirm on the denial of his mo-\\ntion to suppress without a hearing. We also affirm on the\\nguideline issue and determine that the supervised release\\nchallenge was waived. We address in Part I the need for a\\nFranks hearing and in Part II the need for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on the motion to suppress. We address the sentencing is-\\nsues in Part III.\\nI. The Need for a Franks Hearing\\n The Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for the use of\\nsearch warrants calls for probable cause determinations by a\\n“neutral and detached magistrate” as opposed to “officer[s]\\nengaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out\\ncrime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The ap-\\nplication for a warrant “must provide the magistrate with a\\nsubstantial basis for determining the existence of probable\\ncause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).\\n The ability of the neutral and detached magistrate to de-\\ntermine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the infor-\\nmation the police submit. “[A] search warrant is not valid if\\nthe police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting\\nfalse, material information,” or by omitting material infor-\\nmation from the affidavit provided to the issuing judge.\\nUnited States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013),\\nciting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 15556 (1978). To inval-\\nidate a warrant on this basis, a defendant at a so-called Franks\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 3\\n\\nhearing must prove by a preponderance of the evidence either\\nfalsity or recklessness, as well as materiality. McMurtrey, 704\\nF.3d at 509.\\n Merely to obtain a Franks hearing, however, a defendant\\ndoes not need to prove the Franks violation. A defendant must\\nonly make a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the war-\\nrant application contained a material falsity or omission that\\nwould alter the issuing judge’s probable cause determination,\\nand (2) that the affiant included the material falsity or omitted\\ninformation intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the\\ntruth. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014);\\nsee also, e.g., United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702, 708 (7th\\nCir. 2016); United States v. Mullins, 803 F.3d 858, 861–62 (7th\\nCir. 2015); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 887–88 (7th\\nCir. 2008). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not\\nrequired until the Franks hearing itself.” Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n820.\\n Clark asserted in the district court that the police investi-\\ngator who applied for the search warrant of the hotel room\\ndeliberately or recklessly omitted critical information affect-\\ning the credibility of the unidentified informant who told the\\nofficer about drug distribution at the hotel where Clark was\\narrested. The district court denied the motion for an eviden-\\ntiary hearing on the question. The court agreed that the police\\nhad provided no information about the informant’s credibil-\\nity. The court found, however, that the police had provided\\nsufficient corroboration for the informant’s tip so that the war-\\nrant did not depend on the informant’s credibility. That\\nmeant the omitted credibility information was not material\\nfor Franks purposes. We disagree and find that a hearing is\\nneeded. “[W]e review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear\\n\\n4 No. 18-2604\\n\\nerror, but any legal determinations that factored into the rul-\\ning are reviewed de novo.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 815; see also Han-\\ncock, 844 F.3d at 70708.\\n A. The Warrant Application\\n Investigator Todd Maas is a police officer in Superior, Wis-\\nconsin. He prepared the warrant application and signed the\\nsupporting affidavit. Maas said that a confidential informant\\ncontacted him on October 14, 2015 and told him that earlier\\nthat day, he had driven someone to a parking lot adjacent to\\nthe Baywalk Inn in Superior to buy heroin from a black male\\ncalled “Big Mike,” the brother of “Toonchie.” Maas said he\\nand another officer then performed their own investigations,\\nincluding surveillance of the parking lot. Maas observed a\\nblack male leave the hotel and enter and then exit at least five\\ncars in the hotel parking lot. He also learned that the guest\\nstaying in Room 203 was the only hotel guest who both had\\npaid in cash and was staying only one night, all behavior that\\nMaas said was typical of drug trafficking, based on his train-\\ning and experience. Maas also said he had spoken to a woman\\n(referred to in this case as the “mom on a mission”) who said\\nthat her daughter was a heroin addict and that she (the\\nmother) had followed a man she suspected of drug-dealing to\\nRoom 203.\\n Maas included all of this information in his affidavit,\\nwhich convinced a state trial judge to issue a search warrant\\nfor Room 203. Maas did not include any damaging infor-\\nmation about the credibility of his confidential informant,\\nwho was the only source of information specifically about\\ndrug trafficking. The informant was being paid for his ser-\\nvices. He also had two pending criminal charges against him,\\nfifteen prior convictions, and a history of opiate and cocaine\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 5\\n\\nabuse, and he was hoping to receive a reduced sentence in ex-\\nchange for his cooperation.\\n B. Materiality\\n Where an affidavit is based primarily on tips from an in-\\nformant, probable cause can be shown based on the totality of\\nthe circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n816. In cases based on informants’ tips, we have identified five\\nfactors of particular relevance: (1) the level of detail the in-\\nformant provided; (2) the extent to which the informant’s in-\\nformation is based on his or her own first-hand observations;\\n(3) the degree to which police have corroborated the inform-\\nant’s information; (4) the time elapsed between the events re-\\nported and the warrant application; (5) and “whether the in-\\nformant appeared or testified before the magistrate.” Glover,\\n755 F.3d at 816, citing United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594,\\n600 (7th Cir. 2011). Information omitted from a warrant appli-\\ncation is material when its omission affects the probable cause\\ndetermination. Glover, 755 F.3d at 820.\\n In performing this probable cause inquiry, courts must\\nkeep in mind that a search warrant for a home, business, or\\neven hotel room can authorize highly intrusive and even de-\\nstructive actions by the police, and that informants, especially\\nin drug cases, can be unreliable and motivated by rivalries or\\nrevenge. United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.\\n2018), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1617 (1968) (“What\\nwe blandly call ‘Terry stops’ can be highly intrusive.” They are\\n“not just ‘a “petty indignity,”’ wrote the Supreme Court, but\\n‘a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a person, which may\\ninflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is\\nnot to be undertaken lightly’”); United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d\\n1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2009) (“For all we know, [the informant]\\n\\n6 No. 18-2604\\n\\ncould have been a rival drug dealer, an angry customer, or\\nhad some other beef” with the defendant).\\n Our cases do not hold that a Franks hearing is required\\nevery time some substantial adverse information about an in-\\nformant’s credibility is omitted from a probable cause affida-\\nvit. Hancock, 844 F.3d at 709. We have said generally that\\nwhere a warrant is obtained based on an informant’s tip, “in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility or potential bias\\nis crucial.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 816; see, e.g., United States v.\\nBradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018). That being said,\\nwe also have upheld warrants tainted by police omission of\\nadverse informant credibility information. Our Franks hearing\\ncases show that when police have sufficiently corroborated an\\ninformant’s tip, the omission of facts pertaining to the inform-\\nant’s credibility may not be material.\\n In United States v. Musgraves, for example, the police omit-\\nted from the affidavit important and damaging credibility in-\\nformation about one informant. 831 F.3d 454, 45960 (7th Cir.\\n2016). We affirmed the denial of a Franks hearing because a\\nsecond affidavit included information from a second inform-\\nant without credibility problems who had provided the police\\nwith specific and timely information about the suspect’s drug\\ntrafficking to support the warrant. Id. at 46061.\\n In United States v. Bradford, we also held that the affidavit’s\\nomission of facts damaging to an informant’s credibility did\\nnot require suppression of evidence seized with a search war-\\nrant for drug and weapons trafficking. 905 F.3d at 50305. In\\nBradford, the application failed to disclose that the informant\\nhad three felony convictions, was on probation, and was be-\\ning paid for his help. Id. at 502. But his information was fresh,\\nspecific, and corroborated by his having carried out\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 7\\n\\ncontrolled drug buys from the target and by specific infor-\\nmation from another informant without his credibility prob-\\nlems. Id. at 504\\n In United States v. Hancock, we affirmed the denial of a\\nFranks hearing in similar circumstances. 844 F.3d at 710. An\\ninformant provided fresh, detailed information about a sus-\\npect’s drug sales, but the affidavit for the warrant left out in-\\nformation about the informant’s own criminal history and the\\nfact that he was in custody when he provided the information.\\nId. at 70506. We found that the omissions were not material\\nbecause the warrant application included extensive corrobo-\\nration of the suspect’s drug trafficking and intimidation of\\nwitnesses. That corroboration came from other informants, a\\nsearch of a cellular telephone showing texts referring to drug\\ndeals, and from an earlier interview with the suspect himself.\\nThe quantity and quality of corroborating information meant\\nthat the omitted adverse credibility information about one in-\\nformant did not require a Franks hearing. Id. at 70710.\\n This case is readily distinguishable. This warrant applica-\\ntion did not include any of the substantial adverse information\\nMaas had about the informant’s credibility. The government\\ndoes not try to justify Maas’s omissions, but it argues that the\\ninformant’s credibility was not material to the warrant appli-\\ncation because Maas and his colleague investigated and cor-\\nroborated the informant’s tip sufficiently to provide probable\\ncause independent of that tip. We disagree.\\n The corroboration in this case was much weaker than in\\nthe cases where we upheld warrants’ validity in the face of\\ncredibility omissions. This case is more akin to Glover, where\\nthe warrant application depended so heavily on the credibil-\\nity of the informant. Here, the police had no controlled buys.\\n\\n8 No. 18-2604\\n\\nThey never saw money or drugs change hands. Even the in-\\nformant did not claim to have seen drugs or money change\\nhands. If his tip did not pan out, he had plenty of deniability.\\nHe claimed only that his passenger had met with “Big Mike”\\noutside his presence to buy heroin. And the “mom on a mis-\\nsion” had no track record of credibility and provided no spe-\\ncifics to support her suspicions of the man she had followed\\nto Room 203. In sum, the foundation for probable cause inde-\\npendent of the credibility of the informant was so meager in\\nthis case that the credibility of the informant was material for\\nFranks purposes.\\n C. Deliberate or Reckless Omissions?\\n To obtain a Franks hearing, Clark needed to “offer direct\\nevidence of [Maas’s] state of mind or circumstantial evidence\\nthat [Maas] had a subjective intent to deceive based on the na-\\nture of [his] omissions.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. In his report\\nand recommendation to the district court, we must note, the\\nmagistrate judge in Clark’s case incorrectly read our decision\\nin Glover to “mandate that … court[s] infer recklessness from\\nthe fact that an officer omitted known and substantial adverse\\ninformation from a search warrant affidavit….” That is not\\ncorrect. In Glover, we held that “credibility omissions them-\\nselves, even in the absence of more direct evidence of the of-\\nficer’s state of mind, provide sufficient circumstantial evi-\\ndence to support a reasonable and thus permissible inference\\nof reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. (emphasis added). In\\nother words, credibility omissions do not require courts to in-\\nfer recklessness. Such omissions are matters for a trier of fact\\nto weigh, just as when a witness testifies incorrectly or falsely\\nabout one or a few matters, and the trier of fact must weigh\\nthe rest of the witness’s testimony.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 9\\n\\n In this case, the questions of materiality and the police af-\\nfiant’s state of mind are intertwined. To the extent that cor-\\nroboration might have avoided the need for a Franks hearing\\nin this case, the reliability of the corroboration all depended,\\nfrom the issuing judge’s point of view, on the same officer\\nwhose credibility is at issue: Maas omitted all adverse infor-\\nmation he had about the credibility of the informant who pro-\\nvided the most specific (but still second-hand) information\\nabout drug trafficking. As noted, the omission of so much im-\\nportant information permits (but does not require) an infer-\\nence that the omissions were deliberate or reckless. If the\\nshowing of probable cause in the warrant application de-\\npended on the credibility of the informant, that permissible\\ninference should be enough to obtain a Franks hearing.\\n The district court’s and government’s rationale for deny-\\ning a Franks hearing is that Maas’s own observations supply\\nprobable cause, independent of the informant. We assume\\nthat if Maas’s own observations are credited, they could lead\\na reasonable judge to find probable cause, though the appli-\\ncation would have been much weaker without the inform-\\nant’s tip to Maas. The problem is that Maas’s credibility can\\nlegitimately be questioned here based on what could have\\nbeen deliberate or reckless omissions of information about the\\ncredibility of the informant.\\n This is where materiality and intent become intertwined.\\nIf the omissions were deliberate or reckless, it would not be\\nunreasonable to take seriously the prospect that other por-\\ntions of the same warrant application may have been deliber-\\nately or recklessly false. Judges often instruct jurors that if\\nthey believe a witness has lied intentionally about a material\\nmatter, they may (but are not required to) discount the\\n\\n10 No. 18-2604\\n\\nwitness’s testimony on other matters. See United States v.\\nWeinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1971) (no positive rule\\nof law excludes witness’s testimony entirely based on willful\\nfalsehood, but such falsification presents issue for jury to con-\\nsider in weighing rest of testimony), quoting Knowles v. People,\\n15 Mich. 408, 412 (1867); Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E, Grenig, and\\nWilliam C. Lee, 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. §§ 15:0106 (6th ed.\\n2019).\\n The same point is at the heart of the Supreme Court’s ju-\\nrisprudence on impeachment evidence in Brady cases. Brady\\nv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny establish that\\ngovernment-suppressed evidence is material “if there is a rea-\\nsonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the\\nresult of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles v.\\nWhitely, 514 U.S. 419, 43334 (1995), quoting United States v.\\nBagley, 473 U.S. 657, 682 (1985). Strong, non-cumulative evi-\\ndence that undermines the credibility of an important govern-\\nment witness satisfies that definition. Sims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d\\n1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The reason is simple. Evidence in-\\ndicating that a witness whose testimony “may well be deter-\\nminative of guilt or innocence” is unreliable might prompt a\\njury to distrust everything the witness says. Giglio v. United\\nStates, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The same logic applies in this\\ncontext. Maas’s potentially intentional or reckless omission\\ncompromises his credibility, which determines whether prob-\\nable cause for the warrant existed or not.\\n To be clear, we are not saying or finding here that Maas\\nwas in fact deliberately or recklessly deceptive. The issue on\\nappeal is only whether Clark was entitled to a hearing, one\\nwhere Maas’s credibility could be addressed with evidence\\nfrom both sides. The informant was the only source of\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 11\\n\\ninformation (and again, that was only second-hand) who said\\nthe person in Room 203 was actually dealing drugs. All of the\\nother information in the warrant application indicated\\ngrounds for suspicion, but we can assume that Maas had a\\ngood reason for including the informant’s more specific infor-\\nmation. The complete omission of the available damaging in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility permits an infer-\\nence that Maas was not being honest and careful with the is-\\nsuing court. Whether he in fact was honest and careful about\\nthe facts is an appropriate subject for the Franks hearing on\\nremand.1\\nII. The Timing of the Warrant and Search\\n Defendant Clark was in Room 203 when police executed\\nthe warrant. Also in the room were cellophane bags, a digital\\nscale, and approximately 82 grams of a mixture of heroin and\\nfentanyl. The police photographed the hotel room during\\ntheir search. In a photograph of suspected drugs on a\\nnightstand, a digital clock is visible, reading 8:15 p.m. If the\\nclock was correct, the search was executed at least 25 minutes\\nbefore the judge issued the warrant.\\n\\n\\n 1 Maas’s application also did not explain why the informant would\\nknow heroin if he saw it. See United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 75657 (7th\\nCir. 2003) (no probable cause for search warrant where affidavit was based\\non informant’s report of seeing drugs in defendant’s house, but according\\nto affidavit, informant failed to give details about specific location and\\namount of drugs, or any explanation as to how informant knew that what\\nshe saw were controlled substances). Nor did Maas provide the kind of\\ndetail about his own training and experience that is needed to justify reli-\\nance upon them. See generally, e.g., United States v. Scott, 901 F.3d 842, 845\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (“Details … are vital when an officer proposes his own\\ntraining and experience as the basis of a warrant”).\\n\\n12 No. 18-2604\\n\\n The police of course are not permitted to rely on a search\\nwarrant that has not yet been approved by a judge. The dis-\\ntrict court denied Clark’s motion to suppress without a hear-\\ning. The issue here is whether the photograph of the clock was\\nsufficient evidence for Clark to have an evidentiary hearing\\non his motion to suppress.\\n A defendant who requests a suppression hearing must\\npresent “definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural facts\\n… demonstrat[ing] that there is a disputed material issue of\\nfact.” United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1995);\\nsee United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n“Reliance on vague, conclusory allegations is insufficient.”\\nUnited States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n In response to Clark’s motion to suppress, the government\\nsubmitted the “metadata” from the digital camera. The\\nmetadata showed a host of data about each photograph, in-\\ncluding the time each was taken. The metadata showed that\\nall of the search photographs were taken between 10:36 and\\n10:52 p.m., well after the judge issued the search warrant.\\nClark responded in turn not with an affidavit from any wit-\\nness to the search but with results of Google searches about\\nhow to edit metadata for photographs. In light of the\\nmetadata, and in the absence of any specific indications that\\ndata had been altered, the district court decided that there was\\nno need for a hearing and denied Clark’s motion to suppress.\\n The situation here is similar to United States v. Woods, 995\\nF.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1993).2 In Woods, the police conducted a\\n\\n 2 Another portion of the Woods opinion was abrogated by the Supreme\\n\\nCourt’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), as we noted\\nin United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 13\\n\\nsearch on February 12th. The problem was that both the war-\\nrant and the supporting affidavit bore handwritten dates of\\nFebruary 14th, though both were also date-stamped February\\n11th. The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the\\nsearch had been executed two days before the warrant was\\nissued. The government responded with an affidavit from a\\nprosecutor testifying that the application and warrant were\\nboth prepared and signed on February 11th and that the Feb-\\nruary 14th dates were mistakes. Using language associated\\nwith civil motions for summary judgment—“disputed issues\\nof material fact” and “genuine factual dispute”—we affirmed\\nthe district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress\\nwithout a hearing. Because the defendant had failed to re-\\nspond to the government’s explanation, we agreed that he\\nhad failed to show a genuine factual dispute and a need for\\nan evidentiary hearing. Id. at 715–16.\\n One might argue that in Woods the government submitted\\nan affidavit to explain the discrepancy, while the government\\nhere submitted letters and copies of documents, without any\\naffidavits. Both parties here submitted various documents to\\nthe district court with this less formal approach. But the bur-\\nden is on the defendant to support his motion to suppress.\\nMissing from this record is an assertion by any witness—de-\\nfendant Clark or anyone else—to the effect that the search ac-\\ntually occurred at 8:15 p.m. and that the clock was correct.\\nWithout such an assertion, whether in an affidavit or other-\\nwise (given the less formal procedures being used in the dis-\\ntrict court), the Google search results about how to alter\\nmetadata merely invite speculation. The district court did not\\nerr by denying the motion to suppress, to the extent it was\\nbased on the photograph of the clock, without a hearing.\\n\\n14 No. 18-2604\\n\\nIII. Sentencing Issues\\n A. Relevant Conduct Under the Guidelines\\n Clark also challenges two aspects of his sentence. The first\\nis a Sentencing Guidelines issue concerning the scope of his\\nrelevant conduct and criminal history, which are two sides of\\nthe same coin here. The U.S. Probation Office prepared a Pre-\\nSentence Report for Clark. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)\\nand (c)(8) of the 2016 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the PSR\\ncalculated Clark’s base offense level as 24 because he pos-\\nsessed between 40 and 160 grams of a substance containing\\nfentanyl. No other adjustments applied, so his total offense\\nlevel remained 24. The PSR also determined that Clark had 11\\ncriminal history points and was in criminal history category\\nV. Three of those 11 points were from a 2017 federal convic-\\ntion for drug distribution stemming from events that occurred\\nin Illinois after Clark was arrested in this Wisconsin federal\\ncase. Clark also received three points for a prior felony drug\\nconviction in Minnesota. Because of the Minnesota convic-\\ntion, Clark faced a 120-month mandatory minimum pursuant\\nto 21 U.S.C. § 851. (If not for the enhancement, Clark would\\nhave had an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months.)\\n Both the government and Clark argued for the 120-month\\nmandatory minimum sentence. The district court adopted the\\nfacts of the PSR and determined that the PSR had calculated\\ncorrectly Clark’s offense level, criminal history, and guideline\\nrange. The court sentenced Clark to 120 months in prison to\\nbe served consecutively to the 71-month sentence he had re-\\nceived in the Illinois case.\\n On appeal, Clark argues that his later drug offense in the\\nIllinois conviction should be treated under the Sentencing\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 15\\n\\nGuidelines as “relevant conduct” for this case rather than as\\npart of his criminal history. That means, he contends, his 120-\\nmonth sentence in this case should run concurrently with the\\n71-month sentence he received in Illinois. Clark did not raise\\nthis argument in the district court. At sentencing, the govern-\\nment asked that Clark’s sentence run consecutively to his Illi-\\nnois sentence. Clark did not object. He requested only that\\nthis sentence run concurrently with any state sentence. The\\ngovernment argues that Clark therefore waived this issue.\\n Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right,\\nwhereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant “negligently fails\\nto assert a right in a timely fashion.” United States v. Brodie,\\n507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 733 (1993). Concurrent sentences would reduce sig-\\nnificantly the time Clark spends in prison. There is no reason\\nfor us to draw the inference here that Clark intentionally\\nwaived this argument. “Waiver principles should be con-\\nstrued liberally in favor of the defendant,” and we are hesi-\\ntant, without more, to construe a defendant’s failure to object\\nto a PSR as an intentional relinquishment of a known right.\\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 84849 (7th Cir.\\n2005). This is especially the case where, as here, the defendant\\nhad no strategic reason to forgo this sentencing argument. See\\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Plain-error review, however, does not win relief for Clark\\non this issue. Plain-error review allows reversal where: (1)\\nthere was an error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error af-\\nfected the substantial rights of the defendant; and (4) the error\\nseriously impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation\\nof the proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 73238; United States v.\\nDuran, 407 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, we need not\\n\\n16 No. 18-2604\\n\\naddress the third and fourth elements. If any error occurred\\nat all, it was not “plain.”\\n Under § 5G1.3(b) of the Guidelines, where a defendant has\\nan undischarged term of imprisonment, and where the con-\\nduct that led to the undischarged sentence\\n is relevant conduct to the instant offense of con-\\n viction under the provisions of subsections\\n (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Con-\\n duct), the sentence for the instant offense shall\\n be imposed as follows:\\n (1) The court shall adjust the sentence for\\n any period of imprisonment already\\n served on the undischarged term of im-\\n prisonment if the court determines that\\n such period of imprisonment will not be\\n credited to the federal sentence by the\\n Bureau of Prisons; and\\n (2) the sentence for the instant offense\\n shall be imposed to run concurrently to\\n the remainder of the undischarged term\\n of imprisonment.\\nSection 5G1.3(d) further advises that “in any other case in-\\nvolving an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence\\nfor the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently,\\npartially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undis-\\ncharged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable pun-\\nishment for the instant offense.” So if Clark’s Illinois offense\\nwas relevant conduct here, the Guidelines would recommend\\nconcurrent sentences. If his Illinois offense was not relevant\\nconduct here, the choice of consecutive or concurrent\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 17\\n\\nsentences is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge, and\\nthere is no reason to find an abuse of discretion here.\\n As for the scope of relevant conduct, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) pro-\\nvides that “relevant conduct” is based on “all acts and omis-\\nsions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, in-\\nduced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.” “Sec-\\ntion 1B1.3(a)(2) applies to grouped offenses and includes ‘all\\nacts and omissions described in subdivisions 1(A) and 1(B)\\nthat were part of the same course of conduct or common\\nscheme or plan as the offense of conviction.’” United States v.\\nSchrode, 839 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting U.S.S.G.\\n§ 1B1.3(a)(2).\\n “In assessing whether offenses are part of the same course\\nof conduct, we focus on whether the government has demon-\\nstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and temporal prox-\\nimity.” United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(internal citations omitted). In considering whether an offense\\nis relevant within the meaning of § 1B1.3, our court has em-\\nphasized several factors that should guide courts’ analysis.\\n“Sufficient factual overlap exists where the past and present\\noffenses involve the same victims, stem from the same under-\\nlying conduct, or are in fact similar offenses.” United States v.\\nOrozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2016); see also\\nUnited States v. Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2003) (in\\ndeciding relevant conduct in drug cases, courts look for “a\\nstrong relationship between the uncharged conduct and the\\nconvicted offense, focusing on whether the government has\\ndemonstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and tem-\\nporal proximity”), quoting United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275,\\n279 (7th Cir. 1996). The relevant conduct issue is similar to the\\nissue in calculating criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2\\n\\n18 No. 18-2604\\n\\n(defining “prior sentence”), where two similar prior convic-\\ntions separated by an intervening arrest are counted sepa-\\nrately. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.\\n2003); United States v. Bradley, 218 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n The district court did not plainly err in not treating Clark’s\\nlater offense in Illinois as relevant conduct for his Wisconsin\\nconviction. To support his argument, Clark points to facts set\\nforth in his Wisconsin PSR. The PSR explained that Clark trav-\\neled to Chicago to obtain the drugs that he would then sell in\\nWisconsin. This fact, Clark asserts, establishes that his drug\\nactivities in both states were part of the same course of con-\\nduct, his fentanyl-trafficking enterprise.\\n Under our precedents, this argument faces obvious “tem-\\nporal proximity” and “similarity” problems. First, Clark was\\narrested in Wisconsin seven months before he was arrested\\nfor selling a fentanyl mixture in Illinois. Further, the offenses\\nwere dissimilar. In Wisconsin, Clark possessed more than 80\\ngrams of fentanyl, most of which was packaged in retail pack-\\nages of 0.5 grams. In Illinois, by contrast, he was arrested for\\nselling a confidential informant more than 65.2 grams of fen-\\ntanyl. And even if the offenses had been more similar, “the\\nfact that a defendant commits a certain type of offense on mul-\\ntiple occasions does not inevitably mean that each separate\\noffense is part of the same course of conduct.” Schrode, 839\\nF.3d at 552. There is not enough here to have required the dis-\\ntrict court to have found such strong connections between\\nthese two drug offenses, especially without an objection by\\nthe defense to that effect. The offenses involved different buy-\\ners, in different cities, in different types of quantities, months\\napart, and with an intervening arrest for the Wisconsin of-\\nfense.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 19\\n\\n “An error is ‘plain’ if the law at the time of appellate re-\\nview shows clearly that it was an error.” United States v.\\nPierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Henderson v.\\nUnited States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013). Clark cannot establish\\nwith precedent or otherwise that the district court should\\nhave acted sua sponte to treat his Illinois offense as conduct\\nrelevant to his Wisconsin charge. Even if there might have\\nbeen an error, it was not plain error to run Clark’s two federal\\nsentences consecutively.\\n B. Supervised Release Condition\\n Finally, the district court imposed a supervised release\\ncondition that Clark “Not meet, communicate or spend time\\nwith any persons known by defendant to be a member of or\\naffiliate of any known street gang.” On appeal, Clark argues\\nthat the term “affiliate” is unconstitutionally vague. He did\\nnot object to this condition at sentencing.\\n In at least scores of appeals over the past five years, in the\\nwake of United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014),\\nUnited States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), and\\nUnited States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015), this court\\nhas wrestled with how best to handle appellate challenges to\\nsupervised release conditions that were not raised in the dis-\\ntrict court. Our recent opinion in United States v. Flores, 929\\nF.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019), should bring some order to our\\ncaselaw in this niche of waiver law, particularly since it was\\ncirculated to the entire court under Circuit Rule 40(e), and no\\njudge voted to hear the case en banc. Special considerations\\napply to our handling of supervised release conditions both\\nbecause they are usually the least salient concern at the time\\nof sentencing and, more important, because a defendant may\\nchallenge them in the district court at any time. See Flores, 929\\n\\n20 No. 18-2604\\n\\nF.3d at 451, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); see also United States\\nv. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant waived\\nchallenge to supervised release condition: “sentencing in the\\ndistrict court is the main event”).\\n This case meets the standards of waiver set forth in Flores:\\nClark had prior notice of the proposed conditions, including\\nthe “affiliate” condition. He had a meaningful opportunity to\\nobject, and his lawyer told the judge that the proposed condi-\\ntions were acceptable. Clark even raised other objections to\\nthe PSR prior to sentencing but did not challenge this condi-\\ntion, which signals an intentional decision not to object. See\\nFlores, 929 F.3d at 449.\\n We REVERSE the district court’s denial of Clark’s motion\\nfor a Franks hearing without an evidentiary hearing. We\\nVACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for a\\nFranks hearing and appropriate action based on the outcome\\nof that hearing, either granting Clark’s motion to suppress or,\\nif his motion is denied, reinstating the convictions and sen-\\ntence. If the judgment is reinstated, the denial of Clark’s mo-\\ntion to suppress and the district court’s sentence are\\nAFFIRMED.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 21\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3866,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4648756,"string":"4,648,756"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jon Giles"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3126"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"William Joseph Bauer\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-3126\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nJON GILES,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 CR 00112-1 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 28, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. After Jon Giles’s DNA was found at\\nthe scene of the robbery of North Community Bank, FBI agents\\ninterrogated him at the Pontiac Correctional Center where he\\nwas serving a prison term for two other bank robberies. Giles\\nconfessed to the robbery. Giles argues the district court erred\\n\\f2 No. 18-3126\\n\\nin denying his motion to suppress the confession, because his\\nprolonged solitary confinement prior to the interview rendered\\nhim incapable of exercising a voluntary and knowing waiver\\nof his Fifth Amendment rights. Giles also argues that the\\ndistrict court failed to properly address his mitigating argu-\\nments at sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we reject these\\narguments and affirm the orders of the district court.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In 2010, Jon Giles pleaded guilty to state robbery charges.\\nGiles spent the next two years in solitary confinement at\\nTamms Correctional Center. When Tamms was shuttered,\\nGiles was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center. He spent\\none month in general population before returning to isolation\\nfrom January 2013 until January 2014.\\n On August 30, 2013, during this period of solitary confine-\\nment, FBI agents Timothy Bacha and Michael Lovernick\\nquestioned Jon Giles. They were investigating a bank robbery\\nat North Community Bank that took place in 2009. DNA\\nrecovered from a glove found near the crime scene matched\\nGiles’s DNA. The glove was found next to dye-stained money\\nstolen from the bank.\\n At first, Giles refused to meet with the agents. Robin\\nLopeman, a Pontiac correctional officer, approached Giles’s cell\\nwith Bacha’s business card. Giles requested that she show the\\ncard to Robert Hall, a fellow inmate and former gang associate,\\nfollowing a “home-grown” prison custom of letting other\\ninmates know where you are going and who you are talking\\nto. Hall shouted his consent and Giles agreed to speak to the\\nagents.\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 3\\n\\n Bacha and Lovernick read Giles his Miranda rights, and he\\nagreed in writing to be questioned without an attorney present.\\nGiles initially denied his involvement in the North Community\\nBank robbery until he was shown the DNA report and photo-\\ngraphs of the dyed money. Giles then confessed to the robbery\\nand agreed to a cheek swab after being advised of his right to\\nrefuse. The swab matched the DNA found on the glove.\\n Giles was indicted on March 4, 2014, on one count of bank\\nrobbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 and one count of using a\\nfirearm in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(c). He moved to suppress the confession, arguing that\\nneither his Miranda waiver nor his confession were made\\nvoluntarily. In support of this claim, Giles cited his long-term\\nconfinement in a “small windowless cell” which provided little\\nopportunity for human interaction. Giles said his mental state\\nwas “precarious” and that he had experienced symptoms of\\n“acute anxiety attacks, insomnia … uncontrollable rage” and\\n“hallucinations.”\\n At an evidentiary hearing, Giles called psychiatrist\\nDr. Silberberg who testified that he conducted a forensic\\npsychiatric evaluation of Giles on November 4, 2014, and had\\nreviewed administrative and medical records. Dr. Silberberg\\nstated that prolonged isolation could result in impaired\\nmemory, attention, and concentration. Isolation could also\\naffect the ability to make rational decisions, and cause mood\\ndisorders. He testified that the effects could be temporary, and\\nthat a person might be competent at one point in time but not\\nanother. Dr. Silberberg recited Giles’s medical history, which\\nincluded treatment for psychological disorders and repeated\\nhead trauma, and concluded that Giles would be particularly\\n\\f4 No. 18-3126\\n\\nvulnerable to the effects of isolation. He concluded that Giles\\ndid not appreciate the significance of the Miranda warning and\\nthat his confession was not voluntary.\\n Lopeman described Giles’s initial refusal to speak with the\\nFBI agents; and how she showed Hall Bacha’s business card as\\nGiles requested. Hall testified that he knew Giles for 17 years,\\nthat both were members of the Four Corner Hustlers gang, and\\ncorroborated Lopeman’s testimony regarding Bacha’s business\\ncard. He said he spoke to Giles regularly, and had no difficulty\\ncommunicating with him.\\n Bacha corroborated the statements of Lopeman and Hall.\\nHe testified that Giles read a form informing him of his\\nMiranda rights, recited the consent portion back to Bacha\\nwithout any difficulty, and then signed the form agreeing to be\\ninterviewed without an attorney present. Giles denied involve-\\nment with the robbery until being shown the DNA evidence;\\nGiles then described the robbery, providing details such as the\\ngender of the teller he robbed and details about his getaway.\\n When Bacha asked whether Giles had information about\\nany other criminal activity, Giles indicated that he could\\nprovide information about money and drugs in exchange for\\na lenient sentence. When asked whether he had information\\nabout any murders, Giles stated that if the agents wanted to\\n“talk about bodies” that he would have to think about it. Giles\\nthen signed a consent form and gave a sample of his DNA.\\nBacha testified that Giles showed no signs of mental distress,\\ndid not appear disoriented, and appeared to be rational.\\n The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding\\nDr. Silberberg’s conclusions about Giles’s mental state on the\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 5\\n\\ndate of the interrogation and confession to be unsupported.\\nThe district court gave great weight to the testimony of\\nLopeman, Hall, and Bacha, all of whom were present on\\nAugust 30, 2013. The court concluded that Giles’s “conduct\\nand statements [reflected] a clear, intelligent, and knowledge-\\nable thought process for anyone in the defendant's difficult\\nsituation” and that his statements and actions were “contrary\\nto those of a person who is unable to appreciate either his\\nrights or the effect of waiving his rights” or who lacked free\\nwill. United States v. Giles, No. 14 CR 112, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\\n137232, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2015).\\n Giles was found guilty of the robbery. At sentencing, he\\nargued that the mental health effects of prolonged isolation\\nwarranted a reduced sentence. Other arguments in favor of\\nmitigation included Giles’s age upon release and the effect of\\ncontinued imprisonment on his mental health.\\n The district court sentenced Giles to a total term of 30 years’\\nimprisonment. Because Giles was given credit for time served,\\nand imprisonment was ordered to be served concurrently with\\nthe sentence for his other two robberies, Giles’s sentence was\\neffectively an additional 18 years of imprisonment for the\\nrobbery.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n A. The Confession and Conviction\\n This court considers whether a Miranda waiver was made\\nknowing and voluntarily de novo, but reviews the district\\ncourt’s findings of fact and credibility determinations under\\nthe clear error standard. United States v. Shabaz, 579 F.3d 815,\\n\\f6 No. 18-3126\\n\\n819–820 (7th. Cir 2009). “The evaluation of whether a confes-\\nsion is coerced involves consideration of the totality of the\\ncircumstances to determine whether the suspect confessed\\nvoluntarily, of his own free will, or whether the police over-\\nrode his volition.” Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 265 (7th Cir.\\n2018).\\n The district court received extensive briefing and held an\\nevidentiary hearing prior to denying Giles’s motion to sup-\\npress. Giles presented Dr. Silberberg’s testimony that Giles did\\nnot appreciate the significance of the Miranda warning given to\\nhim before the confession. The district court found Dr. Silber-\\nberg’s testimony was unsupported, and credited multiple fact\\nwitnesses who were actually present the day of the confession.\\n Bacha testified about the interview itself, stating that he\\nnoticed no signs of mental distress or anything else that would\\ncause him concern about the defendant's mental health. The\\ncourt concluded that “the totality of the evidence establishes\\nthat at the time in question, the defendant was a rational\\nperson who was in touch with reality, able to consider his\\noptions, and make intelligent, rational choices” and that his\\nconfession was the “product of a free and voluntary mind.”\\nUltimately, Giles failed to present evidence that the govern-\\nment obtained his confession through coercion.\\n Furthermore, Giles was identified as the major contributor\\nof DNA on a glove found outside the bank, and a DNA expert\\ntestified that the odds of the DNA coming from someone else\\nwas one in six trillion. Giles took the stand and offered an\\nimplausible explanation for the presence of his DNA—that his\\ngang took gloves from a shared box and his DNA may have\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 7\\n\\ngotten on it while he grabbed a different pair of gloves. In\\naddition to the compelling DNA evidence, two eyewitnesses\\ndescribed the bank robber as matching the general description\\nof Giles. There was sufficient evidence to convict Giles, even in\\nthe absence of the confession.\\n B. Sentencing\\n This court reviews claims of procedural error at sentencing\\nde novo. United States v. Banks, 828 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nThe district court must “consider a defendant's principal,\\nnonfrivolous arguments for lenience.” United States v. Martin,\\n718 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). In considering\\nsuch arguments, the district court must demonstrate it\\n“considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis\\nfor exercising [its] own legal decision making authority.” Rita\\nv. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).\\n Giles asked the court to consider reducing his sentence\\nbased on the effects of his solitary confinement. As he did in\\nhis motion to suppress, Giles relied on general literature about\\nthe effects of solitary confinement and Dr. Silberberg’s opinion\\nwhich the court already found to be unsupported.\\n Giles argues that the district court did not address his\\nargument that a longer prison sentence would fail as a deter-\\nrent because he would be 45 at the end of his sentence for the\\ntwo other robberies. The filings only contained a general\\ndiscussion of “aging out” and did not make any argument\\npersonal to Giles. Nevertheless, the district court did address\\nand reject this argument, stating that the court would “like to\\ngive a great deal of credit to his statement that he has reached\\nan age of maturity where he can look back at what he has done\\n\\f8 No. 18-3126\\n\\nand realize the many mistakes he has made” but found very\\nlittle likelihood of rehabilitation based on Giles’s extensive\\ncriminal background and continued misconduct in prison.\\n Giles also argues that the district court failed to discuss the\\nnegative consequences of continued incarceration on his\\nmental health. The district court did address this argument by\\ngranting Giles’s request that he be placed at a facility with a\\nmental health treatment program.\\n Lastly, Giles argues the district court failed to ask whether\\nhe was satisfied that the court had addressed his main argu-\\nments in mitigation. While we have encouraged such a specific\\ninquiry in the past, we have not required it. United States v.\\nGarcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We encourage\\nsentencing courts to inquire of defense counsel whether they\\nare satisfied that the court has addressed their main arguments\\nin mitigation.”) (emphasis added). While it didn’t use the\\nspecific format we articulated in Garcia-Segura, the district\\ncourt invited comments from the parties four separate times\\nduring the sentencing hearing. Giles raised no objections at\\nthat time as to the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation\\nfor its sentencing decision.\\n The district court set forth a well-reasoned explanation for\\nGiles’s sentence, and considered all of Giles’s non-frivolous\\narguments. The objections he raises now do not show other-\\nwise.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Giles failed to show that his solitary confinement rendered\\nhim incapable of voluntarily waiving his Fifth Amendment\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 9\\n\\nrights. He also failed to show any error in the court’s sentenc-\\ning. The district court’s orders are hereby affirmed.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426009/\", \"author_raw\": \"William Joseph Bauer\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648756/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Jon Giles\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-3126\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n\nJON GILES,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 14 CR 00112-1 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED MAY 28, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\n\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK,\nCircuit Judges.\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. After Jon Giles’s DNA was found at\nthe scene of the robbery of North Community Bank, FBI agents\ninterrogated him at the Pontiac Correctional Center where he\nwas serving a prison term for two other bank robberies. Giles\nconfessed to the robbery. Giles argues the district court erred\n\f2 No. 18-3126\n\nin denying his motion to suppress the confession, because his\nprolonged solitary confinement prior to the interview rendered\nhim incapable of exercising a voluntary and knowing waiver\nof his Fifth Amendment rights. Giles also argues that the\ndistrict court failed to properly address his mitigating argu-\nments at sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we reject these\narguments and affirm the orders of the district court.\n I. BACKGROUND\n In 2010, Jon Giles pleaded guilty to state robbery charges.\nGiles spent the next two years in solitary confinement at\nTamms Correctional Center. When Tamms was shuttered,\nGiles was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center. He spent\none month in general population before returning to isolation\nfrom January 2013 until January 2014.\n On August 30, 2013, during this period of solitary confine-\nment, FBI agents Timothy Bacha and Michael Lovernick\nquestioned Jon Giles. They were investigating a bank robbery\nat North Community Bank that took place in 2009. DNA\nrecovered from a glove found near the crime scene matched\nGiles’s DNA. The glove was found next to dye-stained money\nstolen from the bank.\n At first, Giles refused to meet with the agents. Robin\nLopeman, a Pontiac correctional officer, approached Giles’s cell\nwith Bacha’s business card. Giles requested that she show the\ncard to Robert Hall, a fellow inmate and former gang associate,\nfollowing a “home-grown” prison custom of letting other\ninmates know where you are going and who you are talking\nto. Hall shouted his consent and Giles agreed to speak to the\nagents.\n\fNo. 18-3126 3\n\n Bacha and Lovernick read Giles his Miranda rights, and he\nagreed in writing to be questioned without an attorney present.\nGiles initially denied his involvement in the North Community\nBank robbery until he was shown the DNA report and photo-\ngraphs of the dyed money. Giles then confessed to the robbery\nand agreed to a cheek swab after being advised of his right to\nrefuse. The swab matched the DNA found on the glove.\n Giles was indicted on March 4, 2014, on one count of bank\nrobbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 and one count of using a\nfirearm in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.\n§ 924(c). He moved to suppress the confession, arguing that\nneither his Miranda waiver nor his confession were made\nvoluntarily. In support of this claim, Giles cited his long-term\nconfinement in a “small windowless cell” which provided little\nopportunity for human interaction. Giles said his mental state\nwas “precarious” and that he had experienced symptoms of\n“acute anxiety attacks, insomnia … uncontrollable rage” and\n“hallucinations.”\n At an evidentiary hearing, Giles called psychiatrist\nDr. Silberberg who testified that he conducted a forensic\npsychiatric evaluation of Giles on November 4, 2014, and had\nreviewed administrative and medical records. Dr. Silberberg\nstated that prolonged isolation could result in impaired\nmemory, attention, and concentration. Isolation could also\naffect the ability to make rational decisions, and cause mood\ndisorders. He testified that the effects could be temporary, and\nthat a person might be competent at one point in time but not\nanother. Dr. Silberberg recited Giles’s medical history, which\nincluded treatment for psychological disorders and repeated\nhead trauma, and concluded that Giles would be particularly\n\f4 No. 18-3126\n\nvulnerable to the effects of isolation. He concluded that Giles\ndid not appreciate the significance of the Miranda warning and\nthat his confession was not voluntary.\n Lopeman described Giles’s initial refusal to speak with the\nFBI agents; and how she showed Hall Bacha’s business card as\nGiles requested. Hall testified that he knew Giles for 17 years,\nthat both were members of the Four Corner Hustlers gang, and\ncorroborated Lopeman’s testimony regarding Bacha’s business\ncard. He said he spoke to Giles regularly, and had no difficulty\ncommunicating with him.\n Bacha corroborated the statements of Lopeman and Hall.\nHe testified that Giles read a form informing him of his\nMiranda rights, recited the consent portion back to Bacha\nwithout any difficulty, and then signed the form agreeing to be\ninterviewed without an attorney present. Giles denied involve-\nment with the robbery until being shown the DNA evidence;\nGiles then described the robbery, providing details such as the\ngender of the teller he robbed and details about his getaway.\n When Bacha asked whether Giles had information about\nany other criminal activity, Giles indicated that he could\nprovide information about money and drugs in exchange for\na lenient sentence. When asked whether he had information\nabout any murders, Giles stated that if the agents wanted to\n“talk about bodies” that he would have to think about it. Giles\nthen signed a consent form and gave a sample of his DNA.\nBacha testified that Giles showed no signs of mental distress,\ndid not appear disoriented, and appeared to be rational.\n The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding\nDr. Silberberg’s conclusions about Giles’s mental state on the\n\fNo. 18-3126 5\n\ndate of the interrogation and confession to be unsupported.\nThe district court gave great weight to the testimony of\nLopeman, Hall, and Bacha, all of whom were present on\nAugust 30, 2013. The court concluded that Giles’s “conduct\nand statements [reflected] a clear, intelligent, and knowledge-\nable thought process for anyone in the defendant's difficult\nsituation” and that his statements and actions were “contrary\nto those of a person who is unable to appreciate either his\nrights or the effect of waiving his rights” or who lacked free\nwill. United States v. Giles, No. 14 CR 112, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\n137232, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2015).\n Giles was found guilty of the robbery. At sentencing, he\nargued that the mental health effects of prolonged isolation\nwarranted a reduced sentence. Other arguments in favor of\nmitigation included Giles’s age upon release and the effect of\ncontinued imprisonment on his mental health.\n The district court sentenced Giles to a total term of 30 years’\nimprisonment. Because Giles was given credit for time served,\nand imprisonment was ordered to be served concurrently with\nthe sentence for his other two robberies, Giles’s sentence was\neffectively an additional 18 years of imprisonment for the\nrobbery.\n II. ANALYSIS\n A. The Confession and Conviction\n This court considers whether a Miranda waiver was made\nknowing and voluntarily de novo, but reviews the district\ncourt’s findings of fact and credibility determinations under\nthe clear error standard. United States v. Shabaz, 579 F.3d 815,\n\f6 No. 18-3126\n\n819–820 (7th. Cir 2009). “The evaluation of whether a confes-\nsion is coerced involves consideration of the totality of the\ncircumstances to determine whether the suspect confessed\nvoluntarily, of his own free will, or whether the police over-\nrode his volition.” Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 265 (7th Cir.\n2018).\n The district court received extensive briefing and held an\nevidentiary hearing prior to denying Giles’s motion to sup-\npress. Giles presented Dr. Silberberg’s testimony that Giles did\nnot appreciate the significance of the Miranda warning given to\nhim before the confession. The district court found Dr. Silber-\nberg’s testimony was unsupported, and credited multiple fact\nwitnesses who were actually present the day of the confession.\n Bacha testified about the interview itself, stating that he\nnoticed no signs of mental distress or anything else that would\ncause him concern about the defendant's mental health. The\ncourt concluded that “the totality of the evidence establishes\nthat at the time in question, the defendant was a rational\nperson who was in touch with reality, able to consider his\noptions, and make intelligent, rational choices” and that his\nconfession was the “product of a free and voluntary mind.”\nUltimately, Giles failed to present evidence that the govern-\nment obtained his confession through coercion.\n Furthermore, Giles was identified as the major contributor\nof DNA on a glove found outside the bank, and a DNA expert\ntestified that the odds of the DNA coming from someone else\nwas one in six trillion. Giles took the stand and offered an\nimplausible explanation for the presence of his DNA—that his\ngang took gloves from a shared box and his DNA may have\n\fNo. 18-3126 7\n\ngotten on it while he grabbed a different pair of gloves. In\naddition to the compelling DNA evidence, two eyewitnesses\ndescribed the bank robber as matching the general description\nof Giles. There was sufficient evidence to convict Giles, even in\nthe absence of the confession.\n B. Sentencing\n This court reviews claims of procedural error at sentencing\nde novo. United States v. Banks, 828 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2016).\nThe district court must “consider a defendant's principal,\nnonfrivolous arguments for lenience.” United States v. Martin,\n718 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). In considering\nsuch arguments, the district court must demonstrate it\n“considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis\nfor exercising [its] own legal decision making authority.” Rita\nv. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).\n Giles asked the court to consider reducing his sentence\nbased on the effects of his solitary confinement. As he did in\nhis motion to suppress, Giles relied on general literature about\nthe effects of solitary confinement and Dr. Silberberg’s opinion\nwhich the court already found to be unsupported.\n Giles argues that the district court did not address his\nargument that a longer prison sentence would fail as a deter-\nrent because he would be 45 at the end of his sentence for the\ntwo other robberies. The filings only contained a general\ndiscussion of “aging out” and did not make any argument\npersonal to Giles. Nevertheless, the district court did address\nand reject this argument, stating that the court would “like to\ngive a great deal of credit to his statement that he has reached\nan age of maturity where he can look back at what he has done\n\f8 No. 18-3126\n\nand realize the many mistakes he has made” but found very\nlittle likelihood of rehabilitation based on Giles’s extensive\ncriminal background and continued misconduct in prison.\n Giles also argues that the district court failed to discuss the\nnegative consequences of continued incarceration on his\nmental health. The district court did address this argument by\ngranting Giles’s request that he be placed at a facility with a\nmental health treatment program.\n Lastly, Giles argues the district court failed to ask whether\nhe was satisfied that the court had addressed his main argu-\nments in mitigation. While we have encouraged such a specific\ninquiry in the past, we have not required it. United States v.\nGarcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We encourage\nsentencing courts to inquire of defense counsel whether they\nare satisfied that the court has addressed their main arguments\nin mitigation.”) (emphasis added). While it didn’t use the\nspecific format we articulated in Garcia-Segura, the district\ncourt invited comments from the parties four separate times\nduring the sentencing hearing. Giles raised no objections at\nthat time as to the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation\nfor its sentencing decision.\n The district court set forth a well-reasoned explanation for\nGiles’s sentence, and considered all of Giles’s non-frivolous\narguments. The objections he raises now do not show other-\nwise.\n III. CONCLUSION\n Giles failed to show that his solitary confinement rendered\nhim incapable of voluntarily waiving his Fifth Amendment\n\fNo. 18-3126 9\n\nrights. He also failed to show any error in the court’s sentenc-\ning. The district court’s orders are hereby affirmed.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Jon Giles\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-3126\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nJON GILES,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 14 CR 00112-1 — Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 28, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n BAUER, Circuit Judge. After Jon Giles’s DNA was found at\\nthe scene of the robbery of North Community Bank, FBI agents\\ninterrogated him at the Pontiac Correctional Center where he\\nwas serving a prison term for two other bank robberies. Giles\\nconfessed to the robbery. Giles argues the district court erred\\n\\f2 No. 18-3126\\n\\nin denying his motion to suppress the confession, because his\\nprolonged solitary confinement prior to the interview rendered\\nhim incapable of exercising a voluntary and knowing waiver\\nof his Fifth Amendment rights. Giles also argues that the\\ndistrict court failed to properly address his mitigating argu-\\nments at sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we reject these\\narguments and affirm the orders of the district court.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In 2010, Jon Giles pleaded guilty to state robbery charges.\\nGiles spent the next two years in solitary confinement at\\nTamms Correctional Center. When Tamms was shuttered,\\nGiles was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center. He spent\\none month in general population before returning to isolation\\nfrom January 2013 until January 2014.\\n On August 30, 2013, during this period of solitary confine-\\nment, FBI agents Timothy Bacha and Michael Lovernick\\nquestioned Jon Giles. They were investigating a bank robbery\\nat North Community Bank that took place in 2009. DNA\\nrecovered from a glove found near the crime scene matched\\nGiles’s DNA. The glove was found next to dye-stained money\\nstolen from the bank.\\n At first, Giles refused to meet with the agents. Robin\\nLopeman, a Pontiac correctional officer, approached Giles’s cell\\nwith Bacha’s business card. Giles requested that she show the\\ncard to Robert Hall, a fellow inmate and former gang associate,\\nfollowing a “home-grown” prison custom of letting other\\ninmates know where you are going and who you are talking\\nto. Hall shouted his consent and Giles agreed to speak to the\\nagents.\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 3\\n\\n Bacha and Lovernick read Giles his Miranda rights, and he\\nagreed in writing to be questioned without an attorney present.\\nGiles initially denied his involvement in the North Community\\nBank robbery until he was shown the DNA report and photo-\\ngraphs of the dyed money. Giles then confessed to the robbery\\nand agreed to a cheek swab after being advised of his right to\\nrefuse. The swab matched the DNA found on the glove.\\n Giles was indicted on March 4, 2014, on one count of bank\\nrobbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 and one count of using a\\nfirearm in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 924(c). He moved to suppress the confession, arguing that\\nneither his Miranda waiver nor his confession were made\\nvoluntarily. In support of this claim, Giles cited his long-term\\nconfinement in a “small windowless cell” which provided little\\nopportunity for human interaction. Giles said his mental state\\nwas “precarious” and that he had experienced symptoms of\\n“acute anxiety attacks, insomnia … uncontrollable rage” and\\n“hallucinations.”\\n At an evidentiary hearing, Giles called psychiatrist\\nDr. Silberberg who testified that he conducted a forensic\\npsychiatric evaluation of Giles on November 4, 2014, and had\\nreviewed administrative and medical records. Dr. Silberberg\\nstated that prolonged isolation could result in impaired\\nmemory, attention, and concentration. Isolation could also\\naffect the ability to make rational decisions, and cause mood\\ndisorders. He testified that the effects could be temporary, and\\nthat a person might be competent at one point in time but not\\nanother. Dr. Silberberg recited Giles’s medical history, which\\nincluded treatment for psychological disorders and repeated\\nhead trauma, and concluded that Giles would be particularly\\n\\f4 No. 18-3126\\n\\nvulnerable to the effects of isolation. He concluded that Giles\\ndid not appreciate the significance of the Miranda warning and\\nthat his confession was not voluntary.\\n Lopeman described Giles’s initial refusal to speak with the\\nFBI agents; and how she showed Hall Bacha’s business card as\\nGiles requested. Hall testified that he knew Giles for 17 years,\\nthat both were members of the Four Corner Hustlers gang, and\\ncorroborated Lopeman’s testimony regarding Bacha’s business\\ncard. He said he spoke to Giles regularly, and had no difficulty\\ncommunicating with him.\\n Bacha corroborated the statements of Lopeman and Hall.\\nHe testified that Giles read a form informing him of his\\nMiranda rights, recited the consent portion back to Bacha\\nwithout any difficulty, and then signed the form agreeing to be\\ninterviewed without an attorney present. Giles denied involve-\\nment with the robbery until being shown the DNA evidence;\\nGiles then described the robbery, providing details such as the\\ngender of the teller he robbed and details about his getaway.\\n When Bacha asked whether Giles had information about\\nany other criminal activity, Giles indicated that he could\\nprovide information about money and drugs in exchange for\\na lenient sentence. When asked whether he had information\\nabout any murders, Giles stated that if the agents wanted to\\n“talk about bodies” that he would have to think about it. Giles\\nthen signed a consent form and gave a sample of his DNA.\\nBacha testified that Giles showed no signs of mental distress,\\ndid not appear disoriented, and appeared to be rational.\\n The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding\\nDr. Silberberg’s conclusions about Giles’s mental state on the\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 5\\n\\ndate of the interrogation and confession to be unsupported.\\nThe district court gave great weight to the testimony of\\nLopeman, Hall, and Bacha, all of whom were present on\\nAugust 30, 2013. The court concluded that Giles’s “conduct\\nand statements [reflected] a clear, intelligent, and knowledge-\\nable thought process for anyone in the defendant's difficult\\nsituation” and that his statements and actions were “contrary\\nto those of a person who is unable to appreciate either his\\nrights or the effect of waiving his rights” or who lacked free\\nwill. United States v. Giles, No. 14 CR 112, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS\\n137232, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2015).\\n Giles was found guilty of the robbery. At sentencing, he\\nargued that the mental health effects of prolonged isolation\\nwarranted a reduced sentence. Other arguments in favor of\\nmitigation included Giles’s age upon release and the effect of\\ncontinued imprisonment on his mental health.\\n The district court sentenced Giles to a total term of 30 years’\\nimprisonment. Because Giles was given credit for time served,\\nand imprisonment was ordered to be served concurrently with\\nthe sentence for his other two robberies, Giles’s sentence was\\neffectively an additional 18 years of imprisonment for the\\nrobbery.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n A. The Confession and Conviction\\n This court considers whether a Miranda waiver was made\\nknowing and voluntarily de novo, but reviews the district\\ncourt’s findings of fact and credibility determinations under\\nthe clear error standard. United States v. Shabaz, 579 F.3d 815,\\n\\f6 No. 18-3126\\n\\n819–820 (7th. Cir 2009). “The evaluation of whether a confes-\\nsion is coerced involves consideration of the totality of the\\ncircumstances to determine whether the suspect confessed\\nvoluntarily, of his own free will, or whether the police over-\\nrode his volition.” Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 265 (7th Cir.\\n2018).\\n The district court received extensive briefing and held an\\nevidentiary hearing prior to denying Giles’s motion to sup-\\npress. Giles presented Dr. Silberberg’s testimony that Giles did\\nnot appreciate the significance of the Miranda warning given to\\nhim before the confession. The district court found Dr. Silber-\\nberg’s testimony was unsupported, and credited multiple fact\\nwitnesses who were actually present the day of the confession.\\n Bacha testified about the interview itself, stating that he\\nnoticed no signs of mental distress or anything else that would\\ncause him concern about the defendant's mental health. The\\ncourt concluded that “the totality of the evidence establishes\\nthat at the time in question, the defendant was a rational\\nperson who was in touch with reality, able to consider his\\noptions, and make intelligent, rational choices” and that his\\nconfession was the “product of a free and voluntary mind.”\\nUltimately, Giles failed to present evidence that the govern-\\nment obtained his confession through coercion.\\n Furthermore, Giles was identified as the major contributor\\nof DNA on a glove found outside the bank, and a DNA expert\\ntestified that the odds of the DNA coming from someone else\\nwas one in six trillion. Giles took the stand and offered an\\nimplausible explanation for the presence of his DNA—that his\\ngang took gloves from a shared box and his DNA may have\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 7\\n\\ngotten on it while he grabbed a different pair of gloves. In\\naddition to the compelling DNA evidence, two eyewitnesses\\ndescribed the bank robber as matching the general description\\nof Giles. There was sufficient evidence to convict Giles, even in\\nthe absence of the confession.\\n B. Sentencing\\n This court reviews claims of procedural error at sentencing\\nde novo. United States v. Banks, 828 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nThe district court must “consider a defendant's principal,\\nnonfrivolous arguments for lenience.” United States v. Martin,\\n718 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). In considering\\nsuch arguments, the district court must demonstrate it\\n“considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis\\nfor exercising [its] own legal decision making authority.” Rita\\nv. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).\\n Giles asked the court to consider reducing his sentence\\nbased on the effects of his solitary confinement. As he did in\\nhis motion to suppress, Giles relied on general literature about\\nthe effects of solitary confinement and Dr. Silberberg’s opinion\\nwhich the court already found to be unsupported.\\n Giles argues that the district court did not address his\\nargument that a longer prison sentence would fail as a deter-\\nrent because he would be 45 at the end of his sentence for the\\ntwo other robberies. The filings only contained a general\\ndiscussion of “aging out” and did not make any argument\\npersonal to Giles. Nevertheless, the district court did address\\nand reject this argument, stating that the court would “like to\\ngive a great deal of credit to his statement that he has reached\\nan age of maturity where he can look back at what he has done\\n\\f8 No. 18-3126\\n\\nand realize the many mistakes he has made” but found very\\nlittle likelihood of rehabilitation based on Giles’s extensive\\ncriminal background and continued misconduct in prison.\\n Giles also argues that the district court failed to discuss the\\nnegative consequences of continued incarceration on his\\nmental health. The district court did address this argument by\\ngranting Giles’s request that he be placed at a facility with a\\nmental health treatment program.\\n Lastly, Giles argues the district court failed to ask whether\\nhe was satisfied that the court had addressed his main argu-\\nments in mitigation. While we have encouraged such a specific\\ninquiry in the past, we have not required it. United States v.\\nGarcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We encourage\\nsentencing courts to inquire of defense counsel whether they\\nare satisfied that the court has addressed their main arguments\\nin mitigation.”) (emphasis added). While it didn’t use the\\nspecific format we articulated in Garcia-Segura, the district\\ncourt invited comments from the parties four separate times\\nduring the sentencing hearing. Giles raised no objections at\\nthat time as to the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation\\nfor its sentencing decision.\\n The district court set forth a well-reasoned explanation for\\nGiles’s sentence, and considered all of Giles’s non-frivolous\\narguments. The objections he raises now do not show other-\\nwise.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n Giles failed to show that his solitary confinement rendered\\nhim incapable of voluntarily waiving his Fifth Amendment\\n\\fNo. 18-3126 9\\n\\nrights. He also failed to show any error in the court’s sentenc-\\ning. The district court’s orders are hereby affirmed.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3867,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4648757,"string":"4,648,757"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Elisa J. YOCHIM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin S. CARSON, Sr., Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Elisa J. Yochim v. Benjamin S. Carson, Sr."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3670"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Kanne, Hamilton, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3670\\nELISA J. YOCHIM,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBENJAMIN S. CARSON, SR.,\\nSecretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban\\nDevelopment,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cv-4926 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Elisa Yochim worked in the legal\\ndepartment of the United States Department of Housing and\\nUrban Development for 26 years. Throughout her tenure, she\\ntook full advantage of HUD’s flexible and progressive policy\\npermitting employees to work from home several days per\\nweek. After undergoing hand surgery, Yochim requested time\\n\\f2 No. 18-3670\\n\\noff and permission to work from home. HUD agreed and al-\\nlowed her time to recover and to telework several days a week\\nfor many months as she received physical therapy. HUD later\\nrestructured its law department and this development had\\nthe effect of requiring employees like Yochim to spend more\\ntime in the office. In time this restructuring, combined with\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies, led HUD to revoke her\\ntelework privileges and offer alternative accommodations.\\nFor her part, Yochim responded with this lawsuit, alleging vi-\\nolations of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate\\nher ongoing rehabilitation needs. The district court entered\\nsummary judgment for HUD, and we affirm. No rational jury\\ncould conclude that the Department failed to offer reasonable\\naccommodations.\\n I\\n In reviewing the district court’s award of summary judg-\\nment to HUD, we construe the facts in the light most favora-\\nble to Yochim as the nonmovant, resolving evidentiary con-\\nflicts and competing inferences in her favor. See Brown v. Mil-\\nwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Yochim worked as a HUD attorney for 26 years, serving in\\nthe Chicago office for the last 15 years before her retirement\\nin May 2015. During her tenure, the Department maintained\\na forward-leaning telework policy that allowed full-time em-\\nployees to work from home up to three days a week at their\\nmanager’s discretion.\\n Beginning in October 2012, HUD’s legal department un-\\nderwent a functional reorganization. Before this change, the\\nDepartment’s attorneys tended to specialize in particular ar-\\neas. With the reorganization, however, HUD wanted its\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 3\\n\\nattorneys to work more as generalists and to assist each other\\nthrough cross-training and collaboration—a change in ap-\\nproach less suited to telework. Yochim’s job description\\nchanged to include “training, orientation, [and] working\\ngroups” as well as “administrative responsibilities,” includ-\\ning “space and file management,” as areas of focus. Around\\nthis same time, Yochim applied for a supervisory position, but\\nthe Department passed her up and instead awarded the role\\nto Lisa Danna-Brennan, who became Yochim’s supervisor.\\nThis development was not one Yochim welcomed.\\n In November 2012, Yochim had surgery to treat carpal tun-\\nnel syndrome in her right hand. The surgery brought with it\\na recovery and rehabilitation process, prompting Yochim to\\nsubmit several requests to HUD to accommodate her needs.\\nThe HUD handbook outlines the Department’s process for ac-\\ncommodating such requests. Employees can seek reasonable\\naccommodations through their immediate supervisor or the\\nDepartment’s Reasonable Accommodation Branch. The su-\\npervisor and employee then engage in an interactive process\\nto identify an accommodation, and the Reasonable Accom-\\nmodation Branch facilitates this communication. The Branch\\ndetermines an employee’s eligibility for a reasonable accom-\\nmodation, while the supervisor shoulders responsibility for\\ndeciding what accommodation is suitable.\\n Yochim submitted her first accommodation request in De-\\ncember 2012, asking her supervisor, Danna-Brennan, to per-\\nmit her to telework during the eight days in December on\\nwhich she had not already scheduled leave and all of January.\\nTo support her request, Yochim submitted two work-status\\nforms from her surgeon. In the first form, the doctor identified\\nno work or functional limitations while adding that Yochim\\n\\f4 No. 18-3670\\n\\n“may work from home until the end of January.” The doctor’s\\nsecond form conveyed a work-related limitation, explaining\\nthat Yochim had “diminished right-hand strength and should\\nnot rely on gripping with that hand until February 1, 2013;\\nspecifically, riding public transportation that requires holding\\non with her right hand may be a safe[t]y concern.”\\n Danna-Brennan approved Yochim’s request to work from\\nhome the remainder of December. As for Yochim’s request to\\ntelework throughout January, Danna-Brennan offered a com-\\npressed schedule consisting of four ten-hour days—two in the\\noffice and two at home. Danna-Brennan also afforded Yochim\\nthe flexibility to “set her schedule to reflect her need to avoid\\nrush hour” if she maintained a set daily schedule. Apparently\\nunhappy that her compressed schedule still required her to\\ncome to the office two days a week, Yochim later complained\\nto Danna-Brennan that she had to use sick leave to stay home\\nthese extra two days per week. At no point, however, did\\nYochim explain why HUD’s accommodation would interfere\\nwith ongoing and medically necessary rehabilitation or phys-\\nical therapy. Nor did Yochim suggest other accommodation\\noptions.\\n In March 2013, Yochim submitted a second request to\\nwork full-time from home until June 30 to accommodate her\\nongoing recovery from surgery. She supported this request\\nwith a letter from her primary-care physician, Dr. Lexy\\nWistenberg, who reported that she continued to experience\\npain and swelling in her right hand. Dr. Wistenberg also ad-\\nvised that Yochim may need to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour to avoid getting stuck standing in a train aisle and need-\\ning to grasp a handrail. Otherwise, however, Dr. Wistenberg\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 5\\n\\ncleared Yochim to work as she continued her physical ther-\\napy.\\n In April 2013, while the second accommodation request\\nwas pending, Danna-Brennan placed Yochim on a sick-leave\\nrestriction. This restriction required Yochim to provide a doc-\\ntor’s note with the date and time of an appointment or any\\nanticipated medical care and to schedule medical appoint-\\nments at the beginning or end of the day to have the least im-\\npact on the workday. This new restriction resulted from\\nDanna-Brennan’s determination that Yochim had a history of\\nexcessive absences from work—an audit of Yochim’s time re-\\nvealed that she had taken leave on 339 days out of a possible\\n1,010 work days between January 1, 2009 and May 1, 2013—\\nand that she often took leave without any prior approval.\\n A month later, in May 2013, HUD responded to Yochim’s\\nsecond accommodation request. The Department offered\\nvoice-recognition software to reduce Yochim’s need to type\\nand the option to telework three days per week. The accom-\\nmodation called for Yochim to work in the office two days per\\nweek while allowing her to work from home for two hours in\\nthe morning on these days to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour. HUD also permitted her to leave work 15 minutes early\\nto secure seating on the train. Yochim agreed to this revised\\nschedule and concedes that it reflected an effective accommo-\\ndation. This accommodation lasted approximately one\\nmonth, expiring in June 2013.\\n A year later, in June 2014, Danna-Brennan revoked\\nYochim’s telework privileges and issued a written reprimand\\nfor performance deficiencies. Danna-Brennan decided the\\nreprimand was warranted based on the results of an audit of\\nthe legal team’s docket. The audit revealed that Yochim had\\n\\f6 No. 18-3670\\n\\nleft particular assignments incomplete for up to two years\\nwithout ever reporting the delays, despite HUD’s policy re-\\nquiring her to do so.\\n In August 2014, Yochim submitted a third accommodation\\nrequest seeking to telework three days per week for six\\nmonths plus two additional days per week “as needed due to\\npain, medical appointments, and recovery.” She supported\\nthis request with another letter from Dr. Wistenberg who re-\\nported that Yochim had inflammatory osteoarthritis, causing\\n“significant pain and stiffness” and swollen joints throughout\\nher body. Dr. Wistenberg recommended that Yochim work\\nfrom home at least three days per week to minimize the risks\\nof further discomfort from commuting and to accommodate\\nvisits to physical therapists near her suburban home. Yochim\\nnever inquired about attending physical therapy in down-\\ntown Chicago near HUD’s office.\\n Danna-Brennan responded by offering a list of alternative\\naccommodations including an ergonomic assessment, addi-\\ntional paralegal assistance to reduce Yochim’s typing, a com-\\npressed weekly schedule, and generous leave approval. In do-\\ning so, Danna-Brennan explained that Yochim working from\\nhome was no longer an acceptable accommodation “because\\n[her] telework was suspended as a result of performance de-\\nficiencies while teleworking 3 days a week.” Yochim ex-\\npressed her disagreement with the proposed arrangement by\\nfiling a written statement with a specialist in HUD’s Reason-\\nable Accommodation Branch. The specialist then informed\\nYochim of the procedures to seek reconsideration, but she\\nnever did so.\\n During the same period, after the restructuring of HUD’s\\nlegal department, Yochim lodged two complaints with the\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 7\\n\\nEqual Employment Opportunity Commission. She alleged\\nthat HUD discriminated and retaliated against her by failing\\nto promote her and, separately, to accommodate her need for\\nongoing rehabilitation.\\n Yochim retired from HUD once she became eligible to do\\nso in May 2015. She then filed this suit, advancing claims un-\\nder the Rehabilitation Act and alleging that HUD failed to ac-\\ncommodate her requests to telework and to engage in the in-\\nteractive process promptly and in good faith. Yochim also al-\\nleged that HUD retaliated against her for filing her EEO com-\\nplaints and subjected her to a hostile work environment by\\nrestricting her telework and sick-leave privileges.\\n The district court granted HUD’s motion for summary\\njudgment, concluding that although Yochim had established\\nthat she was a qualified person with a disability, no reasona-\\nble jury could find that the Department had failed to offer rea-\\nsonable accommodations. The district court found that\\nHUD’s alternative accommodations were reasonable given\\nthe need that arose for Yochim to work in the office several\\ndays a week as a result of the Department’s restructuring of\\nits legal department. The district court also determined that\\nYochim fell short in her efforts to show that HUD retaliated\\nagainst her or subjected her to a hostile work environment.\\n II\\n On appeal Yochim argues that she brought forth enough\\nevidence to get to a jury on her allegations that HUD did not\\nreasonably accommodate her because it offered only ineffec-\\ntive accommodations and failed to engage in the interactive\\nprocess in good faith. We review a district court’s entry of\\n\\f8 No. 18-3670\\n\\nsummary judgment de novo and must affirm if no reasonable\\njuror could find in favor of Yochim. See Brown, 855 F.3d at 820.\\n Yochim brought her claims under the Rehabilitation Act.\\nThis enactment mandates that no qualifying individual with\\na disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability”\\nexperience discrimination by an executive agency. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 794(a). To prevail on her claim of discrimination, Yochim\\nmust show that (1) she was a qualified individual with a dis-\\nability, (2) HUD was aware of her disability, and (3) the De-\\npartment failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.\\nSee Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2019);\\nsee also Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(explaining that the Rehabilitation Act adopted the standard\\nfor determining whether a violation has occurred from the\\nAmericans with Disabilities Act). The accommodation obliga-\\ntion embodied in the third prong brings with it a requirement\\nthat both the employer and the employee engage in a flexible\\n“interactive process” and make a “good faith effort” to deter-\\nmine what accommodations are necessary. See Lawler v. Peoria\\nSch. Dist. No. 150, 837 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n A\\n We agree with the district court that no rational jury could\\nfind that HUD failed to offer Yochim reasonable accommoda-\\ntions or engage in the interactive process in good faith. The\\nDepartment either granted each of Yochim’s requests or re-\\nsponded with a list of alternative options that reasonably ad-\\ndressed her needs. Nor does the record support Yochim’s con-\\ntentions of bad faith. This is not a case where an employee’s\\nrequests for accommodations fell on deaf ears. To the con-\\ntrary, the parties engaged in a meaningful back-and-forth\\nwith Yochim requesting to work from home and HUD\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 9\\n\\npresenting her with appropriate alternative accommodations.\\nThe communication process did not break down simply be-\\ncause Yochim did not receive the answers she had hoped for.\\n Start with the period following Yochim’s surgery. HUD\\ngranted her request to telework for the eight remaining days\\nin December 2012 that she had not already requested off. The\\nDepartment also permitted her to adjust her work hours (to\\navoid having to stand on a train) and to telework two days a\\nweek for the entirety of January. While this fell short of\\nYochim’s preference to work from home all of January, an em-\\nployer must provide a “reasonable accommodation, not the\\naccommodation [the employee] would prefer.” Hoppe v. Lewis\\nUniv., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the Depart-\\nment’s restructuring and Yochim’s updated job description\\nfocusing on cross-training, teamwork, and collaboration,\\nwhich necessarily required her presence in the office, HUD’s\\naccommodations were entirely reasonable. And recall that the\\nonly medical basis for Yochim’s request to work from home\\nin January 2013 was her surgeon’s concerns about Yochim’s\\ncommute on crowded trains and her need to attend therapy\\nappointments. HUD’s alternative options reasonably ad-\\ndressed these concerns by adjusting her work hours to avoid\\nrush hour and limiting—but not eliminating—her time in the\\noffice.\\n Now consider HUD’s response to Yochim’s August 2014\\nrequest to work from home three to five days per week for six\\nmonths. HUD offered her a four-day work week, generous\\nleave approval (to ease commuting and attending physical\\ntherapy), and other accommodations. The Department did so\\nattentive to the needs of its legal department in Chicago and\\nmindful that Yochim, although medically cleared for work,\\n\\f10 No. 18-3670\\n\\nhad ongoing needs for physical therapy. So, too, did HUD de-\\ntermine that further telework was not warranted given\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies. No reasonable jury could\\nfind this response unreasonable. Yochim has never explained\\nwhy HUD’s approval of regular sick leave to attend physical\\ntherapy appointments was inadequate. And not once has\\nYochim identified any reason why she could not attend ther-\\napy appointments closer to her Chicago office to minimize her\\ncommute or why changes to her work hours would not re-\\nsolve her concern about crowded trains. Put most simply,\\nYochim failed to connect the accommodation she persisted\\nwas necessary with what the record showed were her ongoing\\nmedical needs. In the end, it was Yochim’s own insistence on\\nteleworking three or more days a week and her refusal to re-\\nmain open to anything less that doomed the interactive pro-\\ncess.\\n Yochim’s claim that HUD failed to offer her reasonable ac-\\ncommodations fails for another reason. She cannot point to\\nevidence that the two accommodations she sought but did not\\nreceive—to telework full-time for one month and later for\\nthree to five days per week for six months—were “reasonable\\non [their] face.” See Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans,\\nInc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Majors v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013)) (stating that a plain-\\ntiff seeking to establish claim for failure to accommodate un-\\nder the ADA must “make an initial showing that the accom-\\nmodation she sought was ‘reasonable on its face’”). Yochim\\ninsists that her requests to telework were appropriate because\\nshe had worked from home full time for six weeks in 2004,\\nHUD’s telework policy allows employees to work from home\\nup to three days a week, and another employee was allowed\\nto work from home for an unknown period of time.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 11\\n\\n Yochim’s position falls short. An accommodation to tele-\\nwork requires a context-specific inquiry, and a “general con-\\nsensus [exists] among courts” that jobs “often require face-to-\\nface collaboration.” See Bilinksy v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d\\n565, 573 (7th Cir. 2019). Yochim has failed to counter HUD’s\\nevidence that she held just such a job. The 2012 restructuring\\nof the legal department, which changed Yochim’s responsibil-\\nities and job description, required attorneys to work in teams,\\ncollaborate more, and cross-train each other. She points to the\\nDepartment’s 2010 telework policy that allows telework up to\\nthree days a week, but this policy predates the restructuring.\\nEven more to the point, the policy, by its terms, is subject to\\nmanagement’s discretion—it does not confer a legally pro-\\ntected entitlement upon an employee.\\n B\\n Yochim next argues that HUD’s accommodations were in-\\neffective. She says, for example, that many of HUD’s options\\n(like the compressed work week and the flexibility to tele-\\nwork a few days a week) already were widely available to\\nHUD employees without a reasonable accommodation and\\nthus were not “alternative accommodations.” But this posi-\\ntion misses the mark. “Reasonable accommodation” under\\nthe relevant statutes includes “modified work schedules”\\nsuch as the compressed schedules and telework that HUD of-\\nfered. See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476,\\n481 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)). It makes no\\ndifference that modified scheduling options might have been\\navailable to other HUD employees who obtained permission\\nto telework from their manager.\\n By way of another example, Yochim contends that HUD’s\\noptions were ineffective because requiring her to work in the\\n\\f12 No. 18-3670\\n\\noffice meant that she had to commute on the train and grasp\\nthe handrails with her injured right hand. But the medical rec-\\nords supporting Yochim’s accommodation requests demon-\\nstrated that the only limitation related to her commute was\\nthe need to avoid crowded trains that could cause her to fall\\nor force her to grip the railings. HUD’s proposed accommo-\\ndations addressed these concerns by offering her an adjusted\\nschedule to avoid rush hour.\\n Yochim has offered a few other views as to why HUD’s\\naccommodations were ineffective. She claims that the long\\nten-hour days of her compressed schedule (and HUD’s\\nrequirement that she maintain a set daily schedule) limited\\nher flexibility to make her therapy appointments before or\\nafter work, necessitating that she take sick leave. And she says\\nthat doing so was especially difficult with the sick-leave\\nrestriction imposed by her supervisor. But one purpose of\\npaid sick leave is to allow employees to attend such\\nappointments, and Yochim does not present any evidence\\nthat the leave restriction—which merely required her to\\nsubmit a medical note detailing the time and date of an\\nappointment—interfered with her physical-therapy sessions.\\nNone of Yochim’s remaining arguments persuade us that a\\nreasonable jury could find that the Department’s\\naccommodations were ineffective.\\n C\\n Finally, Yochim contends that HUD’s refusal to allow her\\nto work from home and the imposition of her sick-leave re-\\nstriction created a “retaliatory hostile work environment” that\\nled to her premature retirement. This court has not deter-\\nmined whether the ADA (and by extension, the Rehabilitation\\nAct) encompasses claims of a hostile work environment.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 13\\n\\nSee Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712–13 (7th Cir.\\n2000). We need not resolve the question here. Even assuming\\nYochim could bring a hostile-work-environment claim, she\\nmust at a minimum demonstrate that the work environment\\nwas both objectively and subjectively offensive because of\\n“severe or pervasive” harassment. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,\\n920 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n At summary judgment, Yochim did not offer evidence\\nshowing that her leave and telework restrictions—actions that\\nare permissible for an employer to take—were so severe or\\npervasive as to “alter the conditions” of employment and\\n“create an abusive working environment.” See id.; see also\\nHerron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (concluding that empr’s disciplinary action for perfor-\\nmance issues was “normal workplace friction”). And it is this\\nevidentiary shortcoming that defeats this dimension of her\\nclaims on summary judgment.\\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426010/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648757/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Elisa J. YOCHIM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin S. CARSON, Sr., Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3670\nELISA J. YOCHIM,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nBENJAMIN S. CARSON, SR.,\nSecretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban\nDevelopment,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:16-cv-4926 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Elisa Yochim worked in the legal\ndepartment of the United States Department of Housing and\nUrban Development for 26 years. Throughout her tenure, she\ntook full advantage of HUD’s flexible and progressive policy\npermitting employees to work from home several days per\nweek. After undergoing hand surgery, Yochim requested time\n\f2 No. 18-3670\n\noff and permission to work from home. HUD agreed and al-\nlowed her time to recover and to telework several days a week\nfor many months as she received physical therapy. HUD later\nrestructured its law department and this development had\nthe effect of requiring employees like Yochim to spend more\ntime in the office. In time this restructuring, combined with\nYochim’s performance deficiencies, led HUD to revoke her\ntelework privileges and offer alternative accommodations.\nFor her part, Yochim responded with this lawsuit, alleging vi-\nolations of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate\nher ongoing rehabilitation needs. The district court entered\nsummary judgment for HUD, and we affirm. No rational jury\ncould conclude that the Department failed to offer reasonable\naccommodations.\n I\n In reviewing the district court’s award of summary judg-\nment to HUD, we construe the facts in the light most favora-\nble to Yochim as the nonmovant, resolving evidentiary con-\nflicts and competing inferences in her favor. See Brown v. Mil-\nwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017).\n Yochim worked as a HUD attorney for 26 years, serving in\nthe Chicago office for the last 15 years before her retirement\nin May 2015. During her tenure, the Department maintained\na forward-leaning telework policy that allowed full-time em-\nployees to work from home up to three days a week at their\nmanager’s discretion.\n Beginning in October 2012, HUD’s legal department un-\nderwent a functional reorganization. Before this change, the\nDepartment’s attorneys tended to specialize in particular ar-\neas. With the reorganization, however, HUD wanted its\n\fNo. 18-3670 3\n\nattorneys to work more as generalists and to assist each other\nthrough cross-training and collaboration—a change in ap-\nproach less suited to telework. Yochim’s job description\nchanged to include “training, orientation, [and] working\ngroups” as well as “administrative responsibilities,” includ-\ning “space and file management,” as areas of focus. Around\nthis same time, Yochim applied for a supervisory position, but\nthe Department passed her up and instead awarded the role\nto Lisa Danna-Brennan, who became Yochim’s supervisor.\nThis development was not one Yochim welcomed.\n In November 2012, Yochim had surgery to treat carpal tun-\nnel syndrome in her right hand. The surgery brought with it\na recovery and rehabilitation process, prompting Yochim to\nsubmit several requests to HUD to accommodate her needs.\nThe HUD handbook outlines the Department’s process for ac-\ncommodating such requests. Employees can seek reasonable\naccommodations through their immediate supervisor or the\nDepartment’s Reasonable Accommodation Branch. The su-\npervisor and employee then engage in an interactive process\nto identify an accommodation, and the Reasonable Accom-\nmodation Branch facilitates this communication. The Branch\ndetermines an employee’s eligibility for a reasonable accom-\nmodation, while the supervisor shoulders responsibility for\ndeciding what accommodation is suitable.\n Yochim submitted her first accommodation request in De-\ncember 2012, asking her supervisor, Danna-Brennan, to per-\nmit her to telework during the eight days in December on\nwhich she had not already scheduled leave and all of January.\nTo support her request, Yochim submitted two work-status\nforms from her surgeon. In the first form, the doctor identified\nno work or functional limitations while adding that Yochim\n\f4 No. 18-3670\n\n“may work from home until the end of January.” The doctor’s\nsecond form conveyed a work-related limitation, explaining\nthat Yochim had “diminished right-hand strength and should\nnot rely on gripping with that hand until February 1, 2013;\nspecifically, riding public transportation that requires holding\non with her right hand may be a safe[t]y concern.”\n Danna-Brennan approved Yochim’s request to work from\nhome the remainder of December. As for Yochim’s request to\ntelework throughout January, Danna-Brennan offered a com-\npressed schedule consisting of four ten-hour days—two in the\noffice and two at home. Danna-Brennan also afforded Yochim\nthe flexibility to “set her schedule to reflect her need to avoid\nrush hour” if she maintained a set daily schedule. Apparently\nunhappy that her compressed schedule still required her to\ncome to the office two days a week, Yochim later complained\nto Danna-Brennan that she had to use sick leave to stay home\nthese extra two days per week. At no point, however, did\nYochim explain why HUD’s accommodation would interfere\nwith ongoing and medically necessary rehabilitation or phys-\nical therapy. Nor did Yochim suggest other accommodation\noptions.\n In March 2013, Yochim submitted a second request to\nwork full-time from home until June 30 to accommodate her\nongoing recovery from surgery. She supported this request\nwith a letter from her primary-care physician, Dr. Lexy\nWistenberg, who reported that she continued to experience\npain and swelling in her right hand. Dr. Wistenberg also ad-\nvised that Yochim may need to avoid commuting during rush\nhour to avoid getting stuck standing in a train aisle and need-\ning to grasp a handrail. Otherwise, however, Dr. Wistenberg\n\fNo. 18-3670 5\n\ncleared Yochim to work as she continued her physical ther-\napy.\n In April 2013, while the second accommodation request\nwas pending, Danna-Brennan placed Yochim on a sick-leave\nrestriction. This restriction required Yochim to provide a doc-\ntor’s note with the date and time of an appointment or any\nanticipated medical care and to schedule medical appoint-\nments at the beginning or end of the day to have the least im-\npact on the workday. This new restriction resulted from\nDanna-Brennan’s determination that Yochim had a history of\nexcessive absences from work—an audit of Yochim’s time re-\nvealed that she had taken leave on 339 days out of a possible\n1,010 work days between January 1, 2009 and May 1, 2013—\nand that she often took leave without any prior approval.\n A month later, in May 2013, HUD responded to Yochim’s\nsecond accommodation request. The Department offered\nvoice-recognition software to reduce Yochim’s need to type\nand the option to telework three days per week. The accom-\nmodation called for Yochim to work in the office two days per\nweek while allowing her to work from home for two hours in\nthe morning on these days to avoid commuting during rush\nhour. HUD also permitted her to leave work 15 minutes early\nto secure seating on the train. Yochim agreed to this revised\nschedule and concedes that it reflected an effective accommo-\ndation. This accommodation lasted approximately one\nmonth, expiring in June 2013.\n A year later, in June 2014, Danna-Brennan revoked\nYochim’s telework privileges and issued a written reprimand\nfor performance deficiencies. Danna-Brennan decided the\nreprimand was warranted based on the results of an audit of\nthe legal team’s docket. The audit revealed that Yochim had\n\f6 No. 18-3670\n\nleft particular assignments incomplete for up to two years\nwithout ever reporting the delays, despite HUD’s policy re-\nquiring her to do so.\n In August 2014, Yochim submitted a third accommodation\nrequest seeking to telework three days per week for six\nmonths plus two additional days per week “as needed due to\npain, medical appointments, and recovery.” She supported\nthis request with another letter from Dr. Wistenberg who re-\nported that Yochim had inflammatory osteoarthritis, causing\n“significant pain and stiffness” and swollen joints throughout\nher body. Dr. Wistenberg recommended that Yochim work\nfrom home at least three days per week to minimize the risks\nof further discomfort from commuting and to accommodate\nvisits to physical therapists near her suburban home. Yochim\nnever inquired about attending physical therapy in down-\ntown Chicago near HUD’s office.\n Danna-Brennan responded by offering a list of alternative\naccommodations including an ergonomic assessment, addi-\ntional paralegal assistance to reduce Yochim’s typing, a com-\npressed weekly schedule, and generous leave approval. In do-\ning so, Danna-Brennan explained that Yochim working from\nhome was no longer an acceptable accommodation “because\n[her] telework was suspended as a result of performance de-\nficiencies while teleworking 3 days a week.” Yochim ex-\npressed her disagreement with the proposed arrangement by\nfiling a written statement with a specialist in HUD’s Reason-\nable Accommodation Branch. The specialist then informed\nYochim of the procedures to seek reconsideration, but she\nnever did so.\n During the same period, after the restructuring of HUD’s\nlegal department, Yochim lodged two complaints with the\n\fNo. 18-3670 7\n\nEqual Employment Opportunity Commission. She alleged\nthat HUD discriminated and retaliated against her by failing\nto promote her and, separately, to accommodate her need for\nongoing rehabilitation.\n Yochim retired from HUD once she became eligible to do\nso in May 2015. She then filed this suit, advancing claims un-\nder the Rehabilitation Act and alleging that HUD failed to ac-\ncommodate her requests to telework and to engage in the in-\nteractive process promptly and in good faith. Yochim also al-\nleged that HUD retaliated against her for filing her EEO com-\nplaints and subjected her to a hostile work environment by\nrestricting her telework and sick-leave privileges.\n The district court granted HUD’s motion for summary\njudgment, concluding that although Yochim had established\nthat she was a qualified person with a disability, no reasona-\nble jury could find that the Department had failed to offer rea-\nsonable accommodations. The district court found that\nHUD’s alternative accommodations were reasonable given\nthe need that arose for Yochim to work in the office several\ndays a week as a result of the Department’s restructuring of\nits legal department. The district court also determined that\nYochim fell short in her efforts to show that HUD retaliated\nagainst her or subjected her to a hostile work environment.\n II\n On appeal Yochim argues that she brought forth enough\nevidence to get to a jury on her allegations that HUD did not\nreasonably accommodate her because it offered only ineffec-\ntive accommodations and failed to engage in the interactive\nprocess in good faith. We review a district court’s entry of\n\f8 No. 18-3670\n\nsummary judgment de novo and must affirm if no reasonable\njuror could find in favor of Yochim. See Brown, 855 F.3d at 820.\n Yochim brought her claims under the Rehabilitation Act.\nThis enactment mandates that no qualifying individual with\na disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability”\nexperience discrimination by an executive agency. 29 U.S.C.\n§ 794(a). To prevail on her claim of discrimination, Yochim\nmust show that (1) she was a qualified individual with a dis-\nability, (2) HUD was aware of her disability, and (3) the De-\npartment failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.\nSee Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2019);\nsee also Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001)\n(explaining that the Rehabilitation Act adopted the standard\nfor determining whether a violation has occurred from the\nAmericans with Disabilities Act). The accommodation obliga-\ntion embodied in the third prong brings with it a requirement\nthat both the employer and the employee engage in a flexible\n“interactive process” and make a “good faith effort” to deter-\nmine what accommodations are necessary. See Lawler v. Peoria\nSch. Dist. No. 150, 837 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2016).\n A\n We agree with the district court that no rational jury could\nfind that HUD failed to offer Yochim reasonable accommoda-\ntions or engage in the interactive process in good faith. The\nDepartment either granted each of Yochim’s requests or re-\nsponded with a list of alternative options that reasonably ad-\ndressed her needs. Nor does the record support Yochim’s con-\ntentions of bad faith. This is not a case where an employee’s\nrequests for accommodations fell on deaf ears. To the con-\ntrary, the parties engaged in a meaningful back-and-forth\nwith Yochim requesting to work from home and HUD\n\fNo. 18-3670 9\n\npresenting her with appropriate alternative accommodations.\nThe communication process did not break down simply be-\ncause Yochim did not receive the answers she had hoped for.\n Start with the period following Yochim’s surgery. HUD\ngranted her request to telework for the eight remaining days\nin December 2012 that she had not already requested off. The\nDepartment also permitted her to adjust her work hours (to\navoid having to stand on a train) and to telework two days a\nweek for the entirety of January. While this fell short of\nYochim’s preference to work from home all of January, an em-\nployer must provide a “reasonable accommodation, not the\naccommodation [the employee] would prefer.” Hoppe v. Lewis\nUniv., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the Depart-\nment’s restructuring and Yochim’s updated job description\nfocusing on cross-training, teamwork, and collaboration,\nwhich necessarily required her presence in the office, HUD’s\naccommodations were entirely reasonable. And recall that the\nonly medical basis for Yochim’s request to work from home\nin January 2013 was her surgeon’s concerns about Yochim’s\ncommute on crowded trains and her need to attend therapy\nappointments. HUD’s alternative options reasonably ad-\ndressed these concerns by adjusting her work hours to avoid\nrush hour and limiting—but not eliminating—her time in the\noffice.\n Now consider HUD’s response to Yochim’s August 2014\nrequest to work from home three to five days per week for six\nmonths. HUD offered her a four-day work week, generous\nleave approval (to ease commuting and attending physical\ntherapy), and other accommodations. The Department did so\nattentive to the needs of its legal department in Chicago and\nmindful that Yochim, although medically cleared for work,\n\f10 No. 18-3670\n\nhad ongoing needs for physical therapy. So, too, did HUD de-\ntermine that further telework was not warranted given\nYochim’s performance deficiencies. No reasonable jury could\nfind this response unreasonable. Yochim has never explained\nwhy HUD’s approval of regular sick leave to attend physical\ntherapy appointments was inadequate. And not once has\nYochim identified any reason why she could not attend ther-\napy appointments closer to her Chicago office to minimize her\ncommute or why changes to her work hours would not re-\nsolve her concern about crowded trains. Put most simply,\nYochim failed to connect the accommodation she persisted\nwas necessary with what the record showed were her ongoing\nmedical needs. In the end, it was Yochim’s own insistence on\nteleworking three or more days a week and her refusal to re-\nmain open to anything less that doomed the interactive pro-\ncess.\n Yochim’s claim that HUD failed to offer her reasonable ac-\ncommodations fails for another reason. She cannot point to\nevidence that the two accommodations she sought but did not\nreceive—to telework full-time for one month and later for\nthree to five days per week for six months—were “reasonable\non [their] face.” See Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans,\nInc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Majors v. Gen.\nElec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013)) (stating that a plain-\ntiff seeking to establish claim for failure to accommodate un-\nder the ADA must “make an initial showing that the accom-\nmodation she sought was ‘reasonable on its face’”). Yochim\ninsists that her requests to telework were appropriate because\nshe had worked from home full time for six weeks in 2004,\nHUD’s telework policy allows employees to work from home\nup to three days a week, and another employee was allowed\nto work from home for an unknown period of time.\n\fNo. 18-3670 11\n\n Yochim’s position falls short. An accommodation to tele-\nwork requires a context-specific inquiry, and a “general con-\nsensus [exists] among courts” that jobs “often require face-to-\nface collaboration.” See Bilinksy v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d\n565, 573 (7th Cir. 2019). Yochim has failed to counter HUD’s\nevidence that she held just such a job. The 2012 restructuring\nof the legal department, which changed Yochim’s responsibil-\nities and job description, required attorneys to work in teams,\ncollaborate more, and cross-train each other. She points to the\nDepartment’s 2010 telework policy that allows telework up to\nthree days a week, but this policy predates the restructuring.\nEven more to the point, the policy, by its terms, is subject to\nmanagement’s discretion—it does not confer a legally pro-\ntected entitlement upon an employee.\n B\n Yochim next argues that HUD’s accommodations were in-\neffective. She says, for example, that many of HUD’s options\n(like the compressed work week and the flexibility to tele-\nwork a few days a week) already were widely available to\nHUD employees without a reasonable accommodation and\nthus were not “alternative accommodations.” But this posi-\ntion misses the mark. “Reasonable accommodation” under\nthe relevant statutes includes “modified work schedules”\nsuch as the compressed schedules and telework that HUD of-\nfered. See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476,\n481 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)). It makes no\ndifference that modified scheduling options might have been\navailable to other HUD employees who obtained permission\nto telework from their manager.\n By way of another example, Yochim contends that HUD’s\noptions were ineffective because requiring her to work in the\n\f12 No. 18-3670\n\noffice meant that she had to commute on the train and grasp\nthe handrails with her injured right hand. But the medical rec-\nords supporting Yochim’s accommodation requests demon-\nstrated that the only limitation related to her commute was\nthe need to avoid crowded trains that could cause her to fall\nor force her to grip the railings. HUD’s proposed accommo-\ndations addressed these concerns by offering her an adjusted\nschedule to avoid rush hour.\n Yochim has offered a few other views as to why HUD’s\naccommodations were ineffective. She claims that the long\nten-hour days of her compressed schedule (and HUD’s\nrequirement that she maintain a set daily schedule) limited\nher flexibility to make her therapy appointments before or\nafter work, necessitating that she take sick leave. And she says\nthat doing so was especially difficult with the sick-leave\nrestriction imposed by her supervisor. But one purpose of\npaid sick leave is to allow employees to attend such\nappointments, and Yochim does not present any evidence\nthat the leave restriction—which merely required her to\nsubmit a medical note detailing the time and date of an\nappointment—interfered with her physical-therapy sessions.\nNone of Yochim’s remaining arguments persuade us that a\nreasonable jury could find that the Department’s\naccommodations were ineffective.\n C\n Finally, Yochim contends that HUD’s refusal to allow her\nto work from home and the imposition of her sick-leave re-\nstriction created a “retaliatory hostile work environment” that\nled to her premature retirement. This court has not deter-\nmined whether the ADA (and by extension, the Rehabilitation\nAct) encompasses claims of a hostile work environment.\n\fNo. 18-3670 13\n\nSee Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712–13 (7th Cir.\n2000). We need not resolve the question here. Even assuming\nYochim could bring a hostile-work-environment claim, she\nmust at a minimum demonstrate that the work environment\nwas both objectively and subjectively offensive because of\n“severe or pervasive” harassment. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,\n920 (7th Cir. 2016).\n At summary judgment, Yochim did not offer evidence\nshowing that her leave and telework restrictions—actions that\nare permissible for an employer to take—were so severe or\npervasive as to “alter the conditions” of employment and\n“create an abusive working environment.” See id.; see also\nHerron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\n2004) (concluding that empr’s disciplinary action for perfor-\nmance issues was “normal workplace friction”). And it is this\nevidentiary shortcoming that defeats this dimension of her\nclaims on summary judgment.\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Elisa J. YOCHIM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin S. CARSON, Sr., Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3670\\nELISA J. YOCHIM,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBENJAMIN S. CARSON, SR.,\\nSecretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban\\nDevelopment,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cv-4926 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Elisa Yochim worked in the legal\\ndepartment of the United States Department of Housing and\\nUrban Development for 26 years. Throughout her tenure, she\\ntook full advantage of HUD’s flexible and progressive policy\\npermitting employees to work from home several days per\\nweek. After undergoing hand surgery, Yochim requested time\\n\\f2 No. 18-3670\\n\\noff and permission to work from home. HUD agreed and al-\\nlowed her time to recover and to telework several days a week\\nfor many months as she received physical therapy. HUD later\\nrestructured its law department and this development had\\nthe effect of requiring employees like Yochim to spend more\\ntime in the office. In time this restructuring, combined with\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies, led HUD to revoke her\\ntelework privileges and offer alternative accommodations.\\nFor her part, Yochim responded with this lawsuit, alleging vi-\\nolations of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate\\nher ongoing rehabilitation needs. The district court entered\\nsummary judgment for HUD, and we affirm. No rational jury\\ncould conclude that the Department failed to offer reasonable\\naccommodations.\\n I\\n In reviewing the district court’s award of summary judg-\\nment to HUD, we construe the facts in the light most favora-\\nble to Yochim as the nonmovant, resolving evidentiary con-\\nflicts and competing inferences in her favor. See Brown v. Mil-\\nwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Yochim worked as a HUD attorney for 26 years, serving in\\nthe Chicago office for the last 15 years before her retirement\\nin May 2015. During her tenure, the Department maintained\\na forward-leaning telework policy that allowed full-time em-\\nployees to work from home up to three days a week at their\\nmanager’s discretion.\\n Beginning in October 2012, HUD’s legal department un-\\nderwent a functional reorganization. Before this change, the\\nDepartment’s attorneys tended to specialize in particular ar-\\neas. With the reorganization, however, HUD wanted its\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 3\\n\\nattorneys to work more as generalists and to assist each other\\nthrough cross-training and collaboration—a change in ap-\\nproach less suited to telework. Yochim’s job description\\nchanged to include “training, orientation, [and] working\\ngroups” as well as “administrative responsibilities,” includ-\\ning “space and file management,” as areas of focus. Around\\nthis same time, Yochim applied for a supervisory position, but\\nthe Department passed her up and instead awarded the role\\nto Lisa Danna-Brennan, who became Yochim’s supervisor.\\nThis development was not one Yochim welcomed.\\n In November 2012, Yochim had surgery to treat carpal tun-\\nnel syndrome in her right hand. The surgery brought with it\\na recovery and rehabilitation process, prompting Yochim to\\nsubmit several requests to HUD to accommodate her needs.\\nThe HUD handbook outlines the Department’s process for ac-\\ncommodating such requests. Employees can seek reasonable\\naccommodations through their immediate supervisor or the\\nDepartment’s Reasonable Accommodation Branch. The su-\\npervisor and employee then engage in an interactive process\\nto identify an accommodation, and the Reasonable Accom-\\nmodation Branch facilitates this communication. The Branch\\ndetermines an employee’s eligibility for a reasonable accom-\\nmodation, while the supervisor shoulders responsibility for\\ndeciding what accommodation is suitable.\\n Yochim submitted her first accommodation request in De-\\ncember 2012, asking her supervisor, Danna-Brennan, to per-\\nmit her to telework during the eight days in December on\\nwhich she had not already scheduled leave and all of January.\\nTo support her request, Yochim submitted two work-status\\nforms from her surgeon. In the first form, the doctor identified\\nno work or functional limitations while adding that Yochim\\n\\f4 No. 18-3670\\n\\n“may work from home until the end of January.” The doctor’s\\nsecond form conveyed a work-related limitation, explaining\\nthat Yochim had “diminished right-hand strength and should\\nnot rely on gripping with that hand until February 1, 2013;\\nspecifically, riding public transportation that requires holding\\non with her right hand may be a safe[t]y concern.”\\n Danna-Brennan approved Yochim’s request to work from\\nhome the remainder of December. As for Yochim’s request to\\ntelework throughout January, Danna-Brennan offered a com-\\npressed schedule consisting of four ten-hour days—two in the\\noffice and two at home. Danna-Brennan also afforded Yochim\\nthe flexibility to “set her schedule to reflect her need to avoid\\nrush hour” if she maintained a set daily schedule. Apparently\\nunhappy that her compressed schedule still required her to\\ncome to the office two days a week, Yochim later complained\\nto Danna-Brennan that she had to use sick leave to stay home\\nthese extra two days per week. At no point, however, did\\nYochim explain why HUD’s accommodation would interfere\\nwith ongoing and medically necessary rehabilitation or phys-\\nical therapy. Nor did Yochim suggest other accommodation\\noptions.\\n In March 2013, Yochim submitted a second request to\\nwork full-time from home until June 30 to accommodate her\\nongoing recovery from surgery. She supported this request\\nwith a letter from her primary-care physician, Dr. Lexy\\nWistenberg, who reported that she continued to experience\\npain and swelling in her right hand. Dr. Wistenberg also ad-\\nvised that Yochim may need to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour to avoid getting stuck standing in a train aisle and need-\\ning to grasp a handrail. Otherwise, however, Dr. Wistenberg\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 5\\n\\ncleared Yochim to work as she continued her physical ther-\\napy.\\n In April 2013, while the second accommodation request\\nwas pending, Danna-Brennan placed Yochim on a sick-leave\\nrestriction. This restriction required Yochim to provide a doc-\\ntor’s note with the date and time of an appointment or any\\nanticipated medical care and to schedule medical appoint-\\nments at the beginning or end of the day to have the least im-\\npact on the workday. This new restriction resulted from\\nDanna-Brennan’s determination that Yochim had a history of\\nexcessive absences from work—an audit of Yochim’s time re-\\nvealed that she had taken leave on 339 days out of a possible\\n1,010 work days between January 1, 2009 and May 1, 2013—\\nand that she often took leave without any prior approval.\\n A month later, in May 2013, HUD responded to Yochim’s\\nsecond accommodation request. The Department offered\\nvoice-recognition software to reduce Yochim’s need to type\\nand the option to telework three days per week. The accom-\\nmodation called for Yochim to work in the office two days per\\nweek while allowing her to work from home for two hours in\\nthe morning on these days to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour. HUD also permitted her to leave work 15 minutes early\\nto secure seating on the train. Yochim agreed to this revised\\nschedule and concedes that it reflected an effective accommo-\\ndation. This accommodation lasted approximately one\\nmonth, expiring in June 2013.\\n A year later, in June 2014, Danna-Brennan revoked\\nYochim’s telework privileges and issued a written reprimand\\nfor performance deficiencies. Danna-Brennan decided the\\nreprimand was warranted based on the results of an audit of\\nthe legal team’s docket. The audit revealed that Yochim had\\n\\f6 No. 18-3670\\n\\nleft particular assignments incomplete for up to two years\\nwithout ever reporting the delays, despite HUD’s policy re-\\nquiring her to do so.\\n In August 2014, Yochim submitted a third accommodation\\nrequest seeking to telework three days per week for six\\nmonths plus two additional days per week “as needed due to\\npain, medical appointments, and recovery.” She supported\\nthis request with another letter from Dr. Wistenberg who re-\\nported that Yochim had inflammatory osteoarthritis, causing\\n“significant pain and stiffness” and swollen joints throughout\\nher body. Dr. Wistenberg recommended that Yochim work\\nfrom home at least three days per week to minimize the risks\\nof further discomfort from commuting and to accommodate\\nvisits to physical therapists near her suburban home. Yochim\\nnever inquired about attending physical therapy in down-\\ntown Chicago near HUD’s office.\\n Danna-Brennan responded by offering a list of alternative\\naccommodations including an ergonomic assessment, addi-\\ntional paralegal assistance to reduce Yochim’s typing, a com-\\npressed weekly schedule, and generous leave approval. In do-\\ning so, Danna-Brennan explained that Yochim working from\\nhome was no longer an acceptable accommodation “because\\n[her] telework was suspended as a result of performance de-\\nficiencies while teleworking 3 days a week.” Yochim ex-\\npressed her disagreement with the proposed arrangement by\\nfiling a written statement with a specialist in HUD’s Reason-\\nable Accommodation Branch. The specialist then informed\\nYochim of the procedures to seek reconsideration, but she\\nnever did so.\\n During the same period, after the restructuring of HUD’s\\nlegal department, Yochim lodged two complaints with the\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 7\\n\\nEqual Employment Opportunity Commission. She alleged\\nthat HUD discriminated and retaliated against her by failing\\nto promote her and, separately, to accommodate her need for\\nongoing rehabilitation.\\n Yochim retired from HUD once she became eligible to do\\nso in May 2015. She then filed this suit, advancing claims un-\\nder the Rehabilitation Act and alleging that HUD failed to ac-\\ncommodate her requests to telework and to engage in the in-\\nteractive process promptly and in good faith. Yochim also al-\\nleged that HUD retaliated against her for filing her EEO com-\\nplaints and subjected her to a hostile work environment by\\nrestricting her telework and sick-leave privileges.\\n The district court granted HUD’s motion for summary\\njudgment, concluding that although Yochim had established\\nthat she was a qualified person with a disability, no reasona-\\nble jury could find that the Department had failed to offer rea-\\nsonable accommodations. The district court found that\\nHUD’s alternative accommodations were reasonable given\\nthe need that arose for Yochim to work in the office several\\ndays a week as a result of the Department’s restructuring of\\nits legal department. The district court also determined that\\nYochim fell short in her efforts to show that HUD retaliated\\nagainst her or subjected her to a hostile work environment.\\n II\\n On appeal Yochim argues that she brought forth enough\\nevidence to get to a jury on her allegations that HUD did not\\nreasonably accommodate her because it offered only ineffec-\\ntive accommodations and failed to engage in the interactive\\nprocess in good faith. We review a district court’s entry of\\n\\f8 No. 18-3670\\n\\nsummary judgment de novo and must affirm if no reasonable\\njuror could find in favor of Yochim. See Brown, 855 F.3d at 820.\\n Yochim brought her claims under the Rehabilitation Act.\\nThis enactment mandates that no qualifying individual with\\na disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability”\\nexperience discrimination by an executive agency. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 794(a). To prevail on her claim of discrimination, Yochim\\nmust show that (1) she was a qualified individual with a dis-\\nability, (2) HUD was aware of her disability, and (3) the De-\\npartment failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.\\nSee Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2019);\\nsee also Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(explaining that the Rehabilitation Act adopted the standard\\nfor determining whether a violation has occurred from the\\nAmericans with Disabilities Act). The accommodation obliga-\\ntion embodied in the third prong brings with it a requirement\\nthat both the employer and the employee engage in a flexible\\n“interactive process” and make a “good faith effort” to deter-\\nmine what accommodations are necessary. See Lawler v. Peoria\\nSch. Dist. No. 150, 837 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n A\\n We agree with the district court that no rational jury could\\nfind that HUD failed to offer Yochim reasonable accommoda-\\ntions or engage in the interactive process in good faith. The\\nDepartment either granted each of Yochim’s requests or re-\\nsponded with a list of alternative options that reasonably ad-\\ndressed her needs. Nor does the record support Yochim’s con-\\ntentions of bad faith. This is not a case where an employee’s\\nrequests for accommodations fell on deaf ears. To the con-\\ntrary, the parties engaged in a meaningful back-and-forth\\nwith Yochim requesting to work from home and HUD\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 9\\n\\npresenting her with appropriate alternative accommodations.\\nThe communication process did not break down simply be-\\ncause Yochim did not receive the answers she had hoped for.\\n Start with the period following Yochim’s surgery. HUD\\ngranted her request to telework for the eight remaining days\\nin December 2012 that she had not already requested off. The\\nDepartment also permitted her to adjust her work hours (to\\navoid having to stand on a train) and to telework two days a\\nweek for the entirety of January. While this fell short of\\nYochim’s preference to work from home all of January, an em-\\nployer must provide a “reasonable accommodation, not the\\naccommodation [the employee] would prefer.” Hoppe v. Lewis\\nUniv., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the Depart-\\nment’s restructuring and Yochim’s updated job description\\nfocusing on cross-training, teamwork, and collaboration,\\nwhich necessarily required her presence in the office, HUD’s\\naccommodations were entirely reasonable. And recall that the\\nonly medical basis for Yochim’s request to work from home\\nin January 2013 was her surgeon’s concerns about Yochim’s\\ncommute on crowded trains and her need to attend therapy\\nappointments. HUD’s alternative options reasonably ad-\\ndressed these concerns by adjusting her work hours to avoid\\nrush hour and limiting—but not eliminating—her time in the\\noffice.\\n Now consider HUD’s response to Yochim’s August 2014\\nrequest to work from home three to five days per week for six\\nmonths. HUD offered her a four-day work week, generous\\nleave approval (to ease commuting and attending physical\\ntherapy), and other accommodations. The Department did so\\nattentive to the needs of its legal department in Chicago and\\nmindful that Yochim, although medically cleared for work,\\n\\f10 No. 18-3670\\n\\nhad ongoing needs for physical therapy. So, too, did HUD de-\\ntermine that further telework was not warranted given\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies. No reasonable jury could\\nfind this response unreasonable. Yochim has never explained\\nwhy HUD’s approval of regular sick leave to attend physical\\ntherapy appointments was inadequate. And not once has\\nYochim identified any reason why she could not attend ther-\\napy appointments closer to her Chicago office to minimize her\\ncommute or why changes to her work hours would not re-\\nsolve her concern about crowded trains. Put most simply,\\nYochim failed to connect the accommodation she persisted\\nwas necessary with what the record showed were her ongoing\\nmedical needs. In the end, it was Yochim’s own insistence on\\nteleworking three or more days a week and her refusal to re-\\nmain open to anything less that doomed the interactive pro-\\ncess.\\n Yochim’s claim that HUD failed to offer her reasonable ac-\\ncommodations fails for another reason. She cannot point to\\nevidence that the two accommodations she sought but did not\\nreceive—to telework full-time for one month and later for\\nthree to five days per week for six months—were “reasonable\\non [their] face.” See Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans,\\nInc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Majors v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013)) (stating that a plain-\\ntiff seeking to establish claim for failure to accommodate un-\\nder the ADA must “make an initial showing that the accom-\\nmodation she sought was ‘reasonable on its face’”). Yochim\\ninsists that her requests to telework were appropriate because\\nshe had worked from home full time for six weeks in 2004,\\nHUD’s telework policy allows employees to work from home\\nup to three days a week, and another employee was allowed\\nto work from home for an unknown period of time.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 11\\n\\n Yochim’s position falls short. An accommodation to tele-\\nwork requires a context-specific inquiry, and a “general con-\\nsensus [exists] among courts” that jobs “often require face-to-\\nface collaboration.” See Bilinksy v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d\\n565, 573 (7th Cir. 2019). Yochim has failed to counter HUD’s\\nevidence that she held just such a job. The 2012 restructuring\\nof the legal department, which changed Yochim’s responsibil-\\nities and job description, required attorneys to work in teams,\\ncollaborate more, and cross-train each other. She points to the\\nDepartment’s 2010 telework policy that allows telework up to\\nthree days a week, but this policy predates the restructuring.\\nEven more to the point, the policy, by its terms, is subject to\\nmanagement’s discretion—it does not confer a legally pro-\\ntected entitlement upon an employee.\\n B\\n Yochim next argues that HUD’s accommodations were in-\\neffective. She says, for example, that many of HUD’s options\\n(like the compressed work week and the flexibility to tele-\\nwork a few days a week) already were widely available to\\nHUD employees without a reasonable accommodation and\\nthus were not “alternative accommodations.” But this posi-\\ntion misses the mark. “Reasonable accommodation” under\\nthe relevant statutes includes “modified work schedules”\\nsuch as the compressed schedules and telework that HUD of-\\nfered. See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476,\\n481 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)). It makes no\\ndifference that modified scheduling options might have been\\navailable to other HUD employees who obtained permission\\nto telework from their manager.\\n By way of another example, Yochim contends that HUD’s\\noptions were ineffective because requiring her to work in the\\n\\f12 No. 18-3670\\n\\noffice meant that she had to commute on the train and grasp\\nthe handrails with her injured right hand. But the medical rec-\\nords supporting Yochim’s accommodation requests demon-\\nstrated that the only limitation related to her commute was\\nthe need to avoid crowded trains that could cause her to fall\\nor force her to grip the railings. HUD’s proposed accommo-\\ndations addressed these concerns by offering her an adjusted\\nschedule to avoid rush hour.\\n Yochim has offered a few other views as to why HUD’s\\naccommodations were ineffective. She claims that the long\\nten-hour days of her compressed schedule (and HUD’s\\nrequirement that she maintain a set daily schedule) limited\\nher flexibility to make her therapy appointments before or\\nafter work, necessitating that she take sick leave. And she says\\nthat doing so was especially difficult with the sick-leave\\nrestriction imposed by her supervisor. But one purpose of\\npaid sick leave is to allow employees to attend such\\nappointments, and Yochim does not present any evidence\\nthat the leave restriction—which merely required her to\\nsubmit a medical note detailing the time and date of an\\nappointment—interfered with her physical-therapy sessions.\\nNone of Yochim’s remaining arguments persuade us that a\\nreasonable jury could find that the Department’s\\naccommodations were ineffective.\\n C\\n Finally, Yochim contends that HUD’s refusal to allow her\\nto work from home and the imposition of her sick-leave re-\\nstriction created a “retaliatory hostile work environment” that\\nled to her premature retirement. This court has not deter-\\nmined whether the ADA (and by extension, the Rehabilitation\\nAct) encompasses claims of a hostile work environment.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 13\\n\\nSee Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712–13 (7th Cir.\\n2000). We need not resolve the question here. Even assuming\\nYochim could bring a hostile-work-environment claim, she\\nmust at a minimum demonstrate that the work environment\\nwas both objectively and subjectively offensive because of\\n“severe or pervasive” harassment. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,\\n920 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n At summary judgment, Yochim did not offer evidence\\nshowing that her leave and telework restrictions—actions that\\nare permissible for an employer to take—were so severe or\\npervasive as to “alter the conditions” of employment and\\n“create an abusive working environment.” See id.; see also\\nHerron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (concluding that empr’s disciplinary action for perfor-\\nmance issues was “normal workplace friction”). And it is this\\nevidentiary shortcoming that defeats this dimension of her\\nclaims on summary judgment.\\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3868,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4648779,"string":"4,648,779"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Michael Clark"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2604"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2604\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL CLARK,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cr-53-JDP-1 — James D. Peterson, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Michael\\nClark was convicted of possessing a mixture containing fen-\\ntanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Clark had been\\nfound in a hotel room with more than 80 grams of a mixture\\nof heroin and fentanyl, a digital scale, and cellophane bags.\\nHe does not appeal any aspect of his jury trial, but he chal-\\nlenges the denial of his motion for a Franks hearing challeng-\\ning the issuance of the search warrant for the hotel room. He\\n\\n2 No. 18-2604\\n\\nalso challenges the denial of his motion to suppress without\\nan evidentiary hearing. And he challenges two aspects of his\\nsentence: the guideline treatment of his conviction for drug\\ndistribution that occurred in Illinois seven months after his\\nWisconsin arrest and one condition of supervised release. We\\nvacate Clark’s conviction and remand for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on his Franks challenge. We affirm on the denial of his mo-\\ntion to suppress without a hearing. We also affirm on the\\nguideline issue and determine that the supervised release\\nchallenge was waived. We address in Part I the need for a\\nFranks hearing and in Part II the need for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on the motion to suppress. We address the sentencing is-\\nsues in Part III.\\nI. The Need for a Franks Hearing\\n The Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for the use of\\nsearch warrants calls for probable cause determinations by a\\n“neutral and detached magistrate” as opposed to “officer[s]\\nengaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out\\ncrime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The ap-\\nplication for a warrant “must provide the magistrate with a\\nsubstantial basis for determining the existence of probable\\ncause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).\\n The ability of the neutral and detached magistrate to de-\\ntermine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the infor-\\nmation the police submit. “[A] search warrant is not valid if\\nthe police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting\\nfalse, material information,” or by omitting material infor-\\nmation from the affidavit provided to the issuing judge.\\nUnited States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013),\\nciting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 15556 (1978). To inval-\\nidate a warrant on this basis, a defendant at a so-called Franks\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 3\\n\\nhearing must prove by a preponderance of the evidence either\\nfalsity or recklessness, as well as materiality. McMurtrey, 704\\nF.3d at 509.\\n Merely to obtain a Franks hearing, however, a defendant\\ndoes not need to prove the Franks violation. A defendant must\\nonly make a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the war-\\nrant application contained a material falsity or omission that\\nwould alter the issuing judge’s probable cause determination,\\nand (2) that the affiant included the material falsity or omitted\\ninformation intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the\\ntruth. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014);\\nsee also, e.g., United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702, 708 (7th\\nCir. 2016); United States v. Mullins, 803 F.3d 858, 861–62 (7th\\nCir. 2015); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 887–88 (7th\\nCir. 2008). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not\\nrequired until the Franks hearing itself.” Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n820.\\n Clark asserted in the district court that the police investi-\\ngator who applied for the search warrant of the hotel room\\ndeliberately or recklessly omitted critical information affect-\\ning the credibility of the unidentified informant who told the\\nofficer about drug distribution at the hotel where Clark was\\narrested. The district court denied the motion for an eviden-\\ntiary hearing on the question. The court agreed that the police\\nhad provided no information about the informant’s credibil-\\nity. The court found, however, that the police had provided\\nsufficient corroboration for the informant’s tip so that the war-\\nrant did not depend on the informant’s credibility. That\\nmeant the omitted credibility information was not material\\nfor Franks purposes. We disagree and find that a hearing is\\nneeded. “[W]e review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear\\n\\n4 No. 18-2604\\n\\nerror, but any legal determinations that factored into the rul-\\ning are reviewed de novo.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 815; see also Han-\\ncock, 844 F.3d at 70708.\\n A. The Warrant Application\\n Investigator Todd Maas is a police officer in Superior, Wis-\\nconsin. He prepared the warrant application and signed the\\nsupporting affidavit. Maas said that a confidential informant\\ncontacted him on October 14, 2015 and told him that earlier\\nthat day, he had driven someone to a parking lot adjacent to\\nthe Baywalk Inn in Superior to buy heroin from a black male\\ncalled “Big Mike,” the brother of “Toonchie.” Maas said he\\nand another officer then performed their own investigations,\\nincluding surveillance of the parking lot. Maas observed a\\nblack male leave the hotel and enter and then exit at least five\\ncars in the hotel parking lot. He also learned that the guest\\nstaying in Room 203 was the only hotel guest who both had\\npaid in cash and was staying only one night, all behavior that\\nMaas said was typical of drug trafficking, based on his train-\\ning and experience. Maas also said he had spoken to a woman\\n(referred to in this case as the “mom on a mission”) who said\\nthat her daughter was a heroin addict and that she (the\\nmother) had followed a man she suspected of drug-dealing to\\nRoom 203.\\n Maas included all of this information in his affidavit,\\nwhich convinced a state trial judge to issue a search warrant\\nfor Room 203. Maas did not include any damaging infor-\\nmation about the credibility of his confidential informant,\\nwho was the only source of information specifically about\\ndrug trafficking. The informant was being paid for his ser-\\nvices. He also had two pending criminal charges against him,\\nfifteen prior convictions, and a history of opiate and cocaine\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 5\\n\\nabuse, and he was hoping to receive a reduced sentence in ex-\\nchange for his cooperation.\\n B. Materiality\\n Where an affidavit is based primarily on tips from an in-\\nformant, probable cause can be shown based on the totality of\\nthe circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n816. In cases based on informants’ tips, we have identified five\\nfactors of particular relevance: (1) the level of detail the in-\\nformant provided; (2) the extent to which the informant’s in-\\nformation is based on his or her own first-hand observations;\\n(3) the degree to which police have corroborated the inform-\\nant’s information; (4) the time elapsed between the events re-\\nported and the warrant application; (5) and “whether the in-\\nformant appeared or testified before the magistrate.” Glover,\\n755 F.3d at 816, citing United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594,\\n600 (7th Cir. 2011). Information omitted from a warrant appli-\\ncation is material when its omission affects the probable cause\\ndetermination. Glover, 755 F.3d at 820.\\n In performing this probable cause inquiry, courts must\\nkeep in mind that a search warrant for a home, business, or\\neven hotel room can authorize highly intrusive and even de-\\nstructive actions by the police, and that informants, especially\\nin drug cases, can be unreliable and motivated by rivalries or\\nrevenge. United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.\\n2018), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1617 (1968) (“What\\nwe blandly call ‘Terry stops’ can be highly intrusive.” They are\\n“not just ‘a “petty indignity,”’ wrote the Supreme Court, but\\n‘a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a person, which may\\ninflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is\\nnot to be undertaken lightly’”); United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d\\n1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2009) (“For all we know, [the informant]\\n\\n6 No. 18-2604\\n\\ncould have been a rival drug dealer, an angry customer, or\\nhad some other beef” with the defendant).\\n Our cases do not hold that a Franks hearing is required\\nevery time some substantial adverse information about an in-\\nformant’s credibility is omitted from a probable cause affida-\\nvit. Hancock, 844 F.3d at 709. We have said generally that\\nwhere a warrant is obtained based on an informant’s tip, “in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility or potential bias\\nis crucial.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 816; see, e.g., United States v.\\nBradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018). That being said,\\nwe also have upheld warrants tainted by police omission of\\nadverse informant credibility information. Our Franks hearing\\ncases show that when police have sufficiently corroborated an\\ninformant’s tip, the omission of facts pertaining to the inform-\\nant’s credibility may not be material.\\n In United States v. Musgraves, for example, the police omit-\\nted from the affidavit important and damaging credibility in-\\nformation about one informant. 831 F.3d 454, 45960 (7th Cir.\\n2016). We affirmed the denial of a Franks hearing because a\\nsecond affidavit included information from a second inform-\\nant without credibility problems who had provided the police\\nwith specific and timely information about the suspect’s drug\\ntrafficking to support the warrant. Id. at 46061.\\n In United States v. Bradford, we also held that the affidavit’s\\nomission of facts damaging to an informant’s credibility did\\nnot require suppression of evidence seized with a search war-\\nrant for drug and weapons trafficking. 905 F.3d at 50305. In\\nBradford, the application failed to disclose that the informant\\nhad three felony convictions, was on probation, and was be-\\ning paid for his help. Id. at 502. But his information was fresh,\\nspecific, and corroborated by his having carried out\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 7\\n\\ncontrolled drug buys from the target and by specific infor-\\nmation from another informant without his credibility prob-\\nlems. Id. at 504\\n In United States v. Hancock, we affirmed the denial of a\\nFranks hearing in similar circumstances. 844 F.3d at 710. An\\ninformant provided fresh, detailed information about a sus-\\npect’s drug sales, but the affidavit for the warrant left out in-\\nformation about the informant’s own criminal history and the\\nfact that he was in custody when he provided the information.\\nId. at 70506. We found that the omissions were not material\\nbecause the warrant application included extensive corrobo-\\nration of the suspect’s drug trafficking and intimidation of\\nwitnesses. That corroboration came from other informants, a\\nsearch of a cellular telephone showing texts referring to drug\\ndeals, and from an earlier interview with the suspect himself.\\nThe quantity and quality of corroborating information meant\\nthat the omitted adverse credibility information about one in-\\nformant did not require a Franks hearing. Id. at 70710.\\n This case is readily distinguishable. This warrant applica-\\ntion did not include any of the substantial adverse information\\nMaas had about the informant’s credibility. The government\\ndoes not try to justify Maas’s omissions, but it argues that the\\ninformant’s credibility was not material to the warrant appli-\\ncation because Maas and his colleague investigated and cor-\\nroborated the informant’s tip sufficiently to provide probable\\ncause independent of that tip. We disagree.\\n The corroboration in this case was much weaker than in\\nthe cases where we upheld warrants’ validity in the face of\\ncredibility omissions. This case is more akin to Glover, where\\nthe warrant application depended so heavily on the credibil-\\nity of the informant. Here, the police had no controlled buys.\\n\\n8 No. 18-2604\\n\\nThey never saw money or drugs change hands. Even the in-\\nformant did not claim to have seen drugs or money change\\nhands. If his tip did not pan out, he had plenty of deniability.\\nHe claimed only that his passenger had met with “Big Mike”\\noutside his presence to buy heroin. And the “mom on a mis-\\nsion” had no track record of credibility and provided no spe-\\ncifics to support her suspicions of the man she had followed\\nto Room 203. In sum, the foundation for probable cause inde-\\npendent of the credibility of the informant was so meager in\\nthis case that the credibility of the informant was material for\\nFranks purposes.\\n C. Deliberate or Reckless Omissions?\\n To obtain a Franks hearing, Clark needed to “offer direct\\nevidence of [Maas’s] state of mind or circumstantial evidence\\nthat [Maas] had a subjective intent to deceive based on the na-\\nture of [his] omissions.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. In his report\\nand recommendation to the district court, we must note, the\\nmagistrate judge in Clark’s case incorrectly read our decision\\nin Glover to “mandate that … court[s] infer recklessness from\\nthe fact that an officer omitted known and substantial adverse\\ninformation from a search warrant affidavit….” That is not\\ncorrect. In Glover, we held that “credibility omissions them-\\nselves, even in the absence of more direct evidence of the of-\\nficer’s state of mind, provide sufficient circumstantial evi-\\ndence to support a reasonable and thus permissible inference\\nof reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. (emphasis added). In\\nother words, credibility omissions do not require courts to in-\\nfer recklessness. Such omissions are matters for a trier of fact\\nto weigh, just as when a witness testifies incorrectly or falsely\\nabout one or a few matters, and the trier of fact must weigh\\nthe rest of the witness’s testimony.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 9\\n\\n In this case, the questions of materiality and the police af-\\nfiant’s state of mind are intertwined. To the extent that cor-\\nroboration might have avoided the need for a Franks hearing\\nin this case, the reliability of the corroboration all depended,\\nfrom the issuing judge’s point of view, on the same officer\\nwhose credibility is at issue: Maas omitted all adverse infor-\\nmation he had about the credibility of the informant who pro-\\nvided the most specific (but still second-hand) information\\nabout drug trafficking. As noted, the omission of so much im-\\nportant information permits (but does not require) an infer-\\nence that the omissions were deliberate or reckless. If the\\nshowing of probable cause in the warrant application de-\\npended on the credibility of the informant, that permissible\\ninference should be enough to obtain a Franks hearing.\\n The district court’s and government’s rationale for deny-\\ning a Franks hearing is that Maas’s own observations supply\\nprobable cause, independent of the informant. We assume\\nthat if Maas’s own observations are credited, they could lead\\na reasonable judge to find probable cause, though the appli-\\ncation would have been much weaker without the inform-\\nant’s tip to Maas. The problem is that Maas’s credibility can\\nlegitimately be questioned here based on what could have\\nbeen deliberate or reckless omissions of information about the\\ncredibility of the informant.\\n This is where materiality and intent become intertwined.\\nIf the omissions were deliberate or reckless, it would not be\\nunreasonable to take seriously the prospect that other por-\\ntions of the same warrant application may have been deliber-\\nately or recklessly false. Judges often instruct jurors that if\\nthey believe a witness has lied intentionally about a material\\nmatter, they may (but are not required to) discount the\\n\\n10 No. 18-2604\\n\\nwitness’s testimony on other matters. See United States v.\\nWeinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1971) (no positive rule\\nof law excludes witness’s testimony entirely based on willful\\nfalsehood, but such falsification presents issue for jury to con-\\nsider in weighing rest of testimony), quoting Knowles v. People,\\n15 Mich. 408, 412 (1867); Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E, Grenig, and\\nWilliam C. Lee, 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. §§ 15:0106 (6th ed.\\n2019).\\n The same point is at the heart of the Supreme Court’s ju-\\nrisprudence on impeachment evidence in Brady cases. Brady\\nv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny establish that\\ngovernment-suppressed evidence is material “if there is a rea-\\nsonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the\\nresult of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles v.\\nWhitely, 514 U.S. 419, 43334 (1995), quoting United States v.\\nBagley, 473 U.S. 657, 682 (1985). Strong, non-cumulative evi-\\ndence that undermines the credibility of an important govern-\\nment witness satisfies that definition. Sims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d\\n1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The reason is simple. Evidence in-\\ndicating that a witness whose testimony “may well be deter-\\nminative of guilt or innocence” is unreliable might prompt a\\njury to distrust everything the witness says. Giglio v. United\\nStates, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The same logic applies in this\\ncontext. Maas’s potentially intentional or reckless omission\\ncompromises his credibility, which determines whether prob-\\nable cause for the warrant existed or not.\\n To be clear, we are not saying or finding here that Maas\\nwas in fact deliberately or recklessly deceptive. The issue on\\nappeal is only whether Clark was entitled to a hearing, one\\nwhere Maas’s credibility could be addressed with evidence\\nfrom both sides. The informant was the only source of\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 11\\n\\ninformation (and again, that was only second-hand) who said\\nthe person in Room 203 was actually dealing drugs. All of the\\nother information in the warrant application indicated\\ngrounds for suspicion, but we can assume that Maas had a\\ngood reason for including the informant’s more specific infor-\\nmation. The complete omission of the available damaging in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility permits an infer-\\nence that Maas was not being honest and careful with the is-\\nsuing court. Whether he in fact was honest and careful about\\nthe facts is an appropriate subject for the Franks hearing on\\nremand.1\\nII. The Timing of the Warrant and Search\\n Defendant Clark was in Room 203 when police executed\\nthe warrant. Also in the room were cellophane bags, a digital\\nscale, and approximately 82 grams of a mixture of heroin and\\nfentanyl. The police photographed the hotel room during\\ntheir search. In a photograph of suspected drugs on a\\nnightstand, a digital clock is visible, reading 8:15 p.m. If the\\nclock was correct, the search was executed at least 25 minutes\\nbefore the judge issued the warrant.\\n\\n\\n 1 Maas’s application also did not explain why the informant would\\nknow heroin if he saw it. See United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 75657 (7th\\nCir. 2003) (no probable cause for search warrant where affidavit was based\\non informant’s report of seeing drugs in defendant’s house, but according\\nto affidavit, informant failed to give details about specific location and\\namount of drugs, or any explanation as to how informant knew that what\\nshe saw were controlled substances). Nor did Maas provide the kind of\\ndetail about his own training and experience that is needed to justify reli-\\nance upon them. See generally, e.g., United States v. Scott, 901 F.3d 842, 845\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (“Details … are vital when an officer proposes his own\\ntraining and experience as the basis of a warrant”).\\n\\n12 No. 18-2604\\n\\n The police of course are not permitted to rely on a search\\nwarrant that has not yet been approved by a judge. The dis-\\ntrict court denied Clark’s motion to suppress without a hear-\\ning. The issue here is whether the photograph of the clock was\\nsufficient evidence for Clark to have an evidentiary hearing\\non his motion to suppress.\\n A defendant who requests a suppression hearing must\\npresent “definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural facts\\n… demonstrat[ing] that there is a disputed material issue of\\nfact.” United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1995);\\nsee United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n“Reliance on vague, conclusory allegations is insufficient.”\\nUnited States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n In response to Clark’s motion to suppress, the government\\nsubmitted the “metadata” from the digital camera. The\\nmetadata showed a host of data about each photograph, in-\\ncluding the time each was taken. The metadata showed that\\nall of the search photographs were taken between 10:36 and\\n10:52 p.m., well after the judge issued the search warrant.\\nClark responded in turn not with an affidavit from any wit-\\nness to the search but with results of Google searches about\\nhow to edit metadata for photographs. In light of the\\nmetadata, and in the absence of any specific indications that\\ndata had been altered, the district court decided that there was\\nno need for a hearing and denied Clark’s motion to suppress.\\n The situation here is similar to United States v. Woods, 995\\nF.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1993).2 In Woods, the police conducted a\\n\\n 2 Another portion of the Woods opinion was abrogated by the Supreme\\n\\nCourt’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), as we noted\\nin United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 13\\n\\nsearch on February 12th. The problem was that both the war-\\nrant and the supporting affidavit bore handwritten dates of\\nFebruary 14th, though both were also date-stamped February\\n11th. The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the\\nsearch had been executed two days before the warrant was\\nissued. The government responded with an affidavit from a\\nprosecutor testifying that the application and warrant were\\nboth prepared and signed on February 11th and that the Feb-\\nruary 14th dates were mistakes. Using language associated\\nwith civil motions for summary judgment—“disputed issues\\nof material fact” and “genuine factual dispute”—we affirmed\\nthe district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress\\nwithout a hearing. Because the defendant had failed to re-\\nspond to the government’s explanation, we agreed that he\\nhad failed to show a genuine factual dispute and a need for\\nan evidentiary hearing. Id. at 715–16.\\n One might argue that in Woods the government submitted\\nan affidavit to explain the discrepancy, while the government\\nhere submitted letters and copies of documents, without any\\naffidavits. Both parties here submitted various documents to\\nthe district court with this less formal approach. But the bur-\\nden is on the defendant to support his motion to suppress.\\nMissing from this record is an assertion by any witness—de-\\nfendant Clark or anyone else—to the effect that the search ac-\\ntually occurred at 8:15 p.m. and that the clock was correct.\\nWithout such an assertion, whether in an affidavit or other-\\nwise (given the less formal procedures being used in the dis-\\ntrict court), the Google search results about how to alter\\nmetadata merely invite speculation. The district court did not\\nerr by denying the motion to suppress, to the extent it was\\nbased on the photograph of the clock, without a hearing.\\n\\n14 No. 18-2604\\n\\nIII. Sentencing Issues\\n A. Relevant Conduct Under the Guidelines\\n Clark also challenges two aspects of his sentence. The first\\nis a Sentencing Guidelines issue concerning the scope of his\\nrelevant conduct and criminal history, which are two sides of\\nthe same coin here. The U.S. Probation Office prepared a Pre-\\nSentence Report for Clark. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)\\nand (c)(8) of the 2016 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the PSR\\ncalculated Clark’s base offense level as 24 because he pos-\\nsessed between 40 and 160 grams of a substance containing\\nfentanyl. No other adjustments applied, so his total offense\\nlevel remained 24. The PSR also determined that Clark had 11\\ncriminal history points and was in criminal history category\\nV. Three of those 11 points were from a 2017 federal convic-\\ntion for drug distribution stemming from events that occurred\\nin Illinois after Clark was arrested in this Wisconsin federal\\ncase. Clark also received three points for a prior felony drug\\nconviction in Minnesota. Because of the Minnesota convic-\\ntion, Clark faced a 120-month mandatory minimum pursuant\\nto 21 U.S.C. § 851. (If not for the enhancement, Clark would\\nhave had an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months.)\\n Both the government and Clark argued for the 120-month\\nmandatory minimum sentence. The district court adopted the\\nfacts of the PSR and determined that the PSR had calculated\\ncorrectly Clark’s offense level, criminal history, and guideline\\nrange. The court sentenced Clark to 120 months in prison to\\nbe served consecutively to the 71-month sentence he had re-\\nceived in the Illinois case.\\n On appeal, Clark argues that his later drug offense in the\\nIllinois conviction should be treated under the Sentencing\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 15\\n\\nGuidelines as “relevant conduct” for this case rather than as\\npart of his criminal history. That means, he contends, his 120-\\nmonth sentence in this case should run concurrently with the\\n71-month sentence he received in Illinois. Clark did not raise\\nthis argument in the district court. At sentencing, the govern-\\nment asked that Clark’s sentence run consecutively to his Illi-\\nnois sentence. Clark did not object. He requested only that\\nthis sentence run concurrently with any state sentence. The\\ngovernment argues that Clark therefore waived this issue.\\n Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right,\\nwhereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant “negligently fails\\nto assert a right in a timely fashion.” United States v. Brodie,\\n507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 733 (1993). Concurrent sentences would reduce sig-\\nnificantly the time Clark spends in prison. There is no reason\\nfor us to draw the inference here that Clark intentionally\\nwaived this argument. “Waiver principles should be con-\\nstrued liberally in favor of the defendant,” and we are hesi-\\ntant, without more, to construe a defendant’s failure to object\\nto a PSR as an intentional relinquishment of a known right.\\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 84849 (7th Cir.\\n2005). This is especially the case where, as here, the defendant\\nhad no strategic reason to forgo this sentencing argument. See\\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Plain-error review, however, does not win relief for Clark\\non this issue. Plain-error review allows reversal where: (1)\\nthere was an error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error af-\\nfected the substantial rights of the defendant; and (4) the error\\nseriously impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation\\nof the proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 73238; United States v.\\nDuran, 407 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, we need not\\n\\n16 No. 18-2604\\n\\naddress the third and fourth elements. If any error occurred\\nat all, it was not “plain.”\\n Under § 5G1.3(b) of the Guidelines, where a defendant has\\nan undischarged term of imprisonment, and where the con-\\nduct that led to the undischarged sentence\\n is relevant conduct to the instant offense of con-\\n viction under the provisions of subsections\\n (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Con-\\n duct), the sentence for the instant offense shall\\n be imposed as follows:\\n (1) The court shall adjust the sentence for\\n any period of imprisonment already\\n served on the undischarged term of im-\\n prisonment if the court determines that\\n such period of imprisonment will not be\\n credited to the federal sentence by the\\n Bureau of Prisons; and\\n (2) the sentence for the instant offense\\n shall be imposed to run concurrently to\\n the remainder of the undischarged term\\n of imprisonment.\\nSection 5G1.3(d) further advises that “in any other case in-\\nvolving an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence\\nfor the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently,\\npartially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undis-\\ncharged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable pun-\\nishment for the instant offense.” So if Clark’s Illinois offense\\nwas relevant conduct here, the Guidelines would recommend\\nconcurrent sentences. If his Illinois offense was not relevant\\nconduct here, the choice of consecutive or concurrent\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 17\\n\\nsentences is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge, and\\nthere is no reason to find an abuse of discretion here.\\n As for the scope of relevant conduct, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) pro-\\nvides that “relevant conduct” is based on “all acts and omis-\\nsions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, in-\\nduced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.” “Sec-\\ntion 1B1.3(a)(2) applies to grouped offenses and includes ‘all\\nacts and omissions described in subdivisions 1(A) and 1(B)\\nthat were part of the same course of conduct or common\\nscheme or plan as the offense of conviction.’” United States v.\\nSchrode, 839 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting U.S.S.G.\\n§ 1B1.3(a)(2).\\n “In assessing whether offenses are part of the same course\\nof conduct, we focus on whether the government has demon-\\nstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and temporal prox-\\nimity.” United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(internal citations omitted). In considering whether an offense\\nis relevant within the meaning of § 1B1.3, our court has em-\\nphasized several factors that should guide courts’ analysis.\\n“Sufficient factual overlap exists where the past and present\\noffenses involve the same victims, stem from the same under-\\nlying conduct, or are in fact similar offenses.” United States v.\\nOrozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2016); see also\\nUnited States v. Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2003) (in\\ndeciding relevant conduct in drug cases, courts look for “a\\nstrong relationship between the uncharged conduct and the\\nconvicted offense, focusing on whether the government has\\ndemonstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and tem-\\nporal proximity”), quoting United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275,\\n279 (7th Cir. 1996). The relevant conduct issue is similar to the\\nissue in calculating criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2\\n\\n18 No. 18-2604\\n\\n(defining “prior sentence”), where two similar prior convic-\\ntions separated by an intervening arrest are counted sepa-\\nrately. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.\\n2003); United States v. Bradley, 218 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n The district court did not plainly err in not treating Clark’s\\nlater offense in Illinois as relevant conduct for his Wisconsin\\nconviction. To support his argument, Clark points to facts set\\nforth in his Wisconsin PSR. The PSR explained that Clark trav-\\neled to Chicago to obtain the drugs that he would then sell in\\nWisconsin. This fact, Clark asserts, establishes that his drug\\nactivities in both states were part of the same course of con-\\nduct, his fentanyl-trafficking enterprise.\\n Under our precedents, this argument faces obvious “tem-\\nporal proximity” and “similarity” problems. First, Clark was\\narrested in Wisconsin seven months before he was arrested\\nfor selling a fentanyl mixture in Illinois. Further, the offenses\\nwere dissimilar. In Wisconsin, Clark possessed more than 80\\ngrams of fentanyl, most of which was packaged in retail pack-\\nages of 0.5 grams. In Illinois, by contrast, he was arrested for\\nselling a confidential informant more than 65.2 grams of fen-\\ntanyl. And even if the offenses had been more similar, “the\\nfact that a defendant commits a certain type of offense on mul-\\ntiple occasions does not inevitably mean that each separate\\noffense is part of the same course of conduct.” Schrode, 839\\nF.3d at 552. There is not enough here to have required the dis-\\ntrict court to have found such strong connections between\\nthese two drug offenses, especially without an objection by\\nthe defense to that effect. The offenses involved different buy-\\ners, in different cities, in different types of quantities, months\\napart, and with an intervening arrest for the Wisconsin of-\\nfense.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 19\\n\\n “An error is ‘plain’ if the law at the time of appellate re-\\nview shows clearly that it was an error.” United States v.\\nPierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Henderson v.\\nUnited States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013). Clark cannot establish\\nwith precedent or otherwise that the district court should\\nhave acted sua sponte to treat his Illinois offense as conduct\\nrelevant to his Wisconsin charge. Even if there might have\\nbeen an error, it was not plain error to run Clark’s two federal\\nsentences consecutively.\\n B. Supervised Release Condition\\n Finally, the district court imposed a supervised release\\ncondition that Clark “Not meet, communicate or spend time\\nwith any persons known by defendant to be a member of or\\naffiliate of any known street gang.” On appeal, Clark argues\\nthat the term “affiliate” is unconstitutionally vague. He did\\nnot object to this condition at sentencing.\\n In at least scores of appeals over the past five years, in the\\nwake of United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014),\\nUnited States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), and\\nUnited States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015), this court\\nhas wrestled with how best to handle appellate challenges to\\nsupervised release conditions that were not raised in the dis-\\ntrict court. Our recent opinion in United States v. Flores, 929\\nF.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019), should bring some order to our\\ncaselaw in this niche of waiver law, particularly since it was\\ncirculated to the entire court under Circuit Rule 40(e), and no\\njudge voted to hear the case en banc. Special considerations\\napply to our handling of supervised release conditions both\\nbecause they are usually the least salient concern at the time\\nof sentencing and, more important, because a defendant may\\nchallenge them in the district court at any time. See Flores, 929\\n\\n20 No. 18-2604\\n\\nF.3d at 451, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); see also United States\\nv. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant waived\\nchallenge to supervised release condition: “sentencing in the\\ndistrict court is the main event”).\\n This case meets the standards of waiver set forth in Flores:\\nClark had prior notice of the proposed conditions, including\\nthe “affiliate” condition. He had a meaningful opportunity to\\nobject, and his lawyer told the judge that the proposed condi-\\ntions were acceptable. Clark even raised other objections to\\nthe PSR prior to sentencing but did not challenge this condi-\\ntion, which signals an intentional decision not to object. See\\nFlores, 929 F.3d at 449.\\n We REVERSE the district court’s denial of Clark’s motion\\nfor a Franks hearing without an evidentiary hearing. We\\nVACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for a\\nFranks hearing and appropriate action based on the outcome\\nof that hearing, either granting Clark’s motion to suppress or,\\nif his motion is denied, reinstating the convictions and sen-\\ntence. If the judgment is reinstated, the denial of Clark’s mo-\\ntion to suppress and the district court’s sentence are\\nAFFIRMED.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 21\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426032/\", \"author_raw\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. The panel opin-\\nion is well done, and I join all parts of it except the conclusion\\nthat the district court should have granted Michael Clark’s\\nmotion for a Franks hearing. In my view, Investigator Todd\\nMaas’s affidavit supporting the search warrant, while omit-\\nting facts damaging to the confidential informant’s credibil-\\nity—facts that unquestionably should have been included—\\nadequately corroborated the information supplied by the in-\\nformant. The district judge reached this precise conclusion,\\nand under the deferential standard that guides our review on\\nappeal, we should affirm. There was no clear error here.\\n I\\n The majority’s opinion correctly articulates the standard\\nfor obtaining a Franks hearing: a defendant must make a sub-\\nstantial preliminary showing that an officer intentionally or\\nrecklessly omitted information from a search warrant affida-\\nvit and the omissions were material to the probable cause de-\\ntermination. See United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th\\nCir. 2014). The majority also rightly observes that the omis-\\nsion of adverse information about an informant’s credibility\\ndoes not automatically warrant a hearing. See United States v.\\nHancock, 844 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2016). Instead the proper\\nquestion is whether the affidavit would have established\\nprobable cause if the omitted information had been included.\\nSee id. at 708. To make this determination, we consider the\\ntotality of the circumstances, including “the extent to which\\nthe police have corroborated the informant’s statements.”\\nUnited States v. Sutton, 742 F.3d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n All agree that Investigator Maas failed to disclose critical\\nfacts about the informant’s background. In my judgment,\\nthough, the warrant application had sufficient corroboration\\n\\n22 No. 18-2604\\n\\nto overcome this omission and establish the requisite proba-\\nble cause to search hotel room 203 at the Baywalk Inn. Maas\\ntook care to include three key pieces of corroborating evi-\\ndence in his affidavit:\\n In response to the informant’s tip about possible drug\\n dealing at the Baywalk Inn, Investigator Maas sur-\\n veilled the hotel and observed a black male exit the\\n hotel and quickly enter and exit at least five cars.\\n Drawing on his experience as a narcotics investigator,\\n Maas characterized this conduct as “textbook behav-\\n ior to dealing narcotics.”\\n Maas discovered that only two of the hotel’s 25 rooms\\n had been rented with cash, with only one of the two—\\n room 203—being rented for one night, which Maas\\n explained was consistent with drug trafficking be-\\n cause “drug dealers usually pay in cash and only stay\\n one or two nights so to throw off police.”\\n Maas also reported that, upon arriving at the hotel, he\\n had a conversation with a woman he identified by\\n name in the warrant application, who said her 20-\\n year-old daughter was addicted to heroin. The\\n woman added that, before the officer arrived, she was\\n “also watching the black male who [was] suspected to\\n be dealing” and she followed him to room 203.\\n The majority’s analysis discounts this information, reason-\\ning that Investigator Maas’s omission of material facts about\\nthe informant’s background compromised his credibility on\\nall other portions of the warrant application. Put another way,\\nif Maas omitted critical information about the informant’s re-\\nliability, nothing else he included in his affidavit deserved to\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 23\\n\\nbe credited as part of the probable cause analysis. But our case\\nlaw does not require such broad discounting and distrust. See,\\ne.g., United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–05. The district\\ncourt was not required to view as worthless the entirety of the\\ncorroborating information provided by Maas.\\n To be sure, a court faced with a reckless or intentional\\nomission of material information may consider whether (and\\nto what extent) the omission bears on the officer’s credibility\\nas part of its probable cause analysis. But I cannot say that the\\ndistrict court clearly erred, in light of other corroborating ev-\\nidence, by choosing to credit Maas’s affidavit despite his\\nomission. So I would affirm the court’s denial of Clark’s mo-\\ntion for a Franks hearing.\\n II\\n A final observation seems worthwhile. When this case en-\\ntered federal court, a magistrate judge reviewed the state-\\ncourt warrant application and noted that it, like many others\\nprepared by law enforcement officers in Wisconsin, omitted\\ninformation about the confidential informant’s criminal his-\\ntory. The panel’s opinion, aligned with our precedent, rein-\\nforces that this information is essential to a proper probable\\ncause analysis under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016). Given the\\nfrequency with which search warrants sought and executed\\nat the state level result in federal prosecutions, Wisconsin law\\nenforcement would do well to revisit its warrant application\\npractices. Omitting information about an informant’s credi-\\nbility creates real yet avoidable peril. Today’s decision proves\\nthe point.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426032/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648779/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Michael Clark\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2604\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMICHAEL CLARK,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:17-cr-53-JDP-1 — James D. Peterson, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Michael\nClark was convicted of possessing a mixture containing fen-\ntanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Clark had been\nfound in a hotel room with more than 80 grams of a mixture\nof heroin and fentanyl, a digital scale, and cellophane bags.\nHe does not appeal any aspect of his jury trial, but he chal-\nlenges the denial of his motion for a Franks hearing challeng-\ning the issuance of the search warrant for the hotel room. He\n\n2 No. 18-2604\n\nalso challenges the denial of his motion to suppress without\nan evidentiary hearing. And he challenges two aspects of his\nsentence: the guideline treatment of his conviction for drug\ndistribution that occurred in Illinois seven months after his\nWisconsin arrest and one condition of supervised release. We\nvacate Clark’s conviction and remand for an evidentiary hear-\ning on his Franks challenge. We affirm on the denial of his mo-\ntion to suppress without a hearing. We also affirm on the\nguideline issue and determine that the supervised release\nchallenge was waived. We address in Part I the need for a\nFranks hearing and in Part II the need for an evidentiary hear-\ning on the motion to suppress. We address the sentencing is-\nsues in Part III.\nI. The Need for a Franks Hearing\n The Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for the use of\nsearch warrants calls for probable cause determinations by a\n“neutral and detached magistrate” as opposed to “officer[s]\nengaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out\ncrime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The ap-\nplication for a warrant “must provide the magistrate with a\nsubstantial basis for determining the existence of probable\ncause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).\n The ability of the neutral and detached magistrate to de-\ntermine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the infor-\nmation the police submit. “[A] search warrant is not valid if\nthe police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting\nfalse, material information,” or by omitting material infor-\nmation from the affidavit provided to the issuing judge.\nUnited States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013),\nciting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 15556 (1978). To inval-\nidate a warrant on this basis, a defendant at a so-called Franks\n\nNo. 18-2604 3\n\nhearing must prove by a preponderance of the evidence either\nfalsity or recklessness, as well as materiality. McMurtrey, 704\nF.3d at 509.\n Merely to obtain a Franks hearing, however, a defendant\ndoes not need to prove the Franks violation. A defendant must\nonly make a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the war-\nrant application contained a material falsity or omission that\nwould alter the issuing judge’s probable cause determination,\nand (2) that the affiant included the material falsity or omitted\ninformation intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the\ntruth. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014);\nsee also, e.g., United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702, 708 (7th\nCir. 2016); United States v. Mullins, 803 F.3d 858, 861–62 (7th\nCir. 2015); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 887–88 (7th\nCir. 2008). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not\nrequired until the Franks hearing itself.” Glover, 755 F.3d at\n820.\n Clark asserted in the district court that the police investi-\ngator who applied for the search warrant of the hotel room\ndeliberately or recklessly omitted critical information affect-\ning the credibility of the unidentified informant who told the\nofficer about drug distribution at the hotel where Clark was\narrested. The district court denied the motion for an eviden-\ntiary hearing on the question. The court agreed that the police\nhad provided no information about the informant’s credibil-\nity. The court found, however, that the police had provided\nsufficient corroboration for the informant’s tip so that the war-\nrant did not depend on the informant’s credibility. That\nmeant the omitted credibility information was not material\nfor Franks purposes. We disagree and find that a hearing is\nneeded. “[W]e review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear\n\n4 No. 18-2604\n\nerror, but any legal determinations that factored into the rul-\ning are reviewed de novo.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 815; see also Han-\ncock, 844 F.3d at 70708.\n A. The Warrant Application\n Investigator Todd Maas is a police officer in Superior, Wis-\nconsin. He prepared the warrant application and signed the\nsupporting affidavit. Maas said that a confidential informant\ncontacted him on October 14, 2015 and told him that earlier\nthat day, he had driven someone to a parking lot adjacent to\nthe Baywalk Inn in Superior to buy heroin from a black male\ncalled “Big Mike,” the brother of “Toonchie.” Maas said he\nand another officer then performed their own investigations,\nincluding surveillance of the parking lot. Maas observed a\nblack male leave the hotel and enter and then exit at least five\ncars in the hotel parking lot. He also learned that the guest\nstaying in Room 203 was the only hotel guest who both had\npaid in cash and was staying only one night, all behavior that\nMaas said was typical of drug trafficking, based on his train-\ning and experience. Maas also said he had spoken to a woman\n(referred to in this case as the “mom on a mission”) who said\nthat her daughter was a heroin addict and that she (the\nmother) had followed a man she suspected of drug-dealing to\nRoom 203.\n Maas included all of this information in his affidavit,\nwhich convinced a state trial judge to issue a search warrant\nfor Room 203. Maas did not include any damaging infor-\nmation about the credibility of his confidential informant,\nwho was the only source of information specifically about\ndrug trafficking. The informant was being paid for his ser-\nvices. He also had two pending criminal charges against him,\nfifteen prior convictions, and a history of opiate and cocaine\n\nNo. 18-2604 5\n\nabuse, and he was hoping to receive a reduced sentence in ex-\nchange for his cooperation.\n B. Materiality\n Where an affidavit is based primarily on tips from an in-\nformant, probable cause can be shown based on the totality of\nthe circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Glover, 755 F.3d at\n816. In cases based on informants’ tips, we have identified five\nfactors of particular relevance: (1) the level of detail the in-\nformant provided; (2) the extent to which the informant’s in-\nformation is based on his or her own first-hand observations;\n(3) the degree to which police have corroborated the inform-\nant’s information; (4) the time elapsed between the events re-\nported and the warrant application; (5) and “whether the in-\nformant appeared or testified before the magistrate.” Glover,\n755 F.3d at 816, citing United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594,\n600 (7th Cir. 2011). Information omitted from a warrant appli-\ncation is material when its omission affects the probable cause\ndetermination. Glover, 755 F.3d at 820.\n In performing this probable cause inquiry, courts must\nkeep in mind that a search warrant for a home, business, or\neven hotel room can authorize highly intrusive and even de-\nstructive actions by the police, and that informants, especially\nin drug cases, can be unreliable and motivated by rivalries or\nrevenge. United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.\n2018), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1617 (1968) (“What\nwe blandly call ‘Terry stops’ can be highly intrusive.” They are\n“not just ‘a “petty indignity,”’ wrote the Supreme Court, but\n‘a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a person, which may\ninflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is\nnot to be undertaken lightly’”); United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d\n1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2009) (“For all we know, [the informant]\n\n6 No. 18-2604\n\ncould have been a rival drug dealer, an angry customer, or\nhad some other beef” with the defendant).\n Our cases do not hold that a Franks hearing is required\nevery time some substantial adverse information about an in-\nformant’s credibility is omitted from a probable cause affida-\nvit. Hancock, 844 F.3d at 709. We have said generally that\nwhere a warrant is obtained based on an informant’s tip, “in-\nformation about the informant’s credibility or potential bias\nis crucial.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 816; see, e.g., United States v.\nBradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018). That being said,\nwe also have upheld warrants tainted by police omission of\nadverse informant credibility information. Our Franks hearing\ncases show that when police have sufficiently corroborated an\ninformant’s tip, the omission of facts pertaining to the inform-\nant’s credibility may not be material.\n In United States v. Musgraves, for example, the police omit-\nted from the affidavit important and damaging credibility in-\nformation about one informant. 831 F.3d 454, 45960 (7th Cir.\n2016). We affirmed the denial of a Franks hearing because a\nsecond affidavit included information from a second inform-\nant without credibility problems who had provided the police\nwith specific and timely information about the suspect’s drug\ntrafficking to support the warrant. Id. at 46061.\n In United States v. Bradford, we also held that the affidavit’s\nomission of facts damaging to an informant’s credibility did\nnot require suppression of evidence seized with a search war-\nrant for drug and weapons trafficking. 905 F.3d at 50305. In\nBradford, the application failed to disclose that the informant\nhad three felony convictions, was on probation, and was be-\ning paid for his help. Id. at 502. But his information was fresh,\nspecific, and corroborated by his having carried out\n\nNo. 18-2604 7\n\ncontrolled drug buys from the target and by specific infor-\nmation from another informant without his credibility prob-\nlems. Id. at 504\n In United States v. Hancock, we affirmed the denial of a\nFranks hearing in similar circumstances. 844 F.3d at 710. An\ninformant provided fresh, detailed information about a sus-\npect’s drug sales, but the affidavit for the warrant left out in-\nformation about the informant’s own criminal history and the\nfact that he was in custody when he provided the information.\nId. at 70506. We found that the omissions were not material\nbecause the warrant application included extensive corrobo-\nration of the suspect’s drug trafficking and intimidation of\nwitnesses. That corroboration came from other informants, a\nsearch of a cellular telephone showing texts referring to drug\ndeals, and from an earlier interview with the suspect himself.\nThe quantity and quality of corroborating information meant\nthat the omitted adverse credibility information about one in-\nformant did not require a Franks hearing. Id. at 70710.\n This case is readily distinguishable. This warrant applica-\ntion did not include any of the substantial adverse information\nMaas had about the informant’s credibility. The government\ndoes not try to justify Maas’s omissions, but it argues that the\ninformant’s credibility was not material to the warrant appli-\ncation because Maas and his colleague investigated and cor-\nroborated the informant’s tip sufficiently to provide probable\ncause independent of that tip. We disagree.\n The corroboration in this case was much weaker than in\nthe cases where we upheld warrants’ validity in the face of\ncredibility omissions. This case is more akin to Glover, where\nthe warrant application depended so heavily on the credibil-\nity of the informant. Here, the police had no controlled buys.\n\n8 No. 18-2604\n\nThey never saw money or drugs change hands. Even the in-\nformant did not claim to have seen drugs or money change\nhands. If his tip did not pan out, he had plenty of deniability.\nHe claimed only that his passenger had met with “Big Mike”\noutside his presence to buy heroin. And the “mom on a mis-\nsion” had no track record of credibility and provided no spe-\ncifics to support her suspicions of the man she had followed\nto Room 203. In sum, the foundation for probable cause inde-\npendent of the credibility of the informant was so meager in\nthis case that the credibility of the informant was material for\nFranks purposes.\n C. Deliberate or Reckless Omissions?\n To obtain a Franks hearing, Clark needed to “offer direct\nevidence of [Maas’s] state of mind or circumstantial evidence\nthat [Maas] had a subjective intent to deceive based on the na-\nture of [his] omissions.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. In his report\nand recommendation to the district court, we must note, the\nmagistrate judge in Clark’s case incorrectly read our decision\nin Glover to “mandate that … court[s] infer recklessness from\nthe fact that an officer omitted known and substantial adverse\ninformation from a search warrant affidavit….” That is not\ncorrect. In Glover, we held that “credibility omissions them-\nselves, even in the absence of more direct evidence of the of-\nficer’s state of mind, provide sufficient circumstantial evi-\ndence to support a reasonable and thus permissible inference\nof reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. (emphasis added). In\nother words, credibility omissions do not require courts to in-\nfer recklessness. Such omissions are matters for a trier of fact\nto weigh, just as when a witness testifies incorrectly or falsely\nabout one or a few matters, and the trier of fact must weigh\nthe rest of the witness’s testimony.\n\nNo. 18-2604 9\n\n In this case, the questions of materiality and the police af-\nfiant’s state of mind are intertwined. To the extent that cor-\nroboration might have avoided the need for a Franks hearing\nin this case, the reliability of the corroboration all depended,\nfrom the issuing judge’s point of view, on the same officer\nwhose credibility is at issue: Maas omitted all adverse infor-\nmation he had about the credibility of the informant who pro-\nvided the most specific (but still second-hand) information\nabout drug trafficking. As noted, the omission of so much im-\nportant information permits (but does not require) an infer-\nence that the omissions were deliberate or reckless. If the\nshowing of probable cause in the warrant application de-\npended on the credibility of the informant, that permissible\ninference should be enough to obtain a Franks hearing.\n The district court’s and government’s rationale for deny-\ning a Franks hearing is that Maas’s own observations supply\nprobable cause, independent of the informant. We assume\nthat if Maas’s own observations are credited, they could lead\na reasonable judge to find probable cause, though the appli-\ncation would have been much weaker without the inform-\nant’s tip to Maas. The problem is that Maas’s credibility can\nlegitimately be questioned here based on what could have\nbeen deliberate or reckless omissions of information about the\ncredibility of the informant.\n This is where materiality and intent become intertwined.\nIf the omissions were deliberate or reckless, it would not be\nunreasonable to take seriously the prospect that other por-\ntions of the same warrant application may have been deliber-\nately or recklessly false. Judges often instruct jurors that if\nthey believe a witness has lied intentionally about a material\nmatter, they may (but are not required to) discount the\n\n10 No. 18-2604\n\nwitness’s testimony on other matters. See United States v.\nWeinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1971) (no positive rule\nof law excludes witness’s testimony entirely based on willful\nfalsehood, but such falsification presents issue for jury to con-\nsider in weighing rest of testimony), quoting Knowles v. People,\n15 Mich. 408, 412 (1867); Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E, Grenig, and\nWilliam C. Lee, 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. §§ 15:0106 (6th ed.\n2019).\n The same point is at the heart of the Supreme Court’s ju-\nrisprudence on impeachment evidence in Brady cases. Brady\nv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny establish that\ngovernment-suppressed evidence is material “if there is a rea-\nsonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the\nresult of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles v.\nWhitely, 514 U.S. 419, 43334 (1995), quoting United States v.\nBagley, 473 U.S. 657, 682 (1985). Strong, non-cumulative evi-\ndence that undermines the credibility of an important govern-\nment witness satisfies that definition. Sims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d\n1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The reason is simple. Evidence in-\ndicating that a witness whose testimony “may well be deter-\nminative of guilt or innocence” is unreliable might prompt a\njury to distrust everything the witness says. Giglio v. United\nStates, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The same logic applies in this\ncontext. Maas’s potentially intentional or reckless omission\ncompromises his credibility, which determines whether prob-\nable cause for the warrant existed or not.\n To be clear, we are not saying or finding here that Maas\nwas in fact deliberately or recklessly deceptive. The issue on\nappeal is only whether Clark was entitled to a hearing, one\nwhere Maas’s credibility could be addressed with evidence\nfrom both sides. The informant was the only source of\n\nNo. 18-2604 11\n\ninformation (and again, that was only second-hand) who said\nthe person in Room 203 was actually dealing drugs. All of the\nother information in the warrant application indicated\ngrounds for suspicion, but we can assume that Maas had a\ngood reason for including the informant’s more specific infor-\nmation. The complete omission of the available damaging in-\nformation about the informant’s credibility permits an infer-\nence that Maas was not being honest and careful with the is-\nsuing court. Whether he in fact was honest and careful about\nthe facts is an appropriate subject for the Franks hearing on\nremand.1\nII. The Timing of the Warrant and Search\n Defendant Clark was in Room 203 when police executed\nthe warrant. Also in the room were cellophane bags, a digital\nscale, and approximately 82 grams of a mixture of heroin and\nfentanyl. The police photographed the hotel room during\ntheir search. In a photograph of suspected drugs on a\nnightstand, a digital clock is visible, reading 8:15 p.m. If the\nclock was correct, the search was executed at least 25 minutes\nbefore the judge issued the warrant.\n\n\n 1 Maas’s application also did not explain why the informant would\nknow heroin if he saw it. See United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 75657 (7th\nCir. 2003) (no probable cause for search warrant where affidavit was based\non informant’s report of seeing drugs in defendant’s house, but according\nto affidavit, informant failed to give details about specific location and\namount of drugs, or any explanation as to how informant knew that what\nshe saw were controlled substances). Nor did Maas provide the kind of\ndetail about his own training and experience that is needed to justify reli-\nance upon them. See generally, e.g., United States v. Scott, 901 F.3d 842, 845\n(7th Cir. 2018) (“Details … are vital when an officer proposes his own\ntraining and experience as the basis of a warrant”).\n\n12 No. 18-2604\n\n The police of course are not permitted to rely on a search\nwarrant that has not yet been approved by a judge. The dis-\ntrict court denied Clark’s motion to suppress without a hear-\ning. The issue here is whether the photograph of the clock was\nsufficient evidence for Clark to have an evidentiary hearing\non his motion to suppress.\n A defendant who requests a suppression hearing must\npresent “definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural facts\n… demonstrat[ing] that there is a disputed material issue of\nfact.” United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1995);\nsee United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2011).\n“Reliance on vague, conclusory allegations is insufficient.”\nUnited States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1992).\n In response to Clark’s motion to suppress, the government\nsubmitted the “metadata” from the digital camera. The\nmetadata showed a host of data about each photograph, in-\ncluding the time each was taken. The metadata showed that\nall of the search photographs were taken between 10:36 and\n10:52 p.m., well after the judge issued the search warrant.\nClark responded in turn not with an affidavit from any wit-\nness to the search but with results of Google searches about\nhow to edit metadata for photographs. In light of the\nmetadata, and in the absence of any specific indications that\ndata had been altered, the district court decided that there was\nno need for a hearing and denied Clark’s motion to suppress.\n The situation here is similar to United States v. Woods, 995\nF.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1993).2 In Woods, the police conducted a\n\n 2 Another portion of the Woods opinion was abrogated by the Supreme\n\nCourt’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), as we noted\nin United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1995).\n\nNo. 18-2604 13\n\nsearch on February 12th. The problem was that both the war-\nrant and the supporting affidavit bore handwritten dates of\nFebruary 14th, though both were also date-stamped February\n11th. The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the\nsearch had been executed two days before the warrant was\nissued. The government responded with an affidavit from a\nprosecutor testifying that the application and warrant were\nboth prepared and signed on February 11th and that the Feb-\nruary 14th dates were mistakes. Using language associated\nwith civil motions for summary judgment—“disputed issues\nof material fact” and “genuine factual dispute”—we affirmed\nthe district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress\nwithout a hearing. Because the defendant had failed to re-\nspond to the government’s explanation, we agreed that he\nhad failed to show a genuine factual dispute and a need for\nan evidentiary hearing. Id. at 715–16.\n One might argue that in Woods the government submitted\nan affidavit to explain the discrepancy, while the government\nhere submitted letters and copies of documents, without any\naffidavits. Both parties here submitted various documents to\nthe district court with this less formal approach. But the bur-\nden is on the defendant to support his motion to suppress.\nMissing from this record is an assertion by any witness—de-\nfendant Clark or anyone else—to the effect that the search ac-\ntually occurred at 8:15 p.m. and that the clock was correct.\nWithout such an assertion, whether in an affidavit or other-\nwise (given the less formal procedures being used in the dis-\ntrict court), the Google search results about how to alter\nmetadata merely invite speculation. The district court did not\nerr by denying the motion to suppress, to the extent it was\nbased on the photograph of the clock, without a hearing.\n\n14 No. 18-2604\n\nIII. Sentencing Issues\n A. Relevant Conduct Under the Guidelines\n Clark also challenges two aspects of his sentence. The first\nis a Sentencing Guidelines issue concerning the scope of his\nrelevant conduct and criminal history, which are two sides of\nthe same coin here. The U.S. Probation Office prepared a Pre-\nSentence Report for Clark. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)\nand (c)(8) of the 2016 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the PSR\ncalculated Clark’s base offense level as 24 because he pos-\nsessed between 40 and 160 grams of a substance containing\nfentanyl. No other adjustments applied, so his total offense\nlevel remained 24. The PSR also determined that Clark had 11\ncriminal history points and was in criminal history category\nV. Three of those 11 points were from a 2017 federal convic-\ntion for drug distribution stemming from events that occurred\nin Illinois after Clark was arrested in this Wisconsin federal\ncase. Clark also received three points for a prior felony drug\nconviction in Minnesota. Because of the Minnesota convic-\ntion, Clark faced a 120-month mandatory minimum pursuant\nto 21 U.S.C. § 851. (If not for the enhancement, Clark would\nhave had an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months.)\n Both the government and Clark argued for the 120-month\nmandatory minimum sentence. The district court adopted the\nfacts of the PSR and determined that the PSR had calculated\ncorrectly Clark’s offense level, criminal history, and guideline\nrange. The court sentenced Clark to 120 months in prison to\nbe served consecutively to the 71-month sentence he had re-\nceived in the Illinois case.\n On appeal, Clark argues that his later drug offense in the\nIllinois conviction should be treated under the Sentencing\n\nNo. 18-2604 15\n\nGuidelines as “relevant conduct” for this case rather than as\npart of his criminal history. That means, he contends, his 120-\nmonth sentence in this case should run concurrently with the\n71-month sentence he received in Illinois. Clark did not raise\nthis argument in the district court. At sentencing, the govern-\nment asked that Clark’s sentence run consecutively to his Illi-\nnois sentence. Clark did not object. He requested only that\nthis sentence run concurrently with any state sentence. The\ngovernment argues that Clark therefore waived this issue.\n Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right,\nwhereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant “negligently fails\nto assert a right in a timely fashion.” United States v. Brodie,\n507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Olano, 507\nU.S. 725, 733 (1993). Concurrent sentences would reduce sig-\nnificantly the time Clark spends in prison. There is no reason\nfor us to draw the inference here that Clark intentionally\nwaived this argument. “Waiver principles should be con-\nstrued liberally in favor of the defendant,” and we are hesi-\ntant, without more, to construe a defendant’s failure to object\nto a PSR as an intentional relinquishment of a known right.\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 84849 (7th Cir.\n2005). This is especially the case where, as here, the defendant\nhad no strategic reason to forgo this sentencing argument. See\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014).\n Plain-error review, however, does not win relief for Clark\non this issue. Plain-error review allows reversal where: (1)\nthere was an error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error af-\nfected the substantial rights of the defendant; and (4) the error\nseriously impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation\nof the proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 73238; United States v.\nDuran, 407 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, we need not\n\n16 No. 18-2604\n\naddress the third and fourth elements. If any error occurred\nat all, it was not “plain.”\n Under § 5G1.3(b) of the Guidelines, where a defendant has\nan undischarged term of imprisonment, and where the con-\nduct that led to the undischarged sentence\n is relevant conduct to the instant offense of con-\n viction under the provisions of subsections\n (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Con-\n duct), the sentence for the instant offense shall\n be imposed as follows:\n (1) The court shall adjust the sentence for\n any period of imprisonment already\n served on the undischarged term of im-\n prisonment if the court determines that\n such period of imprisonment will not be\n credited to the federal sentence by the\n Bureau of Prisons; and\n (2) the sentence for the instant offense\n shall be imposed to run concurrently to\n the remainder of the undischarged term\n of imprisonment.\nSection 5G1.3(d) further advises that “in any other case in-\nvolving an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence\nfor the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently,\npartially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undis-\ncharged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable pun-\nishment for the instant offense.” So if Clark’s Illinois offense\nwas relevant conduct here, the Guidelines would recommend\nconcurrent sentences. If his Illinois offense was not relevant\nconduct here, the choice of consecutive or concurrent\n\nNo. 18-2604 17\n\nsentences is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge, and\nthere is no reason to find an abuse of discretion here.\n As for the scope of relevant conduct, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) pro-\nvides that “relevant conduct” is based on “all acts and omis-\nsions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, in-\nduced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.” “Sec-\ntion 1B1.3(a)(2) applies to grouped offenses and includes ‘all\nacts and omissions described in subdivisions 1(A) and 1(B)\nthat were part of the same course of conduct or common\nscheme or plan as the offense of conviction.’” United States v.\nSchrode, 839 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting U.S.S.G.\n§ 1B1.3(a)(2).\n “In assessing whether offenses are part of the same course\nof conduct, we focus on whether the government has demon-\nstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and temporal prox-\nimity.” United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015)\n(internal citations omitted). In considering whether an offense\nis relevant within the meaning of § 1B1.3, our court has em-\nphasized several factors that should guide courts’ analysis.\n“Sufficient factual overlap exists where the past and present\noffenses involve the same victims, stem from the same under-\nlying conduct, or are in fact similar offenses.” United States v.\nOrozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2016); see also\nUnited States v. Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2003) (in\ndeciding relevant conduct in drug cases, courts look for “a\nstrong relationship between the uncharged conduct and the\nconvicted offense, focusing on whether the government has\ndemonstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and tem-\nporal proximity”), quoting United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275,\n279 (7th Cir. 1996). The relevant conduct issue is similar to the\nissue in calculating criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2\n\n18 No. 18-2604\n\n(defining “prior sentence”), where two similar prior convic-\ntions separated by an intervening arrest are counted sepa-\nrately. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.\n2003); United States v. Bradley, 218 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2000).\n The district court did not plainly err in not treating Clark’s\nlater offense in Illinois as relevant conduct for his Wisconsin\nconviction. To support his argument, Clark points to facts set\nforth in his Wisconsin PSR. The PSR explained that Clark trav-\neled to Chicago to obtain the drugs that he would then sell in\nWisconsin. This fact, Clark asserts, establishes that his drug\nactivities in both states were part of the same course of con-\nduct, his fentanyl-trafficking enterprise.\n Under our precedents, this argument faces obvious “tem-\nporal proximity” and “similarity” problems. First, Clark was\narrested in Wisconsin seven months before he was arrested\nfor selling a fentanyl mixture in Illinois. Further, the offenses\nwere dissimilar. In Wisconsin, Clark possessed more than 80\ngrams of fentanyl, most of which was packaged in retail pack-\nages of 0.5 grams. In Illinois, by contrast, he was arrested for\nselling a confidential informant more than 65.2 grams of fen-\ntanyl. And even if the offenses had been more similar, “the\nfact that a defendant commits a certain type of offense on mul-\ntiple occasions does not inevitably mean that each separate\noffense is part of the same course of conduct.” Schrode, 839\nF.3d at 552. There is not enough here to have required the dis-\ntrict court to have found such strong connections between\nthese two drug offenses, especially without an objection by\nthe defense to that effect. The offenses involved different buy-\ners, in different cities, in different types of quantities, months\napart, and with an intervening arrest for the Wisconsin of-\nfense.\n\nNo. 18-2604 19\n\n “An error is ‘plain’ if the law at the time of appellate re-\nview shows clearly that it was an error.” United States v.\nPierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Henderson v.\nUnited States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013). Clark cannot establish\nwith precedent or otherwise that the district court should\nhave acted sua sponte to treat his Illinois offense as conduct\nrelevant to his Wisconsin charge. Even if there might have\nbeen an error, it was not plain error to run Clark’s two federal\nsentences consecutively.\n B. Supervised Release Condition\n Finally, the district court imposed a supervised release\ncondition that Clark “Not meet, communicate or spend time\nwith any persons known by defendant to be a member of or\naffiliate of any known street gang.” On appeal, Clark argues\nthat the term “affiliate” is unconstitutionally vague. He did\nnot object to this condition at sentencing.\n In at least scores of appeals over the past five years, in the\nwake of United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014),\nUnited States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), and\nUnited States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015), this court\nhas wrestled with how best to handle appellate challenges to\nsupervised release conditions that were not raised in the dis-\ntrict court. Our recent opinion in United States v. Flores, 929\nF.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019), should bring some order to our\ncaselaw in this niche of waiver law, particularly since it was\ncirculated to the entire court under Circuit Rule 40(e), and no\njudge voted to hear the case en banc. Special considerations\napply to our handling of supervised release conditions both\nbecause they are usually the least salient concern at the time\nof sentencing and, more important, because a defendant may\nchallenge them in the district court at any time. See Flores, 929\n\n20 No. 18-2604\n\nF.3d at 451, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); see also United States\nv. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant waived\nchallenge to supervised release condition: “sentencing in the\ndistrict court is the main event”).\n This case meets the standards of waiver set forth in Flores:\nClark had prior notice of the proposed conditions, including\nthe “affiliate” condition. He had a meaningful opportunity to\nobject, and his lawyer told the judge that the proposed condi-\ntions were acceptable. Clark even raised other objections to\nthe PSR prior to sentencing but did not challenge this condi-\ntion, which signals an intentional decision not to object. See\nFlores, 929 F.3d at 449.\n We REVERSE the district court’s denial of Clark’s motion\nfor a Franks hearing without an evidentiary hearing. We\nVACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for a\nFranks hearing and appropriate action based on the outcome\nof that hearing, either granting Clark’s motion to suppress or,\nif his motion is denied, reinstating the convictions and sen-\ntence. If the judgment is reinstated, the denial of Clark’s mo-\ntion to suppress and the district court’s sentence are\nAFFIRMED.\n\nNo. 18-2604 21\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Michael Clark\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2604\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL CLARK,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cr-53-JDP-1 — James D. Peterson, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Michael\\nClark was convicted of possessing a mixture containing fen-\\ntanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Clark had been\\nfound in a hotel room with more than 80 grams of a mixture\\nof heroin and fentanyl, a digital scale, and cellophane bags.\\nHe does not appeal any aspect of his jury trial, but he chal-\\nlenges the denial of his motion for a Franks hearing challeng-\\ning the issuance of the search warrant for the hotel room. He\\n\\n2 No. 18-2604\\n\\nalso challenges the denial of his motion to suppress without\\nan evidentiary hearing. And he challenges two aspects of his\\nsentence: the guideline treatment of his conviction for drug\\ndistribution that occurred in Illinois seven months after his\\nWisconsin arrest and one condition of supervised release. We\\nvacate Clark’s conviction and remand for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on his Franks challenge. We affirm on the denial of his mo-\\ntion to suppress without a hearing. We also affirm on the\\nguideline issue and determine that the supervised release\\nchallenge was waived. We address in Part I the need for a\\nFranks hearing and in Part II the need for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on the motion to suppress. We address the sentencing is-\\nsues in Part III.\\nI. The Need for a Franks Hearing\\n The Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for the use of\\nsearch warrants calls for probable cause determinations by a\\n“neutral and detached magistrate” as opposed to “officer[s]\\nengaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out\\ncrime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The ap-\\nplication for a warrant “must provide the magistrate with a\\nsubstantial basis for determining the existence of probable\\ncause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).\\n The ability of the neutral and detached magistrate to de-\\ntermine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the infor-\\nmation the police submit. “[A] search warrant is not valid if\\nthe police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting\\nfalse, material information,” or by omitting material infor-\\nmation from the affidavit provided to the issuing judge.\\nUnited States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013),\\nciting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 15556 (1978). To inval-\\nidate a warrant on this basis, a defendant at a so-called Franks\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 3\\n\\nhearing must prove by a preponderance of the evidence either\\nfalsity or recklessness, as well as materiality. McMurtrey, 704\\nF.3d at 509.\\n Merely to obtain a Franks hearing, however, a defendant\\ndoes not need to prove the Franks violation. A defendant must\\nonly make a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the war-\\nrant application contained a material falsity or omission that\\nwould alter the issuing judge’s probable cause determination,\\nand (2) that the affiant included the material falsity or omitted\\ninformation intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the\\ntruth. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014);\\nsee also, e.g., United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702, 708 (7th\\nCir. 2016); United States v. Mullins, 803 F.3d 858, 861–62 (7th\\nCir. 2015); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 887–88 (7th\\nCir. 2008). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not\\nrequired until the Franks hearing itself.” Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n820.\\n Clark asserted in the district court that the police investi-\\ngator who applied for the search warrant of the hotel room\\ndeliberately or recklessly omitted critical information affect-\\ning the credibility of the unidentified informant who told the\\nofficer about drug distribution at the hotel where Clark was\\narrested. The district court denied the motion for an eviden-\\ntiary hearing on the question. The court agreed that the police\\nhad provided no information about the informant’s credibil-\\nity. The court found, however, that the police had provided\\nsufficient corroboration for the informant’s tip so that the war-\\nrant did not depend on the informant’s credibility. That\\nmeant the omitted credibility information was not material\\nfor Franks purposes. We disagree and find that a hearing is\\nneeded. “[W]e review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear\\n\\n4 No. 18-2604\\n\\nerror, but any legal determinations that factored into the rul-\\ning are reviewed de novo.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 815; see also Han-\\ncock, 844 F.3d at 70708.\\n A. The Warrant Application\\n Investigator Todd Maas is a police officer in Superior, Wis-\\nconsin. He prepared the warrant application and signed the\\nsupporting affidavit. Maas said that a confidential informant\\ncontacted him on October 14, 2015 and told him that earlier\\nthat day, he had driven someone to a parking lot adjacent to\\nthe Baywalk Inn in Superior to buy heroin from a black male\\ncalled “Big Mike,” the brother of “Toonchie.” Maas said he\\nand another officer then performed their own investigations,\\nincluding surveillance of the parking lot. Maas observed a\\nblack male leave the hotel and enter and then exit at least five\\ncars in the hotel parking lot. He also learned that the guest\\nstaying in Room 203 was the only hotel guest who both had\\npaid in cash and was staying only one night, all behavior that\\nMaas said was typical of drug trafficking, based on his train-\\ning and experience. Maas also said he had spoken to a woman\\n(referred to in this case as the “mom on a mission”) who said\\nthat her daughter was a heroin addict and that she (the\\nmother) had followed a man she suspected of drug-dealing to\\nRoom 203.\\n Maas included all of this information in his affidavit,\\nwhich convinced a state trial judge to issue a search warrant\\nfor Room 203. Maas did not include any damaging infor-\\nmation about the credibility of his confidential informant,\\nwho was the only source of information specifically about\\ndrug trafficking. The informant was being paid for his ser-\\nvices. He also had two pending criminal charges against him,\\nfifteen prior convictions, and a history of opiate and cocaine\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 5\\n\\nabuse, and he was hoping to receive a reduced sentence in ex-\\nchange for his cooperation.\\n B. Materiality\\n Where an affidavit is based primarily on tips from an in-\\nformant, probable cause can be shown based on the totality of\\nthe circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n816. In cases based on informants’ tips, we have identified five\\nfactors of particular relevance: (1) the level of detail the in-\\nformant provided; (2) the extent to which the informant’s in-\\nformation is based on his or her own first-hand observations;\\n(3) the degree to which police have corroborated the inform-\\nant’s information; (4) the time elapsed between the events re-\\nported and the warrant application; (5) and “whether the in-\\nformant appeared or testified before the magistrate.” Glover,\\n755 F.3d at 816, citing United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594,\\n600 (7th Cir. 2011). Information omitted from a warrant appli-\\ncation is material when its omission affects the probable cause\\ndetermination. Glover, 755 F.3d at 820.\\n In performing this probable cause inquiry, courts must\\nkeep in mind that a search warrant for a home, business, or\\neven hotel room can authorize highly intrusive and even de-\\nstructive actions by the police, and that informants, especially\\nin drug cases, can be unreliable and motivated by rivalries or\\nrevenge. United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.\\n2018), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1617 (1968) (“What\\nwe blandly call ‘Terry stops’ can be highly intrusive.” They are\\n“not just ‘a “petty indignity,”’ wrote the Supreme Court, but\\n‘a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a person, which may\\ninflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is\\nnot to be undertaken lightly’”); United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d\\n1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2009) (“For all we know, [the informant]\\n\\n6 No. 18-2604\\n\\ncould have been a rival drug dealer, an angry customer, or\\nhad some other beef” with the defendant).\\n Our cases do not hold that a Franks hearing is required\\nevery time some substantial adverse information about an in-\\nformant’s credibility is omitted from a probable cause affida-\\nvit. Hancock, 844 F.3d at 709. We have said generally that\\nwhere a warrant is obtained based on an informant’s tip, “in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility or potential bias\\nis crucial.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 816; see, e.g., United States v.\\nBradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018). That being said,\\nwe also have upheld warrants tainted by police omission of\\nadverse informant credibility information. Our Franks hearing\\ncases show that when police have sufficiently corroborated an\\ninformant’s tip, the omission of facts pertaining to the inform-\\nant’s credibility may not be material.\\n In United States v. Musgraves, for example, the police omit-\\nted from the affidavit important and damaging credibility in-\\nformation about one informant. 831 F.3d 454, 45960 (7th Cir.\\n2016). We affirmed the denial of a Franks hearing because a\\nsecond affidavit included information from a second inform-\\nant without credibility problems who had provided the police\\nwith specific and timely information about the suspect’s drug\\ntrafficking to support the warrant. Id. at 46061.\\n In United States v. Bradford, we also held that the affidavit’s\\nomission of facts damaging to an informant’s credibility did\\nnot require suppression of evidence seized with a search war-\\nrant for drug and weapons trafficking. 905 F.3d at 50305. In\\nBradford, the application failed to disclose that the informant\\nhad three felony convictions, was on probation, and was be-\\ning paid for his help. Id. at 502. But his information was fresh,\\nspecific, and corroborated by his having carried out\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 7\\n\\ncontrolled drug buys from the target and by specific infor-\\nmation from another informant without his credibility prob-\\nlems. Id. at 504\\n In United States v. Hancock, we affirmed the denial of a\\nFranks hearing in similar circumstances. 844 F.3d at 710. An\\ninformant provided fresh, detailed information about a sus-\\npect’s drug sales, but the affidavit for the warrant left out in-\\nformation about the informant’s own criminal history and the\\nfact that he was in custody when he provided the information.\\nId. at 70506. We found that the omissions were not material\\nbecause the warrant application included extensive corrobo-\\nration of the suspect’s drug trafficking and intimidation of\\nwitnesses. That corroboration came from other informants, a\\nsearch of a cellular telephone showing texts referring to drug\\ndeals, and from an earlier interview with the suspect himself.\\nThe quantity and quality of corroborating information meant\\nthat the omitted adverse credibility information about one in-\\nformant did not require a Franks hearing. Id. at 70710.\\n This case is readily distinguishable. This warrant applica-\\ntion did not include any of the substantial adverse information\\nMaas had about the informant’s credibility. The government\\ndoes not try to justify Maas’s omissions, but it argues that the\\ninformant’s credibility was not material to the warrant appli-\\ncation because Maas and his colleague investigated and cor-\\nroborated the informant’s tip sufficiently to provide probable\\ncause independent of that tip. We disagree.\\n The corroboration in this case was much weaker than in\\nthe cases where we upheld warrants’ validity in the face of\\ncredibility omissions. This case is more akin to Glover, where\\nthe warrant application depended so heavily on the credibil-\\nity of the informant. Here, the police had no controlled buys.\\n\\n8 No. 18-2604\\n\\nThey never saw money or drugs change hands. Even the in-\\nformant did not claim to have seen drugs or money change\\nhands. If his tip did not pan out, he had plenty of deniability.\\nHe claimed only that his passenger had met with “Big Mike”\\noutside his presence to buy heroin. And the “mom on a mis-\\nsion” had no track record of credibility and provided no spe-\\ncifics to support her suspicions of the man she had followed\\nto Room 203. In sum, the foundation for probable cause inde-\\npendent of the credibility of the informant was so meager in\\nthis case that the credibility of the informant was material for\\nFranks purposes.\\n C. Deliberate or Reckless Omissions?\\n To obtain a Franks hearing, Clark needed to “offer direct\\nevidence of [Maas’s] state of mind or circumstantial evidence\\nthat [Maas] had a subjective intent to deceive based on the na-\\nture of [his] omissions.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. In his report\\nand recommendation to the district court, we must note, the\\nmagistrate judge in Clark’s case incorrectly read our decision\\nin Glover to “mandate that … court[s] infer recklessness from\\nthe fact that an officer omitted known and substantial adverse\\ninformation from a search warrant affidavit….” That is not\\ncorrect. In Glover, we held that “credibility omissions them-\\nselves, even in the absence of more direct evidence of the of-\\nficer’s state of mind, provide sufficient circumstantial evi-\\ndence to support a reasonable and thus permissible inference\\nof reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. (emphasis added). In\\nother words, credibility omissions do not require courts to in-\\nfer recklessness. Such omissions are matters for a trier of fact\\nto weigh, just as when a witness testifies incorrectly or falsely\\nabout one or a few matters, and the trier of fact must weigh\\nthe rest of the witness’s testimony.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 9\\n\\n In this case, the questions of materiality and the police af-\\nfiant’s state of mind are intertwined. To the extent that cor-\\nroboration might have avoided the need for a Franks hearing\\nin this case, the reliability of the corroboration all depended,\\nfrom the issuing judge’s point of view, on the same officer\\nwhose credibility is at issue: Maas omitted all adverse infor-\\nmation he had about the credibility of the informant who pro-\\nvided the most specific (but still second-hand) information\\nabout drug trafficking. As noted, the omission of so much im-\\nportant information permits (but does not require) an infer-\\nence that the omissions were deliberate or reckless. If the\\nshowing of probable cause in the warrant application de-\\npended on the credibility of the informant, that permissible\\ninference should be enough to obtain a Franks hearing.\\n The district court’s and government’s rationale for deny-\\ning a Franks hearing is that Maas’s own observations supply\\nprobable cause, independent of the informant. We assume\\nthat if Maas’s own observations are credited, they could lead\\na reasonable judge to find probable cause, though the appli-\\ncation would have been much weaker without the inform-\\nant’s tip to Maas. The problem is that Maas’s credibility can\\nlegitimately be questioned here based on what could have\\nbeen deliberate or reckless omissions of information about the\\ncredibility of the informant.\\n This is where materiality and intent become intertwined.\\nIf the omissions were deliberate or reckless, it would not be\\nunreasonable to take seriously the prospect that other por-\\ntions of the same warrant application may have been deliber-\\nately or recklessly false. Judges often instruct jurors that if\\nthey believe a witness has lied intentionally about a material\\nmatter, they may (but are not required to) discount the\\n\\n10 No. 18-2604\\n\\nwitness’s testimony on other matters. See United States v.\\nWeinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1971) (no positive rule\\nof law excludes witness’s testimony entirely based on willful\\nfalsehood, but such falsification presents issue for jury to con-\\nsider in weighing rest of testimony), quoting Knowles v. People,\\n15 Mich. 408, 412 (1867); Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E, Grenig, and\\nWilliam C. Lee, 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. §§ 15:0106 (6th ed.\\n2019).\\n The same point is at the heart of the Supreme Court’s ju-\\nrisprudence on impeachment evidence in Brady cases. Brady\\nv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny establish that\\ngovernment-suppressed evidence is material “if there is a rea-\\nsonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the\\nresult of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles v.\\nWhitely, 514 U.S. 419, 43334 (1995), quoting United States v.\\nBagley, 473 U.S. 657, 682 (1985). Strong, non-cumulative evi-\\ndence that undermines the credibility of an important govern-\\nment witness satisfies that definition. Sims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d\\n1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The reason is simple. Evidence in-\\ndicating that a witness whose testimony “may well be deter-\\nminative of guilt or innocence” is unreliable might prompt a\\njury to distrust everything the witness says. Giglio v. United\\nStates, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The same logic applies in this\\ncontext. Maas’s potentially intentional or reckless omission\\ncompromises his credibility, which determines whether prob-\\nable cause for the warrant existed or not.\\n To be clear, we are not saying or finding here that Maas\\nwas in fact deliberately or recklessly deceptive. The issue on\\nappeal is only whether Clark was entitled to a hearing, one\\nwhere Maas’s credibility could be addressed with evidence\\nfrom both sides. The informant was the only source of\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 11\\n\\ninformation (and again, that was only second-hand) who said\\nthe person in Room 203 was actually dealing drugs. All of the\\nother information in the warrant application indicated\\ngrounds for suspicion, but we can assume that Maas had a\\ngood reason for including the informant’s more specific infor-\\nmation. The complete omission of the available damaging in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility permits an infer-\\nence that Maas was not being honest and careful with the is-\\nsuing court. Whether he in fact was honest and careful about\\nthe facts is an appropriate subject for the Franks hearing on\\nremand.1\\nII. The Timing of the Warrant and Search\\n Defendant Clark was in Room 203 when police executed\\nthe warrant. Also in the room were cellophane bags, a digital\\nscale, and approximately 82 grams of a mixture of heroin and\\nfentanyl. The police photographed the hotel room during\\ntheir search. In a photograph of suspected drugs on a\\nnightstand, a digital clock is visible, reading 8:15 p.m. If the\\nclock was correct, the search was executed at least 25 minutes\\nbefore the judge issued the warrant.\\n\\n\\n 1 Maas’s application also did not explain why the informant would\\nknow heroin if he saw it. See United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 75657 (7th\\nCir. 2003) (no probable cause for search warrant where affidavit was based\\non informant’s report of seeing drugs in defendant’s house, but according\\nto affidavit, informant failed to give details about specific location and\\namount of drugs, or any explanation as to how informant knew that what\\nshe saw were controlled substances). Nor did Maas provide the kind of\\ndetail about his own training and experience that is needed to justify reli-\\nance upon them. See generally, e.g., United States v. Scott, 901 F.3d 842, 845\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (“Details … are vital when an officer proposes his own\\ntraining and experience as the basis of a warrant”).\\n\\n12 No. 18-2604\\n\\n The police of course are not permitted to rely on a search\\nwarrant that has not yet been approved by a judge. The dis-\\ntrict court denied Clark’s motion to suppress without a hear-\\ning. The issue here is whether the photograph of the clock was\\nsufficient evidence for Clark to have an evidentiary hearing\\non his motion to suppress.\\n A defendant who requests a suppression hearing must\\npresent “definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural facts\\n… demonstrat[ing] that there is a disputed material issue of\\nfact.” United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1995);\\nsee United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n“Reliance on vague, conclusory allegations is insufficient.”\\nUnited States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n In response to Clark’s motion to suppress, the government\\nsubmitted the “metadata” from the digital camera. The\\nmetadata showed a host of data about each photograph, in-\\ncluding the time each was taken. The metadata showed that\\nall of the search photographs were taken between 10:36 and\\n10:52 p.m., well after the judge issued the search warrant.\\nClark responded in turn not with an affidavit from any wit-\\nness to the search but with results of Google searches about\\nhow to edit metadata for photographs. In light of the\\nmetadata, and in the absence of any specific indications that\\ndata had been altered, the district court decided that there was\\nno need for a hearing and denied Clark’s motion to suppress.\\n The situation here is similar to United States v. Woods, 995\\nF.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1993).2 In Woods, the police conducted a\\n\\n 2 Another portion of the Woods opinion was abrogated by the Supreme\\n\\nCourt’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), as we noted\\nin United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 13\\n\\nsearch on February 12th. The problem was that both the war-\\nrant and the supporting affidavit bore handwritten dates of\\nFebruary 14th, though both were also date-stamped February\\n11th. The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the\\nsearch had been executed two days before the warrant was\\nissued. The government responded with an affidavit from a\\nprosecutor testifying that the application and warrant were\\nboth prepared and signed on February 11th and that the Feb-\\nruary 14th dates were mistakes. Using language associated\\nwith civil motions for summary judgment—“disputed issues\\nof material fact” and “genuine factual dispute”—we affirmed\\nthe district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress\\nwithout a hearing. Because the defendant had failed to re-\\nspond to the government’s explanation, we agreed that he\\nhad failed to show a genuine factual dispute and a need for\\nan evidentiary hearing. Id. at 715–16.\\n One might argue that in Woods the government submitted\\nan affidavit to explain the discrepancy, while the government\\nhere submitted letters and copies of documents, without any\\naffidavits. Both parties here submitted various documents to\\nthe district court with this less formal approach. But the bur-\\nden is on the defendant to support his motion to suppress.\\nMissing from this record is an assertion by any witness—de-\\nfendant Clark or anyone else—to the effect that the search ac-\\ntually occurred at 8:15 p.m. and that the clock was correct.\\nWithout such an assertion, whether in an affidavit or other-\\nwise (given the less formal procedures being used in the dis-\\ntrict court), the Google search results about how to alter\\nmetadata merely invite speculation. The district court did not\\nerr by denying the motion to suppress, to the extent it was\\nbased on the photograph of the clock, without a hearing.\\n\\n14 No. 18-2604\\n\\nIII. Sentencing Issues\\n A. Relevant Conduct Under the Guidelines\\n Clark also challenges two aspects of his sentence. The first\\nis a Sentencing Guidelines issue concerning the scope of his\\nrelevant conduct and criminal history, which are two sides of\\nthe same coin here. The U.S. Probation Office prepared a Pre-\\nSentence Report for Clark. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)\\nand (c)(8) of the 2016 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the PSR\\ncalculated Clark’s base offense level as 24 because he pos-\\nsessed between 40 and 160 grams of a substance containing\\nfentanyl. No other adjustments applied, so his total offense\\nlevel remained 24. The PSR also determined that Clark had 11\\ncriminal history points and was in criminal history category\\nV. Three of those 11 points were from a 2017 federal convic-\\ntion for drug distribution stemming from events that occurred\\nin Illinois after Clark was arrested in this Wisconsin federal\\ncase. Clark also received three points for a prior felony drug\\nconviction in Minnesota. Because of the Minnesota convic-\\ntion, Clark faced a 120-month mandatory minimum pursuant\\nto 21 U.S.C. § 851. (If not for the enhancement, Clark would\\nhave had an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months.)\\n Both the government and Clark argued for the 120-month\\nmandatory minimum sentence. The district court adopted the\\nfacts of the PSR and determined that the PSR had calculated\\ncorrectly Clark’s offense level, criminal history, and guideline\\nrange. The court sentenced Clark to 120 months in prison to\\nbe served consecutively to the 71-month sentence he had re-\\nceived in the Illinois case.\\n On appeal, Clark argues that his later drug offense in the\\nIllinois conviction should be treated under the Sentencing\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 15\\n\\nGuidelines as “relevant conduct” for this case rather than as\\npart of his criminal history. That means, he contends, his 120-\\nmonth sentence in this case should run concurrently with the\\n71-month sentence he received in Illinois. Clark did not raise\\nthis argument in the district court. At sentencing, the govern-\\nment asked that Clark’s sentence run consecutively to his Illi-\\nnois sentence. Clark did not object. He requested only that\\nthis sentence run concurrently with any state sentence. The\\ngovernment argues that Clark therefore waived this issue.\\n Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right,\\nwhereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant “negligently fails\\nto assert a right in a timely fashion.” United States v. Brodie,\\n507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 733 (1993). Concurrent sentences would reduce sig-\\nnificantly the time Clark spends in prison. There is no reason\\nfor us to draw the inference here that Clark intentionally\\nwaived this argument. “Waiver principles should be con-\\nstrued liberally in favor of the defendant,” and we are hesi-\\ntant, without more, to construe a defendant’s failure to object\\nto a PSR as an intentional relinquishment of a known right.\\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 84849 (7th Cir.\\n2005). This is especially the case where, as here, the defendant\\nhad no strategic reason to forgo this sentencing argument. See\\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Plain-error review, however, does not win relief for Clark\\non this issue. Plain-error review allows reversal where: (1)\\nthere was an error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error af-\\nfected the substantial rights of the defendant; and (4) the error\\nseriously impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation\\nof the proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 73238; United States v.\\nDuran, 407 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, we need not\\n\\n16 No. 18-2604\\n\\naddress the third and fourth elements. If any error occurred\\nat all, it was not “plain.”\\n Under § 5G1.3(b) of the Guidelines, where a defendant has\\nan undischarged term of imprisonment, and where the con-\\nduct that led to the undischarged sentence\\n is relevant conduct to the instant offense of con-\\n viction under the provisions of subsections\\n (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Con-\\n duct), the sentence for the instant offense shall\\n be imposed as follows:\\n (1) The court shall adjust the sentence for\\n any period of imprisonment already\\n served on the undischarged term of im-\\n prisonment if the court determines that\\n such period of imprisonment will not be\\n credited to the federal sentence by the\\n Bureau of Prisons; and\\n (2) the sentence for the instant offense\\n shall be imposed to run concurrently to\\n the remainder of the undischarged term\\n of imprisonment.\\nSection 5G1.3(d) further advises that “in any other case in-\\nvolving an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence\\nfor the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently,\\npartially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undis-\\ncharged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable pun-\\nishment for the instant offense.” So if Clark’s Illinois offense\\nwas relevant conduct here, the Guidelines would recommend\\nconcurrent sentences. If his Illinois offense was not relevant\\nconduct here, the choice of consecutive or concurrent\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 17\\n\\nsentences is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge, and\\nthere is no reason to find an abuse of discretion here.\\n As for the scope of relevant conduct, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) pro-\\nvides that “relevant conduct” is based on “all acts and omis-\\nsions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, in-\\nduced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.” “Sec-\\ntion 1B1.3(a)(2) applies to grouped offenses and includes ‘all\\nacts and omissions described in subdivisions 1(A) and 1(B)\\nthat were part of the same course of conduct or common\\nscheme or plan as the offense of conviction.’” United States v.\\nSchrode, 839 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting U.S.S.G.\\n§ 1B1.3(a)(2).\\n “In assessing whether offenses are part of the same course\\nof conduct, we focus on whether the government has demon-\\nstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and temporal prox-\\nimity.” United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(internal citations omitted). In considering whether an offense\\nis relevant within the meaning of § 1B1.3, our court has em-\\nphasized several factors that should guide courts’ analysis.\\n“Sufficient factual overlap exists where the past and present\\noffenses involve the same victims, stem from the same under-\\nlying conduct, or are in fact similar offenses.” United States v.\\nOrozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2016); see also\\nUnited States v. Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2003) (in\\ndeciding relevant conduct in drug cases, courts look for “a\\nstrong relationship between the uncharged conduct and the\\nconvicted offense, focusing on whether the government has\\ndemonstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and tem-\\nporal proximity”), quoting United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275,\\n279 (7th Cir. 1996). The relevant conduct issue is similar to the\\nissue in calculating criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2\\n\\n18 No. 18-2604\\n\\n(defining “prior sentence”), where two similar prior convic-\\ntions separated by an intervening arrest are counted sepa-\\nrately. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.\\n2003); United States v. Bradley, 218 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n The district court did not plainly err in not treating Clark’s\\nlater offense in Illinois as relevant conduct for his Wisconsin\\nconviction. To support his argument, Clark points to facts set\\nforth in his Wisconsin PSR. The PSR explained that Clark trav-\\neled to Chicago to obtain the drugs that he would then sell in\\nWisconsin. This fact, Clark asserts, establishes that his drug\\nactivities in both states were part of the same course of con-\\nduct, his fentanyl-trafficking enterprise.\\n Under our precedents, this argument faces obvious “tem-\\nporal proximity” and “similarity” problems. First, Clark was\\narrested in Wisconsin seven months before he was arrested\\nfor selling a fentanyl mixture in Illinois. Further, the offenses\\nwere dissimilar. In Wisconsin, Clark possessed more than 80\\ngrams of fentanyl, most of which was packaged in retail pack-\\nages of 0.5 grams. In Illinois, by contrast, he was arrested for\\nselling a confidential informant more than 65.2 grams of fen-\\ntanyl. And even if the offenses had been more similar, “the\\nfact that a defendant commits a certain type of offense on mul-\\ntiple occasions does not inevitably mean that each separate\\noffense is part of the same course of conduct.” Schrode, 839\\nF.3d at 552. There is not enough here to have required the dis-\\ntrict court to have found such strong connections between\\nthese two drug offenses, especially without an objection by\\nthe defense to that effect. The offenses involved different buy-\\ners, in different cities, in different types of quantities, months\\napart, and with an intervening arrest for the Wisconsin of-\\nfense.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 19\\n\\n “An error is ‘plain’ if the law at the time of appellate re-\\nview shows clearly that it was an error.” United States v.\\nPierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Henderson v.\\nUnited States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013). Clark cannot establish\\nwith precedent or otherwise that the district court should\\nhave acted sua sponte to treat his Illinois offense as conduct\\nrelevant to his Wisconsin charge. Even if there might have\\nbeen an error, it was not plain error to run Clark’s two federal\\nsentences consecutively.\\n B. Supervised Release Condition\\n Finally, the district court imposed a supervised release\\ncondition that Clark “Not meet, communicate or spend time\\nwith any persons known by defendant to be a member of or\\naffiliate of any known street gang.” On appeal, Clark argues\\nthat the term “affiliate” is unconstitutionally vague. He did\\nnot object to this condition at sentencing.\\n In at least scores of appeals over the past five years, in the\\nwake of United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014),\\nUnited States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), and\\nUnited States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015), this court\\nhas wrestled with how best to handle appellate challenges to\\nsupervised release conditions that were not raised in the dis-\\ntrict court. Our recent opinion in United States v. Flores, 929\\nF.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019), should bring some order to our\\ncaselaw in this niche of waiver law, particularly since it was\\ncirculated to the entire court under Circuit Rule 40(e), and no\\njudge voted to hear the case en banc. Special considerations\\napply to our handling of supervised release conditions both\\nbecause they are usually the least salient concern at the time\\nof sentencing and, more important, because a defendant may\\nchallenge them in the district court at any time. See Flores, 929\\n\\n20 No. 18-2604\\n\\nF.3d at 451, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); see also United States\\nv. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant waived\\nchallenge to supervised release condition: “sentencing in the\\ndistrict court is the main event”).\\n This case meets the standards of waiver set forth in Flores:\\nClark had prior notice of the proposed conditions, including\\nthe “affiliate” condition. He had a meaningful opportunity to\\nobject, and his lawyer told the judge that the proposed condi-\\ntions were acceptable. Clark even raised other objections to\\nthe PSR prior to sentencing but did not challenge this condi-\\ntion, which signals an intentional decision not to object. See\\nFlores, 929 F.3d at 449.\\n We REVERSE the district court’s denial of Clark’s motion\\nfor a Franks hearing without an evidentiary hearing. We\\nVACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for a\\nFranks hearing and appropriate action based on the outcome\\nof that hearing, either granting Clark’s motion to suppress or,\\nif his motion is denied, reinstating the convictions and sen-\\ntence. If the judgment is reinstated, the denial of Clark’s mo-\\ntion to suppress and the district court’s sentence are\\nAFFIRMED.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 21\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3869,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4648780,"string":"4,648,780"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"MAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant. Appeal Of: Christopher L. Coffin, Et Al."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Mao-Mso Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2377; 18-2463"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wood, Brennan, Eve\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\nMAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n Cross-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSTATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellee,\\n Cross-Appellant.\\n\\nAPPEAL OF: CHRISTOPHER L. COFFIN, et al.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 17-1541 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. When all the dust is cleared away, this\\ncase is relatively straightforward: we must review a dismissal\\nfor lack of Article III standing and the imposition of sanctions\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nunder Rule 11. Only the factual backdrop is complex, as it\\ndeals with one aspect of the federal Medicare program. The\\nPlaintiffs assert that they are assignees of certain private\\ninsurers called Medicare Advantage Organizations, which\\nprovide Medicare benefits. They brought a putative class\\naction against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance\\nCompany in an effort to recover payments State Farm\\nallegedly should have made to them as reimbursement for\\ncertain medical costs. The district court dismissed the action\\nwith prejudice, although the basis for the dismissal was lack\\nof standing. In addition, the court imposed sanctions under\\nRule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against one of\\nthe plaintiffs, MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, and its\\nattorneys.\\n Plaintiffs, MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC; MSP Recovery,\\nLLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and MSP Recovery Claims, Series\\nLLC MSP (“Recovery Claims”), appealed. They argue that the\\ncourt erred in its standing analysis, and that in any event it\\nshould not have dismissed the case with prejudice. Recovery\\nClaims and the attorneys (Christopher Coffin, David\\nHundley, and Courtney Stidham) appealed the sanctions\\norder. Finally, State Farm cross-appealed in order to preserve\\nits alternative argument in favor of affirmance—that the case\\nshould be dismissed on the merits because plaintiffs failed to\\nstate a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Matushkina\\nv. Nielsen, 877 F.3d 289, 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[a]s a\\ngeneral rule, where a defendant has won dismissal for lack of\\nstanding or some other jurisdictional ground, modifying the\\njudgment to dismissal on the merits” requires a cross-appeal).\\n We conclude that the district court erred insofar as it\\ndismissed plaintiffs’ case with prejudice, when the problem\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 3\\n\\nwas a fundamental lack of Article III standing. But this victory\\ngets the plaintiffs only so far. The court acted well within its\\ndiscretion when it denied plaintiffs a third opportunity to\\ncure the defects in their pleadings. The court’s order, in\\nsubstance, was a jurisdictional dismissal with denial of leave\\nto amend. So understood, we affirm the judgment and correct\\nthe record to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice.\\nWe also dismiss State Farm’s cross-appeal. Finally, we find\\nthat the district court exceeded the bounds of its discretion\\nwhen it imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Recovery Claims and\\nits attorneys.\\n I\\n Although the issues before us are ultimately procedural,\\nsome background on Medicare is helpful to place them in\\ncontext. Medicare is “the federal health insurance program\\nfor people who are 65 or older,” as well as for certain other\\ngroups. See https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-\\ncovers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/whats-medicare.\\nWhile many Americans receive benefits directly from the\\ngovernment through Medicare Parts A and B, others receive\\ntheir benefits from private entities known as Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations, pursuant to Medicare Part C.\\n42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a). For each Medicare enrollee covered\\nby a Medicare Advantage Organization, the Organization\\nreceives a per capita reimbursement from the federal\\ngovernment. The amount of that reimbursement may vary\\naccording to the characteristics of the individual enrollees and\\nother factors. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.\\nLiab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 364–65 (3d Cir. 2012). The Medical\\nAdvantage Organizations assume the financial risk of\\ninsuring their enrollees. Id.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n One other piece of Medicare vocabulary is important to\\nthis case: the difference between “primary” and “secondary”\\npayments. When an enrollee is covered directly by the\\ngovernment (under Medicare Parts A and B), Medicare is\\nstatutorily barred from making payments for medical costs\\nwhen an enrollee has benefited or is likely to benefit from\\nsome other insurance or worker’s compensation plan. The\\nstatute mentions such alternative sources of benefits as “a\\nworkmen’s compensation law … or … automobile or liability\\ninsurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or …\\nno fault insurance.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii). In such\\nsituations, Medicare is a secondary form of coverage that\\napplies only to costs not covered by the primary insurance.\\nBut if a primary insurer fails to pay, the government does not\\nleave the enrollee and her medical providers in the lurch.\\nRather, it makes conditional payments to providers and then\\nseeks reimbursement from the primary insurer. Id.\\n§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i). An analogous provision in Medicare\\nPart C makes the private Medicare Advantage Organizations\\nsecondary payers where enrollees have some form of primary\\ncoverage. Id. § 1395w-22(a)(4). When the primary insurers fall\\ndown on their responsibilities, Medicare Advantage\\nOrganizations are authorized by statute to pay first and seek\\nreimbursement later, just as the government may. Id.\\n Sometimes, however, the primary insurer never\\nreimburses the secondary payer (be it the government or a\\nMedicare Advantage Organization) for benefits it should have\\nprovided. In that case, the Medicare Secondary Payer\\nprovisions establish a private right of action that permits some\\nprivate plaintiffs to sue for double damages. But the relevant\\nsection of the statute does not specify who may take\\nadvantage of that provision. All it says, without further\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 5\\n\\nelaboration, is that “[t]here is established a private cause of\\naction for damages (which shall be in an amount double the\\namount otherwise provided) in the case of a primary plan\\nwhich fails to provide for primary payment (or appropriate\\nreimbursement) in accordance with paragraphs (1) and\\n(2)(A).” Id. § 1395y(b)(3)(A).\\n The plaintiffs in this case are not themselves Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations; they assert instead that they are\\nassignees of claims that originally belonged to such entities.\\nThey argue that Medicare Advantage Organizations are\\namong the proper plaintiffs that can exercise this private right\\nof action, and that through the assignments, they stand in the\\nshoes of those Organizations. The plaintiffs and related\\nentities have pursued this theory not just in this litigation, but\\nin several suits throughout the country. See, e.g., MAO-MSO\\nRecovery II, LLC v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., No. PWG-17-711,\\n2018 WL 999920 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2018); MAO-MSO Recovery\\nII, LLC v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-175-JDP, 2018\\nWL 835160 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018). At the same time as it\\ngranted State Farm’s motion to dismiss the First Amended\\nComplaint for lack of standing in this case, the district court\\nagreed with the plaintiffs that the statute does support a\\nprivate right of action for Medicare Advantage Organizations.\\nIn that respect, it relied on rulings from the Third and\\nEleventh Circuits. See Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. W. Heritage\\nIns. Co., 832 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Avandia\\nMktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 355 (3d\\nCir. 2012). Although State Farm did not challenge this point\\nin the district court, it has changed its tune on appeal and now\\nargues that the private right of action does not extend to\\nMedicare Advantage Organizations. Those entities, State\\nFarm contends, must look to contract law for appropriate\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nremedies. This dispute is at the heart of State Farm’s cross-\\nappeal.\\n Plaintiffs’ efforts in the present case foundered, however,\\nwhen the district court found that they did not have valid\\nassignments from any Medicare Advantage Organization that\\nmade unreimbursed payments. Without the link to a proper\\nOrganization that possessed claims to reimbursement, the\\ncourt concluded, plaintiffs had no injury for which they could\\nseek redress on this or any other legal theory. Accordingly, it\\nruled, no matter the scope of the private right of action, these\\nplaintiffs lacked standing to sue. We come to the same\\nconclusion. We save for another day the question whether a\\nMedicare Advantage Organization or a proper assignee of its\\nrights may invoke the Medicare Secondary Payer private right\\nof action for double damages against a primary insurer.\\n II\\n We now turn to the specific defects that the district court\\nfound to be fatal to the plaintiffs’ case. This appeal comes to\\nus on a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Second Amended\\nComplaint. A brief review of the first two iterations of the\\ncomplaint sheds some light on what went wrong and why\\nplaintiffs are entitled to no further amendments.\\n From the outset of this litigation, the question of standing\\nhas been hotly disputed. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they and\\nsimilar organizations have filed a number of suits in which\\nthe initial complaints “did not name any exemplar\\nbeneficiaries or their corresponding assignor [Medicare\\nAdvantage] Plans.” Instead, they “generally alleged the\\nassignments held by plaintiffs from multiple [Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations], and alleged plaintiffs’ analysis of\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 7\\n\\nthe data from multiple unreimbursed claims.” This led to\\nsuccessful defense motions to dismiss for lack of standing: as\\nthe plaintiffs put it, “[g]enerally, the district court rulings on\\nthese early motions were to dismiss the complaints, with\\nleave to amend, directing some degree of greater specificity.”\\nWhen State Farm in this case moved to dismiss the initial\\ncomplaint for lack of Article III standing (among other\\ngrounds), the plaintiffs responded by filing an amended\\ncomplaint to put more meat on the bone.\\n The First Amended Complaint fell short, however. It\\nidentified an exemplar beneficiary by initials and a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization (whose identity was redacted) that\\nallegedly had made secondary payments, but it provided\\nlittle additional information about the underlying claims or\\npayments. Even after the district court issued a protective\\norder, plaintiffs still failed to disclose the name of the assignor\\nMedicare Advantage Organization to State Farm. This time,\\nin response to State Farm’s motion, the district court\\ndismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing. It\\nfound that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate an “injury in\\nfact” for purposes of Article III standing without more\\nspecificity as to the injuries sustained by the exemplar\\nbeneficiary and the assignor Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization that had allegedly paid the unreimbursed\\nmedical costs. The court gave the plaintiffs another chance to\\ncure that defect by granting leave to amend.\\n Plaintiffs took advantage of that opportunity and filed a\\nSecond Amended Complaint. In this iteration, the plaintiffs\\nchose a new “exemplar beneficiary” (identified by the initials\\n“R.Y.”) and named the Medicare Advantage Organization\\nthat had made the secondary payments as Health First\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nAdministrative Plans (“HFAP”). A chain of assignments\\ntransferred HFAP’s alleged right of recovery to Recovery\\nClaims. The complaint alleged that R.Y. suffered specific\\ninjuries in an accident; that HFAP was the entity that paid\\nmedical costs for R.Y.; that State Farm entered into a\\nsettlement agreement with R.Y.; and that State Farm failed to\\nreimburse HFAP for the costs HFAP had incurred.\\n This time, however, there was a new problem: it was not\\nclear that HFAP qualified as a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization. After the defendants filed another motion to\\ndismiss for lack of standing, but before the district court had\\narrived at a decision, a district court in Florida ruled in a\\nrelated case that HFAP was not a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization at all. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Auto-\\nOwners Ins. Co., No. 17-23841, 2018 WL 1953861 *5 (S.D. Fla.\\nApr. 25, 2018) (“Auto-Owners”). The Florida court took judicial\\nnotice of the fact that HFAP does not appear on the list\\nmaintained by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services\\nof Medicare Advantage Organizations. Id. Instead, HFAP is an\\nentity that had contracted with a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization—a closely linked entity by the name of Health\\nFirst Health Plans—to provide a range of administrative,\\nfinancial, and strategic-planning services. The two entities\\n(Health First Administrative Plans and Health First Health\\nPlans) shared very similar names, a holding company, and a\\nChief Operating Officer, Michael Keeler. But crucially, in the\\nFlorida court’s view, only Health First Health contracted\\ndirectly with the government and qualified as a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization for purposes of the private right of\\naction that the plaintiffs were asserting. Accordingly, the\\nFlorida court found that HFAP did not have any recovery\\nrights to assign, even assuming plaintiffs were correct about\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 9\\n\\nthe private right of action: any such claims belonged only to\\nHealth First Health.\\n Only one of the plaintiffs in this case—Recovery Claims—\\nwas a party to Auto-Owners. Nonetheless, the overlap was\\nenough to matter. As in this case, the plaintiffs in Auto-Owners\\nargued that whatever the proper characterization of HFAP\\nmight have been, its service contract with Health First Health\\nmeant that it could pursue Health First Health’s legal claims\\nor assign them away. The Florida court rejected that\\ncontention, ruling that “a contract for services is not an\\nassignment of rights,” and thus “HFAP [could] not assign\\nrights to Plaintiff that were not assigned to it in the first place.”\\nId. This left the Florida plaintiffs without any rights to enforce.\\nSimilarly, in this litigation, the district court thought, the only\\npurported assignment that could confer standing on any of\\nthe plaintiffs was one from HFAP to Recovery Claims.\\n State Farm brought Auto-Owners to the attention of the\\ndistrict court the day after it was issued. The next day, the\\ndistrict court entered a Text Order directing the plaintiffs to\\nexplain why this litigation should not be dismissed on the\\nsame grounds.\\n The plaintiffs complied with that order. Their response\\nfirst argued that Auto-Owners was wrongly decided for two\\nreasons: (1) HFAP does qualify as a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization for purposes of the private right of action; and\\n(2) the agreement between Health First Health and HFAP\\ngranted HFAP the power to enforce Health First Health’s\\nlegal rights as its agent, making the agreement the equivalent\\nof an assignment. In a decision issued on May 25, 2018, the\\ndistrict court rejected both points.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n The court was particularly bothered by what it saw as a\\nbombshell: the revelation in the plaintiffs’ response that\\nHealth First Health, which had never been mentioned in the\\nCentral Illinois case, not HFAP, was the entity that paid the\\nunreimbursed medical costs. This fact contradicted earlier\\nfilings that identified HFAP as the payer with reimbursement\\nrights. If that was true, the district court thought, then HFAP\\n(whatever its status) never incurred any injury and so had no\\nrights that it could assign. The court also reasoned that in light\\nof this development, there was no need to decide, as the\\nFlorida court had, whether HFAP was a qualifying Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization. It was Health First Health that paid\\nthe unreimbursed bills, but the plaintiffs had an assignment\\nonly from HFAP. Only if Health First Health’s service contract\\nwith HFAP also assigned HFAP its legal rights could the case\\nhave a leg to stand on. And on this point, the district court\\nagreed fully with its Florida counterpart: it emphasized,\\ncontrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, that a document\\ncreating an agency relationship and one effecting an\\nassignment of rights are two entirely different things.\\nAccordingly, the district court dismissed the case on this\\nground alone. “Assuming HFAP is [a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization], Plaintiffs still need to satisfy Article-III\\nstanding requirements, and this they cannot do.”\\n Up to this point, we agree with the district court’s\\ndisposition of the case. Nothing in the agreement between\\nHealth First Health and HFAP suggests that Health First\\nHealth was assigning away any of its rights. Without such an\\nassignment, HFAP’s own assignment to plaintiff Recovery\\nClaims conveyed nothing, and thus the plaintiffs had no\\nrights to enforce and no standing to sue. As we note when we\\nreach the sanctions portion of this appeal, additional\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 11\\n\\ninformation later came to the district court’s attention, but\\nthat new information could not have affected the court’s order\\nof May 25.\\n We part ways with the district court only with respect to\\nthe bottom line. The decision that plaintiffs lacked Article III\\nstanding is one of jurisdictional significance: it means that the\\ncourt had no authority to resolve the case. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc.\\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). And that is why the\\ncourt erred by dismissing the case “with prejudice.” See, e.g.,\\nT.W. and M.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1997)\\n(“[W]hen a suit is dismissed for want of subject-matter\\njurisdiction, that is, because the court has no power to resolve\\nthe case on the merits even if the parties are content to have it\\ndo so, it is error to make the dismissal with prejudice”).\\n If a complaint fails to include enough allegations to\\nsupport Article III standing for the plaintiffs, the court has\\nonly two options: it can either dismiss the complaint with\\nleave to amend, or it can dismiss the case for want of\\njurisdiction and hence without prejudice. The Federal Rules\\nof Civil Procedure allow for one amendment as of right and\\ndirect district courts “freely [to] give leave [for further\\namendments] when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).\\nBut after the first round of amendments, the court has the\\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend. If, after amendments, the\\njurisdictional problem persists, then the only option left is a\\ndismissal without prejudice.\\n A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction without leave to amend\\nis not the same thing as a dismissal with prejudice. A\\ndismissal with prejudice is a ruling on the merits, because it\\ncarries with it a preclusive effect that prevents the plaintiffs\\nfrom relitigating—in any court, ever again—any claim\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nencompassed by the suit. We have emphasized this\\ndistinction before. See, e.g., Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 467 F.3d\\n602, 605 (7th Cir. 2006) (“‘No jurisdiction’ and ‘with prejudice’\\nare mutually exclusive.’ A court that lacks subject matter\\njurisdiction cannot dismiss a case with prejudice.”); Okoro v.\\nBohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] judgment on\\nthe merits precludes relitigation of any ground within the\\ncompass of the suit, while a jurisdictional dismissal precludes\\nonly the relitigation of the ground of that dismissal.”).\\n If plaintiffs believe they have satisfied the standing\\nrequirements of a proper state-court forum—requirements\\nthat may differ from those used by the federal courts—they\\nmay try their luck in state court. Or, if they later believe they\\ncan demonstrate that they have suffered an injury in fact after\\nall, perhaps on the basis of a different assignment or exemplar\\nclaim, they can present these claims against the same\\ndefendant in a new federal suit (assuming of course that no\\nindependent barrier, such as the statute of limitations, exists).\\nIndeed, in a case brought by these plaintiffs against the same\\ndefendant and before the same district judge—which the\\ncourt called “a putative class action with slightly different\\nfacts, but consisting of virtually identical allegations under\\nthe law”—these plaintiffs did successfully demonstrate\\nstanding and survived a motion to dismiss. MAO-MSO\\nRecovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (“State Farm\\nI”), No. 17-cv-01537, 2018 WL 3420796 at *1, *7 (C.D. Ill. July\\n13, 2018).\\n None of these later developments, however, means that\\nthe district court was required to let this lawsuit continue. The\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by saying “enough is\\nenough.” It observed that “Plaintiffs have been given a few\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 13\\n\\nchances to demonstrate this Court has jurisdiction.” This suit,\\nthe judge thought, had run its course. Indeed, in a footnote\\nexplaining its dismissal “with prejudice,” the court cited\\nArreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008) for the\\nunassailable proposition that district courts “have broad\\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue delay,\\nbad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure\\ndeficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or where the\\namendment would be futile.” (Emphasis added). The only\\nproblem was thus the court’s use of the phrase “with\\nprejudice” to signal that it would permit no more\\namendments.\\n On this understanding of the district court’s order, we find\\nno abuse of discretion in its decision to dismiss on standing\\ngrounds and to refuse further amendments. While it is true\\nthat the plaintiffs had not previously had a chance to address\\nthe HFAP/Health First Health mix-up, they were on notice\\nfrom the outset that the issue of standing would be front and\\ncenter. If they were going to hang their hat on a single\\n“exemplar” after two unsuccessful attempts, it was important\\nto get it right on the third try. The district court’s frustration\\nat their failure to do so was understandable. And the court\\nwas entitled to give little weight to their plea for another\\nround of pleading, since their memorandum included\\nnothing beyond a request for “leave to allege additional\\nexemplar beneficiaries,” without naming them or providing\\nany reason for the district court to believe that the fourth time\\nwould be the charm. Denying leave to amend under such\\ncircumstances was well within the district court’s discretion.\\nSee James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Const. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 400–\\n01 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of specificity in proposed\\namendments justified denial of leave to amend).\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n III\\n In the same order that dismissed the Second Amended\\nComplaint, the district court also ordered the plaintiffs to\\nshow cause why they should not be sanctioned for their\\nearlier filings, which wrongly identified HFAP as the payer of\\nthe relevant medical costs. We address the substance of the\\nsanctions issue below. Here we note that the plaintiffs’\\nresponse to the order to show cause contained materials\\nrelevant to standing and the merits, including (1) a\\ndeclaration attesting to many additional exemplars that could\\nbe alleged; (2) a purported “nunc pro tunc” or retroactive\\nassignment from Health First Health to one of the plaintiffs,\\nintended to cure the defect identified by the court; and (3) a\\ndeclaration from Michael Keeler, the Chief Operating Officer\\nof Health First Health and HFAP, explaining the relationship\\nbetween the two entities and putting on the record that he had\\nalways intended to assign rights from Health First Health to\\nthe plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that in light of\\nthis new evidence, the district court abused its discretion\\nwhen it refused further amendments.\\n We need not decide whether any of these documents\\nmight have been enough to call into question the district\\ncourt’s dismissal without leave to amend, because the court\\ndid not have any of this evidence in front of it when it issued\\nthe dismissal order. The time to provide this information was\\nin response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss or in the\\nsupplemental response to the district court’s Text Order\\nregarding Auto-Owners. A post-dismissal filing in response to\\nan order to show cause was too little, too late. And to make\\nmatters worse, the plaintiffs never filed a motion for\\nreconsideration or relief from judgment. None of the\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 15\\n\\ninformation provided to the district court after the dismissal\\nrequired it to revive the suit.\\n Because we agree that the district court was without\\njurisdiction to address the merits of the case, that means we\\nare, too. Accordingly, we also dismiss State Farm’s cross-\\nappeal arguing for a dismissal on the merits.\\n IV\\n Finally, we must decide whether Rule 11 sanctions against\\nplaintiff Recovery Claims and three of its attorneys were\\nproper. We review the district court’s decision to impose\\nsanctions for abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax\\nCorporation, 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). When we apply that\\nstandard, however, we must bear in mind that “[a] district\\ncourt would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its\\nruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly\\nerroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. See also Equal\\nEmployment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 907\\nF.3d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining the Rule 11 abuse-of-\\ndiscretion standard as clarified in Cooter & Gell).\\n\\n A\\n\\n Rule 11 requires that attorneys certify “to the best of [their]\\nknowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry\\nreasonable under the circumstances” that their filings have\\nadequate foundation in fact and law and lack an “improper\\npurpose.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Because the district court\\nappeared to base its sanctions order on counsel’s lack of\\ncandor—i.e. filing documents with the court in bad faith —\\nand a failure to undertake an objectively reasonable inquiry,\\nwe address both grounds. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nN.A., 880 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that Rule\\n11 embodies both an objective and a subjective standard,\\nprohibiting both “frivolousness on the objective side” and\\n“bad faith on the subjective side.”)\\n At this stage of the case, the district court had the benefit\\nof the plaintiffs’ response to the order to show cause, in which\\nthey filed the additional materials mentioned above. Those\\nsubmissions are relevant to the Rule 11 analysis.\\n We begin with the finding of bad faith or “lack of candor.”\\nWe are hard-pressed to see any indication of intentional\\nmisrepresentation in this confused and confusing record.\\nNone of the counsel for Recovery Claims—the only party that\\nwas sanctioned—entered an appearance in the Florida Auto-\\nOwners litigation. As far as the record shows, the first time\\nthese attorneys learned of the Auto-Owners decision was when\\nState Farm brought the case to the attention of the district\\ncourt here. We also agree with the plaintiffs that, contrary to\\nthe district court’s finding, there is no basis in the record for\\nthe conclusion that these attorneys knew anything about the\\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction until they saw the Text\\nOrder. (The district court seemed to derive its conclusion\\nfrom what it understood to be the plaintiffs’ “admis[sion] that\\n[they] knew there were multiple ‘Health First’ entities and\\nthat HFAP did not actually pay R.Y.’s medical expenses … .”\\nBut the cited portion of plaintiffs’ response to the Text Order\\ndoes not support that conclusion, and plaintiffs disclaim ever\\nhaving made such an admission.) Without knowledge of the\\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction, most of the supposed\\nmisrepresentations in the earlier filings regarding HFAP’s\\nstatus as a Medicare Advantage Organization or as the payer\\nof R.Y.’s medical bills look more like honest mistakes. The\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 17\\n\\nsame goes for any misunderstanding about the nature of the\\nassignment.\\n The district court also appears to have found that\\ncounsel’s submissions after the Text Order was issued\\ndemonstrated a lack of candor inasmuch as they did not\\nimmediately admit (1) the inaccuracies in their earlier\\npleadings and (2) that fatal nature of the mix-up uncovered in\\nAuto-Owners. This also goes too far. In light of the evidence\\nthe plaintiffs submitted to the district court on the Rule 11\\npoint, it is understandable why they had maintained that\\nthere was a colorable reading of the underlying assignment\\nthat would give effect to Keeler’s unquestioned intent, i.e., to\\nassign Health First Health’s rights to plaintiff Recovery\\nClaims. And as the district court eventually acknowledged in\\nits order imposing sanctions, there was “some debate” on the\\nquestion whether HFAP might qualify as a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization (an issue that ultimately proved\\nimmaterial but that was relevant to the claimed accuracy of\\nthe earlier filings). True, the plaintiffs may have understated\\nthe scope of the problem in their response to the Text Order,\\nand they may have erred by pursuing a legal argument that\\nstretched agency theory too far. They also should have\\nbrought their supporting materials before the district judge at\\nthe same time as they filed their response to the Text Order.\\nBut in the absence of either affirmative representations or\\nmaterial omissions in the response to the Text Order, what we\\nare left with is an aggressive litigation strategy with a\\ncolorable (if strained) basis in law and fact, rather than a lack\\nof candor. That is not sanctionable conduct.\\n The district court also had other grounds for imposing\\nsanctions: carelessness and inattentiveness. As we have\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nemphasized repeatedly, an ‘empty head but a pure heart is no\\ndefense.’” U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, N.D. v. Sullivan-Moore, 406\\nF.3d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chambers v. Am. Trans\\nAir, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 1994)). Because Rule 11\\nimposes on attorneys a duty to conduct an “inquiry\\nreasonable under the circumstances” before they attest to\\n“knowledge, information, and belief” supporting their filings,\\neven honest mistakes can be sanctionable. The district court\\nfound that the attorneys in this case failed to live up to that\\nduty.\\n It is one thing to lose on a point, however, and another to\\nurge something so ill-founded that it is sanctionable.\\nAlthough the standard for abuse of discretion is demanding,\\nwe conclude that the district court stepped over the\\nboundaries of its discretion in imposing sanctions on the basis\\nof carelessness or inattention. Again, the exhibits the plaintiffs\\nfiled in response to the order to show cause are instructive.\\nThe affidavit from Keeler demonstrates that Health First\\nAdministrative Plans (HFAP) and Health First Health Plans\\nshared more than very similar names, a holding company,\\nand a common COO; they were, for many purposes, almost\\nindistinguishable to any external party dealing with them. As\\nKeeler averred, “[Health First Health] acts through myself\\nand its other corporate officers, but it has no employees …\\n[Health First Health] takes no action except through HFAP’s\\nagents and employees.” Affidavit of Michael Keeler, June 1,\\n2018 at 1–2. To make matters more confusing, at least\\naccording to plaintiffs’ allegations, HFAP did business under\\nthe name “Health First Health Plans.” And even if Health\\nFirst Health was the entity from whose assets the beneficiary\\nwas paid—meaning it possessed the reimbursement rights—\\nplaintiffs point out that “the act of payment would not\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 19\\n\\nunreasonably or inaccurately be attributed to HFAP, which\\ncarried out all acts on behalf of [Health First Health].”\\n Without getting further into the weeds, it suffices to say\\nthat this corporate arrangement was not just complex, but so\\nfreighted with overlapping names and functions that a mix-\\nup was, at the end of the day, understandable. The district\\ncourt did “not accept that Health First’s ‘corporate structure’\\nwas too confusing to warrant the misstatements in the Second\\nAmended Complaint.” Respectfully, the district court\\nreached its conclusion about the straightforward nature of the\\ncorporate arrangement while it was looking at it with the\\nbenefit of hindsight. The court did not give adequate weight\\nto the plaintiffs’ additional evidence, nor did it consider\\ncarefully enough what the attorneys knew and when they\\nknew it. (How could the details of this structure have been\\napparent at a time when the attorneys were unaware that\\nthere was a second “Health First” entity?) Sanctions against\\nthe attorneys for Recovery Claims were not warranted on this\\nrecord.\\n B\\n The sanctions against plaintiff Recovery Claims must also\\nbe reversed. As discussed, we find that none of the actions or\\nomissions of its counsel in this case amounted to sanctionable\\nconduct. The district court did not point to any conduct by\\nRecovery Claims itself, rather than its agents, that would\\nindependently allow us to sustain the imposition of sanctions.\\nUnlike its counsel, Recovery Claims did have some\\nknowledge of the Florida litigation. But we detect nothing\\nimproper in the two-day lapse between the Auto-Owners\\ndecision on April 25, 2018, and the district court’s Text Order\\non April 27, especially given the factual and legal arguments\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nthat plaintiffs might have wished to develop in response. It is\\ntrue that there was a 14-day hiatus between Keeler’s affidavit\\nin the Auto-Owners case, which explained the HFAP/Health\\nFirst Health ownership structure, and the day the district\\ncourt learned of the ruling that the Florida district judge made\\nas a result. Nonetheless, we conclude that it is too much of a\\nstretch to sanction plaintiff Recovery Claims for failing to\\nrecognize the implications of an affidavit filed in one case,\\nwithout the benefit of any dispositive ruling on the issue, for\\na completely different case being litigated by a separate team\\nof attorneys. As far as we can tell, the sanctions against\\nRecovery Claims must rise or fall with the sanctions against\\nits attorneys. And so they fall.\\n Plaintiffs and their counsel have been punished for their\\nmissteps: the case was dismissed without leave to amend, and\\nwe affirm that dismissal today. But sanctions are a step too\\nfar.\\n IV\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal without leave to\\namend, but we modify it to be a dismissal without prejudice.\\nWe REVERSE the entry of sanctions against MSP Recovery\\nClaims, Series LLC, and its counsel in this case. State Farm’s\\ncross-appeal is DISMISSED. Each party will bear its own costs\\non appeal.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426033/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648780/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: MAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant. Appeal Of: Christopher L. Coffin, Et Al.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\nMAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, et al.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n Cross-Appellees,\n\n v.\n\nSTATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,\n Defendant-Appellee,\n Cross-Appellant.\n\nAPPEAL OF: CHRISTOPHER L. COFFIN, et al.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 17-1541 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE,\nCircuit Judges.\n WOOD, Chief Judge. When all the dust is cleared away, this\ncase is relatively straightforward: we must review a dismissal\nfor lack of Article III standing and the imposition of sanctions\n\f2 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nunder Rule 11. Only the factual backdrop is complex, as it\ndeals with one aspect of the federal Medicare program. The\nPlaintiffs assert that they are assignees of certain private\ninsurers called Medicare Advantage Organizations, which\nprovide Medicare benefits. They brought a putative class\naction against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance\nCompany in an effort to recover payments State Farm\nallegedly should have made to them as reimbursement for\ncertain medical costs. The district court dismissed the action\nwith prejudice, although the basis for the dismissal was lack\nof standing. In addition, the court imposed sanctions under\nRule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against one of\nthe plaintiffs, MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, and its\nattorneys.\n Plaintiffs, MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC; MSP Recovery,\nLLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and MSP Recovery Claims, Series\nLLC MSP (“Recovery Claims”), appealed. They argue that the\ncourt erred in its standing analysis, and that in any event it\nshould not have dismissed the case with prejudice. Recovery\nClaims and the attorneys (Christopher Coffin, David\nHundley, and Courtney Stidham) appealed the sanctions\norder. Finally, State Farm cross-appealed in order to preserve\nits alternative argument in favor of affirmance—that the case\nshould be dismissed on the merits because plaintiffs failed to\nstate a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Matushkina\nv. Nielsen, 877 F.3d 289, 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[a]s a\ngeneral rule, where a defendant has won dismissal for lack of\nstanding or some other jurisdictional ground, modifying the\njudgment to dismissal on the merits” requires a cross-appeal).\n We conclude that the district court erred insofar as it\ndismissed plaintiffs’ case with prejudice, when the problem\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 3\n\nwas a fundamental lack of Article III standing. But this victory\ngets the plaintiffs only so far. The court acted well within its\ndiscretion when it denied plaintiffs a third opportunity to\ncure the defects in their pleadings. The court’s order, in\nsubstance, was a jurisdictional dismissal with denial of leave\nto amend. So understood, we affirm the judgment and correct\nthe record to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice.\nWe also dismiss State Farm’s cross-appeal. Finally, we find\nthat the district court exceeded the bounds of its discretion\nwhen it imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Recovery Claims and\nits attorneys.\n I\n Although the issues before us are ultimately procedural,\nsome background on Medicare is helpful to place them in\ncontext. Medicare is “the federal health insurance program\nfor people who are 65 or older,” as well as for certain other\ngroups. See https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-\ncovers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/whats-medicare.\nWhile many Americans receive benefits directly from the\ngovernment through Medicare Parts A and B, others receive\ntheir benefits from private entities known as Medicare\nAdvantage Organizations, pursuant to Medicare Part C.\n42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a). For each Medicare enrollee covered\nby a Medicare Advantage Organization, the Organization\nreceives a per capita reimbursement from the federal\ngovernment. The amount of that reimbursement may vary\naccording to the characteristics of the individual enrollees and\nother factors. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.\nLiab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 364–65 (3d Cir. 2012). The Medical\nAdvantage Organizations assume the financial risk of\ninsuring their enrollees. Id.\n\f4 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\n One other piece of Medicare vocabulary is important to\nthis case: the difference between “primary” and “secondary”\npayments. When an enrollee is covered directly by the\ngovernment (under Medicare Parts A and B), Medicare is\nstatutorily barred from making payments for medical costs\nwhen an enrollee has benefited or is likely to benefit from\nsome other insurance or worker’s compensation plan. The\nstatute mentions such alternative sources of benefits as “a\nworkmen’s compensation law … or … automobile or liability\ninsurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or …\nno fault insurance.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii). In such\nsituations, Medicare is a secondary form of coverage that\napplies only to costs not covered by the primary insurance.\nBut if a primary insurer fails to pay, the government does not\nleave the enrollee and her medical providers in the lurch.\nRather, it makes conditional payments to providers and then\nseeks reimbursement from the primary insurer. Id.\n§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i). An analogous provision in Medicare\nPart C makes the private Medicare Advantage Organizations\nsecondary payers where enrollees have some form of primary\ncoverage. Id. § 1395w-22(a)(4). When the primary insurers fall\ndown on their responsibilities, Medicare Advantage\nOrganizations are authorized by statute to pay first and seek\nreimbursement later, just as the government may. Id.\n Sometimes, however, the primary insurer never\nreimburses the secondary payer (be it the government or a\nMedicare Advantage Organization) for benefits it should have\nprovided. In that case, the Medicare Secondary Payer\nprovisions establish a private right of action that permits some\nprivate plaintiffs to sue for double damages. But the relevant\nsection of the statute does not specify who may take\nadvantage of that provision. All it says, without further\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 5\n\nelaboration, is that “[t]here is established a private cause of\naction for damages (which shall be in an amount double the\namount otherwise provided) in the case of a primary plan\nwhich fails to provide for primary payment (or appropriate\nreimbursement) in accordance with paragraphs (1) and\n(2)(A).” Id. § 1395y(b)(3)(A).\n The plaintiffs in this case are not themselves Medicare\nAdvantage Organizations; they assert instead that they are\nassignees of claims that originally belonged to such entities.\nThey argue that Medicare Advantage Organizations are\namong the proper plaintiffs that can exercise this private right\nof action, and that through the assignments, they stand in the\nshoes of those Organizations. The plaintiffs and related\nentities have pursued this theory not just in this litigation, but\nin several suits throughout the country. See, e.g., MAO-MSO\nRecovery II, LLC v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., No. PWG-17-711,\n2018 WL 999920 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2018); MAO-MSO Recovery\nII, LLC v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-175-JDP, 2018\nWL 835160 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018). At the same time as it\ngranted State Farm’s motion to dismiss the First Amended\nComplaint for lack of standing in this case, the district court\nagreed with the plaintiffs that the statute does support a\nprivate right of action for Medicare Advantage Organizations.\nIn that respect, it relied on rulings from the Third and\nEleventh Circuits. See Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. W. Heritage\nIns. Co., 832 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Avandia\nMktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 355 (3d\nCir. 2012). Although State Farm did not challenge this point\nin the district court, it has changed its tune on appeal and now\nargues that the private right of action does not extend to\nMedicare Advantage Organizations. Those entities, State\nFarm contends, must look to contract law for appropriate\n\f6 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nremedies. This dispute is at the heart of State Farm’s cross-\nappeal.\n Plaintiffs’ efforts in the present case foundered, however,\nwhen the district court found that they did not have valid\nassignments from any Medicare Advantage Organization that\nmade unreimbursed payments. Without the link to a proper\nOrganization that possessed claims to reimbursement, the\ncourt concluded, plaintiffs had no injury for which they could\nseek redress on this or any other legal theory. Accordingly, it\nruled, no matter the scope of the private right of action, these\nplaintiffs lacked standing to sue. We come to the same\nconclusion. We save for another day the question whether a\nMedicare Advantage Organization or a proper assignee of its\nrights may invoke the Medicare Secondary Payer private right\nof action for double damages against a primary insurer.\n II\n We now turn to the specific defects that the district court\nfound to be fatal to the plaintiffs’ case. This appeal comes to\nus on a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Second Amended\nComplaint. A brief review of the first two iterations of the\ncomplaint sheds some light on what went wrong and why\nplaintiffs are entitled to no further amendments.\n From the outset of this litigation, the question of standing\nhas been hotly disputed. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they and\nsimilar organizations have filed a number of suits in which\nthe initial complaints “did not name any exemplar\nbeneficiaries or their corresponding assignor [Medicare\nAdvantage] Plans.” Instead, they “generally alleged the\nassignments held by plaintiffs from multiple [Medicare\nAdvantage Organizations], and alleged plaintiffs’ analysis of\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 7\n\nthe data from multiple unreimbursed claims.” This led to\nsuccessful defense motions to dismiss for lack of standing: as\nthe plaintiffs put it, “[g]enerally, the district court rulings on\nthese early motions were to dismiss the complaints, with\nleave to amend, directing some degree of greater specificity.”\nWhen State Farm in this case moved to dismiss the initial\ncomplaint for lack of Article III standing (among other\ngrounds), the plaintiffs responded by filing an amended\ncomplaint to put more meat on the bone.\n The First Amended Complaint fell short, however. It\nidentified an exemplar beneficiary by initials and a Medicare\nAdvantage Organization (whose identity was redacted) that\nallegedly had made secondary payments, but it provided\nlittle additional information about the underlying claims or\npayments. Even after the district court issued a protective\norder, plaintiffs still failed to disclose the name of the assignor\nMedicare Advantage Organization to State Farm. This time,\nin response to State Farm’s motion, the district court\ndismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing. It\nfound that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate an “injury in\nfact” for purposes of Article III standing without more\nspecificity as to the injuries sustained by the exemplar\nbeneficiary and the assignor Medicare Advantage\nOrganization that had allegedly paid the unreimbursed\nmedical costs. The court gave the plaintiffs another chance to\ncure that defect by granting leave to amend.\n Plaintiffs took advantage of that opportunity and filed a\nSecond Amended Complaint. In this iteration, the plaintiffs\nchose a new “exemplar beneficiary” (identified by the initials\n“R.Y.”) and named the Medicare Advantage Organization\nthat had made the secondary payments as Health First\n\f8 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nAdministrative Plans (“HFAP”). A chain of assignments\ntransferred HFAP’s alleged right of recovery to Recovery\nClaims. The complaint alleged that R.Y. suffered specific\ninjuries in an accident; that HFAP was the entity that paid\nmedical costs for R.Y.; that State Farm entered into a\nsettlement agreement with R.Y.; and that State Farm failed to\nreimburse HFAP for the costs HFAP had incurred.\n This time, however, there was a new problem: it was not\nclear that HFAP qualified as a Medicare Advantage\nOrganization. After the defendants filed another motion to\ndismiss for lack of standing, but before the district court had\narrived at a decision, a district court in Florida ruled in a\nrelated case that HFAP was not a Medicare Advantage\nOrganization at all. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Auto-\nOwners Ins. Co., No. 17-23841, 2018 WL 1953861 *5 (S.D. Fla.\nApr. 25, 2018) (“Auto-Owners”). The Florida court took judicial\nnotice of the fact that HFAP does not appear on the list\nmaintained by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services\nof Medicare Advantage Organizations. Id. Instead, HFAP is an\nentity that had contracted with a Medicare Advantage\nOrganization—a closely linked entity by the name of Health\nFirst Health Plans—to provide a range of administrative,\nfinancial, and strategic-planning services. The two entities\n(Health First Administrative Plans and Health First Health\nPlans) shared very similar names, a holding company, and a\nChief Operating Officer, Michael Keeler. But crucially, in the\nFlorida court’s view, only Health First Health contracted\ndirectly with the government and qualified as a Medicare\nAdvantage Organization for purposes of the private right of\naction that the plaintiffs were asserting. Accordingly, the\nFlorida court found that HFAP did not have any recovery\nrights to assign, even assuming plaintiffs were correct about\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 9\n\nthe private right of action: any such claims belonged only to\nHealth First Health.\n Only one of the plaintiffs in this case—Recovery Claims—\nwas a party to Auto-Owners. Nonetheless, the overlap was\nenough to matter. As in this case, the plaintiffs in Auto-Owners\nargued that whatever the proper characterization of HFAP\nmight have been, its service contract with Health First Health\nmeant that it could pursue Health First Health’s legal claims\nor assign them away. The Florida court rejected that\ncontention, ruling that “a contract for services is not an\nassignment of rights,” and thus “HFAP [could] not assign\nrights to Plaintiff that were not assigned to it in the first place.”\nId. This left the Florida plaintiffs without any rights to enforce.\nSimilarly, in this litigation, the district court thought, the only\npurported assignment that could confer standing on any of\nthe plaintiffs was one from HFAP to Recovery Claims.\n State Farm brought Auto-Owners to the attention of the\ndistrict court the day after it was issued. The next day, the\ndistrict court entered a Text Order directing the plaintiffs to\nexplain why this litigation should not be dismissed on the\nsame grounds.\n The plaintiffs complied with that order. Their response\nfirst argued that Auto-Owners was wrongly decided for two\nreasons: (1) HFAP does qualify as a Medicare Advantage\nOrganization for purposes of the private right of action; and\n(2) the agreement between Health First Health and HFAP\ngranted HFAP the power to enforce Health First Health’s\nlegal rights as its agent, making the agreement the equivalent\nof an assignment. In a decision issued on May 25, 2018, the\ndistrict court rejected both points.\n\f10 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\n The court was particularly bothered by what it saw as a\nbombshell: the revelation in the plaintiffs’ response that\nHealth First Health, which had never been mentioned in the\nCentral Illinois case, not HFAP, was the entity that paid the\nunreimbursed medical costs. This fact contradicted earlier\nfilings that identified HFAP as the payer with reimbursement\nrights. If that was true, the district court thought, then HFAP\n(whatever its status) never incurred any injury and so had no\nrights that it could assign. The court also reasoned that in light\nof this development, there was no need to decide, as the\nFlorida court had, whether HFAP was a qualifying Medicare\nAdvantage Organization. It was Health First Health that paid\nthe unreimbursed bills, but the plaintiffs had an assignment\nonly from HFAP. Only if Health First Health’s service contract\nwith HFAP also assigned HFAP its legal rights could the case\nhave a leg to stand on. And on this point, the district court\nagreed fully with its Florida counterpart: it emphasized,\ncontrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, that a document\ncreating an agency relationship and one effecting an\nassignment of rights are two entirely different things.\nAccordingly, the district court dismissed the case on this\nground alone. “Assuming HFAP is [a Medicare Advantage\nOrganization], Plaintiffs still need to satisfy Article-III\nstanding requirements, and this they cannot do.”\n Up to this point, we agree with the district court’s\ndisposition of the case. Nothing in the agreement between\nHealth First Health and HFAP suggests that Health First\nHealth was assigning away any of its rights. Without such an\nassignment, HFAP’s own assignment to plaintiff Recovery\nClaims conveyed nothing, and thus the plaintiffs had no\nrights to enforce and no standing to sue. As we note when we\nreach the sanctions portion of this appeal, additional\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 11\n\ninformation later came to the district court’s attention, but\nthat new information could not have affected the court’s order\nof May 25.\n We part ways with the district court only with respect to\nthe bottom line. The decision that plaintiffs lacked Article III\nstanding is one of jurisdictional significance: it means that the\ncourt had no authority to resolve the case. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc.\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). And that is why the\ncourt erred by dismissing the case “with prejudice.” See, e.g.,\nT.W. and M.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1997)\n(“[W]hen a suit is dismissed for want of subject-matter\njurisdiction, that is, because the court has no power to resolve\nthe case on the merits even if the parties are content to have it\ndo so, it is error to make the dismissal with prejudice”).\n If a complaint fails to include enough allegations to\nsupport Article III standing for the plaintiffs, the court has\nonly two options: it can either dismiss the complaint with\nleave to amend, or it can dismiss the case for want of\njurisdiction and hence without prejudice. The Federal Rules\nof Civil Procedure allow for one amendment as of right and\ndirect district courts “freely [to] give leave [for further\namendments] when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).\nBut after the first round of amendments, the court has the\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend. If, after amendments, the\njurisdictional problem persists, then the only option left is a\ndismissal without prejudice.\n A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction without leave to amend\nis not the same thing as a dismissal with prejudice. A\ndismissal with prejudice is a ruling on the merits, because it\ncarries with it a preclusive effect that prevents the plaintiffs\nfrom relitigating—in any court, ever again—any claim\n\f12 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nencompassed by the suit. We have emphasized this\ndistinction before. See, e.g., Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 467 F.3d\n602, 605 (7th Cir. 2006) (“‘No jurisdiction’ and ‘with prejudice’\nare mutually exclusive.’ A court that lacks subject matter\njurisdiction cannot dismiss a case with prejudice.”); Okoro v.\nBohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] judgment on\nthe merits precludes relitigation of any ground within the\ncompass of the suit, while a jurisdictional dismissal precludes\nonly the relitigation of the ground of that dismissal.”).\n If plaintiffs believe they have satisfied the standing\nrequirements of a proper state-court forum—requirements\nthat may differ from those used by the federal courts—they\nmay try their luck in state court. Or, if they later believe they\ncan demonstrate that they have suffered an injury in fact after\nall, perhaps on the basis of a different assignment or exemplar\nclaim, they can present these claims against the same\ndefendant in a new federal suit (assuming of course that no\nindependent barrier, such as the statute of limitations, exists).\nIndeed, in a case brought by these plaintiffs against the same\ndefendant and before the same district judge—which the\ncourt called “a putative class action with slightly different\nfacts, but consisting of virtually identical allegations under\nthe law”—these plaintiffs did successfully demonstrate\nstanding and survived a motion to dismiss. MAO-MSO\nRecovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (“State Farm\nI”), No. 17-cv-01537, 2018 WL 3420796 at *1, *7 (C.D. Ill. July\n13, 2018).\n None of these later developments, however, means that\nthe district court was required to let this lawsuit continue. The\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by saying “enough is\nenough.” It observed that “Plaintiffs have been given a few\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 13\n\nchances to demonstrate this Court has jurisdiction.” This suit,\nthe judge thought, had run its course. Indeed, in a footnote\nexplaining its dismissal “with prejudice,” the court cited\nArreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008) for the\nunassailable proposition that district courts “have broad\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue delay,\nbad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure\ndeficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or where the\namendment would be futile.” (Emphasis added). The only\nproblem was thus the court’s use of the phrase “with\nprejudice” to signal that it would permit no more\namendments.\n On this understanding of the district court’s order, we find\nno abuse of discretion in its decision to dismiss on standing\ngrounds and to refuse further amendments. While it is true\nthat the plaintiffs had not previously had a chance to address\nthe HFAP/Health First Health mix-up, they were on notice\nfrom the outset that the issue of standing would be front and\ncenter. If they were going to hang their hat on a single\n“exemplar” after two unsuccessful attempts, it was important\nto get it right on the third try. The district court’s frustration\nat their failure to do so was understandable. And the court\nwas entitled to give little weight to their plea for another\nround of pleading, since their memorandum included\nnothing beyond a request for “leave to allege additional\nexemplar beneficiaries,” without naming them or providing\nany reason for the district court to believe that the fourth time\nwould be the charm. Denying leave to amend under such\ncircumstances was well within the district court’s discretion.\nSee James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Const. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 400–\n01 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of specificity in proposed\namendments justified denial of leave to amend).\n\f14 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\n III\n In the same order that dismissed the Second Amended\nComplaint, the district court also ordered the plaintiffs to\nshow cause why they should not be sanctioned for their\nearlier filings, which wrongly identified HFAP as the payer of\nthe relevant medical costs. We address the substance of the\nsanctions issue below. Here we note that the plaintiffs’\nresponse to the order to show cause contained materials\nrelevant to standing and the merits, including (1) a\ndeclaration attesting to many additional exemplars that could\nbe alleged; (2) a purported “nunc pro tunc” or retroactive\nassignment from Health First Health to one of the plaintiffs,\nintended to cure the defect identified by the court; and (3) a\ndeclaration from Michael Keeler, the Chief Operating Officer\nof Health First Health and HFAP, explaining the relationship\nbetween the two entities and putting on the record that he had\nalways intended to assign rights from Health First Health to\nthe plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that in light of\nthis new evidence, the district court abused its discretion\nwhen it refused further amendments.\n We need not decide whether any of these documents\nmight have been enough to call into question the district\ncourt’s dismissal without leave to amend, because the court\ndid not have any of this evidence in front of it when it issued\nthe dismissal order. The time to provide this information was\nin response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss or in the\nsupplemental response to the district court’s Text Order\nregarding Auto-Owners. A post-dismissal filing in response to\nan order to show cause was too little, too late. And to make\nmatters worse, the plaintiffs never filed a motion for\nreconsideration or relief from judgment. None of the\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 15\n\ninformation provided to the district court after the dismissal\nrequired it to revive the suit.\n Because we agree that the district court was without\njurisdiction to address the merits of the case, that means we\nare, too. Accordingly, we also dismiss State Farm’s cross-\nappeal arguing for a dismissal on the merits.\n IV\n Finally, we must decide whether Rule 11 sanctions against\nplaintiff Recovery Claims and three of its attorneys were\nproper. We review the district court’s decision to impose\nsanctions for abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax\nCorporation, 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). When we apply that\nstandard, however, we must bear in mind that “[a] district\ncourt would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its\nruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly\nerroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. See also Equal\nEmployment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 907\nF.3d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining the Rule 11 abuse-of-\ndiscretion standard as clarified in Cooter & Gell).\n\n A\n\n Rule 11 requires that attorneys certify “to the best of [their]\nknowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry\nreasonable under the circumstances” that their filings have\nadequate foundation in fact and law and lack an “improper\npurpose.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Because the district court\nappeared to base its sanctions order on counsel’s lack of\ncandor—i.e. filing documents with the court in bad faith —\nand a failure to undertake an objectively reasonable inquiry,\nwe address both grounds. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank\n\f16 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nN.A., 880 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that Rule\n11 embodies both an objective and a subjective standard,\nprohibiting both “frivolousness on the objective side” and\n“bad faith on the subjective side.”)\n At this stage of the case, the district court had the benefit\nof the plaintiffs’ response to the order to show cause, in which\nthey filed the additional materials mentioned above. Those\nsubmissions are relevant to the Rule 11 analysis.\n We begin with the finding of bad faith or “lack of candor.”\nWe are hard-pressed to see any indication of intentional\nmisrepresentation in this confused and confusing record.\nNone of the counsel for Recovery Claims—the only party that\nwas sanctioned—entered an appearance in the Florida Auto-\nOwners litigation. As far as the record shows, the first time\nthese attorneys learned of the Auto-Owners decision was when\nState Farm brought the case to the attention of the district\ncourt here. We also agree with the plaintiffs that, contrary to\nthe district court’s finding, there is no basis in the record for\nthe conclusion that these attorneys knew anything about the\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction until they saw the Text\nOrder. (The district court seemed to derive its conclusion\nfrom what it understood to be the plaintiffs’ “admis[sion] that\n[they] knew there were multiple ‘Health First’ entities and\nthat HFAP did not actually pay R.Y.’s medical expenses … .”\nBut the cited portion of plaintiffs’ response to the Text Order\ndoes not support that conclusion, and plaintiffs disclaim ever\nhaving made such an admission.) Without knowledge of the\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction, most of the supposed\nmisrepresentations in the earlier filings regarding HFAP’s\nstatus as a Medicare Advantage Organization or as the payer\nof R.Y.’s medical bills look more like honest mistakes. The\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 17\n\nsame goes for any misunderstanding about the nature of the\nassignment.\n The district court also appears to have found that\ncounsel’s submissions after the Text Order was issued\ndemonstrated a lack of candor inasmuch as they did not\nimmediately admit (1) the inaccuracies in their earlier\npleadings and (2) that fatal nature of the mix-up uncovered in\nAuto-Owners. This also goes too far. In light of the evidence\nthe plaintiffs submitted to the district court on the Rule 11\npoint, it is understandable why they had maintained that\nthere was a colorable reading of the underlying assignment\nthat would give effect to Keeler’s unquestioned intent, i.e., to\nassign Health First Health’s rights to plaintiff Recovery\nClaims. And as the district court eventually acknowledged in\nits order imposing sanctions, there was “some debate” on the\nquestion whether HFAP might qualify as a Medicare\nAdvantage Organization (an issue that ultimately proved\nimmaterial but that was relevant to the claimed accuracy of\nthe earlier filings). True, the plaintiffs may have understated\nthe scope of the problem in their response to the Text Order,\nand they may have erred by pursuing a legal argument that\nstretched agency theory too far. They also should have\nbrought their supporting materials before the district judge at\nthe same time as they filed their response to the Text Order.\nBut in the absence of either affirmative representations or\nmaterial omissions in the response to the Text Order, what we\nare left with is an aggressive litigation strategy with a\ncolorable (if strained) basis in law and fact, rather than a lack\nof candor. That is not sanctionable conduct.\n The district court also had other grounds for imposing\nsanctions: carelessness and inattentiveness. As we have\n\f18 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nemphasized repeatedly, an ‘empty head but a pure heart is no\ndefense.’” U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, N.D. v. Sullivan-Moore, 406\nF.3d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chambers v. Am. Trans\nAir, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 1994)). Because Rule 11\nimposes on attorneys a duty to conduct an “inquiry\nreasonable under the circumstances” before they attest to\n“knowledge, information, and belief” supporting their filings,\neven honest mistakes can be sanctionable. The district court\nfound that the attorneys in this case failed to live up to that\nduty.\n It is one thing to lose on a point, however, and another to\nurge something so ill-founded that it is sanctionable.\nAlthough the standard for abuse of discretion is demanding,\nwe conclude that the district court stepped over the\nboundaries of its discretion in imposing sanctions on the basis\nof carelessness or inattention. Again, the exhibits the plaintiffs\nfiled in response to the order to show cause are instructive.\nThe affidavit from Keeler demonstrates that Health First\nAdministrative Plans (HFAP) and Health First Health Plans\nshared more than very similar names, a holding company,\nand a common COO; they were, for many purposes, almost\nindistinguishable to any external party dealing with them. As\nKeeler averred, “[Health First Health] acts through myself\nand its other corporate officers, but it has no employees …\n[Health First Health] takes no action except through HFAP’s\nagents and employees.” Affidavit of Michael Keeler, June 1,\n2018 at 1–2. To make matters more confusing, at least\naccording to plaintiffs’ allegations, HFAP did business under\nthe name “Health First Health Plans.” And even if Health\nFirst Health was the entity from whose assets the beneficiary\nwas paid—meaning it possessed the reimbursement rights—\nplaintiffs point out that “the act of payment would not\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 19\n\nunreasonably or inaccurately be attributed to HFAP, which\ncarried out all acts on behalf of [Health First Health].”\n Without getting further into the weeds, it suffices to say\nthat this corporate arrangement was not just complex, but so\nfreighted with overlapping names and functions that a mix-\nup was, at the end of the day, understandable. The district\ncourt did “not accept that Health First’s ‘corporate structure’\nwas too confusing to warrant the misstatements in the Second\nAmended Complaint.” Respectfully, the district court\nreached its conclusion about the straightforward nature of the\ncorporate arrangement while it was looking at it with the\nbenefit of hindsight. The court did not give adequate weight\nto the plaintiffs’ additional evidence, nor did it consider\ncarefully enough what the attorneys knew and when they\nknew it. (How could the details of this structure have been\napparent at a time when the attorneys were unaware that\nthere was a second “Health First” entity?) Sanctions against\nthe attorneys for Recovery Claims were not warranted on this\nrecord.\n B\n The sanctions against plaintiff Recovery Claims must also\nbe reversed. As discussed, we find that none of the actions or\nomissions of its counsel in this case amounted to sanctionable\nconduct. The district court did not point to any conduct by\nRecovery Claims itself, rather than its agents, that would\nindependently allow us to sustain the imposition of sanctions.\nUnlike its counsel, Recovery Claims did have some\nknowledge of the Florida litigation. But we detect nothing\nimproper in the two-day lapse between the Auto-Owners\ndecision on April 25, 2018, and the district court’s Text Order\non April 27, especially given the factual and legal arguments\n\f20 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nthat plaintiffs might have wished to develop in response. It is\ntrue that there was a 14-day hiatus between Keeler’s affidavit\nin the Auto-Owners case, which explained the HFAP/Health\nFirst Health ownership structure, and the day the district\ncourt learned of the ruling that the Florida district judge made\nas a result. Nonetheless, we conclude that it is too much of a\nstretch to sanction plaintiff Recovery Claims for failing to\nrecognize the implications of an affidavit filed in one case,\nwithout the benefit of any dispositive ruling on the issue, for\na completely different case being litigated by a separate team\nof attorneys. As far as we can tell, the sanctions against\nRecovery Claims must rise or fall with the sanctions against\nits attorneys. And so they fall.\n Plaintiffs and their counsel have been punished for their\nmissteps: the case was dismissed without leave to amend, and\nwe affirm that dismissal today. But sanctions are a step too\nfar.\n IV\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal without leave to\namend, but we modify it to be a dismissal without prejudice.\nWe REVERSE the entry of sanctions against MSP Recovery\nClaims, Series LLC, and its counsel in this case. State Farm’s\ncross-appeal is DISMISSED. Each party will bear its own costs\non appeal.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: MAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant. Appeal Of: Christopher L. Coffin, Et Al.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\nMAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n Cross-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSTATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellee,\\n Cross-Appellant.\\n\\nAPPEAL OF: CHRISTOPHER L. COFFIN, et al.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 17-1541 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. When all the dust is cleared away, this\\ncase is relatively straightforward: we must review a dismissal\\nfor lack of Article III standing and the imposition of sanctions\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nunder Rule 11. Only the factual backdrop is complex, as it\\ndeals with one aspect of the federal Medicare program. The\\nPlaintiffs assert that they are assignees of certain private\\ninsurers called Medicare Advantage Organizations, which\\nprovide Medicare benefits. They brought a putative class\\naction against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance\\nCompany in an effort to recover payments State Farm\\nallegedly should have made to them as reimbursement for\\ncertain medical costs. The district court dismissed the action\\nwith prejudice, although the basis for the dismissal was lack\\nof standing. In addition, the court imposed sanctions under\\nRule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against one of\\nthe plaintiffs, MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, and its\\nattorneys.\\n Plaintiffs, MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC; MSP Recovery,\\nLLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and MSP Recovery Claims, Series\\nLLC MSP (“Recovery Claims”), appealed. They argue that the\\ncourt erred in its standing analysis, and that in any event it\\nshould not have dismissed the case with prejudice. Recovery\\nClaims and the attorneys (Christopher Coffin, David\\nHundley, and Courtney Stidham) appealed the sanctions\\norder. Finally, State Farm cross-appealed in order to preserve\\nits alternative argument in favor of affirmance—that the case\\nshould be dismissed on the merits because plaintiffs failed to\\nstate a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Matushkina\\nv. Nielsen, 877 F.3d 289, 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[a]s a\\ngeneral rule, where a defendant has won dismissal for lack of\\nstanding or some other jurisdictional ground, modifying the\\njudgment to dismissal on the merits” requires a cross-appeal).\\n We conclude that the district court erred insofar as it\\ndismissed plaintiffs’ case with prejudice, when the problem\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 3\\n\\nwas a fundamental lack of Article III standing. But this victory\\ngets the plaintiffs only so far. The court acted well within its\\ndiscretion when it denied plaintiffs a third opportunity to\\ncure the defects in their pleadings. The court’s order, in\\nsubstance, was a jurisdictional dismissal with denial of leave\\nto amend. So understood, we affirm the judgment and correct\\nthe record to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice.\\nWe also dismiss State Farm’s cross-appeal. Finally, we find\\nthat the district court exceeded the bounds of its discretion\\nwhen it imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Recovery Claims and\\nits attorneys.\\n I\\n Although the issues before us are ultimately procedural,\\nsome background on Medicare is helpful to place them in\\ncontext. Medicare is “the federal health insurance program\\nfor people who are 65 or older,” as well as for certain other\\ngroups. See https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-\\ncovers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/whats-medicare.\\nWhile many Americans receive benefits directly from the\\ngovernment through Medicare Parts A and B, others receive\\ntheir benefits from private entities known as Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations, pursuant to Medicare Part C.\\n42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a). For each Medicare enrollee covered\\nby a Medicare Advantage Organization, the Organization\\nreceives a per capita reimbursement from the federal\\ngovernment. The amount of that reimbursement may vary\\naccording to the characteristics of the individual enrollees and\\nother factors. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.\\nLiab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 364–65 (3d Cir. 2012). The Medical\\nAdvantage Organizations assume the financial risk of\\ninsuring their enrollees. Id.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n One other piece of Medicare vocabulary is important to\\nthis case: the difference between “primary” and “secondary”\\npayments. When an enrollee is covered directly by the\\ngovernment (under Medicare Parts A and B), Medicare is\\nstatutorily barred from making payments for medical costs\\nwhen an enrollee has benefited or is likely to benefit from\\nsome other insurance or worker’s compensation plan. The\\nstatute mentions such alternative sources of benefits as “a\\nworkmen’s compensation law … or … automobile or liability\\ninsurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or …\\nno fault insurance.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii). In such\\nsituations, Medicare is a secondary form of coverage that\\napplies only to costs not covered by the primary insurance.\\nBut if a primary insurer fails to pay, the government does not\\nleave the enrollee and her medical providers in the lurch.\\nRather, it makes conditional payments to providers and then\\nseeks reimbursement from the primary insurer. Id.\\n§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i). An analogous provision in Medicare\\nPart C makes the private Medicare Advantage Organizations\\nsecondary payers where enrollees have some form of primary\\ncoverage. Id. § 1395w-22(a)(4). When the primary insurers fall\\ndown on their responsibilities, Medicare Advantage\\nOrganizations are authorized by statute to pay first and seek\\nreimbursement later, just as the government may. Id.\\n Sometimes, however, the primary insurer never\\nreimburses the secondary payer (be it the government or a\\nMedicare Advantage Organization) for benefits it should have\\nprovided. In that case, the Medicare Secondary Payer\\nprovisions establish a private right of action that permits some\\nprivate plaintiffs to sue for double damages. But the relevant\\nsection of the statute does not specify who may take\\nadvantage of that provision. All it says, without further\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 5\\n\\nelaboration, is that “[t]here is established a private cause of\\naction for damages (which shall be in an amount double the\\namount otherwise provided) in the case of a primary plan\\nwhich fails to provide for primary payment (or appropriate\\nreimbursement) in accordance with paragraphs (1) and\\n(2)(A).” Id. § 1395y(b)(3)(A).\\n The plaintiffs in this case are not themselves Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations; they assert instead that they are\\nassignees of claims that originally belonged to such entities.\\nThey argue that Medicare Advantage Organizations are\\namong the proper plaintiffs that can exercise this private right\\nof action, and that through the assignments, they stand in the\\nshoes of those Organizations. The plaintiffs and related\\nentities have pursued this theory not just in this litigation, but\\nin several suits throughout the country. See, e.g., MAO-MSO\\nRecovery II, LLC v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., No. PWG-17-711,\\n2018 WL 999920 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2018); MAO-MSO Recovery\\nII, LLC v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-175-JDP, 2018\\nWL 835160 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018). At the same time as it\\ngranted State Farm’s motion to dismiss the First Amended\\nComplaint for lack of standing in this case, the district court\\nagreed with the plaintiffs that the statute does support a\\nprivate right of action for Medicare Advantage Organizations.\\nIn that respect, it relied on rulings from the Third and\\nEleventh Circuits. See Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. W. Heritage\\nIns. Co., 832 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Avandia\\nMktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 355 (3d\\nCir. 2012). Although State Farm did not challenge this point\\nin the district court, it has changed its tune on appeal and now\\nargues that the private right of action does not extend to\\nMedicare Advantage Organizations. Those entities, State\\nFarm contends, must look to contract law for appropriate\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nremedies. This dispute is at the heart of State Farm’s cross-\\nappeal.\\n Plaintiffs’ efforts in the present case foundered, however,\\nwhen the district court found that they did not have valid\\nassignments from any Medicare Advantage Organization that\\nmade unreimbursed payments. Without the link to a proper\\nOrganization that possessed claims to reimbursement, the\\ncourt concluded, plaintiffs had no injury for which they could\\nseek redress on this or any other legal theory. Accordingly, it\\nruled, no matter the scope of the private right of action, these\\nplaintiffs lacked standing to sue. We come to the same\\nconclusion. We save for another day the question whether a\\nMedicare Advantage Organization or a proper assignee of its\\nrights may invoke the Medicare Secondary Payer private right\\nof action for double damages against a primary insurer.\\n II\\n We now turn to the specific defects that the district court\\nfound to be fatal to the plaintiffs’ case. This appeal comes to\\nus on a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Second Amended\\nComplaint. A brief review of the first two iterations of the\\ncomplaint sheds some light on what went wrong and why\\nplaintiffs are entitled to no further amendments.\\n From the outset of this litigation, the question of standing\\nhas been hotly disputed. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they and\\nsimilar organizations have filed a number of suits in which\\nthe initial complaints “did not name any exemplar\\nbeneficiaries or their corresponding assignor [Medicare\\nAdvantage] Plans.” Instead, they “generally alleged the\\nassignments held by plaintiffs from multiple [Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations], and alleged plaintiffs’ analysis of\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 7\\n\\nthe data from multiple unreimbursed claims.” This led to\\nsuccessful defense motions to dismiss for lack of standing: as\\nthe plaintiffs put it, “[g]enerally, the district court rulings on\\nthese early motions were to dismiss the complaints, with\\nleave to amend, directing some degree of greater specificity.”\\nWhen State Farm in this case moved to dismiss the initial\\ncomplaint for lack of Article III standing (among other\\ngrounds), the plaintiffs responded by filing an amended\\ncomplaint to put more meat on the bone.\\n The First Amended Complaint fell short, however. It\\nidentified an exemplar beneficiary by initials and a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization (whose identity was redacted) that\\nallegedly had made secondary payments, but it provided\\nlittle additional information about the underlying claims or\\npayments. Even after the district court issued a protective\\norder, plaintiffs still failed to disclose the name of the assignor\\nMedicare Advantage Organization to State Farm. This time,\\nin response to State Farm’s motion, the district court\\ndismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing. It\\nfound that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate an “injury in\\nfact” for purposes of Article III standing without more\\nspecificity as to the injuries sustained by the exemplar\\nbeneficiary and the assignor Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization that had allegedly paid the unreimbursed\\nmedical costs. The court gave the plaintiffs another chance to\\ncure that defect by granting leave to amend.\\n Plaintiffs took advantage of that opportunity and filed a\\nSecond Amended Complaint. In this iteration, the plaintiffs\\nchose a new “exemplar beneficiary” (identified by the initials\\n“R.Y.”) and named the Medicare Advantage Organization\\nthat had made the secondary payments as Health First\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nAdministrative Plans (“HFAP”). A chain of assignments\\ntransferred HFAP’s alleged right of recovery to Recovery\\nClaims. The complaint alleged that R.Y. suffered specific\\ninjuries in an accident; that HFAP was the entity that paid\\nmedical costs for R.Y.; that State Farm entered into a\\nsettlement agreement with R.Y.; and that State Farm failed to\\nreimburse HFAP for the costs HFAP had incurred.\\n This time, however, there was a new problem: it was not\\nclear that HFAP qualified as a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization. After the defendants filed another motion to\\ndismiss for lack of standing, but before the district court had\\narrived at a decision, a district court in Florida ruled in a\\nrelated case that HFAP was not a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization at all. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Auto-\\nOwners Ins. Co., No. 17-23841, 2018 WL 1953861 *5 (S.D. Fla.\\nApr. 25, 2018) (“Auto-Owners”). The Florida court took judicial\\nnotice of the fact that HFAP does not appear on the list\\nmaintained by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services\\nof Medicare Advantage Organizations. Id. Instead, HFAP is an\\nentity that had contracted with a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization—a closely linked entity by the name of Health\\nFirst Health Plans—to provide a range of administrative,\\nfinancial, and strategic-planning services. The two entities\\n(Health First Administrative Plans and Health First Health\\nPlans) shared very similar names, a holding company, and a\\nChief Operating Officer, Michael Keeler. But crucially, in the\\nFlorida court’s view, only Health First Health contracted\\ndirectly with the government and qualified as a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization for purposes of the private right of\\naction that the plaintiffs were asserting. Accordingly, the\\nFlorida court found that HFAP did not have any recovery\\nrights to assign, even assuming plaintiffs were correct about\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 9\\n\\nthe private right of action: any such claims belonged only to\\nHealth First Health.\\n Only one of the plaintiffs in this case—Recovery Claims—\\nwas a party to Auto-Owners. Nonetheless, the overlap was\\nenough to matter. As in this case, the plaintiffs in Auto-Owners\\nargued that whatever the proper characterization of HFAP\\nmight have been, its service contract with Health First Health\\nmeant that it could pursue Health First Health’s legal claims\\nor assign them away. The Florida court rejected that\\ncontention, ruling that “a contract for services is not an\\nassignment of rights,” and thus “HFAP [could] not assign\\nrights to Plaintiff that were not assigned to it in the first place.”\\nId. This left the Florida plaintiffs without any rights to enforce.\\nSimilarly, in this litigation, the district court thought, the only\\npurported assignment that could confer standing on any of\\nthe plaintiffs was one from HFAP to Recovery Claims.\\n State Farm brought Auto-Owners to the attention of the\\ndistrict court the day after it was issued. The next day, the\\ndistrict court entered a Text Order directing the plaintiffs to\\nexplain why this litigation should not be dismissed on the\\nsame grounds.\\n The plaintiffs complied with that order. Their response\\nfirst argued that Auto-Owners was wrongly decided for two\\nreasons: (1) HFAP does qualify as a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization for purposes of the private right of action; and\\n(2) the agreement between Health First Health and HFAP\\ngranted HFAP the power to enforce Health First Health’s\\nlegal rights as its agent, making the agreement the equivalent\\nof an assignment. In a decision issued on May 25, 2018, the\\ndistrict court rejected both points.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n The court was particularly bothered by what it saw as a\\nbombshell: the revelation in the plaintiffs’ response that\\nHealth First Health, which had never been mentioned in the\\nCentral Illinois case, not HFAP, was the entity that paid the\\nunreimbursed medical costs. This fact contradicted earlier\\nfilings that identified HFAP as the payer with reimbursement\\nrights. If that was true, the district court thought, then HFAP\\n(whatever its status) never incurred any injury and so had no\\nrights that it could assign. The court also reasoned that in light\\nof this development, there was no need to decide, as the\\nFlorida court had, whether HFAP was a qualifying Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization. It was Health First Health that paid\\nthe unreimbursed bills, but the plaintiffs had an assignment\\nonly from HFAP. Only if Health First Health’s service contract\\nwith HFAP also assigned HFAP its legal rights could the case\\nhave a leg to stand on. And on this point, the district court\\nagreed fully with its Florida counterpart: it emphasized,\\ncontrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, that a document\\ncreating an agency relationship and one effecting an\\nassignment of rights are two entirely different things.\\nAccordingly, the district court dismissed the case on this\\nground alone. “Assuming HFAP is [a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization], Plaintiffs still need to satisfy Article-III\\nstanding requirements, and this they cannot do.”\\n Up to this point, we agree with the district court’s\\ndisposition of the case. Nothing in the agreement between\\nHealth First Health and HFAP suggests that Health First\\nHealth was assigning away any of its rights. Without such an\\nassignment, HFAP’s own assignment to plaintiff Recovery\\nClaims conveyed nothing, and thus the plaintiffs had no\\nrights to enforce and no standing to sue. As we note when we\\nreach the sanctions portion of this appeal, additional\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 11\\n\\ninformation later came to the district court’s attention, but\\nthat new information could not have affected the court’s order\\nof May 25.\\n We part ways with the district court only with respect to\\nthe bottom line. The decision that plaintiffs lacked Article III\\nstanding is one of jurisdictional significance: it means that the\\ncourt had no authority to resolve the case. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc.\\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). And that is why the\\ncourt erred by dismissing the case “with prejudice.” See, e.g.,\\nT.W. and M.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1997)\\n(“[W]hen a suit is dismissed for want of subject-matter\\njurisdiction, that is, because the court has no power to resolve\\nthe case on the merits even if the parties are content to have it\\ndo so, it is error to make the dismissal with prejudice”).\\n If a complaint fails to include enough allegations to\\nsupport Article III standing for the plaintiffs, the court has\\nonly two options: it can either dismiss the complaint with\\nleave to amend, or it can dismiss the case for want of\\njurisdiction and hence without prejudice. The Federal Rules\\nof Civil Procedure allow for one amendment as of right and\\ndirect district courts “freely [to] give leave [for further\\namendments] when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).\\nBut after the first round of amendments, the court has the\\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend. If, after amendments, the\\njurisdictional problem persists, then the only option left is a\\ndismissal without prejudice.\\n A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction without leave to amend\\nis not the same thing as a dismissal with prejudice. A\\ndismissal with prejudice is a ruling on the merits, because it\\ncarries with it a preclusive effect that prevents the plaintiffs\\nfrom relitigating—in any court, ever again—any claim\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nencompassed by the suit. We have emphasized this\\ndistinction before. See, e.g., Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 467 F.3d\\n602, 605 (7th Cir. 2006) (“‘No jurisdiction’ and ‘with prejudice’\\nare mutually exclusive.’ A court that lacks subject matter\\njurisdiction cannot dismiss a case with prejudice.”); Okoro v.\\nBohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] judgment on\\nthe merits precludes relitigation of any ground within the\\ncompass of the suit, while a jurisdictional dismissal precludes\\nonly the relitigation of the ground of that dismissal.”).\\n If plaintiffs believe they have satisfied the standing\\nrequirements of a proper state-court forum—requirements\\nthat may differ from those used by the federal courts—they\\nmay try their luck in state court. Or, if they later believe they\\ncan demonstrate that they have suffered an injury in fact after\\nall, perhaps on the basis of a different assignment or exemplar\\nclaim, they can present these claims against the same\\ndefendant in a new federal suit (assuming of course that no\\nindependent barrier, such as the statute of limitations, exists).\\nIndeed, in a case brought by these plaintiffs against the same\\ndefendant and before the same district judge—which the\\ncourt called “a putative class action with slightly different\\nfacts, but consisting of virtually identical allegations under\\nthe law”—these plaintiffs did successfully demonstrate\\nstanding and survived a motion to dismiss. MAO-MSO\\nRecovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (“State Farm\\nI”), No. 17-cv-01537, 2018 WL 3420796 at *1, *7 (C.D. Ill. July\\n13, 2018).\\n None of these later developments, however, means that\\nthe district court was required to let this lawsuit continue. The\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by saying “enough is\\nenough.” It observed that “Plaintiffs have been given a few\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 13\\n\\nchances to demonstrate this Court has jurisdiction.” This suit,\\nthe judge thought, had run its course. Indeed, in a footnote\\nexplaining its dismissal “with prejudice,” the court cited\\nArreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008) for the\\nunassailable proposition that district courts “have broad\\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue delay,\\nbad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure\\ndeficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or where the\\namendment would be futile.” (Emphasis added). The only\\nproblem was thus the court’s use of the phrase “with\\nprejudice” to signal that it would permit no more\\namendments.\\n On this understanding of the district court’s order, we find\\nno abuse of discretion in its decision to dismiss on standing\\ngrounds and to refuse further amendments. While it is true\\nthat the plaintiffs had not previously had a chance to address\\nthe HFAP/Health First Health mix-up, they were on notice\\nfrom the outset that the issue of standing would be front and\\ncenter. If they were going to hang their hat on a single\\n“exemplar” after two unsuccessful attempts, it was important\\nto get it right on the third try. The district court’s frustration\\nat their failure to do so was understandable. And the court\\nwas entitled to give little weight to their plea for another\\nround of pleading, since their memorandum included\\nnothing beyond a request for “leave to allege additional\\nexemplar beneficiaries,” without naming them or providing\\nany reason for the district court to believe that the fourth time\\nwould be the charm. Denying leave to amend under such\\ncircumstances was well within the district court’s discretion.\\nSee James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Const. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 400–\\n01 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of specificity in proposed\\namendments justified denial of leave to amend).\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n III\\n In the same order that dismissed the Second Amended\\nComplaint, the district court also ordered the plaintiffs to\\nshow cause why they should not be sanctioned for their\\nearlier filings, which wrongly identified HFAP as the payer of\\nthe relevant medical costs. We address the substance of the\\nsanctions issue below. Here we note that the plaintiffs’\\nresponse to the order to show cause contained materials\\nrelevant to standing and the merits, including (1) a\\ndeclaration attesting to many additional exemplars that could\\nbe alleged; (2) a purported “nunc pro tunc” or retroactive\\nassignment from Health First Health to one of the plaintiffs,\\nintended to cure the defect identified by the court; and (3) a\\ndeclaration from Michael Keeler, the Chief Operating Officer\\nof Health First Health and HFAP, explaining the relationship\\nbetween the two entities and putting on the record that he had\\nalways intended to assign rights from Health First Health to\\nthe plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that in light of\\nthis new evidence, the district court abused its discretion\\nwhen it refused further amendments.\\n We need not decide whether any of these documents\\nmight have been enough to call into question the district\\ncourt’s dismissal without leave to amend, because the court\\ndid not have any of this evidence in front of it when it issued\\nthe dismissal order. The time to provide this information was\\nin response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss or in the\\nsupplemental response to the district court’s Text Order\\nregarding Auto-Owners. A post-dismissal filing in response to\\nan order to show cause was too little, too late. And to make\\nmatters worse, the plaintiffs never filed a motion for\\nreconsideration or relief from judgment. None of the\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 15\\n\\ninformation provided to the district court after the dismissal\\nrequired it to revive the suit.\\n Because we agree that the district court was without\\njurisdiction to address the merits of the case, that means we\\nare, too. Accordingly, we also dismiss State Farm’s cross-\\nappeal arguing for a dismissal on the merits.\\n IV\\n Finally, we must decide whether Rule 11 sanctions against\\nplaintiff Recovery Claims and three of its attorneys were\\nproper. We review the district court’s decision to impose\\nsanctions for abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax\\nCorporation, 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). When we apply that\\nstandard, however, we must bear in mind that “[a] district\\ncourt would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its\\nruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly\\nerroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. See also Equal\\nEmployment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 907\\nF.3d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining the Rule 11 abuse-of-\\ndiscretion standard as clarified in Cooter & Gell).\\n\\n A\\n\\n Rule 11 requires that attorneys certify “to the best of [their]\\nknowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry\\nreasonable under the circumstances” that their filings have\\nadequate foundation in fact and law and lack an “improper\\npurpose.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Because the district court\\nappeared to base its sanctions order on counsel’s lack of\\ncandor—i.e. filing documents with the court in bad faith —\\nand a failure to undertake an objectively reasonable inquiry,\\nwe address both grounds. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nN.A., 880 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that Rule\\n11 embodies both an objective and a subjective standard,\\nprohibiting both “frivolousness on the objective side” and\\n“bad faith on the subjective side.”)\\n At this stage of the case, the district court had the benefit\\nof the plaintiffs’ response to the order to show cause, in which\\nthey filed the additional materials mentioned above. Those\\nsubmissions are relevant to the Rule 11 analysis.\\n We begin with the finding of bad faith or “lack of candor.”\\nWe are hard-pressed to see any indication of intentional\\nmisrepresentation in this confused and confusing record.\\nNone of the counsel for Recovery Claims—the only party that\\nwas sanctioned—entered an appearance in the Florida Auto-\\nOwners litigation. As far as the record shows, the first time\\nthese attorneys learned of the Auto-Owners decision was when\\nState Farm brought the case to the attention of the district\\ncourt here. We also agree with the plaintiffs that, contrary to\\nthe district court’s finding, there is no basis in the record for\\nthe conclusion that these attorneys knew anything about the\\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction until they saw the Text\\nOrder. (The district court seemed to derive its conclusion\\nfrom what it understood to be the plaintiffs’ “admis[sion] that\\n[they] knew there were multiple ‘Health First’ entities and\\nthat HFAP did not actually pay R.Y.’s medical expenses … .”\\nBut the cited portion of plaintiffs’ response to the Text Order\\ndoes not support that conclusion, and plaintiffs disclaim ever\\nhaving made such an admission.) Without knowledge of the\\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction, most of the supposed\\nmisrepresentations in the earlier filings regarding HFAP’s\\nstatus as a Medicare Advantage Organization or as the payer\\nof R.Y.’s medical bills look more like honest mistakes. The\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 17\\n\\nsame goes for any misunderstanding about the nature of the\\nassignment.\\n The district court also appears to have found that\\ncounsel’s submissions after the Text Order was issued\\ndemonstrated a lack of candor inasmuch as they did not\\nimmediately admit (1) the inaccuracies in their earlier\\npleadings and (2) that fatal nature of the mix-up uncovered in\\nAuto-Owners. This also goes too far. In light of the evidence\\nthe plaintiffs submitted to the district court on the Rule 11\\npoint, it is understandable why they had maintained that\\nthere was a colorable reading of the underlying assignment\\nthat would give effect to Keeler’s unquestioned intent, i.e., to\\nassign Health First Health’s rights to plaintiff Recovery\\nClaims. And as the district court eventually acknowledged in\\nits order imposing sanctions, there was “some debate” on the\\nquestion whether HFAP might qualify as a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization (an issue that ultimately proved\\nimmaterial but that was relevant to the claimed accuracy of\\nthe earlier filings). True, the plaintiffs may have understated\\nthe scope of the problem in their response to the Text Order,\\nand they may have erred by pursuing a legal argument that\\nstretched agency theory too far. They also should have\\nbrought their supporting materials before the district judge at\\nthe same time as they filed their response to the Text Order.\\nBut in the absence of either affirmative representations or\\nmaterial omissions in the response to the Text Order, what we\\nare left with is an aggressive litigation strategy with a\\ncolorable (if strained) basis in law and fact, rather than a lack\\nof candor. That is not sanctionable conduct.\\n The district court also had other grounds for imposing\\nsanctions: carelessness and inattentiveness. As we have\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nemphasized repeatedly, an ‘empty head but a pure heart is no\\ndefense.’” U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, N.D. v. Sullivan-Moore, 406\\nF.3d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chambers v. Am. Trans\\nAir, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 1994)). Because Rule 11\\nimposes on attorneys a duty to conduct an “inquiry\\nreasonable under the circumstances” before they attest to\\n“knowledge, information, and belief” supporting their filings,\\neven honest mistakes can be sanctionable. The district court\\nfound that the attorneys in this case failed to live up to that\\nduty.\\n It is one thing to lose on a point, however, and another to\\nurge something so ill-founded that it is sanctionable.\\nAlthough the standard for abuse of discretion is demanding,\\nwe conclude that the district court stepped over the\\nboundaries of its discretion in imposing sanctions on the basis\\nof carelessness or inattention. Again, the exhibits the plaintiffs\\nfiled in response to the order to show cause are instructive.\\nThe affidavit from Keeler demonstrates that Health First\\nAdministrative Plans (HFAP) and Health First Health Plans\\nshared more than very similar names, a holding company,\\nand a common COO; they were, for many purposes, almost\\nindistinguishable to any external party dealing with them. As\\nKeeler averred, “[Health First Health] acts through myself\\nand its other corporate officers, but it has no employees …\\n[Health First Health] takes no action except through HFAP’s\\nagents and employees.” Affidavit of Michael Keeler, June 1,\\n2018 at 1–2. To make matters more confusing, at least\\naccording to plaintiffs’ allegations, HFAP did business under\\nthe name “Health First Health Plans.” And even if Health\\nFirst Health was the entity from whose assets the beneficiary\\nwas paid—meaning it possessed the reimbursement rights—\\nplaintiffs point out that “the act of payment would not\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 19\\n\\nunreasonably or inaccurately be attributed to HFAP, which\\ncarried out all acts on behalf of [Health First Health].”\\n Without getting further into the weeds, it suffices to say\\nthat this corporate arrangement was not just complex, but so\\nfreighted with overlapping names and functions that a mix-\\nup was, at the end of the day, understandable. The district\\ncourt did “not accept that Health First’s ‘corporate structure’\\nwas too confusing to warrant the misstatements in the Second\\nAmended Complaint.” Respectfully, the district court\\nreached its conclusion about the straightforward nature of the\\ncorporate arrangement while it was looking at it with the\\nbenefit of hindsight. The court did not give adequate weight\\nto the plaintiffs’ additional evidence, nor did it consider\\ncarefully enough what the attorneys knew and when they\\nknew it. (How could the details of this structure have been\\napparent at a time when the attorneys were unaware that\\nthere was a second “Health First” entity?) Sanctions against\\nthe attorneys for Recovery Claims were not warranted on this\\nrecord.\\n B\\n The sanctions against plaintiff Recovery Claims must also\\nbe reversed. As discussed, we find that none of the actions or\\nomissions of its counsel in this case amounted to sanctionable\\nconduct. The district court did not point to any conduct by\\nRecovery Claims itself, rather than its agents, that would\\nindependently allow us to sustain the imposition of sanctions.\\nUnlike its counsel, Recovery Claims did have some\\nknowledge of the Florida litigation. But we detect nothing\\nimproper in the two-day lapse between the Auto-Owners\\ndecision on April 25, 2018, and the district court’s Text Order\\non April 27, especially given the factual and legal arguments\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nthat plaintiffs might have wished to develop in response. It is\\ntrue that there was a 14-day hiatus between Keeler’s affidavit\\nin the Auto-Owners case, which explained the HFAP/Health\\nFirst Health ownership structure, and the day the district\\ncourt learned of the ruling that the Florida district judge made\\nas a result. Nonetheless, we conclude that it is too much of a\\nstretch to sanction plaintiff Recovery Claims for failing to\\nrecognize the implications of an affidavit filed in one case,\\nwithout the benefit of any dispositive ruling on the issue, for\\na completely different case being litigated by a separate team\\nof attorneys. As far as we can tell, the sanctions against\\nRecovery Claims must rise or fall with the sanctions against\\nits attorneys. And so they fall.\\n Plaintiffs and their counsel have been punished for their\\nmissteps: the case was dismissed without leave to amend, and\\nwe affirm that dismissal today. But sanctions are a step too\\nfar.\\n IV\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal without leave to\\namend, but we modify it to be a dismissal without prejudice.\\nWe REVERSE the entry of sanctions against MSP Recovery\\nClaims, Series LLC, and its counsel in this case. State Farm’s\\ncross-appeal is DISMISSED. Each party will bear its own costs\\non appeal.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3870,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4648781,"string":"4,648,781"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Elisa J. Yochim v. Benjamin S. Carson, Sr."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3670"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3670\\nELISA J. YOCHIM,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBENJAMIN S. CARSON, SR.,\\nSecretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban\\nDevelopment,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cv-4926 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Elisa Yochim worked in the legal\\ndepartment of the United States Department of Housing and\\nUrban Development for 26 years. Throughout her tenure, she\\ntook full advantage of HUD’s flexible and progressive policy\\npermitting employees to work from home several days per\\nweek. After undergoing hand surgery, Yochim requested time\\n\\f2 No. 18-3670\\n\\noff and permission to work from home. HUD agreed and al-\\nlowed her time to recover and to telework several days a week\\nfor many months as she received physical therapy. HUD later\\nrestructured its law department and this development had\\nthe effect of requiring employees like Yochim to spend more\\ntime in the office. In time this restructuring, combined with\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies, led HUD to revoke her\\ntelework privileges and offer alternative accommodations.\\nFor her part, Yochim responded with this lawsuit, alleging vi-\\nolations of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate\\nher ongoing rehabilitation needs. The district court entered\\nsummary judgment for HUD, and we affirm. No rational jury\\ncould conclude that the Department failed to offer reasonable\\naccommodations.\\n I\\n In reviewing the district court’s award of summary judg-\\nment to HUD, we construe the facts in the light most favora-\\nble to Yochim as the nonmovant, resolving evidentiary con-\\nflicts and competing inferences in her favor. See Brown v. Mil-\\nwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Yochim worked as a HUD attorney for 26 years, serving in\\nthe Chicago office for the last 15 years before her retirement\\nin May 2015. During her tenure, the Department maintained\\na forward-leaning telework policy that allowed full-time em-\\nployees to work from home up to three days a week at their\\nmanager’s discretion.\\n Beginning in October 2012, HUD’s legal department un-\\nderwent a functional reorganization. Before this change, the\\nDepartment’s attorneys tended to specialize in particular ar-\\neas. With the reorganization, however, HUD wanted its\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 3\\n\\nattorneys to work more as generalists and to assist each other\\nthrough cross-training and collaboration—a change in ap-\\nproach less suited to telework. Yochim’s job description\\nchanged to include “training, orientation, [and] working\\ngroups” as well as “administrative responsibilities,” includ-\\ning “space and file management,” as areas of focus. Around\\nthis same time, Yochim applied for a supervisory position, but\\nthe Department passed her up and instead awarded the role\\nto Lisa Danna-Brennan, who became Yochim’s supervisor.\\nThis development was not one Yochim welcomed.\\n In November 2012, Yochim had surgery to treat carpal tun-\\nnel syndrome in her right hand. The surgery brought with it\\na recovery and rehabilitation process, prompting Yochim to\\nsubmit several requests to HUD to accommodate her needs.\\nThe HUD handbook outlines the Department’s process for ac-\\ncommodating such requests. Employees can seek reasonable\\naccommodations through their immediate supervisor or the\\nDepartment’s Reasonable Accommodation Branch. The su-\\npervisor and employee then engage in an interactive process\\nto identify an accommodation, and the Reasonable Accom-\\nmodation Branch facilitates this communication. The Branch\\ndetermines an employee’s eligibility for a reasonable accom-\\nmodation, while the supervisor shoulders responsibility for\\ndeciding what accommodation is suitable.\\n Yochim submitted her first accommodation request in De-\\ncember 2012, asking her supervisor, Danna-Brennan, to per-\\nmit her to telework during the eight days in December on\\nwhich she had not already scheduled leave and all of January.\\nTo support her request, Yochim submitted two work-status\\nforms from her surgeon. In the first form, the doctor identified\\nno work or functional limitations while adding that Yochim\\n\\f4 No. 18-3670\\n\\n“may work from home until the end of January.” The doctor’s\\nsecond form conveyed a work-related limitation, explaining\\nthat Yochim had “diminished right-hand strength and should\\nnot rely on gripping with that hand until February 1, 2013;\\nspecifically, riding public transportation that requires holding\\non with her right hand may be a safe[t]y concern.”\\n Danna-Brennan approved Yochim’s request to work from\\nhome the remainder of December. As for Yochim’s request to\\ntelework throughout January, Danna-Brennan offered a com-\\npressed schedule consisting of four ten-hour days—two in the\\noffice and two at home. Danna-Brennan also afforded Yochim\\nthe flexibility to “set her schedule to reflect her need to avoid\\nrush hour” if she maintained a set daily schedule. Apparently\\nunhappy that her compressed schedule still required her to\\ncome to the office two days a week, Yochim later complained\\nto Danna-Brennan that she had to use sick leave to stay home\\nthese extra two days per week. At no point, however, did\\nYochim explain why HUD’s accommodation would interfere\\nwith ongoing and medically necessary rehabilitation or phys-\\nical therapy. Nor did Yochim suggest other accommodation\\noptions.\\n In March 2013, Yochim submitted a second request to\\nwork full-time from home until June 30 to accommodate her\\nongoing recovery from surgery. She supported this request\\nwith a letter from her primary-care physician, Dr. Lexy\\nWistenberg, who reported that she continued to experience\\npain and swelling in her right hand. Dr. Wistenberg also ad-\\nvised that Yochim may need to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour to avoid getting stuck standing in a train aisle and need-\\ning to grasp a handrail. Otherwise, however, Dr. Wistenberg\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 5\\n\\ncleared Yochim to work as she continued her physical ther-\\napy.\\n In April 2013, while the second accommodation request\\nwas pending, Danna-Brennan placed Yochim on a sick-leave\\nrestriction. This restriction required Yochim to provide a doc-\\ntor’s note with the date and time of an appointment or any\\nanticipated medical care and to schedule medical appoint-\\nments at the beginning or end of the day to have the least im-\\npact on the workday. This new restriction resulted from\\nDanna-Brennan’s determination that Yochim had a history of\\nexcessive absences from work—an audit of Yochim’s time re-\\nvealed that she had taken leave on 339 days out of a possible\\n1,010 work days between January 1, 2009 and May 1, 2013—\\nand that she often took leave without any prior approval.\\n A month later, in May 2013, HUD responded to Yochim’s\\nsecond accommodation request. The Department offered\\nvoice-recognition software to reduce Yochim’s need to type\\nand the option to telework three days per week. The accom-\\nmodation called for Yochim to work in the office two days per\\nweek while allowing her to work from home for two hours in\\nthe morning on these days to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour. HUD also permitted her to leave work 15 minutes early\\nto secure seating on the train. Yochim agreed to this revised\\nschedule and concedes that it reflected an effective accommo-\\ndation. This accommodation lasted approximately one\\nmonth, expiring in June 2013.\\n A year later, in June 2014, Danna-Brennan revoked\\nYochim’s telework privileges and issued a written reprimand\\nfor performance deficiencies. Danna-Brennan decided the\\nreprimand was warranted based on the results of an audit of\\nthe legal team’s docket. The audit revealed that Yochim had\\n\\f6 No. 18-3670\\n\\nleft particular assignments incomplete for up to two years\\nwithout ever reporting the delays, despite HUD’s policy re-\\nquiring her to do so.\\n In August 2014, Yochim submitted a third accommodation\\nrequest seeking to telework three days per week for six\\nmonths plus two additional days per week “as needed due to\\npain, medical appointments, and recovery.” She supported\\nthis request with another letter from Dr. Wistenberg who re-\\nported that Yochim had inflammatory osteoarthritis, causing\\n“significant pain and stiffness” and swollen joints throughout\\nher body. Dr. Wistenberg recommended that Yochim work\\nfrom home at least three days per week to minimize the risks\\nof further discomfort from commuting and to accommodate\\nvisits to physical therapists near her suburban home. Yochim\\nnever inquired about attending physical therapy in down-\\ntown Chicago near HUD’s office.\\n Danna-Brennan responded by offering a list of alternative\\naccommodations including an ergonomic assessment, addi-\\ntional paralegal assistance to reduce Yochim’s typing, a com-\\npressed weekly schedule, and generous leave approval. In do-\\ning so, Danna-Brennan explained that Yochim working from\\nhome was no longer an acceptable accommodation “because\\n[her] telework was suspended as a result of performance de-\\nficiencies while teleworking 3 days a week.” Yochim ex-\\npressed her disagreement with the proposed arrangement by\\nfiling a written statement with a specialist in HUD’s Reason-\\nable Accommodation Branch. The specialist then informed\\nYochim of the procedures to seek reconsideration, but she\\nnever did so.\\n During the same period, after the restructuring of HUD’s\\nlegal department, Yochim lodged two complaints with the\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 7\\n\\nEqual Employment Opportunity Commission. She alleged\\nthat HUD discriminated and retaliated against her by failing\\nto promote her and, separately, to accommodate her need for\\nongoing rehabilitation.\\n Yochim retired from HUD once she became eligible to do\\nso in May 2015. She then filed this suit, advancing claims un-\\nder the Rehabilitation Act and alleging that HUD failed to ac-\\ncommodate her requests to telework and to engage in the in-\\nteractive process promptly and in good faith. Yochim also al-\\nleged that HUD retaliated against her for filing her EEO com-\\nplaints and subjected her to a hostile work environment by\\nrestricting her telework and sick-leave privileges.\\n The district court granted HUD’s motion for summary\\njudgment, concluding that although Yochim had established\\nthat she was a qualified person with a disability, no reasona-\\nble jury could find that the Department had failed to offer rea-\\nsonable accommodations. The district court found that\\nHUD’s alternative accommodations were reasonable given\\nthe need that arose for Yochim to work in the office several\\ndays a week as a result of the Department’s restructuring of\\nits legal department. The district court also determined that\\nYochim fell short in her efforts to show that HUD retaliated\\nagainst her or subjected her to a hostile work environment.\\n II\\n On appeal Yochim argues that she brought forth enough\\nevidence to get to a jury on her allegations that HUD did not\\nreasonably accommodate her because it offered only ineffec-\\ntive accommodations and failed to engage in the interactive\\nprocess in good faith. We review a district court’s entry of\\n\\f8 No. 18-3670\\n\\nsummary judgment de novo and must affirm if no reasonable\\njuror could find in favor of Yochim. See Brown, 855 F.3d at 820.\\n Yochim brought her claims under the Rehabilitation Act.\\nThis enactment mandates that no qualifying individual with\\na disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability”\\nexperience discrimination by an executive agency. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 794(a). To prevail on her claim of discrimination, Yochim\\nmust show that (1) she was a qualified individual with a dis-\\nability, (2) HUD was aware of her disability, and (3) the De-\\npartment failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.\\nSee Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2019);\\nsee also Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(explaining that the Rehabilitation Act adopted the standard\\nfor determining whether a violation has occurred from the\\nAmericans with Disabilities Act). The accommodation obliga-\\ntion embodied in the third prong brings with it a requirement\\nthat both the employer and the employee engage in a flexible\\n“interactive process” and make a “good faith effort” to deter-\\nmine what accommodations are necessary. See Lawler v. Peoria\\nSch. Dist. No. 150, 837 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n A\\n We agree with the district court that no rational jury could\\nfind that HUD failed to offer Yochim reasonable accommoda-\\ntions or engage in the interactive process in good faith. The\\nDepartment either granted each of Yochim’s requests or re-\\nsponded with a list of alternative options that reasonably ad-\\ndressed her needs. Nor does the record support Yochim’s con-\\ntentions of bad faith. This is not a case where an employee’s\\nrequests for accommodations fell on deaf ears. To the con-\\ntrary, the parties engaged in a meaningful back-and-forth\\nwith Yochim requesting to work from home and HUD\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 9\\n\\npresenting her with appropriate alternative accommodations.\\nThe communication process did not break down simply be-\\ncause Yochim did not receive the answers she had hoped for.\\n Start with the period following Yochim’s surgery. HUD\\ngranted her request to telework for the eight remaining days\\nin December 2012 that she had not already requested off. The\\nDepartment also permitted her to adjust her work hours (to\\navoid having to stand on a train) and to telework two days a\\nweek for the entirety of January. While this fell short of\\nYochim’s preference to work from home all of January, an em-\\nployer must provide a “reasonable accommodation, not the\\naccommodation [the employee] would prefer.” Hoppe v. Lewis\\nUniv., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the Depart-\\nment’s restructuring and Yochim’s updated job description\\nfocusing on cross-training, teamwork, and collaboration,\\nwhich necessarily required her presence in the office, HUD’s\\naccommodations were entirely reasonable. And recall that the\\nonly medical basis for Yochim’s request to work from home\\nin January 2013 was her surgeon’s concerns about Yochim’s\\ncommute on crowded trains and her need to attend therapy\\nappointments. HUD’s alternative options reasonably ad-\\ndressed these concerns by adjusting her work hours to avoid\\nrush hour and limiting—but not eliminating—her time in the\\noffice.\\n Now consider HUD’s response to Yochim’s August 2014\\nrequest to work from home three to five days per week for six\\nmonths. HUD offered her a four-day work week, generous\\nleave approval (to ease commuting and attending physical\\ntherapy), and other accommodations. The Department did so\\nattentive to the needs of its legal department in Chicago and\\nmindful that Yochim, although medically cleared for work,\\n\\f10 No. 18-3670\\n\\nhad ongoing needs for physical therapy. So, too, did HUD de-\\ntermine that further telework was not warranted given\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies. No reasonable jury could\\nfind this response unreasonable. Yochim has never explained\\nwhy HUD’s approval of regular sick leave to attend physical\\ntherapy appointments was inadequate. And not once has\\nYochim identified any reason why she could not attend ther-\\napy appointments closer to her Chicago office to minimize her\\ncommute or why changes to her work hours would not re-\\nsolve her concern about crowded trains. Put most simply,\\nYochim failed to connect the accommodation she persisted\\nwas necessary with what the record showed were her ongoing\\nmedical needs. In the end, it was Yochim’s own insistence on\\nteleworking three or more days a week and her refusal to re-\\nmain open to anything less that doomed the interactive pro-\\ncess.\\n Yochim’s claim that HUD failed to offer her reasonable ac-\\ncommodations fails for another reason. She cannot point to\\nevidence that the two accommodations she sought but did not\\nreceive—to telework full-time for one month and later for\\nthree to five days per week for six months—were “reasonable\\non [their] face.” See Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans,\\nInc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Majors v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013)) (stating that a plain-\\ntiff seeking to establish claim for failure to accommodate un-\\nder the ADA must “make an initial showing that the accom-\\nmodation she sought was ‘reasonable on its face’”). Yochim\\ninsists that her requests to telework were appropriate because\\nshe had worked from home full time for six weeks in 2004,\\nHUD’s telework policy allows employees to work from home\\nup to three days a week, and another employee was allowed\\nto work from home for an unknown period of time.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 11\\n\\n Yochim’s position falls short. An accommodation to tele-\\nwork requires a context-specific inquiry, and a “general con-\\nsensus [exists] among courts” that jobs “often require face-to-\\nface collaboration.” See Bilinksy v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d\\n565, 573 (7th Cir. 2019). Yochim has failed to counter HUD’s\\nevidence that she held just such a job. The 2012 restructuring\\nof the legal department, which changed Yochim’s responsibil-\\nities and job description, required attorneys to work in teams,\\ncollaborate more, and cross-train each other. She points to the\\nDepartment’s 2010 telework policy that allows telework up to\\nthree days a week, but this policy predates the restructuring.\\nEven more to the point, the policy, by its terms, is subject to\\nmanagement’s discretion—it does not confer a legally pro-\\ntected entitlement upon an employee.\\n B\\n Yochim next argues that HUD’s accommodations were in-\\neffective. She says, for example, that many of HUD’s options\\n(like the compressed work week and the flexibility to tele-\\nwork a few days a week) already were widely available to\\nHUD employees without a reasonable accommodation and\\nthus were not “alternative accommodations.” But this posi-\\ntion misses the mark. “Reasonable accommodation” under\\nthe relevant statutes includes “modified work schedules”\\nsuch as the compressed schedules and telework that HUD of-\\nfered. See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476,\\n481 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)). It makes no\\ndifference that modified scheduling options might have been\\navailable to other HUD employees who obtained permission\\nto telework from their manager.\\n By way of another example, Yochim contends that HUD’s\\noptions were ineffective because requiring her to work in the\\n\\f12 No. 18-3670\\n\\noffice meant that she had to commute on the train and grasp\\nthe handrails with her injured right hand. But the medical rec-\\nords supporting Yochim’s accommodation requests demon-\\nstrated that the only limitation related to her commute was\\nthe need to avoid crowded trains that could cause her to fall\\nor force her to grip the railings. HUD’s proposed accommo-\\ndations addressed these concerns by offering her an adjusted\\nschedule to avoid rush hour.\\n Yochim has offered a few other views as to why HUD’s\\naccommodations were ineffective. She claims that the long\\nten-hour days of her compressed schedule (and HUD’s\\nrequirement that she maintain a set daily schedule) limited\\nher flexibility to make her therapy appointments before or\\nafter work, necessitating that she take sick leave. And she says\\nthat doing so was especially difficult with the sick-leave\\nrestriction imposed by her supervisor. But one purpose of\\npaid sick leave is to allow employees to attend such\\nappointments, and Yochim does not present any evidence\\nthat the leave restriction—which merely required her to\\nsubmit a medical note detailing the time and date of an\\nappointment—interfered with her physical-therapy sessions.\\nNone of Yochim’s remaining arguments persuade us that a\\nreasonable jury could find that the Department’s\\naccommodations were ineffective.\\n C\\n Finally, Yochim contends that HUD’s refusal to allow her\\nto work from home and the imposition of her sick-leave re-\\nstriction created a “retaliatory hostile work environment” that\\nled to her premature retirement. This court has not deter-\\nmined whether the ADA (and by extension, the Rehabilitation\\nAct) encompasses claims of a hostile work environment.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 13\\n\\nSee Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712–13 (7th Cir.\\n2000). We need not resolve the question here. Even assuming\\nYochim could bring a hostile-work-environment claim, she\\nmust at a minimum demonstrate that the work environment\\nwas both objectively and subjectively offensive because of\\n“severe or pervasive” harassment. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,\\n920 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n At summary judgment, Yochim did not offer evidence\\nshowing that her leave and telework restrictions—actions that\\nare permissible for an employer to take—were so severe or\\npervasive as to “alter the conditions” of employment and\\n“create an abusive working environment.” See id.; see also\\nHerron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (concluding that empr’s disciplinary action for perfor-\\nmance issues was “normal workplace friction”). And it is this\\nevidentiary shortcoming that defeats this dimension of her\\nclaims on summary judgment.\\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426034/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648781/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Elisa J. Yochim v. Benjamin S. Carson, Sr.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3670\nELISA J. YOCHIM,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nBENJAMIN S. CARSON, SR.,\nSecretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban\nDevelopment,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:16-cv-4926 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Elisa Yochim worked in the legal\ndepartment of the United States Department of Housing and\nUrban Development for 26 years. Throughout her tenure, she\ntook full advantage of HUD’s flexible and progressive policy\npermitting employees to work from home several days per\nweek. After undergoing hand surgery, Yochim requested time\n\f2 No. 18-3670\n\noff and permission to work from home. HUD agreed and al-\nlowed her time to recover and to telework several days a week\nfor many months as she received physical therapy. HUD later\nrestructured its law department and this development had\nthe effect of requiring employees like Yochim to spend more\ntime in the office. In time this restructuring, combined with\nYochim’s performance deficiencies, led HUD to revoke her\ntelework privileges and offer alternative accommodations.\nFor her part, Yochim responded with this lawsuit, alleging vi-\nolations of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate\nher ongoing rehabilitation needs. The district court entered\nsummary judgment for HUD, and we affirm. No rational jury\ncould conclude that the Department failed to offer reasonable\naccommodations.\n I\n In reviewing the district court’s award of summary judg-\nment to HUD, we construe the facts in the light most favora-\nble to Yochim as the nonmovant, resolving evidentiary con-\nflicts and competing inferences in her favor. See Brown v. Mil-\nwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017).\n Yochim worked as a HUD attorney for 26 years, serving in\nthe Chicago office for the last 15 years before her retirement\nin May 2015. During her tenure, the Department maintained\na forward-leaning telework policy that allowed full-time em-\nployees to work from home up to three days a week at their\nmanager’s discretion.\n Beginning in October 2012, HUD’s legal department un-\nderwent a functional reorganization. Before this change, the\nDepartment’s attorneys tended to specialize in particular ar-\neas. With the reorganization, however, HUD wanted its\n\fNo. 18-3670 3\n\nattorneys to work more as generalists and to assist each other\nthrough cross-training and collaboration—a change in ap-\nproach less suited to telework. Yochim’s job description\nchanged to include “training, orientation, [and] working\ngroups” as well as “administrative responsibilities,” includ-\ning “space and file management,” as areas of focus. Around\nthis same time, Yochim applied for a supervisory position, but\nthe Department passed her up and instead awarded the role\nto Lisa Danna-Brennan, who became Yochim’s supervisor.\nThis development was not one Yochim welcomed.\n In November 2012, Yochim had surgery to treat carpal tun-\nnel syndrome in her right hand. The surgery brought with it\na recovery and rehabilitation process, prompting Yochim to\nsubmit several requests to HUD to accommodate her needs.\nThe HUD handbook outlines the Department’s process for ac-\ncommodating such requests. Employees can seek reasonable\naccommodations through their immediate supervisor or the\nDepartment’s Reasonable Accommodation Branch. The su-\npervisor and employee then engage in an interactive process\nto identify an accommodation, and the Reasonable Accom-\nmodation Branch facilitates this communication. The Branch\ndetermines an employee’s eligibility for a reasonable accom-\nmodation, while the supervisor shoulders responsibility for\ndeciding what accommodation is suitable.\n Yochim submitted her first accommodation request in De-\ncember 2012, asking her supervisor, Danna-Brennan, to per-\nmit her to telework during the eight days in December on\nwhich she had not already scheduled leave and all of January.\nTo support her request, Yochim submitted two work-status\nforms from her surgeon. In the first form, the doctor identified\nno work or functional limitations while adding that Yochim\n\f4 No. 18-3670\n\n“may work from home until the end of January.” The doctor’s\nsecond form conveyed a work-related limitation, explaining\nthat Yochim had “diminished right-hand strength and should\nnot rely on gripping with that hand until February 1, 2013;\nspecifically, riding public transportation that requires holding\non with her right hand may be a safe[t]y concern.”\n Danna-Brennan approved Yochim’s request to work from\nhome the remainder of December. As for Yochim’s request to\ntelework throughout January, Danna-Brennan offered a com-\npressed schedule consisting of four ten-hour days—two in the\noffice and two at home. Danna-Brennan also afforded Yochim\nthe flexibility to “set her schedule to reflect her need to avoid\nrush hour” if she maintained a set daily schedule. Apparently\nunhappy that her compressed schedule still required her to\ncome to the office two days a week, Yochim later complained\nto Danna-Brennan that she had to use sick leave to stay home\nthese extra two days per week. At no point, however, did\nYochim explain why HUD’s accommodation would interfere\nwith ongoing and medically necessary rehabilitation or phys-\nical therapy. Nor did Yochim suggest other accommodation\noptions.\n In March 2013, Yochim submitted a second request to\nwork full-time from home until June 30 to accommodate her\nongoing recovery from surgery. She supported this request\nwith a letter from her primary-care physician, Dr. Lexy\nWistenberg, who reported that she continued to experience\npain and swelling in her right hand. Dr. Wistenberg also ad-\nvised that Yochim may need to avoid commuting during rush\nhour to avoid getting stuck standing in a train aisle and need-\ning to grasp a handrail. Otherwise, however, Dr. Wistenberg\n\fNo. 18-3670 5\n\ncleared Yochim to work as she continued her physical ther-\napy.\n In April 2013, while the second accommodation request\nwas pending, Danna-Brennan placed Yochim on a sick-leave\nrestriction. This restriction required Yochim to provide a doc-\ntor’s note with the date and time of an appointment or any\nanticipated medical care and to schedule medical appoint-\nments at the beginning or end of the day to have the least im-\npact on the workday. This new restriction resulted from\nDanna-Brennan’s determination that Yochim had a history of\nexcessive absences from work—an audit of Yochim’s time re-\nvealed that she had taken leave on 339 days out of a possible\n1,010 work days between January 1, 2009 and May 1, 2013—\nand that she often took leave without any prior approval.\n A month later, in May 2013, HUD responded to Yochim’s\nsecond accommodation request. The Department offered\nvoice-recognition software to reduce Yochim’s need to type\nand the option to telework three days per week. The accom-\nmodation called for Yochim to work in the office two days per\nweek while allowing her to work from home for two hours in\nthe morning on these days to avoid commuting during rush\nhour. HUD also permitted her to leave work 15 minutes early\nto secure seating on the train. Yochim agreed to this revised\nschedule and concedes that it reflected an effective accommo-\ndation. This accommodation lasted approximately one\nmonth, expiring in June 2013.\n A year later, in June 2014, Danna-Brennan revoked\nYochim’s telework privileges and issued a written reprimand\nfor performance deficiencies. Danna-Brennan decided the\nreprimand was warranted based on the results of an audit of\nthe legal team’s docket. The audit revealed that Yochim had\n\f6 No. 18-3670\n\nleft particular assignments incomplete for up to two years\nwithout ever reporting the delays, despite HUD’s policy re-\nquiring her to do so.\n In August 2014, Yochim submitted a third accommodation\nrequest seeking to telework three days per week for six\nmonths plus two additional days per week “as needed due to\npain, medical appointments, and recovery.” She supported\nthis request with another letter from Dr. Wistenberg who re-\nported that Yochim had inflammatory osteoarthritis, causing\n“significant pain and stiffness” and swollen joints throughout\nher body. Dr. Wistenberg recommended that Yochim work\nfrom home at least three days per week to minimize the risks\nof further discomfort from commuting and to accommodate\nvisits to physical therapists near her suburban home. Yochim\nnever inquired about attending physical therapy in down-\ntown Chicago near HUD’s office.\n Danna-Brennan responded by offering a list of alternative\naccommodations including an ergonomic assessment, addi-\ntional paralegal assistance to reduce Yochim’s typing, a com-\npressed weekly schedule, and generous leave approval. In do-\ning so, Danna-Brennan explained that Yochim working from\nhome was no longer an acceptable accommodation “because\n[her] telework was suspended as a result of performance de-\nficiencies while teleworking 3 days a week.” Yochim ex-\npressed her disagreement with the proposed arrangement by\nfiling a written statement with a specialist in HUD’s Reason-\nable Accommodation Branch. The specialist then informed\nYochim of the procedures to seek reconsideration, but she\nnever did so.\n During the same period, after the restructuring of HUD’s\nlegal department, Yochim lodged two complaints with the\n\fNo. 18-3670 7\n\nEqual Employment Opportunity Commission. She alleged\nthat HUD discriminated and retaliated against her by failing\nto promote her and, separately, to accommodate her need for\nongoing rehabilitation.\n Yochim retired from HUD once she became eligible to do\nso in May 2015. She then filed this suit, advancing claims un-\nder the Rehabilitation Act and alleging that HUD failed to ac-\ncommodate her requests to telework and to engage in the in-\nteractive process promptly and in good faith. Yochim also al-\nleged that HUD retaliated against her for filing her EEO com-\nplaints and subjected her to a hostile work environment by\nrestricting her telework and sick-leave privileges.\n The district court granted HUD’s motion for summary\njudgment, concluding that although Yochim had established\nthat she was a qualified person with a disability, no reasona-\nble jury could find that the Department had failed to offer rea-\nsonable accommodations. The district court found that\nHUD’s alternative accommodations were reasonable given\nthe need that arose for Yochim to work in the office several\ndays a week as a result of the Department’s restructuring of\nits legal department. The district court also determined that\nYochim fell short in her efforts to show that HUD retaliated\nagainst her or subjected her to a hostile work environment.\n II\n On appeal Yochim argues that she brought forth enough\nevidence to get to a jury on her allegations that HUD did not\nreasonably accommodate her because it offered only ineffec-\ntive accommodations and failed to engage in the interactive\nprocess in good faith. We review a district court’s entry of\n\f8 No. 18-3670\n\nsummary judgment de novo and must affirm if no reasonable\njuror could find in favor of Yochim. See Brown, 855 F.3d at 820.\n Yochim brought her claims under the Rehabilitation Act.\nThis enactment mandates that no qualifying individual with\na disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability”\nexperience discrimination by an executive agency. 29 U.S.C.\n§ 794(a). To prevail on her claim of discrimination, Yochim\nmust show that (1) she was a qualified individual with a dis-\nability, (2) HUD was aware of her disability, and (3) the De-\npartment failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.\nSee Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2019);\nsee also Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001)\n(explaining that the Rehabilitation Act adopted the standard\nfor determining whether a violation has occurred from the\nAmericans with Disabilities Act). The accommodation obliga-\ntion embodied in the third prong brings with it a requirement\nthat both the employer and the employee engage in a flexible\n“interactive process” and make a “good faith effort” to deter-\nmine what accommodations are necessary. See Lawler v. Peoria\nSch. Dist. No. 150, 837 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2016).\n A\n We agree with the district court that no rational jury could\nfind that HUD failed to offer Yochim reasonable accommoda-\ntions or engage in the interactive process in good faith. The\nDepartment either granted each of Yochim’s requests or re-\nsponded with a list of alternative options that reasonably ad-\ndressed her needs. Nor does the record support Yochim’s con-\ntentions of bad faith. This is not a case where an employee’s\nrequests for accommodations fell on deaf ears. To the con-\ntrary, the parties engaged in a meaningful back-and-forth\nwith Yochim requesting to work from home and HUD\n\fNo. 18-3670 9\n\npresenting her with appropriate alternative accommodations.\nThe communication process did not break down simply be-\ncause Yochim did not receive the answers she had hoped for.\n Start with the period following Yochim’s surgery. HUD\ngranted her request to telework for the eight remaining days\nin December 2012 that she had not already requested off. The\nDepartment also permitted her to adjust her work hours (to\navoid having to stand on a train) and to telework two days a\nweek for the entirety of January. While this fell short of\nYochim’s preference to work from home all of January, an em-\nployer must provide a “reasonable accommodation, not the\naccommodation [the employee] would prefer.” Hoppe v. Lewis\nUniv., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the Depart-\nment’s restructuring and Yochim’s updated job description\nfocusing on cross-training, teamwork, and collaboration,\nwhich necessarily required her presence in the office, HUD’s\naccommodations were entirely reasonable. And recall that the\nonly medical basis for Yochim’s request to work from home\nin January 2013 was her surgeon’s concerns about Yochim’s\ncommute on crowded trains and her need to attend therapy\nappointments. HUD’s alternative options reasonably ad-\ndressed these concerns by adjusting her work hours to avoid\nrush hour and limiting—but not eliminating—her time in the\noffice.\n Now consider HUD’s response to Yochim’s August 2014\nrequest to work from home three to five days per week for six\nmonths. HUD offered her a four-day work week, generous\nleave approval (to ease commuting and attending physical\ntherapy), and other accommodations. The Department did so\nattentive to the needs of its legal department in Chicago and\nmindful that Yochim, although medically cleared for work,\n\f10 No. 18-3670\n\nhad ongoing needs for physical therapy. So, too, did HUD de-\ntermine that further telework was not warranted given\nYochim’s performance deficiencies. No reasonable jury could\nfind this response unreasonable. Yochim has never explained\nwhy HUD’s approval of regular sick leave to attend physical\ntherapy appointments was inadequate. And not once has\nYochim identified any reason why she could not attend ther-\napy appointments closer to her Chicago office to minimize her\ncommute or why changes to her work hours would not re-\nsolve her concern about crowded trains. Put most simply,\nYochim failed to connect the accommodation she persisted\nwas necessary with what the record showed were her ongoing\nmedical needs. In the end, it was Yochim’s own insistence on\nteleworking three or more days a week and her refusal to re-\nmain open to anything less that doomed the interactive pro-\ncess.\n Yochim’s claim that HUD failed to offer her reasonable ac-\ncommodations fails for another reason. She cannot point to\nevidence that the two accommodations she sought but did not\nreceive—to telework full-time for one month and later for\nthree to five days per week for six months—were “reasonable\non [their] face.” See Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans,\nInc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Majors v. Gen.\nElec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013)) (stating that a plain-\ntiff seeking to establish claim for failure to accommodate un-\nder the ADA must “make an initial showing that the accom-\nmodation she sought was ‘reasonable on its face’”). Yochim\ninsists that her requests to telework were appropriate because\nshe had worked from home full time for six weeks in 2004,\nHUD’s telework policy allows employees to work from home\nup to three days a week, and another employee was allowed\nto work from home for an unknown period of time.\n\fNo. 18-3670 11\n\n Yochim’s position falls short. An accommodation to tele-\nwork requires a context-specific inquiry, and a “general con-\nsensus [exists] among courts” that jobs “often require face-to-\nface collaboration.” See Bilinksy v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d\n565, 573 (7th Cir. 2019). Yochim has failed to counter HUD’s\nevidence that she held just such a job. The 2012 restructuring\nof the legal department, which changed Yochim’s responsibil-\nities and job description, required attorneys to work in teams,\ncollaborate more, and cross-train each other. She points to the\nDepartment’s 2010 telework policy that allows telework up to\nthree days a week, but this policy predates the restructuring.\nEven more to the point, the policy, by its terms, is subject to\nmanagement’s discretion—it does not confer a legally pro-\ntected entitlement upon an employee.\n B\n Yochim next argues that HUD’s accommodations were in-\neffective. She says, for example, that many of HUD’s options\n(like the compressed work week and the flexibility to tele-\nwork a few days a week) already were widely available to\nHUD employees without a reasonable accommodation and\nthus were not “alternative accommodations.” But this posi-\ntion misses the mark. “Reasonable accommodation” under\nthe relevant statutes includes “modified work schedules”\nsuch as the compressed schedules and telework that HUD of-\nfered. See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476,\n481 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)). It makes no\ndifference that modified scheduling options might have been\navailable to other HUD employees who obtained permission\nto telework from their manager.\n By way of another example, Yochim contends that HUD’s\noptions were ineffective because requiring her to work in the\n\f12 No. 18-3670\n\noffice meant that she had to commute on the train and grasp\nthe handrails with her injured right hand. But the medical rec-\nords supporting Yochim’s accommodation requests demon-\nstrated that the only limitation related to her commute was\nthe need to avoid crowded trains that could cause her to fall\nor force her to grip the railings. HUD’s proposed accommo-\ndations addressed these concerns by offering her an adjusted\nschedule to avoid rush hour.\n Yochim has offered a few other views as to why HUD’s\naccommodations were ineffective. She claims that the long\nten-hour days of her compressed schedule (and HUD’s\nrequirement that she maintain a set daily schedule) limited\nher flexibility to make her therapy appointments before or\nafter work, necessitating that she take sick leave. And she says\nthat doing so was especially difficult with the sick-leave\nrestriction imposed by her supervisor. But one purpose of\npaid sick leave is to allow employees to attend such\nappointments, and Yochim does not present any evidence\nthat the leave restriction—which merely required her to\nsubmit a medical note detailing the time and date of an\nappointment—interfered with her physical-therapy sessions.\nNone of Yochim’s remaining arguments persuade us that a\nreasonable jury could find that the Department’s\naccommodations were ineffective.\n C\n Finally, Yochim contends that HUD’s refusal to allow her\nto work from home and the imposition of her sick-leave re-\nstriction created a “retaliatory hostile work environment” that\nled to her premature retirement. This court has not deter-\nmined whether the ADA (and by extension, the Rehabilitation\nAct) encompasses claims of a hostile work environment.\n\fNo. 18-3670 13\n\nSee Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712–13 (7th Cir.\n2000). We need not resolve the question here. Even assuming\nYochim could bring a hostile-work-environment claim, she\nmust at a minimum demonstrate that the work environment\nwas both objectively and subjectively offensive because of\n“severe or pervasive” harassment. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,\n920 (7th Cir. 2016).\n At summary judgment, Yochim did not offer evidence\nshowing that her leave and telework restrictions—actions that\nare permissible for an employer to take—were so severe or\npervasive as to “alter the conditions” of employment and\n“create an abusive working environment.” See id.; see also\nHerron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\n2004) (concluding that empr’s disciplinary action for perfor-\nmance issues was “normal workplace friction”). And it is this\nevidentiary shortcoming that defeats this dimension of her\nclaims on summary judgment.\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Elisa J. Yochim v. Benjamin S. Carson, Sr.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3670\\nELISA J. YOCHIM,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBENJAMIN S. CARSON, SR.,\\nSecretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban\\nDevelopment,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cv-4926 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Elisa Yochim worked in the legal\\ndepartment of the United States Department of Housing and\\nUrban Development for 26 years. Throughout her tenure, she\\ntook full advantage of HUD’s flexible and progressive policy\\npermitting employees to work from home several days per\\nweek. After undergoing hand surgery, Yochim requested time\\n\\f2 No. 18-3670\\n\\noff and permission to work from home. HUD agreed and al-\\nlowed her time to recover and to telework several days a week\\nfor many months as she received physical therapy. HUD later\\nrestructured its law department and this development had\\nthe effect of requiring employees like Yochim to spend more\\ntime in the office. In time this restructuring, combined with\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies, led HUD to revoke her\\ntelework privileges and offer alternative accommodations.\\nFor her part, Yochim responded with this lawsuit, alleging vi-\\nolations of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate\\nher ongoing rehabilitation needs. The district court entered\\nsummary judgment for HUD, and we affirm. No rational jury\\ncould conclude that the Department failed to offer reasonable\\naccommodations.\\n I\\n In reviewing the district court’s award of summary judg-\\nment to HUD, we construe the facts in the light most favora-\\nble to Yochim as the nonmovant, resolving evidentiary con-\\nflicts and competing inferences in her favor. See Brown v. Mil-\\nwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Yochim worked as a HUD attorney for 26 years, serving in\\nthe Chicago office for the last 15 years before her retirement\\nin May 2015. During her tenure, the Department maintained\\na forward-leaning telework policy that allowed full-time em-\\nployees to work from home up to three days a week at their\\nmanager’s discretion.\\n Beginning in October 2012, HUD’s legal department un-\\nderwent a functional reorganization. Before this change, the\\nDepartment’s attorneys tended to specialize in particular ar-\\neas. With the reorganization, however, HUD wanted its\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 3\\n\\nattorneys to work more as generalists and to assist each other\\nthrough cross-training and collaboration—a change in ap-\\nproach less suited to telework. Yochim’s job description\\nchanged to include “training, orientation, [and] working\\ngroups” as well as “administrative responsibilities,” includ-\\ning “space and file management,” as areas of focus. Around\\nthis same time, Yochim applied for a supervisory position, but\\nthe Department passed her up and instead awarded the role\\nto Lisa Danna-Brennan, who became Yochim’s supervisor.\\nThis development was not one Yochim welcomed.\\n In November 2012, Yochim had surgery to treat carpal tun-\\nnel syndrome in her right hand. The surgery brought with it\\na recovery and rehabilitation process, prompting Yochim to\\nsubmit several requests to HUD to accommodate her needs.\\nThe HUD handbook outlines the Department’s process for ac-\\ncommodating such requests. Employees can seek reasonable\\naccommodations through their immediate supervisor or the\\nDepartment’s Reasonable Accommodation Branch. The su-\\npervisor and employee then engage in an interactive process\\nto identify an accommodation, and the Reasonable Accom-\\nmodation Branch facilitates this communication. The Branch\\ndetermines an employee’s eligibility for a reasonable accom-\\nmodation, while the supervisor shoulders responsibility for\\ndeciding what accommodation is suitable.\\n Yochim submitted her first accommodation request in De-\\ncember 2012, asking her supervisor, Danna-Brennan, to per-\\nmit her to telework during the eight days in December on\\nwhich she had not already scheduled leave and all of January.\\nTo support her request, Yochim submitted two work-status\\nforms from her surgeon. In the first form, the doctor identified\\nno work or functional limitations while adding that Yochim\\n\\f4 No. 18-3670\\n\\n“may work from home until the end of January.” The doctor’s\\nsecond form conveyed a work-related limitation, explaining\\nthat Yochim had “diminished right-hand strength and should\\nnot rely on gripping with that hand until February 1, 2013;\\nspecifically, riding public transportation that requires holding\\non with her right hand may be a safe[t]y concern.”\\n Danna-Brennan approved Yochim’s request to work from\\nhome the remainder of December. As for Yochim’s request to\\ntelework throughout January, Danna-Brennan offered a com-\\npressed schedule consisting of four ten-hour days—two in the\\noffice and two at home. Danna-Brennan also afforded Yochim\\nthe flexibility to “set her schedule to reflect her need to avoid\\nrush hour” if she maintained a set daily schedule. Apparently\\nunhappy that her compressed schedule still required her to\\ncome to the office two days a week, Yochim later complained\\nto Danna-Brennan that she had to use sick leave to stay home\\nthese extra two days per week. At no point, however, did\\nYochim explain why HUD’s accommodation would interfere\\nwith ongoing and medically necessary rehabilitation or phys-\\nical therapy. Nor did Yochim suggest other accommodation\\noptions.\\n In March 2013, Yochim submitted a second request to\\nwork full-time from home until June 30 to accommodate her\\nongoing recovery from surgery. She supported this request\\nwith a letter from her primary-care physician, Dr. Lexy\\nWistenberg, who reported that she continued to experience\\npain and swelling in her right hand. Dr. Wistenberg also ad-\\nvised that Yochim may need to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour to avoid getting stuck standing in a train aisle and need-\\ning to grasp a handrail. Otherwise, however, Dr. Wistenberg\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 5\\n\\ncleared Yochim to work as she continued her physical ther-\\napy.\\n In April 2013, while the second accommodation request\\nwas pending, Danna-Brennan placed Yochim on a sick-leave\\nrestriction. This restriction required Yochim to provide a doc-\\ntor’s note with the date and time of an appointment or any\\nanticipated medical care and to schedule medical appoint-\\nments at the beginning or end of the day to have the least im-\\npact on the workday. This new restriction resulted from\\nDanna-Brennan’s determination that Yochim had a history of\\nexcessive absences from work—an audit of Yochim’s time re-\\nvealed that she had taken leave on 339 days out of a possible\\n1,010 work days between January 1, 2009 and May 1, 2013—\\nand that she often took leave without any prior approval.\\n A month later, in May 2013, HUD responded to Yochim’s\\nsecond accommodation request. The Department offered\\nvoice-recognition software to reduce Yochim’s need to type\\nand the option to telework three days per week. The accom-\\nmodation called for Yochim to work in the office two days per\\nweek while allowing her to work from home for two hours in\\nthe morning on these days to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour. HUD also permitted her to leave work 15 minutes early\\nto secure seating on the train. Yochim agreed to this revised\\nschedule and concedes that it reflected an effective accommo-\\ndation. This accommodation lasted approximately one\\nmonth, expiring in June 2013.\\n A year later, in June 2014, Danna-Brennan revoked\\nYochim’s telework privileges and issued a written reprimand\\nfor performance deficiencies. Danna-Brennan decided the\\nreprimand was warranted based on the results of an audit of\\nthe legal team’s docket. The audit revealed that Yochim had\\n\\f6 No. 18-3670\\n\\nleft particular assignments incomplete for up to two years\\nwithout ever reporting the delays, despite HUD’s policy re-\\nquiring her to do so.\\n In August 2014, Yochim submitted a third accommodation\\nrequest seeking to telework three days per week for six\\nmonths plus two additional days per week “as needed due to\\npain, medical appointments, and recovery.” She supported\\nthis request with another letter from Dr. Wistenberg who re-\\nported that Yochim had inflammatory osteoarthritis, causing\\n“significant pain and stiffness” and swollen joints throughout\\nher body. Dr. Wistenberg recommended that Yochim work\\nfrom home at least three days per week to minimize the risks\\nof further discomfort from commuting and to accommodate\\nvisits to physical therapists near her suburban home. Yochim\\nnever inquired about attending physical therapy in down-\\ntown Chicago near HUD’s office.\\n Danna-Brennan responded by offering a list of alternative\\naccommodations including an ergonomic assessment, addi-\\ntional paralegal assistance to reduce Yochim’s typing, a com-\\npressed weekly schedule, and generous leave approval. In do-\\ning so, Danna-Brennan explained that Yochim working from\\nhome was no longer an acceptable accommodation “because\\n[her] telework was suspended as a result of performance de-\\nficiencies while teleworking 3 days a week.” Yochim ex-\\npressed her disagreement with the proposed arrangement by\\nfiling a written statement with a specialist in HUD’s Reason-\\nable Accommodation Branch. The specialist then informed\\nYochim of the procedures to seek reconsideration, but she\\nnever did so.\\n During the same period, after the restructuring of HUD’s\\nlegal department, Yochim lodged two complaints with the\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 7\\n\\nEqual Employment Opportunity Commission. She alleged\\nthat HUD discriminated and retaliated against her by failing\\nto promote her and, separately, to accommodate her need for\\nongoing rehabilitation.\\n Yochim retired from HUD once she became eligible to do\\nso in May 2015. She then filed this suit, advancing claims un-\\nder the Rehabilitation Act and alleging that HUD failed to ac-\\ncommodate her requests to telework and to engage in the in-\\nteractive process promptly and in good faith. Yochim also al-\\nleged that HUD retaliated against her for filing her EEO com-\\nplaints and subjected her to a hostile work environment by\\nrestricting her telework and sick-leave privileges.\\n The district court granted HUD’s motion for summary\\njudgment, concluding that although Yochim had established\\nthat she was a qualified person with a disability, no reasona-\\nble jury could find that the Department had failed to offer rea-\\nsonable accommodations. The district court found that\\nHUD’s alternative accommodations were reasonable given\\nthe need that arose for Yochim to work in the office several\\ndays a week as a result of the Department’s restructuring of\\nits legal department. The district court also determined that\\nYochim fell short in her efforts to show that HUD retaliated\\nagainst her or subjected her to a hostile work environment.\\n II\\n On appeal Yochim argues that she brought forth enough\\nevidence to get to a jury on her allegations that HUD did not\\nreasonably accommodate her because it offered only ineffec-\\ntive accommodations and failed to engage in the interactive\\nprocess in good faith. We review a district court’s entry of\\n\\f8 No. 18-3670\\n\\nsummary judgment de novo and must affirm if no reasonable\\njuror could find in favor of Yochim. See Brown, 855 F.3d at 820.\\n Yochim brought her claims under the Rehabilitation Act.\\nThis enactment mandates that no qualifying individual with\\na disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability”\\nexperience discrimination by an executive agency. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 794(a). To prevail on her claim of discrimination, Yochim\\nmust show that (1) she was a qualified individual with a dis-\\nability, (2) HUD was aware of her disability, and (3) the De-\\npartment failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.\\nSee Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2019);\\nsee also Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(explaining that the Rehabilitation Act adopted the standard\\nfor determining whether a violation has occurred from the\\nAmericans with Disabilities Act). The accommodation obliga-\\ntion embodied in the third prong brings with it a requirement\\nthat both the employer and the employee engage in a flexible\\n“interactive process” and make a “good faith effort” to deter-\\nmine what accommodations are necessary. See Lawler v. Peoria\\nSch. Dist. No. 150, 837 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n A\\n We agree with the district court that no rational jury could\\nfind that HUD failed to offer Yochim reasonable accommoda-\\ntions or engage in the interactive process in good faith. The\\nDepartment either granted each of Yochim’s requests or re-\\nsponded with a list of alternative options that reasonably ad-\\ndressed her needs. Nor does the record support Yochim’s con-\\ntentions of bad faith. This is not a case where an employee’s\\nrequests for accommodations fell on deaf ears. To the con-\\ntrary, the parties engaged in a meaningful back-and-forth\\nwith Yochim requesting to work from home and HUD\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 9\\n\\npresenting her with appropriate alternative accommodations.\\nThe communication process did not break down simply be-\\ncause Yochim did not receive the answers she had hoped for.\\n Start with the period following Yochim’s surgery. HUD\\ngranted her request to telework for the eight remaining days\\nin December 2012 that she had not already requested off. The\\nDepartment also permitted her to adjust her work hours (to\\navoid having to stand on a train) and to telework two days a\\nweek for the entirety of January. While this fell short of\\nYochim’s preference to work from home all of January, an em-\\nployer must provide a “reasonable accommodation, not the\\naccommodation [the employee] would prefer.” Hoppe v. Lewis\\nUniv., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the Depart-\\nment’s restructuring and Yochim’s updated job description\\nfocusing on cross-training, teamwork, and collaboration,\\nwhich necessarily required her presence in the office, HUD’s\\naccommodations were entirely reasonable. And recall that the\\nonly medical basis for Yochim’s request to work from home\\nin January 2013 was her surgeon’s concerns about Yochim’s\\ncommute on crowded trains and her need to attend therapy\\nappointments. HUD’s alternative options reasonably ad-\\ndressed these concerns by adjusting her work hours to avoid\\nrush hour and limiting—but not eliminating—her time in the\\noffice.\\n Now consider HUD’s response to Yochim’s August 2014\\nrequest to work from home three to five days per week for six\\nmonths. HUD offered her a four-day work week, generous\\nleave approval (to ease commuting and attending physical\\ntherapy), and other accommodations. The Department did so\\nattentive to the needs of its legal department in Chicago and\\nmindful that Yochim, although medically cleared for work,\\n\\f10 No. 18-3670\\n\\nhad ongoing needs for physical therapy. So, too, did HUD de-\\ntermine that further telework was not warranted given\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies. No reasonable jury could\\nfind this response unreasonable. Yochim has never explained\\nwhy HUD’s approval of regular sick leave to attend physical\\ntherapy appointments was inadequate. And not once has\\nYochim identified any reason why she could not attend ther-\\napy appointments closer to her Chicago office to minimize her\\ncommute or why changes to her work hours would not re-\\nsolve her concern about crowded trains. Put most simply,\\nYochim failed to connect the accommodation she persisted\\nwas necessary with what the record showed were her ongoing\\nmedical needs. In the end, it was Yochim’s own insistence on\\nteleworking three or more days a week and her refusal to re-\\nmain open to anything less that doomed the interactive pro-\\ncess.\\n Yochim’s claim that HUD failed to offer her reasonable ac-\\ncommodations fails for another reason. She cannot point to\\nevidence that the two accommodations she sought but did not\\nreceive—to telework full-time for one month and later for\\nthree to five days per week for six months—were “reasonable\\non [their] face.” See Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans,\\nInc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Majors v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013)) (stating that a plain-\\ntiff seeking to establish claim for failure to accommodate un-\\nder the ADA must “make an initial showing that the accom-\\nmodation she sought was ‘reasonable on its face’”). Yochim\\ninsists that her requests to telework were appropriate because\\nshe had worked from home full time for six weeks in 2004,\\nHUD’s telework policy allows employees to work from home\\nup to three days a week, and another employee was allowed\\nto work from home for an unknown period of time.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 11\\n\\n Yochim’s position falls short. An accommodation to tele-\\nwork requires a context-specific inquiry, and a “general con-\\nsensus [exists] among courts” that jobs “often require face-to-\\nface collaboration.” See Bilinksy v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d\\n565, 573 (7th Cir. 2019). Yochim has failed to counter HUD’s\\nevidence that she held just such a job. The 2012 restructuring\\nof the legal department, which changed Yochim’s responsibil-\\nities and job description, required attorneys to work in teams,\\ncollaborate more, and cross-train each other. She points to the\\nDepartment’s 2010 telework policy that allows telework up to\\nthree days a week, but this policy predates the restructuring.\\nEven more to the point, the policy, by its terms, is subject to\\nmanagement’s discretion—it does not confer a legally pro-\\ntected entitlement upon an employee.\\n B\\n Yochim next argues that HUD’s accommodations were in-\\neffective. She says, for example, that many of HUD’s options\\n(like the compressed work week and the flexibility to tele-\\nwork a few days a week) already were widely available to\\nHUD employees without a reasonable accommodation and\\nthus were not “alternative accommodations.” But this posi-\\ntion misses the mark. “Reasonable accommodation” under\\nthe relevant statutes includes “modified work schedules”\\nsuch as the compressed schedules and telework that HUD of-\\nfered. See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476,\\n481 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)). It makes no\\ndifference that modified scheduling options might have been\\navailable to other HUD employees who obtained permission\\nto telework from their manager.\\n By way of another example, Yochim contends that HUD’s\\noptions were ineffective because requiring her to work in the\\n\\f12 No. 18-3670\\n\\noffice meant that she had to commute on the train and grasp\\nthe handrails with her injured right hand. But the medical rec-\\nords supporting Yochim’s accommodation requests demon-\\nstrated that the only limitation related to her commute was\\nthe need to avoid crowded trains that could cause her to fall\\nor force her to grip the railings. HUD’s proposed accommo-\\ndations addressed these concerns by offering her an adjusted\\nschedule to avoid rush hour.\\n Yochim has offered a few other views as to why HUD’s\\naccommodations were ineffective. She claims that the long\\nten-hour days of her compressed schedule (and HUD’s\\nrequirement that she maintain a set daily schedule) limited\\nher flexibility to make her therapy appointments before or\\nafter work, necessitating that she take sick leave. And she says\\nthat doing so was especially difficult with the sick-leave\\nrestriction imposed by her supervisor. But one purpose of\\npaid sick leave is to allow employees to attend such\\nappointments, and Yochim does not present any evidence\\nthat the leave restriction—which merely required her to\\nsubmit a medical note detailing the time and date of an\\nappointment—interfered with her physical-therapy sessions.\\nNone of Yochim’s remaining arguments persuade us that a\\nreasonable jury could find that the Department’s\\naccommodations were ineffective.\\n C\\n Finally, Yochim contends that HUD’s refusal to allow her\\nto work from home and the imposition of her sick-leave re-\\nstriction created a “retaliatory hostile work environment” that\\nled to her premature retirement. This court has not deter-\\nmined whether the ADA (and by extension, the Rehabilitation\\nAct) encompasses claims of a hostile work environment.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 13\\n\\nSee Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712–13 (7th Cir.\\n2000). We need not resolve the question here. Even assuming\\nYochim could bring a hostile-work-environment claim, she\\nmust at a minimum demonstrate that the work environment\\nwas both objectively and subjectively offensive because of\\n“severe or pervasive” harassment. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,\\n920 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n At summary judgment, Yochim did not offer evidence\\nshowing that her leave and telework restrictions—actions that\\nare permissible for an employer to take—were so severe or\\npervasive as to “alter the conditions” of employment and\\n“create an abusive working environment.” See id.; see also\\nHerron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (concluding that empr’s disciplinary action for perfor-\\nmance issues was “normal workplace friction”). And it is this\\nevidentiary shortcoming that defeats this dimension of her\\nclaims on summary judgment.\\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3871,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4648867,"string":"4,648,867"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Michael Clark"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2604"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2604\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL CLARK,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cr-53-JDP-1 — James D. Peterson, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Michael\\nClark was convicted of possessing a mixture containing fen-\\ntanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Clark had been\\nfound in a hotel room with more than 80 grams of a mixture\\nof heroin and fentanyl, a digital scale, and cellophane bags.\\nHe does not appeal any aspect of his jury trial, but he chal-\\nlenges the denial of his motion for a Franks hearing challeng-\\ning the issuance of the search warrant for the hotel room. He\\n\\n2 No. 18-2604\\n\\nalso challenges the denial of his motion to suppress without\\nan evidentiary hearing. And he challenges two aspects of his\\nsentence: the guideline treatment of his conviction for drug\\ndistribution that occurred in Illinois seven months after his\\nWisconsin arrest and one condition of supervised release. We\\nvacate Clark’s conviction and remand for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on his Franks challenge. We affirm on the denial of his mo-\\ntion to suppress without a hearing. We also affirm on the\\nguideline issue and determine that the supervised release\\nchallenge was waived. We address in Part I the need for a\\nFranks hearing and in Part II the need for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on the motion to suppress. We address the sentencing is-\\nsues in Part III.\\nI. The Need for a Franks Hearing\\n The Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for the use of\\nsearch warrants calls for probable cause determinations by a\\n“neutral and detached magistrate” as opposed to “officer[s]\\nengaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out\\ncrime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The ap-\\nplication for a warrant “must provide the magistrate with a\\nsubstantial basis for determining the existence of probable\\ncause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).\\n The ability of the neutral and detached magistrate to de-\\ntermine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the infor-\\nmation the police submit. “[A] search warrant is not valid if\\nthe police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting\\nfalse, material information,” or by omitting material infor-\\nmation from the affidavit provided to the issuing judge.\\nUnited States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013),\\nciting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 15556 (1978). To inval-\\nidate a warrant on this basis, a defendant at a so-called Franks\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 3\\n\\nhearing must prove by a preponderance of the evidence either\\nfalsity or recklessness, as well as materiality. McMurtrey, 704\\nF.3d at 509.\\n Merely to obtain a Franks hearing, however, a defendant\\ndoes not need to prove the Franks violation. A defendant must\\nonly make a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the war-\\nrant application contained a material falsity or omission that\\nwould alter the issuing judge’s probable cause determination,\\nand (2) that the affiant included the material falsity or omitted\\ninformation intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the\\ntruth. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014);\\nsee also, e.g., United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702, 708 (7th\\nCir. 2016); United States v. Mullins, 803 F.3d 858, 861–62 (7th\\nCir. 2015); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 887–88 (7th\\nCir. 2008). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not\\nrequired until the Franks hearing itself.” Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n820.\\n Clark asserted in the district court that the police investi-\\ngator who applied for the search warrant of the hotel room\\ndeliberately or recklessly omitted critical information affect-\\ning the credibility of the unidentified informant who told the\\nofficer about drug distribution at the hotel where Clark was\\narrested. The district court denied the motion for an eviden-\\ntiary hearing on the question. The court agreed that the police\\nhad provided no information about the informant’s credibil-\\nity. The court found, however, that the police had provided\\nsufficient corroboration for the informant’s tip so that the war-\\nrant did not depend on the informant’s credibility. That\\nmeant the omitted credibility information was not material\\nfor Franks purposes. We disagree and find that a hearing is\\nneeded. “[W]e review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear\\n\\n4 No. 18-2604\\n\\nerror, but any legal determinations that factored into the rul-\\ning are reviewed de novo.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 815; see also Han-\\ncock, 844 F.3d at 70708.\\n A. The Warrant Application\\n Investigator Todd Maas is a police officer in Superior, Wis-\\nconsin. He prepared the warrant application and signed the\\nsupporting affidavit. Maas said that a confidential informant\\ncontacted him on October 14, 2015 and told him that earlier\\nthat day, he had driven someone to a parking lot adjacent to\\nthe Baywalk Inn in Superior to buy heroin from a black male\\ncalled “Big Mike,” the brother of “Toonchie.” Maas said he\\nand another officer then performed their own investigations,\\nincluding surveillance of the parking lot. Maas observed a\\nblack male leave the hotel and enter and then exit at least five\\ncars in the hotel parking lot. He also learned that the guest\\nstaying in Room 203 was the only hotel guest who both had\\npaid in cash and was staying only one night, all behavior that\\nMaas said was typical of drug trafficking, based on his train-\\ning and experience. Maas also said he had spoken to a woman\\n(referred to in this case as the “mom on a mission”) who said\\nthat her daughter was a heroin addict and that she (the\\nmother) had followed a man she suspected of drug-dealing to\\nRoom 203.\\n Maas included all of this information in his affidavit,\\nwhich convinced a state trial judge to issue a search warrant\\nfor Room 203. Maas did not include any damaging infor-\\nmation about the credibility of his confidential informant,\\nwho was the only source of information specifically about\\ndrug trafficking. The informant was being paid for his ser-\\nvices. He also had two pending criminal charges against him,\\nfifteen prior convictions, and a history of opiate and cocaine\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 5\\n\\nabuse, and he was hoping to receive a reduced sentence in ex-\\nchange for his cooperation.\\n B. Materiality\\n Where an affidavit is based primarily on tips from an in-\\nformant, probable cause can be shown based on the totality of\\nthe circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n816. In cases based on informants’ tips, we have identified five\\nfactors of particular relevance: (1) the level of detail the in-\\nformant provided; (2) the extent to which the informant’s in-\\nformation is based on his or her own first-hand observations;\\n(3) the degree to which police have corroborated the inform-\\nant’s information; (4) the time elapsed between the events re-\\nported and the warrant application; (5) and “whether the in-\\nformant appeared or testified before the magistrate.” Glover,\\n755 F.3d at 816, citing United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594,\\n600 (7th Cir. 2011). Information omitted from a warrant appli-\\ncation is material when its omission affects the probable cause\\ndetermination. Glover, 755 F.3d at 820.\\n In performing this probable cause inquiry, courts must\\nkeep in mind that a search warrant for a home, business, or\\neven hotel room can authorize highly intrusive and even de-\\nstructive actions by the police, and that informants, especially\\nin drug cases, can be unreliable and motivated by rivalries or\\nrevenge. United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.\\n2018), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1617 (1968) (“What\\nwe blandly call ‘Terry stops’ can be highly intrusive.” They are\\n“not just ‘a “petty indignity,”’ wrote the Supreme Court, but\\n‘a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a person, which may\\ninflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is\\nnot to be undertaken lightly’”); United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d\\n1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2009) (“For all we know, [the informant]\\n\\n6 No. 18-2604\\n\\ncould have been a rival drug dealer, an angry customer, or\\nhad some other beef” with the defendant).\\n Our cases do not hold that a Franks hearing is required\\nevery time some substantial adverse information about an in-\\nformant’s credibility is omitted from a probable cause affida-\\nvit. Hancock, 844 F.3d at 709. We have said generally that\\nwhere a warrant is obtained based on an informant’s tip, “in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility or potential bias\\nis crucial.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 816; see, e.g., United States v.\\nBradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018). That being said,\\nwe also have upheld warrants tainted by police omission of\\nadverse informant credibility information. Our Franks hearing\\ncases show that when police have sufficiently corroborated an\\ninformant’s tip, the omission of facts pertaining to the inform-\\nant’s credibility may not be material.\\n In United States v. Musgraves, for example, the police omit-\\nted from the affidavit important and damaging credibility in-\\nformation about one informant. 831 F.3d 454, 45960 (7th Cir.\\n2016). We affirmed the denial of a Franks hearing because a\\nsecond affidavit included information from a second inform-\\nant without credibility problems who had provided the police\\nwith specific and timely information about the suspect’s drug\\ntrafficking to support the warrant. Id. at 46061.\\n In United States v. Bradford, we also held that the affidavit’s\\nomission of facts damaging to an informant’s credibility did\\nnot require suppression of evidence seized with a search war-\\nrant for drug and weapons trafficking. 905 F.3d at 50305. In\\nBradford, the application failed to disclose that the informant\\nhad three felony convictions, was on probation, and was be-\\ning paid for his help. Id. at 502. But his information was fresh,\\nspecific, and corroborated by his having carried out\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 7\\n\\ncontrolled drug buys from the target and by specific infor-\\nmation from another informant without his credibility prob-\\nlems. Id. at 504\\n In United States v. Hancock, we affirmed the denial of a\\nFranks hearing in similar circumstances. 844 F.3d at 710. An\\ninformant provided fresh, detailed information about a sus-\\npect’s drug sales, but the affidavit for the warrant left out in-\\nformation about the informant’s own criminal history and the\\nfact that he was in custody when he provided the information.\\nId. at 70506. We found that the omissions were not material\\nbecause the warrant application included extensive corrobo-\\nration of the suspect’s drug trafficking and intimidation of\\nwitnesses. That corroboration came from other informants, a\\nsearch of a cellular telephone showing texts referring to drug\\ndeals, and from an earlier interview with the suspect himself.\\nThe quantity and quality of corroborating information meant\\nthat the omitted adverse credibility information about one in-\\nformant did not require a Franks hearing. Id. at 70710.\\n This case is readily distinguishable. This warrant applica-\\ntion did not include any of the substantial adverse information\\nMaas had about the informant’s credibility. The government\\ndoes not try to justify Maas’s omissions, but it argues that the\\ninformant’s credibility was not material to the warrant appli-\\ncation because Maas and his colleague investigated and cor-\\nroborated the informant’s tip sufficiently to provide probable\\ncause independent of that tip. We disagree.\\n The corroboration in this case was much weaker than in\\nthe cases where we upheld warrants’ validity in the face of\\ncredibility omissions. This case is more akin to Glover, where\\nthe warrant application depended so heavily on the credibil-\\nity of the informant. Here, the police had no controlled buys.\\n\\n8 No. 18-2604\\n\\nThey never saw money or drugs change hands. Even the in-\\nformant did not claim to have seen drugs or money change\\nhands. If his tip did not pan out, he had plenty of deniability.\\nHe claimed only that his passenger had met with “Big Mike”\\noutside his presence to buy heroin. And the “mom on a mis-\\nsion” had no track record of credibility and provided no spe-\\ncifics to support her suspicions of the man she had followed\\nto Room 203. In sum, the foundation for probable cause inde-\\npendent of the credibility of the informant was so meager in\\nthis case that the credibility of the informant was material for\\nFranks purposes.\\n C. Deliberate or Reckless Omissions?\\n To obtain a Franks hearing, Clark needed to “offer direct\\nevidence of [Maas’s] state of mind or circumstantial evidence\\nthat [Maas] had a subjective intent to deceive based on the na-\\nture of [his] omissions.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. In his report\\nand recommendation to the district court, we must note, the\\nmagistrate judge in Clark’s case incorrectly read our decision\\nin Glover to “mandate that … court[s] infer recklessness from\\nthe fact that an officer omitted known and substantial adverse\\ninformation from a search warrant affidavit….” That is not\\ncorrect. In Glover, we held that “credibility omissions them-\\nselves, even in the absence of more direct evidence of the of-\\nficer’s state of mind, provide sufficient circumstantial evi-\\ndence to support a reasonable and thus permissible inference\\nof reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. (emphasis added). In\\nother words, credibility omissions do not require courts to in-\\nfer recklessness. Such omissions are matters for a trier of fact\\nto weigh, just as when a witness testifies incorrectly or falsely\\nabout one or a few matters, and the trier of fact must weigh\\nthe rest of the witness’s testimony.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 9\\n\\n In this case, the questions of materiality and the police af-\\nfiant’s state of mind are intertwined. To the extent that cor-\\nroboration might have avoided the need for a Franks hearing\\nin this case, the reliability of the corroboration all depended,\\nfrom the issuing judge’s point of view, on the same officer\\nwhose credibility is at issue: Maas omitted all adverse infor-\\nmation he had about the credibility of the informant who pro-\\nvided the most specific (but still second-hand) information\\nabout drug trafficking. As noted, the omission of so much im-\\nportant information permits (but does not require) an infer-\\nence that the omissions were deliberate or reckless. If the\\nshowing of probable cause in the warrant application de-\\npended on the credibility of the informant, that permissible\\ninference should be enough to obtain a Franks hearing.\\n The district court’s and government’s rationale for deny-\\ning a Franks hearing is that Maas’s own observations supply\\nprobable cause, independent of the informant. We assume\\nthat if Maas’s own observations are credited, they could lead\\na reasonable judge to find probable cause, though the appli-\\ncation would have been much weaker without the inform-\\nant’s tip to Maas. The problem is that Maas’s credibility can\\nlegitimately be questioned here based on what could have\\nbeen deliberate or reckless omissions of information about the\\ncredibility of the informant.\\n This is where materiality and intent become intertwined.\\nIf the omissions were deliberate or reckless, it would not be\\nunreasonable to take seriously the prospect that other por-\\ntions of the same warrant application may have been deliber-\\nately or recklessly false. Judges often instruct jurors that if\\nthey believe a witness has lied intentionally about a material\\nmatter, they may (but are not required to) discount the\\n\\n10 No. 18-2604\\n\\nwitness’s testimony on other matters. See United States v.\\nWeinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1971) (no positive rule\\nof law excludes witness’s testimony entirely based on willful\\nfalsehood, but such falsification presents issue for jury to con-\\nsider in weighing rest of testimony), quoting Knowles v. People,\\n15 Mich. 408, 412 (1867); Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E, Grenig, and\\nWilliam C. Lee, 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. §§ 15:0106 (6th ed.\\n2019).\\n The same point is at the heart of the Supreme Court’s ju-\\nrisprudence on impeachment evidence in Brady cases. Brady\\nv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny establish that\\ngovernment-suppressed evidence is material “if there is a rea-\\nsonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the\\nresult of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles v.\\nWhitely, 514 U.S. 419, 43334 (1995), quoting United States v.\\nBagley, 473 U.S. 657, 682 (1985). Strong, non-cumulative evi-\\ndence that undermines the credibility of an important govern-\\nment witness satisfies that definition. Sims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d\\n1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The reason is simple. Evidence in-\\ndicating that a witness whose testimony “may well be deter-\\nminative of guilt or innocence” is unreliable might prompt a\\njury to distrust everything the witness says. Giglio v. United\\nStates, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The same logic applies in this\\ncontext. Maas’s potentially intentional or reckless omission\\ncompromises his credibility, which determines whether prob-\\nable cause for the warrant existed or not.\\n To be clear, we are not saying or finding here that Maas\\nwas in fact deliberately or recklessly deceptive. The issue on\\nappeal is only whether Clark was entitled to a hearing, one\\nwhere Maas’s credibility could be addressed with evidence\\nfrom both sides. The informant was the only source of\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 11\\n\\ninformation (and again, that was only second-hand) who said\\nthe person in Room 203 was actually dealing drugs. All of the\\nother information in the warrant application indicated\\ngrounds for suspicion, but we can assume that Maas had a\\ngood reason for including the informant’s more specific infor-\\nmation. The complete omission of the available damaging in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility permits an infer-\\nence that Maas was not being honest and careful with the is-\\nsuing court. Whether he in fact was honest and careful about\\nthe facts is an appropriate subject for the Franks hearing on\\nremand.1\\nII. The Timing of the Warrant and Search\\n Defendant Clark was in Room 203 when police executed\\nthe warrant. Also in the room were cellophane bags, a digital\\nscale, and approximately 82 grams of a mixture of heroin and\\nfentanyl. The police photographed the hotel room during\\ntheir search. In a photograph of suspected drugs on a\\nnightstand, a digital clock is visible, reading 8:15 p.m. If the\\nclock was correct, the search was executed at least 25 minutes\\nbefore the judge issued the warrant.\\n\\n\\n 1 Maas’s application also did not explain why the informant would\\nknow heroin if he saw it. See United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 75657 (7th\\nCir. 2003) (no probable cause for search warrant where affidavit was based\\non informant’s report of seeing drugs in defendant’s house, but according\\nto affidavit, informant failed to give details about specific location and\\namount of drugs, or any explanation as to how informant knew that what\\nshe saw were controlled substances). Nor did Maas provide the kind of\\ndetail about his own training and experience that is needed to justify reli-\\nance upon them. See generally, e.g., United States v. Scott, 901 F.3d 842, 845\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (“Details … are vital when an officer proposes his own\\ntraining and experience as the basis of a warrant”).\\n\\n12 No. 18-2604\\n\\n The police of course are not permitted to rely on a search\\nwarrant that has not yet been approved by a judge. The dis-\\ntrict court denied Clark’s motion to suppress without a hear-\\ning. The issue here is whether the photograph of the clock was\\nsufficient evidence for Clark to have an evidentiary hearing\\non his motion to suppress.\\n A defendant who requests a suppression hearing must\\npresent “definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural facts\\n… demonstrat[ing] that there is a disputed material issue of\\nfact.” United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1995);\\nsee United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n“Reliance on vague, conclusory allegations is insufficient.”\\nUnited States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n In response to Clark’s motion to suppress, the government\\nsubmitted the “metadata” from the digital camera. The\\nmetadata showed a host of data about each photograph, in-\\ncluding the time each was taken. The metadata showed that\\nall of the search photographs were taken between 10:36 and\\n10:52 p.m., well after the judge issued the search warrant.\\nClark responded in turn not with an affidavit from any wit-\\nness to the search but with results of Google searches about\\nhow to edit metadata for photographs. In light of the\\nmetadata, and in the absence of any specific indications that\\ndata had been altered, the district court decided that there was\\nno need for a hearing and denied Clark’s motion to suppress.\\n The situation here is similar to United States v. Woods, 995\\nF.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1993).2 In Woods, the police conducted a\\n\\n 2 Another portion of the Woods opinion was abrogated by the Supreme\\n\\nCourt’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), as we noted\\nin United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 13\\n\\nsearch on February 12th. The problem was that both the war-\\nrant and the supporting affidavit bore handwritten dates of\\nFebruary 14th, though both were also date-stamped February\\n11th. The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the\\nsearch had been executed two days before the warrant was\\nissued. The government responded with an affidavit from a\\nprosecutor testifying that the application and warrant were\\nboth prepared and signed on February 11th and that the Feb-\\nruary 14th dates were mistakes. Using language associated\\nwith civil motions for summary judgment—“disputed issues\\nof material fact” and “genuine factual dispute”—we affirmed\\nthe district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress\\nwithout a hearing. Because the defendant had failed to re-\\nspond to the government’s explanation, we agreed that he\\nhad failed to show a genuine factual dispute and a need for\\nan evidentiary hearing. Id. at 715–16.\\n One might argue that in Woods the government submitted\\nan affidavit to explain the discrepancy, while the government\\nhere submitted letters and copies of documents, without any\\naffidavits. Both parties here submitted various documents to\\nthe district court with this less formal approach. But the bur-\\nden is on the defendant to support his motion to suppress.\\nMissing from this record is an assertion by any witness—de-\\nfendant Clark or anyone else—to the effect that the search ac-\\ntually occurred at 8:15 p.m. and that the clock was correct.\\nWithout such an assertion, whether in an affidavit or other-\\nwise (given the less formal procedures being used in the dis-\\ntrict court), the Google search results about how to alter\\nmetadata merely invite speculation. The district court did not\\nerr by denying the motion to suppress, to the extent it was\\nbased on the photograph of the clock, without a hearing.\\n\\n14 No. 18-2604\\n\\nIII. Sentencing Issues\\n A. Relevant Conduct Under the Guidelines\\n Clark also challenges two aspects of his sentence. The first\\nis a Sentencing Guidelines issue concerning the scope of his\\nrelevant conduct and criminal history, which are two sides of\\nthe same coin here. The U.S. Probation Office prepared a Pre-\\nSentence Report for Clark. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)\\nand (c)(8) of the 2016 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the PSR\\ncalculated Clark’s base offense level as 24 because he pos-\\nsessed between 40 and 160 grams of a substance containing\\nfentanyl. No other adjustments applied, so his total offense\\nlevel remained 24. The PSR also determined that Clark had 11\\ncriminal history points and was in criminal history category\\nV. Three of those 11 points were from a 2017 federal convic-\\ntion for drug distribution stemming from events that occurred\\nin Illinois after Clark was arrested in this Wisconsin federal\\ncase. Clark also received three points for a prior felony drug\\nconviction in Minnesota. Because of the Minnesota convic-\\ntion, Clark faced a 120-month mandatory minimum pursuant\\nto 21 U.S.C. § 851. (If not for the enhancement, Clark would\\nhave had an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months.)\\n Both the government and Clark argued for the 120-month\\nmandatory minimum sentence. The district court adopted the\\nfacts of the PSR and determined that the PSR had calculated\\ncorrectly Clark’s offense level, criminal history, and guideline\\nrange. The court sentenced Clark to 120 months in prison to\\nbe served consecutively to the 71-month sentence he had re-\\nceived in the Illinois case.\\n On appeal, Clark argues that his later drug offense in the\\nIllinois conviction should be treated under the Sentencing\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 15\\n\\nGuidelines as “relevant conduct” for this case rather than as\\npart of his criminal history. That means, he contends, his 120-\\nmonth sentence in this case should run concurrently with the\\n71-month sentence he received in Illinois. Clark did not raise\\nthis argument in the district court. At sentencing, the govern-\\nment asked that Clark’s sentence run consecutively to his Illi-\\nnois sentence. Clark did not object. He requested only that\\nthis sentence run concurrently with any state sentence. The\\ngovernment argues that Clark therefore waived this issue.\\n Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right,\\nwhereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant “negligently fails\\nto assert a right in a timely fashion.” United States v. Brodie,\\n507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 733 (1993). Concurrent sentences would reduce sig-\\nnificantly the time Clark spends in prison. There is no reason\\nfor us to draw the inference here that Clark intentionally\\nwaived this argument. “Waiver principles should be con-\\nstrued liberally in favor of the defendant,” and we are hesi-\\ntant, without more, to construe a defendant’s failure to object\\nto a PSR as an intentional relinquishment of a known right.\\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 84849 (7th Cir.\\n2005). This is especially the case where, as here, the defendant\\nhad no strategic reason to forgo this sentencing argument. See\\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Plain-error review, however, does not win relief for Clark\\non this issue. Plain-error review allows reversal where: (1)\\nthere was an error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error af-\\nfected the substantial rights of the defendant; and (4) the error\\nseriously impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation\\nof the proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 73238; United States v.\\nDuran, 407 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, we need not\\n\\n16 No. 18-2604\\n\\naddress the third and fourth elements. If any error occurred\\nat all, it was not “plain.”\\n Under § 5G1.3(b) of the Guidelines, where a defendant has\\nan undischarged term of imprisonment, and where the con-\\nduct that led to the undischarged sentence\\n is relevant conduct to the instant offense of con-\\n viction under the provisions of subsections\\n (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Con-\\n duct), the sentence for the instant offense shall\\n be imposed as follows:\\n (1) The court shall adjust the sentence for\\n any period of imprisonment already\\n served on the undischarged term of im-\\n prisonment if the court determines that\\n such period of imprisonment will not be\\n credited to the federal sentence by the\\n Bureau of Prisons; and\\n (2) the sentence for the instant offense\\n shall be imposed to run concurrently to\\n the remainder of the undischarged term\\n of imprisonment.\\nSection 5G1.3(d) further advises that “in any other case in-\\nvolving an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence\\nfor the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently,\\npartially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undis-\\ncharged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable pun-\\nishment for the instant offense.” So if Clark’s Illinois offense\\nwas relevant conduct here, the Guidelines would recommend\\nconcurrent sentences. If his Illinois offense was not relevant\\nconduct here, the choice of consecutive or concurrent\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 17\\n\\nsentences is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge, and\\nthere is no reason to find an abuse of discretion here.\\n As for the scope of relevant conduct, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) pro-\\nvides that “relevant conduct” is based on “all acts and omis-\\nsions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, in-\\nduced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.” “Sec-\\ntion 1B1.3(a)(2) applies to grouped offenses and includes ‘all\\nacts and omissions described in subdivisions 1(A) and 1(B)\\nthat were part of the same course of conduct or common\\nscheme or plan as the offense of conviction.’” United States v.\\nSchrode, 839 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting U.S.S.G.\\n§ 1B1.3(a)(2).\\n “In assessing whether offenses are part of the same course\\nof conduct, we focus on whether the government has demon-\\nstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and temporal prox-\\nimity.” United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(internal citations omitted). In considering whether an offense\\nis relevant within the meaning of § 1B1.3, our court has em-\\nphasized several factors that should guide courts’ analysis.\\n“Sufficient factual overlap exists where the past and present\\noffenses involve the same victims, stem from the same under-\\nlying conduct, or are in fact similar offenses.” United States v.\\nOrozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2016); see also\\nUnited States v. Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2003) (in\\ndeciding relevant conduct in drug cases, courts look for “a\\nstrong relationship between the uncharged conduct and the\\nconvicted offense, focusing on whether the government has\\ndemonstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and tem-\\nporal proximity”), quoting United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275,\\n279 (7th Cir. 1996). The relevant conduct issue is similar to the\\nissue in calculating criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2\\n\\n18 No. 18-2604\\n\\n(defining “prior sentence”), where two similar prior convic-\\ntions separated by an intervening arrest are counted sepa-\\nrately. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.\\n2003); United States v. Bradley, 218 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n The district court did not plainly err in not treating Clark’s\\nlater offense in Illinois as relevant conduct for his Wisconsin\\nconviction. To support his argument, Clark points to facts set\\nforth in his Wisconsin PSR. The PSR explained that Clark trav-\\neled to Chicago to obtain the drugs that he would then sell in\\nWisconsin. This fact, Clark asserts, establishes that his drug\\nactivities in both states were part of the same course of con-\\nduct, his fentanyl-trafficking enterprise.\\n Under our precedents, this argument faces obvious “tem-\\nporal proximity” and “similarity” problems. First, Clark was\\narrested in Wisconsin seven months before he was arrested\\nfor selling a fentanyl mixture in Illinois. Further, the offenses\\nwere dissimilar. In Wisconsin, Clark possessed more than 80\\ngrams of fentanyl, most of which was packaged in retail pack-\\nages of 0.5 grams. In Illinois, by contrast, he was arrested for\\nselling a confidential informant more than 65.2 grams of fen-\\ntanyl. And even if the offenses had been more similar, “the\\nfact that a defendant commits a certain type of offense on mul-\\ntiple occasions does not inevitably mean that each separate\\noffense is part of the same course of conduct.” Schrode, 839\\nF.3d at 552. There is not enough here to have required the dis-\\ntrict court to have found such strong connections between\\nthese two drug offenses, especially without an objection by\\nthe defense to that effect. The offenses involved different buy-\\ners, in different cities, in different types of quantities, months\\napart, and with an intervening arrest for the Wisconsin of-\\nfense.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 19\\n\\n “An error is ‘plain’ if the law at the time of appellate re-\\nview shows clearly that it was an error.” United States v.\\nPierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Henderson v.\\nUnited States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013). Clark cannot establish\\nwith precedent or otherwise that the district court should\\nhave acted sua sponte to treat his Illinois offense as conduct\\nrelevant to his Wisconsin charge. Even if there might have\\nbeen an error, it was not plain error to run Clark’s two federal\\nsentences consecutively.\\n B. Supervised Release Condition\\n Finally, the district court imposed a supervised release\\ncondition that Clark “Not meet, communicate or spend time\\nwith any persons known by defendant to be a member of or\\naffiliate of any known street gang.” On appeal, Clark argues\\nthat the term “affiliate” is unconstitutionally vague. He did\\nnot object to this condition at sentencing.\\n In at least scores of appeals over the past five years, in the\\nwake of United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014),\\nUnited States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), and\\nUnited States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015), this court\\nhas wrestled with how best to handle appellate challenges to\\nsupervised release conditions that were not raised in the dis-\\ntrict court. Our recent opinion in United States v. Flores, 929\\nF.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019), should bring some order to our\\ncaselaw in this niche of waiver law, particularly since it was\\ncirculated to the entire court under Circuit Rule 40(e), and no\\njudge voted to hear the case en banc. Special considerations\\napply to our handling of supervised release conditions both\\nbecause they are usually the least salient concern at the time\\nof sentencing and, more important, because a defendant may\\nchallenge them in the district court at any time. See Flores, 929\\n\\n20 No. 18-2604\\n\\nF.3d at 451, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); see also United States\\nv. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant waived\\nchallenge to supervised release condition: “sentencing in the\\ndistrict court is the main event”).\\n This case meets the standards of waiver set forth in Flores:\\nClark had prior notice of the proposed conditions, including\\nthe “affiliate” condition. He had a meaningful opportunity to\\nobject, and his lawyer told the judge that the proposed condi-\\ntions were acceptable. Clark even raised other objections to\\nthe PSR prior to sentencing but did not challenge this condi-\\ntion, which signals an intentional decision not to object. See\\nFlores, 929 F.3d at 449.\\n We REVERSE the district court’s denial of Clark’s motion\\nfor a Franks hearing without an evidentiary hearing. We\\nVACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for a\\nFranks hearing and appropriate action based on the outcome\\nof that hearing, either granting Clark’s motion to suppress or,\\nif his motion is denied, reinstating the convictions and sen-\\ntence. If the judgment is reinstated, the denial of Clark’s mo-\\ntion to suppress and the district court’s sentence are\\nAFFIRMED.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 21\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426120/\", \"author_raw\": \"HAMILTON, Circuit Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. The panel opin-\\nion is well done, and I join all parts of it except the conclusion\\nthat the district court should have granted Michael Clark’s\\nmotion for a Franks hearing. In my view, Investigator Todd\\nMaas’s affidavit supporting the search warrant, while omit-\\nting facts damaging to the confidential informant’s credibil-\\nity—facts that unquestionably should have been included—\\nadequately corroborated the information supplied by the in-\\nformant. The district judge reached this precise conclusion,\\nand under the deferential standard that guides our review on\\nappeal, we should affirm. There was no clear error here.\\n I\\n The majority’s opinion correctly articulates the standard\\nfor obtaining a Franks hearing: a defendant must make a sub-\\nstantial preliminary showing that an officer intentionally or\\nrecklessly omitted information from a search warrant affida-\\nvit and the omissions were material to the probable cause de-\\ntermination. See United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th\\nCir. 2014). The majority also rightly observes that the omis-\\nsion of adverse information about an informant’s credibility\\ndoes not automatically warrant a hearing. See United States v.\\nHancock, 844 F.3d 702, 709 (7th Cir. 2016). Instead the proper\\nquestion is whether the affidavit would have established\\nprobable cause if the omitted information had been included.\\nSee id. at 708. To make this determination, we consider the\\ntotality of the circumstances, including “the extent to which\\nthe police have corroborated the informant’s statements.”\\nUnited States v. Sutton, 742 F.3d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n All agree that Investigator Maas failed to disclose critical\\nfacts about the informant’s background. In my judgment,\\nthough, the warrant application had sufficient corroboration\\n\\n22 No. 18-2604\\n\\nto overcome this omission and establish the requisite proba-\\nble cause to search hotel room 203 at the Baywalk Inn. Maas\\ntook care to include three key pieces of corroborating evi-\\ndence in his affidavit:\\n In response to the informant’s tip about possible drug\\n dealing at the Baywalk Inn, Investigator Maas sur-\\n veilled the hotel and observed a black male exit the\\n hotel and quickly enter and exit at least five cars.\\n Drawing on his experience as a narcotics investigator,\\n Maas characterized this conduct as “textbook behav-\\n ior to dealing narcotics.”\\n Maas discovered that only two of the hotel’s 25 rooms\\n had been rented with cash, with only one of the two—\\n room 203—being rented for one night, which Maas\\n explained was consistent with drug trafficking be-\\n cause “drug dealers usually pay in cash and only stay\\n one or two nights so to throw off police.”\\n Maas also reported that, upon arriving at the hotel, he\\n had a conversation with a woman he identified by\\n name in the warrant application, who said her 20-\\n year-old daughter was addicted to heroin. The\\n woman added that, before the officer arrived, she was\\n “also watching the black male who [was] suspected to\\n be dealing” and she followed him to room 203.\\n The majority’s analysis discounts this information, reason-\\ning that Investigator Maas’s omission of material facts about\\nthe informant’s background compromised his credibility on\\nall other portions of the warrant application. Put another way,\\nif Maas omitted critical information about the informant’s re-\\nliability, nothing else he included in his affidavit deserved to\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 23\\n\\nbe credited as part of the probable cause analysis. But our case\\nlaw does not require such broad discounting and distrust. See,\\ne.g., United States v. Bradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–05. The district\\ncourt was not required to view as worthless the entirety of the\\ncorroborating information provided by Maas.\\n To be sure, a court faced with a reckless or intentional\\nomission of material information may consider whether (and\\nto what extent) the omission bears on the officer’s credibility\\nas part of its probable cause analysis. But I cannot say that the\\ndistrict court clearly erred, in light of other corroborating ev-\\nidence, by choosing to credit Maas’s affidavit despite his\\nomission. So I would affirm the court’s denial of Clark’s mo-\\ntion for a Franks hearing.\\n II\\n A final observation seems worthwhile. When this case en-\\ntered federal court, a magistrate judge reviewed the state-\\ncourt warrant application and noted that it, like many others\\nprepared by law enforcement officers in Wisconsin, omitted\\ninformation about the confidential informant’s criminal his-\\ntory. The panel’s opinion, aligned with our precedent, rein-\\nforces that this information is essential to a proper probable\\ncause analysis under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United\\nStates v. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 460 (7th Cir. 2016). Given the\\nfrequency with which search warrants sought and executed\\nat the state level result in federal prosecutions, Wisconsin law\\nenforcement would do well to revisit its warrant application\\npractices. Omitting information about an informant’s credi-\\nbility creates real yet avoidable peril. Today’s decision proves\\nthe point.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426120/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648867/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Michael Clark\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2604\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMICHAEL CLARK,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:17-cr-53-JDP-1 — James D. Peterson, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Michael\nClark was convicted of possessing a mixture containing fen-\ntanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Clark had been\nfound in a hotel room with more than 80 grams of a mixture\nof heroin and fentanyl, a digital scale, and cellophane bags.\nHe does not appeal any aspect of his jury trial, but he chal-\nlenges the denial of his motion for a Franks hearing challeng-\ning the issuance of the search warrant for the hotel room. He\n\n2 No. 18-2604\n\nalso challenges the denial of his motion to suppress without\nan evidentiary hearing. And he challenges two aspects of his\nsentence: the guideline treatment of his conviction for drug\ndistribution that occurred in Illinois seven months after his\nWisconsin arrest and one condition of supervised release. We\nvacate Clark’s conviction and remand for an evidentiary hear-\ning on his Franks challenge. We affirm on the denial of his mo-\ntion to suppress without a hearing. We also affirm on the\nguideline issue and determine that the supervised release\nchallenge was waived. We address in Part I the need for a\nFranks hearing and in Part II the need for an evidentiary hear-\ning on the motion to suppress. We address the sentencing is-\nsues in Part III.\nI. The Need for a Franks Hearing\n The Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for the use of\nsearch warrants calls for probable cause determinations by a\n“neutral and detached magistrate” as opposed to “officer[s]\nengaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out\ncrime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The ap-\nplication for a warrant “must provide the magistrate with a\nsubstantial basis for determining the existence of probable\ncause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).\n The ability of the neutral and detached magistrate to de-\ntermine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the infor-\nmation the police submit. “[A] search warrant is not valid if\nthe police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting\nfalse, material information,” or by omitting material infor-\nmation from the affidavit provided to the issuing judge.\nUnited States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013),\nciting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 15556 (1978). To inval-\nidate a warrant on this basis, a defendant at a so-called Franks\n\nNo. 18-2604 3\n\nhearing must prove by a preponderance of the evidence either\nfalsity or recklessness, as well as materiality. McMurtrey, 704\nF.3d at 509.\n Merely to obtain a Franks hearing, however, a defendant\ndoes not need to prove the Franks violation. A defendant must\nonly make a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the war-\nrant application contained a material falsity or omission that\nwould alter the issuing judge’s probable cause determination,\nand (2) that the affiant included the material falsity or omitted\ninformation intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the\ntruth. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014);\nsee also, e.g., United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702, 708 (7th\nCir. 2016); United States v. Mullins, 803 F.3d 858, 861–62 (7th\nCir. 2015); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 887–88 (7th\nCir. 2008). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not\nrequired until the Franks hearing itself.” Glover, 755 F.3d at\n820.\n Clark asserted in the district court that the police investi-\ngator who applied for the search warrant of the hotel room\ndeliberately or recklessly omitted critical information affect-\ning the credibility of the unidentified informant who told the\nofficer about drug distribution at the hotel where Clark was\narrested. The district court denied the motion for an eviden-\ntiary hearing on the question. The court agreed that the police\nhad provided no information about the informant’s credibil-\nity. The court found, however, that the police had provided\nsufficient corroboration for the informant’s tip so that the war-\nrant did not depend on the informant’s credibility. That\nmeant the omitted credibility information was not material\nfor Franks purposes. We disagree and find that a hearing is\nneeded. “[W]e review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear\n\n4 No. 18-2604\n\nerror, but any legal determinations that factored into the rul-\ning are reviewed de novo.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 815; see also Han-\ncock, 844 F.3d at 70708.\n A. The Warrant Application\n Investigator Todd Maas is a police officer in Superior, Wis-\nconsin. He prepared the warrant application and signed the\nsupporting affidavit. Maas said that a confidential informant\ncontacted him on October 14, 2015 and told him that earlier\nthat day, he had driven someone to a parking lot adjacent to\nthe Baywalk Inn in Superior to buy heroin from a black male\ncalled “Big Mike,” the brother of “Toonchie.” Maas said he\nand another officer then performed their own investigations,\nincluding surveillance of the parking lot. Maas observed a\nblack male leave the hotel and enter and then exit at least five\ncars in the hotel parking lot. He also learned that the guest\nstaying in Room 203 was the only hotel guest who both had\npaid in cash and was staying only one night, all behavior that\nMaas said was typical of drug trafficking, based on his train-\ning and experience. Maas also said he had spoken to a woman\n(referred to in this case as the “mom on a mission”) who said\nthat her daughter was a heroin addict and that she (the\nmother) had followed a man she suspected of drug-dealing to\nRoom 203.\n Maas included all of this information in his affidavit,\nwhich convinced a state trial judge to issue a search warrant\nfor Room 203. Maas did not include any damaging infor-\nmation about the credibility of his confidential informant,\nwho was the only source of information specifically about\ndrug trafficking. The informant was being paid for his ser-\nvices. He also had two pending criminal charges against him,\nfifteen prior convictions, and a history of opiate and cocaine\n\nNo. 18-2604 5\n\nabuse, and he was hoping to receive a reduced sentence in ex-\nchange for his cooperation.\n B. Materiality\n Where an affidavit is based primarily on tips from an in-\nformant, probable cause can be shown based on the totality of\nthe circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Glover, 755 F.3d at\n816. In cases based on informants’ tips, we have identified five\nfactors of particular relevance: (1) the level of detail the in-\nformant provided; (2) the extent to which the informant’s in-\nformation is based on his or her own first-hand observations;\n(3) the degree to which police have corroborated the inform-\nant’s information; (4) the time elapsed between the events re-\nported and the warrant application; (5) and “whether the in-\nformant appeared or testified before the magistrate.” Glover,\n755 F.3d at 816, citing United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594,\n600 (7th Cir. 2011). Information omitted from a warrant appli-\ncation is material when its omission affects the probable cause\ndetermination. Glover, 755 F.3d at 820.\n In performing this probable cause inquiry, courts must\nkeep in mind that a search warrant for a home, business, or\neven hotel room can authorize highly intrusive and even de-\nstructive actions by the police, and that informants, especially\nin drug cases, can be unreliable and motivated by rivalries or\nrevenge. United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.\n2018), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1617 (1968) (“What\nwe blandly call ‘Terry stops’ can be highly intrusive.” They are\n“not just ‘a “petty indignity,”’ wrote the Supreme Court, but\n‘a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a person, which may\ninflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is\nnot to be undertaken lightly’”); United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d\n1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2009) (“For all we know, [the informant]\n\n6 No. 18-2604\n\ncould have been a rival drug dealer, an angry customer, or\nhad some other beef” with the defendant).\n Our cases do not hold that a Franks hearing is required\nevery time some substantial adverse information about an in-\nformant’s credibility is omitted from a probable cause affida-\nvit. Hancock, 844 F.3d at 709. We have said generally that\nwhere a warrant is obtained based on an informant’s tip, “in-\nformation about the informant’s credibility or potential bias\nis crucial.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 816; see, e.g., United States v.\nBradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018). That being said,\nwe also have upheld warrants tainted by police omission of\nadverse informant credibility information. Our Franks hearing\ncases show that when police have sufficiently corroborated an\ninformant’s tip, the omission of facts pertaining to the inform-\nant’s credibility may not be material.\n In United States v. Musgraves, for example, the police omit-\nted from the affidavit important and damaging credibility in-\nformation about one informant. 831 F.3d 454, 45960 (7th Cir.\n2016). We affirmed the denial of a Franks hearing because a\nsecond affidavit included information from a second inform-\nant without credibility problems who had provided the police\nwith specific and timely information about the suspect’s drug\ntrafficking to support the warrant. Id. at 46061.\n In United States v. Bradford, we also held that the affidavit’s\nomission of facts damaging to an informant’s credibility did\nnot require suppression of evidence seized with a search war-\nrant for drug and weapons trafficking. 905 F.3d at 50305. In\nBradford, the application failed to disclose that the informant\nhad three felony convictions, was on probation, and was be-\ning paid for his help. Id. at 502. But his information was fresh,\nspecific, and corroborated by his having carried out\n\nNo. 18-2604 7\n\ncontrolled drug buys from the target and by specific infor-\nmation from another informant without his credibility prob-\nlems. Id. at 504\n In United States v. Hancock, we affirmed the denial of a\nFranks hearing in similar circumstances. 844 F.3d at 710. An\ninformant provided fresh, detailed information about a sus-\npect’s drug sales, but the affidavit for the warrant left out in-\nformation about the informant’s own criminal history and the\nfact that he was in custody when he provided the information.\nId. at 70506. We found that the omissions were not material\nbecause the warrant application included extensive corrobo-\nration of the suspect’s drug trafficking and intimidation of\nwitnesses. That corroboration came from other informants, a\nsearch of a cellular telephone showing texts referring to drug\ndeals, and from an earlier interview with the suspect himself.\nThe quantity and quality of corroborating information meant\nthat the omitted adverse credibility information about one in-\nformant did not require a Franks hearing. Id. at 70710.\n This case is readily distinguishable. This warrant applica-\ntion did not include any of the substantial adverse information\nMaas had about the informant’s credibility. The government\ndoes not try to justify Maas’s omissions, but it argues that the\ninformant’s credibility was not material to the warrant appli-\ncation because Maas and his colleague investigated and cor-\nroborated the informant’s tip sufficiently to provide probable\ncause independent of that tip. We disagree.\n The corroboration in this case was much weaker than in\nthe cases where we upheld warrants’ validity in the face of\ncredibility omissions. This case is more akin to Glover, where\nthe warrant application depended so heavily on the credibil-\nity of the informant. Here, the police had no controlled buys.\n\n8 No. 18-2604\n\nThey never saw money or drugs change hands. Even the in-\nformant did not claim to have seen drugs or money change\nhands. If his tip did not pan out, he had plenty of deniability.\nHe claimed only that his passenger had met with “Big Mike”\noutside his presence to buy heroin. And the “mom on a mis-\nsion” had no track record of credibility and provided no spe-\ncifics to support her suspicions of the man she had followed\nto Room 203. In sum, the foundation for probable cause inde-\npendent of the credibility of the informant was so meager in\nthis case that the credibility of the informant was material for\nFranks purposes.\n C. Deliberate or Reckless Omissions?\n To obtain a Franks hearing, Clark needed to “offer direct\nevidence of [Maas’s] state of mind or circumstantial evidence\nthat [Maas] had a subjective intent to deceive based on the na-\nture of [his] omissions.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. In his report\nand recommendation to the district court, we must note, the\nmagistrate judge in Clark’s case incorrectly read our decision\nin Glover to “mandate that … court[s] infer recklessness from\nthe fact that an officer omitted known and substantial adverse\ninformation from a search warrant affidavit….” That is not\ncorrect. In Glover, we held that “credibility omissions them-\nselves, even in the absence of more direct evidence of the of-\nficer’s state of mind, provide sufficient circumstantial evi-\ndence to support a reasonable and thus permissible inference\nof reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. (emphasis added). In\nother words, credibility omissions do not require courts to in-\nfer recklessness. Such omissions are matters for a trier of fact\nto weigh, just as when a witness testifies incorrectly or falsely\nabout one or a few matters, and the trier of fact must weigh\nthe rest of the witness’s testimony.\n\nNo. 18-2604 9\n\n In this case, the questions of materiality and the police af-\nfiant’s state of mind are intertwined. To the extent that cor-\nroboration might have avoided the need for a Franks hearing\nin this case, the reliability of the corroboration all depended,\nfrom the issuing judge’s point of view, on the same officer\nwhose credibility is at issue: Maas omitted all adverse infor-\nmation he had about the credibility of the informant who pro-\nvided the most specific (but still second-hand) information\nabout drug trafficking. As noted, the omission of so much im-\nportant information permits (but does not require) an infer-\nence that the omissions were deliberate or reckless. If the\nshowing of probable cause in the warrant application de-\npended on the credibility of the informant, that permissible\ninference should be enough to obtain a Franks hearing.\n The district court’s and government’s rationale for deny-\ning a Franks hearing is that Maas’s own observations supply\nprobable cause, independent of the informant. We assume\nthat if Maas’s own observations are credited, they could lead\na reasonable judge to find probable cause, though the appli-\ncation would have been much weaker without the inform-\nant’s tip to Maas. The problem is that Maas’s credibility can\nlegitimately be questioned here based on what could have\nbeen deliberate or reckless omissions of information about the\ncredibility of the informant.\n This is where materiality and intent become intertwined.\nIf the omissions were deliberate or reckless, it would not be\nunreasonable to take seriously the prospect that other por-\ntions of the same warrant application may have been deliber-\nately or recklessly false. Judges often instruct jurors that if\nthey believe a witness has lied intentionally about a material\nmatter, they may (but are not required to) discount the\n\n10 No. 18-2604\n\nwitness’s testimony on other matters. See United States v.\nWeinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1971) (no positive rule\nof law excludes witness’s testimony entirely based on willful\nfalsehood, but such falsification presents issue for jury to con-\nsider in weighing rest of testimony), quoting Knowles v. People,\n15 Mich. 408, 412 (1867); Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E, Grenig, and\nWilliam C. Lee, 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. §§ 15:0106 (6th ed.\n2019).\n The same point is at the heart of the Supreme Court’s ju-\nrisprudence on impeachment evidence in Brady cases. Brady\nv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny establish that\ngovernment-suppressed evidence is material “if there is a rea-\nsonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the\nresult of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles v.\nWhitely, 514 U.S. 419, 43334 (1995), quoting United States v.\nBagley, 473 U.S. 657, 682 (1985). Strong, non-cumulative evi-\ndence that undermines the credibility of an important govern-\nment witness satisfies that definition. Sims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d\n1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The reason is simple. Evidence in-\ndicating that a witness whose testimony “may well be deter-\nminative of guilt or innocence” is unreliable might prompt a\njury to distrust everything the witness says. Giglio v. United\nStates, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The same logic applies in this\ncontext. Maas’s potentially intentional or reckless omission\ncompromises his credibility, which determines whether prob-\nable cause for the warrant existed or not.\n To be clear, we are not saying or finding here that Maas\nwas in fact deliberately or recklessly deceptive. The issue on\nappeal is only whether Clark was entitled to a hearing, one\nwhere Maas’s credibility could be addressed with evidence\nfrom both sides. The informant was the only source of\n\nNo. 18-2604 11\n\ninformation (and again, that was only second-hand) who said\nthe person in Room 203 was actually dealing drugs. All of the\nother information in the warrant application indicated\ngrounds for suspicion, but we can assume that Maas had a\ngood reason for including the informant’s more specific infor-\nmation. The complete omission of the available damaging in-\nformation about the informant’s credibility permits an infer-\nence that Maas was not being honest and careful with the is-\nsuing court. Whether he in fact was honest and careful about\nthe facts is an appropriate subject for the Franks hearing on\nremand.1\nII. The Timing of the Warrant and Search\n Defendant Clark was in Room 203 when police executed\nthe warrant. Also in the room were cellophane bags, a digital\nscale, and approximately 82 grams of a mixture of heroin and\nfentanyl. The police photographed the hotel room during\ntheir search. In a photograph of suspected drugs on a\nnightstand, a digital clock is visible, reading 8:15 p.m. If the\nclock was correct, the search was executed at least 25 minutes\nbefore the judge issued the warrant.\n\n\n 1 Maas’s application also did not explain why the informant would\nknow heroin if he saw it. See United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 75657 (7th\nCir. 2003) (no probable cause for search warrant where affidavit was based\non informant’s report of seeing drugs in defendant’s house, but according\nto affidavit, informant failed to give details about specific location and\namount of drugs, or any explanation as to how informant knew that what\nshe saw were controlled substances). Nor did Maas provide the kind of\ndetail about his own training and experience that is needed to justify reli-\nance upon them. See generally, e.g., United States v. Scott, 901 F.3d 842, 845\n(7th Cir. 2018) (“Details … are vital when an officer proposes his own\ntraining and experience as the basis of a warrant”).\n\n12 No. 18-2604\n\n The police of course are not permitted to rely on a search\nwarrant that has not yet been approved by a judge. The dis-\ntrict court denied Clark’s motion to suppress without a hear-\ning. The issue here is whether the photograph of the clock was\nsufficient evidence for Clark to have an evidentiary hearing\non his motion to suppress.\n A defendant who requests a suppression hearing must\npresent “definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural facts\n… demonstrat[ing] that there is a disputed material issue of\nfact.” United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1995);\nsee United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2011).\n“Reliance on vague, conclusory allegations is insufficient.”\nUnited States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1992).\n In response to Clark’s motion to suppress, the government\nsubmitted the “metadata” from the digital camera. The\nmetadata showed a host of data about each photograph, in-\ncluding the time each was taken. The metadata showed that\nall of the search photographs were taken between 10:36 and\n10:52 p.m., well after the judge issued the search warrant.\nClark responded in turn not with an affidavit from any wit-\nness to the search but with results of Google searches about\nhow to edit metadata for photographs. In light of the\nmetadata, and in the absence of any specific indications that\ndata had been altered, the district court decided that there was\nno need for a hearing and denied Clark’s motion to suppress.\n The situation here is similar to United States v. Woods, 995\nF.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1993).2 In Woods, the police conducted a\n\n 2 Another portion of the Woods opinion was abrogated by the Supreme\n\nCourt’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), as we noted\nin United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1995).\n\nNo. 18-2604 13\n\nsearch on February 12th. The problem was that both the war-\nrant and the supporting affidavit bore handwritten dates of\nFebruary 14th, though both were also date-stamped February\n11th. The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the\nsearch had been executed two days before the warrant was\nissued. The government responded with an affidavit from a\nprosecutor testifying that the application and warrant were\nboth prepared and signed on February 11th and that the Feb-\nruary 14th dates were mistakes. Using language associated\nwith civil motions for summary judgment—“disputed issues\nof material fact” and “genuine factual dispute”—we affirmed\nthe district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress\nwithout a hearing. Because the defendant had failed to re-\nspond to the government’s explanation, we agreed that he\nhad failed to show a genuine factual dispute and a need for\nan evidentiary hearing. Id. at 715–16.\n One might argue that in Woods the government submitted\nan affidavit to explain the discrepancy, while the government\nhere submitted letters and copies of documents, without any\naffidavits. Both parties here submitted various documents to\nthe district court with this less formal approach. But the bur-\nden is on the defendant to support his motion to suppress.\nMissing from this record is an assertion by any witness—de-\nfendant Clark or anyone else—to the effect that the search ac-\ntually occurred at 8:15 p.m. and that the clock was correct.\nWithout such an assertion, whether in an affidavit or other-\nwise (given the less formal procedures being used in the dis-\ntrict court), the Google search results about how to alter\nmetadata merely invite speculation. The district court did not\nerr by denying the motion to suppress, to the extent it was\nbased on the photograph of the clock, without a hearing.\n\n14 No. 18-2604\n\nIII. Sentencing Issues\n A. Relevant Conduct Under the Guidelines\n Clark also challenges two aspects of his sentence. The first\nis a Sentencing Guidelines issue concerning the scope of his\nrelevant conduct and criminal history, which are two sides of\nthe same coin here. The U.S. Probation Office prepared a Pre-\nSentence Report for Clark. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)\nand (c)(8) of the 2016 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the PSR\ncalculated Clark’s base offense level as 24 because he pos-\nsessed between 40 and 160 grams of a substance containing\nfentanyl. No other adjustments applied, so his total offense\nlevel remained 24. The PSR also determined that Clark had 11\ncriminal history points and was in criminal history category\nV. Three of those 11 points were from a 2017 federal convic-\ntion for drug distribution stemming from events that occurred\nin Illinois after Clark was arrested in this Wisconsin federal\ncase. Clark also received three points for a prior felony drug\nconviction in Minnesota. Because of the Minnesota convic-\ntion, Clark faced a 120-month mandatory minimum pursuant\nto 21 U.S.C. § 851. (If not for the enhancement, Clark would\nhave had an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months.)\n Both the government and Clark argued for the 120-month\nmandatory minimum sentence. The district court adopted the\nfacts of the PSR and determined that the PSR had calculated\ncorrectly Clark’s offense level, criminal history, and guideline\nrange. The court sentenced Clark to 120 months in prison to\nbe served consecutively to the 71-month sentence he had re-\nceived in the Illinois case.\n On appeal, Clark argues that his later drug offense in the\nIllinois conviction should be treated under the Sentencing\n\nNo. 18-2604 15\n\nGuidelines as “relevant conduct” for this case rather than as\npart of his criminal history. That means, he contends, his 120-\nmonth sentence in this case should run concurrently with the\n71-month sentence he received in Illinois. Clark did not raise\nthis argument in the district court. At sentencing, the govern-\nment asked that Clark’s sentence run consecutively to his Illi-\nnois sentence. Clark did not object. He requested only that\nthis sentence run concurrently with any state sentence. The\ngovernment argues that Clark therefore waived this issue.\n Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right,\nwhereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant “negligently fails\nto assert a right in a timely fashion.” United States v. Brodie,\n507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Olano, 507\nU.S. 725, 733 (1993). Concurrent sentences would reduce sig-\nnificantly the time Clark spends in prison. There is no reason\nfor us to draw the inference here that Clark intentionally\nwaived this argument. “Waiver principles should be con-\nstrued liberally in favor of the defendant,” and we are hesi-\ntant, without more, to construe a defendant’s failure to object\nto a PSR as an intentional relinquishment of a known right.\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 84849 (7th Cir.\n2005). This is especially the case where, as here, the defendant\nhad no strategic reason to forgo this sentencing argument. See\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014).\n Plain-error review, however, does not win relief for Clark\non this issue. Plain-error review allows reversal where: (1)\nthere was an error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error af-\nfected the substantial rights of the defendant; and (4) the error\nseriously impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation\nof the proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 73238; United States v.\nDuran, 407 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, we need not\n\n16 No. 18-2604\n\naddress the third and fourth elements. If any error occurred\nat all, it was not “plain.”\n Under § 5G1.3(b) of the Guidelines, where a defendant has\nan undischarged term of imprisonment, and where the con-\nduct that led to the undischarged sentence\n is relevant conduct to the instant offense of con-\n viction under the provisions of subsections\n (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Con-\n duct), the sentence for the instant offense shall\n be imposed as follows:\n (1) The court shall adjust the sentence for\n any period of imprisonment already\n served on the undischarged term of im-\n prisonment if the court determines that\n such period of imprisonment will not be\n credited to the federal sentence by the\n Bureau of Prisons; and\n (2) the sentence for the instant offense\n shall be imposed to run concurrently to\n the remainder of the undischarged term\n of imprisonment.\nSection 5G1.3(d) further advises that “in any other case in-\nvolving an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence\nfor the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently,\npartially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undis-\ncharged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable pun-\nishment for the instant offense.” So if Clark’s Illinois offense\nwas relevant conduct here, the Guidelines would recommend\nconcurrent sentences. If his Illinois offense was not relevant\nconduct here, the choice of consecutive or concurrent\n\nNo. 18-2604 17\n\nsentences is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge, and\nthere is no reason to find an abuse of discretion here.\n As for the scope of relevant conduct, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) pro-\nvides that “relevant conduct” is based on “all acts and omis-\nsions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, in-\nduced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.” “Sec-\ntion 1B1.3(a)(2) applies to grouped offenses and includes ‘all\nacts and omissions described in subdivisions 1(A) and 1(B)\nthat were part of the same course of conduct or common\nscheme or plan as the offense of conviction.’” United States v.\nSchrode, 839 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting U.S.S.G.\n§ 1B1.3(a)(2).\n “In assessing whether offenses are part of the same course\nof conduct, we focus on whether the government has demon-\nstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and temporal prox-\nimity.” United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015)\n(internal citations omitted). In considering whether an offense\nis relevant within the meaning of § 1B1.3, our court has em-\nphasized several factors that should guide courts’ analysis.\n“Sufficient factual overlap exists where the past and present\noffenses involve the same victims, stem from the same under-\nlying conduct, or are in fact similar offenses.” United States v.\nOrozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2016); see also\nUnited States v. Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2003) (in\ndeciding relevant conduct in drug cases, courts look for “a\nstrong relationship between the uncharged conduct and the\nconvicted offense, focusing on whether the government has\ndemonstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and tem-\nporal proximity”), quoting United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275,\n279 (7th Cir. 1996). The relevant conduct issue is similar to the\nissue in calculating criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2\n\n18 No. 18-2604\n\n(defining “prior sentence”), where two similar prior convic-\ntions separated by an intervening arrest are counted sepa-\nrately. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.\n2003); United States v. Bradley, 218 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2000).\n The district court did not plainly err in not treating Clark’s\nlater offense in Illinois as relevant conduct for his Wisconsin\nconviction. To support his argument, Clark points to facts set\nforth in his Wisconsin PSR. The PSR explained that Clark trav-\neled to Chicago to obtain the drugs that he would then sell in\nWisconsin. This fact, Clark asserts, establishes that his drug\nactivities in both states were part of the same course of con-\nduct, his fentanyl-trafficking enterprise.\n Under our precedents, this argument faces obvious “tem-\nporal proximity” and “similarity” problems. First, Clark was\narrested in Wisconsin seven months before he was arrested\nfor selling a fentanyl mixture in Illinois. Further, the offenses\nwere dissimilar. In Wisconsin, Clark possessed more than 80\ngrams of fentanyl, most of which was packaged in retail pack-\nages of 0.5 grams. In Illinois, by contrast, he was arrested for\nselling a confidential informant more than 65.2 grams of fen-\ntanyl. And even if the offenses had been more similar, “the\nfact that a defendant commits a certain type of offense on mul-\ntiple occasions does not inevitably mean that each separate\noffense is part of the same course of conduct.” Schrode, 839\nF.3d at 552. There is not enough here to have required the dis-\ntrict court to have found such strong connections between\nthese two drug offenses, especially without an objection by\nthe defense to that effect. The offenses involved different buy-\ners, in different cities, in different types of quantities, months\napart, and with an intervening arrest for the Wisconsin of-\nfense.\n\nNo. 18-2604 19\n\n “An error is ‘plain’ if the law at the time of appellate re-\nview shows clearly that it was an error.” United States v.\nPierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Henderson v.\nUnited States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013). Clark cannot establish\nwith precedent or otherwise that the district court should\nhave acted sua sponte to treat his Illinois offense as conduct\nrelevant to his Wisconsin charge. Even if there might have\nbeen an error, it was not plain error to run Clark’s two federal\nsentences consecutively.\n B. Supervised Release Condition\n Finally, the district court imposed a supervised release\ncondition that Clark “Not meet, communicate or spend time\nwith any persons known by defendant to be a member of or\naffiliate of any known street gang.” On appeal, Clark argues\nthat the term “affiliate” is unconstitutionally vague. He did\nnot object to this condition at sentencing.\n In at least scores of appeals over the past five years, in the\nwake of United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014),\nUnited States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), and\nUnited States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015), this court\nhas wrestled with how best to handle appellate challenges to\nsupervised release conditions that were not raised in the dis-\ntrict court. Our recent opinion in United States v. Flores, 929\nF.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019), should bring some order to our\ncaselaw in this niche of waiver law, particularly since it was\ncirculated to the entire court under Circuit Rule 40(e), and no\njudge voted to hear the case en banc. Special considerations\napply to our handling of supervised release conditions both\nbecause they are usually the least salient concern at the time\nof sentencing and, more important, because a defendant may\nchallenge them in the district court at any time. See Flores, 929\n\n20 No. 18-2604\n\nF.3d at 451, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); see also United States\nv. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant waived\nchallenge to supervised release condition: “sentencing in the\ndistrict court is the main event”).\n This case meets the standards of waiver set forth in Flores:\nClark had prior notice of the proposed conditions, including\nthe “affiliate” condition. He had a meaningful opportunity to\nobject, and his lawyer told the judge that the proposed condi-\ntions were acceptable. Clark even raised other objections to\nthe PSR prior to sentencing but did not challenge this condi-\ntion, which signals an intentional decision not to object. See\nFlores, 929 F.3d at 449.\n We REVERSE the district court’s denial of Clark’s motion\nfor a Franks hearing without an evidentiary hearing. We\nVACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for a\nFranks hearing and appropriate action based on the outcome\nof that hearing, either granting Clark’s motion to suppress or,\nif his motion is denied, reinstating the convictions and sen-\ntence. If the judgment is reinstated, the denial of Clark’s mo-\ntion to suppress and the district court’s sentence are\nAFFIRMED.\n\nNo. 18-2604 21\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Michael Clark\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2604\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMICHAEL CLARK,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:17-cr-53-JDP-1 — James D. Peterson, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 22, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Michael\\nClark was convicted of possessing a mixture containing fen-\\ntanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Clark had been\\nfound in a hotel room with more than 80 grams of a mixture\\nof heroin and fentanyl, a digital scale, and cellophane bags.\\nHe does not appeal any aspect of his jury trial, but he chal-\\nlenges the denial of his motion for a Franks hearing challeng-\\ning the issuance of the search warrant for the hotel room. He\\n\\n2 No. 18-2604\\n\\nalso challenges the denial of his motion to suppress without\\nan evidentiary hearing. And he challenges two aspects of his\\nsentence: the guideline treatment of his conviction for drug\\ndistribution that occurred in Illinois seven months after his\\nWisconsin arrest and one condition of supervised release. We\\nvacate Clark’s conviction and remand for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on his Franks challenge. We affirm on the denial of his mo-\\ntion to suppress without a hearing. We also affirm on the\\nguideline issue and determine that the supervised release\\nchallenge was waived. We address in Part I the need for a\\nFranks hearing and in Part II the need for an evidentiary hear-\\ning on the motion to suppress. We address the sentencing is-\\nsues in Part III.\\nI. The Need for a Franks Hearing\\n The Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for the use of\\nsearch warrants calls for probable cause determinations by a\\n“neutral and detached magistrate” as opposed to “officer[s]\\nengaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out\\ncrime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). The ap-\\nplication for a warrant “must provide the magistrate with a\\nsubstantial basis for determining the existence of probable\\ncause.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).\\n The ability of the neutral and detached magistrate to de-\\ntermine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the infor-\\nmation the police submit. “[A] search warrant is not valid if\\nthe police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting\\nfalse, material information,” or by omitting material infor-\\nmation from the affidavit provided to the issuing judge.\\nUnited States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013),\\nciting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 15556 (1978). To inval-\\nidate a warrant on this basis, a defendant at a so-called Franks\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 3\\n\\nhearing must prove by a preponderance of the evidence either\\nfalsity or recklessness, as well as materiality. McMurtrey, 704\\nF.3d at 509.\\n Merely to obtain a Franks hearing, however, a defendant\\ndoes not need to prove the Franks violation. A defendant must\\nonly make a substantial preliminary showing (1) that the war-\\nrant application contained a material falsity or omission that\\nwould alter the issuing judge’s probable cause determination,\\nand (2) that the affiant included the material falsity or omitted\\ninformation intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the\\ntruth. United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014);\\nsee also, e.g., United States v. Hancock, 844 F.3d 702, 708 (7th\\nCir. 2016); United States v. Mullins, 803 F.3d 858, 861–62 (7th\\nCir. 2015); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.3d 884, 887–88 (7th\\nCir. 2008). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not\\nrequired until the Franks hearing itself.” Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n820.\\n Clark asserted in the district court that the police investi-\\ngator who applied for the search warrant of the hotel room\\ndeliberately or recklessly omitted critical information affect-\\ning the credibility of the unidentified informant who told the\\nofficer about drug distribution at the hotel where Clark was\\narrested. The district court denied the motion for an eviden-\\ntiary hearing on the question. The court agreed that the police\\nhad provided no information about the informant’s credibil-\\nity. The court found, however, that the police had provided\\nsufficient corroboration for the informant’s tip so that the war-\\nrant did not depend on the informant’s credibility. That\\nmeant the omitted credibility information was not material\\nfor Franks purposes. We disagree and find that a hearing is\\nneeded. “[W]e review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear\\n\\n4 No. 18-2604\\n\\nerror, but any legal determinations that factored into the rul-\\ning are reviewed de novo.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 815; see also Han-\\ncock, 844 F.3d at 70708.\\n A. The Warrant Application\\n Investigator Todd Maas is a police officer in Superior, Wis-\\nconsin. He prepared the warrant application and signed the\\nsupporting affidavit. Maas said that a confidential informant\\ncontacted him on October 14, 2015 and told him that earlier\\nthat day, he had driven someone to a parking lot adjacent to\\nthe Baywalk Inn in Superior to buy heroin from a black male\\ncalled “Big Mike,” the brother of “Toonchie.” Maas said he\\nand another officer then performed their own investigations,\\nincluding surveillance of the parking lot. Maas observed a\\nblack male leave the hotel and enter and then exit at least five\\ncars in the hotel parking lot. He also learned that the guest\\nstaying in Room 203 was the only hotel guest who both had\\npaid in cash and was staying only one night, all behavior that\\nMaas said was typical of drug trafficking, based on his train-\\ning and experience. Maas also said he had spoken to a woman\\n(referred to in this case as the “mom on a mission”) who said\\nthat her daughter was a heroin addict and that she (the\\nmother) had followed a man she suspected of drug-dealing to\\nRoom 203.\\n Maas included all of this information in his affidavit,\\nwhich convinced a state trial judge to issue a search warrant\\nfor Room 203. Maas did not include any damaging infor-\\nmation about the credibility of his confidential informant,\\nwho was the only source of information specifically about\\ndrug trafficking. The informant was being paid for his ser-\\nvices. He also had two pending criminal charges against him,\\nfifteen prior convictions, and a history of opiate and cocaine\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 5\\n\\nabuse, and he was hoping to receive a reduced sentence in ex-\\nchange for his cooperation.\\n B. Materiality\\n Where an affidavit is based primarily on tips from an in-\\nformant, probable cause can be shown based on the totality of\\nthe circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; Glover, 755 F.3d at\\n816. In cases based on informants’ tips, we have identified five\\nfactors of particular relevance: (1) the level of detail the in-\\nformant provided; (2) the extent to which the informant’s in-\\nformation is based on his or her own first-hand observations;\\n(3) the degree to which police have corroborated the inform-\\nant’s information; (4) the time elapsed between the events re-\\nported and the warrant application; (5) and “whether the in-\\nformant appeared or testified before the magistrate.” Glover,\\n755 F.3d at 816, citing United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594,\\n600 (7th Cir. 2011). Information omitted from a warrant appli-\\ncation is material when its omission affects the probable cause\\ndetermination. Glover, 755 F.3d at 820.\\n In performing this probable cause inquiry, courts must\\nkeep in mind that a search warrant for a home, business, or\\neven hotel room can authorize highly intrusive and even de-\\nstructive actions by the police, and that informants, especially\\nin drug cases, can be unreliable and motivated by rivalries or\\nrevenge. United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir.\\n2018), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1617 (1968) (“What\\nwe blandly call ‘Terry stops’ can be highly intrusive.” They are\\n“not just ‘a “petty indignity,”’ wrote the Supreme Court, but\\n‘a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of a person, which may\\ninflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is\\nnot to be undertaken lightly’”); United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d\\n1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2009) (“For all we know, [the informant]\\n\\n6 No. 18-2604\\n\\ncould have been a rival drug dealer, an angry customer, or\\nhad some other beef” with the defendant).\\n Our cases do not hold that a Franks hearing is required\\nevery time some substantial adverse information about an in-\\nformant’s credibility is omitted from a probable cause affida-\\nvit. Hancock, 844 F.3d at 709. We have said generally that\\nwhere a warrant is obtained based on an informant’s tip, “in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility or potential bias\\nis crucial.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 816; see, e.g., United States v.\\nBradford, 905 F.3d 497, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2018). That being said,\\nwe also have upheld warrants tainted by police omission of\\nadverse informant credibility information. Our Franks hearing\\ncases show that when police have sufficiently corroborated an\\ninformant’s tip, the omission of facts pertaining to the inform-\\nant’s credibility may not be material.\\n In United States v. Musgraves, for example, the police omit-\\nted from the affidavit important and damaging credibility in-\\nformation about one informant. 831 F.3d 454, 45960 (7th Cir.\\n2016). We affirmed the denial of a Franks hearing because a\\nsecond affidavit included information from a second inform-\\nant without credibility problems who had provided the police\\nwith specific and timely information about the suspect’s drug\\ntrafficking to support the warrant. Id. at 46061.\\n In United States v. Bradford, we also held that the affidavit’s\\nomission of facts damaging to an informant’s credibility did\\nnot require suppression of evidence seized with a search war-\\nrant for drug and weapons trafficking. 905 F.3d at 50305. In\\nBradford, the application failed to disclose that the informant\\nhad three felony convictions, was on probation, and was be-\\ning paid for his help. Id. at 502. But his information was fresh,\\nspecific, and corroborated by his having carried out\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 7\\n\\ncontrolled drug buys from the target and by specific infor-\\nmation from another informant without his credibility prob-\\nlems. Id. at 504\\n In United States v. Hancock, we affirmed the denial of a\\nFranks hearing in similar circumstances. 844 F.3d at 710. An\\ninformant provided fresh, detailed information about a sus-\\npect’s drug sales, but the affidavit for the warrant left out in-\\nformation about the informant’s own criminal history and the\\nfact that he was in custody when he provided the information.\\nId. at 70506. We found that the omissions were not material\\nbecause the warrant application included extensive corrobo-\\nration of the suspect’s drug trafficking and intimidation of\\nwitnesses. That corroboration came from other informants, a\\nsearch of a cellular telephone showing texts referring to drug\\ndeals, and from an earlier interview with the suspect himself.\\nThe quantity and quality of corroborating information meant\\nthat the omitted adverse credibility information about one in-\\nformant did not require a Franks hearing. Id. at 70710.\\n This case is readily distinguishable. This warrant applica-\\ntion did not include any of the substantial adverse information\\nMaas had about the informant’s credibility. The government\\ndoes not try to justify Maas’s omissions, but it argues that the\\ninformant’s credibility was not material to the warrant appli-\\ncation because Maas and his colleague investigated and cor-\\nroborated the informant’s tip sufficiently to provide probable\\ncause independent of that tip. We disagree.\\n The corroboration in this case was much weaker than in\\nthe cases where we upheld warrants’ validity in the face of\\ncredibility omissions. This case is more akin to Glover, where\\nthe warrant application depended so heavily on the credibil-\\nity of the informant. Here, the police had no controlled buys.\\n\\n8 No. 18-2604\\n\\nThey never saw money or drugs change hands. Even the in-\\nformant did not claim to have seen drugs or money change\\nhands. If his tip did not pan out, he had plenty of deniability.\\nHe claimed only that his passenger had met with “Big Mike”\\noutside his presence to buy heroin. And the “mom on a mis-\\nsion” had no track record of credibility and provided no spe-\\ncifics to support her suspicions of the man she had followed\\nto Room 203. In sum, the foundation for probable cause inde-\\npendent of the credibility of the informant was so meager in\\nthis case that the credibility of the informant was material for\\nFranks purposes.\\n C. Deliberate or Reckless Omissions?\\n To obtain a Franks hearing, Clark needed to “offer direct\\nevidence of [Maas’s] state of mind or circumstantial evidence\\nthat [Maas] had a subjective intent to deceive based on the na-\\nture of [his] omissions.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 820. In his report\\nand recommendation to the district court, we must note, the\\nmagistrate judge in Clark’s case incorrectly read our decision\\nin Glover to “mandate that … court[s] infer recklessness from\\nthe fact that an officer omitted known and substantial adverse\\ninformation from a search warrant affidavit….” That is not\\ncorrect. In Glover, we held that “credibility omissions them-\\nselves, even in the absence of more direct evidence of the of-\\nficer’s state of mind, provide sufficient circumstantial evi-\\ndence to support a reasonable and thus permissible inference\\nof reckless disregard for the truth.” Id. (emphasis added). In\\nother words, credibility omissions do not require courts to in-\\nfer recklessness. Such omissions are matters for a trier of fact\\nto weigh, just as when a witness testifies incorrectly or falsely\\nabout one or a few matters, and the trier of fact must weigh\\nthe rest of the witness’s testimony.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 9\\n\\n In this case, the questions of materiality and the police af-\\nfiant’s state of mind are intertwined. To the extent that cor-\\nroboration might have avoided the need for a Franks hearing\\nin this case, the reliability of the corroboration all depended,\\nfrom the issuing judge’s point of view, on the same officer\\nwhose credibility is at issue: Maas omitted all adverse infor-\\nmation he had about the credibility of the informant who pro-\\nvided the most specific (but still second-hand) information\\nabout drug trafficking. As noted, the omission of so much im-\\nportant information permits (but does not require) an infer-\\nence that the omissions were deliberate or reckless. If the\\nshowing of probable cause in the warrant application de-\\npended on the credibility of the informant, that permissible\\ninference should be enough to obtain a Franks hearing.\\n The district court’s and government’s rationale for deny-\\ning a Franks hearing is that Maas’s own observations supply\\nprobable cause, independent of the informant. We assume\\nthat if Maas’s own observations are credited, they could lead\\na reasonable judge to find probable cause, though the appli-\\ncation would have been much weaker without the inform-\\nant’s tip to Maas. The problem is that Maas’s credibility can\\nlegitimately be questioned here based on what could have\\nbeen deliberate or reckless omissions of information about the\\ncredibility of the informant.\\n This is where materiality and intent become intertwined.\\nIf the omissions were deliberate or reckless, it would not be\\nunreasonable to take seriously the prospect that other por-\\ntions of the same warrant application may have been deliber-\\nately or recklessly false. Judges often instruct jurors that if\\nthey believe a witness has lied intentionally about a material\\nmatter, they may (but are not required to) discount the\\n\\n10 No. 18-2604\\n\\nwitness’s testimony on other matters. See United States v.\\nWeinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1971) (no positive rule\\nof law excludes witness’s testimony entirely based on willful\\nfalsehood, but such falsification presents issue for jury to con-\\nsider in weighing rest of testimony), quoting Knowles v. People,\\n15 Mich. 408, 412 (1867); Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E, Grenig, and\\nWilliam C. Lee, 1A Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. §§ 15:0106 (6th ed.\\n2019).\\n The same point is at the heart of the Supreme Court’s ju-\\nrisprudence on impeachment evidence in Brady cases. Brady\\nv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny establish that\\ngovernment-suppressed evidence is material “if there is a rea-\\nsonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the\\nresult of the proceeding would have been different.’” Kyles v.\\nWhitely, 514 U.S. 419, 43334 (1995), quoting United States v.\\nBagley, 473 U.S. 657, 682 (1985). Strong, non-cumulative evi-\\ndence that undermines the credibility of an important govern-\\nment witness satisfies that definition. Sims v. Hyatte, 914 F.3d\\n1078, 1087 (7th Cir. 2019). The reason is simple. Evidence in-\\ndicating that a witness whose testimony “may well be deter-\\nminative of guilt or innocence” is unreliable might prompt a\\njury to distrust everything the witness says. Giglio v. United\\nStates, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The same logic applies in this\\ncontext. Maas’s potentially intentional or reckless omission\\ncompromises his credibility, which determines whether prob-\\nable cause for the warrant existed or not.\\n To be clear, we are not saying or finding here that Maas\\nwas in fact deliberately or recklessly deceptive. The issue on\\nappeal is only whether Clark was entitled to a hearing, one\\nwhere Maas’s credibility could be addressed with evidence\\nfrom both sides. The informant was the only source of\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 11\\n\\ninformation (and again, that was only second-hand) who said\\nthe person in Room 203 was actually dealing drugs. All of the\\nother information in the warrant application indicated\\ngrounds for suspicion, but we can assume that Maas had a\\ngood reason for including the informant’s more specific infor-\\nmation. The complete omission of the available damaging in-\\nformation about the informant’s credibility permits an infer-\\nence that Maas was not being honest and careful with the is-\\nsuing court. Whether he in fact was honest and careful about\\nthe facts is an appropriate subject for the Franks hearing on\\nremand.1\\nII. The Timing of the Warrant and Search\\n Defendant Clark was in Room 203 when police executed\\nthe warrant. Also in the room were cellophane bags, a digital\\nscale, and approximately 82 grams of a mixture of heroin and\\nfentanyl. The police photographed the hotel room during\\ntheir search. In a photograph of suspected drugs on a\\nnightstand, a digital clock is visible, reading 8:15 p.m. If the\\nclock was correct, the search was executed at least 25 minutes\\nbefore the judge issued the warrant.\\n\\n\\n 1 Maas’s application also did not explain why the informant would\\nknow heroin if he saw it. See United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 75657 (7th\\nCir. 2003) (no probable cause for search warrant where affidavit was based\\non informant’s report of seeing drugs in defendant’s house, but according\\nto affidavit, informant failed to give details about specific location and\\namount of drugs, or any explanation as to how informant knew that what\\nshe saw were controlled substances). Nor did Maas provide the kind of\\ndetail about his own training and experience that is needed to justify reli-\\nance upon them. See generally, e.g., United States v. Scott, 901 F.3d 842, 845\\n(7th Cir. 2018) (“Details … are vital when an officer proposes his own\\ntraining and experience as the basis of a warrant”).\\n\\n12 No. 18-2604\\n\\n The police of course are not permitted to rely on a search\\nwarrant that has not yet been approved by a judge. The dis-\\ntrict court denied Clark’s motion to suppress without a hear-\\ning. The issue here is whether the photograph of the clock was\\nsufficient evidence for Clark to have an evidentiary hearing\\non his motion to suppress.\\n A defendant who requests a suppression hearing must\\npresent “definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural facts\\n… demonstrat[ing] that there is a disputed material issue of\\nfact.” United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 141 (7th Cir. 1995);\\nsee United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n“Reliance on vague, conclusory allegations is insufficient.”\\nUnited States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1992).\\n In response to Clark’s motion to suppress, the government\\nsubmitted the “metadata” from the digital camera. The\\nmetadata showed a host of data about each photograph, in-\\ncluding the time each was taken. The metadata showed that\\nall of the search photographs were taken between 10:36 and\\n10:52 p.m., well after the judge issued the search warrant.\\nClark responded in turn not with an affidavit from any wit-\\nness to the search but with results of Google searches about\\nhow to edit metadata for photographs. In light of the\\nmetadata, and in the absence of any specific indications that\\ndata had been altered, the district court decided that there was\\nno need for a hearing and denied Clark’s motion to suppress.\\n The situation here is similar to United States v. Woods, 995\\nF.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1993).2 In Woods, the police conducted a\\n\\n 2 Another portion of the Woods opinion was abrogated by the Supreme\\n\\nCourt’s decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), as we noted\\nin United States v. Monroe, 73 F.3d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1995).\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 13\\n\\nsearch on February 12th. The problem was that both the war-\\nrant and the supporting affidavit bore handwritten dates of\\nFebruary 14th, though both were also date-stamped February\\n11th. The defendant moved to suppress, arguing that the\\nsearch had been executed two days before the warrant was\\nissued. The government responded with an affidavit from a\\nprosecutor testifying that the application and warrant were\\nboth prepared and signed on February 11th and that the Feb-\\nruary 14th dates were mistakes. Using language associated\\nwith civil motions for summary judgment—“disputed issues\\nof material fact” and “genuine factual dispute”—we affirmed\\nthe district court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress\\nwithout a hearing. Because the defendant had failed to re-\\nspond to the government’s explanation, we agreed that he\\nhad failed to show a genuine factual dispute and a need for\\nan evidentiary hearing. Id. at 715–16.\\n One might argue that in Woods the government submitted\\nan affidavit to explain the discrepancy, while the government\\nhere submitted letters and copies of documents, without any\\naffidavits. Both parties here submitted various documents to\\nthe district court with this less formal approach. But the bur-\\nden is on the defendant to support his motion to suppress.\\nMissing from this record is an assertion by any witness—de-\\nfendant Clark or anyone else—to the effect that the search ac-\\ntually occurred at 8:15 p.m. and that the clock was correct.\\nWithout such an assertion, whether in an affidavit or other-\\nwise (given the less formal procedures being used in the dis-\\ntrict court), the Google search results about how to alter\\nmetadata merely invite speculation. The district court did not\\nerr by denying the motion to suppress, to the extent it was\\nbased on the photograph of the clock, without a hearing.\\n\\n14 No. 18-2604\\n\\nIII. Sentencing Issues\\n A. Relevant Conduct Under the Guidelines\\n Clark also challenges two aspects of his sentence. The first\\nis a Sentencing Guidelines issue concerning the scope of his\\nrelevant conduct and criminal history, which are two sides of\\nthe same coin here. The U.S. Probation Office prepared a Pre-\\nSentence Report for Clark. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5)\\nand (c)(8) of the 2016 Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the PSR\\ncalculated Clark’s base offense level as 24 because he pos-\\nsessed between 40 and 160 grams of a substance containing\\nfentanyl. No other adjustments applied, so his total offense\\nlevel remained 24. The PSR also determined that Clark had 11\\ncriminal history points and was in criminal history category\\nV. Three of those 11 points were from a 2017 federal convic-\\ntion for drug distribution stemming from events that occurred\\nin Illinois after Clark was arrested in this Wisconsin federal\\ncase. Clark also received three points for a prior felony drug\\nconviction in Minnesota. Because of the Minnesota convic-\\ntion, Clark faced a 120-month mandatory minimum pursuant\\nto 21 U.S.C. § 851. (If not for the enhancement, Clark would\\nhave had an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months.)\\n Both the government and Clark argued for the 120-month\\nmandatory minimum sentence. The district court adopted the\\nfacts of the PSR and determined that the PSR had calculated\\ncorrectly Clark’s offense level, criminal history, and guideline\\nrange. The court sentenced Clark to 120 months in prison to\\nbe served consecutively to the 71-month sentence he had re-\\nceived in the Illinois case.\\n On appeal, Clark argues that his later drug offense in the\\nIllinois conviction should be treated under the Sentencing\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 15\\n\\nGuidelines as “relevant conduct” for this case rather than as\\npart of his criminal history. That means, he contends, his 120-\\nmonth sentence in this case should run concurrently with the\\n71-month sentence he received in Illinois. Clark did not raise\\nthis argument in the district court. At sentencing, the govern-\\nment asked that Clark’s sentence run consecutively to his Illi-\\nnois sentence. Clark did not object. He requested only that\\nthis sentence run concurrently with any state sentence. The\\ngovernment argues that Clark therefore waived this issue.\\n Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right,\\nwhereas forfeiture occurs when a defendant “negligently fails\\nto assert a right in a timely fashion.” United States v. Brodie,\\n507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 733 (1993). Concurrent sentences would reduce sig-\\nnificantly the time Clark spends in prison. There is no reason\\nfor us to draw the inference here that Clark intentionally\\nwaived this argument. “Waiver principles should be con-\\nstrued liberally in favor of the defendant,” and we are hesi-\\ntant, without more, to construe a defendant’s failure to object\\nto a PSR as an intentional relinquishment of a known right.\\nUnited States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 84849 (7th Cir.\\n2005). This is especially the case where, as here, the defendant\\nhad no strategic reason to forgo this sentencing argument. See\\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 772 F.3d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n Plain-error review, however, does not win relief for Clark\\non this issue. Plain-error review allows reversal where: (1)\\nthere was an error; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error af-\\nfected the substantial rights of the defendant; and (4) the error\\nseriously impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation\\nof the proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 73238; United States v.\\nDuran, 407 F.3d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, we need not\\n\\n16 No. 18-2604\\n\\naddress the third and fourth elements. If any error occurred\\nat all, it was not “plain.”\\n Under § 5G1.3(b) of the Guidelines, where a defendant has\\nan undischarged term of imprisonment, and where the con-\\nduct that led to the undischarged sentence\\n is relevant conduct to the instant offense of con-\\n viction under the provisions of subsections\\n (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Con-\\n duct), the sentence for the instant offense shall\\n be imposed as follows:\\n (1) The court shall adjust the sentence for\\n any period of imprisonment already\\n served on the undischarged term of im-\\n prisonment if the court determines that\\n such period of imprisonment will not be\\n credited to the federal sentence by the\\n Bureau of Prisons; and\\n (2) the sentence for the instant offense\\n shall be imposed to run concurrently to\\n the remainder of the undischarged term\\n of imprisonment.\\nSection 5G1.3(d) further advises that “in any other case in-\\nvolving an undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence\\nfor the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently,\\npartially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undis-\\ncharged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable pun-\\nishment for the instant offense.” So if Clark’s Illinois offense\\nwas relevant conduct here, the Guidelines would recommend\\nconcurrent sentences. If his Illinois offense was not relevant\\nconduct here, the choice of consecutive or concurrent\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 17\\n\\nsentences is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge, and\\nthere is no reason to find an abuse of discretion here.\\n As for the scope of relevant conduct, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) pro-\\nvides that “relevant conduct” is based on “all acts and omis-\\nsions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, in-\\nduced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.” “Sec-\\ntion 1B1.3(a)(2) applies to grouped offenses and includes ‘all\\nacts and omissions described in subdivisions 1(A) and 1(B)\\nthat were part of the same course of conduct or common\\nscheme or plan as the offense of conviction.’” United States v.\\nSchrode, 839 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2016), quoting U.S.S.G.\\n§ 1B1.3(a)(2).\\n “In assessing whether offenses are part of the same course\\nof conduct, we focus on whether the government has demon-\\nstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and temporal prox-\\nimity.” United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(internal citations omitted). In considering whether an offense\\nis relevant within the meaning of § 1B1.3, our court has em-\\nphasized several factors that should guide courts’ analysis.\\n“Sufficient factual overlap exists where the past and present\\noffenses involve the same victims, stem from the same under-\\nlying conduct, or are in fact similar offenses.” United States v.\\nOrozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2016); see also\\nUnited States v. Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2003) (in\\ndeciding relevant conduct in drug cases, courts look for “a\\nstrong relationship between the uncharged conduct and the\\nconvicted offense, focusing on whether the government has\\ndemonstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and tem-\\nporal proximity”), quoting United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275,\\n279 (7th Cir. 1996). The relevant conduct issue is similar to the\\nissue in calculating criminal history under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2\\n\\n18 No. 18-2604\\n\\n(defining “prior sentence”), where two similar prior convic-\\ntions separated by an intervening arrest are counted sepa-\\nrately. E.g., United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir.\\n2003); United States v. Bradley, 218 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2000).\\n The district court did not plainly err in not treating Clark’s\\nlater offense in Illinois as relevant conduct for his Wisconsin\\nconviction. To support his argument, Clark points to facts set\\nforth in his Wisconsin PSR. The PSR explained that Clark trav-\\neled to Chicago to obtain the drugs that he would then sell in\\nWisconsin. This fact, Clark asserts, establishes that his drug\\nactivities in both states were part of the same course of con-\\nduct, his fentanyl-trafficking enterprise.\\n Under our precedents, this argument faces obvious “tem-\\nporal proximity” and “similarity” problems. First, Clark was\\narrested in Wisconsin seven months before he was arrested\\nfor selling a fentanyl mixture in Illinois. Further, the offenses\\nwere dissimilar. In Wisconsin, Clark possessed more than 80\\ngrams of fentanyl, most of which was packaged in retail pack-\\nages of 0.5 grams. In Illinois, by contrast, he was arrested for\\nselling a confidential informant more than 65.2 grams of fen-\\ntanyl. And even if the offenses had been more similar, “the\\nfact that a defendant commits a certain type of offense on mul-\\ntiple occasions does not inevitably mean that each separate\\noffense is part of the same course of conduct.” Schrode, 839\\nF.3d at 552. There is not enough here to have required the dis-\\ntrict court to have found such strong connections between\\nthese two drug offenses, especially without an objection by\\nthe defense to that effect. The offenses involved different buy-\\ners, in different cities, in different types of quantities, months\\napart, and with an intervening arrest for the Wisconsin of-\\nfense.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 19\\n\\n “An error is ‘plain’ if the law at the time of appellate re-\\nview shows clearly that it was an error.” United States v.\\nPierson, 925 F.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019), citing Henderson v.\\nUnited States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013). Clark cannot establish\\nwith precedent or otherwise that the district court should\\nhave acted sua sponte to treat his Illinois offense as conduct\\nrelevant to his Wisconsin charge. Even if there might have\\nbeen an error, it was not plain error to run Clark’s two federal\\nsentences consecutively.\\n B. Supervised Release Condition\\n Finally, the district court imposed a supervised release\\ncondition that Clark “Not meet, communicate or spend time\\nwith any persons known by defendant to be a member of or\\naffiliate of any known street gang.” On appeal, Clark argues\\nthat the term “affiliate” is unconstitutionally vague. He did\\nnot object to this condition at sentencing.\\n In at least scores of appeals over the past five years, in the\\nwake of United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2014),\\nUnited States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015), and\\nUnited States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015), this court\\nhas wrestled with how best to handle appellate challenges to\\nsupervised release conditions that were not raised in the dis-\\ntrict court. Our recent opinion in United States v. Flores, 929\\nF.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019), should bring some order to our\\ncaselaw in this niche of waiver law, particularly since it was\\ncirculated to the entire court under Circuit Rule 40(e), and no\\njudge voted to hear the case en banc. Special considerations\\napply to our handling of supervised release conditions both\\nbecause they are usually the least salient concern at the time\\nof sentencing and, more important, because a defendant may\\nchallenge them in the district court at any time. See Flores, 929\\n\\n20 No. 18-2604\\n\\nF.3d at 451, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2); see also United States\\nv. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075, 1083 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant waived\\nchallenge to supervised release condition: “sentencing in the\\ndistrict court is the main event”).\\n This case meets the standards of waiver set forth in Flores:\\nClark had prior notice of the proposed conditions, including\\nthe “affiliate” condition. He had a meaningful opportunity to\\nobject, and his lawyer told the judge that the proposed condi-\\ntions were acceptable. Clark even raised other objections to\\nthe PSR prior to sentencing but did not challenge this condi-\\ntion, which signals an intentional decision not to object. See\\nFlores, 929 F.3d at 449.\\n We REVERSE the district court’s denial of Clark’s motion\\nfor a Franks hearing without an evidentiary hearing. We\\nVACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for a\\nFranks hearing and appropriate action based on the outcome\\nof that hearing, either granting Clark’s motion to suppress or,\\nif his motion is denied, reinstating the convictions and sen-\\ntence. If the judgment is reinstated, the denial of Clark’s mo-\\ntion to suppress and the district court’s sentence are\\nAFFIRMED.\\n\\nNo. 18-2604 21\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3872,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4648868,"string":"4,648,868"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2463"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\nMAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n Cross-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSTATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellee,\\n Cross-Appellant.\\n\\nAPPEAL OF: CHRISTOPHER L. COFFIN, et al.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 17-1541 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. When all the dust is cleared away, this\\ncase is relatively straightforward: we must review a dismissal\\nfor lack of Article III standing and the imposition of sanctions\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nunder Rule 11. Only the factual backdrop is complex, as it\\ndeals with one aspect of the federal Medicare program. The\\nPlaintiffs assert that they are assignees of certain private\\ninsurers called Medicare Advantage Organizations, which\\nprovide Medicare benefits. They brought a putative class\\naction against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance\\nCompany in an effort to recover payments State Farm\\nallegedly should have made to them as reimbursement for\\ncertain medical costs. The district court dismissed the action\\nwith prejudice, although the basis for the dismissal was lack\\nof standing. In addition, the court imposed sanctions under\\nRule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against one of\\nthe plaintiffs, MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, and its\\nattorneys.\\n Plaintiffs, MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC; MSP Recovery,\\nLLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and MSP Recovery Claims, Series\\nLLC MSP (“Recovery Claims”), appealed. They argue that the\\ncourt erred in its standing analysis, and that in any event it\\nshould not have dismissed the case with prejudice. Recovery\\nClaims and the attorneys (Christopher Coffin, David\\nHundley, and Courtney Stidham) appealed the sanctions\\norder. Finally, State Farm cross-appealed in order to preserve\\nits alternative argument in favor of affirmance—that the case\\nshould be dismissed on the merits because plaintiffs failed to\\nstate a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Matushkina\\nv. Nielsen, 877 F.3d 289, 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[a]s a\\ngeneral rule, where a defendant has won dismissal for lack of\\nstanding or some other jurisdictional ground, modifying the\\njudgment to dismissal on the merits” requires a cross-appeal).\\n We conclude that the district court erred insofar as it\\ndismissed plaintiffs’ case with prejudice, when the problem\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 3\\n\\nwas a fundamental lack of Article III standing. But this victory\\ngets the plaintiffs only so far. The court acted well within its\\ndiscretion when it denied plaintiffs a third opportunity to\\ncure the defects in their pleadings. The court’s order, in\\nsubstance, was a jurisdictional dismissal with denial of leave\\nto amend. So understood, we affirm the judgment and correct\\nthe record to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice.\\nWe also dismiss State Farm’s cross-appeal. Finally, we find\\nthat the district court exceeded the bounds of its discretion\\nwhen it imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Recovery Claims and\\nits attorneys.\\n I\\n Although the issues before us are ultimately procedural,\\nsome background on Medicare is helpful to place them in\\ncontext. Medicare is “the federal health insurance program\\nfor people who are 65 or older,” as well as for certain other\\ngroups. See https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-\\ncovers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/whats-medicare.\\nWhile many Americans receive benefits directly from the\\ngovernment through Medicare Parts A and B, others receive\\ntheir benefits from private entities known as Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations, pursuant to Medicare Part C.\\n42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a). For each Medicare enrollee covered\\nby a Medicare Advantage Organization, the Organization\\nreceives a per capita reimbursement from the federal\\ngovernment. The amount of that reimbursement may vary\\naccording to the characteristics of the individual enrollees and\\nother factors. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.\\nLiab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 364–65 (3d Cir. 2012). The Medical\\nAdvantage Organizations assume the financial risk of\\ninsuring their enrollees. Id.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n One other piece of Medicare vocabulary is important to\\nthis case: the difference between “primary” and “secondary”\\npayments. When an enrollee is covered directly by the\\ngovernment (under Medicare Parts A and B), Medicare is\\nstatutorily barred from making payments for medical costs\\nwhen an enrollee has benefited or is likely to benefit from\\nsome other insurance or worker’s compensation plan. The\\nstatute mentions such alternative sources of benefits as “a\\nworkmen’s compensation law … or … automobile or liability\\ninsurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or …\\nno fault insurance.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii). In such\\nsituations, Medicare is a secondary form of coverage that\\napplies only to costs not covered by the primary insurance.\\nBut if a primary insurer fails to pay, the government does not\\nleave the enrollee and her medical providers in the lurch.\\nRather, it makes conditional payments to providers and then\\nseeks reimbursement from the primary insurer. Id.\\n§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i). An analogous provision in Medicare\\nPart C makes the private Medicare Advantage Organizations\\nsecondary payers where enrollees have some form of primary\\ncoverage. Id. § 1395w-22(a)(4). When the primary insurers fall\\ndown on their responsibilities, Medicare Advantage\\nOrganizations are authorized by statute to pay first and seek\\nreimbursement later, just as the government may. Id.\\n Sometimes, however, the primary insurer never\\nreimburses the secondary payer (be it the government or a\\nMedicare Advantage Organization) for benefits it should have\\nprovided. In that case, the Medicare Secondary Payer\\nprovisions establish a private right of action that permits some\\nprivate plaintiffs to sue for double damages. But the relevant\\nsection of the statute does not specify who may take\\nadvantage of that provision. All it says, without further\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 5\\n\\nelaboration, is that “[t]here is established a private cause of\\naction for damages (which shall be in an amount double the\\namount otherwise provided) in the case of a primary plan\\nwhich fails to provide for primary payment (or appropriate\\nreimbursement) in accordance with paragraphs (1) and\\n(2)(A).” Id. § 1395y(b)(3)(A).\\n The plaintiffs in this case are not themselves Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations; they assert instead that they are\\nassignees of claims that originally belonged to such entities.\\nThey argue that Medicare Advantage Organizations are\\namong the proper plaintiffs that can exercise this private right\\nof action, and that through the assignments, they stand in the\\nshoes of those Organizations. The plaintiffs and related\\nentities have pursued this theory not just in this litigation, but\\nin several suits throughout the country. See, e.g., MAO-MSO\\nRecovery II, LLC v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., No. PWG-17-711,\\n2018 WL 999920 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2018); MAO-MSO Recovery\\nII, LLC v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-175-JDP, 2018\\nWL 835160 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018). At the same time as it\\ngranted State Farm’s motion to dismiss the First Amended\\nComplaint for lack of standing in this case, the district court\\nagreed with the plaintiffs that the statute does support a\\nprivate right of action for Medicare Advantage Organizations.\\nIn that respect, it relied on rulings from the Third and\\nEleventh Circuits. See Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. W. Heritage\\nIns. Co., 832 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Avandia\\nMktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 355 (3d\\nCir. 2012). Although State Farm did not challenge this point\\nin the district court, it has changed its tune on appeal and now\\nargues that the private right of action does not extend to\\nMedicare Advantage Organizations. Those entities, State\\nFarm contends, must look to contract law for appropriate\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nremedies. This dispute is at the heart of State Farm’s cross-\\nappeal.\\n Plaintiffs’ efforts in the present case foundered, however,\\nwhen the district court found that they did not have valid\\nassignments from any Medicare Advantage Organization that\\nmade unreimbursed payments. Without the link to a proper\\nOrganization that possessed claims to reimbursement, the\\ncourt concluded, plaintiffs had no injury for which they could\\nseek redress on this or any other legal theory. Accordingly, it\\nruled, no matter the scope of the private right of action, these\\nplaintiffs lacked standing to sue. We come to the same\\nconclusion. We save for another day the question whether a\\nMedicare Advantage Organization or a proper assignee of its\\nrights may invoke the Medicare Secondary Payer private right\\nof action for double damages against a primary insurer.\\n II\\n We now turn to the specific defects that the district court\\nfound to be fatal to the plaintiffs’ case. This appeal comes to\\nus on a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Second Amended\\nComplaint. A brief review of the first two iterations of the\\ncomplaint sheds some light on what went wrong and why\\nplaintiffs are entitled to no further amendments.\\n From the outset of this litigation, the question of standing\\nhas been hotly disputed. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they and\\nsimilar organizations have filed a number of suits in which\\nthe initial complaints “did not name any exemplar\\nbeneficiaries or their corresponding assignor [Medicare\\nAdvantage] Plans.” Instead, they “generally alleged the\\nassignments held by plaintiffs from multiple [Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations], and alleged plaintiffs’ analysis of\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 7\\n\\nthe data from multiple unreimbursed claims.” This led to\\nsuccessful defense motions to dismiss for lack of standing: as\\nthe plaintiffs put it, “[g]enerally, the district court rulings on\\nthese early motions were to dismiss the complaints, with\\nleave to amend, directing some degree of greater specificity.”\\nWhen State Farm in this case moved to dismiss the initial\\ncomplaint for lack of Article III standing (among other\\ngrounds), the plaintiffs responded by filing an amended\\ncomplaint to put more meat on the bone.\\n The First Amended Complaint fell short, however. It\\nidentified an exemplar beneficiary by initials and a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization (whose identity was redacted) that\\nallegedly had made secondary payments, but it provided\\nlittle additional information about the underlying claims or\\npayments. Even after the district court issued a protective\\norder, plaintiffs still failed to disclose the name of the assignor\\nMedicare Advantage Organization to State Farm. This time,\\nin response to State Farm’s motion, the district court\\ndismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing. It\\nfound that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate an “injury in\\nfact” for purposes of Article III standing without more\\nspecificity as to the injuries sustained by the exemplar\\nbeneficiary and the assignor Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization that had allegedly paid the unreimbursed\\nmedical costs. The court gave the plaintiffs another chance to\\ncure that defect by granting leave to amend.\\n Plaintiffs took advantage of that opportunity and filed a\\nSecond Amended Complaint. In this iteration, the plaintiffs\\nchose a new “exemplar beneficiary” (identified by the initials\\n“R.Y.”) and named the Medicare Advantage Organization\\nthat had made the secondary payments as Health First\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nAdministrative Plans (“HFAP”). A chain of assignments\\ntransferred HFAP’s alleged right of recovery to Recovery\\nClaims. The complaint alleged that R.Y. suffered specific\\ninjuries in an accident; that HFAP was the entity that paid\\nmedical costs for R.Y.; that State Farm entered into a\\nsettlement agreement with R.Y.; and that State Farm failed to\\nreimburse HFAP for the costs HFAP had incurred.\\n This time, however, there was a new problem: it was not\\nclear that HFAP qualified as a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization. After the defendants filed another motion to\\ndismiss for lack of standing, but before the district court had\\narrived at a decision, a district court in Florida ruled in a\\nrelated case that HFAP was not a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization at all. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Auto-\\nOwners Ins. Co., No. 17-23841, 2018 WL 1953861 *5 (S.D. Fla.\\nApr. 25, 2018) (“Auto-Owners”). The Florida court took judicial\\nnotice of the fact that HFAP does not appear on the list\\nmaintained by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services\\nof Medicare Advantage Organizations. Id. Instead, HFAP is an\\nentity that had contracted with a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization—a closely linked entity by the name of Health\\nFirst Health Plans—to provide a range of administrative,\\nfinancial, and strategic-planning services. The two entities\\n(Health First Administrative Plans and Health First Health\\nPlans) shared very similar names, a holding company, and a\\nChief Operating Officer, Michael Keeler. But crucially, in the\\nFlorida court’s view, only Health First Health contracted\\ndirectly with the government and qualified as a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization for purposes of the private right of\\naction that the plaintiffs were asserting. Accordingly, the\\nFlorida court found that HFAP did not have any recovery\\nrights to assign, even assuming plaintiffs were correct about\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 9\\n\\nthe private right of action: any such claims belonged only to\\nHealth First Health.\\n Only one of the plaintiffs in this case—Recovery Claims—\\nwas a party to Auto-Owners. Nonetheless, the overlap was\\nenough to matter. As in this case, the plaintiffs in Auto-Owners\\nargued that whatever the proper characterization of HFAP\\nmight have been, its service contract with Health First Health\\nmeant that it could pursue Health First Health’s legal claims\\nor assign them away. The Florida court rejected that\\ncontention, ruling that “a contract for services is not an\\nassignment of rights,” and thus “HFAP [could] not assign\\nrights to Plaintiff that were not assigned to it in the first place.”\\nId. This left the Florida plaintiffs without any rights to enforce.\\nSimilarly, in this litigation, the district court thought, the only\\npurported assignment that could confer standing on any of\\nthe plaintiffs was one from HFAP to Recovery Claims.\\n State Farm brought Auto-Owners to the attention of the\\ndistrict court the day after it was issued. The next day, the\\ndistrict court entered a Text Order directing the plaintiffs to\\nexplain why this litigation should not be dismissed on the\\nsame grounds.\\n The plaintiffs complied with that order. Their response\\nfirst argued that Auto-Owners was wrongly decided for two\\nreasons: (1) HFAP does qualify as a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization for purposes of the private right of action; and\\n(2) the agreement between Health First Health and HFAP\\ngranted HFAP the power to enforce Health First Health’s\\nlegal rights as its agent, making the agreement the equivalent\\nof an assignment. In a decision issued on May 25, 2018, the\\ndistrict court rejected both points.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n The court was particularly bothered by what it saw as a\\nbombshell: the revelation in the plaintiffs’ response that\\nHealth First Health, which had never been mentioned in the\\nCentral Illinois case, not HFAP, was the entity that paid the\\nunreimbursed medical costs. This fact contradicted earlier\\nfilings that identified HFAP as the payer with reimbursement\\nrights. If that was true, the district court thought, then HFAP\\n(whatever its status) never incurred any injury and so had no\\nrights that it could assign. The court also reasoned that in light\\nof this development, there was no need to decide, as the\\nFlorida court had, whether HFAP was a qualifying Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization. It was Health First Health that paid\\nthe unreimbursed bills, but the plaintiffs had an assignment\\nonly from HFAP. Only if Health First Health’s service contract\\nwith HFAP also assigned HFAP its legal rights could the case\\nhave a leg to stand on. And on this point, the district court\\nagreed fully with its Florida counterpart: it emphasized,\\ncontrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, that a document\\ncreating an agency relationship and one effecting an\\nassignment of rights are two entirely different things.\\nAccordingly, the district court dismissed the case on this\\nground alone. “Assuming HFAP is [a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization], Plaintiffs still need to satisfy Article-III\\nstanding requirements, and this they cannot do.”\\n Up to this point, we agree with the district court’s\\ndisposition of the case. Nothing in the agreement between\\nHealth First Health and HFAP suggests that Health First\\nHealth was assigning away any of its rights. Without such an\\nassignment, HFAP’s own assignment to plaintiff Recovery\\nClaims conveyed nothing, and thus the plaintiffs had no\\nrights to enforce and no standing to sue. As we note when we\\nreach the sanctions portion of this appeal, additional\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 11\\n\\ninformation later came to the district court’s attention, but\\nthat new information could not have affected the court’s order\\nof May 25.\\n We part ways with the district court only with respect to\\nthe bottom line. The decision that plaintiffs lacked Article III\\nstanding is one of jurisdictional significance: it means that the\\ncourt had no authority to resolve the case. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc.\\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). And that is why the\\ncourt erred by dismissing the case “with prejudice.” See, e.g.,\\nT.W. and M.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1997)\\n(“[W]hen a suit is dismissed for want of subject-matter\\njurisdiction, that is, because the court has no power to resolve\\nthe case on the merits even if the parties are content to have it\\ndo so, it is error to make the dismissal with prejudice”).\\n If a complaint fails to include enough allegations to\\nsupport Article III standing for the plaintiffs, the court has\\nonly two options: it can either dismiss the complaint with\\nleave to amend, or it can dismiss the case for want of\\njurisdiction and hence without prejudice. The Federal Rules\\nof Civil Procedure allow for one amendment as of right and\\ndirect district courts “freely [to] give leave [for further\\namendments] when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).\\nBut after the first round of amendments, the court has the\\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend. If, after amendments, the\\njurisdictional problem persists, then the only option left is a\\ndismissal without prejudice.\\n A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction without leave to amend\\nis not the same thing as a dismissal with prejudice. A\\ndismissal with prejudice is a ruling on the merits, because it\\ncarries with it a preclusive effect that prevents the plaintiffs\\nfrom relitigating—in any court, ever again—any claim\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nencompassed by the suit. We have emphasized this\\ndistinction before. See, e.g., Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 467 F.3d\\n602, 605 (7th Cir. 2006) (“‘No jurisdiction’ and ‘with prejudice’\\nare mutually exclusive.’ A court that lacks subject matter\\njurisdiction cannot dismiss a case with prejudice.”); Okoro v.\\nBohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] judgment on\\nthe merits precludes relitigation of any ground within the\\ncompass of the suit, while a jurisdictional dismissal precludes\\nonly the relitigation of the ground of that dismissal.”).\\n If plaintiffs believe they have satisfied the standing\\nrequirements of a proper state-court forum—requirements\\nthat may differ from those used by the federal courts—they\\nmay try their luck in state court. Or, if they later believe they\\ncan demonstrate that they have suffered an injury in fact after\\nall, perhaps on the basis of a different assignment or exemplar\\nclaim, they can present these claims against the same\\ndefendant in a new federal suit (assuming of course that no\\nindependent barrier, such as the statute of limitations, exists).\\nIndeed, in a case brought by these plaintiffs against the same\\ndefendant and before the same district judge—which the\\ncourt called “a putative class action with slightly different\\nfacts, but consisting of virtually identical allegations under\\nthe law”—these plaintiffs did successfully demonstrate\\nstanding and survived a motion to dismiss. MAO-MSO\\nRecovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (“State Farm\\nI”), No. 17-cv-01537, 2018 WL 3420796 at *1, *7 (C.D. Ill. July\\n13, 2018).\\n None of these later developments, however, means that\\nthe district court was required to let this lawsuit continue. The\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by saying “enough is\\nenough.” It observed that “Plaintiffs have been given a few\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 13\\n\\nchances to demonstrate this Court has jurisdiction.” This suit,\\nthe judge thought, had run its course. Indeed, in a footnote\\nexplaining its dismissal “with prejudice,” the court cited\\nArreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008) for the\\nunassailable proposition that district courts “have broad\\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue delay,\\nbad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure\\ndeficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or where the\\namendment would be futile.” (Emphasis added). The only\\nproblem was thus the court’s use of the phrase “with\\nprejudice” to signal that it would permit no more\\namendments.\\n On this understanding of the district court’s order, we find\\nno abuse of discretion in its decision to dismiss on standing\\ngrounds and to refuse further amendments. While it is true\\nthat the plaintiffs had not previously had a chance to address\\nthe HFAP/Health First Health mix-up, they were on notice\\nfrom the outset that the issue of standing would be front and\\ncenter. If they were going to hang their hat on a single\\n“exemplar” after two unsuccessful attempts, it was important\\nto get it right on the third try. The district court’s frustration\\nat their failure to do so was understandable. And the court\\nwas entitled to give little weight to their plea for another\\nround of pleading, since their memorandum included\\nnothing beyond a request for “leave to allege additional\\nexemplar beneficiaries,” without naming them or providing\\nany reason for the district court to believe that the fourth time\\nwould be the charm. Denying leave to amend under such\\ncircumstances was well within the district court’s discretion.\\nSee James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Const. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 400–\\n01 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of specificity in proposed\\namendments justified denial of leave to amend).\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n III\\n In the same order that dismissed the Second Amended\\nComplaint, the district court also ordered the plaintiffs to\\nshow cause why they should not be sanctioned for their\\nearlier filings, which wrongly identified HFAP as the payer of\\nthe relevant medical costs. We address the substance of the\\nsanctions issue below. Here we note that the plaintiffs’\\nresponse to the order to show cause contained materials\\nrelevant to standing and the merits, including (1) a\\ndeclaration attesting to many additional exemplars that could\\nbe alleged; (2) a purported “nunc pro tunc” or retroactive\\nassignment from Health First Health to one of the plaintiffs,\\nintended to cure the defect identified by the court; and (3) a\\ndeclaration from Michael Keeler, the Chief Operating Officer\\nof Health First Health and HFAP, explaining the relationship\\nbetween the two entities and putting on the record that he had\\nalways intended to assign rights from Health First Health to\\nthe plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that in light of\\nthis new evidence, the district court abused its discretion\\nwhen it refused further amendments.\\n We need not decide whether any of these documents\\nmight have been enough to call into question the district\\ncourt’s dismissal without leave to amend, because the court\\ndid not have any of this evidence in front of it when it issued\\nthe dismissal order. The time to provide this information was\\nin response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss or in the\\nsupplemental response to the district court’s Text Order\\nregarding Auto-Owners. A post-dismissal filing in response to\\nan order to show cause was too little, too late. And to make\\nmatters worse, the plaintiffs never filed a motion for\\nreconsideration or relief from judgment. None of the\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 15\\n\\ninformation provided to the district court after the dismissal\\nrequired it to revive the suit.\\n Because we agree that the district court was without\\njurisdiction to address the merits of the case, that means we\\nare, too. Accordingly, we also dismiss State Farm’s cross-\\nappeal arguing for a dismissal on the merits.\\n IV\\n Finally, we must decide whether Rule 11 sanctions against\\nplaintiff Recovery Claims and three of its attorneys were\\nproper. We review the district court’s decision to impose\\nsanctions for abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax\\nCorporation, 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). When we apply that\\nstandard, however, we must bear in mind that “[a] district\\ncourt would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its\\nruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly\\nerroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. See also Equal\\nEmployment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 907\\nF.3d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining the Rule 11 abuse-of-\\ndiscretion standard as clarified in Cooter & Gell).\\n\\n A\\n\\n Rule 11 requires that attorneys certify “to the best of [their]\\nknowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry\\nreasonable under the circumstances” that their filings have\\nadequate foundation in fact and law and lack an “improper\\npurpose.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Because the district court\\nappeared to base its sanctions order on counsel’s lack of\\ncandor—i.e. filing documents with the court in bad faith —\\nand a failure to undertake an objectively reasonable inquiry,\\nwe address both grounds. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nN.A., 880 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that Rule\\n11 embodies both an objective and a subjective standard,\\nprohibiting both “frivolousness on the objective side” and\\n“bad faith on the subjective side.”)\\n At this stage of the case, the district court had the benefit\\nof the plaintiffs’ response to the order to show cause, in which\\nthey filed the additional materials mentioned above. Those\\nsubmissions are relevant to the Rule 11 analysis.\\n We begin with the finding of bad faith or “lack of candor.”\\nWe are hard-pressed to see any indication of intentional\\nmisrepresentation in this confused and confusing record.\\nNone of the counsel for Recovery Claims—the only party that\\nwas sanctioned—entered an appearance in the Florida Auto-\\nOwners litigation. As far as the record shows, the first time\\nthese attorneys learned of the Auto-Owners decision was when\\nState Farm brought the case to the attention of the district\\ncourt here. We also agree with the plaintiffs that, contrary to\\nthe district court’s finding, there is no basis in the record for\\nthe conclusion that these attorneys knew anything about the\\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction until they saw the Text\\nOrder. (The district court seemed to derive its conclusion\\nfrom what it understood to be the plaintiffs’ “admis[sion] that\\n[they] knew there were multiple ‘Health First’ entities and\\nthat HFAP did not actually pay R.Y.’s medical expenses … .”\\nBut the cited portion of plaintiffs’ response to the Text Order\\ndoes not support that conclusion, and plaintiffs disclaim ever\\nhaving made such an admission.) Without knowledge of the\\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction, most of the supposed\\nmisrepresentations in the earlier filings regarding HFAP’s\\nstatus as a Medicare Advantage Organization or as the payer\\nof R.Y.’s medical bills look more like honest mistakes. The\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 17\\n\\nsame goes for any misunderstanding about the nature of the\\nassignment.\\n The district court also appears to have found that\\ncounsel’s submissions after the Text Order was issued\\ndemonstrated a lack of candor inasmuch as they did not\\nimmediately admit (1) the inaccuracies in their earlier\\npleadings and (2) that fatal nature of the mix-up uncovered in\\nAuto-Owners. This also goes too far. In light of the evidence\\nthe plaintiffs submitted to the district court on the Rule 11\\npoint, it is understandable why they had maintained that\\nthere was a colorable reading of the underlying assignment\\nthat would give effect to Keeler’s unquestioned intent, i.e., to\\nassign Health First Health’s rights to plaintiff Recovery\\nClaims. And as the district court eventually acknowledged in\\nits order imposing sanctions, there was “some debate” on the\\nquestion whether HFAP might qualify as a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization (an issue that ultimately proved\\nimmaterial but that was relevant to the claimed accuracy of\\nthe earlier filings). True, the plaintiffs may have understated\\nthe scope of the problem in their response to the Text Order,\\nand they may have erred by pursuing a legal argument that\\nstretched agency theory too far. They also should have\\nbrought their supporting materials before the district judge at\\nthe same time as they filed their response to the Text Order.\\nBut in the absence of either affirmative representations or\\nmaterial omissions in the response to the Text Order, what we\\nare left with is an aggressive litigation strategy with a\\ncolorable (if strained) basis in law and fact, rather than a lack\\nof candor. That is not sanctionable conduct.\\n The district court also had other grounds for imposing\\nsanctions: carelessness and inattentiveness. As we have\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nemphasized repeatedly, an ‘empty head but a pure heart is no\\ndefense.’” U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, N.D. v. Sullivan-Moore, 406\\nF.3d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chambers v. Am. Trans\\nAir, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 1994)). Because Rule 11\\nimposes on attorneys a duty to conduct an “inquiry\\nreasonable under the circumstances” before they attest to\\n“knowledge, information, and belief” supporting their filings,\\neven honest mistakes can be sanctionable. The district court\\nfound that the attorneys in this case failed to live up to that\\nduty.\\n It is one thing to lose on a point, however, and another to\\nurge something so ill-founded that it is sanctionable.\\nAlthough the standard for abuse of discretion is demanding,\\nwe conclude that the district court stepped over the\\nboundaries of its discretion in imposing sanctions on the basis\\nof carelessness or inattention. Again, the exhibits the plaintiffs\\nfiled in response to the order to show cause are instructive.\\nThe affidavit from Keeler demonstrates that Health First\\nAdministrative Plans (HFAP) and Health First Health Plans\\nshared more than very similar names, a holding company,\\nand a common COO; they were, for many purposes, almost\\nindistinguishable to any external party dealing with them. As\\nKeeler averred, “[Health First Health] acts through myself\\nand its other corporate officers, but it has no employees …\\n[Health First Health] takes no action except through HFAP’s\\nagents and employees.” Affidavit of Michael Keeler, June 1,\\n2018 at 1–2. To make matters more confusing, at least\\naccording to plaintiffs’ allegations, HFAP did business under\\nthe name “Health First Health Plans.” And even if Health\\nFirst Health was the entity from whose assets the beneficiary\\nwas paid—meaning it possessed the reimbursement rights—\\nplaintiffs point out that “the act of payment would not\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 19\\n\\nunreasonably or inaccurately be attributed to HFAP, which\\ncarried out all acts on behalf of [Health First Health].”\\n Without getting further into the weeds, it suffices to say\\nthat this corporate arrangement was not just complex, but so\\nfreighted with overlapping names and functions that a mix-\\nup was, at the end of the day, understandable. The district\\ncourt did “not accept that Health First’s ‘corporate structure’\\nwas too confusing to warrant the misstatements in the Second\\nAmended Complaint.” Respectfully, the district court\\nreached its conclusion about the straightforward nature of the\\ncorporate arrangement while it was looking at it with the\\nbenefit of hindsight. The court did not give adequate weight\\nto the plaintiffs’ additional evidence, nor did it consider\\ncarefully enough what the attorneys knew and when they\\nknew it. (How could the details of this structure have been\\napparent at a time when the attorneys were unaware that\\nthere was a second “Health First” entity?) Sanctions against\\nthe attorneys for Recovery Claims were not warranted on this\\nrecord.\\n B\\n The sanctions against plaintiff Recovery Claims must also\\nbe reversed. As discussed, we find that none of the actions or\\nomissions of its counsel in this case amounted to sanctionable\\nconduct. The district court did not point to any conduct by\\nRecovery Claims itself, rather than its agents, that would\\nindependently allow us to sustain the imposition of sanctions.\\nUnlike its counsel, Recovery Claims did have some\\nknowledge of the Florida litigation. But we detect nothing\\nimproper in the two-day lapse between the Auto-Owners\\ndecision on April 25, 2018, and the district court’s Text Order\\non April 27, especially given the factual and legal arguments\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nthat plaintiffs might have wished to develop in response. It is\\ntrue that there was a 14-day hiatus between Keeler’s affidavit\\nin the Auto-Owners case, which explained the HFAP/Health\\nFirst Health ownership structure, and the day the district\\ncourt learned of the ruling that the Florida district judge made\\nas a result. Nonetheless, we conclude that it is too much of a\\nstretch to sanction plaintiff Recovery Claims for failing to\\nrecognize the implications of an affidavit filed in one case,\\nwithout the benefit of any dispositive ruling on the issue, for\\na completely different case being litigated by a separate team\\nof attorneys. As far as we can tell, the sanctions against\\nRecovery Claims must rise or fall with the sanctions against\\nits attorneys. And so they fall.\\n Plaintiffs and their counsel have been punished for their\\nmissteps: the case was dismissed without leave to amend, and\\nwe affirm that dismissal today. But sanctions are a step too\\nfar.\\n IV\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal without leave to\\namend, but we modify it to be a dismissal without prejudice.\\nWe REVERSE the entry of sanctions against MSP Recovery\\nClaims, Series LLC, and its counsel in this case. State Farm’s\\ncross-appeal is DISMISSED. Each party will bear its own costs\\non appeal.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426121/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648868/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\nMAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, et al.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n Cross-Appellees,\n\n v.\n\nSTATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,\n Defendant-Appellee,\n Cross-Appellant.\n\nAPPEAL OF: CHRISTOPHER L. COFFIN, et al.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 17-1541 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE,\nCircuit Judges.\n WOOD, Chief Judge. When all the dust is cleared away, this\ncase is relatively straightforward: we must review a dismissal\nfor lack of Article III standing and the imposition of sanctions\n\f2 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nunder Rule 11. Only the factual backdrop is complex, as it\ndeals with one aspect of the federal Medicare program. The\nPlaintiffs assert that they are assignees of certain private\ninsurers called Medicare Advantage Organizations, which\nprovide Medicare benefits. They brought a putative class\naction against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance\nCompany in an effort to recover payments State Farm\nallegedly should have made to them as reimbursement for\ncertain medical costs. The district court dismissed the action\nwith prejudice, although the basis for the dismissal was lack\nof standing. In addition, the court imposed sanctions under\nRule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against one of\nthe plaintiffs, MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, and its\nattorneys.\n Plaintiffs, MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC; MSP Recovery,\nLLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and MSP Recovery Claims, Series\nLLC MSP (“Recovery Claims”), appealed. They argue that the\ncourt erred in its standing analysis, and that in any event it\nshould not have dismissed the case with prejudice. Recovery\nClaims and the attorneys (Christopher Coffin, David\nHundley, and Courtney Stidham) appealed the sanctions\norder. Finally, State Farm cross-appealed in order to preserve\nits alternative argument in favor of affirmance—that the case\nshould be dismissed on the merits because plaintiffs failed to\nstate a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Matushkina\nv. Nielsen, 877 F.3d 289, 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[a]s a\ngeneral rule, where a defendant has won dismissal for lack of\nstanding or some other jurisdictional ground, modifying the\njudgment to dismissal on the merits” requires a cross-appeal).\n We conclude that the district court erred insofar as it\ndismissed plaintiffs’ case with prejudice, when the problem\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 3\n\nwas a fundamental lack of Article III standing. But this victory\ngets the plaintiffs only so far. The court acted well within its\ndiscretion when it denied plaintiffs a third opportunity to\ncure the defects in their pleadings. The court’s order, in\nsubstance, was a jurisdictional dismissal with denial of leave\nto amend. So understood, we affirm the judgment and correct\nthe record to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice.\nWe also dismiss State Farm’s cross-appeal. Finally, we find\nthat the district court exceeded the bounds of its discretion\nwhen it imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Recovery Claims and\nits attorneys.\n I\n Although the issues before us are ultimately procedural,\nsome background on Medicare is helpful to place them in\ncontext. Medicare is “the federal health insurance program\nfor people who are 65 or older,” as well as for certain other\ngroups. See https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-\ncovers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/whats-medicare.\nWhile many Americans receive benefits directly from the\ngovernment through Medicare Parts A and B, others receive\ntheir benefits from private entities known as Medicare\nAdvantage Organizations, pursuant to Medicare Part C.\n42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a). For each Medicare enrollee covered\nby a Medicare Advantage Organization, the Organization\nreceives a per capita reimbursement from the federal\ngovernment. The amount of that reimbursement may vary\naccording to the characteristics of the individual enrollees and\nother factors. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.\nLiab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 364–65 (3d Cir. 2012). The Medical\nAdvantage Organizations assume the financial risk of\ninsuring their enrollees. Id.\n\f4 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\n One other piece of Medicare vocabulary is important to\nthis case: the difference between “primary” and “secondary”\npayments. When an enrollee is covered directly by the\ngovernment (under Medicare Parts A and B), Medicare is\nstatutorily barred from making payments for medical costs\nwhen an enrollee has benefited or is likely to benefit from\nsome other insurance or worker’s compensation plan. The\nstatute mentions such alternative sources of benefits as “a\nworkmen’s compensation law … or … automobile or liability\ninsurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or …\nno fault insurance.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii). In such\nsituations, Medicare is a secondary form of coverage that\napplies only to costs not covered by the primary insurance.\nBut if a primary insurer fails to pay, the government does not\nleave the enrollee and her medical providers in the lurch.\nRather, it makes conditional payments to providers and then\nseeks reimbursement from the primary insurer. Id.\n§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i). An analogous provision in Medicare\nPart C makes the private Medicare Advantage Organizations\nsecondary payers where enrollees have some form of primary\ncoverage. Id. § 1395w-22(a)(4). When the primary insurers fall\ndown on their responsibilities, Medicare Advantage\nOrganizations are authorized by statute to pay first and seek\nreimbursement later, just as the government may. Id.\n Sometimes, however, the primary insurer never\nreimburses the secondary payer (be it the government or a\nMedicare Advantage Organization) for benefits it should have\nprovided. In that case, the Medicare Secondary Payer\nprovisions establish a private right of action that permits some\nprivate plaintiffs to sue for double damages. But the relevant\nsection of the statute does not specify who may take\nadvantage of that provision. All it says, without further\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 5\n\nelaboration, is that “[t]here is established a private cause of\naction for damages (which shall be in an amount double the\namount otherwise provided) in the case of a primary plan\nwhich fails to provide for primary payment (or appropriate\nreimbursement) in accordance with paragraphs (1) and\n(2)(A).” Id. § 1395y(b)(3)(A).\n The plaintiffs in this case are not themselves Medicare\nAdvantage Organizations; they assert instead that they are\nassignees of claims that originally belonged to such entities.\nThey argue that Medicare Advantage Organizations are\namong the proper plaintiffs that can exercise this private right\nof action, and that through the assignments, they stand in the\nshoes of those Organizations. The plaintiffs and related\nentities have pursued this theory not just in this litigation, but\nin several suits throughout the country. See, e.g., MAO-MSO\nRecovery II, LLC v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., No. PWG-17-711,\n2018 WL 999920 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2018); MAO-MSO Recovery\nII, LLC v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-175-JDP, 2018\nWL 835160 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018). At the same time as it\ngranted State Farm’s motion to dismiss the First Amended\nComplaint for lack of standing in this case, the district court\nagreed with the plaintiffs that the statute does support a\nprivate right of action for Medicare Advantage Organizations.\nIn that respect, it relied on rulings from the Third and\nEleventh Circuits. See Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. W. Heritage\nIns. Co., 832 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Avandia\nMktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 355 (3d\nCir. 2012). Although State Farm did not challenge this point\nin the district court, it has changed its tune on appeal and now\nargues that the private right of action does not extend to\nMedicare Advantage Organizations. Those entities, State\nFarm contends, must look to contract law for appropriate\n\f6 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nremedies. This dispute is at the heart of State Farm’s cross-\nappeal.\n Plaintiffs’ efforts in the present case foundered, however,\nwhen the district court found that they did not have valid\nassignments from any Medicare Advantage Organization that\nmade unreimbursed payments. Without the link to a proper\nOrganization that possessed claims to reimbursement, the\ncourt concluded, plaintiffs had no injury for which they could\nseek redress on this or any other legal theory. Accordingly, it\nruled, no matter the scope of the private right of action, these\nplaintiffs lacked standing to sue. We come to the same\nconclusion. We save for another day the question whether a\nMedicare Advantage Organization or a proper assignee of its\nrights may invoke the Medicare Secondary Payer private right\nof action for double damages against a primary insurer.\n II\n We now turn to the specific defects that the district court\nfound to be fatal to the plaintiffs’ case. This appeal comes to\nus on a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Second Amended\nComplaint. A brief review of the first two iterations of the\ncomplaint sheds some light on what went wrong and why\nplaintiffs are entitled to no further amendments.\n From the outset of this litigation, the question of standing\nhas been hotly disputed. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they and\nsimilar organizations have filed a number of suits in which\nthe initial complaints “did not name any exemplar\nbeneficiaries or their corresponding assignor [Medicare\nAdvantage] Plans.” Instead, they “generally alleged the\nassignments held by plaintiffs from multiple [Medicare\nAdvantage Organizations], and alleged plaintiffs’ analysis of\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 7\n\nthe data from multiple unreimbursed claims.” This led to\nsuccessful defense motions to dismiss for lack of standing: as\nthe plaintiffs put it, “[g]enerally, the district court rulings on\nthese early motions were to dismiss the complaints, with\nleave to amend, directing some degree of greater specificity.”\nWhen State Farm in this case moved to dismiss the initial\ncomplaint for lack of Article III standing (among other\ngrounds), the plaintiffs responded by filing an amended\ncomplaint to put more meat on the bone.\n The First Amended Complaint fell short, however. It\nidentified an exemplar beneficiary by initials and a Medicare\nAdvantage Organization (whose identity was redacted) that\nallegedly had made secondary payments, but it provided\nlittle additional information about the underlying claims or\npayments. Even after the district court issued a protective\norder, plaintiffs still failed to disclose the name of the assignor\nMedicare Advantage Organization to State Farm. This time,\nin response to State Farm’s motion, the district court\ndismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing. It\nfound that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate an “injury in\nfact” for purposes of Article III standing without more\nspecificity as to the injuries sustained by the exemplar\nbeneficiary and the assignor Medicare Advantage\nOrganization that had allegedly paid the unreimbursed\nmedical costs. The court gave the plaintiffs another chance to\ncure that defect by granting leave to amend.\n Plaintiffs took advantage of that opportunity and filed a\nSecond Amended Complaint. In this iteration, the plaintiffs\nchose a new “exemplar beneficiary” (identified by the initials\n“R.Y.”) and named the Medicare Advantage Organization\nthat had made the secondary payments as Health First\n\f8 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nAdministrative Plans (“HFAP”). A chain of assignments\ntransferred HFAP’s alleged right of recovery to Recovery\nClaims. The complaint alleged that R.Y. suffered specific\ninjuries in an accident; that HFAP was the entity that paid\nmedical costs for R.Y.; that State Farm entered into a\nsettlement agreement with R.Y.; and that State Farm failed to\nreimburse HFAP for the costs HFAP had incurred.\n This time, however, there was a new problem: it was not\nclear that HFAP qualified as a Medicare Advantage\nOrganization. After the defendants filed another motion to\ndismiss for lack of standing, but before the district court had\narrived at a decision, a district court in Florida ruled in a\nrelated case that HFAP was not a Medicare Advantage\nOrganization at all. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Auto-\nOwners Ins. Co., No. 17-23841, 2018 WL 1953861 *5 (S.D. Fla.\nApr. 25, 2018) (“Auto-Owners”). The Florida court took judicial\nnotice of the fact that HFAP does not appear on the list\nmaintained by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services\nof Medicare Advantage Organizations. Id. Instead, HFAP is an\nentity that had contracted with a Medicare Advantage\nOrganization—a closely linked entity by the name of Health\nFirst Health Plans—to provide a range of administrative,\nfinancial, and strategic-planning services. The two entities\n(Health First Administrative Plans and Health First Health\nPlans) shared very similar names, a holding company, and a\nChief Operating Officer, Michael Keeler. But crucially, in the\nFlorida court’s view, only Health First Health contracted\ndirectly with the government and qualified as a Medicare\nAdvantage Organization for purposes of the private right of\naction that the plaintiffs were asserting. Accordingly, the\nFlorida court found that HFAP did not have any recovery\nrights to assign, even assuming plaintiffs were correct about\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 9\n\nthe private right of action: any such claims belonged only to\nHealth First Health.\n Only one of the plaintiffs in this case—Recovery Claims—\nwas a party to Auto-Owners. Nonetheless, the overlap was\nenough to matter. As in this case, the plaintiffs in Auto-Owners\nargued that whatever the proper characterization of HFAP\nmight have been, its service contract with Health First Health\nmeant that it could pursue Health First Health’s legal claims\nor assign them away. The Florida court rejected that\ncontention, ruling that “a contract for services is not an\nassignment of rights,” and thus “HFAP [could] not assign\nrights to Plaintiff that were not assigned to it in the first place.”\nId. This left the Florida plaintiffs without any rights to enforce.\nSimilarly, in this litigation, the district court thought, the only\npurported assignment that could confer standing on any of\nthe plaintiffs was one from HFAP to Recovery Claims.\n State Farm brought Auto-Owners to the attention of the\ndistrict court the day after it was issued. The next day, the\ndistrict court entered a Text Order directing the plaintiffs to\nexplain why this litigation should not be dismissed on the\nsame grounds.\n The plaintiffs complied with that order. Their response\nfirst argued that Auto-Owners was wrongly decided for two\nreasons: (1) HFAP does qualify as a Medicare Advantage\nOrganization for purposes of the private right of action; and\n(2) the agreement between Health First Health and HFAP\ngranted HFAP the power to enforce Health First Health’s\nlegal rights as its agent, making the agreement the equivalent\nof an assignment. In a decision issued on May 25, 2018, the\ndistrict court rejected both points.\n\f10 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\n The court was particularly bothered by what it saw as a\nbombshell: the revelation in the plaintiffs’ response that\nHealth First Health, which had never been mentioned in the\nCentral Illinois case, not HFAP, was the entity that paid the\nunreimbursed medical costs. This fact contradicted earlier\nfilings that identified HFAP as the payer with reimbursement\nrights. If that was true, the district court thought, then HFAP\n(whatever its status) never incurred any injury and so had no\nrights that it could assign. The court also reasoned that in light\nof this development, there was no need to decide, as the\nFlorida court had, whether HFAP was a qualifying Medicare\nAdvantage Organization. It was Health First Health that paid\nthe unreimbursed bills, but the plaintiffs had an assignment\nonly from HFAP. Only if Health First Health’s service contract\nwith HFAP also assigned HFAP its legal rights could the case\nhave a leg to stand on. And on this point, the district court\nagreed fully with its Florida counterpart: it emphasized,\ncontrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, that a document\ncreating an agency relationship and one effecting an\nassignment of rights are two entirely different things.\nAccordingly, the district court dismissed the case on this\nground alone. “Assuming HFAP is [a Medicare Advantage\nOrganization], Plaintiffs still need to satisfy Article-III\nstanding requirements, and this they cannot do.”\n Up to this point, we agree with the district court’s\ndisposition of the case. Nothing in the agreement between\nHealth First Health and HFAP suggests that Health First\nHealth was assigning away any of its rights. Without such an\nassignment, HFAP’s own assignment to plaintiff Recovery\nClaims conveyed nothing, and thus the plaintiffs had no\nrights to enforce and no standing to sue. As we note when we\nreach the sanctions portion of this appeal, additional\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 11\n\ninformation later came to the district court’s attention, but\nthat new information could not have affected the court’s order\nof May 25.\n We part ways with the district court only with respect to\nthe bottom line. The decision that plaintiffs lacked Article III\nstanding is one of jurisdictional significance: it means that the\ncourt had no authority to resolve the case. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc.\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). And that is why the\ncourt erred by dismissing the case “with prejudice.” See, e.g.,\nT.W. and M.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1997)\n(“[W]hen a suit is dismissed for want of subject-matter\njurisdiction, that is, because the court has no power to resolve\nthe case on the merits even if the parties are content to have it\ndo so, it is error to make the dismissal with prejudice”).\n If a complaint fails to include enough allegations to\nsupport Article III standing for the plaintiffs, the court has\nonly two options: it can either dismiss the complaint with\nleave to amend, or it can dismiss the case for want of\njurisdiction and hence without prejudice. The Federal Rules\nof Civil Procedure allow for one amendment as of right and\ndirect district courts “freely [to] give leave [for further\namendments] when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).\nBut after the first round of amendments, the court has the\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend. If, after amendments, the\njurisdictional problem persists, then the only option left is a\ndismissal without prejudice.\n A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction without leave to amend\nis not the same thing as a dismissal with prejudice. A\ndismissal with prejudice is a ruling on the merits, because it\ncarries with it a preclusive effect that prevents the plaintiffs\nfrom relitigating—in any court, ever again—any claim\n\f12 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nencompassed by the suit. We have emphasized this\ndistinction before. See, e.g., Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 467 F.3d\n602, 605 (7th Cir. 2006) (“‘No jurisdiction’ and ‘with prejudice’\nare mutually exclusive.’ A court that lacks subject matter\njurisdiction cannot dismiss a case with prejudice.”); Okoro v.\nBohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] judgment on\nthe merits precludes relitigation of any ground within the\ncompass of the suit, while a jurisdictional dismissal precludes\nonly the relitigation of the ground of that dismissal.”).\n If plaintiffs believe they have satisfied the standing\nrequirements of a proper state-court forum—requirements\nthat may differ from those used by the federal courts—they\nmay try their luck in state court. Or, if they later believe they\ncan demonstrate that they have suffered an injury in fact after\nall, perhaps on the basis of a different assignment or exemplar\nclaim, they can present these claims against the same\ndefendant in a new federal suit (assuming of course that no\nindependent barrier, such as the statute of limitations, exists).\nIndeed, in a case brought by these plaintiffs against the same\ndefendant and before the same district judge—which the\ncourt called “a putative class action with slightly different\nfacts, but consisting of virtually identical allegations under\nthe law”—these plaintiffs did successfully demonstrate\nstanding and survived a motion to dismiss. MAO-MSO\nRecovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (“State Farm\nI”), No. 17-cv-01537, 2018 WL 3420796 at *1, *7 (C.D. Ill. July\n13, 2018).\n None of these later developments, however, means that\nthe district court was required to let this lawsuit continue. The\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by saying “enough is\nenough.” It observed that “Plaintiffs have been given a few\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 13\n\nchances to demonstrate this Court has jurisdiction.” This suit,\nthe judge thought, had run its course. Indeed, in a footnote\nexplaining its dismissal “with prejudice,” the court cited\nArreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008) for the\nunassailable proposition that district courts “have broad\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue delay,\nbad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure\ndeficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or where the\namendment would be futile.” (Emphasis added). The only\nproblem was thus the court’s use of the phrase “with\nprejudice” to signal that it would permit no more\namendments.\n On this understanding of the district court’s order, we find\nno abuse of discretion in its decision to dismiss on standing\ngrounds and to refuse further amendments. While it is true\nthat the plaintiffs had not previously had a chance to address\nthe HFAP/Health First Health mix-up, they were on notice\nfrom the outset that the issue of standing would be front and\ncenter. If they were going to hang their hat on a single\n“exemplar” after two unsuccessful attempts, it was important\nto get it right on the third try. The district court’s frustration\nat their failure to do so was understandable. And the court\nwas entitled to give little weight to their plea for another\nround of pleading, since their memorandum included\nnothing beyond a request for “leave to allege additional\nexemplar beneficiaries,” without naming them or providing\nany reason for the district court to believe that the fourth time\nwould be the charm. Denying leave to amend under such\ncircumstances was well within the district court’s discretion.\nSee James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Const. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 400–\n01 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of specificity in proposed\namendments justified denial of leave to amend).\n\f14 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\n III\n In the same order that dismissed the Second Amended\nComplaint, the district court also ordered the plaintiffs to\nshow cause why they should not be sanctioned for their\nearlier filings, which wrongly identified HFAP as the payer of\nthe relevant medical costs. We address the substance of the\nsanctions issue below. Here we note that the plaintiffs’\nresponse to the order to show cause contained materials\nrelevant to standing and the merits, including (1) a\ndeclaration attesting to many additional exemplars that could\nbe alleged; (2) a purported “nunc pro tunc” or retroactive\nassignment from Health First Health to one of the plaintiffs,\nintended to cure the defect identified by the court; and (3) a\ndeclaration from Michael Keeler, the Chief Operating Officer\nof Health First Health and HFAP, explaining the relationship\nbetween the two entities and putting on the record that he had\nalways intended to assign rights from Health First Health to\nthe plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that in light of\nthis new evidence, the district court abused its discretion\nwhen it refused further amendments.\n We need not decide whether any of these documents\nmight have been enough to call into question the district\ncourt’s dismissal without leave to amend, because the court\ndid not have any of this evidence in front of it when it issued\nthe dismissal order. The time to provide this information was\nin response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss or in the\nsupplemental response to the district court’s Text Order\nregarding Auto-Owners. A post-dismissal filing in response to\nan order to show cause was too little, too late. And to make\nmatters worse, the plaintiffs never filed a motion for\nreconsideration or relief from judgment. None of the\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 15\n\ninformation provided to the district court after the dismissal\nrequired it to revive the suit.\n Because we agree that the district court was without\njurisdiction to address the merits of the case, that means we\nare, too. Accordingly, we also dismiss State Farm’s cross-\nappeal arguing for a dismissal on the merits.\n IV\n Finally, we must decide whether Rule 11 sanctions against\nplaintiff Recovery Claims and three of its attorneys were\nproper. We review the district court’s decision to impose\nsanctions for abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax\nCorporation, 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). When we apply that\nstandard, however, we must bear in mind that “[a] district\ncourt would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its\nruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly\nerroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. See also Equal\nEmployment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 907\nF.3d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining the Rule 11 abuse-of-\ndiscretion standard as clarified in Cooter & Gell).\n\n A\n\n Rule 11 requires that attorneys certify “to the best of [their]\nknowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry\nreasonable under the circumstances” that their filings have\nadequate foundation in fact and law and lack an “improper\npurpose.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Because the district court\nappeared to base its sanctions order on counsel’s lack of\ncandor—i.e. filing documents with the court in bad faith —\nand a failure to undertake an objectively reasonable inquiry,\nwe address both grounds. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank\n\f16 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nN.A., 880 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that Rule\n11 embodies both an objective and a subjective standard,\nprohibiting both “frivolousness on the objective side” and\n“bad faith on the subjective side.”)\n At this stage of the case, the district court had the benefit\nof the plaintiffs’ response to the order to show cause, in which\nthey filed the additional materials mentioned above. Those\nsubmissions are relevant to the Rule 11 analysis.\n We begin with the finding of bad faith or “lack of candor.”\nWe are hard-pressed to see any indication of intentional\nmisrepresentation in this confused and confusing record.\nNone of the counsel for Recovery Claims—the only party that\nwas sanctioned—entered an appearance in the Florida Auto-\nOwners litigation. As far as the record shows, the first time\nthese attorneys learned of the Auto-Owners decision was when\nState Farm brought the case to the attention of the district\ncourt here. We also agree with the plaintiffs that, contrary to\nthe district court’s finding, there is no basis in the record for\nthe conclusion that these attorneys knew anything about the\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction until they saw the Text\nOrder. (The district court seemed to derive its conclusion\nfrom what it understood to be the plaintiffs’ “admis[sion] that\n[they] knew there were multiple ‘Health First’ entities and\nthat HFAP did not actually pay R.Y.’s medical expenses … .”\nBut the cited portion of plaintiffs’ response to the Text Order\ndoes not support that conclusion, and plaintiffs disclaim ever\nhaving made such an admission.) Without knowledge of the\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction, most of the supposed\nmisrepresentations in the earlier filings regarding HFAP’s\nstatus as a Medicare Advantage Organization or as the payer\nof R.Y.’s medical bills look more like honest mistakes. The\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 17\n\nsame goes for any misunderstanding about the nature of the\nassignment.\n The district court also appears to have found that\ncounsel’s submissions after the Text Order was issued\ndemonstrated a lack of candor inasmuch as they did not\nimmediately admit (1) the inaccuracies in their earlier\npleadings and (2) that fatal nature of the mix-up uncovered in\nAuto-Owners. This also goes too far. In light of the evidence\nthe plaintiffs submitted to the district court on the Rule 11\npoint, it is understandable why they had maintained that\nthere was a colorable reading of the underlying assignment\nthat would give effect to Keeler’s unquestioned intent, i.e., to\nassign Health First Health’s rights to plaintiff Recovery\nClaims. And as the district court eventually acknowledged in\nits order imposing sanctions, there was “some debate” on the\nquestion whether HFAP might qualify as a Medicare\nAdvantage Organization (an issue that ultimately proved\nimmaterial but that was relevant to the claimed accuracy of\nthe earlier filings). True, the plaintiffs may have understated\nthe scope of the problem in their response to the Text Order,\nand they may have erred by pursuing a legal argument that\nstretched agency theory too far. They also should have\nbrought their supporting materials before the district judge at\nthe same time as they filed their response to the Text Order.\nBut in the absence of either affirmative representations or\nmaterial omissions in the response to the Text Order, what we\nare left with is an aggressive litigation strategy with a\ncolorable (if strained) basis in law and fact, rather than a lack\nof candor. That is not sanctionable conduct.\n The district court also had other grounds for imposing\nsanctions: carelessness and inattentiveness. As we have\n\f18 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nemphasized repeatedly, an ‘empty head but a pure heart is no\ndefense.’” U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, N.D. v. Sullivan-Moore, 406\nF.3d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chambers v. Am. Trans\nAir, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 1994)). Because Rule 11\nimposes on attorneys a duty to conduct an “inquiry\nreasonable under the circumstances” before they attest to\n“knowledge, information, and belief” supporting their filings,\neven honest mistakes can be sanctionable. The district court\nfound that the attorneys in this case failed to live up to that\nduty.\n It is one thing to lose on a point, however, and another to\nurge something so ill-founded that it is sanctionable.\nAlthough the standard for abuse of discretion is demanding,\nwe conclude that the district court stepped over the\nboundaries of its discretion in imposing sanctions on the basis\nof carelessness or inattention. Again, the exhibits the plaintiffs\nfiled in response to the order to show cause are instructive.\nThe affidavit from Keeler demonstrates that Health First\nAdministrative Plans (HFAP) and Health First Health Plans\nshared more than very similar names, a holding company,\nand a common COO; they were, for many purposes, almost\nindistinguishable to any external party dealing with them. As\nKeeler averred, “[Health First Health] acts through myself\nand its other corporate officers, but it has no employees …\n[Health First Health] takes no action except through HFAP’s\nagents and employees.” Affidavit of Michael Keeler, June 1,\n2018 at 1–2. To make matters more confusing, at least\naccording to plaintiffs’ allegations, HFAP did business under\nthe name “Health First Health Plans.” And even if Health\nFirst Health was the entity from whose assets the beneficiary\nwas paid—meaning it possessed the reimbursement rights—\nplaintiffs point out that “the act of payment would not\n\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 19\n\nunreasonably or inaccurately be attributed to HFAP, which\ncarried out all acts on behalf of [Health First Health].”\n Without getting further into the weeds, it suffices to say\nthat this corporate arrangement was not just complex, but so\nfreighted with overlapping names and functions that a mix-\nup was, at the end of the day, understandable. The district\ncourt did “not accept that Health First’s ‘corporate structure’\nwas too confusing to warrant the misstatements in the Second\nAmended Complaint.” Respectfully, the district court\nreached its conclusion about the straightforward nature of the\ncorporate arrangement while it was looking at it with the\nbenefit of hindsight. The court did not give adequate weight\nto the plaintiffs’ additional evidence, nor did it consider\ncarefully enough what the attorneys knew and when they\nknew it. (How could the details of this structure have been\napparent at a time when the attorneys were unaware that\nthere was a second “Health First” entity?) Sanctions against\nthe attorneys for Recovery Claims were not warranted on this\nrecord.\n B\n The sanctions against plaintiff Recovery Claims must also\nbe reversed. As discussed, we find that none of the actions or\nomissions of its counsel in this case amounted to sanctionable\nconduct. The district court did not point to any conduct by\nRecovery Claims itself, rather than its agents, that would\nindependently allow us to sustain the imposition of sanctions.\nUnlike its counsel, Recovery Claims did have some\nknowledge of the Florida litigation. But we detect nothing\nimproper in the two-day lapse between the Auto-Owners\ndecision on April 25, 2018, and the district court’s Text Order\non April 27, especially given the factual and legal arguments\n\f20 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\n\nthat plaintiffs might have wished to develop in response. It is\ntrue that there was a 14-day hiatus between Keeler’s affidavit\nin the Auto-Owners case, which explained the HFAP/Health\nFirst Health ownership structure, and the day the district\ncourt learned of the ruling that the Florida district judge made\nas a result. Nonetheless, we conclude that it is too much of a\nstretch to sanction plaintiff Recovery Claims for failing to\nrecognize the implications of an affidavit filed in one case,\nwithout the benefit of any dispositive ruling on the issue, for\na completely different case being litigated by a separate team\nof attorneys. As far as we can tell, the sanctions against\nRecovery Claims must rise or fall with the sanctions against\nits attorneys. And so they fall.\n Plaintiffs and their counsel have been punished for their\nmissteps: the case was dismissed without leave to amend, and\nwe affirm that dismissal today. But sanctions are a step too\nfar.\n IV\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal without leave to\namend, but we modify it to be a dismissal without prejudice.\nWe REVERSE the entry of sanctions against MSP Recovery\nClaims, Series LLC, and its counsel in this case. State Farm’s\ncross-appeal is DISMISSED. Each party will bear its own costs\non appeal.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\nMAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, et al.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n Cross-Appellees,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSTATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Defendant-Appellee,\\n Cross-Appellant.\\n\\nAPPEAL OF: CHRISTOPHER L. COFFIN, et al.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 17-1541 — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n WOOD, Chief Judge. When all the dust is cleared away, this\\ncase is relatively straightforward: we must review a dismissal\\nfor lack of Article III standing and the imposition of sanctions\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nunder Rule 11. Only the factual backdrop is complex, as it\\ndeals with one aspect of the federal Medicare program. The\\nPlaintiffs assert that they are assignees of certain private\\ninsurers called Medicare Advantage Organizations, which\\nprovide Medicare benefits. They brought a putative class\\naction against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance\\nCompany in an effort to recover payments State Farm\\nallegedly should have made to them as reimbursement for\\ncertain medical costs. The district court dismissed the action\\nwith prejudice, although the basis for the dismissal was lack\\nof standing. In addition, the court imposed sanctions under\\nRule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against one of\\nthe plaintiffs, MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, and its\\nattorneys.\\n Plaintiffs, MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC; MSP Recovery,\\nLLC; MSPA Claims 1, LLC; and MSP Recovery Claims, Series\\nLLC MSP (“Recovery Claims”), appealed. They argue that the\\ncourt erred in its standing analysis, and that in any event it\\nshould not have dismissed the case with prejudice. Recovery\\nClaims and the attorneys (Christopher Coffin, David\\nHundley, and Courtney Stidham) appealed the sanctions\\norder. Finally, State Farm cross-appealed in order to preserve\\nits alternative argument in favor of affirmance—that the case\\nshould be dismissed on the merits because plaintiffs failed to\\nstate a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Matushkina\\nv. Nielsen, 877 F.3d 289, 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[a]s a\\ngeneral rule, where a defendant has won dismissal for lack of\\nstanding or some other jurisdictional ground, modifying the\\njudgment to dismissal on the merits” requires a cross-appeal).\\n We conclude that the district court erred insofar as it\\ndismissed plaintiffs’ case with prejudice, when the problem\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 3\\n\\nwas a fundamental lack of Article III standing. But this victory\\ngets the plaintiffs only so far. The court acted well within its\\ndiscretion when it denied plaintiffs a third opportunity to\\ncure the defects in their pleadings. The court’s order, in\\nsubstance, was a jurisdictional dismissal with denial of leave\\nto amend. So understood, we affirm the judgment and correct\\nthe record to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice.\\nWe also dismiss State Farm’s cross-appeal. Finally, we find\\nthat the district court exceeded the bounds of its discretion\\nwhen it imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Recovery Claims and\\nits attorneys.\\n I\\n Although the issues before us are ultimately procedural,\\nsome background on Medicare is helpful to place them in\\ncontext. Medicare is “the federal health insurance program\\nfor people who are 65 or older,” as well as for certain other\\ngroups. See https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-\\ncovers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/whats-medicare.\\nWhile many Americans receive benefits directly from the\\ngovernment through Medicare Parts A and B, others receive\\ntheir benefits from private entities known as Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations, pursuant to Medicare Part C.\\n42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a). For each Medicare enrollee covered\\nby a Medicare Advantage Organization, the Organization\\nreceives a per capita reimbursement from the federal\\ngovernment. The amount of that reimbursement may vary\\naccording to the characteristics of the individual enrollees and\\nother factors. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods.\\nLiab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 364–65 (3d Cir. 2012). The Medical\\nAdvantage Organizations assume the financial risk of\\ninsuring their enrollees. Id.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n One other piece of Medicare vocabulary is important to\\nthis case: the difference between “primary” and “secondary”\\npayments. When an enrollee is covered directly by the\\ngovernment (under Medicare Parts A and B), Medicare is\\nstatutorily barred from making payments for medical costs\\nwhen an enrollee has benefited or is likely to benefit from\\nsome other insurance or worker’s compensation plan. The\\nstatute mentions such alternative sources of benefits as “a\\nworkmen’s compensation law … or … automobile or liability\\ninsurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or …\\nno fault insurance.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii). In such\\nsituations, Medicare is a secondary form of coverage that\\napplies only to costs not covered by the primary insurance.\\nBut if a primary insurer fails to pay, the government does not\\nleave the enrollee and her medical providers in the lurch.\\nRather, it makes conditional payments to providers and then\\nseeks reimbursement from the primary insurer. Id.\\n§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i). An analogous provision in Medicare\\nPart C makes the private Medicare Advantage Organizations\\nsecondary payers where enrollees have some form of primary\\ncoverage. Id. § 1395w-22(a)(4). When the primary insurers fall\\ndown on their responsibilities, Medicare Advantage\\nOrganizations are authorized by statute to pay first and seek\\nreimbursement later, just as the government may. Id.\\n Sometimes, however, the primary insurer never\\nreimburses the secondary payer (be it the government or a\\nMedicare Advantage Organization) for benefits it should have\\nprovided. In that case, the Medicare Secondary Payer\\nprovisions establish a private right of action that permits some\\nprivate plaintiffs to sue for double damages. But the relevant\\nsection of the statute does not specify who may take\\nadvantage of that provision. All it says, without further\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 5\\n\\nelaboration, is that “[t]here is established a private cause of\\naction for damages (which shall be in an amount double the\\namount otherwise provided) in the case of a primary plan\\nwhich fails to provide for primary payment (or appropriate\\nreimbursement) in accordance with paragraphs (1) and\\n(2)(A).” Id. § 1395y(b)(3)(A).\\n The plaintiffs in this case are not themselves Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations; they assert instead that they are\\nassignees of claims that originally belonged to such entities.\\nThey argue that Medicare Advantage Organizations are\\namong the proper plaintiffs that can exercise this private right\\nof action, and that through the assignments, they stand in the\\nshoes of those Organizations. The plaintiffs and related\\nentities have pursued this theory not just in this litigation, but\\nin several suits throughout the country. See, e.g., MAO-MSO\\nRecovery II, LLC v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., No. PWG-17-711,\\n2018 WL 999920 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2018); MAO-MSO Recovery\\nII, LLC v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-175-JDP, 2018\\nWL 835160 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 12, 2018). At the same time as it\\ngranted State Farm’s motion to dismiss the First Amended\\nComplaint for lack of standing in this case, the district court\\nagreed with the plaintiffs that the statute does support a\\nprivate right of action for Medicare Advantage Organizations.\\nIn that respect, it relied on rulings from the Third and\\nEleventh Circuits. See Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. W. Heritage\\nIns. Co., 832 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Avandia\\nMktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 355 (3d\\nCir. 2012). Although State Farm did not challenge this point\\nin the district court, it has changed its tune on appeal and now\\nargues that the private right of action does not extend to\\nMedicare Advantage Organizations. Those entities, State\\nFarm contends, must look to contract law for appropriate\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nremedies. This dispute is at the heart of State Farm’s cross-\\nappeal.\\n Plaintiffs’ efforts in the present case foundered, however,\\nwhen the district court found that they did not have valid\\nassignments from any Medicare Advantage Organization that\\nmade unreimbursed payments. Without the link to a proper\\nOrganization that possessed claims to reimbursement, the\\ncourt concluded, plaintiffs had no injury for which they could\\nseek redress on this or any other legal theory. Accordingly, it\\nruled, no matter the scope of the private right of action, these\\nplaintiffs lacked standing to sue. We come to the same\\nconclusion. We save for another day the question whether a\\nMedicare Advantage Organization or a proper assignee of its\\nrights may invoke the Medicare Secondary Payer private right\\nof action for double damages against a primary insurer.\\n II\\n We now turn to the specific defects that the district court\\nfound to be fatal to the plaintiffs’ case. This appeal comes to\\nus on a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Second Amended\\nComplaint. A brief review of the first two iterations of the\\ncomplaint sheds some light on what went wrong and why\\nplaintiffs are entitled to no further amendments.\\n From the outset of this litigation, the question of standing\\nhas been hotly disputed. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they and\\nsimilar organizations have filed a number of suits in which\\nthe initial complaints “did not name any exemplar\\nbeneficiaries or their corresponding assignor [Medicare\\nAdvantage] Plans.” Instead, they “generally alleged the\\nassignments held by plaintiffs from multiple [Medicare\\nAdvantage Organizations], and alleged plaintiffs’ analysis of\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 7\\n\\nthe data from multiple unreimbursed claims.” This led to\\nsuccessful defense motions to dismiss for lack of standing: as\\nthe plaintiffs put it, “[g]enerally, the district court rulings on\\nthese early motions were to dismiss the complaints, with\\nleave to amend, directing some degree of greater specificity.”\\nWhen State Farm in this case moved to dismiss the initial\\ncomplaint for lack of Article III standing (among other\\ngrounds), the plaintiffs responded by filing an amended\\ncomplaint to put more meat on the bone.\\n The First Amended Complaint fell short, however. It\\nidentified an exemplar beneficiary by initials and a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization (whose identity was redacted) that\\nallegedly had made secondary payments, but it provided\\nlittle additional information about the underlying claims or\\npayments. Even after the district court issued a protective\\norder, plaintiffs still failed to disclose the name of the assignor\\nMedicare Advantage Organization to State Farm. This time,\\nin response to State Farm’s motion, the district court\\ndismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing. It\\nfound that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate an “injury in\\nfact” for purposes of Article III standing without more\\nspecificity as to the injuries sustained by the exemplar\\nbeneficiary and the assignor Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization that had allegedly paid the unreimbursed\\nmedical costs. The court gave the plaintiffs another chance to\\ncure that defect by granting leave to amend.\\n Plaintiffs took advantage of that opportunity and filed a\\nSecond Amended Complaint. In this iteration, the plaintiffs\\nchose a new “exemplar beneficiary” (identified by the initials\\n“R.Y.”) and named the Medicare Advantage Organization\\nthat had made the secondary payments as Health First\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nAdministrative Plans (“HFAP”). A chain of assignments\\ntransferred HFAP’s alleged right of recovery to Recovery\\nClaims. The complaint alleged that R.Y. suffered specific\\ninjuries in an accident; that HFAP was the entity that paid\\nmedical costs for R.Y.; that State Farm entered into a\\nsettlement agreement with R.Y.; and that State Farm failed to\\nreimburse HFAP for the costs HFAP had incurred.\\n This time, however, there was a new problem: it was not\\nclear that HFAP qualified as a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization. After the defendants filed another motion to\\ndismiss for lack of standing, but before the district court had\\narrived at a decision, a district court in Florida ruled in a\\nrelated case that HFAP was not a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization at all. MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Auto-\\nOwners Ins. Co., No. 17-23841, 2018 WL 1953861 *5 (S.D. Fla.\\nApr. 25, 2018) (“Auto-Owners”). The Florida court took judicial\\nnotice of the fact that HFAP does not appear on the list\\nmaintained by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services\\nof Medicare Advantage Organizations. Id. Instead, HFAP is an\\nentity that had contracted with a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization—a closely linked entity by the name of Health\\nFirst Health Plans—to provide a range of administrative,\\nfinancial, and strategic-planning services. The two entities\\n(Health First Administrative Plans and Health First Health\\nPlans) shared very similar names, a holding company, and a\\nChief Operating Officer, Michael Keeler. But crucially, in the\\nFlorida court’s view, only Health First Health contracted\\ndirectly with the government and qualified as a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization for purposes of the private right of\\naction that the plaintiffs were asserting. Accordingly, the\\nFlorida court found that HFAP did not have any recovery\\nrights to assign, even assuming plaintiffs were correct about\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 9\\n\\nthe private right of action: any such claims belonged only to\\nHealth First Health.\\n Only one of the plaintiffs in this case—Recovery Claims—\\nwas a party to Auto-Owners. Nonetheless, the overlap was\\nenough to matter. As in this case, the plaintiffs in Auto-Owners\\nargued that whatever the proper characterization of HFAP\\nmight have been, its service contract with Health First Health\\nmeant that it could pursue Health First Health’s legal claims\\nor assign them away. The Florida court rejected that\\ncontention, ruling that “a contract for services is not an\\nassignment of rights,” and thus “HFAP [could] not assign\\nrights to Plaintiff that were not assigned to it in the first place.”\\nId. This left the Florida plaintiffs without any rights to enforce.\\nSimilarly, in this litigation, the district court thought, the only\\npurported assignment that could confer standing on any of\\nthe plaintiffs was one from HFAP to Recovery Claims.\\n State Farm brought Auto-Owners to the attention of the\\ndistrict court the day after it was issued. The next day, the\\ndistrict court entered a Text Order directing the plaintiffs to\\nexplain why this litigation should not be dismissed on the\\nsame grounds.\\n The plaintiffs complied with that order. Their response\\nfirst argued that Auto-Owners was wrongly decided for two\\nreasons: (1) HFAP does qualify as a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization for purposes of the private right of action; and\\n(2) the agreement between Health First Health and HFAP\\ngranted HFAP the power to enforce Health First Health’s\\nlegal rights as its agent, making the agreement the equivalent\\nof an assignment. In a decision issued on May 25, 2018, the\\ndistrict court rejected both points.\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n The court was particularly bothered by what it saw as a\\nbombshell: the revelation in the plaintiffs’ response that\\nHealth First Health, which had never been mentioned in the\\nCentral Illinois case, not HFAP, was the entity that paid the\\nunreimbursed medical costs. This fact contradicted earlier\\nfilings that identified HFAP as the payer with reimbursement\\nrights. If that was true, the district court thought, then HFAP\\n(whatever its status) never incurred any injury and so had no\\nrights that it could assign. The court also reasoned that in light\\nof this development, there was no need to decide, as the\\nFlorida court had, whether HFAP was a qualifying Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization. It was Health First Health that paid\\nthe unreimbursed bills, but the plaintiffs had an assignment\\nonly from HFAP. Only if Health First Health’s service contract\\nwith HFAP also assigned HFAP its legal rights could the case\\nhave a leg to stand on. And on this point, the district court\\nagreed fully with its Florida counterpart: it emphasized,\\ncontrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, that a document\\ncreating an agency relationship and one effecting an\\nassignment of rights are two entirely different things.\\nAccordingly, the district court dismissed the case on this\\nground alone. “Assuming HFAP is [a Medicare Advantage\\nOrganization], Plaintiffs still need to satisfy Article-III\\nstanding requirements, and this they cannot do.”\\n Up to this point, we agree with the district court’s\\ndisposition of the case. Nothing in the agreement between\\nHealth First Health and HFAP suggests that Health First\\nHealth was assigning away any of its rights. Without such an\\nassignment, HFAP’s own assignment to plaintiff Recovery\\nClaims conveyed nothing, and thus the plaintiffs had no\\nrights to enforce and no standing to sue. As we note when we\\nreach the sanctions portion of this appeal, additional\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 11\\n\\ninformation later came to the district court’s attention, but\\nthat new information could not have affected the court’s order\\nof May 25.\\n We part ways with the district court only with respect to\\nthe bottom line. The decision that plaintiffs lacked Article III\\nstanding is one of jurisdictional significance: it means that the\\ncourt had no authority to resolve the case. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc.\\nv. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). And that is why the\\ncourt erred by dismissing the case “with prejudice.” See, e.g.,\\nT.W. and M.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1997)\\n(“[W]hen a suit is dismissed for want of subject-matter\\njurisdiction, that is, because the court has no power to resolve\\nthe case on the merits even if the parties are content to have it\\ndo so, it is error to make the dismissal with prejudice”).\\n If a complaint fails to include enough allegations to\\nsupport Article III standing for the plaintiffs, the court has\\nonly two options: it can either dismiss the complaint with\\nleave to amend, or it can dismiss the case for want of\\njurisdiction and hence without prejudice. The Federal Rules\\nof Civil Procedure allow for one amendment as of right and\\ndirect district courts “freely [to] give leave [for further\\namendments] when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).\\nBut after the first round of amendments, the court has the\\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend. If, after amendments, the\\njurisdictional problem persists, then the only option left is a\\ndismissal without prejudice.\\n A dismissal for lack of jurisdiction without leave to amend\\nis not the same thing as a dismissal with prejudice. A\\ndismissal with prejudice is a ruling on the merits, because it\\ncarries with it a preclusive effect that prevents the plaintiffs\\nfrom relitigating—in any court, ever again—any claim\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nencompassed by the suit. We have emphasized this\\ndistinction before. See, e.g., Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 467 F.3d\\n602, 605 (7th Cir. 2006) (“‘No jurisdiction’ and ‘with prejudice’\\nare mutually exclusive.’ A court that lacks subject matter\\njurisdiction cannot dismiss a case with prejudice.”); Okoro v.\\nBohman, 164 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] judgment on\\nthe merits precludes relitigation of any ground within the\\ncompass of the suit, while a jurisdictional dismissal precludes\\nonly the relitigation of the ground of that dismissal.”).\\n If plaintiffs believe they have satisfied the standing\\nrequirements of a proper state-court forum—requirements\\nthat may differ from those used by the federal courts—they\\nmay try their luck in state court. Or, if they later believe they\\ncan demonstrate that they have suffered an injury in fact after\\nall, perhaps on the basis of a different assignment or exemplar\\nclaim, they can present these claims against the same\\ndefendant in a new federal suit (assuming of course that no\\nindependent barrier, such as the statute of limitations, exists).\\nIndeed, in a case brought by these plaintiffs against the same\\ndefendant and before the same district judge—which the\\ncourt called “a putative class action with slightly different\\nfacts, but consisting of virtually identical allegations under\\nthe law”—these plaintiffs did successfully demonstrate\\nstanding and survived a motion to dismiss. MAO-MSO\\nRecovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (“State Farm\\nI”), No. 17-cv-01537, 2018 WL 3420796 at *1, *7 (C.D. Ill. July\\n13, 2018).\\n None of these later developments, however, means that\\nthe district court was required to let this lawsuit continue. The\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion by saying “enough is\\nenough.” It observed that “Plaintiffs have been given a few\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 13\\n\\nchances to demonstrate this Court has jurisdiction.” This suit,\\nthe judge thought, had run its course. Indeed, in a footnote\\nexplaining its dismissal “with prejudice,” the court cited\\nArreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008) for the\\nunassailable proposition that district courts “have broad\\ndiscretion to deny leave to amend where there is undue delay,\\nbad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure\\ndeficiencies, undue prejudice to the defendants, or where the\\namendment would be futile.” (Emphasis added). The only\\nproblem was thus the court’s use of the phrase “with\\nprejudice” to signal that it would permit no more\\namendments.\\n On this understanding of the district court’s order, we find\\nno abuse of discretion in its decision to dismiss on standing\\ngrounds and to refuse further amendments. While it is true\\nthat the plaintiffs had not previously had a chance to address\\nthe HFAP/Health First Health mix-up, they were on notice\\nfrom the outset that the issue of standing would be front and\\ncenter. If they were going to hang their hat on a single\\n“exemplar” after two unsuccessful attempts, it was important\\nto get it right on the third try. The district court’s frustration\\nat their failure to do so was understandable. And the court\\nwas entitled to give little weight to their plea for another\\nround of pleading, since their memorandum included\\nnothing beyond a request for “leave to allege additional\\nexemplar beneficiaries,” without naming them or providing\\nany reason for the district court to believe that the fourth time\\nwould be the charm. Denying leave to amend under such\\ncircumstances was well within the district court’s discretion.\\nSee James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Const. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 400–\\n01 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that lack of specificity in proposed\\namendments justified denial of leave to amend).\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\n III\\n In the same order that dismissed the Second Amended\\nComplaint, the district court also ordered the plaintiffs to\\nshow cause why they should not be sanctioned for their\\nearlier filings, which wrongly identified HFAP as the payer of\\nthe relevant medical costs. We address the substance of the\\nsanctions issue below. Here we note that the plaintiffs’\\nresponse to the order to show cause contained materials\\nrelevant to standing and the merits, including (1) a\\ndeclaration attesting to many additional exemplars that could\\nbe alleged; (2) a purported “nunc pro tunc” or retroactive\\nassignment from Health First Health to one of the plaintiffs,\\nintended to cure the defect identified by the court; and (3) a\\ndeclaration from Michael Keeler, the Chief Operating Officer\\nof Health First Health and HFAP, explaining the relationship\\nbetween the two entities and putting on the record that he had\\nalways intended to assign rights from Health First Health to\\nthe plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that in light of\\nthis new evidence, the district court abused its discretion\\nwhen it refused further amendments.\\n We need not decide whether any of these documents\\nmight have been enough to call into question the district\\ncourt’s dismissal without leave to amend, because the court\\ndid not have any of this evidence in front of it when it issued\\nthe dismissal order. The time to provide this information was\\nin response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss or in the\\nsupplemental response to the district court’s Text Order\\nregarding Auto-Owners. A post-dismissal filing in response to\\nan order to show cause was too little, too late. And to make\\nmatters worse, the plaintiffs never filed a motion for\\nreconsideration or relief from judgment. None of the\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 15\\n\\ninformation provided to the district court after the dismissal\\nrequired it to revive the suit.\\n Because we agree that the district court was without\\njurisdiction to address the merits of the case, that means we\\nare, too. Accordingly, we also dismiss State Farm’s cross-\\nappeal arguing for a dismissal on the merits.\\n IV\\n Finally, we must decide whether Rule 11 sanctions against\\nplaintiff Recovery Claims and three of its attorneys were\\nproper. We review the district court’s decision to impose\\nsanctions for abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax\\nCorporation, 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). When we apply that\\nstandard, however, we must bear in mind that “[a] district\\ncourt would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its\\nruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly\\nerroneous assessment of the evidence.” Id. See also Equal\\nEmployment Opportunity Comm'n v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 907\\nF.3d 968, 973 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining the Rule 11 abuse-of-\\ndiscretion standard as clarified in Cooter & Gell).\\n\\n A\\n\\n Rule 11 requires that attorneys certify “to the best of [their]\\nknowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry\\nreasonable under the circumstances” that their filings have\\nadequate foundation in fact and law and lack an “improper\\npurpose.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Because the district court\\nappeared to base its sanctions order on counsel’s lack of\\ncandor—i.e. filing documents with the court in bad faith —\\nand a failure to undertake an objectively reasonable inquiry,\\nwe address both grounds. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nN.A., 880 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that Rule\\n11 embodies both an objective and a subjective standard,\\nprohibiting both “frivolousness on the objective side” and\\n“bad faith on the subjective side.”)\\n At this stage of the case, the district court had the benefit\\nof the plaintiffs’ response to the order to show cause, in which\\nthey filed the additional materials mentioned above. Those\\nsubmissions are relevant to the Rule 11 analysis.\\n We begin with the finding of bad faith or “lack of candor.”\\nWe are hard-pressed to see any indication of intentional\\nmisrepresentation in this confused and confusing record.\\nNone of the counsel for Recovery Claims—the only party that\\nwas sanctioned—entered an appearance in the Florida Auto-\\nOwners litigation. As far as the record shows, the first time\\nthese attorneys learned of the Auto-Owners decision was when\\nState Farm brought the case to the attention of the district\\ncourt here. We also agree with the plaintiffs that, contrary to\\nthe district court’s finding, there is no basis in the record for\\nthe conclusion that these attorneys knew anything about the\\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction until they saw the Text\\nOrder. (The district court seemed to derive its conclusion\\nfrom what it understood to be the plaintiffs’ “admis[sion] that\\n[they] knew there were multiple ‘Health First’ entities and\\nthat HFAP did not actually pay R.Y.’s medical expenses … .”\\nBut the cited portion of plaintiffs’ response to the Text Order\\ndoes not support that conclusion, and plaintiffs disclaim ever\\nhaving made such an admission.) Without knowledge of the\\nHFAP/Health First Health distinction, most of the supposed\\nmisrepresentations in the earlier filings regarding HFAP’s\\nstatus as a Medicare Advantage Organization or as the payer\\nof R.Y.’s medical bills look more like honest mistakes. The\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 17\\n\\nsame goes for any misunderstanding about the nature of the\\nassignment.\\n The district court also appears to have found that\\ncounsel’s submissions after the Text Order was issued\\ndemonstrated a lack of candor inasmuch as they did not\\nimmediately admit (1) the inaccuracies in their earlier\\npleadings and (2) that fatal nature of the mix-up uncovered in\\nAuto-Owners. This also goes too far. In light of the evidence\\nthe plaintiffs submitted to the district court on the Rule 11\\npoint, it is understandable why they had maintained that\\nthere was a colorable reading of the underlying assignment\\nthat would give effect to Keeler’s unquestioned intent, i.e., to\\nassign Health First Health’s rights to plaintiff Recovery\\nClaims. And as the district court eventually acknowledged in\\nits order imposing sanctions, there was “some debate” on the\\nquestion whether HFAP might qualify as a Medicare\\nAdvantage Organization (an issue that ultimately proved\\nimmaterial but that was relevant to the claimed accuracy of\\nthe earlier filings). True, the plaintiffs may have understated\\nthe scope of the problem in their response to the Text Order,\\nand they may have erred by pursuing a legal argument that\\nstretched agency theory too far. They also should have\\nbrought their supporting materials before the district judge at\\nthe same time as they filed their response to the Text Order.\\nBut in the absence of either affirmative representations or\\nmaterial omissions in the response to the Text Order, what we\\nare left with is an aggressive litigation strategy with a\\ncolorable (if strained) basis in law and fact, rather than a lack\\nof candor. That is not sanctionable conduct.\\n The district court also had other grounds for imposing\\nsanctions: carelessness and inattentiveness. As we have\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nemphasized repeatedly, an ‘empty head but a pure heart is no\\ndefense.’” U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, N.D. v. Sullivan-Moore, 406\\nF.3d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chambers v. Am. Trans\\nAir, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 1994)). Because Rule 11\\nimposes on attorneys a duty to conduct an “inquiry\\nreasonable under the circumstances” before they attest to\\n“knowledge, information, and belief” supporting their filings,\\neven honest mistakes can be sanctionable. The district court\\nfound that the attorneys in this case failed to live up to that\\nduty.\\n It is one thing to lose on a point, however, and another to\\nurge something so ill-founded that it is sanctionable.\\nAlthough the standard for abuse of discretion is demanding,\\nwe conclude that the district court stepped over the\\nboundaries of its discretion in imposing sanctions on the basis\\nof carelessness or inattention. Again, the exhibits the plaintiffs\\nfiled in response to the order to show cause are instructive.\\nThe affidavit from Keeler demonstrates that Health First\\nAdministrative Plans (HFAP) and Health First Health Plans\\nshared more than very similar names, a holding company,\\nand a common COO; they were, for many purposes, almost\\nindistinguishable to any external party dealing with them. As\\nKeeler averred, “[Health First Health] acts through myself\\nand its other corporate officers, but it has no employees …\\n[Health First Health] takes no action except through HFAP’s\\nagents and employees.” Affidavit of Michael Keeler, June 1,\\n2018 at 1–2. To make matters more confusing, at least\\naccording to plaintiffs’ allegations, HFAP did business under\\nthe name “Health First Health Plans.” And even if Health\\nFirst Health was the entity from whose assets the beneficiary\\nwas paid—meaning it possessed the reimbursement rights—\\nplaintiffs point out that “the act of payment would not\\n\\fNos. 17-3636 and 18-2463 19\\n\\nunreasonably or inaccurately be attributed to HFAP, which\\ncarried out all acts on behalf of [Health First Health].”\\n Without getting further into the weeds, it suffices to say\\nthat this corporate arrangement was not just complex, but so\\nfreighted with overlapping names and functions that a mix-\\nup was, at the end of the day, understandable. The district\\ncourt did “not accept that Health First’s ‘corporate structure’\\nwas too confusing to warrant the misstatements in the Second\\nAmended Complaint.” Respectfully, the district court\\nreached its conclusion about the straightforward nature of the\\ncorporate arrangement while it was looking at it with the\\nbenefit of hindsight. The court did not give adequate weight\\nto the plaintiffs’ additional evidence, nor did it consider\\ncarefully enough what the attorneys knew and when they\\nknew it. (How could the details of this structure have been\\napparent at a time when the attorneys were unaware that\\nthere was a second “Health First” entity?) Sanctions against\\nthe attorneys for Recovery Claims were not warranted on this\\nrecord.\\n B\\n The sanctions against plaintiff Recovery Claims must also\\nbe reversed. As discussed, we find that none of the actions or\\nomissions of its counsel in this case amounted to sanctionable\\nconduct. The district court did not point to any conduct by\\nRecovery Claims itself, rather than its agents, that would\\nindependently allow us to sustain the imposition of sanctions.\\nUnlike its counsel, Recovery Claims did have some\\nknowledge of the Florida litigation. But we detect nothing\\nimproper in the two-day lapse between the Auto-Owners\\ndecision on April 25, 2018, and the district court’s Text Order\\non April 27, especially given the factual and legal arguments\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\\n\\nthat plaintiffs might have wished to develop in response. It is\\ntrue that there was a 14-day hiatus between Keeler’s affidavit\\nin the Auto-Owners case, which explained the HFAP/Health\\nFirst Health ownership structure, and the day the district\\ncourt learned of the ruling that the Florida district judge made\\nas a result. Nonetheless, we conclude that it is too much of a\\nstretch to sanction plaintiff Recovery Claims for failing to\\nrecognize the implications of an affidavit filed in one case,\\nwithout the benefit of any dispositive ruling on the issue, for\\na completely different case being litigated by a separate team\\nof attorneys. As far as we can tell, the sanctions against\\nRecovery Claims must rise or fall with the sanctions against\\nits attorneys. And so they fall.\\n Plaintiffs and their counsel have been punished for their\\nmissteps: the case was dismissed without leave to amend, and\\nwe affirm that dismissal today. But sanctions are a step too\\nfar.\\n IV\\n We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal without leave to\\namend, but we modify it to be a dismissal without prejudice.\\nWe REVERSE the entry of sanctions against MSP Recovery\\nClaims, Series LLC, and its counsel in this case. State Farm’s\\ncross-appeal is DISMISSED. Each party will bear its own costs\\non appeal.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3873,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4648869,"string":"4,648,869"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Elisa J. Yochim v. Benjamin S. Carson, Sr."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3670"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3670\\nELISA J. YOCHIM,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBENJAMIN S. CARSON, SR.,\\nSecretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban\\nDevelopment,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cv-4926 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Elisa Yochim worked in the legal\\ndepartment of the United States Department of Housing and\\nUrban Development for 26 years. Throughout her tenure, she\\ntook full advantage of HUD’s flexible and progressive policy\\npermitting employees to work from home several days per\\nweek. After undergoing hand surgery, Yochim requested time\\n\\f2 No. 18-3670\\n\\noff and permission to work from home. HUD agreed and al-\\nlowed her time to recover and to telework several days a week\\nfor many months as she received physical therapy. HUD later\\nrestructured its law department and this development had\\nthe effect of requiring employees like Yochim to spend more\\ntime in the office. In time this restructuring, combined with\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies, led HUD to revoke her\\ntelework privileges and offer alternative accommodations.\\nFor her part, Yochim responded with this lawsuit, alleging vi-\\nolations of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate\\nher ongoing rehabilitation needs. The district court entered\\nsummary judgment for HUD, and we affirm. No rational jury\\ncould conclude that the Department failed to offer reasonable\\naccommodations.\\n I\\n In reviewing the district court’s award of summary judg-\\nment to HUD, we construe the facts in the light most favora-\\nble to Yochim as the nonmovant, resolving evidentiary con-\\nflicts and competing inferences in her favor. See Brown v. Mil-\\nwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Yochim worked as a HUD attorney for 26 years, serving in\\nthe Chicago office for the last 15 years before her retirement\\nin May 2015. During her tenure, the Department maintained\\na forward-leaning telework policy that allowed full-time em-\\nployees to work from home up to three days a week at their\\nmanager’s discretion.\\n Beginning in October 2012, HUD’s legal department un-\\nderwent a functional reorganization. Before this change, the\\nDepartment’s attorneys tended to specialize in particular ar-\\neas. With the reorganization, however, HUD wanted its\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 3\\n\\nattorneys to work more as generalists and to assist each other\\nthrough cross-training and collaboration—a change in ap-\\nproach less suited to telework. Yochim’s job description\\nchanged to include “training, orientation, [and] working\\ngroups” as well as “administrative responsibilities,” includ-\\ning “space and file management,” as areas of focus. Around\\nthis same time, Yochim applied for a supervisory position, but\\nthe Department passed her up and instead awarded the role\\nto Lisa Danna-Brennan, who became Yochim’s supervisor.\\nThis development was not one Yochim welcomed.\\n In November 2012, Yochim had surgery to treat carpal tun-\\nnel syndrome in her right hand. The surgery brought with it\\na recovery and rehabilitation process, prompting Yochim to\\nsubmit several requests to HUD to accommodate her needs.\\nThe HUD handbook outlines the Department’s process for ac-\\ncommodating such requests. Employees can seek reasonable\\naccommodations through their immediate supervisor or the\\nDepartment’s Reasonable Accommodation Branch. The su-\\npervisor and employee then engage in an interactive process\\nto identify an accommodation, and the Reasonable Accom-\\nmodation Branch facilitates this communication. The Branch\\ndetermines an employee’s eligibility for a reasonable accom-\\nmodation, while the supervisor shoulders responsibility for\\ndeciding what accommodation is suitable.\\n Yochim submitted her first accommodation request in De-\\ncember 2012, asking her supervisor, Danna-Brennan, to per-\\nmit her to telework during the eight days in December on\\nwhich she had not already scheduled leave and all of January.\\nTo support her request, Yochim submitted two work-status\\nforms from her surgeon. In the first form, the doctor identified\\nno work or functional limitations while adding that Yochim\\n\\f4 No. 18-3670\\n\\n“may work from home until the end of January.” The doctor’s\\nsecond form conveyed a work-related limitation, explaining\\nthat Yochim had “diminished right-hand strength and should\\nnot rely on gripping with that hand until February 1, 2013;\\nspecifically, riding public transportation that requires holding\\non with her right hand may be a safe[t]y concern.”\\n Danna-Brennan approved Yochim’s request to work from\\nhome the remainder of December. As for Yochim’s request to\\ntelework throughout January, Danna-Brennan offered a com-\\npressed schedule consisting of four ten-hour days—two in the\\noffice and two at home. Danna-Brennan also afforded Yochim\\nthe flexibility to “set her schedule to reflect her need to avoid\\nrush hour” if she maintained a set daily schedule. Apparently\\nunhappy that her compressed schedule still required her to\\ncome to the office two days a week, Yochim later complained\\nto Danna-Brennan that she had to use sick leave to stay home\\nthese extra two days per week. At no point, however, did\\nYochim explain why HUD’s accommodation would interfere\\nwith ongoing and medically necessary rehabilitation or phys-\\nical therapy. Nor did Yochim suggest other accommodation\\noptions.\\n In March 2013, Yochim submitted a second request to\\nwork full-time from home until June 30 to accommodate her\\nongoing recovery from surgery. She supported this request\\nwith a letter from her primary-care physician, Dr. Lexy\\nWistenberg, who reported that she continued to experience\\npain and swelling in her right hand. Dr. Wistenberg also ad-\\nvised that Yochim may need to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour to avoid getting stuck standing in a train aisle and need-\\ning to grasp a handrail. Otherwise, however, Dr. Wistenberg\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 5\\n\\ncleared Yochim to work as she continued her physical ther-\\napy.\\n In April 2013, while the second accommodation request\\nwas pending, Danna-Brennan placed Yochim on a sick-leave\\nrestriction. This restriction required Yochim to provide a doc-\\ntor’s note with the date and time of an appointment or any\\nanticipated medical care and to schedule medical appoint-\\nments at the beginning or end of the day to have the least im-\\npact on the workday. This new restriction resulted from\\nDanna-Brennan’s determination that Yochim had a history of\\nexcessive absences from work—an audit of Yochim’s time re-\\nvealed that she had taken leave on 339 days out of a possible\\n1,010 work days between January 1, 2009 and May 1, 2013—\\nand that she often took leave without any prior approval.\\n A month later, in May 2013, HUD responded to Yochim’s\\nsecond accommodation request. The Department offered\\nvoice-recognition software to reduce Yochim’s need to type\\nand the option to telework three days per week. The accom-\\nmodation called for Yochim to work in the office two days per\\nweek while allowing her to work from home for two hours in\\nthe morning on these days to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour. HUD also permitted her to leave work 15 minutes early\\nto secure seating on the train. Yochim agreed to this revised\\nschedule and concedes that it reflected an effective accommo-\\ndation. This accommodation lasted approximately one\\nmonth, expiring in June 2013.\\n A year later, in June 2014, Danna-Brennan revoked\\nYochim’s telework privileges and issued a written reprimand\\nfor performance deficiencies. Danna-Brennan decided the\\nreprimand was warranted based on the results of an audit of\\nthe legal team’s docket. The audit revealed that Yochim had\\n\\f6 No. 18-3670\\n\\nleft particular assignments incomplete for up to two years\\nwithout ever reporting the delays, despite HUD’s policy re-\\nquiring her to do so.\\n In August 2014, Yochim submitted a third accommodation\\nrequest seeking to telework three days per week for six\\nmonths plus two additional days per week “as needed due to\\npain, medical appointments, and recovery.” She supported\\nthis request with another letter from Dr. Wistenberg who re-\\nported that Yochim had inflammatory osteoarthritis, causing\\n“significant pain and stiffness” and swollen joints throughout\\nher body. Dr. Wistenberg recommended that Yochim work\\nfrom home at least three days per week to minimize the risks\\nof further discomfort from commuting and to accommodate\\nvisits to physical therapists near her suburban home. Yochim\\nnever inquired about attending physical therapy in down-\\ntown Chicago near HUD’s office.\\n Danna-Brennan responded by offering a list of alternative\\naccommodations including an ergonomic assessment, addi-\\ntional paralegal assistance to reduce Yochim’s typing, a com-\\npressed weekly schedule, and generous leave approval. In do-\\ning so, Danna-Brennan explained that Yochim working from\\nhome was no longer an acceptable accommodation “because\\n[her] telework was suspended as a result of performance de-\\nficiencies while teleworking 3 days a week.” Yochim ex-\\npressed her disagreement with the proposed arrangement by\\nfiling a written statement with a specialist in HUD’s Reason-\\nable Accommodation Branch. The specialist then informed\\nYochim of the procedures to seek reconsideration, but she\\nnever did so.\\n During the same period, after the restructuring of HUD’s\\nlegal department, Yochim lodged two complaints with the\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 7\\n\\nEqual Employment Opportunity Commission. She alleged\\nthat HUD discriminated and retaliated against her by failing\\nto promote her and, separately, to accommodate her need for\\nongoing rehabilitation.\\n Yochim retired from HUD once she became eligible to do\\nso in May 2015. She then filed this suit, advancing claims un-\\nder the Rehabilitation Act and alleging that HUD failed to ac-\\ncommodate her requests to telework and to engage in the in-\\nteractive process promptly and in good faith. Yochim also al-\\nleged that HUD retaliated against her for filing her EEO com-\\nplaints and subjected her to a hostile work environment by\\nrestricting her telework and sick-leave privileges.\\n The district court granted HUD’s motion for summary\\njudgment, concluding that although Yochim had established\\nthat she was a qualified person with a disability, no reasona-\\nble jury could find that the Department had failed to offer rea-\\nsonable accommodations. The district court found that\\nHUD’s alternative accommodations were reasonable given\\nthe need that arose for Yochim to work in the office several\\ndays a week as a result of the Department’s restructuring of\\nits legal department. The district court also determined that\\nYochim fell short in her efforts to show that HUD retaliated\\nagainst her or subjected her to a hostile work environment.\\n II\\n On appeal Yochim argues that she brought forth enough\\nevidence to get to a jury on her allegations that HUD did not\\nreasonably accommodate her because it offered only ineffec-\\ntive accommodations and failed to engage in the interactive\\nprocess in good faith. We review a district court’s entry of\\n\\f8 No. 18-3670\\n\\nsummary judgment de novo and must affirm if no reasonable\\njuror could find in favor of Yochim. See Brown, 855 F.3d at 820.\\n Yochim brought her claims under the Rehabilitation Act.\\nThis enactment mandates that no qualifying individual with\\na disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability”\\nexperience discrimination by an executive agency. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 794(a). To prevail on her claim of discrimination, Yochim\\nmust show that (1) she was a qualified individual with a dis-\\nability, (2) HUD was aware of her disability, and (3) the De-\\npartment failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.\\nSee Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2019);\\nsee also Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(explaining that the Rehabilitation Act adopted the standard\\nfor determining whether a violation has occurred from the\\nAmericans with Disabilities Act). The accommodation obliga-\\ntion embodied in the third prong brings with it a requirement\\nthat both the employer and the employee engage in a flexible\\n“interactive process” and make a “good faith effort” to deter-\\nmine what accommodations are necessary. See Lawler v. Peoria\\nSch. Dist. No. 150, 837 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n A\\n We agree with the district court that no rational jury could\\nfind that HUD failed to offer Yochim reasonable accommoda-\\ntions or engage in the interactive process in good faith. The\\nDepartment either granted each of Yochim’s requests or re-\\nsponded with a list of alternative options that reasonably ad-\\ndressed her needs. Nor does the record support Yochim’s con-\\ntentions of bad faith. This is not a case where an employee’s\\nrequests for accommodations fell on deaf ears. To the con-\\ntrary, the parties engaged in a meaningful back-and-forth\\nwith Yochim requesting to work from home and HUD\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 9\\n\\npresenting her with appropriate alternative accommodations.\\nThe communication process did not break down simply be-\\ncause Yochim did not receive the answers she had hoped for.\\n Start with the period following Yochim’s surgery. HUD\\ngranted her request to telework for the eight remaining days\\nin December 2012 that she had not already requested off. The\\nDepartment also permitted her to adjust her work hours (to\\navoid having to stand on a train) and to telework two days a\\nweek for the entirety of January. While this fell short of\\nYochim’s preference to work from home all of January, an em-\\nployer must provide a “reasonable accommodation, not the\\naccommodation [the employee] would prefer.” Hoppe v. Lewis\\nUniv., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the Depart-\\nment’s restructuring and Yochim’s updated job description\\nfocusing on cross-training, teamwork, and collaboration,\\nwhich necessarily required her presence in the office, HUD’s\\naccommodations were entirely reasonable. And recall that the\\nonly medical basis for Yochim’s request to work from home\\nin January 2013 was her surgeon’s concerns about Yochim’s\\ncommute on crowded trains and her need to attend therapy\\nappointments. HUD’s alternative options reasonably ad-\\ndressed these concerns by adjusting her work hours to avoid\\nrush hour and limiting—but not eliminating—her time in the\\noffice.\\n Now consider HUD’s response to Yochim’s August 2014\\nrequest to work from home three to five days per week for six\\nmonths. HUD offered her a four-day work week, generous\\nleave approval (to ease commuting and attending physical\\ntherapy), and other accommodations. The Department did so\\nattentive to the needs of its legal department in Chicago and\\nmindful that Yochim, although medically cleared for work,\\n\\f10 No. 18-3670\\n\\nhad ongoing needs for physical therapy. So, too, did HUD de-\\ntermine that further telework was not warranted given\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies. No reasonable jury could\\nfind this response unreasonable. Yochim has never explained\\nwhy HUD’s approval of regular sick leave to attend physical\\ntherapy appointments was inadequate. And not once has\\nYochim identified any reason why she could not attend ther-\\napy appointments closer to her Chicago office to minimize her\\ncommute or why changes to her work hours would not re-\\nsolve her concern about crowded trains. Put most simply,\\nYochim failed to connect the accommodation she persisted\\nwas necessary with what the record showed were her ongoing\\nmedical needs. In the end, it was Yochim’s own insistence on\\nteleworking three or more days a week and her refusal to re-\\nmain open to anything less that doomed the interactive pro-\\ncess.\\n Yochim’s claim that HUD failed to offer her reasonable ac-\\ncommodations fails for another reason. She cannot point to\\nevidence that the two accommodations she sought but did not\\nreceive—to telework full-time for one month and later for\\nthree to five days per week for six months—were “reasonable\\non [their] face.” See Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans,\\nInc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Majors v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013)) (stating that a plain-\\ntiff seeking to establish claim for failure to accommodate un-\\nder the ADA must “make an initial showing that the accom-\\nmodation she sought was ‘reasonable on its face’”). Yochim\\ninsists that her requests to telework were appropriate because\\nshe had worked from home full time for six weeks in 2004,\\nHUD’s telework policy allows employees to work from home\\nup to three days a week, and another employee was allowed\\nto work from home for an unknown period of time.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 11\\n\\n Yochim’s position falls short. An accommodation to tele-\\nwork requires a context-specific inquiry, and a “general con-\\nsensus [exists] among courts” that jobs “often require face-to-\\nface collaboration.” See Bilinksy v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d\\n565, 573 (7th Cir. 2019). Yochim has failed to counter HUD’s\\nevidence that she held just such a job. The 2012 restructuring\\nof the legal department, which changed Yochim’s responsibil-\\nities and job description, required attorneys to work in teams,\\ncollaborate more, and cross-train each other. She points to the\\nDepartment’s 2010 telework policy that allows telework up to\\nthree days a week, but this policy predates the restructuring.\\nEven more to the point, the policy, by its terms, is subject to\\nmanagement’s discretion—it does not confer a legally pro-\\ntected entitlement upon an employee.\\n B\\n Yochim next argues that HUD’s accommodations were in-\\neffective. She says, for example, that many of HUD’s options\\n(like the compressed work week and the flexibility to tele-\\nwork a few days a week) already were widely available to\\nHUD employees without a reasonable accommodation and\\nthus were not “alternative accommodations.” But this posi-\\ntion misses the mark. “Reasonable accommodation” under\\nthe relevant statutes includes “modified work schedules”\\nsuch as the compressed schedules and telework that HUD of-\\nfered. See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476,\\n481 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)). It makes no\\ndifference that modified scheduling options might have been\\navailable to other HUD employees who obtained permission\\nto telework from their manager.\\n By way of another example, Yochim contends that HUD’s\\noptions were ineffective because requiring her to work in the\\n\\f12 No. 18-3670\\n\\noffice meant that she had to commute on the train and grasp\\nthe handrails with her injured right hand. But the medical rec-\\nords supporting Yochim’s accommodation requests demon-\\nstrated that the only limitation related to her commute was\\nthe need to avoid crowded trains that could cause her to fall\\nor force her to grip the railings. HUD’s proposed accommo-\\ndations addressed these concerns by offering her an adjusted\\nschedule to avoid rush hour.\\n Yochim has offered a few other views as to why HUD’s\\naccommodations were ineffective. She claims that the long\\nten-hour days of her compressed schedule (and HUD’s\\nrequirement that she maintain a set daily schedule) limited\\nher flexibility to make her therapy appointments before or\\nafter work, necessitating that she take sick leave. And she says\\nthat doing so was especially difficult with the sick-leave\\nrestriction imposed by her supervisor. But one purpose of\\npaid sick leave is to allow employees to attend such\\nappointments, and Yochim does not present any evidence\\nthat the leave restriction—which merely required her to\\nsubmit a medical note detailing the time and date of an\\nappointment—interfered with her physical-therapy sessions.\\nNone of Yochim’s remaining arguments persuade us that a\\nreasonable jury could find that the Department’s\\naccommodations were ineffective.\\n C\\n Finally, Yochim contends that HUD’s refusal to allow her\\nto work from home and the imposition of her sick-leave re-\\nstriction created a “retaliatory hostile work environment” that\\nled to her premature retirement. This court has not deter-\\nmined whether the ADA (and by extension, the Rehabilitation\\nAct) encompasses claims of a hostile work environment.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 13\\n\\nSee Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712–13 (7th Cir.\\n2000). We need not resolve the question here. Even assuming\\nYochim could bring a hostile-work-environment claim, she\\nmust at a minimum demonstrate that the work environment\\nwas both objectively and subjectively offensive because of\\n“severe or pervasive” harassment. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,\\n920 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n At summary judgment, Yochim did not offer evidence\\nshowing that her leave and telework restrictions—actions that\\nare permissible for an employer to take—were so severe or\\npervasive as to “alter the conditions” of employment and\\n“create an abusive working environment.” See id.; see also\\nHerron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (concluding that empr’s disciplinary action for perfor-\\nmance issues was “normal workplace friction”). And it is this\\nevidentiary shortcoming that defeats this dimension of her\\nclaims on summary judgment.\\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426122/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648869/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Elisa J. Yochim v. Benjamin S. Carson, Sr.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3670\nELISA J. YOCHIM,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nBENJAMIN S. CARSON, SR.,\nSecretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban\nDevelopment,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:16-cv-4926 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Elisa Yochim worked in the legal\ndepartment of the United States Department of Housing and\nUrban Development for 26 years. Throughout her tenure, she\ntook full advantage of HUD’s flexible and progressive policy\npermitting employees to work from home several days per\nweek. After undergoing hand surgery, Yochim requested time\n\f2 No. 18-3670\n\noff and permission to work from home. HUD agreed and al-\nlowed her time to recover and to telework several days a week\nfor many months as she received physical therapy. HUD later\nrestructured its law department and this development had\nthe effect of requiring employees like Yochim to spend more\ntime in the office. In time this restructuring, combined with\nYochim’s performance deficiencies, led HUD to revoke her\ntelework privileges and offer alternative accommodations.\nFor her part, Yochim responded with this lawsuit, alleging vi-\nolations of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate\nher ongoing rehabilitation needs. The district court entered\nsummary judgment for HUD, and we affirm. No rational jury\ncould conclude that the Department failed to offer reasonable\naccommodations.\n I\n In reviewing the district court’s award of summary judg-\nment to HUD, we construe the facts in the light most favora-\nble to Yochim as the nonmovant, resolving evidentiary con-\nflicts and competing inferences in her favor. See Brown v. Mil-\nwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017).\n Yochim worked as a HUD attorney for 26 years, serving in\nthe Chicago office for the last 15 years before her retirement\nin May 2015. During her tenure, the Department maintained\na forward-leaning telework policy that allowed full-time em-\nployees to work from home up to three days a week at their\nmanager’s discretion.\n Beginning in October 2012, HUD’s legal department un-\nderwent a functional reorganization. Before this change, the\nDepartment’s attorneys tended to specialize in particular ar-\neas. With the reorganization, however, HUD wanted its\n\fNo. 18-3670 3\n\nattorneys to work more as generalists and to assist each other\nthrough cross-training and collaboration—a change in ap-\nproach less suited to telework. Yochim’s job description\nchanged to include “training, orientation, [and] working\ngroups” as well as “administrative responsibilities,” includ-\ning “space and file management,” as areas of focus. Around\nthis same time, Yochim applied for a supervisory position, but\nthe Department passed her up and instead awarded the role\nto Lisa Danna-Brennan, who became Yochim’s supervisor.\nThis development was not one Yochim welcomed.\n In November 2012, Yochim had surgery to treat carpal tun-\nnel syndrome in her right hand. The surgery brought with it\na recovery and rehabilitation process, prompting Yochim to\nsubmit several requests to HUD to accommodate her needs.\nThe HUD handbook outlines the Department’s process for ac-\ncommodating such requests. Employees can seek reasonable\naccommodations through their immediate supervisor or the\nDepartment’s Reasonable Accommodation Branch. The su-\npervisor and employee then engage in an interactive process\nto identify an accommodation, and the Reasonable Accom-\nmodation Branch facilitates this communication. The Branch\ndetermines an employee’s eligibility for a reasonable accom-\nmodation, while the supervisor shoulders responsibility for\ndeciding what accommodation is suitable.\n Yochim submitted her first accommodation request in De-\ncember 2012, asking her supervisor, Danna-Brennan, to per-\nmit her to telework during the eight days in December on\nwhich she had not already scheduled leave and all of January.\nTo support her request, Yochim submitted two work-status\nforms from her surgeon. In the first form, the doctor identified\nno work or functional limitations while adding that Yochim\n\f4 No. 18-3670\n\n“may work from home until the end of January.” The doctor’s\nsecond form conveyed a work-related limitation, explaining\nthat Yochim had “diminished right-hand strength and should\nnot rely on gripping with that hand until February 1, 2013;\nspecifically, riding public transportation that requires holding\non with her right hand may be a safe[t]y concern.”\n Danna-Brennan approved Yochim’s request to work from\nhome the remainder of December. As for Yochim’s request to\ntelework throughout January, Danna-Brennan offered a com-\npressed schedule consisting of four ten-hour days—two in the\noffice and two at home. Danna-Brennan also afforded Yochim\nthe flexibility to “set her schedule to reflect her need to avoid\nrush hour” if she maintained a set daily schedule. Apparently\nunhappy that her compressed schedule still required her to\ncome to the office two days a week, Yochim later complained\nto Danna-Brennan that she had to use sick leave to stay home\nthese extra two days per week. At no point, however, did\nYochim explain why HUD’s accommodation would interfere\nwith ongoing and medically necessary rehabilitation or phys-\nical therapy. Nor did Yochim suggest other accommodation\noptions.\n In March 2013, Yochim submitted a second request to\nwork full-time from home until June 30 to accommodate her\nongoing recovery from surgery. She supported this request\nwith a letter from her primary-care physician, Dr. Lexy\nWistenberg, who reported that she continued to experience\npain and swelling in her right hand. Dr. Wistenberg also ad-\nvised that Yochim may need to avoid commuting during rush\nhour to avoid getting stuck standing in a train aisle and need-\ning to grasp a handrail. Otherwise, however, Dr. Wistenberg\n\fNo. 18-3670 5\n\ncleared Yochim to work as she continued her physical ther-\napy.\n In April 2013, while the second accommodation request\nwas pending, Danna-Brennan placed Yochim on a sick-leave\nrestriction. This restriction required Yochim to provide a doc-\ntor’s note with the date and time of an appointment or any\nanticipated medical care and to schedule medical appoint-\nments at the beginning or end of the day to have the least im-\npact on the workday. This new restriction resulted from\nDanna-Brennan’s determination that Yochim had a history of\nexcessive absences from work—an audit of Yochim’s time re-\nvealed that she had taken leave on 339 days out of a possible\n1,010 work days between January 1, 2009 and May 1, 2013—\nand that she often took leave without any prior approval.\n A month later, in May 2013, HUD responded to Yochim’s\nsecond accommodation request. The Department offered\nvoice-recognition software to reduce Yochim’s need to type\nand the option to telework three days per week. The accom-\nmodation called for Yochim to work in the office two days per\nweek while allowing her to work from home for two hours in\nthe morning on these days to avoid commuting during rush\nhour. HUD also permitted her to leave work 15 minutes early\nto secure seating on the train. Yochim agreed to this revised\nschedule and concedes that it reflected an effective accommo-\ndation. This accommodation lasted approximately one\nmonth, expiring in June 2013.\n A year later, in June 2014, Danna-Brennan revoked\nYochim’s telework privileges and issued a written reprimand\nfor performance deficiencies. Danna-Brennan decided the\nreprimand was warranted based on the results of an audit of\nthe legal team’s docket. The audit revealed that Yochim had\n\f6 No. 18-3670\n\nleft particular assignments incomplete for up to two years\nwithout ever reporting the delays, despite HUD’s policy re-\nquiring her to do so.\n In August 2014, Yochim submitted a third accommodation\nrequest seeking to telework three days per week for six\nmonths plus two additional days per week “as needed due to\npain, medical appointments, and recovery.” She supported\nthis request with another letter from Dr. Wistenberg who re-\nported that Yochim had inflammatory osteoarthritis, causing\n“significant pain and stiffness” and swollen joints throughout\nher body. Dr. Wistenberg recommended that Yochim work\nfrom home at least three days per week to minimize the risks\nof further discomfort from commuting and to accommodate\nvisits to physical therapists near her suburban home. Yochim\nnever inquired about attending physical therapy in down-\ntown Chicago near HUD’s office.\n Danna-Brennan responded by offering a list of alternative\naccommodations including an ergonomic assessment, addi-\ntional paralegal assistance to reduce Yochim’s typing, a com-\npressed weekly schedule, and generous leave approval. In do-\ning so, Danna-Brennan explained that Yochim working from\nhome was no longer an acceptable accommodation “because\n[her] telework was suspended as a result of performance de-\nficiencies while teleworking 3 days a week.” Yochim ex-\npressed her disagreement with the proposed arrangement by\nfiling a written statement with a specialist in HUD’s Reason-\nable Accommodation Branch. The specialist then informed\nYochim of the procedures to seek reconsideration, but she\nnever did so.\n During the same period, after the restructuring of HUD’s\nlegal department, Yochim lodged two complaints with the\n\fNo. 18-3670 7\n\nEqual Employment Opportunity Commission. She alleged\nthat HUD discriminated and retaliated against her by failing\nto promote her and, separately, to accommodate her need for\nongoing rehabilitation.\n Yochim retired from HUD once she became eligible to do\nso in May 2015. She then filed this suit, advancing claims un-\nder the Rehabilitation Act and alleging that HUD failed to ac-\ncommodate her requests to telework and to engage in the in-\nteractive process promptly and in good faith. Yochim also al-\nleged that HUD retaliated against her for filing her EEO com-\nplaints and subjected her to a hostile work environment by\nrestricting her telework and sick-leave privileges.\n The district court granted HUD’s motion for summary\njudgment, concluding that although Yochim had established\nthat she was a qualified person with a disability, no reasona-\nble jury could find that the Department had failed to offer rea-\nsonable accommodations. The district court found that\nHUD’s alternative accommodations were reasonable given\nthe need that arose for Yochim to work in the office several\ndays a week as a result of the Department’s restructuring of\nits legal department. The district court also determined that\nYochim fell short in her efforts to show that HUD retaliated\nagainst her or subjected her to a hostile work environment.\n II\n On appeal Yochim argues that she brought forth enough\nevidence to get to a jury on her allegations that HUD did not\nreasonably accommodate her because it offered only ineffec-\ntive accommodations and failed to engage in the interactive\nprocess in good faith. We review a district court’s entry of\n\f8 No. 18-3670\n\nsummary judgment de novo and must affirm if no reasonable\njuror could find in favor of Yochim. See Brown, 855 F.3d at 820.\n Yochim brought her claims under the Rehabilitation Act.\nThis enactment mandates that no qualifying individual with\na disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability”\nexperience discrimination by an executive agency. 29 U.S.C.\n§ 794(a). To prevail on her claim of discrimination, Yochim\nmust show that (1) she was a qualified individual with a dis-\nability, (2) HUD was aware of her disability, and (3) the De-\npartment failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.\nSee Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2019);\nsee also Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001)\n(explaining that the Rehabilitation Act adopted the standard\nfor determining whether a violation has occurred from the\nAmericans with Disabilities Act). The accommodation obliga-\ntion embodied in the third prong brings with it a requirement\nthat both the employer and the employee engage in a flexible\n“interactive process” and make a “good faith effort” to deter-\nmine what accommodations are necessary. See Lawler v. Peoria\nSch. Dist. No. 150, 837 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2016).\n A\n We agree with the district court that no rational jury could\nfind that HUD failed to offer Yochim reasonable accommoda-\ntions or engage in the interactive process in good faith. The\nDepartment either granted each of Yochim’s requests or re-\nsponded with a list of alternative options that reasonably ad-\ndressed her needs. Nor does the record support Yochim’s con-\ntentions of bad faith. This is not a case where an employee’s\nrequests for accommodations fell on deaf ears. To the con-\ntrary, the parties engaged in a meaningful back-and-forth\nwith Yochim requesting to work from home and HUD\n\fNo. 18-3670 9\n\npresenting her with appropriate alternative accommodations.\nThe communication process did not break down simply be-\ncause Yochim did not receive the answers she had hoped for.\n Start with the period following Yochim’s surgery. HUD\ngranted her request to telework for the eight remaining days\nin December 2012 that she had not already requested off. The\nDepartment also permitted her to adjust her work hours (to\navoid having to stand on a train) and to telework two days a\nweek for the entirety of January. While this fell short of\nYochim’s preference to work from home all of January, an em-\nployer must provide a “reasonable accommodation, not the\naccommodation [the employee] would prefer.” Hoppe v. Lewis\nUniv., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the Depart-\nment’s restructuring and Yochim’s updated job description\nfocusing on cross-training, teamwork, and collaboration,\nwhich necessarily required her presence in the office, HUD’s\naccommodations were entirely reasonable. And recall that the\nonly medical basis for Yochim’s request to work from home\nin January 2013 was her surgeon’s concerns about Yochim’s\ncommute on crowded trains and her need to attend therapy\nappointments. HUD’s alternative options reasonably ad-\ndressed these concerns by adjusting her work hours to avoid\nrush hour and limiting—but not eliminating—her time in the\noffice.\n Now consider HUD’s response to Yochim’s August 2014\nrequest to work from home three to five days per week for six\nmonths. HUD offered her a four-day work week, generous\nleave approval (to ease commuting and attending physical\ntherapy), and other accommodations. The Department did so\nattentive to the needs of its legal department in Chicago and\nmindful that Yochim, although medically cleared for work,\n\f10 No. 18-3670\n\nhad ongoing needs for physical therapy. So, too, did HUD de-\ntermine that further telework was not warranted given\nYochim’s performance deficiencies. No reasonable jury could\nfind this response unreasonable. Yochim has never explained\nwhy HUD’s approval of regular sick leave to attend physical\ntherapy appointments was inadequate. And not once has\nYochim identified any reason why she could not attend ther-\napy appointments closer to her Chicago office to minimize her\ncommute or why changes to her work hours would not re-\nsolve her concern about crowded trains. Put most simply,\nYochim failed to connect the accommodation she persisted\nwas necessary with what the record showed were her ongoing\nmedical needs. In the end, it was Yochim’s own insistence on\nteleworking three or more days a week and her refusal to re-\nmain open to anything less that doomed the interactive pro-\ncess.\n Yochim’s claim that HUD failed to offer her reasonable ac-\ncommodations fails for another reason. She cannot point to\nevidence that the two accommodations she sought but did not\nreceive—to telework full-time for one month and later for\nthree to five days per week for six months—were “reasonable\non [their] face.” See Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans,\nInc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Majors v. Gen.\nElec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013)) (stating that a plain-\ntiff seeking to establish claim for failure to accommodate un-\nder the ADA must “make an initial showing that the accom-\nmodation she sought was ‘reasonable on its face’”). Yochim\ninsists that her requests to telework were appropriate because\nshe had worked from home full time for six weeks in 2004,\nHUD’s telework policy allows employees to work from home\nup to three days a week, and another employee was allowed\nto work from home for an unknown period of time.\n\fNo. 18-3670 11\n\n Yochim’s position falls short. An accommodation to tele-\nwork requires a context-specific inquiry, and a “general con-\nsensus [exists] among courts” that jobs “often require face-to-\nface collaboration.” See Bilinksy v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d\n565, 573 (7th Cir. 2019). Yochim has failed to counter HUD’s\nevidence that she held just such a job. The 2012 restructuring\nof the legal department, which changed Yochim’s responsibil-\nities and job description, required attorneys to work in teams,\ncollaborate more, and cross-train each other. She points to the\nDepartment’s 2010 telework policy that allows telework up to\nthree days a week, but this policy predates the restructuring.\nEven more to the point, the policy, by its terms, is subject to\nmanagement’s discretion—it does not confer a legally pro-\ntected entitlement upon an employee.\n B\n Yochim next argues that HUD’s accommodations were in-\neffective. She says, for example, that many of HUD’s options\n(like the compressed work week and the flexibility to tele-\nwork a few days a week) already were widely available to\nHUD employees without a reasonable accommodation and\nthus were not “alternative accommodations.” But this posi-\ntion misses the mark. “Reasonable accommodation” under\nthe relevant statutes includes “modified work schedules”\nsuch as the compressed schedules and telework that HUD of-\nfered. See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476,\n481 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)). It makes no\ndifference that modified scheduling options might have been\navailable to other HUD employees who obtained permission\nto telework from their manager.\n By way of another example, Yochim contends that HUD’s\noptions were ineffective because requiring her to work in the\n\f12 No. 18-3670\n\noffice meant that she had to commute on the train and grasp\nthe handrails with her injured right hand. But the medical rec-\nords supporting Yochim’s accommodation requests demon-\nstrated that the only limitation related to her commute was\nthe need to avoid crowded trains that could cause her to fall\nor force her to grip the railings. HUD’s proposed accommo-\ndations addressed these concerns by offering her an adjusted\nschedule to avoid rush hour.\n Yochim has offered a few other views as to why HUD’s\naccommodations were ineffective. She claims that the long\nten-hour days of her compressed schedule (and HUD’s\nrequirement that she maintain a set daily schedule) limited\nher flexibility to make her therapy appointments before or\nafter work, necessitating that she take sick leave. And she says\nthat doing so was especially difficult with the sick-leave\nrestriction imposed by her supervisor. But one purpose of\npaid sick leave is to allow employees to attend such\nappointments, and Yochim does not present any evidence\nthat the leave restriction—which merely required her to\nsubmit a medical note detailing the time and date of an\nappointment—interfered with her physical-therapy sessions.\nNone of Yochim’s remaining arguments persuade us that a\nreasonable jury could find that the Department’s\naccommodations were ineffective.\n C\n Finally, Yochim contends that HUD’s refusal to allow her\nto work from home and the imposition of her sick-leave re-\nstriction created a “retaliatory hostile work environment” that\nled to her premature retirement. This court has not deter-\nmined whether the ADA (and by extension, the Rehabilitation\nAct) encompasses claims of a hostile work environment.\n\fNo. 18-3670 13\n\nSee Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712–13 (7th Cir.\n2000). We need not resolve the question here. Even assuming\nYochim could bring a hostile-work-environment claim, she\nmust at a minimum demonstrate that the work environment\nwas both objectively and subjectively offensive because of\n“severe or pervasive” harassment. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,\n920 (7th Cir. 2016).\n At summary judgment, Yochim did not offer evidence\nshowing that her leave and telework restrictions—actions that\nare permissible for an employer to take—were so severe or\npervasive as to “alter the conditions” of employment and\n“create an abusive working environment.” See id.; see also\nHerron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\n2004) (concluding that empr’s disciplinary action for perfor-\nmance issues was “normal workplace friction”). And it is this\nevidentiary shortcoming that defeats this dimension of her\nclaims on summary judgment.\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Elisa J. Yochim v. Benjamin S. Carson, Sr.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3670\\nELISA J. YOCHIM,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nBENJAMIN S. CARSON, SR.,\\nSecretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban\\nDevelopment,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:16-cv-4926 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Elisa Yochim worked in the legal\\ndepartment of the United States Department of Housing and\\nUrban Development for 26 years. Throughout her tenure, she\\ntook full advantage of HUD’s flexible and progressive policy\\npermitting employees to work from home several days per\\nweek. After undergoing hand surgery, Yochim requested time\\n\\f2 No. 18-3670\\n\\noff and permission to work from home. HUD agreed and al-\\nlowed her time to recover and to telework several days a week\\nfor many months as she received physical therapy. HUD later\\nrestructured its law department and this development had\\nthe effect of requiring employees like Yochim to spend more\\ntime in the office. In time this restructuring, combined with\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies, led HUD to revoke her\\ntelework privileges and offer alternative accommodations.\\nFor her part, Yochim responded with this lawsuit, alleging vi-\\nolations of the Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate\\nher ongoing rehabilitation needs. The district court entered\\nsummary judgment for HUD, and we affirm. No rational jury\\ncould conclude that the Department failed to offer reasonable\\naccommodations.\\n I\\n In reviewing the district court’s award of summary judg-\\nment to HUD, we construe the facts in the light most favora-\\nble to Yochim as the nonmovant, resolving evidentiary con-\\nflicts and competing inferences in her favor. See Brown v. Mil-\\nwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 855 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n Yochim worked as a HUD attorney for 26 years, serving in\\nthe Chicago office for the last 15 years before her retirement\\nin May 2015. During her tenure, the Department maintained\\na forward-leaning telework policy that allowed full-time em-\\nployees to work from home up to three days a week at their\\nmanager’s discretion.\\n Beginning in October 2012, HUD’s legal department un-\\nderwent a functional reorganization. Before this change, the\\nDepartment’s attorneys tended to specialize in particular ar-\\neas. With the reorganization, however, HUD wanted its\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 3\\n\\nattorneys to work more as generalists and to assist each other\\nthrough cross-training and collaboration—a change in ap-\\nproach less suited to telework. Yochim’s job description\\nchanged to include “training, orientation, [and] working\\ngroups” as well as “administrative responsibilities,” includ-\\ning “space and file management,” as areas of focus. Around\\nthis same time, Yochim applied for a supervisory position, but\\nthe Department passed her up and instead awarded the role\\nto Lisa Danna-Brennan, who became Yochim’s supervisor.\\nThis development was not one Yochim welcomed.\\n In November 2012, Yochim had surgery to treat carpal tun-\\nnel syndrome in her right hand. The surgery brought with it\\na recovery and rehabilitation process, prompting Yochim to\\nsubmit several requests to HUD to accommodate her needs.\\nThe HUD handbook outlines the Department’s process for ac-\\ncommodating such requests. Employees can seek reasonable\\naccommodations through their immediate supervisor or the\\nDepartment’s Reasonable Accommodation Branch. The su-\\npervisor and employee then engage in an interactive process\\nto identify an accommodation, and the Reasonable Accom-\\nmodation Branch facilitates this communication. The Branch\\ndetermines an employee’s eligibility for a reasonable accom-\\nmodation, while the supervisor shoulders responsibility for\\ndeciding what accommodation is suitable.\\n Yochim submitted her first accommodation request in De-\\ncember 2012, asking her supervisor, Danna-Brennan, to per-\\nmit her to telework during the eight days in December on\\nwhich she had not already scheduled leave and all of January.\\nTo support her request, Yochim submitted two work-status\\nforms from her surgeon. In the first form, the doctor identified\\nno work or functional limitations while adding that Yochim\\n\\f4 No. 18-3670\\n\\n“may work from home until the end of January.” The doctor’s\\nsecond form conveyed a work-related limitation, explaining\\nthat Yochim had “diminished right-hand strength and should\\nnot rely on gripping with that hand until February 1, 2013;\\nspecifically, riding public transportation that requires holding\\non with her right hand may be a safe[t]y concern.”\\n Danna-Brennan approved Yochim’s request to work from\\nhome the remainder of December. As for Yochim’s request to\\ntelework throughout January, Danna-Brennan offered a com-\\npressed schedule consisting of four ten-hour days—two in the\\noffice and two at home. Danna-Brennan also afforded Yochim\\nthe flexibility to “set her schedule to reflect her need to avoid\\nrush hour” if she maintained a set daily schedule. Apparently\\nunhappy that her compressed schedule still required her to\\ncome to the office two days a week, Yochim later complained\\nto Danna-Brennan that she had to use sick leave to stay home\\nthese extra two days per week. At no point, however, did\\nYochim explain why HUD’s accommodation would interfere\\nwith ongoing and medically necessary rehabilitation or phys-\\nical therapy. Nor did Yochim suggest other accommodation\\noptions.\\n In March 2013, Yochim submitted a second request to\\nwork full-time from home until June 30 to accommodate her\\nongoing recovery from surgery. She supported this request\\nwith a letter from her primary-care physician, Dr. Lexy\\nWistenberg, who reported that she continued to experience\\npain and swelling in her right hand. Dr. Wistenberg also ad-\\nvised that Yochim may need to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour to avoid getting stuck standing in a train aisle and need-\\ning to grasp a handrail. Otherwise, however, Dr. Wistenberg\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 5\\n\\ncleared Yochim to work as she continued her physical ther-\\napy.\\n In April 2013, while the second accommodation request\\nwas pending, Danna-Brennan placed Yochim on a sick-leave\\nrestriction. This restriction required Yochim to provide a doc-\\ntor’s note with the date and time of an appointment or any\\nanticipated medical care and to schedule medical appoint-\\nments at the beginning or end of the day to have the least im-\\npact on the workday. This new restriction resulted from\\nDanna-Brennan’s determination that Yochim had a history of\\nexcessive absences from work—an audit of Yochim’s time re-\\nvealed that she had taken leave on 339 days out of a possible\\n1,010 work days between January 1, 2009 and May 1, 2013—\\nand that she often took leave without any prior approval.\\n A month later, in May 2013, HUD responded to Yochim’s\\nsecond accommodation request. The Department offered\\nvoice-recognition software to reduce Yochim’s need to type\\nand the option to telework three days per week. The accom-\\nmodation called for Yochim to work in the office two days per\\nweek while allowing her to work from home for two hours in\\nthe morning on these days to avoid commuting during rush\\nhour. HUD also permitted her to leave work 15 minutes early\\nto secure seating on the train. Yochim agreed to this revised\\nschedule and concedes that it reflected an effective accommo-\\ndation. This accommodation lasted approximately one\\nmonth, expiring in June 2013.\\n A year later, in June 2014, Danna-Brennan revoked\\nYochim’s telework privileges and issued a written reprimand\\nfor performance deficiencies. Danna-Brennan decided the\\nreprimand was warranted based on the results of an audit of\\nthe legal team’s docket. The audit revealed that Yochim had\\n\\f6 No. 18-3670\\n\\nleft particular assignments incomplete for up to two years\\nwithout ever reporting the delays, despite HUD’s policy re-\\nquiring her to do so.\\n In August 2014, Yochim submitted a third accommodation\\nrequest seeking to telework three days per week for six\\nmonths plus two additional days per week “as needed due to\\npain, medical appointments, and recovery.” She supported\\nthis request with another letter from Dr. Wistenberg who re-\\nported that Yochim had inflammatory osteoarthritis, causing\\n“significant pain and stiffness” and swollen joints throughout\\nher body. Dr. Wistenberg recommended that Yochim work\\nfrom home at least three days per week to minimize the risks\\nof further discomfort from commuting and to accommodate\\nvisits to physical therapists near her suburban home. Yochim\\nnever inquired about attending physical therapy in down-\\ntown Chicago near HUD’s office.\\n Danna-Brennan responded by offering a list of alternative\\naccommodations including an ergonomic assessment, addi-\\ntional paralegal assistance to reduce Yochim’s typing, a com-\\npressed weekly schedule, and generous leave approval. In do-\\ning so, Danna-Brennan explained that Yochim working from\\nhome was no longer an acceptable accommodation “because\\n[her] telework was suspended as a result of performance de-\\nficiencies while teleworking 3 days a week.” Yochim ex-\\npressed her disagreement with the proposed arrangement by\\nfiling a written statement with a specialist in HUD’s Reason-\\nable Accommodation Branch. The specialist then informed\\nYochim of the procedures to seek reconsideration, but she\\nnever did so.\\n During the same period, after the restructuring of HUD’s\\nlegal department, Yochim lodged two complaints with the\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 7\\n\\nEqual Employment Opportunity Commission. She alleged\\nthat HUD discriminated and retaliated against her by failing\\nto promote her and, separately, to accommodate her need for\\nongoing rehabilitation.\\n Yochim retired from HUD once she became eligible to do\\nso in May 2015. She then filed this suit, advancing claims un-\\nder the Rehabilitation Act and alleging that HUD failed to ac-\\ncommodate her requests to telework and to engage in the in-\\nteractive process promptly and in good faith. Yochim also al-\\nleged that HUD retaliated against her for filing her EEO com-\\nplaints and subjected her to a hostile work environment by\\nrestricting her telework and sick-leave privileges.\\n The district court granted HUD’s motion for summary\\njudgment, concluding that although Yochim had established\\nthat she was a qualified person with a disability, no reasona-\\nble jury could find that the Department had failed to offer rea-\\nsonable accommodations. The district court found that\\nHUD’s alternative accommodations were reasonable given\\nthe need that arose for Yochim to work in the office several\\ndays a week as a result of the Department’s restructuring of\\nits legal department. The district court also determined that\\nYochim fell short in her efforts to show that HUD retaliated\\nagainst her or subjected her to a hostile work environment.\\n II\\n On appeal Yochim argues that she brought forth enough\\nevidence to get to a jury on her allegations that HUD did not\\nreasonably accommodate her because it offered only ineffec-\\ntive accommodations and failed to engage in the interactive\\nprocess in good faith. We review a district court’s entry of\\n\\f8 No. 18-3670\\n\\nsummary judgment de novo and must affirm if no reasonable\\njuror could find in favor of Yochim. See Brown, 855 F.3d at 820.\\n Yochim brought her claims under the Rehabilitation Act.\\nThis enactment mandates that no qualifying individual with\\na disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability”\\nexperience discrimination by an executive agency. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 794(a). To prevail on her claim of discrimination, Yochim\\nmust show that (1) she was a qualified individual with a dis-\\nability, (2) HUD was aware of her disability, and (3) the De-\\npartment failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.\\nSee Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2019);\\nsee also Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2001)\\n(explaining that the Rehabilitation Act adopted the standard\\nfor determining whether a violation has occurred from the\\nAmericans with Disabilities Act). The accommodation obliga-\\ntion embodied in the third prong brings with it a requirement\\nthat both the employer and the employee engage in a flexible\\n“interactive process” and make a “good faith effort” to deter-\\nmine what accommodations are necessary. See Lawler v. Peoria\\nSch. Dist. No. 150, 837 F.3d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n A\\n We agree with the district court that no rational jury could\\nfind that HUD failed to offer Yochim reasonable accommoda-\\ntions or engage in the interactive process in good faith. The\\nDepartment either granted each of Yochim’s requests or re-\\nsponded with a list of alternative options that reasonably ad-\\ndressed her needs. Nor does the record support Yochim’s con-\\ntentions of bad faith. This is not a case where an employee’s\\nrequests for accommodations fell on deaf ears. To the con-\\ntrary, the parties engaged in a meaningful back-and-forth\\nwith Yochim requesting to work from home and HUD\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 9\\n\\npresenting her with appropriate alternative accommodations.\\nThe communication process did not break down simply be-\\ncause Yochim did not receive the answers she had hoped for.\\n Start with the period following Yochim’s surgery. HUD\\ngranted her request to telework for the eight remaining days\\nin December 2012 that she had not already requested off. The\\nDepartment also permitted her to adjust her work hours (to\\navoid having to stand on a train) and to telework two days a\\nweek for the entirety of January. While this fell short of\\nYochim’s preference to work from home all of January, an em-\\nployer must provide a “reasonable accommodation, not the\\naccommodation [the employee] would prefer.” Hoppe v. Lewis\\nUniv., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012). Given the Depart-\\nment’s restructuring and Yochim’s updated job description\\nfocusing on cross-training, teamwork, and collaboration,\\nwhich necessarily required her presence in the office, HUD’s\\naccommodations were entirely reasonable. And recall that the\\nonly medical basis for Yochim’s request to work from home\\nin January 2013 was her surgeon’s concerns about Yochim’s\\ncommute on crowded trains and her need to attend therapy\\nappointments. HUD’s alternative options reasonably ad-\\ndressed these concerns by adjusting her work hours to avoid\\nrush hour and limiting—but not eliminating—her time in the\\noffice.\\n Now consider HUD’s response to Yochim’s August 2014\\nrequest to work from home three to five days per week for six\\nmonths. HUD offered her a four-day work week, generous\\nleave approval (to ease commuting and attending physical\\ntherapy), and other accommodations. The Department did so\\nattentive to the needs of its legal department in Chicago and\\nmindful that Yochim, although medically cleared for work,\\n\\f10 No. 18-3670\\n\\nhad ongoing needs for physical therapy. So, too, did HUD de-\\ntermine that further telework was not warranted given\\nYochim’s performance deficiencies. No reasonable jury could\\nfind this response unreasonable. Yochim has never explained\\nwhy HUD’s approval of regular sick leave to attend physical\\ntherapy appointments was inadequate. And not once has\\nYochim identified any reason why she could not attend ther-\\napy appointments closer to her Chicago office to minimize her\\ncommute or why changes to her work hours would not re-\\nsolve her concern about crowded trains. Put most simply,\\nYochim failed to connect the accommodation she persisted\\nwas necessary with what the record showed were her ongoing\\nmedical needs. In the end, it was Yochim’s own insistence on\\nteleworking three or more days a week and her refusal to re-\\nmain open to anything less that doomed the interactive pro-\\ncess.\\n Yochim’s claim that HUD failed to offer her reasonable ac-\\ncommodations fails for another reason. She cannot point to\\nevidence that the two accommodations she sought but did not\\nreceive—to telework full-time for one month and later for\\nthree to five days per week for six months—were “reasonable\\non [their] face.” See Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med. Plans,\\nInc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Majors v. Gen.\\nElec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013)) (stating that a plain-\\ntiff seeking to establish claim for failure to accommodate un-\\nder the ADA must “make an initial showing that the accom-\\nmodation she sought was ‘reasonable on its face’”). Yochim\\ninsists that her requests to telework were appropriate because\\nshe had worked from home full time for six weeks in 2004,\\nHUD’s telework policy allows employees to work from home\\nup to three days a week, and another employee was allowed\\nto work from home for an unknown period of time.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 11\\n\\n Yochim’s position falls short. An accommodation to tele-\\nwork requires a context-specific inquiry, and a “general con-\\nsensus [exists] among courts” that jobs “often require face-to-\\nface collaboration.” See Bilinksy v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d\\n565, 573 (7th Cir. 2019). Yochim has failed to counter HUD’s\\nevidence that she held just such a job. The 2012 restructuring\\nof the legal department, which changed Yochim’s responsibil-\\nities and job description, required attorneys to work in teams,\\ncollaborate more, and cross-train each other. She points to the\\nDepartment’s 2010 telework policy that allows telework up to\\nthree days a week, but this policy predates the restructuring.\\nEven more to the point, the policy, by its terms, is subject to\\nmanagement’s discretion—it does not confer a legally pro-\\ntected entitlement upon an employee.\\n B\\n Yochim next argues that HUD’s accommodations were in-\\neffective. She says, for example, that many of HUD’s options\\n(like the compressed work week and the flexibility to tele-\\nwork a few days a week) already were widely available to\\nHUD employees without a reasonable accommodation and\\nthus were not “alternative accommodations.” But this posi-\\ntion misses the mark. “Reasonable accommodation” under\\nthe relevant statutes includes “modified work schedules”\\nsuch as the compressed schedules and telework that HUD of-\\nfered. See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476,\\n481 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)). It makes no\\ndifference that modified scheduling options might have been\\navailable to other HUD employees who obtained permission\\nto telework from their manager.\\n By way of another example, Yochim contends that HUD’s\\noptions were ineffective because requiring her to work in the\\n\\f12 No. 18-3670\\n\\noffice meant that she had to commute on the train and grasp\\nthe handrails with her injured right hand. But the medical rec-\\nords supporting Yochim’s accommodation requests demon-\\nstrated that the only limitation related to her commute was\\nthe need to avoid crowded trains that could cause her to fall\\nor force her to grip the railings. HUD’s proposed accommo-\\ndations addressed these concerns by offering her an adjusted\\nschedule to avoid rush hour.\\n Yochim has offered a few other views as to why HUD’s\\naccommodations were ineffective. She claims that the long\\nten-hour days of her compressed schedule (and HUD’s\\nrequirement that she maintain a set daily schedule) limited\\nher flexibility to make her therapy appointments before or\\nafter work, necessitating that she take sick leave. And she says\\nthat doing so was especially difficult with the sick-leave\\nrestriction imposed by her supervisor. But one purpose of\\npaid sick leave is to allow employees to attend such\\nappointments, and Yochim does not present any evidence\\nthat the leave restriction—which merely required her to\\nsubmit a medical note detailing the time and date of an\\nappointment—interfered with her physical-therapy sessions.\\nNone of Yochim’s remaining arguments persuade us that a\\nreasonable jury could find that the Department’s\\naccommodations were ineffective.\\n C\\n Finally, Yochim contends that HUD’s refusal to allow her\\nto work from home and the imposition of her sick-leave re-\\nstriction created a “retaliatory hostile work environment” that\\nled to her premature retirement. This court has not deter-\\nmined whether the ADA (and by extension, the Rehabilitation\\nAct) encompasses claims of a hostile work environment.\\n\\fNo. 18-3670 13\\n\\nSee Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 712–13 (7th Cir.\\n2000). We need not resolve the question here. Even assuming\\nYochim could bring a hostile-work-environment claim, she\\nmust at a minimum demonstrate that the work environment\\nwas both objectively and subjectively offensive because of\\n“severe or pervasive” harassment. Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,\\n920 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n At summary judgment, Yochim did not offer evidence\\nshowing that her leave and telework restrictions—actions that\\nare permissible for an employer to take—were so severe or\\npervasive as to “alter the conditions” of employment and\\n“create an abusive working environment.” See id.; see also\\nHerron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir.\\n2004) (concluding that empr’s disciplinary action for perfor-\\nmance issues was “normal workplace friction”). And it is this\\nevidentiary shortcoming that defeats this dimension of her\\nclaims on summary judgment.\\n For all of these reasons, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3874,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4649412,"string":"4,649,412"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Christopher REGAN and Northwest Indiana Creative Investors Association, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Christopher Regan v. City of Hammond, Indiana"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3051"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wood, Bauer, Rovner\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-3051\\n\\nCHRISTOPHER REGAN and\\nNORTHWEST INDIANA CREATIVE\\nINVESTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nCITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.\\n No. 2:16-cv-00098-JTM — James T. Moody, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs in this case press a\\ndormant commerce clause challenge to a local ordinance that\\nrequires a residential property owner who wishes to make\\n\\f2 No. 18-3051\\n\\nrepairs to the residence either to obtain a license or to hire a\\nlicensed contractor; but a homeowner making repairs to the\\nsingle-family residence he or she occupies is exempted from\\nthis requirement. The plaintiffs argue that this scheme discrim-\\ninates against interstate commerce and to that extent is\\ncontrary to the dormant commerce clause. But the ordinance\\ndraws no distinction between in-state or out-of-state property\\nowners and imposes no burden on interstate commerce. We\\ntherefore affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment\\nagainst the plaintiffs.\\n I.\\n Plaintiff Christopher Regan lives in Cook County, Illinois,\\nbut owns real property in the City of Hammond, Indiana, that\\nhe leases or rents to others. The Northwest Indiana Creative\\nInvestors Association, Inc. (“NICIA”) is a trade association for\\nreal estate investors who likewise own and lease real property\\nin Hammond. As landlords, Regan and NICIA members\\nnaturally have the need to make periodic repairs and improve-\\nments to their Hammond properties. In order to repair or\\nremodel their properties, the Hammond municipal code\\nrequires that they either obtain a license from the city or hire a\\nHammond-licensed general contractor. Hammond, Ind.\\nMunicipal Code §§ 150.15, 150.17. In order to obtain a license,\\na general contractor or landlord must, among other things,\\nsubmit an application, pass a test and criminal background\\ncheck, and pay a fee. (General contractors are subject to\\nadditional requirements and obtain a broader license.) The\\ncode makes an exception for an individual making repairs or\\nimprovements to a private, single-family residence in which he\\nresides. Any work he performs will be subject to review and\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 3\\n\\ninspection by the city building commissioner (as would\\nlicensed work), but he need not obtain a license in order to do\\nthe work. §§ 150.15, 150.17.\\n Regan and NICIA contend that the license requirement,\\ncoupled with the exemption, impermissibly burdens interstate\\ncommerce by imposing costs on property owners who, like\\nRegan, do not reside in Hammond which locally-domiciled\\nhomeowners do not have to pay. That burden, they argue, is\\ninconsistent with the dormant commerce clause. The district\\ncourt disagreed and entered summary judgment for\\nHammond. Regan v. City of Hammond, Ind., 331 F. Supp. 3d 798\\n(N.D. Ind. 2018). Judge Moody reasoned that the city’s license\\nrequirement does not facially discriminate against property\\nowners who do not live in Hammond, does not have a dispa-\\nrate impact on those owners, and is rationally related to the\\ncity’s interest in public safety. Id.\\n II.\\n The commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate\\ncommerce among the states. U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, cl. 3. This\\nprovision “presumes a national market free from local legisla-\\ntion that discriminates in favor of local interests.” C & A\\nCarbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393, 114\\nS. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994). The clause therefore comprises not\\nonly an affirmative authorization for Congress to regulate\\ninterstate commerce, but a corresponding restraint on the\\npower of state and local governments to regulate that com-\\nmerce. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38, 128\\nS. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub.\\nServ. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2422–23 (2005).\\n\\f4 No. 18-3051\\n\\nThat restraint is referred to as the dormant commerce clause,\\nand it precludes states and municipalities from erecting\\nobstacles to interstate commerce even where Congress has not\\nregulated. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139\\nS. Ct. 2449, 2459–61 (2019); Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v.\\nWynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015); Endsley v. City of Chicago,\\n230 F.3d 276, 284 (7th Cir. 2000). The fact that a state or\\nmunicipal law affects interstate commerce in some way is by\\nitself insufficient to render the law suspect under the com-\\nmerce clause, as almost any local regulation is bound to touch\\nupon interstate commerce. Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City\\nof Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 1995). “Dormant\\nCommerce Clause doctrine applies only to laws that discrimi-\\nnate against interstate commerce, either expressly or in fact.”\\nPark Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 872 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (emphasis in original) (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at\\n1130–31).\\n Our precedents place state and local laws into one of three\\ncategories for purposes of commerce clause analysis, depend-\\ning on the degree to which they affect interstate commerce:\\n(1) laws that expressly discriminate against interstate com-\\nmerce; (2) laws that, although neutral on their face, bear more\\nheavily on interstate than local commerce; and (3) laws that\\nmay have a mild effect on interstate commerce but in practice\\ndo not give local firms any competitive advantage over firms\\nlocated elsewhere. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02 (citing Nat’l\\nPaint, 45 F.3d at 1131). A law falling into the first category is\\npresumed to be almost per se unconstitutional and is subject to\\nrigorous scrutiny that will allow the law to stand only if it\\nserves a legitimate governmental interest and there is no\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 5\\n\\nreasonable non-discriminatory means of furthering that\\ninterest. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45\\nF.3d at 1131); see Davis, 553 U.S. at 338, 128 S. Ct. at 1808; United\\nHaulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,\\n550 U.S. 330, 338–39, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1793 (2007); Or. Waste Sys.,\\nInc. v. Dep’t of Environ. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93,\\n100–01, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1351 (1994). A law falling into the\\nsecond category is analyzed according to its effect. If the\\nimpact is so strong that the law effectively operates as an\\nembargo on interstate commerce, it is treated as the equivalent\\nof a facially discriminatory law and is subject to the same\\ndemanding scrutiny given to such a law. Id. (citing Nat’l Paint,\\n45 F.3d at 1131). But if the law regulates even-handedly and\\nonly incidentally burdens interstate commerce, then it is\\nexamined under the balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce\\nChurch, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 847 (1970), to\\ndetermine whether it is animated by a legitimate public\\npurpose and, if so, whether the burden the law imposes on\\ninterstate commerce is excessive in relation to that interest.\\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02; see Davis, 563 U.S. at 338–39,\\n128 S. Ct. at 1808–09; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State\\nLiquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (1986). A\\nlaw falling into the third category is examined solely to\\ndetermine whether it has a rational basis. Park Pet Shop, 872\\nF.3d at 502 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1131–32). The district\\ncourt concluded that the Hammond ordinance falls into the\\nthird category and indeed is justified by a rational basis. We\\nreview its conclusion de novo. Legato Vapors, LLC v. Cook, 847\\nF.3d 825, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\f6 No. 18-3051\\n\\n The plaintiffs are landlords, and as the ordinance concerns\\nlandlords, it draws no distinction between those who are\\ndomiciled in Hammond (or elsewhere in Indiana) and those\\nwho are not; all landlords are subject to the license require-\\nment. So the landlord who lives in Chicago and owns a rental\\nproperty in Hammond must obtain a license or hire a licensed\\ncontractor, but so must the landlord who lives next door to his\\nHammond rental. The ordinance imposes no impediment or\\nburden for the non-Hammond landlord that it does not also\\nimpose on the Hammond landlord. There is no disparity in\\nclassification of local versus non-local landlords nor is there a\\ndisparity in how the two are impacted by the ordinance. See\\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 502 (municipal “puppy mill” ordi-\\nnance that prohibits all large commercial breeders from selling\\ndomestic pets to local pet stores regardless of where breeder is\\nlocated neither expressly discriminates against interstate\\ncommerce nor has disparate impact on out-of-state breeders).\\n It is only the exception the ordinance makes for occupant\\nhomeowners that causes the plaintiffs to complain that the\\nordinance is inconsistent with the dormant commerce clause,\\nbecause by definition only a property owner who lives in\\nHammond can be an occupant of a Hammond residence. The\\noccupant can, if he chooses, save himself the expense of\\nobtaining a license or hiring a licensed contractor to make\\nimprovements to his property; and he is the only property\\nowner who is given that option. But the exception is tied to\\noccupancy of the property rather than the owner’s domicile; a\\nHammond-based landlord will not qualify for the exception\\neven if his tenant lives next door to him in the adjoining unit of\\na side-by-side duplex.\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 7\\n\\n The premise of the plaintiffs’ commerce clause challenge is\\nthat all owners of residential property in Hammond are\\nparticipants and competitors in the national housing market,\\nso that to give an occupant homeowner an exemption from the\\nlicense requirement is to discriminate in favor of the occupant\\nagainst the non-occupant homeowner, including in particular\\nthe landlord who is not domiciled in Hammond. But occupant\\nhomeowners are not similarly situated with landlords, as the\\ndistrict court recognized. The owner-occupant of a single-\\nfamily home typically is not deriving rental income from his\\nproperty, which means that he or she is not in meaningful\\ncompetition with landlords. Yes, both own property, and both\\nmay ultimately sell that property in the national market, but\\nduring the term of their ownership, they are using the property\\nfor different purposes. Moreover, the occupant also bears the\\nconsequences of repairs or improvements made to his home in\\na way that a landlord does not. Of course, all repairs and\\nimprovements are reviewed by the Hammond building\\ncommissioner for compliance with municipal codes, so one\\nmay presume the alterations by the occupant owner are good\\nenough to pass inspection; but compliance with local regula-\\ntions does not ensure that the craftsmanship is sound, effective\\nin resolving any problems that necessitated repairs, or suffi-\\ncient to prevent future problems. And as between the occupant\\nand the landlord, it is the former who will be without heat,\\nwater, a working kitchen, a watertight roof, or a sound\\nstaircase if the repairs or improvements are not made properly.\\nThe occupant and the landlord alike ultimately may suffer the\\neconomic consequences of bad work (a tenant might withhold\\nrent or abandon the lease), but only the occupant actually\\n\\f8 No. 18-3051\\n\\nexperiences the deterioration in living conditions with its\\nattendant hardships and dangers. In the district court’s words,\\n“While resident homeowners will bear the risk of their own\\npoor craftsmanship, building contractors and landlords impose\\nthe risk of faulty construction upon current or future tenants.”\\n331 F. Supp. 3d at 805.\\n Given the material distinctions between occupant owners\\nand landlords, the exception for occupant owners does not\\nmake the ordinance one that discriminates against non-\\nHammond property owners, so as to trigger a presumption of\\ninvalidity. “[L]aws that draw distinctions between entities that\\nare not competitors do not ‘discriminate’ for purposes of the\\ndormant commerce clause.” Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584\\nF.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Town of Southold v. Town of\\nE. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 2007)); see Gen. Motors Corp.\\nv. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298–300, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824–25 (1997).\\nHammond’s ordinance does not impede interstate commerce\\nin the sense that it poses an obstacle to non-residents who wish\\nto invest in Hammond rental properties or imposes a sur-\\ncharge on such non-residents that is not imposed on local,\\nsimilarly-situated investors. Nor does it otherwise impose a\\ndisparate burden on non-Hammond landlords so as to trigger\\nthe Pike analysis. As we have said, the ordinance treats all\\nlandlords the same, regardless of whether they are domiciled\\nin Hammond. Consequently, the law falls into the third\\ncategory, and is subject only to rational basis review.\\n And for the same reasons that occupant homeowners are\\nnot similarly situated to landlords, the license requirement and\\nexemption easily survive deferential review. Hammond has an\\nobvious interest in the safety and habitability of the homes in\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 9\\n\\nwhich its residents live, and the ordinance is a legitimate\\nexercise of its authority to promote that interest. The license\\nrequirement serves to ensure not only that whoever performs\\nthe work, be it the property owner or a contractor, is familiar\\nwith the local code requirements and is therefore capable of\\ncompleting work in a sound manner that complies with those\\nrequirements, but that he lacks a criminal background that\\nmay place the property’s owner or occupant in jeopardy of\\nfraud. Insofar as the exemption for occupant homeowners is\\nconcerned, it is reasonable for the city to think that such\\nhomeowners, who have a keen interest in the adequacy of\\nrepairs and improvements made to their own homes, will also\\nendeavor to comply with all local requirements.\\n III.\\n Hammond’s licensing ordinance does not discriminate\\nbased on the domicile of a homeowner in name or effect and\\nhas the support of a rational basis; it therefore poses no\\nproblem under the dormant commerce clause. The district\\ncourt property granted summary judgment to Hammond.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426665/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649412/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Christopher REGAN and Northwest Indiana Creative Investors Association, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-3051\n\nCHRISTOPHER REGAN and\nNORTHWEST INDIANA CREATIVE\nINVESTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\n\nCITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.\n No. 2:16-cv-00098-JTM — James T. Moody, Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\n\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\nJudges.\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs in this case press a\ndormant commerce clause challenge to a local ordinance that\nrequires a residential property owner who wishes to make\n\f2 No. 18-3051\n\nrepairs to the residence either to obtain a license or to hire a\nlicensed contractor; but a homeowner making repairs to the\nsingle-family residence he or she occupies is exempted from\nthis requirement. The plaintiffs argue that this scheme discrim-\ninates against interstate commerce and to that extent is\ncontrary to the dormant commerce clause. But the ordinance\ndraws no distinction between in-state or out-of-state property\nowners and imposes no burden on interstate commerce. We\ntherefore affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment\nagainst the plaintiffs.\n I.\n Plaintiff Christopher Regan lives in Cook County, Illinois,\nbut owns real property in the City of Hammond, Indiana, that\nhe leases or rents to others. The Northwest Indiana Creative\nInvestors Association, Inc. (“NICIA”) is a trade association for\nreal estate investors who likewise own and lease real property\nin Hammond. As landlords, Regan and NICIA members\nnaturally have the need to make periodic repairs and improve-\nments to their Hammond properties. In order to repair or\nremodel their properties, the Hammond municipal code\nrequires that they either obtain a license from the city or hire a\nHammond-licensed general contractor. Hammond, Ind.\nMunicipal Code §§ 150.15, 150.17. In order to obtain a license,\na general contractor or landlord must, among other things,\nsubmit an application, pass a test and criminal background\ncheck, and pay a fee. (General contractors are subject to\nadditional requirements and obtain a broader license.) The\ncode makes an exception for an individual making repairs or\nimprovements to a private, single-family residence in which he\nresides. Any work he performs will be subject to review and\n\fNo. 18-3051 3\n\ninspection by the city building commissioner (as would\nlicensed work), but he need not obtain a license in order to do\nthe work. §§ 150.15, 150.17.\n Regan and NICIA contend that the license requirement,\ncoupled with the exemption, impermissibly burdens interstate\ncommerce by imposing costs on property owners who, like\nRegan, do not reside in Hammond which locally-domiciled\nhomeowners do not have to pay. That burden, they argue, is\ninconsistent with the dormant commerce clause. The district\ncourt disagreed and entered summary judgment for\nHammond. Regan v. City of Hammond, Ind., 331 F. Supp. 3d 798\n(N.D. Ind. 2018). Judge Moody reasoned that the city’s license\nrequirement does not facially discriminate against property\nowners who do not live in Hammond, does not have a dispa-\nrate impact on those owners, and is rationally related to the\ncity’s interest in public safety. Id.\n II.\n The commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate\ncommerce among the states. U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, cl. 3. This\nprovision “presumes a national market free from local legisla-\ntion that discriminates in favor of local interests.” C & A\nCarbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393, 114\nS. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994). The clause therefore comprises not\nonly an affirmative authorization for Congress to regulate\ninterstate commerce, but a corresponding restraint on the\npower of state and local governments to regulate that com-\nmerce. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38, 128\nS. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub.\nServ. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2422–23 (2005).\n\f4 No. 18-3051\n\nThat restraint is referred to as the dormant commerce clause,\nand it precludes states and municipalities from erecting\nobstacles to interstate commerce even where Congress has not\nregulated. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139\nS. Ct. 2449, 2459–61 (2019); Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v.\nWynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015); Endsley v. City of Chicago,\n230 F.3d 276, 284 (7th Cir. 2000). The fact that a state or\nmunicipal law affects interstate commerce in some way is by\nitself insufficient to render the law suspect under the com-\nmerce clause, as almost any local regulation is bound to touch\nupon interstate commerce. Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City\nof Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 1995). “Dormant\nCommerce Clause doctrine applies only to laws that discrimi-\nnate against interstate commerce, either expressly or in fact.”\nPark Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 872 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir.\n2017) (emphasis in original) (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at\n1130–31).\n Our precedents place state and local laws into one of three\ncategories for purposes of commerce clause analysis, depend-\ning on the degree to which they affect interstate commerce:\n(1) laws that expressly discriminate against interstate com-\nmerce; (2) laws that, although neutral on their face, bear more\nheavily on interstate than local commerce; and (3) laws that\nmay have a mild effect on interstate commerce but in practice\ndo not give local firms any competitive advantage over firms\nlocated elsewhere. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02 (citing Nat’l\nPaint, 45 F.3d at 1131). A law falling into the first category is\npresumed to be almost per se unconstitutional and is subject to\nrigorous scrutiny that will allow the law to stand only if it\nserves a legitimate governmental interest and there is no\n\fNo. 18-3051 5\n\nreasonable non-discriminatory means of furthering that\ninterest. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45\nF.3d at 1131); see Davis, 553 U.S. at 338, 128 S. Ct. at 1808; United\nHaulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,\n550 U.S. 330, 338–39, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1793 (2007); Or. Waste Sys.,\nInc. v. Dep’t of Environ. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93,\n100–01, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1351 (1994). A law falling into the\nsecond category is analyzed according to its effect. If the\nimpact is so strong that the law effectively operates as an\nembargo on interstate commerce, it is treated as the equivalent\nof a facially discriminatory law and is subject to the same\ndemanding scrutiny given to such a law. Id. (citing Nat’l Paint,\n45 F.3d at 1131). But if the law regulates even-handedly and\nonly incidentally burdens interstate commerce, then it is\nexamined under the balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce\nChurch, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 847 (1970), to\ndetermine whether it is animated by a legitimate public\npurpose and, if so, whether the burden the law imposes on\ninterstate commerce is excessive in relation to that interest.\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02; see Davis, 563 U.S. at 338–39,\n128 S. Ct. at 1808–09; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State\nLiquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (1986). A\nlaw falling into the third category is examined solely to\ndetermine whether it has a rational basis. Park Pet Shop, 872\nF.3d at 502 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1131–32). The district\ncourt concluded that the Hammond ordinance falls into the\nthird category and indeed is justified by a rational basis. We\nreview its conclusion de novo. Legato Vapors, LLC v. Cook, 847\nF.3d 825, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2017).\n\f6 No. 18-3051\n\n The plaintiffs are landlords, and as the ordinance concerns\nlandlords, it draws no distinction between those who are\ndomiciled in Hammond (or elsewhere in Indiana) and those\nwho are not; all landlords are subject to the license require-\nment. So the landlord who lives in Chicago and owns a rental\nproperty in Hammond must obtain a license or hire a licensed\ncontractor, but so must the landlord who lives next door to his\nHammond rental. The ordinance imposes no impediment or\nburden for the non-Hammond landlord that it does not also\nimpose on the Hammond landlord. There is no disparity in\nclassification of local versus non-local landlords nor is there a\ndisparity in how the two are impacted by the ordinance. See\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 502 (municipal “puppy mill” ordi-\nnance that prohibits all large commercial breeders from selling\ndomestic pets to local pet stores regardless of where breeder is\nlocated neither expressly discriminates against interstate\ncommerce nor has disparate impact on out-of-state breeders).\n It is only the exception the ordinance makes for occupant\nhomeowners that causes the plaintiffs to complain that the\nordinance is inconsistent with the dormant commerce clause,\nbecause by definition only a property owner who lives in\nHammond can be an occupant of a Hammond residence. The\noccupant can, if he chooses, save himself the expense of\nobtaining a license or hiring a licensed contractor to make\nimprovements to his property; and he is the only property\nowner who is given that option. But the exception is tied to\noccupancy of the property rather than the owner’s domicile; a\nHammond-based landlord will not qualify for the exception\neven if his tenant lives next door to him in the adjoining unit of\na side-by-side duplex.\n\fNo. 18-3051 7\n\n The premise of the plaintiffs’ commerce clause challenge is\nthat all owners of residential property in Hammond are\nparticipants and competitors in the national housing market,\nso that to give an occupant homeowner an exemption from the\nlicense requirement is to discriminate in favor of the occupant\nagainst the non-occupant homeowner, including in particular\nthe landlord who is not domiciled in Hammond. But occupant\nhomeowners are not similarly situated with landlords, as the\ndistrict court recognized. The owner-occupant of a single-\nfamily home typically is not deriving rental income from his\nproperty, which means that he or she is not in meaningful\ncompetition with landlords. Yes, both own property, and both\nmay ultimately sell that property in the national market, but\nduring the term of their ownership, they are using the property\nfor different purposes. Moreover, the occupant also bears the\nconsequences of repairs or improvements made to his home in\na way that a landlord does not. Of course, all repairs and\nimprovements are reviewed by the Hammond building\ncommissioner for compliance with municipal codes, so one\nmay presume the alterations by the occupant owner are good\nenough to pass inspection; but compliance with local regula-\ntions does not ensure that the craftsmanship is sound, effective\nin resolving any problems that necessitated repairs, or suffi-\ncient to prevent future problems. And as between the occupant\nand the landlord, it is the former who will be without heat,\nwater, a working kitchen, a watertight roof, or a sound\nstaircase if the repairs or improvements are not made properly.\nThe occupant and the landlord alike ultimately may suffer the\neconomic consequences of bad work (a tenant might withhold\nrent or abandon the lease), but only the occupant actually\n\f8 No. 18-3051\n\nexperiences the deterioration in living conditions with its\nattendant hardships and dangers. In the district court’s words,\n“While resident homeowners will bear the risk of their own\npoor craftsmanship, building contractors and landlords impose\nthe risk of faulty construction upon current or future tenants.”\n331 F. Supp. 3d at 805.\n Given the material distinctions between occupant owners\nand landlords, the exception for occupant owners does not\nmake the ordinance one that discriminates against non-\nHammond property owners, so as to trigger a presumption of\ninvalidity. “[L]aws that draw distinctions between entities that\nare not competitors do not ‘discriminate’ for purposes of the\ndormant commerce clause.” Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584\nF.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Town of Southold v. Town of\nE. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 2007)); see Gen. Motors Corp.\nv. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298–300, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824–25 (1997).\nHammond’s ordinance does not impede interstate commerce\nin the sense that it poses an obstacle to non-residents who wish\nto invest in Hammond rental properties or imposes a sur-\ncharge on such non-residents that is not imposed on local,\nsimilarly-situated investors. Nor does it otherwise impose a\ndisparate burden on non-Hammond landlords so as to trigger\nthe Pike analysis. As we have said, the ordinance treats all\nlandlords the same, regardless of whether they are domiciled\nin Hammond. Consequently, the law falls into the third\ncategory, and is subject only to rational basis review.\n And for the same reasons that occupant homeowners are\nnot similarly situated to landlords, the license requirement and\nexemption easily survive deferential review. Hammond has an\nobvious interest in the safety and habitability of the homes in\n\fNo. 18-3051 9\n\nwhich its residents live, and the ordinance is a legitimate\nexercise of its authority to promote that interest. The license\nrequirement serves to ensure not only that whoever performs\nthe work, be it the property owner or a contractor, is familiar\nwith the local code requirements and is therefore capable of\ncompleting work in a sound manner that complies with those\nrequirements, but that he lacks a criminal background that\nmay place the property’s owner or occupant in jeopardy of\nfraud. Insofar as the exemption for occupant homeowners is\nconcerned, it is reasonable for the city to think that such\nhomeowners, who have a keen interest in the adequacy of\nrepairs and improvements made to their own homes, will also\nendeavor to comply with all local requirements.\n III.\n Hammond’s licensing ordinance does not discriminate\nbased on the domicile of a homeowner in name or effect and\nhas the support of a rational basis; it therefore poses no\nproblem under the dormant commerce clause. The district\ncourt property granted summary judgment to Hammond.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Christopher REGAN and Northwest Indiana Creative Investors Association, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-3051\\n\\nCHRISTOPHER REGAN and\\nNORTHWEST INDIANA CREATIVE\\nINVESTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nCITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.\\n No. 2:16-cv-00098-JTM — James T. Moody, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs in this case press a\\ndormant commerce clause challenge to a local ordinance that\\nrequires a residential property owner who wishes to make\\n\\f2 No. 18-3051\\n\\nrepairs to the residence either to obtain a license or to hire a\\nlicensed contractor; but a homeowner making repairs to the\\nsingle-family residence he or she occupies is exempted from\\nthis requirement. The plaintiffs argue that this scheme discrim-\\ninates against interstate commerce and to that extent is\\ncontrary to the dormant commerce clause. But the ordinance\\ndraws no distinction between in-state or out-of-state property\\nowners and imposes no burden on interstate commerce. We\\ntherefore affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment\\nagainst the plaintiffs.\\n I.\\n Plaintiff Christopher Regan lives in Cook County, Illinois,\\nbut owns real property in the City of Hammond, Indiana, that\\nhe leases or rents to others. The Northwest Indiana Creative\\nInvestors Association, Inc. (“NICIA”) is a trade association for\\nreal estate investors who likewise own and lease real property\\nin Hammond. As landlords, Regan and NICIA members\\nnaturally have the need to make periodic repairs and improve-\\nments to their Hammond properties. In order to repair or\\nremodel their properties, the Hammond municipal code\\nrequires that they either obtain a license from the city or hire a\\nHammond-licensed general contractor. Hammond, Ind.\\nMunicipal Code §§ 150.15, 150.17. In order to obtain a license,\\na general contractor or landlord must, among other things,\\nsubmit an application, pass a test and criminal background\\ncheck, and pay a fee. (General contractors are subject to\\nadditional requirements and obtain a broader license.) The\\ncode makes an exception for an individual making repairs or\\nimprovements to a private, single-family residence in which he\\nresides. Any work he performs will be subject to review and\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 3\\n\\ninspection by the city building commissioner (as would\\nlicensed work), but he need not obtain a license in order to do\\nthe work. §§ 150.15, 150.17.\\n Regan and NICIA contend that the license requirement,\\ncoupled with the exemption, impermissibly burdens interstate\\ncommerce by imposing costs on property owners who, like\\nRegan, do not reside in Hammond which locally-domiciled\\nhomeowners do not have to pay. That burden, they argue, is\\ninconsistent with the dormant commerce clause. The district\\ncourt disagreed and entered summary judgment for\\nHammond. Regan v. City of Hammond, Ind., 331 F. Supp. 3d 798\\n(N.D. Ind. 2018). Judge Moody reasoned that the city’s license\\nrequirement does not facially discriminate against property\\nowners who do not live in Hammond, does not have a dispa-\\nrate impact on those owners, and is rationally related to the\\ncity’s interest in public safety. Id.\\n II.\\n The commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate\\ncommerce among the states. U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, cl. 3. This\\nprovision “presumes a national market free from local legisla-\\ntion that discriminates in favor of local interests.” C & A\\nCarbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393, 114\\nS. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994). The clause therefore comprises not\\nonly an affirmative authorization for Congress to regulate\\ninterstate commerce, but a corresponding restraint on the\\npower of state and local governments to regulate that com-\\nmerce. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38, 128\\nS. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub.\\nServ. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2422–23 (2005).\\n\\f4 No. 18-3051\\n\\nThat restraint is referred to as the dormant commerce clause,\\nand it precludes states and municipalities from erecting\\nobstacles to interstate commerce even where Congress has not\\nregulated. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139\\nS. Ct. 2449, 2459–61 (2019); Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v.\\nWynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015); Endsley v. City of Chicago,\\n230 F.3d 276, 284 (7th Cir. 2000). The fact that a state or\\nmunicipal law affects interstate commerce in some way is by\\nitself insufficient to render the law suspect under the com-\\nmerce clause, as almost any local regulation is bound to touch\\nupon interstate commerce. Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City\\nof Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 1995). “Dormant\\nCommerce Clause doctrine applies only to laws that discrimi-\\nnate against interstate commerce, either expressly or in fact.”\\nPark Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 872 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (emphasis in original) (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at\\n1130–31).\\n Our precedents place state and local laws into one of three\\ncategories for purposes of commerce clause analysis, depend-\\ning on the degree to which they affect interstate commerce:\\n(1) laws that expressly discriminate against interstate com-\\nmerce; (2) laws that, although neutral on their face, bear more\\nheavily on interstate than local commerce; and (3) laws that\\nmay have a mild effect on interstate commerce but in practice\\ndo not give local firms any competitive advantage over firms\\nlocated elsewhere. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02 (citing Nat’l\\nPaint, 45 F.3d at 1131). A law falling into the first category is\\npresumed to be almost per se unconstitutional and is subject to\\nrigorous scrutiny that will allow the law to stand only if it\\nserves a legitimate governmental interest and there is no\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 5\\n\\nreasonable non-discriminatory means of furthering that\\ninterest. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45\\nF.3d at 1131); see Davis, 553 U.S. at 338, 128 S. Ct. at 1808; United\\nHaulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,\\n550 U.S. 330, 338–39, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1793 (2007); Or. Waste Sys.,\\nInc. v. Dep’t of Environ. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93,\\n100–01, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1351 (1994). A law falling into the\\nsecond category is analyzed according to its effect. If the\\nimpact is so strong that the law effectively operates as an\\nembargo on interstate commerce, it is treated as the equivalent\\nof a facially discriminatory law and is subject to the same\\ndemanding scrutiny given to such a law. Id. (citing Nat’l Paint,\\n45 F.3d at 1131). But if the law regulates even-handedly and\\nonly incidentally burdens interstate commerce, then it is\\nexamined under the balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce\\nChurch, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 847 (1970), to\\ndetermine whether it is animated by a legitimate public\\npurpose and, if so, whether the burden the law imposes on\\ninterstate commerce is excessive in relation to that interest.\\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02; see Davis, 563 U.S. at 338–39,\\n128 S. Ct. at 1808–09; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State\\nLiquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (1986). A\\nlaw falling into the third category is examined solely to\\ndetermine whether it has a rational basis. Park Pet Shop, 872\\nF.3d at 502 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1131–32). The district\\ncourt concluded that the Hammond ordinance falls into the\\nthird category and indeed is justified by a rational basis. We\\nreview its conclusion de novo. Legato Vapors, LLC v. Cook, 847\\nF.3d 825, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\f6 No. 18-3051\\n\\n The plaintiffs are landlords, and as the ordinance concerns\\nlandlords, it draws no distinction between those who are\\ndomiciled in Hammond (or elsewhere in Indiana) and those\\nwho are not; all landlords are subject to the license require-\\nment. So the landlord who lives in Chicago and owns a rental\\nproperty in Hammond must obtain a license or hire a licensed\\ncontractor, but so must the landlord who lives next door to his\\nHammond rental. The ordinance imposes no impediment or\\nburden for the non-Hammond landlord that it does not also\\nimpose on the Hammond landlord. There is no disparity in\\nclassification of local versus non-local landlords nor is there a\\ndisparity in how the two are impacted by the ordinance. See\\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 502 (municipal “puppy mill” ordi-\\nnance that prohibits all large commercial breeders from selling\\ndomestic pets to local pet stores regardless of where breeder is\\nlocated neither expressly discriminates against interstate\\ncommerce nor has disparate impact on out-of-state breeders).\\n It is only the exception the ordinance makes for occupant\\nhomeowners that causes the plaintiffs to complain that the\\nordinance is inconsistent with the dormant commerce clause,\\nbecause by definition only a property owner who lives in\\nHammond can be an occupant of a Hammond residence. The\\noccupant can, if he chooses, save himself the expense of\\nobtaining a license or hiring a licensed contractor to make\\nimprovements to his property; and he is the only property\\nowner who is given that option. But the exception is tied to\\noccupancy of the property rather than the owner’s domicile; a\\nHammond-based landlord will not qualify for the exception\\neven if his tenant lives next door to him in the adjoining unit of\\na side-by-side duplex.\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 7\\n\\n The premise of the plaintiffs’ commerce clause challenge is\\nthat all owners of residential property in Hammond are\\nparticipants and competitors in the national housing market,\\nso that to give an occupant homeowner an exemption from the\\nlicense requirement is to discriminate in favor of the occupant\\nagainst the non-occupant homeowner, including in particular\\nthe landlord who is not domiciled in Hammond. But occupant\\nhomeowners are not similarly situated with landlords, as the\\ndistrict court recognized. The owner-occupant of a single-\\nfamily home typically is not deriving rental income from his\\nproperty, which means that he or she is not in meaningful\\ncompetition with landlords. Yes, both own property, and both\\nmay ultimately sell that property in the national market, but\\nduring the term of their ownership, they are using the property\\nfor different purposes. Moreover, the occupant also bears the\\nconsequences of repairs or improvements made to his home in\\na way that a landlord does not. Of course, all repairs and\\nimprovements are reviewed by the Hammond building\\ncommissioner for compliance with municipal codes, so one\\nmay presume the alterations by the occupant owner are good\\nenough to pass inspection; but compliance with local regula-\\ntions does not ensure that the craftsmanship is sound, effective\\nin resolving any problems that necessitated repairs, or suffi-\\ncient to prevent future problems. And as between the occupant\\nand the landlord, it is the former who will be without heat,\\nwater, a working kitchen, a watertight roof, or a sound\\nstaircase if the repairs or improvements are not made properly.\\nThe occupant and the landlord alike ultimately may suffer the\\neconomic consequences of bad work (a tenant might withhold\\nrent or abandon the lease), but only the occupant actually\\n\\f8 No. 18-3051\\n\\nexperiences the deterioration in living conditions with its\\nattendant hardships and dangers. In the district court’s words,\\n“While resident homeowners will bear the risk of their own\\npoor craftsmanship, building contractors and landlords impose\\nthe risk of faulty construction upon current or future tenants.”\\n331 F. Supp. 3d at 805.\\n Given the material distinctions between occupant owners\\nand landlords, the exception for occupant owners does not\\nmake the ordinance one that discriminates against non-\\nHammond property owners, so as to trigger a presumption of\\ninvalidity. “[L]aws that draw distinctions between entities that\\nare not competitors do not ‘discriminate’ for purposes of the\\ndormant commerce clause.” Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584\\nF.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Town of Southold v. Town of\\nE. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 2007)); see Gen. Motors Corp.\\nv. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298–300, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824–25 (1997).\\nHammond’s ordinance does not impede interstate commerce\\nin the sense that it poses an obstacle to non-residents who wish\\nto invest in Hammond rental properties or imposes a sur-\\ncharge on such non-residents that is not imposed on local,\\nsimilarly-situated investors. Nor does it otherwise impose a\\ndisparate burden on non-Hammond landlords so as to trigger\\nthe Pike analysis. As we have said, the ordinance treats all\\nlandlords the same, regardless of whether they are domiciled\\nin Hammond. Consequently, the law falls into the third\\ncategory, and is subject only to rational basis review.\\n And for the same reasons that occupant homeowners are\\nnot similarly situated to landlords, the license requirement and\\nexemption easily survive deferential review. Hammond has an\\nobvious interest in the safety and habitability of the homes in\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 9\\n\\nwhich its residents live, and the ordinance is a legitimate\\nexercise of its authority to promote that interest. The license\\nrequirement serves to ensure not only that whoever performs\\nthe work, be it the property owner or a contractor, is familiar\\nwith the local code requirements and is therefore capable of\\ncompleting work in a sound manner that complies with those\\nrequirements, but that he lacks a criminal background that\\nmay place the property’s owner or occupant in jeopardy of\\nfraud. Insofar as the exemption for occupant homeowners is\\nconcerned, it is reasonable for the city to think that such\\nhomeowners, who have a keen interest in the adequacy of\\nrepairs and improvements made to their own homes, will also\\nendeavor to comply with all local requirements.\\n III.\\n Hammond’s licensing ordinance does not discriminate\\nbased on the domicile of a homeowner in name or effect and\\nhas the support of a rational basis; it therefore poses no\\nproblem under the dormant commerce clause. The district\\ncourt property granted summary judgment to Hammond.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3875,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4649520,"string":"4,649,520"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Rajesh GUPTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY, LLC, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Rajesh Gupta v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, L"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3584"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Sykes, Brennan, Scudder\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3584\\nRAJESH GUPTA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nMORGAN STANLEY\\nSMITH BARNEY, LLC, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 8375 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\\ncontract formation. After Rajesh Gupta sued his former em-\\nployer Morgan Stanley for discrimination, retaliation, and\\n\\f2 No. 18-3584\\n\\ndefamation, the company moved to compel arbitration.1\\nMorgan Stanley contends Gupta agreed to arbitrate these\\nclaims after he did not opt out of the company’s arbitration\\nagreement. Gupta responds that during his employment he\\nneither saw an arbitration offer nor agreed to arbitrate em-\\nployment-related disputes. The district court sided with\\nMorgan Stanley and sent the parties off to arbitration. Gupta\\nappeals this ruling, and we affirm.\\n I\\n Morgan Stanley hired Gupta as a financial advisor in 2013.\\nUpon joining the company, Gupta signed an employment\\nagreement containing an arbitration clause “agree[ing] to ar-\\nbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy that may arise be-\\ntween you and Morgan Stanley … that is required to be\\narbitrated … pursuant to any arbitration agreement to which\\nyou are a party.” That agreement also contained a merger\\nclause providing:\\n All terms and conditions of your employment\\n with Morgan Stanley are contained in this\\n Agreement and other written agreements be-\\n tween you and Morgan Stanley, and the policies\\n and procedures of the Firm … This writing con-\\n stitutes the entire agreement of the parties with\\n respect to the subject matter recited in this\\n Agreement. This Agreement may be amended\\n only by a writing signed by both you and\\n Morgan Stanley.\\n\\n 1 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC and Morgan Stanley\\n\\nSmith Barney Notes Holdings, FA, which we refer to collectively as\\n“Morgan Stanley” or “the company.”\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 3\\n\\n Among the additional terms and conditions, Morgan Stan-\\nley administered an employee dispute resolution program\\ncalled “CARE,” an acronym for “Convenient Access to Reso-\\nlutions for Employees.” CARE applied to all U.S. employees\\nof Morgan Stanley, and the company posted a “CARE guide-\\nbook” explaining the program on its intranet site for em-\\nployee access.\\n When Gupta joined Morgan Stanley, the CARE program\\ndid not require employees to arbitrate employment discrimi-\\nnation claims. But it did specify that the program’s terms\\n“may change or be discontinued,” and that any such changes\\nwould be “announced in advance” before becoming “equally\\nbinding upon [the employee] and the Firm.” That change\\ncame in 2015, when Morgan Stanley amended its CARE\\nprogram to compel mandatory arbitration for all employ-\\nment-related disputes, including discrimination claims. To\\nannounce the amended program, Morgan Stanley sent an\\nemail to the account of each of its employees in the U.S.\\n Morgan Stanley emailed Gupta the new arbitration agree-\\nment on September 2, 2015. The email’s subject line read “Ex-\\npansion of CARE Arbitration Program,” and the email itself\\nexplained that, effective October 2, 2015, “final and binding\\narbitration” under the new “CARE arbitration program”\\nwould be “mandatory for all employees” unless an employee\\nindividually elected to opt out. The email included links to\\nthe new arbitration agreement and Morgan Stanley’s revised\\nCARE guidebook, and it encouraged employees to “read and\\nunderstand” both documents because “they describe the\\nterms, features and details of this program.” The revised\\nCARE guidebook similarly explained that “employment dis-\\ncrimination claims under … any federal … law (including\\n\\f4 No. 18-3584\\n\\nclaims of harassment and retaliation under those laws) will be\\nresolved by final and binding arbitration.”\\n The final section of the company’s September 2 email to\\nGupta, entitled “Next Steps,” attached a link to the arbitration\\nagreement opt-out form, explained instructions for submit-\\nting that form, and again notified that Gupta had until Octo-\\nber 2, 2015, to decline. The email twice cautioned that, if the\\nemployee did not opt out, continued employment would re-\\nflect that the employee “consented and agreed to the terms”\\nof the arbitration agreement and CARE guidebook. The email\\nconcluded with an assurance that opting out of the arbitration\\nagreement would not adversely affect Gupta’s employment\\nstatus. The one page opt-out form attached to the email prom-\\ninently placed the opt-out deadline in bold capital letters, al-\\nlowed for submission by email, and provided directions if\\nMorgan Stanley failed to confirm the employee’s rejection of\\nmandatory arbitration.\\n Over the next thirty days, Gupta had access via links on\\nthe September 2 email to the arbitration agreement, CARE\\nguidebook, and arbitration opt-out form. During this period,\\nMorgan Stanley also maintained on its intranet page (accessi-\\nble by all Morgan Stanley employees) a reminder notification\\nabout the upcoming expansion to mandatory arbitration and\\nthe deadline to opt out. The reminder encouraged employees\\nto “carefully review the September 2 email from Human Re-\\nsources” and once more instructed that, unless they chose to\\nopt out, continued employment would bind them to the terms\\nof the new arbitration agreement.\\n The October 2015 deadline to opt out came and went.\\nGupta did not submit an opt-out form, respond to the Sep-\\ntember 2 email, or otherwise communicate with human\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 5\\n\\nresources about the mandatory arbitration program. He con-\\ntinued to work at Morgan Stanley for two more years until,\\nhe alleges, the company forced him to resign because of im-\\nminent military leave.2 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley for dis-\\ncrimination and retaliation in violation of the Uniformed\\nServices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38\\nU.S.C. §§ 4301–35, and a related defamation claim.\\n Morgan Stanley moved to compel arbitration under the\\nterms of the 2015 CARE arbitration program and agreement.\\nGupta resisted, asserting he never agreed to arbitrate. He said\\nhe first saw the September 2 email and arbitration agreement\\nwhen Morgan Stanley filed its motion to compel and filed a\\ndeclaration to that effect.3\\n The district court deferred ruling on Morgan Stanley’s mo-\\ntion to compel “pending a trial regarding whether an agree-\\nment to arbitrate exists.” The court agreed with Morgan\\nStanley that Illinois law permits an offeror to construe silence\\nas acceptance if circumstances make it reasonable to do so.\\n\\n 2 In addition to working as a financial advisor, Gupta is a member of\\nthe Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps reserves. He alleges Morgan\\nStanley “effectively terminated” him after he notified the company that he\\nhad been called for six months active duty. Morgan Stanley counters that\\nGupta resigned after the company notified him of an internal investiga-\\ntion into his alleged corporate policy violations; according to Morgan\\nStanley, Gupta recommended insurance products outside of Morgan\\nStanley without prior notice or approval. Gupta’s appeal is limited to the\\ndistrict court’s order compelling arbitration, and neither party asks us to\\nresolve their substantive disputes.\\n 3 Gupta also declared “[a]s an attorney, I am familiar with arbitrations\\n\\nand arbitration clauses … and am cautious to avoid them. … If I had seen\\nany email that referenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it\\nand immediately opted out of the agreement.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-3584\\n\\nBut it treated Gupta’s sworn statement that he had “never\\nseen” the September 2 email as a denial that he received the\\nemail, not simply a denial that he read it. At that point, the\\ncourt found Morgan Stanley had not reliably demonstrated\\nthat Gupta had received the email. Because Gupta said\\nMorgan Stanley never sent him an offer, the court reasoned,\\n“there [was] a genuine dispute about the existence of an\\nagreement to arbitrate.” See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“If the making of the\\narbitration agreement … be in issue, the court shall proceed\\nsummarily to the trial thereof.”). After the parties’ submitted\\npretrial evidence, however, Gupta could no longer dispute he\\nreceived the September 2 email in his work email account. As\\na result, he stipulated “that the email arrived at his in-box,”\\nbut he maintains he first saw the email only after this lawsuit\\nwas filed.\\n With Gupta’s stipulation, the district court concluded no\\ngenuine dispute of material fact required a trial. The court\\nfound that Gupta’s receipt of the September 2 email, com-\\nbined with his continued employment and failure to opt out\\nof mandatory arbitration, gave rise to an agreement to arbi-\\ntrate. So the court granted Morgan Stanley’s motion to compel\\narbitration and stayed the litigation. The district court certi-\\nfied its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1292(b), which we agreed to accept.\\n II\\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\\ncompel arbitration. A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 885 F.3d\\n1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Gupta’s appeal implicates the Federal Arbitration Act,\\nwhich reflects “both a liberal federal policy favoring\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 7\\n\\narbitration … and the fundamental principle that arbitration\\nis a matter of contract.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563\\nU.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citations omitted). Specifically, the act\\nmandates enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. 9\\nU.S.C. §§ 2, 4. Although it requires arbitration agreements to\\nbe in writing, it does not require them to be signed. Id. § 3;\\nTinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002). The\\nact also extends to employment contracts. Circuit City Stores,\\nInc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001). Even still, courts\\ncannot require a party to submit a dispute to arbitration un-\\nless he has agreed to do so. See A.D. v. Credit One Bank, 885\\nF.3d at 1060 (citations omitted); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local\\n2150 v. NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d 592, 594 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (citations omitted) (holding a party seeking arbitra-\\ntion must present a claim that is, “on its face,” governed by an\\narbitration clause).\\n Against this backdrop, we must resolve whether a valid\\nagreement to arbitrate exists between Gupta and Morgan\\nStanley. If yes, we consider whether Gupta’s claims fall within\\nthe scope of that agreement. We apply state-law principles of\\ncontract formation to answer these questions. Gore v. Alltel\\nCommc’ns, LLC, 666 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2012). “Our role\\nin interpreting a question of state law is to predict how the\\nhighest court of the state would answer the question.” Cannon\\nv. Burge, 752 F.3d 1079, 1091 (7th Cir. 2014). “In the absence of\\nguiding decisions by the state’s highest court, we consult and\\nfollow the decisions of intermediate appellate courts unless\\nthere is a convincing reason to predict the state’s highest court\\nwould disagree.” ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire\\nProt. Dist., 672 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n\\f8 No. 18-3584\\n\\n The parties agree Illinois contract law governs this law-\\nsuit. But they dispute whether an agreement exists at all un-\\nder Illinois law, which “requires only a manifestation of\\nmutual assent on the part of two or more persons.” Zabinsky\\nv. Gelber Grp., Inc., 807 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (cit-\\ning RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981)).\\n When, as here, a “case concerns the application of the Fed-\\neral Arbitration Act,” the Illinois Supreme Court has “base[d]\\n[its] analysis upon principles of fundamental contract law” to\\ndetermine the formation of an agreement. Melena v. Anheuser-\\nBusch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 103, 107 (2006). The court “appl[ies]\\ngeneral contract doctrines” because “that approach is more\\nfaithful to the [act].” Id. at 107–08. Applying these principles,\\nwe start by evaluating the standard we must use under Illi-\\nnois law to ascertain the parties’ manifestation of mutual as-\\nsent (the proverbial meeting of the minds). After that, we\\nconsider the elements of contract formation and whether they\\nexist here to create an enforceable arbitration agreement.\\n A\\n Illinois courts evaluate contract formation under an objec-\\ntive theory. Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1034\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (Illinois law) (citations omitted); Vill. of S. Elgin\\nv. Waste Mgmt. of Illinois, Inc., 810 N.E.2d 658, 670 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n2004) (“‘Intent’ refers to the objective manifestations of intent\\nin the words of the contract and the actions of the parties\\n… .”); J.F. McKinney & Assocs., Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Inv. Corp., 183\\nF.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Illinois uses an objective theory\\nof contract … .”) (citations omitted).\\n Judge Learned Hand famously explained the objective\\ntheory of contract: “A contract has … nothing to do with the\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 9\\n\\npersonal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an\\nobligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of\\nthe parties … which ordinarily accompany and represent a\\nknown intent.” Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of New York, 200 F.\\n287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, Ernst v. Mechanics’ & Metals Nat.\\nBank of City of New York, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d, Nat’l\\nCity Bank of New York v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). “Under\\nthe objective theory, intent to manifest assent in Illinois is re-\\nvealed by ‘outward expressions such as words and acts.’”\\nSgouros, 817 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Bank Computer Network\\nCorp. v. Cont’l Illinois Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago, 442 N.E.2d\\n586, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)). “Intent … does not encompass\\none party’s … purely subjective understandings of which the\\nother party is unaware.” Vill. of S. Elgin, 810 N.E.2d at 670. We\\nevaluate these outward expressions through the lens of an ob-\\njectively reasonable person. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank,\\nN.A., 673 F.3d 547, 563 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying “objectively\\nreasonable person” standard to determine validity of contract\\noffer under Illinois law); Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293–94 (holding\\nacts or words must be “reasonably interpreted” as they would\\nby “ordinary men” and that “whatever was the understand-\\ning” of the parties “is of not the slightest consequence”); see\\nalso Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and\\nContractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 858 (1992) (explaining\\nthat the “objective theory of assent” holds persons to the rea-\\nsonable or normal meaning that their conduct conveys to oth-\\ners). So the parties’ objective conduct, not their subjective\\nintent, determines whether Gupta agreed to mandatory arbi-\\ntration.\\n Gupta contends the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in\\nMelena, 847 N.E.2d 99, requires an employee to have “actual\\nknowledge of an offer” and “a general understanding that a\\n\\f10 No. 18-3584\\n\\nbinding agreement or contract has been entered into.” We do\\nnot read Melena to create these requirements. In Melena the\\nIllinois Supreme Court recognized “that state … court deci-\\nsions cannot hold arbitration agreements to a standard any\\ndifferent or higher than those applicable to other contracts in\\ngeneral.” Id. at 108. On this ground, the court rejected a\\n“knowing and voluntary standard” because it “raise[s] arbi-\\ntration agreements to an elevated status not contemplated by\\nthe [act]” and “means much more than a general understanding\\nthat a binding agreement or contract is being entered into.”\\nId. (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotations omit-\\nted).4\\n Gupta’s reliance on Melena rests entirely on the Illinois Su-\\npreme Court’s use of the phrase “general understanding.” He\\ninterprets that reference to mean contract formation is impos-\\nsible if the offeree lacks a “general understanding” that a con-\\ntract is being formed. He interprets “general understanding”\\nto mean “actual knowledge.” But this interpretation relies on\\nthe subjective intent of the parties, and Illinois uses an objec-\\ntive theory. No part of Melena’s holding or its phrasing allows\\ncourts to consider subjective intent to evaluate the existence\\nof a contract. Rather, Melena is consistent with an objective ap-\\nproach, emphasizing the employee’s conduct—receipt of the\\nemployer’s agreement, and performance consistent with the\\nagreement’s terms—not the employee’s intent. 847 N.E.2d at\\n109.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 The Appellate Court of Illinois had held an agreement to arbitrate\\nclaims must be entered into knowingly and voluntarily to be enforceable.\\nMelena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 826, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004),\\nrev’d, 847 N.E.2d 99 (2006).\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 11\\n\\n Because the parties’ objective conduct governs our evalu-\\nation—not any one party’s “general understanding” or “ac-\\ntual knowledge”—we consider whether an enforceable\\nagreement exists here.\\n B\\n “In Illinois, an offer, an acceptance and consideration are\\nthe basic ingredients of a contract.” Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109.\\nGupta does not dispute that the September 2 email qualifies\\nas an offer, nor does he challenge that continued employment\\nconstitutes consideration.5 Instead, Gupta argues he never ac-\\ncepted the offer.\\n Although Gupta acknowledges that Morgan Stanley de-\\nlivered its arbitration offer to his work email, he argues “an\\nemployer cannot form a contract by an employee’s silence\\nsimply by proving email delivery of an offer and a failure to\\nopt out.“ The critical question, then, is whether Gupta’s si-\\nlence and inaction in the face of Morgan Stanley’s September\\n2 email constitute acceptance of its proposed arbitration\\nagreement.\\n “‘[A] party named in a contract may, by his acts and con-\\nduct, indicate his assent to its terms and become bound by its\\nprovisions even though he has not signed it.’” Bauer v. Qwest\\nCommc’ns Co., LLC, 743 F.3d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 2014) (interpret-\\ning Illinois law) (quoting Carlton at the Lake, Inc. v. Barber, 928\\nN.E.2d 1266, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)); Landmark Properties, Inc.\\n\\n 5 Gupta’s concessions on these elements are sensible. See Melena, 847\\nN.E.2d at 109 (holding that the employer’s postal mailing of program-re-\\nlated materials to its employees constituted a valid offer and that “contin-\\nued employment is sufficient consideration for the enforcement of\\nemployment agreements”).\\n\\f12 No. 18-3584\\n\\nv. Architects Int’l-Chicago, 526 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n1988) (holding same). As a corollary, an offeror may construe\\nsilence as acceptance if the circumstances make it reasonable\\nto do so. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Atl. Tele-Network Co., 946\\nF.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Illinois law). For ex-\\nample, “[s]ilence may be construed as acceptance where ‘be-\\ncause of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that\\nthe offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to\\naccept.’” Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT\\n(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(1)(c) (1981)); Ragan v. AT & T\\nCorp., 824 N.E.2d 1183, 1188–89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding\\nplaintiffs’ silence and inaction upon receipt of mailed agree-\\nment for telephone services, and their use of those services,\\nconstituted acceptance of arbitration clause within agree-\\nment); Fineman v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS\\n§ 69(1)(c)).\\n In the same vein, the relationship between parties may jus-\\ntify the offeror expecting a reply, and thus assuming that si-\\nlence is assent to its proposal. See 2 Williston on Contracts § 6:50\\n(4th ed. 2007); 1 Corbin on Contracts § 3:18 (rev. ed. 2018) (“Of-\\nten … silence coupled with … expectations engendered by a\\nprior relationship can reasonably be understood by the offe-\\nror as an acceptance.”); see also Rivera-Colon v. AT&T Mobility\\nPuerto Rico, Inc., 913 F.3d 200, 213–14 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding\\nemployee’s silence operated as acceptance of employer’s ar-\\nbitration agreement transmitted by email); Circuit City Stores,\\nInc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding em-\\nployee’s failure to opt out of employer’s dispute resolution\\nagreement manifested consent to arbitration under that\\nagreement).\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 13\\n\\n The pre-2015 CARE program explicitly stated its terms\\nwere subject to change after an “announce[ment] in advance,”\\nso Gupta had to keep abreast of the company’s dispute reso-\\nlution policies upon announcement. Morgan Stanley emailed\\nthe arbitration policy changes to Gupta personally, granted\\nhim thirty days to review the new arbitration agreement, cir-\\nculated an opt-out form, conspicuously displayed the dead-\\nline to opt out, posted a continual company intranet reminder\\nof the new arbitration policy and opt-out date, and repeatedly\\ninformed that it would construe silence as acceptance of man-\\ndatory arbitration. All these actions bolstered the company’s\\nexpectation of a response.\\n Gupta worked for Morgan Stanley for four years. That em-\\nployment included regular email communication, and justi-\\nfied Morgan Stanley’s expectation of a reply, and its\\nassumption that Gupta’s silence indicated his acceptance of\\nmandatory arbitration. This case does not present an unsolic-\\nited offer-by-email from a stranger when the expectation of\\nthe offeree’s response is rare, if not baseless. Instead, employ-\\nment includes the understanding that employees will act with\\ndiligence in following an employer’s instructions and\\nresponding to requests, whether transmitted by email or an-\\nother reasonable mode of communication. Here, Gupta sub-\\nmits no evidence, policy, or prior course of dealings from\\nwhich we can infer that Gupta was free as an employee to ig-\\nnore Morgan Stanley’s communications without repercus-\\nsion.\\n Instead, Gupta argues Morgan Stanley failed to provide\\nenough notice to trigger his response, pointing to Campbell v.\\nGen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005). In\\nCampbell, an employer sent a companywide email\\n\\f14 No. 18-3584\\n\\nannouncing the implementation of a new dispute resolution\\npolicy. Id. at 547–48. Yet the employer’s email failed to men-\\ntion several crucial facts about the policy: that it contained an\\nagreement to arbitrate and contractually binding terms;\\ntreated continued employment as an acceptance of those\\nterms; and resulted in a waiver of an employee’s access to a\\njudicial forum. Id. at 547–48, 557–58. For those reasons, the\\ncourt held the employer’s email failed to provide “minimally\\nsufficient notice” of a contractual modification. Id. at 557, 559.\\n But unlike in Campbell, Morgan Stanley’s September 2\\nemail to Gupta mentioned the new “arbitration agreement”\\neight times; explained that arbitration would become the ex-\\nclusive forum for covered claims; informed that he was free\\nto opt out without consequence; instructed if he did not elect\\nto opt out that continued employment would be construed as\\nacceptance; and, in the agreement itself, explained in bold and\\ncapitalized words that the parties were “giving up [their]\\nright to a jury trial in any forum.” Even more, Gupta attested\\nto the clarity of Morgan Stanley’s email when he declared un-\\nder oath, “[a]s an attorney … [i]f I had seen [the] email that\\nreferenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it and\\nimmediately opted out.” Given these differences, Campbell\\ndoes not offer Gupta a lifeline.\\n The conduct of Morgan Stanley and Gupta indicated mu-\\ntual assent to mandatory arbitration. See Zabinsky, 807 N.E.2d\\nat 671. Morgan Stanley reasonably construed Gupta’s silence\\nas acceptance of the arbitration agreement after he was given\\na clear offer, a reasonable opportunity to opt-out, and re-\\npeated instructions that silence and continued employment\\nreflected acceptance. See Ragan, 824 N.E.2d at 1188–89 (hold-\\ning silence reflected acceptance of arbitration agreement\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 15\\n\\nwhere plaintiff “had a reasonable opportunity to reject the of-\\nfer but failed to do so”); see also Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309\\nF.3d 404, 415 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding same under Illinois law).\\nSimilarly, the parties’ employment relationship made it rea-\\nsonable to expect Gupta would notify Morgan Stanley if he\\nintended to decline its offer, as well as that silence would\\nconvey acceptance. Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228. When, as here, “in-\\naction is indistinguishable from overt acceptance,” Najd, 294\\nF.3d at 1109, we may infer the parties have agreed. For these\\nreasons, we conclude the district court reasonably construed\\nGupta’s silence and continued employment as assent to the\\narbitration agreement.\\n The next question is whether that agreement covers\\nGupta’s claims for discrimination, retaliation, and defama-\\ntion. It does: § 2 of the arbitration agreement expressly desig-\\nnates each of these charges as a “covered claim.” Because\\nGupta’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration\\nagreement, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d at 594,\\nthe district court did not err in compelling the parties to arbi-\\ntrate those claims.\\n As a final line of defense, Gupta contends his employment\\nagreement prohibits Morgan Stanley from requiring manda-\\ntory arbitration without his written consent. This argument\\nfails to acknowledge that Gupta’s employment agreement\\nand the CARE arbitration program are separate, free-standing\\nagreements. No version of Morgan Stanley’s CARE program,\\nbefore or after 2015, required a signed agreement. So unless\\nthe employment agreement incorporated the terms of the\\nCARE arbitration program, no signature was needed to mod-\\nify that program, as Gupta claims.\\n\\f16 No. 18-3584\\n\\n As we relayed earlier, Gupta’s employment agreement\\ncontained a merger clause. “The presence of a merger clause\\nis strong evidence that the parties intended the writing to be\\nthe complete and exclusive agreement between them.”\\nRosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 665 (7th Cir.\\n2002) (interpreting Illinois law) (citations omitted). That the\\nparties here intended to exclude “other written agreements”\\nand “policies and procedures of the Firm” is supported by the\\nmerger clause’s proviso “[t]his writing constitutes the entire\\nagreement … with respect to the subject matter recited in this\\nAgreement.” It also provides“[t]his Agreement” requires a\\nwriting signed by the parties to amend terms.\\n “Mere reference to another contract or document is not\\nsufficient to incorporate its terms into a contract.” Id. at 666.\\nInstead, “there must be an express intent to incorporate,” id.,\\nand there is no such expression here. A fair reading of the\\nmerger clause supports that it references “other” agreements\\nand policies to “assure[] the continued vitality” of those in-\\nstruments, each of which are “necessary, but self-contained”\\nagreements in Gupta’s employment relationship. Id. at 663,\\n665. Gupta’s employment agreement is not susceptible to an\\ninterpretation that it incorporated the terms of the CARE ar-\\nbitration program, such that any modification to the program\\nneeded Gupta’s sign off.\\n Last, Gupta claims the parties had a “course of dealing”\\nrequiring him to initial “each and every paragraph” of any\\nagreement between them. But the record does not support\\nthis conclusion. Gupta entered several agreements with\\nMorgan Stanley, including for a $1.5 million loan. Yet he\\npoints to only one contract, his employment agreement, to\\nprove a “course of dealing.” Even putting this imbalance\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 17\\n\\naside, Gupta fails to acknowledge that the source of his arbi-\\ntration obligation, the CARE program, specified its terms\\n“may change or be discontinued” after an “announce[ment]\\nin advance” before becoming “equally binding upon [the\\nemployee] and the Firm.” No version of the CARE program\\nrequires employees to initial policy modifications before tak-\\ning effect. So here the absence of initialing poses no problems.\\n The employment agreement is relevant in another key re-\\nspect: its arbitration clause requires Gupta to honor any arbi-\\ntration agreement with Morgan Stanley. A valid arbitration\\nagreement exists that covers Gupta’s claims, so the district\\ncourt correctly compelled those claims to arbitration.\\n III\\n Because this case meets all three requirements to compel\\narbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act—a written\\nagreement to arbitrate, a dispute within the scope of the arbi-\\ntration agreement, and a refusal to arbitrate—the district\\ncourt correctly compelled arbitration, and its judgment is\\nAFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426773/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649520/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Rajesh GUPTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY, LLC, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3584\nRAJESH GUPTA,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nMORGAN STANLEY\nSMITH BARNEY, LLC, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 8375 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before SYKES, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\ncontract formation. After Rajesh Gupta sued his former em-\nployer Morgan Stanley for discrimination, retaliation, and\n\f2 No. 18-3584\n\ndefamation, the company moved to compel arbitration.1\nMorgan Stanley contends Gupta agreed to arbitrate these\nclaims after he did not opt out of the company’s arbitration\nagreement. Gupta responds that during his employment he\nneither saw an arbitration offer nor agreed to arbitrate em-\nployment-related disputes. The district court sided with\nMorgan Stanley and sent the parties off to arbitration. Gupta\nappeals this ruling, and we affirm.\n I\n Morgan Stanley hired Gupta as a financial advisor in 2013.\nUpon joining the company, Gupta signed an employment\nagreement containing an arbitration clause “agree[ing] to ar-\nbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy that may arise be-\ntween you and Morgan Stanley … that is required to be\narbitrated … pursuant to any arbitration agreement to which\nyou are a party.” That agreement also contained a merger\nclause providing:\n All terms and conditions of your employment\n with Morgan Stanley are contained in this\n Agreement and other written agreements be-\n tween you and Morgan Stanley, and the policies\n and procedures of the Firm … This writing con-\n stitutes the entire agreement of the parties with\n respect to the subject matter recited in this\n Agreement. This Agreement may be amended\n only by a writing signed by both you and\n Morgan Stanley.\n\n 1 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC and Morgan Stanley\n\nSmith Barney Notes Holdings, FA, which we refer to collectively as\n“Morgan Stanley” or “the company.”\n\fNo. 18-3584 3\n\n Among the additional terms and conditions, Morgan Stan-\nley administered an employee dispute resolution program\ncalled “CARE,” an acronym for “Convenient Access to Reso-\nlutions for Employees.” CARE applied to all U.S. employees\nof Morgan Stanley, and the company posted a “CARE guide-\nbook” explaining the program on its intranet site for em-\nployee access.\n When Gupta joined Morgan Stanley, the CARE program\ndid not require employees to arbitrate employment discrimi-\nnation claims. But it did specify that the program’s terms\n“may change or be discontinued,” and that any such changes\nwould be “announced in advance” before becoming “equally\nbinding upon [the employee] and the Firm.” That change\ncame in 2015, when Morgan Stanley amended its CARE\nprogram to compel mandatory arbitration for all employ-\nment-related disputes, including discrimination claims. To\nannounce the amended program, Morgan Stanley sent an\nemail to the account of each of its employees in the U.S.\n Morgan Stanley emailed Gupta the new arbitration agree-\nment on September 2, 2015. The email’s subject line read “Ex-\npansion of CARE Arbitration Program,” and the email itself\nexplained that, effective October 2, 2015, “final and binding\narbitration” under the new “CARE arbitration program”\nwould be “mandatory for all employees” unless an employee\nindividually elected to opt out. The email included links to\nthe new arbitration agreement and Morgan Stanley’s revised\nCARE guidebook, and it encouraged employees to “read and\nunderstand” both documents because “they describe the\nterms, features and details of this program.” The revised\nCARE guidebook similarly explained that “employment dis-\ncrimination claims under … any federal … law (including\n\f4 No. 18-3584\n\nclaims of harassment and retaliation under those laws) will be\nresolved by final and binding arbitration.”\n The final section of the company’s September 2 email to\nGupta, entitled “Next Steps,” attached a link to the arbitration\nagreement opt-out form, explained instructions for submit-\nting that form, and again notified that Gupta had until Octo-\nber 2, 2015, to decline. The email twice cautioned that, if the\nemployee did not opt out, continued employment would re-\nflect that the employee “consented and agreed to the terms”\nof the arbitration agreement and CARE guidebook. The email\nconcluded with an assurance that opting out of the arbitration\nagreement would not adversely affect Gupta’s employment\nstatus. The one page opt-out form attached to the email prom-\ninently placed the opt-out deadline in bold capital letters, al-\nlowed for submission by email, and provided directions if\nMorgan Stanley failed to confirm the employee’s rejection of\nmandatory arbitration.\n Over the next thirty days, Gupta had access via links on\nthe September 2 email to the arbitration agreement, CARE\nguidebook, and arbitration opt-out form. During this period,\nMorgan Stanley also maintained on its intranet page (accessi-\nble by all Morgan Stanley employees) a reminder notification\nabout the upcoming expansion to mandatory arbitration and\nthe deadline to opt out. The reminder encouraged employees\nto “carefully review the September 2 email from Human Re-\nsources” and once more instructed that, unless they chose to\nopt out, continued employment would bind them to the terms\nof the new arbitration agreement.\n The October 2015 deadline to opt out came and went.\nGupta did not submit an opt-out form, respond to the Sep-\ntember 2 email, or otherwise communicate with human\n\fNo. 18-3584 5\n\nresources about the mandatory arbitration program. He con-\ntinued to work at Morgan Stanley for two more years until,\nhe alleges, the company forced him to resign because of im-\nminent military leave.2 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley for dis-\ncrimination and retaliation in violation of the Uniformed\nServices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38\nU.S.C. §§ 4301–35, and a related defamation claim.\n Morgan Stanley moved to compel arbitration under the\nterms of the 2015 CARE arbitration program and agreement.\nGupta resisted, asserting he never agreed to arbitrate. He said\nhe first saw the September 2 email and arbitration agreement\nwhen Morgan Stanley filed its motion to compel and filed a\ndeclaration to that effect.3\n The district court deferred ruling on Morgan Stanley’s mo-\ntion to compel “pending a trial regarding whether an agree-\nment to arbitrate exists.” The court agreed with Morgan\nStanley that Illinois law permits an offeror to construe silence\nas acceptance if circumstances make it reasonable to do so.\n\n 2 In addition to working as a financial advisor, Gupta is a member of\nthe Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps reserves. He alleges Morgan\nStanley “effectively terminated” him after he notified the company that he\nhad been called for six months active duty. Morgan Stanley counters that\nGupta resigned after the company notified him of an internal investiga-\ntion into his alleged corporate policy violations; according to Morgan\nStanley, Gupta recommended insurance products outside of Morgan\nStanley without prior notice or approval. Gupta’s appeal is limited to the\ndistrict court’s order compelling arbitration, and neither party asks us to\nresolve their substantive disputes.\n 3 Gupta also declared “[a]s an attorney, I am familiar with arbitrations\n\nand arbitration clauses … and am cautious to avoid them. … If I had seen\nany email that referenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it\nand immediately opted out of the agreement.”\n\f6 No. 18-3584\n\nBut it treated Gupta’s sworn statement that he had “never\nseen” the September 2 email as a denial that he received the\nemail, not simply a denial that he read it. At that point, the\ncourt found Morgan Stanley had not reliably demonstrated\nthat Gupta had received the email. Because Gupta said\nMorgan Stanley never sent him an offer, the court reasoned,\n“there [was] a genuine dispute about the existence of an\nagreement to arbitrate.” See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“If the making of the\narbitration agreement … be in issue, the court shall proceed\nsummarily to the trial thereof.”). After the parties’ submitted\npretrial evidence, however, Gupta could no longer dispute he\nreceived the September 2 email in his work email account. As\na result, he stipulated “that the email arrived at his in-box,”\nbut he maintains he first saw the email only after this lawsuit\nwas filed.\n With Gupta’s stipulation, the district court concluded no\ngenuine dispute of material fact required a trial. The court\nfound that Gupta’s receipt of the September 2 email, com-\nbined with his continued employment and failure to opt out\nof mandatory arbitration, gave rise to an agreement to arbi-\ntrate. So the court granted Morgan Stanley’s motion to compel\narbitration and stayed the litigation. The district court certi-\nfied its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1292(b), which we agreed to accept.\n II\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\ncompel arbitration. A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 885 F.3d\n1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 2018).\n Gupta’s appeal implicates the Federal Arbitration Act,\nwhich reflects “both a liberal federal policy favoring\n\fNo. 18-3584 7\n\narbitration … and the fundamental principle that arbitration\nis a matter of contract.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563\nU.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citations omitted). Specifically, the act\nmandates enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. 9\nU.S.C. §§ 2, 4. Although it requires arbitration agreements to\nbe in writing, it does not require them to be signed. Id. § 3;\nTinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002). The\nact also extends to employment contracts. Circuit City Stores,\nInc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001). Even still, courts\ncannot require a party to submit a dispute to arbitration un-\nless he has agreed to do so. See A.D. v. Credit One Bank, 885\nF.3d at 1060 (citations omitted); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local\n2150 v. NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d 592, 594 (7th\nCir. 2014) (citations omitted) (holding a party seeking arbitra-\ntion must present a claim that is, “on its face,” governed by an\narbitration clause).\n Against this backdrop, we must resolve whether a valid\nagreement to arbitrate exists between Gupta and Morgan\nStanley. If yes, we consider whether Gupta’s claims fall within\nthe scope of that agreement. We apply state-law principles of\ncontract formation to answer these questions. Gore v. Alltel\nCommc’ns, LLC, 666 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2012). “Our role\nin interpreting a question of state law is to predict how the\nhighest court of the state would answer the question.” Cannon\nv. Burge, 752 F.3d 1079, 1091 (7th Cir. 2014). “In the absence of\nguiding decisions by the state’s highest court, we consult and\nfollow the decisions of intermediate appellate courts unless\nthere is a convincing reason to predict the state’s highest court\nwould disagree.” ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire\nProt. Dist., 672 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2012).\n\f8 No. 18-3584\n\n The parties agree Illinois contract law governs this law-\nsuit. But they dispute whether an agreement exists at all un-\nder Illinois law, which “requires only a manifestation of\nmutual assent on the part of two or more persons.” Zabinsky\nv. Gelber Grp., Inc., 807 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (cit-\ning RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981)).\n When, as here, a “case concerns the application of the Fed-\neral Arbitration Act,” the Illinois Supreme Court has “base[d]\n[its] analysis upon principles of fundamental contract law” to\ndetermine the formation of an agreement. Melena v. Anheuser-\nBusch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 103, 107 (2006). The court “appl[ies]\ngeneral contract doctrines” because “that approach is more\nfaithful to the [act].” Id. at 107–08. Applying these principles,\nwe start by evaluating the standard we must use under Illi-\nnois law to ascertain the parties’ manifestation of mutual as-\nsent (the proverbial meeting of the minds). After that, we\nconsider the elements of contract formation and whether they\nexist here to create an enforceable arbitration agreement.\n A\n Illinois courts evaluate contract formation under an objec-\ntive theory. Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1034\n(7th Cir. 2016) (Illinois law) (citations omitted); Vill. of S. Elgin\nv. Waste Mgmt. of Illinois, Inc., 810 N.E.2d 658, 670 (Ill. App. Ct.\n2004) (“‘Intent’ refers to the objective manifestations of intent\nin the words of the contract and the actions of the parties\n… .”); J.F. McKinney & Assocs., Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Inv. Corp., 183\nF.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Illinois uses an objective theory\nof contract … .”) (citations omitted).\n Judge Learned Hand famously explained the objective\ntheory of contract: “A contract has … nothing to do with the\n\fNo. 18-3584 9\n\npersonal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an\nobligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of\nthe parties … which ordinarily accompany and represent a\nknown intent.” Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of New York, 200 F.\n287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, Ernst v. Mechanics’ & Metals Nat.\nBank of City of New York, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d, Nat’l\nCity Bank of New York v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). “Under\nthe objective theory, intent to manifest assent in Illinois is re-\nvealed by ‘outward expressions such as words and acts.’”\nSgouros, 817 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Bank Computer Network\nCorp. v. Cont’l Illinois Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago, 442 N.E.2d\n586, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)). “Intent … does not encompass\none party’s … purely subjective understandings of which the\nother party is unaware.” Vill. of S. Elgin, 810 N.E.2d at 670. We\nevaluate these outward expressions through the lens of an ob-\njectively reasonable person. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank,\nN.A., 673 F.3d 547, 563 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying “objectively\nreasonable person” standard to determine validity of contract\noffer under Illinois law); Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293–94 (holding\nacts or words must be “reasonably interpreted” as they would\nby “ordinary men” and that “whatever was the understand-\ning” of the parties “is of not the slightest consequence”); see\nalso Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and\nContractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 858 (1992) (explaining\nthat the “objective theory of assent” holds persons to the rea-\nsonable or normal meaning that their conduct conveys to oth-\ners). So the parties’ objective conduct, not their subjective\nintent, determines whether Gupta agreed to mandatory arbi-\ntration.\n Gupta contends the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in\nMelena, 847 N.E.2d 99, requires an employee to have “actual\nknowledge of an offer” and “a general understanding that a\n\f10 No. 18-3584\n\nbinding agreement or contract has been entered into.” We do\nnot read Melena to create these requirements. In Melena the\nIllinois Supreme Court recognized “that state … court deci-\nsions cannot hold arbitration agreements to a standard any\ndifferent or higher than those applicable to other contracts in\ngeneral.” Id. at 108. On this ground, the court rejected a\n“knowing and voluntary standard” because it “raise[s] arbi-\ntration agreements to an elevated status not contemplated by\nthe [act]” and “means much more than a general understanding\nthat a binding agreement or contract is being entered into.”\nId. (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotations omit-\nted).4\n Gupta’s reliance on Melena rests entirely on the Illinois Su-\npreme Court’s use of the phrase “general understanding.” He\ninterprets that reference to mean contract formation is impos-\nsible if the offeree lacks a “general understanding” that a con-\ntract is being formed. He interprets “general understanding”\nto mean “actual knowledge.” But this interpretation relies on\nthe subjective intent of the parties, and Illinois uses an objec-\ntive theory. No part of Melena’s holding or its phrasing allows\ncourts to consider subjective intent to evaluate the existence\nof a contract. Rather, Melena is consistent with an objective ap-\nproach, emphasizing the employee’s conduct—receipt of the\nemployer’s agreement, and performance consistent with the\nagreement’s terms—not the employee’s intent. 847 N.E.2d at\n109.\n\n\n\n 4 The Appellate Court of Illinois had held an agreement to arbitrate\nclaims must be entered into knowingly and voluntarily to be enforceable.\nMelena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 826, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004),\nrev’d, 847 N.E.2d 99 (2006).\n\fNo. 18-3584 11\n\n Because the parties’ objective conduct governs our evalu-\nation—not any one party’s “general understanding” or “ac-\ntual knowledge”—we consider whether an enforceable\nagreement exists here.\n B\n “In Illinois, an offer, an acceptance and consideration are\nthe basic ingredients of a contract.” Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109.\nGupta does not dispute that the September 2 email qualifies\nas an offer, nor does he challenge that continued employment\nconstitutes consideration.5 Instead, Gupta argues he never ac-\ncepted the offer.\n Although Gupta acknowledges that Morgan Stanley de-\nlivered its arbitration offer to his work email, he argues “an\nemployer cannot form a contract by an employee’s silence\nsimply by proving email delivery of an offer and a failure to\nopt out.“ The critical question, then, is whether Gupta’s si-\nlence and inaction in the face of Morgan Stanley’s September\n2 email constitute acceptance of its proposed arbitration\nagreement.\n “‘[A] party named in a contract may, by his acts and con-\nduct, indicate his assent to its terms and become bound by its\nprovisions even though he has not signed it.’” Bauer v. Qwest\nCommc’ns Co., LLC, 743 F.3d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 2014) (interpret-\ning Illinois law) (quoting Carlton at the Lake, Inc. v. Barber, 928\nN.E.2d 1266, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)); Landmark Properties, Inc.\n\n 5 Gupta’s concessions on these elements are sensible. See Melena, 847\nN.E.2d at 109 (holding that the employer’s postal mailing of program-re-\nlated materials to its employees constituted a valid offer and that “contin-\nued employment is sufficient consideration for the enforcement of\nemployment agreements”).\n\f12 No. 18-3584\n\nv. Architects Int’l-Chicago, 526 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ill. App. Ct.\n1988) (holding same). As a corollary, an offeror may construe\nsilence as acceptance if the circumstances make it reasonable\nto do so. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Atl. Tele-Network Co., 946\nF.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Illinois law). For ex-\nample, “[s]ilence may be construed as acceptance where ‘be-\ncause of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that\nthe offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to\naccept.’” Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT\n(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(1)(c) (1981)); Ragan v. AT & T\nCorp., 824 N.E.2d 1183, 1188–89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding\nplaintiffs’ silence and inaction upon receipt of mailed agree-\nment for telephone services, and their use of those services,\nconstituted acceptance of arbitration clause within agree-\nment); Fineman v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ill.\nApp. Ct. 1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS\n§ 69(1)(c)).\n In the same vein, the relationship between parties may jus-\ntify the offeror expecting a reply, and thus assuming that si-\nlence is assent to its proposal. See 2 Williston on Contracts § 6:50\n(4th ed. 2007); 1 Corbin on Contracts § 3:18 (rev. ed. 2018) (“Of-\nten … silence coupled with … expectations engendered by a\nprior relationship can reasonably be understood by the offe-\nror as an acceptance.”); see also Rivera-Colon v. AT&T Mobility\nPuerto Rico, Inc., 913 F.3d 200, 213–14 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding\nemployee’s silence operated as acceptance of employer’s ar-\nbitration agreement transmitted by email); Circuit City Stores,\nInc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding em-\nployee’s failure to opt out of employer’s dispute resolution\nagreement manifested consent to arbitration under that\nagreement).\n\fNo. 18-3584 13\n\n The pre-2015 CARE program explicitly stated its terms\nwere subject to change after an “announce[ment] in advance,”\nso Gupta had to keep abreast of the company’s dispute reso-\nlution policies upon announcement. Morgan Stanley emailed\nthe arbitration policy changes to Gupta personally, granted\nhim thirty days to review the new arbitration agreement, cir-\nculated an opt-out form, conspicuously displayed the dead-\nline to opt out, posted a continual company intranet reminder\nof the new arbitration policy and opt-out date, and repeatedly\ninformed that it would construe silence as acceptance of man-\ndatory arbitration. All these actions bolstered the company’s\nexpectation of a response.\n Gupta worked for Morgan Stanley for four years. That em-\nployment included regular email communication, and justi-\nfied Morgan Stanley’s expectation of a reply, and its\nassumption that Gupta’s silence indicated his acceptance of\nmandatory arbitration. This case does not present an unsolic-\nited offer-by-email from a stranger when the expectation of\nthe offeree’s response is rare, if not baseless. Instead, employ-\nment includes the understanding that employees will act with\ndiligence in following an employer’s instructions and\nresponding to requests, whether transmitted by email or an-\nother reasonable mode of communication. Here, Gupta sub-\nmits no evidence, policy, or prior course of dealings from\nwhich we can infer that Gupta was free as an employee to ig-\nnore Morgan Stanley’s communications without repercus-\nsion.\n Instead, Gupta argues Morgan Stanley failed to provide\nenough notice to trigger his response, pointing to Campbell v.\nGen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005). In\nCampbell, an employer sent a companywide email\n\f14 No. 18-3584\n\nannouncing the implementation of a new dispute resolution\npolicy. Id. at 547–48. Yet the employer’s email failed to men-\ntion several crucial facts about the policy: that it contained an\nagreement to arbitrate and contractually binding terms;\ntreated continued employment as an acceptance of those\nterms; and resulted in a waiver of an employee’s access to a\njudicial forum. Id. at 547–48, 557–58. For those reasons, the\ncourt held the employer’s email failed to provide “minimally\nsufficient notice” of a contractual modification. Id. at 557, 559.\n But unlike in Campbell, Morgan Stanley’s September 2\nemail to Gupta mentioned the new “arbitration agreement”\neight times; explained that arbitration would become the ex-\nclusive forum for covered claims; informed that he was free\nto opt out without consequence; instructed if he did not elect\nto opt out that continued employment would be construed as\nacceptance; and, in the agreement itself, explained in bold and\ncapitalized words that the parties were “giving up [their]\nright to a jury trial in any forum.” Even more, Gupta attested\nto the clarity of Morgan Stanley’s email when he declared un-\nder oath, “[a]s an attorney … [i]f I had seen [the] email that\nreferenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it and\nimmediately opted out.” Given these differences, Campbell\ndoes not offer Gupta a lifeline.\n The conduct of Morgan Stanley and Gupta indicated mu-\ntual assent to mandatory arbitration. See Zabinsky, 807 N.E.2d\nat 671. Morgan Stanley reasonably construed Gupta’s silence\nas acceptance of the arbitration agreement after he was given\na clear offer, a reasonable opportunity to opt-out, and re-\npeated instructions that silence and continued employment\nreflected acceptance. See Ragan, 824 N.E.2d at 1188–89 (hold-\ning silence reflected acceptance of arbitration agreement\n\fNo. 18-3584 15\n\nwhere plaintiff “had a reasonable opportunity to reject the of-\nfer but failed to do so”); see also Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309\nF.3d 404, 415 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding same under Illinois law).\nSimilarly, the parties’ employment relationship made it rea-\nsonable to expect Gupta would notify Morgan Stanley if he\nintended to decline its offer, as well as that silence would\nconvey acceptance. Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228. When, as here, “in-\naction is indistinguishable from overt acceptance,” Najd, 294\nF.3d at 1109, we may infer the parties have agreed. For these\nreasons, we conclude the district court reasonably construed\nGupta’s silence and continued employment as assent to the\narbitration agreement.\n The next question is whether that agreement covers\nGupta’s claims for discrimination, retaliation, and defama-\ntion. It does: § 2 of the arbitration agreement expressly desig-\nnates each of these charges as a “covered claim.” Because\nGupta’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration\nagreement, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d at 594,\nthe district court did not err in compelling the parties to arbi-\ntrate those claims.\n As a final line of defense, Gupta contends his employment\nagreement prohibits Morgan Stanley from requiring manda-\ntory arbitration without his written consent. This argument\nfails to acknowledge that Gupta’s employment agreement\nand the CARE arbitration program are separate, free-standing\nagreements. No version of Morgan Stanley’s CARE program,\nbefore or after 2015, required a signed agreement. So unless\nthe employment agreement incorporated the terms of the\nCARE arbitration program, no signature was needed to mod-\nify that program, as Gupta claims.\n\f16 No. 18-3584\n\n As we relayed earlier, Gupta’s employment agreement\ncontained a merger clause. “The presence of a merger clause\nis strong evidence that the parties intended the writing to be\nthe complete and exclusive agreement between them.”\nRosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 665 (7th Cir.\n2002) (interpreting Illinois law) (citations omitted). That the\nparties here intended to exclude “other written agreements”\nand “policies and procedures of the Firm” is supported by the\nmerger clause’s proviso “[t]his writing constitutes the entire\nagreement … with respect to the subject matter recited in this\nAgreement.” It also provides“[t]his Agreement” requires a\nwriting signed by the parties to amend terms.\n “Mere reference to another contract or document is not\nsufficient to incorporate its terms into a contract.” Id. at 666.\nInstead, “there must be an express intent to incorporate,” id.,\nand there is no such expression here. A fair reading of the\nmerger clause supports that it references “other” agreements\nand policies to “assure[] the continued vitality” of those in-\nstruments, each of which are “necessary, but self-contained”\nagreements in Gupta’s employment relationship. Id. at 663,\n665. Gupta’s employment agreement is not susceptible to an\ninterpretation that it incorporated the terms of the CARE ar-\nbitration program, such that any modification to the program\nneeded Gupta’s sign off.\n Last, Gupta claims the parties had a “course of dealing”\nrequiring him to initial “each and every paragraph” of any\nagreement between them. But the record does not support\nthis conclusion. Gupta entered several agreements with\nMorgan Stanley, including for a $1.5 million loan. Yet he\npoints to only one contract, his employment agreement, to\nprove a “course of dealing.” Even putting this imbalance\n\fNo. 18-3584 17\n\naside, Gupta fails to acknowledge that the source of his arbi-\ntration obligation, the CARE program, specified its terms\n“may change or be discontinued” after an “announce[ment]\nin advance” before becoming “equally binding upon [the\nemployee] and the Firm.” No version of the CARE program\nrequires employees to initial policy modifications before tak-\ning effect. So here the absence of initialing poses no problems.\n The employment agreement is relevant in another key re-\nspect: its arbitration clause requires Gupta to honor any arbi-\ntration agreement with Morgan Stanley. A valid arbitration\nagreement exists that covers Gupta’s claims, so the district\ncourt correctly compelled those claims to arbitration.\n III\n Because this case meets all three requirements to compel\narbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act—a written\nagreement to arbitrate, a dispute within the scope of the arbi-\ntration agreement, and a refusal to arbitrate—the district\ncourt correctly compelled arbitration, and its judgment is\nAFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Rajesh GUPTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY, LLC, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3584\\nRAJESH GUPTA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nMORGAN STANLEY\\nSMITH BARNEY, LLC, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 8375 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\\ncontract formation. After Rajesh Gupta sued his former em-\\nployer Morgan Stanley for discrimination, retaliation, and\\n\\f2 No. 18-3584\\n\\ndefamation, the company moved to compel arbitration.1\\nMorgan Stanley contends Gupta agreed to arbitrate these\\nclaims after he did not opt out of the company’s arbitration\\nagreement. Gupta responds that during his employment he\\nneither saw an arbitration offer nor agreed to arbitrate em-\\nployment-related disputes. The district court sided with\\nMorgan Stanley and sent the parties off to arbitration. Gupta\\nappeals this ruling, and we affirm.\\n I\\n Morgan Stanley hired Gupta as a financial advisor in 2013.\\nUpon joining the company, Gupta signed an employment\\nagreement containing an arbitration clause “agree[ing] to ar-\\nbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy that may arise be-\\ntween you and Morgan Stanley … that is required to be\\narbitrated … pursuant to any arbitration agreement to which\\nyou are a party.” That agreement also contained a merger\\nclause providing:\\n All terms and conditions of your employment\\n with Morgan Stanley are contained in this\\n Agreement and other written agreements be-\\n tween you and Morgan Stanley, and the policies\\n and procedures of the Firm … This writing con-\\n stitutes the entire agreement of the parties with\\n respect to the subject matter recited in this\\n Agreement. This Agreement may be amended\\n only by a writing signed by both you and\\n Morgan Stanley.\\n\\n 1 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC and Morgan Stanley\\n\\nSmith Barney Notes Holdings, FA, which we refer to collectively as\\n“Morgan Stanley” or “the company.”\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 3\\n\\n Among the additional terms and conditions, Morgan Stan-\\nley administered an employee dispute resolution program\\ncalled “CARE,” an acronym for “Convenient Access to Reso-\\nlutions for Employees.” CARE applied to all U.S. employees\\nof Morgan Stanley, and the company posted a “CARE guide-\\nbook” explaining the program on its intranet site for em-\\nployee access.\\n When Gupta joined Morgan Stanley, the CARE program\\ndid not require employees to arbitrate employment discrimi-\\nnation claims. But it did specify that the program’s terms\\n“may change or be discontinued,” and that any such changes\\nwould be “announced in advance” before becoming “equally\\nbinding upon [the employee] and the Firm.” That change\\ncame in 2015, when Morgan Stanley amended its CARE\\nprogram to compel mandatory arbitration for all employ-\\nment-related disputes, including discrimination claims. To\\nannounce the amended program, Morgan Stanley sent an\\nemail to the account of each of its employees in the U.S.\\n Morgan Stanley emailed Gupta the new arbitration agree-\\nment on September 2, 2015. The email’s subject line read “Ex-\\npansion of CARE Arbitration Program,” and the email itself\\nexplained that, effective October 2, 2015, “final and binding\\narbitration” under the new “CARE arbitration program”\\nwould be “mandatory for all employees” unless an employee\\nindividually elected to opt out. The email included links to\\nthe new arbitration agreement and Morgan Stanley’s revised\\nCARE guidebook, and it encouraged employees to “read and\\nunderstand” both documents because “they describe the\\nterms, features and details of this program.” The revised\\nCARE guidebook similarly explained that “employment dis-\\ncrimination claims under … any federal … law (including\\n\\f4 No. 18-3584\\n\\nclaims of harassment and retaliation under those laws) will be\\nresolved by final and binding arbitration.”\\n The final section of the company’s September 2 email to\\nGupta, entitled “Next Steps,” attached a link to the arbitration\\nagreement opt-out form, explained instructions for submit-\\nting that form, and again notified that Gupta had until Octo-\\nber 2, 2015, to decline. The email twice cautioned that, if the\\nemployee did not opt out, continued employment would re-\\nflect that the employee “consented and agreed to the terms”\\nof the arbitration agreement and CARE guidebook. The email\\nconcluded with an assurance that opting out of the arbitration\\nagreement would not adversely affect Gupta’s employment\\nstatus. The one page opt-out form attached to the email prom-\\ninently placed the opt-out deadline in bold capital letters, al-\\nlowed for submission by email, and provided directions if\\nMorgan Stanley failed to confirm the employee’s rejection of\\nmandatory arbitration.\\n Over the next thirty days, Gupta had access via links on\\nthe September 2 email to the arbitration agreement, CARE\\nguidebook, and arbitration opt-out form. During this period,\\nMorgan Stanley also maintained on its intranet page (accessi-\\nble by all Morgan Stanley employees) a reminder notification\\nabout the upcoming expansion to mandatory arbitration and\\nthe deadline to opt out. The reminder encouraged employees\\nto “carefully review the September 2 email from Human Re-\\nsources” and once more instructed that, unless they chose to\\nopt out, continued employment would bind them to the terms\\nof the new arbitration agreement.\\n The October 2015 deadline to opt out came and went.\\nGupta did not submit an opt-out form, respond to the Sep-\\ntember 2 email, or otherwise communicate with human\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 5\\n\\nresources about the mandatory arbitration program. He con-\\ntinued to work at Morgan Stanley for two more years until,\\nhe alleges, the company forced him to resign because of im-\\nminent military leave.2 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley for dis-\\ncrimination and retaliation in violation of the Uniformed\\nServices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38\\nU.S.C. §§ 4301–35, and a related defamation claim.\\n Morgan Stanley moved to compel arbitration under the\\nterms of the 2015 CARE arbitration program and agreement.\\nGupta resisted, asserting he never agreed to arbitrate. He said\\nhe first saw the September 2 email and arbitration agreement\\nwhen Morgan Stanley filed its motion to compel and filed a\\ndeclaration to that effect.3\\n The district court deferred ruling on Morgan Stanley’s mo-\\ntion to compel “pending a trial regarding whether an agree-\\nment to arbitrate exists.” The court agreed with Morgan\\nStanley that Illinois law permits an offeror to construe silence\\nas acceptance if circumstances make it reasonable to do so.\\n\\n 2 In addition to working as a financial advisor, Gupta is a member of\\nthe Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps reserves. He alleges Morgan\\nStanley “effectively terminated” him after he notified the company that he\\nhad been called for six months active duty. Morgan Stanley counters that\\nGupta resigned after the company notified him of an internal investiga-\\ntion into his alleged corporate policy violations; according to Morgan\\nStanley, Gupta recommended insurance products outside of Morgan\\nStanley without prior notice or approval. Gupta’s appeal is limited to the\\ndistrict court’s order compelling arbitration, and neither party asks us to\\nresolve their substantive disputes.\\n 3 Gupta also declared “[a]s an attorney, I am familiar with arbitrations\\n\\nand arbitration clauses … and am cautious to avoid them. … If I had seen\\nany email that referenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it\\nand immediately opted out of the agreement.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-3584\\n\\nBut it treated Gupta’s sworn statement that he had “never\\nseen” the September 2 email as a denial that he received the\\nemail, not simply a denial that he read it. At that point, the\\ncourt found Morgan Stanley had not reliably demonstrated\\nthat Gupta had received the email. Because Gupta said\\nMorgan Stanley never sent him an offer, the court reasoned,\\n“there [was] a genuine dispute about the existence of an\\nagreement to arbitrate.” See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“If the making of the\\narbitration agreement … be in issue, the court shall proceed\\nsummarily to the trial thereof.”). After the parties’ submitted\\npretrial evidence, however, Gupta could no longer dispute he\\nreceived the September 2 email in his work email account. As\\na result, he stipulated “that the email arrived at his in-box,”\\nbut he maintains he first saw the email only after this lawsuit\\nwas filed.\\n With Gupta’s stipulation, the district court concluded no\\ngenuine dispute of material fact required a trial. The court\\nfound that Gupta’s receipt of the September 2 email, com-\\nbined with his continued employment and failure to opt out\\nof mandatory arbitration, gave rise to an agreement to arbi-\\ntrate. So the court granted Morgan Stanley’s motion to compel\\narbitration and stayed the litigation. The district court certi-\\nfied its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1292(b), which we agreed to accept.\\n II\\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\\ncompel arbitration. A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 885 F.3d\\n1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Gupta’s appeal implicates the Federal Arbitration Act,\\nwhich reflects “both a liberal federal policy favoring\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 7\\n\\narbitration … and the fundamental principle that arbitration\\nis a matter of contract.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563\\nU.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citations omitted). Specifically, the act\\nmandates enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. 9\\nU.S.C. §§ 2, 4. Although it requires arbitration agreements to\\nbe in writing, it does not require them to be signed. Id. § 3;\\nTinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002). The\\nact also extends to employment contracts. Circuit City Stores,\\nInc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001). Even still, courts\\ncannot require a party to submit a dispute to arbitration un-\\nless he has agreed to do so. See A.D. v. Credit One Bank, 885\\nF.3d at 1060 (citations omitted); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local\\n2150 v. NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d 592, 594 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (citations omitted) (holding a party seeking arbitra-\\ntion must present a claim that is, “on its face,” governed by an\\narbitration clause).\\n Against this backdrop, we must resolve whether a valid\\nagreement to arbitrate exists between Gupta and Morgan\\nStanley. If yes, we consider whether Gupta’s claims fall within\\nthe scope of that agreement. We apply state-law principles of\\ncontract formation to answer these questions. Gore v. Alltel\\nCommc’ns, LLC, 666 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2012). “Our role\\nin interpreting a question of state law is to predict how the\\nhighest court of the state would answer the question.” Cannon\\nv. Burge, 752 F.3d 1079, 1091 (7th Cir. 2014). “In the absence of\\nguiding decisions by the state’s highest court, we consult and\\nfollow the decisions of intermediate appellate courts unless\\nthere is a convincing reason to predict the state’s highest court\\nwould disagree.” ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire\\nProt. Dist., 672 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n\\f8 No. 18-3584\\n\\n The parties agree Illinois contract law governs this law-\\nsuit. But they dispute whether an agreement exists at all un-\\nder Illinois law, which “requires only a manifestation of\\nmutual assent on the part of two or more persons.” Zabinsky\\nv. Gelber Grp., Inc., 807 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (cit-\\ning RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981)).\\n When, as here, a “case concerns the application of the Fed-\\neral Arbitration Act,” the Illinois Supreme Court has “base[d]\\n[its] analysis upon principles of fundamental contract law” to\\ndetermine the formation of an agreement. Melena v. Anheuser-\\nBusch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 103, 107 (2006). The court “appl[ies]\\ngeneral contract doctrines” because “that approach is more\\nfaithful to the [act].” Id. at 107–08. Applying these principles,\\nwe start by evaluating the standard we must use under Illi-\\nnois law to ascertain the parties’ manifestation of mutual as-\\nsent (the proverbial meeting of the minds). After that, we\\nconsider the elements of contract formation and whether they\\nexist here to create an enforceable arbitration agreement.\\n A\\n Illinois courts evaluate contract formation under an objec-\\ntive theory. Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1034\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (Illinois law) (citations omitted); Vill. of S. Elgin\\nv. Waste Mgmt. of Illinois, Inc., 810 N.E.2d 658, 670 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n2004) (“‘Intent’ refers to the objective manifestations of intent\\nin the words of the contract and the actions of the parties\\n… .”); J.F. McKinney & Assocs., Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Inv. Corp., 183\\nF.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Illinois uses an objective theory\\nof contract … .”) (citations omitted).\\n Judge Learned Hand famously explained the objective\\ntheory of contract: “A contract has … nothing to do with the\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 9\\n\\npersonal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an\\nobligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of\\nthe parties … which ordinarily accompany and represent a\\nknown intent.” Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of New York, 200 F.\\n287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, Ernst v. Mechanics’ & Metals Nat.\\nBank of City of New York, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d, Nat’l\\nCity Bank of New York v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). “Under\\nthe objective theory, intent to manifest assent in Illinois is re-\\nvealed by ‘outward expressions such as words and acts.’”\\nSgouros, 817 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Bank Computer Network\\nCorp. v. Cont’l Illinois Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago, 442 N.E.2d\\n586, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)). “Intent … does not encompass\\none party’s … purely subjective understandings of which the\\nother party is unaware.” Vill. of S. Elgin, 810 N.E.2d at 670. We\\nevaluate these outward expressions through the lens of an ob-\\njectively reasonable person. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank,\\nN.A., 673 F.3d 547, 563 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying “objectively\\nreasonable person” standard to determine validity of contract\\noffer under Illinois law); Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293–94 (holding\\nacts or words must be “reasonably interpreted” as they would\\nby “ordinary men” and that “whatever was the understand-\\ning” of the parties “is of not the slightest consequence”); see\\nalso Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and\\nContractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 858 (1992) (explaining\\nthat the “objective theory of assent” holds persons to the rea-\\nsonable or normal meaning that their conduct conveys to oth-\\ners). So the parties’ objective conduct, not their subjective\\nintent, determines whether Gupta agreed to mandatory arbi-\\ntration.\\n Gupta contends the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in\\nMelena, 847 N.E.2d 99, requires an employee to have “actual\\nknowledge of an offer” and “a general understanding that a\\n\\f10 No. 18-3584\\n\\nbinding agreement or contract has been entered into.” We do\\nnot read Melena to create these requirements. In Melena the\\nIllinois Supreme Court recognized “that state … court deci-\\nsions cannot hold arbitration agreements to a standard any\\ndifferent or higher than those applicable to other contracts in\\ngeneral.” Id. at 108. On this ground, the court rejected a\\n“knowing and voluntary standard” because it “raise[s] arbi-\\ntration agreements to an elevated status not contemplated by\\nthe [act]” and “means much more than a general understanding\\nthat a binding agreement or contract is being entered into.”\\nId. (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotations omit-\\nted).4\\n Gupta’s reliance on Melena rests entirely on the Illinois Su-\\npreme Court’s use of the phrase “general understanding.” He\\ninterprets that reference to mean contract formation is impos-\\nsible if the offeree lacks a “general understanding” that a con-\\ntract is being formed. He interprets “general understanding”\\nto mean “actual knowledge.” But this interpretation relies on\\nthe subjective intent of the parties, and Illinois uses an objec-\\ntive theory. No part of Melena’s holding or its phrasing allows\\ncourts to consider subjective intent to evaluate the existence\\nof a contract. Rather, Melena is consistent with an objective ap-\\nproach, emphasizing the employee’s conduct—receipt of the\\nemployer’s agreement, and performance consistent with the\\nagreement’s terms—not the employee’s intent. 847 N.E.2d at\\n109.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 The Appellate Court of Illinois had held an agreement to arbitrate\\nclaims must be entered into knowingly and voluntarily to be enforceable.\\nMelena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 826, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004),\\nrev’d, 847 N.E.2d 99 (2006).\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 11\\n\\n Because the parties’ objective conduct governs our evalu-\\nation—not any one party’s “general understanding” or “ac-\\ntual knowledge”—we consider whether an enforceable\\nagreement exists here.\\n B\\n “In Illinois, an offer, an acceptance and consideration are\\nthe basic ingredients of a contract.” Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109.\\nGupta does not dispute that the September 2 email qualifies\\nas an offer, nor does he challenge that continued employment\\nconstitutes consideration.5 Instead, Gupta argues he never ac-\\ncepted the offer.\\n Although Gupta acknowledges that Morgan Stanley de-\\nlivered its arbitration offer to his work email, he argues “an\\nemployer cannot form a contract by an employee’s silence\\nsimply by proving email delivery of an offer and a failure to\\nopt out.“ The critical question, then, is whether Gupta’s si-\\nlence and inaction in the face of Morgan Stanley’s September\\n2 email constitute acceptance of its proposed arbitration\\nagreement.\\n “‘[A] party named in a contract may, by his acts and con-\\nduct, indicate his assent to its terms and become bound by its\\nprovisions even though he has not signed it.’” Bauer v. Qwest\\nCommc’ns Co., LLC, 743 F.3d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 2014) (interpret-\\ning Illinois law) (quoting Carlton at the Lake, Inc. v. Barber, 928\\nN.E.2d 1266, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)); Landmark Properties, Inc.\\n\\n 5 Gupta’s concessions on these elements are sensible. See Melena, 847\\nN.E.2d at 109 (holding that the employer’s postal mailing of program-re-\\nlated materials to its employees constituted a valid offer and that “contin-\\nued employment is sufficient consideration for the enforcement of\\nemployment agreements”).\\n\\f12 No. 18-3584\\n\\nv. Architects Int’l-Chicago, 526 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n1988) (holding same). As a corollary, an offeror may construe\\nsilence as acceptance if the circumstances make it reasonable\\nto do so. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Atl. Tele-Network Co., 946\\nF.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Illinois law). For ex-\\nample, “[s]ilence may be construed as acceptance where ‘be-\\ncause of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that\\nthe offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to\\naccept.’” Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT\\n(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(1)(c) (1981)); Ragan v. AT & T\\nCorp., 824 N.E.2d 1183, 1188–89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding\\nplaintiffs’ silence and inaction upon receipt of mailed agree-\\nment for telephone services, and their use of those services,\\nconstituted acceptance of arbitration clause within agree-\\nment); Fineman v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS\\n§ 69(1)(c)).\\n In the same vein, the relationship between parties may jus-\\ntify the offeror expecting a reply, and thus assuming that si-\\nlence is assent to its proposal. See 2 Williston on Contracts § 6:50\\n(4th ed. 2007); 1 Corbin on Contracts § 3:18 (rev. ed. 2018) (“Of-\\nten … silence coupled with … expectations engendered by a\\nprior relationship can reasonably be understood by the offe-\\nror as an acceptance.”); see also Rivera-Colon v. AT&T Mobility\\nPuerto Rico, Inc., 913 F.3d 200, 213–14 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding\\nemployee’s silence operated as acceptance of employer’s ar-\\nbitration agreement transmitted by email); Circuit City Stores,\\nInc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding em-\\nployee’s failure to opt out of employer’s dispute resolution\\nagreement manifested consent to arbitration under that\\nagreement).\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 13\\n\\n The pre-2015 CARE program explicitly stated its terms\\nwere subject to change after an “announce[ment] in advance,”\\nso Gupta had to keep abreast of the company’s dispute reso-\\nlution policies upon announcement. Morgan Stanley emailed\\nthe arbitration policy changes to Gupta personally, granted\\nhim thirty days to review the new arbitration agreement, cir-\\nculated an opt-out form, conspicuously displayed the dead-\\nline to opt out, posted a continual company intranet reminder\\nof the new arbitration policy and opt-out date, and repeatedly\\ninformed that it would construe silence as acceptance of man-\\ndatory arbitration. All these actions bolstered the company’s\\nexpectation of a response.\\n Gupta worked for Morgan Stanley for four years. That em-\\nployment included regular email communication, and justi-\\nfied Morgan Stanley’s expectation of a reply, and its\\nassumption that Gupta’s silence indicated his acceptance of\\nmandatory arbitration. This case does not present an unsolic-\\nited offer-by-email from a stranger when the expectation of\\nthe offeree’s response is rare, if not baseless. Instead, employ-\\nment includes the understanding that employees will act with\\ndiligence in following an employer’s instructions and\\nresponding to requests, whether transmitted by email or an-\\nother reasonable mode of communication. Here, Gupta sub-\\nmits no evidence, policy, or prior course of dealings from\\nwhich we can infer that Gupta was free as an employee to ig-\\nnore Morgan Stanley’s communications without repercus-\\nsion.\\n Instead, Gupta argues Morgan Stanley failed to provide\\nenough notice to trigger his response, pointing to Campbell v.\\nGen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005). In\\nCampbell, an employer sent a companywide email\\n\\f14 No. 18-3584\\n\\nannouncing the implementation of a new dispute resolution\\npolicy. Id. at 547–48. Yet the employer’s email failed to men-\\ntion several crucial facts about the policy: that it contained an\\nagreement to arbitrate and contractually binding terms;\\ntreated continued employment as an acceptance of those\\nterms; and resulted in a waiver of an employee’s access to a\\njudicial forum. Id. at 547–48, 557–58. For those reasons, the\\ncourt held the employer’s email failed to provide “minimally\\nsufficient notice” of a contractual modification. Id. at 557, 559.\\n But unlike in Campbell, Morgan Stanley’s September 2\\nemail to Gupta mentioned the new “arbitration agreement”\\neight times; explained that arbitration would become the ex-\\nclusive forum for covered claims; informed that he was free\\nto opt out without consequence; instructed if he did not elect\\nto opt out that continued employment would be construed as\\nacceptance; and, in the agreement itself, explained in bold and\\ncapitalized words that the parties were “giving up [their]\\nright to a jury trial in any forum.” Even more, Gupta attested\\nto the clarity of Morgan Stanley’s email when he declared un-\\nder oath, “[a]s an attorney … [i]f I had seen [the] email that\\nreferenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it and\\nimmediately opted out.” Given these differences, Campbell\\ndoes not offer Gupta a lifeline.\\n The conduct of Morgan Stanley and Gupta indicated mu-\\ntual assent to mandatory arbitration. See Zabinsky, 807 N.E.2d\\nat 671. Morgan Stanley reasonably construed Gupta’s silence\\nas acceptance of the arbitration agreement after he was given\\na clear offer, a reasonable opportunity to opt-out, and re-\\npeated instructions that silence and continued employment\\nreflected acceptance. See Ragan, 824 N.E.2d at 1188–89 (hold-\\ning silence reflected acceptance of arbitration agreement\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 15\\n\\nwhere plaintiff “had a reasonable opportunity to reject the of-\\nfer but failed to do so”); see also Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309\\nF.3d 404, 415 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding same under Illinois law).\\nSimilarly, the parties’ employment relationship made it rea-\\nsonable to expect Gupta would notify Morgan Stanley if he\\nintended to decline its offer, as well as that silence would\\nconvey acceptance. Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228. When, as here, “in-\\naction is indistinguishable from overt acceptance,” Najd, 294\\nF.3d at 1109, we may infer the parties have agreed. For these\\nreasons, we conclude the district court reasonably construed\\nGupta’s silence and continued employment as assent to the\\narbitration agreement.\\n The next question is whether that agreement covers\\nGupta’s claims for discrimination, retaliation, and defama-\\ntion. It does: § 2 of the arbitration agreement expressly desig-\\nnates each of these charges as a “covered claim.” Because\\nGupta’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration\\nagreement, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d at 594,\\nthe district court did not err in compelling the parties to arbi-\\ntrate those claims.\\n As a final line of defense, Gupta contends his employment\\nagreement prohibits Morgan Stanley from requiring manda-\\ntory arbitration without his written consent. This argument\\nfails to acknowledge that Gupta’s employment agreement\\nand the CARE arbitration program are separate, free-standing\\nagreements. No version of Morgan Stanley’s CARE program,\\nbefore or after 2015, required a signed agreement. So unless\\nthe employment agreement incorporated the terms of the\\nCARE arbitration program, no signature was needed to mod-\\nify that program, as Gupta claims.\\n\\f16 No. 18-3584\\n\\n As we relayed earlier, Gupta’s employment agreement\\ncontained a merger clause. “The presence of a merger clause\\nis strong evidence that the parties intended the writing to be\\nthe complete and exclusive agreement between them.”\\nRosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 665 (7th Cir.\\n2002) (interpreting Illinois law) (citations omitted). That the\\nparties here intended to exclude “other written agreements”\\nand “policies and procedures of the Firm” is supported by the\\nmerger clause’s proviso “[t]his writing constitutes the entire\\nagreement … with respect to the subject matter recited in this\\nAgreement.” It also provides“[t]his Agreement” requires a\\nwriting signed by the parties to amend terms.\\n “Mere reference to another contract or document is not\\nsufficient to incorporate its terms into a contract.” Id. at 666.\\nInstead, “there must be an express intent to incorporate,” id.,\\nand there is no such expression here. A fair reading of the\\nmerger clause supports that it references “other” agreements\\nand policies to “assure[] the continued vitality” of those in-\\nstruments, each of which are “necessary, but self-contained”\\nagreements in Gupta’s employment relationship. Id. at 663,\\n665. Gupta’s employment agreement is not susceptible to an\\ninterpretation that it incorporated the terms of the CARE ar-\\nbitration program, such that any modification to the program\\nneeded Gupta’s sign off.\\n Last, Gupta claims the parties had a “course of dealing”\\nrequiring him to initial “each and every paragraph” of any\\nagreement between them. But the record does not support\\nthis conclusion. Gupta entered several agreements with\\nMorgan Stanley, including for a $1.5 million loan. Yet he\\npoints to only one contract, his employment agreement, to\\nprove a “course of dealing.” Even putting this imbalance\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 17\\n\\naside, Gupta fails to acknowledge that the source of his arbi-\\ntration obligation, the CARE program, specified its terms\\n“may change or be discontinued” after an “announce[ment]\\nin advance” before becoming “equally binding upon [the\\nemployee] and the Firm.” No version of the CARE program\\nrequires employees to initial policy modifications before tak-\\ning effect. So here the absence of initialing poses no problems.\\n The employment agreement is relevant in another key re-\\nspect: its arbitration clause requires Gupta to honor any arbi-\\ntration agreement with Morgan Stanley. A valid arbitration\\nagreement exists that covers Gupta’s claims, so the district\\ncourt correctly compelled those claims to arbitration.\\n III\\n Because this case meets all three requirements to compel\\narbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act—a written\\nagreement to arbitrate, a dispute within the scope of the arbi-\\ntration agreement, and a refusal to arbitrate—the district\\ncourt correctly compelled arbitration, and its judgment is\\nAFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3876,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4649521,"string":"4,649,521"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Christopher Regan v. City of Hammond, Indiana"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3051"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-3051\\n\\nCHRISTOPHER REGAN and\\nNORTHWEST INDIANA CREATIVE\\nINVESTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nCITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.\\n No. 2:16-cv-00098-JTM — James T. Moody, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs in this case press a\\ndormant commerce clause challenge to a local ordinance that\\nrequires a residential property owner who wishes to make\\n\\f2 No. 18-3051\\n\\nrepairs to the residence either to obtain a license or to hire a\\nlicensed contractor; but a homeowner making repairs to the\\nsingle-family residence he or she occupies is exempted from\\nthis requirement. The plaintiffs argue that this scheme discrim-\\ninates against interstate commerce and to that extent is\\ncontrary to the dormant commerce clause. But the ordinance\\ndraws no distinction between in-state or out-of-state property\\nowners and imposes no burden on interstate commerce. We\\ntherefore affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment\\nagainst the plaintiffs.\\n I.\\n Plaintiff Christopher Regan lives in Cook County, Illinois,\\nbut owns real property in the City of Hammond, Indiana, that\\nhe leases or rents to others. The Northwest Indiana Creative\\nInvestors Association, Inc. (“NICIA”) is a trade association for\\nreal estate investors who likewise own and lease real property\\nin Hammond. As landlords, Regan and NICIA members\\nnaturally have the need to make periodic repairs and improve-\\nments to their Hammond properties. In order to repair or\\nremodel their properties, the Hammond municipal code\\nrequires that they either obtain a license from the city or hire a\\nHammond-licensed general contractor. Hammond, Ind.\\nMunicipal Code §§ 150.15, 150.17. In order to obtain a license,\\na general contractor or landlord must, among other things,\\nsubmit an application, pass a test and criminal background\\ncheck, and pay a fee. (General contractors are subject to\\nadditional requirements and obtain a broader license.) The\\ncode makes an exception for an individual making repairs or\\nimprovements to a private, single-family residence in which he\\nresides. Any work he performs will be subject to review and\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 3\\n\\ninspection by the city building commissioner (as would\\nlicensed work), but he need not obtain a license in order to do\\nthe work. §§ 150.15, 150.17.\\n Regan and NICIA contend that the license requirement,\\ncoupled with the exemption, impermissibly burdens interstate\\ncommerce by imposing costs on property owners who, like\\nRegan, do not reside in Hammond which locally-domiciled\\nhomeowners do not have to pay. That burden, they argue, is\\ninconsistent with the dormant commerce clause. The district\\ncourt disagreed and entered summary judgment for\\nHammond. Regan v. City of Hammond, Ind., 331 F. Supp. 3d 798\\n(N.D. Ind. 2018). Judge Moody reasoned that the city’s license\\nrequirement does not facially discriminate against property\\nowners who do not live in Hammond, does not have a dispa-\\nrate impact on those owners, and is rationally related to the\\ncity’s interest in public safety. Id.\\n II.\\n The commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate\\ncommerce among the states. U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, cl. 3. This\\nprovision “presumes a national market free from local legisla-\\ntion that discriminates in favor of local interests.” C & A\\nCarbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393, 114\\nS. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994). The clause therefore comprises not\\nonly an affirmative authorization for Congress to regulate\\ninterstate commerce, but a corresponding restraint on the\\npower of state and local governments to regulate that com-\\nmerce. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38, 128\\nS. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub.\\nServ. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2422–23 (2005).\\n\\f4 No. 18-3051\\n\\nThat restraint is referred to as the dormant commerce clause,\\nand it precludes states and municipalities from erecting\\nobstacles to interstate commerce even where Congress has not\\nregulated. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139\\nS. Ct. 2449, 2459–61 (2019); Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v.\\nWynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015); Endsley v. City of Chicago,\\n230 F.3d 276, 284 (7th Cir. 2000). The fact that a state or\\nmunicipal law affects interstate commerce in some way is by\\nitself insufficient to render the law suspect under the com-\\nmerce clause, as almost any local regulation is bound to touch\\nupon interstate commerce. Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City\\nof Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 1995). “Dormant\\nCommerce Clause doctrine applies only to laws that discrimi-\\nnate against interstate commerce, either expressly or in fact.”\\nPark Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 872 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (emphasis in original) (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at\\n1130–31).\\n Our precedents place state and local laws into one of three\\ncategories for purposes of commerce clause analysis, depend-\\ning on the degree to which they affect interstate commerce:\\n(1) laws that expressly discriminate against interstate com-\\nmerce; (2) laws that, although neutral on their face, bear more\\nheavily on interstate than local commerce; and (3) laws that\\nmay have a mild effect on interstate commerce but in practice\\ndo not give local firms any competitive advantage over firms\\nlocated elsewhere. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02 (citing Nat’l\\nPaint, 45 F.3d at 1131). A law falling into the first category is\\npresumed to be almost per se unconstitutional and is subject to\\nrigorous scrutiny that will allow the law to stand only if it\\nserves a legitimate governmental interest and there is no\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 5\\n\\nreasonable non-discriminatory means of furthering that\\ninterest. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45\\nF.3d at 1131); see Davis, 553 U.S. at 338, 128 S. Ct. at 1808; United\\nHaulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,\\n550 U.S. 330, 338–39, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1793 (2007); Or. Waste Sys.,\\nInc. v. Dep’t of Environ. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93,\\n100–01, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1351 (1994). A law falling into the\\nsecond category is analyzed according to its effect. If the\\nimpact is so strong that the law effectively operates as an\\nembargo on interstate commerce, it is treated as the equivalent\\nof a facially discriminatory law and is subject to the same\\ndemanding scrutiny given to such a law. Id. (citing Nat’l Paint,\\n45 F.3d at 1131). But if the law regulates even-handedly and\\nonly incidentally burdens interstate commerce, then it is\\nexamined under the balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce\\nChurch, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 847 (1970), to\\ndetermine whether it is animated by a legitimate public\\npurpose and, if so, whether the burden the law imposes on\\ninterstate commerce is excessive in relation to that interest.\\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02; see Davis, 563 U.S. at 338–39,\\n128 S. Ct. at 1808–09; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State\\nLiquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (1986). A\\nlaw falling into the third category is examined solely to\\ndetermine whether it has a rational basis. Park Pet Shop, 872\\nF.3d at 502 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1131–32). The district\\ncourt concluded that the Hammond ordinance falls into the\\nthird category and indeed is justified by a rational basis. We\\nreview its conclusion de novo. Legato Vapors, LLC v. Cook, 847\\nF.3d 825, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\f6 No. 18-3051\\n\\n The plaintiffs are landlords, and as the ordinance concerns\\nlandlords, it draws no distinction between those who are\\ndomiciled in Hammond (or elsewhere in Indiana) and those\\nwho are not; all landlords are subject to the license require-\\nment. So the landlord who lives in Chicago and owns a rental\\nproperty in Hammond must obtain a license or hire a licensed\\ncontractor, but so must the landlord who lives next door to his\\nHammond rental. The ordinance imposes no impediment or\\nburden for the non-Hammond landlord that it does not also\\nimpose on the Hammond landlord. There is no disparity in\\nclassification of local versus non-local landlords nor is there a\\ndisparity in how the two are impacted by the ordinance. See\\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 502 (municipal “puppy mill” ordi-\\nnance that prohibits all large commercial breeders from selling\\ndomestic pets to local pet stores regardless of where breeder is\\nlocated neither expressly discriminates against interstate\\ncommerce nor has disparate impact on out-of-state breeders).\\n It is only the exception the ordinance makes for occupant\\nhomeowners that causes the plaintiffs to complain that the\\nordinance is inconsistent with the dormant commerce clause,\\nbecause by definition only a property owner who lives in\\nHammond can be an occupant of a Hammond residence. The\\noccupant can, if he chooses, save himself the expense of\\nobtaining a license or hiring a licensed contractor to make\\nimprovements to his property; and he is the only property\\nowner who is given that option. But the exception is tied to\\noccupancy of the property rather than the owner’s domicile; a\\nHammond-based landlord will not qualify for the exception\\neven if his tenant lives next door to him in the adjoining unit of\\na side-by-side duplex.\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 7\\n\\n The premise of the plaintiffs’ commerce clause challenge is\\nthat all owners of residential property in Hammond are\\nparticipants and competitors in the national housing market,\\nso that to give an occupant homeowner an exemption from the\\nlicense requirement is to discriminate in favor of the occupant\\nagainst the non-occupant homeowner, including in particular\\nthe landlord who is not domiciled in Hammond. But occupant\\nhomeowners are not similarly situated with landlords, as the\\ndistrict court recognized. The owner-occupant of a single-\\nfamily home typically is not deriving rental income from his\\nproperty, which means that he or she is not in meaningful\\ncompetition with landlords. Yes, both own property, and both\\nmay ultimately sell that property in the national market, but\\nduring the term of their ownership, they are using the property\\nfor different purposes. Moreover, the occupant also bears the\\nconsequences of repairs or improvements made to his home in\\na way that a landlord does not. Of course, all repairs and\\nimprovements are reviewed by the Hammond building\\ncommissioner for compliance with municipal codes, so one\\nmay presume the alterations by the occupant owner are good\\nenough to pass inspection; but compliance with local regula-\\ntions does not ensure that the craftsmanship is sound, effective\\nin resolving any problems that necessitated repairs, or suffi-\\ncient to prevent future problems. And as between the occupant\\nand the landlord, it is the former who will be without heat,\\nwater, a working kitchen, a watertight roof, or a sound\\nstaircase if the repairs or improvements are not made properly.\\nThe occupant and the landlord alike ultimately may suffer the\\neconomic consequences of bad work (a tenant might withhold\\nrent or abandon the lease), but only the occupant actually\\n\\f8 No. 18-3051\\n\\nexperiences the deterioration in living conditions with its\\nattendant hardships and dangers. In the district court’s words,\\n“While resident homeowners will bear the risk of their own\\npoor craftsmanship, building contractors and landlords impose\\nthe risk of faulty construction upon current or future tenants.”\\n331 F. Supp. 3d at 805.\\n Given the material distinctions between occupant owners\\nand landlords, the exception for occupant owners does not\\nmake the ordinance one that discriminates against non-\\nHammond property owners, so as to trigger a presumption of\\ninvalidity. “[L]aws that draw distinctions between entities that\\nare not competitors do not ‘discriminate’ for purposes of the\\ndormant commerce clause.” Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584\\nF.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Town of Southold v. Town of\\nE. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 2007)); see Gen. Motors Corp.\\nv. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298–300, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824–25 (1997).\\nHammond’s ordinance does not impede interstate commerce\\nin the sense that it poses an obstacle to non-residents who wish\\nto invest in Hammond rental properties or imposes a sur-\\ncharge on such non-residents that is not imposed on local,\\nsimilarly-situated investors. Nor does it otherwise impose a\\ndisparate burden on non-Hammond landlords so as to trigger\\nthe Pike analysis. As we have said, the ordinance treats all\\nlandlords the same, regardless of whether they are domiciled\\nin Hammond. Consequently, the law falls into the third\\ncategory, and is subject only to rational basis review.\\n And for the same reasons that occupant homeowners are\\nnot similarly situated to landlords, the license requirement and\\nexemption easily survive deferential review. Hammond has an\\nobvious interest in the safety and habitability of the homes in\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 9\\n\\nwhich its residents live, and the ordinance is a legitimate\\nexercise of its authority to promote that interest. The license\\nrequirement serves to ensure not only that whoever performs\\nthe work, be it the property owner or a contractor, is familiar\\nwith the local code requirements and is therefore capable of\\ncompleting work in a sound manner that complies with those\\nrequirements, but that he lacks a criminal background that\\nmay place the property’s owner or occupant in jeopardy of\\nfraud. Insofar as the exemption for occupant homeowners is\\nconcerned, it is reasonable for the city to think that such\\nhomeowners, who have a keen interest in the adequacy of\\nrepairs and improvements made to their own homes, will also\\nendeavor to comply with all local requirements.\\n III.\\n Hammond’s licensing ordinance does not discriminate\\nbased on the domicile of a homeowner in name or effect and\\nhas the support of a rational basis; it therefore poses no\\nproblem under the dormant commerce clause. The district\\ncourt property granted summary judgment to Hammond.\\n AFFIRMED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426774/\", \"author_raw\": \"Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROVNER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"ROVNER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649521/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Christopher Regan v. City of Hammond, Indiana\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-3051\n\nCHRISTOPHER REGAN and\nNORTHWEST INDIANA CREATIVE\nINVESTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\n\nCITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.\n No. 2:16-cv-00098-JTM — James T. Moody, Judge.\n\n\n\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\n\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\nJudges.\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs in this case press a\ndormant commerce clause challenge to a local ordinance that\nrequires a residential property owner who wishes to make\n\f2 No. 18-3051\n\nrepairs to the residence either to obtain a license or to hire a\nlicensed contractor; but a homeowner making repairs to the\nsingle-family residence he or she occupies is exempted from\nthis requirement. The plaintiffs argue that this scheme discrim-\ninates against interstate commerce and to that extent is\ncontrary to the dormant commerce clause. But the ordinance\ndraws no distinction between in-state or out-of-state property\nowners and imposes no burden on interstate commerce. We\ntherefore affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment\nagainst the plaintiffs.\n I.\n Plaintiff Christopher Regan lives in Cook County, Illinois,\nbut owns real property in the City of Hammond, Indiana, that\nhe leases or rents to others. The Northwest Indiana Creative\nInvestors Association, Inc. (“NICIA”) is a trade association for\nreal estate investors who likewise own and lease real property\nin Hammond. As landlords, Regan and NICIA members\nnaturally have the need to make periodic repairs and improve-\nments to their Hammond properties. In order to repair or\nremodel their properties, the Hammond municipal code\nrequires that they either obtain a license from the city or hire a\nHammond-licensed general contractor. Hammond, Ind.\nMunicipal Code §§ 150.15, 150.17. In order to obtain a license,\na general contractor or landlord must, among other things,\nsubmit an application, pass a test and criminal background\ncheck, and pay a fee. (General contractors are subject to\nadditional requirements and obtain a broader license.) The\ncode makes an exception for an individual making repairs or\nimprovements to a private, single-family residence in which he\nresides. Any work he performs will be subject to review and\n\fNo. 18-3051 3\n\ninspection by the city building commissioner (as would\nlicensed work), but he need not obtain a license in order to do\nthe work. §§ 150.15, 150.17.\n Regan and NICIA contend that the license requirement,\ncoupled with the exemption, impermissibly burdens interstate\ncommerce by imposing costs on property owners who, like\nRegan, do not reside in Hammond which locally-domiciled\nhomeowners do not have to pay. That burden, they argue, is\ninconsistent with the dormant commerce clause. The district\ncourt disagreed and entered summary judgment for\nHammond. Regan v. City of Hammond, Ind., 331 F. Supp. 3d 798\n(N.D. Ind. 2018). Judge Moody reasoned that the city’s license\nrequirement does not facially discriminate against property\nowners who do not live in Hammond, does not have a dispa-\nrate impact on those owners, and is rationally related to the\ncity’s interest in public safety. Id.\n II.\n The commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate\ncommerce among the states. U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, cl. 3. This\nprovision “presumes a national market free from local legisla-\ntion that discriminates in favor of local interests.” C & A\nCarbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393, 114\nS. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994). The clause therefore comprises not\nonly an affirmative authorization for Congress to regulate\ninterstate commerce, but a corresponding restraint on the\npower of state and local governments to regulate that com-\nmerce. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38, 128\nS. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub.\nServ. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2422–23 (2005).\n\f4 No. 18-3051\n\nThat restraint is referred to as the dormant commerce clause,\nand it precludes states and municipalities from erecting\nobstacles to interstate commerce even where Congress has not\nregulated. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139\nS. Ct. 2449, 2459–61 (2019); Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v.\nWynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015); Endsley v. City of Chicago,\n230 F.3d 276, 284 (7th Cir. 2000). The fact that a state or\nmunicipal law affects interstate commerce in some way is by\nitself insufficient to render the law suspect under the com-\nmerce clause, as almost any local regulation is bound to touch\nupon interstate commerce. Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City\nof Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 1995). “Dormant\nCommerce Clause doctrine applies only to laws that discrimi-\nnate against interstate commerce, either expressly or in fact.”\nPark Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 872 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir.\n2017) (emphasis in original) (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at\n1130–31).\n Our precedents place state and local laws into one of three\ncategories for purposes of commerce clause analysis, depend-\ning on the degree to which they affect interstate commerce:\n(1) laws that expressly discriminate against interstate com-\nmerce; (2) laws that, although neutral on their face, bear more\nheavily on interstate than local commerce; and (3) laws that\nmay have a mild effect on interstate commerce but in practice\ndo not give local firms any competitive advantage over firms\nlocated elsewhere. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02 (citing Nat’l\nPaint, 45 F.3d at 1131). A law falling into the first category is\npresumed to be almost per se unconstitutional and is subject to\nrigorous scrutiny that will allow the law to stand only if it\nserves a legitimate governmental interest and there is no\n\fNo. 18-3051 5\n\nreasonable non-discriminatory means of furthering that\ninterest. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45\nF.3d at 1131); see Davis, 553 U.S. at 338, 128 S. Ct. at 1808; United\nHaulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,\n550 U.S. 330, 338–39, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1793 (2007); Or. Waste Sys.,\nInc. v. Dep’t of Environ. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93,\n100–01, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1351 (1994). A law falling into the\nsecond category is analyzed according to its effect. If the\nimpact is so strong that the law effectively operates as an\nembargo on interstate commerce, it is treated as the equivalent\nof a facially discriminatory law and is subject to the same\ndemanding scrutiny given to such a law. Id. (citing Nat’l Paint,\n45 F.3d at 1131). But if the law regulates even-handedly and\nonly incidentally burdens interstate commerce, then it is\nexamined under the balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce\nChurch, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 847 (1970), to\ndetermine whether it is animated by a legitimate public\npurpose and, if so, whether the burden the law imposes on\ninterstate commerce is excessive in relation to that interest.\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02; see Davis, 563 U.S. at 338–39,\n128 S. Ct. at 1808–09; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State\nLiquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (1986). A\nlaw falling into the third category is examined solely to\ndetermine whether it has a rational basis. Park Pet Shop, 872\nF.3d at 502 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1131–32). The district\ncourt concluded that the Hammond ordinance falls into the\nthird category and indeed is justified by a rational basis. We\nreview its conclusion de novo. Legato Vapors, LLC v. Cook, 847\nF.3d 825, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2017).\n\f6 No. 18-3051\n\n The plaintiffs are landlords, and as the ordinance concerns\nlandlords, it draws no distinction between those who are\ndomiciled in Hammond (or elsewhere in Indiana) and those\nwho are not; all landlords are subject to the license require-\nment. So the landlord who lives in Chicago and owns a rental\nproperty in Hammond must obtain a license or hire a licensed\ncontractor, but so must the landlord who lives next door to his\nHammond rental. The ordinance imposes no impediment or\nburden for the non-Hammond landlord that it does not also\nimpose on the Hammond landlord. There is no disparity in\nclassification of local versus non-local landlords nor is there a\ndisparity in how the two are impacted by the ordinance. See\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 502 (municipal “puppy mill” ordi-\nnance that prohibits all large commercial breeders from selling\ndomestic pets to local pet stores regardless of where breeder is\nlocated neither expressly discriminates against interstate\ncommerce nor has disparate impact on out-of-state breeders).\n It is only the exception the ordinance makes for occupant\nhomeowners that causes the plaintiffs to complain that the\nordinance is inconsistent with the dormant commerce clause,\nbecause by definition only a property owner who lives in\nHammond can be an occupant of a Hammond residence. The\noccupant can, if he chooses, save himself the expense of\nobtaining a license or hiring a licensed contractor to make\nimprovements to his property; and he is the only property\nowner who is given that option. But the exception is tied to\noccupancy of the property rather than the owner’s domicile; a\nHammond-based landlord will not qualify for the exception\neven if his tenant lives next door to him in the adjoining unit of\na side-by-side duplex.\n\fNo. 18-3051 7\n\n The premise of the plaintiffs’ commerce clause challenge is\nthat all owners of residential property in Hammond are\nparticipants and competitors in the national housing market,\nso that to give an occupant homeowner an exemption from the\nlicense requirement is to discriminate in favor of the occupant\nagainst the non-occupant homeowner, including in particular\nthe landlord who is not domiciled in Hammond. But occupant\nhomeowners are not similarly situated with landlords, as the\ndistrict court recognized. The owner-occupant of a single-\nfamily home typically is not deriving rental income from his\nproperty, which means that he or she is not in meaningful\ncompetition with landlords. Yes, both own property, and both\nmay ultimately sell that property in the national market, but\nduring the term of their ownership, they are using the property\nfor different purposes. Moreover, the occupant also bears the\nconsequences of repairs or improvements made to his home in\na way that a landlord does not. Of course, all repairs and\nimprovements are reviewed by the Hammond building\ncommissioner for compliance with municipal codes, so one\nmay presume the alterations by the occupant owner are good\nenough to pass inspection; but compliance with local regula-\ntions does not ensure that the craftsmanship is sound, effective\nin resolving any problems that necessitated repairs, or suffi-\ncient to prevent future problems. And as between the occupant\nand the landlord, it is the former who will be without heat,\nwater, a working kitchen, a watertight roof, or a sound\nstaircase if the repairs or improvements are not made properly.\nThe occupant and the landlord alike ultimately may suffer the\neconomic consequences of bad work (a tenant might withhold\nrent or abandon the lease), but only the occupant actually\n\f8 No. 18-3051\n\nexperiences the deterioration in living conditions with its\nattendant hardships and dangers. In the district court’s words,\n“While resident homeowners will bear the risk of their own\npoor craftsmanship, building contractors and landlords impose\nthe risk of faulty construction upon current or future tenants.”\n331 F. Supp. 3d at 805.\n Given the material distinctions between occupant owners\nand landlords, the exception for occupant owners does not\nmake the ordinance one that discriminates against non-\nHammond property owners, so as to trigger a presumption of\ninvalidity. “[L]aws that draw distinctions between entities that\nare not competitors do not ‘discriminate’ for purposes of the\ndormant commerce clause.” Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584\nF.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Town of Southold v. Town of\nE. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 2007)); see Gen. Motors Corp.\nv. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298–300, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824–25 (1997).\nHammond’s ordinance does not impede interstate commerce\nin the sense that it poses an obstacle to non-residents who wish\nto invest in Hammond rental properties or imposes a sur-\ncharge on such non-residents that is not imposed on local,\nsimilarly-situated investors. Nor does it otherwise impose a\ndisparate burden on non-Hammond landlords so as to trigger\nthe Pike analysis. As we have said, the ordinance treats all\nlandlords the same, regardless of whether they are domiciled\nin Hammond. Consequently, the law falls into the third\ncategory, and is subject only to rational basis review.\n And for the same reasons that occupant homeowners are\nnot similarly situated to landlords, the license requirement and\nexemption easily survive deferential review. Hammond has an\nobvious interest in the safety and habitability of the homes in\n\fNo. 18-3051 9\n\nwhich its residents live, and the ordinance is a legitimate\nexercise of its authority to promote that interest. The license\nrequirement serves to ensure not only that whoever performs\nthe work, be it the property owner or a contractor, is familiar\nwith the local code requirements and is therefore capable of\ncompleting work in a sound manner that complies with those\nrequirements, but that he lacks a criminal background that\nmay place the property’s owner or occupant in jeopardy of\nfraud. Insofar as the exemption for occupant homeowners is\nconcerned, it is reasonable for the city to think that such\nhomeowners, who have a keen interest in the adequacy of\nrepairs and improvements made to their own homes, will also\nendeavor to comply with all local requirements.\n III.\n Hammond’s licensing ordinance does not discriminate\nbased on the domicile of a homeowner in name or effect and\nhas the support of a rational basis; it therefore poses no\nproblem under the dormant commerce clause. The district\ncourt property granted summary judgment to Hammond.\n AFFIRMED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Christopher Regan v. City of Hammond, Indiana\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\nNo. 18-3051\\n\\nCHRISTOPHER REGAN and\\nNORTHWEST INDIANA CREATIVE\\nINVESTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nCITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.\\n No. 2:16-cv-00098-JTM — James T. Moody, Judge.\\n\\n\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 3, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs in this case press a\\ndormant commerce clause challenge to a local ordinance that\\nrequires a residential property owner who wishes to make\\n\\f2 No. 18-3051\\n\\nrepairs to the residence either to obtain a license or to hire a\\nlicensed contractor; but a homeowner making repairs to the\\nsingle-family residence he or she occupies is exempted from\\nthis requirement. The plaintiffs argue that this scheme discrim-\\ninates against interstate commerce and to that extent is\\ncontrary to the dormant commerce clause. But the ordinance\\ndraws no distinction between in-state or out-of-state property\\nowners and imposes no burden on interstate commerce. We\\ntherefore affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment\\nagainst the plaintiffs.\\n I.\\n Plaintiff Christopher Regan lives in Cook County, Illinois,\\nbut owns real property in the City of Hammond, Indiana, that\\nhe leases or rents to others. The Northwest Indiana Creative\\nInvestors Association, Inc. (“NICIA”) is a trade association for\\nreal estate investors who likewise own and lease real property\\nin Hammond. As landlords, Regan and NICIA members\\nnaturally have the need to make periodic repairs and improve-\\nments to their Hammond properties. In order to repair or\\nremodel their properties, the Hammond municipal code\\nrequires that they either obtain a license from the city or hire a\\nHammond-licensed general contractor. Hammond, Ind.\\nMunicipal Code §§ 150.15, 150.17. In order to obtain a license,\\na general contractor or landlord must, among other things,\\nsubmit an application, pass a test and criminal background\\ncheck, and pay a fee. (General contractors are subject to\\nadditional requirements and obtain a broader license.) The\\ncode makes an exception for an individual making repairs or\\nimprovements to a private, single-family residence in which he\\nresides. Any work he performs will be subject to review and\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 3\\n\\ninspection by the city building commissioner (as would\\nlicensed work), but he need not obtain a license in order to do\\nthe work. §§ 150.15, 150.17.\\n Regan and NICIA contend that the license requirement,\\ncoupled with the exemption, impermissibly burdens interstate\\ncommerce by imposing costs on property owners who, like\\nRegan, do not reside in Hammond which locally-domiciled\\nhomeowners do not have to pay. That burden, they argue, is\\ninconsistent with the dormant commerce clause. The district\\ncourt disagreed and entered summary judgment for\\nHammond. Regan v. City of Hammond, Ind., 331 F. Supp. 3d 798\\n(N.D. Ind. 2018). Judge Moody reasoned that the city’s license\\nrequirement does not facially discriminate against property\\nowners who do not live in Hammond, does not have a dispa-\\nrate impact on those owners, and is rationally related to the\\ncity’s interest in public safety. Id.\\n II.\\n The commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate\\ncommerce among the states. U.S. Const. Article I, § 8, cl. 3. This\\nprovision “presumes a national market free from local legisla-\\ntion that discriminates in favor of local interests.” C & A\\nCarbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 393, 114\\nS. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994). The clause therefore comprises not\\nonly an affirmative authorization for Congress to regulate\\ninterstate commerce, but a corresponding restraint on the\\npower of state and local governments to regulate that com-\\nmerce. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38, 128\\nS. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub.\\nServ. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433, 125 S. Ct. 2419, 2422–23 (2005).\\n\\f4 No. 18-3051\\n\\nThat restraint is referred to as the dormant commerce clause,\\nand it precludes states and municipalities from erecting\\nobstacles to interstate commerce even where Congress has not\\nregulated. Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139\\nS. Ct. 2449, 2459–61 (2019); Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v.\\nWynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794 (2015); Endsley v. City of Chicago,\\n230 F.3d 276, 284 (7th Cir. 2000). The fact that a state or\\nmunicipal law affects interstate commerce in some way is by\\nitself insufficient to render the law suspect under the com-\\nmerce clause, as almost any local regulation is bound to touch\\nupon interstate commerce. Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City\\nof Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 1995). “Dormant\\nCommerce Clause doctrine applies only to laws that discrimi-\\nnate against interstate commerce, either expressly or in fact.”\\nPark Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 872 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (emphasis in original) (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at\\n1130–31).\\n Our precedents place state and local laws into one of three\\ncategories for purposes of commerce clause analysis, depend-\\ning on the degree to which they affect interstate commerce:\\n(1) laws that expressly discriminate against interstate com-\\nmerce; (2) laws that, although neutral on their face, bear more\\nheavily on interstate than local commerce; and (3) laws that\\nmay have a mild effect on interstate commerce but in practice\\ndo not give local firms any competitive advantage over firms\\nlocated elsewhere. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02 (citing Nat’l\\nPaint, 45 F.3d at 1131). A law falling into the first category is\\npresumed to be almost per se unconstitutional and is subject to\\nrigorous scrutiny that will allow the law to stand only if it\\nserves a legitimate governmental interest and there is no\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 5\\n\\nreasonable non-discriminatory means of furthering that\\ninterest. Park Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45\\nF.3d at 1131); see Davis, 553 U.S. at 338, 128 S. Ct. at 1808; United\\nHaulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,\\n550 U.S. 330, 338–39, 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1793 (2007); Or. Waste Sys.,\\nInc. v. Dep’t of Environ. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93,\\n100–01, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1351 (1994). A law falling into the\\nsecond category is analyzed according to its effect. If the\\nimpact is so strong that the law effectively operates as an\\nembargo on interstate commerce, it is treated as the equivalent\\nof a facially discriminatory law and is subject to the same\\ndemanding scrutiny given to such a law. Id. (citing Nat’l Paint,\\n45 F.3d at 1131). But if the law regulates even-handedly and\\nonly incidentally burdens interstate commerce, then it is\\nexamined under the balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce\\nChurch, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 847 (1970), to\\ndetermine whether it is animated by a legitimate public\\npurpose and, if so, whether the burden the law imposes on\\ninterstate commerce is excessive in relation to that interest.\\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 501–02; see Davis, 563 U.S. at 338–39,\\n128 S. Ct. at 1808–09; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State\\nLiquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084 (1986). A\\nlaw falling into the third category is examined solely to\\ndetermine whether it has a rational basis. Park Pet Shop, 872\\nF.3d at 502 (citing Nat’l Paint, 45 F.3d at 1131–32). The district\\ncourt concluded that the Hammond ordinance falls into the\\nthird category and indeed is justified by a rational basis. We\\nreview its conclusion de novo. Legato Vapors, LLC v. Cook, 847\\nF.3d 825, 828–29 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n\\f6 No. 18-3051\\n\\n The plaintiffs are landlords, and as the ordinance concerns\\nlandlords, it draws no distinction between those who are\\ndomiciled in Hammond (or elsewhere in Indiana) and those\\nwho are not; all landlords are subject to the license require-\\nment. So the landlord who lives in Chicago and owns a rental\\nproperty in Hammond must obtain a license or hire a licensed\\ncontractor, but so must the landlord who lives next door to his\\nHammond rental. The ordinance imposes no impediment or\\nburden for the non-Hammond landlord that it does not also\\nimpose on the Hammond landlord. There is no disparity in\\nclassification of local versus non-local landlords nor is there a\\ndisparity in how the two are impacted by the ordinance. See\\nPark Pet Shop, 872 F.3d at 502 (municipal “puppy mill” ordi-\\nnance that prohibits all large commercial breeders from selling\\ndomestic pets to local pet stores regardless of where breeder is\\nlocated neither expressly discriminates against interstate\\ncommerce nor has disparate impact on out-of-state breeders).\\n It is only the exception the ordinance makes for occupant\\nhomeowners that causes the plaintiffs to complain that the\\nordinance is inconsistent with the dormant commerce clause,\\nbecause by definition only a property owner who lives in\\nHammond can be an occupant of a Hammond residence. The\\noccupant can, if he chooses, save himself the expense of\\nobtaining a license or hiring a licensed contractor to make\\nimprovements to his property; and he is the only property\\nowner who is given that option. But the exception is tied to\\noccupancy of the property rather than the owner’s domicile; a\\nHammond-based landlord will not qualify for the exception\\neven if his tenant lives next door to him in the adjoining unit of\\na side-by-side duplex.\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 7\\n\\n The premise of the plaintiffs’ commerce clause challenge is\\nthat all owners of residential property in Hammond are\\nparticipants and competitors in the national housing market,\\nso that to give an occupant homeowner an exemption from the\\nlicense requirement is to discriminate in favor of the occupant\\nagainst the non-occupant homeowner, including in particular\\nthe landlord who is not domiciled in Hammond. But occupant\\nhomeowners are not similarly situated with landlords, as the\\ndistrict court recognized. The owner-occupant of a single-\\nfamily home typically is not deriving rental income from his\\nproperty, which means that he or she is not in meaningful\\ncompetition with landlords. Yes, both own property, and both\\nmay ultimately sell that property in the national market, but\\nduring the term of their ownership, they are using the property\\nfor different purposes. Moreover, the occupant also bears the\\nconsequences of repairs or improvements made to his home in\\na way that a landlord does not. Of course, all repairs and\\nimprovements are reviewed by the Hammond building\\ncommissioner for compliance with municipal codes, so one\\nmay presume the alterations by the occupant owner are good\\nenough to pass inspection; but compliance with local regula-\\ntions does not ensure that the craftsmanship is sound, effective\\nin resolving any problems that necessitated repairs, or suffi-\\ncient to prevent future problems. And as between the occupant\\nand the landlord, it is the former who will be without heat,\\nwater, a working kitchen, a watertight roof, or a sound\\nstaircase if the repairs or improvements are not made properly.\\nThe occupant and the landlord alike ultimately may suffer the\\neconomic consequences of bad work (a tenant might withhold\\nrent or abandon the lease), but only the occupant actually\\n\\f8 No. 18-3051\\n\\nexperiences the deterioration in living conditions with its\\nattendant hardships and dangers. In the district court’s words,\\n“While resident homeowners will bear the risk of their own\\npoor craftsmanship, building contractors and landlords impose\\nthe risk of faulty construction upon current or future tenants.”\\n331 F. Supp. 3d at 805.\\n Given the material distinctions between occupant owners\\nand landlords, the exception for occupant owners does not\\nmake the ordinance one that discriminates against non-\\nHammond property owners, so as to trigger a presumption of\\ninvalidity. “[L]aws that draw distinctions between entities that\\nare not competitors do not ‘discriminate’ for purposes of the\\ndormant commerce clause.” Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584\\nF.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Town of Southold v. Town of\\nE. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 2007)); see Gen. Motors Corp.\\nv. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298–300, 117 S. Ct. 811, 824–25 (1997).\\nHammond’s ordinance does not impede interstate commerce\\nin the sense that it poses an obstacle to non-residents who wish\\nto invest in Hammond rental properties or imposes a sur-\\ncharge on such non-residents that is not imposed on local,\\nsimilarly-situated investors. Nor does it otherwise impose a\\ndisparate burden on non-Hammond landlords so as to trigger\\nthe Pike analysis. As we have said, the ordinance treats all\\nlandlords the same, regardless of whether they are domiciled\\nin Hammond. Consequently, the law falls into the third\\ncategory, and is subject only to rational basis review.\\n And for the same reasons that occupant homeowners are\\nnot similarly situated to landlords, the license requirement and\\nexemption easily survive deferential review. Hammond has an\\nobvious interest in the safety and habitability of the homes in\\n\\fNo. 18-3051 9\\n\\nwhich its residents live, and the ordinance is a legitimate\\nexercise of its authority to promote that interest. The license\\nrequirement serves to ensure not only that whoever performs\\nthe work, be it the property owner or a contractor, is familiar\\nwith the local code requirements and is therefore capable of\\ncompleting work in a sound manner that complies with those\\nrequirements, but that he lacks a criminal background that\\nmay place the property’s owner or occupant in jeopardy of\\nfraud. Insofar as the exemption for occupant homeowners is\\nconcerned, it is reasonable for the city to think that such\\nhomeowners, who have a keen interest in the adequacy of\\nrepairs and improvements made to their own homes, will also\\nendeavor to comply with all local requirements.\\n III.\\n Hammond’s licensing ordinance does not discriminate\\nbased on the domicile of a homeowner in name or effect and\\nhas the support of a rational basis; it therefore poses no\\nproblem under the dormant commerce clause. The district\\ncourt property granted summary judgment to Hammond.\\n AFFIRMED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3877,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4649540,"string":"4,649,540"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Rajesh Gupta v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, L"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3584"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before SYKES, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3584\\nRAJESH GUPTA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nMORGAN STANLEY\\nSMITH BARNEY, LLC, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 8375 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\\ncontract formation. After Rajesh Gupta sued his former em-\\nployer Morgan Stanley for discrimination, retaliation, and\\n\\f2 No. 18-3584\\n\\ndefamation, the company moved to compel arbitration.1\\nMorgan Stanley contends Gupta agreed to arbitrate these\\nclaims after he did not opt out of the company’s arbitration\\nagreement. Gupta responds that during his employment he\\nneither saw an arbitration offer nor agreed to arbitrate em-\\nployment-related disputes. The district court sided with\\nMorgan Stanley and sent the parties off to arbitration. Gupta\\nappeals this ruling, and we affirm.\\n I\\n Morgan Stanley hired Gupta as a financial advisor in 2013.\\nUpon joining the company, Gupta signed an employment\\nagreement containing an arbitration clause “agree[ing] to ar-\\nbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy that may arise be-\\ntween you and Morgan Stanley … that is required to be\\narbitrated … pursuant to any arbitration agreement to which\\nyou are a party.” That agreement also contained a merger\\nclause providing:\\n All terms and conditions of your employment\\n with Morgan Stanley are contained in this\\n Agreement and other written agreements be-\\n tween you and Morgan Stanley, and the policies\\n and procedures of the Firm … This writing con-\\n stitutes the entire agreement of the parties with\\n respect to the subject matter recited in this\\n Agreement. This Agreement may be amended\\n only by a writing signed by both you and\\n Morgan Stanley.\\n\\n 1 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC and Morgan Stanley\\n\\nSmith Barney Notes Holdings, FA, which we refer to collectively as\\n“Morgan Stanley” or “the company.”\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 3\\n\\n Among the additional terms and conditions, Morgan Stan-\\nley administered an employee dispute resolution program\\ncalled “CARE,” an acronym for “Convenient Access to Reso-\\nlutions for Employees.” CARE applied to all U.S. employees\\nof Morgan Stanley, and the company posted a “CARE guide-\\nbook” explaining the program on its intranet site for em-\\nployee access.\\n When Gupta joined Morgan Stanley, the CARE program\\ndid not require employees to arbitrate employment discrimi-\\nnation claims. But it did specify that the program’s terms\\n“may change or be discontinued,” and that any such changes\\nwould be “announced in advance” before becoming “equally\\nbinding upon [the employee] and the Firm.” That change\\ncame in 2015, when Morgan Stanley amended its CARE\\nprogram to compel mandatory arbitration for all employ-\\nment-related disputes, including discrimination claims. To\\nannounce the amended program, Morgan Stanley sent an\\nemail to the account of each of its employees in the U.S.\\n Morgan Stanley emailed Gupta the new arbitration agree-\\nment on September 2, 2015. The email’s subject line read “Ex-\\npansion of CARE Arbitration Program,” and the email itself\\nexplained that, effective October 2, 2015, “final and binding\\narbitration” under the new “CARE arbitration program”\\nwould be “mandatory for all employees” unless an employee\\nindividually elected to opt out. The email included links to\\nthe new arbitration agreement and Morgan Stanley’s revised\\nCARE guidebook, and it encouraged employees to “read and\\nunderstand” both documents because “they describe the\\nterms, features and details of this program.” The revised\\nCARE guidebook similarly explained that “employment dis-\\ncrimination claims under … any federal … law (including\\n\\f4 No. 18-3584\\n\\nclaims of harassment and retaliation under those laws) will be\\nresolved by final and binding arbitration.”\\n The final section of the company’s September 2 email to\\nGupta, entitled “Next Steps,” attached a link to the arbitration\\nagreement opt-out form, explained instructions for submit-\\nting that form, and again notified that Gupta had until Octo-\\nber 2, 2015, to decline. The email twice cautioned that, if the\\nemployee did not opt out, continued employment would re-\\nflect that the employee “consented and agreed to the terms”\\nof the arbitration agreement and CARE guidebook. The email\\nconcluded with an assurance that opting out of the arbitration\\nagreement would not adversely affect Gupta’s employment\\nstatus. The one page opt-out form attached to the email prom-\\ninently placed the opt-out deadline in bold capital letters, al-\\nlowed for submission by email, and provided directions if\\nMorgan Stanley failed to confirm the employee’s rejection of\\nmandatory arbitration.\\n Over the next thirty days, Gupta had access via links on\\nthe September 2 email to the arbitration agreement, CARE\\nguidebook, and arbitration opt-out form. During this period,\\nMorgan Stanley also maintained on its intranet page (accessi-\\nble by all Morgan Stanley employees) a reminder notification\\nabout the upcoming expansion to mandatory arbitration and\\nthe deadline to opt out. The reminder encouraged employees\\nto “carefully review the September 2 email from Human Re-\\nsources” and once more instructed that, unless they chose to\\nopt out, continued employment would bind them to the terms\\nof the new arbitration agreement.\\n The October 2015 deadline to opt out came and went.\\nGupta did not submit an opt-out form, respond to the Sep-\\ntember 2 email, or otherwise communicate with human\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 5\\n\\nresources about the mandatory arbitration program. He con-\\ntinued to work at Morgan Stanley for two more years until,\\nhe alleges, the company forced him to resign because of im-\\nminent military leave.2 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley for dis-\\ncrimination and retaliation in violation of the Uniformed\\nServices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38\\nU.S.C. §§ 4301–35, and a related defamation claim.\\n Morgan Stanley moved to compel arbitration under the\\nterms of the 2015 CARE arbitration program and agreement.\\nGupta resisted, asserting he never agreed to arbitrate. He said\\nhe first saw the September 2 email and arbitration agreement\\nwhen Morgan Stanley filed its motion to compel and filed a\\ndeclaration to that effect.3\\n The district court deferred ruling on Morgan Stanley’s mo-\\ntion to compel “pending a trial regarding whether an agree-\\nment to arbitrate exists.” The court agreed with Morgan\\nStanley that Illinois law permits an offeror to construe silence\\nas acceptance if circumstances make it reasonable to do so.\\n\\n 2 In addition to working as a financial advisor, Gupta is a member of\\nthe Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps reserves. He alleges Morgan\\nStanley “effectively terminated” him after he notified the company that he\\nhad been called for six months active duty. Morgan Stanley counters that\\nGupta resigned after the company notified him of an internal investiga-\\ntion into his alleged corporate policy violations; according to Morgan\\nStanley, Gupta recommended insurance products outside of Morgan\\nStanley without prior notice or approval. Gupta’s appeal is limited to the\\ndistrict court’s order compelling arbitration, and neither party asks us to\\nresolve their substantive disputes.\\n 3 Gupta also declared “[a]s an attorney, I am familiar with arbitrations\\n\\nand arbitration clauses … and am cautious to avoid them. … If I had seen\\nany email that referenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it\\nand immediately opted out of the agreement.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-3584\\n\\nBut it treated Gupta’s sworn statement that he had “never\\nseen” the September 2 email as a denial that he received the\\nemail, not simply a denial that he read it. At that point, the\\ncourt found Morgan Stanley had not reliably demonstrated\\nthat Gupta had received the email. Because Gupta said\\nMorgan Stanley never sent him an offer, the court reasoned,\\n“there [was] a genuine dispute about the existence of an\\nagreement to arbitrate.” See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“If the making of the\\narbitration agreement … be in issue, the court shall proceed\\nsummarily to the trial thereof.”). After the parties’ submitted\\npretrial evidence, however, Gupta could no longer dispute he\\nreceived the September 2 email in his work email account. As\\na result, he stipulated “that the email arrived at his in-box,”\\nbut he maintains he first saw the email only after this lawsuit\\nwas filed.\\n With Gupta’s stipulation, the district court concluded no\\ngenuine dispute of material fact required a trial. The court\\nfound that Gupta’s receipt of the September 2 email, com-\\nbined with his continued employment and failure to opt out\\nof mandatory arbitration, gave rise to an agreement to arbi-\\ntrate. So the court granted Morgan Stanley’s motion to compel\\narbitration and stayed the litigation. The district court certi-\\nfied its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1292(b), which we agreed to accept.\\n II\\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\\ncompel arbitration. A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 885 F.3d\\n1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Gupta’s appeal implicates the Federal Arbitration Act,\\nwhich reflects “both a liberal federal policy favoring\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 7\\n\\narbitration … and the fundamental principle that arbitration\\nis a matter of contract.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563\\nU.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citations omitted). Specifically, the act\\nmandates enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. 9\\nU.S.C. §§ 2, 4. Although it requires arbitration agreements to\\nbe in writing, it does not require them to be signed. Id. § 3;\\nTinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002). The\\nact also extends to employment contracts. Circuit City Stores,\\nInc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001). Even still, courts\\ncannot require a party to submit a dispute to arbitration un-\\nless he has agreed to do so. See A.D. v. Credit One Bank, 885\\nF.3d at 1060 (citations omitted); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local\\n2150 v. NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d 592, 594 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (citations omitted) (holding a party seeking arbitra-\\ntion must present a claim that is, “on its face,” governed by an\\narbitration clause).\\n Against this backdrop, we must resolve whether a valid\\nagreement to arbitrate exists between Gupta and Morgan\\nStanley. If yes, we consider whether Gupta’s claims fall within\\nthe scope of that agreement. We apply state-law principles of\\ncontract formation to answer these questions. Gore v. Alltel\\nCommc’ns, LLC, 666 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2012). “Our role\\nin interpreting a question of state law is to predict how the\\nhighest court of the state would answer the question.” Cannon\\nv. Burge, 752 F.3d 1079, 1091 (7th Cir. 2014). “In the absence of\\nguiding decisions by the state’s highest court, we consult and\\nfollow the decisions of intermediate appellate courts unless\\nthere is a convincing reason to predict the state’s highest court\\nwould disagree.” ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire\\nProt. Dist., 672 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n\\f8 No. 18-3584\\n\\n The parties agree Illinois contract law governs this law-\\nsuit. But they dispute whether an agreement exists at all un-\\nder Illinois law, which “requires only a manifestation of\\nmutual assent on the part of two or more persons.” Zabinsky\\nv. Gelber Grp., Inc., 807 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (cit-\\ning RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981)).\\n When, as here, a “case concerns the application of the Fed-\\neral Arbitration Act,” the Illinois Supreme Court has “base[d]\\n[its] analysis upon principles of fundamental contract law” to\\ndetermine the formation of an agreement. Melena v. Anheuser-\\nBusch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 103, 107 (2006). The court “appl[ies]\\ngeneral contract doctrines” because “that approach is more\\nfaithful to the [act].” Id. at 107–08. Applying these principles,\\nwe start by evaluating the standard we must use under Illi-\\nnois law to ascertain the parties’ manifestation of mutual as-\\nsent (the proverbial meeting of the minds). After that, we\\nconsider the elements of contract formation and whether they\\nexist here to create an enforceable arbitration agreement.\\n A\\n Illinois courts evaluate contract formation under an objec-\\ntive theory. Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1034\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (Illinois law) (citations omitted); Vill. of S. Elgin\\nv. Waste Mgmt. of Illinois, Inc., 810 N.E.2d 658, 670 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n2004) (“‘Intent’ refers to the objective manifestations of intent\\nin the words of the contract and the actions of the parties\\n… .”); J.F. McKinney & Assocs., Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Inv. Corp., 183\\nF.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Illinois uses an objective theory\\nof contract … .”) (citations omitted).\\n Judge Learned Hand famously explained the objective\\ntheory of contract: “A contract has … nothing to do with the\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 9\\n\\npersonal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an\\nobligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of\\nthe parties … which ordinarily accompany and represent a\\nknown intent.” Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of New York, 200 F.\\n287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, Ernst v. Mechanics’ & Metals Nat.\\nBank of City of New York, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d, Nat’l\\nCity Bank of New York v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). “Under\\nthe objective theory, intent to manifest assent in Illinois is re-\\nvealed by ‘outward expressions such as words and acts.’”\\nSgouros, 817 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Bank Computer Network\\nCorp. v. Cont’l Illinois Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago, 442 N.E.2d\\n586, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)). “Intent … does not encompass\\none party’s … purely subjective understandings of which the\\nother party is unaware.” Vill. of S. Elgin, 810 N.E.2d at 670. We\\nevaluate these outward expressions through the lens of an ob-\\njectively reasonable person. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank,\\nN.A., 673 F.3d 547, 563 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying “objectively\\nreasonable person” standard to determine validity of contract\\noffer under Illinois law); Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293–94 (holding\\nacts or words must be “reasonably interpreted” as they would\\nby “ordinary men” and that “whatever was the understand-\\ning” of the parties “is of not the slightest consequence”); see\\nalso Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and\\nContractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 858 (1992) (explaining\\nthat the “objective theory of assent” holds persons to the rea-\\nsonable or normal meaning that their conduct conveys to oth-\\ners). So the parties’ objective conduct, not their subjective\\nintent, determines whether Gupta agreed to mandatory arbi-\\ntration.\\n Gupta contends the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in\\nMelena, 847 N.E.2d 99, requires an employee to have “actual\\nknowledge of an offer” and “a general understanding that a\\n\\f10 No. 18-3584\\n\\nbinding agreement or contract has been entered into.” We do\\nnot read Melena to create these requirements. In Melena the\\nIllinois Supreme Court recognized “that state … court deci-\\nsions cannot hold arbitration agreements to a standard any\\ndifferent or higher than those applicable to other contracts in\\ngeneral.” Id. at 108. On this ground, the court rejected a\\n“knowing and voluntary standard” because it “raise[s] arbi-\\ntration agreements to an elevated status not contemplated by\\nthe [act]” and “means much more than a general understanding\\nthat a binding agreement or contract is being entered into.”\\nId. (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotations omit-\\nted).4\\n Gupta’s reliance on Melena rests entirely on the Illinois Su-\\npreme Court’s use of the phrase “general understanding.” He\\ninterprets that reference to mean contract formation is impos-\\nsible if the offeree lacks a “general understanding” that a con-\\ntract is being formed. He interprets “general understanding”\\nto mean “actual knowledge.” But this interpretation relies on\\nthe subjective intent of the parties, and Illinois uses an objec-\\ntive theory. No part of Melena’s holding or its phrasing allows\\ncourts to consider subjective intent to evaluate the existence\\nof a contract. Rather, Melena is consistent with an objective ap-\\nproach, emphasizing the employee’s conduct—receipt of the\\nemployer’s agreement, and performance consistent with the\\nagreement’s terms—not the employee’s intent. 847 N.E.2d at\\n109.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 The Appellate Court of Illinois had held an agreement to arbitrate\\nclaims must be entered into knowingly and voluntarily to be enforceable.\\nMelena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 826, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004),\\nrev’d, 847 N.E.2d 99 (2006).\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 11\\n\\n Because the parties’ objective conduct governs our evalu-\\nation—not any one party’s “general understanding” or “ac-\\ntual knowledge”—we consider whether an enforceable\\nagreement exists here.\\n B\\n “In Illinois, an offer, an acceptance and consideration are\\nthe basic ingredients of a contract.” Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109.\\nGupta does not dispute that the September 2 email qualifies\\nas an offer, nor does he challenge that continued employment\\nconstitutes consideration.5 Instead, Gupta argues he never ac-\\ncepted the offer.\\n Although Gupta acknowledges that Morgan Stanley de-\\nlivered its arbitration offer to his work email, he argues “an\\nemployer cannot form a contract by an employee’s silence\\nsimply by proving email delivery of an offer and a failure to\\nopt out.“ The critical question, then, is whether Gupta’s si-\\nlence and inaction in the face of Morgan Stanley’s September\\n2 email constitute acceptance of its proposed arbitration\\nagreement.\\n “‘[A] party named in a contract may, by his acts and con-\\nduct, indicate his assent to its terms and become bound by its\\nprovisions even though he has not signed it.’” Bauer v. Qwest\\nCommc’ns Co., LLC, 743 F.3d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 2014) (interpret-\\ning Illinois law) (quoting Carlton at the Lake, Inc. v. Barber, 928\\nN.E.2d 1266, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)); Landmark Properties, Inc.\\n\\n 5 Gupta’s concessions on these elements are sensible. See Melena, 847\\nN.E.2d at 109 (holding that the employer’s postal mailing of program-re-\\nlated materials to its employees constituted a valid offer and that “contin-\\nued employment is sufficient consideration for the enforcement of\\nemployment agreements”).\\n\\f12 No. 18-3584\\n\\nv. Architects Int’l-Chicago, 526 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n1988) (holding same). As a corollary, an offeror may construe\\nsilence as acceptance if the circumstances make it reasonable\\nto do so. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Atl. Tele-Network Co., 946\\nF.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Illinois law). For ex-\\nample, “[s]ilence may be construed as acceptance where ‘be-\\ncause of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that\\nthe offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to\\naccept.’” Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT\\n(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(1)(c) (1981)); Ragan v. AT & T\\nCorp., 824 N.E.2d 1183, 1188–89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding\\nplaintiffs’ silence and inaction upon receipt of mailed agree-\\nment for telephone services, and their use of those services,\\nconstituted acceptance of arbitration clause within agree-\\nment); Fineman v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS\\n§ 69(1)(c)).\\n In the same vein, the relationship between parties may jus-\\ntify the offeror expecting a reply, and thus assuming that si-\\nlence is assent to its proposal. See 2 Williston on Contracts § 6:50\\n(4th ed. 2007); 1 Corbin on Contracts § 3:18 (rev. ed. 2018) (“Of-\\nten … silence coupled with … expectations engendered by a\\nprior relationship can reasonably be understood by the offe-\\nror as an acceptance.”); see also Rivera-Colon v. AT&T Mobility\\nPuerto Rico, Inc., 913 F.3d 200, 213–14 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding\\nemployee’s silence operated as acceptance of employer’s ar-\\nbitration agreement transmitted by email); Circuit City Stores,\\nInc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding em-\\nployee’s failure to opt out of employer’s dispute resolution\\nagreement manifested consent to arbitration under that\\nagreement).\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 13\\n\\n The pre-2015 CARE program explicitly stated its terms\\nwere subject to change after an “announce[ment] in advance,”\\nso Gupta had to keep abreast of the company’s dispute reso-\\nlution policies upon announcement. Morgan Stanley emailed\\nthe arbitration policy changes to Gupta personally, granted\\nhim thirty days to review the new arbitration agreement, cir-\\nculated an opt-out form, conspicuously displayed the dead-\\nline to opt out, posted a continual company intranet reminder\\nof the new arbitration policy and opt-out date, and repeatedly\\ninformed that it would construe silence as acceptance of man-\\ndatory arbitration. All these actions bolstered the company’s\\nexpectation of a response.\\n Gupta worked for Morgan Stanley for four years. That em-\\nployment included regular email communication, and justi-\\nfied Morgan Stanley’s expectation of a reply, and its\\nassumption that Gupta’s silence indicated his acceptance of\\nmandatory arbitration. This case does not present an unsolic-\\nited offer-by-email from a stranger when the expectation of\\nthe offeree’s response is rare, if not baseless. Instead, employ-\\nment includes the understanding that employees will act with\\ndiligence in following an employer’s instructions and\\nresponding to requests, whether transmitted by email or an-\\nother reasonable mode of communication. Here, Gupta sub-\\nmits no evidence, policy, or prior course of dealings from\\nwhich we can infer that Gupta was free as an employee to ig-\\nnore Morgan Stanley’s communications without repercus-\\nsion.\\n Instead, Gupta argues Morgan Stanley failed to provide\\nenough notice to trigger his response, pointing to Campbell v.\\nGen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005). In\\nCampbell, an employer sent a companywide email\\n\\f14 No. 18-3584\\n\\nannouncing the implementation of a new dispute resolution\\npolicy. Id. at 547–48. Yet the employer’s email failed to men-\\ntion several crucial facts about the policy: that it contained an\\nagreement to arbitrate and contractually binding terms;\\ntreated continued employment as an acceptance of those\\nterms; and resulted in a waiver of an employee’s access to a\\njudicial forum. Id. at 547–48, 557–58. For those reasons, the\\ncourt held the employer’s email failed to provide “minimally\\nsufficient notice” of a contractual modification. Id. at 557, 559.\\n But unlike in Campbell, Morgan Stanley’s September 2\\nemail to Gupta mentioned the new “arbitration agreement”\\neight times; explained that arbitration would become the ex-\\nclusive forum for covered claims; informed that he was free\\nto opt out without consequence; instructed if he did not elect\\nto opt out that continued employment would be construed as\\nacceptance; and, in the agreement itself, explained in bold and\\ncapitalized words that the parties were “giving up [their]\\nright to a jury trial in any forum.” Even more, Gupta attested\\nto the clarity of Morgan Stanley’s email when he declared un-\\nder oath, “[a]s an attorney … [i]f I had seen [the] email that\\nreferenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it and\\nimmediately opted out.” Given these differences, Campbell\\ndoes not offer Gupta a lifeline.\\n The conduct of Morgan Stanley and Gupta indicated mu-\\ntual assent to mandatory arbitration. See Zabinsky, 807 N.E.2d\\nat 671. Morgan Stanley reasonably construed Gupta’s silence\\nas acceptance of the arbitration agreement after he was given\\na clear offer, a reasonable opportunity to opt-out, and re-\\npeated instructions that silence and continued employment\\nreflected acceptance. See Ragan, 824 N.E.2d at 1188–89 (hold-\\ning silence reflected acceptance of arbitration agreement\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 15\\n\\nwhere plaintiff “had a reasonable opportunity to reject the of-\\nfer but failed to do so”); see also Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309\\nF.3d 404, 415 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding same under Illinois law).\\nSimilarly, the parties’ employment relationship made it rea-\\nsonable to expect Gupta would notify Morgan Stanley if he\\nintended to decline its offer, as well as that silence would\\nconvey acceptance. Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228. When, as here, “in-\\naction is indistinguishable from overt acceptance,” Najd, 294\\nF.3d at 1109, we may infer the parties have agreed. For these\\nreasons, we conclude the district court reasonably construed\\nGupta’s silence and continued employment as assent to the\\narbitration agreement.\\n The next question is whether that agreement covers\\nGupta’s claims for discrimination, retaliation, and defama-\\ntion. It does: § 2 of the arbitration agreement expressly desig-\\nnates each of these charges as a “covered claim.” Because\\nGupta’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration\\nagreement, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d at 594,\\nthe district court did not err in compelling the parties to arbi-\\ntrate those claims.\\n As a final line of defense, Gupta contends his employment\\nagreement prohibits Morgan Stanley from requiring manda-\\ntory arbitration without his written consent. This argument\\nfails to acknowledge that Gupta’s employment agreement\\nand the CARE arbitration program are separate, free-standing\\nagreements. No version of Morgan Stanley’s CARE program,\\nbefore or after 2015, required a signed agreement. So unless\\nthe employment agreement incorporated the terms of the\\nCARE arbitration program, no signature was needed to mod-\\nify that program, as Gupta claims.\\n\\f16 No. 18-3584\\n\\n As we relayed earlier, Gupta’s employment agreement\\ncontained a merger clause. “The presence of a merger clause\\nis strong evidence that the parties intended the writing to be\\nthe complete and exclusive agreement between them.”\\nRosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 665 (7th Cir.\\n2002) (interpreting Illinois law) (citations omitted). That the\\nparties here intended to exclude “other written agreements”\\nand “policies and procedures of the Firm” is supported by the\\nmerger clause’s proviso “[t]his writing constitutes the entire\\nagreement … with respect to the subject matter recited in this\\nAgreement.” It also provides“[t]his Agreement” requires a\\nwriting signed by the parties to amend terms.\\n “Mere reference to another contract or document is not\\nsufficient to incorporate its terms into a contract.” Id. at 666.\\nInstead, “there must be an express intent to incorporate,” id.,\\nand there is no such expression here. A fair reading of the\\nmerger clause supports that it references “other” agreements\\nand policies to “assure[] the continued vitality” of those in-\\nstruments, each of which are “necessary, but self-contained”\\nagreements in Gupta’s employment relationship. Id. at 663,\\n665. Gupta’s employment agreement is not susceptible to an\\ninterpretation that it incorporated the terms of the CARE ar-\\nbitration program, such that any modification to the program\\nneeded Gupta’s sign off.\\n Last, Gupta claims the parties had a “course of dealing”\\nrequiring him to initial “each and every paragraph” of any\\nagreement between them. But the record does not support\\nthis conclusion. Gupta entered several agreements with\\nMorgan Stanley, including for a $1.5 million loan. Yet he\\npoints to only one contract, his employment agreement, to\\nprove a “course of dealing.” Even putting this imbalance\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 17\\n\\naside, Gupta fails to acknowledge that the source of his arbi-\\ntration obligation, the CARE program, specified its terms\\n“may change or be discontinued” after an “announce[ment]\\nin advance” before becoming “equally binding upon [the\\nemployee] and the Firm.” No version of the CARE program\\nrequires employees to initial policy modifications before tak-\\ning effect. So here the absence of initialing poses no problems.\\n The employment agreement is relevant in another key re-\\nspect: its arbitration clause requires Gupta to honor any arbi-\\ntration agreement with Morgan Stanley. A valid arbitration\\nagreement exists that covers Gupta’s claims, so the district\\ncourt correctly compelled those claims to arbitration.\\n III\\n Because this case meets all three requirements to compel\\narbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act—a written\\nagreement to arbitrate, a dispute within the scope of the arbi-\\ntration agreement, and a refusal to arbitrate—the district\\ncourt correctly compelled arbitration, and its judgment is\\nAFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426793/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649540/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Rajesh Gupta v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, L\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3584\nRAJESH GUPTA,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nMORGAN STANLEY\nSMITH BARNEY, LLC, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 8375 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before SYKES, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\ncontract formation. After Rajesh Gupta sued his former em-\nployer Morgan Stanley for discrimination, retaliation, and\n\f2 No. 18-3584\n\ndefamation, the company moved to compel arbitration.1\nMorgan Stanley contends Gupta agreed to arbitrate these\nclaims after he did not opt out of the company’s arbitration\nagreement. Gupta responds that during his employment he\nneither saw an arbitration offer nor agreed to arbitrate em-\nployment-related disputes. The district court sided with\nMorgan Stanley and sent the parties off to arbitration. Gupta\nappeals this ruling, and we affirm.\n I\n Morgan Stanley hired Gupta as a financial advisor in 2013.\nUpon joining the company, Gupta signed an employment\nagreement containing an arbitration clause “agree[ing] to ar-\nbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy that may arise be-\ntween you and Morgan Stanley … that is required to be\narbitrated … pursuant to any arbitration agreement to which\nyou are a party.” That agreement also contained a merger\nclause providing:\n All terms and conditions of your employment\n with Morgan Stanley are contained in this\n Agreement and other written agreements be-\n tween you and Morgan Stanley, and the policies\n and procedures of the Firm … This writing con-\n stitutes the entire agreement of the parties with\n respect to the subject matter recited in this\n Agreement. This Agreement may be amended\n only by a writing signed by both you and\n Morgan Stanley.\n\n 1 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC and Morgan Stanley\n\nSmith Barney Notes Holdings, FA, which we refer to collectively as\n“Morgan Stanley” or “the company.”\n\fNo. 18-3584 3\n\n Among the additional terms and conditions, Morgan Stan-\nley administered an employee dispute resolution program\ncalled “CARE,” an acronym for “Convenient Access to Reso-\nlutions for Employees.” CARE applied to all U.S. employees\nof Morgan Stanley, and the company posted a “CARE guide-\nbook” explaining the program on its intranet site for em-\nployee access.\n When Gupta joined Morgan Stanley, the CARE program\ndid not require employees to arbitrate employment discrimi-\nnation claims. But it did specify that the program’s terms\n“may change or be discontinued,” and that any such changes\nwould be “announced in advance” before becoming “equally\nbinding upon [the employee] and the Firm.” That change\ncame in 2015, when Morgan Stanley amended its CARE\nprogram to compel mandatory arbitration for all employ-\nment-related disputes, including discrimination claims. To\nannounce the amended program, Morgan Stanley sent an\nemail to the account of each of its employees in the U.S.\n Morgan Stanley emailed Gupta the new arbitration agree-\nment on September 2, 2015. The email’s subject line read “Ex-\npansion of CARE Arbitration Program,” and the email itself\nexplained that, effective October 2, 2015, “final and binding\narbitration” under the new “CARE arbitration program”\nwould be “mandatory for all employees” unless an employee\nindividually elected to opt out. The email included links to\nthe new arbitration agreement and Morgan Stanley’s revised\nCARE guidebook, and it encouraged employees to “read and\nunderstand” both documents because “they describe the\nterms, features and details of this program.” The revised\nCARE guidebook similarly explained that “employment dis-\ncrimination claims under … any federal … law (including\n\f4 No. 18-3584\n\nclaims of harassment and retaliation under those laws) will be\nresolved by final and binding arbitration.”\n The final section of the company’s September 2 email to\nGupta, entitled “Next Steps,” attached a link to the arbitration\nagreement opt-out form, explained instructions for submit-\nting that form, and again notified that Gupta had until Octo-\nber 2, 2015, to decline. The email twice cautioned that, if the\nemployee did not opt out, continued employment would re-\nflect that the employee “consented and agreed to the terms”\nof the arbitration agreement and CARE guidebook. The email\nconcluded with an assurance that opting out of the arbitration\nagreement would not adversely affect Gupta’s employment\nstatus. The one page opt-out form attached to the email prom-\ninently placed the opt-out deadline in bold capital letters, al-\nlowed for submission by email, and provided directions if\nMorgan Stanley failed to confirm the employee’s rejection of\nmandatory arbitration.\n Over the next thirty days, Gupta had access via links on\nthe September 2 email to the arbitration agreement, CARE\nguidebook, and arbitration opt-out form. During this period,\nMorgan Stanley also maintained on its intranet page (accessi-\nble by all Morgan Stanley employees) a reminder notification\nabout the upcoming expansion to mandatory arbitration and\nthe deadline to opt out. The reminder encouraged employees\nto “carefully review the September 2 email from Human Re-\nsources” and once more instructed that, unless they chose to\nopt out, continued employment would bind them to the terms\nof the new arbitration agreement.\n The October 2015 deadline to opt out came and went.\nGupta did not submit an opt-out form, respond to the Sep-\ntember 2 email, or otherwise communicate with human\n\fNo. 18-3584 5\n\nresources about the mandatory arbitration program. He con-\ntinued to work at Morgan Stanley for two more years until,\nhe alleges, the company forced him to resign because of im-\nminent military leave.2 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley for dis-\ncrimination and retaliation in violation of the Uniformed\nServices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38\nU.S.C. §§ 4301–35, and a related defamation claim.\n Morgan Stanley moved to compel arbitration under the\nterms of the 2015 CARE arbitration program and agreement.\nGupta resisted, asserting he never agreed to arbitrate. He said\nhe first saw the September 2 email and arbitration agreement\nwhen Morgan Stanley filed its motion to compel and filed a\ndeclaration to that effect.3\n The district court deferred ruling on Morgan Stanley’s mo-\ntion to compel “pending a trial regarding whether an agree-\nment to arbitrate exists.” The court agreed with Morgan\nStanley that Illinois law permits an offeror to construe silence\nas acceptance if circumstances make it reasonable to do so.\n\n 2 In addition to working as a financial advisor, Gupta is a member of\nthe Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps reserves. He alleges Morgan\nStanley “effectively terminated” him after he notified the company that he\nhad been called for six months active duty. Morgan Stanley counters that\nGupta resigned after the company notified him of an internal investiga-\ntion into his alleged corporate policy violations; according to Morgan\nStanley, Gupta recommended insurance products outside of Morgan\nStanley without prior notice or approval. Gupta’s appeal is limited to the\ndistrict court’s order compelling arbitration, and neither party asks us to\nresolve their substantive disputes.\n 3 Gupta also declared “[a]s an attorney, I am familiar with arbitrations\n\nand arbitration clauses … and am cautious to avoid them. … If I had seen\nany email that referenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it\nand immediately opted out of the agreement.”\n\f6 No. 18-3584\n\nBut it treated Gupta’s sworn statement that he had “never\nseen” the September 2 email as a denial that he received the\nemail, not simply a denial that he read it. At that point, the\ncourt found Morgan Stanley had not reliably demonstrated\nthat Gupta had received the email. Because Gupta said\nMorgan Stanley never sent him an offer, the court reasoned,\n“there [was] a genuine dispute about the existence of an\nagreement to arbitrate.” See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“If the making of the\narbitration agreement … be in issue, the court shall proceed\nsummarily to the trial thereof.”). After the parties’ submitted\npretrial evidence, however, Gupta could no longer dispute he\nreceived the September 2 email in his work email account. As\na result, he stipulated “that the email arrived at his in-box,”\nbut he maintains he first saw the email only after this lawsuit\nwas filed.\n With Gupta’s stipulation, the district court concluded no\ngenuine dispute of material fact required a trial. The court\nfound that Gupta’s receipt of the September 2 email, com-\nbined with his continued employment and failure to opt out\nof mandatory arbitration, gave rise to an agreement to arbi-\ntrate. So the court granted Morgan Stanley’s motion to compel\narbitration and stayed the litigation. The district court certi-\nfied its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1292(b), which we agreed to accept.\n II\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\ncompel arbitration. A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 885 F.3d\n1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 2018).\n Gupta’s appeal implicates the Federal Arbitration Act,\nwhich reflects “both a liberal federal policy favoring\n\fNo. 18-3584 7\n\narbitration … and the fundamental principle that arbitration\nis a matter of contract.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563\nU.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citations omitted). Specifically, the act\nmandates enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. 9\nU.S.C. §§ 2, 4. Although it requires arbitration agreements to\nbe in writing, it does not require them to be signed. Id. § 3;\nTinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002). The\nact also extends to employment contracts. Circuit City Stores,\nInc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001). Even still, courts\ncannot require a party to submit a dispute to arbitration un-\nless he has agreed to do so. See A.D. v. Credit One Bank, 885\nF.3d at 1060 (citations omitted); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local\n2150 v. NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d 592, 594 (7th\nCir. 2014) (citations omitted) (holding a party seeking arbitra-\ntion must present a claim that is, “on its face,” governed by an\narbitration clause).\n Against this backdrop, we must resolve whether a valid\nagreement to arbitrate exists between Gupta and Morgan\nStanley. If yes, we consider whether Gupta’s claims fall within\nthe scope of that agreement. We apply state-law principles of\ncontract formation to answer these questions. Gore v. Alltel\nCommc’ns, LLC, 666 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2012). “Our role\nin interpreting a question of state law is to predict how the\nhighest court of the state would answer the question.” Cannon\nv. Burge, 752 F.3d 1079, 1091 (7th Cir. 2014). “In the absence of\nguiding decisions by the state’s highest court, we consult and\nfollow the decisions of intermediate appellate courts unless\nthere is a convincing reason to predict the state’s highest court\nwould disagree.” ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire\nProt. Dist., 672 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2012).\n\f8 No. 18-3584\n\n The parties agree Illinois contract law governs this law-\nsuit. But they dispute whether an agreement exists at all un-\nder Illinois law, which “requires only a manifestation of\nmutual assent on the part of two or more persons.” Zabinsky\nv. Gelber Grp., Inc., 807 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (cit-\ning RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981)).\n When, as here, a “case concerns the application of the Fed-\neral Arbitration Act,” the Illinois Supreme Court has “base[d]\n[its] analysis upon principles of fundamental contract law” to\ndetermine the formation of an agreement. Melena v. Anheuser-\nBusch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 103, 107 (2006). The court “appl[ies]\ngeneral contract doctrines” because “that approach is more\nfaithful to the [act].” Id. at 107–08. Applying these principles,\nwe start by evaluating the standard we must use under Illi-\nnois law to ascertain the parties’ manifestation of mutual as-\nsent (the proverbial meeting of the minds). After that, we\nconsider the elements of contract formation and whether they\nexist here to create an enforceable arbitration agreement.\n A\n Illinois courts evaluate contract formation under an objec-\ntive theory. Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1034\n(7th Cir. 2016) (Illinois law) (citations omitted); Vill. of S. Elgin\nv. Waste Mgmt. of Illinois, Inc., 810 N.E.2d 658, 670 (Ill. App. Ct.\n2004) (“‘Intent’ refers to the objective manifestations of intent\nin the words of the contract and the actions of the parties\n… .”); J.F. McKinney & Assocs., Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Inv. Corp., 183\nF.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Illinois uses an objective theory\nof contract … .”) (citations omitted).\n Judge Learned Hand famously explained the objective\ntheory of contract: “A contract has … nothing to do with the\n\fNo. 18-3584 9\n\npersonal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an\nobligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of\nthe parties … which ordinarily accompany and represent a\nknown intent.” Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of New York, 200 F.\n287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, Ernst v. Mechanics’ & Metals Nat.\nBank of City of New York, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d, Nat’l\nCity Bank of New York v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). “Under\nthe objective theory, intent to manifest assent in Illinois is re-\nvealed by ‘outward expressions such as words and acts.’”\nSgouros, 817 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Bank Computer Network\nCorp. v. Cont’l Illinois Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago, 442 N.E.2d\n586, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)). “Intent … does not encompass\none party’s … purely subjective understandings of which the\nother party is unaware.” Vill. of S. Elgin, 810 N.E.2d at 670. We\nevaluate these outward expressions through the lens of an ob-\njectively reasonable person. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank,\nN.A., 673 F.3d 547, 563 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying “objectively\nreasonable person” standard to determine validity of contract\noffer under Illinois law); Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293–94 (holding\nacts or words must be “reasonably interpreted” as they would\nby “ordinary men” and that “whatever was the understand-\ning” of the parties “is of not the slightest consequence”); see\nalso Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and\nContractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 858 (1992) (explaining\nthat the “objective theory of assent” holds persons to the rea-\nsonable or normal meaning that their conduct conveys to oth-\ners). So the parties’ objective conduct, not their subjective\nintent, determines whether Gupta agreed to mandatory arbi-\ntration.\n Gupta contends the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in\nMelena, 847 N.E.2d 99, requires an employee to have “actual\nknowledge of an offer” and “a general understanding that a\n\f10 No. 18-3584\n\nbinding agreement or contract has been entered into.” We do\nnot read Melena to create these requirements. In Melena the\nIllinois Supreme Court recognized “that state … court deci-\nsions cannot hold arbitration agreements to a standard any\ndifferent or higher than those applicable to other contracts in\ngeneral.” Id. at 108. On this ground, the court rejected a\n“knowing and voluntary standard” because it “raise[s] arbi-\ntration agreements to an elevated status not contemplated by\nthe [act]” and “means much more than a general understanding\nthat a binding agreement or contract is being entered into.”\nId. (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotations omit-\nted).4\n Gupta’s reliance on Melena rests entirely on the Illinois Su-\npreme Court’s use of the phrase “general understanding.” He\ninterprets that reference to mean contract formation is impos-\nsible if the offeree lacks a “general understanding” that a con-\ntract is being formed. He interprets “general understanding”\nto mean “actual knowledge.” But this interpretation relies on\nthe subjective intent of the parties, and Illinois uses an objec-\ntive theory. No part of Melena’s holding or its phrasing allows\ncourts to consider subjective intent to evaluate the existence\nof a contract. Rather, Melena is consistent with an objective ap-\nproach, emphasizing the employee’s conduct—receipt of the\nemployer’s agreement, and performance consistent with the\nagreement’s terms—not the employee’s intent. 847 N.E.2d at\n109.\n\n\n\n 4 The Appellate Court of Illinois had held an agreement to arbitrate\nclaims must be entered into knowingly and voluntarily to be enforceable.\nMelena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 826, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004),\nrev’d, 847 N.E.2d 99 (2006).\n\fNo. 18-3584 11\n\n Because the parties’ objective conduct governs our evalu-\nation—not any one party’s “general understanding” or “ac-\ntual knowledge”—we consider whether an enforceable\nagreement exists here.\n B\n “In Illinois, an offer, an acceptance and consideration are\nthe basic ingredients of a contract.” Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109.\nGupta does not dispute that the September 2 email qualifies\nas an offer, nor does he challenge that continued employment\nconstitutes consideration.5 Instead, Gupta argues he never ac-\ncepted the offer.\n Although Gupta acknowledges that Morgan Stanley de-\nlivered its arbitration offer to his work email, he argues “an\nemployer cannot form a contract by an employee’s silence\nsimply by proving email delivery of an offer and a failure to\nopt out.“ The critical question, then, is whether Gupta’s si-\nlence and inaction in the face of Morgan Stanley’s September\n2 email constitute acceptance of its proposed arbitration\nagreement.\n “‘[A] party named in a contract may, by his acts and con-\nduct, indicate his assent to its terms and become bound by its\nprovisions even though he has not signed it.’” Bauer v. Qwest\nCommc’ns Co., LLC, 743 F.3d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 2014) (interpret-\ning Illinois law) (quoting Carlton at the Lake, Inc. v. Barber, 928\nN.E.2d 1266, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)); Landmark Properties, Inc.\n\n 5 Gupta’s concessions on these elements are sensible. See Melena, 847\nN.E.2d at 109 (holding that the employer’s postal mailing of program-re-\nlated materials to its employees constituted a valid offer and that “contin-\nued employment is sufficient consideration for the enforcement of\nemployment agreements”).\n\f12 No. 18-3584\n\nv. Architects Int’l-Chicago, 526 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ill. App. Ct.\n1988) (holding same). As a corollary, an offeror may construe\nsilence as acceptance if the circumstances make it reasonable\nto do so. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Atl. Tele-Network Co., 946\nF.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Illinois law). For ex-\nample, “[s]ilence may be construed as acceptance where ‘be-\ncause of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that\nthe offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to\naccept.’” Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT\n(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(1)(c) (1981)); Ragan v. AT & T\nCorp., 824 N.E.2d 1183, 1188–89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding\nplaintiffs’ silence and inaction upon receipt of mailed agree-\nment for telephone services, and their use of those services,\nconstituted acceptance of arbitration clause within agree-\nment); Fineman v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ill.\nApp. Ct. 1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS\n§ 69(1)(c)).\n In the same vein, the relationship between parties may jus-\ntify the offeror expecting a reply, and thus assuming that si-\nlence is assent to its proposal. See 2 Williston on Contracts § 6:50\n(4th ed. 2007); 1 Corbin on Contracts § 3:18 (rev. ed. 2018) (“Of-\nten … silence coupled with … expectations engendered by a\nprior relationship can reasonably be understood by the offe-\nror as an acceptance.”); see also Rivera-Colon v. AT&T Mobility\nPuerto Rico, Inc., 913 F.3d 200, 213–14 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding\nemployee’s silence operated as acceptance of employer’s ar-\nbitration agreement transmitted by email); Circuit City Stores,\nInc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding em-\nployee’s failure to opt out of employer’s dispute resolution\nagreement manifested consent to arbitration under that\nagreement).\n\fNo. 18-3584 13\n\n The pre-2015 CARE program explicitly stated its terms\nwere subject to change after an “announce[ment] in advance,”\nso Gupta had to keep abreast of the company’s dispute reso-\nlution policies upon announcement. Morgan Stanley emailed\nthe arbitration policy changes to Gupta personally, granted\nhim thirty days to review the new arbitration agreement, cir-\nculated an opt-out form, conspicuously displayed the dead-\nline to opt out, posted a continual company intranet reminder\nof the new arbitration policy and opt-out date, and repeatedly\ninformed that it would construe silence as acceptance of man-\ndatory arbitration. All these actions bolstered the company’s\nexpectation of a response.\n Gupta worked for Morgan Stanley for four years. That em-\nployment included regular email communication, and justi-\nfied Morgan Stanley’s expectation of a reply, and its\nassumption that Gupta’s silence indicated his acceptance of\nmandatory arbitration. This case does not present an unsolic-\nited offer-by-email from a stranger when the expectation of\nthe offeree’s response is rare, if not baseless. Instead, employ-\nment includes the understanding that employees will act with\ndiligence in following an employer’s instructions and\nresponding to requests, whether transmitted by email or an-\nother reasonable mode of communication. Here, Gupta sub-\nmits no evidence, policy, or prior course of dealings from\nwhich we can infer that Gupta was free as an employee to ig-\nnore Morgan Stanley’s communications without repercus-\nsion.\n Instead, Gupta argues Morgan Stanley failed to provide\nenough notice to trigger his response, pointing to Campbell v.\nGen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005). In\nCampbell, an employer sent a companywide email\n\f14 No. 18-3584\n\nannouncing the implementation of a new dispute resolution\npolicy. Id. at 547–48. Yet the employer’s email failed to men-\ntion several crucial facts about the policy: that it contained an\nagreement to arbitrate and contractually binding terms;\ntreated continued employment as an acceptance of those\nterms; and resulted in a waiver of an employee’s access to a\njudicial forum. Id. at 547–48, 557–58. For those reasons, the\ncourt held the employer’s email failed to provide “minimally\nsufficient notice” of a contractual modification. Id. at 557, 559.\n But unlike in Campbell, Morgan Stanley’s September 2\nemail to Gupta mentioned the new “arbitration agreement”\neight times; explained that arbitration would become the ex-\nclusive forum for covered claims; informed that he was free\nto opt out without consequence; instructed if he did not elect\nto opt out that continued employment would be construed as\nacceptance; and, in the agreement itself, explained in bold and\ncapitalized words that the parties were “giving up [their]\nright to a jury trial in any forum.” Even more, Gupta attested\nto the clarity of Morgan Stanley’s email when he declared un-\nder oath, “[a]s an attorney … [i]f I had seen [the] email that\nreferenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it and\nimmediately opted out.” Given these differences, Campbell\ndoes not offer Gupta a lifeline.\n The conduct of Morgan Stanley and Gupta indicated mu-\ntual assent to mandatory arbitration. See Zabinsky, 807 N.E.2d\nat 671. Morgan Stanley reasonably construed Gupta’s silence\nas acceptance of the arbitration agreement after he was given\na clear offer, a reasonable opportunity to opt-out, and re-\npeated instructions that silence and continued employment\nreflected acceptance. See Ragan, 824 N.E.2d at 1188–89 (hold-\ning silence reflected acceptance of arbitration agreement\n\fNo. 18-3584 15\n\nwhere plaintiff “had a reasonable opportunity to reject the of-\nfer but failed to do so”); see also Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309\nF.3d 404, 415 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding same under Illinois law).\nSimilarly, the parties’ employment relationship made it rea-\nsonable to expect Gupta would notify Morgan Stanley if he\nintended to decline its offer, as well as that silence would\nconvey acceptance. Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228. When, as here, “in-\naction is indistinguishable from overt acceptance,” Najd, 294\nF.3d at 1109, we may infer the parties have agreed. For these\nreasons, we conclude the district court reasonably construed\nGupta’s silence and continued employment as assent to the\narbitration agreement.\n The next question is whether that agreement covers\nGupta’s claims for discrimination, retaliation, and defama-\ntion. It does: § 2 of the arbitration agreement expressly desig-\nnates each of these charges as a “covered claim.” Because\nGupta’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration\nagreement, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d at 594,\nthe district court did not err in compelling the parties to arbi-\ntrate those claims.\n As a final line of defense, Gupta contends his employment\nagreement prohibits Morgan Stanley from requiring manda-\ntory arbitration without his written consent. This argument\nfails to acknowledge that Gupta’s employment agreement\nand the CARE arbitration program are separate, free-standing\nagreements. No version of Morgan Stanley’s CARE program,\nbefore or after 2015, required a signed agreement. So unless\nthe employment agreement incorporated the terms of the\nCARE arbitration program, no signature was needed to mod-\nify that program, as Gupta claims.\n\f16 No. 18-3584\n\n As we relayed earlier, Gupta’s employment agreement\ncontained a merger clause. “The presence of a merger clause\nis strong evidence that the parties intended the writing to be\nthe complete and exclusive agreement between them.”\nRosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 665 (7th Cir.\n2002) (interpreting Illinois law) (citations omitted). That the\nparties here intended to exclude “other written agreements”\nand “policies and procedures of the Firm” is supported by the\nmerger clause’s proviso “[t]his writing constitutes the entire\nagreement … with respect to the subject matter recited in this\nAgreement.” It also provides“[t]his Agreement” requires a\nwriting signed by the parties to amend terms.\n “Mere reference to another contract or document is not\nsufficient to incorporate its terms into a contract.” Id. at 666.\nInstead, “there must be an express intent to incorporate,” id.,\nand there is no such expression here. A fair reading of the\nmerger clause supports that it references “other” agreements\nand policies to “assure[] the continued vitality” of those in-\nstruments, each of which are “necessary, but self-contained”\nagreements in Gupta’s employment relationship. Id. at 663,\n665. Gupta’s employment agreement is not susceptible to an\ninterpretation that it incorporated the terms of the CARE ar-\nbitration program, such that any modification to the program\nneeded Gupta’s sign off.\n Last, Gupta claims the parties had a “course of dealing”\nrequiring him to initial “each and every paragraph” of any\nagreement between them. But the record does not support\nthis conclusion. Gupta entered several agreements with\nMorgan Stanley, including for a $1.5 million loan. Yet he\npoints to only one contract, his employment agreement, to\nprove a “course of dealing.” Even putting this imbalance\n\fNo. 18-3584 17\n\naside, Gupta fails to acknowledge that the source of his arbi-\ntration obligation, the CARE program, specified its terms\n“may change or be discontinued” after an “announce[ment]\nin advance” before becoming “equally binding upon [the\nemployee] and the Firm.” No version of the CARE program\nrequires employees to initial policy modifications before tak-\ning effect. So here the absence of initialing poses no problems.\n The employment agreement is relevant in another key re-\nspect: its arbitration clause requires Gupta to honor any arbi-\ntration agreement with Morgan Stanley. A valid arbitration\nagreement exists that covers Gupta’s claims, so the district\ncourt correctly compelled those claims to arbitration.\n III\n Because this case meets all three requirements to compel\narbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act—a written\nagreement to arbitrate, a dispute within the scope of the arbi-\ntration agreement, and a refusal to arbitrate—the district\ncourt correctly compelled arbitration, and its judgment is\nAFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Rajesh Gupta v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, L\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-3584\\nRAJESH GUPTA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nMORGAN STANLEY\\nSMITH BARNEY, LLC, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 8375 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before SYKES, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\\ncontract formation. After Rajesh Gupta sued his former em-\\nployer Morgan Stanley for discrimination, retaliation, and\\n\\f2 No. 18-3584\\n\\ndefamation, the company moved to compel arbitration.1\\nMorgan Stanley contends Gupta agreed to arbitrate these\\nclaims after he did not opt out of the company’s arbitration\\nagreement. Gupta responds that during his employment he\\nneither saw an arbitration offer nor agreed to arbitrate em-\\nployment-related disputes. The district court sided with\\nMorgan Stanley and sent the parties off to arbitration. Gupta\\nappeals this ruling, and we affirm.\\n I\\n Morgan Stanley hired Gupta as a financial advisor in 2013.\\nUpon joining the company, Gupta signed an employment\\nagreement containing an arbitration clause “agree[ing] to ar-\\nbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy that may arise be-\\ntween you and Morgan Stanley … that is required to be\\narbitrated … pursuant to any arbitration agreement to which\\nyou are a party.” That agreement also contained a merger\\nclause providing:\\n All terms and conditions of your employment\\n with Morgan Stanley are contained in this\\n Agreement and other written agreements be-\\n tween you and Morgan Stanley, and the policies\\n and procedures of the Firm … This writing con-\\n stitutes the entire agreement of the parties with\\n respect to the subject matter recited in this\\n Agreement. This Agreement may be amended\\n only by a writing signed by both you and\\n Morgan Stanley.\\n\\n 1 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC and Morgan Stanley\\n\\nSmith Barney Notes Holdings, FA, which we refer to collectively as\\n“Morgan Stanley” or “the company.”\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 3\\n\\n Among the additional terms and conditions, Morgan Stan-\\nley administered an employee dispute resolution program\\ncalled “CARE,” an acronym for “Convenient Access to Reso-\\nlutions for Employees.” CARE applied to all U.S. employees\\nof Morgan Stanley, and the company posted a “CARE guide-\\nbook” explaining the program on its intranet site for em-\\nployee access.\\n When Gupta joined Morgan Stanley, the CARE program\\ndid not require employees to arbitrate employment discrimi-\\nnation claims. But it did specify that the program’s terms\\n“may change or be discontinued,” and that any such changes\\nwould be “announced in advance” before becoming “equally\\nbinding upon [the employee] and the Firm.” That change\\ncame in 2015, when Morgan Stanley amended its CARE\\nprogram to compel mandatory arbitration for all employ-\\nment-related disputes, including discrimination claims. To\\nannounce the amended program, Morgan Stanley sent an\\nemail to the account of each of its employees in the U.S.\\n Morgan Stanley emailed Gupta the new arbitration agree-\\nment on September 2, 2015. The email’s subject line read “Ex-\\npansion of CARE Arbitration Program,” and the email itself\\nexplained that, effective October 2, 2015, “final and binding\\narbitration” under the new “CARE arbitration program”\\nwould be “mandatory for all employees” unless an employee\\nindividually elected to opt out. The email included links to\\nthe new arbitration agreement and Morgan Stanley’s revised\\nCARE guidebook, and it encouraged employees to “read and\\nunderstand” both documents because “they describe the\\nterms, features and details of this program.” The revised\\nCARE guidebook similarly explained that “employment dis-\\ncrimination claims under … any federal … law (including\\n\\f4 No. 18-3584\\n\\nclaims of harassment and retaliation under those laws) will be\\nresolved by final and binding arbitration.”\\n The final section of the company’s September 2 email to\\nGupta, entitled “Next Steps,” attached a link to the arbitration\\nagreement opt-out form, explained instructions for submit-\\nting that form, and again notified that Gupta had until Octo-\\nber 2, 2015, to decline. The email twice cautioned that, if the\\nemployee did not opt out, continued employment would re-\\nflect that the employee “consented and agreed to the terms”\\nof the arbitration agreement and CARE guidebook. The email\\nconcluded with an assurance that opting out of the arbitration\\nagreement would not adversely affect Gupta’s employment\\nstatus. The one page opt-out form attached to the email prom-\\ninently placed the opt-out deadline in bold capital letters, al-\\nlowed for submission by email, and provided directions if\\nMorgan Stanley failed to confirm the employee’s rejection of\\nmandatory arbitration.\\n Over the next thirty days, Gupta had access via links on\\nthe September 2 email to the arbitration agreement, CARE\\nguidebook, and arbitration opt-out form. During this period,\\nMorgan Stanley also maintained on its intranet page (accessi-\\nble by all Morgan Stanley employees) a reminder notification\\nabout the upcoming expansion to mandatory arbitration and\\nthe deadline to opt out. The reminder encouraged employees\\nto “carefully review the September 2 email from Human Re-\\nsources” and once more instructed that, unless they chose to\\nopt out, continued employment would bind them to the terms\\nof the new arbitration agreement.\\n The October 2015 deadline to opt out came and went.\\nGupta did not submit an opt-out form, respond to the Sep-\\ntember 2 email, or otherwise communicate with human\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 5\\n\\nresources about the mandatory arbitration program. He con-\\ntinued to work at Morgan Stanley for two more years until,\\nhe alleges, the company forced him to resign because of im-\\nminent military leave.2 Gupta sued Morgan Stanley for dis-\\ncrimination and retaliation in violation of the Uniformed\\nServices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38\\nU.S.C. §§ 4301–35, and a related defamation claim.\\n Morgan Stanley moved to compel arbitration under the\\nterms of the 2015 CARE arbitration program and agreement.\\nGupta resisted, asserting he never agreed to arbitrate. He said\\nhe first saw the September 2 email and arbitration agreement\\nwhen Morgan Stanley filed its motion to compel and filed a\\ndeclaration to that effect.3\\n The district court deferred ruling on Morgan Stanley’s mo-\\ntion to compel “pending a trial regarding whether an agree-\\nment to arbitrate exists.” The court agreed with Morgan\\nStanley that Illinois law permits an offeror to construe silence\\nas acceptance if circumstances make it reasonable to do so.\\n\\n 2 In addition to working as a financial advisor, Gupta is a member of\\nthe Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps reserves. He alleges Morgan\\nStanley “effectively terminated” him after he notified the company that he\\nhad been called for six months active duty. Morgan Stanley counters that\\nGupta resigned after the company notified him of an internal investiga-\\ntion into his alleged corporate policy violations; according to Morgan\\nStanley, Gupta recommended insurance products outside of Morgan\\nStanley without prior notice or approval. Gupta’s appeal is limited to the\\ndistrict court’s order compelling arbitration, and neither party asks us to\\nresolve their substantive disputes.\\n 3 Gupta also declared “[a]s an attorney, I am familiar with arbitrations\\n\\nand arbitration clauses … and am cautious to avoid them. … If I had seen\\nany email that referenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it\\nand immediately opted out of the agreement.”\\n\\f6 No. 18-3584\\n\\nBut it treated Gupta’s sworn statement that he had “never\\nseen” the September 2 email as a denial that he received the\\nemail, not simply a denial that he read it. At that point, the\\ncourt found Morgan Stanley had not reliably demonstrated\\nthat Gupta had received the email. Because Gupta said\\nMorgan Stanley never sent him an offer, the court reasoned,\\n“there [was] a genuine dispute about the existence of an\\nagreement to arbitrate.” See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“If the making of the\\narbitration agreement … be in issue, the court shall proceed\\nsummarily to the trial thereof.”). After the parties’ submitted\\npretrial evidence, however, Gupta could no longer dispute he\\nreceived the September 2 email in his work email account. As\\na result, he stipulated “that the email arrived at his in-box,”\\nbut he maintains he first saw the email only after this lawsuit\\nwas filed.\\n With Gupta’s stipulation, the district court concluded no\\ngenuine dispute of material fact required a trial. The court\\nfound that Gupta’s receipt of the September 2 email, com-\\nbined with his continued employment and failure to opt out\\nof mandatory arbitration, gave rise to an agreement to arbi-\\ntrate. So the court granted Morgan Stanley’s motion to compel\\narbitration and stayed the litigation. The district court certi-\\nfied its ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 1292(b), which we agreed to accept.\\n II\\n We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to\\ncompel arbitration. A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 885 F.3d\\n1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 2018).\\n Gupta’s appeal implicates the Federal Arbitration Act,\\nwhich reflects “both a liberal federal policy favoring\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 7\\n\\narbitration … and the fundamental principle that arbitration\\nis a matter of contract.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563\\nU.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citations omitted). Specifically, the act\\nmandates enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. 9\\nU.S.C. §§ 2, 4. Although it requires arbitration agreements to\\nbe in writing, it does not require them to be signed. Id. § 3;\\nTinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002). The\\nact also extends to employment contracts. Circuit City Stores,\\nInc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118–19 (2001). Even still, courts\\ncannot require a party to submit a dispute to arbitration un-\\nless he has agreed to do so. See A.D. v. Credit One Bank, 885\\nF.3d at 1060 (citations omitted); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local\\n2150 v. NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d 592, 594 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (citations omitted) (holding a party seeking arbitra-\\ntion must present a claim that is, “on its face,” governed by an\\narbitration clause).\\n Against this backdrop, we must resolve whether a valid\\nagreement to arbitrate exists between Gupta and Morgan\\nStanley. If yes, we consider whether Gupta’s claims fall within\\nthe scope of that agreement. We apply state-law principles of\\ncontract formation to answer these questions. Gore v. Alltel\\nCommc’ns, LLC, 666 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2012). “Our role\\nin interpreting a question of state law is to predict how the\\nhighest court of the state would answer the question.” Cannon\\nv. Burge, 752 F.3d 1079, 1091 (7th Cir. 2014). “In the absence of\\nguiding decisions by the state’s highest court, we consult and\\nfollow the decisions of intermediate appellate courts unless\\nthere is a convincing reason to predict the state’s highest court\\nwould disagree.” ADT Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire\\nProt. Dist., 672 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n\\f8 No. 18-3584\\n\\n The parties agree Illinois contract law governs this law-\\nsuit. But they dispute whether an agreement exists at all un-\\nder Illinois law, which “requires only a manifestation of\\nmutual assent on the part of two or more persons.” Zabinsky\\nv. Gelber Grp., Inc., 807 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (cit-\\ning RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981)).\\n When, as here, a “case concerns the application of the Fed-\\neral Arbitration Act,” the Illinois Supreme Court has “base[d]\\n[its] analysis upon principles of fundamental contract law” to\\ndetermine the formation of an agreement. Melena v. Anheuser-\\nBusch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 103, 107 (2006). The court “appl[ies]\\ngeneral contract doctrines” because “that approach is more\\nfaithful to the [act].” Id. at 107–08. Applying these principles,\\nwe start by evaluating the standard we must use under Illi-\\nnois law to ascertain the parties’ manifestation of mutual as-\\nsent (the proverbial meeting of the minds). After that, we\\nconsider the elements of contract formation and whether they\\nexist here to create an enforceable arbitration agreement.\\n A\\n Illinois courts evaluate contract formation under an objec-\\ntive theory. Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1034\\n(7th Cir. 2016) (Illinois law) (citations omitted); Vill. of S. Elgin\\nv. Waste Mgmt. of Illinois, Inc., 810 N.E.2d 658, 670 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n2004) (“‘Intent’ refers to the objective manifestations of intent\\nin the words of the contract and the actions of the parties\\n… .”); J.F. McKinney & Assocs., Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Inv. Corp., 183\\nF.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Illinois uses an objective theory\\nof contract … .”) (citations omitted).\\n Judge Learned Hand famously explained the objective\\ntheory of contract: “A contract has … nothing to do with the\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 9\\n\\npersonal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an\\nobligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of\\nthe parties … which ordinarily accompany and represent a\\nknown intent.” Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of New York, 200 F.\\n287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, Ernst v. Mechanics’ & Metals Nat.\\nBank of City of New York, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d, Nat’l\\nCity Bank of New York v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). “Under\\nthe objective theory, intent to manifest assent in Illinois is re-\\nvealed by ‘outward expressions such as words and acts.’”\\nSgouros, 817 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Bank Computer Network\\nCorp. v. Cont’l Illinois Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago, 442 N.E.2d\\n586, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)). “Intent … does not encompass\\none party’s … purely subjective understandings of which the\\nother party is unaware.” Vill. of S. Elgin, 810 N.E.2d at 670. We\\nevaluate these outward expressions through the lens of an ob-\\njectively reasonable person. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank,\\nN.A., 673 F.3d 547, 563 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying “objectively\\nreasonable person” standard to determine validity of contract\\noffer under Illinois law); Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293–94 (holding\\nacts or words must be “reasonably interpreted” as they would\\nby “ordinary men” and that “whatever was the understand-\\ning” of the parties “is of not the slightest consequence”); see\\nalso Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and\\nContractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 858 (1992) (explaining\\nthat the “objective theory of assent” holds persons to the rea-\\nsonable or normal meaning that their conduct conveys to oth-\\ners). So the parties’ objective conduct, not their subjective\\nintent, determines whether Gupta agreed to mandatory arbi-\\ntration.\\n Gupta contends the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in\\nMelena, 847 N.E.2d 99, requires an employee to have “actual\\nknowledge of an offer” and “a general understanding that a\\n\\f10 No. 18-3584\\n\\nbinding agreement or contract has been entered into.” We do\\nnot read Melena to create these requirements. In Melena the\\nIllinois Supreme Court recognized “that state … court deci-\\nsions cannot hold arbitration agreements to a standard any\\ndifferent or higher than those applicable to other contracts in\\ngeneral.” Id. at 108. On this ground, the court rejected a\\n“knowing and voluntary standard” because it “raise[s] arbi-\\ntration agreements to an elevated status not contemplated by\\nthe [act]” and “means much more than a general understanding\\nthat a binding agreement or contract is being entered into.”\\nId. (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotations omit-\\nted).4\\n Gupta’s reliance on Melena rests entirely on the Illinois Su-\\npreme Court’s use of the phrase “general understanding.” He\\ninterprets that reference to mean contract formation is impos-\\nsible if the offeree lacks a “general understanding” that a con-\\ntract is being formed. He interprets “general understanding”\\nto mean “actual knowledge.” But this interpretation relies on\\nthe subjective intent of the parties, and Illinois uses an objec-\\ntive theory. No part of Melena’s holding or its phrasing allows\\ncourts to consider subjective intent to evaluate the existence\\nof a contract. Rather, Melena is consistent with an objective ap-\\nproach, emphasizing the employee’s conduct—receipt of the\\nemployer’s agreement, and performance consistent with the\\nagreement’s terms—not the employee’s intent. 847 N.E.2d at\\n109.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 The Appellate Court of Illinois had held an agreement to arbitrate\\nclaims must be entered into knowingly and voluntarily to be enforceable.\\nMelena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 826, 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004),\\nrev’d, 847 N.E.2d 99 (2006).\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 11\\n\\n Because the parties’ objective conduct governs our evalu-\\nation—not any one party’s “general understanding” or “ac-\\ntual knowledge”—we consider whether an enforceable\\nagreement exists here.\\n B\\n “In Illinois, an offer, an acceptance and consideration are\\nthe basic ingredients of a contract.” Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109.\\nGupta does not dispute that the September 2 email qualifies\\nas an offer, nor does he challenge that continued employment\\nconstitutes consideration.5 Instead, Gupta argues he never ac-\\ncepted the offer.\\n Although Gupta acknowledges that Morgan Stanley de-\\nlivered its arbitration offer to his work email, he argues “an\\nemployer cannot form a contract by an employee’s silence\\nsimply by proving email delivery of an offer and a failure to\\nopt out.“ The critical question, then, is whether Gupta’s si-\\nlence and inaction in the face of Morgan Stanley’s September\\n2 email constitute acceptance of its proposed arbitration\\nagreement.\\n “‘[A] party named in a contract may, by his acts and con-\\nduct, indicate his assent to its terms and become bound by its\\nprovisions even though he has not signed it.’” Bauer v. Qwest\\nCommc’ns Co., LLC, 743 F.3d 221, 227 (7th Cir. 2014) (interpret-\\ning Illinois law) (quoting Carlton at the Lake, Inc. v. Barber, 928\\nN.E.2d 1266, 1270 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)); Landmark Properties, Inc.\\n\\n 5 Gupta’s concessions on these elements are sensible. See Melena, 847\\nN.E.2d at 109 (holding that the employer’s postal mailing of program-re-\\nlated materials to its employees constituted a valid offer and that “contin-\\nued employment is sufficient consideration for the enforcement of\\nemployment agreements”).\\n\\f12 No. 18-3584\\n\\nv. Architects Int’l-Chicago, 526 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ill. App. Ct.\\n1988) (holding same). As a corollary, an offeror may construe\\nsilence as acceptance if the circumstances make it reasonable\\nto do so. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Atl. Tele-Network Co., 946\\nF.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Illinois law). For ex-\\nample, “[s]ilence may be construed as acceptance where ‘be-\\ncause of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that\\nthe offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to\\naccept.’” Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT\\n(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69(1)(c) (1981)); Ragan v. AT & T\\nCorp., 824 N.E.2d 1183, 1188–89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding\\nplaintiffs’ silence and inaction upon receipt of mailed agree-\\nment for telephone services, and their use of those services,\\nconstituted acceptance of arbitration clause within agree-\\nment); Fineman v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ill.\\nApp. Ct. 1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS\\n§ 69(1)(c)).\\n In the same vein, the relationship between parties may jus-\\ntify the offeror expecting a reply, and thus assuming that si-\\nlence is assent to its proposal. See 2 Williston on Contracts § 6:50\\n(4th ed. 2007); 1 Corbin on Contracts § 3:18 (rev. ed. 2018) (“Of-\\nten … silence coupled with … expectations engendered by a\\nprior relationship can reasonably be understood by the offe-\\nror as an acceptance.”); see also Rivera-Colon v. AT&T Mobility\\nPuerto Rico, Inc., 913 F.3d 200, 213–14 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding\\nemployee’s silence operated as acceptance of employer’s ar-\\nbitration agreement transmitted by email); Circuit City Stores,\\nInc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding em-\\nployee’s failure to opt out of employer’s dispute resolution\\nagreement manifested consent to arbitration under that\\nagreement).\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 13\\n\\n The pre-2015 CARE program explicitly stated its terms\\nwere subject to change after an “announce[ment] in advance,”\\nso Gupta had to keep abreast of the company’s dispute reso-\\nlution policies upon announcement. Morgan Stanley emailed\\nthe arbitration policy changes to Gupta personally, granted\\nhim thirty days to review the new arbitration agreement, cir-\\nculated an opt-out form, conspicuously displayed the dead-\\nline to opt out, posted a continual company intranet reminder\\nof the new arbitration policy and opt-out date, and repeatedly\\ninformed that it would construe silence as acceptance of man-\\ndatory arbitration. All these actions bolstered the company’s\\nexpectation of a response.\\n Gupta worked for Morgan Stanley for four years. That em-\\nployment included regular email communication, and justi-\\nfied Morgan Stanley’s expectation of a reply, and its\\nassumption that Gupta’s silence indicated his acceptance of\\nmandatory arbitration. This case does not present an unsolic-\\nited offer-by-email from a stranger when the expectation of\\nthe offeree’s response is rare, if not baseless. Instead, employ-\\nment includes the understanding that employees will act with\\ndiligence in following an employer’s instructions and\\nresponding to requests, whether transmitted by email or an-\\nother reasonable mode of communication. Here, Gupta sub-\\nmits no evidence, policy, or prior course of dealings from\\nwhich we can infer that Gupta was free as an employee to ig-\\nnore Morgan Stanley’s communications without repercus-\\nsion.\\n Instead, Gupta argues Morgan Stanley failed to provide\\nenough notice to trigger his response, pointing to Campbell v.\\nGen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005). In\\nCampbell, an employer sent a companywide email\\n\\f14 No. 18-3584\\n\\nannouncing the implementation of a new dispute resolution\\npolicy. Id. at 547–48. Yet the employer’s email failed to men-\\ntion several crucial facts about the policy: that it contained an\\nagreement to arbitrate and contractually binding terms;\\ntreated continued employment as an acceptance of those\\nterms; and resulted in a waiver of an employee’s access to a\\njudicial forum. Id. at 547–48, 557–58. For those reasons, the\\ncourt held the employer’s email failed to provide “minimally\\nsufficient notice” of a contractual modification. Id. at 557, 559.\\n But unlike in Campbell, Morgan Stanley’s September 2\\nemail to Gupta mentioned the new “arbitration agreement”\\neight times; explained that arbitration would become the ex-\\nclusive forum for covered claims; informed that he was free\\nto opt out without consequence; instructed if he did not elect\\nto opt out that continued employment would be construed as\\nacceptance; and, in the agreement itself, explained in bold and\\ncapitalized words that the parties were “giving up [their]\\nright to a jury trial in any forum.” Even more, Gupta attested\\nto the clarity of Morgan Stanley’s email when he declared un-\\nder oath, “[a]s an attorney … [i]f I had seen [the] email that\\nreferenced an arbitration clause, I would have reviewed it and\\nimmediately opted out.” Given these differences, Campbell\\ndoes not offer Gupta a lifeline.\\n The conduct of Morgan Stanley and Gupta indicated mu-\\ntual assent to mandatory arbitration. See Zabinsky, 807 N.E.2d\\nat 671. Morgan Stanley reasonably construed Gupta’s silence\\nas acceptance of the arbitration agreement after he was given\\na clear offer, a reasonable opportunity to opt-out, and re-\\npeated instructions that silence and continued employment\\nreflected acceptance. See Ragan, 824 N.E.2d at 1188–89 (hold-\\ning silence reflected acceptance of arbitration agreement\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 15\\n\\nwhere plaintiff “had a reasonable opportunity to reject the of-\\nfer but failed to do so”); see also Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309\\nF.3d 404, 415 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding same under Illinois law).\\nSimilarly, the parties’ employment relationship made it rea-\\nsonable to expect Gupta would notify Morgan Stanley if he\\nintended to decline its offer, as well as that silence would\\nconvey acceptance. Bauer, 743 F.3d at 228. When, as here, “in-\\naction is indistinguishable from overt acceptance,” Najd, 294\\nF.3d at 1109, we may infer the parties have agreed. For these\\nreasons, we conclude the district court reasonably construed\\nGupta’s silence and continued employment as assent to the\\narbitration agreement.\\n The next question is whether that agreement covers\\nGupta’s claims for discrimination, retaliation, and defama-\\ntion. It does: § 2 of the arbitration agreement expressly desig-\\nnates each of these charges as a “covered claim.” Because\\nGupta’s claims fall within the scope of the arbitration\\nagreement, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC, 762 F.3d at 594,\\nthe district court did not err in compelling the parties to arbi-\\ntrate those claims.\\n As a final line of defense, Gupta contends his employment\\nagreement prohibits Morgan Stanley from requiring manda-\\ntory arbitration without his written consent. This argument\\nfails to acknowledge that Gupta’s employment agreement\\nand the CARE arbitration program are separate, free-standing\\nagreements. No version of Morgan Stanley’s CARE program,\\nbefore or after 2015, required a signed agreement. So unless\\nthe employment agreement incorporated the terms of the\\nCARE arbitration program, no signature was needed to mod-\\nify that program, as Gupta claims.\\n\\f16 No. 18-3584\\n\\n As we relayed earlier, Gupta’s employment agreement\\ncontained a merger clause. “The presence of a merger clause\\nis strong evidence that the parties intended the writing to be\\nthe complete and exclusive agreement between them.”\\nRosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 665 (7th Cir.\\n2002) (interpreting Illinois law) (citations omitted). That the\\nparties here intended to exclude “other written agreements”\\nand “policies and procedures of the Firm” is supported by the\\nmerger clause’s proviso “[t]his writing constitutes the entire\\nagreement … with respect to the subject matter recited in this\\nAgreement.” It also provides“[t]his Agreement” requires a\\nwriting signed by the parties to amend terms.\\n “Mere reference to another contract or document is not\\nsufficient to incorporate its terms into a contract.” Id. at 666.\\nInstead, “there must be an express intent to incorporate,” id.,\\nand there is no such expression here. A fair reading of the\\nmerger clause supports that it references “other” agreements\\nand policies to “assure[] the continued vitality” of those in-\\nstruments, each of which are “necessary, but self-contained”\\nagreements in Gupta’s employment relationship. Id. at 663,\\n665. Gupta’s employment agreement is not susceptible to an\\ninterpretation that it incorporated the terms of the CARE ar-\\nbitration program, such that any modification to the program\\nneeded Gupta’s sign off.\\n Last, Gupta claims the parties had a “course of dealing”\\nrequiring him to initial “each and every paragraph” of any\\nagreement between them. But the record does not support\\nthis conclusion. Gupta entered several agreements with\\nMorgan Stanley, including for a $1.5 million loan. Yet he\\npoints to only one contract, his employment agreement, to\\nprove a “course of dealing.” Even putting this imbalance\\n\\fNo. 18-3584 17\\n\\naside, Gupta fails to acknowledge that the source of his arbi-\\ntration obligation, the CARE program, specified its terms\\n“may change or be discontinued” after an “announce[ment]\\nin advance” before becoming “equally binding upon [the\\nemployee] and the Firm.” No version of the CARE program\\nrequires employees to initial policy modifications before tak-\\ning effect. So here the absence of initialing poses no problems.\\n The employment agreement is relevant in another key re-\\nspect: its arbitration clause requires Gupta to honor any arbi-\\ntration agreement with Morgan Stanley. A valid arbitration\\nagreement exists that covers Gupta’s claims, so the district\\ncourt correctly compelled those claims to arbitration.\\n III\\n Because this case meets all three requirements to compel\\narbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act—a written\\nagreement to arbitrate, a dispute within the scope of the arbi-\\ntration agreement, and a refusal to arbitrate—the district\\ncourt correctly compelled arbitration, and its judgment is\\nAFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3878,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4649542,"string":"4,649,542"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Mark A. Campbell v. Kevin Kallas"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2075"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2075\\nMARK A. CAMPBELL,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nKEVIN KALLAS, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-261-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Mark Campbell, also known as\\nNicole Rose Campbell, is an inmate in the Wisconsin prison\\nsystem. In 2007 Campbell pleaded guilty to first-degree\\nsexual assault of a child and is now serving a 34-year sen-\\ntence. Campbell has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria;\\nshe is biologically male but identifies as female. Department\\n\\n2 No. 18-2075\\n\\nof Corrections (“DOC”) medical staff are treating Campbell’s\\ncondition with cross-gender hormone therapy.\\n Beginning in September 2013, Campbell repeatedly re-\\nquested a more radical intervention: sex-reassignment\\nsurgery. National standards of care recommend that patients\\nundertake one year of “real life” experience as a person of\\ntheir self-identified gender before resorting to irreversible\\nsurgical options. That preparatory period presents challeng-\\nes for officials charged with the administration of sex-\\nsegregated prisons. DOC officials consulted an outside\\nexpert, who determined that Campbell was a potential\\nsurgical candidate. But the expert’s cautious conclusion was\\nconditioned on DOC officials developing a safe, workable\\nsolution to the real-life-experience dilemma. Citing these\\nconcerns and DOC policy, officials denied Campbell’s re-\\nquest.\\n After filing grievances and exhausting administrative\\nappeals, Campbell sued Dr. Kevin Kallas, the DOC Mental\\nHealth Director, and a host of other prison officials under\\n42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the defendants were\\ndeliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in\\nviolation of the Eighth Amendment and sought damages\\nand injunctive relief. Both sides moved for summary judg-\\nment, and the defendants also claimed qualified immunity.\\nThe district court denied the motions. As relevant here, the\\njudge rejected the claim of qualified immunity, concluding\\nthat caselaw clearly established a constitutional right to\\neffective medical treatment.\\n We reverse. Qualified immunity shields a public official\\nfrom suit for damages unless caselaw clearly puts him on\\nnotice that his action is unconstitutional. The judge’s ap-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 3\\n\\nproach to the qualified-immunity question was far too\\ngeneral. The Eighth Amendment requires prison healthcare\\nprofessionals to exercise medical judgment when making\\ndecisions about an inmate’s treatment. And they cannot\\ncompletely deny the care of a serious medical condition. But\\ncases recognizing those broad principles could not have\\nwarned these defendants that treating an inmate’s gender\\ndysphoria with hormone therapy and deferring considera-\\ntion of sex-reassignment surgery violates the Constitution.\\nMoreover, it’s doubtful that a prisoner can prove a case of\\ndeliberate indifference when, as here, prison officials fol-\\nlowed accepted medical standards. The defendants are\\nimmune from damages liability.\\n I. Background\\nA. Standards of Care\\n Campbell suffers from gender dysphoria, an acute form\\nof mental distress stemming from strong feelings of incon-\\ngruity between one’s anatomy and one’s gender identity. See\\nAM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL\\nOF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013). To “provide clinical\\nguidance for health professionals,” the World Professional\\nAssociation for Transgender Health established national\\nstandards of care for transsexual, transgender, and gender-\\nnonconforming individuals. WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASS’N FOR\\nTRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH\\nOF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, & GENDER NONCONFORMING\\nPEOPLE 1 (7th version 2011) (“the Standards”),\\nhttps://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7/\\nStandards%20of%20Care_V7%20Full%20Book_English.pdf.\\nThe parties cite the Standards extensively and treat them as\\n\\n4 No. 18-2075\\n\\nauthoritative. “While flexible,” these clinical guidelines\\n“offer standards for promoting optimal health care.” Id. at 2.\\n The Standards outline a range of treatment options for in-\\ndividuals with gender dysphoria. Patients may be encour-\\naged to alter their “gender expression” by living\\ncontinuously or part-time in another gender role. Id. at 9.\\nHormone therapy, which can “feminize or masculinize the\\nbody,” is appropriate for some patients. Id. The Standards\\nprovide four criteria for hormone-therapy eligibility:\\n 1. Persistent, well-documented gender dyspho-\\n ria;\\n 2. Capacity to make a fully informed decision\\n and to consent for treatment;\\n 3. Age of majority in a given country … ; [and]\\n 4. If significant medical or mental health con-\\n cerns are present, they must be reasonably\\n well-controlled.\\nId. at 34. Psychotherapy is not an “absolute” prerequisite for\\nhormone therapy or surgery but is “highly recommended.”\\nId. at 28.\\n Surgery is “the last and the most considered step in the\\ntreatment process,” and not all gender-dysphoric patients\\nare surgical candidates. Id. at 54. The Standards outline\\nseveral surgical approaches. Id. at 57–61. Some modify\\nsecondary sex characteristics via breast reduction or aug-\\nmentation, and facial- and voice-feminization surgery. Id. at\\n57. The Standards don’t require hormonal interventions or\\nextensive preparatory periods for these surgeries, though\\n12 months of feminizing hormone therapy is recommended\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 5\\n\\nfor male-to-female patients. Id. at 58–59. Surgeries altering a\\npatient’s reproductive organs carry stricter eligibility criteria.\\nId. at 59–61. A patient meets the criteria for a hysterectomy\\nand ovariectomy (removal of the uterus and ovaries) or an\\norchiectomy (removal of the testicles) if he or she satisfies\\nthe hormone-therapy criteria and has completed a year of\\ncontinuous hormone therapy. Id. at 60.\\n For operations commonly referred to as sex-reassignment\\nsurgeries—surgeries that replace an individual’s existing\\ngenitals with approximations of those of the opposite sex—\\nthe Standards add yet another requirement. In addition to a\\nyear of hormone therapy, the Standards require patients to\\nhave “12 continuous months of living in a gender role that is\\ncongruent with their gender identity.” Id. The World Profes-\\nsional Association for Transgender Health justifies this\\nrequirement by citing an “expert clinical consensus that this\\nexperience provides ample opportunity for patients to\\nexperience and socially adjust in their desired gender role[]\\nbefore undergoing irreversible surgery.” Id. at 60. The one-\\nyear preparatory period helps patients adjust to the “pro-\\nfound personal and social consequences” of adjusting one’s\\ngender expression. Id. at 61. The Standards don’t include an\\nexception to the real-life-experience requirement for patients\\nliving in institutional settings. Id. at 67–68. The World Pro-\\nfessional Association for Transgender Health explicitly states\\nthat the Standards can be utilized effectively under those\\nconditions. Id.\\nB. DOC Policies and Procedures\\n The DOC established policies to address the unique chal-\\nlenges posed by the incarceration of transgender inmates.\\nThe Gender Dysphoria Committee (the “Committee”) is\\n\\n6 No. 18-2075\\n\\ncharged with handling medical treatment and accommoda-\\ntion requests by an inmate with gender dysphoria. Several of\\nthe defendants are current and former committee members;\\nDr. Kallas serves as DOC Mental Health Director and chairs\\nthe Committee.\\n DOC Policy 500.70.27 lays out the protocol for trans-\\ngender inmates. Wisconsin Department of Corrections,\\nDivision of Adult Institutions, Policy and Procedures, Policy\\nNo. 500.70.27 (Nov. 11, 2017) at Separate Appendix of\\nDefendants–Appellants at 64–73, Campbell v. Kallas,\\nNo. 18-2075 (7th Cir. July 18, 2018), ECF No. 17. An inmate\\nmay self-identify as transgender at any point during his\\nincarceration, making him eligible for several accommoda-\\ntions. Id. at 66. The inmate may order “clothing, shoes,\\nundergarments[,] and prescription eyeglass frames … that\\ncorrespond to the desired gender.” Id. at 73. Undergarments\\nmatching the inmate’s gender identity are also allowed,\\nprovided “they are not visible to others when leaving the\\ncell” or worn in a “disruptive or provocative” manner. Id.\\nMakeup is unavailable for an inmate in male facilities, but an\\ninmate may purchase feminine shower products and request\\na hair-removal product. Id.\\n In addition to these lifestyle accommodations, the DOC\\noffers several forms of medical treatment. Once an inmate\\nself-identifies as transgender, prison medical staff or an\\noutside consultant may assign a clinical diagnosis of gender\\ndysphoria. Id. at 66. A clinically diagnosed inmate is entitled\\nto appropriate psychological treatment, psychiatric care,\\nhormone therapy (under certain circumstances), and “[o]ther\\ntreatment determined to be medically necessary by the\\nTransgender Committee.” Id. at 68.\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 7\\n\\n Requests for new hormonal or surgical interventions are\\nprocessed by a hierarchy of prison medical officials who\\nreview the inmate’s condition. Id. at 69–70. When an inmate\\nfirst requests hormone therapy or surgery, the Supervisor of\\nthe Psychological Services Unit is notified. Id. at 69. The\\nSupervisor assigns a staff member to determine whether to\\ndiagnose the patient with gender dysphoria and whether a\\n“more specialized evaluation” by a gender-dysphoria con-\\nsultant is needed. Id. The Psychological Services Unit report\\nis forwarded to the Mental Health Director, who may call in\\na gender-dysphoria consultant for further evaluation. Id. If\\nthe consultant recommends hormone therapy or surgery, the\\nDirector reviews the report. The consultant’s recommenda-\\ntions are not binding and can either be approved or denied\\nby the Director in consultation with the Committee. Id. at 69–\\n70. Finally, the policy notes: “Due to the limitations inherent\\nin being incarcerated, a real-life experience for the purpose\\nof gender-reassignment therapy is not possible for inmates\\nwho reside within a correctional facility. However, treatment\\nand accommodations may be provided to lessen gender\\ndysphoria.” Id. at 70.\\nC. Campbell’s Course of Treatment\\n Campbell is currently incarcerated at the Racine Correc-\\ntional Institution. Prior to her incarceration, she self-\\nadministered hormone treatments. Although she considered\\nsex-reassignment surgery, she never discussed it with a\\nphysician.\\n Campbell raised gender-identity concerns with a prison\\npsychologist in January 2012. The Committee hired Cynthia\\nOsborne to evaluate Campbell. Osborne is a gender-\\ndysphoria expert and has consulted on numerous cases for\\n\\n8 No. 18-2075\\n\\nprison systems around the country. In August 2012 Osborne\\ndiagnosed Campbell with gender dysphoria but stopped\\nwell short of recommending sex-reassignment surgery.\\n Osborne explained that the 12-month real-life experience\\nrequired by the World Professional Association for\\nTransgender Health could not be fully implemented in the\\nprison setting. She noted that Campbell had “never had the\\nopportunity to meaningfully consolidate [her] preferred\\nfemale identity into a successful life” and would “not be able\\nto do such consolidation in the restrictive environment of\\nincarceration.” Given that challenge, as well as Campbell’s\\n“comorbid psychiatric conditions and vulnerabilities,”\\nOsborne determined that “only reversible interventions\\nshould be considered” and that “[s]ex[-]reassignment sur-\\ngery [was] wholly contraindicated.” Osborne recommended\\nhormone therapy, counseling, and “that the DOC consider\\nwhat feminizing allowances might be made,” even though\\n“[s]uch accommodations are rarely if ever medically neces-\\nsary.”\\n The Committee adopted Osborne’s recommendations,\\ninitiating hormone therapy and permitting Campbell to don\\nfeminine clothing and glasses and use feminine shower\\nproducts. On September 5, 2013, Campbell submitted a\\nrequest for sex-reassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas, following\\nthe Committee’s recommendation, denied Campbell’s re-\\nquest, citing Osborne’s finding that “surgical interventions\\nwere contraindicated.” Dr. Kallas explained that DOC\\n“policy does not prohibit surgical intervention,” but he and\\nthe Committee recognized “the inherent difficulty for any\\ninmate to meet eligibility requirements for gender reassign-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 9\\n\\nment surgery while in prison—specifically, the need for a\\nvalid real-life experience in the desired gender role.”\\n Campbell continued to file surgery requests, and DOC\\nofficials again consulted with Osborne. She reviewed\\nCampbell’s file, talked with the treating psychologist, and\\nmet with Campbell face to face. On August 4, 2014, Osborne\\nsubmitted her second report. Echoing themes from her first\\nreport, Osborne described the Standards as imperfect guides\\nfor treating gender dysphoria in prison. On the possibility of\\nsurgery, Osborne explained that given “the persistent pres-\\nence of severe anatomic dysphoria[,] inmate Campbell may\\nbe a candidate for” sex reassignment. The length of\\nCampbell’s sentence and her track record of cooperating\\nwith medical personnel bolstered the case for surgery.\\n Turning to the “real life experience” requirement,\\nOsborne explained that “[m]any gender dysphoria experts\\nbelieve that the challenges of completing a valid real-life\\nexperience … in the context of incarceration present a formi-\\ndable obstacle to” sex-reassignment surgery. She noted that\\n“there is no empirical evidence on which the DOC can rely\\nin its efforts to predict outcomes, prevent harm[,] and main-\\ntain safety” in developing a real-life experience for\\nCampbell. Thus, the DOC’s “[r]eluctance to embark on a\\nsocial experiment” was “understandable and prudent.” For\\ninmates with lengthy sentences, however, Osborne ques-\\ntioned “whether the [real-life experience] as traditionally\\nunderstood” should be required. Modifying or eliminating\\nthe requirement would carry risks for Campbell, but the\\nDOC should undertake “an examination of the [real-life\\nexperience] concept in order to determine whether there is a\\nworkable approach for inmates.” Still, given these challeng-\\n\\n10 No. 18-2075\\n\\nes, she concluded that “conservative approaches … for\\nincarcerated individuals are wholly warranted.”\\n Summarizing her conclusions, Osborne explained that\\nCampbell had not undergone a valid real-life experience\\nwhile incarcerated, despite Campbell’s claim to the contrary.\\nDeparting from the requirement “may be justifiable in rare\\ncircumstances in correctional settings”—including Camp-\\nbell’s case. Osborne stated that Campbell could be a surgical\\ncandidate but conditioned her assessment on the DOC’s\\ndevelopment of “a safe and reasonable approach to resolv-\\ning the [real-life experience] conundrum.”\\n On September 29, 2014, Campbell filed another request\\nseeking approval for a real-life experience and sex-\\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas responded on October 23,\\nassuring Campbell that “the DOC is continuing to look at\\nhow we can provide at least some elements of a real-life\\nexperience.” Nevertheless, “providing a true or full real-life\\nexperience that will help to determine future suitability for\\nsurgical interventions remain[ed] problematic in an incar-\\ncerated setting.” Referring to Osborne’s second report,\\nDr. Kallas, with the Committee’s recommendation, denied\\nCampbell’s request. Campbell sent additional letters on\\nMarch 15 and April 4, 2015, but Dr. Kallas again denied the\\nrequests for surgery citing the “considerable limitations in\\nwhat [officials could] provide for a real-life experience.”\\nDr. Kallas also rejected Campbell’s request for electrolysis for\\nhair removal and “light makeup,” neither of which was\\n“currently permitted” in the prison.\\n In the wake of these denials, Campbell filed four admin-\\nistrative grievances reiterating her arguments for sex-\\nreassignment surgery, electrolysis, and makeup. All were\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 11\\n\\ndenied. In response to the electrolysis and makeup requests,\\nDOC officials determined that “makeup is not a medically\\nnecessary accommodation” and “[a]lternatives to electroly-\\nsis” were readily available.\\nD. District-Court Proceedings\\n In April 2016 Campbell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\\nalleging that DOC officials were deliberately indifferent to\\nher serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth\\nAmendment. 1 The suit seeks damages and injunctive relief\\nordering “necessary medical care, including [sex-\\nreassignment surgery], and other appropriate treatment,\\nincluding light makeup, electrolysis, breast augmentation,\\nand voice therapy.”\\n Both sides moved for summary judgment, introducing\\ndueling expert opinions on Campbell’s suitability for sur-\\ngery. Dr. Kathy Oriel, one of Campbell’s experts, determined\\nthat “no physician with adequate expertise and experience\\nin gender medicine would” dispute Campbell’s need for sex-\\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Chester W. Schmidt, the defense\\nexpert, opined that sex-reassignment surgery was not medi-\\ncally necessary.\\n Campbell argued that because DOC officials “imple-\\nmented and enforce[d] a blanket ban on medically necessary\\ntreatment … and applied it to Campbell,” they “acted with\\ndeliberate indifference as a matter of law.” The defendants\\nsought qualified immunity, arguing that their treatment\\n\\n\\n1 Campbell later amended her complaint to bring an equal-protection\\nclaim under the Fourteenth Amendment. That claim is not at issue in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n12 No. 18-2075\\n\\ndecisions were not a substantial departure from accepted\\nprofessional judgment.\\n The district judge denied the motions for the most part.\\nBecause DOC officials knew about Campbell’s gender\\ndysphoria and admitted its status as a serious medical\\ncondition, the judge saw one key remaining question:\\nwhether sex-reassignment surgery was medically necessary.\\nOn that issue Dr. Oriel’s expert testimony generated a\\nfactual dispute, so the judge held that “Campbell ha[d]\\nadduced evidence sufficient to show deliberate indiffer-\\nence,” precluding summary judgment. The medical necessi-\\nty of sex-reassignment surgery in Campbell’s case would be\\ndetermined at a bench trial.\\n The judge also addressed Campbell’s requests for elec-\\ntrolysis and makeup, articulating a preliminary determina-\\ntion that providing those accommodations “would offer\\nmore effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender dysphoria\\nand finding “no apparent medical reason to deny” them. But\\nCampbell hadn’t moved for summary judgment on those\\nclaims, so the judge gave the defendants notice and an\\nopportunity to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules\\nof Civil Procedure. They replied with two arguments: First, a\\nruling on electrolysis and makeup prior to a ruling on\\nsurgery would be premature. Second, they cited the lack of\\nrecord evidence that Campbell, “on an individualized basis,\\nhas a medical need for electrolysis and makeup.” The judge\\npostponed further consideration of the issue until trial.\\n The judge’s discussion of qualified immunity was brief\\nand framed the inquiry at a high level of generality. He\\nruled that because the Eighth Amendment does not permit\\nstate officials to deny effective treatment for the serious\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 13\\n\\nmedical needs of prisoners, the “[d]efendants had fair notice\\nthat denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender\\ndysphoria would violate the Constitution. The judge re-\\nbuffed the defendants’ request for a more fact-specific\\nanalysis focusing on sex-reassignment surgery.\\n II. Discussion\\nA. Appellate Jurisdiction\\n The defendants appeal the denial of qualified immunity.\\n“[P]retrial orders denying qualified immunity generally fall\\nwithin the collateral order doctrine.” Plumhoff v. Rickard,\\n572 U.S. 765, 772 (2014) (citation omitted). Campbell’s suit\\nseeks damages and injunctive relief, and the case will pro-\\nceed to trial on the claim for injunctive relief even if the\\ndefendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the damag-\\nes claim. Campbell argues that we should therefore decline\\nto exercise jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.\\n That position cannot be squared with Supreme Court and\\ncircuit precedent. It has long been clear that an order deny-\\ning qualified immunity, “to the extent that it turns on an\\nissue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the\\nmeaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of\\na final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530\\n(1985). Qualified immunity is a form of immunity from\\nsuit—that is, the trial process and attendant burdens—not\\nmerely immunity from damages. Id. at 526–27.\\n The Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide\\nwhether an order denying qualified immunity may be\\nimmediately appealed when the suit also seeks injunctive\\nrelief. Id. at 520 n.5. We have done so, however. In Scott v.\\nLacy, 811 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff sought\\n\\n14 No. 18-2075\\n\\nmoney damages and injunctive relief in a suit against public\\nuniversity officials. Id. at 1154. He argued that the collateral-\\norder doctrine is inapplicable to suits seeking injunctive\\nrelief as well as damages because the case could still proceed\\nto trial regardless of the outcome of an interlocutory appeal\\nof a qualified-immunity ruling. Id. at 1153.\\n Acknowledging a circuit split on this question, we fol-\\nlowed the majority rule and held “that a pending request for\\nan injunction does not defeat jurisdiction of interlocutory\\nappeals based on claims of immunity.” Id. We restated the\\nreasoning in Forsyth and added that “if a request for an\\ninjunction prevented appeal on the question of immunity,\\nplaintiffs who wished to harass officials to travail would\\nneed only demand equitable relief.” Id. at 1154.\\n Every circuit to address this question agrees. See Acierno\\nv. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc); Schopler v.\\nBliss, 903 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1990); DiMartini v. Ferrin,\\n889 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1989); Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79\\n(2d Cir. 1988); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,\\n844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988); Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395 (8th\\nCir. 1987); Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.\\n1986); de Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187 (1st Cir.\\n1986). The Fourth Circuit—the outlier when we decided\\nScott—has since reversed course. See Young v. Lynch,\\n846 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1988).\\n As we’ve noted, the Supreme Court hasn’t squarely re-\\nvisited the question left open in Forsyth. But in Behrens v.\\nPelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), the Court came quite close to\\nembracing the rule we adopted in Scott. The plaintiff there\\nraised multiple claims, including Bivens claims against\\nwhich the defendant unsuccessfully sought qualified im-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 15\\n\\nmunity. Id. at 302–03. The plaintiff argued that the defend-\\nant’s interlocutory appeal was inappropriate because he\\nwould still “be required to endure discovery and trial on\\nmatters separate from the claims against which immunity\\nwas asserted.” Id. at 311. The Court clarified that a qualified-\\nimmunity appeal “cannot be foreclosed by the mere addition\\nof other claims to the suit.” Id. at 312 (emphasis added). Then,\\nventuring beyond the specific facts of the case, the Court\\nexpressed the same concern we identified in Scott: under the\\nplaintiff’s reasoning, “the qualified-immunity right not to be\\nsubjected to pretrial proceedings” or “to trial itself [would]\\nbe eliminated, so long as the complaint seeks injunctive\\nrelief.” Id. (emphasis added). Behrens represents a variation\\non Scott—the case concerned multiple substantive claims\\nrather than multiple forms of relief—but the variation was\\nso slight that the Court saw fit to cite Scott in support of its\\nconclusion. Id. at 312 n.5.\\n Campbell urges us to reconsider Scott, a step that would\\nrevive a long-dormant circuit split and come close to contra-\\ndicting Behrens. We need “compelling reasons” to overrule\\ncircuit precedent. Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir.\\n2005). We may do so when “our position remains a minority\\none among other circuits, when the Supreme Court issues a\\ndecision on an analogous issue that compels us to reconsider\\nour position, or when an intracircuit conflict exists.” Glaser v.\\nWound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 2009)\\n(citations omitted). None of those conditions are satisfied\\nhere. And while Campbell claims that she “is not asking this\\n[c]ourt to reconsider qualified-immunity jurisprudence writ\\nlarge,” each of her arguments does just that. She argues that\\nScott rests on misperceptions about the efficacy of qualified\\nimmunity as a shield against the burdens of litigation. She\\n\\n16 No. 18-2075\\n\\ncites recent scholarship criticizing qualified immunity and\\nmarshals policy arguments focused on judicial resources.\\nAnd she draws our attention to separate opinions by some\\nSupreme Court justices raising questions about the doctrine.\\n We have no authority to depart from the Supreme\\nCourt’s qualified-immunity jurisprudence. And while some\\njustices have questioned qualified immunity, those misgiv-\\nings haven’t stopped the Court from vigorously applying\\nthe doctrine. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.\\n577 (2018). Campbell’s fallback argument asks us to carve\\nout an exception to Scott for cases involving a substantial\\nrisk of harm. But in true emergencies, a plaintiff can seek\\npreliminary injunctive relief. See Wheeler v. Wexford Health\\nSources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681–83 (7th Cir. 2012). We proceed\\nto the merits.\\nB. Qualified Immunity\\n We review qualified-immunity questions independently.\\nGreen v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n The Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and\\nunusual punishment includes the right of prisoners to be\\nfree from “pain and suffering [that] no one suggests would\\nserve any penological purpose.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.\\n97, 103 (1976). As applied in the context of prison medical\\ncare, “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or\\ninjury states a cause of action under § 1983” for violation of\\nthe Eighth Amendment. Id. We evaluate deliberate-\\nindifference claims by “first examining whether a plaintiff\\nsuffered from an objectively serious medical condition[] and\\nthen determining whether the individual defendant was\\ndeliberately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter,\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 17\\n\\n836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The parties agree\\nthat gender dysphoria is a serious medical condition. See\\nMaggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing\\ngender dysphoria as a “serious psychiatric disorder”).\\n To prove deliberate indifference, “mere negligence is not\\nenough. … [A] plaintiff must provide evidence that an\\nofficial actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of\\nharm.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. The linchpin is a lack of\\nprofessional judgment. “A medical professional is entitled to\\ndeference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally\\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\\nthose circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th\\nCir. 2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d\\n982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998)). A prison medical professional faces\\nliability only if his course of treatment is “such a substantial\\ndeparture from accepted professional judgment, practice, or\\nstandards[] as to demonstrate that the person responsible\\nactually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at\\n895 (quoting Collignon, 163 F.3d at 988).\\n Qualified immunity protects government officials from\\ndamages liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate\\nclearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which\\na reasonable person would have known.” Estate of Clark v.\\nWalker, 865 F.3d 544, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson\\nv. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). We evaluate “(1) wheth-\\ner the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plain-\\ntiff[], show that the defendants violated a constitutional\\nright; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly\\nestablished at the time of the alleged violation.” Gonzalez v.\\nCity of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009). The latter\\n\\n18 No. 18-2075\\n\\ninquiry is often dispositive and may be addressed first.\\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 236. We do so here.\\n To be “clearly established,” a constitutional right “must\\nhave a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing prece-\\ndent.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. The principle of fair notice\\npervades the doctrine. Qualified immunity applies unless\\nthe specific contours of the right “were sufficiently definite\\nthat any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would\\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\\nat 778–79.\\n Given this emphasis on notice, clearly established law\\ncannot be framed at a “high level of generality.” Ashcroft v.\\nal-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). As the Supreme Court\\nrecently reminded us, “[a] rule is too general if the unlaw-\\nfulness of the officer’s conduct ‘does not follow immediately\\nfrom the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.’”\\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,\\n483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (second alteration in original)).\\nExisting caselaw must “dictate the resolution of the parties’\\ndispute,” Comsys, Inc. v. Pacetti, 893 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir.\\n2018), so while “a case directly on point” isn’t required,\\n“precedent must have placed the … constitutional question\\nbeyond debate,” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)\\n(quotation marks omitted); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct.\\n1148, 1152–53 (2018). Put slightly differently, a right is\\nclearly established only if “every reasonable official would\\nhave understood that what he is doing violates that right.”\\nTaylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (quoting Reichle\\nv. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)) (emphasis added).\\n The Supreme Court’s message is unmistakable: Frame\\nthe constitutional right in terms granular enough to provide\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 19\\n\\nfair notice because qualified immunity “protects all but the\\nplainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the\\nlaw.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quotation marks omitted).\\n Here the judge framed the qualified-immunity question\\nin very broad terms, asking whether it was clearly estab-\\nlished that “denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s\\nmedical condition violates the Eighth Amendment. That\\nformulation—which is basically a highly conceptualized\\nversion of the deliberate-indifference standard—is far too\\ngeneral. On appeal Campbell likewise frames the issue at too\\nhigh a level of generality, arguing that the defendants violat-\\ned clearly established law by failing to exercise individual-\\nized medical judgment and persisting in an ineffective\\ncourse of treatment. These broad principles have support in\\nour caselaw, but neither has been applied in a factual context\\nspecific enough to provide fair notice to the defendants that\\ntheir conduct was unconstitutional.\\n Campbell relies on Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir.\\n2011), and Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011), but\\nneither case clearly establishes that the conduct at issue here\\nwas unconstitutional. In Elyea, Illinois inmates with hepatitis\\nrequested antiviral drugs but were denied medication\\nbecause a prison policy barred that treatment for inmates\\nwith fewer than 18 months of incarceration remaining.\\n631 F.3d at 850. We explained that “inmate medical care\\ndecisions must be fact-based with respect to the particular\\ninmate” rather than the product of categorical rules and that\\nadministrative considerations cannot trump “reasonable\\nmedical judgment.” Id. at 859, 863 (emphasis omitted).\\nTreatment protocols are permissible, but in “an individual\\ncase, … prison officials still must make a determination that\\n\\n20 No. 18-2075\\n\\napplication of the protocols result[s] in adequate medical\\ncare.” Id. at 860.\\n In Fields we considered a facial Eighth Amendment\\nchallenge to a Wisconsin statute that flatly prohibited DOC\\nofficials from providing sex-reassignment surgery or hormone\\ntherapy to inmates. 653 F.3d at 552–53. The district court held\\nthat the “defendants acted with deliberate indifference in\\nthat [they] knew of [plaintiffs’] serious medical need but\\nrefused to provide hormone therapy because of” the statute.\\nId. at 555. We affirmed, but we did not specifically address\\nthe issue of sex-reassignment surgery because the plaintiffs’\\nrequest was limited to hormone therapy. Id. at 556.\\n Campbell argues that Elyea and Fields clearly establish a\\nright to individualized medical judgment. But to accept that\\nframing would contradict the Supreme Court’s instruction to\\neschew broad generalities. When considering deliberate-\\nindifference claims challenging the medical judgment of\\nprison healthcare personnel, qualified-immunity analysis\\nrequires us to frame the legal question with reasonable\\nspecificity.\\n The proper inquiry is whether then-existing caselaw\\nclearly established a constitutional right to gender-dysphoria\\ntreatment beyond hormone therapy. This framing is specific\\nenough to ensure that “the unlawfulness of the officer’s\\nconduct … follow[s] immediately from the conclusion that\\n[the rule] was firmly established.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590\\n(quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original).\\nAnd in this fact-intensive area of constitutional law, a broad-\\ner formulation would violate the Supreme Court’s instruc-\\ntion that the specific contours of the right must be\\n“sufficiently definite that any reasonable official … would\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 21\\n\\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\\nat 779.\\n Neither Elyea nor Fields provides the required level of\\nspecificity. Elyea amounts to a general admonition that\\nofficials must exercise medical judgment rather than me-\\nchanically apply categorical rules. And Fields doesn’t place\\n“beyond debate” the proposition that medical professionals\\nviolate the Eighth Amendment when they provide hormone\\ntherapy but decide—after extensive deliberation and consul-\\ntation with an outside expert—to deny sex-reassignment\\nsurgery. White, 137 S. Ct. at 551. In both cases prison officials\\nrefused to provide any treatment for serious diseases based\\nsolely on categorical rules. That simply didn’t occur here.\\nThese DOC officials consulted an expert in the field and,\\nfacing a gray area of professional opinion, decided to deny\\nthe “last and … most considered step” of gender-dysphoria\\ntreatment.\\n No case in the Federal Reporter could have warned these\\nDOC officials that their treatment choice was unconstitu-\\ntional. When the defendants were making these decisions,\\nonly one federal appellate decision had addressed the merits\\nof a deliberate-indifference claim involving sex-\\nreassignment surgery: Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir.\\n2014) (en banc). 2 There the First Circuit concluded that\\n\\n2 In De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit\\nreversed a district-court order dismissing a gender-dysphoric inmate’s\\nEighth Amendment challenge at screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.\\nEven setting aside that difference in procedural posture, De’lonta bears\\nno resemblance to this case. Unlike the defendants here, in De’lonta the\\nVirginia Department of Corrections officials “never allowed [the plain-\\ntiff] to be evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist in the first place.”\\nId. at 526 n.4; see also id. at 523 (explaining that the plaintiff had “never\\n\\n22 No. 18-2075\\n\\nprison officials who provided hormone therapy and lifestyle\\naccommodations but denied a request for surgery did not\\nviolate the Eighth Amendment. 3 See id. at 90, 96.\\n Campbell next argues that then-existing caselaw clearly\\nestablished that prison officials cannot abandon medical\\njudgment by “persist[ing] in a course of treatment known to\\nbe ineffective.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir.\\n2005). It’s true that we’ve identified this species of\\ndeliberate-indifference claim. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 729–30.\\nBut we’ve never applied that general principle to facts\\nresembling these. Campbell’s lightly developed argument\\ndoes not convince us that this right was “established not as a\\nbroad general proposition but in a particularized sense so\\nthat the contours of the right are clear to a reasonable offi-\\ncial.” Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (quota-\\ntion marks omitted).\\n We’ve previously noted that “[f]or purposes of qualified\\nimmunity, [the Eighth-Amendment] duty” to treat prison-\\n\\nbeen evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist concerning her need\\nfor sex reassignment surgery”). Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.\\n2015), is similar. There the Ninth Circuit reversed an order dismissing a\\ngender-dysphoric inmate’s Eighth Amendment challenge at screening.\\nUnlike the defendants here, in Rosati the defendants applied a blanket\\npolicy against sex-reassignment surgery and never allowed the plaintiff\\nto be evaluated by a gender-dysphoria specialist. Id. at 1039–40.\\n3 A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit recently announced agreement with\\nKosilek. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019). The panel majority\\nfocused on the ongoing debate over the efficacy of sex-reassignment\\nsurgery in general and wasn’t prepared to accept the World Professional\\nAssociation of Transgender Health’s Standards as authoritative. Id. at 221–\\n24. We don’t need to venture beyond the record and address that wider\\ndebate to decide this appeal.\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 23\\n\\ners’ serious medical conditions “need not be litigated and\\nthen established disease by disease or injury by injury.”\\nEstate of Clark, 865 F.3d at 553. Campbell seizes on this\\naphorism and argues that by the same token, “rights need\\nnot be established treatment by treatment.”\\n That argument overlooks the nature of this deliberate-\\nindifference claim. In Estate of Clark, the prison official\\n“chose to do nothing” in response to a known risk of sub-\\nstantial harm to the prisoner. Id. When prison officials\\nutterly fail to provide care for a serious medical condition,\\nthe constitutional violation is obvious and qualified immuni-\\nty offers little protection. See Orlowski v. Milwaukee County,\\n872 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2017) (denying qualified immuni-\\nty where, in the face of clear symptoms, officers “chose to do\\nnothing”).\\n To be sure, the constitutional concern in cases involving\\nno treatment at all is not disease- or injury-specific. But\\nprisons aren’t obligated to provide every requested treat-\\nment once medical care begins. In a deliberate-indifference\\ncase challenging the medical judgment of prison healthcare\\nprofessionals who actually diagnose and treat an inmate’s\\nmedical condition (as opposed to ignoring it), we necessarily\\nevaluate those discrete treatment decisions. And we defer to\\nthose decisions “unless no minimally competent profession-\\nal would have” made them. Sain, 512 F.3d at 895 (quotation\\nmarks omitted). Deciding whether a particular treatment\\nplan was a “substantial departure from accepted profession-\\nal judgment, practice, or standards”—a necessary predicate\\nto establish an Eighth Amendment violation—requires a\\nclose examination of professional standards and the specific\\nchoices made by care providers. Id. (quotation marks omit-\\n\\n24 No. 18-2075\\n\\nted). Given the fact-specific nature of these claims, the notice\\naspect of qualified-immunity doctrine is crucial.\\n Campbell also relies on our recent decision in Mitchell v.\\nKallas, 895 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2018), another gender-dysphoria\\ncase involving a Wisconsin inmate, Osborne, and Dr. Kallas.\\nIn that case Dr. Kallas denied a prisoner’s request for hor-\\nmone therapy despite Osborne’s unequivocal endorsement\\nof the treatment. He cited a DOC policy requiring at least six\\nremaining months of incarceration to initiate a hormone\\nregimen. Id. at 497. The inmate raised deliberate-indifference\\nclaims based on a “fail[ure] to provide [recommended] care\\nfor a non-medical reason” and “inexplicable delays.” Id. at\\n498.\\n Because prisons around the country applied varied eval-\\nuation periods for hormone-therapy eligibility, we held that\\n“Dr. Kallas was not on notice that a 13-month evaluation\\nwould violate” the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 500. To the\\nextent that the claim was based on the length of time it took\\nto complete the assessment, we concluded that qualified\\nimmunity protected Dr. Kallas from damages liability.\\n But we rejected the immunity defense to the failure-to-\\ntreat claim. We framed the question as “whether a prison\\ndoctor would have known that it was unconstitutional never\\nto provide” hormone therapy. Id. at 499. Interpreting the\\nrefusal to begin hormone therapy as a complete denial of\\ncare, we observed that “[p]rison officials have been on notice\\nfor years that leaving serious medical conditions, including\\ngender dysphoria, untreated can amount to unconstitutional\\ndeliberate indifference.” Id. Given our decision in Fields,\\n“circuit precedent clearly established that a total absence of\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 25\\n\\ntreatment for the serious medical needs created by gender\\ndysphoria is unconstitutional.” Id. (emphasis added).\\n We hadn’t decided Mitchell when DOC officials were\\nmaking decisions about Campbell’s care, so it has little\\nrelevance to the qualified-immunity analysis here. Moreo-\\nver, Mitchell illustrates the difference between a complete\\ndenial of care and context-specific judgment calls. A plausi-\\nble interpretation of the record in Mitchell was that the DOC\\noffered the inmate no treatment whatsoever. As we’ve\\nexplained, our caselaw clearly establishes that regardless of\\nthe disease or injury at issue, utterly failing to treat a serious\\nmedical condition constitutes deliberate indifference.\\nCampbell, by contrast, received extensive treatment in the\\nform of hormone therapy, counseling, and various lifestyle\\naccommodations.\\n Deciding whether to provide additional medical inter-\\nventions—especially when the inmate’s preferred course of\\ntreatment poses considerable challenges to prison admin-\\nistration—is not the same as deciding to provide no treat-\\nment at all. Denying a specific therapy in a particular case\\nmight amount to a constitutional violation, but qualified\\nimmunity applies absent reasonably specific notice to prison\\nofficials.\\n In short, when the defendants denied Campbell’s request\\nfor sex-reassignment surgery, no case clearly established a\\nright to gender-dysphoria treatment beyond hormone\\ntherapy. As for Campbell’s requests for electrolysis and\\nmakeup, our cases offer no indication that denying arguably\\nnonmedical cosmetic accommodations violates the Eighth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n26 No. 18-2075\\n\\n Qualified-immunity analysis also asks whether “the facts,\\ntaken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[], show that\\nthe defendants violated a constitutional right.” Gonzalez,\\n578 F.3d at 540. Because no case clearly establishes that\\ndenying treatment beyond hormone therapy is unconstitu-\\ntional, qualified immunity applies regardless. So it’s enough\\nto note that a factfinder may infer deliberate indifference\\nonly where a prison medical professional makes “a medical\\ndecision that has no support in the medical community” and\\nprovides “a suspect rationale … for making it.” Petties,\\n836 F.3d at 729 n.2. And “even admitted medical malpractice\\ndoes not automatically give rise to a constitutional viola-\\ntion”; only “sub-minimal competence … crosses the thresh-\\nold into deliberate indifference.” Id. at 729. Prison healthcare\\nproviders necessarily exercise medical judgment—and thus\\nby definition do not act with deliberate indifference—when\\nthey base treatment decisions on accepted national stand-\\nards and the advice of an expert.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Because clearly established law did not require\\nWisconsin prison officials to provide Campbell with gender-\\ndysphoria treatment beyond hormone therapy, the defend-\\nants are immune from damages liability. The district court’s\\ndecision to the contrary is\\n REVERSED\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 27\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426795/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}, {\"author\": \"WOOD, Chief Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"WOOD, Chief Judge, dissenting. The Supreme Court has\\npounded home the point that when deciding whether quali‐\\nfied immunity applies, lower courts cannot view the law at a\\n“high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al‐Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742\\n(2011). Nonetheless, while “a case directly on point” may be\\nsufficient, it is not necessary. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551\\n(2017). The majority opinion in the case before us recognizes\\nthis distinction, admitting that “‘[f]or purposes of qualified\\nimmunity, [the Eighth‐Amendment] duty’ to treat prisoners’\\nserious medical conditions ‘need not be litigated and then es‐\\ntablished disease by disease or injury by injury.’” Ante at 22\\n(quoting Estate of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 553 (7th Cir.\\n2017)). The Eighth Amendment applies whether the serious\\ncondition is Type I diabetes, paraplegia, congestive heart fail‐\\nure, or a broken leg, even though the treatments for those con‐\\nditions are quite different. Yet the majority fails to follow this\\nrule. Instead, it states that Campbell must show a clearly es‐\\ntablished right specific to her condition—gender dysphoria—\\nand to the particular way the medical profession addresses it.\\nAnte at 20. With respect, that is the wrong question, and so it\\nleads to the wrong answer. I therefore dissent.\\n Before outlining my disagreement with the majority, I\\nshould emphasize my agreement with much of what it says. I\\njoin in full Part II.A of the majority’s opinion, which addresses\\nour jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. Like my col‐\\nleagues, I see no reason to break with our sister circuits, over‐\\nrule Scott v. Lacy, 811 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1987), and decline\\njurisdiction because of Campbell’s outstanding request for in‐\\njunctive relief. My disagreement is limited to the majority’s\\napplication of the qualified immunity inquiry to this case.\\nEven there, I have no quarrel with much of the reasoning. As\\nthe majority notes, the relevant Eighth Amendment inquiry is\\n\\n28 No. 18‐2075\\n\\nwhether Kallas and the other defendants were deliberately in‐\\ndifferent to Campbell’s serious medical condition. Ante at 16.\\nAs the majority recognizes, gender dysphoria is a serious\\nmedical condition for which prison officials must provide\\ntreatment. Ante at 17 (citing Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670,\\n671 (7th Cir. 1997)). We diverge only on the description of the\\nclearly established right and whether Campbell has presented\\nenough evidence to show (if believed by a trier of fact) that\\nKallas violated that right.\\n I\\n This case comes to us from the denial of qualified immun‐\\nity by the district court. That means our review is limited. We\\nmust answer only two questions: whether defendants vio‐\\nlated a constitutional right, and whether that constitutional\\nright was clearly established at the time defendants acted.\\nAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 673 (2009). This means not only\\nthat we must take the facts in the light most favorable to the\\nplaintiff, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656–57 (2014), but also—\\nas is the case any time there are disputed issues of material\\nfact—that we have no jurisdiction to resolve any factual dis‐\\nputes. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). We thus ap‐\\nproach the facts in much the same way as we would if we\\nwere reviewing a motion to dismiss or a grant of summary\\njudgment. See, e.g., Tolan, 572 U.S. at 657 (vacating the grant\\nof qualified immunity because “[i]n holding that Cotton’s ac‐\\ntions did not violate clearly established law, the Fifth Circuit\\nfailed to view the evidence at summary judgment in the light\\nmost favorable to Tolan”).\\n Some 22 years ago, this court stated that because prisoners\\nwere “entitled only to minimum care,” they were not entitled\\n\\nNo. 18‐2075 29\\n\\nto sexual‐reassignment surgery (“SRS”)1 or hormone therapy,\\nbecause the minimal record before the court indicated that\\nthose treatments were expensive and “esoteric medical treat‐\\nment that only the wealthy can afford ….” Maggert, 131 F.3d\\nat 671–72. But that was not our last word on this issue. In Fields\\nv. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011), we evaluated a claim that\\nthe total denial of either medically necessary hormones or\\nmedically necessary SRS violated the Eighth Amendment.\\nUnlike in Maggert, in Fields we had the benefit of a full trial\\nrecord. Id. at 555. We determined that time and the crucible of\\ntrial had disproven the “empirical assumptions” on which\\nMaggert relied. Id. Both hormones and SRS were, for example,\\nsignificantly cheaper than other treatments and surgeries that\\nthe Wisconsin Department of Corrections had provided in re‐\\ncent years. Id.\\n Despite the majority’s contention, ante at 20, while the\\nbulk of our discussion in Fields focused on hormone therapy,\\nwe also specifically addressed the Fields plaintiffs’ attempt to\\nstrike down Wisconsin’s surgery ban. On this point, we up‐\\nheld the district court’s enjoining of Wisconsin’s surgery ban,\\nbecause that statute forbade “even the consideration of … sur‐\\ngery” regardless of whether SRS was medically necessary for\\n\\n 1 I recognize that the term “sexual‐reassignment surgery” is now con‐\\n\\nsidered an outdated and inaccurate descriptor of this procedure. This sur‐\\ngical treatment is now more commonly referred to as gender confirmation\\nsurgery. See, e.g., Gender Confirmation Surgery, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN\\nSCHOOL OF MEDICINE, https://www.uofmhealth.org/conditions‐treat‐\\nments/gender‐confirmation‐surgery (last visited July 26, 2019) (explaining\\nthe available options for gender confirmation surgery in the University of\\nMichigan Health System). For the sake of consistency, however, I use the\\nterm “SRS” here, as it is the label given to this surgery by the majority, the\\nparties, and the WPATH Standards.\\n\\n30 No. 18‐2075\\n\\nan individual prisoner. Id. at 558–59. We concluded that “[i]t\\nis well established that the Constitution’s ban on cruel and\\nunusual punishment does not permit a state to deny effective\\ntreatment for the serious medical needs of prisoners. … Re‐\\nfusing to provide effective treatment for a serious medical\\ncondition serves no valid penological purpose and amounts\\nto torture.” Id. at 556. Our bottom line was simple: “Just as the\\nlegislature cannot outlaw all effective cancer treatments for\\nprison inmates, it cannot outlaw the only effective treatment\\nfor a serious condition like [gender dysphoria].” Id. at 557.\\n Recently, in Estate of Clark, we recognized that “[t]he Su‐\\npreme Court has long held that prisoners have an Eighth\\nAmendment right to treatment for their ‘serious medical\\nneeds,’” 865 F.3d at 553, and thus that this right is clearly es‐\\ntablished. “For purposes of qualified immunity, that legal\\nduty need not be litigated and then established disease by dis‐\\nease or injury by injury.” Id. The majority opinion now seems\\nto walk back the latter statement. But in doing so it confuses\\nthe legal definition of the clearly established right with the\\nfactual question of the medical necessity of a particular treat‐\\nment for a particular patient.\\n Our inquiry should be simple: first, we must determine\\nwhether Campbell suffers from a medical need that is clearly\\nestablished as objectively serious; second, we must determine\\nwhether, as a subjective matter, it was clear to the defendants\\nthat they were being deliberately indifferent to Campbell’s\\nobjectively serious medical need.\\n The first half of this inquiry is easy. We recognized in 1997\\nthat “[g]ender dysphoria … is a serious psychiatric disorder.”\\nMaggert, 131 F.3d at 671. It has thus been established for more\\nthan 20 years that gender dysphoria is a serious medical need;\\n\\nNo. 18‐2075 31\\n\\ncommendably, the defendants in this litigation do not con‐\\ntend that it is not. See also Fields, 653 F.3d at 554–55; Meri‐\\nwhether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding\\nthat “plaintiff’s complaint [asserting that she received no\\ntreatment for her gender dysphoria] does state a ‘serious\\nmedical need’”).\\n That takes us to the second inquiry: whether the defend‐\\nants were deliberately indifferent in refusing Campbell’s re‐\\nquests for surgery. Because the deliberate indifference inquiry\\nis a subjective one, it necessarily “turns on [a defendant’s]\\nmental state, and it is well established what the law requires\\nin that regard.” Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 807 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nIf a defendant “consciously disregard[s] the risks of [denying\\nan inmate’s medical care], then his conduct violates clearly es‐\\ntablished law under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 807–08.\\n Proving someone’s state of mind is always difficult. See\\nPetties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc)\\n(“Rarely if ever will an official declare, ‘I knew this would\\nprobably harm you, and I did it anyway!’”). But it is not im‐\\npossible: circumstantial evidence pointing to deliberate indif‐\\nference can be gathered in medical cases just as in others. See\\nid. The obvious case is a defendant who sees a suffering in‐\\nmate and ostentatiously does nothing to help her. See, e.g.,\\nMitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Prison of‐\\nficials have been on notice for years that leaving serious med‐\\nical conditions, including gender dysphoria, untreated can\\namount to unconstitutional deliberate indifference.”). None‐\\ntheless, that is the beginning, not the end, of the deliberate‐\\nindifference inquiry. See Zaya, 836 F.3d at 805 (“[W]e have\\nalso made clear that an inmate need not show that he was ‘lit‐\\nerally ignored’ to prevail on a deliberate‐indifference claim.”).\\n\\n32 No. 18‐2075\\n\\nA plaintiff may prove deliberate indifference through evi‐\\ndence that the defendant’s treatment was far outside of med‐\\nical norms. “[I]f the defendant’s chosen ‘course of treatment’\\ndeparts radically from ‘accepted professional practice,’ a jury\\nmay infer from the treatment decision itself that no exercise\\nof professional judgment actually occurred.” Id. (quoting\\nPyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)). Similarly, it\\nhas long “been established that the choice of an ‘easier and\\nless efficacious treatment’ can demonstrate that the actor dis‐\\nplayed ‘deliberate indifference … rather than an exercise of\\nprofessional judgment.’” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 861 (7th\\nCir. 2011) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,\\n429 U.S. 97, 104 n.10 (1976)). Finally, “[a]nother situation that\\nmight establish a departure from minimally competent med‐\\nical judgment is where a prison official persists in a course of\\ntreatment known to be ineffective.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 729–30.\\n Importantly, whether a defendant had a deliberately indif‐\\nferent state of mind is not a legal question; it is a factual one.\\nSee Zaya, 836 F.3d at 808 (“As we’ve explained, that’s [i.e.\\nwhether the defendant was deliberately indifferent] a ques‐\\ntion of fact that needs to be resolved by a jury.”); Petties, 836\\nF.3d at 728 (“We must determine what kind of evidence is ad‐\\nequate for a jury to draw a reasonable inference that a prison\\nofficial acted with deliberate indifference.” (emphasis\\nadded)). We can thus resolve this case now only if there is no\\ndisputed issue of material fact on this point.\\n The question whether a particular course of treatment for\\nan objectively serious medical condition amounts to deliber‐\\nate indifference can be answered only with evidence from the\\nmedical community. For that reason, courts cannot look to\\noutdated factual evidence from past cases to determine\\n\\nNo. 18‐2075 33\\n\\nwhether some course of treatment is within acceptable\\nboundaries. If the medical community uniformly decides that\\na recent advance is the only proper course of treatment, a de‐\\nfendant cannot rely on a case from before that advance oc‐\\ncurred to say that her outdated treatment choice was reason‐\\nable. A court’s role is only to determine whether a plaintiff has\\nput forward sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to con‐\\nclude that the treatment she received was so far outside the\\nbounds of medical professional judgment that it amounted to\\ndeliberate indifference.\\n II\\n What, then, is the evidence about treatments for gender\\ndysphoria? Is it undisputed that responsible doctors might\\nchoose the course that Wisconsin followed, or is there evi‐\\ndence that, if believed by a jury, would show that Wisconsin’s\\nchoice was so far out of line with accepted practice that it\\namounted to deliberate indifference? We do not write here on\\na clean slate. In Fields, the district court “addressed both hor‐\\nmone therapy and sex reassignment surgery,” and we upheld\\nits finding that banning either treatment despite its medical\\nnecessity violated the Eighth Amendment. Fields, 653 F.3d at\\n558–59. While no other court of appeals has dealt with a pris‐\\noner’s claim for SRS in the context of qualified immunity, our\\nsister circuits are largely in accord about whether the denial\\nof SRS can violate the Eighth Amendment: It can. See Rosati v.\\nIgbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the\\ndenial of SRS stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment);\\nDe’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525–26 (4th Cir. 2013) (same).\\nThe cases denying a plaintiff’s claim for SRS do so not because\\nthe denial of SRS can never be deliberate indifference, but be‐\\ncause the factual record before them did not contain evidence\\n\\n34 No. 18‐2075\\n\\nthat, if believed, would show that only SRS would be appro‐\\npriate for that plaintiff. See Lamb v. Norwood, 899 F.3d 1159,\\n1162–63 (10th Cir. 2018). In Lamb, the court noted that the\\n“sparseness of the summary judgment record precludes a rea‐\\nsonable fact‐finder from inferring deliberate indifference.” Id.\\nIt also relied on the fact that “Paul Corbier, M.D. stated under\\noath that Michelle’s existing treatment has proven beneficial\\nand that surgery is impractical and unnecessary in light of the\\navailability and effectiveness of more conservative therapies.”\\nId. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc), is\\nsimilar. There the First Circuit rejected Kosilek’s plea for SRS,\\nbut it went out of its way to say that “this case presents unique\\ncircumstances; we are simply unconvinced that our decision\\non the record before us today will foreclose all litigants from\\nsuccessfully seeking SRS in the future. Certain facts in this\\nparticular record—including the medical providers’ non‐uni‐\\nform opinions regarding the necessity of SRS, Kosilek’s crim‐\\ninal history, and the feasibility of postoperative housing—\\nwere important factors impacting the decision.” Id. at 91. It is\\nalso noteworthy that the First Circuit decided Kosilek only af‐\\nter a lengthy trial. Id. at 74–81 (describing the trial record);\\nKosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 212 (D. Mass. 2012)\\n(making findings of fact after “a 28‐day trial”).\\n The one court of appeals to foreclose SRS entirely said that\\nit was doing so based on a lack of record evidence. See Gibson\\nv. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 220–21 (5th Cir. 2019). In Gibson, the\\nFifth Circuit held that Gibson could not survive summary\\njudgment because she had provided no evidence that SRS was\\nthe only medically acceptable treatment option for her. Id. She\\n“did not dispute that the medical controversy” over SRS—\\nwhich the Fifth Circuit found existed based on Kosilek—“con‐\\ntinues to this day.” Id. at 221. Campbell, by contrast, has\\n\\nNo. 18‐2075 35\\n\\nproduced precisely the evidence that the Fifth Circuit wanted.\\nAs the majority opinion notes, Campbell’s experts have testi‐\\nfied that SRS is both medically necessary for her and uncon‐\\ntroversial within the medical community. Indeed, Dr. Kathy\\nOriel opined that “‘no physician with adequate expertise and\\nexperience in gender medicine would’ dispute Campbell’s\\nneed for sex‐reassignment surgery.” Ante at 11. If the trier of\\nfact credited that testimony, Campbell could prevail.\\n The majority attempts to distinguish De’lonta because it\\nwas an appeal of a motion to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,\\nand because the plaintiff there had not yet been evaluated by\\na gender‐identity medical specialist. Ante at 21 n.2. But just as\\nin a motion‐to‐dismiss posture, in a qualified immunity inter‐\\nlocutory appeal we must draw inferences and resolve factual\\ndisputes in the plaintiff’s favor. And the fact that the defend‐\\nants in De’lonta had not yet allowed De’lonta to see a specialist\\nhas no bearing on the legal question whether refusing to pro‐\\nvide universally accepted surgery would violate the Eighth\\nAmendment. As the Fourth Circuit recognized, a surgical\\nconsultation was merely one step toward curing the potential\\nconstitutional violation. See De’lonta, 708 F.3d at 526 & n.4.\\n The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rosati, which rests on a\\nprocedural and factual posture similar to that in De’lonta, is\\nalso instructive. There the court held that Rosati stated an\\nEighth Amendment claim despite prison officials having en‐\\ngaged a medical consultant, because the consultant was “a\\nphysician’s assistant with no experience in transgender med‐\\nicine.” Rosati, 791 F.3d at 1040. While Cynthia Osborne, the\\ndefendants’ outside consultant in our case, does specialize in\\ngender identity issues, she is not a doctor. And Campbell has\\nadduced significant evidence that Osborne’s opinion about\\n\\n36 No. 18‐2075\\n\\nthe need for surgery is not only incorrect, it is also well out‐\\nside the bounds accepted by the medical community. This\\npresents a question of fact for a trial, where the trier of fact\\nwill decide whether to accept or reject Campbell’s views.\\n As the district court recognized, when viewed in the light\\nmost favorable to Campbell, the evidence shows that despite\\nbeing treated with hormones, Campbell’s gender dysphoria\\nhas not improved. She has continued to threaten self‐castra‐\\ntion and to experience suicidal ideation. The defendants are\\naware of Campbell’s continued suffering and have neverthe‐\\nless refused her further treatment. Campbell’s experts have\\nopined that no reasonable medical professional would recom‐\\nmend any course of treatment in her case except surgery. The\\nmajority opinion swipes this evidence away. Instead it\\nchooses to reach its own conclusion that, despite members of\\nthe medical community swearing to the contrary, SRS is not\\nso well‐established that Kallas could be deliberately indiffer‐\\nent by refusing to provide it. But that is a conclusion of fact\\nthat lies outside our competence. It also rests on the flawed\\nlegal basis of an “injury by injury” determination of clearly\\nestablished law.\\n I respectfully dissent.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426795/\", \"author_raw\": \"WOOD, Chief Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649542/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Mark A. Campbell v. Kevin Kallas\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2075\nMARK A. CAMPBELL,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nKEVIN KALLAS, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-261-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER,\nCircuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Mark Campbell, also known as\nNicole Rose Campbell, is an inmate in the Wisconsin prison\nsystem. In 2007 Campbell pleaded guilty to first-degree\nsexual assault of a child and is now serving a 34-year sen-\ntence. Campbell has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria;\nshe is biologically male but identifies as female. Department\n\n2 No. 18-2075\n\nof Corrections (“DOC”) medical staff are treating Campbell’s\ncondition with cross-gender hormone therapy.\n Beginning in September 2013, Campbell repeatedly re-\nquested a more radical intervention: sex-reassignment\nsurgery. National standards of care recommend that patients\nundertake one year of “real life” experience as a person of\ntheir self-identified gender before resorting to irreversible\nsurgical options. That preparatory period presents challeng-\nes for officials charged with the administration of sex-\nsegregated prisons. DOC officials consulted an outside\nexpert, who determined that Campbell was a potential\nsurgical candidate. But the expert’s cautious conclusion was\nconditioned on DOC officials developing a safe, workable\nsolution to the real-life-experience dilemma. Citing these\nconcerns and DOC policy, officials denied Campbell’s re-\nquest.\n After filing grievances and exhausting administrative\nappeals, Campbell sued Dr. Kevin Kallas, the DOC Mental\nHealth Director, and a host of other prison officials under\n42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the defendants were\ndeliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in\nviolation of the Eighth Amendment and sought damages\nand injunctive relief. Both sides moved for summary judg-\nment, and the defendants also claimed qualified immunity.\nThe district court denied the motions. As relevant here, the\njudge rejected the claim of qualified immunity, concluding\nthat caselaw clearly established a constitutional right to\neffective medical treatment.\n We reverse. Qualified immunity shields a public official\nfrom suit for damages unless caselaw clearly puts him on\nnotice that his action is unconstitutional. The judge’s ap-\n\nNo. 18-2075 3\n\nproach to the qualified-immunity question was far too\ngeneral. The Eighth Amendment requires prison healthcare\nprofessionals to exercise medical judgment when making\ndecisions about an inmate’s treatment. And they cannot\ncompletely deny the care of a serious medical condition. But\ncases recognizing those broad principles could not have\nwarned these defendants that treating an inmate’s gender\ndysphoria with hormone therapy and deferring considera-\ntion of sex-reassignment surgery violates the Constitution.\nMoreover, it’s doubtful that a prisoner can prove a case of\ndeliberate indifference when, as here, prison officials fol-\nlowed accepted medical standards. The defendants are\nimmune from damages liability.\n I. Background\nA. Standards of Care\n Campbell suffers from gender dysphoria, an acute form\nof mental distress stemming from strong feelings of incon-\ngruity between one’s anatomy and one’s gender identity. See\nAM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL\nOF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013). To “provide clinical\nguidance for health professionals,” the World Professional\nAssociation for Transgender Health established national\nstandards of care for transsexual, transgender, and gender-\nnonconforming individuals. WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASS’N FOR\nTRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH\nOF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, & GENDER NONCONFORMING\nPEOPLE 1 (7th version 2011) (“the Standards”),\nhttps://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7/\nStandards%20of%20Care_V7%20Full%20Book_English.pdf.\nThe parties cite the Standards extensively and treat them as\n\n4 No. 18-2075\n\nauthoritative. “While flexible,” these clinical guidelines\n“offer standards for promoting optimal health care.” Id. at 2.\n The Standards outline a range of treatment options for in-\ndividuals with gender dysphoria. Patients may be encour-\naged to alter their “gender expression” by living\ncontinuously or part-time in another gender role. Id. at 9.\nHormone therapy, which can “feminize or masculinize the\nbody,” is appropriate for some patients. Id. The Standards\nprovide four criteria for hormone-therapy eligibility:\n 1. Persistent, well-documented gender dyspho-\n ria;\n 2. Capacity to make a fully informed decision\n and to consent for treatment;\n 3. Age of majority in a given country … ; [and]\n 4. If significant medical or mental health con-\n cerns are present, they must be reasonably\n well-controlled.\nId. at 34. Psychotherapy is not an “absolute” prerequisite for\nhormone therapy or surgery but is “highly recommended.”\nId. at 28.\n Surgery is “the last and the most considered step in the\ntreatment process,” and not all gender-dysphoric patients\nare surgical candidates. Id. at 54. The Standards outline\nseveral surgical approaches. Id. at 57–61. Some modify\nsecondary sex characteristics via breast reduction or aug-\nmentation, and facial- and voice-feminization surgery. Id. at\n57. The Standards don’t require hormonal interventions or\nextensive preparatory periods for these surgeries, though\n12 months of feminizing hormone therapy is recommended\n\nNo. 18-2075 5\n\nfor male-to-female patients. Id. at 58–59. Surgeries altering a\npatient’s reproductive organs carry stricter eligibility criteria.\nId. at 59–61. A patient meets the criteria for a hysterectomy\nand ovariectomy (removal of the uterus and ovaries) or an\norchiectomy (removal of the testicles) if he or she satisfies\nthe hormone-therapy criteria and has completed a year of\ncontinuous hormone therapy. Id. at 60.\n For operations commonly referred to as sex-reassignment\nsurgeries—surgeries that replace an individual’s existing\ngenitals with approximations of those of the opposite sex—\nthe Standards add yet another requirement. In addition to a\nyear of hormone therapy, the Standards require patients to\nhave “12 continuous months of living in a gender role that is\ncongruent with their gender identity.” Id. The World Profes-\nsional Association for Transgender Health justifies this\nrequirement by citing an “expert clinical consensus that this\nexperience provides ample opportunity for patients to\nexperience and socially adjust in their desired gender role[]\nbefore undergoing irreversible surgery.” Id. at 60. The one-\nyear preparatory period helps patients adjust to the “pro-\nfound personal and social consequences” of adjusting one’s\ngender expression. Id. at 61. The Standards don’t include an\nexception to the real-life-experience requirement for patients\nliving in institutional settings. Id. at 67–68. The World Pro-\nfessional Association for Transgender Health explicitly states\nthat the Standards can be utilized effectively under those\nconditions. Id.\nB. DOC Policies and Procedures\n The DOC established policies to address the unique chal-\nlenges posed by the incarceration of transgender inmates.\nThe Gender Dysphoria Committee (the “Committee”) is\n\n6 No. 18-2075\n\ncharged with handling medical treatment and accommoda-\ntion requests by an inmate with gender dysphoria. Several of\nthe defendants are current and former committee members;\nDr. Kallas serves as DOC Mental Health Director and chairs\nthe Committee.\n DOC Policy 500.70.27 lays out the protocol for trans-\ngender inmates. Wisconsin Department of Corrections,\nDivision of Adult Institutions, Policy and Procedures, Policy\nNo. 500.70.27 (Nov. 11, 2017) at Separate Appendix of\nDefendants–Appellants at 64–73, Campbell v. Kallas,\nNo. 18-2075 (7th Cir. July 18, 2018), ECF No. 17. An inmate\nmay self-identify as transgender at any point during his\nincarceration, making him eligible for several accommoda-\ntions. Id. at 66. The inmate may order “clothing, shoes,\nundergarments[,] and prescription eyeglass frames … that\ncorrespond to the desired gender.” Id. at 73. Undergarments\nmatching the inmate’s gender identity are also allowed,\nprovided “they are not visible to others when leaving the\ncell” or worn in a “disruptive or provocative” manner. Id.\nMakeup is unavailable for an inmate in male facilities, but an\ninmate may purchase feminine shower products and request\na hair-removal product. Id.\n In addition to these lifestyle accommodations, the DOC\noffers several forms of medical treatment. Once an inmate\nself-identifies as transgender, prison medical staff or an\noutside consultant may assign a clinical diagnosis of gender\ndysphoria. Id. at 66. A clinically diagnosed inmate is entitled\nto appropriate psychological treatment, psychiatric care,\nhormone therapy (under certain circumstances), and “[o]ther\ntreatment determined to be medically necessary by the\nTransgender Committee.” Id. at 68.\n\nNo. 18-2075 7\n\n Requests for new hormonal or surgical interventions are\nprocessed by a hierarchy of prison medical officials who\nreview the inmate’s condition. Id. at 69–70. When an inmate\nfirst requests hormone therapy or surgery, the Supervisor of\nthe Psychological Services Unit is notified. Id. at 69. The\nSupervisor assigns a staff member to determine whether to\ndiagnose the patient with gender dysphoria and whether a\n“more specialized evaluation” by a gender-dysphoria con-\nsultant is needed. Id. The Psychological Services Unit report\nis forwarded to the Mental Health Director, who may call in\na gender-dysphoria consultant for further evaluation. Id. If\nthe consultant recommends hormone therapy or surgery, the\nDirector reviews the report. The consultant’s recommenda-\ntions are not binding and can either be approved or denied\nby the Director in consultation with the Committee. Id. at 69–\n70. Finally, the policy notes: “Due to the limitations inherent\nin being incarcerated, a real-life experience for the purpose\nof gender-reassignment therapy is not possible for inmates\nwho reside within a correctional facility. However, treatment\nand accommodations may be provided to lessen gender\ndysphoria.” Id. at 70.\nC. Campbell’s Course of Treatment\n Campbell is currently incarcerated at the Racine Correc-\ntional Institution. Prior to her incarceration, she self-\nadministered hormone treatments. Although she considered\nsex-reassignment surgery, she never discussed it with a\nphysician.\n Campbell raised gender-identity concerns with a prison\npsychologist in January 2012. The Committee hired Cynthia\nOsborne to evaluate Campbell. Osborne is a gender-\ndysphoria expert and has consulted on numerous cases for\n\n8 No. 18-2075\n\nprison systems around the country. In August 2012 Osborne\ndiagnosed Campbell with gender dysphoria but stopped\nwell short of recommending sex-reassignment surgery.\n Osborne explained that the 12-month real-life experience\nrequired by the World Professional Association for\nTransgender Health could not be fully implemented in the\nprison setting. She noted that Campbell had “never had the\nopportunity to meaningfully consolidate [her] preferred\nfemale identity into a successful life” and would “not be able\nto do such consolidation in the restrictive environment of\nincarceration.” Given that challenge, as well as Campbell’s\n“comorbid psychiatric conditions and vulnerabilities,”\nOsborne determined that “only reversible interventions\nshould be considered” and that “[s]ex[-]reassignment sur-\ngery [was] wholly contraindicated.” Osborne recommended\nhormone therapy, counseling, and “that the DOC consider\nwhat feminizing allowances might be made,” even though\n“[s]uch accommodations are rarely if ever medically neces-\nsary.”\n The Committee adopted Osborne’s recommendations,\ninitiating hormone therapy and permitting Campbell to don\nfeminine clothing and glasses and use feminine shower\nproducts. On September 5, 2013, Campbell submitted a\nrequest for sex-reassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas, following\nthe Committee’s recommendation, denied Campbell’s re-\nquest, citing Osborne’s finding that “surgical interventions\nwere contraindicated.” Dr. Kallas explained that DOC\n“policy does not prohibit surgical intervention,” but he and\nthe Committee recognized “the inherent difficulty for any\ninmate to meet eligibility requirements for gender reassign-\n\nNo. 18-2075 9\n\nment surgery while in prison—specifically, the need for a\nvalid real-life experience in the desired gender role.”\n Campbell continued to file surgery requests, and DOC\nofficials again consulted with Osborne. She reviewed\nCampbell’s file, talked with the treating psychologist, and\nmet with Campbell face to face. On August 4, 2014, Osborne\nsubmitted her second report. Echoing themes from her first\nreport, Osborne described the Standards as imperfect guides\nfor treating gender dysphoria in prison. On the possibility of\nsurgery, Osborne explained that given “the persistent pres-\nence of severe anatomic dysphoria[,] inmate Campbell may\nbe a candidate for” sex reassignment. The length of\nCampbell’s sentence and her track record of cooperating\nwith medical personnel bolstered the case for surgery.\n Turning to the “real life experience” requirement,\nOsborne explained that “[m]any gender dysphoria experts\nbelieve that the challenges of completing a valid real-life\nexperience … in the context of incarceration present a formi-\ndable obstacle to” sex-reassignment surgery. She noted that\n“there is no empirical evidence on which the DOC can rely\nin its efforts to predict outcomes, prevent harm[,] and main-\ntain safety” in developing a real-life experience for\nCampbell. Thus, the DOC’s “[r]eluctance to embark on a\nsocial experiment” was “understandable and prudent.” For\ninmates with lengthy sentences, however, Osborne ques-\ntioned “whether the [real-life experience] as traditionally\nunderstood” should be required. Modifying or eliminating\nthe requirement would carry risks for Campbell, but the\nDOC should undertake “an examination of the [real-life\nexperience] concept in order to determine whether there is a\nworkable approach for inmates.” Still, given these challeng-\n\n10 No. 18-2075\n\nes, she concluded that “conservative approaches … for\nincarcerated individuals are wholly warranted.”\n Summarizing her conclusions, Osborne explained that\nCampbell had not undergone a valid real-life experience\nwhile incarcerated, despite Campbell’s claim to the contrary.\nDeparting from the requirement “may be justifiable in rare\ncircumstances in correctional settings”—including Camp-\nbell’s case. Osborne stated that Campbell could be a surgical\ncandidate but conditioned her assessment on the DOC’s\ndevelopment of “a safe and reasonable approach to resolv-\ning the [real-life experience] conundrum.”\n On September 29, 2014, Campbell filed another request\nseeking approval for a real-life experience and sex-\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas responded on October 23,\nassuring Campbell that “the DOC is continuing to look at\nhow we can provide at least some elements of a real-life\nexperience.” Nevertheless, “providing a true or full real-life\nexperience that will help to determine future suitability for\nsurgical interventions remain[ed] problematic in an incar-\ncerated setting.” Referring to Osborne’s second report,\nDr. Kallas, with the Committee’s recommendation, denied\nCampbell’s request. Campbell sent additional letters on\nMarch 15 and April 4, 2015, but Dr. Kallas again denied the\nrequests for surgery citing the “considerable limitations in\nwhat [officials could] provide for a real-life experience.”\nDr. Kallas also rejected Campbell’s request for electrolysis for\nhair removal and “light makeup,” neither of which was\n“currently permitted” in the prison.\n In the wake of these denials, Campbell filed four admin-\nistrative grievances reiterating her arguments for sex-\nreassignment surgery, electrolysis, and makeup. All were\n\nNo. 18-2075 11\n\ndenied. In response to the electrolysis and makeup requests,\nDOC officials determined that “makeup is not a medically\nnecessary accommodation” and “[a]lternatives to electroly-\nsis” were readily available.\nD. District-Court Proceedings\n In April 2016 Campbell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\nalleging that DOC officials were deliberately indifferent to\nher serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth\nAmendment. 1 The suit seeks damages and injunctive relief\nordering “necessary medical care, including [sex-\nreassignment surgery], and other appropriate treatment,\nincluding light makeup, electrolysis, breast augmentation,\nand voice therapy.”\n Both sides moved for summary judgment, introducing\ndueling expert opinions on Campbell’s suitability for sur-\ngery. Dr. Kathy Oriel, one of Campbell’s experts, determined\nthat “no physician with adequate expertise and experience\nin gender medicine would” dispute Campbell’s need for sex-\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Chester W. Schmidt, the defense\nexpert, opined that sex-reassignment surgery was not medi-\ncally necessary.\n Campbell argued that because DOC officials “imple-\nmented and enforce[d] a blanket ban on medically necessary\ntreatment … and applied it to Campbell,” they “acted with\ndeliberate indifference as a matter of law.” The defendants\nsought qualified immunity, arguing that their treatment\n\n\n1 Campbell later amended her complaint to bring an equal-protection\nclaim under the Fourteenth Amendment. That claim is not at issue in this\nappeal.\n\n12 No. 18-2075\n\ndecisions were not a substantial departure from accepted\nprofessional judgment.\n The district judge denied the motions for the most part.\nBecause DOC officials knew about Campbell’s gender\ndysphoria and admitted its status as a serious medical\ncondition, the judge saw one key remaining question:\nwhether sex-reassignment surgery was medically necessary.\nOn that issue Dr. Oriel’s expert testimony generated a\nfactual dispute, so the judge held that “Campbell ha[d]\nadduced evidence sufficient to show deliberate indiffer-\nence,” precluding summary judgment. The medical necessi-\nty of sex-reassignment surgery in Campbell’s case would be\ndetermined at a bench trial.\n The judge also addressed Campbell’s requests for elec-\ntrolysis and makeup, articulating a preliminary determina-\ntion that providing those accommodations “would offer\nmore effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender dysphoria\nand finding “no apparent medical reason to deny” them. But\nCampbell hadn’t moved for summary judgment on those\nclaims, so the judge gave the defendants notice and an\nopportunity to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules\nof Civil Procedure. They replied with two arguments: First, a\nruling on electrolysis and makeup prior to a ruling on\nsurgery would be premature. Second, they cited the lack of\nrecord evidence that Campbell, “on an individualized basis,\nhas a medical need for electrolysis and makeup.” The judge\npostponed further consideration of the issue until trial.\n The judge’s discussion of qualified immunity was brief\nand framed the inquiry at a high level of generality. He\nruled that because the Eighth Amendment does not permit\nstate officials to deny effective treatment for the serious\n\nNo. 18-2075 13\n\nmedical needs of prisoners, the “[d]efendants had fair notice\nthat denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender\ndysphoria would violate the Constitution. The judge re-\nbuffed the defendants’ request for a more fact-specific\nanalysis focusing on sex-reassignment surgery.\n II. Discussion\nA. Appellate Jurisdiction\n The defendants appeal the denial of qualified immunity.\n“[P]retrial orders denying qualified immunity generally fall\nwithin the collateral order doctrine.” Plumhoff v. Rickard,\n572 U.S. 765, 772 (2014) (citation omitted). Campbell’s suit\nseeks damages and injunctive relief, and the case will pro-\nceed to trial on the claim for injunctive relief even if the\ndefendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the damag-\nes claim. Campbell argues that we should therefore decline\nto exercise jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.\n That position cannot be squared with Supreme Court and\ncircuit precedent. It has long been clear that an order deny-\ning qualified immunity, “to the extent that it turns on an\nissue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the\nmeaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of\na final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530\n(1985). Qualified immunity is a form of immunity from\nsuit—that is, the trial process and attendant burdens—not\nmerely immunity from damages. Id. at 526–27.\n The Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide\nwhether an order denying qualified immunity may be\nimmediately appealed when the suit also seeks injunctive\nrelief. Id. at 520 n.5. We have done so, however. In Scott v.\nLacy, 811 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff sought\n\n14 No. 18-2075\n\nmoney damages and injunctive relief in a suit against public\nuniversity officials. Id. at 1154. He argued that the collateral-\norder doctrine is inapplicable to suits seeking injunctive\nrelief as well as damages because the case could still proceed\nto trial regardless of the outcome of an interlocutory appeal\nof a qualified-immunity ruling. Id. at 1153.\n Acknowledging a circuit split on this question, we fol-\nlowed the majority rule and held “that a pending request for\nan injunction does not defeat jurisdiction of interlocutory\nappeals based on claims of immunity.” Id. We restated the\nreasoning in Forsyth and added that “if a request for an\ninjunction prevented appeal on the question of immunity,\nplaintiffs who wished to harass officials to travail would\nneed only demand equitable relief.” Id. at 1154.\n Every circuit to address this question agrees. See Acierno\nv. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc); Schopler v.\nBliss, 903 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1990); DiMartini v. Ferrin,\n889 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1989); Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79\n(2d Cir. 1988); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,\n844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988); Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395 (8th\nCir. 1987); Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.\n1986); de Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187 (1st Cir.\n1986). The Fourth Circuit—the outlier when we decided\nScott—has since reversed course. See Young v. Lynch,\n846 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1988).\n As we’ve noted, the Supreme Court hasn’t squarely re-\nvisited the question left open in Forsyth. But in Behrens v.\nPelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), the Court came quite close to\nembracing the rule we adopted in Scott. The plaintiff there\nraised multiple claims, including Bivens claims against\nwhich the defendant unsuccessfully sought qualified im-\n\nNo. 18-2075 15\n\nmunity. Id. at 302–03. The plaintiff argued that the defend-\nant’s interlocutory appeal was inappropriate because he\nwould still “be required to endure discovery and trial on\nmatters separate from the claims against which immunity\nwas asserted.” Id. at 311. The Court clarified that a qualified-\nimmunity appeal “cannot be foreclosed by the mere addition\nof other claims to the suit.” Id. at 312 (emphasis added). Then,\nventuring beyond the specific facts of the case, the Court\nexpressed the same concern we identified in Scott: under the\nplaintiff’s reasoning, “the qualified-immunity right not to be\nsubjected to pretrial proceedings” or “to trial itself [would]\nbe eliminated, so long as the complaint seeks injunctive\nrelief.” Id. (emphasis added). Behrens represents a variation\non Scott—the case concerned multiple substantive claims\nrather than multiple forms of relief—but the variation was\nso slight that the Court saw fit to cite Scott in support of its\nconclusion. Id. at 312 n.5.\n Campbell urges us to reconsider Scott, a step that would\nrevive a long-dormant circuit split and come close to contra-\ndicting Behrens. We need “compelling reasons” to overrule\ncircuit precedent. Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir.\n2005). We may do so when “our position remains a minority\none among other circuits, when the Supreme Court issues a\ndecision on an analogous issue that compels us to reconsider\nour position, or when an intracircuit conflict exists.” Glaser v.\nWound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 2009)\n(citations omitted). None of those conditions are satisfied\nhere. And while Campbell claims that she “is not asking this\n[c]ourt to reconsider qualified-immunity jurisprudence writ\nlarge,” each of her arguments does just that. She argues that\nScott rests on misperceptions about the efficacy of qualified\nimmunity as a shield against the burdens of litigation. She\n\n16 No. 18-2075\n\ncites recent scholarship criticizing qualified immunity and\nmarshals policy arguments focused on judicial resources.\nAnd she draws our attention to separate opinions by some\nSupreme Court justices raising questions about the doctrine.\n We have no authority to depart from the Supreme\nCourt’s qualified-immunity jurisprudence. And while some\njustices have questioned qualified immunity, those misgiv-\nings haven’t stopped the Court from vigorously applying\nthe doctrine. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.\n577 (2018). Campbell’s fallback argument asks us to carve\nout an exception to Scott for cases involving a substantial\nrisk of harm. But in true emergencies, a plaintiff can seek\npreliminary injunctive relief. See Wheeler v. Wexford Health\nSources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681–83 (7th Cir. 2012). We proceed\nto the merits.\nB. Qualified Immunity\n We review qualified-immunity questions independently.\nGreen v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2017).\n The Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and\nunusual punishment includes the right of prisoners to be\nfree from “pain and suffering [that] no one suggests would\nserve any penological purpose.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.\n97, 103 (1976). As applied in the context of prison medical\ncare, “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or\ninjury states a cause of action under § 1983” for violation of\nthe Eighth Amendment. Id. We evaluate deliberate-\nindifference claims by “first examining whether a plaintiff\nsuffered from an objectively serious medical condition[] and\nthen determining whether the individual defendant was\ndeliberately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter,\n\nNo. 18-2075 17\n\n836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The parties agree\nthat gender dysphoria is a serious medical condition. See\nMaggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing\ngender dysphoria as a “serious psychiatric disorder”).\n To prove deliberate indifference, “mere negligence is not\nenough. … [A] plaintiff must provide evidence that an\nofficial actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of\nharm.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. The linchpin is a lack of\nprofessional judgment. “A medical professional is entitled to\ndeference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\nthose circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th\nCir. 2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d\n982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998)). A prison medical professional faces\nliability only if his course of treatment is “such a substantial\ndeparture from accepted professional judgment, practice, or\nstandards[] as to demonstrate that the person responsible\nactually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at\n895 (quoting Collignon, 163 F.3d at 988).\n Qualified immunity protects government officials from\ndamages liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate\nclearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which\na reasonable person would have known.” Estate of Clark v.\nWalker, 865 F.3d 544, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson\nv. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). We evaluate “(1) wheth-\ner the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plain-\ntiff[], show that the defendants violated a constitutional\nright; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly\nestablished at the time of the alleged violation.” Gonzalez v.\nCity of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009). The latter\n\n18 No. 18-2075\n\ninquiry is often dispositive and may be addressed first.\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 236. We do so here.\n To be “clearly established,” a constitutional right “must\nhave a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing prece-\ndent.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. The principle of fair notice\npervades the doctrine. Qualified immunity applies unless\nthe specific contours of the right “were sufficiently definite\nthat any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\nat 778–79.\n Given this emphasis on notice, clearly established law\ncannot be framed at a “high level of generality.” Ashcroft v.\nal-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). As the Supreme Court\nrecently reminded us, “[a] rule is too general if the unlaw-\nfulness of the officer’s conduct ‘does not follow immediately\nfrom the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.’”\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,\n483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (second alteration in original)).\nExisting caselaw must “dictate the resolution of the parties’\ndispute,” Comsys, Inc. v. Pacetti, 893 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir.\n2018), so while “a case directly on point” isn’t required,\n“precedent must have placed the … constitutional question\nbeyond debate,” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)\n(quotation marks omitted); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct.\n1148, 1152–53 (2018). Put slightly differently, a right is\nclearly established only if “every reasonable official would\nhave understood that what he is doing violates that right.”\nTaylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (quoting Reichle\nv. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)) (emphasis added).\n The Supreme Court’s message is unmistakable: Frame\nthe constitutional right in terms granular enough to provide\n\nNo. 18-2075 19\n\nfair notice because qualified immunity “protects all but the\nplainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the\nlaw.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quotation marks omitted).\n Here the judge framed the qualified-immunity question\nin very broad terms, asking whether it was clearly estab-\nlished that “denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s\nmedical condition violates the Eighth Amendment. That\nformulation—which is basically a highly conceptualized\nversion of the deliberate-indifference standard—is far too\ngeneral. On appeal Campbell likewise frames the issue at too\nhigh a level of generality, arguing that the defendants violat-\ned clearly established law by failing to exercise individual-\nized medical judgment and persisting in an ineffective\ncourse of treatment. These broad principles have support in\nour caselaw, but neither has been applied in a factual context\nspecific enough to provide fair notice to the defendants that\ntheir conduct was unconstitutional.\n Campbell relies on Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir.\n2011), and Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011), but\nneither case clearly establishes that the conduct at issue here\nwas unconstitutional. In Elyea, Illinois inmates with hepatitis\nrequested antiviral drugs but were denied medication\nbecause a prison policy barred that treatment for inmates\nwith fewer than 18 months of incarceration remaining.\n631 F.3d at 850. We explained that “inmate medical care\ndecisions must be fact-based with respect to the particular\ninmate” rather than the product of categorical rules and that\nadministrative considerations cannot trump “reasonable\nmedical judgment.” Id. at 859, 863 (emphasis omitted).\nTreatment protocols are permissible, but in “an individual\ncase, … prison officials still must make a determination that\n\n20 No. 18-2075\n\napplication of the protocols result[s] in adequate medical\ncare.” Id. at 860.\n In Fields we considered a facial Eighth Amendment\nchallenge to a Wisconsin statute that flatly prohibited DOC\nofficials from providing sex-reassignment surgery or hormone\ntherapy to inmates. 653 F.3d at 552–53. The district court held\nthat the “defendants acted with deliberate indifference in\nthat [they] knew of [plaintiffs’] serious medical need but\nrefused to provide hormone therapy because of” the statute.\nId. at 555. We affirmed, but we did not specifically address\nthe issue of sex-reassignment surgery because the plaintiffs’\nrequest was limited to hormone therapy. Id. at 556.\n Campbell argues that Elyea and Fields clearly establish a\nright to individualized medical judgment. But to accept that\nframing would contradict the Supreme Court’s instruction to\neschew broad generalities. When considering deliberate-\nindifference claims challenging the medical judgment of\nprison healthcare personnel, qualified-immunity analysis\nrequires us to frame the legal question with reasonable\nspecificity.\n The proper inquiry is whether then-existing caselaw\nclearly established a constitutional right to gender-dysphoria\ntreatment beyond hormone therapy. This framing is specific\nenough to ensure that “the unlawfulness of the officer’s\nconduct … follow[s] immediately from the conclusion that\n[the rule] was firmly established.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590\n(quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original).\nAnd in this fact-intensive area of constitutional law, a broad-\ner formulation would violate the Supreme Court’s instruc-\ntion that the specific contours of the right must be\n“sufficiently definite that any reasonable official … would\n\nNo. 18-2075 21\n\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\nat 779.\n Neither Elyea nor Fields provides the required level of\nspecificity. Elyea amounts to a general admonition that\nofficials must exercise medical judgment rather than me-\nchanically apply categorical rules. And Fields doesn’t place\n“beyond debate” the proposition that medical professionals\nviolate the Eighth Amendment when they provide hormone\ntherapy but decide—after extensive deliberation and consul-\ntation with an outside expert—to deny sex-reassignment\nsurgery. White, 137 S. Ct. at 551. In both cases prison officials\nrefused to provide any treatment for serious diseases based\nsolely on categorical rules. That simply didn’t occur here.\nThese DOC officials consulted an expert in the field and,\nfacing a gray area of professional opinion, decided to deny\nthe “last and … most considered step” of gender-dysphoria\ntreatment.\n No case in the Federal Reporter could have warned these\nDOC officials that their treatment choice was unconstitu-\ntional. When the defendants were making these decisions,\nonly one federal appellate decision had addressed the merits\nof a deliberate-indifference claim involving sex-\nreassignment surgery: Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir.\n2014) (en banc). 2 There the First Circuit concluded that\n\n2 In De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit\nreversed a district-court order dismissing a gender-dysphoric inmate’s\nEighth Amendment challenge at screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.\nEven setting aside that difference in procedural posture, De’lonta bears\nno resemblance to this case. Unlike the defendants here, in De’lonta the\nVirginia Department of Corrections officials “never allowed [the plain-\ntiff] to be evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist in the first place.”\nId. at 526 n.4; see also id. at 523 (explaining that the plaintiff had “never\n\n22 No. 18-2075\n\nprison officials who provided hormone therapy and lifestyle\naccommodations but denied a request for surgery did not\nviolate the Eighth Amendment. 3 See id. at 90, 96.\n Campbell next argues that then-existing caselaw clearly\nestablished that prison officials cannot abandon medical\njudgment by “persist[ing] in a course of treatment known to\nbe ineffective.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir.\n2005). It’s true that we’ve identified this species of\ndeliberate-indifference claim. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 729–30.\nBut we’ve never applied that general principle to facts\nresembling these. Campbell’s lightly developed argument\ndoes not convince us that this right was “established not as a\nbroad general proposition but in a particularized sense so\nthat the contours of the right are clear to a reasonable offi-\ncial.” Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (quota-\ntion marks omitted).\n We’ve previously noted that “[f]or purposes of qualified\nimmunity, [the Eighth-Amendment] duty” to treat prison-\n\nbeen evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist concerning her need\nfor sex reassignment surgery”). Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.\n2015), is similar. There the Ninth Circuit reversed an order dismissing a\ngender-dysphoric inmate’s Eighth Amendment challenge at screening.\nUnlike the defendants here, in Rosati the defendants applied a blanket\npolicy against sex-reassignment surgery and never allowed the plaintiff\nto be evaluated by a gender-dysphoria specialist. Id. at 1039–40.\n3 A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit recently announced agreement with\nKosilek. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019). The panel majority\nfocused on the ongoing debate over the efficacy of sex-reassignment\nsurgery in general and wasn’t prepared to accept the World Professional\nAssociation of Transgender Health’s Standards as authoritative. Id. at 221–\n24. We don’t need to venture beyond the record and address that wider\ndebate to decide this appeal.\n\nNo. 18-2075 23\n\ners’ serious medical conditions “need not be litigated and\nthen established disease by disease or injury by injury.”\nEstate of Clark, 865 F.3d at 553. Campbell seizes on this\naphorism and argues that by the same token, “rights need\nnot be established treatment by treatment.”\n That argument overlooks the nature of this deliberate-\nindifference claim. In Estate of Clark, the prison official\n“chose to do nothing” in response to a known risk of sub-\nstantial harm to the prisoner. Id. When prison officials\nutterly fail to provide care for a serious medical condition,\nthe constitutional violation is obvious and qualified immuni-\nty offers little protection. See Orlowski v. Milwaukee County,\n872 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2017) (denying qualified immuni-\nty where, in the face of clear symptoms, officers “chose to do\nnothing”).\n To be sure, the constitutional concern in cases involving\nno treatment at all is not disease- or injury-specific. But\nprisons aren’t obligated to provide every requested treat-\nment once medical care begins. In a deliberate-indifference\ncase challenging the medical judgment of prison healthcare\nprofessionals who actually diagnose and treat an inmate’s\nmedical condition (as opposed to ignoring it), we necessarily\nevaluate those discrete treatment decisions. And we defer to\nthose decisions “unless no minimally competent profession-\nal would have” made them. Sain, 512 F.3d at 895 (quotation\nmarks omitted). Deciding whether a particular treatment\nplan was a “substantial departure from accepted profession-\nal judgment, practice, or standards”—a necessary predicate\nto establish an Eighth Amendment violation—requires a\nclose examination of professional standards and the specific\nchoices made by care providers. Id. (quotation marks omit-\n\n24 No. 18-2075\n\nted). Given the fact-specific nature of these claims, the notice\naspect of qualified-immunity doctrine is crucial.\n Campbell also relies on our recent decision in Mitchell v.\nKallas, 895 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2018), another gender-dysphoria\ncase involving a Wisconsin inmate, Osborne, and Dr. Kallas.\nIn that case Dr. Kallas denied a prisoner’s request for hor-\nmone therapy despite Osborne’s unequivocal endorsement\nof the treatment. He cited a DOC policy requiring at least six\nremaining months of incarceration to initiate a hormone\nregimen. Id. at 497. The inmate raised deliberate-indifference\nclaims based on a “fail[ure] to provide [recommended] care\nfor a non-medical reason” and “inexplicable delays.” Id. at\n498.\n Because prisons around the country applied varied eval-\nuation periods for hormone-therapy eligibility, we held that\n“Dr. Kallas was not on notice that a 13-month evaluation\nwould violate” the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 500. To the\nextent that the claim was based on the length of time it took\nto complete the assessment, we concluded that qualified\nimmunity protected Dr. Kallas from damages liability.\n But we rejected the immunity defense to the failure-to-\ntreat claim. We framed the question as “whether a prison\ndoctor would have known that it was unconstitutional never\nto provide” hormone therapy. Id. at 499. Interpreting the\nrefusal to begin hormone therapy as a complete denial of\ncare, we observed that “[p]rison officials have been on notice\nfor years that leaving serious medical conditions, including\ngender dysphoria, untreated can amount to unconstitutional\ndeliberate indifference.” Id. Given our decision in Fields,\n“circuit precedent clearly established that a total absence of\n\nNo. 18-2075 25\n\ntreatment for the serious medical needs created by gender\ndysphoria is unconstitutional.” Id. (emphasis added).\n We hadn’t decided Mitchell when DOC officials were\nmaking decisions about Campbell’s care, so it has little\nrelevance to the qualified-immunity analysis here. Moreo-\nver, Mitchell illustrates the difference between a complete\ndenial of care and context-specific judgment calls. A plausi-\nble interpretation of the record in Mitchell was that the DOC\noffered the inmate no treatment whatsoever. As we’ve\nexplained, our caselaw clearly establishes that regardless of\nthe disease or injury at issue, utterly failing to treat a serious\nmedical condition constitutes deliberate indifference.\nCampbell, by contrast, received extensive treatment in the\nform of hormone therapy, counseling, and various lifestyle\naccommodations.\n Deciding whether to provide additional medical inter-\nventions—especially when the inmate’s preferred course of\ntreatment poses considerable challenges to prison admin-\nistration—is not the same as deciding to provide no treat-\nment at all. Denying a specific therapy in a particular case\nmight amount to a constitutional violation, but qualified\nimmunity applies absent reasonably specific notice to prison\nofficials.\n In short, when the defendants denied Campbell’s request\nfor sex-reassignment surgery, no case clearly established a\nright to gender-dysphoria treatment beyond hormone\ntherapy. As for Campbell’s requests for electrolysis and\nmakeup, our cases offer no indication that denying arguably\nnonmedical cosmetic accommodations violates the Eighth\nAmendment.\n\n26 No. 18-2075\n\n Qualified-immunity analysis also asks whether “the facts,\ntaken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[], show that\nthe defendants violated a constitutional right.” Gonzalez,\n578 F.3d at 540. Because no case clearly establishes that\ndenying treatment beyond hormone therapy is unconstitu-\ntional, qualified immunity applies regardless. So it’s enough\nto note that a factfinder may infer deliberate indifference\nonly where a prison medical professional makes “a medical\ndecision that has no support in the medical community” and\nprovides “a suspect rationale … for making it.” Petties,\n836 F.3d at 729 n.2. And “even admitted medical malpractice\ndoes not automatically give rise to a constitutional viola-\ntion”; only “sub-minimal competence … crosses the thresh-\nold into deliberate indifference.” Id. at 729. Prison healthcare\nproviders necessarily exercise medical judgment—and thus\nby definition do not act with deliberate indifference—when\nthey base treatment decisions on accepted national stand-\nards and the advice of an expert.\n III. Conclusion\n Because clearly established law did not require\nWisconsin prison officials to provide Campbell with gender-\ndysphoria treatment beyond hormone therapy, the defend-\nants are immune from damages liability. The district court’s\ndecision to the contrary is\n REVERSED\n\nNo. 18-2075 27\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Mark A. Campbell v. Kevin Kallas\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2075\\nMARK A. CAMPBELL,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nKEVIN KALLAS, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-261-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Mark Campbell, also known as\\nNicole Rose Campbell, is an inmate in the Wisconsin prison\\nsystem. In 2007 Campbell pleaded guilty to first-degree\\nsexual assault of a child and is now serving a 34-year sen-\\ntence. Campbell has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria;\\nshe is biologically male but identifies as female. Department\\n\\n2 No. 18-2075\\n\\nof Corrections (“DOC”) medical staff are treating Campbell’s\\ncondition with cross-gender hormone therapy.\\n Beginning in September 2013, Campbell repeatedly re-\\nquested a more radical intervention: sex-reassignment\\nsurgery. National standards of care recommend that patients\\nundertake one year of “real life” experience as a person of\\ntheir self-identified gender before resorting to irreversible\\nsurgical options. That preparatory period presents challeng-\\nes for officials charged with the administration of sex-\\nsegregated prisons. DOC officials consulted an outside\\nexpert, who determined that Campbell was a potential\\nsurgical candidate. But the expert’s cautious conclusion was\\nconditioned on DOC officials developing a safe, workable\\nsolution to the real-life-experience dilemma. Citing these\\nconcerns and DOC policy, officials denied Campbell’s re-\\nquest.\\n After filing grievances and exhausting administrative\\nappeals, Campbell sued Dr. Kevin Kallas, the DOC Mental\\nHealth Director, and a host of other prison officials under\\n42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the defendants were\\ndeliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in\\nviolation of the Eighth Amendment and sought damages\\nand injunctive relief. Both sides moved for summary judg-\\nment, and the defendants also claimed qualified immunity.\\nThe district court denied the motions. As relevant here, the\\njudge rejected the claim of qualified immunity, concluding\\nthat caselaw clearly established a constitutional right to\\neffective medical treatment.\\n We reverse. Qualified immunity shields a public official\\nfrom suit for damages unless caselaw clearly puts him on\\nnotice that his action is unconstitutional. The judge’s ap-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 3\\n\\nproach to the qualified-immunity question was far too\\ngeneral. The Eighth Amendment requires prison healthcare\\nprofessionals to exercise medical judgment when making\\ndecisions about an inmate’s treatment. And they cannot\\ncompletely deny the care of a serious medical condition. But\\ncases recognizing those broad principles could not have\\nwarned these defendants that treating an inmate’s gender\\ndysphoria with hormone therapy and deferring considera-\\ntion of sex-reassignment surgery violates the Constitution.\\nMoreover, it’s doubtful that a prisoner can prove a case of\\ndeliberate indifference when, as here, prison officials fol-\\nlowed accepted medical standards. The defendants are\\nimmune from damages liability.\\n I. Background\\nA. Standards of Care\\n Campbell suffers from gender dysphoria, an acute form\\nof mental distress stemming from strong feelings of incon-\\ngruity between one’s anatomy and one’s gender identity. See\\nAM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL\\nOF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013). To “provide clinical\\nguidance for health professionals,” the World Professional\\nAssociation for Transgender Health established national\\nstandards of care for transsexual, transgender, and gender-\\nnonconforming individuals. WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASS’N FOR\\nTRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH\\nOF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, & GENDER NONCONFORMING\\nPEOPLE 1 (7th version 2011) (“the Standards”),\\nhttps://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7/\\nStandards%20of%20Care_V7%20Full%20Book_English.pdf.\\nThe parties cite the Standards extensively and treat them as\\n\\n4 No. 18-2075\\n\\nauthoritative. “While flexible,” these clinical guidelines\\n“offer standards for promoting optimal health care.” Id. at 2.\\n The Standards outline a range of treatment options for in-\\ndividuals with gender dysphoria. Patients may be encour-\\naged to alter their “gender expression” by living\\ncontinuously or part-time in another gender role. Id. at 9.\\nHormone therapy, which can “feminize or masculinize the\\nbody,” is appropriate for some patients. Id. The Standards\\nprovide four criteria for hormone-therapy eligibility:\\n 1. Persistent, well-documented gender dyspho-\\n ria;\\n 2. Capacity to make a fully informed decision\\n and to consent for treatment;\\n 3. Age of majority in a given country … ; [and]\\n 4. If significant medical or mental health con-\\n cerns are present, they must be reasonably\\n well-controlled.\\nId. at 34. Psychotherapy is not an “absolute” prerequisite for\\nhormone therapy or surgery but is “highly recommended.”\\nId. at 28.\\n Surgery is “the last and the most considered step in the\\ntreatment process,” and not all gender-dysphoric patients\\nare surgical candidates. Id. at 54. The Standards outline\\nseveral surgical approaches. Id. at 57–61. Some modify\\nsecondary sex characteristics via breast reduction or aug-\\nmentation, and facial- and voice-feminization surgery. Id. at\\n57. The Standards don’t require hormonal interventions or\\nextensive preparatory periods for these surgeries, though\\n12 months of feminizing hormone therapy is recommended\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 5\\n\\nfor male-to-female patients. Id. at 58–59. Surgeries altering a\\npatient’s reproductive organs carry stricter eligibility criteria.\\nId. at 59–61. A patient meets the criteria for a hysterectomy\\nand ovariectomy (removal of the uterus and ovaries) or an\\norchiectomy (removal of the testicles) if he or she satisfies\\nthe hormone-therapy criteria and has completed a year of\\ncontinuous hormone therapy. Id. at 60.\\n For operations commonly referred to as sex-reassignment\\nsurgeries—surgeries that replace an individual’s existing\\ngenitals with approximations of those of the opposite sex—\\nthe Standards add yet another requirement. In addition to a\\nyear of hormone therapy, the Standards require patients to\\nhave “12 continuous months of living in a gender role that is\\ncongruent with their gender identity.” Id. The World Profes-\\nsional Association for Transgender Health justifies this\\nrequirement by citing an “expert clinical consensus that this\\nexperience provides ample opportunity for patients to\\nexperience and socially adjust in their desired gender role[]\\nbefore undergoing irreversible surgery.” Id. at 60. The one-\\nyear preparatory period helps patients adjust to the “pro-\\nfound personal and social consequences” of adjusting one’s\\ngender expression. Id. at 61. The Standards don’t include an\\nexception to the real-life-experience requirement for patients\\nliving in institutional settings. Id. at 67–68. The World Pro-\\nfessional Association for Transgender Health explicitly states\\nthat the Standards can be utilized effectively under those\\nconditions. Id.\\nB. DOC Policies and Procedures\\n The DOC established policies to address the unique chal-\\nlenges posed by the incarceration of transgender inmates.\\nThe Gender Dysphoria Committee (the “Committee”) is\\n\\n6 No. 18-2075\\n\\ncharged with handling medical treatment and accommoda-\\ntion requests by an inmate with gender dysphoria. Several of\\nthe defendants are current and former committee members;\\nDr. Kallas serves as DOC Mental Health Director and chairs\\nthe Committee.\\n DOC Policy 500.70.27 lays out the protocol for trans-\\ngender inmates. Wisconsin Department of Corrections,\\nDivision of Adult Institutions, Policy and Procedures, Policy\\nNo. 500.70.27 (Nov. 11, 2017) at Separate Appendix of\\nDefendants–Appellants at 64–73, Campbell v. Kallas,\\nNo. 18-2075 (7th Cir. July 18, 2018), ECF No. 17. An inmate\\nmay self-identify as transgender at any point during his\\nincarceration, making him eligible for several accommoda-\\ntions. Id. at 66. The inmate may order “clothing, shoes,\\nundergarments[,] and prescription eyeglass frames … that\\ncorrespond to the desired gender.” Id. at 73. Undergarments\\nmatching the inmate’s gender identity are also allowed,\\nprovided “they are not visible to others when leaving the\\ncell” or worn in a “disruptive or provocative” manner. Id.\\nMakeup is unavailable for an inmate in male facilities, but an\\ninmate may purchase feminine shower products and request\\na hair-removal product. Id.\\n In addition to these lifestyle accommodations, the DOC\\noffers several forms of medical treatment. Once an inmate\\nself-identifies as transgender, prison medical staff or an\\noutside consultant may assign a clinical diagnosis of gender\\ndysphoria. Id. at 66. A clinically diagnosed inmate is entitled\\nto appropriate psychological treatment, psychiatric care,\\nhormone therapy (under certain circumstances), and “[o]ther\\ntreatment determined to be medically necessary by the\\nTransgender Committee.” Id. at 68.\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 7\\n\\n Requests for new hormonal or surgical interventions are\\nprocessed by a hierarchy of prison medical officials who\\nreview the inmate’s condition. Id. at 69–70. When an inmate\\nfirst requests hormone therapy or surgery, the Supervisor of\\nthe Psychological Services Unit is notified. Id. at 69. The\\nSupervisor assigns a staff member to determine whether to\\ndiagnose the patient with gender dysphoria and whether a\\n“more specialized evaluation” by a gender-dysphoria con-\\nsultant is needed. Id. The Psychological Services Unit report\\nis forwarded to the Mental Health Director, who may call in\\na gender-dysphoria consultant for further evaluation. Id. If\\nthe consultant recommends hormone therapy or surgery, the\\nDirector reviews the report. The consultant’s recommenda-\\ntions are not binding and can either be approved or denied\\nby the Director in consultation with the Committee. Id. at 69–\\n70. Finally, the policy notes: “Due to the limitations inherent\\nin being incarcerated, a real-life experience for the purpose\\nof gender-reassignment therapy is not possible for inmates\\nwho reside within a correctional facility. However, treatment\\nand accommodations may be provided to lessen gender\\ndysphoria.” Id. at 70.\\nC. Campbell’s Course of Treatment\\n Campbell is currently incarcerated at the Racine Correc-\\ntional Institution. Prior to her incarceration, she self-\\nadministered hormone treatments. Although she considered\\nsex-reassignment surgery, she never discussed it with a\\nphysician.\\n Campbell raised gender-identity concerns with a prison\\npsychologist in January 2012. The Committee hired Cynthia\\nOsborne to evaluate Campbell. Osborne is a gender-\\ndysphoria expert and has consulted on numerous cases for\\n\\n8 No. 18-2075\\n\\nprison systems around the country. In August 2012 Osborne\\ndiagnosed Campbell with gender dysphoria but stopped\\nwell short of recommending sex-reassignment surgery.\\n Osborne explained that the 12-month real-life experience\\nrequired by the World Professional Association for\\nTransgender Health could not be fully implemented in the\\nprison setting. She noted that Campbell had “never had the\\nopportunity to meaningfully consolidate [her] preferred\\nfemale identity into a successful life” and would “not be able\\nto do such consolidation in the restrictive environment of\\nincarceration.” Given that challenge, as well as Campbell’s\\n“comorbid psychiatric conditions and vulnerabilities,”\\nOsborne determined that “only reversible interventions\\nshould be considered” and that “[s]ex[-]reassignment sur-\\ngery [was] wholly contraindicated.” Osborne recommended\\nhormone therapy, counseling, and “that the DOC consider\\nwhat feminizing allowances might be made,” even though\\n“[s]uch accommodations are rarely if ever medically neces-\\nsary.”\\n The Committee adopted Osborne’s recommendations,\\ninitiating hormone therapy and permitting Campbell to don\\nfeminine clothing and glasses and use feminine shower\\nproducts. On September 5, 2013, Campbell submitted a\\nrequest for sex-reassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas, following\\nthe Committee’s recommendation, denied Campbell’s re-\\nquest, citing Osborne’s finding that “surgical interventions\\nwere contraindicated.” Dr. Kallas explained that DOC\\n“policy does not prohibit surgical intervention,” but he and\\nthe Committee recognized “the inherent difficulty for any\\ninmate to meet eligibility requirements for gender reassign-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 9\\n\\nment surgery while in prison—specifically, the need for a\\nvalid real-life experience in the desired gender role.”\\n Campbell continued to file surgery requests, and DOC\\nofficials again consulted with Osborne. She reviewed\\nCampbell’s file, talked with the treating psychologist, and\\nmet with Campbell face to face. On August 4, 2014, Osborne\\nsubmitted her second report. Echoing themes from her first\\nreport, Osborne described the Standards as imperfect guides\\nfor treating gender dysphoria in prison. On the possibility of\\nsurgery, Osborne explained that given “the persistent pres-\\nence of severe anatomic dysphoria[,] inmate Campbell may\\nbe a candidate for” sex reassignment. The length of\\nCampbell’s sentence and her track record of cooperating\\nwith medical personnel bolstered the case for surgery.\\n Turning to the “real life experience” requirement,\\nOsborne explained that “[m]any gender dysphoria experts\\nbelieve that the challenges of completing a valid real-life\\nexperience … in the context of incarceration present a formi-\\ndable obstacle to” sex-reassignment surgery. She noted that\\n“there is no empirical evidence on which the DOC can rely\\nin its efforts to predict outcomes, prevent harm[,] and main-\\ntain safety” in developing a real-life experience for\\nCampbell. Thus, the DOC’s “[r]eluctance to embark on a\\nsocial experiment” was “understandable and prudent.” For\\ninmates with lengthy sentences, however, Osborne ques-\\ntioned “whether the [real-life experience] as traditionally\\nunderstood” should be required. Modifying or eliminating\\nthe requirement would carry risks for Campbell, but the\\nDOC should undertake “an examination of the [real-life\\nexperience] concept in order to determine whether there is a\\nworkable approach for inmates.” Still, given these challeng-\\n\\n10 No. 18-2075\\n\\nes, she concluded that “conservative approaches … for\\nincarcerated individuals are wholly warranted.”\\n Summarizing her conclusions, Osborne explained that\\nCampbell had not undergone a valid real-life experience\\nwhile incarcerated, despite Campbell’s claim to the contrary.\\nDeparting from the requirement “may be justifiable in rare\\ncircumstances in correctional settings”—including Camp-\\nbell’s case. Osborne stated that Campbell could be a surgical\\ncandidate but conditioned her assessment on the DOC’s\\ndevelopment of “a safe and reasonable approach to resolv-\\ning the [real-life experience] conundrum.”\\n On September 29, 2014, Campbell filed another request\\nseeking approval for a real-life experience and sex-\\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas responded on October 23,\\nassuring Campbell that “the DOC is continuing to look at\\nhow we can provide at least some elements of a real-life\\nexperience.” Nevertheless, “providing a true or full real-life\\nexperience that will help to determine future suitability for\\nsurgical interventions remain[ed] problematic in an incar-\\ncerated setting.” Referring to Osborne’s second report,\\nDr. Kallas, with the Committee’s recommendation, denied\\nCampbell’s request. Campbell sent additional letters on\\nMarch 15 and April 4, 2015, but Dr. Kallas again denied the\\nrequests for surgery citing the “considerable limitations in\\nwhat [officials could] provide for a real-life experience.”\\nDr. Kallas also rejected Campbell’s request for electrolysis for\\nhair removal and “light makeup,” neither of which was\\n“currently permitted” in the prison.\\n In the wake of these denials, Campbell filed four admin-\\nistrative grievances reiterating her arguments for sex-\\nreassignment surgery, electrolysis, and makeup. All were\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 11\\n\\ndenied. In response to the electrolysis and makeup requests,\\nDOC officials determined that “makeup is not a medically\\nnecessary accommodation” and “[a]lternatives to electroly-\\nsis” were readily available.\\nD. District-Court Proceedings\\n In April 2016 Campbell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\\nalleging that DOC officials were deliberately indifferent to\\nher serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth\\nAmendment. 1 The suit seeks damages and injunctive relief\\nordering “necessary medical care, including [sex-\\nreassignment surgery], and other appropriate treatment,\\nincluding light makeup, electrolysis, breast augmentation,\\nand voice therapy.”\\n Both sides moved for summary judgment, introducing\\ndueling expert opinions on Campbell’s suitability for sur-\\ngery. Dr. Kathy Oriel, one of Campbell’s experts, determined\\nthat “no physician with adequate expertise and experience\\nin gender medicine would” dispute Campbell’s need for sex-\\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Chester W. Schmidt, the defense\\nexpert, opined that sex-reassignment surgery was not medi-\\ncally necessary.\\n Campbell argued that because DOC officials “imple-\\nmented and enforce[d] a blanket ban on medically necessary\\ntreatment … and applied it to Campbell,” they “acted with\\ndeliberate indifference as a matter of law.” The defendants\\nsought qualified immunity, arguing that their treatment\\n\\n\\n1 Campbell later amended her complaint to bring an equal-protection\\nclaim under the Fourteenth Amendment. That claim is not at issue in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n12 No. 18-2075\\n\\ndecisions were not a substantial departure from accepted\\nprofessional judgment.\\n The district judge denied the motions for the most part.\\nBecause DOC officials knew about Campbell’s gender\\ndysphoria and admitted its status as a serious medical\\ncondition, the judge saw one key remaining question:\\nwhether sex-reassignment surgery was medically necessary.\\nOn that issue Dr. Oriel’s expert testimony generated a\\nfactual dispute, so the judge held that “Campbell ha[d]\\nadduced evidence sufficient to show deliberate indiffer-\\nence,” precluding summary judgment. The medical necessi-\\nty of sex-reassignment surgery in Campbell’s case would be\\ndetermined at a bench trial.\\n The judge also addressed Campbell’s requests for elec-\\ntrolysis and makeup, articulating a preliminary determina-\\ntion that providing those accommodations “would offer\\nmore effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender dysphoria\\nand finding “no apparent medical reason to deny” them. But\\nCampbell hadn’t moved for summary judgment on those\\nclaims, so the judge gave the defendants notice and an\\nopportunity to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules\\nof Civil Procedure. They replied with two arguments: First, a\\nruling on electrolysis and makeup prior to a ruling on\\nsurgery would be premature. Second, they cited the lack of\\nrecord evidence that Campbell, “on an individualized basis,\\nhas a medical need for electrolysis and makeup.” The judge\\npostponed further consideration of the issue until trial.\\n The judge’s discussion of qualified immunity was brief\\nand framed the inquiry at a high level of generality. He\\nruled that because the Eighth Amendment does not permit\\nstate officials to deny effective treatment for the serious\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 13\\n\\nmedical needs of prisoners, the “[d]efendants had fair notice\\nthat denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender\\ndysphoria would violate the Constitution. The judge re-\\nbuffed the defendants’ request for a more fact-specific\\nanalysis focusing on sex-reassignment surgery.\\n II. Discussion\\nA. Appellate Jurisdiction\\n The defendants appeal the denial of qualified immunity.\\n“[P]retrial orders denying qualified immunity generally fall\\nwithin the collateral order doctrine.” Plumhoff v. Rickard,\\n572 U.S. 765, 772 (2014) (citation omitted). Campbell’s suit\\nseeks damages and injunctive relief, and the case will pro-\\nceed to trial on the claim for injunctive relief even if the\\ndefendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the damag-\\nes claim. Campbell argues that we should therefore decline\\nto exercise jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.\\n That position cannot be squared with Supreme Court and\\ncircuit precedent. It has long been clear that an order deny-\\ning qualified immunity, “to the extent that it turns on an\\nissue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the\\nmeaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of\\na final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530\\n(1985). Qualified immunity is a form of immunity from\\nsuit—that is, the trial process and attendant burdens—not\\nmerely immunity from damages. Id. at 526–27.\\n The Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide\\nwhether an order denying qualified immunity may be\\nimmediately appealed when the suit also seeks injunctive\\nrelief. Id. at 520 n.5. We have done so, however. In Scott v.\\nLacy, 811 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff sought\\n\\n14 No. 18-2075\\n\\nmoney damages and injunctive relief in a suit against public\\nuniversity officials. Id. at 1154. He argued that the collateral-\\norder doctrine is inapplicable to suits seeking injunctive\\nrelief as well as damages because the case could still proceed\\nto trial regardless of the outcome of an interlocutory appeal\\nof a qualified-immunity ruling. Id. at 1153.\\n Acknowledging a circuit split on this question, we fol-\\nlowed the majority rule and held “that a pending request for\\nan injunction does not defeat jurisdiction of interlocutory\\nappeals based on claims of immunity.” Id. We restated the\\nreasoning in Forsyth and added that “if a request for an\\ninjunction prevented appeal on the question of immunity,\\nplaintiffs who wished to harass officials to travail would\\nneed only demand equitable relief.” Id. at 1154.\\n Every circuit to address this question agrees. See Acierno\\nv. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc); Schopler v.\\nBliss, 903 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1990); DiMartini v. Ferrin,\\n889 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1989); Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79\\n(2d Cir. 1988); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,\\n844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988); Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395 (8th\\nCir. 1987); Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.\\n1986); de Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187 (1st Cir.\\n1986). The Fourth Circuit—the outlier when we decided\\nScott—has since reversed course. See Young v. Lynch,\\n846 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1988).\\n As we’ve noted, the Supreme Court hasn’t squarely re-\\nvisited the question left open in Forsyth. But in Behrens v.\\nPelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), the Court came quite close to\\nembracing the rule we adopted in Scott. The plaintiff there\\nraised multiple claims, including Bivens claims against\\nwhich the defendant unsuccessfully sought qualified im-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 15\\n\\nmunity. Id. at 302–03. The plaintiff argued that the defend-\\nant’s interlocutory appeal was inappropriate because he\\nwould still “be required to endure discovery and trial on\\nmatters separate from the claims against which immunity\\nwas asserted.” Id. at 311. The Court clarified that a qualified-\\nimmunity appeal “cannot be foreclosed by the mere addition\\nof other claims to the suit.” Id. at 312 (emphasis added). Then,\\nventuring beyond the specific facts of the case, the Court\\nexpressed the same concern we identified in Scott: under the\\nplaintiff’s reasoning, “the qualified-immunity right not to be\\nsubjected to pretrial proceedings” or “to trial itself [would]\\nbe eliminated, so long as the complaint seeks injunctive\\nrelief.” Id. (emphasis added). Behrens represents a variation\\non Scott—the case concerned multiple substantive claims\\nrather than multiple forms of relief—but the variation was\\nso slight that the Court saw fit to cite Scott in support of its\\nconclusion. Id. at 312 n.5.\\n Campbell urges us to reconsider Scott, a step that would\\nrevive a long-dormant circuit split and come close to contra-\\ndicting Behrens. We need “compelling reasons” to overrule\\ncircuit precedent. Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir.\\n2005). We may do so when “our position remains a minority\\none among other circuits, when the Supreme Court issues a\\ndecision on an analogous issue that compels us to reconsider\\nour position, or when an intracircuit conflict exists.” Glaser v.\\nWound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 2009)\\n(citations omitted). None of those conditions are satisfied\\nhere. And while Campbell claims that she “is not asking this\\n[c]ourt to reconsider qualified-immunity jurisprudence writ\\nlarge,” each of her arguments does just that. She argues that\\nScott rests on misperceptions about the efficacy of qualified\\nimmunity as a shield against the burdens of litigation. She\\n\\n16 No. 18-2075\\n\\ncites recent scholarship criticizing qualified immunity and\\nmarshals policy arguments focused on judicial resources.\\nAnd she draws our attention to separate opinions by some\\nSupreme Court justices raising questions about the doctrine.\\n We have no authority to depart from the Supreme\\nCourt’s qualified-immunity jurisprudence. And while some\\njustices have questioned qualified immunity, those misgiv-\\nings haven’t stopped the Court from vigorously applying\\nthe doctrine. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.\\n577 (2018). Campbell’s fallback argument asks us to carve\\nout an exception to Scott for cases involving a substantial\\nrisk of harm. But in true emergencies, a plaintiff can seek\\npreliminary injunctive relief. See Wheeler v. Wexford Health\\nSources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681–83 (7th Cir. 2012). We proceed\\nto the merits.\\nB. Qualified Immunity\\n We review qualified-immunity questions independently.\\nGreen v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n The Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and\\nunusual punishment includes the right of prisoners to be\\nfree from “pain and suffering [that] no one suggests would\\nserve any penological purpose.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.\\n97, 103 (1976). As applied in the context of prison medical\\ncare, “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or\\ninjury states a cause of action under § 1983” for violation of\\nthe Eighth Amendment. Id. We evaluate deliberate-\\nindifference claims by “first examining whether a plaintiff\\nsuffered from an objectively serious medical condition[] and\\nthen determining whether the individual defendant was\\ndeliberately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter,\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 17\\n\\n836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The parties agree\\nthat gender dysphoria is a serious medical condition. See\\nMaggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing\\ngender dysphoria as a “serious psychiatric disorder”).\\n To prove deliberate indifference, “mere negligence is not\\nenough. … [A] plaintiff must provide evidence that an\\nofficial actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of\\nharm.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. The linchpin is a lack of\\nprofessional judgment. “A medical professional is entitled to\\ndeference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally\\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\\nthose circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th\\nCir. 2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d\\n982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998)). A prison medical professional faces\\nliability only if his course of treatment is “such a substantial\\ndeparture from accepted professional judgment, practice, or\\nstandards[] as to demonstrate that the person responsible\\nactually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at\\n895 (quoting Collignon, 163 F.3d at 988).\\n Qualified immunity protects government officials from\\ndamages liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate\\nclearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which\\na reasonable person would have known.” Estate of Clark v.\\nWalker, 865 F.3d 544, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson\\nv. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). We evaluate “(1) wheth-\\ner the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plain-\\ntiff[], show that the defendants violated a constitutional\\nright; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly\\nestablished at the time of the alleged violation.” Gonzalez v.\\nCity of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009). The latter\\n\\n18 No. 18-2075\\n\\ninquiry is often dispositive and may be addressed first.\\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 236. We do so here.\\n To be “clearly established,” a constitutional right “must\\nhave a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing prece-\\ndent.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. The principle of fair notice\\npervades the doctrine. Qualified immunity applies unless\\nthe specific contours of the right “were sufficiently definite\\nthat any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would\\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\\nat 778–79.\\n Given this emphasis on notice, clearly established law\\ncannot be framed at a “high level of generality.” Ashcroft v.\\nal-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). As the Supreme Court\\nrecently reminded us, “[a] rule is too general if the unlaw-\\nfulness of the officer’s conduct ‘does not follow immediately\\nfrom the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.’”\\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,\\n483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (second alteration in original)).\\nExisting caselaw must “dictate the resolution of the parties’\\ndispute,” Comsys, Inc. v. Pacetti, 893 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir.\\n2018), so while “a case directly on point” isn’t required,\\n“precedent must have placed the … constitutional question\\nbeyond debate,” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)\\n(quotation marks omitted); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct.\\n1148, 1152–53 (2018). Put slightly differently, a right is\\nclearly established only if “every reasonable official would\\nhave understood that what he is doing violates that right.”\\nTaylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (quoting Reichle\\nv. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)) (emphasis added).\\n The Supreme Court’s message is unmistakable: Frame\\nthe constitutional right in terms granular enough to provide\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 19\\n\\nfair notice because qualified immunity “protects all but the\\nplainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the\\nlaw.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quotation marks omitted).\\n Here the judge framed the qualified-immunity question\\nin very broad terms, asking whether it was clearly estab-\\nlished that “denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s\\nmedical condition violates the Eighth Amendment. That\\nformulation—which is basically a highly conceptualized\\nversion of the deliberate-indifference standard—is far too\\ngeneral. On appeal Campbell likewise frames the issue at too\\nhigh a level of generality, arguing that the defendants violat-\\ned clearly established law by failing to exercise individual-\\nized medical judgment and persisting in an ineffective\\ncourse of treatment. These broad principles have support in\\nour caselaw, but neither has been applied in a factual context\\nspecific enough to provide fair notice to the defendants that\\ntheir conduct was unconstitutional.\\n Campbell relies on Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir.\\n2011), and Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011), but\\nneither case clearly establishes that the conduct at issue here\\nwas unconstitutional. In Elyea, Illinois inmates with hepatitis\\nrequested antiviral drugs but were denied medication\\nbecause a prison policy barred that treatment for inmates\\nwith fewer than 18 months of incarceration remaining.\\n631 F.3d at 850. We explained that “inmate medical care\\ndecisions must be fact-based with respect to the particular\\ninmate” rather than the product of categorical rules and that\\nadministrative considerations cannot trump “reasonable\\nmedical judgment.” Id. at 859, 863 (emphasis omitted).\\nTreatment protocols are permissible, but in “an individual\\ncase, … prison officials still must make a determination that\\n\\n20 No. 18-2075\\n\\napplication of the protocols result[s] in adequate medical\\ncare.” Id. at 860.\\n In Fields we considered a facial Eighth Amendment\\nchallenge to a Wisconsin statute that flatly prohibited DOC\\nofficials from providing sex-reassignment surgery or hormone\\ntherapy to inmates. 653 F.3d at 552–53. The district court held\\nthat the “defendants acted with deliberate indifference in\\nthat [they] knew of [plaintiffs’] serious medical need but\\nrefused to provide hormone therapy because of” the statute.\\nId. at 555. We affirmed, but we did not specifically address\\nthe issue of sex-reassignment surgery because the plaintiffs’\\nrequest was limited to hormone therapy. Id. at 556.\\n Campbell argues that Elyea and Fields clearly establish a\\nright to individualized medical judgment. But to accept that\\nframing would contradict the Supreme Court’s instruction to\\neschew broad generalities. When considering deliberate-\\nindifference claims challenging the medical judgment of\\nprison healthcare personnel, qualified-immunity analysis\\nrequires us to frame the legal question with reasonable\\nspecificity.\\n The proper inquiry is whether then-existing caselaw\\nclearly established a constitutional right to gender-dysphoria\\ntreatment beyond hormone therapy. This framing is specific\\nenough to ensure that “the unlawfulness of the officer’s\\nconduct … follow[s] immediately from the conclusion that\\n[the rule] was firmly established.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590\\n(quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original).\\nAnd in this fact-intensive area of constitutional law, a broad-\\ner formulation would violate the Supreme Court’s instruc-\\ntion that the specific contours of the right must be\\n“sufficiently definite that any reasonable official … would\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 21\\n\\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\\nat 779.\\n Neither Elyea nor Fields provides the required level of\\nspecificity. Elyea amounts to a general admonition that\\nofficials must exercise medical judgment rather than me-\\nchanically apply categorical rules. And Fields doesn’t place\\n“beyond debate” the proposition that medical professionals\\nviolate the Eighth Amendment when they provide hormone\\ntherapy but decide—after extensive deliberation and consul-\\ntation with an outside expert—to deny sex-reassignment\\nsurgery. White, 137 S. Ct. at 551. In both cases prison officials\\nrefused to provide any treatment for serious diseases based\\nsolely on categorical rules. That simply didn’t occur here.\\nThese DOC officials consulted an expert in the field and,\\nfacing a gray area of professional opinion, decided to deny\\nthe “last and … most considered step” of gender-dysphoria\\ntreatment.\\n No case in the Federal Reporter could have warned these\\nDOC officials that their treatment choice was unconstitu-\\ntional. When the defendants were making these decisions,\\nonly one federal appellate decision had addressed the merits\\nof a deliberate-indifference claim involving sex-\\nreassignment surgery: Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir.\\n2014) (en banc). 2 There the First Circuit concluded that\\n\\n2 In De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit\\nreversed a district-court order dismissing a gender-dysphoric inmate’s\\nEighth Amendment challenge at screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.\\nEven setting aside that difference in procedural posture, De’lonta bears\\nno resemblance to this case. Unlike the defendants here, in De’lonta the\\nVirginia Department of Corrections officials “never allowed [the plain-\\ntiff] to be evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist in the first place.”\\nId. at 526 n.4; see also id. at 523 (explaining that the plaintiff had “never\\n\\n22 No. 18-2075\\n\\nprison officials who provided hormone therapy and lifestyle\\naccommodations but denied a request for surgery did not\\nviolate the Eighth Amendment. 3 See id. at 90, 96.\\n Campbell next argues that then-existing caselaw clearly\\nestablished that prison officials cannot abandon medical\\njudgment by “persist[ing] in a course of treatment known to\\nbe ineffective.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir.\\n2005). It’s true that we’ve identified this species of\\ndeliberate-indifference claim. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 729–30.\\nBut we’ve never applied that general principle to facts\\nresembling these. Campbell’s lightly developed argument\\ndoes not convince us that this right was “established not as a\\nbroad general proposition but in a particularized sense so\\nthat the contours of the right are clear to a reasonable offi-\\ncial.” Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (quota-\\ntion marks omitted).\\n We’ve previously noted that “[f]or purposes of qualified\\nimmunity, [the Eighth-Amendment] duty” to treat prison-\\n\\nbeen evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist concerning her need\\nfor sex reassignment surgery”). Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.\\n2015), is similar. There the Ninth Circuit reversed an order dismissing a\\ngender-dysphoric inmate’s Eighth Amendment challenge at screening.\\nUnlike the defendants here, in Rosati the defendants applied a blanket\\npolicy against sex-reassignment surgery and never allowed the plaintiff\\nto be evaluated by a gender-dysphoria specialist. Id. at 1039–40.\\n3 A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit recently announced agreement with\\nKosilek. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019). The panel majority\\nfocused on the ongoing debate over the efficacy of sex-reassignment\\nsurgery in general and wasn’t prepared to accept the World Professional\\nAssociation of Transgender Health’s Standards as authoritative. Id. at 221–\\n24. We don’t need to venture beyond the record and address that wider\\ndebate to decide this appeal.\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 23\\n\\ners’ serious medical conditions “need not be litigated and\\nthen established disease by disease or injury by injury.”\\nEstate of Clark, 865 F.3d at 553. Campbell seizes on this\\naphorism and argues that by the same token, “rights need\\nnot be established treatment by treatment.”\\n That argument overlooks the nature of this deliberate-\\nindifference claim. In Estate of Clark, the prison official\\n“chose to do nothing” in response to a known risk of sub-\\nstantial harm to the prisoner. Id. When prison officials\\nutterly fail to provide care for a serious medical condition,\\nthe constitutional violation is obvious and qualified immuni-\\nty offers little protection. See Orlowski v. Milwaukee County,\\n872 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2017) (denying qualified immuni-\\nty where, in the face of clear symptoms, officers “chose to do\\nnothing”).\\n To be sure, the constitutional concern in cases involving\\nno treatment at all is not disease- or injury-specific. But\\nprisons aren’t obligated to provide every requested treat-\\nment once medical care begins. In a deliberate-indifference\\ncase challenging the medical judgment of prison healthcare\\nprofessionals who actually diagnose and treat an inmate’s\\nmedical condition (as opposed to ignoring it), we necessarily\\nevaluate those discrete treatment decisions. And we defer to\\nthose decisions “unless no minimally competent profession-\\nal would have” made them. Sain, 512 F.3d at 895 (quotation\\nmarks omitted). Deciding whether a particular treatment\\nplan was a “substantial departure from accepted profession-\\nal judgment, practice, or standards”—a necessary predicate\\nto establish an Eighth Amendment violation—requires a\\nclose examination of professional standards and the specific\\nchoices made by care providers. Id. (quotation marks omit-\\n\\n24 No. 18-2075\\n\\nted). Given the fact-specific nature of these claims, the notice\\naspect of qualified-immunity doctrine is crucial.\\n Campbell also relies on our recent decision in Mitchell v.\\nKallas, 895 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2018), another gender-dysphoria\\ncase involving a Wisconsin inmate, Osborne, and Dr. Kallas.\\nIn that case Dr. Kallas denied a prisoner’s request for hor-\\nmone therapy despite Osborne’s unequivocal endorsement\\nof the treatment. He cited a DOC policy requiring at least six\\nremaining months of incarceration to initiate a hormone\\nregimen. Id. at 497. The inmate raised deliberate-indifference\\nclaims based on a “fail[ure] to provide [recommended] care\\nfor a non-medical reason” and “inexplicable delays.” Id. at\\n498.\\n Because prisons around the country applied varied eval-\\nuation periods for hormone-therapy eligibility, we held that\\n“Dr. Kallas was not on notice that a 13-month evaluation\\nwould violate” the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 500. To the\\nextent that the claim was based on the length of time it took\\nto complete the assessment, we concluded that qualified\\nimmunity protected Dr. Kallas from damages liability.\\n But we rejected the immunity defense to the failure-to-\\ntreat claim. We framed the question as “whether a prison\\ndoctor would have known that it was unconstitutional never\\nto provide” hormone therapy. Id. at 499. Interpreting the\\nrefusal to begin hormone therapy as a complete denial of\\ncare, we observed that “[p]rison officials have been on notice\\nfor years that leaving serious medical conditions, including\\ngender dysphoria, untreated can amount to unconstitutional\\ndeliberate indifference.” Id. Given our decision in Fields,\\n“circuit precedent clearly established that a total absence of\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 25\\n\\ntreatment for the serious medical needs created by gender\\ndysphoria is unconstitutional.” Id. (emphasis added).\\n We hadn’t decided Mitchell when DOC officials were\\nmaking decisions about Campbell’s care, so it has little\\nrelevance to the qualified-immunity analysis here. Moreo-\\nver, Mitchell illustrates the difference between a complete\\ndenial of care and context-specific judgment calls. A plausi-\\nble interpretation of the record in Mitchell was that the DOC\\noffered the inmate no treatment whatsoever. As we’ve\\nexplained, our caselaw clearly establishes that regardless of\\nthe disease or injury at issue, utterly failing to treat a serious\\nmedical condition constitutes deliberate indifference.\\nCampbell, by contrast, received extensive treatment in the\\nform of hormone therapy, counseling, and various lifestyle\\naccommodations.\\n Deciding whether to provide additional medical inter-\\nventions—especially when the inmate’s preferred course of\\ntreatment poses considerable challenges to prison admin-\\nistration—is not the same as deciding to provide no treat-\\nment at all. Denying a specific therapy in a particular case\\nmight amount to a constitutional violation, but qualified\\nimmunity applies absent reasonably specific notice to prison\\nofficials.\\n In short, when the defendants denied Campbell’s request\\nfor sex-reassignment surgery, no case clearly established a\\nright to gender-dysphoria treatment beyond hormone\\ntherapy. As for Campbell’s requests for electrolysis and\\nmakeup, our cases offer no indication that denying arguably\\nnonmedical cosmetic accommodations violates the Eighth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n26 No. 18-2075\\n\\n Qualified-immunity analysis also asks whether “the facts,\\ntaken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[], show that\\nthe defendants violated a constitutional right.” Gonzalez,\\n578 F.3d at 540. Because no case clearly establishes that\\ndenying treatment beyond hormone therapy is unconstitu-\\ntional, qualified immunity applies regardless. So it’s enough\\nto note that a factfinder may infer deliberate indifference\\nonly where a prison medical professional makes “a medical\\ndecision that has no support in the medical community” and\\nprovides “a suspect rationale … for making it.” Petties,\\n836 F.3d at 729 n.2. And “even admitted medical malpractice\\ndoes not automatically give rise to a constitutional viola-\\ntion”; only “sub-minimal competence … crosses the thresh-\\nold into deliberate indifference.” Id. at 729. Prison healthcare\\nproviders necessarily exercise medical judgment—and thus\\nby definition do not act with deliberate indifference—when\\nthey base treatment decisions on accepted national stand-\\nards and the advice of an expert.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Because clearly established law did not require\\nWisconsin prison officials to provide Campbell with gender-\\ndysphoria treatment beyond hormone therapy, the defend-\\nants are immune from damages liability. The district court’s\\ndecision to the contrary is\\n REVERSED\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 27\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3879,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4649555,"string":"4,649,555"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Mark A. Campbell v. Kevin Kallas"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2075"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2075\\nMARK A. CAMPBELL,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nKEVIN KALLAS, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-261-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Mark Campbell, also known as\\nNicole Rose Campbell, is an inmate in the Wisconsin prison\\nsystem. In 2007 Campbell pleaded guilty to first-degree\\nsexual assault of a child and is now serving a 34-year sen-\\ntence. Campbell has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria;\\nshe is biologically male but identifies as female. Department\\n\\n2 No. 18-2075\\n\\nof Corrections (“DOC”) medical staff are treating Campbell’s\\ncondition with cross-gender hormone therapy.\\n Beginning in September 2013, Campbell repeatedly re-\\nquested a more radical intervention: sex-reassignment\\nsurgery. National standards of care recommend that patients\\nundertake one year of “real life” experience as a person of\\ntheir self-identified gender before resorting to irreversible\\nsurgical options. That preparatory period presents challeng-\\nes for officials charged with the administration of sex-\\nsegregated prisons. DOC officials consulted an outside\\nexpert, who determined that Campbell was a potential\\nsurgical candidate. But the expert’s cautious conclusion was\\nconditioned on DOC officials developing a safe, workable\\nsolution to the real-life-experience dilemma. Citing these\\nconcerns and DOC policy, officials denied Campbell’s re-\\nquest.\\n After filing grievances and exhausting administrative\\nappeals, Campbell sued Dr. Kevin Kallas, the DOC Mental\\nHealth Director, and a host of other prison officials under\\n42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the defendants were\\ndeliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in\\nviolation of the Eighth Amendment and sought damages\\nand injunctive relief. Both sides moved for summary judg-\\nment, and the defendants also claimed qualified immunity.\\nThe district court denied the motions. As relevant here, the\\njudge rejected the claim of qualified immunity, concluding\\nthat caselaw clearly established a constitutional right to\\neffective medical treatment.\\n We reverse. Qualified immunity shields a public official\\nfrom suit for damages unless caselaw clearly puts him on\\nnotice that his action is unconstitutional. The judge’s ap-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 3\\n\\nproach to the qualified-immunity question was far too\\ngeneral. The Eighth Amendment requires prison healthcare\\nprofessionals to exercise medical judgment when making\\ndecisions about an inmate’s treatment. And they cannot\\ncompletely deny the care of a serious medical condition. But\\ncases recognizing those broad principles could not have\\nwarned these defendants that treating an inmate’s gender\\ndysphoria with hormone therapy and deferring considera-\\ntion of sex-reassignment surgery violates the Constitution.\\nMoreover, it’s doubtful that a prisoner can prove a case of\\ndeliberate indifference when, as here, prison officials fol-\\nlowed accepted medical standards. The defendants are\\nimmune from damages liability.\\n I. Background\\nA. Standards of Care\\n Campbell suffers from gender dysphoria, an acute form\\nof mental distress stemming from strong feelings of incon-\\ngruity between one’s anatomy and one’s gender identity. See\\nAM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL\\nOF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013). To “provide clinical\\nguidance for health professionals,” the World Professional\\nAssociation for Transgender Health established national\\nstandards of care for transsexual, transgender, and gender-\\nnonconforming individuals. WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASS’N FOR\\nTRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH\\nOF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, & GENDER NONCONFORMING\\nPEOPLE 1 (7th version 2011) (“the Standards”),\\nhttps://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7/\\nStandards%20of%20Care_V7%20Full%20Book_English.pdf.\\nThe parties cite the Standards extensively and treat them as\\n\\n4 No. 18-2075\\n\\nauthoritative. “While flexible,” these clinical guidelines\\n“offer standards for promoting optimal health care.” Id. at 2.\\n The Standards outline a range of treatment options for in-\\ndividuals with gender dysphoria. Patients may be encour-\\naged to alter their “gender expression” by living\\ncontinuously or part-time in another gender role. Id. at 9.\\nHormone therapy, which can “feminize or masculinize the\\nbody,” is appropriate for some patients. Id. The Standards\\nprovide four criteria for hormone-therapy eligibility:\\n 1. Persistent, well-documented gender dyspho-\\n ria;\\n 2. Capacity to make a fully informed decision\\n and to consent for treatment;\\n 3. Age of majority in a given country … ; [and]\\n 4. If significant medical or mental health con-\\n cerns are present, they must be reasonably\\n well-controlled.\\nId. at 34. Psychotherapy is not an “absolute” prerequisite for\\nhormone therapy or surgery but is “highly recommended.”\\nId. at 28.\\n Surgery is “the last and the most considered step in the\\ntreatment process,” and not all gender-dysphoric patients\\nare surgical candidates. Id. at 54. The Standards outline\\nseveral surgical approaches. Id. at 57–61. Some modify\\nsecondary sex characteristics via breast reduction or aug-\\nmentation, and facial- and voice-feminization surgery. Id. at\\n57. The Standards don’t require hormonal interventions or\\nextensive preparatory periods for these surgeries, though\\n12 months of feminizing hormone therapy is recommended\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 5\\n\\nfor male-to-female patients. Id. at 58–59. Surgeries altering a\\npatient’s reproductive organs carry stricter eligibility criteria.\\nId. at 59–61. A patient meets the criteria for a hysterectomy\\nand ovariectomy (removal of the uterus and ovaries) or an\\norchiectomy (removal of the testicles) if he or she satisfies\\nthe hormone-therapy criteria and has completed a year of\\ncontinuous hormone therapy. Id. at 60.\\n For operations commonly referred to as sex-reassignment\\nsurgeries—surgeries that replace an individual’s existing\\ngenitals with approximations of those of the opposite sex—\\nthe Standards add yet another requirement. In addition to a\\nyear of hormone therapy, the Standards require patients to\\nhave “12 continuous months of living in a gender role that is\\ncongruent with their gender identity.” Id. The World Profes-\\nsional Association for Transgender Health justifies this\\nrequirement by citing an “expert clinical consensus that this\\nexperience provides ample opportunity for patients to\\nexperience and socially adjust in their desired gender role[]\\nbefore undergoing irreversible surgery.” Id. at 60. The one-\\nyear preparatory period helps patients adjust to the “pro-\\nfound personal and social consequences” of adjusting one’s\\ngender expression. Id. at 61. The Standards don’t include an\\nexception to the real-life-experience requirement for patients\\nliving in institutional settings. Id. at 67–68. The World Pro-\\nfessional Association for Transgender Health explicitly states\\nthat the Standards can be utilized effectively under those\\nconditions. Id.\\nB. DOC Policies and Procedures\\n The DOC established policies to address the unique chal-\\nlenges posed by the incarceration of transgender inmates.\\nThe Gender Dysphoria Committee (the “Committee”) is\\n\\n6 No. 18-2075\\n\\ncharged with handling medical treatment and accommoda-\\ntion requests by an inmate with gender dysphoria. Several of\\nthe defendants are current and former committee members;\\nDr. Kallas serves as DOC Mental Health Director and chairs\\nthe Committee.\\n DOC Policy 500.70.27 lays out the protocol for trans-\\ngender inmates. Wisconsin Department of Corrections,\\nDivision of Adult Institutions, Policy and Procedures, Policy\\nNo. 500.70.27 (Nov. 11, 2017) at Separate Appendix of\\nDefendants–Appellants at 64–73, Campbell v. Kallas,\\nNo. 18-2075 (7th Cir. July 18, 2018), ECF No. 17. An inmate\\nmay self-identify as transgender at any point during his\\nincarceration, making him eligible for several accommoda-\\ntions. Id. at 66. The inmate may order “clothing, shoes,\\nundergarments[,] and prescription eyeglass frames … that\\ncorrespond to the desired gender.” Id. at 73. Undergarments\\nmatching the inmate’s gender identity are also allowed,\\nprovided “they are not visible to others when leaving the\\ncell” or worn in a “disruptive or provocative” manner. Id.\\nMakeup is unavailable for an inmate in male facilities, but an\\ninmate may purchase feminine shower products and request\\na hair-removal product. Id.\\n In addition to these lifestyle accommodations, the DOC\\noffers several forms of medical treatment. Once an inmate\\nself-identifies as transgender, prison medical staff or an\\noutside consultant may assign a clinical diagnosis of gender\\ndysphoria. Id. at 66. A clinically diagnosed inmate is entitled\\nto appropriate psychological treatment, psychiatric care,\\nhormone therapy (under certain circumstances), and “[o]ther\\ntreatment determined to be medically necessary by the\\nTransgender Committee.” Id. at 68.\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 7\\n\\n Requests for new hormonal or surgical interventions are\\nprocessed by a hierarchy of prison medical officials who\\nreview the inmate’s condition. Id. at 69–70. When an inmate\\nfirst requests hormone therapy or surgery, the Supervisor of\\nthe Psychological Services Unit is notified. Id. at 69. The\\nSupervisor assigns a staff member to determine whether to\\ndiagnose the patient with gender dysphoria and whether a\\n“more specialized evaluation” by a gender-dysphoria con-\\nsultant is needed. Id. The Psychological Services Unit report\\nis forwarded to the Mental Health Director, who may call in\\na gender-dysphoria consultant for further evaluation. Id. If\\nthe consultant recommends hormone therapy or surgery, the\\nDirector reviews the report. The consultant’s recommenda-\\ntions are not binding and can either be approved or denied\\nby the Director in consultation with the Committee. Id. at 69–\\n70. Finally, the policy notes: “Due to the limitations inherent\\nin being incarcerated, a real-life experience for the purpose\\nof gender-reassignment therapy is not possible for inmates\\nwho reside within a correctional facility. However, treatment\\nand accommodations may be provided to lessen gender\\ndysphoria.” Id. at 70.\\nC. Campbell’s Course of Treatment\\n Campbell is currently incarcerated at the Racine Correc-\\ntional Institution. Prior to her incarceration, she self-\\nadministered hormone treatments. Although she considered\\nsex-reassignment surgery, she never discussed it with a\\nphysician.\\n Campbell raised gender-identity concerns with a prison\\npsychologist in January 2012. The Committee hired Cynthia\\nOsborne to evaluate Campbell. Osborne is a gender-\\ndysphoria expert and has consulted on numerous cases for\\n\\n8 No. 18-2075\\n\\nprison systems around the country. In August 2012 Osborne\\ndiagnosed Campbell with gender dysphoria but stopped\\nwell short of recommending sex-reassignment surgery.\\n Osborne explained that the 12-month real-life experience\\nrequired by the World Professional Association for\\nTransgender Health could not be fully implemented in the\\nprison setting. She noted that Campbell had “never had the\\nopportunity to meaningfully consolidate [her] preferred\\nfemale identity into a successful life” and would “not be able\\nto do such consolidation in the restrictive environment of\\nincarceration.” Given that challenge, as well as Campbell’s\\n“comorbid psychiatric conditions and vulnerabilities,”\\nOsborne determined that “only reversible interventions\\nshould be considered” and that “[s]ex[-]reassignment sur-\\ngery [was] wholly contraindicated.” Osborne recommended\\nhormone therapy, counseling, and “that the DOC consider\\nwhat feminizing allowances might be made,” even though\\n“[s]uch accommodations are rarely if ever medically neces-\\nsary.”\\n The Committee adopted Osborne’s recommendations,\\ninitiating hormone therapy and permitting Campbell to don\\nfeminine clothing and glasses and use feminine shower\\nproducts. On September 5, 2013, Campbell submitted a\\nrequest for sex-reassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas, following\\nthe Committee’s recommendation, denied Campbell’s re-\\nquest, citing Osborne’s finding that “surgical interventions\\nwere contraindicated.” Dr. Kallas explained that DOC\\n“policy does not prohibit surgical intervention,” but he and\\nthe Committee recognized “the inherent difficulty for any\\ninmate to meet eligibility requirements for gender reassign-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 9\\n\\nment surgery while in prison—specifically, the need for a\\nvalid real-life experience in the desired gender role.”\\n Campbell continued to file surgery requests, and DOC\\nofficials again consulted with Osborne. She reviewed\\nCampbell’s file, talked with the treating psychologist, and\\nmet with Campbell face to face. On August 4, 2014, Osborne\\nsubmitted her second report. Echoing themes from her first\\nreport, Osborne described the Standards as imperfect guides\\nfor treating gender dysphoria in prison. On the possibility of\\nsurgery, Osborne explained that given “the persistent pres-\\nence of severe anatomic dysphoria[,] inmate Campbell may\\nbe a candidate for” sex reassignment. The length of\\nCampbell’s sentence and her track record of cooperating\\nwith medical personnel bolstered the case for surgery.\\n Turning to the “real life experience” requirement,\\nOsborne explained that “[m]any gender dysphoria experts\\nbelieve that the challenges of completing a valid real-life\\nexperience … in the context of incarceration present a formi-\\ndable obstacle to” sex-reassignment surgery. She noted that\\n“there is no empirical evidence on which the DOC can rely\\nin its efforts to predict outcomes, prevent harm[,] and main-\\ntain safety” in developing a real-life experience for\\nCampbell. Thus, the DOC’s “[r]eluctance to embark on a\\nsocial experiment” was “understandable and prudent.” For\\ninmates with lengthy sentences, however, Osborne ques-\\ntioned “whether the [real-life experience] as traditionally\\nunderstood” should be required. Modifying or eliminating\\nthe requirement would carry risks for Campbell, but the\\nDOC should undertake “an examination of the [real-life\\nexperience] concept in order to determine whether there is a\\nworkable approach for inmates.” Still, given these challeng-\\n\\n10 No. 18-2075\\n\\nes, she concluded that “conservative approaches … for\\nincarcerated individuals are wholly warranted.”\\n Summarizing her conclusions, Osborne explained that\\nCampbell had not undergone a valid real-life experience\\nwhile incarcerated, despite Campbell’s claim to the contrary.\\nDeparting from the requirement “may be justifiable in rare\\ncircumstances in correctional settings”—including Camp-\\nbell’s case. Osborne stated that Campbell could be a surgical\\ncandidate but conditioned her assessment on the DOC’s\\ndevelopment of “a safe and reasonable approach to resolv-\\ning the [real-life experience] conundrum.”\\n On September 29, 2014, Campbell filed another request\\nseeking approval for a real-life experience and sex-\\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas responded on October 23,\\nassuring Campbell that “the DOC is continuing to look at\\nhow we can provide at least some elements of a real-life\\nexperience.” Nevertheless, “providing a true or full real-life\\nexperience that will help to determine future suitability for\\nsurgical interventions remain[ed] problematic in an incar-\\ncerated setting.” Referring to Osborne’s second report,\\nDr. Kallas, with the Committee’s recommendation, denied\\nCampbell’s request. Campbell sent additional letters on\\nMarch 15 and April 4, 2015, but Dr. Kallas again denied the\\nrequests for surgery citing the “considerable limitations in\\nwhat [officials could] provide for a real-life experience.”\\nDr. Kallas also rejected Campbell’s request for electrolysis for\\nhair removal and “light makeup,” neither of which was\\n“currently permitted” in the prison.\\n In the wake of these denials, Campbell filed four admin-\\nistrative grievances reiterating her arguments for sex-\\nreassignment surgery, electrolysis, and makeup. All were\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 11\\n\\ndenied. In response to the electrolysis and makeup requests,\\nDOC officials determined that “makeup is not a medically\\nnecessary accommodation” and “[a]lternatives to electroly-\\nsis” were readily available.\\nD. District-Court Proceedings\\n In April 2016 Campbell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\\nalleging that DOC officials were deliberately indifferent to\\nher serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth\\nAmendment. 1 The suit seeks damages and injunctive relief\\nordering “necessary medical care, including [sex-\\nreassignment surgery], and other appropriate treatment,\\nincluding light makeup, electrolysis, breast augmentation,\\nand voice therapy.”\\n Both sides moved for summary judgment, introducing\\ndueling expert opinions on Campbell’s suitability for sur-\\ngery. Dr. Kathy Oriel, one of Campbell’s experts, determined\\nthat “no physician with adequate expertise and experience\\nin gender medicine would” dispute Campbell’s need for sex-\\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Chester W. Schmidt, the defense\\nexpert, opined that sex-reassignment surgery was not medi-\\ncally necessary.\\n Campbell argued that because DOC officials “imple-\\nmented and enforce[d] a blanket ban on medically necessary\\ntreatment … and applied it to Campbell,” they “acted with\\ndeliberate indifference as a matter of law.” The defendants\\nsought qualified immunity, arguing that their treatment\\n\\n\\n1 Campbell later amended her complaint to bring an equal-protection\\nclaim under the Fourteenth Amendment. That claim is not at issue in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n12 No. 18-2075\\n\\ndecisions were not a substantial departure from accepted\\nprofessional judgment.\\n The district judge denied the motions for the most part.\\nBecause DOC officials knew about Campbell’s gender\\ndysphoria and admitted its status as a serious medical\\ncondition, the judge saw one key remaining question:\\nwhether sex-reassignment surgery was medically necessary.\\nOn that issue Dr. Oriel’s expert testimony generated a\\nfactual dispute, so the judge held that “Campbell ha[d]\\nadduced evidence sufficient to show deliberate indiffer-\\nence,” precluding summary judgment. The medical necessi-\\nty of sex-reassignment surgery in Campbell’s case would be\\ndetermined at a bench trial.\\n The judge also addressed Campbell’s requests for elec-\\ntrolysis and makeup, articulating a preliminary determina-\\ntion that providing those accommodations “would offer\\nmore effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender dysphoria\\nand finding “no apparent medical reason to deny” them. But\\nCampbell hadn’t moved for summary judgment on those\\nclaims, so the judge gave the defendants notice and an\\nopportunity to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules\\nof Civil Procedure. They replied with two arguments: First, a\\nruling on electrolysis and makeup prior to a ruling on\\nsurgery would be premature. Second, they cited the lack of\\nrecord evidence that Campbell, “on an individualized basis,\\nhas a medical need for electrolysis and makeup.” The judge\\npostponed further consideration of the issue until trial.\\n The judge’s discussion of qualified immunity was brief\\nand framed the inquiry at a high level of generality. He\\nruled that because the Eighth Amendment does not permit\\nstate officials to deny effective treatment for the serious\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 13\\n\\nmedical needs of prisoners, the “[d]efendants had fair notice\\nthat denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender\\ndysphoria would violate the Constitution. The judge re-\\nbuffed the defendants’ request for a more fact-specific\\nanalysis focusing on sex-reassignment surgery.\\n II. Discussion\\nA. Appellate Jurisdiction\\n The defendants appeal the denial of qualified immunity.\\n“[P]retrial orders denying qualified immunity generally fall\\nwithin the collateral order doctrine.” Plumhoff v. Rickard,\\n572 U.S. 765, 772 (2014) (citation omitted). Campbell’s suit\\nseeks damages and injunctive relief, and the case will pro-\\nceed to trial on the claim for injunctive relief even if the\\ndefendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the damag-\\nes claim. Campbell argues that we should therefore decline\\nto exercise jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.\\n That position cannot be squared with Supreme Court and\\ncircuit precedent. It has long been clear that an order deny-\\ning qualified immunity, “to the extent that it turns on an\\nissue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the\\nmeaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of\\na final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530\\n(1985). Qualified immunity is a form of immunity from\\nsuit—that is, the trial process and attendant burdens—not\\nmerely immunity from damages. Id. at 526–27.\\n The Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide\\nwhether an order denying qualified immunity may be\\nimmediately appealed when the suit also seeks injunctive\\nrelief. Id. at 520 n.5. We have done so, however. In Scott v.\\nLacy, 811 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff sought\\n\\n14 No. 18-2075\\n\\nmoney damages and injunctive relief in a suit against public\\nuniversity officials. Id. at 1154. He argued that the collateral-\\norder doctrine is inapplicable to suits seeking injunctive\\nrelief as well as damages because the case could still proceed\\nto trial regardless of the outcome of an interlocutory appeal\\nof a qualified-immunity ruling. Id. at 1153.\\n Acknowledging a circuit split on this question, we fol-\\nlowed the majority rule and held “that a pending request for\\nan injunction does not defeat jurisdiction of interlocutory\\nappeals based on claims of immunity.” Id. We restated the\\nreasoning in Forsyth and added that “if a request for an\\ninjunction prevented appeal on the question of immunity,\\nplaintiffs who wished to harass officials to travail would\\nneed only demand equitable relief.” Id. at 1154.\\n Every circuit to address this question agrees. See Acierno\\nv. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc); Schopler v.\\nBliss, 903 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1990); DiMartini v. Ferrin,\\n889 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1989); Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79\\n(2d Cir. 1988); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,\\n844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988); Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395 (8th\\nCir. 1987); Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.\\n1986); de Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187 (1st Cir.\\n1986). The Fourth Circuit—the outlier when we decided\\nScott—has since reversed course. See Young v. Lynch,\\n846 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1988).\\n As we’ve noted, the Supreme Court hasn’t squarely re-\\nvisited the question left open in Forsyth. But in Behrens v.\\nPelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), the Court came quite close to\\nembracing the rule we adopted in Scott. The plaintiff there\\nraised multiple claims, including Bivens claims against\\nwhich the defendant unsuccessfully sought qualified im-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 15\\n\\nmunity. Id. at 302–03. The plaintiff argued that the defend-\\nant’s interlocutory appeal was inappropriate because he\\nwould still “be required to endure discovery and trial on\\nmatters separate from the claims against which immunity\\nwas asserted.” Id. at 311. The Court clarified that a qualified-\\nimmunity appeal “cannot be foreclosed by the mere addition\\nof other claims to the suit.” Id. at 312 (emphasis added). Then,\\nventuring beyond the specific facts of the case, the Court\\nexpressed the same concern we identified in Scott: under the\\nplaintiff’s reasoning, “the qualified-immunity right not to be\\nsubjected to pretrial proceedings” or “to trial itself [would]\\nbe eliminated, so long as the complaint seeks injunctive\\nrelief.” Id. (emphasis added). Behrens represents a variation\\non Scott—the case concerned multiple substantive claims\\nrather than multiple forms of relief—but the variation was\\nso slight that the Court saw fit to cite Scott in support of its\\nconclusion. Id. at 312 n.5.\\n Campbell urges us to reconsider Scott, a step that would\\nrevive a long-dormant circuit split and come close to contra-\\ndicting Behrens. We need “compelling reasons” to overrule\\ncircuit precedent. Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir.\\n2005). We may do so when “our position remains a minority\\none among other circuits, when the Supreme Court issues a\\ndecision on an analogous issue that compels us to reconsider\\nour position, or when an intracircuit conflict exists.” Glaser v.\\nWound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 2009)\\n(citations omitted). None of those conditions are satisfied\\nhere. And while Campbell claims that she “is not asking this\\n[c]ourt to reconsider qualified-immunity jurisprudence writ\\nlarge,” each of her arguments does just that. She argues that\\nScott rests on misperceptions about the efficacy of qualified\\nimmunity as a shield against the burdens of litigation. She\\n\\n16 No. 18-2075\\n\\ncites recent scholarship criticizing qualified immunity and\\nmarshals policy arguments focused on judicial resources.\\nAnd she draws our attention to separate opinions by some\\nSupreme Court justices raising questions about the doctrine.\\n We have no authority to depart from the Supreme\\nCourt’s qualified-immunity jurisprudence. And while some\\njustices have questioned qualified immunity, those misgiv-\\nings haven’t stopped the Court from vigorously applying\\nthe doctrine. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.\\n577 (2018). Campbell’s fallback argument asks us to carve\\nout an exception to Scott for cases involving a substantial\\nrisk of harm. But in true emergencies, a plaintiff can seek\\npreliminary injunctive relief. See Wheeler v. Wexford Health\\nSources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681–83 (7th Cir. 2012). We proceed\\nto the merits.\\nB. Qualified Immunity\\n We review qualified-immunity questions independently.\\nGreen v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n The Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and\\nunusual punishment includes the right of prisoners to be\\nfree from “pain and suffering [that] no one suggests would\\nserve any penological purpose.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.\\n97, 103 (1976). As applied in the context of prison medical\\ncare, “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or\\ninjury states a cause of action under § 1983” for violation of\\nthe Eighth Amendment. Id. We evaluate deliberate-\\nindifference claims by “first examining whether a plaintiff\\nsuffered from an objectively serious medical condition[] and\\nthen determining whether the individual defendant was\\ndeliberately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter,\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 17\\n\\n836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The parties agree\\nthat gender dysphoria is a serious medical condition. See\\nMaggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing\\ngender dysphoria as a “serious psychiatric disorder”).\\n To prove deliberate indifference, “mere negligence is not\\nenough. … [A] plaintiff must provide evidence that an\\nofficial actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of\\nharm.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. The linchpin is a lack of\\nprofessional judgment. “A medical professional is entitled to\\ndeference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally\\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\\nthose circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th\\nCir. 2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d\\n982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998)). A prison medical professional faces\\nliability only if his course of treatment is “such a substantial\\ndeparture from accepted professional judgment, practice, or\\nstandards[] as to demonstrate that the person responsible\\nactually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at\\n895 (quoting Collignon, 163 F.3d at 988).\\n Qualified immunity protects government officials from\\ndamages liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate\\nclearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which\\na reasonable person would have known.” Estate of Clark v.\\nWalker, 865 F.3d 544, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson\\nv. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). We evaluate “(1) wheth-\\ner the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plain-\\ntiff[], show that the defendants violated a constitutional\\nright; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly\\nestablished at the time of the alleged violation.” Gonzalez v.\\nCity of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009). The latter\\n\\n18 No. 18-2075\\n\\ninquiry is often dispositive and may be addressed first.\\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 236. We do so here.\\n To be “clearly established,” a constitutional right “must\\nhave a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing prece-\\ndent.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. The principle of fair notice\\npervades the doctrine. Qualified immunity applies unless\\nthe specific contours of the right “were sufficiently definite\\nthat any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would\\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\\nat 778–79.\\n Given this emphasis on notice, clearly established law\\ncannot be framed at a “high level of generality.” Ashcroft v.\\nal-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). As the Supreme Court\\nrecently reminded us, “[a] rule is too general if the unlaw-\\nfulness of the officer’s conduct ‘does not follow immediately\\nfrom the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.’”\\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,\\n483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (second alteration in original)).\\nExisting caselaw must “dictate the resolution of the parties’\\ndispute,” Comsys, Inc. v. Pacetti, 893 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir.\\n2018), so while “a case directly on point” isn’t required,\\n“precedent must have placed the … constitutional question\\nbeyond debate,” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)\\n(quotation marks omitted); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct.\\n1148, 1152–53 (2018). Put slightly differently, a right is\\nclearly established only if “every reasonable official would\\nhave understood that what he is doing violates that right.”\\nTaylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (quoting Reichle\\nv. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)) (emphasis added).\\n The Supreme Court’s message is unmistakable: Frame\\nthe constitutional right in terms granular enough to provide\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 19\\n\\nfair notice because qualified immunity “protects all but the\\nplainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the\\nlaw.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quotation marks omitted).\\n Here the judge framed the qualified-immunity question\\nin very broad terms, asking whether it was clearly estab-\\nlished that “denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s\\nmedical condition violates the Eighth Amendment. That\\nformulation—which is basically a highly conceptualized\\nversion of the deliberate-indifference standard—is far too\\ngeneral. On appeal Campbell likewise frames the issue at too\\nhigh a level of generality, arguing that the defendants violat-\\ned clearly established law by failing to exercise individual-\\nized medical judgment and persisting in an ineffective\\ncourse of treatment. These broad principles have support in\\nour caselaw, but neither has been applied in a factual context\\nspecific enough to provide fair notice to the defendants that\\ntheir conduct was unconstitutional.\\n Campbell relies on Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir.\\n2011), and Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011), but\\nneither case clearly establishes that the conduct at issue here\\nwas unconstitutional. In Elyea, Illinois inmates with hepatitis\\nrequested antiviral drugs but were denied medication\\nbecause a prison policy barred that treatment for inmates\\nwith fewer than 18 months of incarceration remaining.\\n631 F.3d at 850. We explained that “inmate medical care\\ndecisions must be fact-based with respect to the particular\\ninmate” rather than the product of categorical rules and that\\nadministrative considerations cannot trump “reasonable\\nmedical judgment.” Id. at 859, 863 (emphasis omitted).\\nTreatment protocols are permissible, but in “an individual\\ncase, … prison officials still must make a determination that\\n\\n20 No. 18-2075\\n\\napplication of the protocols result[s] in adequate medical\\ncare.” Id. at 860.\\n In Fields we considered a facial Eighth Amendment\\nchallenge to a Wisconsin statute that flatly prohibited DOC\\nofficials from providing sex-reassignment surgery or hormone\\ntherapy to inmates. 653 F.3d at 552–53. The district court held\\nthat the “defendants acted with deliberate indifference in\\nthat [they] knew of [plaintiffs’] serious medical need but\\nrefused to provide hormone therapy because of” the statute.\\nId. at 555. We affirmed, but we did not specifically address\\nthe issue of sex-reassignment surgery because the plaintiffs’\\nrequest was limited to hormone therapy. Id. at 556.\\n Campbell argues that Elyea and Fields clearly establish a\\nright to individualized medical judgment. But to accept that\\nframing would contradict the Supreme Court’s instruction to\\neschew broad generalities. When considering deliberate-\\nindifference claims challenging the medical judgment of\\nprison healthcare personnel, qualified-immunity analysis\\nrequires us to frame the legal question with reasonable\\nspecificity.\\n The proper inquiry is whether then-existing caselaw\\nclearly established a constitutional right to gender-dysphoria\\ntreatment beyond hormone therapy. This framing is specific\\nenough to ensure that “the unlawfulness of the officer’s\\nconduct … follow[s] immediately from the conclusion that\\n[the rule] was firmly established.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590\\n(quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original).\\nAnd in this fact-intensive area of constitutional law, a broad-\\ner formulation would violate the Supreme Court’s instruc-\\ntion that the specific contours of the right must be\\n“sufficiently definite that any reasonable official … would\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 21\\n\\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\\nat 779.\\n Neither Elyea nor Fields provides the required level of\\nspecificity. Elyea amounts to a general admonition that\\nofficials must exercise medical judgment rather than me-\\nchanically apply categorical rules. And Fields doesn’t place\\n“beyond debate” the proposition that medical professionals\\nviolate the Eighth Amendment when they provide hormone\\ntherapy but decide—after extensive deliberation and consul-\\ntation with an outside expert—to deny sex-reassignment\\nsurgery. White, 137 S. Ct. at 551. In both cases prison officials\\nrefused to provide any treatment for serious diseases based\\nsolely on categorical rules. That simply didn’t occur here.\\nThese DOC officials consulted an expert in the field and,\\nfacing a gray area of professional opinion, decided to deny\\nthe “last and … most considered step” of gender-dysphoria\\ntreatment.\\n No case in the Federal Reporter could have warned these\\nDOC officials that their treatment choice was unconstitu-\\ntional. When the defendants were making these decisions,\\nonly one federal appellate decision had addressed the merits\\nof a deliberate-indifference claim involving sex-\\nreassignment surgery: Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir.\\n2014) (en banc). 2 There the First Circuit concluded that\\n\\n2 In De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit\\nreversed a district-court order dismissing a gender-dysphoric inmate’s\\nEighth Amendment challenge at screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.\\nEven setting aside that difference in procedural posture, De’lonta bears\\nno resemblance to this case. Unlike the defendants here, in De’lonta the\\nVirginia Department of Corrections officials “never allowed [the plain-\\ntiff] to be evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist in the first place.”\\nId. at 526 n.4; see also id. at 523 (explaining that the plaintiff had “never\\n\\n22 No. 18-2075\\n\\nprison officials who provided hormone therapy and lifestyle\\naccommodations but denied a request for surgery did not\\nviolate the Eighth Amendment. 3 See id. at 90, 96.\\n Campbell next argues that then-existing caselaw clearly\\nestablished that prison officials cannot abandon medical\\njudgment by “persist[ing] in a course of treatment known to\\nbe ineffective.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir.\\n2005). It’s true that we’ve identified this species of\\ndeliberate-indifference claim. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 729–30.\\nBut we’ve never applied that general principle to facts\\nresembling these. Campbell’s lightly developed argument\\ndoes not convince us that this right was “established not as a\\nbroad general proposition but in a particularized sense so\\nthat the contours of the right are clear to a reasonable offi-\\ncial.” Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (quota-\\ntion marks omitted).\\n We’ve previously noted that “[f]or purposes of qualified\\nimmunity, [the Eighth-Amendment] duty” to treat prison-\\n\\nbeen evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist concerning her need\\nfor sex reassignment surgery”). Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.\\n2015), is similar. There the Ninth Circuit reversed an order dismissing a\\ngender-dysphoric inmate’s Eighth Amendment challenge at screening.\\nUnlike the defendants here, in Rosati the defendants applied a blanket\\npolicy against sex-reassignment surgery and never allowed the plaintiff\\nto be evaluated by a gender-dysphoria specialist. Id. at 1039–40.\\n3 A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit recently announced agreement with\\nKosilek. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019). The panel majority\\nfocused on the ongoing debate over the efficacy of sex-reassignment\\nsurgery in general and wasn’t prepared to accept the World Professional\\nAssociation of Transgender Health’s Standards as authoritative. Id. at 221–\\n24. We don’t need to venture beyond the record and address that wider\\ndebate to decide this appeal.\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 23\\n\\ners’ serious medical conditions “need not be litigated and\\nthen established disease by disease or injury by injury.”\\nEstate of Clark, 865 F.3d at 553. Campbell seizes on this\\naphorism and argues that by the same token, “rights need\\nnot be established treatment by treatment.”\\n That argument overlooks the nature of this deliberate-\\nindifference claim. In Estate of Clark, the prison official\\n“chose to do nothing” in response to a known risk of sub-\\nstantial harm to the prisoner. Id. When prison officials\\nutterly fail to provide care for a serious medical condition,\\nthe constitutional violation is obvious and qualified immuni-\\nty offers little protection. See Orlowski v. Milwaukee County,\\n872 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2017) (denying qualified immuni-\\nty where, in the face of clear symptoms, officers “chose to do\\nnothing”).\\n To be sure, the constitutional concern in cases involving\\nno treatment at all is not disease- or injury-specific. But\\nprisons aren’t obligated to provide every requested treat-\\nment once medical care begins. In a deliberate-indifference\\ncase challenging the medical judgment of prison healthcare\\nprofessionals who actually diagnose and treat an inmate’s\\nmedical condition (as opposed to ignoring it), we necessarily\\nevaluate those discrete treatment decisions. And we defer to\\nthose decisions “unless no minimally competent profession-\\nal would have” made them. Sain, 512 F.3d at 895 (quotation\\nmarks omitted). Deciding whether a particular treatment\\nplan was a “substantial departure from accepted profession-\\nal judgment, practice, or standards”—a necessary predicate\\nto establish an Eighth Amendment violation—requires a\\nclose examination of professional standards and the specific\\nchoices made by care providers. Id. (quotation marks omit-\\n\\n24 No. 18-2075\\n\\nted). Given the fact-specific nature of these claims, the notice\\naspect of qualified-immunity doctrine is crucial.\\n Campbell also relies on our recent decision in Mitchell v.\\nKallas, 895 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2018), another gender-dysphoria\\ncase involving a Wisconsin inmate, Osborne, and Dr. Kallas.\\nIn that case Dr. Kallas denied a prisoner’s request for hor-\\nmone therapy despite Osborne’s unequivocal endorsement\\nof the treatment. He cited a DOC policy requiring at least six\\nremaining months of incarceration to initiate a hormone\\nregimen. Id. at 497. The inmate raised deliberate-indifference\\nclaims based on a “fail[ure] to provide [recommended] care\\nfor a non-medical reason” and “inexplicable delays.” Id. at\\n498.\\n Because prisons around the country applied varied eval-\\nuation periods for hormone-therapy eligibility, we held that\\n“Dr. Kallas was not on notice that a 13-month evaluation\\nwould violate” the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 500. To the\\nextent that the claim was based on the length of time it took\\nto complete the assessment, we concluded that qualified\\nimmunity protected Dr. Kallas from damages liability.\\n But we rejected the immunity defense to the failure-to-\\ntreat claim. We framed the question as “whether a prison\\ndoctor would have known that it was unconstitutional never\\nto provide” hormone therapy. Id. at 499. Interpreting the\\nrefusal to begin hormone therapy as a complete denial of\\ncare, we observed that “[p]rison officials have been on notice\\nfor years that leaving serious medical conditions, including\\ngender dysphoria, untreated can amount to unconstitutional\\ndeliberate indifference.” Id. Given our decision in Fields,\\n“circuit precedent clearly established that a total absence of\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 25\\n\\ntreatment for the serious medical needs created by gender\\ndysphoria is unconstitutional.” Id. (emphasis added).\\n We hadn’t decided Mitchell when DOC officials were\\nmaking decisions about Campbell’s care, so it has little\\nrelevance to the qualified-immunity analysis here. Moreo-\\nver, Mitchell illustrates the difference between a complete\\ndenial of care and context-specific judgment calls. A plausi-\\nble interpretation of the record in Mitchell was that the DOC\\noffered the inmate no treatment whatsoever. As we’ve\\nexplained, our caselaw clearly establishes that regardless of\\nthe disease or injury at issue, utterly failing to treat a serious\\nmedical condition constitutes deliberate indifference.\\nCampbell, by contrast, received extensive treatment in the\\nform of hormone therapy, counseling, and various lifestyle\\naccommodations.\\n Deciding whether to provide additional medical inter-\\nventions—especially when the inmate’s preferred course of\\ntreatment poses considerable challenges to prison admin-\\nistration—is not the same as deciding to provide no treat-\\nment at all. Denying a specific therapy in a particular case\\nmight amount to a constitutional violation, but qualified\\nimmunity applies absent reasonably specific notice to prison\\nofficials.\\n In short, when the defendants denied Campbell’s request\\nfor sex-reassignment surgery, no case clearly established a\\nright to gender-dysphoria treatment beyond hormone\\ntherapy. As for Campbell’s requests for electrolysis and\\nmakeup, our cases offer no indication that denying arguably\\nnonmedical cosmetic accommodations violates the Eighth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n26 No. 18-2075\\n\\n Qualified-immunity analysis also asks whether “the facts,\\ntaken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[], show that\\nthe defendants violated a constitutional right.” Gonzalez,\\n578 F.3d at 540. Because no case clearly establishes that\\ndenying treatment beyond hormone therapy is unconstitu-\\ntional, qualified immunity applies regardless. So it’s enough\\nto note that a factfinder may infer deliberate indifference\\nonly where a prison medical professional makes “a medical\\ndecision that has no support in the medical community” and\\nprovides “a suspect rationale … for making it.” Petties,\\n836 F.3d at 729 n.2. And “even admitted medical malpractice\\ndoes not automatically give rise to a constitutional viola-\\ntion”; only “sub-minimal competence … crosses the thresh-\\nold into deliberate indifference.” Id. at 729. Prison healthcare\\nproviders necessarily exercise medical judgment—and thus\\nby definition do not act with deliberate indifference—when\\nthey base treatment decisions on accepted national stand-\\nards and the advice of an expert.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Because clearly established law did not require\\nWisconsin prison officials to provide Campbell with gender-\\ndysphoria treatment beyond hormone therapy, the defend-\\nants are immune from damages liability. The district court’s\\ndecision to the contrary is\\n REVERSED\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 27\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426808/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane Pamela Wood\"}, {\"author\": \"WOOD, Chief Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"WOOD, Chief Judge, dissenting. The Supreme Court has\\npounded home the point that when deciding whether quali‐\\nfied immunity applies, lower courts cannot view the law at a\\n“high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al‐Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742\\n(2011). Nonetheless, while “a case directly on point” may be\\nsufficient, it is not necessary. White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551\\n(2017). The majority opinion in the case before us recognizes\\nthis distinction, admitting that “‘[f]or purposes of qualified\\nimmunity, [the Eighth‐Amendment] duty’ to treat prisoners’\\nserious medical conditions ‘need not be litigated and then es‐\\ntablished disease by disease or injury by injury.’” Ante at 22\\n(quoting Estate of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 553 (7th Cir.\\n2017)). The Eighth Amendment applies whether the serious\\ncondition is Type I diabetes, paraplegia, congestive heart fail‐\\nure, or a broken leg, even though the treatments for those con‐\\nditions are quite different. Yet the majority fails to follow this\\nrule. Instead, it states that Campbell must show a clearly es‐\\ntablished right specific to her condition—gender dysphoria—\\nand to the particular way the medical profession addresses it.\\nAnte at 20. With respect, that is the wrong question, and so it\\nleads to the wrong answer. I therefore dissent.\\n Before outlining my disagreement with the majority, I\\nshould emphasize my agreement with much of what it says. I\\njoin in full Part II.A of the majority’s opinion, which addresses\\nour jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. Like my col‐\\nleagues, I see no reason to break with our sister circuits, over‐\\nrule Scott v. Lacy, 811 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1987), and decline\\njurisdiction because of Campbell’s outstanding request for in‐\\njunctive relief. My disagreement is limited to the majority’s\\napplication of the qualified immunity inquiry to this case.\\nEven there, I have no quarrel with much of the reasoning. As\\nthe majority notes, the relevant Eighth Amendment inquiry is\\n\\n28 No. 18‐2075\\n\\nwhether Kallas and the other defendants were deliberately in‐\\ndifferent to Campbell’s serious medical condition. Ante at 16.\\nAs the majority recognizes, gender dysphoria is a serious\\nmedical condition for which prison officials must provide\\ntreatment. Ante at 17 (citing Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670,\\n671 (7th Cir. 1997)). We diverge only on the description of the\\nclearly established right and whether Campbell has presented\\nenough evidence to show (if believed by a trier of fact) that\\nKallas violated that right.\\n I\\n This case comes to us from the denial of qualified immun‐\\nity by the district court. That means our review is limited. We\\nmust answer only two questions: whether defendants vio‐\\nlated a constitutional right, and whether that constitutional\\nright was clearly established at the time defendants acted.\\nAshcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 673 (2009). This means not only\\nthat we must take the facts in the light most favorable to the\\nplaintiff, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656–57 (2014), but also—\\nas is the case any time there are disputed issues of material\\nfact—that we have no jurisdiction to resolve any factual dis‐\\nputes. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). We thus ap‐\\nproach the facts in much the same way as we would if we\\nwere reviewing a motion to dismiss or a grant of summary\\njudgment. See, e.g., Tolan, 572 U.S. at 657 (vacating the grant\\nof qualified immunity because “[i]n holding that Cotton’s ac‐\\ntions did not violate clearly established law, the Fifth Circuit\\nfailed to view the evidence at summary judgment in the light\\nmost favorable to Tolan”).\\n Some 22 years ago, this court stated that because prisoners\\nwere “entitled only to minimum care,” they were not entitled\\n\\nNo. 18‐2075 29\\n\\nto sexual‐reassignment surgery (“SRS”)1 or hormone therapy,\\nbecause the minimal record before the court indicated that\\nthose treatments were expensive and “esoteric medical treat‐\\nment that only the wealthy can afford ….” Maggert, 131 F.3d\\nat 671–72. But that was not our last word on this issue. In Fields\\nv. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011), we evaluated a claim that\\nthe total denial of either medically necessary hormones or\\nmedically necessary SRS violated the Eighth Amendment.\\nUnlike in Maggert, in Fields we had the benefit of a full trial\\nrecord. Id. at 555. We determined that time and the crucible of\\ntrial had disproven the “empirical assumptions” on which\\nMaggert relied. Id. Both hormones and SRS were, for example,\\nsignificantly cheaper than other treatments and surgeries that\\nthe Wisconsin Department of Corrections had provided in re‐\\ncent years. Id.\\n Despite the majority’s contention, ante at 20, while the\\nbulk of our discussion in Fields focused on hormone therapy,\\nwe also specifically addressed the Fields plaintiffs’ attempt to\\nstrike down Wisconsin’s surgery ban. On this point, we up‐\\nheld the district court’s enjoining of Wisconsin’s surgery ban,\\nbecause that statute forbade “even the consideration of … sur‐\\ngery” regardless of whether SRS was medically necessary for\\n\\n 1 I recognize that the term “sexual‐reassignment surgery” is now con‐\\n\\nsidered an outdated and inaccurate descriptor of this procedure. This sur‐\\ngical treatment is now more commonly referred to as gender confirmation\\nsurgery. See, e.g., Gender Confirmation Surgery, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN\\nSCHOOL OF MEDICINE, https://www.uofmhealth.org/conditions‐treat‐\\nments/gender‐confirmation‐surgery (last visited July 26, 2019) (explaining\\nthe available options for gender confirmation surgery in the University of\\nMichigan Health System). For the sake of consistency, however, I use the\\nterm “SRS” here, as it is the label given to this surgery by the majority, the\\nparties, and the WPATH Standards.\\n\\n30 No. 18‐2075\\n\\nan individual prisoner. Id. at 558–59. We concluded that “[i]t\\nis well established that the Constitution’s ban on cruel and\\nunusual punishment does not permit a state to deny effective\\ntreatment for the serious medical needs of prisoners. … Re‐\\nfusing to provide effective treatment for a serious medical\\ncondition serves no valid penological purpose and amounts\\nto torture.” Id. at 556. Our bottom line was simple: “Just as the\\nlegislature cannot outlaw all effective cancer treatments for\\nprison inmates, it cannot outlaw the only effective treatment\\nfor a serious condition like [gender dysphoria].” Id. at 557.\\n Recently, in Estate of Clark, we recognized that “[t]he Su‐\\npreme Court has long held that prisoners have an Eighth\\nAmendment right to treatment for their ‘serious medical\\nneeds,’” 865 F.3d at 553, and thus that this right is clearly es‐\\ntablished. “For purposes of qualified immunity, that legal\\nduty need not be litigated and then established disease by dis‐\\nease or injury by injury.” Id. The majority opinion now seems\\nto walk back the latter statement. But in doing so it confuses\\nthe legal definition of the clearly established right with the\\nfactual question of the medical necessity of a particular treat‐\\nment for a particular patient.\\n Our inquiry should be simple: first, we must determine\\nwhether Campbell suffers from a medical need that is clearly\\nestablished as objectively serious; second, we must determine\\nwhether, as a subjective matter, it was clear to the defendants\\nthat they were being deliberately indifferent to Campbell’s\\nobjectively serious medical need.\\n The first half of this inquiry is easy. We recognized in 1997\\nthat “[g]ender dysphoria … is a serious psychiatric disorder.”\\nMaggert, 131 F.3d at 671. It has thus been established for more\\nthan 20 years that gender dysphoria is a serious medical need;\\n\\nNo. 18‐2075 31\\n\\ncommendably, the defendants in this litigation do not con‐\\ntend that it is not. See also Fields, 653 F.3d at 554–55; Meri‐\\nwhether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding\\nthat “plaintiff’s complaint [asserting that she received no\\ntreatment for her gender dysphoria] does state a ‘serious\\nmedical need’”).\\n That takes us to the second inquiry: whether the defend‐\\nants were deliberately indifferent in refusing Campbell’s re‐\\nquests for surgery. Because the deliberate indifference inquiry\\nis a subjective one, it necessarily “turns on [a defendant’s]\\nmental state, and it is well established what the law requires\\nin that regard.” Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 807 (7th Cir. 2016).\\nIf a defendant “consciously disregard[s] the risks of [denying\\nan inmate’s medical care], then his conduct violates clearly es‐\\ntablished law under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 807–08.\\n Proving someone’s state of mind is always difficult. See\\nPetties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc)\\n(“Rarely if ever will an official declare, ‘I knew this would\\nprobably harm you, and I did it anyway!’”). But it is not im‐\\npossible: circumstantial evidence pointing to deliberate indif‐\\nference can be gathered in medical cases just as in others. See\\nid. The obvious case is a defendant who sees a suffering in‐\\nmate and ostentatiously does nothing to help her. See, e.g.,\\nMitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Prison of‐\\nficials have been on notice for years that leaving serious med‐\\nical conditions, including gender dysphoria, untreated can\\namount to unconstitutional deliberate indifference.”). None‐\\ntheless, that is the beginning, not the end, of the deliberate‐\\nindifference inquiry. See Zaya, 836 F.3d at 805 (“[W]e have\\nalso made clear that an inmate need not show that he was ‘lit‐\\nerally ignored’ to prevail on a deliberate‐indifference claim.”).\\n\\n32 No. 18‐2075\\n\\nA plaintiff may prove deliberate indifference through evi‐\\ndence that the defendant’s treatment was far outside of med‐\\nical norms. “[I]f the defendant’s chosen ‘course of treatment’\\ndeparts radically from ‘accepted professional practice,’ a jury\\nmay infer from the treatment decision itself that no exercise\\nof professional judgment actually occurred.” Id. (quoting\\nPyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)). Similarly, it\\nhas long “been established that the choice of an ‘easier and\\nless efficacious treatment’ can demonstrate that the actor dis‐\\nplayed ‘deliberate indifference … rather than an exercise of\\nprofessional judgment.’” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 861 (7th\\nCir. 2011) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,\\n429 U.S. 97, 104 n.10 (1976)). Finally, “[a]nother situation that\\nmight establish a departure from minimally competent med‐\\nical judgment is where a prison official persists in a course of\\ntreatment known to be ineffective.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 729–30.\\n Importantly, whether a defendant had a deliberately indif‐\\nferent state of mind is not a legal question; it is a factual one.\\nSee Zaya, 836 F.3d at 808 (“As we’ve explained, that’s [i.e.\\nwhether the defendant was deliberately indifferent] a ques‐\\ntion of fact that needs to be resolved by a jury.”); Petties, 836\\nF.3d at 728 (“We must determine what kind of evidence is ad‐\\nequate for a jury to draw a reasonable inference that a prison\\nofficial acted with deliberate indifference.” (emphasis\\nadded)). We can thus resolve this case now only if there is no\\ndisputed issue of material fact on this point.\\n The question whether a particular course of treatment for\\nan objectively serious medical condition amounts to deliber‐\\nate indifference can be answered only with evidence from the\\nmedical community. For that reason, courts cannot look to\\noutdated factual evidence from past cases to determine\\n\\nNo. 18‐2075 33\\n\\nwhether some course of treatment is within acceptable\\nboundaries. If the medical community uniformly decides that\\na recent advance is the only proper course of treatment, a de‐\\nfendant cannot rely on a case from before that advance oc‐\\ncurred to say that her outdated treatment choice was reason‐\\nable. A court’s role is only to determine whether a plaintiff has\\nput forward sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to con‐\\nclude that the treatment she received was so far outside the\\nbounds of medical professional judgment that it amounted to\\ndeliberate indifference.\\n II\\n What, then, is the evidence about treatments for gender\\ndysphoria? Is it undisputed that responsible doctors might\\nchoose the course that Wisconsin followed, or is there evi‐\\ndence that, if believed by a jury, would show that Wisconsin’s\\nchoice was so far out of line with accepted practice that it\\namounted to deliberate indifference? We do not write here on\\na clean slate. In Fields, the district court “addressed both hor‐\\nmone therapy and sex reassignment surgery,” and we upheld\\nits finding that banning either treatment despite its medical\\nnecessity violated the Eighth Amendment. Fields, 653 F.3d at\\n558–59. While no other court of appeals has dealt with a pris‐\\noner’s claim for SRS in the context of qualified immunity, our\\nsister circuits are largely in accord about whether the denial\\nof SRS can violate the Eighth Amendment: It can. See Rosati v.\\nIgbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the\\ndenial of SRS stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment);\\nDe’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525–26 (4th Cir. 2013) (same).\\nThe cases denying a plaintiff’s claim for SRS do so not because\\nthe denial of SRS can never be deliberate indifference, but be‐\\ncause the factual record before them did not contain evidence\\n\\n34 No. 18‐2075\\n\\nthat, if believed, would show that only SRS would be appro‐\\npriate for that plaintiff. See Lamb v. Norwood, 899 F.3d 1159,\\n1162–63 (10th Cir. 2018). In Lamb, the court noted that the\\n“sparseness of the summary judgment record precludes a rea‐\\nsonable fact‐finder from inferring deliberate indifference.” Id.\\nIt also relied on the fact that “Paul Corbier, M.D. stated under\\noath that Michelle’s existing treatment has proven beneficial\\nand that surgery is impractical and unnecessary in light of the\\navailability and effectiveness of more conservative therapies.”\\nId. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc), is\\nsimilar. There the First Circuit rejected Kosilek’s plea for SRS,\\nbut it went out of its way to say that “this case presents unique\\ncircumstances; we are simply unconvinced that our decision\\non the record before us today will foreclose all litigants from\\nsuccessfully seeking SRS in the future. Certain facts in this\\nparticular record—including the medical providers’ non‐uni‐\\nform opinions regarding the necessity of SRS, Kosilek’s crim‐\\ninal history, and the feasibility of postoperative housing—\\nwere important factors impacting the decision.” Id. at 91. It is\\nalso noteworthy that the First Circuit decided Kosilek only af‐\\nter a lengthy trial. Id. at 74–81 (describing the trial record);\\nKosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 212 (D. Mass. 2012)\\n(making findings of fact after “a 28‐day trial”).\\n The one court of appeals to foreclose SRS entirely said that\\nit was doing so based on a lack of record evidence. See Gibson\\nv. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 220–21 (5th Cir. 2019). In Gibson, the\\nFifth Circuit held that Gibson could not survive summary\\njudgment because she had provided no evidence that SRS was\\nthe only medically acceptable treatment option for her. Id. She\\n“did not dispute that the medical controversy” over SRS—\\nwhich the Fifth Circuit found existed based on Kosilek—“con‐\\ntinues to this day.” Id. at 221. Campbell, by contrast, has\\n\\nNo. 18‐2075 35\\n\\nproduced precisely the evidence that the Fifth Circuit wanted.\\nAs the majority opinion notes, Campbell’s experts have testi‐\\nfied that SRS is both medically necessary for her and uncon‐\\ntroversial within the medical community. Indeed, Dr. Kathy\\nOriel opined that “‘no physician with adequate expertise and\\nexperience in gender medicine would’ dispute Campbell’s\\nneed for sex‐reassignment surgery.” Ante at 11. If the trier of\\nfact credited that testimony, Campbell could prevail.\\n The majority attempts to distinguish De’lonta because it\\nwas an appeal of a motion to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,\\nand because the plaintiff there had not yet been evaluated by\\na gender‐identity medical specialist. Ante at 21 n.2. But just as\\nin a motion‐to‐dismiss posture, in a qualified immunity inter‐\\nlocutory appeal we must draw inferences and resolve factual\\ndisputes in the plaintiff’s favor. And the fact that the defend‐\\nants in De’lonta had not yet allowed De’lonta to see a specialist\\nhas no bearing on the legal question whether refusing to pro‐\\nvide universally accepted surgery would violate the Eighth\\nAmendment. As the Fourth Circuit recognized, a surgical\\nconsultation was merely one step toward curing the potential\\nconstitutional violation. See De’lonta, 708 F.3d at 526 & n.4.\\n The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rosati, which rests on a\\nprocedural and factual posture similar to that in De’lonta, is\\nalso instructive. There the court held that Rosati stated an\\nEighth Amendment claim despite prison officials having en‐\\ngaged a medical consultant, because the consultant was “a\\nphysician’s assistant with no experience in transgender med‐\\nicine.” Rosati, 791 F.3d at 1040. While Cynthia Osborne, the\\ndefendants’ outside consultant in our case, does specialize in\\ngender identity issues, she is not a doctor. And Campbell has\\nadduced significant evidence that Osborne’s opinion about\\n\\n36 No. 18‐2075\\n\\nthe need for surgery is not only incorrect, it is also well out‐\\nside the bounds accepted by the medical community. This\\npresents a question of fact for a trial, where the trier of fact\\nwill decide whether to accept or reject Campbell’s views.\\n As the district court recognized, when viewed in the light\\nmost favorable to Campbell, the evidence shows that despite\\nbeing treated with hormones, Campbell’s gender dysphoria\\nhas not improved. She has continued to threaten self‐castra‐\\ntion and to experience suicidal ideation. The defendants are\\naware of Campbell’s continued suffering and have neverthe‐\\nless refused her further treatment. Campbell’s experts have\\nopined that no reasonable medical professional would recom‐\\nmend any course of treatment in her case except surgery. The\\nmajority opinion swipes this evidence away. Instead it\\nchooses to reach its own conclusion that, despite members of\\nthe medical community swearing to the contrary, SRS is not\\nso well‐established that Kallas could be deliberately indiffer‐\\nent by refusing to provide it. But that is a conclusion of fact\\nthat lies outside our competence. It also rests on the flawed\\nlegal basis of an “injury by injury” determination of clearly\\nestablished law.\\n I respectfully dissent.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4426808/\", \"author_raw\": \"WOOD, Chief Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WOOD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WOOD\": \", Chief\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649555/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Mark A. Campbell v. Kevin Kallas\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2075\nMARK A. CAMPBELL,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nKEVIN KALLAS, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 16-cv-261-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER,\nCircuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Mark Campbell, also known as\nNicole Rose Campbell, is an inmate in the Wisconsin prison\nsystem. In 2007 Campbell pleaded guilty to first-degree\nsexual assault of a child and is now serving a 34-year sen-\ntence. Campbell has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria;\nshe is biologically male but identifies as female. Department\n\n2 No. 18-2075\n\nof Corrections (“DOC”) medical staff are treating Campbell’s\ncondition with cross-gender hormone therapy.\n Beginning in September 2013, Campbell repeatedly re-\nquested a more radical intervention: sex-reassignment\nsurgery. National standards of care recommend that patients\nundertake one year of “real life” experience as a person of\ntheir self-identified gender before resorting to irreversible\nsurgical options. That preparatory period presents challeng-\nes for officials charged with the administration of sex-\nsegregated prisons. DOC officials consulted an outside\nexpert, who determined that Campbell was a potential\nsurgical candidate. But the expert’s cautious conclusion was\nconditioned on DOC officials developing a safe, workable\nsolution to the real-life-experience dilemma. Citing these\nconcerns and DOC policy, officials denied Campbell’s re-\nquest.\n After filing grievances and exhausting administrative\nappeals, Campbell sued Dr. Kevin Kallas, the DOC Mental\nHealth Director, and a host of other prison officials under\n42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the defendants were\ndeliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in\nviolation of the Eighth Amendment and sought damages\nand injunctive relief. Both sides moved for summary judg-\nment, and the defendants also claimed qualified immunity.\nThe district court denied the motions. As relevant here, the\njudge rejected the claim of qualified immunity, concluding\nthat caselaw clearly established a constitutional right to\neffective medical treatment.\n We reverse. Qualified immunity shields a public official\nfrom suit for damages unless caselaw clearly puts him on\nnotice that his action is unconstitutional. The judge’s ap-\n\nNo. 18-2075 3\n\nproach to the qualified-immunity question was far too\ngeneral. The Eighth Amendment requires prison healthcare\nprofessionals to exercise medical judgment when making\ndecisions about an inmate’s treatment. And they cannot\ncompletely deny the care of a serious medical condition. But\ncases recognizing those broad principles could not have\nwarned these defendants that treating an inmate’s gender\ndysphoria with hormone therapy and deferring considera-\ntion of sex-reassignment surgery violates the Constitution.\nMoreover, it’s doubtful that a prisoner can prove a case of\ndeliberate indifference when, as here, prison officials fol-\nlowed accepted medical standards. The defendants are\nimmune from damages liability.\n I. Background\nA. Standards of Care\n Campbell suffers from gender dysphoria, an acute form\nof mental distress stemming from strong feelings of incon-\ngruity between one’s anatomy and one’s gender identity. See\nAM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL\nOF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013). To “provide clinical\nguidance for health professionals,” the World Professional\nAssociation for Transgender Health established national\nstandards of care for transsexual, transgender, and gender-\nnonconforming individuals. WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASS’N FOR\nTRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH\nOF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, & GENDER NONCONFORMING\nPEOPLE 1 (7th version 2011) (“the Standards”),\nhttps://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7/\nStandards%20of%20Care_V7%20Full%20Book_English.pdf.\nThe parties cite the Standards extensively and treat them as\n\n4 No. 18-2075\n\nauthoritative. “While flexible,” these clinical guidelines\n“offer standards for promoting optimal health care.” Id. at 2.\n The Standards outline a range of treatment options for in-\ndividuals with gender dysphoria. Patients may be encour-\naged to alter their “gender expression” by living\ncontinuously or part-time in another gender role. Id. at 9.\nHormone therapy, which can “feminize or masculinize the\nbody,” is appropriate for some patients. Id. The Standards\nprovide four criteria for hormone-therapy eligibility:\n 1. Persistent, well-documented gender dyspho-\n ria;\n 2. Capacity to make a fully informed decision\n and to consent for treatment;\n 3. Age of majority in a given country … ; [and]\n 4. If significant medical or mental health con-\n cerns are present, they must be reasonably\n well-controlled.\nId. at 34. Psychotherapy is not an “absolute” prerequisite for\nhormone therapy or surgery but is “highly recommended.”\nId. at 28.\n Surgery is “the last and the most considered step in the\ntreatment process,” and not all gender-dysphoric patients\nare surgical candidates. Id. at 54. The Standards outline\nseveral surgical approaches. Id. at 57–61. Some modify\nsecondary sex characteristics via breast reduction or aug-\nmentation, and facial- and voice-feminization surgery. Id. at\n57. The Standards don’t require hormonal interventions or\nextensive preparatory periods for these surgeries, though\n12 months of feminizing hormone therapy is recommended\n\nNo. 18-2075 5\n\nfor male-to-female patients. Id. at 58–59. Surgeries altering a\npatient’s reproductive organs carry stricter eligibility criteria.\nId. at 59–61. A patient meets the criteria for a hysterectomy\nand ovariectomy (removal of the uterus and ovaries) or an\norchiectomy (removal of the testicles) if he or she satisfies\nthe hormone-therapy criteria and has completed a year of\ncontinuous hormone therapy. Id. at 60.\n For operations commonly referred to as sex-reassignment\nsurgeries—surgeries that replace an individual’s existing\ngenitals with approximations of those of the opposite sex—\nthe Standards add yet another requirement. In addition to a\nyear of hormone therapy, the Standards require patients to\nhave “12 continuous months of living in a gender role that is\ncongruent with their gender identity.” Id. The World Profes-\nsional Association for Transgender Health justifies this\nrequirement by citing an “expert clinical consensus that this\nexperience provides ample opportunity for patients to\nexperience and socially adjust in their desired gender role[]\nbefore undergoing irreversible surgery.” Id. at 60. The one-\nyear preparatory period helps patients adjust to the “pro-\nfound personal and social consequences” of adjusting one’s\ngender expression. Id. at 61. The Standards don’t include an\nexception to the real-life-experience requirement for patients\nliving in institutional settings. Id. at 67–68. The World Pro-\nfessional Association for Transgender Health explicitly states\nthat the Standards can be utilized effectively under those\nconditions. Id.\nB. DOC Policies and Procedures\n The DOC established policies to address the unique chal-\nlenges posed by the incarceration of transgender inmates.\nThe Gender Dysphoria Committee (the “Committee”) is\n\n6 No. 18-2075\n\ncharged with handling medical treatment and accommoda-\ntion requests by an inmate with gender dysphoria. Several of\nthe defendants are current and former committee members;\nDr. Kallas serves as DOC Mental Health Director and chairs\nthe Committee.\n DOC Policy 500.70.27 lays out the protocol for trans-\ngender inmates. Wisconsin Department of Corrections,\nDivision of Adult Institutions, Policy and Procedures, Policy\nNo. 500.70.27 (Nov. 11, 2017) at Separate Appendix of\nDefendants–Appellants at 64–73, Campbell v. Kallas,\nNo. 18-2075 (7th Cir. July 18, 2018), ECF No. 17. An inmate\nmay self-identify as transgender at any point during his\nincarceration, making him eligible for several accommoda-\ntions. Id. at 66. The inmate may order “clothing, shoes,\nundergarments[,] and prescription eyeglass frames … that\ncorrespond to the desired gender.” Id. at 73. Undergarments\nmatching the inmate’s gender identity are also allowed,\nprovided “they are not visible to others when leaving the\ncell” or worn in a “disruptive or provocative” manner. Id.\nMakeup is unavailable for an inmate in male facilities, but an\ninmate may purchase feminine shower products and request\na hair-removal product. Id.\n In addition to these lifestyle accommodations, the DOC\noffers several forms of medical treatment. Once an inmate\nself-identifies as transgender, prison medical staff or an\noutside consultant may assign a clinical diagnosis of gender\ndysphoria. Id. at 66. A clinically diagnosed inmate is entitled\nto appropriate psychological treatment, psychiatric care,\nhormone therapy (under certain circumstances), and “[o]ther\ntreatment determined to be medically necessary by the\nTransgender Committee.” Id. at 68.\n\nNo. 18-2075 7\n\n Requests for new hormonal or surgical interventions are\nprocessed by a hierarchy of prison medical officials who\nreview the inmate’s condition. Id. at 69–70. When an inmate\nfirst requests hormone therapy or surgery, the Supervisor of\nthe Psychological Services Unit is notified. Id. at 69. The\nSupervisor assigns a staff member to determine whether to\ndiagnose the patient with gender dysphoria and whether a\n“more specialized evaluation” by a gender-dysphoria con-\nsultant is needed. Id. The Psychological Services Unit report\nis forwarded to the Mental Health Director, who may call in\na gender-dysphoria consultant for further evaluation. Id. If\nthe consultant recommends hormone therapy or surgery, the\nDirector reviews the report. The consultant’s recommenda-\ntions are not binding and can either be approved or denied\nby the Director in consultation with the Committee. Id. at 69–\n70. Finally, the policy notes: “Due to the limitations inherent\nin being incarcerated, a real-life experience for the purpose\nof gender-reassignment therapy is not possible for inmates\nwho reside within a correctional facility. However, treatment\nand accommodations may be provided to lessen gender\ndysphoria.” Id. at 70.\nC. Campbell’s Course of Treatment\n Campbell is currently incarcerated at the Racine Correc-\ntional Institution. Prior to her incarceration, she self-\nadministered hormone treatments. Although she considered\nsex-reassignment surgery, she never discussed it with a\nphysician.\n Campbell raised gender-identity concerns with a prison\npsychologist in January 2012. The Committee hired Cynthia\nOsborne to evaluate Campbell. Osborne is a gender-\ndysphoria expert and has consulted on numerous cases for\n\n8 No. 18-2075\n\nprison systems around the country. In August 2012 Osborne\ndiagnosed Campbell with gender dysphoria but stopped\nwell short of recommending sex-reassignment surgery.\n Osborne explained that the 12-month real-life experience\nrequired by the World Professional Association for\nTransgender Health could not be fully implemented in the\nprison setting. She noted that Campbell had “never had the\nopportunity to meaningfully consolidate [her] preferred\nfemale identity into a successful life” and would “not be able\nto do such consolidation in the restrictive environment of\nincarceration.” Given that challenge, as well as Campbell’s\n“comorbid psychiatric conditions and vulnerabilities,”\nOsborne determined that “only reversible interventions\nshould be considered” and that “[s]ex[-]reassignment sur-\ngery [was] wholly contraindicated.” Osborne recommended\nhormone therapy, counseling, and “that the DOC consider\nwhat feminizing allowances might be made,” even though\n“[s]uch accommodations are rarely if ever medically neces-\nsary.”\n The Committee adopted Osborne’s recommendations,\ninitiating hormone therapy and permitting Campbell to don\nfeminine clothing and glasses and use feminine shower\nproducts. On September 5, 2013, Campbell submitted a\nrequest for sex-reassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas, following\nthe Committee’s recommendation, denied Campbell’s re-\nquest, citing Osborne’s finding that “surgical interventions\nwere contraindicated.” Dr. Kallas explained that DOC\n“policy does not prohibit surgical intervention,” but he and\nthe Committee recognized “the inherent difficulty for any\ninmate to meet eligibility requirements for gender reassign-\n\nNo. 18-2075 9\n\nment surgery while in prison—specifically, the need for a\nvalid real-life experience in the desired gender role.”\n Campbell continued to file surgery requests, and DOC\nofficials again consulted with Osborne. She reviewed\nCampbell’s file, talked with the treating psychologist, and\nmet with Campbell face to face. On August 4, 2014, Osborne\nsubmitted her second report. Echoing themes from her first\nreport, Osborne described the Standards as imperfect guides\nfor treating gender dysphoria in prison. On the possibility of\nsurgery, Osborne explained that given “the persistent pres-\nence of severe anatomic dysphoria[,] inmate Campbell may\nbe a candidate for” sex reassignment. The length of\nCampbell’s sentence and her track record of cooperating\nwith medical personnel bolstered the case for surgery.\n Turning to the “real life experience” requirement,\nOsborne explained that “[m]any gender dysphoria experts\nbelieve that the challenges of completing a valid real-life\nexperience … in the context of incarceration present a formi-\ndable obstacle to” sex-reassignment surgery. She noted that\n“there is no empirical evidence on which the DOC can rely\nin its efforts to predict outcomes, prevent harm[,] and main-\ntain safety” in developing a real-life experience for\nCampbell. Thus, the DOC’s “[r]eluctance to embark on a\nsocial experiment” was “understandable and prudent.” For\ninmates with lengthy sentences, however, Osborne ques-\ntioned “whether the [real-life experience] as traditionally\nunderstood” should be required. Modifying or eliminating\nthe requirement would carry risks for Campbell, but the\nDOC should undertake “an examination of the [real-life\nexperience] concept in order to determine whether there is a\nworkable approach for inmates.” Still, given these challeng-\n\n10 No. 18-2075\n\nes, she concluded that “conservative approaches … for\nincarcerated individuals are wholly warranted.”\n Summarizing her conclusions, Osborne explained that\nCampbell had not undergone a valid real-life experience\nwhile incarcerated, despite Campbell’s claim to the contrary.\nDeparting from the requirement “may be justifiable in rare\ncircumstances in correctional settings”—including Camp-\nbell’s case. Osborne stated that Campbell could be a surgical\ncandidate but conditioned her assessment on the DOC’s\ndevelopment of “a safe and reasonable approach to resolv-\ning the [real-life experience] conundrum.”\n On September 29, 2014, Campbell filed another request\nseeking approval for a real-life experience and sex-\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas responded on October 23,\nassuring Campbell that “the DOC is continuing to look at\nhow we can provide at least some elements of a real-life\nexperience.” Nevertheless, “providing a true or full real-life\nexperience that will help to determine future suitability for\nsurgical interventions remain[ed] problematic in an incar-\ncerated setting.” Referring to Osborne’s second report,\nDr. Kallas, with the Committee’s recommendation, denied\nCampbell’s request. Campbell sent additional letters on\nMarch 15 and April 4, 2015, but Dr. Kallas again denied the\nrequests for surgery citing the “considerable limitations in\nwhat [officials could] provide for a real-life experience.”\nDr. Kallas also rejected Campbell’s request for electrolysis for\nhair removal and “light makeup,” neither of which was\n“currently permitted” in the prison.\n In the wake of these denials, Campbell filed four admin-\nistrative grievances reiterating her arguments for sex-\nreassignment surgery, electrolysis, and makeup. All were\n\nNo. 18-2075 11\n\ndenied. In response to the electrolysis and makeup requests,\nDOC officials determined that “makeup is not a medically\nnecessary accommodation” and “[a]lternatives to electroly-\nsis” were readily available.\nD. District-Court Proceedings\n In April 2016 Campbell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\nalleging that DOC officials were deliberately indifferent to\nher serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth\nAmendment. 1 The suit seeks damages and injunctive relief\nordering “necessary medical care, including [sex-\nreassignment surgery], and other appropriate treatment,\nincluding light makeup, electrolysis, breast augmentation,\nand voice therapy.”\n Both sides moved for summary judgment, introducing\ndueling expert opinions on Campbell’s suitability for sur-\ngery. Dr. Kathy Oriel, one of Campbell’s experts, determined\nthat “no physician with adequate expertise and experience\nin gender medicine would” dispute Campbell’s need for sex-\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Chester W. Schmidt, the defense\nexpert, opined that sex-reassignment surgery was not medi-\ncally necessary.\n Campbell argued that because DOC officials “imple-\nmented and enforce[d] a blanket ban on medically necessary\ntreatment … and applied it to Campbell,” they “acted with\ndeliberate indifference as a matter of law.” The defendants\nsought qualified immunity, arguing that their treatment\n\n\n1 Campbell later amended her complaint to bring an equal-protection\nclaim under the Fourteenth Amendment. That claim is not at issue in this\nappeal.\n\n12 No. 18-2075\n\ndecisions were not a substantial departure from accepted\nprofessional judgment.\n The district judge denied the motions for the most part.\nBecause DOC officials knew about Campbell’s gender\ndysphoria and admitted its status as a serious medical\ncondition, the judge saw one key remaining question:\nwhether sex-reassignment surgery was medically necessary.\nOn that issue Dr. Oriel’s expert testimony generated a\nfactual dispute, so the judge held that “Campbell ha[d]\nadduced evidence sufficient to show deliberate indiffer-\nence,” precluding summary judgment. The medical necessi-\nty of sex-reassignment surgery in Campbell’s case would be\ndetermined at a bench trial.\n The judge also addressed Campbell’s requests for elec-\ntrolysis and makeup, articulating a preliminary determina-\ntion that providing those accommodations “would offer\nmore effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender dysphoria\nand finding “no apparent medical reason to deny” them. But\nCampbell hadn’t moved for summary judgment on those\nclaims, so the judge gave the defendants notice and an\nopportunity to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules\nof Civil Procedure. They replied with two arguments: First, a\nruling on electrolysis and makeup prior to a ruling on\nsurgery would be premature. Second, they cited the lack of\nrecord evidence that Campbell, “on an individualized basis,\nhas a medical need for electrolysis and makeup.” The judge\npostponed further consideration of the issue until trial.\n The judge’s discussion of qualified immunity was brief\nand framed the inquiry at a high level of generality. He\nruled that because the Eighth Amendment does not permit\nstate officials to deny effective treatment for the serious\n\nNo. 18-2075 13\n\nmedical needs of prisoners, the “[d]efendants had fair notice\nthat denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender\ndysphoria would violate the Constitution. The judge re-\nbuffed the defendants’ request for a more fact-specific\nanalysis focusing on sex-reassignment surgery.\n II. Discussion\nA. Appellate Jurisdiction\n The defendants appeal the denial of qualified immunity.\n“[P]retrial orders denying qualified immunity generally fall\nwithin the collateral order doctrine.” Plumhoff v. Rickard,\n572 U.S. 765, 772 (2014) (citation omitted). Campbell’s suit\nseeks damages and injunctive relief, and the case will pro-\nceed to trial on the claim for injunctive relief even if the\ndefendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the damag-\nes claim. Campbell argues that we should therefore decline\nto exercise jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.\n That position cannot be squared with Supreme Court and\ncircuit precedent. It has long been clear that an order deny-\ning qualified immunity, “to the extent that it turns on an\nissue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the\nmeaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of\na final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530\n(1985). Qualified immunity is a form of immunity from\nsuit—that is, the trial process and attendant burdens—not\nmerely immunity from damages. Id. at 526–27.\n The Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide\nwhether an order denying qualified immunity may be\nimmediately appealed when the suit also seeks injunctive\nrelief. Id. at 520 n.5. We have done so, however. In Scott v.\nLacy, 811 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff sought\n\n14 No. 18-2075\n\nmoney damages and injunctive relief in a suit against public\nuniversity officials. Id. at 1154. He argued that the collateral-\norder doctrine is inapplicable to suits seeking injunctive\nrelief as well as damages because the case could still proceed\nto trial regardless of the outcome of an interlocutory appeal\nof a qualified-immunity ruling. Id. at 1153.\n Acknowledging a circuit split on this question, we fol-\nlowed the majority rule and held “that a pending request for\nan injunction does not defeat jurisdiction of interlocutory\nappeals based on claims of immunity.” Id. We restated the\nreasoning in Forsyth and added that “if a request for an\ninjunction prevented appeal on the question of immunity,\nplaintiffs who wished to harass officials to travail would\nneed only demand equitable relief.” Id. at 1154.\n Every circuit to address this question agrees. See Acierno\nv. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc); Schopler v.\nBliss, 903 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1990); DiMartini v. Ferrin,\n889 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1989); Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79\n(2d Cir. 1988); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,\n844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988); Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395 (8th\nCir. 1987); Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.\n1986); de Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187 (1st Cir.\n1986). The Fourth Circuit—the outlier when we decided\nScott—has since reversed course. See Young v. Lynch,\n846 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1988).\n As we’ve noted, the Supreme Court hasn’t squarely re-\nvisited the question left open in Forsyth. But in Behrens v.\nPelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), the Court came quite close to\nembracing the rule we adopted in Scott. The plaintiff there\nraised multiple claims, including Bivens claims against\nwhich the defendant unsuccessfully sought qualified im-\n\nNo. 18-2075 15\n\nmunity. Id. at 302–03. The plaintiff argued that the defend-\nant’s interlocutory appeal was inappropriate because he\nwould still “be required to endure discovery and trial on\nmatters separate from the claims against which immunity\nwas asserted.” Id. at 311. The Court clarified that a qualified-\nimmunity appeal “cannot be foreclosed by the mere addition\nof other claims to the suit.” Id. at 312 (emphasis added). Then,\nventuring beyond the specific facts of the case, the Court\nexpressed the same concern we identified in Scott: under the\nplaintiff’s reasoning, “the qualified-immunity right not to be\nsubjected to pretrial proceedings” or “to trial itself [would]\nbe eliminated, so long as the complaint seeks injunctive\nrelief.” Id. (emphasis added). Behrens represents a variation\non Scott—the case concerned multiple substantive claims\nrather than multiple forms of relief—but the variation was\nso slight that the Court saw fit to cite Scott in support of its\nconclusion. Id. at 312 n.5.\n Campbell urges us to reconsider Scott, a step that would\nrevive a long-dormant circuit split and come close to contra-\ndicting Behrens. We need “compelling reasons” to overrule\ncircuit precedent. Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir.\n2005). We may do so when “our position remains a minority\none among other circuits, when the Supreme Court issues a\ndecision on an analogous issue that compels us to reconsider\nour position, or when an intracircuit conflict exists.” Glaser v.\nWound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 2009)\n(citations omitted). None of those conditions are satisfied\nhere. And while Campbell claims that she “is not asking this\n[c]ourt to reconsider qualified-immunity jurisprudence writ\nlarge,” each of her arguments does just that. She argues that\nScott rests on misperceptions about the efficacy of qualified\nimmunity as a shield against the burdens of litigation. She\n\n16 No. 18-2075\n\ncites recent scholarship criticizing qualified immunity and\nmarshals policy arguments focused on judicial resources.\nAnd she draws our attention to separate opinions by some\nSupreme Court justices raising questions about the doctrine.\n We have no authority to depart from the Supreme\nCourt’s qualified-immunity jurisprudence. And while some\njustices have questioned qualified immunity, those misgiv-\nings haven’t stopped the Court from vigorously applying\nthe doctrine. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.\n577 (2018). Campbell’s fallback argument asks us to carve\nout an exception to Scott for cases involving a substantial\nrisk of harm. But in true emergencies, a plaintiff can seek\npreliminary injunctive relief. See Wheeler v. Wexford Health\nSources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681–83 (7th Cir. 2012). We proceed\nto the merits.\nB. Qualified Immunity\n We review qualified-immunity questions independently.\nGreen v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2017).\n The Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and\nunusual punishment includes the right of prisoners to be\nfree from “pain and suffering [that] no one suggests would\nserve any penological purpose.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.\n97, 103 (1976). As applied in the context of prison medical\ncare, “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or\ninjury states a cause of action under § 1983” for violation of\nthe Eighth Amendment. Id. We evaluate deliberate-\nindifference claims by “first examining whether a plaintiff\nsuffered from an objectively serious medical condition[] and\nthen determining whether the individual defendant was\ndeliberately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter,\n\nNo. 18-2075 17\n\n836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The parties agree\nthat gender dysphoria is a serious medical condition. See\nMaggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing\ngender dysphoria as a “serious psychiatric disorder”).\n To prove deliberate indifference, “mere negligence is not\nenough. … [A] plaintiff must provide evidence that an\nofficial actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of\nharm.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. The linchpin is a lack of\nprofessional judgment. “A medical professional is entitled to\ndeference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\nthose circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th\nCir. 2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d\n982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998)). A prison medical professional faces\nliability only if his course of treatment is “such a substantial\ndeparture from accepted professional judgment, practice, or\nstandards[] as to demonstrate that the person responsible\nactually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at\n895 (quoting Collignon, 163 F.3d at 988).\n Qualified immunity protects government officials from\ndamages liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate\nclearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which\na reasonable person would have known.” Estate of Clark v.\nWalker, 865 F.3d 544, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson\nv. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). We evaluate “(1) wheth-\ner the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plain-\ntiff[], show that the defendants violated a constitutional\nright; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly\nestablished at the time of the alleged violation.” Gonzalez v.\nCity of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009). The latter\n\n18 No. 18-2075\n\ninquiry is often dispositive and may be addressed first.\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 236. We do so here.\n To be “clearly established,” a constitutional right “must\nhave a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing prece-\ndent.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. The principle of fair notice\npervades the doctrine. Qualified immunity applies unless\nthe specific contours of the right “were sufficiently definite\nthat any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\nat 778–79.\n Given this emphasis on notice, clearly established law\ncannot be framed at a “high level of generality.” Ashcroft v.\nal-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). As the Supreme Court\nrecently reminded us, “[a] rule is too general if the unlaw-\nfulness of the officer’s conduct ‘does not follow immediately\nfrom the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.’”\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,\n483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (second alteration in original)).\nExisting caselaw must “dictate the resolution of the parties’\ndispute,” Comsys, Inc. v. Pacetti, 893 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir.\n2018), so while “a case directly on point” isn’t required,\n“precedent must have placed the … constitutional question\nbeyond debate,” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)\n(quotation marks omitted); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct.\n1148, 1152–53 (2018). Put slightly differently, a right is\nclearly established only if “every reasonable official would\nhave understood that what he is doing violates that right.”\nTaylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (quoting Reichle\nv. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)) (emphasis added).\n The Supreme Court’s message is unmistakable: Frame\nthe constitutional right in terms granular enough to provide\n\nNo. 18-2075 19\n\nfair notice because qualified immunity “protects all but the\nplainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the\nlaw.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quotation marks omitted).\n Here the judge framed the qualified-immunity question\nin very broad terms, asking whether it was clearly estab-\nlished that “denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s\nmedical condition violates the Eighth Amendment. That\nformulation—which is basically a highly conceptualized\nversion of the deliberate-indifference standard—is far too\ngeneral. On appeal Campbell likewise frames the issue at too\nhigh a level of generality, arguing that the defendants violat-\ned clearly established law by failing to exercise individual-\nized medical judgment and persisting in an ineffective\ncourse of treatment. These broad principles have support in\nour caselaw, but neither has been applied in a factual context\nspecific enough to provide fair notice to the defendants that\ntheir conduct was unconstitutional.\n Campbell relies on Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir.\n2011), and Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011), but\nneither case clearly establishes that the conduct at issue here\nwas unconstitutional. In Elyea, Illinois inmates with hepatitis\nrequested antiviral drugs but were denied medication\nbecause a prison policy barred that treatment for inmates\nwith fewer than 18 months of incarceration remaining.\n631 F.3d at 850. We explained that “inmate medical care\ndecisions must be fact-based with respect to the particular\ninmate” rather than the product of categorical rules and that\nadministrative considerations cannot trump “reasonable\nmedical judgment.” Id. at 859, 863 (emphasis omitted).\nTreatment protocols are permissible, but in “an individual\ncase, … prison officials still must make a determination that\n\n20 No. 18-2075\n\napplication of the protocols result[s] in adequate medical\ncare.” Id. at 860.\n In Fields we considered a facial Eighth Amendment\nchallenge to a Wisconsin statute that flatly prohibited DOC\nofficials from providing sex-reassignment surgery or hormone\ntherapy to inmates. 653 F.3d at 552–53. The district court held\nthat the “defendants acted with deliberate indifference in\nthat [they] knew of [plaintiffs’] serious medical need but\nrefused to provide hormone therapy because of” the statute.\nId. at 555. We affirmed, but we did not specifically address\nthe issue of sex-reassignment surgery because the plaintiffs’\nrequest was limited to hormone therapy. Id. at 556.\n Campbell argues that Elyea and Fields clearly establish a\nright to individualized medical judgment. But to accept that\nframing would contradict the Supreme Court’s instruction to\neschew broad generalities. When considering deliberate-\nindifference claims challenging the medical judgment of\nprison healthcare personnel, qualified-immunity analysis\nrequires us to frame the legal question with reasonable\nspecificity.\n The proper inquiry is whether then-existing caselaw\nclearly established a constitutional right to gender-dysphoria\ntreatment beyond hormone therapy. This framing is specific\nenough to ensure that “the unlawfulness of the officer’s\nconduct … follow[s] immediately from the conclusion that\n[the rule] was firmly established.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590\n(quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original).\nAnd in this fact-intensive area of constitutional law, a broad-\ner formulation would violate the Supreme Court’s instruc-\ntion that the specific contours of the right must be\n“sufficiently definite that any reasonable official … would\n\nNo. 18-2075 21\n\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\nat 779.\n Neither Elyea nor Fields provides the required level of\nspecificity. Elyea amounts to a general admonition that\nofficials must exercise medical judgment rather than me-\nchanically apply categorical rules. And Fields doesn’t place\n“beyond debate” the proposition that medical professionals\nviolate the Eighth Amendment when they provide hormone\ntherapy but decide—after extensive deliberation and consul-\ntation with an outside expert—to deny sex-reassignment\nsurgery. White, 137 S. Ct. at 551. In both cases prison officials\nrefused to provide any treatment for serious diseases based\nsolely on categorical rules. That simply didn’t occur here.\nThese DOC officials consulted an expert in the field and,\nfacing a gray area of professional opinion, decided to deny\nthe “last and … most considered step” of gender-dysphoria\ntreatment.\n No case in the Federal Reporter could have warned these\nDOC officials that their treatment choice was unconstitu-\ntional. When the defendants were making these decisions,\nonly one federal appellate decision had addressed the merits\nof a deliberate-indifference claim involving sex-\nreassignment surgery: Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir.\n2014) (en banc). 2 There the First Circuit concluded that\n\n2 In De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit\nreversed a district-court order dismissing a gender-dysphoric inmate’s\nEighth Amendment challenge at screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.\nEven setting aside that difference in procedural posture, De’lonta bears\nno resemblance to this case. Unlike the defendants here, in De’lonta the\nVirginia Department of Corrections officials “never allowed [the plain-\ntiff] to be evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist in the first place.”\nId. at 526 n.4; see also id. at 523 (explaining that the plaintiff had “never\n\n22 No. 18-2075\n\nprison officials who provided hormone therapy and lifestyle\naccommodations but denied a request for surgery did not\nviolate the Eighth Amendment. 3 See id. at 90, 96.\n Campbell next argues that then-existing caselaw clearly\nestablished that prison officials cannot abandon medical\njudgment by “persist[ing] in a course of treatment known to\nbe ineffective.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir.\n2005). It’s true that we’ve identified this species of\ndeliberate-indifference claim. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 729–30.\nBut we’ve never applied that general principle to facts\nresembling these. Campbell’s lightly developed argument\ndoes not convince us that this right was “established not as a\nbroad general proposition but in a particularized sense so\nthat the contours of the right are clear to a reasonable offi-\ncial.” Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (quota-\ntion marks omitted).\n We’ve previously noted that “[f]or purposes of qualified\nimmunity, [the Eighth-Amendment] duty” to treat prison-\n\nbeen evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist concerning her need\nfor sex reassignment surgery”). Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.\n2015), is similar. There the Ninth Circuit reversed an order dismissing a\ngender-dysphoric inmate’s Eighth Amendment challenge at screening.\nUnlike the defendants here, in Rosati the defendants applied a blanket\npolicy against sex-reassignment surgery and never allowed the plaintiff\nto be evaluated by a gender-dysphoria specialist. Id. at 1039–40.\n3 A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit recently announced agreement with\nKosilek. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019). The panel majority\nfocused on the ongoing debate over the efficacy of sex-reassignment\nsurgery in general and wasn’t prepared to accept the World Professional\nAssociation of Transgender Health’s Standards as authoritative. Id. at 221–\n24. We don’t need to venture beyond the record and address that wider\ndebate to decide this appeal.\n\nNo. 18-2075 23\n\ners’ serious medical conditions “need not be litigated and\nthen established disease by disease or injury by injury.”\nEstate of Clark, 865 F.3d at 553. Campbell seizes on this\naphorism and argues that by the same token, “rights need\nnot be established treatment by treatment.”\n That argument overlooks the nature of this deliberate-\nindifference claim. In Estate of Clark, the prison official\n“chose to do nothing” in response to a known risk of sub-\nstantial harm to the prisoner. Id. When prison officials\nutterly fail to provide care for a serious medical condition,\nthe constitutional violation is obvious and qualified immuni-\nty offers little protection. See Orlowski v. Milwaukee County,\n872 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2017) (denying qualified immuni-\nty where, in the face of clear symptoms, officers “chose to do\nnothing”).\n To be sure, the constitutional concern in cases involving\nno treatment at all is not disease- or injury-specific. But\nprisons aren’t obligated to provide every requested treat-\nment once medical care begins. In a deliberate-indifference\ncase challenging the medical judgment of prison healthcare\nprofessionals who actually diagnose and treat an inmate’s\nmedical condition (as opposed to ignoring it), we necessarily\nevaluate those discrete treatment decisions. And we defer to\nthose decisions “unless no minimally competent profession-\nal would have” made them. Sain, 512 F.3d at 895 (quotation\nmarks omitted). Deciding whether a particular treatment\nplan was a “substantial departure from accepted profession-\nal judgment, practice, or standards”—a necessary predicate\nto establish an Eighth Amendment violation—requires a\nclose examination of professional standards and the specific\nchoices made by care providers. Id. (quotation marks omit-\n\n24 No. 18-2075\n\nted). Given the fact-specific nature of these claims, the notice\naspect of qualified-immunity doctrine is crucial.\n Campbell also relies on our recent decision in Mitchell v.\nKallas, 895 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2018), another gender-dysphoria\ncase involving a Wisconsin inmate, Osborne, and Dr. Kallas.\nIn that case Dr. Kallas denied a prisoner’s request for hor-\nmone therapy despite Osborne’s unequivocal endorsement\nof the treatment. He cited a DOC policy requiring at least six\nremaining months of incarceration to initiate a hormone\nregimen. Id. at 497. The inmate raised deliberate-indifference\nclaims based on a “fail[ure] to provide [recommended] care\nfor a non-medical reason” and “inexplicable delays.” Id. at\n498.\n Because prisons around the country applied varied eval-\nuation periods for hormone-therapy eligibility, we held that\n“Dr. Kallas was not on notice that a 13-month evaluation\nwould violate” the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 500. To the\nextent that the claim was based on the length of time it took\nto complete the assessment, we concluded that qualified\nimmunity protected Dr. Kallas from damages liability.\n But we rejected the immunity defense to the failure-to-\ntreat claim. We framed the question as “whether a prison\ndoctor would have known that it was unconstitutional never\nto provide” hormone therapy. Id. at 499. Interpreting the\nrefusal to begin hormone therapy as a complete denial of\ncare, we observed that “[p]rison officials have been on notice\nfor years that leaving serious medical conditions, including\ngender dysphoria, untreated can amount to unconstitutional\ndeliberate indifference.” Id. Given our decision in Fields,\n“circuit precedent clearly established that a total absence of\n\nNo. 18-2075 25\n\ntreatment for the serious medical needs created by gender\ndysphoria is unconstitutional.” Id. (emphasis added).\n We hadn’t decided Mitchell when DOC officials were\nmaking decisions about Campbell’s care, so it has little\nrelevance to the qualified-immunity analysis here. Moreo-\nver, Mitchell illustrates the difference between a complete\ndenial of care and context-specific judgment calls. A plausi-\nble interpretation of the record in Mitchell was that the DOC\noffered the inmate no treatment whatsoever. As we’ve\nexplained, our caselaw clearly establishes that regardless of\nthe disease or injury at issue, utterly failing to treat a serious\nmedical condition constitutes deliberate indifference.\nCampbell, by contrast, received extensive treatment in the\nform of hormone therapy, counseling, and various lifestyle\naccommodations.\n Deciding whether to provide additional medical inter-\nventions—especially when the inmate’s preferred course of\ntreatment poses considerable challenges to prison admin-\nistration—is not the same as deciding to provide no treat-\nment at all. Denying a specific therapy in a particular case\nmight amount to a constitutional violation, but qualified\nimmunity applies absent reasonably specific notice to prison\nofficials.\n In short, when the defendants denied Campbell’s request\nfor sex-reassignment surgery, no case clearly established a\nright to gender-dysphoria treatment beyond hormone\ntherapy. As for Campbell’s requests for electrolysis and\nmakeup, our cases offer no indication that denying arguably\nnonmedical cosmetic accommodations violates the Eighth\nAmendment.\n\n26 No. 18-2075\n\n Qualified-immunity analysis also asks whether “the facts,\ntaken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[], show that\nthe defendants violated a constitutional right.” Gonzalez,\n578 F.3d at 540. Because no case clearly establishes that\ndenying treatment beyond hormone therapy is unconstitu-\ntional, qualified immunity applies regardless. So it’s enough\nto note that a factfinder may infer deliberate indifference\nonly where a prison medical professional makes “a medical\ndecision that has no support in the medical community” and\nprovides “a suspect rationale … for making it.” Petties,\n836 F.3d at 729 n.2. And “even admitted medical malpractice\ndoes not automatically give rise to a constitutional viola-\ntion”; only “sub-minimal competence … crosses the thresh-\nold into deliberate indifference.” Id. at 729. Prison healthcare\nproviders necessarily exercise medical judgment—and thus\nby definition do not act with deliberate indifference—when\nthey base treatment decisions on accepted national stand-\nards and the advice of an expert.\n III. Conclusion\n Because clearly established law did not require\nWisconsin prison officials to provide Campbell with gender-\ndysphoria treatment beyond hormone therapy, the defend-\nants are immune from damages liability. The district court’s\ndecision to the contrary is\n REVERSED\n\nNo. 18-2075 27\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Mark A. Campbell v. Kevin Kallas\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2075\\nMARK A. CAMPBELL,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nKEVIN KALLAS, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 16-cv-261-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER,\\nCircuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Mark Campbell, also known as\\nNicole Rose Campbell, is an inmate in the Wisconsin prison\\nsystem. In 2007 Campbell pleaded guilty to first-degree\\nsexual assault of a child and is now serving a 34-year sen-\\ntence. Campbell has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria;\\nshe is biologically male but identifies as female. Department\\n\\n2 No. 18-2075\\n\\nof Corrections (“DOC”) medical staff are treating Campbell’s\\ncondition with cross-gender hormone therapy.\\n Beginning in September 2013, Campbell repeatedly re-\\nquested a more radical intervention: sex-reassignment\\nsurgery. National standards of care recommend that patients\\nundertake one year of “real life” experience as a person of\\ntheir self-identified gender before resorting to irreversible\\nsurgical options. That preparatory period presents challeng-\\nes for officials charged with the administration of sex-\\nsegregated prisons. DOC officials consulted an outside\\nexpert, who determined that Campbell was a potential\\nsurgical candidate. But the expert’s cautious conclusion was\\nconditioned on DOC officials developing a safe, workable\\nsolution to the real-life-experience dilemma. Citing these\\nconcerns and DOC policy, officials denied Campbell’s re-\\nquest.\\n After filing grievances and exhausting administrative\\nappeals, Campbell sued Dr. Kevin Kallas, the DOC Mental\\nHealth Director, and a host of other prison officials under\\n42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the defendants were\\ndeliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in\\nviolation of the Eighth Amendment and sought damages\\nand injunctive relief. Both sides moved for summary judg-\\nment, and the defendants also claimed qualified immunity.\\nThe district court denied the motions. As relevant here, the\\njudge rejected the claim of qualified immunity, concluding\\nthat caselaw clearly established a constitutional right to\\neffective medical treatment.\\n We reverse. Qualified immunity shields a public official\\nfrom suit for damages unless caselaw clearly puts him on\\nnotice that his action is unconstitutional. The judge’s ap-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 3\\n\\nproach to the qualified-immunity question was far too\\ngeneral. The Eighth Amendment requires prison healthcare\\nprofessionals to exercise medical judgment when making\\ndecisions about an inmate’s treatment. And they cannot\\ncompletely deny the care of a serious medical condition. But\\ncases recognizing those broad principles could not have\\nwarned these defendants that treating an inmate’s gender\\ndysphoria with hormone therapy and deferring considera-\\ntion of sex-reassignment surgery violates the Constitution.\\nMoreover, it’s doubtful that a prisoner can prove a case of\\ndeliberate indifference when, as here, prison officials fol-\\nlowed accepted medical standards. The defendants are\\nimmune from damages liability.\\n I. Background\\nA. Standards of Care\\n Campbell suffers from gender dysphoria, an acute form\\nof mental distress stemming from strong feelings of incon-\\ngruity between one’s anatomy and one’s gender identity. See\\nAM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL\\nOF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 (5th ed. 2013). To “provide clinical\\nguidance for health professionals,” the World Professional\\nAssociation for Transgender Health established national\\nstandards of care for transsexual, transgender, and gender-\\nnonconforming individuals. WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASS’N FOR\\nTRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH\\nOF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, & GENDER NONCONFORMING\\nPEOPLE 1 (7th version 2011) (“the Standards”),\\nhttps://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC%20v7/\\nStandards%20of%20Care_V7%20Full%20Book_English.pdf.\\nThe parties cite the Standards extensively and treat them as\\n\\n4 No. 18-2075\\n\\nauthoritative. “While flexible,” these clinical guidelines\\n“offer standards for promoting optimal health care.” Id. at 2.\\n The Standards outline a range of treatment options for in-\\ndividuals with gender dysphoria. Patients may be encour-\\naged to alter their “gender expression” by living\\ncontinuously or part-time in another gender role. Id. at 9.\\nHormone therapy, which can “feminize or masculinize the\\nbody,” is appropriate for some patients. Id. The Standards\\nprovide four criteria for hormone-therapy eligibility:\\n 1. Persistent, well-documented gender dyspho-\\n ria;\\n 2. Capacity to make a fully informed decision\\n and to consent for treatment;\\n 3. Age of majority in a given country … ; [and]\\n 4. If significant medical or mental health con-\\n cerns are present, they must be reasonably\\n well-controlled.\\nId. at 34. Psychotherapy is not an “absolute” prerequisite for\\nhormone therapy or surgery but is “highly recommended.”\\nId. at 28.\\n Surgery is “the last and the most considered step in the\\ntreatment process,” and not all gender-dysphoric patients\\nare surgical candidates. Id. at 54. The Standards outline\\nseveral surgical approaches. Id. at 57–61. Some modify\\nsecondary sex characteristics via breast reduction or aug-\\nmentation, and facial- and voice-feminization surgery. Id. at\\n57. The Standards don’t require hormonal interventions or\\nextensive preparatory periods for these surgeries, though\\n12 months of feminizing hormone therapy is recommended\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 5\\n\\nfor male-to-female patients. Id. at 58–59. Surgeries altering a\\npatient’s reproductive organs carry stricter eligibility criteria.\\nId. at 59–61. A patient meets the criteria for a hysterectomy\\nand ovariectomy (removal of the uterus and ovaries) or an\\norchiectomy (removal of the testicles) if he or she satisfies\\nthe hormone-therapy criteria and has completed a year of\\ncontinuous hormone therapy. Id. at 60.\\n For operations commonly referred to as sex-reassignment\\nsurgeries—surgeries that replace an individual’s existing\\ngenitals with approximations of those of the opposite sex—\\nthe Standards add yet another requirement. In addition to a\\nyear of hormone therapy, the Standards require patients to\\nhave “12 continuous months of living in a gender role that is\\ncongruent with their gender identity.” Id. The World Profes-\\nsional Association for Transgender Health justifies this\\nrequirement by citing an “expert clinical consensus that this\\nexperience provides ample opportunity for patients to\\nexperience and socially adjust in their desired gender role[]\\nbefore undergoing irreversible surgery.” Id. at 60. The one-\\nyear preparatory period helps patients adjust to the “pro-\\nfound personal and social consequences” of adjusting one’s\\ngender expression. Id. at 61. The Standards don’t include an\\nexception to the real-life-experience requirement for patients\\nliving in institutional settings. Id. at 67–68. The World Pro-\\nfessional Association for Transgender Health explicitly states\\nthat the Standards can be utilized effectively under those\\nconditions. Id.\\nB. DOC Policies and Procedures\\n The DOC established policies to address the unique chal-\\nlenges posed by the incarceration of transgender inmates.\\nThe Gender Dysphoria Committee (the “Committee”) is\\n\\n6 No. 18-2075\\n\\ncharged with handling medical treatment and accommoda-\\ntion requests by an inmate with gender dysphoria. Several of\\nthe defendants are current and former committee members;\\nDr. Kallas serves as DOC Mental Health Director and chairs\\nthe Committee.\\n DOC Policy 500.70.27 lays out the protocol for trans-\\ngender inmates. Wisconsin Department of Corrections,\\nDivision of Adult Institutions, Policy and Procedures, Policy\\nNo. 500.70.27 (Nov. 11, 2017) at Separate Appendix of\\nDefendants–Appellants at 64–73, Campbell v. Kallas,\\nNo. 18-2075 (7th Cir. July 18, 2018), ECF No. 17. An inmate\\nmay self-identify as transgender at any point during his\\nincarceration, making him eligible for several accommoda-\\ntions. Id. at 66. The inmate may order “clothing, shoes,\\nundergarments[,] and prescription eyeglass frames … that\\ncorrespond to the desired gender.” Id. at 73. Undergarments\\nmatching the inmate’s gender identity are also allowed,\\nprovided “they are not visible to others when leaving the\\ncell” or worn in a “disruptive or provocative” manner. Id.\\nMakeup is unavailable for an inmate in male facilities, but an\\ninmate may purchase feminine shower products and request\\na hair-removal product. Id.\\n In addition to these lifestyle accommodations, the DOC\\noffers several forms of medical treatment. Once an inmate\\nself-identifies as transgender, prison medical staff or an\\noutside consultant may assign a clinical diagnosis of gender\\ndysphoria. Id. at 66. A clinically diagnosed inmate is entitled\\nto appropriate psychological treatment, psychiatric care,\\nhormone therapy (under certain circumstances), and “[o]ther\\ntreatment determined to be medically necessary by the\\nTransgender Committee.” Id. at 68.\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 7\\n\\n Requests for new hormonal or surgical interventions are\\nprocessed by a hierarchy of prison medical officials who\\nreview the inmate’s condition. Id. at 69–70. When an inmate\\nfirst requests hormone therapy or surgery, the Supervisor of\\nthe Psychological Services Unit is notified. Id. at 69. The\\nSupervisor assigns a staff member to determine whether to\\ndiagnose the patient with gender dysphoria and whether a\\n“more specialized evaluation” by a gender-dysphoria con-\\nsultant is needed. Id. The Psychological Services Unit report\\nis forwarded to the Mental Health Director, who may call in\\na gender-dysphoria consultant for further evaluation. Id. If\\nthe consultant recommends hormone therapy or surgery, the\\nDirector reviews the report. The consultant’s recommenda-\\ntions are not binding and can either be approved or denied\\nby the Director in consultation with the Committee. Id. at 69–\\n70. Finally, the policy notes: “Due to the limitations inherent\\nin being incarcerated, a real-life experience for the purpose\\nof gender-reassignment therapy is not possible for inmates\\nwho reside within a correctional facility. However, treatment\\nand accommodations may be provided to lessen gender\\ndysphoria.” Id. at 70.\\nC. Campbell’s Course of Treatment\\n Campbell is currently incarcerated at the Racine Correc-\\ntional Institution. Prior to her incarceration, she self-\\nadministered hormone treatments. Although she considered\\nsex-reassignment surgery, she never discussed it with a\\nphysician.\\n Campbell raised gender-identity concerns with a prison\\npsychologist in January 2012. The Committee hired Cynthia\\nOsborne to evaluate Campbell. Osborne is a gender-\\ndysphoria expert and has consulted on numerous cases for\\n\\n8 No. 18-2075\\n\\nprison systems around the country. In August 2012 Osborne\\ndiagnosed Campbell with gender dysphoria but stopped\\nwell short of recommending sex-reassignment surgery.\\n Osborne explained that the 12-month real-life experience\\nrequired by the World Professional Association for\\nTransgender Health could not be fully implemented in the\\nprison setting. She noted that Campbell had “never had the\\nopportunity to meaningfully consolidate [her] preferred\\nfemale identity into a successful life” and would “not be able\\nto do such consolidation in the restrictive environment of\\nincarceration.” Given that challenge, as well as Campbell’s\\n“comorbid psychiatric conditions and vulnerabilities,”\\nOsborne determined that “only reversible interventions\\nshould be considered” and that “[s]ex[-]reassignment sur-\\ngery [was] wholly contraindicated.” Osborne recommended\\nhormone therapy, counseling, and “that the DOC consider\\nwhat feminizing allowances might be made,” even though\\n“[s]uch accommodations are rarely if ever medically neces-\\nsary.”\\n The Committee adopted Osborne’s recommendations,\\ninitiating hormone therapy and permitting Campbell to don\\nfeminine clothing and glasses and use feminine shower\\nproducts. On September 5, 2013, Campbell submitted a\\nrequest for sex-reassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas, following\\nthe Committee’s recommendation, denied Campbell’s re-\\nquest, citing Osborne’s finding that “surgical interventions\\nwere contraindicated.” Dr. Kallas explained that DOC\\n“policy does not prohibit surgical intervention,” but he and\\nthe Committee recognized “the inherent difficulty for any\\ninmate to meet eligibility requirements for gender reassign-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 9\\n\\nment surgery while in prison—specifically, the need for a\\nvalid real-life experience in the desired gender role.”\\n Campbell continued to file surgery requests, and DOC\\nofficials again consulted with Osborne. She reviewed\\nCampbell’s file, talked with the treating psychologist, and\\nmet with Campbell face to face. On August 4, 2014, Osborne\\nsubmitted her second report. Echoing themes from her first\\nreport, Osborne described the Standards as imperfect guides\\nfor treating gender dysphoria in prison. On the possibility of\\nsurgery, Osborne explained that given “the persistent pres-\\nence of severe anatomic dysphoria[,] inmate Campbell may\\nbe a candidate for” sex reassignment. The length of\\nCampbell’s sentence and her track record of cooperating\\nwith medical personnel bolstered the case for surgery.\\n Turning to the “real life experience” requirement,\\nOsborne explained that “[m]any gender dysphoria experts\\nbelieve that the challenges of completing a valid real-life\\nexperience … in the context of incarceration present a formi-\\ndable obstacle to” sex-reassignment surgery. She noted that\\n“there is no empirical evidence on which the DOC can rely\\nin its efforts to predict outcomes, prevent harm[,] and main-\\ntain safety” in developing a real-life experience for\\nCampbell. Thus, the DOC’s “[r]eluctance to embark on a\\nsocial experiment” was “understandable and prudent.” For\\ninmates with lengthy sentences, however, Osborne ques-\\ntioned “whether the [real-life experience] as traditionally\\nunderstood” should be required. Modifying or eliminating\\nthe requirement would carry risks for Campbell, but the\\nDOC should undertake “an examination of the [real-life\\nexperience] concept in order to determine whether there is a\\nworkable approach for inmates.” Still, given these challeng-\\n\\n10 No. 18-2075\\n\\nes, she concluded that “conservative approaches … for\\nincarcerated individuals are wholly warranted.”\\n Summarizing her conclusions, Osborne explained that\\nCampbell had not undergone a valid real-life experience\\nwhile incarcerated, despite Campbell’s claim to the contrary.\\nDeparting from the requirement “may be justifiable in rare\\ncircumstances in correctional settings”—including Camp-\\nbell’s case. Osborne stated that Campbell could be a surgical\\ncandidate but conditioned her assessment on the DOC’s\\ndevelopment of “a safe and reasonable approach to resolv-\\ning the [real-life experience] conundrum.”\\n On September 29, 2014, Campbell filed another request\\nseeking approval for a real-life experience and sex-\\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Kallas responded on October 23,\\nassuring Campbell that “the DOC is continuing to look at\\nhow we can provide at least some elements of a real-life\\nexperience.” Nevertheless, “providing a true or full real-life\\nexperience that will help to determine future suitability for\\nsurgical interventions remain[ed] problematic in an incar-\\ncerated setting.” Referring to Osborne’s second report,\\nDr. Kallas, with the Committee’s recommendation, denied\\nCampbell’s request. Campbell sent additional letters on\\nMarch 15 and April 4, 2015, but Dr. Kallas again denied the\\nrequests for surgery citing the “considerable limitations in\\nwhat [officials could] provide for a real-life experience.”\\nDr. Kallas also rejected Campbell’s request for electrolysis for\\nhair removal and “light makeup,” neither of which was\\n“currently permitted” in the prison.\\n In the wake of these denials, Campbell filed four admin-\\nistrative grievances reiterating her arguments for sex-\\nreassignment surgery, electrolysis, and makeup. All were\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 11\\n\\ndenied. In response to the electrolysis and makeup requests,\\nDOC officials determined that “makeup is not a medically\\nnecessary accommodation” and “[a]lternatives to electroly-\\nsis” were readily available.\\nD. District-Court Proceedings\\n In April 2016 Campbell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983\\nalleging that DOC officials were deliberately indifferent to\\nher serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth\\nAmendment. 1 The suit seeks damages and injunctive relief\\nordering “necessary medical care, including [sex-\\nreassignment surgery], and other appropriate treatment,\\nincluding light makeup, electrolysis, breast augmentation,\\nand voice therapy.”\\n Both sides moved for summary judgment, introducing\\ndueling expert opinions on Campbell’s suitability for sur-\\ngery. Dr. Kathy Oriel, one of Campbell’s experts, determined\\nthat “no physician with adequate expertise and experience\\nin gender medicine would” dispute Campbell’s need for sex-\\nreassignment surgery. Dr. Chester W. Schmidt, the defense\\nexpert, opined that sex-reassignment surgery was not medi-\\ncally necessary.\\n Campbell argued that because DOC officials “imple-\\nmented and enforce[d] a blanket ban on medically necessary\\ntreatment … and applied it to Campbell,” they “acted with\\ndeliberate indifference as a matter of law.” The defendants\\nsought qualified immunity, arguing that their treatment\\n\\n\\n1 Campbell later amended her complaint to bring an equal-protection\\nclaim under the Fourteenth Amendment. That claim is not at issue in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n12 No. 18-2075\\n\\ndecisions were not a substantial departure from accepted\\nprofessional judgment.\\n The district judge denied the motions for the most part.\\nBecause DOC officials knew about Campbell’s gender\\ndysphoria and admitted its status as a serious medical\\ncondition, the judge saw one key remaining question:\\nwhether sex-reassignment surgery was medically necessary.\\nOn that issue Dr. Oriel’s expert testimony generated a\\nfactual dispute, so the judge held that “Campbell ha[d]\\nadduced evidence sufficient to show deliberate indiffer-\\nence,” precluding summary judgment. The medical necessi-\\nty of sex-reassignment surgery in Campbell’s case would be\\ndetermined at a bench trial.\\n The judge also addressed Campbell’s requests for elec-\\ntrolysis and makeup, articulating a preliminary determina-\\ntion that providing those accommodations “would offer\\nmore effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender dysphoria\\nand finding “no apparent medical reason to deny” them. But\\nCampbell hadn’t moved for summary judgment on those\\nclaims, so the judge gave the defendants notice and an\\nopportunity to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules\\nof Civil Procedure. They replied with two arguments: First, a\\nruling on electrolysis and makeup prior to a ruling on\\nsurgery would be premature. Second, they cited the lack of\\nrecord evidence that Campbell, “on an individualized basis,\\nhas a medical need for electrolysis and makeup.” The judge\\npostponed further consideration of the issue until trial.\\n The judge’s discussion of qualified immunity was brief\\nand framed the inquiry at a high level of generality. He\\nruled that because the Eighth Amendment does not permit\\nstate officials to deny effective treatment for the serious\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 13\\n\\nmedical needs of prisoners, the “[d]efendants had fair notice\\nthat denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s gender\\ndysphoria would violate the Constitution. The judge re-\\nbuffed the defendants’ request for a more fact-specific\\nanalysis focusing on sex-reassignment surgery.\\n II. Discussion\\nA. Appellate Jurisdiction\\n The defendants appeal the denial of qualified immunity.\\n“[P]retrial orders denying qualified immunity generally fall\\nwithin the collateral order doctrine.” Plumhoff v. Rickard,\\n572 U.S. 765, 772 (2014) (citation omitted). Campbell’s suit\\nseeks damages and injunctive relief, and the case will pro-\\nceed to trial on the claim for injunctive relief even if the\\ndefendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the damag-\\nes claim. Campbell argues that we should therefore decline\\nto exercise jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.\\n That position cannot be squared with Supreme Court and\\ncircuit precedent. It has long been clear that an order deny-\\ning qualified immunity, “to the extent that it turns on an\\nissue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the\\nmeaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of\\na final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530\\n(1985). Qualified immunity is a form of immunity from\\nsuit—that is, the trial process and attendant burdens—not\\nmerely immunity from damages. Id. at 526–27.\\n The Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide\\nwhether an order denying qualified immunity may be\\nimmediately appealed when the suit also seeks injunctive\\nrelief. Id. at 520 n.5. We have done so, however. In Scott v.\\nLacy, 811 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1987), the plaintiff sought\\n\\n14 No. 18-2075\\n\\nmoney damages and injunctive relief in a suit against public\\nuniversity officials. Id. at 1154. He argued that the collateral-\\norder doctrine is inapplicable to suits seeking injunctive\\nrelief as well as damages because the case could still proceed\\nto trial regardless of the outcome of an interlocutory appeal\\nof a qualified-immunity ruling. Id. at 1153.\\n Acknowledging a circuit split on this question, we fol-\\nlowed the majority rule and held “that a pending request for\\nan injunction does not defeat jurisdiction of interlocutory\\nappeals based on claims of immunity.” Id. We restated the\\nreasoning in Forsyth and added that “if a request for an\\ninjunction prevented appeal on the question of immunity,\\nplaintiffs who wished to harass officials to travail would\\nneed only demand equitable relief.” Id. at 1154.\\n Every circuit to address this question agrees. See Acierno\\nv. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc); Schopler v.\\nBliss, 903 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1990); DiMartini v. Ferrin,\\n889 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1989); Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79\\n(2d Cir. 1988); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,\\n844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988); Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395 (8th\\nCir. 1987); Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.\\n1986); de Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187 (1st Cir.\\n1986). The Fourth Circuit—the outlier when we decided\\nScott—has since reversed course. See Young v. Lynch,\\n846 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1988).\\n As we’ve noted, the Supreme Court hasn’t squarely re-\\nvisited the question left open in Forsyth. But in Behrens v.\\nPelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), the Court came quite close to\\nembracing the rule we adopted in Scott. The plaintiff there\\nraised multiple claims, including Bivens claims against\\nwhich the defendant unsuccessfully sought qualified im-\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 15\\n\\nmunity. Id. at 302–03. The plaintiff argued that the defend-\\nant’s interlocutory appeal was inappropriate because he\\nwould still “be required to endure discovery and trial on\\nmatters separate from the claims against which immunity\\nwas asserted.” Id. at 311. The Court clarified that a qualified-\\nimmunity appeal “cannot be foreclosed by the mere addition\\nof other claims to the suit.” Id. at 312 (emphasis added). Then,\\nventuring beyond the specific facts of the case, the Court\\nexpressed the same concern we identified in Scott: under the\\nplaintiff’s reasoning, “the qualified-immunity right not to be\\nsubjected to pretrial proceedings” or “to trial itself [would]\\nbe eliminated, so long as the complaint seeks injunctive\\nrelief.” Id. (emphasis added). Behrens represents a variation\\non Scott—the case concerned multiple substantive claims\\nrather than multiple forms of relief—but the variation was\\nso slight that the Court saw fit to cite Scott in support of its\\nconclusion. Id. at 312 n.5.\\n Campbell urges us to reconsider Scott, a step that would\\nrevive a long-dormant circuit split and come close to contra-\\ndicting Behrens. We need “compelling reasons” to overrule\\ncircuit precedent. Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir.\\n2005). We may do so when “our position remains a minority\\none among other circuits, when the Supreme Court issues a\\ndecision on an analogous issue that compels us to reconsider\\nour position, or when an intracircuit conflict exists.” Glaser v.\\nWound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 2009)\\n(citations omitted). None of those conditions are satisfied\\nhere. And while Campbell claims that she “is not asking this\\n[c]ourt to reconsider qualified-immunity jurisprudence writ\\nlarge,” each of her arguments does just that. She argues that\\nScott rests on misperceptions about the efficacy of qualified\\nimmunity as a shield against the burdens of litigation. She\\n\\n16 No. 18-2075\\n\\ncites recent scholarship criticizing qualified immunity and\\nmarshals policy arguments focused on judicial resources.\\nAnd she draws our attention to separate opinions by some\\nSupreme Court justices raising questions about the doctrine.\\n We have no authority to depart from the Supreme\\nCourt’s qualified-immunity jurisprudence. And while some\\njustices have questioned qualified immunity, those misgiv-\\nings haven’t stopped the Court from vigorously applying\\nthe doctrine. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.\\n577 (2018). Campbell’s fallback argument asks us to carve\\nout an exception to Scott for cases involving a substantial\\nrisk of harm. But in true emergencies, a plaintiff can seek\\npreliminary injunctive relief. See Wheeler v. Wexford Health\\nSources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681–83 (7th Cir. 2012). We proceed\\nto the merits.\\nB. Qualified Immunity\\n We review qualified-immunity questions independently.\\nGreen v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2017).\\n The Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and\\nunusual punishment includes the right of prisoners to be\\nfree from “pain and suffering [that] no one suggests would\\nserve any penological purpose.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.\\n97, 103 (1976). As applied in the context of prison medical\\ncare, “deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or\\ninjury states a cause of action under § 1983” for violation of\\nthe Eighth Amendment. Id. We evaluate deliberate-\\nindifference claims by “first examining whether a plaintiff\\nsuffered from an objectively serious medical condition[] and\\nthen determining whether the individual defendant was\\ndeliberately indifferent to that condition.” Petties v. Carter,\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 17\\n\\n836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). The parties agree\\nthat gender dysphoria is a serious medical condition. See\\nMaggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing\\ngender dysphoria as a “serious psychiatric disorder”).\\n To prove deliberate indifference, “mere negligence is not\\nenough. … [A] plaintiff must provide evidence that an\\nofficial actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of\\nharm.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 728. The linchpin is a lack of\\nprofessional judgment. “A medical professional is entitled to\\ndeference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally\\ncompetent professional would have so responded under\\nthose circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894–95 (7th\\nCir. 2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d\\n982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998)). A prison medical professional faces\\nliability only if his course of treatment is “such a substantial\\ndeparture from accepted professional judgment, practice, or\\nstandards[] as to demonstrate that the person responsible\\nactually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. at\\n895 (quoting Collignon, 163 F.3d at 988).\\n Qualified immunity protects government officials from\\ndamages liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate\\nclearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which\\na reasonable person would have known.” Estate of Clark v.\\nWalker, 865 F.3d 544, 549–50 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson\\nv. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). We evaluate “(1) wheth-\\ner the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plain-\\ntiff[], show that the defendants violated a constitutional\\nright; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly\\nestablished at the time of the alleged violation.” Gonzalez v.\\nCity of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009). The latter\\n\\n18 No. 18-2075\\n\\ninquiry is often dispositive and may be addressed first.\\nPearson, 555 U.S. at 236. We do so here.\\n To be “clearly established,” a constitutional right “must\\nhave a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing prece-\\ndent.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589. The principle of fair notice\\npervades the doctrine. Qualified immunity applies unless\\nthe specific contours of the right “were sufficiently definite\\nthat any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would\\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\\nat 778–79.\\n Given this emphasis on notice, clearly established law\\ncannot be framed at a “high level of generality.” Ashcroft v.\\nal-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). As the Supreme Court\\nrecently reminded us, “[a] rule is too general if the unlaw-\\nfulness of the officer’s conduct ‘does not follow immediately\\nfrom the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.’”\\nWesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,\\n483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (second alteration in original)).\\nExisting caselaw must “dictate the resolution of the parties’\\ndispute,” Comsys, Inc. v. Pacetti, 893 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir.\\n2018), so while “a case directly on point” isn’t required,\\n“precedent must have placed the … constitutional question\\nbeyond debate,” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)\\n(quotation marks omitted); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct.\\n1148, 1152–53 (2018). Put slightly differently, a right is\\nclearly established only if “every reasonable official would\\nhave understood that what he is doing violates that right.”\\nTaylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (quoting Reichle\\nv. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)) (emphasis added).\\n The Supreme Court’s message is unmistakable: Frame\\nthe constitutional right in terms granular enough to provide\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 19\\n\\nfair notice because qualified immunity “protects all but the\\nplainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the\\nlaw.” Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quotation marks omitted).\\n Here the judge framed the qualified-immunity question\\nin very broad terms, asking whether it was clearly estab-\\nlished that “denying effective treatment” for Campbell’s\\nmedical condition violates the Eighth Amendment. That\\nformulation—which is basically a highly conceptualized\\nversion of the deliberate-indifference standard—is far too\\ngeneral. On appeal Campbell likewise frames the issue at too\\nhigh a level of generality, arguing that the defendants violat-\\ned clearly established law by failing to exercise individual-\\nized medical judgment and persisting in an ineffective\\ncourse of treatment. These broad principles have support in\\nour caselaw, but neither has been applied in a factual context\\nspecific enough to provide fair notice to the defendants that\\ntheir conduct was unconstitutional.\\n Campbell relies on Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir.\\n2011), and Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011), but\\nneither case clearly establishes that the conduct at issue here\\nwas unconstitutional. In Elyea, Illinois inmates with hepatitis\\nrequested antiviral drugs but were denied medication\\nbecause a prison policy barred that treatment for inmates\\nwith fewer than 18 months of incarceration remaining.\\n631 F.3d at 850. We explained that “inmate medical care\\ndecisions must be fact-based with respect to the particular\\ninmate” rather than the product of categorical rules and that\\nadministrative considerations cannot trump “reasonable\\nmedical judgment.” Id. at 859, 863 (emphasis omitted).\\nTreatment protocols are permissible, but in “an individual\\ncase, … prison officials still must make a determination that\\n\\n20 No. 18-2075\\n\\napplication of the protocols result[s] in adequate medical\\ncare.” Id. at 860.\\n In Fields we considered a facial Eighth Amendment\\nchallenge to a Wisconsin statute that flatly prohibited DOC\\nofficials from providing sex-reassignment surgery or hormone\\ntherapy to inmates. 653 F.3d at 552–53. The district court held\\nthat the “defendants acted with deliberate indifference in\\nthat [they] knew of [plaintiffs’] serious medical need but\\nrefused to provide hormone therapy because of” the statute.\\nId. at 555. We affirmed, but we did not specifically address\\nthe issue of sex-reassignment surgery because the plaintiffs’\\nrequest was limited to hormone therapy. Id. at 556.\\n Campbell argues that Elyea and Fields clearly establish a\\nright to individualized medical judgment. But to accept that\\nframing would contradict the Supreme Court’s instruction to\\neschew broad generalities. When considering deliberate-\\nindifference claims challenging the medical judgment of\\nprison healthcare personnel, qualified-immunity analysis\\nrequires us to frame the legal question with reasonable\\nspecificity.\\n The proper inquiry is whether then-existing caselaw\\nclearly established a constitutional right to gender-dysphoria\\ntreatment beyond hormone therapy. This framing is specific\\nenough to ensure that “the unlawfulness of the officer’s\\nconduct … follow[s] immediately from the conclusion that\\n[the rule] was firmly established.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590\\n(quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original).\\nAnd in this fact-intensive area of constitutional law, a broad-\\ner formulation would violate the Supreme Court’s instruc-\\ntion that the specific contours of the right must be\\n“sufficiently definite that any reasonable official … would\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 21\\n\\nhave understood that he was violating it.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S.\\nat 779.\\n Neither Elyea nor Fields provides the required level of\\nspecificity. Elyea amounts to a general admonition that\\nofficials must exercise medical judgment rather than me-\\nchanically apply categorical rules. And Fields doesn’t place\\n“beyond debate” the proposition that medical professionals\\nviolate the Eighth Amendment when they provide hormone\\ntherapy but decide—after extensive deliberation and consul-\\ntation with an outside expert—to deny sex-reassignment\\nsurgery. White, 137 S. Ct. at 551. In both cases prison officials\\nrefused to provide any treatment for serious diseases based\\nsolely on categorical rules. That simply didn’t occur here.\\nThese DOC officials consulted an expert in the field and,\\nfacing a gray area of professional opinion, decided to deny\\nthe “last and … most considered step” of gender-dysphoria\\ntreatment.\\n No case in the Federal Reporter could have warned these\\nDOC officials that their treatment choice was unconstitu-\\ntional. When the defendants were making these decisions,\\nonly one federal appellate decision had addressed the merits\\nof a deliberate-indifference claim involving sex-\\nreassignment surgery: Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir.\\n2014) (en banc). 2 There the First Circuit concluded that\\n\\n2 In De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013), the Fourth Circuit\\nreversed a district-court order dismissing a gender-dysphoric inmate’s\\nEighth Amendment challenge at screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.\\nEven setting aside that difference in procedural posture, De’lonta bears\\nno resemblance to this case. Unlike the defendants here, in De’lonta the\\nVirginia Department of Corrections officials “never allowed [the plain-\\ntiff] to be evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist in the first place.”\\nId. at 526 n.4; see also id. at 523 (explaining that the plaintiff had “never\\n\\n22 No. 18-2075\\n\\nprison officials who provided hormone therapy and lifestyle\\naccommodations but denied a request for surgery did not\\nviolate the Eighth Amendment. 3 See id. at 90, 96.\\n Campbell next argues that then-existing caselaw clearly\\nestablished that prison officials cannot abandon medical\\njudgment by “persist[ing] in a course of treatment known to\\nbe ineffective.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir.\\n2005). It’s true that we’ve identified this species of\\ndeliberate-indifference claim. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 729–30.\\nBut we’ve never applied that general principle to facts\\nresembling these. Campbell’s lightly developed argument\\ndoes not convince us that this right was “established not as a\\nbroad general proposition but in a particularized sense so\\nthat the contours of the right are clear to a reasonable offi-\\ncial.” Dibble v. Quinn, 793 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (quota-\\ntion marks omitted).\\n We’ve previously noted that “[f]or purposes of qualified\\nimmunity, [the Eighth-Amendment] duty” to treat prison-\\n\\nbeen evaluated by a [gender-dysphoria] specialist concerning her need\\nfor sex reassignment surgery”). Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.\\n2015), is similar. There the Ninth Circuit reversed an order dismissing a\\ngender-dysphoric inmate’s Eighth Amendment challenge at screening.\\nUnlike the defendants here, in Rosati the defendants applied a blanket\\npolicy against sex-reassignment surgery and never allowed the plaintiff\\nto be evaluated by a gender-dysphoria specialist. Id. at 1039–40.\\n3 A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit recently announced agreement with\\nKosilek. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019). The panel majority\\nfocused on the ongoing debate over the efficacy of sex-reassignment\\nsurgery in general and wasn’t prepared to accept the World Professional\\nAssociation of Transgender Health’s Standards as authoritative. Id. at 221–\\n24. We don’t need to venture beyond the record and address that wider\\ndebate to decide this appeal.\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 23\\n\\ners’ serious medical conditions “need not be litigated and\\nthen established disease by disease or injury by injury.”\\nEstate of Clark, 865 F.3d at 553. Campbell seizes on this\\naphorism and argues that by the same token, “rights need\\nnot be established treatment by treatment.”\\n That argument overlooks the nature of this deliberate-\\nindifference claim. In Estate of Clark, the prison official\\n“chose to do nothing” in response to a known risk of sub-\\nstantial harm to the prisoner. Id. When prison officials\\nutterly fail to provide care for a serious medical condition,\\nthe constitutional violation is obvious and qualified immuni-\\nty offers little protection. See Orlowski v. Milwaukee County,\\n872 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 2017) (denying qualified immuni-\\nty where, in the face of clear symptoms, officers “chose to do\\nnothing”).\\n To be sure, the constitutional concern in cases involving\\nno treatment at all is not disease- or injury-specific. But\\nprisons aren’t obligated to provide every requested treat-\\nment once medical care begins. In a deliberate-indifference\\ncase challenging the medical judgment of prison healthcare\\nprofessionals who actually diagnose and treat an inmate’s\\nmedical condition (as opposed to ignoring it), we necessarily\\nevaluate those discrete treatment decisions. And we defer to\\nthose decisions “unless no minimally competent profession-\\nal would have” made them. Sain, 512 F.3d at 895 (quotation\\nmarks omitted). Deciding whether a particular treatment\\nplan was a “substantial departure from accepted profession-\\nal judgment, practice, or standards”—a necessary predicate\\nto establish an Eighth Amendment violation—requires a\\nclose examination of professional standards and the specific\\nchoices made by care providers. Id. (quotation marks omit-\\n\\n24 No. 18-2075\\n\\nted). Given the fact-specific nature of these claims, the notice\\naspect of qualified-immunity doctrine is crucial.\\n Campbell also relies on our recent decision in Mitchell v.\\nKallas, 895 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2018), another gender-dysphoria\\ncase involving a Wisconsin inmate, Osborne, and Dr. Kallas.\\nIn that case Dr. Kallas denied a prisoner’s request for hor-\\nmone therapy despite Osborne’s unequivocal endorsement\\nof the treatment. He cited a DOC policy requiring at least six\\nremaining months of incarceration to initiate a hormone\\nregimen. Id. at 497. The inmate raised deliberate-indifference\\nclaims based on a “fail[ure] to provide [recommended] care\\nfor a non-medical reason” and “inexplicable delays.” Id. at\\n498.\\n Because prisons around the country applied varied eval-\\nuation periods for hormone-therapy eligibility, we held that\\n“Dr. Kallas was not on notice that a 13-month evaluation\\nwould violate” the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 500. To the\\nextent that the claim was based on the length of time it took\\nto complete the assessment, we concluded that qualified\\nimmunity protected Dr. Kallas from damages liability.\\n But we rejected the immunity defense to the failure-to-\\ntreat claim. We framed the question as “whether a prison\\ndoctor would have known that it was unconstitutional never\\nto provide” hormone therapy. Id. at 499. Interpreting the\\nrefusal to begin hormone therapy as a complete denial of\\ncare, we observed that “[p]rison officials have been on notice\\nfor years that leaving serious medical conditions, including\\ngender dysphoria, untreated can amount to unconstitutional\\ndeliberate indifference.” Id. Given our decision in Fields,\\n“circuit precedent clearly established that a total absence of\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 25\\n\\ntreatment for the serious medical needs created by gender\\ndysphoria is unconstitutional.” Id. (emphasis added).\\n We hadn’t decided Mitchell when DOC officials were\\nmaking decisions about Campbell’s care, so it has little\\nrelevance to the qualified-immunity analysis here. Moreo-\\nver, Mitchell illustrates the difference between a complete\\ndenial of care and context-specific judgment calls. A plausi-\\nble interpretation of the record in Mitchell was that the DOC\\noffered the inmate no treatment whatsoever. As we’ve\\nexplained, our caselaw clearly establishes that regardless of\\nthe disease or injury at issue, utterly failing to treat a serious\\nmedical condition constitutes deliberate indifference.\\nCampbell, by contrast, received extensive treatment in the\\nform of hormone therapy, counseling, and various lifestyle\\naccommodations.\\n Deciding whether to provide additional medical inter-\\nventions—especially when the inmate’s preferred course of\\ntreatment poses considerable challenges to prison admin-\\nistration—is not the same as deciding to provide no treat-\\nment at all. Denying a specific therapy in a particular case\\nmight amount to a constitutional violation, but qualified\\nimmunity applies absent reasonably specific notice to prison\\nofficials.\\n In short, when the defendants denied Campbell’s request\\nfor sex-reassignment surgery, no case clearly established a\\nright to gender-dysphoria treatment beyond hormone\\ntherapy. As for Campbell’s requests for electrolysis and\\nmakeup, our cases offer no indication that denying arguably\\nnonmedical cosmetic accommodations violates the Eighth\\nAmendment.\\n\\n26 No. 18-2075\\n\\n Qualified-immunity analysis also asks whether “the facts,\\ntaken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[], show that\\nthe defendants violated a constitutional right.” Gonzalez,\\n578 F.3d at 540. Because no case clearly establishes that\\ndenying treatment beyond hormone therapy is unconstitu-\\ntional, qualified immunity applies regardless. So it’s enough\\nto note that a factfinder may infer deliberate indifference\\nonly where a prison medical professional makes “a medical\\ndecision that has no support in the medical community” and\\nprovides “a suspect rationale … for making it.” Petties,\\n836 F.3d at 729 n.2. And “even admitted medical malpractice\\ndoes not automatically give rise to a constitutional viola-\\ntion”; only “sub-minimal competence … crosses the thresh-\\nold into deliberate indifference.” Id. at 729. Prison healthcare\\nproviders necessarily exercise medical judgment—and thus\\nby definition do not act with deliberate indifference—when\\nthey base treatment decisions on accepted national stand-\\nards and the advice of an expert.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Because clearly established law did not require\\nWisconsin prison officials to provide Campbell with gender-\\ndysphoria treatment beyond hormone therapy, the defend-\\nants are immune from damages liability. The district court’s\\ndecision to the contrary is\\n REVERSED\\n\\nNo. 18-2075 27\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3880,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4649776,"string":"4,649,776"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven A. ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Steven Adams"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2932"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Bauer, Hamilton, Eve\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2932\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 4:17-CR-40062 — James E. Shadid, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Steven Adams plead-\\ned guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this\\nappeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\\nto suppress and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines\\nto his case. We affirm. Probable cause supported the search\\nwarrant for Adams’ house, and in any event the officers could\\nrely on the warrant in good faith. Further, the district court\\n\\f2 No. 18-2932\\n\\nproperly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into ac-\\ncount his prior drug conspiracy conviction.\\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\\n On March 22, 2016, Adams, his girlfriend, and a third per-\\nson were pulled over for speeding. The car was registered to\\nAdams’ girlfriend, Leanna Brandon. Law enforcement offic-\\ners were familiar with Adams because he was the subject of\\nanonymous tips regarding drug activity at his house in\\nKeithsburg, Illinois. They also knew that Adams had a previ-\\nous conviction for conspiracy to distribute methampheta-\\nmine. The third person in the car was also the subject of anon-\\nymous tips regarding drug activity and had outstanding ar-\\nrest warrants.\\n During the traffic stop, the sheriff’s deputy smelled mari-\\njuana from the car. The car was searched, and deputies found\\na meth pipe, paraphernalia used with marijuana, and mariju-\\nana. The three occupants were arrested and taken back to the\\nstation, where Brandon—after receiving Miranda warnings—\\ntold the arresting deputy that additional items of drug para-\\nphernalia, a gun, and a safe containing methamphetamine\\npipes were at Adams’ house. Brandon told the deputy that she\\nalso stayed in the house and that she had been there earlier\\nthat same day. She described the layout of the house and pro-\\nvided descriptions of Adams’ bedroom and the gun and par-\\naphernalia.\\n In his application for a search warrant, the deputy wrote:\\n Brandon disclosed that at Adam’s residence, at\\n [street address], there is often meth and canna-\\n bis used. Brandon stays at the residence, and is\\n familiar with the goings on there. She said that\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 3\\n\\n there is drug paraphernalia for ingestion of can-\\n nabis and methamphetamine in the house.\\n Brandon went into great detail of Adams bed-\\n room where she sleeps when she stays. She said\\n she was last there at around 0430 hours this\\n morning (03/22/2016). She described Adams’\\n room as being in the northwest corner of the\\n house and drew a floor plan of the house. She\\n drew an enlargement of Adams’ room. She de-\\n scribed a dresser with a mirror on the west wall\\n of the bedroom. She said that on that dresser,\\n there is always a clear glass bong. She has seen\\n it used to ingest cannabis. She said the bowl part\\n of it is not on it, but it does have residue in it.\\n She also said that there is a colorful swirled de-\\n signed “bowl” that looks like an elephant; this\\n is used for ingestion of cannabis on a nightstand\\n next to the bed. She said that her .45 caliber\\n Smith and Wesson pistol is in the house. It has a\\n cable lock in it and she has the only keys. She\\n said the pistol is black and is in the blue plastic\\n case. She said there is a gray/black colored safe\\n in the bedroom. Inside that safe is meth pipes,\\n and maybe some meth and cannabis.\\n Brandon said Adams’ bedroom is locked with a\\n deadbolt. She said that only she and Adams\\n have keys. She said that only Adams and she\\n have the keys for the safe in the bedroom, and\\n she provided me one from her purse.\\n She said that there may be other paraphernalia\\n in the house. She said that [Female] and [Male]\\n\\f4 No. 18-2932\\n\\n stay in a bedroom next to Adams. She said that\\n [Female] frequently “huffs” hair spray and has\\n expressed her displeasure of the aerosol odor in\\n the house to [Female]. This agency has also re-\\n ceived recent information about [Male] being at\\n the residence. [Male] had a history for posses-\\n sion of narcotics through Iowa.\\n Based on the results of the traffic stop search, Adams’ prior\\nconviction, the anonymous tips, and the information from\\nBrandon, the police obtained a search warrant for Adams’\\nhouse from a state-court judge. They executed the warrant the\\nsame day as the traffic stop. In Adams’ room, they found a\\nlocked plastic gun case that Brandon had described. A .45 cal-\\niber Smith & Wesson handgun and two loaded magazines\\nwere inside the case. Adams later admitted that he had Bran-\\ndon buy the gun for him because he was a felon.\\n A federal grand jury charged Adams with unlawful pos-\\nsession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g). Adams moved to suppress the evidence discovered\\npursuant to the state search warrant, contending that the affi-\\ndavit in support of the application did not establish probable\\ncause. He also argued that the good-faith exception to the ex-\\nclusionary rule should not apply because the affidavit was so\\nlacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not\\nhave relied on the warrant.\\n The district court ruled from the bench and denied Ad-\\nams’ motion to suppress. The court explained that the issuing\\njudge had a “substantial basis for determining the existence\\nof probable cause” because Brandon had “provided firsthand\\ndetail,” the information was “fresh” as it “was within a day”\\nsince she had been at the house, and the information was “in\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 5\\n\\nsome form corroborated by the number of tips.” The court\\nnoted that the tips were anonymous and that standing alone\\nthey would not establish probable cause. But the court ex-\\nplained that the tips provided some corroboration in conjunc-\\ntion with the other information. The court also highlighted the\\ntraffic stop of the “vehicle that involved drugs” and noted\\nthat, “to some degree,” Brandon’s statements to the deputy\\nwere “against her penal interest.” The court concluded: “So, I\\nbelieve that all of this provides plenty of information for the\\nestablishment of probable cause. If it didn’t, I do believe there\\nis no question that there is good faith here.”\\n Adams pleaded guilty to the indictment, reserving his\\nright to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. At sen-\\ntencing, Adams objected to the probation officer’s use of a\\nbase offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing\\nGuidelines, arguing that his Illinois methamphetamine con-\\nspiracy conviction should not count as a “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” because it was conviction for only conspiracy,\\nnot actually distributing or manufacturing the drug. Section\\n2K2.1(a)(4) of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 20 for\\na defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) “subsequent to\\nsustaining one felony conviction of … a controlled substance\\noffense.” “Controlled substance offense” is not defined in the\\nGuideline itself, but the commentary to that guideline states\\nthat the phrase has the same meaning as it does in § 4B1.2(b)\\nand Application Note 1 to § 4B1.1 (which includes conspiracy\\noffenses). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Adams argued that the\\ncommentary and application note impermissibly added to the\\ndefinition of “controlled substance offense” and that the Sen-\\ntencing Commission’s interpretation of the definition was not\\nentitled to deference.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2932\\n\\n The district court overruled Adams’ objection. The court\\ndetermined that Adams’ advisory guideline range was 70 to\\n87 months, based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\\nhistory category of IV. Adams was sentenced to 84 months in\\nprison and three years of supervised release.\\nII. Analysis\\n Adams raises two issues on appeal. The first is whether\\nthe state search warrant was supported by probable cause,\\nand, if not, whether the police acted in good faith when they\\nexecuted the warrant. The second is whether the district court\\nproperly calculated the advisory guideline range.\\n A. Probable Cause and Good Faith\\n When reviewing a search warrant, we give “‘great defer-\\nence’ to the issuing judge’s determination so long as the judge\\nhad a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding.” United States v. Mil-\\nler, 673 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Illinois v.\\nGates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Here, that deference is given to\\nthe state-court judge who issued the search warrant. We give\\nno deference to (i.e., review de novo) the district court’s finding\\nthat there was a substantial basis for issuing the warrant.\\nUnited States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). We\\nalso review de novo whether the good-faith exception applies\\nto a search warrant later found to be invalid. United States v.\\nMitten, 592 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Probable cause exists when the circumstances “indicate a\\nreasonable probability that evidence of crime will be found in\\na particular location; neither an absolute certainty nor even a\\npreponderance of the evidence is necessary.” United States v.\\nAljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 235. Where, as here, an affidavit is the only\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 7\\n\\nevidence presented to a judge to support a search warrant,\\n“the validity of the warrant rests solely on the strength of the\\naffidavit.” United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir.\\n2009). When an informant is the source of the information in\\nan affidavit, “the probable-cause determination turns on the\\ninformant’s credibility.” United States v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d\\n807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017), citing Bell, 585 F.3d at 1049. We con-\\nsider all relevant circumstances, including:\\n first, the degree to which the informant ac-\\n quired knowledge of the events through\\n firsthand observation; second, the detail and\\n specificity of the information provided by the\\n informant; third, the interval between the date\\n of the events and a police officer’s application\\n for the search warrant; and fourth, the extent to\\n which law enforcement corroborated the in-\\n formant’s statements.\\nSearcy, 664 F.3d at 1122; see also United States v. Glover, 755\\nF.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (we consider “the level of detail,\\nthe extent of firsthand observation, the degree of corrobora-\\ntion, the time between the events reported and the warrant\\napplication, and whether the informant appeared or testified\\nbefore the magistrate.”). We consider these factors as a whole,\\nand “no one factor necessarily dooms a search warrant.”\\nUnited States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n The search warrant here was supported by probable cause.\\nThe affidavit disclosed Brandon’s name, explained her close\\nrelationship with Adams and her connection to the house,\\nand explained that she had been in the house earlier that day.\\nBrandon provided the police with detailed, firsthand infor-\\nmation about the criminal activity in the house. She described\\n\\f8 No. 18-2932\\n\\nthe handgun by both caliber and make, the color of the gun\\ncase, and the color of the safe that contained methampheta-\\nmine pipes and possibly methamphetamine and marijuana.\\nBrandon had a key to the safe that she gave to the police. Her\\ninformation was corroborated to some extent by the anony-\\nmous tips informing the police that drug activity was occur-\\nring in Adam’ house. It was also corroborated by the fact that\\nthe police had discovered drugs and paraphernalia in Bran-\\ndon’s car during the traffic stop, the fact that Brandon and\\nAdams were together when they were pulled over and ar-\\nrested, and the fact that Adams had a prior methampheta-\\nmine-related conviction. The police applied for, received, and\\nexecuted the search warrant on the day that Adams and Bran-\\ndon were arrested and Brandon gave them all of the infor-\\nmation, so the information was fresh.\\n Taking all of these factors into consideration, the affidavit\\nhere is stronger than the one that established probable cause\\nin United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2005), where\\nthe police had received a tip four months earlier that the de-\\nfendant sold marijuana from his house. The defendant’s\\nnephew had been arrested for robbery and aggravated bat-\\ntery. Id. at 369. During his post-arrest interview, the nephew\\ntold police that he had gone to the defendant’s house to steal\\nhis marijuana. The nephew explained that that he had seen a\\npound of marijuana in the defendant’s bedroom just two days\\nearlier, that he had seen guns in the residence, and that the\\ndefendant had a felony conviction. The police then reviewed\\nthe defendant’s criminal history, which included multiple ar-\\nrests and convictions for drug offenses. The police included\\nthis information in an affidavit, received a search warrant,\\nand found over a kilogram of marijuana and multiple guns in\\nthe defendant’s house. Id. We rejected the defendant’s\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 9\\n\\nchallenge to the issuing judge’s probable cause determina-\\ntion, finding that the information the nephew provided was a\\n“firsthand account” that was “of sufficient detail, describing\\nlarge quantities of marijuana … as well as several guns in the\\nresidence … that he had observed only two days earlier.” Id.\\nat 370. We also noted that the nephew’s “admission that he\\nintended to steal drugs from the defendant constitutes a state-\\nment made against his penal interest, and as such carries with\\nit a presumption of reliability.” Id. at 371.\\n Each individual detail in the search warrant affidavit for\\nAdams’ house may not have been sufficient to establish prob-\\nable cause by itself, but the details were mutually reinforcing.\\nThe affidavit showed a “substantial chance” that police could\\nfind drugs and/or a gun in the house. See United States v.\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d 361, 363–64 (7th Cir. 2011); Illinois v. Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 245 n.13 (“probable cause requires only a probabil-\\nity or substantial chance of criminal activity”). Though Ad-\\nams’ prior conviction may not have been decisive in establish-\\ning probable cause, it was “still relevant and entitled to some\\nweight,”as was the fact that the deputy had found drugs and\\nparaphernalia in the car when Adams was arrested. See\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d at 364. The totality of the circumstances\\nhere gave the issuing judge a substantial basis for his probable\\ncause determination.\\n Even if the search warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the deputies were entitled to rely on the war-\\nrant. It is now well settled that “suppression of evidence\\nseized pursuant to a search warrant that is later declared in-\\nvalid is inappropriate if the officers who executed the warrant\\nrelied in good faith on the issuing judge’s finding of probable\\ncause.” United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 656–57 (7th Cir.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2932\\n\\n2008), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984). An\\nofficer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence\\nthat the officer was acting in good faith. United States v. Koerth,\\n312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d\\n519, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). A defendant can rebut this presump-\\ntion in several ways, including by showing that “the affidavit\\nsubmitted in support of the warrant was ‘so lacking in indicia\\nof probable cause as to render official belief in its existence\\nentirely unreasonable.’” Olson, 408 F.3d at 372, quoting Leon,\\n468 U.S. at 923.\\n “Overcoming the presumption of good faith is no small\\nfeat, as an officer cannot ordinarily be expected to question a\\njudge’s probable cause determination.” United States v. Lick-\\ners, 928 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2019). Adams cannot overcome\\nthe presumption here. The situation here does not come close\\nto one in which a reasonable officer would disregard the\\njudge’s determination of probable cause and forgo executing\\nthe warrant. This warrant had substantial support from the\\nresults of the traffic stop, Adams’ criminal history, the anony-\\nmous tips, and the detailed and fresh information from Bran-\\ndon. Thus, even if the warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the evidence from the search would still not\\nbe suppressed since the deputies acted in good faith.\\n B. Sentencing Guidelines\\n Adams’ second argument on appeal is that the district\\ncourt erred in applying the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to\\nhis case. We review de novo claims of procedural errors in sen-\\ntencing, including a district court’s legal interpretation of the\\nGuidelines, such as whether a prior conviction counts as a\\n“controlled substance offense.” United States v. Tate, 822 F.3d\\n370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 11\\n\\n Adams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\\nfirearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the Sen-\\ntencing Guidelines, a person convicted under § 922(g)(1)\\nstarts with a base offense level of 14. See U.S.S.G.\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(6). That level increases to 20 if the defendant has a\\nprior conviction for a “controlled substance offense.” See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The term “controlled substance of-\\nfense” is not defined in § 2K2.1 itself, but its Application Note\\n1 states that “‘controlled substance offense’ has the meaning\\ngiven that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1 of the\\nCommentary to § 4B1.2.”\\n Section 4B1.2(b) provides in turn:\\n The term “controlled substance offense” means\\n an offense under federal or state law, punisha-\\n ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one\\n year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex-\\n port, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled\\n substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the\\n possession of a controlled substance (or a coun-\\n terfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\\n import, export, distribute, or dispense.\\nAnd Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 teaches that “controlled\\nsubstance offense” includes “the offenses of aiding and abet-\\nting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.”\\n Adams argues that his Illinois methamphetamine conspir-\\nacy conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” because\\nthe text of the Guideline itself does not include drug conspir-\\nacies or other inchoate or attempted drug crimes, and Appli-\\ncation Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly adds to that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense” by\\n\\f12 No. 18-2932\\n\\nincluding conspiracies and other inchoate drug offenses.\\nBased on this asserted conflict between the Guideline and the\\napplication note, he argues that the application note is not en-\\ntitled to deference. See generally Stinson v. United States, 508\\nU.S. 36, 43 (1993) (if commentaries such as application notes\\nare inconsistent with a Guideline, the Guideline controls).\\n In response, the government argues that there is no con-\\nflict between Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 and that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense.” Alterna-\\ntively, the government argues that, at the very least, there is\\nno conflict between the undefined term “controlled substance\\noffense” in § 2K2.1 and the referenced definition of the term\\nin that Guideline’s application note. The government con-\\ntends that the application note to § 2K2.1 simply explains\\nwhat is meant by “controlled substance offense” within the\\nmeaning of that Guideline.\\n Adams is arguing one side of a fairly new circuit split cre-\\nated by United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir.\\n2018). Winstead argued that he received ineffective assistance\\nof counsel at trial and at sentencing and that his sentence as a\\ncareer criminal was improper. The case did not concern the\\nGuideline at issue here (§ 2K2.1) but § 4B1.2 itself. Winstead\\nheld that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly ex-\\npands the definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n§ 4B1.2 to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy and at-\\ntempt. 890 F.3d at 1090–92. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged\\nthat it was creating a circuit split on this issue. Id. at 1091, cit-\\ning United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Solomon, 592 F. App’x 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2014);\\nUnited States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011);\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 13\\n\\nUnited States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995)\\n(en banc).\\n One could distinguish Winstead from this case on the\\nground that the applicable Guideline here is § 2K2.1, not\\n§ 4B1.2 itself. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is drafted differently. The\\nGuideline itself refers only to “a controlled substance offense”\\nand leaves all definition for its respective application note. As\\nnoted, Application Note 1 says that “controlled substance of-\\nfense” “has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(b) and ap-\\nplication Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” This basis for\\ndistinguishing Winstead, offered by the government here, may\\nbe a reasonable reading of the different language in the two\\nGuidelines and their application notes because Application\\nNote 1 to § 2K2.1 does not conflict with the language of\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(4) itself.\\n On the other hand, that basis for distinguishing Winstead\\nwould produce two different meanings for the phrase “con-\\ntrolled substance offense” in two different Guidelines, a tex-\\ntual consequence that is at least awkward. For that reason, the\\nSixth Circuit recently extended the reasoning of Winstead to\\nthe issue we face here, in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382,\\n386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In Havis the defendant\\npleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and\\nthe district court set his base level at 20 pursuant to § 2K2.1.\\nId. at 383–84. He had a prior conviction for a crime that could\\nhave included only the attempted sale of cocaine. Id. at 384. At-\\ntempt crimes are treated like conspiracies in these guideline\\nprovisions. Even though the Guideline at issue was § 2K2.1,\\nthe Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the interplay between\\n§ 4B1.2 and its Application Note 1. See id. at 385–87. The court\\nconcluded that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly\\n\\f14 No. 18-2932\\n\\nadded attempted crimes to the definition of “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” in § 4B1.2. Id. at 386–87. This conclusion, ac-\\ncording to the court, meant that attempted crimes were just as\\nimpermissibly added to § 2K2.1. Id. In a footnote, the court\\nwrote:\\n The Government argues in the alternative that\\n the real commentary at issue is Application\\n Note 1 to § 2K2.1, which cross-references the\\n definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. The Government\\n never made that argument in the district court\\n or before the initial panel on appeal and argua-\\n bly has forfeited its right to do so now. At any\\n rate, it makes no difference whether we begin\\n with § 2K2.1 to determine the meaning of “con-\\n trolled substance offense.” The commentary to\\n § 2K2.1 directs us to apply “the meaning given\\n that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1\\n of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” If anything, the\\n Government’s proposed definition—which\\n would require us to defer to commentary on\\n other commentary—would carry an even more\\n tenuous connection to the guideline’s text.\\nId. at 386 n.3.\\n The Sentencing Commission has responded to Winstead by\\nproposing an amendment to § 4B1.2 that would move the in-\\nchoate offense language from the application note to the text\\nof the Guideline as a new subsection (c). See 83 Fed. Reg.\\n65400, 65412–15 (Dec. 20, 2018). The public comment period\\nfor this amendment closed on March 15, 2019. The Sentencing\\nCommission currently lacks a quorum of voting members,\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 15\\n\\nbut this proposed amendment indicates that attempt and con-\\nspiracy crimes may be added to the text of the Guideline itself\\nin the near future, resolving this circuit split, including the\\nHavis extension of Winstead to § 2K2.1(a)(4).\\n The Commission’s correction has not yet taken effect,\\nthough, so we need to decide the legal issue under the current\\nGuidelines. We conclude that the issue is governed by our de-\\ncision in United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012),\\nwhere we rejected the textual arguments that the D.C. Circuit\\nlater found persuasive in Winstead. In Raupp, the defendant\\nwas convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His\\nguideline calculation used § 2K2.1(a)(2) because he had at\\nleast two other convictions for crimes of violence. One of\\nthose prior convictions was for conspiracy to commit robbery.\\nAmong several arguments, Raupp made the same textual\\npoints that prevailed later in Winstead, arguing that Applica-\\ntion Note 1 to § 4B1.2 could not properly extend the Guideline\\nto treat conspiracy to commit robbery as a crime of violence.\\nWe squarely rejected that argument, holding that the applica-\\ntion note’s inclusion of conspiracy did not conflict with the\\ntext of the Guideline itself. “There cannot be a conflict because\\nthe text of § 4B1.2(a) does not tell us, one or another, whether\\ninchoate offense are included or excluded. The note says they\\nare included.” 677 F.3d at 759. We added: “Deciding how to\\nhandle conspiracy is a question about wise policy, not about\\ntextual conflict.” Id. at 760.\\n Other portions of the Raupp opinion addressed the now-\\nabandoned residual clause of the definition of crimes of vio-\\nlence in § 4B1.2 and have had a complicated history as we and\\nthe Supreme Court have struggled with vagueness challenges\\nto the similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal\\n\\f16 No. 18-2932\\n\\nAct, held unconstitutional in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.\\n2551 (2015). In United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737, 742–43 (7th\\nCir. 2016), we overruled Raupp’s reliance on the residual\\nclause in the now-advisory § 4B1.2, but our reasoning in Rol-\\nlins was based on our decision in United States v. Hurlburt, 835\\nF.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), which was in turn overruled\\nby the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886\\n(2017), which held that the now-advisory Guidelines are not\\nsubject to vagueness challenges. The “controlled substance of-\\nfense” definition at issue here does not involve any of the\\ncomplications presented by the residual clauses in definitions\\nof violent crimes. The Raupp analysis of this purely textual is-\\nsue under § 2K2.1 and § 4B1.2 thus remains sound as applied\\nto the Guidelines’ definitions of controlled substance offenses.\\nSee also D’Antoni v. United States, 916 F.3d 658, 663–65 (7th\\nCir. 2019) (reviewing this history as applied to defendant sen-\\ntenced as career offender under then-mandatory Guidelines,\\nusing conviction for conspiracy to kill government witness as\\nprior crime of violence).\\n Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as applied to\\ninchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the\\ndistrict court’s decision to treat Adams as a career offender\\nunder the Sentencing Guidelines.\\n The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4427029/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649776/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven A. ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2932\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 4:17-CR-40062 — James E. Shadid, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Steven Adams plead-\ned guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this\nappeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\nto suppress and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines\nto his case. We affirm. Probable cause supported the search\nwarrant for Adams’ house, and in any event the officers could\nrely on the warrant in good faith. Further, the district court\n\f2 No. 18-2932\n\nproperly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into ac-\ncount his prior drug conspiracy conviction.\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\n On March 22, 2016, Adams, his girlfriend, and a third per-\nson were pulled over for speeding. The car was registered to\nAdams’ girlfriend, Leanna Brandon. Law enforcement offic-\ners were familiar with Adams because he was the subject of\nanonymous tips regarding drug activity at his house in\nKeithsburg, Illinois. They also knew that Adams had a previ-\nous conviction for conspiracy to distribute methampheta-\nmine. The third person in the car was also the subject of anon-\nymous tips regarding drug activity and had outstanding ar-\nrest warrants.\n During the traffic stop, the sheriff’s deputy smelled mari-\njuana from the car. The car was searched, and deputies found\na meth pipe, paraphernalia used with marijuana, and mariju-\nana. The three occupants were arrested and taken back to the\nstation, where Brandon—after receiving Miranda warnings—\ntold the arresting deputy that additional items of drug para-\nphernalia, a gun, and a safe containing methamphetamine\npipes were at Adams’ house. Brandon told the deputy that she\nalso stayed in the house and that she had been there earlier\nthat same day. She described the layout of the house and pro-\nvided descriptions of Adams’ bedroom and the gun and par-\naphernalia.\n In his application for a search warrant, the deputy wrote:\n Brandon disclosed that at Adam’s residence, at\n [street address], there is often meth and canna-\n bis used. Brandon stays at the residence, and is\n familiar with the goings on there. She said that\n\fNo. 18-2932 3\n\n there is drug paraphernalia for ingestion of can-\n nabis and methamphetamine in the house.\n Brandon went into great detail of Adams bed-\n room where she sleeps when she stays. She said\n she was last there at around 0430 hours this\n morning (03/22/2016). She described Adams’\n room as being in the northwest corner of the\n house and drew a floor plan of the house. She\n drew an enlargement of Adams’ room. She de-\n scribed a dresser with a mirror on the west wall\n of the bedroom. She said that on that dresser,\n there is always a clear glass bong. She has seen\n it used to ingest cannabis. She said the bowl part\n of it is not on it, but it does have residue in it.\n She also said that there is a colorful swirled de-\n signed “bowl” that looks like an elephant; this\n is used for ingestion of cannabis on a nightstand\n next to the bed. She said that her .45 caliber\n Smith and Wesson pistol is in the house. It has a\n cable lock in it and she has the only keys. She\n said the pistol is black and is in the blue plastic\n case. She said there is a gray/black colored safe\n in the bedroom. Inside that safe is meth pipes,\n and maybe some meth and cannabis.\n Brandon said Adams’ bedroom is locked with a\n deadbolt. She said that only she and Adams\n have keys. She said that only Adams and she\n have the keys for the safe in the bedroom, and\n she provided me one from her purse.\n She said that there may be other paraphernalia\n in the house. She said that [Female] and [Male]\n\f4 No. 18-2932\n\n stay in a bedroom next to Adams. She said that\n [Female] frequently “huffs” hair spray and has\n expressed her displeasure of the aerosol odor in\n the house to [Female]. This agency has also re-\n ceived recent information about [Male] being at\n the residence. [Male] had a history for posses-\n sion of narcotics through Iowa.\n Based on the results of the traffic stop search, Adams’ prior\nconviction, the anonymous tips, and the information from\nBrandon, the police obtained a search warrant for Adams’\nhouse from a state-court judge. They executed the warrant the\nsame day as the traffic stop. In Adams’ room, they found a\nlocked plastic gun case that Brandon had described. A .45 cal-\niber Smith & Wesson handgun and two loaded magazines\nwere inside the case. Adams later admitted that he had Bran-\ndon buy the gun for him because he was a felon.\n A federal grand jury charged Adams with unlawful pos-\nsession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 922(g). Adams moved to suppress the evidence discovered\npursuant to the state search warrant, contending that the affi-\ndavit in support of the application did not establish probable\ncause. He also argued that the good-faith exception to the ex-\nclusionary rule should not apply because the affidavit was so\nlacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not\nhave relied on the warrant.\n The district court ruled from the bench and denied Ad-\nams’ motion to suppress. The court explained that the issuing\njudge had a “substantial basis for determining the existence\nof probable cause” because Brandon had “provided firsthand\ndetail,” the information was “fresh” as it “was within a day”\nsince she had been at the house, and the information was “in\n\fNo. 18-2932 5\n\nsome form corroborated by the number of tips.” The court\nnoted that the tips were anonymous and that standing alone\nthey would not establish probable cause. But the court ex-\nplained that the tips provided some corroboration in conjunc-\ntion with the other information. The court also highlighted the\ntraffic stop of the “vehicle that involved drugs” and noted\nthat, “to some degree,” Brandon’s statements to the deputy\nwere “against her penal interest.” The court concluded: “So, I\nbelieve that all of this provides plenty of information for the\nestablishment of probable cause. If it didn’t, I do believe there\nis no question that there is good faith here.”\n Adams pleaded guilty to the indictment, reserving his\nright to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. At sen-\ntencing, Adams objected to the probation officer’s use of a\nbase offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing\nGuidelines, arguing that his Illinois methamphetamine con-\nspiracy conviction should not count as a “controlled sub-\nstance offense” because it was conviction for only conspiracy,\nnot actually distributing or manufacturing the drug. Section\n2K2.1(a)(4) of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 20 for\na defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) “subsequent to\nsustaining one felony conviction of … a controlled substance\noffense.” “Controlled substance offense” is not defined in the\nGuideline itself, but the commentary to that guideline states\nthat the phrase has the same meaning as it does in § 4B1.2(b)\nand Application Note 1 to § 4B1.1 (which includes conspiracy\noffenses). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Adams argued that the\ncommentary and application note impermissibly added to the\ndefinition of “controlled substance offense” and that the Sen-\ntencing Commission’s interpretation of the definition was not\nentitled to deference.\n\f6 No. 18-2932\n\n The district court overruled Adams’ objection. The court\ndetermined that Adams’ advisory guideline range was 70 to\n87 months, based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\nhistory category of IV. Adams was sentenced to 84 months in\nprison and three years of supervised release.\nII. Analysis\n Adams raises two issues on appeal. The first is whether\nthe state search warrant was supported by probable cause,\nand, if not, whether the police acted in good faith when they\nexecuted the warrant. The second is whether the district court\nproperly calculated the advisory guideline range.\n A. Probable Cause and Good Faith\n When reviewing a search warrant, we give “‘great defer-\nence’ to the issuing judge’s determination so long as the judge\nhad a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding.” United States v. Mil-\nler, 673 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Illinois v.\nGates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Here, that deference is given to\nthe state-court judge who issued the search warrant. We give\nno deference to (i.e., review de novo) the district court’s finding\nthat there was a substantial basis for issuing the warrant.\nUnited States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). We\nalso review de novo whether the good-faith exception applies\nto a search warrant later found to be invalid. United States v.\nMitten, 592 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2010).\n Probable cause exists when the circumstances “indicate a\nreasonable probability that evidence of crime will be found in\na particular location; neither an absolute certainty nor even a\npreponderance of the evidence is necessary.” United States v.\nAljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Gates,\n462 U.S. at 235. Where, as here, an affidavit is the only\n\fNo. 18-2932 7\n\nevidence presented to a judge to support a search warrant,\n“the validity of the warrant rests solely on the strength of the\naffidavit.” United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir.\n2009). When an informant is the source of the information in\nan affidavit, “the probable-cause determination turns on the\ninformant’s credibility.” United States v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d\n807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017), citing Bell, 585 F.3d at 1049. We con-\nsider all relevant circumstances, including:\n first, the degree to which the informant ac-\n quired knowledge of the events through\n firsthand observation; second, the detail and\n specificity of the information provided by the\n informant; third, the interval between the date\n of the events and a police officer’s application\n for the search warrant; and fourth, the extent to\n which law enforcement corroborated the in-\n formant’s statements.\nSearcy, 664 F.3d at 1122; see also United States v. Glover, 755\nF.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (we consider “the level of detail,\nthe extent of firsthand observation, the degree of corrobora-\ntion, the time between the events reported and the warrant\napplication, and whether the informant appeared or testified\nbefore the magistrate.”). We consider these factors as a whole,\nand “no one factor necessarily dooms a search warrant.”\nUnited States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).\n The search warrant here was supported by probable cause.\nThe affidavit disclosed Brandon’s name, explained her close\nrelationship with Adams and her connection to the house,\nand explained that she had been in the house earlier that day.\nBrandon provided the police with detailed, firsthand infor-\nmation about the criminal activity in the house. She described\n\f8 No. 18-2932\n\nthe handgun by both caliber and make, the color of the gun\ncase, and the color of the safe that contained methampheta-\nmine pipes and possibly methamphetamine and marijuana.\nBrandon had a key to the safe that she gave to the police. Her\ninformation was corroborated to some extent by the anony-\nmous tips informing the police that drug activity was occur-\nring in Adam’ house. It was also corroborated by the fact that\nthe police had discovered drugs and paraphernalia in Bran-\ndon’s car during the traffic stop, the fact that Brandon and\nAdams were together when they were pulled over and ar-\nrested, and the fact that Adams had a prior methampheta-\nmine-related conviction. The police applied for, received, and\nexecuted the search warrant on the day that Adams and Bran-\ndon were arrested and Brandon gave them all of the infor-\nmation, so the information was fresh.\n Taking all of these factors into consideration, the affidavit\nhere is stronger than the one that established probable cause\nin United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2005), where\nthe police had received a tip four months earlier that the de-\nfendant sold marijuana from his house. The defendant’s\nnephew had been arrested for robbery and aggravated bat-\ntery. Id. at 369. During his post-arrest interview, the nephew\ntold police that he had gone to the defendant’s house to steal\nhis marijuana. The nephew explained that that he had seen a\npound of marijuana in the defendant’s bedroom just two days\nearlier, that he had seen guns in the residence, and that the\ndefendant had a felony conviction. The police then reviewed\nthe defendant’s criminal history, which included multiple ar-\nrests and convictions for drug offenses. The police included\nthis information in an affidavit, received a search warrant,\nand found over a kilogram of marijuana and multiple guns in\nthe defendant’s house. Id. We rejected the defendant’s\n\fNo. 18-2932 9\n\nchallenge to the issuing judge’s probable cause determina-\ntion, finding that the information the nephew provided was a\n“firsthand account” that was “of sufficient detail, describing\nlarge quantities of marijuana … as well as several guns in the\nresidence … that he had observed only two days earlier.” Id.\nat 370. We also noted that the nephew’s “admission that he\nintended to steal drugs from the defendant constitutes a state-\nment made against his penal interest, and as such carries with\nit a presumption of reliability.” Id. at 371.\n Each individual detail in the search warrant affidavit for\nAdams’ house may not have been sufficient to establish prob-\nable cause by itself, but the details were mutually reinforcing.\nThe affidavit showed a “substantial chance” that police could\nfind drugs and/or a gun in the house. See United States v.\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d 361, 363–64 (7th Cir. 2011); Illinois v. Gates,\n462 U.S. at 245 n.13 (“probable cause requires only a probabil-\nity or substantial chance of criminal activity”). Though Ad-\nams’ prior conviction may not have been decisive in establish-\ning probable cause, it was “still relevant and entitled to some\nweight,”as was the fact that the deputy had found drugs and\nparaphernalia in the car when Adams was arrested. See\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d at 364. The totality of the circumstances\nhere gave the issuing judge a substantial basis for his probable\ncause determination.\n Even if the search warrant had not been supported by\nprobable cause, the deputies were entitled to rely on the war-\nrant. It is now well settled that “suppression of evidence\nseized pursuant to a search warrant that is later declared in-\nvalid is inappropriate if the officers who executed the warrant\nrelied in good faith on the issuing judge’s finding of probable\ncause.” United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 656–57 (7th Cir.\n\f10 No. 18-2932\n\n2008), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984). An\nofficer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence\nthat the officer was acting in good faith. United States v. Koerth,\n312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d\n519, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). A defendant can rebut this presump-\ntion in several ways, including by showing that “the affidavit\nsubmitted in support of the warrant was ‘so lacking in indicia\nof probable cause as to render official belief in its existence\nentirely unreasonable.’” Olson, 408 F.3d at 372, quoting Leon,\n468 U.S. at 923.\n “Overcoming the presumption of good faith is no small\nfeat, as an officer cannot ordinarily be expected to question a\njudge’s probable cause determination.” United States v. Lick-\ners, 928 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2019). Adams cannot overcome\nthe presumption here. The situation here does not come close\nto one in which a reasonable officer would disregard the\njudge’s determination of probable cause and forgo executing\nthe warrant. This warrant had substantial support from the\nresults of the traffic stop, Adams’ criminal history, the anony-\nmous tips, and the detailed and fresh information from Bran-\ndon. Thus, even if the warrant had not been supported by\nprobable cause, the evidence from the search would still not\nbe suppressed since the deputies acted in good faith.\n B. Sentencing Guidelines\n Adams’ second argument on appeal is that the district\ncourt erred in applying the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to\nhis case. We review de novo claims of procedural errors in sen-\ntencing, including a district court’s legal interpretation of the\nGuidelines, such as whether a prior conviction counts as a\n“controlled substance offense.” United States v. Tate, 822 F.3d\n370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016).\n\fNo. 18-2932 11\n\n Adams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\nfirearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the Sen-\ntencing Guidelines, a person convicted under § 922(g)(1)\nstarts with a base offense level of 14. See U.S.S.G.\n§ 2K2.1(a)(6). That level increases to 20 if the defendant has a\nprior conviction for a “controlled substance offense.” See\nU.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The term “controlled substance of-\nfense” is not defined in § 2K2.1 itself, but its Application Note\n1 states that “‘controlled substance offense’ has the meaning\ngiven that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1 of the\nCommentary to § 4B1.2.”\n Section 4B1.2(b) provides in turn:\n The term “controlled substance offense” means\n an offense under federal or state law, punisha-\n ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one\n year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex-\n port, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled\n substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the\n possession of a controlled substance (or a coun-\n terfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\n import, export, distribute, or dispense.\nAnd Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 teaches that “controlled\nsubstance offense” includes “the offenses of aiding and abet-\nting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.”\n Adams argues that his Illinois methamphetamine conspir-\nacy conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” because\nthe text of the Guideline itself does not include drug conspir-\nacies or other inchoate or attempted drug crimes, and Appli-\ncation Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly adds to that Guide-\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense” by\n\f12 No. 18-2932\n\nincluding conspiracies and other inchoate drug offenses.\nBased on this asserted conflict between the Guideline and the\napplication note, he argues that the application note is not en-\ntitled to deference. See generally Stinson v. United States, 508\nU.S. 36, 43 (1993) (if commentaries such as application notes\nare inconsistent with a Guideline, the Guideline controls).\n In response, the government argues that there is no con-\nflict between Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 and that Guide-\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense.” Alterna-\ntively, the government argues that, at the very least, there is\nno conflict between the undefined term “controlled substance\noffense” in § 2K2.1 and the referenced definition of the term\nin that Guideline’s application note. The government con-\ntends that the application note to § 2K2.1 simply explains\nwhat is meant by “controlled substance offense” within the\nmeaning of that Guideline.\n Adams is arguing one side of a fairly new circuit split cre-\nated by United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir.\n2018). Winstead argued that he received ineffective assistance\nof counsel at trial and at sentencing and that his sentence as a\ncareer criminal was improper. The case did not concern the\nGuideline at issue here (§ 2K2.1) but § 4B1.2 itself. Winstead\nheld that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly ex-\npands the definition of “controlled substance offense” in\n§ 4B1.2 to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy and at-\ntempt. 890 F.3d at 1090–92. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged\nthat it was creating a circuit split on this issue. Id. at 1091, cit-\ning United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2017);\nUnited States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017);\nUnited States v. Solomon, 592 F. App’x 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2014);\nUnited States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011);\n\fNo. 18-2932 13\n\nUnited States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995)\n(en banc).\n One could distinguish Winstead from this case on the\nground that the applicable Guideline here is § 2K2.1, not\n§ 4B1.2 itself. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is drafted differently. The\nGuideline itself refers only to “a controlled substance offense”\nand leaves all definition for its respective application note. As\nnoted, Application Note 1 says that “controlled substance of-\nfense” “has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(b) and ap-\nplication Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” This basis for\ndistinguishing Winstead, offered by the government here, may\nbe a reasonable reading of the different language in the two\nGuidelines and their application notes because Application\nNote 1 to § 2K2.1 does not conflict with the language of\n§ 2K2.1(a)(4) itself.\n On the other hand, that basis for distinguishing Winstead\nwould produce two different meanings for the phrase “con-\ntrolled substance offense” in two different Guidelines, a tex-\ntual consequence that is at least awkward. For that reason, the\nSixth Circuit recently extended the reasoning of Winstead to\nthe issue we face here, in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382,\n386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In Havis the defendant\npleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and\nthe district court set his base level at 20 pursuant to § 2K2.1.\nId. at 383–84. He had a prior conviction for a crime that could\nhave included only the attempted sale of cocaine. Id. at 384. At-\ntempt crimes are treated like conspiracies in these guideline\nprovisions. Even though the Guideline at issue was § 2K2.1,\nthe Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the interplay between\n§ 4B1.2 and its Application Note 1. See id. at 385–87. The court\nconcluded that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly\n\f14 No. 18-2932\n\nadded attempted crimes to the definition of “controlled sub-\nstance offense” in § 4B1.2. Id. at 386–87. This conclusion, ac-\ncording to the court, meant that attempted crimes were just as\nimpermissibly added to § 2K2.1. Id. In a footnote, the court\nwrote:\n The Government argues in the alternative that\n the real commentary at issue is Application\n Note 1 to § 2K2.1, which cross-references the\n definition of “controlled substance offense” in\n Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. The Government\n never made that argument in the district court\n or before the initial panel on appeal and argua-\n bly has forfeited its right to do so now. At any\n rate, it makes no difference whether we begin\n with § 2K2.1 to determine the meaning of “con-\n trolled substance offense.” The commentary to\n § 2K2.1 directs us to apply “the meaning given\n that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1\n of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” If anything, the\n Government’s proposed definition—which\n would require us to defer to commentary on\n other commentary—would carry an even more\n tenuous connection to the guideline’s text.\nId. at 386 n.3.\n The Sentencing Commission has responded to Winstead by\nproposing an amendment to § 4B1.2 that would move the in-\nchoate offense language from the application note to the text\nof the Guideline as a new subsection (c). See 83 Fed. Reg.\n65400, 65412–15 (Dec. 20, 2018). The public comment period\nfor this amendment closed on March 15, 2019. The Sentencing\nCommission currently lacks a quorum of voting members,\n\fNo. 18-2932 15\n\nbut this proposed amendment indicates that attempt and con-\nspiracy crimes may be added to the text of the Guideline itself\nin the near future, resolving this circuit split, including the\nHavis extension of Winstead to § 2K2.1(a)(4).\n The Commission’s correction has not yet taken effect,\nthough, so we need to decide the legal issue under the current\nGuidelines. We conclude that the issue is governed by our de-\ncision in United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012),\nwhere we rejected the textual arguments that the D.C. Circuit\nlater found persuasive in Winstead. In Raupp, the defendant\nwas convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His\nguideline calculation used § 2K2.1(a)(2) because he had at\nleast two other convictions for crimes of violence. One of\nthose prior convictions was for conspiracy to commit robbery.\nAmong several arguments, Raupp made the same textual\npoints that prevailed later in Winstead, arguing that Applica-\ntion Note 1 to § 4B1.2 could not properly extend the Guideline\nto treat conspiracy to commit robbery as a crime of violence.\nWe squarely rejected that argument, holding that the applica-\ntion note’s inclusion of conspiracy did not conflict with the\ntext of the Guideline itself. “There cannot be a conflict because\nthe text of § 4B1.2(a) does not tell us, one or another, whether\ninchoate offense are included or excluded. The note says they\nare included.” 677 F.3d at 759. We added: “Deciding how to\nhandle conspiracy is a question about wise policy, not about\ntextual conflict.” Id. at 760.\n Other portions of the Raupp opinion addressed the now-\nabandoned residual clause of the definition of crimes of vio-\nlence in § 4B1.2 and have had a complicated history as we and\nthe Supreme Court have struggled with vagueness challenges\nto the similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal\n\f16 No. 18-2932\n\nAct, held unconstitutional in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.\n2551 (2015). In United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737, 742–43 (7th\nCir. 2016), we overruled Raupp’s reliance on the residual\nclause in the now-advisory § 4B1.2, but our reasoning in Rol-\nlins was based on our decision in United States v. Hurlburt, 835\nF.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), which was in turn overruled\nby the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886\n(2017), which held that the now-advisory Guidelines are not\nsubject to vagueness challenges. The “controlled substance of-\nfense” definition at issue here does not involve any of the\ncomplications presented by the residual clauses in definitions\nof violent crimes. The Raupp analysis of this purely textual is-\nsue under § 2K2.1 and § 4B1.2 thus remains sound as applied\nto the Guidelines’ definitions of controlled substance offenses.\nSee also D’Antoni v. United States, 916 F.3d 658, 663–65 (7th\nCir. 2019) (reviewing this history as applied to defendant sen-\ntenced as career offender under then-mandatory Guidelines,\nusing conviction for conspiracy to kill government witness as\nprior crime of violence).\n Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as applied to\ninchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the\ndistrict court’s decision to treat Adams as a career offender\nunder the Sentencing Guidelines.\n The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven A. ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2932\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 4:17-CR-40062 — James E. Shadid, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Steven Adams plead-\\ned guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this\\nappeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\\nto suppress and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines\\nto his case. We affirm. Probable cause supported the search\\nwarrant for Adams’ house, and in any event the officers could\\nrely on the warrant in good faith. Further, the district court\\n\\f2 No. 18-2932\\n\\nproperly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into ac-\\ncount his prior drug conspiracy conviction.\\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\\n On March 22, 2016, Adams, his girlfriend, and a third per-\\nson were pulled over for speeding. The car was registered to\\nAdams’ girlfriend, Leanna Brandon. Law enforcement offic-\\ners were familiar with Adams because he was the subject of\\nanonymous tips regarding drug activity at his house in\\nKeithsburg, Illinois. They also knew that Adams had a previ-\\nous conviction for conspiracy to distribute methampheta-\\nmine. The third person in the car was also the subject of anon-\\nymous tips regarding drug activity and had outstanding ar-\\nrest warrants.\\n During the traffic stop, the sheriff’s deputy smelled mari-\\njuana from the car. The car was searched, and deputies found\\na meth pipe, paraphernalia used with marijuana, and mariju-\\nana. The three occupants were arrested and taken back to the\\nstation, where Brandon—after receiving Miranda warnings—\\ntold the arresting deputy that additional items of drug para-\\nphernalia, a gun, and a safe containing methamphetamine\\npipes were at Adams’ house. Brandon told the deputy that she\\nalso stayed in the house and that she had been there earlier\\nthat same day. She described the layout of the house and pro-\\nvided descriptions of Adams’ bedroom and the gun and par-\\naphernalia.\\n In his application for a search warrant, the deputy wrote:\\n Brandon disclosed that at Adam’s residence, at\\n [street address], there is often meth and canna-\\n bis used. Brandon stays at the residence, and is\\n familiar with the goings on there. She said that\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 3\\n\\n there is drug paraphernalia for ingestion of can-\\n nabis and methamphetamine in the house.\\n Brandon went into great detail of Adams bed-\\n room where she sleeps when she stays. She said\\n she was last there at around 0430 hours this\\n morning (03/22/2016). She described Adams’\\n room as being in the northwest corner of the\\n house and drew a floor plan of the house. She\\n drew an enlargement of Adams’ room. She de-\\n scribed a dresser with a mirror on the west wall\\n of the bedroom. She said that on that dresser,\\n there is always a clear glass bong. She has seen\\n it used to ingest cannabis. She said the bowl part\\n of it is not on it, but it does have residue in it.\\n She also said that there is a colorful swirled de-\\n signed “bowl” that looks like an elephant; this\\n is used for ingestion of cannabis on a nightstand\\n next to the bed. She said that her .45 caliber\\n Smith and Wesson pistol is in the house. It has a\\n cable lock in it and she has the only keys. She\\n said the pistol is black and is in the blue plastic\\n case. She said there is a gray/black colored safe\\n in the bedroom. Inside that safe is meth pipes,\\n and maybe some meth and cannabis.\\n Brandon said Adams’ bedroom is locked with a\\n deadbolt. She said that only she and Adams\\n have keys. She said that only Adams and she\\n have the keys for the safe in the bedroom, and\\n she provided me one from her purse.\\n She said that there may be other paraphernalia\\n in the house. She said that [Female] and [Male]\\n\\f4 No. 18-2932\\n\\n stay in a bedroom next to Adams. She said that\\n [Female] frequently “huffs” hair spray and has\\n expressed her displeasure of the aerosol odor in\\n the house to [Female]. This agency has also re-\\n ceived recent information about [Male] being at\\n the residence. [Male] had a history for posses-\\n sion of narcotics through Iowa.\\n Based on the results of the traffic stop search, Adams’ prior\\nconviction, the anonymous tips, and the information from\\nBrandon, the police obtained a search warrant for Adams’\\nhouse from a state-court judge. They executed the warrant the\\nsame day as the traffic stop. In Adams’ room, they found a\\nlocked plastic gun case that Brandon had described. A .45 cal-\\niber Smith & Wesson handgun and two loaded magazines\\nwere inside the case. Adams later admitted that he had Bran-\\ndon buy the gun for him because he was a felon.\\n A federal grand jury charged Adams with unlawful pos-\\nsession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g). Adams moved to suppress the evidence discovered\\npursuant to the state search warrant, contending that the affi-\\ndavit in support of the application did not establish probable\\ncause. He also argued that the good-faith exception to the ex-\\nclusionary rule should not apply because the affidavit was so\\nlacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not\\nhave relied on the warrant.\\n The district court ruled from the bench and denied Ad-\\nams’ motion to suppress. The court explained that the issuing\\njudge had a “substantial basis for determining the existence\\nof probable cause” because Brandon had “provided firsthand\\ndetail,” the information was “fresh” as it “was within a day”\\nsince she had been at the house, and the information was “in\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 5\\n\\nsome form corroborated by the number of tips.” The court\\nnoted that the tips were anonymous and that standing alone\\nthey would not establish probable cause. But the court ex-\\nplained that the tips provided some corroboration in conjunc-\\ntion with the other information. The court also highlighted the\\ntraffic stop of the “vehicle that involved drugs” and noted\\nthat, “to some degree,” Brandon’s statements to the deputy\\nwere “against her penal interest.” The court concluded: “So, I\\nbelieve that all of this provides plenty of information for the\\nestablishment of probable cause. If it didn’t, I do believe there\\nis no question that there is good faith here.”\\n Adams pleaded guilty to the indictment, reserving his\\nright to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. At sen-\\ntencing, Adams objected to the probation officer’s use of a\\nbase offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing\\nGuidelines, arguing that his Illinois methamphetamine con-\\nspiracy conviction should not count as a “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” because it was conviction for only conspiracy,\\nnot actually distributing or manufacturing the drug. Section\\n2K2.1(a)(4) of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 20 for\\na defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) “subsequent to\\nsustaining one felony conviction of … a controlled substance\\noffense.” “Controlled substance offense” is not defined in the\\nGuideline itself, but the commentary to that guideline states\\nthat the phrase has the same meaning as it does in § 4B1.2(b)\\nand Application Note 1 to § 4B1.1 (which includes conspiracy\\noffenses). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Adams argued that the\\ncommentary and application note impermissibly added to the\\ndefinition of “controlled substance offense” and that the Sen-\\ntencing Commission’s interpretation of the definition was not\\nentitled to deference.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2932\\n\\n The district court overruled Adams’ objection. The court\\ndetermined that Adams’ advisory guideline range was 70 to\\n87 months, based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\\nhistory category of IV. Adams was sentenced to 84 months in\\nprison and three years of supervised release.\\nII. Analysis\\n Adams raises two issues on appeal. The first is whether\\nthe state search warrant was supported by probable cause,\\nand, if not, whether the police acted in good faith when they\\nexecuted the warrant. The second is whether the district court\\nproperly calculated the advisory guideline range.\\n A. Probable Cause and Good Faith\\n When reviewing a search warrant, we give “‘great defer-\\nence’ to the issuing judge’s determination so long as the judge\\nhad a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding.” United States v. Mil-\\nler, 673 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Illinois v.\\nGates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Here, that deference is given to\\nthe state-court judge who issued the search warrant. We give\\nno deference to (i.e., review de novo) the district court’s finding\\nthat there was a substantial basis for issuing the warrant.\\nUnited States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). We\\nalso review de novo whether the good-faith exception applies\\nto a search warrant later found to be invalid. United States v.\\nMitten, 592 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Probable cause exists when the circumstances “indicate a\\nreasonable probability that evidence of crime will be found in\\na particular location; neither an absolute certainty nor even a\\npreponderance of the evidence is necessary.” United States v.\\nAljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 235. Where, as here, an affidavit is the only\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 7\\n\\nevidence presented to a judge to support a search warrant,\\n“the validity of the warrant rests solely on the strength of the\\naffidavit.” United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir.\\n2009). When an informant is the source of the information in\\nan affidavit, “the probable-cause determination turns on the\\ninformant’s credibility.” United States v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d\\n807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017), citing Bell, 585 F.3d at 1049. We con-\\nsider all relevant circumstances, including:\\n first, the degree to which the informant ac-\\n quired knowledge of the events through\\n firsthand observation; second, the detail and\\n specificity of the information provided by the\\n informant; third, the interval between the date\\n of the events and a police officer’s application\\n for the search warrant; and fourth, the extent to\\n which law enforcement corroborated the in-\\n formant’s statements.\\nSearcy, 664 F.3d at 1122; see also United States v. Glover, 755\\nF.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (we consider “the level of detail,\\nthe extent of firsthand observation, the degree of corrobora-\\ntion, the time between the events reported and the warrant\\napplication, and whether the informant appeared or testified\\nbefore the magistrate.”). We consider these factors as a whole,\\nand “no one factor necessarily dooms a search warrant.”\\nUnited States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n The search warrant here was supported by probable cause.\\nThe affidavit disclosed Brandon’s name, explained her close\\nrelationship with Adams and her connection to the house,\\nand explained that she had been in the house earlier that day.\\nBrandon provided the police with detailed, firsthand infor-\\nmation about the criminal activity in the house. She described\\n\\f8 No. 18-2932\\n\\nthe handgun by both caliber and make, the color of the gun\\ncase, and the color of the safe that contained methampheta-\\nmine pipes and possibly methamphetamine and marijuana.\\nBrandon had a key to the safe that she gave to the police. Her\\ninformation was corroborated to some extent by the anony-\\nmous tips informing the police that drug activity was occur-\\nring in Adam’ house. It was also corroborated by the fact that\\nthe police had discovered drugs and paraphernalia in Bran-\\ndon’s car during the traffic stop, the fact that Brandon and\\nAdams were together when they were pulled over and ar-\\nrested, and the fact that Adams had a prior methampheta-\\nmine-related conviction. The police applied for, received, and\\nexecuted the search warrant on the day that Adams and Bran-\\ndon were arrested and Brandon gave them all of the infor-\\nmation, so the information was fresh.\\n Taking all of these factors into consideration, the affidavit\\nhere is stronger than the one that established probable cause\\nin United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2005), where\\nthe police had received a tip four months earlier that the de-\\nfendant sold marijuana from his house. The defendant’s\\nnephew had been arrested for robbery and aggravated bat-\\ntery. Id. at 369. During his post-arrest interview, the nephew\\ntold police that he had gone to the defendant’s house to steal\\nhis marijuana. The nephew explained that that he had seen a\\npound of marijuana in the defendant’s bedroom just two days\\nearlier, that he had seen guns in the residence, and that the\\ndefendant had a felony conviction. The police then reviewed\\nthe defendant’s criminal history, which included multiple ar-\\nrests and convictions for drug offenses. The police included\\nthis information in an affidavit, received a search warrant,\\nand found over a kilogram of marijuana and multiple guns in\\nthe defendant’s house. Id. We rejected the defendant’s\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 9\\n\\nchallenge to the issuing judge’s probable cause determina-\\ntion, finding that the information the nephew provided was a\\n“firsthand account” that was “of sufficient detail, describing\\nlarge quantities of marijuana … as well as several guns in the\\nresidence … that he had observed only two days earlier.” Id.\\nat 370. We also noted that the nephew’s “admission that he\\nintended to steal drugs from the defendant constitutes a state-\\nment made against his penal interest, and as such carries with\\nit a presumption of reliability.” Id. at 371.\\n Each individual detail in the search warrant affidavit for\\nAdams’ house may not have been sufficient to establish prob-\\nable cause by itself, but the details were mutually reinforcing.\\nThe affidavit showed a “substantial chance” that police could\\nfind drugs and/or a gun in the house. See United States v.\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d 361, 363–64 (7th Cir. 2011); Illinois v. Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 245 n.13 (“probable cause requires only a probabil-\\nity or substantial chance of criminal activity”). Though Ad-\\nams’ prior conviction may not have been decisive in establish-\\ning probable cause, it was “still relevant and entitled to some\\nweight,”as was the fact that the deputy had found drugs and\\nparaphernalia in the car when Adams was arrested. See\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d at 364. The totality of the circumstances\\nhere gave the issuing judge a substantial basis for his probable\\ncause determination.\\n Even if the search warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the deputies were entitled to rely on the war-\\nrant. It is now well settled that “suppression of evidence\\nseized pursuant to a search warrant that is later declared in-\\nvalid is inappropriate if the officers who executed the warrant\\nrelied in good faith on the issuing judge’s finding of probable\\ncause.” United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 656–57 (7th Cir.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2932\\n\\n2008), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984). An\\nofficer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence\\nthat the officer was acting in good faith. United States v. Koerth,\\n312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d\\n519, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). A defendant can rebut this presump-\\ntion in several ways, including by showing that “the affidavit\\nsubmitted in support of the warrant was ‘so lacking in indicia\\nof probable cause as to render official belief in its existence\\nentirely unreasonable.’” Olson, 408 F.3d at 372, quoting Leon,\\n468 U.S. at 923.\\n “Overcoming the presumption of good faith is no small\\nfeat, as an officer cannot ordinarily be expected to question a\\njudge’s probable cause determination.” United States v. Lick-\\ners, 928 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2019). Adams cannot overcome\\nthe presumption here. The situation here does not come close\\nto one in which a reasonable officer would disregard the\\njudge’s determination of probable cause and forgo executing\\nthe warrant. This warrant had substantial support from the\\nresults of the traffic stop, Adams’ criminal history, the anony-\\nmous tips, and the detailed and fresh information from Bran-\\ndon. Thus, even if the warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the evidence from the search would still not\\nbe suppressed since the deputies acted in good faith.\\n B. Sentencing Guidelines\\n Adams’ second argument on appeal is that the district\\ncourt erred in applying the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to\\nhis case. We review de novo claims of procedural errors in sen-\\ntencing, including a district court’s legal interpretation of the\\nGuidelines, such as whether a prior conviction counts as a\\n“controlled substance offense.” United States v. Tate, 822 F.3d\\n370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 11\\n\\n Adams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\\nfirearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the Sen-\\ntencing Guidelines, a person convicted under § 922(g)(1)\\nstarts with a base offense level of 14. See U.S.S.G.\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(6). That level increases to 20 if the defendant has a\\nprior conviction for a “controlled substance offense.” See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The term “controlled substance of-\\nfense” is not defined in § 2K2.1 itself, but its Application Note\\n1 states that “‘controlled substance offense’ has the meaning\\ngiven that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1 of the\\nCommentary to § 4B1.2.”\\n Section 4B1.2(b) provides in turn:\\n The term “controlled substance offense” means\\n an offense under federal or state law, punisha-\\n ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one\\n year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex-\\n port, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled\\n substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the\\n possession of a controlled substance (or a coun-\\n terfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\\n import, export, distribute, or dispense.\\nAnd Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 teaches that “controlled\\nsubstance offense” includes “the offenses of aiding and abet-\\nting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.”\\n Adams argues that his Illinois methamphetamine conspir-\\nacy conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” because\\nthe text of the Guideline itself does not include drug conspir-\\nacies or other inchoate or attempted drug crimes, and Appli-\\ncation Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly adds to that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense” by\\n\\f12 No. 18-2932\\n\\nincluding conspiracies and other inchoate drug offenses.\\nBased on this asserted conflict between the Guideline and the\\napplication note, he argues that the application note is not en-\\ntitled to deference. See generally Stinson v. United States, 508\\nU.S. 36, 43 (1993) (if commentaries such as application notes\\nare inconsistent with a Guideline, the Guideline controls).\\n In response, the government argues that there is no con-\\nflict between Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 and that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense.” Alterna-\\ntively, the government argues that, at the very least, there is\\nno conflict between the undefined term “controlled substance\\noffense” in § 2K2.1 and the referenced definition of the term\\nin that Guideline’s application note. The government con-\\ntends that the application note to § 2K2.1 simply explains\\nwhat is meant by “controlled substance offense” within the\\nmeaning of that Guideline.\\n Adams is arguing one side of a fairly new circuit split cre-\\nated by United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir.\\n2018). Winstead argued that he received ineffective assistance\\nof counsel at trial and at sentencing and that his sentence as a\\ncareer criminal was improper. The case did not concern the\\nGuideline at issue here (§ 2K2.1) but § 4B1.2 itself. Winstead\\nheld that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly ex-\\npands the definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n§ 4B1.2 to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy and at-\\ntempt. 890 F.3d at 1090–92. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged\\nthat it was creating a circuit split on this issue. Id. at 1091, cit-\\ning United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Solomon, 592 F. App’x 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2014);\\nUnited States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011);\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 13\\n\\nUnited States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995)\\n(en banc).\\n One could distinguish Winstead from this case on the\\nground that the applicable Guideline here is § 2K2.1, not\\n§ 4B1.2 itself. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is drafted differently. The\\nGuideline itself refers only to “a controlled substance offense”\\nand leaves all definition for its respective application note. As\\nnoted, Application Note 1 says that “controlled substance of-\\nfense” “has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(b) and ap-\\nplication Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” This basis for\\ndistinguishing Winstead, offered by the government here, may\\nbe a reasonable reading of the different language in the two\\nGuidelines and their application notes because Application\\nNote 1 to § 2K2.1 does not conflict with the language of\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(4) itself.\\n On the other hand, that basis for distinguishing Winstead\\nwould produce two different meanings for the phrase “con-\\ntrolled substance offense” in two different Guidelines, a tex-\\ntual consequence that is at least awkward. For that reason, the\\nSixth Circuit recently extended the reasoning of Winstead to\\nthe issue we face here, in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382,\\n386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In Havis the defendant\\npleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and\\nthe district court set his base level at 20 pursuant to § 2K2.1.\\nId. at 383–84. He had a prior conviction for a crime that could\\nhave included only the attempted sale of cocaine. Id. at 384. At-\\ntempt crimes are treated like conspiracies in these guideline\\nprovisions. Even though the Guideline at issue was § 2K2.1,\\nthe Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the interplay between\\n§ 4B1.2 and its Application Note 1. See id. at 385–87. The court\\nconcluded that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly\\n\\f14 No. 18-2932\\n\\nadded attempted crimes to the definition of “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” in § 4B1.2. Id. at 386–87. This conclusion, ac-\\ncording to the court, meant that attempted crimes were just as\\nimpermissibly added to § 2K2.1. Id. In a footnote, the court\\nwrote:\\n The Government argues in the alternative that\\n the real commentary at issue is Application\\n Note 1 to § 2K2.1, which cross-references the\\n definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. The Government\\n never made that argument in the district court\\n or before the initial panel on appeal and argua-\\n bly has forfeited its right to do so now. At any\\n rate, it makes no difference whether we begin\\n with § 2K2.1 to determine the meaning of “con-\\n trolled substance offense.” The commentary to\\n § 2K2.1 directs us to apply “the meaning given\\n that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1\\n of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” If anything, the\\n Government’s proposed definition—which\\n would require us to defer to commentary on\\n other commentary—would carry an even more\\n tenuous connection to the guideline’s text.\\nId. at 386 n.3.\\n The Sentencing Commission has responded to Winstead by\\nproposing an amendment to § 4B1.2 that would move the in-\\nchoate offense language from the application note to the text\\nof the Guideline as a new subsection (c). See 83 Fed. Reg.\\n65400, 65412–15 (Dec. 20, 2018). The public comment period\\nfor this amendment closed on March 15, 2019. The Sentencing\\nCommission currently lacks a quorum of voting members,\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 15\\n\\nbut this proposed amendment indicates that attempt and con-\\nspiracy crimes may be added to the text of the Guideline itself\\nin the near future, resolving this circuit split, including the\\nHavis extension of Winstead to § 2K2.1(a)(4).\\n The Commission’s correction has not yet taken effect,\\nthough, so we need to decide the legal issue under the current\\nGuidelines. We conclude that the issue is governed by our de-\\ncision in United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012),\\nwhere we rejected the textual arguments that the D.C. Circuit\\nlater found persuasive in Winstead. In Raupp, the defendant\\nwas convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His\\nguideline calculation used § 2K2.1(a)(2) because he had at\\nleast two other convictions for crimes of violence. One of\\nthose prior convictions was for conspiracy to commit robbery.\\nAmong several arguments, Raupp made the same textual\\npoints that prevailed later in Winstead, arguing that Applica-\\ntion Note 1 to § 4B1.2 could not properly extend the Guideline\\nto treat conspiracy to commit robbery as a crime of violence.\\nWe squarely rejected that argument, holding that the applica-\\ntion note’s inclusion of conspiracy did not conflict with the\\ntext of the Guideline itself. “There cannot be a conflict because\\nthe text of § 4B1.2(a) does not tell us, one or another, whether\\ninchoate offense are included or excluded. The note says they\\nare included.” 677 F.3d at 759. We added: “Deciding how to\\nhandle conspiracy is a question about wise policy, not about\\ntextual conflict.” Id. at 760.\\n Other portions of the Raupp opinion addressed the now-\\nabandoned residual clause of the definition of crimes of vio-\\nlence in § 4B1.2 and have had a complicated history as we and\\nthe Supreme Court have struggled with vagueness challenges\\nto the similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal\\n\\f16 No. 18-2932\\n\\nAct, held unconstitutional in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.\\n2551 (2015). In United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737, 742–43 (7th\\nCir. 2016), we overruled Raupp’s reliance on the residual\\nclause in the now-advisory § 4B1.2, but our reasoning in Rol-\\nlins was based on our decision in United States v. Hurlburt, 835\\nF.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), which was in turn overruled\\nby the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886\\n(2017), which held that the now-advisory Guidelines are not\\nsubject to vagueness challenges. The “controlled substance of-\\nfense” definition at issue here does not involve any of the\\ncomplications presented by the residual clauses in definitions\\nof violent crimes. The Raupp analysis of this purely textual is-\\nsue under § 2K2.1 and § 4B1.2 thus remains sound as applied\\nto the Guidelines’ definitions of controlled substance offenses.\\nSee also D’Antoni v. United States, 916 F.3d 658, 663–65 (7th\\nCir. 2019) (reviewing this history as applied to defendant sen-\\ntenced as career offender under then-mandatory Guidelines,\\nusing conviction for conspiracy to kill government witness as\\nprior crime of violence).\\n Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as applied to\\ninchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the\\ndistrict court’s decision to treat Adams as a career offender\\nunder the Sentencing Guidelines.\\n The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3881,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4650833,"string":"4,650,833"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Steven Adams"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2932"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2932\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 4:17-CR-40062 — James E. Shadid, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Steven Adams plead-\\ned guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this\\nappeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\\nto suppress and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines\\nto his case. We affirm. Probable cause supported the search\\nwarrant for Adams’ house, and in any event the officers could\\nrely on the warrant in good faith. Further, the district court\\n\\f2 No. 18-2932\\n\\nproperly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into ac-\\ncount his prior drug conspiracy conviction.\\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\\n On March 22, 2016, Adams, his girlfriend, and a third per-\\nson were pulled over for speeding. The car was registered to\\nAdams’ girlfriend, Leanna Brandon. Law enforcement offic-\\ners were familiar with Adams because he was the subject of\\nanonymous tips regarding drug activity at his house in\\nKeithsburg, Illinois. They also knew that Adams had a previ-\\nous conviction for conspiracy to distribute methampheta-\\nmine. The third person in the car was also the subject of anon-\\nymous tips regarding drug activity and had outstanding ar-\\nrest warrants.\\n During the traffic stop, the sheriff’s deputy smelled mari-\\njuana from the car. The car was searched, and deputies found\\na meth pipe, paraphernalia used with marijuana, and mariju-\\nana. The three occupants were arrested and taken back to the\\nstation, where Brandon—after receiving Miranda warnings—\\ntold the arresting deputy that additional items of drug para-\\nphernalia, a gun, and a safe containing methamphetamine\\npipes were at Adams’ house. Brandon told the deputy that she\\nalso stayed in the house and that she had been there earlier\\nthat same day. She described the layout of the house and pro-\\nvided descriptions of Adams’ bedroom and the gun and par-\\naphernalia.\\n In his application for a search warrant, the deputy wrote:\\n Brandon disclosed that at Adam’s residence, at\\n [street address], there is often meth and canna-\\n bis used. Brandon stays at the residence, and is\\n familiar with the goings on there. She said that\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 3\\n\\n there is drug paraphernalia for ingestion of can-\\n nabis and methamphetamine in the house.\\n Brandon went into great detail of Adams bed-\\n room where she sleeps when she stays. She said\\n she was last there at around 0430 hours this\\n morning (03/22/2016). She described Adams’\\n room as being in the northwest corner of the\\n house and drew a floor plan of the house. She\\n drew an enlargement of Adams’ room. She de-\\n scribed a dresser with a mirror on the west wall\\n of the bedroom. She said that on that dresser,\\n there is always a clear glass bong. She has seen\\n it used to ingest cannabis. She said the bowl part\\n of it is not on it, but it does have residue in it.\\n She also said that there is a colorful swirled de-\\n signed “bowl” that looks like an elephant; this\\n is used for ingestion of cannabis on a nightstand\\n next to the bed. She said that her .45 caliber\\n Smith and Wesson pistol is in the house. It has a\\n cable lock in it and she has the only keys. She\\n said the pistol is black and is in the blue plastic\\n case. She said there is a gray/black colored safe\\n in the bedroom. Inside that safe is meth pipes,\\n and maybe some meth and cannabis.\\n Brandon said Adams’ bedroom is locked with a\\n deadbolt. She said that only she and Adams\\n have keys. She said that only Adams and she\\n have the keys for the safe in the bedroom, and\\n she provided me one from her purse.\\n She said that there may be other paraphernalia\\n in the house. She said that [Female] and [Male]\\n\\f4 No. 18-2932\\n\\n stay in a bedroom next to Adams. She said that\\n [Female] frequently “huffs” hair spray and has\\n expressed her displeasure of the aerosol odor in\\n the house to [Female]. This agency has also re-\\n ceived recent information about [Male] being at\\n the residence. [Male] had a history for posses-\\n sion of narcotics through Iowa.\\n Based on the results of the traffic stop search, Adams’ prior\\nconviction, the anonymous tips, and the information from\\nBrandon, the police obtained a search warrant for Adams’\\nhouse from a state-court judge. They executed the warrant the\\nsame day as the traffic stop. In Adams’ room, they found a\\nlocked plastic gun case that Brandon had described. A .45 cal-\\niber Smith & Wesson handgun and two loaded magazines\\nwere inside the case. Adams later admitted that he had Bran-\\ndon buy the gun for him because he was a felon.\\n A federal grand jury charged Adams with unlawful pos-\\nsession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g). Adams moved to suppress the evidence discovered\\npursuant to the state search warrant, contending that the affi-\\ndavit in support of the application did not establish probable\\ncause. He also argued that the good-faith exception to the ex-\\nclusionary rule should not apply because the affidavit was so\\nlacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not\\nhave relied on the warrant.\\n The district court ruled from the bench and denied Ad-\\nams’ motion to suppress. The court explained that the issuing\\njudge had a “substantial basis for determining the existence\\nof probable cause” because Brandon had “provided firsthand\\ndetail,” the information was “fresh” as it “was within a day”\\nsince she had been at the house, and the information was “in\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 5\\n\\nsome form corroborated by the number of tips.” The court\\nnoted that the tips were anonymous and that standing alone\\nthey would not establish probable cause. But the court ex-\\nplained that the tips provided some corroboration in conjunc-\\ntion with the other information. The court also highlighted the\\ntraffic stop of the “vehicle that involved drugs” and noted\\nthat, “to some degree,” Brandon’s statements to the deputy\\nwere “against her penal interest.” The court concluded: “So, I\\nbelieve that all of this provides plenty of information for the\\nestablishment of probable cause. If it didn’t, I do believe there\\nis no question that there is good faith here.”\\n Adams pleaded guilty to the indictment, reserving his\\nright to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. At sen-\\ntencing, Adams objected to the probation officer’s use of a\\nbase offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing\\nGuidelines, arguing that his Illinois methamphetamine con-\\nspiracy conviction should not count as a “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” because it was conviction for only conspiracy,\\nnot actually distributing or manufacturing the drug. Section\\n2K2.1(a)(4) of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 20 for\\na defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) “subsequent to\\nsustaining one felony conviction of … a controlled substance\\noffense.” “Controlled substance offense” is not defined in the\\nGuideline itself, but the commentary to that guideline states\\nthat the phrase has the same meaning as it does in § 4B1.2(b)\\nand Application Note 1 to § 4B1.1 (which includes conspiracy\\noffenses). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Adams argued that the\\ncommentary and application note impermissibly added to the\\ndefinition of “controlled substance offense” and that the Sen-\\ntencing Commission’s interpretation of the definition was not\\nentitled to deference.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2932\\n\\n The district court overruled Adams’ objection. The court\\ndetermined that Adams’ advisory guideline range was 70 to\\n87 months, based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\\nhistory category of IV. Adams was sentenced to 84 months in\\nprison and three years of supervised release.\\nII. Analysis\\n Adams raises two issues on appeal. The first is whether\\nthe state search warrant was supported by probable cause,\\nand, if not, whether the police acted in good faith when they\\nexecuted the warrant. The second is whether the district court\\nproperly calculated the advisory guideline range.\\n A. Probable Cause and Good Faith\\n When reviewing a search warrant, we give “‘great defer-\\nence’ to the issuing judge’s determination so long as the judge\\nhad a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding.” United States v. Mil-\\nler, 673 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Illinois v.\\nGates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Here, that deference is given to\\nthe state-court judge who issued the search warrant. We give\\nno deference to (i.e., review de novo) the district court’s finding\\nthat there was a substantial basis for issuing the warrant.\\nUnited States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). We\\nalso review de novo whether the good-faith exception applies\\nto a search warrant later found to be invalid. United States v.\\nMitten, 592 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Probable cause exists when the circumstances “indicate a\\nreasonable probability that evidence of crime will be found in\\na particular location; neither an absolute certainty nor even a\\npreponderance of the evidence is necessary.” United States v.\\nAljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 235. Where, as here, an affidavit is the only\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 7\\n\\nevidence presented to a judge to support a search warrant,\\n“the validity of the warrant rests solely on the strength of the\\naffidavit.” United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir.\\n2009). When an informant is the source of the information in\\nan affidavit, “the probable-cause determination turns on the\\ninformant’s credibility.” United States v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d\\n807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017), citing Bell, 585 F.3d at 1049. We con-\\nsider all relevant circumstances, including:\\n first, the degree to which the informant ac-\\n quired knowledge of the events through\\n firsthand observation; second, the detail and\\n specificity of the information provided by the\\n informant; third, the interval between the date\\n of the events and a police officer’s application\\n for the search warrant; and fourth, the extent to\\n which law enforcement corroborated the in-\\n formant’s statements.\\nSearcy, 664 F.3d at 1122; see also United States v. Glover, 755\\nF.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (we consider “the level of detail,\\nthe extent of firsthand observation, the degree of corrobora-\\ntion, the time between the events reported and the warrant\\napplication, and whether the informant appeared or testified\\nbefore the magistrate.”). We consider these factors as a whole,\\nand “no one factor necessarily dooms a search warrant.”\\nUnited States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n The search warrant here was supported by probable cause.\\nThe affidavit disclosed Brandon’s name, explained her close\\nrelationship with Adams and her connection to the house,\\nand explained that she had been in the house earlier that day.\\nBrandon provided the police with detailed, firsthand infor-\\nmation about the criminal activity in the house. She described\\n\\f8 No. 18-2932\\n\\nthe handgun by both caliber and make, the color of the gun\\ncase, and the color of the safe that contained methampheta-\\nmine pipes and possibly methamphetamine and marijuana.\\nBrandon had a key to the safe that she gave to the police. Her\\ninformation was corroborated to some extent by the anony-\\nmous tips informing the police that drug activity was occur-\\nring in Adam’ house. It was also corroborated by the fact that\\nthe police had discovered drugs and paraphernalia in Bran-\\ndon’s car during the traffic stop, the fact that Brandon and\\nAdams were together when they were pulled over and ar-\\nrested, and the fact that Adams had a prior methampheta-\\nmine-related conviction. The police applied for, received, and\\nexecuted the search warrant on the day that Adams and Bran-\\ndon were arrested and Brandon gave them all of the infor-\\nmation, so the information was fresh.\\n Taking all of these factors into consideration, the affidavit\\nhere is stronger than the one that established probable cause\\nin United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2005), where\\nthe police had received a tip four months earlier that the de-\\nfendant sold marijuana from his house. The defendant’s\\nnephew had been arrested for robbery and aggravated bat-\\ntery. Id. at 369. During his post-arrest interview, the nephew\\ntold police that he had gone to the defendant’s house to steal\\nhis marijuana. The nephew explained that that he had seen a\\npound of marijuana in the defendant’s bedroom just two days\\nearlier, that he had seen guns in the residence, and that the\\ndefendant had a felony conviction. The police then reviewed\\nthe defendant’s criminal history, which included multiple ar-\\nrests and convictions for drug offenses. The police included\\nthis information in an affidavit, received a search warrant,\\nand found over a kilogram of marijuana and multiple guns in\\nthe defendant’s house. Id. We rejected the defendant’s\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 9\\n\\nchallenge to the issuing judge’s probable cause determina-\\ntion, finding that the information the nephew provided was a\\n“firsthand account” that was “of sufficient detail, describing\\nlarge quantities of marijuana … as well as several guns in the\\nresidence … that he had observed only two days earlier.” Id.\\nat 370. We also noted that the nephew’s “admission that he\\nintended to steal drugs from the defendant constitutes a state-\\nment made against his penal interest, and as such carries with\\nit a presumption of reliability.” Id. at 371.\\n Each individual detail in the search warrant affidavit for\\nAdams’ house may not have been sufficient to establish prob-\\nable cause by itself, but the details were mutually reinforcing.\\nThe affidavit showed a “substantial chance” that police could\\nfind drugs and/or a gun in the house. See United States v.\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d 361, 363–64 (7th Cir. 2011); Illinois v. Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 245 n.13 (“probable cause requires only a probabil-\\nity or substantial chance of criminal activity”). Though Ad-\\nams’ prior conviction may not have been decisive in establish-\\ning probable cause, it was “still relevant and entitled to some\\nweight,”as was the fact that the deputy had found drugs and\\nparaphernalia in the car when Adams was arrested. See\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d at 364. The totality of the circumstances\\nhere gave the issuing judge a substantial basis for his probable\\ncause determination.\\n Even if the search warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the deputies were entitled to rely on the war-\\nrant. It is now well settled that “suppression of evidence\\nseized pursuant to a search warrant that is later declared in-\\nvalid is inappropriate if the officers who executed the warrant\\nrelied in good faith on the issuing judge’s finding of probable\\ncause.” United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 656–57 (7th Cir.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2932\\n\\n2008), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984). An\\nofficer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence\\nthat the officer was acting in good faith. United States v. Koerth,\\n312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d\\n519, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). A defendant can rebut this presump-\\ntion in several ways, including by showing that “the affidavit\\nsubmitted in support of the warrant was ‘so lacking in indicia\\nof probable cause as to render official belief in its existence\\nentirely unreasonable.’” Olson, 408 F.3d at 372, quoting Leon,\\n468 U.S. at 923.\\n “Overcoming the presumption of good faith is no small\\nfeat, as an officer cannot ordinarily be expected to question a\\njudge’s probable cause determination.” United States v. Lick-\\ners, 928 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2019). Adams cannot overcome\\nthe presumption here. The situation here does not come close\\nto one in which a reasonable officer would disregard the\\njudge’s determination of probable cause and forgo executing\\nthe warrant. This warrant had substantial support from the\\nresults of the traffic stop, Adams’ criminal history, the anony-\\nmous tips, and the detailed and fresh information from Bran-\\ndon. Thus, even if the warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the evidence from the search would still not\\nbe suppressed since the deputies acted in good faith.\\n B. Sentencing Guidelines\\n Adams’ second argument on appeal is that the district\\ncourt erred in applying the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to\\nhis case. We review de novo claims of procedural errors in sen-\\ntencing, including a district court’s legal interpretation of the\\nGuidelines, such as whether a prior conviction counts as a\\n“controlled substance offense.” United States v. Tate, 822 F.3d\\n370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 11\\n\\n Adams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\\nfirearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the Sen-\\ntencing Guidelines, a person convicted under § 922(g)(1)\\nstarts with a base offense level of 14. See U.S.S.G.\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(6). That level increases to 20 if the defendant has a\\nprior conviction for a “controlled substance offense.” See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The term “controlled substance of-\\nfense” is not defined in § 2K2.1 itself, but its Application Note\\n1 states that “‘controlled substance offense’ has the meaning\\ngiven that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1 of the\\nCommentary to § 4B1.2.”\\n Section 4B1.2(b) provides in turn:\\n The term “controlled substance offense” means\\n an offense under federal or state law, punisha-\\n ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one\\n year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex-\\n port, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled\\n substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the\\n possession of a controlled substance (or a coun-\\n terfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\\n import, export, distribute, or dispense.\\nAnd Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 teaches that “controlled\\nsubstance offense” includes “the offenses of aiding and abet-\\nting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.”\\n Adams argues that his Illinois methamphetamine conspir-\\nacy conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” because\\nthe text of the Guideline itself does not include drug conspir-\\nacies or other inchoate or attempted drug crimes, and Appli-\\ncation Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly adds to that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense” by\\n\\f12 No. 18-2932\\n\\nincluding conspiracies and other inchoate drug offenses.\\nBased on this asserted conflict between the Guideline and the\\napplication note, he argues that the application note is not en-\\ntitled to deference. See generally Stinson v. United States, 508\\nU.S. 36, 43 (1993) (if commentaries such as application notes\\nare inconsistent with a Guideline, the Guideline controls).\\n In response, the government argues that there is no con-\\nflict between Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 and that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense.” Alterna-\\ntively, the government argues that, at the very least, there is\\nno conflict between the undefined term “controlled substance\\noffense” in § 2K2.1 and the referenced definition of the term\\nin that Guideline’s application note. The government con-\\ntends that the application note to § 2K2.1 simply explains\\nwhat is meant by “controlled substance offense” within the\\nmeaning of that Guideline.\\n Adams is arguing one side of a fairly new circuit split cre-\\nated by United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir.\\n2018). Winstead argued that he received ineffective assistance\\nof counsel at trial and at sentencing and that his sentence as a\\ncareer criminal was improper. The case did not concern the\\nGuideline at issue here (§ 2K2.1) but § 4B1.2 itself. Winstead\\nheld that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly ex-\\npands the definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n§ 4B1.2 to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy and at-\\ntempt. 890 F.3d at 1090–92. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged\\nthat it was creating a circuit split on this issue. Id. at 1091, cit-\\ning United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Solomon, 592 F. App’x 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2014);\\nUnited States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011);\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 13\\n\\nUnited States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995)\\n(en banc).\\n One could distinguish Winstead from this case on the\\nground that the applicable Guideline here is § 2K2.1, not\\n§ 4B1.2 itself. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is drafted differently. The\\nGuideline itself refers only to “a controlled substance offense”\\nand leaves all definition for its respective application note. As\\nnoted, Application Note 1 says that “controlled substance of-\\nfense” “has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(b) and ap-\\nplication Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” This basis for\\ndistinguishing Winstead, offered by the government here, may\\nbe a reasonable reading of the different language in the two\\nGuidelines and their application notes because Application\\nNote 1 to § 2K2.1 does not conflict with the language of\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(4) itself.\\n On the other hand, that basis for distinguishing Winstead\\nwould produce two different meanings for the phrase “con-\\ntrolled substance offense” in two different Guidelines, a tex-\\ntual consequence that is at least awkward. For that reason, the\\nSixth Circuit recently extended the reasoning of Winstead to\\nthe issue we face here, in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382,\\n386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In Havis the defendant\\npleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and\\nthe district court set his base level at 20 pursuant to § 2K2.1.\\nId. at 383–84. He had a prior conviction for a crime that could\\nhave included only the attempted sale of cocaine. Id. at 384. At-\\ntempt crimes are treated like conspiracies in these guideline\\nprovisions. Even though the Guideline at issue was § 2K2.1,\\nthe Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the interplay between\\n§ 4B1.2 and its Application Note 1. See id. at 385–87. The court\\nconcluded that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly\\n\\f14 No. 18-2932\\n\\nadded attempted crimes to the definition of “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” in § 4B1.2. Id. at 386–87. This conclusion, ac-\\ncording to the court, meant that attempted crimes were just as\\nimpermissibly added to § 2K2.1. Id. In a footnote, the court\\nwrote:\\n The Government argues in the alternative that\\n the real commentary at issue is Application\\n Note 1 to § 2K2.1, which cross-references the\\n definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. The Government\\n never made that argument in the district court\\n or before the initial panel on appeal and argua-\\n bly has forfeited its right to do so now. At any\\n rate, it makes no difference whether we begin\\n with § 2K2.1 to determine the meaning of “con-\\n trolled substance offense.” The commentary to\\n § 2K2.1 directs us to apply “the meaning given\\n that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1\\n of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” If anything, the\\n Government’s proposed definition—which\\n would require us to defer to commentary on\\n other commentary—would carry an even more\\n tenuous connection to the guideline’s text.\\nId. at 386 n.3.\\n The Sentencing Commission has responded to Winstead by\\nproposing an amendment to § 4B1.2 that would move the in-\\nchoate offense language from the application note to the text\\nof the Guideline as a new subsection (c). See 83 Fed. Reg.\\n65400, 65412–15 (Dec. 20, 2018). The public comment period\\nfor this amendment closed on March 15, 2019. The Sentencing\\nCommission currently lacks a quorum of voting members,\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 15\\n\\nbut this proposed amendment indicates that attempt and con-\\nspiracy crimes may be added to the text of the Guideline itself\\nin the near future, resolving this circuit split, including the\\nHavis extension of Winstead to § 2K2.1(a)(4).\\n The Commission’s correction has not yet taken effect,\\nthough, so we need to decide the legal issue under the current\\nGuidelines. We conclude that the issue is governed by our de-\\ncision in United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012),\\nwhere we rejected the textual arguments that the D.C. Circuit\\nlater found persuasive in Winstead. In Raupp, the defendant\\nwas convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His\\nguideline calculation used § 2K2.1(a)(2) because he had at\\nleast two other convictions for crimes of violence. One of\\nthose prior convictions was for conspiracy to commit robbery.\\nAmong several arguments, Raupp made the same textual\\npoints that prevailed later in Winstead, arguing that Applica-\\ntion Note 1 to § 4B1.2 could not properly extend the Guideline\\nto treat conspiracy to commit robbery as a crime of violence.\\nWe squarely rejected that argument, holding that the applica-\\ntion note’s inclusion of conspiracy did not conflict with the\\ntext of the Guideline itself. “There cannot be a conflict because\\nthe text of § 4B1.2(a) does not tell us, one or another, whether\\ninchoate offense are included or excluded. The note says they\\nare included.” 677 F.3d at 759. We added: “Deciding how to\\nhandle conspiracy is a question about wise policy, not about\\ntextual conflict.” Id. at 760.\\n Other portions of the Raupp opinion addressed the now-\\nabandoned residual clause of the definition of crimes of vio-\\nlence in § 4B1.2 and have had a complicated history as we and\\nthe Supreme Court have struggled with vagueness challenges\\nto the similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal\\n\\f16 No. 18-2932\\n\\nAct, held unconstitutional in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.\\n2551 (2015). In United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737, 742–43 (7th\\nCir. 2016), we overruled Raupp’s reliance on the residual\\nclause in the now-advisory § 4B1.2, but our reasoning in Rol-\\nlins was based on our decision in United States v. Hurlburt, 835\\nF.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), which was in turn overruled\\nby the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886\\n(2017), which held that the now-advisory Guidelines are not\\nsubject to vagueness challenges. The “controlled substance of-\\nfense” definition at issue here does not involve any of the\\ncomplications presented by the residual clauses in definitions\\nof violent crimes. The Raupp analysis of this purely textual is-\\nsue under § 2K2.1 and § 4B1.2 thus remains sound as applied\\nto the Guidelines’ definitions of controlled substance offenses.\\nSee also D’Antoni v. United States, 916 F.3d 658, 663–65 (7th\\nCir. 2019) (reviewing this history as applied to defendant sen-\\ntenced as career offender under then-mandatory Guidelines,\\nusing conviction for conspiracy to kill government witness as\\nprior crime of violence).\\n Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as applied to\\ninchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the\\ndistrict court’s decision to treat Adams as a career offender\\nunder the Sentencing Guidelines.\\n The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4428087/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4650833/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Steven Adams\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2932\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 4:17-CR-40062 — James E. Shadid, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Steven Adams plead-\ned guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this\nappeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\nto suppress and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines\nto his case. We affirm. Probable cause supported the search\nwarrant for Adams’ house, and in any event the officers could\nrely on the warrant in good faith. Further, the district court\n\f2 No. 18-2932\n\nproperly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into ac-\ncount his prior drug conspiracy conviction.\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\n On March 22, 2016, Adams, his girlfriend, and a third per-\nson were pulled over for speeding. The car was registered to\nAdams’ girlfriend, Leanna Brandon. Law enforcement offic-\ners were familiar with Adams because he was the subject of\nanonymous tips regarding drug activity at his house in\nKeithsburg, Illinois. They also knew that Adams had a previ-\nous conviction for conspiracy to distribute methampheta-\nmine. The third person in the car was also the subject of anon-\nymous tips regarding drug activity and had outstanding ar-\nrest warrants.\n During the traffic stop, the sheriff’s deputy smelled mari-\njuana from the car. The car was searched, and deputies found\na meth pipe, paraphernalia used with marijuana, and mariju-\nana. The three occupants were arrested and taken back to the\nstation, where Brandon—after receiving Miranda warnings—\ntold the arresting deputy that additional items of drug para-\nphernalia, a gun, and a safe containing methamphetamine\npipes were at Adams’ house. Brandon told the deputy that she\nalso stayed in the house and that she had been there earlier\nthat same day. She described the layout of the house and pro-\nvided descriptions of Adams’ bedroom and the gun and par-\naphernalia.\n In his application for a search warrant, the deputy wrote:\n Brandon disclosed that at Adam’s residence, at\n [street address], there is often meth and canna-\n bis used. Brandon stays at the residence, and is\n familiar with the goings on there. She said that\n\fNo. 18-2932 3\n\n there is drug paraphernalia for ingestion of can-\n nabis and methamphetamine in the house.\n Brandon went into great detail of Adams bed-\n room where she sleeps when she stays. She said\n she was last there at around 0430 hours this\n morning (03/22/2016). She described Adams’\n room as being in the northwest corner of the\n house and drew a floor plan of the house. She\n drew an enlargement of Adams’ room. She de-\n scribed a dresser with a mirror on the west wall\n of the bedroom. She said that on that dresser,\n there is always a clear glass bong. She has seen\n it used to ingest cannabis. She said the bowl part\n of it is not on it, but it does have residue in it.\n She also said that there is a colorful swirled de-\n signed “bowl” that looks like an elephant; this\n is used for ingestion of cannabis on a nightstand\n next to the bed. She said that her .45 caliber\n Smith and Wesson pistol is in the house. It has a\n cable lock in it and she has the only keys. She\n said the pistol is black and is in the blue plastic\n case. She said there is a gray/black colored safe\n in the bedroom. Inside that safe is meth pipes,\n and maybe some meth and cannabis.\n Brandon said Adams’ bedroom is locked with a\n deadbolt. She said that only she and Adams\n have keys. She said that only Adams and she\n have the keys for the safe in the bedroom, and\n she provided me one from her purse.\n She said that there may be other paraphernalia\n in the house. She said that [Female] and [Male]\n\f4 No. 18-2932\n\n stay in a bedroom next to Adams. She said that\n [Female] frequently “huffs” hair spray and has\n expressed her displeasure of the aerosol odor in\n the house to [Female]. This agency has also re-\n ceived recent information about [Male] being at\n the residence. [Male] had a history for posses-\n sion of narcotics through Iowa.\n Based on the results of the traffic stop search, Adams’ prior\nconviction, the anonymous tips, and the information from\nBrandon, the police obtained a search warrant for Adams’\nhouse from a state-court judge. They executed the warrant the\nsame day as the traffic stop. In Adams’ room, they found a\nlocked plastic gun case that Brandon had described. A .45 cal-\niber Smith & Wesson handgun and two loaded magazines\nwere inside the case. Adams later admitted that he had Bran-\ndon buy the gun for him because he was a felon.\n A federal grand jury charged Adams with unlawful pos-\nsession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 922(g). Adams moved to suppress the evidence discovered\npursuant to the state search warrant, contending that the affi-\ndavit in support of the application did not establish probable\ncause. He also argued that the good-faith exception to the ex-\nclusionary rule should not apply because the affidavit was so\nlacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not\nhave relied on the warrant.\n The district court ruled from the bench and denied Ad-\nams’ motion to suppress. The court explained that the issuing\njudge had a “substantial basis for determining the existence\nof probable cause” because Brandon had “provided firsthand\ndetail,” the information was “fresh” as it “was within a day”\nsince she had been at the house, and the information was “in\n\fNo. 18-2932 5\n\nsome form corroborated by the number of tips.” The court\nnoted that the tips were anonymous and that standing alone\nthey would not establish probable cause. But the court ex-\nplained that the tips provided some corroboration in conjunc-\ntion with the other information. The court also highlighted the\ntraffic stop of the “vehicle that involved drugs” and noted\nthat, “to some degree,” Brandon’s statements to the deputy\nwere “against her penal interest.” The court concluded: “So, I\nbelieve that all of this provides plenty of information for the\nestablishment of probable cause. If it didn’t, I do believe there\nis no question that there is good faith here.”\n Adams pleaded guilty to the indictment, reserving his\nright to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. At sen-\ntencing, Adams objected to the probation officer’s use of a\nbase offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing\nGuidelines, arguing that his Illinois methamphetamine con-\nspiracy conviction should not count as a “controlled sub-\nstance offense” because it was conviction for only conspiracy,\nnot actually distributing or manufacturing the drug. Section\n2K2.1(a)(4) of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 20 for\na defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) “subsequent to\nsustaining one felony conviction of … a controlled substance\noffense.” “Controlled substance offense” is not defined in the\nGuideline itself, but the commentary to that guideline states\nthat the phrase has the same meaning as it does in § 4B1.2(b)\nand Application Note 1 to § 4B1.1 (which includes conspiracy\noffenses). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Adams argued that the\ncommentary and application note impermissibly added to the\ndefinition of “controlled substance offense” and that the Sen-\ntencing Commission’s interpretation of the definition was not\nentitled to deference.\n\f6 No. 18-2932\n\n The district court overruled Adams’ objection. The court\ndetermined that Adams’ advisory guideline range was 70 to\n87 months, based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\nhistory category of IV. Adams was sentenced to 84 months in\nprison and three years of supervised release.\nII. Analysis\n Adams raises two issues on appeal. The first is whether\nthe state search warrant was supported by probable cause,\nand, if not, whether the police acted in good faith when they\nexecuted the warrant. The second is whether the district court\nproperly calculated the advisory guideline range.\n A. Probable Cause and Good Faith\n When reviewing a search warrant, we give “‘great defer-\nence’ to the issuing judge’s determination so long as the judge\nhad a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding.” United States v. Mil-\nler, 673 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Illinois v.\nGates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Here, that deference is given to\nthe state-court judge who issued the search warrant. We give\nno deference to (i.e., review de novo) the district court’s finding\nthat there was a substantial basis for issuing the warrant.\nUnited States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). We\nalso review de novo whether the good-faith exception applies\nto a search warrant later found to be invalid. United States v.\nMitten, 592 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2010).\n Probable cause exists when the circumstances “indicate a\nreasonable probability that evidence of crime will be found in\na particular location; neither an absolute certainty nor even a\npreponderance of the evidence is necessary.” United States v.\nAljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Gates,\n462 U.S. at 235. Where, as here, an affidavit is the only\n\fNo. 18-2932 7\n\nevidence presented to a judge to support a search warrant,\n“the validity of the warrant rests solely on the strength of the\naffidavit.” United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir.\n2009). When an informant is the source of the information in\nan affidavit, “the probable-cause determination turns on the\ninformant’s credibility.” United States v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d\n807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017), citing Bell, 585 F.3d at 1049. We con-\nsider all relevant circumstances, including:\n first, the degree to which the informant ac-\n quired knowledge of the events through\n firsthand observation; second, the detail and\n specificity of the information provided by the\n informant; third, the interval between the date\n of the events and a police officer’s application\n for the search warrant; and fourth, the extent to\n which law enforcement corroborated the in-\n formant’s statements.\nSearcy, 664 F.3d at 1122; see also United States v. Glover, 755\nF.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (we consider “the level of detail,\nthe extent of firsthand observation, the degree of corrobora-\ntion, the time between the events reported and the warrant\napplication, and whether the informant appeared or testified\nbefore the magistrate.”). We consider these factors as a whole,\nand “no one factor necessarily dooms a search warrant.”\nUnited States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).\n The search warrant here was supported by probable cause.\nThe affidavit disclosed Brandon’s name, explained her close\nrelationship with Adams and her connection to the house,\nand explained that she had been in the house earlier that day.\nBrandon provided the police with detailed, firsthand infor-\nmation about the criminal activity in the house. She described\n\f8 No. 18-2932\n\nthe handgun by both caliber and make, the color of the gun\ncase, and the color of the safe that contained methampheta-\nmine pipes and possibly methamphetamine and marijuana.\nBrandon had a key to the safe that she gave to the police. Her\ninformation was corroborated to some extent by the anony-\nmous tips informing the police that drug activity was occur-\nring in Adam’ house. It was also corroborated by the fact that\nthe police had discovered drugs and paraphernalia in Bran-\ndon’s car during the traffic stop, the fact that Brandon and\nAdams were together when they were pulled over and ar-\nrested, and the fact that Adams had a prior methampheta-\nmine-related conviction. The police applied for, received, and\nexecuted the search warrant on the day that Adams and Bran-\ndon were arrested and Brandon gave them all of the infor-\nmation, so the information was fresh.\n Taking all of these factors into consideration, the affidavit\nhere is stronger than the one that established probable cause\nin United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2005), where\nthe police had received a tip four months earlier that the de-\nfendant sold marijuana from his house. The defendant’s\nnephew had been arrested for robbery and aggravated bat-\ntery. Id. at 369. During his post-arrest interview, the nephew\ntold police that he had gone to the defendant’s house to steal\nhis marijuana. The nephew explained that that he had seen a\npound of marijuana in the defendant’s bedroom just two days\nearlier, that he had seen guns in the residence, and that the\ndefendant had a felony conviction. The police then reviewed\nthe defendant’s criminal history, which included multiple ar-\nrests and convictions for drug offenses. The police included\nthis information in an affidavit, received a search warrant,\nand found over a kilogram of marijuana and multiple guns in\nthe defendant’s house. Id. We rejected the defendant’s\n\fNo. 18-2932 9\n\nchallenge to the issuing judge’s probable cause determina-\ntion, finding that the information the nephew provided was a\n“firsthand account” that was “of sufficient detail, describing\nlarge quantities of marijuana … as well as several guns in the\nresidence … that he had observed only two days earlier.” Id.\nat 370. We also noted that the nephew’s “admission that he\nintended to steal drugs from the defendant constitutes a state-\nment made against his penal interest, and as such carries with\nit a presumption of reliability.” Id. at 371.\n Each individual detail in the search warrant affidavit for\nAdams’ house may not have been sufficient to establish prob-\nable cause by itself, but the details were mutually reinforcing.\nThe affidavit showed a “substantial chance” that police could\nfind drugs and/or a gun in the house. See United States v.\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d 361, 363–64 (7th Cir. 2011); Illinois v. Gates,\n462 U.S. at 245 n.13 (“probable cause requires only a probabil-\nity or substantial chance of criminal activity”). Though Ad-\nams’ prior conviction may not have been decisive in establish-\ning probable cause, it was “still relevant and entitled to some\nweight,”as was the fact that the deputy had found drugs and\nparaphernalia in the car when Adams was arrested. See\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d at 364. The totality of the circumstances\nhere gave the issuing judge a substantial basis for his probable\ncause determination.\n Even if the search warrant had not been supported by\nprobable cause, the deputies were entitled to rely on the war-\nrant. It is now well settled that “suppression of evidence\nseized pursuant to a search warrant that is later declared in-\nvalid is inappropriate if the officers who executed the warrant\nrelied in good faith on the issuing judge’s finding of probable\ncause.” United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 656–57 (7th Cir.\n\f10 No. 18-2932\n\n2008), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984). An\nofficer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence\nthat the officer was acting in good faith. United States v. Koerth,\n312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d\n519, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). A defendant can rebut this presump-\ntion in several ways, including by showing that “the affidavit\nsubmitted in support of the warrant was ‘so lacking in indicia\nof probable cause as to render official belief in its existence\nentirely unreasonable.’” Olson, 408 F.3d at 372, quoting Leon,\n468 U.S. at 923.\n “Overcoming the presumption of good faith is no small\nfeat, as an officer cannot ordinarily be expected to question a\njudge’s probable cause determination.” United States v. Lick-\ners, 928 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2019). Adams cannot overcome\nthe presumption here. The situation here does not come close\nto one in which a reasonable officer would disregard the\njudge’s determination of probable cause and forgo executing\nthe warrant. This warrant had substantial support from the\nresults of the traffic stop, Adams’ criminal history, the anony-\nmous tips, and the detailed and fresh information from Bran-\ndon. Thus, even if the warrant had not been supported by\nprobable cause, the evidence from the search would still not\nbe suppressed since the deputies acted in good faith.\n B. Sentencing Guidelines\n Adams’ second argument on appeal is that the district\ncourt erred in applying the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to\nhis case. We review de novo claims of procedural errors in sen-\ntencing, including a district court’s legal interpretation of the\nGuidelines, such as whether a prior conviction counts as a\n“controlled substance offense.” United States v. Tate, 822 F.3d\n370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016).\n\fNo. 18-2932 11\n\n Adams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\nfirearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the Sen-\ntencing Guidelines, a person convicted under § 922(g)(1)\nstarts with a base offense level of 14. See U.S.S.G.\n§ 2K2.1(a)(6). That level increases to 20 if the defendant has a\nprior conviction for a “controlled substance offense.” See\nU.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The term “controlled substance of-\nfense” is not defined in § 2K2.1 itself, but its Application Note\n1 states that “‘controlled substance offense’ has the meaning\ngiven that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1 of the\nCommentary to § 4B1.2.”\n Section 4B1.2(b) provides in turn:\n The term “controlled substance offense” means\n an offense under federal or state law, punisha-\n ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one\n year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex-\n port, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled\n substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the\n possession of a controlled substance (or a coun-\n terfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\n import, export, distribute, or dispense.\nAnd Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 teaches that “controlled\nsubstance offense” includes “the offenses of aiding and abet-\nting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.”\n Adams argues that his Illinois methamphetamine conspir-\nacy conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” because\nthe text of the Guideline itself does not include drug conspir-\nacies or other inchoate or attempted drug crimes, and Appli-\ncation Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly adds to that Guide-\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense” by\n\f12 No. 18-2932\n\nincluding conspiracies and other inchoate drug offenses.\nBased on this asserted conflict between the Guideline and the\napplication note, he argues that the application note is not en-\ntitled to deference. See generally Stinson v. United States, 508\nU.S. 36, 43 (1993) (if commentaries such as application notes\nare inconsistent with a Guideline, the Guideline controls).\n In response, the government argues that there is no con-\nflict between Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 and that Guide-\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense.” Alterna-\ntively, the government argues that, at the very least, there is\nno conflict between the undefined term “controlled substance\noffense” in § 2K2.1 and the referenced definition of the term\nin that Guideline’s application note. The government con-\ntends that the application note to § 2K2.1 simply explains\nwhat is meant by “controlled substance offense” within the\nmeaning of that Guideline.\n Adams is arguing one side of a fairly new circuit split cre-\nated by United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir.\n2018). Winstead argued that he received ineffective assistance\nof counsel at trial and at sentencing and that his sentence as a\ncareer criminal was improper. The case did not concern the\nGuideline at issue here (§ 2K2.1) but § 4B1.2 itself. Winstead\nheld that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly ex-\npands the definition of “controlled substance offense” in\n§ 4B1.2 to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy and at-\ntempt. 890 F.3d at 1090–92. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged\nthat it was creating a circuit split on this issue. Id. at 1091, cit-\ning United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2017);\nUnited States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017);\nUnited States v. Solomon, 592 F. App’x 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2014);\nUnited States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011);\n\fNo. 18-2932 13\n\nUnited States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995)\n(en banc).\n One could distinguish Winstead from this case on the\nground that the applicable Guideline here is § 2K2.1, not\n§ 4B1.2 itself. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is drafted differently. The\nGuideline itself refers only to “a controlled substance offense”\nand leaves all definition for its respective application note. As\nnoted, Application Note 1 says that “controlled substance of-\nfense” “has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(b) and ap-\nplication Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” This basis for\ndistinguishing Winstead, offered by the government here, may\nbe a reasonable reading of the different language in the two\nGuidelines and their application notes because Application\nNote 1 to § 2K2.1 does not conflict with the language of\n§ 2K2.1(a)(4) itself.\n On the other hand, that basis for distinguishing Winstead\nwould produce two different meanings for the phrase “con-\ntrolled substance offense” in two different Guidelines, a tex-\ntual consequence that is at least awkward. For that reason, the\nSixth Circuit recently extended the reasoning of Winstead to\nthe issue we face here, in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382,\n386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In Havis the defendant\npleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and\nthe district court set his base level at 20 pursuant to § 2K2.1.\nId. at 383–84. He had a prior conviction for a crime that could\nhave included only the attempted sale of cocaine. Id. at 384. At-\ntempt crimes are treated like conspiracies in these guideline\nprovisions. Even though the Guideline at issue was § 2K2.1,\nthe Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the interplay between\n§ 4B1.2 and its Application Note 1. See id. at 385–87. The court\nconcluded that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly\n\f14 No. 18-2932\n\nadded attempted crimes to the definition of “controlled sub-\nstance offense” in § 4B1.2. Id. at 386–87. This conclusion, ac-\ncording to the court, meant that attempted crimes were just as\nimpermissibly added to § 2K2.1. Id. In a footnote, the court\nwrote:\n The Government argues in the alternative that\n the real commentary at issue is Application\n Note 1 to § 2K2.1, which cross-references the\n definition of “controlled substance offense” in\n Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. The Government\n never made that argument in the district court\n or before the initial panel on appeal and argua-\n bly has forfeited its right to do so now. At any\n rate, it makes no difference whether we begin\n with § 2K2.1 to determine the meaning of “con-\n trolled substance offense.” The commentary to\n § 2K2.1 directs us to apply “the meaning given\n that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1\n of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” If anything, the\n Government’s proposed definition—which\n would require us to defer to commentary on\n other commentary—would carry an even more\n tenuous connection to the guideline’s text.\nId. at 386 n.3.\n The Sentencing Commission has responded to Winstead by\nproposing an amendment to § 4B1.2 that would move the in-\nchoate offense language from the application note to the text\nof the Guideline as a new subsection (c). See 83 Fed. Reg.\n65400, 65412–15 (Dec. 20, 2018). The public comment period\nfor this amendment closed on March 15, 2019. The Sentencing\nCommission currently lacks a quorum of voting members,\n\fNo. 18-2932 15\n\nbut this proposed amendment indicates that attempt and con-\nspiracy crimes may be added to the text of the Guideline itself\nin the near future, resolving this circuit split, including the\nHavis extension of Winstead to § 2K2.1(a)(4).\n The Commission’s correction has not yet taken effect,\nthough, so we need to decide the legal issue under the current\nGuidelines. We conclude that the issue is governed by our de-\ncision in United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012),\nwhere we rejected the textual arguments that the D.C. Circuit\nlater found persuasive in Winstead. In Raupp, the defendant\nwas convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His\nguideline calculation used § 2K2.1(a)(2) because he had at\nleast two other convictions for crimes of violence. One of\nthose prior convictions was for conspiracy to commit robbery.\nAmong several arguments, Raupp made the same textual\npoints that prevailed later in Winstead, arguing that Applica-\ntion Note 1 to § 4B1.2 could not properly extend the Guideline\nto treat conspiracy to commit robbery as a crime of violence.\nWe squarely rejected that argument, holding that the applica-\ntion note’s inclusion of conspiracy did not conflict with the\ntext of the Guideline itself. “There cannot be a conflict because\nthe text of § 4B1.2(a) does not tell us, one or another, whether\ninchoate offense are included or excluded. The note says they\nare included.” 677 F.3d at 759. We added: “Deciding how to\nhandle conspiracy is a question about wise policy, not about\ntextual conflict.” Id. at 760.\n Other portions of the Raupp opinion addressed the now-\nabandoned residual clause of the definition of crimes of vio-\nlence in § 4B1.2 and have had a complicated history as we and\nthe Supreme Court have struggled with vagueness challenges\nto the similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal\n\f16 No. 18-2932\n\nAct, held unconstitutional in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.\n2551 (2015). In United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737, 742–43 (7th\nCir. 2016), we overruled Raupp’s reliance on the residual\nclause in the now-advisory § 4B1.2, but our reasoning in Rol-\nlins was based on our decision in United States v. Hurlburt, 835\nF.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), which was in turn overruled\nby the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886\n(2017), which held that the now-advisory Guidelines are not\nsubject to vagueness challenges. The “controlled substance of-\nfense” definition at issue here does not involve any of the\ncomplications presented by the residual clauses in definitions\nof violent crimes. The Raupp analysis of this purely textual is-\nsue under § 2K2.1 and § 4B1.2 thus remains sound as applied\nto the Guidelines’ definitions of controlled substance offenses.\nSee also D’Antoni v. United States, 916 F.3d 658, 663–65 (7th\nCir. 2019) (reviewing this history as applied to defendant sen-\ntenced as career offender under then-mandatory Guidelines,\nusing conviction for conspiracy to kill government witness as\nprior crime of violence).\n Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as applied to\ninchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the\ndistrict court’s decision to treat Adams as a career offender\nunder the Sentencing Guidelines.\n The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Steven Adams\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2932\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 4:17-CR-40062 — James E. Shadid, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Steven Adams plead-\\ned guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this\\nappeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\\nto suppress and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines\\nto his case. We affirm. Probable cause supported the search\\nwarrant for Adams’ house, and in any event the officers could\\nrely on the warrant in good faith. Further, the district court\\n\\f2 No. 18-2932\\n\\nproperly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into ac-\\ncount his prior drug conspiracy conviction.\\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\\n On March 22, 2016, Adams, his girlfriend, and a third per-\\nson were pulled over for speeding. The car was registered to\\nAdams’ girlfriend, Leanna Brandon. Law enforcement offic-\\ners were familiar with Adams because he was the subject of\\nanonymous tips regarding drug activity at his house in\\nKeithsburg, Illinois. They also knew that Adams had a previ-\\nous conviction for conspiracy to distribute methampheta-\\nmine. The third person in the car was also the subject of anon-\\nymous tips regarding drug activity and had outstanding ar-\\nrest warrants.\\n During the traffic stop, the sheriff’s deputy smelled mari-\\njuana from the car. The car was searched, and deputies found\\na meth pipe, paraphernalia used with marijuana, and mariju-\\nana. The three occupants were arrested and taken back to the\\nstation, where Brandon—after receiving Miranda warnings—\\ntold the arresting deputy that additional items of drug para-\\nphernalia, a gun, and a safe containing methamphetamine\\npipes were at Adams’ house. Brandon told the deputy that she\\nalso stayed in the house and that she had been there earlier\\nthat same day. She described the layout of the house and pro-\\nvided descriptions of Adams’ bedroom and the gun and par-\\naphernalia.\\n In his application for a search warrant, the deputy wrote:\\n Brandon disclosed that at Adam’s residence, at\\n [street address], there is often meth and canna-\\n bis used. Brandon stays at the residence, and is\\n familiar with the goings on there. She said that\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 3\\n\\n there is drug paraphernalia for ingestion of can-\\n nabis and methamphetamine in the house.\\n Brandon went into great detail of Adams bed-\\n room where she sleeps when she stays. She said\\n she was last there at around 0430 hours this\\n morning (03/22/2016). She described Adams’\\n room as being in the northwest corner of the\\n house and drew a floor plan of the house. She\\n drew an enlargement of Adams’ room. She de-\\n scribed a dresser with a mirror on the west wall\\n of the bedroom. She said that on that dresser,\\n there is always a clear glass bong. She has seen\\n it used to ingest cannabis. She said the bowl part\\n of it is not on it, but it does have residue in it.\\n She also said that there is a colorful swirled de-\\n signed “bowl” that looks like an elephant; this\\n is used for ingestion of cannabis on a nightstand\\n next to the bed. She said that her .45 caliber\\n Smith and Wesson pistol is in the house. It has a\\n cable lock in it and she has the only keys. She\\n said the pistol is black and is in the blue plastic\\n case. She said there is a gray/black colored safe\\n in the bedroom. Inside that safe is meth pipes,\\n and maybe some meth and cannabis.\\n Brandon said Adams’ bedroom is locked with a\\n deadbolt. She said that only she and Adams\\n have keys. She said that only Adams and she\\n have the keys for the safe in the bedroom, and\\n she provided me one from her purse.\\n She said that there may be other paraphernalia\\n in the house. She said that [Female] and [Male]\\n\\f4 No. 18-2932\\n\\n stay in a bedroom next to Adams. She said that\\n [Female] frequently “huffs” hair spray and has\\n expressed her displeasure of the aerosol odor in\\n the house to [Female]. This agency has also re-\\n ceived recent information about [Male] being at\\n the residence. [Male] had a history for posses-\\n sion of narcotics through Iowa.\\n Based on the results of the traffic stop search, Adams’ prior\\nconviction, the anonymous tips, and the information from\\nBrandon, the police obtained a search warrant for Adams’\\nhouse from a state-court judge. They executed the warrant the\\nsame day as the traffic stop. In Adams’ room, they found a\\nlocked plastic gun case that Brandon had described. A .45 cal-\\niber Smith & Wesson handgun and two loaded magazines\\nwere inside the case. Adams later admitted that he had Bran-\\ndon buy the gun for him because he was a felon.\\n A federal grand jury charged Adams with unlawful pos-\\nsession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g). Adams moved to suppress the evidence discovered\\npursuant to the state search warrant, contending that the affi-\\ndavit in support of the application did not establish probable\\ncause. He also argued that the good-faith exception to the ex-\\nclusionary rule should not apply because the affidavit was so\\nlacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not\\nhave relied on the warrant.\\n The district court ruled from the bench and denied Ad-\\nams’ motion to suppress. The court explained that the issuing\\njudge had a “substantial basis for determining the existence\\nof probable cause” because Brandon had “provided firsthand\\ndetail,” the information was “fresh” as it “was within a day”\\nsince she had been at the house, and the information was “in\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 5\\n\\nsome form corroborated by the number of tips.” The court\\nnoted that the tips were anonymous and that standing alone\\nthey would not establish probable cause. But the court ex-\\nplained that the tips provided some corroboration in conjunc-\\ntion with the other information. The court also highlighted the\\ntraffic stop of the “vehicle that involved drugs” and noted\\nthat, “to some degree,” Brandon’s statements to the deputy\\nwere “against her penal interest.” The court concluded: “So, I\\nbelieve that all of this provides plenty of information for the\\nestablishment of probable cause. If it didn’t, I do believe there\\nis no question that there is good faith here.”\\n Adams pleaded guilty to the indictment, reserving his\\nright to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. At sen-\\ntencing, Adams objected to the probation officer’s use of a\\nbase offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing\\nGuidelines, arguing that his Illinois methamphetamine con-\\nspiracy conviction should not count as a “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” because it was conviction for only conspiracy,\\nnot actually distributing or manufacturing the drug. Section\\n2K2.1(a)(4) of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 20 for\\na defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) “subsequent to\\nsustaining one felony conviction of … a controlled substance\\noffense.” “Controlled substance offense” is not defined in the\\nGuideline itself, but the commentary to that guideline states\\nthat the phrase has the same meaning as it does in § 4B1.2(b)\\nand Application Note 1 to § 4B1.1 (which includes conspiracy\\noffenses). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Adams argued that the\\ncommentary and application note impermissibly added to the\\ndefinition of “controlled substance offense” and that the Sen-\\ntencing Commission’s interpretation of the definition was not\\nentitled to deference.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2932\\n\\n The district court overruled Adams’ objection. The court\\ndetermined that Adams’ advisory guideline range was 70 to\\n87 months, based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\\nhistory category of IV. Adams was sentenced to 84 months in\\nprison and three years of supervised release.\\nII. Analysis\\n Adams raises two issues on appeal. The first is whether\\nthe state search warrant was supported by probable cause,\\nand, if not, whether the police acted in good faith when they\\nexecuted the warrant. The second is whether the district court\\nproperly calculated the advisory guideline range.\\n A. Probable Cause and Good Faith\\n When reviewing a search warrant, we give “‘great defer-\\nence’ to the issuing judge’s determination so long as the judge\\nhad a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding.” United States v. Mil-\\nler, 673 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Illinois v.\\nGates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Here, that deference is given to\\nthe state-court judge who issued the search warrant. We give\\nno deference to (i.e., review de novo) the district court’s finding\\nthat there was a substantial basis for issuing the warrant.\\nUnited States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). We\\nalso review de novo whether the good-faith exception applies\\nto a search warrant later found to be invalid. United States v.\\nMitten, 592 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Probable cause exists when the circumstances “indicate a\\nreasonable probability that evidence of crime will be found in\\na particular location; neither an absolute certainty nor even a\\npreponderance of the evidence is necessary.” United States v.\\nAljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 235. Where, as here, an affidavit is the only\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 7\\n\\nevidence presented to a judge to support a search warrant,\\n“the validity of the warrant rests solely on the strength of the\\naffidavit.” United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir.\\n2009). When an informant is the source of the information in\\nan affidavit, “the probable-cause determination turns on the\\ninformant’s credibility.” United States v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d\\n807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017), citing Bell, 585 F.3d at 1049. We con-\\nsider all relevant circumstances, including:\\n first, the degree to which the informant ac-\\n quired knowledge of the events through\\n firsthand observation; second, the detail and\\n specificity of the information provided by the\\n informant; third, the interval between the date\\n of the events and a police officer’s application\\n for the search warrant; and fourth, the extent to\\n which law enforcement corroborated the in-\\n formant’s statements.\\nSearcy, 664 F.3d at 1122; see also United States v. Glover, 755\\nF.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (we consider “the level of detail,\\nthe extent of firsthand observation, the degree of corrobora-\\ntion, the time between the events reported and the warrant\\napplication, and whether the informant appeared or testified\\nbefore the magistrate.”). We consider these factors as a whole,\\nand “no one factor necessarily dooms a search warrant.”\\nUnited States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n The search warrant here was supported by probable cause.\\nThe affidavit disclosed Brandon’s name, explained her close\\nrelationship with Adams and her connection to the house,\\nand explained that she had been in the house earlier that day.\\nBrandon provided the police with detailed, firsthand infor-\\nmation about the criminal activity in the house. She described\\n\\f8 No. 18-2932\\n\\nthe handgun by both caliber and make, the color of the gun\\ncase, and the color of the safe that contained methampheta-\\nmine pipes and possibly methamphetamine and marijuana.\\nBrandon had a key to the safe that she gave to the police. Her\\ninformation was corroborated to some extent by the anony-\\nmous tips informing the police that drug activity was occur-\\nring in Adam’ house. It was also corroborated by the fact that\\nthe police had discovered drugs and paraphernalia in Bran-\\ndon’s car during the traffic stop, the fact that Brandon and\\nAdams were together when they were pulled over and ar-\\nrested, and the fact that Adams had a prior methampheta-\\nmine-related conviction. The police applied for, received, and\\nexecuted the search warrant on the day that Adams and Bran-\\ndon were arrested and Brandon gave them all of the infor-\\nmation, so the information was fresh.\\n Taking all of these factors into consideration, the affidavit\\nhere is stronger than the one that established probable cause\\nin United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2005), where\\nthe police had received a tip four months earlier that the de-\\nfendant sold marijuana from his house. The defendant’s\\nnephew had been arrested for robbery and aggravated bat-\\ntery. Id. at 369. During his post-arrest interview, the nephew\\ntold police that he had gone to the defendant’s house to steal\\nhis marijuana. The nephew explained that that he had seen a\\npound of marijuana in the defendant’s bedroom just two days\\nearlier, that he had seen guns in the residence, and that the\\ndefendant had a felony conviction. The police then reviewed\\nthe defendant’s criminal history, which included multiple ar-\\nrests and convictions for drug offenses. The police included\\nthis information in an affidavit, received a search warrant,\\nand found over a kilogram of marijuana and multiple guns in\\nthe defendant’s house. Id. We rejected the defendant’s\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 9\\n\\nchallenge to the issuing judge’s probable cause determina-\\ntion, finding that the information the nephew provided was a\\n“firsthand account” that was “of sufficient detail, describing\\nlarge quantities of marijuana … as well as several guns in the\\nresidence … that he had observed only two days earlier.” Id.\\nat 370. We also noted that the nephew’s “admission that he\\nintended to steal drugs from the defendant constitutes a state-\\nment made against his penal interest, and as such carries with\\nit a presumption of reliability.” Id. at 371.\\n Each individual detail in the search warrant affidavit for\\nAdams’ house may not have been sufficient to establish prob-\\nable cause by itself, but the details were mutually reinforcing.\\nThe affidavit showed a “substantial chance” that police could\\nfind drugs and/or a gun in the house. See United States v.\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d 361, 363–64 (7th Cir. 2011); Illinois v. Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 245 n.13 (“probable cause requires only a probabil-\\nity or substantial chance of criminal activity”). Though Ad-\\nams’ prior conviction may not have been decisive in establish-\\ning probable cause, it was “still relevant and entitled to some\\nweight,”as was the fact that the deputy had found drugs and\\nparaphernalia in the car when Adams was arrested. See\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d at 364. The totality of the circumstances\\nhere gave the issuing judge a substantial basis for his probable\\ncause determination.\\n Even if the search warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the deputies were entitled to rely on the war-\\nrant. It is now well settled that “suppression of evidence\\nseized pursuant to a search warrant that is later declared in-\\nvalid is inappropriate if the officers who executed the warrant\\nrelied in good faith on the issuing judge’s finding of probable\\ncause.” United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 656–57 (7th Cir.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2932\\n\\n2008), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984). An\\nofficer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence\\nthat the officer was acting in good faith. United States v. Koerth,\\n312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d\\n519, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). A defendant can rebut this presump-\\ntion in several ways, including by showing that “the affidavit\\nsubmitted in support of the warrant was ‘so lacking in indicia\\nof probable cause as to render official belief in its existence\\nentirely unreasonable.’” Olson, 408 F.3d at 372, quoting Leon,\\n468 U.S. at 923.\\n “Overcoming the presumption of good faith is no small\\nfeat, as an officer cannot ordinarily be expected to question a\\njudge’s probable cause determination.” United States v. Lick-\\ners, 928 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2019). Adams cannot overcome\\nthe presumption here. The situation here does not come close\\nto one in which a reasonable officer would disregard the\\njudge’s determination of probable cause and forgo executing\\nthe warrant. This warrant had substantial support from the\\nresults of the traffic stop, Adams’ criminal history, the anony-\\nmous tips, and the detailed and fresh information from Bran-\\ndon. Thus, even if the warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the evidence from the search would still not\\nbe suppressed since the deputies acted in good faith.\\n B. Sentencing Guidelines\\n Adams’ second argument on appeal is that the district\\ncourt erred in applying the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to\\nhis case. We review de novo claims of procedural errors in sen-\\ntencing, including a district court’s legal interpretation of the\\nGuidelines, such as whether a prior conviction counts as a\\n“controlled substance offense.” United States v. Tate, 822 F.3d\\n370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 11\\n\\n Adams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\\nfirearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the Sen-\\ntencing Guidelines, a person convicted under § 922(g)(1)\\nstarts with a base offense level of 14. See U.S.S.G.\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(6). That level increases to 20 if the defendant has a\\nprior conviction for a “controlled substance offense.” See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The term “controlled substance of-\\nfense” is not defined in § 2K2.1 itself, but its Application Note\\n1 states that “‘controlled substance offense’ has the meaning\\ngiven that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1 of the\\nCommentary to § 4B1.2.”\\n Section 4B1.2(b) provides in turn:\\n The term “controlled substance offense” means\\n an offense under federal or state law, punisha-\\n ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one\\n year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex-\\n port, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled\\n substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the\\n possession of a controlled substance (or a coun-\\n terfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\\n import, export, distribute, or dispense.\\nAnd Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 teaches that “controlled\\nsubstance offense” includes “the offenses of aiding and abet-\\nting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.”\\n Adams argues that his Illinois methamphetamine conspir-\\nacy conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” because\\nthe text of the Guideline itself does not include drug conspir-\\nacies or other inchoate or attempted drug crimes, and Appli-\\ncation Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly adds to that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense” by\\n\\f12 No. 18-2932\\n\\nincluding conspiracies and other inchoate drug offenses.\\nBased on this asserted conflict between the Guideline and the\\napplication note, he argues that the application note is not en-\\ntitled to deference. See generally Stinson v. United States, 508\\nU.S. 36, 43 (1993) (if commentaries such as application notes\\nare inconsistent with a Guideline, the Guideline controls).\\n In response, the government argues that there is no con-\\nflict between Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 and that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense.” Alterna-\\ntively, the government argues that, at the very least, there is\\nno conflict between the undefined term “controlled substance\\noffense” in § 2K2.1 and the referenced definition of the term\\nin that Guideline’s application note. The government con-\\ntends that the application note to § 2K2.1 simply explains\\nwhat is meant by “controlled substance offense” within the\\nmeaning of that Guideline.\\n Adams is arguing one side of a fairly new circuit split cre-\\nated by United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir.\\n2018). Winstead argued that he received ineffective assistance\\nof counsel at trial and at sentencing and that his sentence as a\\ncareer criminal was improper. The case did not concern the\\nGuideline at issue here (§ 2K2.1) but § 4B1.2 itself. Winstead\\nheld that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly ex-\\npands the definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n§ 4B1.2 to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy and at-\\ntempt. 890 F.3d at 1090–92. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged\\nthat it was creating a circuit split on this issue. Id. at 1091, cit-\\ning United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Solomon, 592 F. App’x 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2014);\\nUnited States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011);\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 13\\n\\nUnited States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995)\\n(en banc).\\n One could distinguish Winstead from this case on the\\nground that the applicable Guideline here is § 2K2.1, not\\n§ 4B1.2 itself. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is drafted differently. The\\nGuideline itself refers only to “a controlled substance offense”\\nand leaves all definition for its respective application note. As\\nnoted, Application Note 1 says that “controlled substance of-\\nfense” “has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(b) and ap-\\nplication Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” This basis for\\ndistinguishing Winstead, offered by the government here, may\\nbe a reasonable reading of the different language in the two\\nGuidelines and their application notes because Application\\nNote 1 to § 2K2.1 does not conflict with the language of\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(4) itself.\\n On the other hand, that basis for distinguishing Winstead\\nwould produce two different meanings for the phrase “con-\\ntrolled substance offense” in two different Guidelines, a tex-\\ntual consequence that is at least awkward. For that reason, the\\nSixth Circuit recently extended the reasoning of Winstead to\\nthe issue we face here, in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382,\\n386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In Havis the defendant\\npleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and\\nthe district court set his base level at 20 pursuant to § 2K2.1.\\nId. at 383–84. He had a prior conviction for a crime that could\\nhave included only the attempted sale of cocaine. Id. at 384. At-\\ntempt crimes are treated like conspiracies in these guideline\\nprovisions. Even though the Guideline at issue was § 2K2.1,\\nthe Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the interplay between\\n§ 4B1.2 and its Application Note 1. See id. at 385–87. The court\\nconcluded that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly\\n\\f14 No. 18-2932\\n\\nadded attempted crimes to the definition of “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” in § 4B1.2. Id. at 386–87. This conclusion, ac-\\ncording to the court, meant that attempted crimes were just as\\nimpermissibly added to § 2K2.1. Id. In a footnote, the court\\nwrote:\\n The Government argues in the alternative that\\n the real commentary at issue is Application\\n Note 1 to § 2K2.1, which cross-references the\\n definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. The Government\\n never made that argument in the district court\\n or before the initial panel on appeal and argua-\\n bly has forfeited its right to do so now. At any\\n rate, it makes no difference whether we begin\\n with § 2K2.1 to determine the meaning of “con-\\n trolled substance offense.” The commentary to\\n § 2K2.1 directs us to apply “the meaning given\\n that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1\\n of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” If anything, the\\n Government’s proposed definition—which\\n would require us to defer to commentary on\\n other commentary—would carry an even more\\n tenuous connection to the guideline’s text.\\nId. at 386 n.3.\\n The Sentencing Commission has responded to Winstead by\\nproposing an amendment to § 4B1.2 that would move the in-\\nchoate offense language from the application note to the text\\nof the Guideline as a new subsection (c). See 83 Fed. Reg.\\n65400, 65412–15 (Dec. 20, 2018). The public comment period\\nfor this amendment closed on March 15, 2019. The Sentencing\\nCommission currently lacks a quorum of voting members,\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 15\\n\\nbut this proposed amendment indicates that attempt and con-\\nspiracy crimes may be added to the text of the Guideline itself\\nin the near future, resolving this circuit split, including the\\nHavis extension of Winstead to § 2K2.1(a)(4).\\n The Commission’s correction has not yet taken effect,\\nthough, so we need to decide the legal issue under the current\\nGuidelines. We conclude that the issue is governed by our de-\\ncision in United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012),\\nwhere we rejected the textual arguments that the D.C. Circuit\\nlater found persuasive in Winstead. In Raupp, the defendant\\nwas convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His\\nguideline calculation used § 2K2.1(a)(2) because he had at\\nleast two other convictions for crimes of violence. One of\\nthose prior convictions was for conspiracy to commit robbery.\\nAmong several arguments, Raupp made the same textual\\npoints that prevailed later in Winstead, arguing that Applica-\\ntion Note 1 to § 4B1.2 could not properly extend the Guideline\\nto treat conspiracy to commit robbery as a crime of violence.\\nWe squarely rejected that argument, holding that the applica-\\ntion note’s inclusion of conspiracy did not conflict with the\\ntext of the Guideline itself. “There cannot be a conflict because\\nthe text of § 4B1.2(a) does not tell us, one or another, whether\\ninchoate offense are included or excluded. The note says they\\nare included.” 677 F.3d at 759. We added: “Deciding how to\\nhandle conspiracy is a question about wise policy, not about\\ntextual conflict.” Id. at 760.\\n Other portions of the Raupp opinion addressed the now-\\nabandoned residual clause of the definition of crimes of vio-\\nlence in § 4B1.2 and have had a complicated history as we and\\nthe Supreme Court have struggled with vagueness challenges\\nto the similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal\\n\\f16 No. 18-2932\\n\\nAct, held unconstitutional in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.\\n2551 (2015). In United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737, 742–43 (7th\\nCir. 2016), we overruled Raupp’s reliance on the residual\\nclause in the now-advisory § 4B1.2, but our reasoning in Rol-\\nlins was based on our decision in United States v. Hurlburt, 835\\nF.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), which was in turn overruled\\nby the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886\\n(2017), which held that the now-advisory Guidelines are not\\nsubject to vagueness challenges. The “controlled substance of-\\nfense” definition at issue here does not involve any of the\\ncomplications presented by the residual clauses in definitions\\nof violent crimes. The Raupp analysis of this purely textual is-\\nsue under § 2K2.1 and § 4B1.2 thus remains sound as applied\\nto the Guidelines’ definitions of controlled substance offenses.\\nSee also D’Antoni v. United States, 916 F.3d 658, 663–65 (7th\\nCir. 2019) (reviewing this history as applied to defendant sen-\\ntenced as career offender under then-mandatory Guidelines,\\nusing conviction for conspiracy to kill government witness as\\nprior crime of violence).\\n Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as applied to\\ninchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the\\ndistrict court’s decision to treat Adams as a career offender\\nunder the Sentencing Guidelines.\\n The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3882,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654038,"string":"4,654,038"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Steven Adams"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2932"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"David Frank Hamilton\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2932\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 4:17-CR-40062 — James E. Shadid, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Steven Adams plead-\\ned guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this\\nappeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\\nto suppress and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines\\nto his case. We affirm. Probable cause supported the search\\nwarrant for Adams’ house, and in any event the officers could\\nrely on the warrant in good faith. Further, the district court\\n\\f2 No. 18-2932\\n\\nproperly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into ac-\\ncount his prior drug conspiracy conviction.\\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\\n On March 22, 2016, Adams, his girlfriend, and a third per-\\nson were pulled over for speeding. The car was registered to\\nAdams’ girlfriend, Leanna Brandon. Law enforcement offic-\\ners were familiar with Adams because he was the subject of\\nanonymous tips regarding drug activity at his house in\\nKeithsburg, Illinois. They also knew that Adams had a previ-\\nous conviction for conspiracy to distribute methampheta-\\nmine. The third person in the car was also the subject of anon-\\nymous tips regarding drug activity and had outstanding ar-\\nrest warrants.\\n During the traffic stop, the sheriff’s deputy smelled mari-\\njuana from the car. The car was searched, and deputies found\\na meth pipe, paraphernalia used with marijuana, and mariju-\\nana. The three occupants were arrested and taken back to the\\nstation, where Brandon—after receiving Miranda warnings—\\ntold the arresting deputy that additional items of drug para-\\nphernalia, a gun, and a safe containing methamphetamine\\npipes were at Adams’ house. Brandon told the deputy that she\\nalso stayed in the house and that she had been there earlier\\nthat same day. She described the layout of the house and pro-\\nvided descriptions of Adams’ bedroom and the gun and par-\\naphernalia.\\n In his application for a search warrant, the deputy wrote:\\n Brandon disclosed that at Adam’s residence, at\\n [street address], there is often meth and canna-\\n bis used. Brandon stays at the residence, and is\\n familiar with the goings on there. She said that\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 3\\n\\n there is drug paraphernalia for ingestion of can-\\n nabis and methamphetamine in the house.\\n Brandon went into great detail of Adams bed-\\n room where she sleeps when she stays. She said\\n she was last there at around 0430 hours this\\n morning (03/22/2016). She described Adams’\\n room as being in the northwest corner of the\\n house and drew a floor plan of the house. She\\n drew an enlargement of Adams’ room. She de-\\n scribed a dresser with a mirror on the west wall\\n of the bedroom. She said that on that dresser,\\n there is always a clear glass bong. She has seen\\n it used to ingest cannabis. She said the bowl part\\n of it is not on it, but it does have residue in it.\\n She also said that there is a colorful swirled de-\\n signed “bowl” that looks like an elephant; this\\n is used for ingestion of cannabis on a nightstand\\n next to the bed. She said that her .45 caliber\\n Smith and Wesson pistol is in the house. It has a\\n cable lock in it and she has the only keys. She\\n said the pistol is black and is in the blue plastic\\n case. She said there is a gray/black colored safe\\n in the bedroom. Inside that safe is meth pipes,\\n and maybe some meth and cannabis.\\n Brandon said Adams’ bedroom is locked with a\\n deadbolt. She said that only she and Adams\\n have keys. She said that only Adams and she\\n have the keys for the safe in the bedroom, and\\n she provided me one from her purse.\\n She said that there may be other paraphernalia\\n in the house. She said that [Female] and [Male]\\n\\f4 No. 18-2932\\n\\n stay in a bedroom next to Adams. She said that\\n [Female] frequently “huffs” hair spray and has\\n expressed her displeasure of the aerosol odor in\\n the house to [Female]. This agency has also re-\\n ceived recent information about [Male] being at\\n the residence. [Male] had a history for posses-\\n sion of narcotics through Iowa.\\n Based on the results of the traffic stop search, Adams’ prior\\nconviction, the anonymous tips, and the information from\\nBrandon, the police obtained a search warrant for Adams’\\nhouse from a state-court judge. They executed the warrant the\\nsame day as the traffic stop. In Adams’ room, they found a\\nlocked plastic gun case that Brandon had described. A .45 cal-\\niber Smith & Wesson handgun and two loaded magazines\\nwere inside the case. Adams later admitted that he had Bran-\\ndon buy the gun for him because he was a felon.\\n A federal grand jury charged Adams with unlawful pos-\\nsession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g). Adams moved to suppress the evidence discovered\\npursuant to the state search warrant, contending that the affi-\\ndavit in support of the application did not establish probable\\ncause. He also argued that the good-faith exception to the ex-\\nclusionary rule should not apply because the affidavit was so\\nlacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not\\nhave relied on the warrant.\\n The district court ruled from the bench and denied Ad-\\nams’ motion to suppress. The court explained that the issuing\\njudge had a “substantial basis for determining the existence\\nof probable cause” because Brandon had “provided firsthand\\ndetail,” the information was “fresh” as it “was within a day”\\nsince she had been at the house, and the information was “in\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 5\\n\\nsome form corroborated by the number of tips.” The court\\nnoted that the tips were anonymous and that standing alone\\nthey would not establish probable cause. But the court ex-\\nplained that the tips provided some corroboration in conjunc-\\ntion with the other information. The court also highlighted the\\ntraffic stop of the “vehicle that involved drugs” and noted\\nthat, “to some degree,” Brandon’s statements to the deputy\\nwere “against her penal interest.” The court concluded: “So, I\\nbelieve that all of this provides plenty of information for the\\nestablishment of probable cause. If it didn’t, I do believe there\\nis no question that there is good faith here.”\\n Adams pleaded guilty to the indictment, reserving his\\nright to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. At sen-\\ntencing, Adams objected to the probation officer’s use of a\\nbase offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing\\nGuidelines, arguing that his Illinois methamphetamine con-\\nspiracy conviction should not count as a “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” because it was conviction for only conspiracy,\\nnot actually distributing or manufacturing the drug. Section\\n2K2.1(a)(4) of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 20 for\\na defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) “subsequent to\\nsustaining one felony conviction of … a controlled substance\\noffense.” “Controlled substance offense” is not defined in the\\nGuideline itself, but the commentary to that guideline states\\nthat the phrase has the same meaning as it does in § 4B1.2(b)\\nand Application Note 1 to § 4B1.1 (which includes conspiracy\\noffenses). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Adams argued that the\\ncommentary and application note impermissibly added to the\\ndefinition of “controlled substance offense” and that the Sen-\\ntencing Commission’s interpretation of the definition was not\\nentitled to deference.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2932\\n\\n The district court overruled Adams’ objection. The court\\ndetermined that Adams’ advisory guideline range was 70 to\\n87 months, based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\\nhistory category of IV. Adams was sentenced to 84 months in\\nprison and three years of supervised release.\\nII. Analysis\\n Adams raises two issues on appeal. The first is whether\\nthe state search warrant was supported by probable cause,\\nand, if not, whether the police acted in good faith when they\\nexecuted the warrant. The second is whether the district court\\nproperly calculated the advisory guideline range.\\n A. Probable Cause and Good Faith\\n When reviewing a search warrant, we give “‘great defer-\\nence’ to the issuing judge’s determination so long as the judge\\nhad a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding.” United States v. Mil-\\nler, 673 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Illinois v.\\nGates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Here, that deference is given to\\nthe state-court judge who issued the search warrant. We give\\nno deference to (i.e., review de novo) the district court’s finding\\nthat there was a substantial basis for issuing the warrant.\\nUnited States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). We\\nalso review de novo whether the good-faith exception applies\\nto a search warrant later found to be invalid. United States v.\\nMitten, 592 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Probable cause exists when the circumstances “indicate a\\nreasonable probability that evidence of crime will be found in\\na particular location; neither an absolute certainty nor even a\\npreponderance of the evidence is necessary.” United States v.\\nAljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 235. Where, as here, an affidavit is the only\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 7\\n\\nevidence presented to a judge to support a search warrant,\\n“the validity of the warrant rests solely on the strength of the\\naffidavit.” United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir.\\n2009). When an informant is the source of the information in\\nan affidavit, “the probable-cause determination turns on the\\ninformant’s credibility.” United States v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d\\n807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017), citing Bell, 585 F.3d at 1049. We con-\\nsider all relevant circumstances, including:\\n first, the degree to which the informant ac-\\n quired knowledge of the events through\\n firsthand observation; second, the detail and\\n specificity of the information provided by the\\n informant; third, the interval between the date\\n of the events and a police officer’s application\\n for the search warrant; and fourth, the extent to\\n which law enforcement corroborated the in-\\n formant’s statements.\\nSearcy, 664 F.3d at 1122; see also United States v. Glover, 755\\nF.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (we consider “the level of detail,\\nthe extent of firsthand observation, the degree of corrobora-\\ntion, the time between the events reported and the warrant\\napplication, and whether the informant appeared or testified\\nbefore the magistrate.”). We consider these factors as a whole,\\nand “no one factor necessarily dooms a search warrant.”\\nUnited States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n The search warrant here was supported by probable cause.\\nThe affidavit disclosed Brandon’s name, explained her close\\nrelationship with Adams and her connection to the house,\\nand explained that she had been in the house earlier that day.\\nBrandon provided the police with detailed, firsthand infor-\\nmation about the criminal activity in the house. She described\\n\\f8 No. 18-2932\\n\\nthe handgun by both caliber and make, the color of the gun\\ncase, and the color of the safe that contained methampheta-\\nmine pipes and possibly methamphetamine and marijuana.\\nBrandon had a key to the safe that she gave to the police. Her\\ninformation was corroborated to some extent by the anony-\\nmous tips informing the police that drug activity was occur-\\nring in Adam’ house. It was also corroborated by the fact that\\nthe police had discovered drugs and paraphernalia in Bran-\\ndon’s car during the traffic stop, the fact that Brandon and\\nAdams were together when they were pulled over and ar-\\nrested, and the fact that Adams had a prior methampheta-\\nmine-related conviction. The police applied for, received, and\\nexecuted the search warrant on the day that Adams and Bran-\\ndon were arrested and Brandon gave them all of the infor-\\nmation, so the information was fresh.\\n Taking all of these factors into consideration, the affidavit\\nhere is stronger than the one that established probable cause\\nin United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2005), where\\nthe police had received a tip four months earlier that the de-\\nfendant sold marijuana from his house. The defendant’s\\nnephew had been arrested for robbery and aggravated bat-\\ntery. Id. at 369. During his post-arrest interview, the nephew\\ntold police that he had gone to the defendant’s house to steal\\nhis marijuana. The nephew explained that that he had seen a\\npound of marijuana in the defendant’s bedroom just two days\\nearlier, that he had seen guns in the residence, and that the\\ndefendant had a felony conviction. The police then reviewed\\nthe defendant’s criminal history, which included multiple ar-\\nrests and convictions for drug offenses. The police included\\nthis information in an affidavit, received a search warrant,\\nand found over a kilogram of marijuana and multiple guns in\\nthe defendant’s house. Id. We rejected the defendant’s\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 9\\n\\nchallenge to the issuing judge’s probable cause determina-\\ntion, finding that the information the nephew provided was a\\n“firsthand account” that was “of sufficient detail, describing\\nlarge quantities of marijuana … as well as several guns in the\\nresidence … that he had observed only two days earlier.” Id.\\nat 370. We also noted that the nephew’s “admission that he\\nintended to steal drugs from the defendant constitutes a state-\\nment made against his penal interest, and as such carries with\\nit a presumption of reliability.” Id. at 371.\\n Each individual detail in the search warrant affidavit for\\nAdams’ house may not have been sufficient to establish prob-\\nable cause by itself, but the details were mutually reinforcing.\\nThe affidavit showed a “substantial chance” that police could\\nfind drugs and/or a gun in the house. See United States v.\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d 361, 363–64 (7th Cir. 2011); Illinois v. Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 245 n.13 (“probable cause requires only a probabil-\\nity or substantial chance of criminal activity”). Though Ad-\\nams’ prior conviction may not have been decisive in establish-\\ning probable cause, it was “still relevant and entitled to some\\nweight,”as was the fact that the deputy had found drugs and\\nparaphernalia in the car when Adams was arrested. See\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d at 364. The totality of the circumstances\\nhere gave the issuing judge a substantial basis for his probable\\ncause determination.\\n Even if the search warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the deputies were entitled to rely on the war-\\nrant. It is now well settled that “suppression of evidence\\nseized pursuant to a search warrant that is later declared in-\\nvalid is inappropriate if the officers who executed the warrant\\nrelied in good faith on the issuing judge’s finding of probable\\ncause.” United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 656–57 (7th Cir.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2932\\n\\n2008), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984). An\\nofficer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence\\nthat the officer was acting in good faith. United States v. Koerth,\\n312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d\\n519, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). A defendant can rebut this presump-\\ntion in several ways, including by showing that “the affidavit\\nsubmitted in support of the warrant was ‘so lacking in indicia\\nof probable cause as to render official belief in its existence\\nentirely unreasonable.’” Olson, 408 F.3d at 372, quoting Leon,\\n468 U.S. at 923.\\n “Overcoming the presumption of good faith is no small\\nfeat, as an officer cannot ordinarily be expected to question a\\njudge’s probable cause determination.” United States v. Lick-\\ners, 928 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2019). Adams cannot overcome\\nthe presumption here. The situation here does not come close\\nto one in which a reasonable officer would disregard the\\njudge’s determination of probable cause and forgo executing\\nthe warrant. This warrant had substantial support from the\\nresults of the traffic stop, Adams’ criminal history, the anony-\\nmous tips, and the detailed and fresh information from Bran-\\ndon. Thus, even if the warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the evidence from the search would still not\\nbe suppressed since the deputies acted in good faith.\\n B. Sentencing Guidelines\\n Adams’ second argument on appeal is that the district\\ncourt erred in applying the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to\\nhis case. We review de novo claims of procedural errors in sen-\\ntencing, including a district court’s legal interpretation of the\\nGuidelines, such as whether a prior conviction counts as a\\n“controlled substance offense.” United States v. Tate, 822 F.3d\\n370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 11\\n\\n Adams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\\nfirearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the Sen-\\ntencing Guidelines, a person convicted under § 922(g)(1)\\nstarts with a base offense level of 14. See U.S.S.G.\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(6). That level increases to 20 if the defendant has a\\nprior conviction for a “controlled substance offense.” See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The term “controlled substance of-\\nfense” is not defined in § 2K2.1 itself, but its Application Note\\n1 states that “‘controlled substance offense’ has the meaning\\ngiven that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1 of the\\nCommentary to § 4B1.2.”\\n Section 4B1.2(b) provides in turn:\\n The term “controlled substance offense” means\\n an offense under federal or state law, punisha-\\n ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one\\n year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex-\\n port, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled\\n substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the\\n possession of a controlled substance (or a coun-\\n terfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\\n import, export, distribute, or dispense.\\nAnd Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 teaches that “controlled\\nsubstance offense” includes “the offenses of aiding and abet-\\nting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.”\\n Adams argues that his Illinois methamphetamine conspir-\\nacy conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” because\\nthe text of the Guideline itself does not include drug conspir-\\nacies or other inchoate or attempted drug crimes, and Appli-\\ncation Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly adds to that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense” by\\n\\f12 No. 18-2932\\n\\nincluding conspiracies and other inchoate drug offenses.\\nBased on this asserted conflict between the Guideline and the\\napplication note, he argues that the application note is not en-\\ntitled to deference. See generally Stinson v. United States, 508\\nU.S. 36, 43 (1993) (if commentaries such as application notes\\nare inconsistent with a Guideline, the Guideline controls).\\n In response, the government argues that there is no con-\\nflict between Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 and that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense.” Alterna-\\ntively, the government argues that, at the very least, there is\\nno conflict between the undefined term “controlled substance\\noffense” in § 2K2.1 and the referenced definition of the term\\nin that Guideline’s application note. The government con-\\ntends that the application note to § 2K2.1 simply explains\\nwhat is meant by “controlled substance offense” within the\\nmeaning of that Guideline.\\n Adams is arguing one side of a fairly new circuit split cre-\\nated by United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir.\\n2018). Winstead argued that he received ineffective assistance\\nof counsel at trial and at sentencing and that his sentence as a\\ncareer criminal was improper. The case did not concern the\\nGuideline at issue here (§ 2K2.1) but § 4B1.2 itself. Winstead\\nheld that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly ex-\\npands the definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n§ 4B1.2 to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy and at-\\ntempt. 890 F.3d at 1090–92. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged\\nthat it was creating a circuit split on this issue. Id. at 1091, cit-\\ning United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Solomon, 592 F. App’x 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2014);\\nUnited States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011);\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 13\\n\\nUnited States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995)\\n(en banc).\\n One could distinguish Winstead from this case on the\\nground that the applicable Guideline here is § 2K2.1, not\\n§ 4B1.2 itself. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is drafted differently. The\\nGuideline itself refers only to “a controlled substance offense”\\nand leaves all definition for its respective application note. As\\nnoted, Application Note 1 says that “controlled substance of-\\nfense” “has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(b) and ap-\\nplication Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” This basis for\\ndistinguishing Winstead, offered by the government here, may\\nbe a reasonable reading of the different language in the two\\nGuidelines and their application notes because Application\\nNote 1 to § 2K2.1 does not conflict with the language of\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(4) itself.\\n On the other hand, that basis for distinguishing Winstead\\nwould produce two different meanings for the phrase “con-\\ntrolled substance offense” in two different Guidelines, a tex-\\ntual consequence that is at least awkward. For that reason, the\\nSixth Circuit recently extended the reasoning of Winstead to\\nthe issue we face here, in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382,\\n386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In Havis the defendant\\npleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and\\nthe district court set his base level at 20 pursuant to § 2K2.1.\\nId. at 383–84. He had a prior conviction for a crime that could\\nhave included only the attempted sale of cocaine. Id. at 384. At-\\ntempt crimes are treated like conspiracies in these guideline\\nprovisions. Even though the Guideline at issue was § 2K2.1,\\nthe Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the interplay between\\n§ 4B1.2 and its Application Note 1. See id. at 385–87. The court\\nconcluded that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly\\n\\f14 No. 18-2932\\n\\nadded attempted crimes to the definition of “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” in § 4B1.2. Id. at 386–87. This conclusion, ac-\\ncording to the court, meant that attempted crimes were just as\\nimpermissibly added to § 2K2.1. Id. In a footnote, the court\\nwrote:\\n The Government argues in the alternative that\\n the real commentary at issue is Application\\n Note 1 to § 2K2.1, which cross-references the\\n definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. The Government\\n never made that argument in the district court\\n or before the initial panel on appeal and argua-\\n bly has forfeited its right to do so now. At any\\n rate, it makes no difference whether we begin\\n with § 2K2.1 to determine the meaning of “con-\\n trolled substance offense.” The commentary to\\n § 2K2.1 directs us to apply “the meaning given\\n that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1\\n of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” If anything, the\\n Government’s proposed definition—which\\n would require us to defer to commentary on\\n other commentary—would carry an even more\\n tenuous connection to the guideline’s text.\\nId. at 386 n.3.\\n The Sentencing Commission has responded to Winstead by\\nproposing an amendment to § 4B1.2 that would move the in-\\nchoate offense language from the application note to the text\\nof the Guideline as a new subsection (c). See 83 Fed. Reg.\\n65400, 65412–15 (Dec. 20, 2018). The public comment period\\nfor this amendment closed on March 15, 2019. The Sentencing\\nCommission currently lacks a quorum of voting members,\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 15\\n\\nbut this proposed amendment indicates that attempt and con-\\nspiracy crimes may be added to the text of the Guideline itself\\nin the near future, resolving this circuit split, including the\\nHavis extension of Winstead to § 2K2.1(a)(4).\\n The Commission’s correction has not yet taken effect,\\nthough, so we need to decide the legal issue under the current\\nGuidelines. We conclude that the issue is governed by our de-\\ncision in United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012),\\nwhere we rejected the textual arguments that the D.C. Circuit\\nlater found persuasive in Winstead. In Raupp, the defendant\\nwas convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His\\nguideline calculation used § 2K2.1(a)(2) because he had at\\nleast two other convictions for crimes of violence. One of\\nthose prior convictions was for conspiracy to commit robbery.\\nAmong several arguments, Raupp made the same textual\\npoints that prevailed later in Winstead, arguing that Applica-\\ntion Note 1 to § 4B1.2 could not properly extend the Guideline\\nto treat conspiracy to commit robbery as a crime of violence.\\nWe squarely rejected that argument, holding that the applica-\\ntion note’s inclusion of conspiracy did not conflict with the\\ntext of the Guideline itself. “There cannot be a conflict because\\nthe text of § 4B1.2(a) does not tell us, one or another, whether\\ninchoate offense are included or excluded. The note says they\\nare included.” 677 F.3d at 759. We added: “Deciding how to\\nhandle conspiracy is a question about wise policy, not about\\ntextual conflict.” Id. at 760.\\n Other portions of the Raupp opinion addressed the now-\\nabandoned residual clause of the definition of crimes of vio-\\nlence in § 4B1.2 and have had a complicated history as we and\\nthe Supreme Court have struggled with vagueness challenges\\nto the similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal\\n\\f16 No. 18-2932\\n\\nAct, held unconstitutional in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.\\n2551 (2015). In United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737, 742–43 (7th\\nCir. 2016), we overruled Raupp’s reliance on the residual\\nclause in the now-advisory § 4B1.2, but our reasoning in Rol-\\nlins was based on our decision in United States v. Hurlburt, 835\\nF.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), which was in turn overruled\\nby the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886\\n(2017), which held that the now-advisory Guidelines are not\\nsubject to vagueness challenges. The “controlled substance of-\\nfense” definition at issue here does not involve any of the\\ncomplications presented by the residual clauses in definitions\\nof violent crimes. The Raupp analysis of this purely textual is-\\nsue under § 2K2.1 and § 4B1.2 thus remains sound as applied\\nto the Guidelines’ definitions of controlled substance offenses.\\nSee also D’Antoni v. United States, 916 F.3d 658, 663–65 (7th\\nCir. 2019) (reviewing this history as applied to defendant sen-\\ntenced as career offender under then-mandatory Guidelines,\\nusing conviction for conspiracy to kill government witness as\\nprior crime of violence).\\n Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as applied to\\ninchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the\\ndistrict court’s decision to treat Adams as a career offender\\nunder the Sentencing Guidelines.\\n The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431291/\", \"author_raw\": \"David Frank Hamilton\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"BAUER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"BAUER\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654038/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Steven Adams\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2932\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 4:17-CR-40062 — James E. Shadid, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Steven Adams plead-\ned guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this\nappeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\nto suppress and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines\nto his case. We affirm. Probable cause supported the search\nwarrant for Adams’ house, and in any event the officers could\nrely on the warrant in good faith. Further, the district court\n\f2 No. 18-2932\n\nproperly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into ac-\ncount his prior drug conspiracy conviction.\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\n On March 22, 2016, Adams, his girlfriend, and a third per-\nson were pulled over for speeding. The car was registered to\nAdams’ girlfriend, Leanna Brandon. Law enforcement offic-\ners were familiar with Adams because he was the subject of\nanonymous tips regarding drug activity at his house in\nKeithsburg, Illinois. They also knew that Adams had a previ-\nous conviction for conspiracy to distribute methampheta-\nmine. The third person in the car was also the subject of anon-\nymous tips regarding drug activity and had outstanding ar-\nrest warrants.\n During the traffic stop, the sheriff’s deputy smelled mari-\njuana from the car. The car was searched, and deputies found\na meth pipe, paraphernalia used with marijuana, and mariju-\nana. The three occupants were arrested and taken back to the\nstation, where Brandon—after receiving Miranda warnings—\ntold the arresting deputy that additional items of drug para-\nphernalia, a gun, and a safe containing methamphetamine\npipes were at Adams’ house. Brandon told the deputy that she\nalso stayed in the house and that she had been there earlier\nthat same day. She described the layout of the house and pro-\nvided descriptions of Adams’ bedroom and the gun and par-\naphernalia.\n In his application for a search warrant, the deputy wrote:\n Brandon disclosed that at Adam’s residence, at\n [street address], there is often meth and canna-\n bis used. Brandon stays at the residence, and is\n familiar with the goings on there. She said that\n\fNo. 18-2932 3\n\n there is drug paraphernalia for ingestion of can-\n nabis and methamphetamine in the house.\n Brandon went into great detail of Adams bed-\n room where she sleeps when she stays. She said\n she was last there at around 0430 hours this\n morning (03/22/2016). She described Adams’\n room as being in the northwest corner of the\n house and drew a floor plan of the house. She\n drew an enlargement of Adams’ room. She de-\n scribed a dresser with a mirror on the west wall\n of the bedroom. She said that on that dresser,\n there is always a clear glass bong. She has seen\n it used to ingest cannabis. She said the bowl part\n of it is not on it, but it does have residue in it.\n She also said that there is a colorful swirled de-\n signed “bowl” that looks like an elephant; this\n is used for ingestion of cannabis on a nightstand\n next to the bed. She said that her .45 caliber\n Smith and Wesson pistol is in the house. It has a\n cable lock in it and she has the only keys. She\n said the pistol is black and is in the blue plastic\n case. She said there is a gray/black colored safe\n in the bedroom. Inside that safe is meth pipes,\n and maybe some meth and cannabis.\n Brandon said Adams’ bedroom is locked with a\n deadbolt. She said that only she and Adams\n have keys. She said that only Adams and she\n have the keys for the safe in the bedroom, and\n she provided me one from her purse.\n She said that there may be other paraphernalia\n in the house. She said that [Female] and [Male]\n\f4 No. 18-2932\n\n stay in a bedroom next to Adams. She said that\n [Female] frequently “huffs” hair spray and has\n expressed her displeasure of the aerosol odor in\n the house to [Female]. This agency has also re-\n ceived recent information about [Male] being at\n the residence. [Male] had a history for posses-\n sion of narcotics through Iowa.\n Based on the results of the traffic stop search, Adams’ prior\nconviction, the anonymous tips, and the information from\nBrandon, the police obtained a search warrant for Adams’\nhouse from a state-court judge. They executed the warrant the\nsame day as the traffic stop. In Adams’ room, they found a\nlocked plastic gun case that Brandon had described. A .45 cal-\niber Smith & Wesson handgun and two loaded magazines\nwere inside the case. Adams later admitted that he had Bran-\ndon buy the gun for him because he was a felon.\n A federal grand jury charged Adams with unlawful pos-\nsession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 922(g). Adams moved to suppress the evidence discovered\npursuant to the state search warrant, contending that the affi-\ndavit in support of the application did not establish probable\ncause. He also argued that the good-faith exception to the ex-\nclusionary rule should not apply because the affidavit was so\nlacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not\nhave relied on the warrant.\n The district court ruled from the bench and denied Ad-\nams’ motion to suppress. The court explained that the issuing\njudge had a “substantial basis for determining the existence\nof probable cause” because Brandon had “provided firsthand\ndetail,” the information was “fresh” as it “was within a day”\nsince she had been at the house, and the information was “in\n\fNo. 18-2932 5\n\nsome form corroborated by the number of tips.” The court\nnoted that the tips were anonymous and that standing alone\nthey would not establish probable cause. But the court ex-\nplained that the tips provided some corroboration in conjunc-\ntion with the other information. The court also highlighted the\ntraffic stop of the “vehicle that involved drugs” and noted\nthat, “to some degree,” Brandon’s statements to the deputy\nwere “against her penal interest.” The court concluded: “So, I\nbelieve that all of this provides plenty of information for the\nestablishment of probable cause. If it didn’t, I do believe there\nis no question that there is good faith here.”\n Adams pleaded guilty to the indictment, reserving his\nright to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. At sen-\ntencing, Adams objected to the probation officer’s use of a\nbase offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing\nGuidelines, arguing that his Illinois methamphetamine con-\nspiracy conviction should not count as a “controlled sub-\nstance offense” because it was conviction for only conspiracy,\nnot actually distributing or manufacturing the drug. Section\n2K2.1(a)(4) of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 20 for\na defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) “subsequent to\nsustaining one felony conviction of … a controlled substance\noffense.” “Controlled substance offense” is not defined in the\nGuideline itself, but the commentary to that guideline states\nthat the phrase has the same meaning as it does in § 4B1.2(b)\nand Application Note 1 to § 4B1.1 (which includes conspiracy\noffenses). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Adams argued that the\ncommentary and application note impermissibly added to the\ndefinition of “controlled substance offense” and that the Sen-\ntencing Commission’s interpretation of the definition was not\nentitled to deference.\n\f6 No. 18-2932\n\n The district court overruled Adams’ objection. The court\ndetermined that Adams’ advisory guideline range was 70 to\n87 months, based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\nhistory category of IV. Adams was sentenced to 84 months in\nprison and three years of supervised release.\nII. Analysis\n Adams raises two issues on appeal. The first is whether\nthe state search warrant was supported by probable cause,\nand, if not, whether the police acted in good faith when they\nexecuted the warrant. The second is whether the district court\nproperly calculated the advisory guideline range.\n A. Probable Cause and Good Faith\n When reviewing a search warrant, we give “‘great defer-\nence’ to the issuing judge’s determination so long as the judge\nhad a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding.” United States v. Mil-\nler, 673 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Illinois v.\nGates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Here, that deference is given to\nthe state-court judge who issued the search warrant. We give\nno deference to (i.e., review de novo) the district court’s finding\nthat there was a substantial basis for issuing the warrant.\nUnited States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). We\nalso review de novo whether the good-faith exception applies\nto a search warrant later found to be invalid. United States v.\nMitten, 592 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2010).\n Probable cause exists when the circumstances “indicate a\nreasonable probability that evidence of crime will be found in\na particular location; neither an absolute certainty nor even a\npreponderance of the evidence is necessary.” United States v.\nAljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Gates,\n462 U.S. at 235. Where, as here, an affidavit is the only\n\fNo. 18-2932 7\n\nevidence presented to a judge to support a search warrant,\n“the validity of the warrant rests solely on the strength of the\naffidavit.” United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir.\n2009). When an informant is the source of the information in\nan affidavit, “the probable-cause determination turns on the\ninformant’s credibility.” United States v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d\n807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017), citing Bell, 585 F.3d at 1049. We con-\nsider all relevant circumstances, including:\n first, the degree to which the informant ac-\n quired knowledge of the events through\n firsthand observation; second, the detail and\n specificity of the information provided by the\n informant; third, the interval between the date\n of the events and a police officer’s application\n for the search warrant; and fourth, the extent to\n which law enforcement corroborated the in-\n formant’s statements.\nSearcy, 664 F.3d at 1122; see also United States v. Glover, 755\nF.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (we consider “the level of detail,\nthe extent of firsthand observation, the degree of corrobora-\ntion, the time between the events reported and the warrant\napplication, and whether the informant appeared or testified\nbefore the magistrate.”). We consider these factors as a whole,\nand “no one factor necessarily dooms a search warrant.”\nUnited States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).\n The search warrant here was supported by probable cause.\nThe affidavit disclosed Brandon’s name, explained her close\nrelationship with Adams and her connection to the house,\nand explained that she had been in the house earlier that day.\nBrandon provided the police with detailed, firsthand infor-\nmation about the criminal activity in the house. She described\n\f8 No. 18-2932\n\nthe handgun by both caliber and make, the color of the gun\ncase, and the color of the safe that contained methampheta-\nmine pipes and possibly methamphetamine and marijuana.\nBrandon had a key to the safe that she gave to the police. Her\ninformation was corroborated to some extent by the anony-\nmous tips informing the police that drug activity was occur-\nring in Adam’ house. It was also corroborated by the fact that\nthe police had discovered drugs and paraphernalia in Bran-\ndon’s car during the traffic stop, the fact that Brandon and\nAdams were together when they were pulled over and ar-\nrested, and the fact that Adams had a prior methampheta-\nmine-related conviction. The police applied for, received, and\nexecuted the search warrant on the day that Adams and Bran-\ndon were arrested and Brandon gave them all of the infor-\nmation, so the information was fresh.\n Taking all of these factors into consideration, the affidavit\nhere is stronger than the one that established probable cause\nin United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2005), where\nthe police had received a tip four months earlier that the de-\nfendant sold marijuana from his house. The defendant’s\nnephew had been arrested for robbery and aggravated bat-\ntery. Id. at 369. During his post-arrest interview, the nephew\ntold police that he had gone to the defendant’s house to steal\nhis marijuana. The nephew explained that that he had seen a\npound of marijuana in the defendant’s bedroom just two days\nearlier, that he had seen guns in the residence, and that the\ndefendant had a felony conviction. The police then reviewed\nthe defendant’s criminal history, which included multiple ar-\nrests and convictions for drug offenses. The police included\nthis information in an affidavit, received a search warrant,\nand found over a kilogram of marijuana and multiple guns in\nthe defendant’s house. Id. We rejected the defendant’s\n\fNo. 18-2932 9\n\nchallenge to the issuing judge’s probable cause determina-\ntion, finding that the information the nephew provided was a\n“firsthand account” that was “of sufficient detail, describing\nlarge quantities of marijuana … as well as several guns in the\nresidence … that he had observed only two days earlier.” Id.\nat 370. We also noted that the nephew’s “admission that he\nintended to steal drugs from the defendant constitutes a state-\nment made against his penal interest, and as such carries with\nit a presumption of reliability.” Id. at 371.\n Each individual detail in the search warrant affidavit for\nAdams’ house may not have been sufficient to establish prob-\nable cause by itself, but the details were mutually reinforcing.\nThe affidavit showed a “substantial chance” that police could\nfind drugs and/or a gun in the house. See United States v.\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d 361, 363–64 (7th Cir. 2011); Illinois v. Gates,\n462 U.S. at 245 n.13 (“probable cause requires only a probabil-\nity or substantial chance of criminal activity”). Though Ad-\nams’ prior conviction may not have been decisive in establish-\ning probable cause, it was “still relevant and entitled to some\nweight,”as was the fact that the deputy had found drugs and\nparaphernalia in the car when Adams was arrested. See\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d at 364. The totality of the circumstances\nhere gave the issuing judge a substantial basis for his probable\ncause determination.\n Even if the search warrant had not been supported by\nprobable cause, the deputies were entitled to rely on the war-\nrant. It is now well settled that “suppression of evidence\nseized pursuant to a search warrant that is later declared in-\nvalid is inappropriate if the officers who executed the warrant\nrelied in good faith on the issuing judge’s finding of probable\ncause.” United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 656–57 (7th Cir.\n\f10 No. 18-2932\n\n2008), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984). An\nofficer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence\nthat the officer was acting in good faith. United States v. Koerth,\n312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d\n519, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). A defendant can rebut this presump-\ntion in several ways, including by showing that “the affidavit\nsubmitted in support of the warrant was ‘so lacking in indicia\nof probable cause as to render official belief in its existence\nentirely unreasonable.’” Olson, 408 F.3d at 372, quoting Leon,\n468 U.S. at 923.\n “Overcoming the presumption of good faith is no small\nfeat, as an officer cannot ordinarily be expected to question a\njudge’s probable cause determination.” United States v. Lick-\ners, 928 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2019). Adams cannot overcome\nthe presumption here. The situation here does not come close\nto one in which a reasonable officer would disregard the\njudge’s determination of probable cause and forgo executing\nthe warrant. This warrant had substantial support from the\nresults of the traffic stop, Adams’ criminal history, the anony-\nmous tips, and the detailed and fresh information from Bran-\ndon. Thus, even if the warrant had not been supported by\nprobable cause, the evidence from the search would still not\nbe suppressed since the deputies acted in good faith.\n B. Sentencing Guidelines\n Adams’ second argument on appeal is that the district\ncourt erred in applying the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to\nhis case. We review de novo claims of procedural errors in sen-\ntencing, including a district court’s legal interpretation of the\nGuidelines, such as whether a prior conviction counts as a\n“controlled substance offense.” United States v. Tate, 822 F.3d\n370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016).\n\fNo. 18-2932 11\n\n Adams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\nfirearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the Sen-\ntencing Guidelines, a person convicted under § 922(g)(1)\nstarts with a base offense level of 14. See U.S.S.G.\n§ 2K2.1(a)(6). That level increases to 20 if the defendant has a\nprior conviction for a “controlled substance offense.” See\nU.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The term “controlled substance of-\nfense” is not defined in § 2K2.1 itself, but its Application Note\n1 states that “‘controlled substance offense’ has the meaning\ngiven that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1 of the\nCommentary to § 4B1.2.”\n Section 4B1.2(b) provides in turn:\n The term “controlled substance offense” means\n an offense under federal or state law, punisha-\n ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one\n year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex-\n port, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled\n substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the\n possession of a controlled substance (or a coun-\n terfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\n import, export, distribute, or dispense.\nAnd Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 teaches that “controlled\nsubstance offense” includes “the offenses of aiding and abet-\nting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.”\n Adams argues that his Illinois methamphetamine conspir-\nacy conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” because\nthe text of the Guideline itself does not include drug conspir-\nacies or other inchoate or attempted drug crimes, and Appli-\ncation Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly adds to that Guide-\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense” by\n\f12 No. 18-2932\n\nincluding conspiracies and other inchoate drug offenses.\nBased on this asserted conflict between the Guideline and the\napplication note, he argues that the application note is not en-\ntitled to deference. See generally Stinson v. United States, 508\nU.S. 36, 43 (1993) (if commentaries such as application notes\nare inconsistent with a Guideline, the Guideline controls).\n In response, the government argues that there is no con-\nflict between Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 and that Guide-\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense.” Alterna-\ntively, the government argues that, at the very least, there is\nno conflict between the undefined term “controlled substance\noffense” in § 2K2.1 and the referenced definition of the term\nin that Guideline’s application note. The government con-\ntends that the application note to § 2K2.1 simply explains\nwhat is meant by “controlled substance offense” within the\nmeaning of that Guideline.\n Adams is arguing one side of a fairly new circuit split cre-\nated by United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir.\n2018). Winstead argued that he received ineffective assistance\nof counsel at trial and at sentencing and that his sentence as a\ncareer criminal was improper. The case did not concern the\nGuideline at issue here (§ 2K2.1) but § 4B1.2 itself. Winstead\nheld that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly ex-\npands the definition of “controlled substance offense” in\n§ 4B1.2 to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy and at-\ntempt. 890 F.3d at 1090–92. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged\nthat it was creating a circuit split on this issue. Id. at 1091, cit-\ning United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2017);\nUnited States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017);\nUnited States v. Solomon, 592 F. App’x 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2014);\nUnited States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011);\n\fNo. 18-2932 13\n\nUnited States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995)\n(en banc).\n One could distinguish Winstead from this case on the\nground that the applicable Guideline here is § 2K2.1, not\n§ 4B1.2 itself. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is drafted differently. The\nGuideline itself refers only to “a controlled substance offense”\nand leaves all definition for its respective application note. As\nnoted, Application Note 1 says that “controlled substance of-\nfense” “has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(b) and ap-\nplication Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” This basis for\ndistinguishing Winstead, offered by the government here, may\nbe a reasonable reading of the different language in the two\nGuidelines and their application notes because Application\nNote 1 to § 2K2.1 does not conflict with the language of\n§ 2K2.1(a)(4) itself.\n On the other hand, that basis for distinguishing Winstead\nwould produce two different meanings for the phrase “con-\ntrolled substance offense” in two different Guidelines, a tex-\ntual consequence that is at least awkward. For that reason, the\nSixth Circuit recently extended the reasoning of Winstead to\nthe issue we face here, in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382,\n386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In Havis the defendant\npleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and\nthe district court set his base level at 20 pursuant to § 2K2.1.\nId. at 383–84. He had a prior conviction for a crime that could\nhave included only the attempted sale of cocaine. Id. at 384. At-\ntempt crimes are treated like conspiracies in these guideline\nprovisions. Even though the Guideline at issue was § 2K2.1,\nthe Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the interplay between\n§ 4B1.2 and its Application Note 1. See id. at 385–87. The court\nconcluded that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly\n\f14 No. 18-2932\n\nadded attempted crimes to the definition of “controlled sub-\nstance offense” in § 4B1.2. Id. at 386–87. This conclusion, ac-\ncording to the court, meant that attempted crimes were just as\nimpermissibly added to § 2K2.1. Id. In a footnote, the court\nwrote:\n The Government argues in the alternative that\n the real commentary at issue is Application\n Note 1 to § 2K2.1, which cross-references the\n definition of “controlled substance offense” in\n Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. The Government\n never made that argument in the district court\n or before the initial panel on appeal and argua-\n bly has forfeited its right to do so now. At any\n rate, it makes no difference whether we begin\n with § 2K2.1 to determine the meaning of “con-\n trolled substance offense.” The commentary to\n § 2K2.1 directs us to apply “the meaning given\n that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1\n of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” If anything, the\n Government’s proposed definition—which\n would require us to defer to commentary on\n other commentary—would carry an even more\n tenuous connection to the guideline’s text.\nId. at 386 n.3.\n The Sentencing Commission has responded to Winstead by\nproposing an amendment to § 4B1.2 that would move the in-\nchoate offense language from the application note to the text\nof the Guideline as a new subsection (c). See 83 Fed. Reg.\n65400, 65412–15 (Dec. 20, 2018). The public comment period\nfor this amendment closed on March 15, 2019. The Sentencing\nCommission currently lacks a quorum of voting members,\n\fNo. 18-2932 15\n\nbut this proposed amendment indicates that attempt and con-\nspiracy crimes may be added to the text of the Guideline itself\nin the near future, resolving this circuit split, including the\nHavis extension of Winstead to § 2K2.1(a)(4).\n The Commission’s correction has not yet taken effect,\nthough, so we need to decide the legal issue under the current\nGuidelines. We conclude that the issue is governed by our de-\ncision in United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012),\nwhere we rejected the textual arguments that the D.C. Circuit\nlater found persuasive in Winstead. In Raupp, the defendant\nwas convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His\nguideline calculation used § 2K2.1(a)(2) because he had at\nleast two other convictions for crimes of violence. One of\nthose prior convictions was for conspiracy to commit robbery.\nAmong several arguments, Raupp made the same textual\npoints that prevailed later in Winstead, arguing that Applica-\ntion Note 1 to § 4B1.2 could not properly extend the Guideline\nto treat conspiracy to commit robbery as a crime of violence.\nWe squarely rejected that argument, holding that the applica-\ntion note’s inclusion of conspiracy did not conflict with the\ntext of the Guideline itself. “There cannot be a conflict because\nthe text of § 4B1.2(a) does not tell us, one or another, whether\ninchoate offense are included or excluded. The note says they\nare included.” 677 F.3d at 759. We added: “Deciding how to\nhandle conspiracy is a question about wise policy, not about\ntextual conflict.” Id. at 760.\n Other portions of the Raupp opinion addressed the now-\nabandoned residual clause of the definition of crimes of vio-\nlence in § 4B1.2 and have had a complicated history as we and\nthe Supreme Court have struggled with vagueness challenges\nto the similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal\n\f16 No. 18-2932\n\nAct, held unconstitutional in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.\n2551 (2015). In United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737, 742–43 (7th\nCir. 2016), we overruled Raupp’s reliance on the residual\nclause in the now-advisory § 4B1.2, but our reasoning in Rol-\nlins was based on our decision in United States v. Hurlburt, 835\nF.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), which was in turn overruled\nby the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886\n(2017), which held that the now-advisory Guidelines are not\nsubject to vagueness challenges. The “controlled substance of-\nfense” definition at issue here does not involve any of the\ncomplications presented by the residual clauses in definitions\nof violent crimes. The Raupp analysis of this purely textual is-\nsue under § 2K2.1 and § 4B1.2 thus remains sound as applied\nto the Guidelines’ definitions of controlled substance offenses.\nSee also D’Antoni v. United States, 916 F.3d 658, 663–65 (7th\nCir. 2019) (reviewing this history as applied to defendant sen-\ntenced as career offender under then-mandatory Guidelines,\nusing conviction for conspiracy to kill government witness as\nprior crime of violence).\n Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as applied to\ninchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the\ndistrict court’s decision to treat Adams as a career offender\nunder the Sentencing Guidelines.\n The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Steven Adams\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2932\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nSTEVEN A. ADAMS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 4:17-CR-40062 — James E. Shadid, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 16, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant Steven Adams plead-\\ned guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this\\nappeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion\\nto suppress and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines\\nto his case. We affirm. Probable cause supported the search\\nwarrant for Adams’ house, and in any event the officers could\\nrely on the warrant in good faith. Further, the district court\\n\\f2 No. 18-2932\\n\\nproperly calculated Adams’ guideline range, taking into ac-\\ncount his prior drug conspiracy conviction.\\nI. Factual & Procedural Background\\n On March 22, 2016, Adams, his girlfriend, and a third per-\\nson were pulled over for speeding. The car was registered to\\nAdams’ girlfriend, Leanna Brandon. Law enforcement offic-\\ners were familiar with Adams because he was the subject of\\nanonymous tips regarding drug activity at his house in\\nKeithsburg, Illinois. They also knew that Adams had a previ-\\nous conviction for conspiracy to distribute methampheta-\\nmine. The third person in the car was also the subject of anon-\\nymous tips regarding drug activity and had outstanding ar-\\nrest warrants.\\n During the traffic stop, the sheriff’s deputy smelled mari-\\njuana from the car. The car was searched, and deputies found\\na meth pipe, paraphernalia used with marijuana, and mariju-\\nana. The three occupants were arrested and taken back to the\\nstation, where Brandon—after receiving Miranda warnings—\\ntold the arresting deputy that additional items of drug para-\\nphernalia, a gun, and a safe containing methamphetamine\\npipes were at Adams’ house. Brandon told the deputy that she\\nalso stayed in the house and that she had been there earlier\\nthat same day. She described the layout of the house and pro-\\nvided descriptions of Adams’ bedroom and the gun and par-\\naphernalia.\\n In his application for a search warrant, the deputy wrote:\\n Brandon disclosed that at Adam’s residence, at\\n [street address], there is often meth and canna-\\n bis used. Brandon stays at the residence, and is\\n familiar with the goings on there. She said that\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 3\\n\\n there is drug paraphernalia for ingestion of can-\\n nabis and methamphetamine in the house.\\n Brandon went into great detail of Adams bed-\\n room where she sleeps when she stays. She said\\n she was last there at around 0430 hours this\\n morning (03/22/2016). She described Adams’\\n room as being in the northwest corner of the\\n house and drew a floor plan of the house. She\\n drew an enlargement of Adams’ room. She de-\\n scribed a dresser with a mirror on the west wall\\n of the bedroom. She said that on that dresser,\\n there is always a clear glass bong. She has seen\\n it used to ingest cannabis. She said the bowl part\\n of it is not on it, but it does have residue in it.\\n She also said that there is a colorful swirled de-\\n signed “bowl” that looks like an elephant; this\\n is used for ingestion of cannabis on a nightstand\\n next to the bed. She said that her .45 caliber\\n Smith and Wesson pistol is in the house. It has a\\n cable lock in it and she has the only keys. She\\n said the pistol is black and is in the blue plastic\\n case. She said there is a gray/black colored safe\\n in the bedroom. Inside that safe is meth pipes,\\n and maybe some meth and cannabis.\\n Brandon said Adams’ bedroom is locked with a\\n deadbolt. She said that only she and Adams\\n have keys. She said that only Adams and she\\n have the keys for the safe in the bedroom, and\\n she provided me one from her purse.\\n She said that there may be other paraphernalia\\n in the house. She said that [Female] and [Male]\\n\\f4 No. 18-2932\\n\\n stay in a bedroom next to Adams. She said that\\n [Female] frequently “huffs” hair spray and has\\n expressed her displeasure of the aerosol odor in\\n the house to [Female]. This agency has also re-\\n ceived recent information about [Male] being at\\n the residence. [Male] had a history for posses-\\n sion of narcotics through Iowa.\\n Based on the results of the traffic stop search, Adams’ prior\\nconviction, the anonymous tips, and the information from\\nBrandon, the police obtained a search warrant for Adams’\\nhouse from a state-court judge. They executed the warrant the\\nsame day as the traffic stop. In Adams’ room, they found a\\nlocked plastic gun case that Brandon had described. A .45 cal-\\niber Smith & Wesson handgun and two loaded magazines\\nwere inside the case. Adams later admitted that he had Bran-\\ndon buy the gun for him because he was a felon.\\n A federal grand jury charged Adams with unlawful pos-\\nsession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 922(g). Adams moved to suppress the evidence discovered\\npursuant to the state search warrant, contending that the affi-\\ndavit in support of the application did not establish probable\\ncause. He also argued that the good-faith exception to the ex-\\nclusionary rule should not apply because the affidavit was so\\nlacking in probable cause that a reasonable officer could not\\nhave relied on the warrant.\\n The district court ruled from the bench and denied Ad-\\nams’ motion to suppress. The court explained that the issuing\\njudge had a “substantial basis for determining the existence\\nof probable cause” because Brandon had “provided firsthand\\ndetail,” the information was “fresh” as it “was within a day”\\nsince she had been at the house, and the information was “in\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 5\\n\\nsome form corroborated by the number of tips.” The court\\nnoted that the tips were anonymous and that standing alone\\nthey would not establish probable cause. But the court ex-\\nplained that the tips provided some corroboration in conjunc-\\ntion with the other information. The court also highlighted the\\ntraffic stop of the “vehicle that involved drugs” and noted\\nthat, “to some degree,” Brandon’s statements to the deputy\\nwere “against her penal interest.” The court concluded: “So, I\\nbelieve that all of this provides plenty of information for the\\nestablishment of probable cause. If it didn’t, I do believe there\\nis no question that there is good faith here.”\\n Adams pleaded guilty to the indictment, reserving his\\nright to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. At sen-\\ntencing, Adams objected to the probation officer’s use of a\\nbase offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a) of the Sentencing\\nGuidelines, arguing that his Illinois methamphetamine con-\\nspiracy conviction should not count as a “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” because it was conviction for only conspiracy,\\nnot actually distributing or manufacturing the drug. Section\\n2K2.1(a)(4) of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 20 for\\na defendant who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) “subsequent to\\nsustaining one felony conviction of … a controlled substance\\noffense.” “Controlled substance offense” is not defined in the\\nGuideline itself, but the commentary to that guideline states\\nthat the phrase has the same meaning as it does in § 4B1.2(b)\\nand Application Note 1 to § 4B1.1 (which includes conspiracy\\noffenses). U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Adams argued that the\\ncommentary and application note impermissibly added to the\\ndefinition of “controlled substance offense” and that the Sen-\\ntencing Commission’s interpretation of the definition was not\\nentitled to deference.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2932\\n\\n The district court overruled Adams’ objection. The court\\ndetermined that Adams’ advisory guideline range was 70 to\\n87 months, based on a total offense level of 23 and a criminal\\nhistory category of IV. Adams was sentenced to 84 months in\\nprison and three years of supervised release.\\nII. Analysis\\n Adams raises two issues on appeal. The first is whether\\nthe state search warrant was supported by probable cause,\\nand, if not, whether the police acted in good faith when they\\nexecuted the warrant. The second is whether the district court\\nproperly calculated the advisory guideline range.\\n A. Probable Cause and Good Faith\\n When reviewing a search warrant, we give “‘great defer-\\nence’ to the issuing judge’s determination so long as the judge\\nhad a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding.” United States v. Mil-\\nler, 673 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Illinois v.\\nGates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). Here, that deference is given to\\nthe state-court judge who issued the search warrant. We give\\nno deference to (i.e., review de novo) the district court’s finding\\nthat there was a substantial basis for issuing the warrant.\\nUnited States v. Searcy, 664 F.3d 1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 2011). We\\nalso review de novo whether the good-faith exception applies\\nto a search warrant later found to be invalid. United States v.\\nMitten, 592 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n Probable cause exists when the circumstances “indicate a\\nreasonable probability that evidence of crime will be found in\\na particular location; neither an absolute certainty nor even a\\npreponderance of the evidence is necessary.” United States v.\\nAljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010); see generally Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 235. Where, as here, an affidavit is the only\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 7\\n\\nevidence presented to a judge to support a search warrant,\\n“the validity of the warrant rests solely on the strength of the\\naffidavit.” United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir.\\n2009). When an informant is the source of the information in\\nan affidavit, “the probable-cause determination turns on the\\ninformant’s credibility.” United States v. Hansmeier, 867 F.3d\\n807, 811 (7th Cir. 2017), citing Bell, 585 F.3d at 1049. We con-\\nsider all relevant circumstances, including:\\n first, the degree to which the informant ac-\\n quired knowledge of the events through\\n firsthand observation; second, the detail and\\n specificity of the information provided by the\\n informant; third, the interval between the date\\n of the events and a police officer’s application\\n for the search warrant; and fourth, the extent to\\n which law enforcement corroborated the in-\\n formant’s statements.\\nSearcy, 664 F.3d at 1122; see also United States v. Glover, 755\\nF.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (we consider “the level of detail,\\nthe extent of firsthand observation, the degree of corrobora-\\ntion, the time between the events reported and the warrant\\napplication, and whether the informant appeared or testified\\nbefore the magistrate.”). We consider these factors as a whole,\\nand “no one factor necessarily dooms a search warrant.”\\nUnited States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n The search warrant here was supported by probable cause.\\nThe affidavit disclosed Brandon’s name, explained her close\\nrelationship with Adams and her connection to the house,\\nand explained that she had been in the house earlier that day.\\nBrandon provided the police with detailed, firsthand infor-\\nmation about the criminal activity in the house. She described\\n\\f8 No. 18-2932\\n\\nthe handgun by both caliber and make, the color of the gun\\ncase, and the color of the safe that contained methampheta-\\nmine pipes and possibly methamphetamine and marijuana.\\nBrandon had a key to the safe that she gave to the police. Her\\ninformation was corroborated to some extent by the anony-\\nmous tips informing the police that drug activity was occur-\\nring in Adam’ house. It was also corroborated by the fact that\\nthe police had discovered drugs and paraphernalia in Bran-\\ndon’s car during the traffic stop, the fact that Brandon and\\nAdams were together when they were pulled over and ar-\\nrested, and the fact that Adams had a prior methampheta-\\nmine-related conviction. The police applied for, received, and\\nexecuted the search warrant on the day that Adams and Bran-\\ndon were arrested and Brandon gave them all of the infor-\\nmation, so the information was fresh.\\n Taking all of these factors into consideration, the affidavit\\nhere is stronger than the one that established probable cause\\nin United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2005), where\\nthe police had received a tip four months earlier that the de-\\nfendant sold marijuana from his house. The defendant’s\\nnephew had been arrested for robbery and aggravated bat-\\ntery. Id. at 369. During his post-arrest interview, the nephew\\ntold police that he had gone to the defendant’s house to steal\\nhis marijuana. The nephew explained that that he had seen a\\npound of marijuana in the defendant’s bedroom just two days\\nearlier, that he had seen guns in the residence, and that the\\ndefendant had a felony conviction. The police then reviewed\\nthe defendant’s criminal history, which included multiple ar-\\nrests and convictions for drug offenses. The police included\\nthis information in an affidavit, received a search warrant,\\nand found over a kilogram of marijuana and multiple guns in\\nthe defendant’s house. Id. We rejected the defendant’s\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 9\\n\\nchallenge to the issuing judge’s probable cause determina-\\ntion, finding that the information the nephew provided was a\\n“firsthand account” that was “of sufficient detail, describing\\nlarge quantities of marijuana … as well as several guns in the\\nresidence … that he had observed only two days earlier.” Id.\\nat 370. We also noted that the nephew’s “admission that he\\nintended to steal drugs from the defendant constitutes a state-\\nment made against his penal interest, and as such carries with\\nit a presumption of reliability.” Id. at 371.\\n Each individual detail in the search warrant affidavit for\\nAdams’ house may not have been sufficient to establish prob-\\nable cause by itself, but the details were mutually reinforcing.\\nThe affidavit showed a “substantial chance” that police could\\nfind drugs and/or a gun in the house. See United States v.\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d 361, 363–64 (7th Cir. 2011); Illinois v. Gates,\\n462 U.S. at 245 n.13 (“probable cause requires only a probabil-\\nity or substantial chance of criminal activity”). Though Ad-\\nams’ prior conviction may not have been decisive in establish-\\ning probable cause, it was “still relevant and entitled to some\\nweight,”as was the fact that the deputy had found drugs and\\nparaphernalia in the car when Adams was arrested. See\\nMcDuffy, 636 F.3d at 364. The totality of the circumstances\\nhere gave the issuing judge a substantial basis for his probable\\ncause determination.\\n Even if the search warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the deputies were entitled to rely on the war-\\nrant. It is now well settled that “suppression of evidence\\nseized pursuant to a search warrant that is later declared in-\\nvalid is inappropriate if the officers who executed the warrant\\nrelied in good faith on the issuing judge’s finding of probable\\ncause.” United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 656–57 (7th Cir.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2932\\n\\n2008), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984). An\\nofficer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence\\nthat the officer was acting in good faith. United States v. Koerth,\\n312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d\\n519, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). A defendant can rebut this presump-\\ntion in several ways, including by showing that “the affidavit\\nsubmitted in support of the warrant was ‘so lacking in indicia\\nof probable cause as to render official belief in its existence\\nentirely unreasonable.’” Olson, 408 F.3d at 372, quoting Leon,\\n468 U.S. at 923.\\n “Overcoming the presumption of good faith is no small\\nfeat, as an officer cannot ordinarily be expected to question a\\njudge’s probable cause determination.” United States v. Lick-\\ners, 928 F.3d 609, 619 (7th Cir. 2019). Adams cannot overcome\\nthe presumption here. The situation here does not come close\\nto one in which a reasonable officer would disregard the\\njudge’s determination of probable cause and forgo executing\\nthe warrant. This warrant had substantial support from the\\nresults of the traffic stop, Adams’ criminal history, the anony-\\nmous tips, and the detailed and fresh information from Bran-\\ndon. Thus, even if the warrant had not been supported by\\nprobable cause, the evidence from the search would still not\\nbe suppressed since the deputies acted in good faith.\\n B. Sentencing Guidelines\\n Adams’ second argument on appeal is that the district\\ncourt erred in applying the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to\\nhis case. We review de novo claims of procedural errors in sen-\\ntencing, including a district court’s legal interpretation of the\\nGuidelines, such as whether a prior conviction counts as a\\n“controlled substance offense.” United States v. Tate, 822 F.3d\\n370, 375 (7th Cir. 2016).\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 11\\n\\n Adams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a\\nfirearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the Sen-\\ntencing Guidelines, a person convicted under § 922(g)(1)\\nstarts with a base offense level of 14. See U.S.S.G.\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(6). That level increases to 20 if the defendant has a\\nprior conviction for a “controlled substance offense.” See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The term “controlled substance of-\\nfense” is not defined in § 2K2.1 itself, but its Application Note\\n1 states that “‘controlled substance offense’ has the meaning\\ngiven that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1 of the\\nCommentary to § 4B1.2.”\\n Section 4B1.2(b) provides in turn:\\n The term “controlled substance offense” means\\n an offense under federal or state law, punisha-\\n ble by imprisonment for a term exceeding one\\n year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, ex-\\n port, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled\\n substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the\\n possession of a controlled substance (or a coun-\\n terfeit substance) with intent to manufacture,\\n import, export, distribute, or dispense.\\nAnd Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 teaches that “controlled\\nsubstance offense” includes “the offenses of aiding and abet-\\nting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.”\\n Adams argues that his Illinois methamphetamine conspir-\\nacy conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” because\\nthe text of the Guideline itself does not include drug conspir-\\nacies or other inchoate or attempted drug crimes, and Appli-\\ncation Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly adds to that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense” by\\n\\f12 No. 18-2932\\n\\nincluding conspiracies and other inchoate drug offenses.\\nBased on this asserted conflict between the Guideline and the\\napplication note, he argues that the application note is not en-\\ntitled to deference. See generally Stinson v. United States, 508\\nU.S. 36, 43 (1993) (if commentaries such as application notes\\nare inconsistent with a Guideline, the Guideline controls).\\n In response, the government argues that there is no con-\\nflict between Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 and that Guide-\\nline’s definition of “controlled substance offense.” Alterna-\\ntively, the government argues that, at the very least, there is\\nno conflict between the undefined term “controlled substance\\noffense” in § 2K2.1 and the referenced definition of the term\\nin that Guideline’s application note. The government con-\\ntends that the application note to § 2K2.1 simply explains\\nwhat is meant by “controlled substance offense” within the\\nmeaning of that Guideline.\\n Adams is arguing one side of a fairly new circuit split cre-\\nated by United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082 (D.C. Cir.\\n2018). Winstead argued that he received ineffective assistance\\nof counsel at trial and at sentencing and that his sentence as a\\ncareer criminal was improper. The case did not concern the\\nGuideline at issue here (§ 2K2.1) but § 4B1.2 itself. Winstead\\nheld that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly ex-\\npands the definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n§ 4B1.2 to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy and at-\\ntempt. 890 F.3d at 1090–92. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged\\nthat it was creating a circuit split on this issue. Id. at 1091, cit-\\ning United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Nieves-Borrero, 856 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2017);\\nUnited States v. Solomon, 592 F. App’x 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2014);\\nUnited States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011);\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 13\\n\\nUnited States v. Mendoza-Figueroa, 65 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1995)\\n(en banc).\\n One could distinguish Winstead from this case on the\\nground that the applicable Guideline here is § 2K2.1, not\\n§ 4B1.2 itself. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) is drafted differently. The\\nGuideline itself refers only to “a controlled substance offense”\\nand leaves all definition for its respective application note. As\\nnoted, Application Note 1 says that “controlled substance of-\\nfense” “has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(b) and ap-\\nplication Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” This basis for\\ndistinguishing Winstead, offered by the government here, may\\nbe a reasonable reading of the different language in the two\\nGuidelines and their application notes because Application\\nNote 1 to § 2K2.1 does not conflict with the language of\\n§ 2K2.1(a)(4) itself.\\n On the other hand, that basis for distinguishing Winstead\\nwould produce two different meanings for the phrase “con-\\ntrolled substance offense” in two different Guidelines, a tex-\\ntual consequence that is at least awkward. For that reason, the\\nSixth Circuit recently extended the reasoning of Winstead to\\nthe issue we face here, in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382,\\n386–87 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). In Havis the defendant\\npleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and\\nthe district court set his base level at 20 pursuant to § 2K2.1.\\nId. at 383–84. He had a prior conviction for a crime that could\\nhave included only the attempted sale of cocaine. Id. at 384. At-\\ntempt crimes are treated like conspiracies in these guideline\\nprovisions. Even though the Guideline at issue was § 2K2.1,\\nthe Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the interplay between\\n§ 4B1.2 and its Application Note 1. See id. at 385–87. The court\\nconcluded that Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 impermissibly\\n\\f14 No. 18-2932\\n\\nadded attempted crimes to the definition of “controlled sub-\\nstance offense” in § 4B1.2. Id. at 386–87. This conclusion, ac-\\ncording to the court, meant that attempted crimes were just as\\nimpermissibly added to § 2K2.1. Id. In a footnote, the court\\nwrote:\\n The Government argues in the alternative that\\n the real commentary at issue is Application\\n Note 1 to § 2K2.1, which cross-references the\\n definition of “controlled substance offense” in\\n Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. The Government\\n never made that argument in the district court\\n or before the initial panel on appeal and argua-\\n bly has forfeited its right to do so now. At any\\n rate, it makes no difference whether we begin\\n with § 2K2.1 to determine the meaning of “con-\\n trolled substance offense.” The commentary to\\n § 2K2.1 directs us to apply “the meaning given\\n that term in § 4B1.2(b) and Application Note 1\\n of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” If anything, the\\n Government’s proposed definition—which\\n would require us to defer to commentary on\\n other commentary—would carry an even more\\n tenuous connection to the guideline’s text.\\nId. at 386 n.3.\\n The Sentencing Commission has responded to Winstead by\\nproposing an amendment to § 4B1.2 that would move the in-\\nchoate offense language from the application note to the text\\nof the Guideline as a new subsection (c). See 83 Fed. Reg.\\n65400, 65412–15 (Dec. 20, 2018). The public comment period\\nfor this amendment closed on March 15, 2019. The Sentencing\\nCommission currently lacks a quorum of voting members,\\n\\fNo. 18-2932 15\\n\\nbut this proposed amendment indicates that attempt and con-\\nspiracy crimes may be added to the text of the Guideline itself\\nin the near future, resolving this circuit split, including the\\nHavis extension of Winstead to § 2K2.1(a)(4).\\n The Commission’s correction has not yet taken effect,\\nthough, so we need to decide the legal issue under the current\\nGuidelines. We conclude that the issue is governed by our de-\\ncision in United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012),\\nwhere we rejected the textual arguments that the D.C. Circuit\\nlater found persuasive in Winstead. In Raupp, the defendant\\nwas convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. His\\nguideline calculation used § 2K2.1(a)(2) because he had at\\nleast two other convictions for crimes of violence. One of\\nthose prior convictions was for conspiracy to commit robbery.\\nAmong several arguments, Raupp made the same textual\\npoints that prevailed later in Winstead, arguing that Applica-\\ntion Note 1 to § 4B1.2 could not properly extend the Guideline\\nto treat conspiracy to commit robbery as a crime of violence.\\nWe squarely rejected that argument, holding that the applica-\\ntion note’s inclusion of conspiracy did not conflict with the\\ntext of the Guideline itself. “There cannot be a conflict because\\nthe text of § 4B1.2(a) does not tell us, one or another, whether\\ninchoate offense are included or excluded. The note says they\\nare included.” 677 F.3d at 759. We added: “Deciding how to\\nhandle conspiracy is a question about wise policy, not about\\ntextual conflict.” Id. at 760.\\n Other portions of the Raupp opinion addressed the now-\\nabandoned residual clause of the definition of crimes of vio-\\nlence in § 4B1.2 and have had a complicated history as we and\\nthe Supreme Court have struggled with vagueness challenges\\nto the similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal\\n\\f16 No. 18-2932\\n\\nAct, held unconstitutional in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.\\n2551 (2015). In United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737, 742–43 (7th\\nCir. 2016), we overruled Raupp’s reliance on the residual\\nclause in the now-advisory § 4B1.2, but our reasoning in Rol-\\nlins was based on our decision in United States v. Hurlburt, 835\\nF.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), which was in turn overruled\\nby the Supreme Court in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886\\n(2017), which held that the now-advisory Guidelines are not\\nsubject to vagueness challenges. The “controlled substance of-\\nfense” definition at issue here does not involve any of the\\ncomplications presented by the residual clauses in definitions\\nof violent crimes. The Raupp analysis of this purely textual is-\\nsue under § 2K2.1 and § 4B1.2 thus remains sound as applied\\nto the Guidelines’ definitions of controlled substance offenses.\\nSee also D’Antoni v. United States, 916 F.3d 658, 663–65 (7th\\nCir. 2019) (reviewing this history as applied to defendant sen-\\ntenced as career offender under then-mandatory Guidelines,\\nusing conviction for conspiracy to kill government witness as\\nprior crime of violence).\\n Following this surviving portion of Raupp, as applied to\\ninchoate controlled substance offenses, we find no error in the\\ndistrict court’s decision to treat Adams as a career offender\\nunder the Sentencing Guidelines.\\n The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3883,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654039,"string":"4,654,039"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Curtis L. JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Curtis L. Johnson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2350"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Easterbrook, Sykes, Brennan\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2350\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCURTIS L. JOHNSON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00053 — Michael J. Reagan, District Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. During an in-chambers confer-\\nence among court and counsel, Curtis Johnson’s attorney\\nwithdrew an objection to the restitution amount to be paid to\\nthe victims of his client’s wire fraud. Johnson was not present.\\nThen, in open court, Johnson confirmed he no longer disputed\\nrestitution, recognized the plea agreement included an appeal\\nwaiver, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. Johnson now\\nchallenges his sentence, arguing he did not waive this appeal\\n\\f2 No. 18-2350\\n\\nand his sentence is unconstitutional because he was not pre-\\nsent when his attorney dropped the restitution objection. We\\nuphold the appeal waiver and dismiss Johnson’s appeal.\\n I\\n For almost three years, Johnson managed financial and\\nproduction operations for a business that produces hand rails\\nin Fishers, Indiana owned by the Tuttle family. 1 He kept the\\nbooks, paid vendors, purchased equipment, and entered into\\nloan agreements for the company, so he had access to and sig-\\nnature authority for the company’s bank accounts and the\\ncompany’s credit.\\n During that time Johnson defrauded the company by us-\\ning its funds and credit card for personal expenses, including\\na hot tub and three “company” cars for his family members.\\nHe wired money directly from the company’s bank account\\ninto his personal bank account, and he obtained company\\nloans from which he skimmed some proceeds.\\n The company discovered Johnson’s fraud and fired him,\\nbut the damage was done. The business had to pay back the\\nloans, and the owners were forced to use personal retirement\\nand college savings to ward off creditors. The Tuttle family\\nultimately lost its business.\\n Johnson was indicted on eight counts of wire and mail\\nfraud. He eventually pleaded guilty to one count of wire\\nfraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The plea agreement\\n\\n\\n 1 Johnson’s titles were chief operating officer and chief financial officer\\n\\nof Tuttle Aluminum and Bronze Co., Inc. and of Tuttle Railing Systems, a\\ndivision of Tuttle Aluminum, which we refer to collectively as “the com-\\npany.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 3\\n\\ncontained an appeal waiver. It also stated the government’s\\nposition that Johnson owed restitution totaling $211,428.80,\\ncomprised of credit card purchases, vehicle payments, cash\\nwithdrawals, wire transfers, and diverted loan proceeds.\\nJohnson agreed he owed the victims restitution, but he dis-\\nputed the amount.\\n The presentence investigation report adopted the govern-\\nment’s restitution calculation. Johnson never submitted a sen-\\ntencing memorandum, and he has never specified his own\\nrestitution figure. At one point he hypothesized that a loss\\nrange between $40,000 and $95,000 would result in a lesser\\noffense level, but ultimately provided no calculation detailing\\nwhat he believed that figure should be.\\n Johnson’s guilty plea and sentencing took place at the\\nsame hearing, during which the victims of Johnson’s crime\\naddressed the court. Before the hearing, the district judge met\\nwith counsel for the government and the defendant in cham-\\nbers and off the record. Then, on the record early in the\\nhearing, the court reviewed the plea agreement with Johnson,\\nnoting the in-chambers conference:\\n THE COURT: My understanding, in meeting\\n with counsel off the record, is that the amount\\n of restitution and loss is not in dispute now; is\\n that correct?\\n [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, Your\\n Honor.\\n THE COURT: … So restitution in the amount of\\n $211,428.80 plus interest will be ordered, … Do\\n you understand all of that?\\n THE DEFENDANT: Yes.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2350\\n\\nThe court also reviewed with Johnson terms in the plea agree-\\nment, including his previous dispute with the restitution\\namount:\\n THE COURT: Next, over on page 6, there’s a\\n sentence regarding restitution. This indicates\\n that restitution is in dispute. It is no longer in\\n dispute; correct?\\n THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, yes.\\nThe district court also twice reviewed with Johnson the\\nwaiver of his right to appeal, which provided:\\n Direct Appeal:\\n … in exchange for the concessions made by the\\n Government in this Plea Agreement, … [t]he de-\\n fendant further agrees that in the event the\\n Court sentences the defendant to [a] sentence\\n within the applicable Advisory Guidelines\\n Range as calculated by the Court at sentencing,\\n … then the defendant expressly waives the de-\\n fendant’s right to appeal the sentence imposed\\n in this case on any ground, …\\n The court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea and adopted the\\npresentence report’s proposed guideline range of 21 to 27\\nmonths. In his allocution, Johnson told the court, “I under-\\nstand the restitution and, if given the opportunity, I will repay\\nall of that.“ Since the company fired him, Johnson had bought\\ninto a small-town accounting practice and was earning some\\nmoney. The district court noted in its sentencing remarks the\\ntension between incarceration and securing restitution for the\\nvictims through Johnson’s private sector earnings. After a\\nthorough and complete hearing, the district court sentenced\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 5\\n\\nJohnson to 21 months’ imprisonment and ordered $211,428.80\\nin restitution, plus interest.\\n Johnson appeals. 2 According to him, the appeal waiver in\\nthe plea agreement should not preclude this challenge, as he\\nwas “sentenced unconstitutionally.” Johnson contends the\\noff-the-record, in-chambers conference was an integral part of\\nhis sentencing hearing, so his absence violated his constitu-\\ntional right to be present at sentencing. He also asserts he did\\nnot waive any arguments about the restitution, or his right to\\nattend the in-chambers conference.\\n II\\n A defendant may waive the right to appeal his sentence.\\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). We review de novo the en-\\nforceability of an appeal waiver in a plea agreement. United\\nStates v. Alcala, 678 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omit-\\nted). “A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and know-\\ning.” United States v. Galloway, 917 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2019)\\n(citing United States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.\\n2016). “A written appellate waiver signed by the defendant\\nwill typically be voluntary and knowing, and thus enforcea-\\nble through dismissal of a subsequent appeal.” Id. (citation\\nomitted).\\n\\n\\n 2 Johnson’s notice of appeal challenges the judgment of conviction in\\nthis case, and the conclusion of Johnson’s principal brief asks this court to\\nreverse and vacate his conviction and remand for further proceedings. But\\nthe arguments in Johnson’s briefs challenge only his sentence, not the vol-\\nuntariness of his guilty plea or any other aspect of his conviction. This dis-\\ncrepancy is not material given our conclusion that Johnson waived this\\nappeal.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2350\\n\\n We interpret the terms of a plea agreement ‘‘according to\\nthe parties’ reasonable expectations and construe any ambi-\\nguities in the light most favorable to the defendant.’’ United\\nStates v. Shah, 665 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United\\nStates v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 2010)). We also\\nconsider the plea colloquy, evaluating whether the district\\ncourt ‘‘properly informed the defendant that the waiver may\\nbar the right to appeal.’’ Id. (with same citation).\\n The written plea agreement signed by Johnson included\\nthe appeal waiver. He was sentenced within the guidelines\\nrange to 21 months, so per the plea agreement he “expressly\\nwaive[d his] right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case\\non any ground.” “[R]estitution is part of a sentence,” United\\nStates v. Perillo, 897 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations\\nomitted), so the waiver language includes Johnson’s chal-\\nlenge to that figure. See United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499,\\n502 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because restitution is part of a criminal\\nsentence, and [the defendant] agreed not to challenge the sen-\\ntence, he may not appeal the restitution order.”) (citation\\nomitted).\\n Johnson argues his circumstances fall into a due process\\nexception to the appeal waiver. A defendant’s presence “is a\\ncondition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hear-\\ning would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent\\nonly.” United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per cu-\\nriam) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).\\nBecause restitution was the only issue remaining in the case\\nwhen he pleaded guilty and was sentenced—as evidenced by\\nhim not stipulating to the government’s restitution figure in\\nthe plea agreement—to uphold the waiver on that question,\\nhe submits, would depart from the “minimum of civilized\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 7\\n\\nprocedure.” See United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (holding an appeal waiver will not prevent a\\ndefendant from challenging “some minimum of civilized pro-\\ncedure”).\\n Johnson also contends he focused his energies and defense\\non the restitution debate, so that issue must be of a constitu-\\ntional magnitude. But due process violations do not turn on a\\ndefendant’s subjective valuation of the alleged error. Rather,\\nto resurrect a right to an appeal this court has recognized\\n“fundamental errors,” United States v. Kratz, 179 F.3d 1039,\\n1042 (7th Cir. 1999). But this case does not present any of the\\nrecognized examples of procedural defects marring a sen-\\ntence with fundamental error, such as a sentence based on the\\ndefendant’s race, or which exceeds the statutory maximum\\nfor the defendant’s particular crime. See Adkins, 743 F.3d at\\n192–93 (citing United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th\\nCir. 2005)). For example, in Adkins the defendant’s sentence\\nincluded a special condition that prohibited “view[ing] or lis-\\nten[ing] to” certain materials “or patroniz[ing] locations\\nwhere such material is available,” which this court invali-\\ndated as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 743 F.3d at\\n194. That is far afield from the detailed and substantiated res-\\ntitution figure Johnson opposes.\\n There is no fundamental error here. At the plea and sen-\\ntencing hearing, the district court reviewed with Johnson in\\ndetail what the appeal waiver meant. The court also gave ex-\\namples of reasons that Johnson could still appeal despite the\\nwaiver, such as prosecutorial misconduct or a retroactive ben-\\neficial amendment to the sentencing guidelines. Johnson said\\nhe understood it would be difficult to pursue such an appeal\\nand acknowledged the slim chances of success. And in\\n\\f8 No. 18-2350\\n\\nexchange for his promises in the plea agreement—including\\nthe appeal waiver—Johnson obtained dismissal of seven of\\nthe eight counts in the indictment. See United States v. Wenger,\\n58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Defendant] exchanged the\\nright to appeal for prosecutorial concessions; he cannot have\\nhis cake and eat it too.”)\\n Next, Johnson claims he did not intentionally relinquish\\nany arguments about the restitution amount. We construe\\nwaiver principles liberally in favor of defendants. United\\nStates v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2005) (cita-\\ntions omitted). But the topic of restitution arose approxi-\\nmately twenty times during the plea and sentencing hearing.\\nThough Johnson spoke numerous times during the nearly\\none-hour hearing, he did not object to his absence from the in-\\nchambers meeting, or to the court’s statement that the dispute\\nabout the restitution amount had been resolved. Despite nu-\\nmerous opportunities to dispute the amount of restitution\\nowed, Johnson never spoke up to contest that figure.\\n Indeed, shortly after Johnson was placed under oath, he\\nexpressly agreed to the precise restitution amount of\\n$211,428.80. So even if the appeal waiver did not preclude this\\nargument, the record of the plea and sentencing hearing\\nshows Johnson deliberately abandoned his position that the\\nrestitution figure should be less. See United States v. Hathaway,\\n882 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding defendant waived\\nand did not just forfeit any objections to calculation of restitu-\\ntion amount).\\n In sum, Johnson’s circumstances do not present a due pro-\\ncess exception to the rule that most written appeal waivers are\\neffective. Although there are limits to an appeal waiver, see\\nBownes, 405 F.3d at 637, Johnson does not fall outside them.\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 9\\n\\n Johnson’s appeal waiver resolves this case. For the reasons\\ndiscussed, we DISMISS this appeal.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431292/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654039/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Curtis L. JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2350\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nCURTIS L. JOHNSON,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 1:16-cr-00053 — Michael J. Reagan, District Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. During an in-chambers confer-\nence among court and counsel, Curtis Johnson’s attorney\nwithdrew an objection to the restitution amount to be paid to\nthe victims of his client’s wire fraud. Johnson was not present.\nThen, in open court, Johnson confirmed he no longer disputed\nrestitution, recognized the plea agreement included an appeal\nwaiver, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. Johnson now\nchallenges his sentence, arguing he did not waive this appeal\n\f2 No. 18-2350\n\nand his sentence is unconstitutional because he was not pre-\nsent when his attorney dropped the restitution objection. We\nuphold the appeal waiver and dismiss Johnson’s appeal.\n I\n For almost three years, Johnson managed financial and\nproduction operations for a business that produces hand rails\nin Fishers, Indiana owned by the Tuttle family. 1 He kept the\nbooks, paid vendors, purchased equipment, and entered into\nloan agreements for the company, so he had access to and sig-\nnature authority for the company’s bank accounts and the\ncompany’s credit.\n During that time Johnson defrauded the company by us-\ning its funds and credit card for personal expenses, including\na hot tub and three “company” cars for his family members.\nHe wired money directly from the company’s bank account\ninto his personal bank account, and he obtained company\nloans from which he skimmed some proceeds.\n The company discovered Johnson’s fraud and fired him,\nbut the damage was done. The business had to pay back the\nloans, and the owners were forced to use personal retirement\nand college savings to ward off creditors. The Tuttle family\nultimately lost its business.\n Johnson was indicted on eight counts of wire and mail\nfraud. He eventually pleaded guilty to one count of wire\nfraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The plea agreement\n\n\n 1 Johnson’s titles were chief operating officer and chief financial officer\n\nof Tuttle Aluminum and Bronze Co., Inc. and of Tuttle Railing Systems, a\ndivision of Tuttle Aluminum, which we refer to collectively as “the com-\npany.”\n\fNo. 18-2350 3\n\ncontained an appeal waiver. It also stated the government’s\nposition that Johnson owed restitution totaling $211,428.80,\ncomprised of credit card purchases, vehicle payments, cash\nwithdrawals, wire transfers, and diverted loan proceeds.\nJohnson agreed he owed the victims restitution, but he dis-\nputed the amount.\n The presentence investigation report adopted the govern-\nment’s restitution calculation. Johnson never submitted a sen-\ntencing memorandum, and he has never specified his own\nrestitution figure. At one point he hypothesized that a loss\nrange between $40,000 and $95,000 would result in a lesser\noffense level, but ultimately provided no calculation detailing\nwhat he believed that figure should be.\n Johnson’s guilty plea and sentencing took place at the\nsame hearing, during which the victims of Johnson’s crime\naddressed the court. Before the hearing, the district judge met\nwith counsel for the government and the defendant in cham-\nbers and off the record. Then, on the record early in the\nhearing, the court reviewed the plea agreement with Johnson,\nnoting the in-chambers conference:\n THE COURT: My understanding, in meeting\n with counsel off the record, is that the amount\n of restitution and loss is not in dispute now; is\n that correct?\n [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, Your\n Honor.\n THE COURT: … So restitution in the amount of\n $211,428.80 plus interest will be ordered, … Do\n you understand all of that?\n THE DEFENDANT: Yes.\n\f4 No. 18-2350\n\nThe court also reviewed with Johnson terms in the plea agree-\nment, including his previous dispute with the restitution\namount:\n THE COURT: Next, over on page 6, there’s a\n sentence regarding restitution. This indicates\n that restitution is in dispute. It is no longer in\n dispute; correct?\n THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, yes.\nThe district court also twice reviewed with Johnson the\nwaiver of his right to appeal, which provided:\n Direct Appeal:\n … in exchange for the concessions made by the\n Government in this Plea Agreement, … [t]he de-\n fendant further agrees that in the event the\n Court sentences the defendant to [a] sentence\n within the applicable Advisory Guidelines\n Range as calculated by the Court at sentencing,\n … then the defendant expressly waives the de-\n fendant’s right to appeal the sentence imposed\n in this case on any ground, …\n The court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea and adopted the\npresentence report’s proposed guideline range of 21 to 27\nmonths. In his allocution, Johnson told the court, “I under-\nstand the restitution and, if given the opportunity, I will repay\nall of that.“ Since the company fired him, Johnson had bought\ninto a small-town accounting practice and was earning some\nmoney. The district court noted in its sentencing remarks the\ntension between incarceration and securing restitution for the\nvictims through Johnson’s private sector earnings. After a\nthorough and complete hearing, the district court sentenced\n\fNo. 18-2350 5\n\nJohnson to 21 months’ imprisonment and ordered $211,428.80\nin restitution, plus interest.\n Johnson appeals. 2 According to him, the appeal waiver in\nthe plea agreement should not preclude this challenge, as he\nwas “sentenced unconstitutionally.” Johnson contends the\noff-the-record, in-chambers conference was an integral part of\nhis sentencing hearing, so his absence violated his constitu-\ntional right to be present at sentencing. He also asserts he did\nnot waive any arguments about the restitution, or his right to\nattend the in-chambers conference.\n II\n A defendant may waive the right to appeal his sentence.\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). We review de novo the en-\nforceability of an appeal waiver in a plea agreement. United\nStates v. Alcala, 678 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omit-\nted). “A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and know-\ning.” United States v. Galloway, 917 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2019)\n(citing United States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.\n2016). “A written appellate waiver signed by the defendant\nwill typically be voluntary and knowing, and thus enforcea-\nble through dismissal of a subsequent appeal.” Id. (citation\nomitted).\n\n\n 2 Johnson’s notice of appeal challenges the judgment of conviction in\nthis case, and the conclusion of Johnson’s principal brief asks this court to\nreverse and vacate his conviction and remand for further proceedings. But\nthe arguments in Johnson’s briefs challenge only his sentence, not the vol-\nuntariness of his guilty plea or any other aspect of his conviction. This dis-\ncrepancy is not material given our conclusion that Johnson waived this\nappeal.\n\f6 No. 18-2350\n\n We interpret the terms of a plea agreement ‘‘according to\nthe parties’ reasonable expectations and construe any ambi-\nguities in the light most favorable to the defendant.’’ United\nStates v. Shah, 665 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United\nStates v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 2010)). We also\nconsider the plea colloquy, evaluating whether the district\ncourt ‘‘properly informed the defendant that the waiver may\nbar the right to appeal.’’ Id. (with same citation).\n The written plea agreement signed by Johnson included\nthe appeal waiver. He was sentenced within the guidelines\nrange to 21 months, so per the plea agreement he “expressly\nwaive[d his] right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case\non any ground.” “[R]estitution is part of a sentence,” United\nStates v. Perillo, 897 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations\nomitted), so the waiver language includes Johnson’s chal-\nlenge to that figure. See United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499,\n502 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because restitution is part of a criminal\nsentence, and [the defendant] agreed not to challenge the sen-\ntence, he may not appeal the restitution order.”) (citation\nomitted).\n Johnson argues his circumstances fall into a due process\nexception to the appeal waiver. A defendant’s presence “is a\ncondition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hear-\ning would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent\nonly.” United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per cu-\nriam) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).\nBecause restitution was the only issue remaining in the case\nwhen he pleaded guilty and was sentenced—as evidenced by\nhim not stipulating to the government’s restitution figure in\nthe plea agreement—to uphold the waiver on that question,\nhe submits, would depart from the “minimum of civilized\n\fNo. 18-2350 7\n\nprocedure.” See United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93\n(7th Cir. 2014) (holding an appeal waiver will not prevent a\ndefendant from challenging “some minimum of civilized pro-\ncedure”).\n Johnson also contends he focused his energies and defense\non the restitution debate, so that issue must be of a constitu-\ntional magnitude. But due process violations do not turn on a\ndefendant’s subjective valuation of the alleged error. Rather,\nto resurrect a right to an appeal this court has recognized\n“fundamental errors,” United States v. Kratz, 179 F.3d 1039,\n1042 (7th Cir. 1999). But this case does not present any of the\nrecognized examples of procedural defects marring a sen-\ntence with fundamental error, such as a sentence based on the\ndefendant’s race, or which exceeds the statutory maximum\nfor the defendant’s particular crime. See Adkins, 743 F.3d at\n192–93 (citing United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th\nCir. 2005)). For example, in Adkins the defendant’s sentence\nincluded a special condition that prohibited “view[ing] or lis-\nten[ing] to” certain materials “or patroniz[ing] locations\nwhere such material is available,” which this court invali-\ndated as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 743 F.3d at\n194. That is far afield from the detailed and substantiated res-\ntitution figure Johnson opposes.\n There is no fundamental error here. At the plea and sen-\ntencing hearing, the district court reviewed with Johnson in\ndetail what the appeal waiver meant. The court also gave ex-\namples of reasons that Johnson could still appeal despite the\nwaiver, such as prosecutorial misconduct or a retroactive ben-\neficial amendment to the sentencing guidelines. Johnson said\nhe understood it would be difficult to pursue such an appeal\nand acknowledged the slim chances of success. And in\n\f8 No. 18-2350\n\nexchange for his promises in the plea agreement—including\nthe appeal waiver—Johnson obtained dismissal of seven of\nthe eight counts in the indictment. See United States v. Wenger,\n58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Defendant] exchanged the\nright to appeal for prosecutorial concessions; he cannot have\nhis cake and eat it too.”)\n Next, Johnson claims he did not intentionally relinquish\nany arguments about the restitution amount. We construe\nwaiver principles liberally in favor of defendants. United\nStates v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2005) (cita-\ntions omitted). But the topic of restitution arose approxi-\nmately twenty times during the plea and sentencing hearing.\nThough Johnson spoke numerous times during the nearly\none-hour hearing, he did not object to his absence from the in-\nchambers meeting, or to the court’s statement that the dispute\nabout the restitution amount had been resolved. Despite nu-\nmerous opportunities to dispute the amount of restitution\nowed, Johnson never spoke up to contest that figure.\n Indeed, shortly after Johnson was placed under oath, he\nexpressly agreed to the precise restitution amount of\n$211,428.80. So even if the appeal waiver did not preclude this\nargument, the record of the plea and sentencing hearing\nshows Johnson deliberately abandoned his position that the\nrestitution figure should be less. See United States v. Hathaway,\n882 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding defendant waived\nand did not just forfeit any objections to calculation of restitu-\ntion amount).\n In sum, Johnson’s circumstances do not present a due pro-\ncess exception to the rule that most written appeal waivers are\neffective. Although there are limits to an appeal waiver, see\nBownes, 405 F.3d at 637, Johnson does not fall outside them.\n\fNo. 18-2350 9\n\n Johnson’s appeal waiver resolves this case. For the reasons\ndiscussed, we DISMISS this appeal.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Curtis L. JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2350\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCURTIS L. JOHNSON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00053 — Michael J. Reagan, District Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. During an in-chambers confer-\\nence among court and counsel, Curtis Johnson’s attorney\\nwithdrew an objection to the restitution amount to be paid to\\nthe victims of his client’s wire fraud. Johnson was not present.\\nThen, in open court, Johnson confirmed he no longer disputed\\nrestitution, recognized the plea agreement included an appeal\\nwaiver, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. Johnson now\\nchallenges his sentence, arguing he did not waive this appeal\\n\\f2 No. 18-2350\\n\\nand his sentence is unconstitutional because he was not pre-\\nsent when his attorney dropped the restitution objection. We\\nuphold the appeal waiver and dismiss Johnson’s appeal.\\n I\\n For almost three years, Johnson managed financial and\\nproduction operations for a business that produces hand rails\\nin Fishers, Indiana owned by the Tuttle family. 1 He kept the\\nbooks, paid vendors, purchased equipment, and entered into\\nloan agreements for the company, so he had access to and sig-\\nnature authority for the company’s bank accounts and the\\ncompany’s credit.\\n During that time Johnson defrauded the company by us-\\ning its funds and credit card for personal expenses, including\\na hot tub and three “company” cars for his family members.\\nHe wired money directly from the company’s bank account\\ninto his personal bank account, and he obtained company\\nloans from which he skimmed some proceeds.\\n The company discovered Johnson’s fraud and fired him,\\nbut the damage was done. The business had to pay back the\\nloans, and the owners were forced to use personal retirement\\nand college savings to ward off creditors. The Tuttle family\\nultimately lost its business.\\n Johnson was indicted on eight counts of wire and mail\\nfraud. He eventually pleaded guilty to one count of wire\\nfraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The plea agreement\\n\\n\\n 1 Johnson’s titles were chief operating officer and chief financial officer\\n\\nof Tuttle Aluminum and Bronze Co., Inc. and of Tuttle Railing Systems, a\\ndivision of Tuttle Aluminum, which we refer to collectively as “the com-\\npany.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 3\\n\\ncontained an appeal waiver. It also stated the government’s\\nposition that Johnson owed restitution totaling $211,428.80,\\ncomprised of credit card purchases, vehicle payments, cash\\nwithdrawals, wire transfers, and diverted loan proceeds.\\nJohnson agreed he owed the victims restitution, but he dis-\\nputed the amount.\\n The presentence investigation report adopted the govern-\\nment’s restitution calculation. Johnson never submitted a sen-\\ntencing memorandum, and he has never specified his own\\nrestitution figure. At one point he hypothesized that a loss\\nrange between $40,000 and $95,000 would result in a lesser\\noffense level, but ultimately provided no calculation detailing\\nwhat he believed that figure should be.\\n Johnson’s guilty plea and sentencing took place at the\\nsame hearing, during which the victims of Johnson’s crime\\naddressed the court. Before the hearing, the district judge met\\nwith counsel for the government and the defendant in cham-\\nbers and off the record. Then, on the record early in the\\nhearing, the court reviewed the plea agreement with Johnson,\\nnoting the in-chambers conference:\\n THE COURT: My understanding, in meeting\\n with counsel off the record, is that the amount\\n of restitution and loss is not in dispute now; is\\n that correct?\\n [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, Your\\n Honor.\\n THE COURT: … So restitution in the amount of\\n $211,428.80 plus interest will be ordered, … Do\\n you understand all of that?\\n THE DEFENDANT: Yes.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2350\\n\\nThe court also reviewed with Johnson terms in the plea agree-\\nment, including his previous dispute with the restitution\\namount:\\n THE COURT: Next, over on page 6, there’s a\\n sentence regarding restitution. This indicates\\n that restitution is in dispute. It is no longer in\\n dispute; correct?\\n THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, yes.\\nThe district court also twice reviewed with Johnson the\\nwaiver of his right to appeal, which provided:\\n Direct Appeal:\\n … in exchange for the concessions made by the\\n Government in this Plea Agreement, … [t]he de-\\n fendant further agrees that in the event the\\n Court sentences the defendant to [a] sentence\\n within the applicable Advisory Guidelines\\n Range as calculated by the Court at sentencing,\\n … then the defendant expressly waives the de-\\n fendant’s right to appeal the sentence imposed\\n in this case on any ground, …\\n The court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea and adopted the\\npresentence report’s proposed guideline range of 21 to 27\\nmonths. In his allocution, Johnson told the court, “I under-\\nstand the restitution and, if given the opportunity, I will repay\\nall of that.“ Since the company fired him, Johnson had bought\\ninto a small-town accounting practice and was earning some\\nmoney. The district court noted in its sentencing remarks the\\ntension between incarceration and securing restitution for the\\nvictims through Johnson’s private sector earnings. After a\\nthorough and complete hearing, the district court sentenced\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 5\\n\\nJohnson to 21 months’ imprisonment and ordered $211,428.80\\nin restitution, plus interest.\\n Johnson appeals. 2 According to him, the appeal waiver in\\nthe plea agreement should not preclude this challenge, as he\\nwas “sentenced unconstitutionally.” Johnson contends the\\noff-the-record, in-chambers conference was an integral part of\\nhis sentencing hearing, so his absence violated his constitu-\\ntional right to be present at sentencing. He also asserts he did\\nnot waive any arguments about the restitution, or his right to\\nattend the in-chambers conference.\\n II\\n A defendant may waive the right to appeal his sentence.\\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). We review de novo the en-\\nforceability of an appeal waiver in a plea agreement. United\\nStates v. Alcala, 678 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omit-\\nted). “A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and know-\\ning.” United States v. Galloway, 917 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2019)\\n(citing United States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.\\n2016). “A written appellate waiver signed by the defendant\\nwill typically be voluntary and knowing, and thus enforcea-\\nble through dismissal of a subsequent appeal.” Id. (citation\\nomitted).\\n\\n\\n 2 Johnson’s notice of appeal challenges the judgment of conviction in\\nthis case, and the conclusion of Johnson’s principal brief asks this court to\\nreverse and vacate his conviction and remand for further proceedings. But\\nthe arguments in Johnson’s briefs challenge only his sentence, not the vol-\\nuntariness of his guilty plea or any other aspect of his conviction. This dis-\\ncrepancy is not material given our conclusion that Johnson waived this\\nappeal.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2350\\n\\n We interpret the terms of a plea agreement ‘‘according to\\nthe parties’ reasonable expectations and construe any ambi-\\nguities in the light most favorable to the defendant.’’ United\\nStates v. Shah, 665 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United\\nStates v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 2010)). We also\\nconsider the plea colloquy, evaluating whether the district\\ncourt ‘‘properly informed the defendant that the waiver may\\nbar the right to appeal.’’ Id. (with same citation).\\n The written plea agreement signed by Johnson included\\nthe appeal waiver. He was sentenced within the guidelines\\nrange to 21 months, so per the plea agreement he “expressly\\nwaive[d his] right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case\\non any ground.” “[R]estitution is part of a sentence,” United\\nStates v. Perillo, 897 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations\\nomitted), so the waiver language includes Johnson’s chal-\\nlenge to that figure. See United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499,\\n502 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because restitution is part of a criminal\\nsentence, and [the defendant] agreed not to challenge the sen-\\ntence, he may not appeal the restitution order.”) (citation\\nomitted).\\n Johnson argues his circumstances fall into a due process\\nexception to the appeal waiver. A defendant’s presence “is a\\ncondition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hear-\\ning would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent\\nonly.” United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per cu-\\nriam) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).\\nBecause restitution was the only issue remaining in the case\\nwhen he pleaded guilty and was sentenced—as evidenced by\\nhim not stipulating to the government’s restitution figure in\\nthe plea agreement—to uphold the waiver on that question,\\nhe submits, would depart from the “minimum of civilized\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 7\\n\\nprocedure.” See United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (holding an appeal waiver will not prevent a\\ndefendant from challenging “some minimum of civilized pro-\\ncedure”).\\n Johnson also contends he focused his energies and defense\\non the restitution debate, so that issue must be of a constitu-\\ntional magnitude. But due process violations do not turn on a\\ndefendant’s subjective valuation of the alleged error. Rather,\\nto resurrect a right to an appeal this court has recognized\\n“fundamental errors,” United States v. Kratz, 179 F.3d 1039,\\n1042 (7th Cir. 1999). But this case does not present any of the\\nrecognized examples of procedural defects marring a sen-\\ntence with fundamental error, such as a sentence based on the\\ndefendant’s race, or which exceeds the statutory maximum\\nfor the defendant’s particular crime. See Adkins, 743 F.3d at\\n192–93 (citing United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th\\nCir. 2005)). For example, in Adkins the defendant’s sentence\\nincluded a special condition that prohibited “view[ing] or lis-\\nten[ing] to” certain materials “or patroniz[ing] locations\\nwhere such material is available,” which this court invali-\\ndated as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 743 F.3d at\\n194. That is far afield from the detailed and substantiated res-\\ntitution figure Johnson opposes.\\n There is no fundamental error here. At the plea and sen-\\ntencing hearing, the district court reviewed with Johnson in\\ndetail what the appeal waiver meant. The court also gave ex-\\namples of reasons that Johnson could still appeal despite the\\nwaiver, such as prosecutorial misconduct or a retroactive ben-\\neficial amendment to the sentencing guidelines. Johnson said\\nhe understood it would be difficult to pursue such an appeal\\nand acknowledged the slim chances of success. And in\\n\\f8 No. 18-2350\\n\\nexchange for his promises in the plea agreement—including\\nthe appeal waiver—Johnson obtained dismissal of seven of\\nthe eight counts in the indictment. See United States v. Wenger,\\n58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Defendant] exchanged the\\nright to appeal for prosecutorial concessions; he cannot have\\nhis cake and eat it too.”)\\n Next, Johnson claims he did not intentionally relinquish\\nany arguments about the restitution amount. We construe\\nwaiver principles liberally in favor of defendants. United\\nStates v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2005) (cita-\\ntions omitted). But the topic of restitution arose approxi-\\nmately twenty times during the plea and sentencing hearing.\\nThough Johnson spoke numerous times during the nearly\\none-hour hearing, he did not object to his absence from the in-\\nchambers meeting, or to the court’s statement that the dispute\\nabout the restitution amount had been resolved. Despite nu-\\nmerous opportunities to dispute the amount of restitution\\nowed, Johnson never spoke up to contest that figure.\\n Indeed, shortly after Johnson was placed under oath, he\\nexpressly agreed to the precise restitution amount of\\n$211,428.80. So even if the appeal waiver did not preclude this\\nargument, the record of the plea and sentencing hearing\\nshows Johnson deliberately abandoned his position that the\\nrestitution figure should be less. See United States v. Hathaway,\\n882 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding defendant waived\\nand did not just forfeit any objections to calculation of restitu-\\ntion amount).\\n In sum, Johnson’s circumstances do not present a due pro-\\ncess exception to the rule that most written appeal waivers are\\neffective. Although there are limits to an appeal waiver, see\\nBownes, 405 F.3d at 637, Johnson does not fall outside them.\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 9\\n\\n Johnson’s appeal waiver resolves this case. For the reasons\\ndiscussed, we DISMISS this appeal.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3884,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654061,"string":"4,654,061"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Curtis L. Johnson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2350"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2350\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCURTIS L. JOHNSON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00053 — Michael J. Reagan, District Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. During an in-chambers confer-\\nence among court and counsel, Curtis Johnson’s attorney\\nwithdrew an objection to the restitution amount to be paid to\\nthe victims of his client’s wire fraud. Johnson was not present.\\nThen, in open court, Johnson confirmed he no longer disputed\\nrestitution, recognized the plea agreement included an appeal\\nwaiver, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. Johnson now\\nchallenges his sentence, arguing he did not waive this appeal\\n\\f2 No. 18-2350\\n\\nand his sentence is unconstitutional because he was not pre-\\nsent when his attorney dropped the restitution objection. We\\nuphold the appeal waiver and dismiss Johnson’s appeal.\\n I\\n For almost three years, Johnson managed financial and\\nproduction operations for a business that produces hand rails\\nin Fishers, Indiana owned by the Tuttle family. 1 He kept the\\nbooks, paid vendors, purchased equipment, and entered into\\nloan agreements for the company, so he had access to and sig-\\nnature authority for the company’s bank accounts and the\\ncompany’s credit.\\n During that time Johnson defrauded the company by us-\\ning its funds and credit card for personal expenses, including\\na hot tub and three “company” cars for his family members.\\nHe wired money directly from the company’s bank account\\ninto his personal bank account, and he obtained company\\nloans from which he skimmed some proceeds.\\n The company discovered Johnson’s fraud and fired him,\\nbut the damage was done. The business had to pay back the\\nloans, and the owners were forced to use personal retirement\\nand college savings to ward off creditors. The Tuttle family\\nultimately lost its business.\\n Johnson was indicted on eight counts of wire and mail\\nfraud. He eventually pleaded guilty to one count of wire\\nfraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The plea agreement\\n\\n\\n 1 Johnson’s titles were chief operating officer and chief financial officer\\n\\nof Tuttle Aluminum and Bronze Co., Inc. and of Tuttle Railing Systems, a\\ndivision of Tuttle Aluminum, which we refer to collectively as “the com-\\npany.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 3\\n\\ncontained an appeal waiver. It also stated the government’s\\nposition that Johnson owed restitution totaling $211,428.80,\\ncomprised of credit card purchases, vehicle payments, cash\\nwithdrawals, wire transfers, and diverted loan proceeds.\\nJohnson agreed he owed the victims restitution, but he dis-\\nputed the amount.\\n The presentence investigation report adopted the govern-\\nment’s restitution calculation. Johnson never submitted a sen-\\ntencing memorandum, and he has never specified his own\\nrestitution figure. At one point he hypothesized that a loss\\nrange between $40,000 and $95,000 would result in a lesser\\noffense level, but ultimately provided no calculation detailing\\nwhat he believed that figure should be.\\n Johnson’s guilty plea and sentencing took place at the\\nsame hearing, during which the victims of Johnson’s crime\\naddressed the court. Before the hearing, the district judge met\\nwith counsel for the government and the defendant in cham-\\nbers and off the record. Then, on the record early in the\\nhearing, the court reviewed the plea agreement with Johnson,\\nnoting the in-chambers conference:\\n THE COURT: My understanding, in meeting\\n with counsel off the record, is that the amount\\n of restitution and loss is not in dispute now; is\\n that correct?\\n [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, Your\\n Honor.\\n THE COURT: … So restitution in the amount of\\n $211,428.80 plus interest will be ordered, … Do\\n you understand all of that?\\n THE DEFENDANT: Yes.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2350\\n\\nThe court also reviewed with Johnson terms in the plea agree-\\nment, including his previous dispute with the restitution\\namount:\\n THE COURT: Next, over on page 6, there’s a\\n sentence regarding restitution. This indicates\\n that restitution is in dispute. It is no longer in\\n dispute; correct?\\n THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, yes.\\nThe district court also twice reviewed with Johnson the\\nwaiver of his right to appeal, which provided:\\n Direct Appeal:\\n … in exchange for the concessions made by the\\n Government in this Plea Agreement, … [t]he de-\\n fendant further agrees that in the event the\\n Court sentences the defendant to [a] sentence\\n within the applicable Advisory Guidelines\\n Range as calculated by the Court at sentencing,\\n … then the defendant expressly waives the de-\\n fendant’s right to appeal the sentence imposed\\n in this case on any ground, …\\n The court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea and adopted the\\npresentence report’s proposed guideline range of 21 to 27\\nmonths. In his allocution, Johnson told the court, “I under-\\nstand the restitution and, if given the opportunity, I will repay\\nall of that.“ Since the company fired him, Johnson had bought\\ninto a small-town accounting practice and was earning some\\nmoney. The district court noted in its sentencing remarks the\\ntension between incarceration and securing restitution for the\\nvictims through Johnson’s private sector earnings. After a\\nthorough and complete hearing, the district court sentenced\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 5\\n\\nJohnson to 21 months’ imprisonment and ordered $211,428.80\\nin restitution, plus interest.\\n Johnson appeals. 2 According to him, the appeal waiver in\\nthe plea agreement should not preclude this challenge, as he\\nwas “sentenced unconstitutionally.” Johnson contends the\\noff-the-record, in-chambers conference was an integral part of\\nhis sentencing hearing, so his absence violated his constitu-\\ntional right to be present at sentencing. He also asserts he did\\nnot waive any arguments about the restitution, or his right to\\nattend the in-chambers conference.\\n II\\n A defendant may waive the right to appeal his sentence.\\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). We review de novo the en-\\nforceability of an appeal waiver in a plea agreement. United\\nStates v. Alcala, 678 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omit-\\nted). “A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and know-\\ning.” United States v. Galloway, 917 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2019)\\n(citing United States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.\\n2016). “A written appellate waiver signed by the defendant\\nwill typically be voluntary and knowing, and thus enforcea-\\nble through dismissal of a subsequent appeal.” Id. (citation\\nomitted).\\n\\n\\n 2 Johnson’s notice of appeal challenges the judgment of conviction in\\nthis case, and the conclusion of Johnson’s principal brief asks this court to\\nreverse and vacate his conviction and remand for further proceedings. But\\nthe arguments in Johnson’s briefs challenge only his sentence, not the vol-\\nuntariness of his guilty plea or any other aspect of his conviction. This dis-\\ncrepancy is not material given our conclusion that Johnson waived this\\nappeal.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2350\\n\\n We interpret the terms of a plea agreement ‘‘according to\\nthe parties’ reasonable expectations and construe any ambi-\\nguities in the light most favorable to the defendant.’’ United\\nStates v. Shah, 665 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United\\nStates v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 2010)). We also\\nconsider the plea colloquy, evaluating whether the district\\ncourt ‘‘properly informed the defendant that the waiver may\\nbar the right to appeal.’’ Id. (with same citation).\\n The written plea agreement signed by Johnson included\\nthe appeal waiver. He was sentenced within the guidelines\\nrange to 21 months, so per the plea agreement he “expressly\\nwaive[d his] right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case\\non any ground.” “[R]estitution is part of a sentence,” United\\nStates v. Perillo, 897 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations\\nomitted), so the waiver language includes Johnson’s chal-\\nlenge to that figure. See United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499,\\n502 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because restitution is part of a criminal\\nsentence, and [the defendant] agreed not to challenge the sen-\\ntence, he may not appeal the restitution order.”) (citation\\nomitted).\\n Johnson argues his circumstances fall into a due process\\nexception to the appeal waiver. A defendant’s presence “is a\\ncondition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hear-\\ning would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent\\nonly.” United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per cu-\\nriam) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).\\nBecause restitution was the only issue remaining in the case\\nwhen he pleaded guilty and was sentenced—as evidenced by\\nhim not stipulating to the government’s restitution figure in\\nthe plea agreement—to uphold the waiver on that question,\\nhe submits, would depart from the “minimum of civilized\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 7\\n\\nprocedure.” See United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (holding an appeal waiver will not prevent a\\ndefendant from challenging “some minimum of civilized pro-\\ncedure”).\\n Johnson also contends he focused his energies and defense\\non the restitution debate, so that issue must be of a constitu-\\ntional magnitude. But due process violations do not turn on a\\ndefendant’s subjective valuation of the alleged error. Rather,\\nto resurrect a right to an appeal this court has recognized\\n“fundamental errors,” United States v. Kratz, 179 F.3d 1039,\\n1042 (7th Cir. 1999). But this case does not present any of the\\nrecognized examples of procedural defects marring a sen-\\ntence with fundamental error, such as a sentence based on the\\ndefendant’s race, or which exceeds the statutory maximum\\nfor the defendant’s particular crime. See Adkins, 743 F.3d at\\n192–93 (citing United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th\\nCir. 2005)). For example, in Adkins the defendant’s sentence\\nincluded a special condition that prohibited “view[ing] or lis-\\nten[ing] to” certain materials “or patroniz[ing] locations\\nwhere such material is available,” which this court invali-\\ndated as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 743 F.3d at\\n194. That is far afield from the detailed and substantiated res-\\ntitution figure Johnson opposes.\\n There is no fundamental error here. At the plea and sen-\\ntencing hearing, the district court reviewed with Johnson in\\ndetail what the appeal waiver meant. The court also gave ex-\\namples of reasons that Johnson could still appeal despite the\\nwaiver, such as prosecutorial misconduct or a retroactive ben-\\neficial amendment to the sentencing guidelines. Johnson said\\nhe understood it would be difficult to pursue such an appeal\\nand acknowledged the slim chances of success. And in\\n\\f8 No. 18-2350\\n\\nexchange for his promises in the plea agreement—including\\nthe appeal waiver—Johnson obtained dismissal of seven of\\nthe eight counts in the indictment. See United States v. Wenger,\\n58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Defendant] exchanged the\\nright to appeal for prosecutorial concessions; he cannot have\\nhis cake and eat it too.”)\\n Next, Johnson claims he did not intentionally relinquish\\nany arguments about the restitution amount. We construe\\nwaiver principles liberally in favor of defendants. United\\nStates v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2005) (cita-\\ntions omitted). But the topic of restitution arose approxi-\\nmately twenty times during the plea and sentencing hearing.\\nThough Johnson spoke numerous times during the nearly\\none-hour hearing, he did not object to his absence from the in-\\nchambers meeting, or to the court’s statement that the dispute\\nabout the restitution amount had been resolved. Despite nu-\\nmerous opportunities to dispute the amount of restitution\\nowed, Johnson never spoke up to contest that figure.\\n Indeed, shortly after Johnson was placed under oath, he\\nexpressly agreed to the precise restitution amount of\\n$211,428.80. So even if the appeal waiver did not preclude this\\nargument, the record of the plea and sentencing hearing\\nshows Johnson deliberately abandoned his position that the\\nrestitution figure should be less. See United States v. Hathaway,\\n882 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding defendant waived\\nand did not just forfeit any objections to calculation of restitu-\\ntion amount).\\n In sum, Johnson’s circumstances do not present a due pro-\\ncess exception to the rule that most written appeal waivers are\\neffective. Although there are limits to an appeal waiver, see\\nBownes, 405 F.3d at 637, Johnson does not fall outside them.\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 9\\n\\n Johnson’s appeal waiver resolves this case. For the reasons\\ndiscussed, we DISMISS this appeal.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431314/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"EASTERBROOK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"EASTERBROOK\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654061/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Curtis L. Johnson\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2350\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nCURTIS L. JOHNSON,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\n No. 1:16-cr-00053 — Michael J. Reagan, District Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. During an in-chambers confer-\nence among court and counsel, Curtis Johnson’s attorney\nwithdrew an objection to the restitution amount to be paid to\nthe victims of his client’s wire fraud. Johnson was not present.\nThen, in open court, Johnson confirmed he no longer disputed\nrestitution, recognized the plea agreement included an appeal\nwaiver, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. Johnson now\nchallenges his sentence, arguing he did not waive this appeal\n\f2 No. 18-2350\n\nand his sentence is unconstitutional because he was not pre-\nsent when his attorney dropped the restitution objection. We\nuphold the appeal waiver and dismiss Johnson’s appeal.\n I\n For almost three years, Johnson managed financial and\nproduction operations for a business that produces hand rails\nin Fishers, Indiana owned by the Tuttle family. 1 He kept the\nbooks, paid vendors, purchased equipment, and entered into\nloan agreements for the company, so he had access to and sig-\nnature authority for the company’s bank accounts and the\ncompany’s credit.\n During that time Johnson defrauded the company by us-\ning its funds and credit card for personal expenses, including\na hot tub and three “company” cars for his family members.\nHe wired money directly from the company’s bank account\ninto his personal bank account, and he obtained company\nloans from which he skimmed some proceeds.\n The company discovered Johnson’s fraud and fired him,\nbut the damage was done. The business had to pay back the\nloans, and the owners were forced to use personal retirement\nand college savings to ward off creditors. The Tuttle family\nultimately lost its business.\n Johnson was indicted on eight counts of wire and mail\nfraud. He eventually pleaded guilty to one count of wire\nfraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The plea agreement\n\n\n 1 Johnson’s titles were chief operating officer and chief financial officer\n\nof Tuttle Aluminum and Bronze Co., Inc. and of Tuttle Railing Systems, a\ndivision of Tuttle Aluminum, which we refer to collectively as “the com-\npany.”\n\fNo. 18-2350 3\n\ncontained an appeal waiver. It also stated the government’s\nposition that Johnson owed restitution totaling $211,428.80,\ncomprised of credit card purchases, vehicle payments, cash\nwithdrawals, wire transfers, and diverted loan proceeds.\nJohnson agreed he owed the victims restitution, but he dis-\nputed the amount.\n The presentence investigation report adopted the govern-\nment’s restitution calculation. Johnson never submitted a sen-\ntencing memorandum, and he has never specified his own\nrestitution figure. At one point he hypothesized that a loss\nrange between $40,000 and $95,000 would result in a lesser\noffense level, but ultimately provided no calculation detailing\nwhat he believed that figure should be.\n Johnson’s guilty plea and sentencing took place at the\nsame hearing, during which the victims of Johnson’s crime\naddressed the court. Before the hearing, the district judge met\nwith counsel for the government and the defendant in cham-\nbers and off the record. Then, on the record early in the\nhearing, the court reviewed the plea agreement with Johnson,\nnoting the in-chambers conference:\n THE COURT: My understanding, in meeting\n with counsel off the record, is that the amount\n of restitution and loss is not in dispute now; is\n that correct?\n [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, Your\n Honor.\n THE COURT: … So restitution in the amount of\n $211,428.80 plus interest will be ordered, … Do\n you understand all of that?\n THE DEFENDANT: Yes.\n\f4 No. 18-2350\n\nThe court also reviewed with Johnson terms in the plea agree-\nment, including his previous dispute with the restitution\namount:\n THE COURT: Next, over on page 6, there’s a\n sentence regarding restitution. This indicates\n that restitution is in dispute. It is no longer in\n dispute; correct?\n THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, yes.\nThe district court also twice reviewed with Johnson the\nwaiver of his right to appeal, which provided:\n Direct Appeal:\n … in exchange for the concessions made by the\n Government in this Plea Agreement, … [t]he de-\n fendant further agrees that in the event the\n Court sentences the defendant to [a] sentence\n within the applicable Advisory Guidelines\n Range as calculated by the Court at sentencing,\n … then the defendant expressly waives the de-\n fendant’s right to appeal the sentence imposed\n in this case on any ground, …\n The court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea and adopted the\npresentence report’s proposed guideline range of 21 to 27\nmonths. In his allocution, Johnson told the court, “I under-\nstand the restitution and, if given the opportunity, I will repay\nall of that.“ Since the company fired him, Johnson had bought\ninto a small-town accounting practice and was earning some\nmoney. The district court noted in its sentencing remarks the\ntension between incarceration and securing restitution for the\nvictims through Johnson’s private sector earnings. After a\nthorough and complete hearing, the district court sentenced\n\fNo. 18-2350 5\n\nJohnson to 21 months’ imprisonment and ordered $211,428.80\nin restitution, plus interest.\n Johnson appeals. 2 According to him, the appeal waiver in\nthe plea agreement should not preclude this challenge, as he\nwas “sentenced unconstitutionally.” Johnson contends the\noff-the-record, in-chambers conference was an integral part of\nhis sentencing hearing, so his absence violated his constitu-\ntional right to be present at sentencing. He also asserts he did\nnot waive any arguments about the restitution, or his right to\nattend the in-chambers conference.\n II\n A defendant may waive the right to appeal his sentence.\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). We review de novo the en-\nforceability of an appeal waiver in a plea agreement. United\nStates v. Alcala, 678 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omit-\nted). “A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and know-\ning.” United States v. Galloway, 917 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2019)\n(citing United States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.\n2016). “A written appellate waiver signed by the defendant\nwill typically be voluntary and knowing, and thus enforcea-\nble through dismissal of a subsequent appeal.” Id. (citation\nomitted).\n\n\n 2 Johnson’s notice of appeal challenges the judgment of conviction in\nthis case, and the conclusion of Johnson’s principal brief asks this court to\nreverse and vacate his conviction and remand for further proceedings. But\nthe arguments in Johnson’s briefs challenge only his sentence, not the vol-\nuntariness of his guilty plea or any other aspect of his conviction. This dis-\ncrepancy is not material given our conclusion that Johnson waived this\nappeal.\n\f6 No. 18-2350\n\n We interpret the terms of a plea agreement ‘‘according to\nthe parties’ reasonable expectations and construe any ambi-\nguities in the light most favorable to the defendant.’’ United\nStates v. Shah, 665 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United\nStates v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 2010)). We also\nconsider the plea colloquy, evaluating whether the district\ncourt ‘‘properly informed the defendant that the waiver may\nbar the right to appeal.’’ Id. (with same citation).\n The written plea agreement signed by Johnson included\nthe appeal waiver. He was sentenced within the guidelines\nrange to 21 months, so per the plea agreement he “expressly\nwaive[d his] right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case\non any ground.” “[R]estitution is part of a sentence,” United\nStates v. Perillo, 897 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations\nomitted), so the waiver language includes Johnson’s chal-\nlenge to that figure. See United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499,\n502 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because restitution is part of a criminal\nsentence, and [the defendant] agreed not to challenge the sen-\ntence, he may not appeal the restitution order.”) (citation\nomitted).\n Johnson argues his circumstances fall into a due process\nexception to the appeal waiver. A defendant’s presence “is a\ncondition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hear-\ning would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent\nonly.” United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per cu-\nriam) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).\nBecause restitution was the only issue remaining in the case\nwhen he pleaded guilty and was sentenced—as evidenced by\nhim not stipulating to the government’s restitution figure in\nthe plea agreement—to uphold the waiver on that question,\nhe submits, would depart from the “minimum of civilized\n\fNo. 18-2350 7\n\nprocedure.” See United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93\n(7th Cir. 2014) (holding an appeal waiver will not prevent a\ndefendant from challenging “some minimum of civilized pro-\ncedure”).\n Johnson also contends he focused his energies and defense\non the restitution debate, so that issue must be of a constitu-\ntional magnitude. But due process violations do not turn on a\ndefendant’s subjective valuation of the alleged error. Rather,\nto resurrect a right to an appeal this court has recognized\n“fundamental errors,” United States v. Kratz, 179 F.3d 1039,\n1042 (7th Cir. 1999). But this case does not present any of the\nrecognized examples of procedural defects marring a sen-\ntence with fundamental error, such as a sentence based on the\ndefendant’s race, or which exceeds the statutory maximum\nfor the defendant’s particular crime. See Adkins, 743 F.3d at\n192–93 (citing United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th\nCir. 2005)). For example, in Adkins the defendant’s sentence\nincluded a special condition that prohibited “view[ing] or lis-\nten[ing] to” certain materials “or patroniz[ing] locations\nwhere such material is available,” which this court invali-\ndated as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 743 F.3d at\n194. That is far afield from the detailed and substantiated res-\ntitution figure Johnson opposes.\n There is no fundamental error here. At the plea and sen-\ntencing hearing, the district court reviewed with Johnson in\ndetail what the appeal waiver meant. The court also gave ex-\namples of reasons that Johnson could still appeal despite the\nwaiver, such as prosecutorial misconduct or a retroactive ben-\neficial amendment to the sentencing guidelines. Johnson said\nhe understood it would be difficult to pursue such an appeal\nand acknowledged the slim chances of success. And in\n\f8 No. 18-2350\n\nexchange for his promises in the plea agreement—including\nthe appeal waiver—Johnson obtained dismissal of seven of\nthe eight counts in the indictment. See United States v. Wenger,\n58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Defendant] exchanged the\nright to appeal for prosecutorial concessions; he cannot have\nhis cake and eat it too.”)\n Next, Johnson claims he did not intentionally relinquish\nany arguments about the restitution amount. We construe\nwaiver principles liberally in favor of defendants. United\nStates v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2005) (cita-\ntions omitted). But the topic of restitution arose approxi-\nmately twenty times during the plea and sentencing hearing.\nThough Johnson spoke numerous times during the nearly\none-hour hearing, he did not object to his absence from the in-\nchambers meeting, or to the court’s statement that the dispute\nabout the restitution amount had been resolved. Despite nu-\nmerous opportunities to dispute the amount of restitution\nowed, Johnson never spoke up to contest that figure.\n Indeed, shortly after Johnson was placed under oath, he\nexpressly agreed to the precise restitution amount of\n$211,428.80. So even if the appeal waiver did not preclude this\nargument, the record of the plea and sentencing hearing\nshows Johnson deliberately abandoned his position that the\nrestitution figure should be less. See United States v. Hathaway,\n882 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding defendant waived\nand did not just forfeit any objections to calculation of restitu-\ntion amount).\n In sum, Johnson’s circumstances do not present a due pro-\ncess exception to the rule that most written appeal waivers are\neffective. Although there are limits to an appeal waiver, see\nBownes, 405 F.3d at 637, Johnson does not fall outside them.\n\fNo. 18-2350 9\n\n Johnson’s appeal waiver resolves this case. For the reasons\ndiscussed, we DISMISS this appeal.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Curtis L. Johnson\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2350\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCURTIS L. JOHNSON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.\\n No. 1:16-cr-00053 — Michael J. Reagan, District Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 1, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. During an in-chambers confer-\\nence among court and counsel, Curtis Johnson’s attorney\\nwithdrew an objection to the restitution amount to be paid to\\nthe victims of his client’s wire fraud. Johnson was not present.\\nThen, in open court, Johnson confirmed he no longer disputed\\nrestitution, recognized the plea agreement included an appeal\\nwaiver, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. Johnson now\\nchallenges his sentence, arguing he did not waive this appeal\\n\\f2 No. 18-2350\\n\\nand his sentence is unconstitutional because he was not pre-\\nsent when his attorney dropped the restitution objection. We\\nuphold the appeal waiver and dismiss Johnson’s appeal.\\n I\\n For almost three years, Johnson managed financial and\\nproduction operations for a business that produces hand rails\\nin Fishers, Indiana owned by the Tuttle family. 1 He kept the\\nbooks, paid vendors, purchased equipment, and entered into\\nloan agreements for the company, so he had access to and sig-\\nnature authority for the company’s bank accounts and the\\ncompany’s credit.\\n During that time Johnson defrauded the company by us-\\ning its funds and credit card for personal expenses, including\\na hot tub and three “company” cars for his family members.\\nHe wired money directly from the company’s bank account\\ninto his personal bank account, and he obtained company\\nloans from which he skimmed some proceeds.\\n The company discovered Johnson’s fraud and fired him,\\nbut the damage was done. The business had to pay back the\\nloans, and the owners were forced to use personal retirement\\nand college savings to ward off creditors. The Tuttle family\\nultimately lost its business.\\n Johnson was indicted on eight counts of wire and mail\\nfraud. He eventually pleaded guilty to one count of wire\\nfraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The plea agreement\\n\\n\\n 1 Johnson’s titles were chief operating officer and chief financial officer\\n\\nof Tuttle Aluminum and Bronze Co., Inc. and of Tuttle Railing Systems, a\\ndivision of Tuttle Aluminum, which we refer to collectively as “the com-\\npany.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 3\\n\\ncontained an appeal waiver. It also stated the government’s\\nposition that Johnson owed restitution totaling $211,428.80,\\ncomprised of credit card purchases, vehicle payments, cash\\nwithdrawals, wire transfers, and diverted loan proceeds.\\nJohnson agreed he owed the victims restitution, but he dis-\\nputed the amount.\\n The presentence investigation report adopted the govern-\\nment’s restitution calculation. Johnson never submitted a sen-\\ntencing memorandum, and he has never specified his own\\nrestitution figure. At one point he hypothesized that a loss\\nrange between $40,000 and $95,000 would result in a lesser\\noffense level, but ultimately provided no calculation detailing\\nwhat he believed that figure should be.\\n Johnson’s guilty plea and sentencing took place at the\\nsame hearing, during which the victims of Johnson’s crime\\naddressed the court. Before the hearing, the district judge met\\nwith counsel for the government and the defendant in cham-\\nbers and off the record. Then, on the record early in the\\nhearing, the court reviewed the plea agreement with Johnson,\\nnoting the in-chambers conference:\\n THE COURT: My understanding, in meeting\\n with counsel off the record, is that the amount\\n of restitution and loss is not in dispute now; is\\n that correct?\\n [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, Your\\n Honor.\\n THE COURT: … So restitution in the amount of\\n $211,428.80 plus interest will be ordered, … Do\\n you understand all of that?\\n THE DEFENDANT: Yes.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2350\\n\\nThe court also reviewed with Johnson terms in the plea agree-\\nment, including his previous dispute with the restitution\\namount:\\n THE COURT: Next, over on page 6, there’s a\\n sentence regarding restitution. This indicates\\n that restitution is in dispute. It is no longer in\\n dispute; correct?\\n THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, yes.\\nThe district court also twice reviewed with Johnson the\\nwaiver of his right to appeal, which provided:\\n Direct Appeal:\\n … in exchange for the concessions made by the\\n Government in this Plea Agreement, … [t]he de-\\n fendant further agrees that in the event the\\n Court sentences the defendant to [a] sentence\\n within the applicable Advisory Guidelines\\n Range as calculated by the Court at sentencing,\\n … then the defendant expressly waives the de-\\n fendant’s right to appeal the sentence imposed\\n in this case on any ground, …\\n The court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea and adopted the\\npresentence report’s proposed guideline range of 21 to 27\\nmonths. In his allocution, Johnson told the court, “I under-\\nstand the restitution and, if given the opportunity, I will repay\\nall of that.“ Since the company fired him, Johnson had bought\\ninto a small-town accounting practice and was earning some\\nmoney. The district court noted in its sentencing remarks the\\ntension between incarceration and securing restitution for the\\nvictims through Johnson’s private sector earnings. After a\\nthorough and complete hearing, the district court sentenced\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 5\\n\\nJohnson to 21 months’ imprisonment and ordered $211,428.80\\nin restitution, plus interest.\\n Johnson appeals. 2 According to him, the appeal waiver in\\nthe plea agreement should not preclude this challenge, as he\\nwas “sentenced unconstitutionally.” Johnson contends the\\noff-the-record, in-chambers conference was an integral part of\\nhis sentencing hearing, so his absence violated his constitu-\\ntional right to be present at sentencing. He also asserts he did\\nnot waive any arguments about the restitution, or his right to\\nattend the in-chambers conference.\\n II\\n A defendant may waive the right to appeal his sentence.\\nSee FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). We review de novo the en-\\nforceability of an appeal waiver in a plea agreement. United\\nStates v. Alcala, 678 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omit-\\nted). “A defendant may waive appellate rights through a plea\\nagreement, assuming such waiver is voluntary and know-\\ning.” United States v. Galloway, 917 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2019)\\n(citing United States v. Worthen, 842 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.\\n2016). “A written appellate waiver signed by the defendant\\nwill typically be voluntary and knowing, and thus enforcea-\\nble through dismissal of a subsequent appeal.” Id. (citation\\nomitted).\\n\\n\\n 2 Johnson’s notice of appeal challenges the judgment of conviction in\\nthis case, and the conclusion of Johnson’s principal brief asks this court to\\nreverse and vacate his conviction and remand for further proceedings. But\\nthe arguments in Johnson’s briefs challenge only his sentence, not the vol-\\nuntariness of his guilty plea or any other aspect of his conviction. This dis-\\ncrepancy is not material given our conclusion that Johnson waived this\\nappeal.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2350\\n\\n We interpret the terms of a plea agreement ‘‘according to\\nthe parties’ reasonable expectations and construe any ambi-\\nguities in the light most favorable to the defendant.’’ United\\nStates v. Shah, 665 F.3d 827, 837 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United\\nStates v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 2010)). We also\\nconsider the plea colloquy, evaluating whether the district\\ncourt ‘‘properly informed the defendant that the waiver may\\nbar the right to appeal.’’ Id. (with same citation).\\n The written plea agreement signed by Johnson included\\nthe appeal waiver. He was sentenced within the guidelines\\nrange to 21 months, so per the plea agreement he “expressly\\nwaive[d his] right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case\\non any ground.” “[R]estitution is part of a sentence,” United\\nStates v. Perillo, 897 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations\\nomitted), so the waiver language includes Johnson’s chal-\\nlenge to that figure. See United States v. Worden, 646 F.3d 499,\\n502 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because restitution is part of a criminal\\nsentence, and [the defendant] agreed not to challenge the sen-\\ntence, he may not appeal the restitution order.”) (citation\\nomitted).\\n Johnson argues his circumstances fall into a due process\\nexception to the appeal waiver. A defendant’s presence “is a\\ncondition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hear-\\ning would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent\\nonly.” United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per cu-\\nriam) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).\\nBecause restitution was the only issue remaining in the case\\nwhen he pleaded guilty and was sentenced—as evidenced by\\nhim not stipulating to the government’s restitution figure in\\nthe plea agreement—to uphold the waiver on that question,\\nhe submits, would depart from the “minimum of civilized\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 7\\n\\nprocedure.” See United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 192–93\\n(7th Cir. 2014) (holding an appeal waiver will not prevent a\\ndefendant from challenging “some minimum of civilized pro-\\ncedure”).\\n Johnson also contends he focused his energies and defense\\non the restitution debate, so that issue must be of a constitu-\\ntional magnitude. But due process violations do not turn on a\\ndefendant’s subjective valuation of the alleged error. Rather,\\nto resurrect a right to an appeal this court has recognized\\n“fundamental errors,” United States v. Kratz, 179 F.3d 1039,\\n1042 (7th Cir. 1999). But this case does not present any of the\\nrecognized examples of procedural defects marring a sen-\\ntence with fundamental error, such as a sentence based on the\\ndefendant’s race, or which exceeds the statutory maximum\\nfor the defendant’s particular crime. See Adkins, 743 F.3d at\\n192–93 (citing United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th\\nCir. 2005)). For example, in Adkins the defendant’s sentence\\nincluded a special condition that prohibited “view[ing] or lis-\\nten[ing] to” certain materials “or patroniz[ing] locations\\nwhere such material is available,” which this court invali-\\ndated as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 743 F.3d at\\n194. That is far afield from the detailed and substantiated res-\\ntitution figure Johnson opposes.\\n There is no fundamental error here. At the plea and sen-\\ntencing hearing, the district court reviewed with Johnson in\\ndetail what the appeal waiver meant. The court also gave ex-\\namples of reasons that Johnson could still appeal despite the\\nwaiver, such as prosecutorial misconduct or a retroactive ben-\\neficial amendment to the sentencing guidelines. Johnson said\\nhe understood it would be difficult to pursue such an appeal\\nand acknowledged the slim chances of success. And in\\n\\f8 No. 18-2350\\n\\nexchange for his promises in the plea agreement—including\\nthe appeal waiver—Johnson obtained dismissal of seven of\\nthe eight counts in the indictment. See United States v. Wenger,\\n58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Defendant] exchanged the\\nright to appeal for prosecutorial concessions; he cannot have\\nhis cake and eat it too.”)\\n Next, Johnson claims he did not intentionally relinquish\\nany arguments about the restitution amount. We construe\\nwaiver principles liberally in favor of defendants. United\\nStates v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2005) (cita-\\ntions omitted). But the topic of restitution arose approxi-\\nmately twenty times during the plea and sentencing hearing.\\nThough Johnson spoke numerous times during the nearly\\none-hour hearing, he did not object to his absence from the in-\\nchambers meeting, or to the court’s statement that the dispute\\nabout the restitution amount had been resolved. Despite nu-\\nmerous opportunities to dispute the amount of restitution\\nowed, Johnson never spoke up to contest that figure.\\n Indeed, shortly after Johnson was placed under oath, he\\nexpressly agreed to the precise restitution amount of\\n$211,428.80. So even if the appeal waiver did not preclude this\\nargument, the record of the plea and sentencing hearing\\nshows Johnson deliberately abandoned his position that the\\nrestitution figure should be less. See United States v. Hathaway,\\n882 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding defendant waived\\nand did not just forfeit any objections to calculation of restitu-\\ntion amount).\\n In sum, Johnson’s circumstances do not present a due pro-\\ncess exception to the rule that most written appeal waivers are\\neffective. Although there are limits to an appeal waiver, see\\nBownes, 405 F.3d at 637, Johnson does not fall outside them.\\n\\fNo. 18-2350 9\\n\\n Johnson’s appeal waiver resolves this case. For the reasons\\ndiscussed, we DISMISS this appeal.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3885,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654063,"string":"4,654,063"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Holly B. VANZANT and Dana Land, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HILL'S PET NUTRITION, INC., and PetSmart, Inc., Defendants-Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Holly Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Incorpo"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3633"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Flaum, Manion, Sykes\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3633\\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\\nDANA LAND, on behalf of themselves\\nand all others similarly situated,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nHILL’S PET NUTRITION, INC., and\\nPETSMART, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17-cv-2535 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Holly Vanzant and Dana Land own\\ncats with health problems. Their veterinarians prescribed cat\\nfood manufactured by Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., and sold\\nunder Hill’s “Prescription Diet” brand. For several years\\nVanzant and Land purchased this higher-priced cat food\\n\\f2 No. 17-3633\\n\\nfrom their local PetSmart stores using their veterinarian’s\\nprescriptions. They eventually learned, however, that the\\nPrescription Diet cat food is not materially different from\\nnonprescription cat food. And the prescription requirement\\nis illusory; no prescription is necessary. Feeling deceived,\\nVanzant and Land filed a class-action lawsuit against Hill’s\\nand PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Con-\\nsumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq., and for unjust enrichment.\\n The district judge dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim for two reasons: (1) the complaint lacked the specificity\\nrequired for a fraud claim; and (2) the claim is barred by a\\nstatutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by a\\nregulatory body—here, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-\\ntion (“FDA”). The judge dismissed the unjust-enrichment\\nclaim because it was premised on the same conduct as the\\nstatutory claim.\\n We reverse. First, the safe-harbor provision does not\\napply. Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., pet food intended to treat or prevent disease\\nand marketed as such is considered a drug and requires\\napproval of a new animal drug application. Without FDA\\napproval, the manufacturer may not sell it in interstate\\ncommerce and the product is deemed adulterated and\\nmisbranded. The FDA issued guidance recognizing that\\nmost pet-food products in this category do not have the\\nrequired approval; the guidance states that the agency is less\\nlikely to initiate an enforcement action if consumers\\npurchase the food through or under the direction of a\\nveterinarian (among other factors guiding the agency’s\\nenforcement discretion). But the guidance does not\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 3\\n\\nspecifically authorize the conduct alleged here, so the safe\\nharbor does not apply.\\n And the plaintiffs pleaded the fraud claim with the par-\\nticularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil\\nProcedure. So the statutory claim may proceed. The unjust-\\nenrichment claim is more appropriately construed as a\\nrequest for relief in the form of restitution based on the\\nalleged fraud. In Illinois unjust enrichment is not a separate\\ncause of action but is a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d\\n725, 741 (7th Cir. 2017). The request for restitution based on\\nunjust enrichment therefore rests entirely on the consumer-\\nfraud claim, and it too may move forward.\\n I. Background\\n The case comes to us from a dismissal at the pleadings\\nstage, so we recount the facts as alleged in the amended\\ncomplaint. Hill’s Pet Nutrition manufactures a variety of pet\\nfood, and this case concerns its Prescription Diet brand.\\nHill’s sells its Prescription Diet pet food through veterinari-\\nans and pet-food retailers, though consumers may purchase\\nit from a retailer only with a veterinarian’s prescription.\\nPetSmart sells pet supplies and pet food, including Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet brand. Consumers need a veterinarian’s\\nprescription to purchase Hill’s Prescription Diet food at\\nPetSmart.\\n In January 2013 Holly Vanzant’s cat Tarik underwent\\nemergency surgery for bladder stones. At a follow-up\\nappointment, Tarik’s veterinarian prescribed Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet c/d Multicare Feline Bladder Health cat\\nfood. That same day Vanzant purchased the food at a\\n\\f4 No. 17-3633\\n\\nPetSmart store. Inside she saw marketing materials\\nindicating that the cat food is “prescription only,” and the\\nlabel on the bag read “Hill’s Prescription Diet.” PetSmart\\nprovided her with a pet prescription card listing Tarik’s\\nname, prescription number, and prescription date. For three\\nyears Vanzant purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food\\nfrom PetSmart, paying a higher price than for\\nnonprescription food. She showed the prescription card to\\nthe cashier each time.\\n Land had a similar experience. In October 2013 a veteri-\\nnarian diagnosed her cat Chief with diabetes and prescribed\\nHill’s Prescription Diet m/d Feline Glucose/Weight Man-\\nagement cat food. Within a few weeks, Land purchased\\nHill’s Prescription Diet cat food at a PetSmart store. She too\\nsaw marketing materials inside the store indicating that the\\nfood is meant to treat or control diabetes. PetSmart provided\\nLand with a pet prescription card listing Chief’s name,\\nprescription number, and prescription date. For two years\\nLand purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart, paying a higher price than for nonprescription\\nfood. She too showed the prescription card each time.\\n Vanzant and Land eventually learned they were not re-\\nceiving what they expected. They thought prescription pet\\nfood was medically necessary for the health of their pets,\\nhad been approved by the FDA, and could not be sold\\nlegally without a prescription. But the FDA had not ap-\\nproved it, and nothing required that it be sold with a pre-\\nscription. They filed a proposed class action in state court\\nagainst Hill’s and PetSmart alleging claims for violation of\\nthe Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and unjust enrichment. The\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 5\\n\\ndefendants removed the case to federal court and moved to\\ndismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6).\\n The judge granted the motion. He held that the\\nConsumer Fraud Act claim is foreclosed by the statute’s safe-\\nharbor provision, which shields actions authorized by laws\\nadministered by a regulatory body. Specifically, the judge\\nrelied on an FDA Compliance Policy Guide, which he\\nconstrued as regulatory authorization for “the gate-keeping\\nrole of veterinarians in ensuring that pet owners purchase\\nonly appropriate therapeutic foods.” The judge also\\nconcluded that Vanzant and Land failed to plead the\\nconsumer-fraud claim with the particularity required by\\nRule 9(b). With no underlying fraud claim remaining, the\\njudge likewise dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim.\\nVanzant and Land appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review the dismissal order de novo. Camasta v. Jos. A.\\nBank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain\\n“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable\\ninference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct\\nalleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At a\\nminimum it “must give enough details about the subject\\nmatter of the case to present a story that holds together.”\\nSwanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s]\\nconsumers … against fraud, unfair methods of competition,\\nand other unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson\\nv. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002).\\nDeceptive or unfair practices include any “misrepresentation\\n\\f6 No. 17-3633\\n\\nor the concealment, suppression or omission of any material\\nfact.” 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2. To recover on a claim under\\nthe Act, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant\\ncommitted a deceptive or unfair act with the intent that\\nothers rely on the deception, that the act occurred in the\\ncourse of trade or commerce, and that it caused actual\\ndamages. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 934–35 (7th Cir.\\n2010). We begin, however, with the Act’s safe-harbor\\nprovision.\\nA. Safe-Harbor Provision\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act exempts some acts and\\npractices from liability under a safe-harbor provision. See\\n815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b(1). One component of that safe\\nharbor covers actions “specifically authorized by laws\\nadministered by any regulatory body or officer acting under\\nstatutory authority of this State or the United States.” Id.\\nThis provision allows regulated actors to “rely on the direc-\\ntions received from [regulatory] agencies without risk that\\nsuch reliance might expose them to … liability.” Price v.\\nPhilip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 38 (Ill. 2005).\\n To trigger the safe harbor, the regulatory body must be\\noperating within its statutory authority and the challenged\\nconduct must be “specifically authorized by laws adminis-\\ntered by” that regulatory body. § 10b(1). Formal rulemaking\\nis not necessary; “informal regulatory activity” is enough.\\nPrice, 848 N.E.2d at 46. The FDA’s statutory authority in-\\ncludes regulation of pet food, so the dispute centers on\\nwhether the agency’s guidance qualifies as informal regula-\\ntory activity and specifically authorizes the relevant conduct.\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 7\\n\\n The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., regulates pet food. Because Hill’s Prescription\\nDiet cat food is intended to treat or prevent disease and is\\nmarketed as such, the products are considered “drugs”\\nunder the FDCA. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B). Without FDA approval, a\\nnew animal drug cannot be sold in interstate commerce, id.\\n§ 331(a), and the product is deemed misbranded and adul-\\nterated, id. §§ 352(o), 351(a)(5).\\n Manufacturers face two additional requirements, regard-\\nless of whether the animal drug at issue has been approved.\\nAll drug manufacturers must list their drugs and register\\ntheir facilities or else the drugs are misbranded. Id. § 352(o).\\nAnd animal drug products must be manufactured in com-\\npliance with current good-manufacturing practices applica-\\nble to drugs, otherwise the drugs are adulterated. Id.\\n§ 351(a)(2)(B).\\n Most pet-food products claiming to treat or prevent dis-\\nease lack FDA approval and do not comply with the FDCA’s\\ndrug registration and listing requirements. Nor do the\\nmanufacturers of these products follow the appropriate\\nmanufacturing practices for animal drugs. The FDA issued\\nguidance acknowledging this longstanding noncompliance\\nand identifying circumstances in which the agency may\\nexercise its discretion against initiating an enforcement\\naction.\\n The 2016 FDA Compliance Policy Guide offers the FDA’s\\ncurrent thinking on the likelihood of an enforcement action.\\nThe guide lists factors for agency staff to consider—\\nincluding, for example, whether the product presents a\\nknown safety risk when used as labeled, whether the prod-\\nuct label represents that it can be used to treat disease, and\\n\\f8 No. 17-3633\\n\\nwhether the product is marketed as an alternative to ap-\\nproved new drugs. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.\\nFOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE SEC.\\n690.150 LABELING & MARKETING OF DOG & CAT FOOD DIETS\\nINTENDED TO DIAGNOSE, CURE, MITIGATE, TREAT, OR PREVENT\\nDISEASES: GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF 6 (Apr. 2016),\\nhttps://www.fda.gov/media/83998/download. The guide\\ngoes on to list 11 factors that make an enforcement action\\n“less likely”—but only if all 11 are present. Id. at 7.\\n Hill’s and PetSmart characterize the Compliance Policy\\nGuide as informal regulatory activity specifically authoriz-\\ning the prescription requirement and prescription label for\\nHill’s Prescription Diet pet food. They are mistaken. The\\nFDA classifies the guide as a “Level 1 guidance document[]”\\nthat “[s]et[s] forth initial interpretations of statutory or\\nregulatory requirements” and details “changes in interpreta-\\ntion or policy that are of more than a minor nature.”\\n21 C.F.R. § 10.115(c)(1)(i)-(ii); Draft Compliance Policy Guide\\nSec. 690.150 on Labeling and Marketing of Nutritional\\nProducts Intended for Use in Dogs and Cats, 77 Fed. Reg.\\n55,480, 55,480 (Sept. 10, 2012). But the guide does not estab-\\nlish any legally enforceable responsibilities, and it is not\\nbinding on either the FDA or the public.\\n Contrast the Compliance Policy Guide with the\\nregulatory action in Price v. Philip Morris, where the Illinois\\nSupreme Court held that a consent order between the\\nFederal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and a cigarette\\nmanufacturer triggered the Consumer Fraud Act’s safe\\nharbor because the consent order could be understood as\\n“provid[ing] guidance” about cigarette labeling to the entire\\nindustry. 848 N.E.2d at 46. Even though the consent order\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 9\\n\\ndid not bind other industry actors, the safe harbor applied\\nbecause the order “announce[d] to an entire industry what\\nbehavior is and is not authorized.” Id. at 43. Hill’s and\\nPetSmart cite Price for support, but the case cuts against\\nthem. The FDA Compliance Policy Guide does not establish\\nindustry-wide standards for labeling and marketing of pet\\nfood intended to treat or prevent disease. Rather, the\\ndocument helps FDA staff allocate enforcement resources. It\\ndoes not qualify as informal regulatory activity.\\n Nor does the guide specifically authorize the prescription\\nrequirement and label. To determine whether conduct has\\nbeen specifically authorized by a regulatory body, Illinois\\ncourts look to the “affirmative acts or expressions of authori-\\nzation” by the relevant agency. Id. at 36. For an authorization\\nto be “specific,” it must be “related to a particular thing,” but\\n“it need not be express.” Id. at 42 (emphases added). In Price,\\nfor example, the defendant cigarette company’s use of the\\nterm “lights” in its marketing was held to be specifically\\nauthorized by FTC consent orders with other manufactur-\\ners—even though those orders authorized the use of the\\nterms “low,” “lower,” “reduced,” or “like qualifying terms”\\nto describe tar and nicotine content but did not expressly\\ninclude the term “lights.” Id. at 43.\\n In contrast, of the 11 factors listed in the Compliance Pol-\\nicy Guide as making an enforcement action less likely, only\\none is relevant here: whether “[t]he product is made availa-\\nble to the public only through licensed veterinarians or\\nthrough retail or internet sales to individuals purchasing the\\nproduct under the direction of a veterinarian.” U.S. FDA\\nCOMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 7. The defendants rely on this\\nfactor as evidence that the FDA specifically authorizes the\\n\\f10 No. 17-3633\\n\\nprescription requirement. But this argument wrongly\\nequates regulatory forbearance with regulatory authoriza-\\ntion.\\n To be sure, if pet food intended to treat or prevent dis-\\nease is purchased from or under the direction of a licensed\\nveterinarian, the FDA is less likely to initiate an enforcement\\naction based on the lack of an approved new animal drug\\napplication—provided, however, that the other 10 factors are\\nalso present. And “less likely” does not mean “will not”; it\\ncertainly doesn’t signal authorization. Because the Compli-\\nance Policy Guide doesn’t specifically authorize the Hill’s\\nprescription requirement, prescription label, and related\\nmarketing representations, the safe harbor does not apply.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Allegations\\n With the safe harbor off the table, our next question is\\nwhether the complaint adequately alleges that Hill’s and\\nPetSmart committed a deceptive or unfair practice. These are\\nseparate categories; deceptive conduct is distinct from unfair\\nconduct. A claim under the Consumer Fraud Act may be\\npremised on either (or both), but the two categories have\\ndifferent pleading standards. If the claim rests on allegations\\nof deceptive conduct, then Rule 9(b) applies and the plaintiff\\nmust plead with particularity the circumstances constituting\\nfraud. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 737. Specifically, the complaint\\nmust identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the\\nalleged fraud. Id. (quotation marks omitted).\\n On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff may allege that conduct\\nis unfair … without alleging that the conduct is deceptive.”\\nSiegel, 612 F.3d at 935. To determine whether a practice is\\nunfair, Illinois courts consider three factors: whether it\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 11\\n\\n“offends public policy”; is “immoral, unethical, oppressive,\\nor unscrupulous”; or “causes substantial injury to consum-\\ners.” Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th\\nCir. 2014). A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; “[a]\\npractice may be unfair because of the degree to which it\\nmeets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets\\nall three.” Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks\\nomitted). And because fraud is not a required element,\\nRule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard does not apply. See\\nWindy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin.\\nServs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, under\\neither theory of the case, the plaintiff must adequately plead\\ncausation—more specifically, he must allege that but for the\\ndefendant’s deceptive or unfair conduct, he “would not have\\nbeen damaged.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935 (quotation marks\\nomitted).\\n The complaint alleges that the defendants’ marketing\\npractices are both deceptive and unfair. Taking the first\\ncategory first, the complaint alleges that the prescription\\nrequirement, prescription label, and related marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet pet food are deceptive\\nbecause no prescription is necessary and there is no material\\ndifference between the “prescription” food and nonprescrip-\\ntion food. Hill’s and PetSmart respond that the complaint is\\ndeficient because it does not allege that Vanzant and Land\\nrelied on the deceptive representations when purchasing\\nHill’s Prescription Diet food. This argument misconstrues\\nIllinois law. “[R]eliance is not an element of statutory con-\\nsumer fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584,\\n593 (Ill. 1996). Rather, it’s the plaintiff’s “damage,” not his\\npurchase, that must occur “as a result of” the deceptive act\\nor practice. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160. Indeed, it was enough\\n\\f12 No. 17-3633\\n\\nin Connick that the plaintiffs’ purchases “occurred after the\\nallegedly fraudulent statements.” 675 N.E.2d at 595.\\n Here, the complaint alleges that the prescription re-\\nquirement, prescription label, and associated marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet were deceptive; that\\nVanzant and Land saw the specific “prescription” language\\nand symbols when they made their purchases; that the\\nprescription pet food was something less than they expected;\\nand that they suffered damages because they paid a higher\\nprice. These allegations detail the “who,” “what,” and\\n“how” of the fraud claim with particularity. Camasta,\\n761 F.3d at 737.\\n The complaint also alleges the “when” and “where” of\\nthe fraud. Vanzant saw marketing materials for Prescription\\nDiet pet food before purchasing the cat food at PetSmart in\\nFebruary 2013 and thereafter. Land saw similar marketing\\nmaterials before purchasing Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart in November 2013 and thereafter. Nothing more is\\nneeded.\\n In short, the complaint pleads a deceptive-practices claim\\nto the degree of particularity required by Rule 9(b). That’s\\nenough to reverse the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim, so it’s not necessary to address the adequacy of the\\nallegations under the unfair-practices theory of the case. As\\nwe’ve noted, an unfair-practices claim has no fraud element\\nand therefore is not subject to a heightened pleading stand-\\nard.\\nC. Unjust Enrichment\\n The complaint also seeks restitution for unjust\\nenrichment. “Under Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 13\\n\\nseparate cause of action.” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree\\nMed. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir.\\n2011). Rather, it’s a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon, 877 F.3d at 741. Accordingly,\\nthe request for relief based on unjust enrichment is tied to\\nthe fate of the claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Cleary v.\\nPhilip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2011). The\\nstatutory claim may move forward, and that revives the\\nrequest for restitution based on unjust enrichment.\\n REVERSED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431316/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654063/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Holly B. VANZANT and Dana Land, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HILL'S PET NUTRITION, INC., and PetSmart, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3633\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\nDANA LAND, on behalf of themselves\nand all others similarly situated,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nHILL’S PET NUTRITION, INC., and\nPETSMART, INC.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17-cv-2535 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Holly Vanzant and Dana Land own\ncats with health problems. Their veterinarians prescribed cat\nfood manufactured by Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., and sold\nunder Hill’s “Prescription Diet” brand. For several years\nVanzant and Land purchased this higher-priced cat food\n\f2 No. 17-3633\n\nfrom their local PetSmart stores using their veterinarian’s\nprescriptions. They eventually learned, however, that the\nPrescription Diet cat food is not materially different from\nnonprescription cat food. And the prescription requirement\nis illusory; no prescription is necessary. Feeling deceived,\nVanzant and Land filed a class-action lawsuit against Hill’s\nand PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Con-\nsumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL.\nCOMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq., and for unjust enrichment.\n The district judge dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act\nclaim for two reasons: (1) the complaint lacked the specificity\nrequired for a fraud claim; and (2) the claim is barred by a\nstatutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by a\nregulatory body—here, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-\ntion (“FDA”). The judge dismissed the unjust-enrichment\nclaim because it was premised on the same conduct as the\nstatutory claim.\n We reverse. First, the safe-harbor provision does not\napply. Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.\n§§ 301 et seq., pet food intended to treat or prevent disease\nand marketed as such is considered a drug and requires\napproval of a new animal drug application. Without FDA\napproval, the manufacturer may not sell it in interstate\ncommerce and the product is deemed adulterated and\nmisbranded. The FDA issued guidance recognizing that\nmost pet-food products in this category do not have the\nrequired approval; the guidance states that the agency is less\nlikely to initiate an enforcement action if consumers\npurchase the food through or under the direction of a\nveterinarian (among other factors guiding the agency’s\nenforcement discretion). But the guidance does not\n\fNo. 17-3633 3\n\nspecifically authorize the conduct alleged here, so the safe\nharbor does not apply.\n And the plaintiffs pleaded the fraud claim with the par-\nticularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil\nProcedure. So the statutory claim may proceed. The unjust-\nenrichment claim is more appropriately construed as a\nrequest for relief in the form of restitution based on the\nalleged fraud. In Illinois unjust enrichment is not a separate\ncause of action but is a condition brought about by fraud or\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d\n725, 741 (7th Cir. 2017). The request for restitution based on\nunjust enrichment therefore rests entirely on the consumer-\nfraud claim, and it too may move forward.\n I. Background\n The case comes to us from a dismissal at the pleadings\nstage, so we recount the facts as alleged in the amended\ncomplaint. Hill’s Pet Nutrition manufactures a variety of pet\nfood, and this case concerns its Prescription Diet brand.\nHill’s sells its Prescription Diet pet food through veterinari-\nans and pet-food retailers, though consumers may purchase\nit from a retailer only with a veterinarian’s prescription.\nPetSmart sells pet supplies and pet food, including Hill’s\nPrescription Diet brand. Consumers need a veterinarian’s\nprescription to purchase Hill’s Prescription Diet food at\nPetSmart.\n In January 2013 Holly Vanzant’s cat Tarik underwent\nemergency surgery for bladder stones. At a follow-up\nappointment, Tarik’s veterinarian prescribed Hill’s\nPrescription Diet c/d Multicare Feline Bladder Health cat\nfood. That same day Vanzant purchased the food at a\n\f4 No. 17-3633\n\nPetSmart store. Inside she saw marketing materials\nindicating that the cat food is “prescription only,” and the\nlabel on the bag read “Hill’s Prescription Diet.” PetSmart\nprovided her with a pet prescription card listing Tarik’s\nname, prescription number, and prescription date. For three\nyears Vanzant purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food\nfrom PetSmart, paying a higher price than for\nnonprescription food. She showed the prescription card to\nthe cashier each time.\n Land had a similar experience. In October 2013 a veteri-\nnarian diagnosed her cat Chief with diabetes and prescribed\nHill’s Prescription Diet m/d Feline Glucose/Weight Man-\nagement cat food. Within a few weeks, Land purchased\nHill’s Prescription Diet cat food at a PetSmart store. She too\nsaw marketing materials inside the store indicating that the\nfood is meant to treat or control diabetes. PetSmart provided\nLand with a pet prescription card listing Chief’s name,\nprescription number, and prescription date. For two years\nLand purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food from\nPetSmart, paying a higher price than for nonprescription\nfood. She too showed the prescription card each time.\n Vanzant and Land eventually learned they were not re-\nceiving what they expected. They thought prescription pet\nfood was medically necessary for the health of their pets,\nhad been approved by the FDA, and could not be sold\nlegally without a prescription. But the FDA had not ap-\nproved it, and nothing required that it be sold with a pre-\nscription. They filed a proposed class action in state court\nagainst Hill’s and PetSmart alleging claims for violation of\nthe Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and unjust enrichment. The\n\fNo. 17-3633 5\n\ndefendants removed the case to federal court and moved to\ndismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6).\n The judge granted the motion. He held that the\nConsumer Fraud Act claim is foreclosed by the statute’s safe-\nharbor provision, which shields actions authorized by laws\nadministered by a regulatory body. Specifically, the judge\nrelied on an FDA Compliance Policy Guide, which he\nconstrued as regulatory authorization for “the gate-keeping\nrole of veterinarians in ensuring that pet owners purchase\nonly appropriate therapeutic foods.” The judge also\nconcluded that Vanzant and Land failed to plead the\nconsumer-fraud claim with the particularity required by\nRule 9(b). With no underlying fraud claim remaining, the\njudge likewise dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim.\nVanzant and Land appealed.\n II. Discussion\n We review the dismissal order de novo. Camasta v. Jos. A.\nBank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). To\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain\n“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable\ninference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct\nalleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At a\nminimum it “must give enough details about the subject\nmatter of the case to present a story that holds together.”\nSwanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s]\nconsumers … against fraud, unfair methods of competition,\nand other unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson\nv. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002).\nDeceptive or unfair practices include any “misrepresentation\n\f6 No. 17-3633\n\nor the concealment, suppression or omission of any material\nfact.” 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2. To recover on a claim under\nthe Act, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant\ncommitted a deceptive or unfair act with the intent that\nothers rely on the deception, that the act occurred in the\ncourse of trade or commerce, and that it caused actual\ndamages. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 934–35 (7th Cir.\n2010). We begin, however, with the Act’s safe-harbor\nprovision.\nA. Safe-Harbor Provision\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act exempts some acts and\npractices from liability under a safe-harbor provision. See\n815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b(1). One component of that safe\nharbor covers actions “specifically authorized by laws\nadministered by any regulatory body or officer acting under\nstatutory authority of this State or the United States.” Id.\nThis provision allows regulated actors to “rely on the direc-\ntions received from [regulatory] agencies without risk that\nsuch reliance might expose them to … liability.” Price v.\nPhilip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 38 (Ill. 2005).\n To trigger the safe harbor, the regulatory body must be\noperating within its statutory authority and the challenged\nconduct must be “specifically authorized by laws adminis-\ntered by” that regulatory body. § 10b(1). Formal rulemaking\nis not necessary; “informal regulatory activity” is enough.\nPrice, 848 N.E.2d at 46. The FDA’s statutory authority in-\ncludes regulation of pet food, so the dispute centers on\nwhether the agency’s guidance qualifies as informal regula-\ntory activity and specifically authorizes the relevant conduct.\n\fNo. 17-3633 7\n\n The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C.\n§§ 301 et seq., regulates pet food. Because Hill’s Prescription\nDiet cat food is intended to treat or prevent disease and is\nmarketed as such, the products are considered “drugs”\nunder the FDCA. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B). Without FDA approval, a\nnew animal drug cannot be sold in interstate commerce, id.\n§ 331(a), and the product is deemed misbranded and adul-\nterated, id. §§ 352(o), 351(a)(5).\n Manufacturers face two additional requirements, regard-\nless of whether the animal drug at issue has been approved.\nAll drug manufacturers must list their drugs and register\ntheir facilities or else the drugs are misbranded. Id. § 352(o).\nAnd animal drug products must be manufactured in com-\npliance with current good-manufacturing practices applica-\nble to drugs, otherwise the drugs are adulterated. Id.\n§ 351(a)(2)(B).\n Most pet-food products claiming to treat or prevent dis-\nease lack FDA approval and do not comply with the FDCA’s\ndrug registration and listing requirements. Nor do the\nmanufacturers of these products follow the appropriate\nmanufacturing practices for animal drugs. The FDA issued\nguidance acknowledging this longstanding noncompliance\nand identifying circumstances in which the agency may\nexercise its discretion against initiating an enforcement\naction.\n The 2016 FDA Compliance Policy Guide offers the FDA’s\ncurrent thinking on the likelihood of an enforcement action.\nThe guide lists factors for agency staff to consider—\nincluding, for example, whether the product presents a\nknown safety risk when used as labeled, whether the prod-\nuct label represents that it can be used to treat disease, and\n\f8 No. 17-3633\n\nwhether the product is marketed as an alternative to ap-\nproved new drugs. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.\nFOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE SEC.\n690.150 LABELING & MARKETING OF DOG & CAT FOOD DIETS\nINTENDED TO DIAGNOSE, CURE, MITIGATE, TREAT, OR PREVENT\nDISEASES: GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF 6 (Apr. 2016),\nhttps://www.fda.gov/media/83998/download. The guide\ngoes on to list 11 factors that make an enforcement action\n“less likely”—but only if all 11 are present. Id. at 7.\n Hill’s and PetSmart characterize the Compliance Policy\nGuide as informal regulatory activity specifically authoriz-\ning the prescription requirement and prescription label for\nHill’s Prescription Diet pet food. They are mistaken. The\nFDA classifies the guide as a “Level 1 guidance document[]”\nthat “[s]et[s] forth initial interpretations of statutory or\nregulatory requirements” and details “changes in interpreta-\ntion or policy that are of more than a minor nature.”\n21 C.F.R. § 10.115(c)(1)(i)-(ii); Draft Compliance Policy Guide\nSec. 690.150 on Labeling and Marketing of Nutritional\nProducts Intended for Use in Dogs and Cats, 77 Fed. Reg.\n55,480, 55,480 (Sept. 10, 2012). But the guide does not estab-\nlish any legally enforceable responsibilities, and it is not\nbinding on either the FDA or the public.\n Contrast the Compliance Policy Guide with the\nregulatory action in Price v. Philip Morris, where the Illinois\nSupreme Court held that a consent order between the\nFederal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and a cigarette\nmanufacturer triggered the Consumer Fraud Act’s safe\nharbor because the consent order could be understood as\n“provid[ing] guidance” about cigarette labeling to the entire\nindustry. 848 N.E.2d at 46. Even though the consent order\n\fNo. 17-3633 9\n\ndid not bind other industry actors, the safe harbor applied\nbecause the order “announce[d] to an entire industry what\nbehavior is and is not authorized.” Id. at 43. Hill’s and\nPetSmart cite Price for support, but the case cuts against\nthem. The FDA Compliance Policy Guide does not establish\nindustry-wide standards for labeling and marketing of pet\nfood intended to treat or prevent disease. Rather, the\ndocument helps FDA staff allocate enforcement resources. It\ndoes not qualify as informal regulatory activity.\n Nor does the guide specifically authorize the prescription\nrequirement and label. To determine whether conduct has\nbeen specifically authorized by a regulatory body, Illinois\ncourts look to the “affirmative acts or expressions of authori-\nzation” by the relevant agency. Id. at 36. For an authorization\nto be “specific,” it must be “related to a particular thing,” but\n“it need not be express.” Id. at 42 (emphases added). In Price,\nfor example, the defendant cigarette company’s use of the\nterm “lights” in its marketing was held to be specifically\nauthorized by FTC consent orders with other manufactur-\ners—even though those orders authorized the use of the\nterms “low,” “lower,” “reduced,” or “like qualifying terms”\nto describe tar and nicotine content but did not expressly\ninclude the term “lights.” Id. at 43.\n In contrast, of the 11 factors listed in the Compliance Pol-\nicy Guide as making an enforcement action less likely, only\none is relevant here: whether “[t]he product is made availa-\nble to the public only through licensed veterinarians or\nthrough retail or internet sales to individuals purchasing the\nproduct under the direction of a veterinarian.” U.S. FDA\nCOMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 7. The defendants rely on this\nfactor as evidence that the FDA specifically authorizes the\n\f10 No. 17-3633\n\nprescription requirement. But this argument wrongly\nequates regulatory forbearance with regulatory authoriza-\ntion.\n To be sure, if pet food intended to treat or prevent dis-\nease is purchased from or under the direction of a licensed\nveterinarian, the FDA is less likely to initiate an enforcement\naction based on the lack of an approved new animal drug\napplication—provided, however, that the other 10 factors are\nalso present. And “less likely” does not mean “will not”; it\ncertainly doesn’t signal authorization. Because the Compli-\nance Policy Guide doesn’t specifically authorize the Hill’s\nprescription requirement, prescription label, and related\nmarketing representations, the safe harbor does not apply.\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Allegations\n With the safe harbor off the table, our next question is\nwhether the complaint adequately alleges that Hill’s and\nPetSmart committed a deceptive or unfair practice. These are\nseparate categories; deceptive conduct is distinct from unfair\nconduct. A claim under the Consumer Fraud Act may be\npremised on either (or both), but the two categories have\ndifferent pleading standards. If the claim rests on allegations\nof deceptive conduct, then Rule 9(b) applies and the plaintiff\nmust plead with particularity the circumstances constituting\nfraud. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 737. Specifically, the complaint\nmust identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the\nalleged fraud. Id. (quotation marks omitted).\n On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff may allege that conduct\nis unfair … without alleging that the conduct is deceptive.”\nSiegel, 612 F.3d at 935. To determine whether a practice is\nunfair, Illinois courts consider three factors: whether it\n\fNo. 17-3633 11\n\n“offends public policy”; is “immoral, unethical, oppressive,\nor unscrupulous”; or “causes substantial injury to consum-\ners.” Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th\nCir. 2014). A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; “[a]\npractice may be unfair because of the degree to which it\nmeets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets\nall three.” Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks\nomitted). And because fraud is not a required element,\nRule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard does not apply. See\nWindy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin.\nServs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, under\neither theory of the case, the plaintiff must adequately plead\ncausation—more specifically, he must allege that but for the\ndefendant’s deceptive or unfair conduct, he “would not have\nbeen damaged.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935 (quotation marks\nomitted).\n The complaint alleges that the defendants’ marketing\npractices are both deceptive and unfair. Taking the first\ncategory first, the complaint alleges that the prescription\nrequirement, prescription label, and related marketing\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet pet food are deceptive\nbecause no prescription is necessary and there is no material\ndifference between the “prescription” food and nonprescrip-\ntion food. Hill’s and PetSmart respond that the complaint is\ndeficient because it does not allege that Vanzant and Land\nrelied on the deceptive representations when purchasing\nHill’s Prescription Diet food. This argument misconstrues\nIllinois law. “[R]eliance is not an element of statutory con-\nsumer fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584,\n593 (Ill. 1996). Rather, it’s the plaintiff’s “damage,” not his\npurchase, that must occur “as a result of” the deceptive act\nor practice. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160. Indeed, it was enough\n\f12 No. 17-3633\n\nin Connick that the plaintiffs’ purchases “occurred after the\nallegedly fraudulent statements.” 675 N.E.2d at 595.\n Here, the complaint alleges that the prescription re-\nquirement, prescription label, and associated marketing\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet were deceptive; that\nVanzant and Land saw the specific “prescription” language\nand symbols when they made their purchases; that the\nprescription pet food was something less than they expected;\nand that they suffered damages because they paid a higher\nprice. These allegations detail the “who,” “what,” and\n“how” of the fraud claim with particularity. Camasta,\n761 F.3d at 737.\n The complaint also alleges the “when” and “where” of\nthe fraud. Vanzant saw marketing materials for Prescription\nDiet pet food before purchasing the cat food at PetSmart in\nFebruary 2013 and thereafter. Land saw similar marketing\nmaterials before purchasing Prescription Diet cat food from\nPetSmart in November 2013 and thereafter. Nothing more is\nneeded.\n In short, the complaint pleads a deceptive-practices claim\nto the degree of particularity required by Rule 9(b). That’s\nenough to reverse the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act\nclaim, so it’s not necessary to address the adequacy of the\nallegations under the unfair-practices theory of the case. As\nwe’ve noted, an unfair-practices claim has no fraud element\nand therefore is not subject to a heightened pleading stand-\nard.\nC. Unjust Enrichment\n The complaint also seeks restitution for unjust\nenrichment. “Under Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a\n\fNo. 17-3633 13\n\nseparate cause of action.” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree\nMed. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir.\n2011). Rather, it’s a condition brought about by fraud or\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon, 877 F.3d at 741. Accordingly,\nthe request for relief based on unjust enrichment is tied to\nthe fate of the claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Cleary v.\nPhilip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2011). The\nstatutory claim may move forward, and that revives the\nrequest for restitution based on unjust enrichment.\n REVERSED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Holly B. VANZANT and Dana Land, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HILL'S PET NUTRITION, INC., and PetSmart, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3633\\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\\nDANA LAND, on behalf of themselves\\nand all others similarly situated,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nHILL’S PET NUTRITION, INC., and\\nPETSMART, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17-cv-2535 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Holly Vanzant and Dana Land own\\ncats with health problems. Their veterinarians prescribed cat\\nfood manufactured by Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., and sold\\nunder Hill’s “Prescription Diet” brand. For several years\\nVanzant and Land purchased this higher-priced cat food\\n\\f2 No. 17-3633\\n\\nfrom their local PetSmart stores using their veterinarian’s\\nprescriptions. They eventually learned, however, that the\\nPrescription Diet cat food is not materially different from\\nnonprescription cat food. And the prescription requirement\\nis illusory; no prescription is necessary. Feeling deceived,\\nVanzant and Land filed a class-action lawsuit against Hill’s\\nand PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Con-\\nsumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq., and for unjust enrichment.\\n The district judge dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim for two reasons: (1) the complaint lacked the specificity\\nrequired for a fraud claim; and (2) the claim is barred by a\\nstatutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by a\\nregulatory body—here, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-\\ntion (“FDA”). The judge dismissed the unjust-enrichment\\nclaim because it was premised on the same conduct as the\\nstatutory claim.\\n We reverse. First, the safe-harbor provision does not\\napply. Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., pet food intended to treat or prevent disease\\nand marketed as such is considered a drug and requires\\napproval of a new animal drug application. Without FDA\\napproval, the manufacturer may not sell it in interstate\\ncommerce and the product is deemed adulterated and\\nmisbranded. The FDA issued guidance recognizing that\\nmost pet-food products in this category do not have the\\nrequired approval; the guidance states that the agency is less\\nlikely to initiate an enforcement action if consumers\\npurchase the food through or under the direction of a\\nveterinarian (among other factors guiding the agency’s\\nenforcement discretion). But the guidance does not\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 3\\n\\nspecifically authorize the conduct alleged here, so the safe\\nharbor does not apply.\\n And the plaintiffs pleaded the fraud claim with the par-\\nticularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil\\nProcedure. So the statutory claim may proceed. The unjust-\\nenrichment claim is more appropriately construed as a\\nrequest for relief in the form of restitution based on the\\nalleged fraud. In Illinois unjust enrichment is not a separate\\ncause of action but is a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d\\n725, 741 (7th Cir. 2017). The request for restitution based on\\nunjust enrichment therefore rests entirely on the consumer-\\nfraud claim, and it too may move forward.\\n I. Background\\n The case comes to us from a dismissal at the pleadings\\nstage, so we recount the facts as alleged in the amended\\ncomplaint. Hill’s Pet Nutrition manufactures a variety of pet\\nfood, and this case concerns its Prescription Diet brand.\\nHill’s sells its Prescription Diet pet food through veterinari-\\nans and pet-food retailers, though consumers may purchase\\nit from a retailer only with a veterinarian’s prescription.\\nPetSmart sells pet supplies and pet food, including Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet brand. Consumers need a veterinarian’s\\nprescription to purchase Hill’s Prescription Diet food at\\nPetSmart.\\n In January 2013 Holly Vanzant’s cat Tarik underwent\\nemergency surgery for bladder stones. At a follow-up\\nappointment, Tarik’s veterinarian prescribed Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet c/d Multicare Feline Bladder Health cat\\nfood. That same day Vanzant purchased the food at a\\n\\f4 No. 17-3633\\n\\nPetSmart store. Inside she saw marketing materials\\nindicating that the cat food is “prescription only,” and the\\nlabel on the bag read “Hill’s Prescription Diet.” PetSmart\\nprovided her with a pet prescription card listing Tarik’s\\nname, prescription number, and prescription date. For three\\nyears Vanzant purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food\\nfrom PetSmart, paying a higher price than for\\nnonprescription food. She showed the prescription card to\\nthe cashier each time.\\n Land had a similar experience. In October 2013 a veteri-\\nnarian diagnosed her cat Chief with diabetes and prescribed\\nHill’s Prescription Diet m/d Feline Glucose/Weight Man-\\nagement cat food. Within a few weeks, Land purchased\\nHill’s Prescription Diet cat food at a PetSmart store. She too\\nsaw marketing materials inside the store indicating that the\\nfood is meant to treat or control diabetes. PetSmart provided\\nLand with a pet prescription card listing Chief’s name,\\nprescription number, and prescription date. For two years\\nLand purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart, paying a higher price than for nonprescription\\nfood. She too showed the prescription card each time.\\n Vanzant and Land eventually learned they were not re-\\nceiving what they expected. They thought prescription pet\\nfood was medically necessary for the health of their pets,\\nhad been approved by the FDA, and could not be sold\\nlegally without a prescription. But the FDA had not ap-\\nproved it, and nothing required that it be sold with a pre-\\nscription. They filed a proposed class action in state court\\nagainst Hill’s and PetSmart alleging claims for violation of\\nthe Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and unjust enrichment. The\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 5\\n\\ndefendants removed the case to federal court and moved to\\ndismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6).\\n The judge granted the motion. He held that the\\nConsumer Fraud Act claim is foreclosed by the statute’s safe-\\nharbor provision, which shields actions authorized by laws\\nadministered by a regulatory body. Specifically, the judge\\nrelied on an FDA Compliance Policy Guide, which he\\nconstrued as regulatory authorization for “the gate-keeping\\nrole of veterinarians in ensuring that pet owners purchase\\nonly appropriate therapeutic foods.” The judge also\\nconcluded that Vanzant and Land failed to plead the\\nconsumer-fraud claim with the particularity required by\\nRule 9(b). With no underlying fraud claim remaining, the\\njudge likewise dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim.\\nVanzant and Land appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review the dismissal order de novo. Camasta v. Jos. A.\\nBank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain\\n“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable\\ninference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct\\nalleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At a\\nminimum it “must give enough details about the subject\\nmatter of the case to present a story that holds together.”\\nSwanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s]\\nconsumers … against fraud, unfair methods of competition,\\nand other unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson\\nv. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002).\\nDeceptive or unfair practices include any “misrepresentation\\n\\f6 No. 17-3633\\n\\nor the concealment, suppression or omission of any material\\nfact.” 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2. To recover on a claim under\\nthe Act, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant\\ncommitted a deceptive or unfair act with the intent that\\nothers rely on the deception, that the act occurred in the\\ncourse of trade or commerce, and that it caused actual\\ndamages. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 934–35 (7th Cir.\\n2010). We begin, however, with the Act’s safe-harbor\\nprovision.\\nA. Safe-Harbor Provision\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act exempts some acts and\\npractices from liability under a safe-harbor provision. See\\n815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b(1). One component of that safe\\nharbor covers actions “specifically authorized by laws\\nadministered by any regulatory body or officer acting under\\nstatutory authority of this State or the United States.” Id.\\nThis provision allows regulated actors to “rely on the direc-\\ntions received from [regulatory] agencies without risk that\\nsuch reliance might expose them to … liability.” Price v.\\nPhilip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 38 (Ill. 2005).\\n To trigger the safe harbor, the regulatory body must be\\noperating within its statutory authority and the challenged\\nconduct must be “specifically authorized by laws adminis-\\ntered by” that regulatory body. § 10b(1). Formal rulemaking\\nis not necessary; “informal regulatory activity” is enough.\\nPrice, 848 N.E.2d at 46. The FDA’s statutory authority in-\\ncludes regulation of pet food, so the dispute centers on\\nwhether the agency’s guidance qualifies as informal regula-\\ntory activity and specifically authorizes the relevant conduct.\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 7\\n\\n The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., regulates pet food. Because Hill’s Prescription\\nDiet cat food is intended to treat or prevent disease and is\\nmarketed as such, the products are considered “drugs”\\nunder the FDCA. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B). Without FDA approval, a\\nnew animal drug cannot be sold in interstate commerce, id.\\n§ 331(a), and the product is deemed misbranded and adul-\\nterated, id. §§ 352(o), 351(a)(5).\\n Manufacturers face two additional requirements, regard-\\nless of whether the animal drug at issue has been approved.\\nAll drug manufacturers must list their drugs and register\\ntheir facilities or else the drugs are misbranded. Id. § 352(o).\\nAnd animal drug products must be manufactured in com-\\npliance with current good-manufacturing practices applica-\\nble to drugs, otherwise the drugs are adulterated. Id.\\n§ 351(a)(2)(B).\\n Most pet-food products claiming to treat or prevent dis-\\nease lack FDA approval and do not comply with the FDCA’s\\ndrug registration and listing requirements. Nor do the\\nmanufacturers of these products follow the appropriate\\nmanufacturing practices for animal drugs. The FDA issued\\nguidance acknowledging this longstanding noncompliance\\nand identifying circumstances in which the agency may\\nexercise its discretion against initiating an enforcement\\naction.\\n The 2016 FDA Compliance Policy Guide offers the FDA’s\\ncurrent thinking on the likelihood of an enforcement action.\\nThe guide lists factors for agency staff to consider—\\nincluding, for example, whether the product presents a\\nknown safety risk when used as labeled, whether the prod-\\nuct label represents that it can be used to treat disease, and\\n\\f8 No. 17-3633\\n\\nwhether the product is marketed as an alternative to ap-\\nproved new drugs. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.\\nFOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE SEC.\\n690.150 LABELING & MARKETING OF DOG & CAT FOOD DIETS\\nINTENDED TO DIAGNOSE, CURE, MITIGATE, TREAT, OR PREVENT\\nDISEASES: GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF 6 (Apr. 2016),\\nhttps://www.fda.gov/media/83998/download. The guide\\ngoes on to list 11 factors that make an enforcement action\\n“less likely”—but only if all 11 are present. Id. at 7.\\n Hill’s and PetSmart characterize the Compliance Policy\\nGuide as informal regulatory activity specifically authoriz-\\ning the prescription requirement and prescription label for\\nHill’s Prescription Diet pet food. They are mistaken. The\\nFDA classifies the guide as a “Level 1 guidance document[]”\\nthat “[s]et[s] forth initial interpretations of statutory or\\nregulatory requirements” and details “changes in interpreta-\\ntion or policy that are of more than a minor nature.”\\n21 C.F.R. § 10.115(c)(1)(i)-(ii); Draft Compliance Policy Guide\\nSec. 690.150 on Labeling and Marketing of Nutritional\\nProducts Intended for Use in Dogs and Cats, 77 Fed. Reg.\\n55,480, 55,480 (Sept. 10, 2012). But the guide does not estab-\\nlish any legally enforceable responsibilities, and it is not\\nbinding on either the FDA or the public.\\n Contrast the Compliance Policy Guide with the\\nregulatory action in Price v. Philip Morris, where the Illinois\\nSupreme Court held that a consent order between the\\nFederal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and a cigarette\\nmanufacturer triggered the Consumer Fraud Act’s safe\\nharbor because the consent order could be understood as\\n“provid[ing] guidance” about cigarette labeling to the entire\\nindustry. 848 N.E.2d at 46. Even though the consent order\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 9\\n\\ndid not bind other industry actors, the safe harbor applied\\nbecause the order “announce[d] to an entire industry what\\nbehavior is and is not authorized.” Id. at 43. Hill’s and\\nPetSmart cite Price for support, but the case cuts against\\nthem. The FDA Compliance Policy Guide does not establish\\nindustry-wide standards for labeling and marketing of pet\\nfood intended to treat or prevent disease. Rather, the\\ndocument helps FDA staff allocate enforcement resources. It\\ndoes not qualify as informal regulatory activity.\\n Nor does the guide specifically authorize the prescription\\nrequirement and label. To determine whether conduct has\\nbeen specifically authorized by a regulatory body, Illinois\\ncourts look to the “affirmative acts or expressions of authori-\\nzation” by the relevant agency. Id. at 36. For an authorization\\nto be “specific,” it must be “related to a particular thing,” but\\n“it need not be express.” Id. at 42 (emphases added). In Price,\\nfor example, the defendant cigarette company’s use of the\\nterm “lights” in its marketing was held to be specifically\\nauthorized by FTC consent orders with other manufactur-\\ners—even though those orders authorized the use of the\\nterms “low,” “lower,” “reduced,” or “like qualifying terms”\\nto describe tar and nicotine content but did not expressly\\ninclude the term “lights.” Id. at 43.\\n In contrast, of the 11 factors listed in the Compliance Pol-\\nicy Guide as making an enforcement action less likely, only\\none is relevant here: whether “[t]he product is made availa-\\nble to the public only through licensed veterinarians or\\nthrough retail or internet sales to individuals purchasing the\\nproduct under the direction of a veterinarian.” U.S. FDA\\nCOMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 7. The defendants rely on this\\nfactor as evidence that the FDA specifically authorizes the\\n\\f10 No. 17-3633\\n\\nprescription requirement. But this argument wrongly\\nequates regulatory forbearance with regulatory authoriza-\\ntion.\\n To be sure, if pet food intended to treat or prevent dis-\\nease is purchased from or under the direction of a licensed\\nveterinarian, the FDA is less likely to initiate an enforcement\\naction based on the lack of an approved new animal drug\\napplication—provided, however, that the other 10 factors are\\nalso present. And “less likely” does not mean “will not”; it\\ncertainly doesn’t signal authorization. Because the Compli-\\nance Policy Guide doesn’t specifically authorize the Hill’s\\nprescription requirement, prescription label, and related\\nmarketing representations, the safe harbor does not apply.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Allegations\\n With the safe harbor off the table, our next question is\\nwhether the complaint adequately alleges that Hill’s and\\nPetSmart committed a deceptive or unfair practice. These are\\nseparate categories; deceptive conduct is distinct from unfair\\nconduct. A claim under the Consumer Fraud Act may be\\npremised on either (or both), but the two categories have\\ndifferent pleading standards. If the claim rests on allegations\\nof deceptive conduct, then Rule 9(b) applies and the plaintiff\\nmust plead with particularity the circumstances constituting\\nfraud. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 737. Specifically, the complaint\\nmust identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the\\nalleged fraud. Id. (quotation marks omitted).\\n On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff may allege that conduct\\nis unfair … without alleging that the conduct is deceptive.”\\nSiegel, 612 F.3d at 935. To determine whether a practice is\\nunfair, Illinois courts consider three factors: whether it\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 11\\n\\n“offends public policy”; is “immoral, unethical, oppressive,\\nor unscrupulous”; or “causes substantial injury to consum-\\ners.” Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th\\nCir. 2014). A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; “[a]\\npractice may be unfair because of the degree to which it\\nmeets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets\\nall three.” Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks\\nomitted). And because fraud is not a required element,\\nRule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard does not apply. See\\nWindy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin.\\nServs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, under\\neither theory of the case, the plaintiff must adequately plead\\ncausation—more specifically, he must allege that but for the\\ndefendant’s deceptive or unfair conduct, he “would not have\\nbeen damaged.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935 (quotation marks\\nomitted).\\n The complaint alleges that the defendants’ marketing\\npractices are both deceptive and unfair. Taking the first\\ncategory first, the complaint alleges that the prescription\\nrequirement, prescription label, and related marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet pet food are deceptive\\nbecause no prescription is necessary and there is no material\\ndifference between the “prescription” food and nonprescrip-\\ntion food. Hill’s and PetSmart respond that the complaint is\\ndeficient because it does not allege that Vanzant and Land\\nrelied on the deceptive representations when purchasing\\nHill’s Prescription Diet food. This argument misconstrues\\nIllinois law. “[R]eliance is not an element of statutory con-\\nsumer fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584,\\n593 (Ill. 1996). Rather, it’s the plaintiff’s “damage,” not his\\npurchase, that must occur “as a result of” the deceptive act\\nor practice. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160. Indeed, it was enough\\n\\f12 No. 17-3633\\n\\nin Connick that the plaintiffs’ purchases “occurred after the\\nallegedly fraudulent statements.” 675 N.E.2d at 595.\\n Here, the complaint alleges that the prescription re-\\nquirement, prescription label, and associated marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet were deceptive; that\\nVanzant and Land saw the specific “prescription” language\\nand symbols when they made their purchases; that the\\nprescription pet food was something less than they expected;\\nand that they suffered damages because they paid a higher\\nprice. These allegations detail the “who,” “what,” and\\n“how” of the fraud claim with particularity. Camasta,\\n761 F.3d at 737.\\n The complaint also alleges the “when” and “where” of\\nthe fraud. Vanzant saw marketing materials for Prescription\\nDiet pet food before purchasing the cat food at PetSmart in\\nFebruary 2013 and thereafter. Land saw similar marketing\\nmaterials before purchasing Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart in November 2013 and thereafter. Nothing more is\\nneeded.\\n In short, the complaint pleads a deceptive-practices claim\\nto the degree of particularity required by Rule 9(b). That’s\\nenough to reverse the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim, so it’s not necessary to address the adequacy of the\\nallegations under the unfair-practices theory of the case. As\\nwe’ve noted, an unfair-practices claim has no fraud element\\nand therefore is not subject to a heightened pleading stand-\\nard.\\nC. Unjust Enrichment\\n The complaint also seeks restitution for unjust\\nenrichment. “Under Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 13\\n\\nseparate cause of action.” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree\\nMed. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir.\\n2011). Rather, it’s a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon, 877 F.3d at 741. Accordingly,\\nthe request for relief based on unjust enrichment is tied to\\nthe fate of the claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Cleary v.\\nPhilip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2011). The\\nstatutory claim may move forward, and that revives the\\nrequest for restitution based on unjust enrichment.\\n REVERSED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3886,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654068,"string":"4,654,068"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rex A. HOPPER, Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Rex A. Hopper"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2576"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Eve, Hamilton, Ripple\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2576\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nREX A. HOPPER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 4:17-cr-40034-JPG-1 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. In June 2017, a federal grand jury\\nindicted Rex Hopper on one count of conspiracy to distrib-\\nute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),\\n841(b)(1)(B), 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Hopper was part of a\\ncommunity of methamphetamine users and sellers in south-\\nern Illinois. Several of these individuals signed proffer letters\\nwith the Government, agreeing to provide testimony against\\nMr. Hopper in exchange for leniency. Most of these witness-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2576\\n\\nes subsequently entered plea agreements.1 Mr. Hopper,\\nhowever, pleaded not guilty to the single count in the in-\\ndictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late Febru-\\nary 2018.\\n Over the course of three days, the Government presented\\nthe testimony of approximately twenty witnesses against\\nMr. Hopper. The district court denied Mr. Hopper’s motion\\nfor disclosure of the proffer letters given to these witnesses.\\nFollowing deliberations, the jury found Mr. Hopper guilty of\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, as charged in\\nthe indictment, and returned a special verdict form finding\\nthat the conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\\n Based on interviews with other participants in the con-\\nspiracy, the probation office determined that Mr. Hopper’s\\nrelevant conduct involved 1.968 kilograms of ice metham-\\nphetamine. This drug amount corresponded to a base of-\\nfense level of 36. At sentencing, the district court determined\\nthat Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sentence en-\\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\\ndistributing methamphetamine. Based on a total offense lev-\\nel of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the court calcu-\\nlated a guidelines imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months.\\nThe district court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the\\nguidelines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by\\nfour years of supervised release.2\\n\\n\\n\\n1One witness entered an “open” guilty plea, for which there was no\\nwritten plea agreement.\\n2 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 3\\n\\n Mr. Hopper now challenges both his conviction and his\\nsentence. First, we conclude that the Government presented\\nsufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Hopper engaged in a\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in southern Illi-\\nnois, and that there was no material variance between the\\nconspiracy charged in the indictment and the Government’s\\nproof at trial. Second, the district court did not err when it\\ndenied Mr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the cooperat-\\ning witnesses’ proffer letters. Third, the district court proper-\\nly concluded that Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sen-\\ntence enhancement for maintaining his Creal Springs resi-\\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\\nHowever, we conclude that the district court plainly erred\\nwhen it calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct and corre-\\nsponding guidelines range. In context, it is clear that, in their\\nseparate interviews, Lucas Holland and Randall Riley were\\ndescribing the same transactions. By including the amounts\\ndescribed by both Holland and Riley in the calculation of\\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the presentence report\\n(“PSR”), adopted by the district court, erroneously dou-\\nble-counted those drug quantities.\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. We\\nalso affirm the district court’s determination that he was\\nsubject to a sentence enhancement for maintaining a drug\\npremises. Because the court plainly erred in calculating his\\nrelevant conduct, however, we vacate Mr. Hopper’s sentence\\nand remand his case to the district court for resentencing.3\\n\\n3We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18\\nU.S.C. § 3742.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2576\\n\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n In April 2017, law enforcement officers executed a search\\nwarrant at Mr. Hopper’s residence. They sought to recover\\nitems involved in a burglary. Officers observed drug para-\\nphernalia and methamphetamine in plain view. According-\\nly, the officers obtained and executed a second search war-\\nrant for the residence. Upon finding additional drug para-\\nphernalia and methamphetamine in his home, officers took\\nMr. Hopper into custody. A federal grand jury later returned\\nan indictment charging Mr. Hopper with one count of con-\\nspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 18\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, in\\nthe Southern District of Illinois.\\n B.\\n Mr. Hopper was part of a community of methampheta-\\nmine users and sellers in southern Illinois. Around the time\\nof his indictment, the Government also charged other mem-\\nbers of this group with conspiracy to distribute metham-\\nphetamine. Several of these individuals received proffer let-\\nters from the Government and subsequently agreed to pro-\\nvide testimony against Mr. Hopper in exchange for leniency.\\nMost of these witnesses later entered plea agreements.\\nMr. Hopper, however, pleaded not guilty to the single count\\nin the indictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late\\nFebruary 2018.\\n Before the trial began, counsel for Mr. Hopper renewed a\\nprevious motion for disclosure of the proffer letters given to\\nthe witnesses who would testify against Mr. Hopper. Refer-\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 5\\n\\nencing our decision in United States v. Weidenburner, 550\\nF. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (unpublished), counsel recog-\\nnized that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has ruled that” proffer let-\\nters “are not materials that have to be provided.”4 Neverthe-\\nless, counsel wanted “the record to be clear” that he thought\\nhe “ought to be provided a copy” of the proffer letters.5\\n Counsel for Mr. Hopper explained that the proffer letter\\n“is an agreement that sets forth the ground rules” for what\\ntestimony “may or may not lead to a plea agreement.”6 He\\nsubmitted that “this is a very important aspect of the de-\\nfense” because “no plea agreements are offered until you\\nproffer.”7 In other words, the proffer letters are “part of the\\nprocess by which men and women ultimately find their way\\non to the stand to give testimony against a defendant.”8 As a\\nresult, counsel asserted, “if the[] jurors don’t have some un-\\nderstanding of this process,” the defense would be “really\\nhampered in terms of our constitutional right[s] to put on a\\ndefense and … to confront the witnesses through cross ex-\\namination that are here to accuse Rex Hopper of various\\ncrimes.”9\\n Relying on our decision in Weidenburner, the Government\\nresponded that “the Seventh Circuit is clear that the proffer\\n\\n4 R.118 (Trial Tr. Day 1) at 8.\\n5 Id. at 5.\\n6 Id. at 6.\\n7 Id.\\n8 Id.\\n9 Id. at 7.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2576\\n\\nletters don’t come in,” nor does “any information about the\\nproffer,” “because it is a preliminary step in the plea agree-\\nment, and then the plea agreement supersedes all that.”10\\nTurning to defense counsel, the court stated, “I think it is\\npretty clear that, you know, you are not going to get the\\ndocuments.”11\\n The Government further noted its objection to defense\\ncounsel asking any questions about the process of entering a\\nplea agreement. The court asked defense counsel what kind\\nof questions he intended to ask the cooperating witnesses.\\nCounsel explained that he wanted the jury to know that be-\\nfore entering a plea agreement, a witness had to meet with\\nfederal agents and “understood that agents would decide\\nand the prosecutors would decide whether you told the\\ntruth, and if they didn’t think you told the truth that a plea\\nagreement would not be tendered.”12 Counsel acknowl-\\nedged that he planned to review the terms of the plea\\nagreements with each witness, but argued that the jury\\nwould be “missing a big part of this process” without the\\nproffer letters.13 Based on our decision in Weidenburner, the\\nGovernment reiterated that the plea agreement “super-\\nsede[s] the proffer letter” and is “the document which the\\ndefendant is entitled to and entitled to question witnesses\\nabout.”14 The court denied the motion for disclosure of the\\n\\n10 Id. at 8.\\n11 Id.\\n12 Id. at 10.\\n13 Id. at 11.\\n14 Id. at 14.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 7\\n\\nproffer letters and ruled that counsel could ask the witnesses\\n“whether they’ve entered into a proffer agreement, but go-\\ning into the terms of it that are super[s]eded by the plea\\nagreement, I’m not going to let you do.”15\\n C.\\n Mr. Hopper proceeded to trial before a jury on February\\n26, 2018. Over the course of three days, the Government pre-\\nsented the testimony of approximately twenty witnesses\\nagainst Mr. Hopper. Set forth below is a summary of the\\nwitnesses and testimony relevant to this appeal.\\n Dameon Williams testified that he met Mr. Hopper some-\\ntime in 2015 when they were “messing with drugs.”16 He ob-\\ntained ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]ff and\\non” for about one year.17 On these occasions, he received\\nabout one to two ounces of methamphetamine at a cost of\\n$900 to $1200 per ounce. Williams stated that sometimes, he\\nbought the drugs outright, while other times Mr. Hopper\\nprovided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a “front.”18 He\\nexplained that, in this fronting arrangement, Mr. Hopper\\nprovided Williams a quantity of drugs, some of which Wil-\\nliams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back. He\\nfurther testified that Mr. Hopper called Williams occasional-\\nly and asked him to visit the homes of customers who owed\\nMr. Hopper money and bring them to Mr. Hopper’s house\\n\\n15 Id. at 15–16.\\n16 Id. at 59.\\n17 Id.\\n18 Id. at 61.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2576\\n\\nto settle the debt. He explained that he helped Mr. Hopper\\ncollect money from his customers because Williams “was\\nselling drugs for him” and “to help him out in his drug\\nbusiness.”19\\n Brooke Peyton testified that she met Mr. Hopper in 2016\\nwhen she was dating William, also known as “Andy,”\\nKarnes. With Karnes, she had visited Mr. Hopper’s resi-\\ndence in Creal Springs, where Mr. Hopper provided ice\\nmethamphetamine to Karnes. She stated that during the\\nsummer of 2016, Mr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five\\n“8-balls,” or 3.5 gram quantities of ice methamphetamine,\\nseveral times a week.20 Karnes obtained the methampheta-\\nmine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a front,” in which he would sell\\ndrugs to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back for the\\ndrugs he had obtained previously.21 Peyton further testified\\nthat sometimes, Mr. Hopper came to her home to drop off\\nmethamphetamine for Karnes. On other occasions, he sent\\nWilliams to deliver the drugs.\\n Robert Weir, also known as “Boog,” testified that he and\\nMr. Hopper reconnected around April or May 2015. At some\\npoint, he, Mr. Hopper, Lucas Holland, and Randall Riley be-\\ngan an arrangement in which the four of them pooled their\\nmoney together to purchase methamphetamine from a\\nsource in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Sometimes, Weir gave\\nMr. Hopper his money, and Mr. Hopper drove to Murphys-\\nboro, where he gave Weir’s and his money to Riley to pur-\\n\\n19 Id. at 64.\\n20 Id. at 89.\\n21 Id. at 90.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 9\\n\\nchase the drugs. Other times, Mr. Hopper gave Weir his\\nmoney, and Weir delivered the money to Riley. Still other\\ntimes, Weir and Mr. Hopper visited Riley together. After Ri-\\nley obtained the drugs from Cape Girardeau, the group di-\\nvided the methamphetamine into equal, one-ounce shares.\\nWeir stated that he paid about $800 to $900 per ounce of\\nmethamphetamine. This arrangement lasted about a month,\\nduring which the group obtained methamphetamine two to\\nthree times per week.\\n In March 2016, police arrested Riley. Weir and Mr. Hop-\\nper then arranged to pool their money with Holland to pur-\\nchase methamphetamine. Holland took their money and ran,\\nand they never got their drugs. Additionally, Weir acknowl-\\nedged that he had personally observed Mr. Hopper distrib-\\nute methamphetamine to other individuals.\\n Lucas Holland testified that, at the beginning of 2016, he\\nhad been living at Riley’s house for about four or five\\nmonths. Holland confirmed the details of the pooling ar-\\nrangement he engaged in with Mr. Hopper, Riley, and Weir\\nto purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\\nGirardeau. He reiterated that Mr. Hopper or Weir, or some-\\ntimes the two together, came to Riley’s house to deliver their\\nmoney. Holland and Riley then drove to Cape Girardeau to\\nobtain the methamphetamine. When Holland and Riley re-\\nturned to Illinois, the group of four split up the drugs. Ac-\\ncording to Holland, this arrangement lasted from about De-\\ncember 2015 to February 2016.\\n Holland testified that, on one occasion, he traveled to\\nCape Girardeau with Riley, Mr. Hopper, and Erin Wright,\\nMr. Hopper’s girlfriend, for a drug deal that Mr. Hopper\\nhad arranged. The group pooled their money, and Mr. Hop-\\n\\f10 No. 18-2576\\n\\nper gave it to an individual in Cape Girardeau. In addition,\\nHolland confirmed that a few days after police arrested Ri-\\nley, Mr. Hopper and Weir gave him money to purchase\\ndrugs. He acknowledged that he “ran off with it.”22 Holland\\nalso testified that he had observed Mr. Hopper sell metham-\\nphetamine to individuals, including Kevin Shuman, at his\\nhome in Creal Springs.\\n Randall Riley testified that he met Mr. Hopper around\\nthe end of 2015 or early 2016 through a mutual acquaintance\\nwhen Mr. Hopper was seeking methamphetamine. Riley\\nconfirmed that eventually, he, Mr. Hopper, Holland, and\\nWeir began a pooling arrangement in which they combined\\ntheir money to purchase methamphetamine from a source in\\nCape Girardeau. According to Riley, the group bought four\\nounces of methamphetamine every day and split the drugs\\nbetween the four of them. Either Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both\\ncame to Riley’s home with $2,200 for Mr. Hopper and Weir’s\\nshares. Riley and Holland drove to Missouri to obtain the\\ndrugs. When they returned, they met either at Riley’s home\\nor at Mr. Hopper’s residence in Creal Springs to divide up\\nthe drugs.\\n Riley confirmed that on one occasion, his source was un-\\navailable, so Mr. Hopper arranged a transaction with his\\nown source. He, Riley, Holland, and Wright drove to Cape\\nGirardeau, where Mr. Hopper gave the source the money\\nthey had pooled together.\\n Blake Gordon testified that he met Mr. Hopper through\\nWeir. According to Gordon, he sold methamphetamine to\\n\\n22 R.122 (Trial Tr. Day 2) at 54.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 11\\n\\nMr. Hopper “more than ten times.”23 On such occasions, he\\nprovided Mr. Hopper methamphetamine in amounts rang-\\ning from one to fourteen grams. He also stated that “on nu-\\nmerous occasions,” he drove Mr. Hopper around the south-\\nern Illinois area to deliver drugs to his customers.24 Gordon\\ndescribed one occasion in which he, Mr. Hopper, and Weir\\npooled their money together. Weir drove to Cape Girardeau\\nto obtain the methamphetamine, which they divided among\\nthe three of them when he returned to Illinois.\\n Crystal Boulton testified that in March 2016, she and her\\nchildren were living at Riley’s home with Riley, her boy-\\nfriend, as well as Holland and his girlfriend. She stated that\\nshe personally observed Mr. Hopper obtain methampheta-\\nmine from Riley at Riley’s residence about four or five times.\\nOn such occasions, Mr. Hopper paid Riley for the metham-\\nphetamine and Riley gave Boulton the money to count. She\\ncounted about $1,000 to $1,200 per ounce of methampheta-\\nmine. Boulton also overheard discussions between Riley and\\nMr. Hopper about pooling their money together and making\\ntrips to Cape Girardeau to obtain methamphetamine.\\n Erin Wright testified that she met Mr. Hopper in Sep-\\ntember 2015 and moved in with him at his home in Creal\\nSprings soon after. She confirmed that Mr. Hopper and Weir\\nwent to Riley’s house to get drugs. Usually, Mr. Hopper re-\\nturned with an ounce of methamphetamine. She stated that\\nMr. Hopper had scales at his Creal Springs home, which he\\nused to weigh drugs. She further testified that, sometimes,\\n\\n23 Id. at 123.\\n24 Id.\\n\\f12 No. 18-2576\\n\\nRiley and Holland came to the Creal Springs home to do\\nbusiness with Mr. Hopper. She described one occasion on\\nwhich she and Mr. Hopper went to Kansas City, Missouri,\\nwhere Mr. Hopper and an individual named Jason Clapp\\nobtained methamphetamine. Wright stated that there were\\nalso a few times when Clapp came to the Creal Springs resi-\\ndence to provide Mr. Hopper with methamphetamine.\\n William Craig testified that he knew Mr. Hopper through\\nWeir. He bought methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper about\\nten or fifteen times. On such occasions, he obtained meth-\\namphetamine in quantities up to eight ounces. When Craig\\nobtained the methamphetamine for himself, Mr. Hopper\\nwould not charge him. When Craig purchased the metham-\\nphetamine to deliver to others, he paid Mr. Hopper in cash.\\nCraig stated that on one occasion, after Mr. Hopper and\\nWeir pooled their money together, Craig drove with Weir to\\nCharleston, Missouri, to purchase methamphetamine. They\\nreturned to Mr. Hopper’s home, where Mr. Hopper and\\nWeir divided the drugs. Craig also confirmed that he had\\nseen Mr. Hopper sell methamphetamine at his home to Kev-\\nin Page and to Andy Karnes on multiple occasions.\\n Kevin Shuman testified that he had known Mr. Hopper\\nfor years. He moved in with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs\\nhome and lived there in December 2015 and January 2016.\\nInitially, he obtained “small amounts” of methamphetamine,\\nranging from “seven grams to an 8-ball,” from Mr. Hopper.25\\nShuman bought the drugs “on a front,” explaining that he\\nsold drugs in order to repay Mr. Hopper for previously pur-\\n\\n\\n25 R.123 (Trial Tr. Day 3) at 26.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 13\\n\\nchased quantities of methamphetamine.26 He recalled two\\noccasions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Mis-\\nsouri, to obtain methamphetamine. When they returned\\nhome, Mr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\\n After a brief term in jail in early 2016, Shuman returned,\\nand the quantities he bought from Mr. Hopper increased\\nfrom grams to ounces of methamphetamine. The two had an\\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\\nand left in their place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for\\npreviously fronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testi-\\nfied that he drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\\ndeliver methamphetamine to his customers.\\n D.\\n At the close of the Government’s case in chief, counsel for\\nMr. Hopper moved for a judgment of acquittal under Feder-\\nal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which the court denied.\\nMr. Hopper elected not to testify, and the defense rested its\\ncase. Following jury instructions and closing arguments, the\\njury retired to deliberate. Approximately an hour later, the\\ncourt received a note from the jury stating, “Pages 17 + 21\\nare confusing us as to the definition of ‘conspiracy.’”27 Page\\n17 of the jury instructions stated that:\\n A conspiracy is an express or implied\\n agreement between two or more persons to\\n\\n\\n26 Id.\\n27 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\\n\\f14 No. 18-2576\\n\\n commit a crime. A conspiracy may be proven\\n even if its goal was not accomplished.\\n In deciding whether the charged conspiracy\\n existed, you may consider all of the circum-\\n stances, including the words and acts of each\\n of the alleged participants.[28]\\n Page 21 of the jury instructions stated that:\\n A conspiracy requires more than just a\\n buyer-seller relationship between the defend-\\n ant and another person. In addition, a buyer\\n and seller of a mixture and substance contain-\\n ing methamphetamine do not enter into a con-\\n spiracy to distribute a mixture and substance\\n containing methamphetamine simply because\\n the buyer resells the [] mixture and substance\\n containing methamphetamine to others, even if\\n the seller knows that the buyer intends to resell\\n the [] mixture and substance containing meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n To establish that a seller knowingly became\\n a member of a conspiracy with a buyer to dis-\\n tribute a mixture and substance containing\\n methamphetamine, the government must\\n prove that the buyer and seller had the joint\\n criminal objective of distributing a mixture and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n28 R.74 at 17.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 15\\n\\n substance containing methamphetamine to\\n others.[29]\\n After conferring with the parties, the court responded to\\nthe jury, “All instructions should be read together. I cannot\\ngive you any more instruction other than what you have\\nbeen given.”30 Following further deliberations, the jury\\nreached a verdict, finding Mr. Hopper guilty of conspiracy\\nto distribute methamphetamine, as charged in the indict-\\nment. The jury returned a special verdict form finding that\\nthe conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\\n E.\\n Prior to Mr. Hopper’s sentencing, the probation office\\nprepared a PSR. To determine the scope of his relevant con-\\nduct, the probation office interviewed several witnesses with\\nknowledge of the conspiracy. Based on these interviews, the\\ninitial PSR determined that Mr. Hopper had a base offense\\nlevel of 36, which corresponds to offenses involving “at least\\n1.5 kilograms but less than 4.5 kilograms of ice.”31 Specifical-\\nly, according to the PSR, the conspiracy involved 1.968 kilo-\\ngrams of ice methamphetamine.\\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy. In particu-\\nlar:\\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\\n\\n29 Id. at 21.\\n30 R.72 at 1.\\n31 R.81 ¶ 28.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2576\\n\\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\\n es = 850 grams)[32]\\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\\n that from January through March, he sold one\\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\\n grams) [33]\\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\\n ice). [34]\\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\\n\\n\\n32 Id. ¶ 12.\\n33 Id. ¶ 14.\\n34 Id. ¶ 19.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 17\\n\\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\\n grams = 42 grams)[35]\\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”36\\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\\ning.”37 Adding the drug amounts described above, the PSR\\ntotaled Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct to be 1.968 kilograms\\nof ice methamphetamine.\\n The initial PSR awarded Mr. Hopper a two-level sentence\\nreduction for acceptance of responsibility. Based on a total\\noffense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, the\\nPSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range of 151 to\\n188 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the initial PSR,\\nchallenging the sentence reduction for acceptance of respon-\\nsibility.38 He asserted that he had “neither denied, nor ad-\\nmitted, any … involvement” in the conspiracy.39 He also\\n\\n35 Id. ¶ 20.\\n36 Id. ¶ 21.\\n37 Id.\\n38 Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel acknowledged that this objection was high-\\nly unusual. See R.82 at 1 (“This marks the first instance in Undersigned\\nCounsel’s career in which he levels an objection on behalf of a client that\\noperates to raise the applicable advisory guidelines range. Thus, it\\nshould be noted that this objection is filed with Defendant Rex Hopper’s\\nconsent and at his direction.”).\\n39 Id.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2576\\n\\nstated that he “underst[ood] that this objection [would]\\ndoom any opportunity he might have at the two-level [ac-\\nceptance of responsibility] reduction.”40 He submitted that,\\nas a result, his total offense level was 36 and the proper\\nguidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.\\n Consequently, the probation office filed a revised PSR,\\nwhich removed the acceptance of responsibility reduction.\\nBased on a total offense level of 36 and a criminal history\\ncategory of I, the revised PSR calculated a guidelines impris-\\nonment range of 188 to 235 months. The Government filed\\nan objection to the revised PSR, contending that Mr. Hopper\\nwas subject to a two-level sentence enhancement for main-\\ntaining a residence for the purpose of distributing metham-\\nphetamine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).\\n Accordingly, the probation office filed a second revised\\nPSR, adopting the Government’s recommendation that\\nMr. Hopper was subject to the two-level sentence enhance-\\nment for maintaining a drug premises. Based on a total of-\\nfense level of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the sec-\\nond revised PSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range\\nof 235 to 293 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the\\nsecond revised PSR, challenging the application of the drug\\npremises enhancement. He maintained that, consistent with\\nthe first revised PSR, his total offense level was 36 and his\\nguidelines imprisonment range was 188 to 235 months.\\n The district court conducted a hearing to impose its sen-\\ntence. At the outset, the court asked whether there were any\\nobjections to the PSR other than Mr. Hopper’s challenge to\\n\\n40 Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 19\\n\\nthe application of the drug premises enhancement. Both sets\\nof counsel stated that there were not. The court then turned\\nto the sentence enhancement.\\n The Government introduced additional testimony from\\nWright, Mr. Hopper’s former girlfriend. She testified that\\nshe had lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home\\nfrom about October 2015 until May 2017. She acknowledged\\nthat, during this time, she saw methamphetamine at the res-\\nidence. She elaborated that “[i]t was always there” and that\\nshe saw drugs in the home “[p]retty much every day.”41\\nWright testified that after Mr. Hopper obtained metham-\\nphetamine from others, he brought it back to the Creal\\nSprings house. She further stated that she saw Mr. Hopper\\ndistribute methamphetamine from the residence. She said\\nthat this occurred “[t]hroughout the week” and that “each\\nweek there was some sort of activity going on” involving\\nmethamphetamine.42 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper\\ncollected money from individuals who bought methamphet-\\namine at his home. She testified that he had drug scales at\\nthe house, which he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”43 She\\nestimated that, while she lived with him, Mr. Hopper dis-\\ntributed methamphetamine from his residence approximate-\\nly “[w]eekly.”44 She added, however, that toward the end of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n41 R.125 at 8.\\n42 Id. at 9.\\n43 Id.\\n44 Id. at 10.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2576\\n\\ntheir time living together, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling dimin-\\nished and he was “just using.”45\\n The court inquired what Mr. Hopper did for a living.\\nWright explained that Mr. Hopper had received a monetary\\nsettlement after working in the coal mines. Subsequently, he\\nhad a “side business” buying and selling cars, and he dealt\\ndrugs.46 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper did not “of-\\nficially work.”47\\n Based on the testimony introduced at trial and at sentenc-\\ning, the court concluded that Mr. Hopper stored metham-\\nphetamine at and distributed it from the Creal Springs resi-\\ndence. Given Wright’s testimony that this occurred weekly\\nover an extended period of time, the court determined that\\nthe distribution was “more than just incidental or collat-\\neral.”48 Accordingly, the court overruled Mr. Hopper’s objec-\\ntion and concluded that he was subject to the two-level en-\\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\\ndistributing methamphetamine.\\n Noting that there were no other objections, the court\\nadopted the findings of the PSR as the findings of the court.\\nThis included the finding that the conspiracy involved be-\\ntween 1.5 and 4.5 kilograms of ice methamphetamine, specif-\\nically 1.968 kilograms, which corresponded to a base offense\\nlevel of 36. Given its conclusion regarding the two-level\\n\\n45 Id. at 24.\\n46 Id. at 32.\\n47 Id.\\n48 Id. at 41.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 21\\n\\ndrug premises enhancement, the court determined that\\nMr. Hopper had a total offense level of 38. With a criminal\\nhistory category of I, the court concluded that his corre-\\nsponding guidelines imprisonment range was 235 to 293\\nmonths.\\n Neither party objected to the court’s guideline range\\nfindings. The Government recommended a sentence near or\\nat the top of the guidelines range, while counsel for\\nMr. Hopper recommended a sentence of 188 months. Based\\non the information in the PSR, the factors set forth in 18\\nU.S.C. § 3553(a), and the arguments of Mr. Hopper’s counsel,\\nthe court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the guide-\\nlines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by four\\nyears of supervised release. At the conclusion of the hearing,\\nthe court asked defense counsel, “Are there any other argu-\\nments I have not considered?”49 Counsel for Mr. Hopper re-\\nsponded that there were not. Following the entry of final\\njudgment, Mr. Hopper filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Mr. Hopper raises four arguments on appeal. First, he as-\\nserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to\\nsupport his conviction for conspiracy to distribute metham-\\nphetamine and that, even if the Government established the\\nexistence of multiple, smaller conspiracies, there was a fatal\\nvariance between the single, overarching conspiracy alleged\\nin the indictment and the Government’s proof at trial. Sec-\\n\\n\\n49 Id. at 59.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2576\\n\\nond, he contends that the district court erred when it denied\\nhis motion for disclosure of the cooperating witnesses’ prof-\\nfer letters. Third, he challenges the district court’s applica-\\ntion of a two-level sentence enhancement for maintaining a\\ndrug premises. Finally, he submits that the district court\\nerred in calculating his guidelines range because, in deter-\\nmining Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, it double-counted\\nthe drug transactions described by Holland and Riley.\\n A.\\n 1.\\n We begin with Mr. Hopper’s attack on the sufficiency of\\nthe evidence. United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1150\\n(7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.\\nDurrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990).50 He contends that\\nthere was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine because the\\nGovernment proved only a series of buyer-seller relation-\\nships. He preserved this argument by moving for a judg-\\nment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, so we review\\n\\n\\n\\n50 In United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on\\nother grounds by United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990), we\\nadopted a “policy” of “routinely addressing evidentiary sufficiency in\\ncriminal cases when a defendant presents the issue on appeal.” Id. at\\n1150. We reasoned that “[i]f in fact insufficient evidence is presented at a\\nfirst trial, a retrial, on any basis, ordinarily may be a wasted endeavor.”\\nId. By contrast, if we find “that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a con-\\nviction, but reverse based on trial error, a retrial” is proper. Id. Accord-\\ningly, to conserve the “scarce and costly resources” of the courts and the\\nparties, we address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence first. Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 23\\n\\nhis claim de novo. United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699,\\n704 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n A defendant’s burden in showing the evidence was in-\\nsufficient to support a conviction is indeed a high one. See\\nUnited States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 835 (7th Cir. 2008). In\\nattempting to describe that burden, we often have said that\\nthe burden is a direct function of the strength of the Gov-\\nernment’s case. See United States v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489, 496–\\n97 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th\\nCir. 2013). Because “[w]e accord great deference to jury ver-\\ndicts,” United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1004–05 (7th Cir.\\n2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[w]e will over-\\nturn a conviction on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds on-\\nly if no rational jury could have found the essential elements\\nof the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v.\\nJohnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). “In making this de-\\ntermination, we view all evidence and draw all reasonable\\ninferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id.\\nSee Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), superseded on\\nother grounds by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death\\nPenalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (stat-\\ning standard of proof in criminal cases). Cf. Anderson v. Liber-\\nty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–53 (1986) (comparing meth-\\nodology in adjudicating a motion for judgment of acquittal\\nin a criminal case with a motion for summary judgment in a\\ncivil case).\\n “To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the government\\nmust prove that (1) two or more people agreed to commit an\\nunlawful act, and (2) the defendant knowingly and inten-\\ntionally joined in the agreement.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 754.\\n“For a drug-distribution conspiracy, the government must\\n\\f24 No. 18-2576\\n\\nprove that the defendant knowingly agreed—either implicit-\\nly or explicitly—with someone else to distribute drugs.”\\nClaybrooks, 729 F.3d at 704 (internal quotation marks omit-\\nted).\\n Our cases “have underscored that ordinary drug transac-\\ntions do not entail or reflect a conspiracy, for the buyer’s on-\\nly purpose is to buy and the seller’s only purpose is to sell:\\nthe buyer and seller lack a shared criminal goal.” United\\nStates v. Neal, 907 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).\\nIn other words, “evidence of a buyer-seller relationship,\\nstanding alone, is insufficient to support a conspiracy con-\\nviction.” United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th\\nCir. 1991). Instead, we require “[e]vidence of an agreement\\nto advance further distribution—beyond the initial transac-\\ntion.” United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n“The government may prove the existence of this agreement\\nthrough circumstantial evidence.” Claybrooks, 729 F.3d at\\n704–05.\\n A “nonexhaustive list of characteristics that strongly dis-\\ntinguish a conspiracy from a buyer-seller relationship” in-\\ncludes:\\n “sales on credit or consignment, an agreement\\n to look for other customers, a payment of\\n commission on sales, an indication that one\\n party advised the other on the conduct of the\\n other’s business, or an agreement to warn of\\n future threats to each other’s business stem-\\n ming from competitors or law enforcement au-\\n thorities.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 25\\n\\nUnited States v. Pereira, 783 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(quoting Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755–56). “We employ a totali-\\nty-of-the-circumstances approach in these cases,” “‘tak[ing]\\ninto account all the evidence surrounding the alleged con-\\nspiracy and mak[ing] a holistic assessment of whether the\\njury reached a reasonable verdict.’” Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 813\\n(quoting Brown, 726 F.3d at 1002).\\n In this case, the Government presented sufficient evi-\\ndence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Hopper en-\\ntered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\\nsouthern Illinois. Our conclusion is supported by evidence\\nthat Mr. Hopper sold methamphetamine on credit, or\\n“fronted” it, to his co-conspirators and that he engaged in\\npooling arrangements with other co-conspirators to pur-\\nchase large quantities of methamphetamine for further dis-\\ntribution.\\n Evidence of repeated, “fronted” transactions can be com-\\npelling circumstantial evidence of an agreement to distribute\\ndrugs because it demonstrates that the defendant “had\\nknowingly thrown his lot in” with other members of the\\nconspiracy. United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1070 (7th Cir.\\n1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a fronting ar-\\nrangement, “the seller becomes the buyer’s creditor, adding\\na dimension to the relationship that goes beyond a spot sale\\nfor cash.” United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir.\\n2008). Such a relationship indicates that the defendant “had\\na keen interest” in his co-conspirators’ “success at reselling”\\nthe drugs. Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070. Although “not all credit\\nsales can support an inference that there was an agreement\\nto distribute,” “when a credit sale is coupled with certain\\ncharacteristics inherent in an ongoing wholesale buyer-seller\\n\\f26 No. 18-2576\\n\\nrelationship—i.e., large quantities of drugs, repeat purchas-\\nes[,] or some other enduring arrangement—the credit sale\\nbecomes sufficient evidence to distinguish a conspiracy from\\na nonconspiratorial buyer-seller relationship.” Johnson, 592\\nF.3d at 756 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n At Mr. Hopper’s trial, the Government presented evi-\\ndence that he fronted methamphetamine to Williams, Shu-\\nman, and Karnes. Williams testified that he obtained about\\none to two ounces of ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hop-\\nper “[o]ff and on” for about one year.51 He stated that some-\\ntimes, he bought the drugs outright, while other times,\\nMr. Hopper provided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a\\n“front.”52 Williams explained that, in this fronting arrange-\\nment, Mr. Hopper provided him a quantity of drugs, some\\nof which Williams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper\\nback for previously fronted drugs. Williams further testified\\nthat occasionally, Mr. Hopper called Williams and asked\\nhim to bring customers who owed Mr. Hopper money to\\nMr. Hopper’s house to settle their debt. Williams explained\\nthat he helped Mr. Hopper collect money from his customers\\nbecause Williams “was selling drugs for him” and “to help\\nhim out in his drug business.”53\\n Shuman also testified that he bought drugs from\\nMr. Hopper “on a front.”54 In early 2016, the quantities he\\n\\n\\n51 R.118 at 59.\\n52 Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n53 Id. at 64.\\n54 R.123 at 26.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 27\\n\\npurchased increased from grams to ounces of methamphet-\\namine. The two had an arrangement in which Mr. Hopper\\nplaced methamphetamine for Shuman in Mr. Hopper’s gar-\\nage. Shuman retrieved the drugs from the garage and left in\\ntheir place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for previously\\nfronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testified that he\\ndrove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to deliver meth-\\namphetamine to his customers. He also described two occa-\\nsions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Missouri, to\\nobtain methamphetamine. When they returned home,\\nMr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\\n Similarly, Peyton testified that Karnes, her former boy-\\nfriend, obtained methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a\\nfront,” in which he would sell drugs to others in order to\\npay Mr. Hopper back for the drugs he had previously ob-\\ntained.55 She stated that during the summer of 2016,\\nMr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five “8-balls,” or 3.5\\ngram quantities of ice methamphetamine, several times a\\nweek.56 She added that on occasion, Mr. Hopper sent Wil-\\nliams to deliver drugs to Karnes.\\n These fronting arrangements are “substantial evidence”\\nthat Mr. Hopper “expected and encouraged” Williams,\\nShuman, and Karnes “to redistribute the drugs he had pro-\\nvided.” United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir.\\n2009). Because Mr. Hopper expected to be repaid based on\\nsales of previously fronted methamphetamine, “he was de-\\npendent upon the further resale of the drugs to make a prof-\\n\\n55 R.118 at 90.\\n56 Id. at 89.\\n\\f28 No. 18-2576\\n\\nit.” Id.; see also United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 808–09\\n(7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that evidence that co-conspirator\\nsold cocaine to the defendant “on credit” indicated that he\\n“took a stake in her business—he received payment after,\\nand as a result of, her resale”). Mr. Hopper also “demon-\\nstrated a high level of trust and confidence in” Shuman, Wil-\\nliams, and Karnes, given that he provided them “with large\\nquantities of drugs without requiring any payment until the\\ndrugs were resold.” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816.57\\n That Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes repeatedly, in large quantities,\\nover an extended period of time makes clear that these activ-\\nities were more than mere buyer-seller relationships. See\\nBrown, 726 F.3d at 1006 (permitting “an inference of conspir-\\nacy” based on evidence of “repeated transactions, in whole-\\nsale quantities, on credit”). These “factors suggest standard-\\nized transactions and lower transaction costs in the business\\nas well as a continuing relationship.” Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 809;\\nsee also Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070 (reasoning that evidence of\\n“multiple transactions over a prolonged period of time”\\nsuggested “that transaction costs … were quite low, which\\ncounsels a finding of conspiracy”). Evidence that Williams\\nand Shuman drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\\ndeliver drugs to his customers and that Mr. Hopper sent\\nWilliams to deliver drugs on his own or to pick up custom-\\ners who owed Mr. Hopper money reinforces that these rela-\\n\\n\\n57Cf. United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting “[t]he\\nmutual trust in this case was less than it would have been had [a\\nco-conspirator] ‘fronted’ cocaine to the defendant (a factor mentioned in\\nalmost all the cases) rather than being paid in cash at the time of sale”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 29\\n\\ntionships were in furtherance of Mr. Hopper’s distribution of\\ndrugs. Based on this evidence, a jury could rationally con-\\nclude that Mr. Hopper conspired to distribute methamphet-\\namine. See Pereira, 783 F.3d at 704–05.\\n The Government also presented considerable testimony\\nestablishing that Mr. Hopper pooled his resources with other\\nmembers of the conspiracy to obtain methamphetamine at a\\nreduced cost from out-of-state sources. This is circumstantial\\nevidence of an agreement to distribute drugs because, by\\n“put[ting] their money and transportation resources together\\nfor an extended period of time,” the co-conspirators “there-\\nby ha[d] a stake in each other’s success, and kn[ew] that the\\nothers intended to resell” the drugs. United States v. Harris,\\n567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also\\nUnited States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 475 (7th Cir. 2016) (hold-\\ning that “[a] reasonable jury could have found that the\\nshared supplier, funds, and product indicated an agree-\\nment” to sell drugs). Based on such evidence, we upheld the\\ndefendant’s conspiracy conviction in United States v. Hay-\\nwood, 324 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2003), reasoning that:\\n [I]n driving to Chicago together, then bringing\\n the drugs back … and splitting them up upon\\n their return, Haywood and Jackson had a\\n standardized way of doing business; they had\\n a continuing relationship, making three trips\\n together to Chicago and talking about making\\n one to Oklahoma; and they both knew that the\\n cocaine would be resold.\\nId. at 517. Similarly, in Harris, we held that there was suffi-\\ncient evidence of a conspiracy to distribute drugs where the\\ndefendant “pooled his money with that of … the other al-\\n\\f30 No. 18-2576\\n\\nleged co-conspirators to buy larger amounts of crack cocaine\\nfrom outside the state for resale.” 567 F.3d at 851.\\n In this case, Holland, Riley, and Weir testified that, to-\\ngether with Mr. Hopper, they pooled their money and\\ntransportation resources over approximately a month-long\\nperiod to purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\\nGirardeau, Missouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the\\nmoney to Riley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland\\nand Riley drove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they\\nreturned, the group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hop-\\nper’s home to divide up the drugs. The group pooled their\\nmoney multiple times per week to purchase four ounces of\\nmethamphetamine at a time, which they divided into equal,\\none-ounce shares upon return to Illinois.\\n Evidence that Mr. Hopper pooled funds, shared suppli-\\ners, and coordinated transport out of state with Holland, Ri-\\nley, and Weir, underscored a common goal between them to\\ndistribute methamphetamine.58 That this pooling arrange-\\nment involved multiple transactions per week over an ex-\\n\\n58 United States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 474 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding\\nconspiracy conviction based on testimony that Lomax and his\\nco-conspirator “shared customers, a supplier, and heroin, and pooled\\nfunds”); United States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (reason-\\ning that evidence that the co-conspirators “pooled their money and\\nshared rides to buy cheaper crack” from outside the state “mean[t] that\\neach could earn more if the others succeeded”); United States v. Haywood,\\n324 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming conspiracy conviction where\\nHaywood and his co-conspirator “pooled their money and shared rides\\nto Chicago in order to buy inexpensive crack, meaning that each could\\nrun a cheaper operation—and earn higher profits—if the other succeed-\\ned”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 31\\n\\ntended period of time reinforces the conclusion that\\nMr. Hopper had entered an agreement to distribute drugs in\\nsouthern Illinois. Thus, the jury had ample evidence, based\\non the “fronted” transactions and the pooling arrangement,\\nto convict Mr. Hopper of conspiring to distribute metham-\\nphetamine.\\n 2.\\n Mr. Hopper also submits that even if the Government\\npresented some evidence of conspiracy, we must vacate his\\nconviction “because of the variance between the indictment\\n(alleging a single, overarching conspiracy) and the proof at\\ntrial (showing, at most, smaller sub-conspiracies), which\\nprejudiced Mr. Hopper.”59 We conclude that there was no\\nfatal variance in this case.\\n At the close of all evidence, Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel\\nmoved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of\\nCriminal Procedure 29. Rule 29 requires the court to “enter a\\njudgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence\\nis insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Mr. Hopper’s counsel\\ndid not articulate the grounds for his motion and, in denying\\nthe motion, the district court ruled only that the Government\\nhad presented sufficient evidence of the charge against\\nMr. Hopper.60 Because Mr. Hopper’s counsel did not raise\\nthe possibility of a fatal variance in the district court, that\\ncourt did not have the opportunity to address this claim.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n59 Appellant’s Br. 17–18.\\n60 See R.123 at 55.\\n\\f32 No. 18-2576\\n\\nTherefore, we review his variance claim for plain error only.\\nUnited States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2007).61\\n “A variance arises when the facts proved by the govern-\\nment at trial differ from those alleged in the indictment.”\\nAvila, 557 F.3d at 815 (quoting United States v. Stigler, 413\\nF.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2005)). We treat a conspiracy variance\\nclaim “as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence.” Unit-\\ned States v. Handlin, 366 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2004). Alt-\\nhough we treat the question of variance as an attack on the\\nsufficiency of the evidence, a party must raise with specifici-\\nty the issue of variance. A timely objection affords the dis-\\ntrict court the opportunity to address the issue and under-\\ntake curative steps. See United States v Pierson, 925 F.3d 913,\\n921–22 (7th Cir. 2019). To prevail on his claim, Mr. Hopper\\nmust show both that (1) “no rational trier of fact could have\\nfound that the evidence at trial proved a single conspiracy”\\nand (2) “the variance was prejudicial.” United States v.\\nDeKelaita, 875 F.3d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 2017). “Even if the evi-\\ndence arguably established multiple conspiracies, there is no\\nmaterial variance from an indictment charging a single con-\\nspiracy if a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond\\na reasonable doubt the existence of the single conspiracy\\ncharged in the indictment.” United States v. Williams, 272\\nF.3d 845, 862 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Mr. Hopper contends that there was a variance between\\nthe Government’s proof at trial and the conspiracy alleged in\\n\\n\\n61Like the defendant in United States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 795 (7th\\nCir. 2007), Mr. Holmes did not ask for a jury instruction on multiple con-\\nspiracies.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 33\\n\\nthe indictment because the Government “failed to tie togeth-\\ner the disparate purposes of Mr. Hopper’s alleged\\nco-conspirators” to demonstrate a single conspiracy.62 He\\nsubmits that this variance prejudiced him at trial and at sen-\\ntencing.\\n To evaluate Mr. Hopper’s variance claim, “we turn to the\\nindictment first and then to the proof at trial.” Id. at 863. The\\nindictment alleged that from about January 2015 through\\nMay 31, 2017, in Williamson and Franklin Counties, in the\\nSouthern District of Illinois, “and elsewhere,” Mr. Hopper\\nconspired “with other persons known and unknown” to dis-\\ntribute methamphetamine.63 As detailed above, at trial, the\\nGovernment presented substantial evidence that Mr. Hop-\\nper entered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\\nsouthern Illinois. It is sufficient that the purpose of the con-\\nspiracy “was simply to distribute narcotics,” and that “each\\nco-conspirator agreed to advance” that goal. United States v.\\nMartin, 618 F.3d 705, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2010). Based on the ev-\\nidence that Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes for further distribution and that\\nhe engaged in a pooling arrangement with Holland, Riley,\\nand Weir to obtain methamphetamine at a low cost for re-\\nsale, a rational jury could have found that Mr. Hopper joined\\nthe single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Because\\n“[t]he key to proving a conspiracy is that the defendant\\njoined [an] agreement, not [a] group,” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816,\\nany failure to identify the connection between Mr. Hopper’s\\n\\n\\n62 Appellant’s Br. 34.\\n63 R.32 at 1.\\n\\f34 No. 18-2576\\n\\nco-conspirators did not amount to a material variance. See,\\ne.g., Williams, 272 F.3d at 863 (concluding there was no mate-\\nrial variance where there was sufficient evidence “for the ju-\\nry to conclude that a number of people had an agreement to\\ndistribute drugs in East St. Louis, and that Williams joined\\nthat agreement”).\\n In any event, Mr. Hopper suffered no prejudice as a re-\\nsult of the alleged variance. First, he contends that the vari-\\nance prejudiced him at trial because his counsel “was unable\\nto adequately prepare his defense because the government\\ndid not define the scope of the alleged conspiracy until clos-\\ning arguments.”64 But “[i]t is the grand jury’s statement of\\nthe existence of the conspiracy agreement rather than the\\nidentity of those who agree which places the defendant on\\nnotice of the charge he must be prepared to meet.” Townsend,\\n924 F.2d at 1389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The\\nGovernment’s evidence at trial demonstrated that Mr. Hop-\\nper joined others in an agreement to distribute methamphet-\\namine in southern Illinois. Mr. Hopper had sufficient notice\\nof the charged conspiracy and the evidence presented at tri-\\nal.65\\n Next, Mr. Hopper submits that “[t]he indictment and the\\ngovernment’s arguments at trial were so broad as to make it\\n\\n64 Appellant’s Br. 36.\\n65 See,e.g., United States v. Hardimon, 329 F. App’x 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2009)\\n(unpublished) (determining that there was no variance and explaining\\nthat “the indictment’s allegation of a conspiracy agreement alone was\\nsufficient notice of the charge that Hardimon needed to be prepared to\\nmeet, and the indictment was not required to name all those who partic-\\nipated in the conspiracy”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 35\\n\\nimpossible for Mr. Hopper to invoke his Fifth Amendment\\nright against double jeopardy” in a subsequent prosecu-\\ntion.66 He stresses that the record does not reveal the scope\\nof the conspiracy, his role in it, or “with whom the jury con-\\nvicted him of conspiring.”67 If we uphold his conviction “on\\nthe basis that some sub-conspiracy existed,” he posits, the\\nGovernment could indict him “for any other act within that\\ntime frame even though he had already been found guilty by\\nthe jury on the charged indictment.”68\\n We have held that, despite a variance between the in-\\ndictment and the proof at trial, we had “no difficulty in\\njudging the scope of the conviction for double jeopardy pur-\\nposes” where the indictment alleged a specific crime, “dur-\\ning a finite interval,” “involved a particular perpetrator,”\\nand “alleged specific misconduct by the perpetrator.” United\\nStates v. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 822, 824 (7th Cir. 2007)\\n(upholding defendant’s mail fraud conviction because de-\\nfendant was not prejudiced by the variance between the in-\\ndictment, “which pinpointed a particular step in the pay-\\nment process” of her alleged fraud, “and the proof at trial,\\nwhich established another”). In the same way, here, the in-\\ndictment alleged a specific crime (conspiracy to distribute\\nmethamphetamine), during a finite interval (about January\\n2015 through about May 31, 2017), involving a particular\\nperpetrator (Mr. Hopper and “other persons known and un-\\nknown”), and specific misconduct by the perpetrator (know-\\n\\n\\n66 Appellant’s Br. 38.\\n67 Id.\\n68 Id. at 38–39.\\n\\f36 No. 18-2576\\n\\ningly conspiring to distribute a mixture and substance con-\\ntaining methamphetamine).69 The scope of Mr. Hopper’s\\nconviction is sufficiently specific to avoid a future double\\njeopardy problem.\\n He further contends that the alleged variance prejudiced\\nhim at trial because the jury was confused about the instruc-\\ntions regarding the scope of the conspiracy. Evidence of\\nmultiple conspiracies may pose “a danger of ‘spillover’ prej-\\nudice” where multiple defendants are tried together and the\\njury hears incriminating evidence relevant against only\\nsome, but not all, of the defendants. Townsend, 924 F.2d at\\n1411. Because Mr. Hopper was tried alone, however, this\\nconcern was not implicated. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis,\\n37 F.3d 301, 306 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “there could be\\nno prejudice” where “Curtis was the only person on trial,\\nthus eliminating the customary concern with jury confusion\\nresulting from the ‘spillover’ effect associated with simulta-\\nneously trying multiple defendants with various connec-\\ntions to the purported scheme”).\\n Additionally, Mr. Hopper asserts that the variance preju-\\ndiced him at sentencing because it “improperly increased the\\nquantity of drugs attributed to him.”70 As we have stated,\\nhowever, there was ample evidence to support Mr. Hopper’s\\nconspiracy conviction, including but not limited to the pool-\\ning arrangement he participated in with Holland, Riley, and\\nWeir. Moreover, the PSR calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant\\nconduct based on “the amounts obtained by the defendant,\\n\\n69 R.32 at 1.\\n70 Appellant’s Br. 39.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 37\\n\\nwhich he then distributed to others.”71 Because the district\\ncourt did not sentence Mr. Hopper based on drug transac-\\ntions not related to the conspiracy in which he participated,\\nsee Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1412 (determining there was no\\nprejudice where “none of the defendants [could] claim that\\ntheir sentences were increased on the basis of drug transac-\\ntions that were not attributable to the limited conspiracies in\\nwhich they participated”), or based on drug quantities sold\\nby his co-conspirators that were within the scope of the con-\\nspiracy, see Avila, 557 F.3d at 819 (concluding there was no\\nprejudice where the defendant’s sentence was based on\\ndrugs he supplied to others, not “the quantities of drugs that\\nwere seized from the entire drug organization”), he did not\\nsuffer prejudice at sentencing.\\n B.\\n 1.\\n Mr. Hopper next submits that the district court erred\\nwhen it ruled that the Government was not required to dis-\\nclose the proffer letters of its cooperating witnesses. He as-\\nserts that the court erroneously “based its decision solely on\\nBrady[72] and Giglio,[73] and thus did not recognize” that Fed-\\neral Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 “is an independent and\\nmore expansive basis for disclosure of proffer letters.”74\\nMr. Hopper’s trial counsel never filed a request under Rule\\n\\n\\n71 R.94 ¶ 21.\\n72 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\\n73 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\\n74 Appellant’s Br. 14.\\n\\f38 No. 18-2576\\n\\n16 for disclosure of the proffer letters. Nor did counsel sug-\\ngest to the district court, during the hearing on his motion or\\notherwise, that Rule 16 might be a basis for disclosure. That\\ncounsel moved for disclosure of the proffer letters and ar-\\ngued that the court should disregard our decision in United\\nStates v. Weidenburner, 550 F. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (un-\\npublished), was not sufficient to preserve the instant argu-\\nment under Rule 16.75 Because there is no evidence in the\\nrecord that Mr. Hopper intended to relinquish this argu-\\nment, however, we conclude that he has forfeited, not\\nwaived, his request for disclosure under Rule 16. United\\nStates v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining\\nthat “[f]orfeiture occurs when a defendant negligently fails\\nto assert a right in a timely fashion”).\\n Rule 16, which governs discovery and inspection, pro-\\nvides in relevant part that:\\n Upon a defendant’s request, the government\\n must permit the defendant to inspect and to\\n\\n\\n75 Cf. United States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015) (defend-\\nant forfeited argument that his arrest was unlawful because his motion\\nto suppress challenged only the protective sweep of his home, not his\\narrest); United States v. Kelly, 772 F.3d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 2014) (defend-\\nant forfeited argument that the warrant application failed to establish\\nprobable cause because his motion to suppress argued only that the war-\\nrant lacked sufficient particularity in the description of the place to be\\nsearched); United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007) (de-\\nfendant forfeited argument that his waiver of his Fifth Amendment\\nrights and subsequent confession were involuntary due to the coercive\\nconditions of his confinement because, in the district court, he argued\\nonly that his confession was involuntary because the police did not ad-\\nminister Miranda warnings).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 39\\n\\n copy or photograph books, papers, documents,\\n data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings\\n or places, or copies or portions of any of these\\n items, if the item is within the government’s\\n possession, custody, or control and … the item\\n is material to preparing the defense.\\nFed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E).\\n Relatedly, Rule 12 provides that certain motions, includ-\\ning a request for “discovery under Rule 16,” “must be raised\\nby pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reason-\\nably available and the motion can be determined without a\\ntrial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). Under this\\nRule, “[t]he court may … set a deadline for the parties to\\nmake pretrial motions,” and if no deadline is set, then “the\\ndeadline is the start of trial.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1). “If a\\nparty does not meet the deadline for making a Rule 12(b)(3)\\nmotion, the motion is untimely.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).\\n“But a court may consider the defense, objection, or request\\nif the party shows good cause.” Id.\\n Rule 12 thus “imposes an antecedent good-cause re-\\nquirement when a defendant fails to file a timely motion.”\\nUnited States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015). In\\nother words, “if a defendant fails to raise a[n] … argument\\nbelow—even if he does so under circumstances that suggest\\na forfeiture—we cannot proceed directly to a review of the\\ndistrict court’s actions for plain error.” United States v. Kelly,\\n772 F.3d 1072, 1079 (7th Cir. 2014). Instead, we first must ask\\nwhether there was good cause for the failure. United States v.\\nJohnson, 415 F.3d 728, 730–31 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n\\f40 No. 18-2576\\n\\n Mr. Hopper offers no explanation for his trial counsel’s\\nfailure to request disclosure of the proffer letters under Rule\\n16 or to otherwise assert Rule 16 as a basis for disclosure of\\nthe letters before the district court. Further, his counsel made\\nno request for relief based on good cause before the district\\ncourt or in this court. Absent a showing of good cause as re-\\nquired by Rule 12, his claim is not subject to further review.\\nUnited States v. Daniels, 803 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2015);\\nUnited States v. Hargrove, 508 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2007).76\\n 2.\\n Mr. Hopper further contends that “the district court\\nerred in presuming that proffer letters are never” required to\\nbe disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or\\nGiglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).77 We review the\\ndistrict court’s determination that the proffer letters need not\\nbe disclosed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jumah,\\n599 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n At the hearing on Mr. Hopper’s motion, the discussion\\ncentered on our decision in Weidenburner, where we held\\nthat proffer letters “are not Giglio material or Jencks Act[78]\\nstatements.” 550 F. App’x at 304. In that case, the defendant\\nmoved for a new trial based on the Government’s assertion\\n\\n76 We note in passing that Mr. Hopper’s counsel had the information\\ncontained in the proffer letters, even though he did not have the letters\\nthemselves. He also was permitted to cross examine the witness about\\nthe proffer process. His client therefore suffered no prejudice from the\\nabsence of the letters.\\n77 Appellant’s Br. 16.\\n78 18 U.S.C. § 3500.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 41\\n\\nthat it could not locate copies of the proffer letters for two\\ncodefendants who testified against Weidenburner. Id. Nei-\\nther witness disputed the existence of the proffer letters, and\\nWeidenburner received copies of both witnesses’ plea\\nagreements. Id. Consequently, we rejected Weidenburner’s\\nclaim of nondisclosure as frivolous. Id. Acknowledging that\\n“Giglio requires disclosure of inducements for a witness[]’s\\ntestimony,” we reasoned that “the prosecutor fulfilled that\\nobligation by producing the plea agreements, which de-\\nscribe[d] the benefits [the witnesses] would receive for coop-\\nerating.” Id. Because “[t]he proffer letters were preliminary\\nto the resulting plea agreements,” we concluded that “Giglio\\nwas satisfied by disclosure of the plea agreements.” Id. Fur-\\nther, we determined that “the Jencks Act [wa]s irrelevant”\\nbecause “[t]he proffer letters were statements of the prosecu-\\ntor who wrote them,” not “factual narrative[s] useful for im-\\npeachment.” Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).79\\n\\n\\n79 At least one of our sister circuits also has held that “the government\\nsatisfied its obligations” by disclosing a cooperating witness’s plea\\nagreement to the defense. United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 880\\n(8th Cir. 2007). In Santisteban, the defendant alleged that the Govern-\\nment’s non-disclosure of the proffer letters sent to a cooperating witness\\n“violated his due process right to receive exculpatory or impeachment\\nevidence.” Id. Because “the government had already provided [the wit-\\nness]’s plea agreement,” the district court “declined to compel the pro-\\nduction” of the proffer letters. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that there was\\nno due process violation. Id. “Regardless of any preliminary proffer\\nagreements,” the court reasoned, “the formal plea agreement governed\\n[the witness]’s cooperation, and it provided the jury with a sufficient ba-\\nsis for judging the credibility of [his] testimony at trial.” Id. The court\\nconcluded that “[t]he terms of the proffer letters were not material to the\\ndefense.” Id.\\n\\f42 No. 18-2576\\n\\n In this case, the Government disclosed the cooperating\\nwitnesses’ plea agreements, which superseded the proffer\\nletters and outlined the terms of the witnesses’ cooperation.\\nThe agreements provided a sufficient basis for Mr. Hopper’s\\ncounsel to impeach the Government’s witnesses and for the\\njury to assess the credibility of those witnesses. Therefore,\\nthe district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied\\nMr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the proffer letters.\\n C.\\n Next, Mr. Hopper challenges the district court’s finding\\nthat he was subject to a two-level sentence enhancement\\nbased on evidence that he maintained his Creal Springs resi-\\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\\nMr. Hopper preserved this challenge by filing an objection to\\nthe application of the enhancement in the district court.\\nTherefore, “we review the district court’s application of the\\nU.S. Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its underlying factual\\nfindings for clear error.” United States v. Flores-Olague, 717\\nF.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n The guidelines provide for a two-level sentence en-\\nhancement “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for the\\npurpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub-\\nstance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). This includes “storage of a\\ncontrolled substance for the purpose of distribution.” Id.\\ncmt. n.17. The application notes clarify that\\n“[m]anufacturing or distributing a controlled substance need\\nnot be the sole purpose for which the premises was main-\\ntained, but must be one of the defendant’s primary or prin-\\ncipal uses for the premises, rather than one of the defend-\\nant’s incidental or collateral uses for the premises.” Id. Be-\\ncause it is undisputed that Mr. Hopper “maintained” the\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 43\\n\\nCreal Springs house, which was his home, our review is lim-\\nited to whether distributing methamphetamine was a “pri-\\nmary or principal” use of the home.\\n “[T]o determine whether drug distribution was a prima-\\nry or incidental use, the district courts are not required to\\napply a simple balancing test that compares the frequency of\\nunlawful activity at the residence with the frequency of law-\\nful uses.” United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (per curiam). That is because “such a test would im-\\nmunize every family home that is also used for drug distri-\\nbution from being deemed an illegally maintained ‘premis-\\nes,’” since “the amount of lawful activity in a home is all but\\ncertain to exceed the amount of illegal activity.” Id. Instead,\\n“the sentencing court should focus on both the frequency\\nand significance of the illicit activities.” Id. “Neither a specif-\\nic frequency nor a particular significance automatically war-\\nrants applying the enhancement.” United States v. Sanchez,\\n710 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on other grounds,\\nSanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013). “Rather, we con-\\nsider the two in tandem and determine whether the prohib-\\nited purpose can be fairly described as a ‘primary or princi-\\npal’ use of the premises.” Id. Factors relevant to this analysis\\ninclude “quantities dealt, customer interactions, keeping\\n‘tools of the trade’ and business records, and accepting pay-\\nment.” Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284.\\n First, with respect to frequency, Mr. Hopper contends\\nthat Wright’s “vague and inconsistent testimony” at the sen-\\ntencing hearing “was not enough” to establish the frequent\\nuse of his home to distribute drugs.80 He further asserts that\\n\\n80 Appellant’s Br. 45.\\n\\f44 No. 18-2576\\n\\n“the district court failed to account for [his] affirmative deci-\\nsion to stop using his home for drug distribution several\\nmonths before the end of the charged conspiracy.”81 We con-\\nclude that these contentions are without merit.\\n Testimony introduced at Mr. Hopper’s trial and at the\\nsentencing hearing highlighted that he distributed metham-\\nphetamine from his home on approximately a weekly basis\\nfor the duration of the conspiracy. Wright testified that she\\nhad lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home from\\nabout October 2015 until May 2017. During this time, meth-\\namphetamine “was always there” and she saw drugs in the\\nhome “[p]retty much every day.”82 Wright estimated that,\\nwhile she lived with him, Mr. Hopper distributed metham-\\nphetamine from his residence approximately “[w]eekly.”83\\nShe added, however, that toward the end of their time living\\ntogether, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling diminished and he was\\n“just using.”84\\n Similarly, Shuman testified that Mr. Hopper distributed\\nmethamphetamine to him while Shuman was living at the\\n\\n\\n81 Id.\\n82 R.125 at 8.\\n83 Id. at 10.\\n84 Id. at 24:8–15 (“Q. Ms. Wright, did you also add that most of the meth\\ntransactions that you were aware of occurred at Hopper’s brother’s\\nhouse, Mark Hopper? A. I’ve never—I didn’t say that like that. That’s\\nbeen taken out of context. I said that happened there, but everything was\\ndone in Creal in the very beginning, and then he slacked off, and to-\\nwards the end of the relationship he was just using, he wasn’t selling\\nit.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 45\\n\\nCreal Springs home in December 2015 and January 2016. Af-\\nter Shuman returned from jail in early 2016, the two had an\\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\\nand left the money he owed Mr. Hopper in their place. Mul-\\ntiple witnesses, including Craig, Holland, and Peyton, also\\ntestified that they observed Mr. Hopper sell methampheta-\\nmine to other individuals at his home.\\n This evidence that Mr. Hopper stored drugs at his house\\nand regularly distributed methamphetamine to customers\\nthere for the better part of 2016 confirms that he used the\\nhouse for the purpose of drug distribution with sufficient\\nfrequency.85 That Mr. Hopper conducted distribution activi-\\nties with less frequency toward the end of the conspiracy\\ndoes not undermine this conclusion.\\n Turning to the significance of the distribution activities,\\nMr. Hopper submits that “[t]he scope of drug activity at [his]\\n\\n\\n85 See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(concluding that “evidence of eight transactions, most within a\\ntwo-month period, support[ed] the courts’ findings that significant deals\\nwere occurring frequently enough for the home to be deemed, in es-\\nsence, a drug den for the purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(12)”); United States v.\\nWinfield, 846 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (upholding appli-\\ncation of enhancement based on evidence that “in the twelve weeks be-\\nfore the raid, [an] informant bought drugs from Winfield at his apart-\\nment four times and spotted additional drugs and drug paraphernalia\\nduring each transaction”); United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 533\\n(7th Cir. 2013) (holding that enhancement applied based on evidence that\\nthe defendant “sold and stored drugs at his home” and “did so ‘on a dai-\\nly basis’ over a three-year period”).\\n\\f46 No. 18-2576\\n\\nhome was not significant enough to warrant the enhance-\\nment.”86 Again, the testimony adduced at trial and at sen-\\ntencing amply demonstrated that Mr. Hopper carried on\\nsignificant aspects of his distribution business from his\\nhome.\\n We have already observed that there was substantial tes-\\ntimony that Mr. Hopper stored and distributed metham-\\nphetamine at his house.87 In this respect, Wright testified\\nthat Mr. Hopper had drug scales at the Creal Springs home,\\nwhich he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”88 Further, we\\nconsider evidence of financial transactions in the home to be\\nsignificant activity for the purpose of distributing drugs.89\\nHere, Williams testified that, when customers owed\\nMr. Hopper money, Williams occasionally brought these in-\\n\\n86 Appellant’s Br. 47.\\n87 See, e.g., Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284 (upholding application of enhance-\\nment based on “evidence that drugs were shipped to and stored at Con-\\ntreras’s home” and that “Contreras accepted payment for drugs at his\\nhome”). We have also recognized that keeping “tools of the trade” on the\\npremises may indicate “that drug trafficking was the principal use of the\\npremises.” United States v. Thomas, 845 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 2017) (in-\\nternal quotation marks omitted) (upholding application of enhancement\\nwhere a “search of the home yielded a digital scale, a cutting agent, and\\nplastic sandwich baggies with the corners cut out”).\\n88 R.125 at 9.\\n89 See United States v. Sanchez, 710 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on\\nother grounds, Sanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013) (noting that “in\\nconducting this large drug trade, Sanchez used his residence not only for\\nthe drop-off, storage, and pick-up of drugs, but also as a secure place to\\nsettle the financials”), vacated on other grounds, Sanchez v. United States,\\n571 U.S. 801 (2013) .\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 47\\n\\ndividuals to the house to settle their debt with Mr. Hopper.\\nWright also acknowledged that Mr. Hopper collected money\\nfrom individuals who bought methamphetamine at his\\nhome. Finally, testimony that the defendant’s “only regular\\nand reliable source of income stemmed from proceeds of\\ndrug trafficking activities” is evidence that the distribution\\nof drugs from his home was significant to his livelihood.90\\nFor this reason, it is meaningful that Wright testified that\\nMr. Hopper had received money from a settlement and had\\na “side business” buying and selling cars, but that he did not\\n“officially work.”91\\n In sum, we conclude that there was evidence of frequent,\\nsignificant drug distribution activities at Mr. Hopper’s\\nhome. Therefore, the district court properly determined that\\nMr. Hopper was subject to the sentence enhancement for\\nmaintaining a drug premises.\\n D.\\n Finally, we turn to Mr. Hopper’s claim that the district\\ncourt erred in determining his guidelines range because it\\nadopted an incorrectly calculated relevant conduct finding\\nfrom the PSR. He contends that most of the relevant conduct\\nwas based on drug amounts identified in interviews the\\n\\n\\n90 Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 533; see also Winfield, 846 F.3d at 243 (noting\\nthat “Winfield at the time of his arrest was ‘primarily living off proceeds\\nfrom drug sales’”); Sanchez, 710 F.3d at 732 (reasoning that because\\n“Sanchez had no legitimate job and no source of income beyond his drug\\nsales,” “the illicit transactions occurring at the premises were signifi-\\ncant—in quantity, in scope, and in importance to Sanchez’s livelihood”).\\n91 R.125 at 32.\\n\\f48 No. 18-2576\\n\\nprobation office conducted with Holland and Riley. Accord-\\ning to Mr. Hopper, in their separate interviews, Holland and\\nRiley were actually referring to the same transactions. Thus,\\nby including the drug amounts described in both Holland\\nand Riley’s interviews in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s rel-\\nevant conduct, the district court double-counted the same set\\nof drugs.\\n Mr. Hopper did not challenge the relevant conduct calcu-\\nlation in his objection to the initial PSR, his objection to the\\nsecond revised PSR, or at the sentencing hearing. Therefore,\\nwe review his claim for plain error only. Fed. R. Crim. P.\\n52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be\\nconsidered even though it was not brought to the [district]\\ncourt’s attention.”). We have discretion to remedy the for-\\nfeited error provided that Mr. Hopper has satisfied the fol-\\nlowing conditions: (1) there is an error “that has not been in-\\ntentionally relinquished or abandoned”; (2) the error is\\n“plain—that is to say, clear or obvious”; (3) the error “affect-\\ned the defendant’s substantial rights”; and (4) the error “se-\\nriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of\\njudicial proceedings.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136\\nS. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 736 (1993), superseded on other grounds by rule, Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 24(c) (1999)); see also United States v. Pierson, 925\\nF.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence has clarified\\nthe application of the third and fourth prongs in the context\\nof sentencing errors. To demonstrate that the error affected\\nhis substantial rights, “in the ordinary case,” the defendant\\nmust “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,\\nthe outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 49\\n\\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). According to the Court, “[w]hen a defendant is\\nsentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or\\nnot the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct\\nrange—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient\\nto show a reasonable probability of a different outcome ab-\\nsent the error.” Id. at 1345. “That probability is all that is\\nneeded to establish an effect on substantial rights for pur-\\nposes of obtaining relief under Rule 52(b).” Id. at 1349. Fur-\\nther, “[i]n the ordinary case, … the failure to correct a plain\\nGuidelines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights\\nwill seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputa-\\ntion of judicial proceedings.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States,\\n138 S. Ct. 1897, 1911 (2018). In other words, “[a] plain Guide-\\nlines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights is pre-\\ncisely the type of error that ordinarily warrants relief under\\nRule 52(b).” Id. at 1907.\\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy.92 In particu-\\nlar:\\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\\n\\n92 Though the probation office revised Mr. Hopper’s PSR twice before\\nsentencing, the relevant conduct calculations did not change. For pur-\\nposes of this discussion, we reference the most recent version of the re-\\nport, the second revised PSR.\\n\\f50 No. 18-2576\\n\\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\\n es = 850 grams)[93]\\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\\n that from January through March, he sold one\\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\\n grams)[94]\\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\\n ice).[95]\\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\\n grams = 42 grams)[96]\\n\\n\\n93 R.94 ¶ 12.\\n94 Id. ¶ 14.\\n95 Id. ¶ 19.\\n96 Id. ¶ 20.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 51\\n\\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”97\\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\\ning.”98 As demonstrated by the following chart, adding the\\ndrug amounts described above, the PSR totaled Mr. Hop-\\nper’s relevant conduct to be 1.9685 kilograms of ice meth-\\namphetamine.\\n Interviewee Drug Amount\\n Holland 850 grams\\n Riley 793 grams\\n Wright 283.5 grams\\n Wright 42 grams\\n 1,968.5 grams\\n Total\\n (1.9685 kilograms)\\n We agree with Mr. Hopper that the district court plainly\\nerred in adopting the PSR’s relevant conduct calculation.\\nFirst, we conclude that Mr. Hopper did not “intentionally\\nrelinquish[] or abandon[]” this challenge. Molina-Martinez,\\n136 S. Ct. at 1343. Neither party objected to the relevant con-\\nduct calculation prior to or during the sentencing hearing.\\nAt sentencing, the district court adopted the findings of the\\nPSR, including the relevant conduct calculation, without fur-\\n\\n\\n97 Id. ¶ 21.\\n98 Id.\\n\\f52 No. 18-2576\\n\\nther comment. “Given the complexity” of calculating a de-\\nfendant’s guidelines range, “district courts sometimes make\\nmistakes.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904. Accordingly,\\n“when a district court’s sentencing of a defendant within the\\nframework of an incorrect Guidelines range goes unnoticed\\nby the parties as well,” a defendant is “not entirely without\\nrecourse.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Second, the error here was plain. At trial, Holland, Riley,\\nand Weir all testified that, together with Mr. Hopper, they\\npooled their money over approximately a month-long peri-\\nod sometime between late 2015 and early 2016 to purchase\\nmethamphetamine from a source in Cape Girardeau, Mis-\\nsouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the money to Ri-\\nley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland and Riley\\ndrove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they returned,\\nthe group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hopper’s home\\nto divide up the drugs. Holland, Riley, and Weir all de-\\nscribed how the group pooled their money to purchase four\\nounces of methamphetamine at a time, which they divided\\ninto equal, one-ounce shares.\\n In context of the testimony presented at trial, it is clear\\nthat Holland and Riley were describing the same pooling\\narrangement during their separate interviews with the pro-\\nbation office. The amounts attributed to Holland and Riley\\nin the PSR differ only because Riley’s more specific state-\\nments prompted the Government to use a 28-day month in-\\nstead of a 30-day month to calculate the total amount of\\nmethamphetamine described. Regardless, the trial testimony\\nconsistently showed that Mr. Hopper, Holland, Riley, and\\nWeir participated in a pooling arrangement and that follow-\\ning each purchase, each member of the group obtained one\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 53\\n\\nounce of methamphetamine. Because Holland and Riley\\nwere describing the same set of transactions, it was plainly\\nerroneous to include the drug amounts described in both in-\\nterviews in calculating Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\\n Third, we hold that this plain error affected Mr. Hopper’s\\nsubstantial rights because it increased his base offense level\\nand his corresponding guidelines imprisonment range. Mo-\\nlina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346 (“In most cases a defendant\\nwho has shown that the district court mistakenly deemed\\napplicable an incorrect, higher Guidelines range has demon-\\nstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome.”). At\\nsentencing, the district court adopted the PSR’s relevant\\nconduct calculation of 1.968 grams of ice methamphetamine,\\nwhich resulted in a base offense level of 36. Applying the\\ntwo-level enhancement for maintaining a residence for the\\npurpose of distributing methamphetamine, the court calcu-\\nlated a total offense level of 38. With a criminal history cate-\\ngory of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\\nwas 235 to 293 months. The court sentenced Mr. Hopper to\\n235 months’ imprisonment, which is “conspicuous for its po-\\nsition as the lowest sentence within what the [d]istrict\\n[c]ourt believed to be the applicable range.” Id. at 1347.\\n If we count the drugs described by Holland and Riley on-\\nly once, Mr. Hopper’s base offense level falls to 34. Assum-\\ning for purposes of this calculation that the relevant month\\nwas 30 days and, consistent with the testimony at trial, that\\nMr. Hopper received one ounce of methamphetamine ice per\\ntransaction, the resulting drug quantity is 850 grams. Add-\\ning these 850 grams to the drug amounts described by\\nWright, the total quantity is only 1,175.5 grams, or 1.1755\\nkilograms, as shown in the following chart:\\n\\f54 No. 18-2576\\n\\n Interviewee Drug Amount\\n Holland/Riley 850 grams\\n Wright 283.5 grams\\n Wright 42 grams\\n 1,175.5 grams\\n Total\\n (1.1755 kilograms)\\n This amount is significantly below the 1.5-kilogram\\nthreshold that would trigger a base offense level of 36. See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2). At a base offense level of 34, applying\\nthe two-level drug premises enhancement, Mr. Hopper’s to-\\ntal offense level would be 36. With a criminal history catego-\\nry of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\\nwould be 188 to 235 months. At sentencing, the district court\\n“said nothing to suggest that it would have imposed” a sen-\\ntence of 235 months “regardless of the Guidelines range.”\\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1348. Consequently, “there is at\\nleast a reasonable probability that the [d]istrict [c]ourt would\\nhave imposed a different sentence had it known that” a low-\\ner sentence was appropriate. Id.; United States v. Adams, 746\\nF.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2014) (“When a district court incor-\\nrectly calculates the guideline range, we normally presume\\nthe improperly calculated guideline range influenced the\\njudge’s choice of sentence, unless he says otherwise.”).\\n Fourth, we conclude that Mr. Hopper satisfied the last\\nprong of the plain-error analysis. “The risk of unnecessary\\ndeprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness,\\nintegrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings in the\\ncontext of a plain Guidelines error because of the role the\\ndistrict court plays in calculating the range and the relative\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 55\\n\\nease of correcting the error.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at\\n1908. This conclusion is especially forceful where, as here,\\nthe error “was based on a mistake made in the presentence\\ninvestigation report by the Probation Office, which works on\\nbehalf of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” Id. Therefore, we conclude\\nthat resentencing based on recalculation of Mr. Hopper’s\\nrelevant conduct is required.99\\n The Government insists that any error in calculating\\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct was harmless because the\\ndistrict court actually “severely undercounted” the amount\\nof drugs attributable to Mr. Hopper.100 According to the\\nGovernment, the district court should have attributed to\\nMr. Hopper the entire amount purchased by Mr. Hopper,\\nHolland, Riley, and Weir each time they pooled their money\\ntogether because “[t]he entire four ounces was foreseeable\\nrelevant conduct” to Mr. Hopper.101 The Government con-\\ncedes that it failed to challenge the relevant conduct calcula-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n99See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (hold-\\ning that plain error in calculating the defendant’s criminal history points,\\nwhich resulted in a higher guidelines range, required resentencing be-\\ncause we had “no reason to believe” that the district court’s error “did\\nnot affect its selection of the particular sentence”).\\n100 Appellee’s Br. 49.\\n101 Id. at 50; see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (providing that, “in the case of a\\njointly undertaken criminal activity,” a defendant’s base offense level\\nshall be determined based on “all acts and omissions of others” that were\\n“(i) within the scope” of the conspiracy; “(ii) in furtherance of” the con-\\nspiracy; and “(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with” the con-\\nspiracy).\\n\\f56 No. 18-2576\\n\\ntion before the district court but explains that “it most likely\\nwould not have affected the advisory guideline range.”102\\n We have recognized that “an appellate court can affirm\\nthe determination of a sentencing range ‘on any ground\\nsupported by the record even if that ground was not relied\\nupon by the district court.’” United States v. Benitez, 92 F.3d\\n528, 538 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 6 F.3d\\n431, 447 (7th Cir. 1993)). But the Government has not offered,\\nnor have we located, any authority to suggest that we can\\nrely on a relevant conduct calculation not presented to the\\ndistrict court to affirm a defendant’s sentence. Indeed, our\\ndecision in United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir.\\n1995), suggests quite the opposite.\\n In that case, a jury found Henderson guilty of conspiracy\\nto distribute cocaine base and distributing cocaine base. Id.\\nat 1147. At sentencing, the district court attributed to Hen-\\nderson the 18 grams of cocaine he was convicted of selling.\\nId. at 1151. The court also attributed ten percent of the\\namounts of cocaine described by Henderson’s\\nco-conspirator. Id. The court explained that it did not accept\\nthe full amount claimed by his co-conspirator because of\\n“the ‘vagueness and generalized’ nature” of the co-\\nconspirator’s testimony “and the lack of money to support\\nhis contentions that he sold such large amounts of drugs.”\\nId. Henderson challenged the amount of drugs the district\\ncourt attributed to him, arguing that “by accepting only 10%\\nof [the co-conspirator’s] testimony, the court did not simply\\nact conservatively, but instead indicated its belief that [the\\n\\n\\n102 Appellee’s Br. 50 n.6.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 57\\n\\nco-conspirator’s] information was not sufficiently reliable to\\nsupport any amounts above the 18 grams.” Id. We agreed\\nthat the court clearly erred because it “did not have suffi-\\ncient faith” in the co-conspirator’s testimony “to use it as the\\nbasis for attributing further amounts to Henderson.” Id. at\\n1152.\\n The Government submitted, however, that remand was\\nnot required because other calculations would result in drug\\namounts within the range applied by the district court. Id.\\nFor instance, the Government contended that we could cal-\\nculate the drug quantity by multiplying the number of used\\nplastic baggies by the amount of cocaine typically packaged\\nin each baggie. Id. at 1153. Although we were “fairly certain\\nthat this calculation … would adequately sustain the court’s\\ndetermination,” we declined to “embrace it ourselves.” Id.\\nWe explained that “[t]he government first presented this cal-\\nculation on appeal,” such that “the district court, which has\\nsentencing responsibility, [] had no opportunity to consider\\nit.” Id. The Government also proposed that we could deter-\\nmine the drug quantity based on the amount of money\\nseized from Henderson and from a drug location on the day\\nof his arrest. Id. We declined this suggestion, reasoning that\\n“while the government introduced this evidence at trial, it\\ndid not present the calculations at sentencing.” Id. Conse-\\nquently, we left “the initial consideration of these sentencing\\nissues to the district court on remand.” Id.\\n For the same reasons, we decline to affirm Mr. Hopper’s\\nsentence based on relevant conduct calculations that the\\nGovernment presented for the first time on appeal. Because\\nneither party challenged the relevant conduct calculations\\nbelow, “the district court, which has sentencing responsibil-\\n\\f58 No. 18-2576\\n\\nity,” id., had no opportunity to consider any arguments re-\\ngarding the proper calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant\\nconduct. The parties must present their drug quantity calcu-\\nlations to the district court to consider in the first instance on\\nremand.\\n Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and\\naffirm the district court’s determination that he was subject\\nto a sentence enhancement for maintaining a residence for\\nthe purpose of distributing methamphetamine. We vacate\\nhis sentence and remand his case to the district court for re-\\nsentencing based on our conclusion that there was plain er-\\nror in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\\n AFFIRMED IN PART,\\n VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431321/\", \"author_raw\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654068/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rex A. HOPPER, Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2576\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nREX A. HOPPER,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Illinois.\n No. 4:17-cr-40034-JPG-1 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. In June 2017, a federal grand jury\nindicted Rex Hopper on one count of conspiracy to distrib-\nute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),\n841(b)(1)(B), 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Hopper was part of a\ncommunity of methamphetamine users and sellers in south-\nern Illinois. Several of these individuals signed proffer letters\nwith the Government, agreeing to provide testimony against\nMr. Hopper in exchange for leniency. Most of these witness-\n\f2 No. 18-2576\n\nes subsequently entered plea agreements.1 Mr. Hopper,\nhowever, pleaded not guilty to the single count in the in-\ndictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late Febru-\nary 2018.\n Over the course of three days, the Government presented\nthe testimony of approximately twenty witnesses against\nMr. Hopper. The district court denied Mr. Hopper’s motion\nfor disclosure of the proffer letters given to these witnesses.\nFollowing deliberations, the jury found Mr. Hopper guilty of\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, as charged in\nthe indictment, and returned a special verdict form finding\nthat the conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\n Based on interviews with other participants in the con-\nspiracy, the probation office determined that Mr. Hopper’s\nrelevant conduct involved 1.968 kilograms of ice metham-\nphetamine. This drug amount corresponded to a base of-\nfense level of 36. At sentencing, the district court determined\nthat Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sentence en-\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\ndistributing methamphetamine. Based on a total offense lev-\nel of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the court calcu-\nlated a guidelines imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months.\nThe district court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the\nguidelines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by\nfour years of supervised release.2\n\n\n\n1One witness entered an “open” guilty plea, for which there was no\nwritten plea agreement.\n2 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\n\fNo. 18-2576 3\n\n Mr. Hopper now challenges both his conviction and his\nsentence. First, we conclude that the Government presented\nsufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Hopper engaged in a\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in southern Illi-\nnois, and that there was no material variance between the\nconspiracy charged in the indictment and the Government’s\nproof at trial. Second, the district court did not err when it\ndenied Mr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the cooperat-\ning witnesses’ proffer letters. Third, the district court proper-\nly concluded that Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sen-\ntence enhancement for maintaining his Creal Springs resi-\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\nHowever, we conclude that the district court plainly erred\nwhen it calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct and corre-\nsponding guidelines range. In context, it is clear that, in their\nseparate interviews, Lucas Holland and Randall Riley were\ndescribing the same transactions. By including the amounts\ndescribed by both Holland and Riley in the calculation of\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the presentence report\n(“PSR”), adopted by the district court, erroneously dou-\nble-counted those drug quantities.\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. We\nalso affirm the district court’s determination that he was\nsubject to a sentence enhancement for maintaining a drug\npremises. Because the court plainly erred in calculating his\nrelevant conduct, however, we vacate Mr. Hopper’s sentence\nand remand his case to the district court for resentencing.3\n\n3We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18\nU.S.C. § 3742.\n\f4 No. 18-2576\n\n I.\n BACKGROUND\n A.\n In April 2017, law enforcement officers executed a search\nwarrant at Mr. Hopper’s residence. They sought to recover\nitems involved in a burglary. Officers observed drug para-\nphernalia and methamphetamine in plain view. According-\nly, the officers obtained and executed a second search war-\nrant for the residence. Upon finding additional drug para-\nphernalia and methamphetamine in his home, officers took\nMr. Hopper into custody. A federal grand jury later returned\nan indictment charging Mr. Hopper with one count of con-\nspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 18\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, in\nthe Southern District of Illinois.\n B.\n Mr. Hopper was part of a community of methampheta-\nmine users and sellers in southern Illinois. Around the time\nof his indictment, the Government also charged other mem-\nbers of this group with conspiracy to distribute metham-\nphetamine. Several of these individuals received proffer let-\nters from the Government and subsequently agreed to pro-\nvide testimony against Mr. Hopper in exchange for leniency.\nMost of these witnesses later entered plea agreements.\nMr. Hopper, however, pleaded not guilty to the single count\nin the indictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late\nFebruary 2018.\n Before the trial began, counsel for Mr. Hopper renewed a\nprevious motion for disclosure of the proffer letters given to\nthe witnesses who would testify against Mr. Hopper. Refer-\n\fNo. 18-2576 5\n\nencing our decision in United States v. Weidenburner, 550\nF. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (unpublished), counsel recog-\nnized that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has ruled that” proffer let-\nters “are not materials that have to be provided.”4 Neverthe-\nless, counsel wanted “the record to be clear” that he thought\nhe “ought to be provided a copy” of the proffer letters.5\n Counsel for Mr. Hopper explained that the proffer letter\n“is an agreement that sets forth the ground rules” for what\ntestimony “may or may not lead to a plea agreement.”6 He\nsubmitted that “this is a very important aspect of the de-\nfense” because “no plea agreements are offered until you\nproffer.”7 In other words, the proffer letters are “part of the\nprocess by which men and women ultimately find their way\non to the stand to give testimony against a defendant.”8 As a\nresult, counsel asserted, “if the[] jurors don’t have some un-\nderstanding of this process,” the defense would be “really\nhampered in terms of our constitutional right[s] to put on a\ndefense and … to confront the witnesses through cross ex-\namination that are here to accuse Rex Hopper of various\ncrimes.”9\n Relying on our decision in Weidenburner, the Government\nresponded that “the Seventh Circuit is clear that the proffer\n\n4 R.118 (Trial Tr. Day 1) at 8.\n5 Id. at 5.\n6 Id. at 6.\n7 Id.\n8 Id.\n9 Id. at 7.\n\f6 No. 18-2576\n\nletters don’t come in,” nor does “any information about the\nproffer,” “because it is a preliminary step in the plea agree-\nment, and then the plea agreement supersedes all that.”10\nTurning to defense counsel, the court stated, “I think it is\npretty clear that, you know, you are not going to get the\ndocuments.”11\n The Government further noted its objection to defense\ncounsel asking any questions about the process of entering a\nplea agreement. The court asked defense counsel what kind\nof questions he intended to ask the cooperating witnesses.\nCounsel explained that he wanted the jury to know that be-\nfore entering a plea agreement, a witness had to meet with\nfederal agents and “understood that agents would decide\nand the prosecutors would decide whether you told the\ntruth, and if they didn’t think you told the truth that a plea\nagreement would not be tendered.”12 Counsel acknowl-\nedged that he planned to review the terms of the plea\nagreements with each witness, but argued that the jury\nwould be “missing a big part of this process” without the\nproffer letters.13 Based on our decision in Weidenburner, the\nGovernment reiterated that the plea agreement “super-\nsede[s] the proffer letter” and is “the document which the\ndefendant is entitled to and entitled to question witnesses\nabout.”14 The court denied the motion for disclosure of the\n\n10 Id. at 8.\n11 Id.\n12 Id. at 10.\n13 Id. at 11.\n14 Id. at 14.\n\fNo. 18-2576 7\n\nproffer letters and ruled that counsel could ask the witnesses\n“whether they’ve entered into a proffer agreement, but go-\ning into the terms of it that are super[s]eded by the plea\nagreement, I’m not going to let you do.”15\n C.\n Mr. Hopper proceeded to trial before a jury on February\n26, 2018. Over the course of three days, the Government pre-\nsented the testimony of approximately twenty witnesses\nagainst Mr. Hopper. Set forth below is a summary of the\nwitnesses and testimony relevant to this appeal.\n Dameon Williams testified that he met Mr. Hopper some-\ntime in 2015 when they were “messing with drugs.”16 He ob-\ntained ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]ff and\non” for about one year.17 On these occasions, he received\nabout one to two ounces of methamphetamine at a cost of\n$900 to $1200 per ounce. Williams stated that sometimes, he\nbought the drugs outright, while other times Mr. Hopper\nprovided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a “front.”18 He\nexplained that, in this fronting arrangement, Mr. Hopper\nprovided Williams a quantity of drugs, some of which Wil-\nliams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back. He\nfurther testified that Mr. Hopper called Williams occasional-\nly and asked him to visit the homes of customers who owed\nMr. Hopper money and bring them to Mr. Hopper’s house\n\n15 Id. at 15–16.\n16 Id. at 59.\n17 Id.\n18 Id. at 61.\n\f8 No. 18-2576\n\nto settle the debt. He explained that he helped Mr. Hopper\ncollect money from his customers because Williams “was\nselling drugs for him” and “to help him out in his drug\nbusiness.”19\n Brooke Peyton testified that she met Mr. Hopper in 2016\nwhen she was dating William, also known as “Andy,”\nKarnes. With Karnes, she had visited Mr. Hopper’s resi-\ndence in Creal Springs, where Mr. Hopper provided ice\nmethamphetamine to Karnes. She stated that during the\nsummer of 2016, Mr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five\n“8-balls,” or 3.5 gram quantities of ice methamphetamine,\nseveral times a week.20 Karnes obtained the methampheta-\nmine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a front,” in which he would sell\ndrugs to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back for the\ndrugs he had obtained previously.21 Peyton further testified\nthat sometimes, Mr. Hopper came to her home to drop off\nmethamphetamine for Karnes. On other occasions, he sent\nWilliams to deliver the drugs.\n Robert Weir, also known as “Boog,” testified that he and\nMr. Hopper reconnected around April or May 2015. At some\npoint, he, Mr. Hopper, Lucas Holland, and Randall Riley be-\ngan an arrangement in which the four of them pooled their\nmoney together to purchase methamphetamine from a\nsource in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Sometimes, Weir gave\nMr. Hopper his money, and Mr. Hopper drove to Murphys-\nboro, where he gave Weir’s and his money to Riley to pur-\n\n19 Id. at 64.\n20 Id. at 89.\n21 Id. at 90.\n\fNo. 18-2576 9\n\nchase the drugs. Other times, Mr. Hopper gave Weir his\nmoney, and Weir delivered the money to Riley. Still other\ntimes, Weir and Mr. Hopper visited Riley together. After Ri-\nley obtained the drugs from Cape Girardeau, the group di-\nvided the methamphetamine into equal, one-ounce shares.\nWeir stated that he paid about $800 to $900 per ounce of\nmethamphetamine. This arrangement lasted about a month,\nduring which the group obtained methamphetamine two to\nthree times per week.\n In March 2016, police arrested Riley. Weir and Mr. Hop-\nper then arranged to pool their money with Holland to pur-\nchase methamphetamine. Holland took their money and ran,\nand they never got their drugs. Additionally, Weir acknowl-\nedged that he had personally observed Mr. Hopper distrib-\nute methamphetamine to other individuals.\n Lucas Holland testified that, at the beginning of 2016, he\nhad been living at Riley’s house for about four or five\nmonths. Holland confirmed the details of the pooling ar-\nrangement he engaged in with Mr. Hopper, Riley, and Weir\nto purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\nGirardeau. He reiterated that Mr. Hopper or Weir, or some-\ntimes the two together, came to Riley’s house to deliver their\nmoney. Holland and Riley then drove to Cape Girardeau to\nobtain the methamphetamine. When Holland and Riley re-\nturned to Illinois, the group of four split up the drugs. Ac-\ncording to Holland, this arrangement lasted from about De-\ncember 2015 to February 2016.\n Holland testified that, on one occasion, he traveled to\nCape Girardeau with Riley, Mr. Hopper, and Erin Wright,\nMr. Hopper’s girlfriend, for a drug deal that Mr. Hopper\nhad arranged. The group pooled their money, and Mr. Hop-\n\f10 No. 18-2576\n\nper gave it to an individual in Cape Girardeau. In addition,\nHolland confirmed that a few days after police arrested Ri-\nley, Mr. Hopper and Weir gave him money to purchase\ndrugs. He acknowledged that he “ran off with it.”22 Holland\nalso testified that he had observed Mr. Hopper sell metham-\nphetamine to individuals, including Kevin Shuman, at his\nhome in Creal Springs.\n Randall Riley testified that he met Mr. Hopper around\nthe end of 2015 or early 2016 through a mutual acquaintance\nwhen Mr. Hopper was seeking methamphetamine. Riley\nconfirmed that eventually, he, Mr. Hopper, Holland, and\nWeir began a pooling arrangement in which they combined\ntheir money to purchase methamphetamine from a source in\nCape Girardeau. According to Riley, the group bought four\nounces of methamphetamine every day and split the drugs\nbetween the four of them. Either Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both\ncame to Riley’s home with $2,200 for Mr. Hopper and Weir’s\nshares. Riley and Holland drove to Missouri to obtain the\ndrugs. When they returned, they met either at Riley’s home\nor at Mr. Hopper’s residence in Creal Springs to divide up\nthe drugs.\n Riley confirmed that on one occasion, his source was un-\navailable, so Mr. Hopper arranged a transaction with his\nown source. He, Riley, Holland, and Wright drove to Cape\nGirardeau, where Mr. Hopper gave the source the money\nthey had pooled together.\n Blake Gordon testified that he met Mr. Hopper through\nWeir. According to Gordon, he sold methamphetamine to\n\n22 R.122 (Trial Tr. Day 2) at 54.\n\fNo. 18-2576 11\n\nMr. Hopper “more than ten times.”23 On such occasions, he\nprovided Mr. Hopper methamphetamine in amounts rang-\ning from one to fourteen grams. He also stated that “on nu-\nmerous occasions,” he drove Mr. Hopper around the south-\nern Illinois area to deliver drugs to his customers.24 Gordon\ndescribed one occasion in which he, Mr. Hopper, and Weir\npooled their money together. Weir drove to Cape Girardeau\nto obtain the methamphetamine, which they divided among\nthe three of them when he returned to Illinois.\n Crystal Boulton testified that in March 2016, she and her\nchildren were living at Riley’s home with Riley, her boy-\nfriend, as well as Holland and his girlfriend. She stated that\nshe personally observed Mr. Hopper obtain methampheta-\nmine from Riley at Riley’s residence about four or five times.\nOn such occasions, Mr. Hopper paid Riley for the metham-\nphetamine and Riley gave Boulton the money to count. She\ncounted about $1,000 to $1,200 per ounce of methampheta-\nmine. Boulton also overheard discussions between Riley and\nMr. Hopper about pooling their money together and making\ntrips to Cape Girardeau to obtain methamphetamine.\n Erin Wright testified that she met Mr. Hopper in Sep-\ntember 2015 and moved in with him at his home in Creal\nSprings soon after. She confirmed that Mr. Hopper and Weir\nwent to Riley’s house to get drugs. Usually, Mr. Hopper re-\nturned with an ounce of methamphetamine. She stated that\nMr. Hopper had scales at his Creal Springs home, which he\nused to weigh drugs. She further testified that, sometimes,\n\n23 Id. at 123.\n24 Id.\n\f12 No. 18-2576\n\nRiley and Holland came to the Creal Springs home to do\nbusiness with Mr. Hopper. She described one occasion on\nwhich she and Mr. Hopper went to Kansas City, Missouri,\nwhere Mr. Hopper and an individual named Jason Clapp\nobtained methamphetamine. Wright stated that there were\nalso a few times when Clapp came to the Creal Springs resi-\ndence to provide Mr. Hopper with methamphetamine.\n William Craig testified that he knew Mr. Hopper through\nWeir. He bought methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper about\nten or fifteen times. On such occasions, he obtained meth-\namphetamine in quantities up to eight ounces. When Craig\nobtained the methamphetamine for himself, Mr. Hopper\nwould not charge him. When Craig purchased the metham-\nphetamine to deliver to others, he paid Mr. Hopper in cash.\nCraig stated that on one occasion, after Mr. Hopper and\nWeir pooled their money together, Craig drove with Weir to\nCharleston, Missouri, to purchase methamphetamine. They\nreturned to Mr. Hopper’s home, where Mr. Hopper and\nWeir divided the drugs. Craig also confirmed that he had\nseen Mr. Hopper sell methamphetamine at his home to Kev-\nin Page and to Andy Karnes on multiple occasions.\n Kevin Shuman testified that he had known Mr. Hopper\nfor years. He moved in with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs\nhome and lived there in December 2015 and January 2016.\nInitially, he obtained “small amounts” of methamphetamine,\nranging from “seven grams to an 8-ball,” from Mr. Hopper.25\nShuman bought the drugs “on a front,” explaining that he\nsold drugs in order to repay Mr. Hopper for previously pur-\n\n\n25 R.123 (Trial Tr. Day 3) at 26.\n\fNo. 18-2576 13\n\nchased quantities of methamphetamine.26 He recalled two\noccasions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Mis-\nsouri, to obtain methamphetamine. When they returned\nhome, Mr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\n After a brief term in jail in early 2016, Shuman returned,\nand the quantities he bought from Mr. Hopper increased\nfrom grams to ounces of methamphetamine. The two had an\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\nand left in their place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for\npreviously fronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testi-\nfied that he drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\ndeliver methamphetamine to his customers.\n D.\n At the close of the Government’s case in chief, counsel for\nMr. Hopper moved for a judgment of acquittal under Feder-\nal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which the court denied.\nMr. Hopper elected not to testify, and the defense rested its\ncase. Following jury instructions and closing arguments, the\njury retired to deliberate. Approximately an hour later, the\ncourt received a note from the jury stating, “Pages 17 + 21\nare confusing us as to the definition of ‘conspiracy.’”27 Page\n17 of the jury instructions stated that:\n A conspiracy is an express or implied\n agreement between two or more persons to\n\n\n26 Id.\n27 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\n\f14 No. 18-2576\n\n commit a crime. A conspiracy may be proven\n even if its goal was not accomplished.\n In deciding whether the charged conspiracy\n existed, you may consider all of the circum-\n stances, including the words and acts of each\n of the alleged participants.[28]\n Page 21 of the jury instructions stated that:\n A conspiracy requires more than just a\n buyer-seller relationship between the defend-\n ant and another person. In addition, a buyer\n and seller of a mixture and substance contain-\n ing methamphetamine do not enter into a con-\n spiracy to distribute a mixture and substance\n containing methamphetamine simply because\n the buyer resells the [] mixture and substance\n containing methamphetamine to others, even if\n the seller knows that the buyer intends to resell\n the [] mixture and substance containing meth-\n amphetamine.\n To establish that a seller knowingly became\n a member of a conspiracy with a buyer to dis-\n tribute a mixture and substance containing\n methamphetamine, the government must\n prove that the buyer and seller had the joint\n criminal objective of distributing a mixture and\n\n\n\n\n28 R.74 at 17.\n\fNo. 18-2576 15\n\n substance containing methamphetamine to\n others.[29]\n After conferring with the parties, the court responded to\nthe jury, “All instructions should be read together. I cannot\ngive you any more instruction other than what you have\nbeen given.”30 Following further deliberations, the jury\nreached a verdict, finding Mr. Hopper guilty of conspiracy\nto distribute methamphetamine, as charged in the indict-\nment. The jury returned a special verdict form finding that\nthe conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\n E.\n Prior to Mr. Hopper’s sentencing, the probation office\nprepared a PSR. To determine the scope of his relevant con-\nduct, the probation office interviewed several witnesses with\nknowledge of the conspiracy. Based on these interviews, the\ninitial PSR determined that Mr. Hopper had a base offense\nlevel of 36, which corresponds to offenses involving “at least\n1.5 kilograms but less than 4.5 kilograms of ice.”31 Specifical-\nly, according to the PSR, the conspiracy involved 1.968 kilo-\ngrams of ice methamphetamine.\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy. In particu-\nlar:\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\n\n29 Id. at 21.\n30 R.72 at 1.\n31 R.81 ¶ 28.\n\f16 No. 18-2576\n\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\n es = 850 grams)[32]\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\n that from January through March, he sold one\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\n grams) [33]\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\n ice). [34]\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\n\n\n32 Id. ¶ 12.\n33 Id. ¶ 14.\n34 Id. ¶ 19.\n\fNo. 18-2576 17\n\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\n grams = 42 grams)[35]\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”36\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\ning.”37 Adding the drug amounts described above, the PSR\ntotaled Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct to be 1.968 kilograms\nof ice methamphetamine.\n The initial PSR awarded Mr. Hopper a two-level sentence\nreduction for acceptance of responsibility. Based on a total\noffense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, the\nPSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range of 151 to\n188 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the initial PSR,\nchallenging the sentence reduction for acceptance of respon-\nsibility.38 He asserted that he had “neither denied, nor ad-\nmitted, any … involvement” in the conspiracy.39 He also\n\n35 Id. ¶ 20.\n36 Id. ¶ 21.\n37 Id.\n38 Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel acknowledged that this objection was high-\nly unusual. See R.82 at 1 (“This marks the first instance in Undersigned\nCounsel’s career in which he levels an objection on behalf of a client that\noperates to raise the applicable advisory guidelines range. Thus, it\nshould be noted that this objection is filed with Defendant Rex Hopper’s\nconsent and at his direction.”).\n39 Id.\n\f18 No. 18-2576\n\nstated that he “underst[ood] that this objection [would]\ndoom any opportunity he might have at the two-level [ac-\nceptance of responsibility] reduction.”40 He submitted that,\nas a result, his total offense level was 36 and the proper\nguidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.\n Consequently, the probation office filed a revised PSR,\nwhich removed the acceptance of responsibility reduction.\nBased on a total offense level of 36 and a criminal history\ncategory of I, the revised PSR calculated a guidelines impris-\nonment range of 188 to 235 months. The Government filed\nan objection to the revised PSR, contending that Mr. Hopper\nwas subject to a two-level sentence enhancement for main-\ntaining a residence for the purpose of distributing metham-\nphetamine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).\n Accordingly, the probation office filed a second revised\nPSR, adopting the Government’s recommendation that\nMr. Hopper was subject to the two-level sentence enhance-\nment for maintaining a drug premises. Based on a total of-\nfense level of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the sec-\nond revised PSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range\nof 235 to 293 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the\nsecond revised PSR, challenging the application of the drug\npremises enhancement. He maintained that, consistent with\nthe first revised PSR, his total offense level was 36 and his\nguidelines imprisonment range was 188 to 235 months.\n The district court conducted a hearing to impose its sen-\ntence. At the outset, the court asked whether there were any\nobjections to the PSR other than Mr. Hopper’s challenge to\n\n40 Id.\n\fNo. 18-2576 19\n\nthe application of the drug premises enhancement. Both sets\nof counsel stated that there were not. The court then turned\nto the sentence enhancement.\n The Government introduced additional testimony from\nWright, Mr. Hopper’s former girlfriend. She testified that\nshe had lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home\nfrom about October 2015 until May 2017. She acknowledged\nthat, during this time, she saw methamphetamine at the res-\nidence. She elaborated that “[i]t was always there” and that\nshe saw drugs in the home “[p]retty much every day.”41\nWright testified that after Mr. Hopper obtained metham-\nphetamine from others, he brought it back to the Creal\nSprings house. She further stated that she saw Mr. Hopper\ndistribute methamphetamine from the residence. She said\nthat this occurred “[t]hroughout the week” and that “each\nweek there was some sort of activity going on” involving\nmethamphetamine.42 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper\ncollected money from individuals who bought methamphet-\namine at his home. She testified that he had drug scales at\nthe house, which he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”43 She\nestimated that, while she lived with him, Mr. Hopper dis-\ntributed methamphetamine from his residence approximate-\nly “[w]eekly.”44 She added, however, that toward the end of\n\n\n\n\n41 R.125 at 8.\n42 Id. at 9.\n43 Id.\n44 Id. at 10.\n\f20 No. 18-2576\n\ntheir time living together, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling dimin-\nished and he was “just using.”45\n The court inquired what Mr. Hopper did for a living.\nWright explained that Mr. Hopper had received a monetary\nsettlement after working in the coal mines. Subsequently, he\nhad a “side business” buying and selling cars, and he dealt\ndrugs.46 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper did not “of-\nficially work.”47\n Based on the testimony introduced at trial and at sentenc-\ning, the court concluded that Mr. Hopper stored metham-\nphetamine at and distributed it from the Creal Springs resi-\ndence. Given Wright’s testimony that this occurred weekly\nover an extended period of time, the court determined that\nthe distribution was “more than just incidental or collat-\neral.”48 Accordingly, the court overruled Mr. Hopper’s objec-\ntion and concluded that he was subject to the two-level en-\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\ndistributing methamphetamine.\n Noting that there were no other objections, the court\nadopted the findings of the PSR as the findings of the court.\nThis included the finding that the conspiracy involved be-\ntween 1.5 and 4.5 kilograms of ice methamphetamine, specif-\nically 1.968 kilograms, which corresponded to a base offense\nlevel of 36. Given its conclusion regarding the two-level\n\n45 Id. at 24.\n46 Id. at 32.\n47 Id.\n48 Id. at 41.\n\fNo. 18-2576 21\n\ndrug premises enhancement, the court determined that\nMr. Hopper had a total offense level of 38. With a criminal\nhistory category of I, the court concluded that his corre-\nsponding guidelines imprisonment range was 235 to 293\nmonths.\n Neither party objected to the court’s guideline range\nfindings. The Government recommended a sentence near or\nat the top of the guidelines range, while counsel for\nMr. Hopper recommended a sentence of 188 months. Based\non the information in the PSR, the factors set forth in 18\nU.S.C. § 3553(a), and the arguments of Mr. Hopper’s counsel,\nthe court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the guide-\nlines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by four\nyears of supervised release. At the conclusion of the hearing,\nthe court asked defense counsel, “Are there any other argu-\nments I have not considered?”49 Counsel for Mr. Hopper re-\nsponded that there were not. Following the entry of final\njudgment, Mr. Hopper filed a timely notice of appeal.\n II.\n DISCUSSION\n Mr. Hopper raises four arguments on appeal. First, he as-\nserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to\nsupport his conviction for conspiracy to distribute metham-\nphetamine and that, even if the Government established the\nexistence of multiple, smaller conspiracies, there was a fatal\nvariance between the single, overarching conspiracy alleged\nin the indictment and the Government’s proof at trial. Sec-\n\n\n49 Id. at 59.\n\f22 No. 18-2576\n\nond, he contends that the district court erred when it denied\nhis motion for disclosure of the cooperating witnesses’ prof-\nfer letters. Third, he challenges the district court’s applica-\ntion of a two-level sentence enhancement for maintaining a\ndrug premises. Finally, he submits that the district court\nerred in calculating his guidelines range because, in deter-\nmining Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, it double-counted\nthe drug transactions described by Holland and Riley.\n A.\n 1.\n We begin with Mr. Hopper’s attack on the sufficiency of\nthe evidence. United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1150\n(7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.\nDurrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990).50 He contends that\nthere was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine because the\nGovernment proved only a series of buyer-seller relation-\nships. He preserved this argument by moving for a judg-\nment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, so we review\n\n\n\n50 In United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on\nother grounds by United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990), we\nadopted a “policy” of “routinely addressing evidentiary sufficiency in\ncriminal cases when a defendant presents the issue on appeal.” Id. at\n1150. We reasoned that “[i]f in fact insufficient evidence is presented at a\nfirst trial, a retrial, on any basis, ordinarily may be a wasted endeavor.”\nId. By contrast, if we find “that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a con-\nviction, but reverse based on trial error, a retrial” is proper. Id. Accord-\ningly, to conserve the “scarce and costly resources” of the courts and the\nparties, we address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence first. Id.\n\fNo. 18-2576 23\n\nhis claim de novo. United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699,\n704 (7th Cir. 2013).\n A defendant’s burden in showing the evidence was in-\nsufficient to support a conviction is indeed a high one. See\nUnited States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 835 (7th Cir. 2008). In\nattempting to describe that burden, we often have said that\nthe burden is a direct function of the strength of the Gov-\nernment’s case. See United States v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489, 496–\n97 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th\nCir. 2013). Because “[w]e accord great deference to jury ver-\ndicts,” United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1004–05 (7th Cir.\n2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[w]e will over-\nturn a conviction on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds on-\nly if no rational jury could have found the essential elements\nof the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v.\nJohnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). “In making this de-\ntermination, we view all evidence and draw all reasonable\ninferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id.\nSee Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), superseded on\nother grounds by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death\nPenalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (stat-\ning standard of proof in criminal cases). Cf. Anderson v. Liber-\nty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–53 (1986) (comparing meth-\nodology in adjudicating a motion for judgment of acquittal\nin a criminal case with a motion for summary judgment in a\ncivil case).\n “To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the government\nmust prove that (1) two or more people agreed to commit an\nunlawful act, and (2) the defendant knowingly and inten-\ntionally joined in the agreement.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 754.\n“For a drug-distribution conspiracy, the government must\n\f24 No. 18-2576\n\nprove that the defendant knowingly agreed—either implicit-\nly or explicitly—with someone else to distribute drugs.”\nClaybrooks, 729 F.3d at 704 (internal quotation marks omit-\nted).\n Our cases “have underscored that ordinary drug transac-\ntions do not entail or reflect a conspiracy, for the buyer’s on-\nly purpose is to buy and the seller’s only purpose is to sell:\nthe buyer and seller lack a shared criminal goal.” United\nStates v. Neal, 907 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).\nIn other words, “evidence of a buyer-seller relationship,\nstanding alone, is insufficient to support a conspiracy con-\nviction.” United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th\nCir. 1991). Instead, we require “[e]vidence of an agreement\nto advance further distribution—beyond the initial transac-\ntion.” United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2015).\n“The government may prove the existence of this agreement\nthrough circumstantial evidence.” Claybrooks, 729 F.3d at\n704–05.\n A “nonexhaustive list of characteristics that strongly dis-\ntinguish a conspiracy from a buyer-seller relationship” in-\ncludes:\n “sales on credit or consignment, an agreement\n to look for other customers, a payment of\n commission on sales, an indication that one\n party advised the other on the conduct of the\n other’s business, or an agreement to warn of\n future threats to each other’s business stem-\n ming from competitors or law enforcement au-\n thorities.”\n\fNo. 18-2576 25\n\nUnited States v. Pereira, 783 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2015)\n(quoting Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755–56). “We employ a totali-\nty-of-the-circumstances approach in these cases,” “‘tak[ing]\ninto account all the evidence surrounding the alleged con-\nspiracy and mak[ing] a holistic assessment of whether the\njury reached a reasonable verdict.’” Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 813\n(quoting Brown, 726 F.3d at 1002).\n In this case, the Government presented sufficient evi-\ndence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Hopper en-\ntered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\nsouthern Illinois. Our conclusion is supported by evidence\nthat Mr. Hopper sold methamphetamine on credit, or\n“fronted” it, to his co-conspirators and that he engaged in\npooling arrangements with other co-conspirators to pur-\nchase large quantities of methamphetamine for further dis-\ntribution.\n Evidence of repeated, “fronted” transactions can be com-\npelling circumstantial evidence of an agreement to distribute\ndrugs because it demonstrates that the defendant “had\nknowingly thrown his lot in” with other members of the\nconspiracy. United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1070 (7th Cir.\n1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a fronting ar-\nrangement, “the seller becomes the buyer’s creditor, adding\na dimension to the relationship that goes beyond a spot sale\nfor cash.” United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir.\n2008). Such a relationship indicates that the defendant “had\na keen interest” in his co-conspirators’ “success at reselling”\nthe drugs. Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070. Although “not all credit\nsales can support an inference that there was an agreement\nto distribute,” “when a credit sale is coupled with certain\ncharacteristics inherent in an ongoing wholesale buyer-seller\n\f26 No. 18-2576\n\nrelationship—i.e., large quantities of drugs, repeat purchas-\nes[,] or some other enduring arrangement—the credit sale\nbecomes sufficient evidence to distinguish a conspiracy from\na nonconspiratorial buyer-seller relationship.” Johnson, 592\nF.3d at 756 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).\n At Mr. Hopper’s trial, the Government presented evi-\ndence that he fronted methamphetamine to Williams, Shu-\nman, and Karnes. Williams testified that he obtained about\none to two ounces of ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hop-\nper “[o]ff and on” for about one year.51 He stated that some-\ntimes, he bought the drugs outright, while other times,\nMr. Hopper provided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a\n“front.”52 Williams explained that, in this fronting arrange-\nment, Mr. Hopper provided him a quantity of drugs, some\nof which Williams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper\nback for previously fronted drugs. Williams further testified\nthat occasionally, Mr. Hopper called Williams and asked\nhim to bring customers who owed Mr. Hopper money to\nMr. Hopper’s house to settle their debt. Williams explained\nthat he helped Mr. Hopper collect money from his customers\nbecause Williams “was selling drugs for him” and “to help\nhim out in his drug business.”53\n Shuman also testified that he bought drugs from\nMr. Hopper “on a front.”54 In early 2016, the quantities he\n\n\n51 R.118 at 59.\n52 Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).\n53 Id. at 64.\n54 R.123 at 26.\n\fNo. 18-2576 27\n\npurchased increased from grams to ounces of methamphet-\namine. The two had an arrangement in which Mr. Hopper\nplaced methamphetamine for Shuman in Mr. Hopper’s gar-\nage. Shuman retrieved the drugs from the garage and left in\ntheir place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for previously\nfronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testified that he\ndrove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to deliver meth-\namphetamine to his customers. He also described two occa-\nsions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Missouri, to\nobtain methamphetamine. When they returned home,\nMr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\n Similarly, Peyton testified that Karnes, her former boy-\nfriend, obtained methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a\nfront,” in which he would sell drugs to others in order to\npay Mr. Hopper back for the drugs he had previously ob-\ntained.55 She stated that during the summer of 2016,\nMr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five “8-balls,” or 3.5\ngram quantities of ice methamphetamine, several times a\nweek.56 She added that on occasion, Mr. Hopper sent Wil-\nliams to deliver drugs to Karnes.\n These fronting arrangements are “substantial evidence”\nthat Mr. Hopper “expected and encouraged” Williams,\nShuman, and Karnes “to redistribute the drugs he had pro-\nvided.” United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir.\n2009). Because Mr. Hopper expected to be repaid based on\nsales of previously fronted methamphetamine, “he was de-\npendent upon the further resale of the drugs to make a prof-\n\n55 R.118 at 90.\n56 Id. at 89.\n\f28 No. 18-2576\n\nit.” Id.; see also United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 808–09\n(7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that evidence that co-conspirator\nsold cocaine to the defendant “on credit” indicated that he\n“took a stake in her business—he received payment after,\nand as a result of, her resale”). Mr. Hopper also “demon-\nstrated a high level of trust and confidence in” Shuman, Wil-\nliams, and Karnes, given that he provided them “with large\nquantities of drugs without requiring any payment until the\ndrugs were resold.” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816.57\n That Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes repeatedly, in large quantities,\nover an extended period of time makes clear that these activ-\nities were more than mere buyer-seller relationships. See\nBrown, 726 F.3d at 1006 (permitting “an inference of conspir-\nacy” based on evidence of “repeated transactions, in whole-\nsale quantities, on credit”). These “factors suggest standard-\nized transactions and lower transaction costs in the business\nas well as a continuing relationship.” Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 809;\nsee also Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070 (reasoning that evidence of\n“multiple transactions over a prolonged period of time”\nsuggested “that transaction costs … were quite low, which\ncounsels a finding of conspiracy”). Evidence that Williams\nand Shuman drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\ndeliver drugs to his customers and that Mr. Hopper sent\nWilliams to deliver drugs on his own or to pick up custom-\ners who owed Mr. Hopper money reinforces that these rela-\n\n\n57Cf. United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting “[t]he\nmutual trust in this case was less than it would have been had [a\nco-conspirator] ‘fronted’ cocaine to the defendant (a factor mentioned in\nalmost all the cases) rather than being paid in cash at the time of sale”).\n\fNo. 18-2576 29\n\ntionships were in furtherance of Mr. Hopper’s distribution of\ndrugs. Based on this evidence, a jury could rationally con-\nclude that Mr. Hopper conspired to distribute methamphet-\namine. See Pereira, 783 F.3d at 704–05.\n The Government also presented considerable testimony\nestablishing that Mr. Hopper pooled his resources with other\nmembers of the conspiracy to obtain methamphetamine at a\nreduced cost from out-of-state sources. This is circumstantial\nevidence of an agreement to distribute drugs because, by\n“put[ting] their money and transportation resources together\nfor an extended period of time,” the co-conspirators “there-\nby ha[d] a stake in each other’s success, and kn[ew] that the\nothers intended to resell” the drugs. United States v. Harris,\n567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also\nUnited States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 475 (7th Cir. 2016) (hold-\ning that “[a] reasonable jury could have found that the\nshared supplier, funds, and product indicated an agree-\nment” to sell drugs). Based on such evidence, we upheld the\ndefendant’s conspiracy conviction in United States v. Hay-\nwood, 324 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2003), reasoning that:\n [I]n driving to Chicago together, then bringing\n the drugs back … and splitting them up upon\n their return, Haywood and Jackson had a\n standardized way of doing business; they had\n a continuing relationship, making three trips\n together to Chicago and talking about making\n one to Oklahoma; and they both knew that the\n cocaine would be resold.\nId. at 517. Similarly, in Harris, we held that there was suffi-\ncient evidence of a conspiracy to distribute drugs where the\ndefendant “pooled his money with that of … the other al-\n\f30 No. 18-2576\n\nleged co-conspirators to buy larger amounts of crack cocaine\nfrom outside the state for resale.” 567 F.3d at 851.\n In this case, Holland, Riley, and Weir testified that, to-\ngether with Mr. Hopper, they pooled their money and\ntransportation resources over approximately a month-long\nperiod to purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\nGirardeau, Missouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the\nmoney to Riley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland\nand Riley drove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they\nreturned, the group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hop-\nper’s home to divide up the drugs. The group pooled their\nmoney multiple times per week to purchase four ounces of\nmethamphetamine at a time, which they divided into equal,\none-ounce shares upon return to Illinois.\n Evidence that Mr. Hopper pooled funds, shared suppli-\ners, and coordinated transport out of state with Holland, Ri-\nley, and Weir, underscored a common goal between them to\ndistribute methamphetamine.58 That this pooling arrange-\nment involved multiple transactions per week over an ex-\n\n58 United States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 474 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding\nconspiracy conviction based on testimony that Lomax and his\nco-conspirator “shared customers, a supplier, and heroin, and pooled\nfunds”); United States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (reason-\ning that evidence that the co-conspirators “pooled their money and\nshared rides to buy cheaper crack” from outside the state “mean[t] that\neach could earn more if the others succeeded”); United States v. Haywood,\n324 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming conspiracy conviction where\nHaywood and his co-conspirator “pooled their money and shared rides\nto Chicago in order to buy inexpensive crack, meaning that each could\nrun a cheaper operation—and earn higher profits—if the other succeed-\ned”).\n\fNo. 18-2576 31\n\ntended period of time reinforces the conclusion that\nMr. Hopper had entered an agreement to distribute drugs in\nsouthern Illinois. Thus, the jury had ample evidence, based\non the “fronted” transactions and the pooling arrangement,\nto convict Mr. Hopper of conspiring to distribute metham-\nphetamine.\n 2.\n Mr. Hopper also submits that even if the Government\npresented some evidence of conspiracy, we must vacate his\nconviction “because of the variance between the indictment\n(alleging a single, overarching conspiracy) and the proof at\ntrial (showing, at most, smaller sub-conspiracies), which\nprejudiced Mr. Hopper.”59 We conclude that there was no\nfatal variance in this case.\n At the close of all evidence, Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel\nmoved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of\nCriminal Procedure 29. Rule 29 requires the court to “enter a\njudgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence\nis insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Mr. Hopper’s counsel\ndid not articulate the grounds for his motion and, in denying\nthe motion, the district court ruled only that the Government\nhad presented sufficient evidence of the charge against\nMr. Hopper.60 Because Mr. Hopper’s counsel did not raise\nthe possibility of a fatal variance in the district court, that\ncourt did not have the opportunity to address this claim.\n\n\n\n\n59 Appellant’s Br. 17–18.\n60 See R.123 at 55.\n\f32 No. 18-2576\n\nTherefore, we review his variance claim for plain error only.\nUnited States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2007).61\n “A variance arises when the facts proved by the govern-\nment at trial differ from those alleged in the indictment.”\nAvila, 557 F.3d at 815 (quoting United States v. Stigler, 413\nF.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2005)). We treat a conspiracy variance\nclaim “as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence.” Unit-\ned States v. Handlin, 366 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2004). Alt-\nhough we treat the question of variance as an attack on the\nsufficiency of the evidence, a party must raise with specifici-\nty the issue of variance. A timely objection affords the dis-\ntrict court the opportunity to address the issue and under-\ntake curative steps. See United States v Pierson, 925 F.3d 913,\n921–22 (7th Cir. 2019). To prevail on his claim, Mr. Hopper\nmust show both that (1) “no rational trier of fact could have\nfound that the evidence at trial proved a single conspiracy”\nand (2) “the variance was prejudicial.” United States v.\nDeKelaita, 875 F.3d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 2017). “Even if the evi-\ndence arguably established multiple conspiracies, there is no\nmaterial variance from an indictment charging a single con-\nspiracy if a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond\na reasonable doubt the existence of the single conspiracy\ncharged in the indictment.” United States v. Williams, 272\nF.3d 845, 862 (7th Cir. 2001).\n Mr. Hopper contends that there was a variance between\nthe Government’s proof at trial and the conspiracy alleged in\n\n\n61Like the defendant in United States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 795 (7th\nCir. 2007), Mr. Holmes did not ask for a jury instruction on multiple con-\nspiracies.\n\fNo. 18-2576 33\n\nthe indictment because the Government “failed to tie togeth-\ner the disparate purposes of Mr. Hopper’s alleged\nco-conspirators” to demonstrate a single conspiracy.62 He\nsubmits that this variance prejudiced him at trial and at sen-\ntencing.\n To evaluate Mr. Hopper’s variance claim, “we turn to the\nindictment first and then to the proof at trial.” Id. at 863. The\nindictment alleged that from about January 2015 through\nMay 31, 2017, in Williamson and Franklin Counties, in the\nSouthern District of Illinois, “and elsewhere,” Mr. Hopper\nconspired “with other persons known and unknown” to dis-\ntribute methamphetamine.63 As detailed above, at trial, the\nGovernment presented substantial evidence that Mr. Hop-\nper entered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\nsouthern Illinois. It is sufficient that the purpose of the con-\nspiracy “was simply to distribute narcotics,” and that “each\nco-conspirator agreed to advance” that goal. United States v.\nMartin, 618 F.3d 705, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2010). Based on the ev-\nidence that Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes for further distribution and that\nhe engaged in a pooling arrangement with Holland, Riley,\nand Weir to obtain methamphetamine at a low cost for re-\nsale, a rational jury could have found that Mr. Hopper joined\nthe single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Because\n“[t]he key to proving a conspiracy is that the defendant\njoined [an] agreement, not [a] group,” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816,\nany failure to identify the connection between Mr. Hopper’s\n\n\n62 Appellant’s Br. 34.\n63 R.32 at 1.\n\f34 No. 18-2576\n\nco-conspirators did not amount to a material variance. See,\ne.g., Williams, 272 F.3d at 863 (concluding there was no mate-\nrial variance where there was sufficient evidence “for the ju-\nry to conclude that a number of people had an agreement to\ndistribute drugs in East St. Louis, and that Williams joined\nthat agreement”).\n In any event, Mr. Hopper suffered no prejudice as a re-\nsult of the alleged variance. First, he contends that the vari-\nance prejudiced him at trial because his counsel “was unable\nto adequately prepare his defense because the government\ndid not define the scope of the alleged conspiracy until clos-\ning arguments.”64 But “[i]t is the grand jury’s statement of\nthe existence of the conspiracy agreement rather than the\nidentity of those who agree which places the defendant on\nnotice of the charge he must be prepared to meet.” Townsend,\n924 F.2d at 1389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The\nGovernment’s evidence at trial demonstrated that Mr. Hop-\nper joined others in an agreement to distribute methamphet-\namine in southern Illinois. Mr. Hopper had sufficient notice\nof the charged conspiracy and the evidence presented at tri-\nal.65\n Next, Mr. Hopper submits that “[t]he indictment and the\ngovernment’s arguments at trial were so broad as to make it\n\n64 Appellant’s Br. 36.\n65 See,e.g., United States v. Hardimon, 329 F. App’x 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2009)\n(unpublished) (determining that there was no variance and explaining\nthat “the indictment’s allegation of a conspiracy agreement alone was\nsufficient notice of the charge that Hardimon needed to be prepared to\nmeet, and the indictment was not required to name all those who partic-\nipated in the conspiracy”).\n\fNo. 18-2576 35\n\nimpossible for Mr. Hopper to invoke his Fifth Amendment\nright against double jeopardy” in a subsequent prosecu-\ntion.66 He stresses that the record does not reveal the scope\nof the conspiracy, his role in it, or “with whom the jury con-\nvicted him of conspiring.”67 If we uphold his conviction “on\nthe basis that some sub-conspiracy existed,” he posits, the\nGovernment could indict him “for any other act within that\ntime frame even though he had already been found guilty by\nthe jury on the charged indictment.”68\n We have held that, despite a variance between the in-\ndictment and the proof at trial, we had “no difficulty in\njudging the scope of the conviction for double jeopardy pur-\nposes” where the indictment alleged a specific crime, “dur-\ning a finite interval,” “involved a particular perpetrator,”\nand “alleged specific misconduct by the perpetrator.” United\nStates v. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 822, 824 (7th Cir. 2007)\n(upholding defendant’s mail fraud conviction because de-\nfendant was not prejudiced by the variance between the in-\ndictment, “which pinpointed a particular step in the pay-\nment process” of her alleged fraud, “and the proof at trial,\nwhich established another”). In the same way, here, the in-\ndictment alleged a specific crime (conspiracy to distribute\nmethamphetamine), during a finite interval (about January\n2015 through about May 31, 2017), involving a particular\nperpetrator (Mr. Hopper and “other persons known and un-\nknown”), and specific misconduct by the perpetrator (know-\n\n\n66 Appellant’s Br. 38.\n67 Id.\n68 Id. at 38–39.\n\f36 No. 18-2576\n\ningly conspiring to distribute a mixture and substance con-\ntaining methamphetamine).69 The scope of Mr. Hopper’s\nconviction is sufficiently specific to avoid a future double\njeopardy problem.\n He further contends that the alleged variance prejudiced\nhim at trial because the jury was confused about the instruc-\ntions regarding the scope of the conspiracy. Evidence of\nmultiple conspiracies may pose “a danger of ‘spillover’ prej-\nudice” where multiple defendants are tried together and the\njury hears incriminating evidence relevant against only\nsome, but not all, of the defendants. Townsend, 924 F.2d at\n1411. Because Mr. Hopper was tried alone, however, this\nconcern was not implicated. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis,\n37 F.3d 301, 306 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “there could be\nno prejudice” where “Curtis was the only person on trial,\nthus eliminating the customary concern with jury confusion\nresulting from the ‘spillover’ effect associated with simulta-\nneously trying multiple defendants with various connec-\ntions to the purported scheme”).\n Additionally, Mr. Hopper asserts that the variance preju-\ndiced him at sentencing because it “improperly increased the\nquantity of drugs attributed to him.”70 As we have stated,\nhowever, there was ample evidence to support Mr. Hopper’s\nconspiracy conviction, including but not limited to the pool-\ning arrangement he participated in with Holland, Riley, and\nWeir. Moreover, the PSR calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant\nconduct based on “the amounts obtained by the defendant,\n\n69 R.32 at 1.\n70 Appellant’s Br. 39.\n\fNo. 18-2576 37\n\nwhich he then distributed to others.”71 Because the district\ncourt did not sentence Mr. Hopper based on drug transac-\ntions not related to the conspiracy in which he participated,\nsee Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1412 (determining there was no\nprejudice where “none of the defendants [could] claim that\ntheir sentences were increased on the basis of drug transac-\ntions that were not attributable to the limited conspiracies in\nwhich they participated”), or based on drug quantities sold\nby his co-conspirators that were within the scope of the con-\nspiracy, see Avila, 557 F.3d at 819 (concluding there was no\nprejudice where the defendant’s sentence was based on\ndrugs he supplied to others, not “the quantities of drugs that\nwere seized from the entire drug organization”), he did not\nsuffer prejudice at sentencing.\n B.\n 1.\n Mr. Hopper next submits that the district court erred\nwhen it ruled that the Government was not required to dis-\nclose the proffer letters of its cooperating witnesses. He as-\nserts that the court erroneously “based its decision solely on\nBrady[72] and Giglio,[73] and thus did not recognize” that Fed-\neral Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 “is an independent and\nmore expansive basis for disclosure of proffer letters.”74\nMr. Hopper’s trial counsel never filed a request under Rule\n\n\n71 R.94 ¶ 21.\n72 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\n73 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\n74 Appellant’s Br. 14.\n\f38 No. 18-2576\n\n16 for disclosure of the proffer letters. Nor did counsel sug-\ngest to the district court, during the hearing on his motion or\notherwise, that Rule 16 might be a basis for disclosure. That\ncounsel moved for disclosure of the proffer letters and ar-\ngued that the court should disregard our decision in United\nStates v. Weidenburner, 550 F. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (un-\npublished), was not sufficient to preserve the instant argu-\nment under Rule 16.75 Because there is no evidence in the\nrecord that Mr. Hopper intended to relinquish this argu-\nment, however, we conclude that he has forfeited, not\nwaived, his request for disclosure under Rule 16. United\nStates v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining\nthat “[f]orfeiture occurs when a defendant negligently fails\nto assert a right in a timely fashion”).\n Rule 16, which governs discovery and inspection, pro-\nvides in relevant part that:\n Upon a defendant’s request, the government\n must permit the defendant to inspect and to\n\n\n75 Cf. United States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015) (defend-\nant forfeited argument that his arrest was unlawful because his motion\nto suppress challenged only the protective sweep of his home, not his\narrest); United States v. Kelly, 772 F.3d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 2014) (defend-\nant forfeited argument that the warrant application failed to establish\nprobable cause because his motion to suppress argued only that the war-\nrant lacked sufficient particularity in the description of the place to be\nsearched); United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007) (de-\nfendant forfeited argument that his waiver of his Fifth Amendment\nrights and subsequent confession were involuntary due to the coercive\nconditions of his confinement because, in the district court, he argued\nonly that his confession was involuntary because the police did not ad-\nminister Miranda warnings).\n\fNo. 18-2576 39\n\n copy or photograph books, papers, documents,\n data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings\n or places, or copies or portions of any of these\n items, if the item is within the government’s\n possession, custody, or control and … the item\n is material to preparing the defense.\nFed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E).\n Relatedly, Rule 12 provides that certain motions, includ-\ning a request for “discovery under Rule 16,” “must be raised\nby pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reason-\nably available and the motion can be determined without a\ntrial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). Under this\nRule, “[t]he court may … set a deadline for the parties to\nmake pretrial motions,” and if no deadline is set, then “the\ndeadline is the start of trial.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1). “If a\nparty does not meet the deadline for making a Rule 12(b)(3)\nmotion, the motion is untimely.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).\n“But a court may consider the defense, objection, or request\nif the party shows good cause.” Id.\n Rule 12 thus “imposes an antecedent good-cause re-\nquirement when a defendant fails to file a timely motion.”\nUnited States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015). In\nother words, “if a defendant fails to raise a[n] … argument\nbelow—even if he does so under circumstances that suggest\na forfeiture—we cannot proceed directly to a review of the\ndistrict court’s actions for plain error.” United States v. Kelly,\n772 F.3d 1072, 1079 (7th Cir. 2014). Instead, we first must ask\nwhether there was good cause for the failure. United States v.\nJohnson, 415 F.3d 728, 730–31 (7th Cir. 2005).\n\f40 No. 18-2576\n\n Mr. Hopper offers no explanation for his trial counsel’s\nfailure to request disclosure of the proffer letters under Rule\n16 or to otherwise assert Rule 16 as a basis for disclosure of\nthe letters before the district court. Further, his counsel made\nno request for relief based on good cause before the district\ncourt or in this court. Absent a showing of good cause as re-\nquired by Rule 12, his claim is not subject to further review.\nUnited States v. Daniels, 803 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2015);\nUnited States v. Hargrove, 508 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2007).76\n 2.\n Mr. Hopper further contends that “the district court\nerred in presuming that proffer letters are never” required to\nbe disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or\nGiglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).77 We review the\ndistrict court’s determination that the proffer letters need not\nbe disclosed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jumah,\n599 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 2010).\n At the hearing on Mr. Hopper’s motion, the discussion\ncentered on our decision in Weidenburner, where we held\nthat proffer letters “are not Giglio material or Jencks Act[78]\nstatements.” 550 F. App’x at 304. In that case, the defendant\nmoved for a new trial based on the Government’s assertion\n\n76 We note in passing that Mr. Hopper’s counsel had the information\ncontained in the proffer letters, even though he did not have the letters\nthemselves. He also was permitted to cross examine the witness about\nthe proffer process. His client therefore suffered no prejudice from the\nabsence of the letters.\n77 Appellant’s Br. 16.\n78 18 U.S.C. § 3500.\n\fNo. 18-2576 41\n\nthat it could not locate copies of the proffer letters for two\ncodefendants who testified against Weidenburner. Id. Nei-\nther witness disputed the existence of the proffer letters, and\nWeidenburner received copies of both witnesses’ plea\nagreements. Id. Consequently, we rejected Weidenburner’s\nclaim of nondisclosure as frivolous. Id. Acknowledging that\n“Giglio requires disclosure of inducements for a witness[]’s\ntestimony,” we reasoned that “the prosecutor fulfilled that\nobligation by producing the plea agreements, which de-\nscribe[d] the benefits [the witnesses] would receive for coop-\nerating.” Id. Because “[t]he proffer letters were preliminary\nto the resulting plea agreements,” we concluded that “Giglio\nwas satisfied by disclosure of the plea agreements.” Id. Fur-\nther, we determined that “the Jencks Act [wa]s irrelevant”\nbecause “[t]he proffer letters were statements of the prosecu-\ntor who wrote them,” not “factual narrative[s] useful for im-\npeachment.” Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).79\n\n\n79 At least one of our sister circuits also has held that “the government\nsatisfied its obligations” by disclosing a cooperating witness’s plea\nagreement to the defense. United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 880\n(8th Cir. 2007). In Santisteban, the defendant alleged that the Govern-\nment’s non-disclosure of the proffer letters sent to a cooperating witness\n“violated his due process right to receive exculpatory or impeachment\nevidence.” Id. Because “the government had already provided [the wit-\nness]’s plea agreement,” the district court “declined to compel the pro-\nduction” of the proffer letters. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that there was\nno due process violation. Id. “Regardless of any preliminary proffer\nagreements,” the court reasoned, “the formal plea agreement governed\n[the witness]’s cooperation, and it provided the jury with a sufficient ba-\nsis for judging the credibility of [his] testimony at trial.” Id. The court\nconcluded that “[t]he terms of the proffer letters were not material to the\ndefense.” Id.\n\f42 No. 18-2576\n\n In this case, the Government disclosed the cooperating\nwitnesses’ plea agreements, which superseded the proffer\nletters and outlined the terms of the witnesses’ cooperation.\nThe agreements provided a sufficient basis for Mr. Hopper’s\ncounsel to impeach the Government’s witnesses and for the\njury to assess the credibility of those witnesses. Therefore,\nthe district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied\nMr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the proffer letters.\n C.\n Next, Mr. Hopper challenges the district court’s finding\nthat he was subject to a two-level sentence enhancement\nbased on evidence that he maintained his Creal Springs resi-\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\nMr. Hopper preserved this challenge by filing an objection to\nthe application of the enhancement in the district court.\nTherefore, “we review the district court’s application of the\nU.S. Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its underlying factual\nfindings for clear error.” United States v. Flores-Olague, 717\nF.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 2013).\n The guidelines provide for a two-level sentence en-\nhancement “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for the\npurpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub-\nstance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). This includes “storage of a\ncontrolled substance for the purpose of distribution.” Id.\ncmt. n.17. The application notes clarify that\n“[m]anufacturing or distributing a controlled substance need\nnot be the sole purpose for which the premises was main-\ntained, but must be one of the defendant’s primary or prin-\ncipal uses for the premises, rather than one of the defend-\nant’s incidental or collateral uses for the premises.” Id. Be-\ncause it is undisputed that Mr. Hopper “maintained” the\n\fNo. 18-2576 43\n\nCreal Springs house, which was his home, our review is lim-\nited to whether distributing methamphetamine was a “pri-\nmary or principal” use of the home.\n “[T]o determine whether drug distribution was a prima-\nry or incidental use, the district courts are not required to\napply a simple balancing test that compares the frequency of\nunlawful activity at the residence with the frequency of law-\nful uses.” United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir.\n2017) (per curiam). That is because “such a test would im-\nmunize every family home that is also used for drug distri-\nbution from being deemed an illegally maintained ‘premis-\nes,’” since “the amount of lawful activity in a home is all but\ncertain to exceed the amount of illegal activity.” Id. Instead,\n“the sentencing court should focus on both the frequency\nand significance of the illicit activities.” Id. “Neither a specif-\nic frequency nor a particular significance automatically war-\nrants applying the enhancement.” United States v. Sanchez,\n710 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on other grounds,\nSanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013). “Rather, we con-\nsider the two in tandem and determine whether the prohib-\nited purpose can be fairly described as a ‘primary or princi-\npal’ use of the premises.” Id. Factors relevant to this analysis\ninclude “quantities dealt, customer interactions, keeping\n‘tools of the trade’ and business records, and accepting pay-\nment.” Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284.\n First, with respect to frequency, Mr. Hopper contends\nthat Wright’s “vague and inconsistent testimony” at the sen-\ntencing hearing “was not enough” to establish the frequent\nuse of his home to distribute drugs.80 He further asserts that\n\n80 Appellant’s Br. 45.\n\f44 No. 18-2576\n\n“the district court failed to account for [his] affirmative deci-\nsion to stop using his home for drug distribution several\nmonths before the end of the charged conspiracy.”81 We con-\nclude that these contentions are without merit.\n Testimony introduced at Mr. Hopper’s trial and at the\nsentencing hearing highlighted that he distributed metham-\nphetamine from his home on approximately a weekly basis\nfor the duration of the conspiracy. Wright testified that she\nhad lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home from\nabout October 2015 until May 2017. During this time, meth-\namphetamine “was always there” and she saw drugs in the\nhome “[p]retty much every day.”82 Wright estimated that,\nwhile she lived with him, Mr. Hopper distributed metham-\nphetamine from his residence approximately “[w]eekly.”83\nShe added, however, that toward the end of their time living\ntogether, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling diminished and he was\n“just using.”84\n Similarly, Shuman testified that Mr. Hopper distributed\nmethamphetamine to him while Shuman was living at the\n\n\n81 Id.\n82 R.125 at 8.\n83 Id. at 10.\n84 Id. at 24:8–15 (“Q. Ms. Wright, did you also add that most of the meth\ntransactions that you were aware of occurred at Hopper’s brother’s\nhouse, Mark Hopper? A. I’ve never—I didn’t say that like that. That’s\nbeen taken out of context. I said that happened there, but everything was\ndone in Creal in the very beginning, and then he slacked off, and to-\nwards the end of the relationship he was just using, he wasn’t selling\nit.”).\n\fNo. 18-2576 45\n\nCreal Springs home in December 2015 and January 2016. Af-\nter Shuman returned from jail in early 2016, the two had an\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\nand left the money he owed Mr. Hopper in their place. Mul-\ntiple witnesses, including Craig, Holland, and Peyton, also\ntestified that they observed Mr. Hopper sell methampheta-\nmine to other individuals at his home.\n This evidence that Mr. Hopper stored drugs at his house\nand regularly distributed methamphetamine to customers\nthere for the better part of 2016 confirms that he used the\nhouse for the purpose of drug distribution with sufficient\nfrequency.85 That Mr. Hopper conducted distribution activi-\nties with less frequency toward the end of the conspiracy\ndoes not undermine this conclusion.\n Turning to the significance of the distribution activities,\nMr. Hopper submits that “[t]he scope of drug activity at [his]\n\n\n85 See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 2017)\n(concluding that “evidence of eight transactions, most within a\ntwo-month period, support[ed] the courts’ findings that significant deals\nwere occurring frequently enough for the home to be deemed, in es-\nsence, a drug den for the purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(12)”); United States v.\nWinfield, 846 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (upholding appli-\ncation of enhancement based on evidence that “in the twelve weeks be-\nfore the raid, [an] informant bought drugs from Winfield at his apart-\nment four times and spotted additional drugs and drug paraphernalia\nduring each transaction”); United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 533\n(7th Cir. 2013) (holding that enhancement applied based on evidence that\nthe defendant “sold and stored drugs at his home” and “did so ‘on a dai-\nly basis’ over a three-year period”).\n\f46 No. 18-2576\n\nhome was not significant enough to warrant the enhance-\nment.”86 Again, the testimony adduced at trial and at sen-\ntencing amply demonstrated that Mr. Hopper carried on\nsignificant aspects of his distribution business from his\nhome.\n We have already observed that there was substantial tes-\ntimony that Mr. Hopper stored and distributed metham-\nphetamine at his house.87 In this respect, Wright testified\nthat Mr. Hopper had drug scales at the Creal Springs home,\nwhich he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”88 Further, we\nconsider evidence of financial transactions in the home to be\nsignificant activity for the purpose of distributing drugs.89\nHere, Williams testified that, when customers owed\nMr. Hopper money, Williams occasionally brought these in-\n\n86 Appellant’s Br. 47.\n87 See, e.g., Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284 (upholding application of enhance-\nment based on “evidence that drugs were shipped to and stored at Con-\ntreras’s home” and that “Contreras accepted payment for drugs at his\nhome”). We have also recognized that keeping “tools of the trade” on the\npremises may indicate “that drug trafficking was the principal use of the\npremises.” United States v. Thomas, 845 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 2017) (in-\nternal quotation marks omitted) (upholding application of enhancement\nwhere a “search of the home yielded a digital scale, a cutting agent, and\nplastic sandwich baggies with the corners cut out”).\n88 R.125 at 9.\n89 See United States v. Sanchez, 710 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on\nother grounds, Sanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013) (noting that “in\nconducting this large drug trade, Sanchez used his residence not only for\nthe drop-off, storage, and pick-up of drugs, but also as a secure place to\nsettle the financials”), vacated on other grounds, Sanchez v. United States,\n571 U.S. 801 (2013) .\n\fNo. 18-2576 47\n\ndividuals to the house to settle their debt with Mr. Hopper.\nWright also acknowledged that Mr. Hopper collected money\nfrom individuals who bought methamphetamine at his\nhome. Finally, testimony that the defendant’s “only regular\nand reliable source of income stemmed from proceeds of\ndrug trafficking activities” is evidence that the distribution\nof drugs from his home was significant to his livelihood.90\nFor this reason, it is meaningful that Wright testified that\nMr. Hopper had received money from a settlement and had\na “side business” buying and selling cars, but that he did not\n“officially work.”91\n In sum, we conclude that there was evidence of frequent,\nsignificant drug distribution activities at Mr. Hopper’s\nhome. Therefore, the district court properly determined that\nMr. Hopper was subject to the sentence enhancement for\nmaintaining a drug premises.\n D.\n Finally, we turn to Mr. Hopper’s claim that the district\ncourt erred in determining his guidelines range because it\nadopted an incorrectly calculated relevant conduct finding\nfrom the PSR. He contends that most of the relevant conduct\nwas based on drug amounts identified in interviews the\n\n\n90 Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 533; see also Winfield, 846 F.3d at 243 (noting\nthat “Winfield at the time of his arrest was ‘primarily living off proceeds\nfrom drug sales’”); Sanchez, 710 F.3d at 732 (reasoning that because\n“Sanchez had no legitimate job and no source of income beyond his drug\nsales,” “the illicit transactions occurring at the premises were signifi-\ncant—in quantity, in scope, and in importance to Sanchez’s livelihood”).\n91 R.125 at 32.\n\f48 No. 18-2576\n\nprobation office conducted with Holland and Riley. Accord-\ning to Mr. Hopper, in their separate interviews, Holland and\nRiley were actually referring to the same transactions. Thus,\nby including the drug amounts described in both Holland\nand Riley’s interviews in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s rel-\nevant conduct, the district court double-counted the same set\nof drugs.\n Mr. Hopper did not challenge the relevant conduct calcu-\nlation in his objection to the initial PSR, his objection to the\nsecond revised PSR, or at the sentencing hearing. Therefore,\nwe review his claim for plain error only. Fed. R. Crim. P.\n52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be\nconsidered even though it was not brought to the [district]\ncourt’s attention.”). We have discretion to remedy the for-\nfeited error provided that Mr. Hopper has satisfied the fol-\nlowing conditions: (1) there is an error “that has not been in-\ntentionally relinquished or abandoned”; (2) the error is\n“plain—that is to say, clear or obvious”; (3) the error “affect-\ned the defendant’s substantial rights”; and (4) the error “se-\nriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of\njudicial proceedings.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136\nS. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507\nU.S. 725, 736 (1993), superseded on other grounds by rule, Fed.\nR. Crim. P. 24(c) (1999)); see also United States v. Pierson, 925\nF.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\n The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence has clarified\nthe application of the third and fourth prongs in the context\nof sentencing errors. To demonstrate that the error affected\nhis substantial rights, “in the ordinary case,” the defendant\nmust “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,\nthe outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”\n\fNo. 18-2576 49\n\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (internal quotation marks\nomitted). According to the Court, “[w]hen a defendant is\nsentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or\nnot the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct\nrange—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient\nto show a reasonable probability of a different outcome ab-\nsent the error.” Id. at 1345. “That probability is all that is\nneeded to establish an effect on substantial rights for pur-\nposes of obtaining relief under Rule 52(b).” Id. at 1349. Fur-\nther, “[i]n the ordinary case, … the failure to correct a plain\nGuidelines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights\nwill seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputa-\ntion of judicial proceedings.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States,\n138 S. Ct. 1897, 1911 (2018). In other words, “[a] plain Guide-\nlines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights is pre-\ncisely the type of error that ordinarily warrants relief under\nRule 52(b).” Id. at 1907.\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy.92 In particu-\nlar:\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\n\n92 Though the probation office revised Mr. Hopper’s PSR twice before\nsentencing, the relevant conduct calculations did not change. For pur-\nposes of this discussion, we reference the most recent version of the re-\nport, the second revised PSR.\n\f50 No. 18-2576\n\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\n es = 850 grams)[93]\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\n that from January through March, he sold one\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\n grams)[94]\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\n ice).[95]\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\n grams = 42 grams)[96]\n\n\n93 R.94 ¶ 12.\n94 Id. ¶ 14.\n95 Id. ¶ 19.\n96 Id. ¶ 20.\n\fNo. 18-2576 51\n\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”97\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\ning.”98 As demonstrated by the following chart, adding the\ndrug amounts described above, the PSR totaled Mr. Hop-\nper’s relevant conduct to be 1.9685 kilograms of ice meth-\namphetamine.\n Interviewee Drug Amount\n Holland 850 grams\n Riley 793 grams\n Wright 283.5 grams\n Wright 42 grams\n 1,968.5 grams\n Total\n (1.9685 kilograms)\n We agree with Mr. Hopper that the district court plainly\nerred in adopting the PSR’s relevant conduct calculation.\nFirst, we conclude that Mr. Hopper did not “intentionally\nrelinquish[] or abandon[]” this challenge. Molina-Martinez,\n136 S. Ct. at 1343. Neither party objected to the relevant con-\nduct calculation prior to or during the sentencing hearing.\nAt sentencing, the district court adopted the findings of the\nPSR, including the relevant conduct calculation, without fur-\n\n\n97 Id. ¶ 21.\n98 Id.\n\f52 No. 18-2576\n\nther comment. “Given the complexity” of calculating a de-\nfendant’s guidelines range, “district courts sometimes make\nmistakes.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904. Accordingly,\n“when a district court’s sentencing of a defendant within the\nframework of an incorrect Guidelines range goes unnoticed\nby the parties as well,” a defendant is “not entirely without\nrecourse.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\n Second, the error here was plain. At trial, Holland, Riley,\nand Weir all testified that, together with Mr. Hopper, they\npooled their money over approximately a month-long peri-\nod sometime between late 2015 and early 2016 to purchase\nmethamphetamine from a source in Cape Girardeau, Mis-\nsouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the money to Ri-\nley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland and Riley\ndrove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they returned,\nthe group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hopper’s home\nto divide up the drugs. Holland, Riley, and Weir all de-\nscribed how the group pooled their money to purchase four\nounces of methamphetamine at a time, which they divided\ninto equal, one-ounce shares.\n In context of the testimony presented at trial, it is clear\nthat Holland and Riley were describing the same pooling\narrangement during their separate interviews with the pro-\nbation office. The amounts attributed to Holland and Riley\nin the PSR differ only because Riley’s more specific state-\nments prompted the Government to use a 28-day month in-\nstead of a 30-day month to calculate the total amount of\nmethamphetamine described. Regardless, the trial testimony\nconsistently showed that Mr. Hopper, Holland, Riley, and\nWeir participated in a pooling arrangement and that follow-\ning each purchase, each member of the group obtained one\n\fNo. 18-2576 53\n\nounce of methamphetamine. Because Holland and Riley\nwere describing the same set of transactions, it was plainly\nerroneous to include the drug amounts described in both in-\nterviews in calculating Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\n Third, we hold that this plain error affected Mr. Hopper’s\nsubstantial rights because it increased his base offense level\nand his corresponding guidelines imprisonment range. Mo-\nlina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346 (“In most cases a defendant\nwho has shown that the district court mistakenly deemed\napplicable an incorrect, higher Guidelines range has demon-\nstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome.”). At\nsentencing, the district court adopted the PSR’s relevant\nconduct calculation of 1.968 grams of ice methamphetamine,\nwhich resulted in a base offense level of 36. Applying the\ntwo-level enhancement for maintaining a residence for the\npurpose of distributing methamphetamine, the court calcu-\nlated a total offense level of 38. With a criminal history cate-\ngory of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\nwas 235 to 293 months. The court sentenced Mr. Hopper to\n235 months’ imprisonment, which is “conspicuous for its po-\nsition as the lowest sentence within what the [d]istrict\n[c]ourt believed to be the applicable range.” Id. at 1347.\n If we count the drugs described by Holland and Riley on-\nly once, Mr. Hopper’s base offense level falls to 34. Assum-\ning for purposes of this calculation that the relevant month\nwas 30 days and, consistent with the testimony at trial, that\nMr. Hopper received one ounce of methamphetamine ice per\ntransaction, the resulting drug quantity is 850 grams. Add-\ning these 850 grams to the drug amounts described by\nWright, the total quantity is only 1,175.5 grams, or 1.1755\nkilograms, as shown in the following chart:\n\f54 No. 18-2576\n\n Interviewee Drug Amount\n Holland/Riley 850 grams\n Wright 283.5 grams\n Wright 42 grams\n 1,175.5 grams\n Total\n (1.1755 kilograms)\n This amount is significantly below the 1.5-kilogram\nthreshold that would trigger a base offense level of 36. See\nU.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2). At a base offense level of 34, applying\nthe two-level drug premises enhancement, Mr. Hopper’s to-\ntal offense level would be 36. With a criminal history catego-\nry of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\nwould be 188 to 235 months. At sentencing, the district court\n“said nothing to suggest that it would have imposed” a sen-\ntence of 235 months “regardless of the Guidelines range.”\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1348. Consequently, “there is at\nleast a reasonable probability that the [d]istrict [c]ourt would\nhave imposed a different sentence had it known that” a low-\ner sentence was appropriate. Id.; United States v. Adams, 746\nF.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2014) (“When a district court incor-\nrectly calculates the guideline range, we normally presume\nthe improperly calculated guideline range influenced the\njudge’s choice of sentence, unless he says otherwise.”).\n Fourth, we conclude that Mr. Hopper satisfied the last\nprong of the plain-error analysis. “The risk of unnecessary\ndeprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness,\nintegrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings in the\ncontext of a plain Guidelines error because of the role the\ndistrict court plays in calculating the range and the relative\n\fNo. 18-2576 55\n\nease of correcting the error.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at\n1908. This conclusion is especially forceful where, as here,\nthe error “was based on a mistake made in the presentence\ninvestigation report by the Probation Office, which works on\nbehalf of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” Id. Therefore, we conclude\nthat resentencing based on recalculation of Mr. Hopper’s\nrelevant conduct is required.99\n The Government insists that any error in calculating\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct was harmless because the\ndistrict court actually “severely undercounted” the amount\nof drugs attributable to Mr. Hopper.100 According to the\nGovernment, the district court should have attributed to\nMr. Hopper the entire amount purchased by Mr. Hopper,\nHolland, Riley, and Weir each time they pooled their money\ntogether because “[t]he entire four ounces was foreseeable\nrelevant conduct” to Mr. Hopper.101 The Government con-\ncedes that it failed to challenge the relevant conduct calcula-\n\n\n\n\n99See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (hold-\ning that plain error in calculating the defendant’s criminal history points,\nwhich resulted in a higher guidelines range, required resentencing be-\ncause we had “no reason to believe” that the district court’s error “did\nnot affect its selection of the particular sentence”).\n100 Appellee’s Br. 49.\n101 Id. at 50; see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (providing that, “in the case of a\njointly undertaken criminal activity,” a defendant’s base offense level\nshall be determined based on “all acts and omissions of others” that were\n“(i) within the scope” of the conspiracy; “(ii) in furtherance of” the con-\nspiracy; and “(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with” the con-\nspiracy).\n\f56 No. 18-2576\n\ntion before the district court but explains that “it most likely\nwould not have affected the advisory guideline range.”102\n We have recognized that “an appellate court can affirm\nthe determination of a sentencing range ‘on any ground\nsupported by the record even if that ground was not relied\nupon by the district court.’” United States v. Benitez, 92 F.3d\n528, 538 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 6 F.3d\n431, 447 (7th Cir. 1993)). But the Government has not offered,\nnor have we located, any authority to suggest that we can\nrely on a relevant conduct calculation not presented to the\ndistrict court to affirm a defendant’s sentence. Indeed, our\ndecision in United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir.\n1995), suggests quite the opposite.\n In that case, a jury found Henderson guilty of conspiracy\nto distribute cocaine base and distributing cocaine base. Id.\nat 1147. At sentencing, the district court attributed to Hen-\nderson the 18 grams of cocaine he was convicted of selling.\nId. at 1151. The court also attributed ten percent of the\namounts of cocaine described by Henderson’s\nco-conspirator. Id. The court explained that it did not accept\nthe full amount claimed by his co-conspirator because of\n“the ‘vagueness and generalized’ nature” of the co-\nconspirator’s testimony “and the lack of money to support\nhis contentions that he sold such large amounts of drugs.”\nId. Henderson challenged the amount of drugs the district\ncourt attributed to him, arguing that “by accepting only 10%\nof [the co-conspirator’s] testimony, the court did not simply\nact conservatively, but instead indicated its belief that [the\n\n\n102 Appellee’s Br. 50 n.6.\n\fNo. 18-2576 57\n\nco-conspirator’s] information was not sufficiently reliable to\nsupport any amounts above the 18 grams.” Id. We agreed\nthat the court clearly erred because it “did not have suffi-\ncient faith” in the co-conspirator’s testimony “to use it as the\nbasis for attributing further amounts to Henderson.” Id. at\n1152.\n The Government submitted, however, that remand was\nnot required because other calculations would result in drug\namounts within the range applied by the district court. Id.\nFor instance, the Government contended that we could cal-\nculate the drug quantity by multiplying the number of used\nplastic baggies by the amount of cocaine typically packaged\nin each baggie. Id. at 1153. Although we were “fairly certain\nthat this calculation … would adequately sustain the court’s\ndetermination,” we declined to “embrace it ourselves.” Id.\nWe explained that “[t]he government first presented this cal-\nculation on appeal,” such that “the district court, which has\nsentencing responsibility, [] had no opportunity to consider\nit.” Id. The Government also proposed that we could deter-\nmine the drug quantity based on the amount of money\nseized from Henderson and from a drug location on the day\nof his arrest. Id. We declined this suggestion, reasoning that\n“while the government introduced this evidence at trial, it\ndid not present the calculations at sentencing.” Id. Conse-\nquently, we left “the initial consideration of these sentencing\nissues to the district court on remand.” Id.\n For the same reasons, we decline to affirm Mr. Hopper’s\nsentence based on relevant conduct calculations that the\nGovernment presented for the first time on appeal. Because\nneither party challenged the relevant conduct calculations\nbelow, “the district court, which has sentencing responsibil-\n\f58 No. 18-2576\n\nity,” id., had no opportunity to consider any arguments re-\ngarding the proper calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant\nconduct. The parties must present their drug quantity calcu-\nlations to the district court to consider in the first instance on\nremand.\n Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and\naffirm the district court’s determination that he was subject\nto a sentence enhancement for maintaining a residence for\nthe purpose of distributing methamphetamine. We vacate\nhis sentence and remand his case to the district court for re-\nsentencing based on our conclusion that there was plain er-\nror in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\n AFFIRMED IN PART,\n VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rex A. HOPPER, Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2576\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nREX A. HOPPER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 4:17-cr-40034-JPG-1 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. In June 2017, a federal grand jury\\nindicted Rex Hopper on one count of conspiracy to distrib-\\nute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),\\n841(b)(1)(B), 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Hopper was part of a\\ncommunity of methamphetamine users and sellers in south-\\nern Illinois. Several of these individuals signed proffer letters\\nwith the Government, agreeing to provide testimony against\\nMr. Hopper in exchange for leniency. Most of these witness-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2576\\n\\nes subsequently entered plea agreements.1 Mr. Hopper,\\nhowever, pleaded not guilty to the single count in the in-\\ndictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late Febru-\\nary 2018.\\n Over the course of three days, the Government presented\\nthe testimony of approximately twenty witnesses against\\nMr. Hopper. The district court denied Mr. Hopper’s motion\\nfor disclosure of the proffer letters given to these witnesses.\\nFollowing deliberations, the jury found Mr. Hopper guilty of\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, as charged in\\nthe indictment, and returned a special verdict form finding\\nthat the conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\\n Based on interviews with other participants in the con-\\nspiracy, the probation office determined that Mr. Hopper’s\\nrelevant conduct involved 1.968 kilograms of ice metham-\\nphetamine. This drug amount corresponded to a base of-\\nfense level of 36. At sentencing, the district court determined\\nthat Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sentence en-\\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\\ndistributing methamphetamine. Based on a total offense lev-\\nel of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the court calcu-\\nlated a guidelines imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months.\\nThe district court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the\\nguidelines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by\\nfour years of supervised release.2\\n\\n\\n\\n1One witness entered an “open” guilty plea, for which there was no\\nwritten plea agreement.\\n2 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 3\\n\\n Mr. Hopper now challenges both his conviction and his\\nsentence. First, we conclude that the Government presented\\nsufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Hopper engaged in a\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in southern Illi-\\nnois, and that there was no material variance between the\\nconspiracy charged in the indictment and the Government’s\\nproof at trial. Second, the district court did not err when it\\ndenied Mr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the cooperat-\\ning witnesses’ proffer letters. Third, the district court proper-\\nly concluded that Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sen-\\ntence enhancement for maintaining his Creal Springs resi-\\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\\nHowever, we conclude that the district court plainly erred\\nwhen it calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct and corre-\\nsponding guidelines range. In context, it is clear that, in their\\nseparate interviews, Lucas Holland and Randall Riley were\\ndescribing the same transactions. By including the amounts\\ndescribed by both Holland and Riley in the calculation of\\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the presentence report\\n(“PSR”), adopted by the district court, erroneously dou-\\nble-counted those drug quantities.\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. We\\nalso affirm the district court’s determination that he was\\nsubject to a sentence enhancement for maintaining a drug\\npremises. Because the court plainly erred in calculating his\\nrelevant conduct, however, we vacate Mr. Hopper’s sentence\\nand remand his case to the district court for resentencing.3\\n\\n3We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18\\nU.S.C. § 3742.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2576\\n\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n In April 2017, law enforcement officers executed a search\\nwarrant at Mr. Hopper’s residence. They sought to recover\\nitems involved in a burglary. Officers observed drug para-\\nphernalia and methamphetamine in plain view. According-\\nly, the officers obtained and executed a second search war-\\nrant for the residence. Upon finding additional drug para-\\nphernalia and methamphetamine in his home, officers took\\nMr. Hopper into custody. A federal grand jury later returned\\nan indictment charging Mr. Hopper with one count of con-\\nspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 18\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, in\\nthe Southern District of Illinois.\\n B.\\n Mr. Hopper was part of a community of methampheta-\\nmine users and sellers in southern Illinois. Around the time\\nof his indictment, the Government also charged other mem-\\nbers of this group with conspiracy to distribute metham-\\nphetamine. Several of these individuals received proffer let-\\nters from the Government and subsequently agreed to pro-\\nvide testimony against Mr. Hopper in exchange for leniency.\\nMost of these witnesses later entered plea agreements.\\nMr. Hopper, however, pleaded not guilty to the single count\\nin the indictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late\\nFebruary 2018.\\n Before the trial began, counsel for Mr. Hopper renewed a\\nprevious motion for disclosure of the proffer letters given to\\nthe witnesses who would testify against Mr. Hopper. Refer-\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 5\\n\\nencing our decision in United States v. Weidenburner, 550\\nF. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (unpublished), counsel recog-\\nnized that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has ruled that” proffer let-\\nters “are not materials that have to be provided.”4 Neverthe-\\nless, counsel wanted “the record to be clear” that he thought\\nhe “ought to be provided a copy” of the proffer letters.5\\n Counsel for Mr. Hopper explained that the proffer letter\\n“is an agreement that sets forth the ground rules” for what\\ntestimony “may or may not lead to a plea agreement.”6 He\\nsubmitted that “this is a very important aspect of the de-\\nfense” because “no plea agreements are offered until you\\nproffer.”7 In other words, the proffer letters are “part of the\\nprocess by which men and women ultimately find their way\\non to the stand to give testimony against a defendant.”8 As a\\nresult, counsel asserted, “if the[] jurors don’t have some un-\\nderstanding of this process,” the defense would be “really\\nhampered in terms of our constitutional right[s] to put on a\\ndefense and … to confront the witnesses through cross ex-\\namination that are here to accuse Rex Hopper of various\\ncrimes.”9\\n Relying on our decision in Weidenburner, the Government\\nresponded that “the Seventh Circuit is clear that the proffer\\n\\n4 R.118 (Trial Tr. Day 1) at 8.\\n5 Id. at 5.\\n6 Id. at 6.\\n7 Id.\\n8 Id.\\n9 Id. at 7.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2576\\n\\nletters don’t come in,” nor does “any information about the\\nproffer,” “because it is a preliminary step in the plea agree-\\nment, and then the plea agreement supersedes all that.”10\\nTurning to defense counsel, the court stated, “I think it is\\npretty clear that, you know, you are not going to get the\\ndocuments.”11\\n The Government further noted its objection to defense\\ncounsel asking any questions about the process of entering a\\nplea agreement. The court asked defense counsel what kind\\nof questions he intended to ask the cooperating witnesses.\\nCounsel explained that he wanted the jury to know that be-\\nfore entering a plea agreement, a witness had to meet with\\nfederal agents and “understood that agents would decide\\nand the prosecutors would decide whether you told the\\ntruth, and if they didn’t think you told the truth that a plea\\nagreement would not be tendered.”12 Counsel acknowl-\\nedged that he planned to review the terms of the plea\\nagreements with each witness, but argued that the jury\\nwould be “missing a big part of this process” without the\\nproffer letters.13 Based on our decision in Weidenburner, the\\nGovernment reiterated that the plea agreement “super-\\nsede[s] the proffer letter” and is “the document which the\\ndefendant is entitled to and entitled to question witnesses\\nabout.”14 The court denied the motion for disclosure of the\\n\\n10 Id. at 8.\\n11 Id.\\n12 Id. at 10.\\n13 Id. at 11.\\n14 Id. at 14.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 7\\n\\nproffer letters and ruled that counsel could ask the witnesses\\n“whether they’ve entered into a proffer agreement, but go-\\ning into the terms of it that are super[s]eded by the plea\\nagreement, I’m not going to let you do.”15\\n C.\\n Mr. Hopper proceeded to trial before a jury on February\\n26, 2018. Over the course of three days, the Government pre-\\nsented the testimony of approximately twenty witnesses\\nagainst Mr. Hopper. Set forth below is a summary of the\\nwitnesses and testimony relevant to this appeal.\\n Dameon Williams testified that he met Mr. Hopper some-\\ntime in 2015 when they were “messing with drugs.”16 He ob-\\ntained ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]ff and\\non” for about one year.17 On these occasions, he received\\nabout one to two ounces of methamphetamine at a cost of\\n$900 to $1200 per ounce. Williams stated that sometimes, he\\nbought the drugs outright, while other times Mr. Hopper\\nprovided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a “front.”18 He\\nexplained that, in this fronting arrangement, Mr. Hopper\\nprovided Williams a quantity of drugs, some of which Wil-\\nliams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back. He\\nfurther testified that Mr. Hopper called Williams occasional-\\nly and asked him to visit the homes of customers who owed\\nMr. Hopper money and bring them to Mr. Hopper’s house\\n\\n15 Id. at 15–16.\\n16 Id. at 59.\\n17 Id.\\n18 Id. at 61.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2576\\n\\nto settle the debt. He explained that he helped Mr. Hopper\\ncollect money from his customers because Williams “was\\nselling drugs for him” and “to help him out in his drug\\nbusiness.”19\\n Brooke Peyton testified that she met Mr. Hopper in 2016\\nwhen she was dating William, also known as “Andy,”\\nKarnes. With Karnes, she had visited Mr. Hopper’s resi-\\ndence in Creal Springs, where Mr. Hopper provided ice\\nmethamphetamine to Karnes. She stated that during the\\nsummer of 2016, Mr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five\\n“8-balls,” or 3.5 gram quantities of ice methamphetamine,\\nseveral times a week.20 Karnes obtained the methampheta-\\nmine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a front,” in which he would sell\\ndrugs to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back for the\\ndrugs he had obtained previously.21 Peyton further testified\\nthat sometimes, Mr. Hopper came to her home to drop off\\nmethamphetamine for Karnes. On other occasions, he sent\\nWilliams to deliver the drugs.\\n Robert Weir, also known as “Boog,” testified that he and\\nMr. Hopper reconnected around April or May 2015. At some\\npoint, he, Mr. Hopper, Lucas Holland, and Randall Riley be-\\ngan an arrangement in which the four of them pooled their\\nmoney together to purchase methamphetamine from a\\nsource in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Sometimes, Weir gave\\nMr. Hopper his money, and Mr. Hopper drove to Murphys-\\nboro, where he gave Weir’s and his money to Riley to pur-\\n\\n19 Id. at 64.\\n20 Id. at 89.\\n21 Id. at 90.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 9\\n\\nchase the drugs. Other times, Mr. Hopper gave Weir his\\nmoney, and Weir delivered the money to Riley. Still other\\ntimes, Weir and Mr. Hopper visited Riley together. After Ri-\\nley obtained the drugs from Cape Girardeau, the group di-\\nvided the methamphetamine into equal, one-ounce shares.\\nWeir stated that he paid about $800 to $900 per ounce of\\nmethamphetamine. This arrangement lasted about a month,\\nduring which the group obtained methamphetamine two to\\nthree times per week.\\n In March 2016, police arrested Riley. Weir and Mr. Hop-\\nper then arranged to pool their money with Holland to pur-\\nchase methamphetamine. Holland took their money and ran,\\nand they never got their drugs. Additionally, Weir acknowl-\\nedged that he had personally observed Mr. Hopper distrib-\\nute methamphetamine to other individuals.\\n Lucas Holland testified that, at the beginning of 2016, he\\nhad been living at Riley’s house for about four or five\\nmonths. Holland confirmed the details of the pooling ar-\\nrangement he engaged in with Mr. Hopper, Riley, and Weir\\nto purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\\nGirardeau. He reiterated that Mr. Hopper or Weir, or some-\\ntimes the two together, came to Riley’s house to deliver their\\nmoney. Holland and Riley then drove to Cape Girardeau to\\nobtain the methamphetamine. When Holland and Riley re-\\nturned to Illinois, the group of four split up the drugs. Ac-\\ncording to Holland, this arrangement lasted from about De-\\ncember 2015 to February 2016.\\n Holland testified that, on one occasion, he traveled to\\nCape Girardeau with Riley, Mr. Hopper, and Erin Wright,\\nMr. Hopper’s girlfriend, for a drug deal that Mr. Hopper\\nhad arranged. The group pooled their money, and Mr. Hop-\\n\\f10 No. 18-2576\\n\\nper gave it to an individual in Cape Girardeau. In addition,\\nHolland confirmed that a few days after police arrested Ri-\\nley, Mr. Hopper and Weir gave him money to purchase\\ndrugs. He acknowledged that he “ran off with it.”22 Holland\\nalso testified that he had observed Mr. Hopper sell metham-\\nphetamine to individuals, including Kevin Shuman, at his\\nhome in Creal Springs.\\n Randall Riley testified that he met Mr. Hopper around\\nthe end of 2015 or early 2016 through a mutual acquaintance\\nwhen Mr. Hopper was seeking methamphetamine. Riley\\nconfirmed that eventually, he, Mr. Hopper, Holland, and\\nWeir began a pooling arrangement in which they combined\\ntheir money to purchase methamphetamine from a source in\\nCape Girardeau. According to Riley, the group bought four\\nounces of methamphetamine every day and split the drugs\\nbetween the four of them. Either Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both\\ncame to Riley’s home with $2,200 for Mr. Hopper and Weir’s\\nshares. Riley and Holland drove to Missouri to obtain the\\ndrugs. When they returned, they met either at Riley’s home\\nor at Mr. Hopper’s residence in Creal Springs to divide up\\nthe drugs.\\n Riley confirmed that on one occasion, his source was un-\\navailable, so Mr. Hopper arranged a transaction with his\\nown source. He, Riley, Holland, and Wright drove to Cape\\nGirardeau, where Mr. Hopper gave the source the money\\nthey had pooled together.\\n Blake Gordon testified that he met Mr. Hopper through\\nWeir. According to Gordon, he sold methamphetamine to\\n\\n22 R.122 (Trial Tr. Day 2) at 54.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 11\\n\\nMr. Hopper “more than ten times.”23 On such occasions, he\\nprovided Mr. Hopper methamphetamine in amounts rang-\\ning from one to fourteen grams. He also stated that “on nu-\\nmerous occasions,” he drove Mr. Hopper around the south-\\nern Illinois area to deliver drugs to his customers.24 Gordon\\ndescribed one occasion in which he, Mr. Hopper, and Weir\\npooled their money together. Weir drove to Cape Girardeau\\nto obtain the methamphetamine, which they divided among\\nthe three of them when he returned to Illinois.\\n Crystal Boulton testified that in March 2016, she and her\\nchildren were living at Riley’s home with Riley, her boy-\\nfriend, as well as Holland and his girlfriend. She stated that\\nshe personally observed Mr. Hopper obtain methampheta-\\nmine from Riley at Riley’s residence about four or five times.\\nOn such occasions, Mr. Hopper paid Riley for the metham-\\nphetamine and Riley gave Boulton the money to count. She\\ncounted about $1,000 to $1,200 per ounce of methampheta-\\nmine. Boulton also overheard discussions between Riley and\\nMr. Hopper about pooling their money together and making\\ntrips to Cape Girardeau to obtain methamphetamine.\\n Erin Wright testified that she met Mr. Hopper in Sep-\\ntember 2015 and moved in with him at his home in Creal\\nSprings soon after. She confirmed that Mr. Hopper and Weir\\nwent to Riley’s house to get drugs. Usually, Mr. Hopper re-\\nturned with an ounce of methamphetamine. She stated that\\nMr. Hopper had scales at his Creal Springs home, which he\\nused to weigh drugs. She further testified that, sometimes,\\n\\n23 Id. at 123.\\n24 Id.\\n\\f12 No. 18-2576\\n\\nRiley and Holland came to the Creal Springs home to do\\nbusiness with Mr. Hopper. She described one occasion on\\nwhich she and Mr. Hopper went to Kansas City, Missouri,\\nwhere Mr. Hopper and an individual named Jason Clapp\\nobtained methamphetamine. Wright stated that there were\\nalso a few times when Clapp came to the Creal Springs resi-\\ndence to provide Mr. Hopper with methamphetamine.\\n William Craig testified that he knew Mr. Hopper through\\nWeir. He bought methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper about\\nten or fifteen times. On such occasions, he obtained meth-\\namphetamine in quantities up to eight ounces. When Craig\\nobtained the methamphetamine for himself, Mr. Hopper\\nwould not charge him. When Craig purchased the metham-\\nphetamine to deliver to others, he paid Mr. Hopper in cash.\\nCraig stated that on one occasion, after Mr. Hopper and\\nWeir pooled their money together, Craig drove with Weir to\\nCharleston, Missouri, to purchase methamphetamine. They\\nreturned to Mr. Hopper’s home, where Mr. Hopper and\\nWeir divided the drugs. Craig also confirmed that he had\\nseen Mr. Hopper sell methamphetamine at his home to Kev-\\nin Page and to Andy Karnes on multiple occasions.\\n Kevin Shuman testified that he had known Mr. Hopper\\nfor years. He moved in with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs\\nhome and lived there in December 2015 and January 2016.\\nInitially, he obtained “small amounts” of methamphetamine,\\nranging from “seven grams to an 8-ball,” from Mr. Hopper.25\\nShuman bought the drugs “on a front,” explaining that he\\nsold drugs in order to repay Mr. Hopper for previously pur-\\n\\n\\n25 R.123 (Trial Tr. Day 3) at 26.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 13\\n\\nchased quantities of methamphetamine.26 He recalled two\\noccasions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Mis-\\nsouri, to obtain methamphetamine. When they returned\\nhome, Mr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\\n After a brief term in jail in early 2016, Shuman returned,\\nand the quantities he bought from Mr. Hopper increased\\nfrom grams to ounces of methamphetamine. The two had an\\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\\nand left in their place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for\\npreviously fronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testi-\\nfied that he drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\\ndeliver methamphetamine to his customers.\\n D.\\n At the close of the Government’s case in chief, counsel for\\nMr. Hopper moved for a judgment of acquittal under Feder-\\nal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which the court denied.\\nMr. Hopper elected not to testify, and the defense rested its\\ncase. Following jury instructions and closing arguments, the\\njury retired to deliberate. Approximately an hour later, the\\ncourt received a note from the jury stating, “Pages 17 + 21\\nare confusing us as to the definition of ‘conspiracy.’”27 Page\\n17 of the jury instructions stated that:\\n A conspiracy is an express or implied\\n agreement between two or more persons to\\n\\n\\n26 Id.\\n27 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\\n\\f14 No. 18-2576\\n\\n commit a crime. A conspiracy may be proven\\n even if its goal was not accomplished.\\n In deciding whether the charged conspiracy\\n existed, you may consider all of the circum-\\n stances, including the words and acts of each\\n of the alleged participants.[28]\\n Page 21 of the jury instructions stated that:\\n A conspiracy requires more than just a\\n buyer-seller relationship between the defend-\\n ant and another person. In addition, a buyer\\n and seller of a mixture and substance contain-\\n ing methamphetamine do not enter into a con-\\n spiracy to distribute a mixture and substance\\n containing methamphetamine simply because\\n the buyer resells the [] mixture and substance\\n containing methamphetamine to others, even if\\n the seller knows that the buyer intends to resell\\n the [] mixture and substance containing meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n To establish that a seller knowingly became\\n a member of a conspiracy with a buyer to dis-\\n tribute a mixture and substance containing\\n methamphetamine, the government must\\n prove that the buyer and seller had the joint\\n criminal objective of distributing a mixture and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n28 R.74 at 17.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 15\\n\\n substance containing methamphetamine to\\n others.[29]\\n After conferring with the parties, the court responded to\\nthe jury, “All instructions should be read together. I cannot\\ngive you any more instruction other than what you have\\nbeen given.”30 Following further deliberations, the jury\\nreached a verdict, finding Mr. Hopper guilty of conspiracy\\nto distribute methamphetamine, as charged in the indict-\\nment. The jury returned a special verdict form finding that\\nthe conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\\n E.\\n Prior to Mr. Hopper’s sentencing, the probation office\\nprepared a PSR. To determine the scope of his relevant con-\\nduct, the probation office interviewed several witnesses with\\nknowledge of the conspiracy. Based on these interviews, the\\ninitial PSR determined that Mr. Hopper had a base offense\\nlevel of 36, which corresponds to offenses involving “at least\\n1.5 kilograms but less than 4.5 kilograms of ice.”31 Specifical-\\nly, according to the PSR, the conspiracy involved 1.968 kilo-\\ngrams of ice methamphetamine.\\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy. In particu-\\nlar:\\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\\n\\n29 Id. at 21.\\n30 R.72 at 1.\\n31 R.81 ¶ 28.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2576\\n\\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\\n es = 850 grams)[32]\\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\\n that from January through March, he sold one\\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\\n grams) [33]\\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\\n ice). [34]\\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\\n\\n\\n32 Id. ¶ 12.\\n33 Id. ¶ 14.\\n34 Id. ¶ 19.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 17\\n\\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\\n grams = 42 grams)[35]\\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”36\\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\\ning.”37 Adding the drug amounts described above, the PSR\\ntotaled Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct to be 1.968 kilograms\\nof ice methamphetamine.\\n The initial PSR awarded Mr. Hopper a two-level sentence\\nreduction for acceptance of responsibility. Based on a total\\noffense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, the\\nPSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range of 151 to\\n188 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the initial PSR,\\nchallenging the sentence reduction for acceptance of respon-\\nsibility.38 He asserted that he had “neither denied, nor ad-\\nmitted, any … involvement” in the conspiracy.39 He also\\n\\n35 Id. ¶ 20.\\n36 Id. ¶ 21.\\n37 Id.\\n38 Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel acknowledged that this objection was high-\\nly unusual. See R.82 at 1 (“This marks the first instance in Undersigned\\nCounsel’s career in which he levels an objection on behalf of a client that\\noperates to raise the applicable advisory guidelines range. Thus, it\\nshould be noted that this objection is filed with Defendant Rex Hopper’s\\nconsent and at his direction.”).\\n39 Id.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2576\\n\\nstated that he “underst[ood] that this objection [would]\\ndoom any opportunity he might have at the two-level [ac-\\nceptance of responsibility] reduction.”40 He submitted that,\\nas a result, his total offense level was 36 and the proper\\nguidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.\\n Consequently, the probation office filed a revised PSR,\\nwhich removed the acceptance of responsibility reduction.\\nBased on a total offense level of 36 and a criminal history\\ncategory of I, the revised PSR calculated a guidelines impris-\\nonment range of 188 to 235 months. The Government filed\\nan objection to the revised PSR, contending that Mr. Hopper\\nwas subject to a two-level sentence enhancement for main-\\ntaining a residence for the purpose of distributing metham-\\nphetamine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).\\n Accordingly, the probation office filed a second revised\\nPSR, adopting the Government’s recommendation that\\nMr. Hopper was subject to the two-level sentence enhance-\\nment for maintaining a drug premises. Based on a total of-\\nfense level of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the sec-\\nond revised PSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range\\nof 235 to 293 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the\\nsecond revised PSR, challenging the application of the drug\\npremises enhancement. He maintained that, consistent with\\nthe first revised PSR, his total offense level was 36 and his\\nguidelines imprisonment range was 188 to 235 months.\\n The district court conducted a hearing to impose its sen-\\ntence. At the outset, the court asked whether there were any\\nobjections to the PSR other than Mr. Hopper’s challenge to\\n\\n40 Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 19\\n\\nthe application of the drug premises enhancement. Both sets\\nof counsel stated that there were not. The court then turned\\nto the sentence enhancement.\\n The Government introduced additional testimony from\\nWright, Mr. Hopper’s former girlfriend. She testified that\\nshe had lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home\\nfrom about October 2015 until May 2017. She acknowledged\\nthat, during this time, she saw methamphetamine at the res-\\nidence. She elaborated that “[i]t was always there” and that\\nshe saw drugs in the home “[p]retty much every day.”41\\nWright testified that after Mr. Hopper obtained metham-\\nphetamine from others, he brought it back to the Creal\\nSprings house. She further stated that she saw Mr. Hopper\\ndistribute methamphetamine from the residence. She said\\nthat this occurred “[t]hroughout the week” and that “each\\nweek there was some sort of activity going on” involving\\nmethamphetamine.42 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper\\ncollected money from individuals who bought methamphet-\\namine at his home. She testified that he had drug scales at\\nthe house, which he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”43 She\\nestimated that, while she lived with him, Mr. Hopper dis-\\ntributed methamphetamine from his residence approximate-\\nly “[w]eekly.”44 She added, however, that toward the end of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n41 R.125 at 8.\\n42 Id. at 9.\\n43 Id.\\n44 Id. at 10.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2576\\n\\ntheir time living together, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling dimin-\\nished and he was “just using.”45\\n The court inquired what Mr. Hopper did for a living.\\nWright explained that Mr. Hopper had received a monetary\\nsettlement after working in the coal mines. Subsequently, he\\nhad a “side business” buying and selling cars, and he dealt\\ndrugs.46 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper did not “of-\\nficially work.”47\\n Based on the testimony introduced at trial and at sentenc-\\ning, the court concluded that Mr. Hopper stored metham-\\nphetamine at and distributed it from the Creal Springs resi-\\ndence. Given Wright’s testimony that this occurred weekly\\nover an extended period of time, the court determined that\\nthe distribution was “more than just incidental or collat-\\neral.”48 Accordingly, the court overruled Mr. Hopper’s objec-\\ntion and concluded that he was subject to the two-level en-\\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\\ndistributing methamphetamine.\\n Noting that there were no other objections, the court\\nadopted the findings of the PSR as the findings of the court.\\nThis included the finding that the conspiracy involved be-\\ntween 1.5 and 4.5 kilograms of ice methamphetamine, specif-\\nically 1.968 kilograms, which corresponded to a base offense\\nlevel of 36. Given its conclusion regarding the two-level\\n\\n45 Id. at 24.\\n46 Id. at 32.\\n47 Id.\\n48 Id. at 41.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 21\\n\\ndrug premises enhancement, the court determined that\\nMr. Hopper had a total offense level of 38. With a criminal\\nhistory category of I, the court concluded that his corre-\\nsponding guidelines imprisonment range was 235 to 293\\nmonths.\\n Neither party objected to the court’s guideline range\\nfindings. The Government recommended a sentence near or\\nat the top of the guidelines range, while counsel for\\nMr. Hopper recommended a sentence of 188 months. Based\\non the information in the PSR, the factors set forth in 18\\nU.S.C. § 3553(a), and the arguments of Mr. Hopper’s counsel,\\nthe court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the guide-\\nlines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by four\\nyears of supervised release. At the conclusion of the hearing,\\nthe court asked defense counsel, “Are there any other argu-\\nments I have not considered?”49 Counsel for Mr. Hopper re-\\nsponded that there were not. Following the entry of final\\njudgment, Mr. Hopper filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Mr. Hopper raises four arguments on appeal. First, he as-\\nserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to\\nsupport his conviction for conspiracy to distribute metham-\\nphetamine and that, even if the Government established the\\nexistence of multiple, smaller conspiracies, there was a fatal\\nvariance between the single, overarching conspiracy alleged\\nin the indictment and the Government’s proof at trial. Sec-\\n\\n\\n49 Id. at 59.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2576\\n\\nond, he contends that the district court erred when it denied\\nhis motion for disclosure of the cooperating witnesses’ prof-\\nfer letters. Third, he challenges the district court’s applica-\\ntion of a two-level sentence enhancement for maintaining a\\ndrug premises. Finally, he submits that the district court\\nerred in calculating his guidelines range because, in deter-\\nmining Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, it double-counted\\nthe drug transactions described by Holland and Riley.\\n A.\\n 1.\\n We begin with Mr. Hopper’s attack on the sufficiency of\\nthe evidence. United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1150\\n(7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.\\nDurrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990).50 He contends that\\nthere was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine because the\\nGovernment proved only a series of buyer-seller relation-\\nships. He preserved this argument by moving for a judg-\\nment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, so we review\\n\\n\\n\\n50 In United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on\\nother grounds by United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990), we\\nadopted a “policy” of “routinely addressing evidentiary sufficiency in\\ncriminal cases when a defendant presents the issue on appeal.” Id. at\\n1150. We reasoned that “[i]f in fact insufficient evidence is presented at a\\nfirst trial, a retrial, on any basis, ordinarily may be a wasted endeavor.”\\nId. By contrast, if we find “that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a con-\\nviction, but reverse based on trial error, a retrial” is proper. Id. Accord-\\ningly, to conserve the “scarce and costly resources” of the courts and the\\nparties, we address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence first. Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 23\\n\\nhis claim de novo. United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699,\\n704 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n A defendant’s burden in showing the evidence was in-\\nsufficient to support a conviction is indeed a high one. See\\nUnited States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 835 (7th Cir. 2008). In\\nattempting to describe that burden, we often have said that\\nthe burden is a direct function of the strength of the Gov-\\nernment’s case. See United States v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489, 496–\\n97 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th\\nCir. 2013). Because “[w]e accord great deference to jury ver-\\ndicts,” United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1004–05 (7th Cir.\\n2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[w]e will over-\\nturn a conviction on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds on-\\nly if no rational jury could have found the essential elements\\nof the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v.\\nJohnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). “In making this de-\\ntermination, we view all evidence and draw all reasonable\\ninferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id.\\nSee Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), superseded on\\nother grounds by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death\\nPenalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (stat-\\ning standard of proof in criminal cases). Cf. Anderson v. Liber-\\nty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–53 (1986) (comparing meth-\\nodology in adjudicating a motion for judgment of acquittal\\nin a criminal case with a motion for summary judgment in a\\ncivil case).\\n “To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the government\\nmust prove that (1) two or more people agreed to commit an\\nunlawful act, and (2) the defendant knowingly and inten-\\ntionally joined in the agreement.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 754.\\n“For a drug-distribution conspiracy, the government must\\n\\f24 No. 18-2576\\n\\nprove that the defendant knowingly agreed—either implicit-\\nly or explicitly—with someone else to distribute drugs.”\\nClaybrooks, 729 F.3d at 704 (internal quotation marks omit-\\nted).\\n Our cases “have underscored that ordinary drug transac-\\ntions do not entail or reflect a conspiracy, for the buyer’s on-\\nly purpose is to buy and the seller’s only purpose is to sell:\\nthe buyer and seller lack a shared criminal goal.” United\\nStates v. Neal, 907 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).\\nIn other words, “evidence of a buyer-seller relationship,\\nstanding alone, is insufficient to support a conspiracy con-\\nviction.” United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th\\nCir. 1991). Instead, we require “[e]vidence of an agreement\\nto advance further distribution—beyond the initial transac-\\ntion.” United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n“The government may prove the existence of this agreement\\nthrough circumstantial evidence.” Claybrooks, 729 F.3d at\\n704–05.\\n A “nonexhaustive list of characteristics that strongly dis-\\ntinguish a conspiracy from a buyer-seller relationship” in-\\ncludes:\\n “sales on credit or consignment, an agreement\\n to look for other customers, a payment of\\n commission on sales, an indication that one\\n party advised the other on the conduct of the\\n other’s business, or an agreement to warn of\\n future threats to each other’s business stem-\\n ming from competitors or law enforcement au-\\n thorities.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 25\\n\\nUnited States v. Pereira, 783 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(quoting Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755–56). “We employ a totali-\\nty-of-the-circumstances approach in these cases,” “‘tak[ing]\\ninto account all the evidence surrounding the alleged con-\\nspiracy and mak[ing] a holistic assessment of whether the\\njury reached a reasonable verdict.’” Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 813\\n(quoting Brown, 726 F.3d at 1002).\\n In this case, the Government presented sufficient evi-\\ndence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Hopper en-\\ntered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\\nsouthern Illinois. Our conclusion is supported by evidence\\nthat Mr. Hopper sold methamphetamine on credit, or\\n“fronted” it, to his co-conspirators and that he engaged in\\npooling arrangements with other co-conspirators to pur-\\nchase large quantities of methamphetamine for further dis-\\ntribution.\\n Evidence of repeated, “fronted” transactions can be com-\\npelling circumstantial evidence of an agreement to distribute\\ndrugs because it demonstrates that the defendant “had\\nknowingly thrown his lot in” with other members of the\\nconspiracy. United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1070 (7th Cir.\\n1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a fronting ar-\\nrangement, “the seller becomes the buyer’s creditor, adding\\na dimension to the relationship that goes beyond a spot sale\\nfor cash.” United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir.\\n2008). Such a relationship indicates that the defendant “had\\na keen interest” in his co-conspirators’ “success at reselling”\\nthe drugs. Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070. Although “not all credit\\nsales can support an inference that there was an agreement\\nto distribute,” “when a credit sale is coupled with certain\\ncharacteristics inherent in an ongoing wholesale buyer-seller\\n\\f26 No. 18-2576\\n\\nrelationship—i.e., large quantities of drugs, repeat purchas-\\nes[,] or some other enduring arrangement—the credit sale\\nbecomes sufficient evidence to distinguish a conspiracy from\\na nonconspiratorial buyer-seller relationship.” Johnson, 592\\nF.3d at 756 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n At Mr. Hopper’s trial, the Government presented evi-\\ndence that he fronted methamphetamine to Williams, Shu-\\nman, and Karnes. Williams testified that he obtained about\\none to two ounces of ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hop-\\nper “[o]ff and on” for about one year.51 He stated that some-\\ntimes, he bought the drugs outright, while other times,\\nMr. Hopper provided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a\\n“front.”52 Williams explained that, in this fronting arrange-\\nment, Mr. Hopper provided him a quantity of drugs, some\\nof which Williams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper\\nback for previously fronted drugs. Williams further testified\\nthat occasionally, Mr. Hopper called Williams and asked\\nhim to bring customers who owed Mr. Hopper money to\\nMr. Hopper’s house to settle their debt. Williams explained\\nthat he helped Mr. Hopper collect money from his customers\\nbecause Williams “was selling drugs for him” and “to help\\nhim out in his drug business.”53\\n Shuman also testified that he bought drugs from\\nMr. Hopper “on a front.”54 In early 2016, the quantities he\\n\\n\\n51 R.118 at 59.\\n52 Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n53 Id. at 64.\\n54 R.123 at 26.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 27\\n\\npurchased increased from grams to ounces of methamphet-\\namine. The two had an arrangement in which Mr. Hopper\\nplaced methamphetamine for Shuman in Mr. Hopper’s gar-\\nage. Shuman retrieved the drugs from the garage and left in\\ntheir place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for previously\\nfronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testified that he\\ndrove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to deliver meth-\\namphetamine to his customers. He also described two occa-\\nsions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Missouri, to\\nobtain methamphetamine. When they returned home,\\nMr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\\n Similarly, Peyton testified that Karnes, her former boy-\\nfriend, obtained methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a\\nfront,” in which he would sell drugs to others in order to\\npay Mr. Hopper back for the drugs he had previously ob-\\ntained.55 She stated that during the summer of 2016,\\nMr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five “8-balls,” or 3.5\\ngram quantities of ice methamphetamine, several times a\\nweek.56 She added that on occasion, Mr. Hopper sent Wil-\\nliams to deliver drugs to Karnes.\\n These fronting arrangements are “substantial evidence”\\nthat Mr. Hopper “expected and encouraged” Williams,\\nShuman, and Karnes “to redistribute the drugs he had pro-\\nvided.” United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir.\\n2009). Because Mr. Hopper expected to be repaid based on\\nsales of previously fronted methamphetamine, “he was de-\\npendent upon the further resale of the drugs to make a prof-\\n\\n55 R.118 at 90.\\n56 Id. at 89.\\n\\f28 No. 18-2576\\n\\nit.” Id.; see also United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 808–09\\n(7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that evidence that co-conspirator\\nsold cocaine to the defendant “on credit” indicated that he\\n“took a stake in her business—he received payment after,\\nand as a result of, her resale”). Mr. Hopper also “demon-\\nstrated a high level of trust and confidence in” Shuman, Wil-\\nliams, and Karnes, given that he provided them “with large\\nquantities of drugs without requiring any payment until the\\ndrugs were resold.” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816.57\\n That Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes repeatedly, in large quantities,\\nover an extended period of time makes clear that these activ-\\nities were more than mere buyer-seller relationships. See\\nBrown, 726 F.3d at 1006 (permitting “an inference of conspir-\\nacy” based on evidence of “repeated transactions, in whole-\\nsale quantities, on credit”). These “factors suggest standard-\\nized transactions and lower transaction costs in the business\\nas well as a continuing relationship.” Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 809;\\nsee also Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070 (reasoning that evidence of\\n“multiple transactions over a prolonged period of time”\\nsuggested “that transaction costs … were quite low, which\\ncounsels a finding of conspiracy”). Evidence that Williams\\nand Shuman drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\\ndeliver drugs to his customers and that Mr. Hopper sent\\nWilliams to deliver drugs on his own or to pick up custom-\\ners who owed Mr. Hopper money reinforces that these rela-\\n\\n\\n57Cf. United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting “[t]he\\nmutual trust in this case was less than it would have been had [a\\nco-conspirator] ‘fronted’ cocaine to the defendant (a factor mentioned in\\nalmost all the cases) rather than being paid in cash at the time of sale”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 29\\n\\ntionships were in furtherance of Mr. Hopper’s distribution of\\ndrugs. Based on this evidence, a jury could rationally con-\\nclude that Mr. Hopper conspired to distribute methamphet-\\namine. See Pereira, 783 F.3d at 704–05.\\n The Government also presented considerable testimony\\nestablishing that Mr. Hopper pooled his resources with other\\nmembers of the conspiracy to obtain methamphetamine at a\\nreduced cost from out-of-state sources. This is circumstantial\\nevidence of an agreement to distribute drugs because, by\\n“put[ting] their money and transportation resources together\\nfor an extended period of time,” the co-conspirators “there-\\nby ha[d] a stake in each other’s success, and kn[ew] that the\\nothers intended to resell” the drugs. United States v. Harris,\\n567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also\\nUnited States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 475 (7th Cir. 2016) (hold-\\ning that “[a] reasonable jury could have found that the\\nshared supplier, funds, and product indicated an agree-\\nment” to sell drugs). Based on such evidence, we upheld the\\ndefendant’s conspiracy conviction in United States v. Hay-\\nwood, 324 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2003), reasoning that:\\n [I]n driving to Chicago together, then bringing\\n the drugs back … and splitting them up upon\\n their return, Haywood and Jackson had a\\n standardized way of doing business; they had\\n a continuing relationship, making three trips\\n together to Chicago and talking about making\\n one to Oklahoma; and they both knew that the\\n cocaine would be resold.\\nId. at 517. Similarly, in Harris, we held that there was suffi-\\ncient evidence of a conspiracy to distribute drugs where the\\ndefendant “pooled his money with that of … the other al-\\n\\f30 No. 18-2576\\n\\nleged co-conspirators to buy larger amounts of crack cocaine\\nfrom outside the state for resale.” 567 F.3d at 851.\\n In this case, Holland, Riley, and Weir testified that, to-\\ngether with Mr. Hopper, they pooled their money and\\ntransportation resources over approximately a month-long\\nperiod to purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\\nGirardeau, Missouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the\\nmoney to Riley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland\\nand Riley drove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they\\nreturned, the group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hop-\\nper’s home to divide up the drugs. The group pooled their\\nmoney multiple times per week to purchase four ounces of\\nmethamphetamine at a time, which they divided into equal,\\none-ounce shares upon return to Illinois.\\n Evidence that Mr. Hopper pooled funds, shared suppli-\\ners, and coordinated transport out of state with Holland, Ri-\\nley, and Weir, underscored a common goal between them to\\ndistribute methamphetamine.58 That this pooling arrange-\\nment involved multiple transactions per week over an ex-\\n\\n58 United States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 474 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding\\nconspiracy conviction based on testimony that Lomax and his\\nco-conspirator “shared customers, a supplier, and heroin, and pooled\\nfunds”); United States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (reason-\\ning that evidence that the co-conspirators “pooled their money and\\nshared rides to buy cheaper crack” from outside the state “mean[t] that\\neach could earn more if the others succeeded”); United States v. Haywood,\\n324 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming conspiracy conviction where\\nHaywood and his co-conspirator “pooled their money and shared rides\\nto Chicago in order to buy inexpensive crack, meaning that each could\\nrun a cheaper operation—and earn higher profits—if the other succeed-\\ned”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 31\\n\\ntended period of time reinforces the conclusion that\\nMr. Hopper had entered an agreement to distribute drugs in\\nsouthern Illinois. Thus, the jury had ample evidence, based\\non the “fronted” transactions and the pooling arrangement,\\nto convict Mr. Hopper of conspiring to distribute metham-\\nphetamine.\\n 2.\\n Mr. Hopper also submits that even if the Government\\npresented some evidence of conspiracy, we must vacate his\\nconviction “because of the variance between the indictment\\n(alleging a single, overarching conspiracy) and the proof at\\ntrial (showing, at most, smaller sub-conspiracies), which\\nprejudiced Mr. Hopper.”59 We conclude that there was no\\nfatal variance in this case.\\n At the close of all evidence, Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel\\nmoved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of\\nCriminal Procedure 29. Rule 29 requires the court to “enter a\\njudgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence\\nis insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Mr. Hopper’s counsel\\ndid not articulate the grounds for his motion and, in denying\\nthe motion, the district court ruled only that the Government\\nhad presented sufficient evidence of the charge against\\nMr. Hopper.60 Because Mr. Hopper’s counsel did not raise\\nthe possibility of a fatal variance in the district court, that\\ncourt did not have the opportunity to address this claim.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n59 Appellant’s Br. 17–18.\\n60 See R.123 at 55.\\n\\f32 No. 18-2576\\n\\nTherefore, we review his variance claim for plain error only.\\nUnited States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2007).61\\n “A variance arises when the facts proved by the govern-\\nment at trial differ from those alleged in the indictment.”\\nAvila, 557 F.3d at 815 (quoting United States v. Stigler, 413\\nF.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2005)). We treat a conspiracy variance\\nclaim “as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence.” Unit-\\ned States v. Handlin, 366 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2004). Alt-\\nhough we treat the question of variance as an attack on the\\nsufficiency of the evidence, a party must raise with specifici-\\nty the issue of variance. A timely objection affords the dis-\\ntrict court the opportunity to address the issue and under-\\ntake curative steps. See United States v Pierson, 925 F.3d 913,\\n921–22 (7th Cir. 2019). To prevail on his claim, Mr. Hopper\\nmust show both that (1) “no rational trier of fact could have\\nfound that the evidence at trial proved a single conspiracy”\\nand (2) “the variance was prejudicial.” United States v.\\nDeKelaita, 875 F.3d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 2017). “Even if the evi-\\ndence arguably established multiple conspiracies, there is no\\nmaterial variance from an indictment charging a single con-\\nspiracy if a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond\\na reasonable doubt the existence of the single conspiracy\\ncharged in the indictment.” United States v. Williams, 272\\nF.3d 845, 862 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Mr. Hopper contends that there was a variance between\\nthe Government’s proof at trial and the conspiracy alleged in\\n\\n\\n61Like the defendant in United States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 795 (7th\\nCir. 2007), Mr. Holmes did not ask for a jury instruction on multiple con-\\nspiracies.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 33\\n\\nthe indictment because the Government “failed to tie togeth-\\ner the disparate purposes of Mr. Hopper’s alleged\\nco-conspirators” to demonstrate a single conspiracy.62 He\\nsubmits that this variance prejudiced him at trial and at sen-\\ntencing.\\n To evaluate Mr. Hopper’s variance claim, “we turn to the\\nindictment first and then to the proof at trial.” Id. at 863. The\\nindictment alleged that from about January 2015 through\\nMay 31, 2017, in Williamson and Franklin Counties, in the\\nSouthern District of Illinois, “and elsewhere,” Mr. Hopper\\nconspired “with other persons known and unknown” to dis-\\ntribute methamphetamine.63 As detailed above, at trial, the\\nGovernment presented substantial evidence that Mr. Hop-\\nper entered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\\nsouthern Illinois. It is sufficient that the purpose of the con-\\nspiracy “was simply to distribute narcotics,” and that “each\\nco-conspirator agreed to advance” that goal. United States v.\\nMartin, 618 F.3d 705, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2010). Based on the ev-\\nidence that Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes for further distribution and that\\nhe engaged in a pooling arrangement with Holland, Riley,\\nand Weir to obtain methamphetamine at a low cost for re-\\nsale, a rational jury could have found that Mr. Hopper joined\\nthe single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Because\\n“[t]he key to proving a conspiracy is that the defendant\\njoined [an] agreement, not [a] group,” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816,\\nany failure to identify the connection between Mr. Hopper’s\\n\\n\\n62 Appellant’s Br. 34.\\n63 R.32 at 1.\\n\\f34 No. 18-2576\\n\\nco-conspirators did not amount to a material variance. See,\\ne.g., Williams, 272 F.3d at 863 (concluding there was no mate-\\nrial variance where there was sufficient evidence “for the ju-\\nry to conclude that a number of people had an agreement to\\ndistribute drugs in East St. Louis, and that Williams joined\\nthat agreement”).\\n In any event, Mr. Hopper suffered no prejudice as a re-\\nsult of the alleged variance. First, he contends that the vari-\\nance prejudiced him at trial because his counsel “was unable\\nto adequately prepare his defense because the government\\ndid not define the scope of the alleged conspiracy until clos-\\ning arguments.”64 But “[i]t is the grand jury’s statement of\\nthe existence of the conspiracy agreement rather than the\\nidentity of those who agree which places the defendant on\\nnotice of the charge he must be prepared to meet.” Townsend,\\n924 F.2d at 1389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The\\nGovernment’s evidence at trial demonstrated that Mr. Hop-\\nper joined others in an agreement to distribute methamphet-\\namine in southern Illinois. Mr. Hopper had sufficient notice\\nof the charged conspiracy and the evidence presented at tri-\\nal.65\\n Next, Mr. Hopper submits that “[t]he indictment and the\\ngovernment’s arguments at trial were so broad as to make it\\n\\n64 Appellant’s Br. 36.\\n65 See,e.g., United States v. Hardimon, 329 F. App’x 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2009)\\n(unpublished) (determining that there was no variance and explaining\\nthat “the indictment’s allegation of a conspiracy agreement alone was\\nsufficient notice of the charge that Hardimon needed to be prepared to\\nmeet, and the indictment was not required to name all those who partic-\\nipated in the conspiracy”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 35\\n\\nimpossible for Mr. Hopper to invoke his Fifth Amendment\\nright against double jeopardy” in a subsequent prosecu-\\ntion.66 He stresses that the record does not reveal the scope\\nof the conspiracy, his role in it, or “with whom the jury con-\\nvicted him of conspiring.”67 If we uphold his conviction “on\\nthe basis that some sub-conspiracy existed,” he posits, the\\nGovernment could indict him “for any other act within that\\ntime frame even though he had already been found guilty by\\nthe jury on the charged indictment.”68\\n We have held that, despite a variance between the in-\\ndictment and the proof at trial, we had “no difficulty in\\njudging the scope of the conviction for double jeopardy pur-\\nposes” where the indictment alleged a specific crime, “dur-\\ning a finite interval,” “involved a particular perpetrator,”\\nand “alleged specific misconduct by the perpetrator.” United\\nStates v. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 822, 824 (7th Cir. 2007)\\n(upholding defendant’s mail fraud conviction because de-\\nfendant was not prejudiced by the variance between the in-\\ndictment, “which pinpointed a particular step in the pay-\\nment process” of her alleged fraud, “and the proof at trial,\\nwhich established another”). In the same way, here, the in-\\ndictment alleged a specific crime (conspiracy to distribute\\nmethamphetamine), during a finite interval (about January\\n2015 through about May 31, 2017), involving a particular\\nperpetrator (Mr. Hopper and “other persons known and un-\\nknown”), and specific misconduct by the perpetrator (know-\\n\\n\\n66 Appellant’s Br. 38.\\n67 Id.\\n68 Id. at 38–39.\\n\\f36 No. 18-2576\\n\\ningly conspiring to distribute a mixture and substance con-\\ntaining methamphetamine).69 The scope of Mr. Hopper’s\\nconviction is sufficiently specific to avoid a future double\\njeopardy problem.\\n He further contends that the alleged variance prejudiced\\nhim at trial because the jury was confused about the instruc-\\ntions regarding the scope of the conspiracy. Evidence of\\nmultiple conspiracies may pose “a danger of ‘spillover’ prej-\\nudice” where multiple defendants are tried together and the\\njury hears incriminating evidence relevant against only\\nsome, but not all, of the defendants. Townsend, 924 F.2d at\\n1411. Because Mr. Hopper was tried alone, however, this\\nconcern was not implicated. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis,\\n37 F.3d 301, 306 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “there could be\\nno prejudice” where “Curtis was the only person on trial,\\nthus eliminating the customary concern with jury confusion\\nresulting from the ‘spillover’ effect associated with simulta-\\nneously trying multiple defendants with various connec-\\ntions to the purported scheme”).\\n Additionally, Mr. Hopper asserts that the variance preju-\\ndiced him at sentencing because it “improperly increased the\\nquantity of drugs attributed to him.”70 As we have stated,\\nhowever, there was ample evidence to support Mr. Hopper’s\\nconspiracy conviction, including but not limited to the pool-\\ning arrangement he participated in with Holland, Riley, and\\nWeir. Moreover, the PSR calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant\\nconduct based on “the amounts obtained by the defendant,\\n\\n69 R.32 at 1.\\n70 Appellant’s Br. 39.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 37\\n\\nwhich he then distributed to others.”71 Because the district\\ncourt did not sentence Mr. Hopper based on drug transac-\\ntions not related to the conspiracy in which he participated,\\nsee Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1412 (determining there was no\\nprejudice where “none of the defendants [could] claim that\\ntheir sentences were increased on the basis of drug transac-\\ntions that were not attributable to the limited conspiracies in\\nwhich they participated”), or based on drug quantities sold\\nby his co-conspirators that were within the scope of the con-\\nspiracy, see Avila, 557 F.3d at 819 (concluding there was no\\nprejudice where the defendant’s sentence was based on\\ndrugs he supplied to others, not “the quantities of drugs that\\nwere seized from the entire drug organization”), he did not\\nsuffer prejudice at sentencing.\\n B.\\n 1.\\n Mr. Hopper next submits that the district court erred\\nwhen it ruled that the Government was not required to dis-\\nclose the proffer letters of its cooperating witnesses. He as-\\nserts that the court erroneously “based its decision solely on\\nBrady[72] and Giglio,[73] and thus did not recognize” that Fed-\\neral Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 “is an independent and\\nmore expansive basis for disclosure of proffer letters.”74\\nMr. Hopper’s trial counsel never filed a request under Rule\\n\\n\\n71 R.94 ¶ 21.\\n72 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\\n73 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\\n74 Appellant’s Br. 14.\\n\\f38 No. 18-2576\\n\\n16 for disclosure of the proffer letters. Nor did counsel sug-\\ngest to the district court, during the hearing on his motion or\\notherwise, that Rule 16 might be a basis for disclosure. That\\ncounsel moved for disclosure of the proffer letters and ar-\\ngued that the court should disregard our decision in United\\nStates v. Weidenburner, 550 F. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (un-\\npublished), was not sufficient to preserve the instant argu-\\nment under Rule 16.75 Because there is no evidence in the\\nrecord that Mr. Hopper intended to relinquish this argu-\\nment, however, we conclude that he has forfeited, not\\nwaived, his request for disclosure under Rule 16. United\\nStates v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining\\nthat “[f]orfeiture occurs when a defendant negligently fails\\nto assert a right in a timely fashion”).\\n Rule 16, which governs discovery and inspection, pro-\\nvides in relevant part that:\\n Upon a defendant’s request, the government\\n must permit the defendant to inspect and to\\n\\n\\n75 Cf. United States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015) (defend-\\nant forfeited argument that his arrest was unlawful because his motion\\nto suppress challenged only the protective sweep of his home, not his\\narrest); United States v. Kelly, 772 F.3d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 2014) (defend-\\nant forfeited argument that the warrant application failed to establish\\nprobable cause because his motion to suppress argued only that the war-\\nrant lacked sufficient particularity in the description of the place to be\\nsearched); United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007) (de-\\nfendant forfeited argument that his waiver of his Fifth Amendment\\nrights and subsequent confession were involuntary due to the coercive\\nconditions of his confinement because, in the district court, he argued\\nonly that his confession was involuntary because the police did not ad-\\nminister Miranda warnings).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 39\\n\\n copy or photograph books, papers, documents,\\n data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings\\n or places, or copies or portions of any of these\\n items, if the item is within the government’s\\n possession, custody, or control and … the item\\n is material to preparing the defense.\\nFed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E).\\n Relatedly, Rule 12 provides that certain motions, includ-\\ning a request for “discovery under Rule 16,” “must be raised\\nby pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reason-\\nably available and the motion can be determined without a\\ntrial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). Under this\\nRule, “[t]he court may … set a deadline for the parties to\\nmake pretrial motions,” and if no deadline is set, then “the\\ndeadline is the start of trial.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1). “If a\\nparty does not meet the deadline for making a Rule 12(b)(3)\\nmotion, the motion is untimely.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).\\n“But a court may consider the defense, objection, or request\\nif the party shows good cause.” Id.\\n Rule 12 thus “imposes an antecedent good-cause re-\\nquirement when a defendant fails to file a timely motion.”\\nUnited States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015). In\\nother words, “if a defendant fails to raise a[n] … argument\\nbelow—even if he does so under circumstances that suggest\\na forfeiture—we cannot proceed directly to a review of the\\ndistrict court’s actions for plain error.” United States v. Kelly,\\n772 F.3d 1072, 1079 (7th Cir. 2014). Instead, we first must ask\\nwhether there was good cause for the failure. United States v.\\nJohnson, 415 F.3d 728, 730–31 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n\\f40 No. 18-2576\\n\\n Mr. Hopper offers no explanation for his trial counsel’s\\nfailure to request disclosure of the proffer letters under Rule\\n16 or to otherwise assert Rule 16 as a basis for disclosure of\\nthe letters before the district court. Further, his counsel made\\nno request for relief based on good cause before the district\\ncourt or in this court. Absent a showing of good cause as re-\\nquired by Rule 12, his claim is not subject to further review.\\nUnited States v. Daniels, 803 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2015);\\nUnited States v. Hargrove, 508 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2007).76\\n 2.\\n Mr. Hopper further contends that “the district court\\nerred in presuming that proffer letters are never” required to\\nbe disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or\\nGiglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).77 We review the\\ndistrict court’s determination that the proffer letters need not\\nbe disclosed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jumah,\\n599 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n At the hearing on Mr. Hopper’s motion, the discussion\\ncentered on our decision in Weidenburner, where we held\\nthat proffer letters “are not Giglio material or Jencks Act[78]\\nstatements.” 550 F. App’x at 304. In that case, the defendant\\nmoved for a new trial based on the Government’s assertion\\n\\n76 We note in passing that Mr. Hopper’s counsel had the information\\ncontained in the proffer letters, even though he did not have the letters\\nthemselves. He also was permitted to cross examine the witness about\\nthe proffer process. His client therefore suffered no prejudice from the\\nabsence of the letters.\\n77 Appellant’s Br. 16.\\n78 18 U.S.C. § 3500.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 41\\n\\nthat it could not locate copies of the proffer letters for two\\ncodefendants who testified against Weidenburner. Id. Nei-\\nther witness disputed the existence of the proffer letters, and\\nWeidenburner received copies of both witnesses’ plea\\nagreements. Id. Consequently, we rejected Weidenburner’s\\nclaim of nondisclosure as frivolous. Id. Acknowledging that\\n“Giglio requires disclosure of inducements for a witness[]’s\\ntestimony,” we reasoned that “the prosecutor fulfilled that\\nobligation by producing the plea agreements, which de-\\nscribe[d] the benefits [the witnesses] would receive for coop-\\nerating.” Id. Because “[t]he proffer letters were preliminary\\nto the resulting plea agreements,” we concluded that “Giglio\\nwas satisfied by disclosure of the plea agreements.” Id. Fur-\\nther, we determined that “the Jencks Act [wa]s irrelevant”\\nbecause “[t]he proffer letters were statements of the prosecu-\\ntor who wrote them,” not “factual narrative[s] useful for im-\\npeachment.” Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).79\\n\\n\\n79 At least one of our sister circuits also has held that “the government\\nsatisfied its obligations” by disclosing a cooperating witness’s plea\\nagreement to the defense. United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 880\\n(8th Cir. 2007). In Santisteban, the defendant alleged that the Govern-\\nment’s non-disclosure of the proffer letters sent to a cooperating witness\\n“violated his due process right to receive exculpatory or impeachment\\nevidence.” Id. Because “the government had already provided [the wit-\\nness]’s plea agreement,” the district court “declined to compel the pro-\\nduction” of the proffer letters. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that there was\\nno due process violation. Id. “Regardless of any preliminary proffer\\nagreements,” the court reasoned, “the formal plea agreement governed\\n[the witness]’s cooperation, and it provided the jury with a sufficient ba-\\nsis for judging the credibility of [his] testimony at trial.” Id. The court\\nconcluded that “[t]he terms of the proffer letters were not material to the\\ndefense.” Id.\\n\\f42 No. 18-2576\\n\\n In this case, the Government disclosed the cooperating\\nwitnesses’ plea agreements, which superseded the proffer\\nletters and outlined the terms of the witnesses’ cooperation.\\nThe agreements provided a sufficient basis for Mr. Hopper’s\\ncounsel to impeach the Government’s witnesses and for the\\njury to assess the credibility of those witnesses. Therefore,\\nthe district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied\\nMr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the proffer letters.\\n C.\\n Next, Mr. Hopper challenges the district court’s finding\\nthat he was subject to a two-level sentence enhancement\\nbased on evidence that he maintained his Creal Springs resi-\\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\\nMr. Hopper preserved this challenge by filing an objection to\\nthe application of the enhancement in the district court.\\nTherefore, “we review the district court’s application of the\\nU.S. Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its underlying factual\\nfindings for clear error.” United States v. Flores-Olague, 717\\nF.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n The guidelines provide for a two-level sentence en-\\nhancement “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for the\\npurpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub-\\nstance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). This includes “storage of a\\ncontrolled substance for the purpose of distribution.” Id.\\ncmt. n.17. The application notes clarify that\\n“[m]anufacturing or distributing a controlled substance need\\nnot be the sole purpose for which the premises was main-\\ntained, but must be one of the defendant’s primary or prin-\\ncipal uses for the premises, rather than one of the defend-\\nant’s incidental or collateral uses for the premises.” Id. Be-\\ncause it is undisputed that Mr. Hopper “maintained” the\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 43\\n\\nCreal Springs house, which was his home, our review is lim-\\nited to whether distributing methamphetamine was a “pri-\\nmary or principal” use of the home.\\n “[T]o determine whether drug distribution was a prima-\\nry or incidental use, the district courts are not required to\\napply a simple balancing test that compares the frequency of\\nunlawful activity at the residence with the frequency of law-\\nful uses.” United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (per curiam). That is because “such a test would im-\\nmunize every family home that is also used for drug distri-\\nbution from being deemed an illegally maintained ‘premis-\\nes,’” since “the amount of lawful activity in a home is all but\\ncertain to exceed the amount of illegal activity.” Id. Instead,\\n“the sentencing court should focus on both the frequency\\nand significance of the illicit activities.” Id. “Neither a specif-\\nic frequency nor a particular significance automatically war-\\nrants applying the enhancement.” United States v. Sanchez,\\n710 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on other grounds,\\nSanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013). “Rather, we con-\\nsider the two in tandem and determine whether the prohib-\\nited purpose can be fairly described as a ‘primary or princi-\\npal’ use of the premises.” Id. Factors relevant to this analysis\\ninclude “quantities dealt, customer interactions, keeping\\n‘tools of the trade’ and business records, and accepting pay-\\nment.” Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284.\\n First, with respect to frequency, Mr. Hopper contends\\nthat Wright’s “vague and inconsistent testimony” at the sen-\\ntencing hearing “was not enough” to establish the frequent\\nuse of his home to distribute drugs.80 He further asserts that\\n\\n80 Appellant’s Br. 45.\\n\\f44 No. 18-2576\\n\\n“the district court failed to account for [his] affirmative deci-\\nsion to stop using his home for drug distribution several\\nmonths before the end of the charged conspiracy.”81 We con-\\nclude that these contentions are without merit.\\n Testimony introduced at Mr. Hopper’s trial and at the\\nsentencing hearing highlighted that he distributed metham-\\nphetamine from his home on approximately a weekly basis\\nfor the duration of the conspiracy. Wright testified that she\\nhad lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home from\\nabout October 2015 until May 2017. During this time, meth-\\namphetamine “was always there” and she saw drugs in the\\nhome “[p]retty much every day.”82 Wright estimated that,\\nwhile she lived with him, Mr. Hopper distributed metham-\\nphetamine from his residence approximately “[w]eekly.”83\\nShe added, however, that toward the end of their time living\\ntogether, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling diminished and he was\\n“just using.”84\\n Similarly, Shuman testified that Mr. Hopper distributed\\nmethamphetamine to him while Shuman was living at the\\n\\n\\n81 Id.\\n82 R.125 at 8.\\n83 Id. at 10.\\n84 Id. at 24:8–15 (“Q. Ms. Wright, did you also add that most of the meth\\ntransactions that you were aware of occurred at Hopper’s brother’s\\nhouse, Mark Hopper? A. I’ve never—I didn’t say that like that. That’s\\nbeen taken out of context. I said that happened there, but everything was\\ndone in Creal in the very beginning, and then he slacked off, and to-\\nwards the end of the relationship he was just using, he wasn’t selling\\nit.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 45\\n\\nCreal Springs home in December 2015 and January 2016. Af-\\nter Shuman returned from jail in early 2016, the two had an\\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\\nand left the money he owed Mr. Hopper in their place. Mul-\\ntiple witnesses, including Craig, Holland, and Peyton, also\\ntestified that they observed Mr. Hopper sell methampheta-\\nmine to other individuals at his home.\\n This evidence that Mr. Hopper stored drugs at his house\\nand regularly distributed methamphetamine to customers\\nthere for the better part of 2016 confirms that he used the\\nhouse for the purpose of drug distribution with sufficient\\nfrequency.85 That Mr. Hopper conducted distribution activi-\\nties with less frequency toward the end of the conspiracy\\ndoes not undermine this conclusion.\\n Turning to the significance of the distribution activities,\\nMr. Hopper submits that “[t]he scope of drug activity at [his]\\n\\n\\n85 See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(concluding that “evidence of eight transactions, most within a\\ntwo-month period, support[ed] the courts’ findings that significant deals\\nwere occurring frequently enough for the home to be deemed, in es-\\nsence, a drug den for the purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(12)”); United States v.\\nWinfield, 846 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (upholding appli-\\ncation of enhancement based on evidence that “in the twelve weeks be-\\nfore the raid, [an] informant bought drugs from Winfield at his apart-\\nment four times and spotted additional drugs and drug paraphernalia\\nduring each transaction”); United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 533\\n(7th Cir. 2013) (holding that enhancement applied based on evidence that\\nthe defendant “sold and stored drugs at his home” and “did so ‘on a dai-\\nly basis’ over a three-year period”).\\n\\f46 No. 18-2576\\n\\nhome was not significant enough to warrant the enhance-\\nment.”86 Again, the testimony adduced at trial and at sen-\\ntencing amply demonstrated that Mr. Hopper carried on\\nsignificant aspects of his distribution business from his\\nhome.\\n We have already observed that there was substantial tes-\\ntimony that Mr. Hopper stored and distributed metham-\\nphetamine at his house.87 In this respect, Wright testified\\nthat Mr. Hopper had drug scales at the Creal Springs home,\\nwhich he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”88 Further, we\\nconsider evidence of financial transactions in the home to be\\nsignificant activity for the purpose of distributing drugs.89\\nHere, Williams testified that, when customers owed\\nMr. Hopper money, Williams occasionally brought these in-\\n\\n86 Appellant’s Br. 47.\\n87 See, e.g., Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284 (upholding application of enhance-\\nment based on “evidence that drugs were shipped to and stored at Con-\\ntreras’s home” and that “Contreras accepted payment for drugs at his\\nhome”). We have also recognized that keeping “tools of the trade” on the\\npremises may indicate “that drug trafficking was the principal use of the\\npremises.” United States v. Thomas, 845 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 2017) (in-\\nternal quotation marks omitted) (upholding application of enhancement\\nwhere a “search of the home yielded a digital scale, a cutting agent, and\\nplastic sandwich baggies with the corners cut out”).\\n88 R.125 at 9.\\n89 See United States v. Sanchez, 710 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on\\nother grounds, Sanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013) (noting that “in\\nconducting this large drug trade, Sanchez used his residence not only for\\nthe drop-off, storage, and pick-up of drugs, but also as a secure place to\\nsettle the financials”), vacated on other grounds, Sanchez v. United States,\\n571 U.S. 801 (2013) .\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 47\\n\\ndividuals to the house to settle their debt with Mr. Hopper.\\nWright also acknowledged that Mr. Hopper collected money\\nfrom individuals who bought methamphetamine at his\\nhome. Finally, testimony that the defendant’s “only regular\\nand reliable source of income stemmed from proceeds of\\ndrug trafficking activities” is evidence that the distribution\\nof drugs from his home was significant to his livelihood.90\\nFor this reason, it is meaningful that Wright testified that\\nMr. Hopper had received money from a settlement and had\\na “side business” buying and selling cars, but that he did not\\n“officially work.”91\\n In sum, we conclude that there was evidence of frequent,\\nsignificant drug distribution activities at Mr. Hopper’s\\nhome. Therefore, the district court properly determined that\\nMr. Hopper was subject to the sentence enhancement for\\nmaintaining a drug premises.\\n D.\\n Finally, we turn to Mr. Hopper’s claim that the district\\ncourt erred in determining his guidelines range because it\\nadopted an incorrectly calculated relevant conduct finding\\nfrom the PSR. He contends that most of the relevant conduct\\nwas based on drug amounts identified in interviews the\\n\\n\\n90 Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 533; see also Winfield, 846 F.3d at 243 (noting\\nthat “Winfield at the time of his arrest was ‘primarily living off proceeds\\nfrom drug sales’”); Sanchez, 710 F.3d at 732 (reasoning that because\\n“Sanchez had no legitimate job and no source of income beyond his drug\\nsales,” “the illicit transactions occurring at the premises were signifi-\\ncant—in quantity, in scope, and in importance to Sanchez’s livelihood”).\\n91 R.125 at 32.\\n\\f48 No. 18-2576\\n\\nprobation office conducted with Holland and Riley. Accord-\\ning to Mr. Hopper, in their separate interviews, Holland and\\nRiley were actually referring to the same transactions. Thus,\\nby including the drug amounts described in both Holland\\nand Riley’s interviews in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s rel-\\nevant conduct, the district court double-counted the same set\\nof drugs.\\n Mr. Hopper did not challenge the relevant conduct calcu-\\nlation in his objection to the initial PSR, his objection to the\\nsecond revised PSR, or at the sentencing hearing. Therefore,\\nwe review his claim for plain error only. Fed. R. Crim. P.\\n52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be\\nconsidered even though it was not brought to the [district]\\ncourt’s attention.”). We have discretion to remedy the for-\\nfeited error provided that Mr. Hopper has satisfied the fol-\\nlowing conditions: (1) there is an error “that has not been in-\\ntentionally relinquished or abandoned”; (2) the error is\\n“plain—that is to say, clear or obvious”; (3) the error “affect-\\ned the defendant’s substantial rights”; and (4) the error “se-\\nriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of\\njudicial proceedings.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136\\nS. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 736 (1993), superseded on other grounds by rule, Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 24(c) (1999)); see also United States v. Pierson, 925\\nF.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence has clarified\\nthe application of the third and fourth prongs in the context\\nof sentencing errors. To demonstrate that the error affected\\nhis substantial rights, “in the ordinary case,” the defendant\\nmust “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,\\nthe outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 49\\n\\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). According to the Court, “[w]hen a defendant is\\nsentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or\\nnot the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct\\nrange—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient\\nto show a reasonable probability of a different outcome ab-\\nsent the error.” Id. at 1345. “That probability is all that is\\nneeded to establish an effect on substantial rights for pur-\\nposes of obtaining relief under Rule 52(b).” Id. at 1349. Fur-\\nther, “[i]n the ordinary case, … the failure to correct a plain\\nGuidelines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights\\nwill seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputa-\\ntion of judicial proceedings.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States,\\n138 S. Ct. 1897, 1911 (2018). In other words, “[a] plain Guide-\\nlines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights is pre-\\ncisely the type of error that ordinarily warrants relief under\\nRule 52(b).” Id. at 1907.\\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy.92 In particu-\\nlar:\\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\\n\\n92 Though the probation office revised Mr. Hopper’s PSR twice before\\nsentencing, the relevant conduct calculations did not change. For pur-\\nposes of this discussion, we reference the most recent version of the re-\\nport, the second revised PSR.\\n\\f50 No. 18-2576\\n\\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\\n es = 850 grams)[93]\\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\\n that from January through March, he sold one\\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\\n grams)[94]\\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\\n ice).[95]\\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\\n grams = 42 grams)[96]\\n\\n\\n93 R.94 ¶ 12.\\n94 Id. ¶ 14.\\n95 Id. ¶ 19.\\n96 Id. ¶ 20.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 51\\n\\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”97\\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\\ning.”98 As demonstrated by the following chart, adding the\\ndrug amounts described above, the PSR totaled Mr. Hop-\\nper’s relevant conduct to be 1.9685 kilograms of ice meth-\\namphetamine.\\n Interviewee Drug Amount\\n Holland 850 grams\\n Riley 793 grams\\n Wright 283.5 grams\\n Wright 42 grams\\n 1,968.5 grams\\n Total\\n (1.9685 kilograms)\\n We agree with Mr. Hopper that the district court plainly\\nerred in adopting the PSR’s relevant conduct calculation.\\nFirst, we conclude that Mr. Hopper did not “intentionally\\nrelinquish[] or abandon[]” this challenge. Molina-Martinez,\\n136 S. Ct. at 1343. Neither party objected to the relevant con-\\nduct calculation prior to or during the sentencing hearing.\\nAt sentencing, the district court adopted the findings of the\\nPSR, including the relevant conduct calculation, without fur-\\n\\n\\n97 Id. ¶ 21.\\n98 Id.\\n\\f52 No. 18-2576\\n\\nther comment. “Given the complexity” of calculating a de-\\nfendant’s guidelines range, “district courts sometimes make\\nmistakes.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904. Accordingly,\\n“when a district court’s sentencing of a defendant within the\\nframework of an incorrect Guidelines range goes unnoticed\\nby the parties as well,” a defendant is “not entirely without\\nrecourse.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Second, the error here was plain. At trial, Holland, Riley,\\nand Weir all testified that, together with Mr. Hopper, they\\npooled their money over approximately a month-long peri-\\nod sometime between late 2015 and early 2016 to purchase\\nmethamphetamine from a source in Cape Girardeau, Mis-\\nsouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the money to Ri-\\nley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland and Riley\\ndrove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they returned,\\nthe group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hopper’s home\\nto divide up the drugs. Holland, Riley, and Weir all de-\\nscribed how the group pooled their money to purchase four\\nounces of methamphetamine at a time, which they divided\\ninto equal, one-ounce shares.\\n In context of the testimony presented at trial, it is clear\\nthat Holland and Riley were describing the same pooling\\narrangement during their separate interviews with the pro-\\nbation office. The amounts attributed to Holland and Riley\\nin the PSR differ only because Riley’s more specific state-\\nments prompted the Government to use a 28-day month in-\\nstead of a 30-day month to calculate the total amount of\\nmethamphetamine described. Regardless, the trial testimony\\nconsistently showed that Mr. Hopper, Holland, Riley, and\\nWeir participated in a pooling arrangement and that follow-\\ning each purchase, each member of the group obtained one\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 53\\n\\nounce of methamphetamine. Because Holland and Riley\\nwere describing the same set of transactions, it was plainly\\nerroneous to include the drug amounts described in both in-\\nterviews in calculating Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\\n Third, we hold that this plain error affected Mr. Hopper’s\\nsubstantial rights because it increased his base offense level\\nand his corresponding guidelines imprisonment range. Mo-\\nlina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346 (“In most cases a defendant\\nwho has shown that the district court mistakenly deemed\\napplicable an incorrect, higher Guidelines range has demon-\\nstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome.”). At\\nsentencing, the district court adopted the PSR’s relevant\\nconduct calculation of 1.968 grams of ice methamphetamine,\\nwhich resulted in a base offense level of 36. Applying the\\ntwo-level enhancement for maintaining a residence for the\\npurpose of distributing methamphetamine, the court calcu-\\nlated a total offense level of 38. With a criminal history cate-\\ngory of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\\nwas 235 to 293 months. The court sentenced Mr. Hopper to\\n235 months’ imprisonment, which is “conspicuous for its po-\\nsition as the lowest sentence within what the [d]istrict\\n[c]ourt believed to be the applicable range.” Id. at 1347.\\n If we count the drugs described by Holland and Riley on-\\nly once, Mr. Hopper’s base offense level falls to 34. Assum-\\ning for purposes of this calculation that the relevant month\\nwas 30 days and, consistent with the testimony at trial, that\\nMr. Hopper received one ounce of methamphetamine ice per\\ntransaction, the resulting drug quantity is 850 grams. Add-\\ning these 850 grams to the drug amounts described by\\nWright, the total quantity is only 1,175.5 grams, or 1.1755\\nkilograms, as shown in the following chart:\\n\\f54 No. 18-2576\\n\\n Interviewee Drug Amount\\n Holland/Riley 850 grams\\n Wright 283.5 grams\\n Wright 42 grams\\n 1,175.5 grams\\n Total\\n (1.1755 kilograms)\\n This amount is significantly below the 1.5-kilogram\\nthreshold that would trigger a base offense level of 36. See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2). At a base offense level of 34, applying\\nthe two-level drug premises enhancement, Mr. Hopper’s to-\\ntal offense level would be 36. With a criminal history catego-\\nry of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\\nwould be 188 to 235 months. At sentencing, the district court\\n“said nothing to suggest that it would have imposed” a sen-\\ntence of 235 months “regardless of the Guidelines range.”\\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1348. Consequently, “there is at\\nleast a reasonable probability that the [d]istrict [c]ourt would\\nhave imposed a different sentence had it known that” a low-\\ner sentence was appropriate. Id.; United States v. Adams, 746\\nF.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2014) (“When a district court incor-\\nrectly calculates the guideline range, we normally presume\\nthe improperly calculated guideline range influenced the\\njudge’s choice of sentence, unless he says otherwise.”).\\n Fourth, we conclude that Mr. Hopper satisfied the last\\nprong of the plain-error analysis. “The risk of unnecessary\\ndeprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness,\\nintegrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings in the\\ncontext of a plain Guidelines error because of the role the\\ndistrict court plays in calculating the range and the relative\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 55\\n\\nease of correcting the error.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at\\n1908. This conclusion is especially forceful where, as here,\\nthe error “was based on a mistake made in the presentence\\ninvestigation report by the Probation Office, which works on\\nbehalf of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” Id. Therefore, we conclude\\nthat resentencing based on recalculation of Mr. Hopper’s\\nrelevant conduct is required.99\\n The Government insists that any error in calculating\\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct was harmless because the\\ndistrict court actually “severely undercounted” the amount\\nof drugs attributable to Mr. Hopper.100 According to the\\nGovernment, the district court should have attributed to\\nMr. Hopper the entire amount purchased by Mr. Hopper,\\nHolland, Riley, and Weir each time they pooled their money\\ntogether because “[t]he entire four ounces was foreseeable\\nrelevant conduct” to Mr. Hopper.101 The Government con-\\ncedes that it failed to challenge the relevant conduct calcula-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n99See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (hold-\\ning that plain error in calculating the defendant’s criminal history points,\\nwhich resulted in a higher guidelines range, required resentencing be-\\ncause we had “no reason to believe” that the district court’s error “did\\nnot affect its selection of the particular sentence”).\\n100 Appellee’s Br. 49.\\n101 Id. at 50; see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (providing that, “in the case of a\\njointly undertaken criminal activity,” a defendant’s base offense level\\nshall be determined based on “all acts and omissions of others” that were\\n“(i) within the scope” of the conspiracy; “(ii) in furtherance of” the con-\\nspiracy; and “(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with” the con-\\nspiracy).\\n\\f56 No. 18-2576\\n\\ntion before the district court but explains that “it most likely\\nwould not have affected the advisory guideline range.”102\\n We have recognized that “an appellate court can affirm\\nthe determination of a sentencing range ‘on any ground\\nsupported by the record even if that ground was not relied\\nupon by the district court.’” United States v. Benitez, 92 F.3d\\n528, 538 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 6 F.3d\\n431, 447 (7th Cir. 1993)). But the Government has not offered,\\nnor have we located, any authority to suggest that we can\\nrely on a relevant conduct calculation not presented to the\\ndistrict court to affirm a defendant’s sentence. Indeed, our\\ndecision in United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir.\\n1995), suggests quite the opposite.\\n In that case, a jury found Henderson guilty of conspiracy\\nto distribute cocaine base and distributing cocaine base. Id.\\nat 1147. At sentencing, the district court attributed to Hen-\\nderson the 18 grams of cocaine he was convicted of selling.\\nId. at 1151. The court also attributed ten percent of the\\namounts of cocaine described by Henderson’s\\nco-conspirator. Id. The court explained that it did not accept\\nthe full amount claimed by his co-conspirator because of\\n“the ‘vagueness and generalized’ nature” of the co-\\nconspirator’s testimony “and the lack of money to support\\nhis contentions that he sold such large amounts of drugs.”\\nId. Henderson challenged the amount of drugs the district\\ncourt attributed to him, arguing that “by accepting only 10%\\nof [the co-conspirator’s] testimony, the court did not simply\\nact conservatively, but instead indicated its belief that [the\\n\\n\\n102 Appellee’s Br. 50 n.6.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 57\\n\\nco-conspirator’s] information was not sufficiently reliable to\\nsupport any amounts above the 18 grams.” Id. We agreed\\nthat the court clearly erred because it “did not have suffi-\\ncient faith” in the co-conspirator’s testimony “to use it as the\\nbasis for attributing further amounts to Henderson.” Id. at\\n1152.\\n The Government submitted, however, that remand was\\nnot required because other calculations would result in drug\\namounts within the range applied by the district court. Id.\\nFor instance, the Government contended that we could cal-\\nculate the drug quantity by multiplying the number of used\\nplastic baggies by the amount of cocaine typically packaged\\nin each baggie. Id. at 1153. Although we were “fairly certain\\nthat this calculation … would adequately sustain the court’s\\ndetermination,” we declined to “embrace it ourselves.” Id.\\nWe explained that “[t]he government first presented this cal-\\nculation on appeal,” such that “the district court, which has\\nsentencing responsibility, [] had no opportunity to consider\\nit.” Id. The Government also proposed that we could deter-\\nmine the drug quantity based on the amount of money\\nseized from Henderson and from a drug location on the day\\nof his arrest. Id. We declined this suggestion, reasoning that\\n“while the government introduced this evidence at trial, it\\ndid not present the calculations at sentencing.” Id. Conse-\\nquently, we left “the initial consideration of these sentencing\\nissues to the district court on remand.” Id.\\n For the same reasons, we decline to affirm Mr. Hopper’s\\nsentence based on relevant conduct calculations that the\\nGovernment presented for the first time on appeal. Because\\nneither party challenged the relevant conduct calculations\\nbelow, “the district court, which has sentencing responsibil-\\n\\f58 No. 18-2576\\n\\nity,” id., had no opportunity to consider any arguments re-\\ngarding the proper calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant\\nconduct. The parties must present their drug quantity calcu-\\nlations to the district court to consider in the first instance on\\nremand.\\n Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and\\naffirm the district court’s determination that he was subject\\nto a sentence enhancement for maintaining a residence for\\nthe purpose of distributing methamphetamine. We vacate\\nhis sentence and remand his case to the district court for re-\\nsentencing based on our conclusion that there was plain er-\\nror in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\\n AFFIRMED IN PART,\\n VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3887,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654070,"string":"4,654,070"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Holly Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Incorpo"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3633"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3633\\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\\nDANA LAND, on behalf of themselves\\nand all others similarly situated,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nHILL’S PET NUTRITION, INC., and\\nPETSMART, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17-cv-2535 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Holly Vanzant and Dana Land own\\ncats with health problems. Their veterinarians prescribed cat\\nfood manufactured by Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., and sold\\nunder Hill’s “Prescription Diet” brand. For several years\\nVanzant and Land purchased this higher-priced cat food\\n\\f2 No. 17-3633\\n\\nfrom their local PetSmart stores using their veterinarian’s\\nprescriptions. They eventually learned, however, that the\\nPrescription Diet cat food is not materially different from\\nnonprescription cat food. And the prescription requirement\\nis illusory; no prescription is necessary. Feeling deceived,\\nVanzant and Land filed a class-action lawsuit against Hill’s\\nand PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Con-\\nsumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq., and for unjust enrichment.\\n The district judge dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim for two reasons: (1) the complaint lacked the specificity\\nrequired for a fraud claim; and (2) the claim is barred by a\\nstatutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by a\\nregulatory body—here, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-\\ntion (“FDA”). The judge dismissed the unjust-enrichment\\nclaim because it was premised on the same conduct as the\\nstatutory claim.\\n We reverse. First, the safe-harbor provision does not\\napply. Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., pet food intended to treat or prevent disease\\nand marketed as such is considered a drug and requires\\napproval of a new animal drug application. Without FDA\\napproval, the manufacturer may not sell it in interstate\\ncommerce and the product is deemed adulterated and\\nmisbranded. The FDA issued guidance recognizing that\\nmost pet-food products in this category do not have the\\nrequired approval; the guidance states that the agency is less\\nlikely to initiate an enforcement action if consumers\\npurchase the food through or under the direction of a\\nveterinarian (among other factors guiding the agency’s\\nenforcement discretion). But the guidance does not\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 3\\n\\nspecifically authorize the conduct alleged here, so the safe\\nharbor does not apply.\\n And the plaintiffs pleaded the fraud claim with the par-\\nticularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil\\nProcedure. So the statutory claim may proceed. The unjust-\\nenrichment claim is more appropriately construed as a\\nrequest for relief in the form of restitution based on the\\nalleged fraud. In Illinois unjust enrichment is not a separate\\ncause of action but is a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d\\n725, 741 (7th Cir. 2017). The request for restitution based on\\nunjust enrichment therefore rests entirely on the consumer-\\nfraud claim, and it too may move forward.\\n I. Background\\n The case comes to us from a dismissal at the pleadings\\nstage, so we recount the facts as alleged in the amended\\ncomplaint. Hill’s Pet Nutrition manufactures a variety of pet\\nfood, and this case concerns its Prescription Diet brand.\\nHill’s sells its Prescription Diet pet food through veterinari-\\nans and pet-food retailers, though consumers may purchase\\nit from a retailer only with a veterinarian’s prescription.\\nPetSmart sells pet supplies and pet food, including Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet brand. Consumers need a veterinarian’s\\nprescription to purchase Hill’s Prescription Diet food at\\nPetSmart.\\n In January 2013 Holly Vanzant’s cat Tarik underwent\\nemergency surgery for bladder stones. At a follow-up\\nappointment, Tarik’s veterinarian prescribed Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet c/d Multicare Feline Bladder Health cat\\nfood. That same day Vanzant purchased the food at a\\n\\f4 No. 17-3633\\n\\nPetSmart store. Inside she saw marketing materials\\nindicating that the cat food is “prescription only,” and the\\nlabel on the bag read “Hill’s Prescription Diet.” PetSmart\\nprovided her with a pet prescription card listing Tarik’s\\nname, prescription number, and prescription date. For three\\nyears Vanzant purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food\\nfrom PetSmart, paying a higher price than for\\nnonprescription food. She showed the prescription card to\\nthe cashier each time.\\n Land had a similar experience. In October 2013 a veteri-\\nnarian diagnosed her cat Chief with diabetes and prescribed\\nHill’s Prescription Diet m/d Feline Glucose/Weight Man-\\nagement cat food. Within a few weeks, Land purchased\\nHill’s Prescription Diet cat food at a PetSmart store. She too\\nsaw marketing materials inside the store indicating that the\\nfood is meant to treat or control diabetes. PetSmart provided\\nLand with a pet prescription card listing Chief’s name,\\nprescription number, and prescription date. For two years\\nLand purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart, paying a higher price than for nonprescription\\nfood. She too showed the prescription card each time.\\n Vanzant and Land eventually learned they were not re-\\nceiving what they expected. They thought prescription pet\\nfood was medically necessary for the health of their pets,\\nhad been approved by the FDA, and could not be sold\\nlegally without a prescription. But the FDA had not ap-\\nproved it, and nothing required that it be sold with a pre-\\nscription. They filed a proposed class action in state court\\nagainst Hill’s and PetSmart alleging claims for violation of\\nthe Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and unjust enrichment. The\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 5\\n\\ndefendants removed the case to federal court and moved to\\ndismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6).\\n The judge granted the motion. He held that the\\nConsumer Fraud Act claim is foreclosed by the statute’s safe-\\nharbor provision, which shields actions authorized by laws\\nadministered by a regulatory body. Specifically, the judge\\nrelied on an FDA Compliance Policy Guide, which he\\nconstrued as regulatory authorization for “the gate-keeping\\nrole of veterinarians in ensuring that pet owners purchase\\nonly appropriate therapeutic foods.” The judge also\\nconcluded that Vanzant and Land failed to plead the\\nconsumer-fraud claim with the particularity required by\\nRule 9(b). With no underlying fraud claim remaining, the\\njudge likewise dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim.\\nVanzant and Land appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review the dismissal order de novo. Camasta v. Jos. A.\\nBank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain\\n“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable\\ninference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct\\nalleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At a\\nminimum it “must give enough details about the subject\\nmatter of the case to present a story that holds together.”\\nSwanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s]\\nconsumers … against fraud, unfair methods of competition,\\nand other unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson\\nv. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002).\\nDeceptive or unfair practices include any “misrepresentation\\n\\f6 No. 17-3633\\n\\nor the concealment, suppression or omission of any material\\nfact.” 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2. To recover on a claim under\\nthe Act, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant\\ncommitted a deceptive or unfair act with the intent that\\nothers rely on the deception, that the act occurred in the\\ncourse of trade or commerce, and that it caused actual\\ndamages. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 934–35 (7th Cir.\\n2010). We begin, however, with the Act’s safe-harbor\\nprovision.\\nA. Safe-Harbor Provision\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act exempts some acts and\\npractices from liability under a safe-harbor provision. See\\n815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b(1). One component of that safe\\nharbor covers actions “specifically authorized by laws\\nadministered by any regulatory body or officer acting under\\nstatutory authority of this State or the United States.” Id.\\nThis provision allows regulated actors to “rely on the direc-\\ntions received from [regulatory] agencies without risk that\\nsuch reliance might expose them to … liability.” Price v.\\nPhilip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 38 (Ill. 2005).\\n To trigger the safe harbor, the regulatory body must be\\noperating within its statutory authority and the challenged\\nconduct must be “specifically authorized by laws adminis-\\ntered by” that regulatory body. § 10b(1). Formal rulemaking\\nis not necessary; “informal regulatory activity” is enough.\\nPrice, 848 N.E.2d at 46. The FDA’s statutory authority in-\\ncludes regulation of pet food, so the dispute centers on\\nwhether the agency’s guidance qualifies as informal regula-\\ntory activity and specifically authorizes the relevant conduct.\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 7\\n\\n The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., regulates pet food. Because Hill’s Prescription\\nDiet cat food is intended to treat or prevent disease and is\\nmarketed as such, the products are considered “drugs”\\nunder the FDCA. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B). Without FDA approval, a\\nnew animal drug cannot be sold in interstate commerce, id.\\n§ 331(a), and the product is deemed misbranded and adul-\\nterated, id. §§ 352(o), 351(a)(5).\\n Manufacturers face two additional requirements, regard-\\nless of whether the animal drug at issue has been approved.\\nAll drug manufacturers must list their drugs and register\\ntheir facilities or else the drugs are misbranded. Id. § 352(o).\\nAnd animal drug products must be manufactured in com-\\npliance with current good-manufacturing practices applica-\\nble to drugs, otherwise the drugs are adulterated. Id.\\n§ 351(a)(2)(B).\\n Most pet-food products claiming to treat or prevent dis-\\nease lack FDA approval and do not comply with the FDCA’s\\ndrug registration and listing requirements. Nor do the\\nmanufacturers of these products follow the appropriate\\nmanufacturing practices for animal drugs. The FDA issued\\nguidance acknowledging this longstanding noncompliance\\nand identifying circumstances in which the agency may\\nexercise its discretion against initiating an enforcement\\naction.\\n The 2016 FDA Compliance Policy Guide offers the FDA’s\\ncurrent thinking on the likelihood of an enforcement action.\\nThe guide lists factors for agency staff to consider—\\nincluding, for example, whether the product presents a\\nknown safety risk when used as labeled, whether the prod-\\nuct label represents that it can be used to treat disease, and\\n\\f8 No. 17-3633\\n\\nwhether the product is marketed as an alternative to ap-\\nproved new drugs. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.\\nFOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE SEC.\\n690.150 LABELING & MARKETING OF DOG & CAT FOOD DIETS\\nINTENDED TO DIAGNOSE, CURE, MITIGATE, TREAT, OR PREVENT\\nDISEASES: GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF 6 (Apr. 2016),\\nhttps://www.fda.gov/media/83998/download. The guide\\ngoes on to list 11 factors that make an enforcement action\\n“less likely”—but only if all 11 are present. Id. at 7.\\n Hill’s and PetSmart characterize the Compliance Policy\\nGuide as informal regulatory activity specifically authoriz-\\ning the prescription requirement and prescription label for\\nHill’s Prescription Diet pet food. They are mistaken. The\\nFDA classifies the guide as a “Level 1 guidance document[]”\\nthat “[s]et[s] forth initial interpretations of statutory or\\nregulatory requirements” and details “changes in interpreta-\\ntion or policy that are of more than a minor nature.”\\n21 C.F.R. § 10.115(c)(1)(i)-(ii); Draft Compliance Policy Guide\\nSec. 690.150 on Labeling and Marketing of Nutritional\\nProducts Intended for Use in Dogs and Cats, 77 Fed. Reg.\\n55,480, 55,480 (Sept. 10, 2012). But the guide does not estab-\\nlish any legally enforceable responsibilities, and it is not\\nbinding on either the FDA or the public.\\n Contrast the Compliance Policy Guide with the\\nregulatory action in Price v. Philip Morris, where the Illinois\\nSupreme Court held that a consent order between the\\nFederal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and a cigarette\\nmanufacturer triggered the Consumer Fraud Act’s safe\\nharbor because the consent order could be understood as\\n“provid[ing] guidance” about cigarette labeling to the entire\\nindustry. 848 N.E.2d at 46. Even though the consent order\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 9\\n\\ndid not bind other industry actors, the safe harbor applied\\nbecause the order “announce[d] to an entire industry what\\nbehavior is and is not authorized.” Id. at 43. Hill’s and\\nPetSmart cite Price for support, but the case cuts against\\nthem. The FDA Compliance Policy Guide does not establish\\nindustry-wide standards for labeling and marketing of pet\\nfood intended to treat or prevent disease. Rather, the\\ndocument helps FDA staff allocate enforcement resources. It\\ndoes not qualify as informal regulatory activity.\\n Nor does the guide specifically authorize the prescription\\nrequirement and label. To determine whether conduct has\\nbeen specifically authorized by a regulatory body, Illinois\\ncourts look to the “affirmative acts or expressions of authori-\\nzation” by the relevant agency. Id. at 36. For an authorization\\nto be “specific,” it must be “related to a particular thing,” but\\n“it need not be express.” Id. at 42 (emphases added). In Price,\\nfor example, the defendant cigarette company’s use of the\\nterm “lights” in its marketing was held to be specifically\\nauthorized by FTC consent orders with other manufactur-\\ners—even though those orders authorized the use of the\\nterms “low,” “lower,” “reduced,” or “like qualifying terms”\\nto describe tar and nicotine content but did not expressly\\ninclude the term “lights.” Id. at 43.\\n In contrast, of the 11 factors listed in the Compliance Pol-\\nicy Guide as making an enforcement action less likely, only\\none is relevant here: whether “[t]he product is made availa-\\nble to the public only through licensed veterinarians or\\nthrough retail or internet sales to individuals purchasing the\\nproduct under the direction of a veterinarian.” U.S. FDA\\nCOMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 7. The defendants rely on this\\nfactor as evidence that the FDA specifically authorizes the\\n\\f10 No. 17-3633\\n\\nprescription requirement. But this argument wrongly\\nequates regulatory forbearance with regulatory authoriza-\\ntion.\\n To be sure, if pet food intended to treat or prevent dis-\\nease is purchased from or under the direction of a licensed\\nveterinarian, the FDA is less likely to initiate an enforcement\\naction based on the lack of an approved new animal drug\\napplication—provided, however, that the other 10 factors are\\nalso present. And “less likely” does not mean “will not”; it\\ncertainly doesn’t signal authorization. Because the Compli-\\nance Policy Guide doesn’t specifically authorize the Hill’s\\nprescription requirement, prescription label, and related\\nmarketing representations, the safe harbor does not apply.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Allegations\\n With the safe harbor off the table, our next question is\\nwhether the complaint adequately alleges that Hill’s and\\nPetSmart committed a deceptive or unfair practice. These are\\nseparate categories; deceptive conduct is distinct from unfair\\nconduct. A claim under the Consumer Fraud Act may be\\npremised on either (or both), but the two categories have\\ndifferent pleading standards. If the claim rests on allegations\\nof deceptive conduct, then Rule 9(b) applies and the plaintiff\\nmust plead with particularity the circumstances constituting\\nfraud. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 737. Specifically, the complaint\\nmust identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the\\nalleged fraud. Id. (quotation marks omitted).\\n On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff may allege that conduct\\nis unfair … without alleging that the conduct is deceptive.”\\nSiegel, 612 F.3d at 935. To determine whether a practice is\\nunfair, Illinois courts consider three factors: whether it\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 11\\n\\n“offends public policy”; is “immoral, unethical, oppressive,\\nor unscrupulous”; or “causes substantial injury to consum-\\ners.” Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th\\nCir. 2014). A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; “[a]\\npractice may be unfair because of the degree to which it\\nmeets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets\\nall three.” Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks\\nomitted). And because fraud is not a required element,\\nRule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard does not apply. See\\nWindy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin.\\nServs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, under\\neither theory of the case, the plaintiff must adequately plead\\ncausation—more specifically, he must allege that but for the\\ndefendant’s deceptive or unfair conduct, he “would not have\\nbeen damaged.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935 (quotation marks\\nomitted).\\n The complaint alleges that the defendants’ marketing\\npractices are both deceptive and unfair. Taking the first\\ncategory first, the complaint alleges that the prescription\\nrequirement, prescription label, and related marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet pet food are deceptive\\nbecause no prescription is necessary and there is no material\\ndifference between the “prescription” food and nonprescrip-\\ntion food. Hill’s and PetSmart respond that the complaint is\\ndeficient because it does not allege that Vanzant and Land\\nrelied on the deceptive representations when purchasing\\nHill’s Prescription Diet food. This argument misconstrues\\nIllinois law. “[R]eliance is not an element of statutory con-\\nsumer fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584,\\n593 (Ill. 1996). Rather, it’s the plaintiff’s “damage,” not his\\npurchase, that must occur “as a result of” the deceptive act\\nor practice. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160. Indeed, it was enough\\n\\f12 No. 17-3633\\n\\nin Connick that the plaintiffs’ purchases “occurred after the\\nallegedly fraudulent statements.” 675 N.E.2d at 595.\\n Here, the complaint alleges that the prescription re-\\nquirement, prescription label, and associated marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet were deceptive; that\\nVanzant and Land saw the specific “prescription” language\\nand symbols when they made their purchases; that the\\nprescription pet food was something less than they expected;\\nand that they suffered damages because they paid a higher\\nprice. These allegations detail the “who,” “what,” and\\n“how” of the fraud claim with particularity. Camasta,\\n761 F.3d at 737.\\n The complaint also alleges the “when” and “where” of\\nthe fraud. Vanzant saw marketing materials for Prescription\\nDiet pet food before purchasing the cat food at PetSmart in\\nFebruary 2013 and thereafter. Land saw similar marketing\\nmaterials before purchasing Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart in November 2013 and thereafter. Nothing more is\\nneeded.\\n In short, the complaint pleads a deceptive-practices claim\\nto the degree of particularity required by Rule 9(b). That’s\\nenough to reverse the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim, so it’s not necessary to address the adequacy of the\\nallegations under the unfair-practices theory of the case. As\\nwe’ve noted, an unfair-practices claim has no fraud element\\nand therefore is not subject to a heightened pleading stand-\\nard.\\nC. Unjust Enrichment\\n The complaint also seeks restitution for unjust\\nenrichment. “Under Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 13\\n\\nseparate cause of action.” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree\\nMed. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir.\\n2011). Rather, it’s a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon, 877 F.3d at 741. Accordingly,\\nthe request for relief based on unjust enrichment is tied to\\nthe fate of the claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Cleary v.\\nPhilip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2011). The\\nstatutory claim may move forward, and that revives the\\nrequest for restitution based on unjust enrichment.\\n REVERSED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431323/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654070/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Holly Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Incorpo\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3633\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\nDANA LAND, on behalf of themselves\nand all others similarly situated,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nHILL’S PET NUTRITION, INC., and\nPETSMART, INC.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17-cv-2535 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Holly Vanzant and Dana Land own\ncats with health problems. Their veterinarians prescribed cat\nfood manufactured by Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., and sold\nunder Hill’s “Prescription Diet” brand. For several years\nVanzant and Land purchased this higher-priced cat food\n\f2 No. 17-3633\n\nfrom their local PetSmart stores using their veterinarian’s\nprescriptions. They eventually learned, however, that the\nPrescription Diet cat food is not materially different from\nnonprescription cat food. And the prescription requirement\nis illusory; no prescription is necessary. Feeling deceived,\nVanzant and Land filed a class-action lawsuit against Hill’s\nand PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Con-\nsumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL.\nCOMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq., and for unjust enrichment.\n The district judge dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act\nclaim for two reasons: (1) the complaint lacked the specificity\nrequired for a fraud claim; and (2) the claim is barred by a\nstatutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by a\nregulatory body—here, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-\ntion (“FDA”). The judge dismissed the unjust-enrichment\nclaim because it was premised on the same conduct as the\nstatutory claim.\n We reverse. First, the safe-harbor provision does not\napply. Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.\n§§ 301 et seq., pet food intended to treat or prevent disease\nand marketed as such is considered a drug and requires\napproval of a new animal drug application. Without FDA\napproval, the manufacturer may not sell it in interstate\ncommerce and the product is deemed adulterated and\nmisbranded. The FDA issued guidance recognizing that\nmost pet-food products in this category do not have the\nrequired approval; the guidance states that the agency is less\nlikely to initiate an enforcement action if consumers\npurchase the food through or under the direction of a\nveterinarian (among other factors guiding the agency’s\nenforcement discretion). But the guidance does not\n\fNo. 17-3633 3\n\nspecifically authorize the conduct alleged here, so the safe\nharbor does not apply.\n And the plaintiffs pleaded the fraud claim with the par-\nticularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil\nProcedure. So the statutory claim may proceed. The unjust-\nenrichment claim is more appropriately construed as a\nrequest for relief in the form of restitution based on the\nalleged fraud. In Illinois unjust enrichment is not a separate\ncause of action but is a condition brought about by fraud or\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d\n725, 741 (7th Cir. 2017). The request for restitution based on\nunjust enrichment therefore rests entirely on the consumer-\nfraud claim, and it too may move forward.\n I. Background\n The case comes to us from a dismissal at the pleadings\nstage, so we recount the facts as alleged in the amended\ncomplaint. Hill’s Pet Nutrition manufactures a variety of pet\nfood, and this case concerns its Prescription Diet brand.\nHill’s sells its Prescription Diet pet food through veterinari-\nans and pet-food retailers, though consumers may purchase\nit from a retailer only with a veterinarian’s prescription.\nPetSmart sells pet supplies and pet food, including Hill’s\nPrescription Diet brand. Consumers need a veterinarian’s\nprescription to purchase Hill’s Prescription Diet food at\nPetSmart.\n In January 2013 Holly Vanzant’s cat Tarik underwent\nemergency surgery for bladder stones. At a follow-up\nappointment, Tarik’s veterinarian prescribed Hill’s\nPrescription Diet c/d Multicare Feline Bladder Health cat\nfood. That same day Vanzant purchased the food at a\n\f4 No. 17-3633\n\nPetSmart store. Inside she saw marketing materials\nindicating that the cat food is “prescription only,” and the\nlabel on the bag read “Hill’s Prescription Diet.” PetSmart\nprovided her with a pet prescription card listing Tarik’s\nname, prescription number, and prescription date. For three\nyears Vanzant purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food\nfrom PetSmart, paying a higher price than for\nnonprescription food. She showed the prescription card to\nthe cashier each time.\n Land had a similar experience. In October 2013 a veteri-\nnarian diagnosed her cat Chief with diabetes and prescribed\nHill’s Prescription Diet m/d Feline Glucose/Weight Man-\nagement cat food. Within a few weeks, Land purchased\nHill’s Prescription Diet cat food at a PetSmart store. She too\nsaw marketing materials inside the store indicating that the\nfood is meant to treat or control diabetes. PetSmart provided\nLand with a pet prescription card listing Chief’s name,\nprescription number, and prescription date. For two years\nLand purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food from\nPetSmart, paying a higher price than for nonprescription\nfood. She too showed the prescription card each time.\n Vanzant and Land eventually learned they were not re-\nceiving what they expected. They thought prescription pet\nfood was medically necessary for the health of their pets,\nhad been approved by the FDA, and could not be sold\nlegally without a prescription. But the FDA had not ap-\nproved it, and nothing required that it be sold with a pre-\nscription. They filed a proposed class action in state court\nagainst Hill’s and PetSmart alleging claims for violation of\nthe Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and unjust enrichment. The\n\fNo. 17-3633 5\n\ndefendants removed the case to federal court and moved to\ndismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6).\n The judge granted the motion. He held that the\nConsumer Fraud Act claim is foreclosed by the statute’s safe-\nharbor provision, which shields actions authorized by laws\nadministered by a regulatory body. Specifically, the judge\nrelied on an FDA Compliance Policy Guide, which he\nconstrued as regulatory authorization for “the gate-keeping\nrole of veterinarians in ensuring that pet owners purchase\nonly appropriate therapeutic foods.” The judge also\nconcluded that Vanzant and Land failed to plead the\nconsumer-fraud claim with the particularity required by\nRule 9(b). With no underlying fraud claim remaining, the\njudge likewise dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim.\nVanzant and Land appealed.\n II. Discussion\n We review the dismissal order de novo. Camasta v. Jos. A.\nBank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). To\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain\n“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable\ninference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct\nalleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At a\nminimum it “must give enough details about the subject\nmatter of the case to present a story that holds together.”\nSwanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s]\nconsumers … against fraud, unfair methods of competition,\nand other unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson\nv. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002).\nDeceptive or unfair practices include any “misrepresentation\n\f6 No. 17-3633\n\nor the concealment, suppression or omission of any material\nfact.” 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2. To recover on a claim under\nthe Act, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant\ncommitted a deceptive or unfair act with the intent that\nothers rely on the deception, that the act occurred in the\ncourse of trade or commerce, and that it caused actual\ndamages. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 934–35 (7th Cir.\n2010). We begin, however, with the Act’s safe-harbor\nprovision.\nA. Safe-Harbor Provision\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act exempts some acts and\npractices from liability under a safe-harbor provision. See\n815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b(1). One component of that safe\nharbor covers actions “specifically authorized by laws\nadministered by any regulatory body or officer acting under\nstatutory authority of this State or the United States.” Id.\nThis provision allows regulated actors to “rely on the direc-\ntions received from [regulatory] agencies without risk that\nsuch reliance might expose them to … liability.” Price v.\nPhilip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 38 (Ill. 2005).\n To trigger the safe harbor, the regulatory body must be\noperating within its statutory authority and the challenged\nconduct must be “specifically authorized by laws adminis-\ntered by” that regulatory body. § 10b(1). Formal rulemaking\nis not necessary; “informal regulatory activity” is enough.\nPrice, 848 N.E.2d at 46. The FDA’s statutory authority in-\ncludes regulation of pet food, so the dispute centers on\nwhether the agency’s guidance qualifies as informal regula-\ntory activity and specifically authorizes the relevant conduct.\n\fNo. 17-3633 7\n\n The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C.\n§§ 301 et seq., regulates pet food. Because Hill’s Prescription\nDiet cat food is intended to treat or prevent disease and is\nmarketed as such, the products are considered “drugs”\nunder the FDCA. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B). Without FDA approval, a\nnew animal drug cannot be sold in interstate commerce, id.\n§ 331(a), and the product is deemed misbranded and adul-\nterated, id. §§ 352(o), 351(a)(5).\n Manufacturers face two additional requirements, regard-\nless of whether the animal drug at issue has been approved.\nAll drug manufacturers must list their drugs and register\ntheir facilities or else the drugs are misbranded. Id. § 352(o).\nAnd animal drug products must be manufactured in com-\npliance with current good-manufacturing practices applica-\nble to drugs, otherwise the drugs are adulterated. Id.\n§ 351(a)(2)(B).\n Most pet-food products claiming to treat or prevent dis-\nease lack FDA approval and do not comply with the FDCA’s\ndrug registration and listing requirements. Nor do the\nmanufacturers of these products follow the appropriate\nmanufacturing practices for animal drugs. The FDA issued\nguidance acknowledging this longstanding noncompliance\nand identifying circumstances in which the agency may\nexercise its discretion against initiating an enforcement\naction.\n The 2016 FDA Compliance Policy Guide offers the FDA’s\ncurrent thinking on the likelihood of an enforcement action.\nThe guide lists factors for agency staff to consider—\nincluding, for example, whether the product presents a\nknown safety risk when used as labeled, whether the prod-\nuct label represents that it can be used to treat disease, and\n\f8 No. 17-3633\n\nwhether the product is marketed as an alternative to ap-\nproved new drugs. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.\nFOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE SEC.\n690.150 LABELING & MARKETING OF DOG & CAT FOOD DIETS\nINTENDED TO DIAGNOSE, CURE, MITIGATE, TREAT, OR PREVENT\nDISEASES: GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF 6 (Apr. 2016),\nhttps://www.fda.gov/media/83998/download. The guide\ngoes on to list 11 factors that make an enforcement action\n“less likely”—but only if all 11 are present. Id. at 7.\n Hill’s and PetSmart characterize the Compliance Policy\nGuide as informal regulatory activity specifically authoriz-\ning the prescription requirement and prescription label for\nHill’s Prescription Diet pet food. They are mistaken. The\nFDA classifies the guide as a “Level 1 guidance document[]”\nthat “[s]et[s] forth initial interpretations of statutory or\nregulatory requirements” and details “changes in interpreta-\ntion or policy that are of more than a minor nature.”\n21 C.F.R. § 10.115(c)(1)(i)-(ii); Draft Compliance Policy Guide\nSec. 690.150 on Labeling and Marketing of Nutritional\nProducts Intended for Use in Dogs and Cats, 77 Fed. Reg.\n55,480, 55,480 (Sept. 10, 2012). But the guide does not estab-\nlish any legally enforceable responsibilities, and it is not\nbinding on either the FDA or the public.\n Contrast the Compliance Policy Guide with the\nregulatory action in Price v. Philip Morris, where the Illinois\nSupreme Court held that a consent order between the\nFederal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and a cigarette\nmanufacturer triggered the Consumer Fraud Act’s safe\nharbor because the consent order could be understood as\n“provid[ing] guidance” about cigarette labeling to the entire\nindustry. 848 N.E.2d at 46. Even though the consent order\n\fNo. 17-3633 9\n\ndid not bind other industry actors, the safe harbor applied\nbecause the order “announce[d] to an entire industry what\nbehavior is and is not authorized.” Id. at 43. Hill’s and\nPetSmart cite Price for support, but the case cuts against\nthem. The FDA Compliance Policy Guide does not establish\nindustry-wide standards for labeling and marketing of pet\nfood intended to treat or prevent disease. Rather, the\ndocument helps FDA staff allocate enforcement resources. It\ndoes not qualify as informal regulatory activity.\n Nor does the guide specifically authorize the prescription\nrequirement and label. To determine whether conduct has\nbeen specifically authorized by a regulatory body, Illinois\ncourts look to the “affirmative acts or expressions of authori-\nzation” by the relevant agency. Id. at 36. For an authorization\nto be “specific,” it must be “related to a particular thing,” but\n“it need not be express.” Id. at 42 (emphases added). In Price,\nfor example, the defendant cigarette company’s use of the\nterm “lights” in its marketing was held to be specifically\nauthorized by FTC consent orders with other manufactur-\ners—even though those orders authorized the use of the\nterms “low,” “lower,” “reduced,” or “like qualifying terms”\nto describe tar and nicotine content but did not expressly\ninclude the term “lights.” Id. at 43.\n In contrast, of the 11 factors listed in the Compliance Pol-\nicy Guide as making an enforcement action less likely, only\none is relevant here: whether “[t]he product is made availa-\nble to the public only through licensed veterinarians or\nthrough retail or internet sales to individuals purchasing the\nproduct under the direction of a veterinarian.” U.S. FDA\nCOMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 7. The defendants rely on this\nfactor as evidence that the FDA specifically authorizes the\n\f10 No. 17-3633\n\nprescription requirement. But this argument wrongly\nequates regulatory forbearance with regulatory authoriza-\ntion.\n To be sure, if pet food intended to treat or prevent dis-\nease is purchased from or under the direction of a licensed\nveterinarian, the FDA is less likely to initiate an enforcement\naction based on the lack of an approved new animal drug\napplication—provided, however, that the other 10 factors are\nalso present. And “less likely” does not mean “will not”; it\ncertainly doesn’t signal authorization. Because the Compli-\nance Policy Guide doesn’t specifically authorize the Hill’s\nprescription requirement, prescription label, and related\nmarketing representations, the safe harbor does not apply.\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Allegations\n With the safe harbor off the table, our next question is\nwhether the complaint adequately alleges that Hill’s and\nPetSmart committed a deceptive or unfair practice. These are\nseparate categories; deceptive conduct is distinct from unfair\nconduct. A claim under the Consumer Fraud Act may be\npremised on either (or both), but the two categories have\ndifferent pleading standards. If the claim rests on allegations\nof deceptive conduct, then Rule 9(b) applies and the plaintiff\nmust plead with particularity the circumstances constituting\nfraud. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 737. Specifically, the complaint\nmust identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the\nalleged fraud. Id. (quotation marks omitted).\n On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff may allege that conduct\nis unfair … without alleging that the conduct is deceptive.”\nSiegel, 612 F.3d at 935. To determine whether a practice is\nunfair, Illinois courts consider three factors: whether it\n\fNo. 17-3633 11\n\n“offends public policy”; is “immoral, unethical, oppressive,\nor unscrupulous”; or “causes substantial injury to consum-\ners.” Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th\nCir. 2014). A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; “[a]\npractice may be unfair because of the degree to which it\nmeets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets\nall three.” Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks\nomitted). And because fraud is not a required element,\nRule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard does not apply. See\nWindy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin.\nServs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, under\neither theory of the case, the plaintiff must adequately plead\ncausation—more specifically, he must allege that but for the\ndefendant’s deceptive or unfair conduct, he “would not have\nbeen damaged.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935 (quotation marks\nomitted).\n The complaint alleges that the defendants’ marketing\npractices are both deceptive and unfair. Taking the first\ncategory first, the complaint alleges that the prescription\nrequirement, prescription label, and related marketing\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet pet food are deceptive\nbecause no prescription is necessary and there is no material\ndifference between the “prescription” food and nonprescrip-\ntion food. Hill’s and PetSmart respond that the complaint is\ndeficient because it does not allege that Vanzant and Land\nrelied on the deceptive representations when purchasing\nHill’s Prescription Diet food. This argument misconstrues\nIllinois law. “[R]eliance is not an element of statutory con-\nsumer fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584,\n593 (Ill. 1996). Rather, it’s the plaintiff’s “damage,” not his\npurchase, that must occur “as a result of” the deceptive act\nor practice. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160. Indeed, it was enough\n\f12 No. 17-3633\n\nin Connick that the plaintiffs’ purchases “occurred after the\nallegedly fraudulent statements.” 675 N.E.2d at 595.\n Here, the complaint alleges that the prescription re-\nquirement, prescription label, and associated marketing\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet were deceptive; that\nVanzant and Land saw the specific “prescription” language\nand symbols when they made their purchases; that the\nprescription pet food was something less than they expected;\nand that they suffered damages because they paid a higher\nprice. These allegations detail the “who,” “what,” and\n“how” of the fraud claim with particularity. Camasta,\n761 F.3d at 737.\n The complaint also alleges the “when” and “where” of\nthe fraud. Vanzant saw marketing materials for Prescription\nDiet pet food before purchasing the cat food at PetSmart in\nFebruary 2013 and thereafter. Land saw similar marketing\nmaterials before purchasing Prescription Diet cat food from\nPetSmart in November 2013 and thereafter. Nothing more is\nneeded.\n In short, the complaint pleads a deceptive-practices claim\nto the degree of particularity required by Rule 9(b). That’s\nenough to reverse the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act\nclaim, so it’s not necessary to address the adequacy of the\nallegations under the unfair-practices theory of the case. As\nwe’ve noted, an unfair-practices claim has no fraud element\nand therefore is not subject to a heightened pleading stand-\nard.\nC. Unjust Enrichment\n The complaint also seeks restitution for unjust\nenrichment. “Under Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a\n\fNo. 17-3633 13\n\nseparate cause of action.” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree\nMed. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir.\n2011). Rather, it’s a condition brought about by fraud or\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon, 877 F.3d at 741. Accordingly,\nthe request for relief based on unjust enrichment is tied to\nthe fate of the claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Cleary v.\nPhilip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2011). The\nstatutory claim may move forward, and that revives the\nrequest for restitution based on unjust enrichment.\n REVERSED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Holly Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Incorpo\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3633\\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\\nDANA LAND, on behalf of themselves\\nand all others similarly situated,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nHILL’S PET NUTRITION, INC., and\\nPETSMART, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17-cv-2535 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Holly Vanzant and Dana Land own\\ncats with health problems. Their veterinarians prescribed cat\\nfood manufactured by Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., and sold\\nunder Hill’s “Prescription Diet” brand. For several years\\nVanzant and Land purchased this higher-priced cat food\\n\\f2 No. 17-3633\\n\\nfrom their local PetSmart stores using their veterinarian’s\\nprescriptions. They eventually learned, however, that the\\nPrescription Diet cat food is not materially different from\\nnonprescription cat food. And the prescription requirement\\nis illusory; no prescription is necessary. Feeling deceived,\\nVanzant and Land filed a class-action lawsuit against Hill’s\\nand PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Con-\\nsumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq., and for unjust enrichment.\\n The district judge dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim for two reasons: (1) the complaint lacked the specificity\\nrequired for a fraud claim; and (2) the claim is barred by a\\nstatutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by a\\nregulatory body—here, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-\\ntion (“FDA”). The judge dismissed the unjust-enrichment\\nclaim because it was premised on the same conduct as the\\nstatutory claim.\\n We reverse. First, the safe-harbor provision does not\\napply. Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., pet food intended to treat or prevent disease\\nand marketed as such is considered a drug and requires\\napproval of a new animal drug application. Without FDA\\napproval, the manufacturer may not sell it in interstate\\ncommerce and the product is deemed adulterated and\\nmisbranded. The FDA issued guidance recognizing that\\nmost pet-food products in this category do not have the\\nrequired approval; the guidance states that the agency is less\\nlikely to initiate an enforcement action if consumers\\npurchase the food through or under the direction of a\\nveterinarian (among other factors guiding the agency’s\\nenforcement discretion). But the guidance does not\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 3\\n\\nspecifically authorize the conduct alleged here, so the safe\\nharbor does not apply.\\n And the plaintiffs pleaded the fraud claim with the par-\\nticularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil\\nProcedure. So the statutory claim may proceed. The unjust-\\nenrichment claim is more appropriately construed as a\\nrequest for relief in the form of restitution based on the\\nalleged fraud. In Illinois unjust enrichment is not a separate\\ncause of action but is a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d\\n725, 741 (7th Cir. 2017). The request for restitution based on\\nunjust enrichment therefore rests entirely on the consumer-\\nfraud claim, and it too may move forward.\\n I. Background\\n The case comes to us from a dismissal at the pleadings\\nstage, so we recount the facts as alleged in the amended\\ncomplaint. Hill’s Pet Nutrition manufactures a variety of pet\\nfood, and this case concerns its Prescription Diet brand.\\nHill’s sells its Prescription Diet pet food through veterinari-\\nans and pet-food retailers, though consumers may purchase\\nit from a retailer only with a veterinarian’s prescription.\\nPetSmart sells pet supplies and pet food, including Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet brand. Consumers need a veterinarian’s\\nprescription to purchase Hill’s Prescription Diet food at\\nPetSmart.\\n In January 2013 Holly Vanzant’s cat Tarik underwent\\nemergency surgery for bladder stones. At a follow-up\\nappointment, Tarik’s veterinarian prescribed Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet c/d Multicare Feline Bladder Health cat\\nfood. That same day Vanzant purchased the food at a\\n\\f4 No. 17-3633\\n\\nPetSmart store. Inside she saw marketing materials\\nindicating that the cat food is “prescription only,” and the\\nlabel on the bag read “Hill’s Prescription Diet.” PetSmart\\nprovided her with a pet prescription card listing Tarik’s\\nname, prescription number, and prescription date. For three\\nyears Vanzant purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food\\nfrom PetSmart, paying a higher price than for\\nnonprescription food. She showed the prescription card to\\nthe cashier each time.\\n Land had a similar experience. In October 2013 a veteri-\\nnarian diagnosed her cat Chief with diabetes and prescribed\\nHill’s Prescription Diet m/d Feline Glucose/Weight Man-\\nagement cat food. Within a few weeks, Land purchased\\nHill’s Prescription Diet cat food at a PetSmart store. She too\\nsaw marketing materials inside the store indicating that the\\nfood is meant to treat or control diabetes. PetSmart provided\\nLand with a pet prescription card listing Chief’s name,\\nprescription number, and prescription date. For two years\\nLand purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart, paying a higher price than for nonprescription\\nfood. She too showed the prescription card each time.\\n Vanzant and Land eventually learned they were not re-\\nceiving what they expected. They thought prescription pet\\nfood was medically necessary for the health of their pets,\\nhad been approved by the FDA, and could not be sold\\nlegally without a prescription. But the FDA had not ap-\\nproved it, and nothing required that it be sold with a pre-\\nscription. They filed a proposed class action in state court\\nagainst Hill’s and PetSmart alleging claims for violation of\\nthe Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and unjust enrichment. The\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 5\\n\\ndefendants removed the case to federal court and moved to\\ndismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6).\\n The judge granted the motion. He held that the\\nConsumer Fraud Act claim is foreclosed by the statute’s safe-\\nharbor provision, which shields actions authorized by laws\\nadministered by a regulatory body. Specifically, the judge\\nrelied on an FDA Compliance Policy Guide, which he\\nconstrued as regulatory authorization for “the gate-keeping\\nrole of veterinarians in ensuring that pet owners purchase\\nonly appropriate therapeutic foods.” The judge also\\nconcluded that Vanzant and Land failed to plead the\\nconsumer-fraud claim with the particularity required by\\nRule 9(b). With no underlying fraud claim remaining, the\\njudge likewise dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim.\\nVanzant and Land appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review the dismissal order de novo. Camasta v. Jos. A.\\nBank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain\\n“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable\\ninference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct\\nalleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At a\\nminimum it “must give enough details about the subject\\nmatter of the case to present a story that holds together.”\\nSwanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s]\\nconsumers … against fraud, unfair methods of competition,\\nand other unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson\\nv. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002).\\nDeceptive or unfair practices include any “misrepresentation\\n\\f6 No. 17-3633\\n\\nor the concealment, suppression or omission of any material\\nfact.” 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2. To recover on a claim under\\nthe Act, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant\\ncommitted a deceptive or unfair act with the intent that\\nothers rely on the deception, that the act occurred in the\\ncourse of trade or commerce, and that it caused actual\\ndamages. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 934–35 (7th Cir.\\n2010). We begin, however, with the Act’s safe-harbor\\nprovision.\\nA. Safe-Harbor Provision\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act exempts some acts and\\npractices from liability under a safe-harbor provision. See\\n815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b(1). One component of that safe\\nharbor covers actions “specifically authorized by laws\\nadministered by any regulatory body or officer acting under\\nstatutory authority of this State or the United States.” Id.\\nThis provision allows regulated actors to “rely on the direc-\\ntions received from [regulatory] agencies without risk that\\nsuch reliance might expose them to … liability.” Price v.\\nPhilip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 38 (Ill. 2005).\\n To trigger the safe harbor, the regulatory body must be\\noperating within its statutory authority and the challenged\\nconduct must be “specifically authorized by laws adminis-\\ntered by” that regulatory body. § 10b(1). Formal rulemaking\\nis not necessary; “informal regulatory activity” is enough.\\nPrice, 848 N.E.2d at 46. The FDA’s statutory authority in-\\ncludes regulation of pet food, so the dispute centers on\\nwhether the agency’s guidance qualifies as informal regula-\\ntory activity and specifically authorizes the relevant conduct.\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 7\\n\\n The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., regulates pet food. Because Hill’s Prescription\\nDiet cat food is intended to treat or prevent disease and is\\nmarketed as such, the products are considered “drugs”\\nunder the FDCA. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B). Without FDA approval, a\\nnew animal drug cannot be sold in interstate commerce, id.\\n§ 331(a), and the product is deemed misbranded and adul-\\nterated, id. §§ 352(o), 351(a)(5).\\n Manufacturers face two additional requirements, regard-\\nless of whether the animal drug at issue has been approved.\\nAll drug manufacturers must list their drugs and register\\ntheir facilities or else the drugs are misbranded. Id. § 352(o).\\nAnd animal drug products must be manufactured in com-\\npliance with current good-manufacturing practices applica-\\nble to drugs, otherwise the drugs are adulterated. Id.\\n§ 351(a)(2)(B).\\n Most pet-food products claiming to treat or prevent dis-\\nease lack FDA approval and do not comply with the FDCA’s\\ndrug registration and listing requirements. Nor do the\\nmanufacturers of these products follow the appropriate\\nmanufacturing practices for animal drugs. The FDA issued\\nguidance acknowledging this longstanding noncompliance\\nand identifying circumstances in which the agency may\\nexercise its discretion against initiating an enforcement\\naction.\\n The 2016 FDA Compliance Policy Guide offers the FDA’s\\ncurrent thinking on the likelihood of an enforcement action.\\nThe guide lists factors for agency staff to consider—\\nincluding, for example, whether the product presents a\\nknown safety risk when used as labeled, whether the prod-\\nuct label represents that it can be used to treat disease, and\\n\\f8 No. 17-3633\\n\\nwhether the product is marketed as an alternative to ap-\\nproved new drugs. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.\\nFOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE SEC.\\n690.150 LABELING & MARKETING OF DOG & CAT FOOD DIETS\\nINTENDED TO DIAGNOSE, CURE, MITIGATE, TREAT, OR PREVENT\\nDISEASES: GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF 6 (Apr. 2016),\\nhttps://www.fda.gov/media/83998/download. The guide\\ngoes on to list 11 factors that make an enforcement action\\n“less likely”—but only if all 11 are present. Id. at 7.\\n Hill’s and PetSmart characterize the Compliance Policy\\nGuide as informal regulatory activity specifically authoriz-\\ning the prescription requirement and prescription label for\\nHill’s Prescription Diet pet food. They are mistaken. The\\nFDA classifies the guide as a “Level 1 guidance document[]”\\nthat “[s]et[s] forth initial interpretations of statutory or\\nregulatory requirements” and details “changes in interpreta-\\ntion or policy that are of more than a minor nature.”\\n21 C.F.R. § 10.115(c)(1)(i)-(ii); Draft Compliance Policy Guide\\nSec. 690.150 on Labeling and Marketing of Nutritional\\nProducts Intended for Use in Dogs and Cats, 77 Fed. Reg.\\n55,480, 55,480 (Sept. 10, 2012). But the guide does not estab-\\nlish any legally enforceable responsibilities, and it is not\\nbinding on either the FDA or the public.\\n Contrast the Compliance Policy Guide with the\\nregulatory action in Price v. Philip Morris, where the Illinois\\nSupreme Court held that a consent order between the\\nFederal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and a cigarette\\nmanufacturer triggered the Consumer Fraud Act’s safe\\nharbor because the consent order could be understood as\\n“provid[ing] guidance” about cigarette labeling to the entire\\nindustry. 848 N.E.2d at 46. Even though the consent order\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 9\\n\\ndid not bind other industry actors, the safe harbor applied\\nbecause the order “announce[d] to an entire industry what\\nbehavior is and is not authorized.” Id. at 43. Hill’s and\\nPetSmart cite Price for support, but the case cuts against\\nthem. The FDA Compliance Policy Guide does not establish\\nindustry-wide standards for labeling and marketing of pet\\nfood intended to treat or prevent disease. Rather, the\\ndocument helps FDA staff allocate enforcement resources. It\\ndoes not qualify as informal regulatory activity.\\n Nor does the guide specifically authorize the prescription\\nrequirement and label. To determine whether conduct has\\nbeen specifically authorized by a regulatory body, Illinois\\ncourts look to the “affirmative acts or expressions of authori-\\nzation” by the relevant agency. Id. at 36. For an authorization\\nto be “specific,” it must be “related to a particular thing,” but\\n“it need not be express.” Id. at 42 (emphases added). In Price,\\nfor example, the defendant cigarette company’s use of the\\nterm “lights” in its marketing was held to be specifically\\nauthorized by FTC consent orders with other manufactur-\\ners—even though those orders authorized the use of the\\nterms “low,” “lower,” “reduced,” or “like qualifying terms”\\nto describe tar and nicotine content but did not expressly\\ninclude the term “lights.” Id. at 43.\\n In contrast, of the 11 factors listed in the Compliance Pol-\\nicy Guide as making an enforcement action less likely, only\\none is relevant here: whether “[t]he product is made availa-\\nble to the public only through licensed veterinarians or\\nthrough retail or internet sales to individuals purchasing the\\nproduct under the direction of a veterinarian.” U.S. FDA\\nCOMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 7. The defendants rely on this\\nfactor as evidence that the FDA specifically authorizes the\\n\\f10 No. 17-3633\\n\\nprescription requirement. But this argument wrongly\\nequates regulatory forbearance with regulatory authoriza-\\ntion.\\n To be sure, if pet food intended to treat or prevent dis-\\nease is purchased from or under the direction of a licensed\\nveterinarian, the FDA is less likely to initiate an enforcement\\naction based on the lack of an approved new animal drug\\napplication—provided, however, that the other 10 factors are\\nalso present. And “less likely” does not mean “will not”; it\\ncertainly doesn’t signal authorization. Because the Compli-\\nance Policy Guide doesn’t specifically authorize the Hill’s\\nprescription requirement, prescription label, and related\\nmarketing representations, the safe harbor does not apply.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Allegations\\n With the safe harbor off the table, our next question is\\nwhether the complaint adequately alleges that Hill’s and\\nPetSmart committed a deceptive or unfair practice. These are\\nseparate categories; deceptive conduct is distinct from unfair\\nconduct. A claim under the Consumer Fraud Act may be\\npremised on either (or both), but the two categories have\\ndifferent pleading standards. If the claim rests on allegations\\nof deceptive conduct, then Rule 9(b) applies and the plaintiff\\nmust plead with particularity the circumstances constituting\\nfraud. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 737. Specifically, the complaint\\nmust identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the\\nalleged fraud. Id. (quotation marks omitted).\\n On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff may allege that conduct\\nis unfair … without alleging that the conduct is deceptive.”\\nSiegel, 612 F.3d at 935. To determine whether a practice is\\nunfair, Illinois courts consider three factors: whether it\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 11\\n\\n“offends public policy”; is “immoral, unethical, oppressive,\\nor unscrupulous”; or “causes substantial injury to consum-\\ners.” Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th\\nCir. 2014). A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; “[a]\\npractice may be unfair because of the degree to which it\\nmeets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets\\nall three.” Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks\\nomitted). And because fraud is not a required element,\\nRule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard does not apply. See\\nWindy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin.\\nServs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, under\\neither theory of the case, the plaintiff must adequately plead\\ncausation—more specifically, he must allege that but for the\\ndefendant’s deceptive or unfair conduct, he “would not have\\nbeen damaged.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935 (quotation marks\\nomitted).\\n The complaint alleges that the defendants’ marketing\\npractices are both deceptive and unfair. Taking the first\\ncategory first, the complaint alleges that the prescription\\nrequirement, prescription label, and related marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet pet food are deceptive\\nbecause no prescription is necessary and there is no material\\ndifference between the “prescription” food and nonprescrip-\\ntion food. Hill’s and PetSmart respond that the complaint is\\ndeficient because it does not allege that Vanzant and Land\\nrelied on the deceptive representations when purchasing\\nHill’s Prescription Diet food. This argument misconstrues\\nIllinois law. “[R]eliance is not an element of statutory con-\\nsumer fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584,\\n593 (Ill. 1996). Rather, it’s the plaintiff’s “damage,” not his\\npurchase, that must occur “as a result of” the deceptive act\\nor practice. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160. Indeed, it was enough\\n\\f12 No. 17-3633\\n\\nin Connick that the plaintiffs’ purchases “occurred after the\\nallegedly fraudulent statements.” 675 N.E.2d at 595.\\n Here, the complaint alleges that the prescription re-\\nquirement, prescription label, and associated marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet were deceptive; that\\nVanzant and Land saw the specific “prescription” language\\nand symbols when they made their purchases; that the\\nprescription pet food was something less than they expected;\\nand that they suffered damages because they paid a higher\\nprice. These allegations detail the “who,” “what,” and\\n“how” of the fraud claim with particularity. Camasta,\\n761 F.3d at 737.\\n The complaint also alleges the “when” and “where” of\\nthe fraud. Vanzant saw marketing materials for Prescription\\nDiet pet food before purchasing the cat food at PetSmart in\\nFebruary 2013 and thereafter. Land saw similar marketing\\nmaterials before purchasing Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart in November 2013 and thereafter. Nothing more is\\nneeded.\\n In short, the complaint pleads a deceptive-practices claim\\nto the degree of particularity required by Rule 9(b). That’s\\nenough to reverse the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim, so it’s not necessary to address the adequacy of the\\nallegations under the unfair-practices theory of the case. As\\nwe’ve noted, an unfair-practices claim has no fraud element\\nand therefore is not subject to a heightened pleading stand-\\nard.\\nC. Unjust Enrichment\\n The complaint also seeks restitution for unjust\\nenrichment. “Under Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 13\\n\\nseparate cause of action.” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree\\nMed. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir.\\n2011). Rather, it’s a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon, 877 F.3d at 741. Accordingly,\\nthe request for relief based on unjust enrichment is tied to\\nthe fate of the claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Cleary v.\\nPhilip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2011). The\\nstatutory claim may move forward, and that revives the\\nrequest for restitution based on unjust enrichment.\\n REVERSED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3888,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654159,"string":"4,654,159"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Rex A. Hopper"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2576"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2576\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nREX A. HOPPER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 4:17-cr-40034-JPG-1 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. In June 2017, a federal grand jury\\nindicted Rex Hopper on one count of conspiracy to distrib-\\nute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),\\n841(b)(1)(B), 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Hopper was part of a\\ncommunity of methamphetamine users and sellers in south-\\nern Illinois. Several of these individuals signed proffer letters\\nwith the Government, agreeing to provide testimony against\\nMr. Hopper in exchange for leniency. Most of these witness-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2576\\n\\nes subsequently entered plea agreements.1 Mr. Hopper,\\nhowever, pleaded not guilty to the single count in the in-\\ndictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late Febru-\\nary 2018.\\n Over the course of three days, the Government presented\\nthe testimony of approximately twenty witnesses against\\nMr. Hopper. The district court denied Mr. Hopper’s motion\\nfor disclosure of the proffer letters given to these witnesses.\\nFollowing deliberations, the jury found Mr. Hopper guilty of\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, as charged in\\nthe indictment, and returned a special verdict form finding\\nthat the conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\\n Based on interviews with other participants in the con-\\nspiracy, the probation office determined that Mr. Hopper’s\\nrelevant conduct involved 1.968 kilograms of ice metham-\\nphetamine. This drug amount corresponded to a base of-\\nfense level of 36. At sentencing, the district court determined\\nthat Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sentence en-\\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\\ndistributing methamphetamine. Based on a total offense lev-\\nel of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the court calcu-\\nlated a guidelines imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months.\\nThe district court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the\\nguidelines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by\\nfour years of supervised release.2\\n\\n\\n\\n1One witness entered an “open” guilty plea, for which there was no\\nwritten plea agreement.\\n2 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 3\\n\\n Mr. Hopper now challenges both his conviction and his\\nsentence. First, we conclude that the Government presented\\nsufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Hopper engaged in a\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in southern Illi-\\nnois, and that there was no material variance between the\\nconspiracy charged in the indictment and the Government’s\\nproof at trial. Second, the district court did not err when it\\ndenied Mr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the cooperat-\\ning witnesses’ proffer letters. Third, the district court proper-\\nly concluded that Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sen-\\ntence enhancement for maintaining his Creal Springs resi-\\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\\nHowever, we conclude that the district court plainly erred\\nwhen it calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct and corre-\\nsponding guidelines range. In context, it is clear that, in their\\nseparate interviews, Lucas Holland and Randall Riley were\\ndescribing the same transactions. By including the amounts\\ndescribed by both Holland and Riley in the calculation of\\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the presentence report\\n(“PSR”), adopted by the district court, erroneously dou-\\nble-counted those drug quantities.\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. We\\nalso affirm the district court’s determination that he was\\nsubject to a sentence enhancement for maintaining a drug\\npremises. Because the court plainly erred in calculating his\\nrelevant conduct, however, we vacate Mr. Hopper’s sentence\\nand remand his case to the district court for resentencing.3\\n\\n3We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18\\nU.S.C. § 3742.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2576\\n\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n In April 2017, law enforcement officers executed a search\\nwarrant at Mr. Hopper’s residence. They sought to recover\\nitems involved in a burglary. Officers observed drug para-\\nphernalia and methamphetamine in plain view. According-\\nly, the officers obtained and executed a second search war-\\nrant for the residence. Upon finding additional drug para-\\nphernalia and methamphetamine in his home, officers took\\nMr. Hopper into custody. A federal grand jury later returned\\nan indictment charging Mr. Hopper with one count of con-\\nspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 18\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, in\\nthe Southern District of Illinois.\\n B.\\n Mr. Hopper was part of a community of methampheta-\\nmine users and sellers in southern Illinois. Around the time\\nof his indictment, the Government also charged other mem-\\nbers of this group with conspiracy to distribute metham-\\nphetamine. Several of these individuals received proffer let-\\nters from the Government and subsequently agreed to pro-\\nvide testimony against Mr. Hopper in exchange for leniency.\\nMost of these witnesses later entered plea agreements.\\nMr. Hopper, however, pleaded not guilty to the single count\\nin the indictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late\\nFebruary 2018.\\n Before the trial began, counsel for Mr. Hopper renewed a\\nprevious motion for disclosure of the proffer letters given to\\nthe witnesses who would testify against Mr. Hopper. Refer-\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 5\\n\\nencing our decision in United States v. Weidenburner, 550\\nF. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (unpublished), counsel recog-\\nnized that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has ruled that” proffer let-\\nters “are not materials that have to be provided.”4 Neverthe-\\nless, counsel wanted “the record to be clear” that he thought\\nhe “ought to be provided a copy” of the proffer letters.5\\n Counsel for Mr. Hopper explained that the proffer letter\\n“is an agreement that sets forth the ground rules” for what\\ntestimony “may or may not lead to a plea agreement.”6 He\\nsubmitted that “this is a very important aspect of the de-\\nfense” because “no plea agreements are offered until you\\nproffer.”7 In other words, the proffer letters are “part of the\\nprocess by which men and women ultimately find their way\\non to the stand to give testimony against a defendant.”8 As a\\nresult, counsel asserted, “if the[] jurors don’t have some un-\\nderstanding of this process,” the defense would be “really\\nhampered in terms of our constitutional right[s] to put on a\\ndefense and … to confront the witnesses through cross ex-\\namination that are here to accuse Rex Hopper of various\\ncrimes.”9\\n Relying on our decision in Weidenburner, the Government\\nresponded that “the Seventh Circuit is clear that the proffer\\n\\n4 R.118 (Trial Tr. Day 1) at 8.\\n5 Id. at 5.\\n6 Id. at 6.\\n7 Id.\\n8 Id.\\n9 Id. at 7.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2576\\n\\nletters don’t come in,” nor does “any information about the\\nproffer,” “because it is a preliminary step in the plea agree-\\nment, and then the plea agreement supersedes all that.”10\\nTurning to defense counsel, the court stated, “I think it is\\npretty clear that, you know, you are not going to get the\\ndocuments.”11\\n The Government further noted its objection to defense\\ncounsel asking any questions about the process of entering a\\nplea agreement. The court asked defense counsel what kind\\nof questions he intended to ask the cooperating witnesses.\\nCounsel explained that he wanted the jury to know that be-\\nfore entering a plea agreement, a witness had to meet with\\nfederal agents and “understood that agents would decide\\nand the prosecutors would decide whether you told the\\ntruth, and if they didn’t think you told the truth that a plea\\nagreement would not be tendered.”12 Counsel acknowl-\\nedged that he planned to review the terms of the plea\\nagreements with each witness, but argued that the jury\\nwould be “missing a big part of this process” without the\\nproffer letters.13 Based on our decision in Weidenburner, the\\nGovernment reiterated that the plea agreement “super-\\nsede[s] the proffer letter” and is “the document which the\\ndefendant is entitled to and entitled to question witnesses\\nabout.”14 The court denied the motion for disclosure of the\\n\\n10 Id. at 8.\\n11 Id.\\n12 Id. at 10.\\n13 Id. at 11.\\n14 Id. at 14.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 7\\n\\nproffer letters and ruled that counsel could ask the witnesses\\n“whether they’ve entered into a proffer agreement, but go-\\ning into the terms of it that are super[s]eded by the plea\\nagreement, I’m not going to let you do.”15\\n C.\\n Mr. Hopper proceeded to trial before a jury on February\\n26, 2018. Over the course of three days, the Government pre-\\nsented the testimony of approximately twenty witnesses\\nagainst Mr. Hopper. Set forth below is a summary of the\\nwitnesses and testimony relevant to this appeal.\\n Dameon Williams testified that he met Mr. Hopper some-\\ntime in 2015 when they were “messing with drugs.”16 He ob-\\ntained ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]ff and\\non” for about one year.17 On these occasions, he received\\nabout one to two ounces of methamphetamine at a cost of\\n$900 to $1200 per ounce. Williams stated that sometimes, he\\nbought the drugs outright, while other times Mr. Hopper\\nprovided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a “front.”18 He\\nexplained that, in this fronting arrangement, Mr. Hopper\\nprovided Williams a quantity of drugs, some of which Wil-\\nliams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back. He\\nfurther testified that Mr. Hopper called Williams occasional-\\nly and asked him to visit the homes of customers who owed\\nMr. Hopper money and bring them to Mr. Hopper’s house\\n\\n15 Id. at 15–16.\\n16 Id. at 59.\\n17 Id.\\n18 Id. at 61.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2576\\n\\nto settle the debt. He explained that he helped Mr. Hopper\\ncollect money from his customers because Williams “was\\nselling drugs for him” and “to help him out in his drug\\nbusiness.”19\\n Brooke Peyton testified that she met Mr. Hopper in 2016\\nwhen she was dating William, also known as “Andy,”\\nKarnes. With Karnes, she had visited Mr. Hopper’s resi-\\ndence in Creal Springs, where Mr. Hopper provided ice\\nmethamphetamine to Karnes. She stated that during the\\nsummer of 2016, Mr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five\\n“8-balls,” or 3.5 gram quantities of ice methamphetamine,\\nseveral times a week.20 Karnes obtained the methampheta-\\nmine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a front,” in which he would sell\\ndrugs to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back for the\\ndrugs he had obtained previously.21 Peyton further testified\\nthat sometimes, Mr. Hopper came to her home to drop off\\nmethamphetamine for Karnes. On other occasions, he sent\\nWilliams to deliver the drugs.\\n Robert Weir, also known as “Boog,” testified that he and\\nMr. Hopper reconnected around April or May 2015. At some\\npoint, he, Mr. Hopper, Lucas Holland, and Randall Riley be-\\ngan an arrangement in which the four of them pooled their\\nmoney together to purchase methamphetamine from a\\nsource in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Sometimes, Weir gave\\nMr. Hopper his money, and Mr. Hopper drove to Murphys-\\nboro, where he gave Weir’s and his money to Riley to pur-\\n\\n19 Id. at 64.\\n20 Id. at 89.\\n21 Id. at 90.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 9\\n\\nchase the drugs. Other times, Mr. Hopper gave Weir his\\nmoney, and Weir delivered the money to Riley. Still other\\ntimes, Weir and Mr. Hopper visited Riley together. After Ri-\\nley obtained the drugs from Cape Girardeau, the group di-\\nvided the methamphetamine into equal, one-ounce shares.\\nWeir stated that he paid about $800 to $900 per ounce of\\nmethamphetamine. This arrangement lasted about a month,\\nduring which the group obtained methamphetamine two to\\nthree times per week.\\n In March 2016, police arrested Riley. Weir and Mr. Hop-\\nper then arranged to pool their money with Holland to pur-\\nchase methamphetamine. Holland took their money and ran,\\nand they never got their drugs. Additionally, Weir acknowl-\\nedged that he had personally observed Mr. Hopper distrib-\\nute methamphetamine to other individuals.\\n Lucas Holland testified that, at the beginning of 2016, he\\nhad been living at Riley’s house for about four or five\\nmonths. Holland confirmed the details of the pooling ar-\\nrangement he engaged in with Mr. Hopper, Riley, and Weir\\nto purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\\nGirardeau. He reiterated that Mr. Hopper or Weir, or some-\\ntimes the two together, came to Riley’s house to deliver their\\nmoney. Holland and Riley then drove to Cape Girardeau to\\nobtain the methamphetamine. When Holland and Riley re-\\nturned to Illinois, the group of four split up the drugs. Ac-\\ncording to Holland, this arrangement lasted from about De-\\ncember 2015 to February 2016.\\n Holland testified that, on one occasion, he traveled to\\nCape Girardeau with Riley, Mr. Hopper, and Erin Wright,\\nMr. Hopper’s girlfriend, for a drug deal that Mr. Hopper\\nhad arranged. The group pooled their money, and Mr. Hop-\\n\\f10 No. 18-2576\\n\\nper gave it to an individual in Cape Girardeau. In addition,\\nHolland confirmed that a few days after police arrested Ri-\\nley, Mr. Hopper and Weir gave him money to purchase\\ndrugs. He acknowledged that he “ran off with it.”22 Holland\\nalso testified that he had observed Mr. Hopper sell metham-\\nphetamine to individuals, including Kevin Shuman, at his\\nhome in Creal Springs.\\n Randall Riley testified that he met Mr. Hopper around\\nthe end of 2015 or early 2016 through a mutual acquaintance\\nwhen Mr. Hopper was seeking methamphetamine. Riley\\nconfirmed that eventually, he, Mr. Hopper, Holland, and\\nWeir began a pooling arrangement in which they combined\\ntheir money to purchase methamphetamine from a source in\\nCape Girardeau. According to Riley, the group bought four\\nounces of methamphetamine every day and split the drugs\\nbetween the four of them. Either Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both\\ncame to Riley’s home with $2,200 for Mr. Hopper and Weir’s\\nshares. Riley and Holland drove to Missouri to obtain the\\ndrugs. When they returned, they met either at Riley’s home\\nor at Mr. Hopper’s residence in Creal Springs to divide up\\nthe drugs.\\n Riley confirmed that on one occasion, his source was un-\\navailable, so Mr. Hopper arranged a transaction with his\\nown source. He, Riley, Holland, and Wright drove to Cape\\nGirardeau, where Mr. Hopper gave the source the money\\nthey had pooled together.\\n Blake Gordon testified that he met Mr. Hopper through\\nWeir. According to Gordon, he sold methamphetamine to\\n\\n22 R.122 (Trial Tr. Day 2) at 54.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 11\\n\\nMr. Hopper “more than ten times.”23 On such occasions, he\\nprovided Mr. Hopper methamphetamine in amounts rang-\\ning from one to fourteen grams. He also stated that “on nu-\\nmerous occasions,” he drove Mr. Hopper around the south-\\nern Illinois area to deliver drugs to his customers.24 Gordon\\ndescribed one occasion in which he, Mr. Hopper, and Weir\\npooled their money together. Weir drove to Cape Girardeau\\nto obtain the methamphetamine, which they divided among\\nthe three of them when he returned to Illinois.\\n Crystal Boulton testified that in March 2016, she and her\\nchildren were living at Riley’s home with Riley, her boy-\\nfriend, as well as Holland and his girlfriend. She stated that\\nshe personally observed Mr. Hopper obtain methampheta-\\nmine from Riley at Riley’s residence about four or five times.\\nOn such occasions, Mr. Hopper paid Riley for the metham-\\nphetamine and Riley gave Boulton the money to count. She\\ncounted about $1,000 to $1,200 per ounce of methampheta-\\nmine. Boulton also overheard discussions between Riley and\\nMr. Hopper about pooling their money together and making\\ntrips to Cape Girardeau to obtain methamphetamine.\\n Erin Wright testified that she met Mr. Hopper in Sep-\\ntember 2015 and moved in with him at his home in Creal\\nSprings soon after. She confirmed that Mr. Hopper and Weir\\nwent to Riley’s house to get drugs. Usually, Mr. Hopper re-\\nturned with an ounce of methamphetamine. She stated that\\nMr. Hopper had scales at his Creal Springs home, which he\\nused to weigh drugs. She further testified that, sometimes,\\n\\n23 Id. at 123.\\n24 Id.\\n\\f12 No. 18-2576\\n\\nRiley and Holland came to the Creal Springs home to do\\nbusiness with Mr. Hopper. She described one occasion on\\nwhich she and Mr. Hopper went to Kansas City, Missouri,\\nwhere Mr. Hopper and an individual named Jason Clapp\\nobtained methamphetamine. Wright stated that there were\\nalso a few times when Clapp came to the Creal Springs resi-\\ndence to provide Mr. Hopper with methamphetamine.\\n William Craig testified that he knew Mr. Hopper through\\nWeir. He bought methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper about\\nten or fifteen times. On such occasions, he obtained meth-\\namphetamine in quantities up to eight ounces. When Craig\\nobtained the methamphetamine for himself, Mr. Hopper\\nwould not charge him. When Craig purchased the metham-\\nphetamine to deliver to others, he paid Mr. Hopper in cash.\\nCraig stated that on one occasion, after Mr. Hopper and\\nWeir pooled their money together, Craig drove with Weir to\\nCharleston, Missouri, to purchase methamphetamine. They\\nreturned to Mr. Hopper’s home, where Mr. Hopper and\\nWeir divided the drugs. Craig also confirmed that he had\\nseen Mr. Hopper sell methamphetamine at his home to Kev-\\nin Page and to Andy Karnes on multiple occasions.\\n Kevin Shuman testified that he had known Mr. Hopper\\nfor years. He moved in with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs\\nhome and lived there in December 2015 and January 2016.\\nInitially, he obtained “small amounts” of methamphetamine,\\nranging from “seven grams to an 8-ball,” from Mr. Hopper.25\\nShuman bought the drugs “on a front,” explaining that he\\nsold drugs in order to repay Mr. Hopper for previously pur-\\n\\n\\n25 R.123 (Trial Tr. Day 3) at 26.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 13\\n\\nchased quantities of methamphetamine.26 He recalled two\\noccasions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Mis-\\nsouri, to obtain methamphetamine. When they returned\\nhome, Mr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\\n After a brief term in jail in early 2016, Shuman returned,\\nand the quantities he bought from Mr. Hopper increased\\nfrom grams to ounces of methamphetamine. The two had an\\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\\nand left in their place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for\\npreviously fronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testi-\\nfied that he drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\\ndeliver methamphetamine to his customers.\\n D.\\n At the close of the Government’s case in chief, counsel for\\nMr. Hopper moved for a judgment of acquittal under Feder-\\nal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which the court denied.\\nMr. Hopper elected not to testify, and the defense rested its\\ncase. Following jury instructions and closing arguments, the\\njury retired to deliberate. Approximately an hour later, the\\ncourt received a note from the jury stating, “Pages 17 + 21\\nare confusing us as to the definition of ‘conspiracy.’”27 Page\\n17 of the jury instructions stated that:\\n A conspiracy is an express or implied\\n agreement between two or more persons to\\n\\n\\n26 Id.\\n27 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\\n\\f14 No. 18-2576\\n\\n commit a crime. A conspiracy may be proven\\n even if its goal was not accomplished.\\n In deciding whether the charged conspiracy\\n existed, you may consider all of the circum-\\n stances, including the words and acts of each\\n of the alleged participants.[28]\\n Page 21 of the jury instructions stated that:\\n A conspiracy requires more than just a\\n buyer-seller relationship between the defend-\\n ant and another person. In addition, a buyer\\n and seller of a mixture and substance contain-\\n ing methamphetamine do not enter into a con-\\n spiracy to distribute a mixture and substance\\n containing methamphetamine simply because\\n the buyer resells the [] mixture and substance\\n containing methamphetamine to others, even if\\n the seller knows that the buyer intends to resell\\n the [] mixture and substance containing meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n To establish that a seller knowingly became\\n a member of a conspiracy with a buyer to dis-\\n tribute a mixture and substance containing\\n methamphetamine, the government must\\n prove that the buyer and seller had the joint\\n criminal objective of distributing a mixture and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n28 R.74 at 17.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 15\\n\\n substance containing methamphetamine to\\n others.[29]\\n After conferring with the parties, the court responded to\\nthe jury, “All instructions should be read together. I cannot\\ngive you any more instruction other than what you have\\nbeen given.”30 Following further deliberations, the jury\\nreached a verdict, finding Mr. Hopper guilty of conspiracy\\nto distribute methamphetamine, as charged in the indict-\\nment. The jury returned a special verdict form finding that\\nthe conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\\n E.\\n Prior to Mr. Hopper’s sentencing, the probation office\\nprepared a PSR. To determine the scope of his relevant con-\\nduct, the probation office interviewed several witnesses with\\nknowledge of the conspiracy. Based on these interviews, the\\ninitial PSR determined that Mr. Hopper had a base offense\\nlevel of 36, which corresponds to offenses involving “at least\\n1.5 kilograms but less than 4.5 kilograms of ice.”31 Specifical-\\nly, according to the PSR, the conspiracy involved 1.968 kilo-\\ngrams of ice methamphetamine.\\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy. In particu-\\nlar:\\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\\n\\n29 Id. at 21.\\n30 R.72 at 1.\\n31 R.81 ¶ 28.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2576\\n\\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\\n es = 850 grams)[32]\\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\\n that from January through March, he sold one\\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\\n grams) [33]\\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\\n ice). [34]\\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\\n\\n\\n32 Id. ¶ 12.\\n33 Id. ¶ 14.\\n34 Id. ¶ 19.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 17\\n\\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\\n grams = 42 grams)[35]\\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”36\\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\\ning.”37 Adding the drug amounts described above, the PSR\\ntotaled Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct to be 1.968 kilograms\\nof ice methamphetamine.\\n The initial PSR awarded Mr. Hopper a two-level sentence\\nreduction for acceptance of responsibility. Based on a total\\noffense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, the\\nPSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range of 151 to\\n188 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the initial PSR,\\nchallenging the sentence reduction for acceptance of respon-\\nsibility.38 He asserted that he had “neither denied, nor ad-\\nmitted, any … involvement” in the conspiracy.39 He also\\n\\n35 Id. ¶ 20.\\n36 Id. ¶ 21.\\n37 Id.\\n38 Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel acknowledged that this objection was high-\\nly unusual. See R.82 at 1 (“This marks the first instance in Undersigned\\nCounsel’s career in which he levels an objection on behalf of a client that\\noperates to raise the applicable advisory guidelines range. Thus, it\\nshould be noted that this objection is filed with Defendant Rex Hopper’s\\nconsent and at his direction.”).\\n39 Id.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2576\\n\\nstated that he “underst[ood] that this objection [would]\\ndoom any opportunity he might have at the two-level [ac-\\nceptance of responsibility] reduction.”40 He submitted that,\\nas a result, his total offense level was 36 and the proper\\nguidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.\\n Consequently, the probation office filed a revised PSR,\\nwhich removed the acceptance of responsibility reduction.\\nBased on a total offense level of 36 and a criminal history\\ncategory of I, the revised PSR calculated a guidelines impris-\\nonment range of 188 to 235 months. The Government filed\\nan objection to the revised PSR, contending that Mr. Hopper\\nwas subject to a two-level sentence enhancement for main-\\ntaining a residence for the purpose of distributing metham-\\nphetamine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).\\n Accordingly, the probation office filed a second revised\\nPSR, adopting the Government’s recommendation that\\nMr. Hopper was subject to the two-level sentence enhance-\\nment for maintaining a drug premises. Based on a total of-\\nfense level of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the sec-\\nond revised PSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range\\nof 235 to 293 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the\\nsecond revised PSR, challenging the application of the drug\\npremises enhancement. He maintained that, consistent with\\nthe first revised PSR, his total offense level was 36 and his\\nguidelines imprisonment range was 188 to 235 months.\\n The district court conducted a hearing to impose its sen-\\ntence. At the outset, the court asked whether there were any\\nobjections to the PSR other than Mr. Hopper’s challenge to\\n\\n40 Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 19\\n\\nthe application of the drug premises enhancement. Both sets\\nof counsel stated that there were not. The court then turned\\nto the sentence enhancement.\\n The Government introduced additional testimony from\\nWright, Mr. Hopper’s former girlfriend. She testified that\\nshe had lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home\\nfrom about October 2015 until May 2017. She acknowledged\\nthat, during this time, she saw methamphetamine at the res-\\nidence. She elaborated that “[i]t was always there” and that\\nshe saw drugs in the home “[p]retty much every day.”41\\nWright testified that after Mr. Hopper obtained metham-\\nphetamine from others, he brought it back to the Creal\\nSprings house. She further stated that she saw Mr. Hopper\\ndistribute methamphetamine from the residence. She said\\nthat this occurred “[t]hroughout the week” and that “each\\nweek there was some sort of activity going on” involving\\nmethamphetamine.42 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper\\ncollected money from individuals who bought methamphet-\\namine at his home. She testified that he had drug scales at\\nthe house, which he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”43 She\\nestimated that, while she lived with him, Mr. Hopper dis-\\ntributed methamphetamine from his residence approximate-\\nly “[w]eekly.”44 She added, however, that toward the end of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n41 R.125 at 8.\\n42 Id. at 9.\\n43 Id.\\n44 Id. at 10.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2576\\n\\ntheir time living together, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling dimin-\\nished and he was “just using.”45\\n The court inquired what Mr. Hopper did for a living.\\nWright explained that Mr. Hopper had received a monetary\\nsettlement after working in the coal mines. Subsequently, he\\nhad a “side business” buying and selling cars, and he dealt\\ndrugs.46 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper did not “of-\\nficially work.”47\\n Based on the testimony introduced at trial and at sentenc-\\ning, the court concluded that Mr. Hopper stored metham-\\nphetamine at and distributed it from the Creal Springs resi-\\ndence. Given Wright’s testimony that this occurred weekly\\nover an extended period of time, the court determined that\\nthe distribution was “more than just incidental or collat-\\neral.”48 Accordingly, the court overruled Mr. Hopper’s objec-\\ntion and concluded that he was subject to the two-level en-\\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\\ndistributing methamphetamine.\\n Noting that there were no other objections, the court\\nadopted the findings of the PSR as the findings of the court.\\nThis included the finding that the conspiracy involved be-\\ntween 1.5 and 4.5 kilograms of ice methamphetamine, specif-\\nically 1.968 kilograms, which corresponded to a base offense\\nlevel of 36. Given its conclusion regarding the two-level\\n\\n45 Id. at 24.\\n46 Id. at 32.\\n47 Id.\\n48 Id. at 41.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 21\\n\\ndrug premises enhancement, the court determined that\\nMr. Hopper had a total offense level of 38. With a criminal\\nhistory category of I, the court concluded that his corre-\\nsponding guidelines imprisonment range was 235 to 293\\nmonths.\\n Neither party objected to the court’s guideline range\\nfindings. The Government recommended a sentence near or\\nat the top of the guidelines range, while counsel for\\nMr. Hopper recommended a sentence of 188 months. Based\\non the information in the PSR, the factors set forth in 18\\nU.S.C. § 3553(a), and the arguments of Mr. Hopper’s counsel,\\nthe court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the guide-\\nlines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by four\\nyears of supervised release. At the conclusion of the hearing,\\nthe court asked defense counsel, “Are there any other argu-\\nments I have not considered?”49 Counsel for Mr. Hopper re-\\nsponded that there were not. Following the entry of final\\njudgment, Mr. Hopper filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Mr. Hopper raises four arguments on appeal. First, he as-\\nserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to\\nsupport his conviction for conspiracy to distribute metham-\\nphetamine and that, even if the Government established the\\nexistence of multiple, smaller conspiracies, there was a fatal\\nvariance between the single, overarching conspiracy alleged\\nin the indictment and the Government’s proof at trial. Sec-\\n\\n\\n49 Id. at 59.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2576\\n\\nond, he contends that the district court erred when it denied\\nhis motion for disclosure of the cooperating witnesses’ prof-\\nfer letters. Third, he challenges the district court’s applica-\\ntion of a two-level sentence enhancement for maintaining a\\ndrug premises. Finally, he submits that the district court\\nerred in calculating his guidelines range because, in deter-\\nmining Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, it double-counted\\nthe drug transactions described by Holland and Riley.\\n A.\\n 1.\\n We begin with Mr. Hopper’s attack on the sufficiency of\\nthe evidence. United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1150\\n(7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.\\nDurrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990).50 He contends that\\nthere was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine because the\\nGovernment proved only a series of buyer-seller relation-\\nships. He preserved this argument by moving for a judg-\\nment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, so we review\\n\\n\\n\\n50 In United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on\\nother grounds by United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990), we\\nadopted a “policy” of “routinely addressing evidentiary sufficiency in\\ncriminal cases when a defendant presents the issue on appeal.” Id. at\\n1150. We reasoned that “[i]f in fact insufficient evidence is presented at a\\nfirst trial, a retrial, on any basis, ordinarily may be a wasted endeavor.”\\nId. By contrast, if we find “that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a con-\\nviction, but reverse based on trial error, a retrial” is proper. Id. Accord-\\ningly, to conserve the “scarce and costly resources” of the courts and the\\nparties, we address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence first. Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 23\\n\\nhis claim de novo. United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699,\\n704 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n A defendant’s burden in showing the evidence was in-\\nsufficient to support a conviction is indeed a high one. See\\nUnited States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 835 (7th Cir. 2008). In\\nattempting to describe that burden, we often have said that\\nthe burden is a direct function of the strength of the Gov-\\nernment’s case. See United States v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489, 496–\\n97 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th\\nCir. 2013). Because “[w]e accord great deference to jury ver-\\ndicts,” United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1004–05 (7th Cir.\\n2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[w]e will over-\\nturn a conviction on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds on-\\nly if no rational jury could have found the essential elements\\nof the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v.\\nJohnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). “In making this de-\\ntermination, we view all evidence and draw all reasonable\\ninferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id.\\nSee Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), superseded on\\nother grounds by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death\\nPenalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (stat-\\ning standard of proof in criminal cases). Cf. Anderson v. Liber-\\nty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–53 (1986) (comparing meth-\\nodology in adjudicating a motion for judgment of acquittal\\nin a criminal case with a motion for summary judgment in a\\ncivil case).\\n “To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the government\\nmust prove that (1) two or more people agreed to commit an\\nunlawful act, and (2) the defendant knowingly and inten-\\ntionally joined in the agreement.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 754.\\n“For a drug-distribution conspiracy, the government must\\n\\f24 No. 18-2576\\n\\nprove that the defendant knowingly agreed—either implicit-\\nly or explicitly—with someone else to distribute drugs.”\\nClaybrooks, 729 F.3d at 704 (internal quotation marks omit-\\nted).\\n Our cases “have underscored that ordinary drug transac-\\ntions do not entail or reflect a conspiracy, for the buyer’s on-\\nly purpose is to buy and the seller’s only purpose is to sell:\\nthe buyer and seller lack a shared criminal goal.” United\\nStates v. Neal, 907 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).\\nIn other words, “evidence of a buyer-seller relationship,\\nstanding alone, is insufficient to support a conspiracy con-\\nviction.” United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th\\nCir. 1991). Instead, we require “[e]vidence of an agreement\\nto advance further distribution—beyond the initial transac-\\ntion.” United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n“The government may prove the existence of this agreement\\nthrough circumstantial evidence.” Claybrooks, 729 F.3d at\\n704–05.\\n A “nonexhaustive list of characteristics that strongly dis-\\ntinguish a conspiracy from a buyer-seller relationship” in-\\ncludes:\\n “sales on credit or consignment, an agreement\\n to look for other customers, a payment of\\n commission on sales, an indication that one\\n party advised the other on the conduct of the\\n other’s business, or an agreement to warn of\\n future threats to each other’s business stem-\\n ming from competitors or law enforcement au-\\n thorities.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 25\\n\\nUnited States v. Pereira, 783 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(quoting Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755–56). “We employ a totali-\\nty-of-the-circumstances approach in these cases,” “‘tak[ing]\\ninto account all the evidence surrounding the alleged con-\\nspiracy and mak[ing] a holistic assessment of whether the\\njury reached a reasonable verdict.’” Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 813\\n(quoting Brown, 726 F.3d at 1002).\\n In this case, the Government presented sufficient evi-\\ndence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Hopper en-\\ntered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\\nsouthern Illinois. Our conclusion is supported by evidence\\nthat Mr. Hopper sold methamphetamine on credit, or\\n“fronted” it, to his co-conspirators and that he engaged in\\npooling arrangements with other co-conspirators to pur-\\nchase large quantities of methamphetamine for further dis-\\ntribution.\\n Evidence of repeated, “fronted” transactions can be com-\\npelling circumstantial evidence of an agreement to distribute\\ndrugs because it demonstrates that the defendant “had\\nknowingly thrown his lot in” with other members of the\\nconspiracy. United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1070 (7th Cir.\\n1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a fronting ar-\\nrangement, “the seller becomes the buyer’s creditor, adding\\na dimension to the relationship that goes beyond a spot sale\\nfor cash.” United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir.\\n2008). Such a relationship indicates that the defendant “had\\na keen interest” in his co-conspirators’ “success at reselling”\\nthe drugs. Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070. Although “not all credit\\nsales can support an inference that there was an agreement\\nto distribute,” “when a credit sale is coupled with certain\\ncharacteristics inherent in an ongoing wholesale buyer-seller\\n\\f26 No. 18-2576\\n\\nrelationship—i.e., large quantities of drugs, repeat purchas-\\nes[,] or some other enduring arrangement—the credit sale\\nbecomes sufficient evidence to distinguish a conspiracy from\\na nonconspiratorial buyer-seller relationship.” Johnson, 592\\nF.3d at 756 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n At Mr. Hopper’s trial, the Government presented evi-\\ndence that he fronted methamphetamine to Williams, Shu-\\nman, and Karnes. Williams testified that he obtained about\\none to two ounces of ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hop-\\nper “[o]ff and on” for about one year.51 He stated that some-\\ntimes, he bought the drugs outright, while other times,\\nMr. Hopper provided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a\\n“front.”52 Williams explained that, in this fronting arrange-\\nment, Mr. Hopper provided him a quantity of drugs, some\\nof which Williams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper\\nback for previously fronted drugs. Williams further testified\\nthat occasionally, Mr. Hopper called Williams and asked\\nhim to bring customers who owed Mr. Hopper money to\\nMr. Hopper’s house to settle their debt. Williams explained\\nthat he helped Mr. Hopper collect money from his customers\\nbecause Williams “was selling drugs for him” and “to help\\nhim out in his drug business.”53\\n Shuman also testified that he bought drugs from\\nMr. Hopper “on a front.”54 In early 2016, the quantities he\\n\\n\\n51 R.118 at 59.\\n52 Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n53 Id. at 64.\\n54 R.123 at 26.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 27\\n\\npurchased increased from grams to ounces of methamphet-\\namine. The two had an arrangement in which Mr. Hopper\\nplaced methamphetamine for Shuman in Mr. Hopper’s gar-\\nage. Shuman retrieved the drugs from the garage and left in\\ntheir place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for previously\\nfronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testified that he\\ndrove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to deliver meth-\\namphetamine to his customers. He also described two occa-\\nsions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Missouri, to\\nobtain methamphetamine. When they returned home,\\nMr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\\n Similarly, Peyton testified that Karnes, her former boy-\\nfriend, obtained methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a\\nfront,” in which he would sell drugs to others in order to\\npay Mr. Hopper back for the drugs he had previously ob-\\ntained.55 She stated that during the summer of 2016,\\nMr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five “8-balls,” or 3.5\\ngram quantities of ice methamphetamine, several times a\\nweek.56 She added that on occasion, Mr. Hopper sent Wil-\\nliams to deliver drugs to Karnes.\\n These fronting arrangements are “substantial evidence”\\nthat Mr. Hopper “expected and encouraged” Williams,\\nShuman, and Karnes “to redistribute the drugs he had pro-\\nvided.” United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir.\\n2009). Because Mr. Hopper expected to be repaid based on\\nsales of previously fronted methamphetamine, “he was de-\\npendent upon the further resale of the drugs to make a prof-\\n\\n55 R.118 at 90.\\n56 Id. at 89.\\n\\f28 No. 18-2576\\n\\nit.” Id.; see also United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 808–09\\n(7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that evidence that co-conspirator\\nsold cocaine to the defendant “on credit” indicated that he\\n“took a stake in her business—he received payment after,\\nand as a result of, her resale”). Mr. Hopper also “demon-\\nstrated a high level of trust and confidence in” Shuman, Wil-\\nliams, and Karnes, given that he provided them “with large\\nquantities of drugs without requiring any payment until the\\ndrugs were resold.” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816.57\\n That Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes repeatedly, in large quantities,\\nover an extended period of time makes clear that these activ-\\nities were more than mere buyer-seller relationships. See\\nBrown, 726 F.3d at 1006 (permitting “an inference of conspir-\\nacy” based on evidence of “repeated transactions, in whole-\\nsale quantities, on credit”). These “factors suggest standard-\\nized transactions and lower transaction costs in the business\\nas well as a continuing relationship.” Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 809;\\nsee also Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070 (reasoning that evidence of\\n“multiple transactions over a prolonged period of time”\\nsuggested “that transaction costs … were quite low, which\\ncounsels a finding of conspiracy”). Evidence that Williams\\nand Shuman drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\\ndeliver drugs to his customers and that Mr. Hopper sent\\nWilliams to deliver drugs on his own or to pick up custom-\\ners who owed Mr. Hopper money reinforces that these rela-\\n\\n\\n57Cf. United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting “[t]he\\nmutual trust in this case was less than it would have been had [a\\nco-conspirator] ‘fronted’ cocaine to the defendant (a factor mentioned in\\nalmost all the cases) rather than being paid in cash at the time of sale”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 29\\n\\ntionships were in furtherance of Mr. Hopper’s distribution of\\ndrugs. Based on this evidence, a jury could rationally con-\\nclude that Mr. Hopper conspired to distribute methamphet-\\namine. See Pereira, 783 F.3d at 704–05.\\n The Government also presented considerable testimony\\nestablishing that Mr. Hopper pooled his resources with other\\nmembers of the conspiracy to obtain methamphetamine at a\\nreduced cost from out-of-state sources. This is circumstantial\\nevidence of an agreement to distribute drugs because, by\\n“put[ting] their money and transportation resources together\\nfor an extended period of time,” the co-conspirators “there-\\nby ha[d] a stake in each other’s success, and kn[ew] that the\\nothers intended to resell” the drugs. United States v. Harris,\\n567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also\\nUnited States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 475 (7th Cir. 2016) (hold-\\ning that “[a] reasonable jury could have found that the\\nshared supplier, funds, and product indicated an agree-\\nment” to sell drugs). Based on such evidence, we upheld the\\ndefendant’s conspiracy conviction in United States v. Hay-\\nwood, 324 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2003), reasoning that:\\n [I]n driving to Chicago together, then bringing\\n the drugs back … and splitting them up upon\\n their return, Haywood and Jackson had a\\n standardized way of doing business; they had\\n a continuing relationship, making three trips\\n together to Chicago and talking about making\\n one to Oklahoma; and they both knew that the\\n cocaine would be resold.\\nId. at 517. Similarly, in Harris, we held that there was suffi-\\ncient evidence of a conspiracy to distribute drugs where the\\ndefendant “pooled his money with that of … the other al-\\n\\f30 No. 18-2576\\n\\nleged co-conspirators to buy larger amounts of crack cocaine\\nfrom outside the state for resale.” 567 F.3d at 851.\\n In this case, Holland, Riley, and Weir testified that, to-\\ngether with Mr. Hopper, they pooled their money and\\ntransportation resources over approximately a month-long\\nperiod to purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\\nGirardeau, Missouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the\\nmoney to Riley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland\\nand Riley drove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they\\nreturned, the group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hop-\\nper’s home to divide up the drugs. The group pooled their\\nmoney multiple times per week to purchase four ounces of\\nmethamphetamine at a time, which they divided into equal,\\none-ounce shares upon return to Illinois.\\n Evidence that Mr. Hopper pooled funds, shared suppli-\\ners, and coordinated transport out of state with Holland, Ri-\\nley, and Weir, underscored a common goal between them to\\ndistribute methamphetamine.58 That this pooling arrange-\\nment involved multiple transactions per week over an ex-\\n\\n58 United States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 474 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding\\nconspiracy conviction based on testimony that Lomax and his\\nco-conspirator “shared customers, a supplier, and heroin, and pooled\\nfunds”); United States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (reason-\\ning that evidence that the co-conspirators “pooled their money and\\nshared rides to buy cheaper crack” from outside the state “mean[t] that\\neach could earn more if the others succeeded”); United States v. Haywood,\\n324 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming conspiracy conviction where\\nHaywood and his co-conspirator “pooled their money and shared rides\\nto Chicago in order to buy inexpensive crack, meaning that each could\\nrun a cheaper operation—and earn higher profits—if the other succeed-\\ned”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 31\\n\\ntended period of time reinforces the conclusion that\\nMr. Hopper had entered an agreement to distribute drugs in\\nsouthern Illinois. Thus, the jury had ample evidence, based\\non the “fronted” transactions and the pooling arrangement,\\nto convict Mr. Hopper of conspiring to distribute metham-\\nphetamine.\\n 2.\\n Mr. Hopper also submits that even if the Government\\npresented some evidence of conspiracy, we must vacate his\\nconviction “because of the variance between the indictment\\n(alleging a single, overarching conspiracy) and the proof at\\ntrial (showing, at most, smaller sub-conspiracies), which\\nprejudiced Mr. Hopper.”59 We conclude that there was no\\nfatal variance in this case.\\n At the close of all evidence, Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel\\nmoved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of\\nCriminal Procedure 29. Rule 29 requires the court to “enter a\\njudgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence\\nis insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Mr. Hopper’s counsel\\ndid not articulate the grounds for his motion and, in denying\\nthe motion, the district court ruled only that the Government\\nhad presented sufficient evidence of the charge against\\nMr. Hopper.60 Because Mr. Hopper’s counsel did not raise\\nthe possibility of a fatal variance in the district court, that\\ncourt did not have the opportunity to address this claim.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n59 Appellant’s Br. 17–18.\\n60 See R.123 at 55.\\n\\f32 No. 18-2576\\n\\nTherefore, we review his variance claim for plain error only.\\nUnited States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2007).61\\n “A variance arises when the facts proved by the govern-\\nment at trial differ from those alleged in the indictment.”\\nAvila, 557 F.3d at 815 (quoting United States v. Stigler, 413\\nF.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2005)). We treat a conspiracy variance\\nclaim “as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence.” Unit-\\ned States v. Handlin, 366 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2004). Alt-\\nhough we treat the question of variance as an attack on the\\nsufficiency of the evidence, a party must raise with specifici-\\nty the issue of variance. A timely objection affords the dis-\\ntrict court the opportunity to address the issue and under-\\ntake curative steps. See United States v Pierson, 925 F.3d 913,\\n921–22 (7th Cir. 2019). To prevail on his claim, Mr. Hopper\\nmust show both that (1) “no rational trier of fact could have\\nfound that the evidence at trial proved a single conspiracy”\\nand (2) “the variance was prejudicial.” United States v.\\nDeKelaita, 875 F.3d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 2017). “Even if the evi-\\ndence arguably established multiple conspiracies, there is no\\nmaterial variance from an indictment charging a single con-\\nspiracy if a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond\\na reasonable doubt the existence of the single conspiracy\\ncharged in the indictment.” United States v. Williams, 272\\nF.3d 845, 862 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Mr. Hopper contends that there was a variance between\\nthe Government’s proof at trial and the conspiracy alleged in\\n\\n\\n61Like the defendant in United States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 795 (7th\\nCir. 2007), Mr. Holmes did not ask for a jury instruction on multiple con-\\nspiracies.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 33\\n\\nthe indictment because the Government “failed to tie togeth-\\ner the disparate purposes of Mr. Hopper’s alleged\\nco-conspirators” to demonstrate a single conspiracy.62 He\\nsubmits that this variance prejudiced him at trial and at sen-\\ntencing.\\n To evaluate Mr. Hopper’s variance claim, “we turn to the\\nindictment first and then to the proof at trial.” Id. at 863. The\\nindictment alleged that from about January 2015 through\\nMay 31, 2017, in Williamson and Franklin Counties, in the\\nSouthern District of Illinois, “and elsewhere,” Mr. Hopper\\nconspired “with other persons known and unknown” to dis-\\ntribute methamphetamine.63 As detailed above, at trial, the\\nGovernment presented substantial evidence that Mr. Hop-\\nper entered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\\nsouthern Illinois. It is sufficient that the purpose of the con-\\nspiracy “was simply to distribute narcotics,” and that “each\\nco-conspirator agreed to advance” that goal. United States v.\\nMartin, 618 F.3d 705, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2010). Based on the ev-\\nidence that Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes for further distribution and that\\nhe engaged in a pooling arrangement with Holland, Riley,\\nand Weir to obtain methamphetamine at a low cost for re-\\nsale, a rational jury could have found that Mr. Hopper joined\\nthe single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Because\\n“[t]he key to proving a conspiracy is that the defendant\\njoined [an] agreement, not [a] group,” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816,\\nany failure to identify the connection between Mr. Hopper’s\\n\\n\\n62 Appellant’s Br. 34.\\n63 R.32 at 1.\\n\\f34 No. 18-2576\\n\\nco-conspirators did not amount to a material variance. See,\\ne.g., Williams, 272 F.3d at 863 (concluding there was no mate-\\nrial variance where there was sufficient evidence “for the ju-\\nry to conclude that a number of people had an agreement to\\ndistribute drugs in East St. Louis, and that Williams joined\\nthat agreement”).\\n In any event, Mr. Hopper suffered no prejudice as a re-\\nsult of the alleged variance. First, he contends that the vari-\\nance prejudiced him at trial because his counsel “was unable\\nto adequately prepare his defense because the government\\ndid not define the scope of the alleged conspiracy until clos-\\ning arguments.”64 But “[i]t is the grand jury’s statement of\\nthe existence of the conspiracy agreement rather than the\\nidentity of those who agree which places the defendant on\\nnotice of the charge he must be prepared to meet.” Townsend,\\n924 F.2d at 1389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The\\nGovernment’s evidence at trial demonstrated that Mr. Hop-\\nper joined others in an agreement to distribute methamphet-\\namine in southern Illinois. Mr. Hopper had sufficient notice\\nof the charged conspiracy and the evidence presented at tri-\\nal.65\\n Next, Mr. Hopper submits that “[t]he indictment and the\\ngovernment’s arguments at trial were so broad as to make it\\n\\n64 Appellant’s Br. 36.\\n65 See,e.g., United States v. Hardimon, 329 F. App’x 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2009)\\n(unpublished) (determining that there was no variance and explaining\\nthat “the indictment’s allegation of a conspiracy agreement alone was\\nsufficient notice of the charge that Hardimon needed to be prepared to\\nmeet, and the indictment was not required to name all those who partic-\\nipated in the conspiracy”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 35\\n\\nimpossible for Mr. Hopper to invoke his Fifth Amendment\\nright against double jeopardy” in a subsequent prosecu-\\ntion.66 He stresses that the record does not reveal the scope\\nof the conspiracy, his role in it, or “with whom the jury con-\\nvicted him of conspiring.”67 If we uphold his conviction “on\\nthe basis that some sub-conspiracy existed,” he posits, the\\nGovernment could indict him “for any other act within that\\ntime frame even though he had already been found guilty by\\nthe jury on the charged indictment.”68\\n We have held that, despite a variance between the in-\\ndictment and the proof at trial, we had “no difficulty in\\njudging the scope of the conviction for double jeopardy pur-\\nposes” where the indictment alleged a specific crime, “dur-\\ning a finite interval,” “involved a particular perpetrator,”\\nand “alleged specific misconduct by the perpetrator.” United\\nStates v. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 822, 824 (7th Cir. 2007)\\n(upholding defendant’s mail fraud conviction because de-\\nfendant was not prejudiced by the variance between the in-\\ndictment, “which pinpointed a particular step in the pay-\\nment process” of her alleged fraud, “and the proof at trial,\\nwhich established another”). In the same way, here, the in-\\ndictment alleged a specific crime (conspiracy to distribute\\nmethamphetamine), during a finite interval (about January\\n2015 through about May 31, 2017), involving a particular\\nperpetrator (Mr. Hopper and “other persons known and un-\\nknown”), and specific misconduct by the perpetrator (know-\\n\\n\\n66 Appellant’s Br. 38.\\n67 Id.\\n68 Id. at 38–39.\\n\\f36 No. 18-2576\\n\\ningly conspiring to distribute a mixture and substance con-\\ntaining methamphetamine).69 The scope of Mr. Hopper’s\\nconviction is sufficiently specific to avoid a future double\\njeopardy problem.\\n He further contends that the alleged variance prejudiced\\nhim at trial because the jury was confused about the instruc-\\ntions regarding the scope of the conspiracy. Evidence of\\nmultiple conspiracies may pose “a danger of ‘spillover’ prej-\\nudice” where multiple defendants are tried together and the\\njury hears incriminating evidence relevant against only\\nsome, but not all, of the defendants. Townsend, 924 F.2d at\\n1411. Because Mr. Hopper was tried alone, however, this\\nconcern was not implicated. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis,\\n37 F.3d 301, 306 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “there could be\\nno prejudice” where “Curtis was the only person on trial,\\nthus eliminating the customary concern with jury confusion\\nresulting from the ‘spillover’ effect associated with simulta-\\nneously trying multiple defendants with various connec-\\ntions to the purported scheme”).\\n Additionally, Mr. Hopper asserts that the variance preju-\\ndiced him at sentencing because it “improperly increased the\\nquantity of drugs attributed to him.”70 As we have stated,\\nhowever, there was ample evidence to support Mr. Hopper’s\\nconspiracy conviction, including but not limited to the pool-\\ning arrangement he participated in with Holland, Riley, and\\nWeir. Moreover, the PSR calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant\\nconduct based on “the amounts obtained by the defendant,\\n\\n69 R.32 at 1.\\n70 Appellant’s Br. 39.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 37\\n\\nwhich he then distributed to others.”71 Because the district\\ncourt did not sentence Mr. Hopper based on drug transac-\\ntions not related to the conspiracy in which he participated,\\nsee Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1412 (determining there was no\\nprejudice where “none of the defendants [could] claim that\\ntheir sentences were increased on the basis of drug transac-\\ntions that were not attributable to the limited conspiracies in\\nwhich they participated”), or based on drug quantities sold\\nby his co-conspirators that were within the scope of the con-\\nspiracy, see Avila, 557 F.3d at 819 (concluding there was no\\nprejudice where the defendant’s sentence was based on\\ndrugs he supplied to others, not “the quantities of drugs that\\nwere seized from the entire drug organization”), he did not\\nsuffer prejudice at sentencing.\\n B.\\n 1.\\n Mr. Hopper next submits that the district court erred\\nwhen it ruled that the Government was not required to dis-\\nclose the proffer letters of its cooperating witnesses. He as-\\nserts that the court erroneously “based its decision solely on\\nBrady[72] and Giglio,[73] and thus did not recognize” that Fed-\\neral Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 “is an independent and\\nmore expansive basis for disclosure of proffer letters.”74\\nMr. Hopper’s trial counsel never filed a request under Rule\\n\\n\\n71 R.94 ¶ 21.\\n72 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\\n73 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\\n74 Appellant’s Br. 14.\\n\\f38 No. 18-2576\\n\\n16 for disclosure of the proffer letters. Nor did counsel sug-\\ngest to the district court, during the hearing on his motion or\\notherwise, that Rule 16 might be a basis for disclosure. That\\ncounsel moved for disclosure of the proffer letters and ar-\\ngued that the court should disregard our decision in United\\nStates v. Weidenburner, 550 F. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (un-\\npublished), was not sufficient to preserve the instant argu-\\nment under Rule 16.75 Because there is no evidence in the\\nrecord that Mr. Hopper intended to relinquish this argu-\\nment, however, we conclude that he has forfeited, not\\nwaived, his request for disclosure under Rule 16. United\\nStates v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining\\nthat “[f]orfeiture occurs when a defendant negligently fails\\nto assert a right in a timely fashion”).\\n Rule 16, which governs discovery and inspection, pro-\\nvides in relevant part that:\\n Upon a defendant’s request, the government\\n must permit the defendant to inspect and to\\n\\n\\n75 Cf. United States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015) (defend-\\nant forfeited argument that his arrest was unlawful because his motion\\nto suppress challenged only the protective sweep of his home, not his\\narrest); United States v. Kelly, 772 F.3d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 2014) (defend-\\nant forfeited argument that the warrant application failed to establish\\nprobable cause because his motion to suppress argued only that the war-\\nrant lacked sufficient particularity in the description of the place to be\\nsearched); United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007) (de-\\nfendant forfeited argument that his waiver of his Fifth Amendment\\nrights and subsequent confession were involuntary due to the coercive\\nconditions of his confinement because, in the district court, he argued\\nonly that his confession was involuntary because the police did not ad-\\nminister Miranda warnings).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 39\\n\\n copy or photograph books, papers, documents,\\n data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings\\n or places, or copies or portions of any of these\\n items, if the item is within the government’s\\n possession, custody, or control and … the item\\n is material to preparing the defense.\\nFed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E).\\n Relatedly, Rule 12 provides that certain motions, includ-\\ning a request for “discovery under Rule 16,” “must be raised\\nby pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reason-\\nably available and the motion can be determined without a\\ntrial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). Under this\\nRule, “[t]he court may … set a deadline for the parties to\\nmake pretrial motions,” and if no deadline is set, then “the\\ndeadline is the start of trial.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1). “If a\\nparty does not meet the deadline for making a Rule 12(b)(3)\\nmotion, the motion is untimely.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).\\n“But a court may consider the defense, objection, or request\\nif the party shows good cause.” Id.\\n Rule 12 thus “imposes an antecedent good-cause re-\\nquirement when a defendant fails to file a timely motion.”\\nUnited States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015). In\\nother words, “if a defendant fails to raise a[n] … argument\\nbelow—even if he does so under circumstances that suggest\\na forfeiture—we cannot proceed directly to a review of the\\ndistrict court’s actions for plain error.” United States v. Kelly,\\n772 F.3d 1072, 1079 (7th Cir. 2014). Instead, we first must ask\\nwhether there was good cause for the failure. United States v.\\nJohnson, 415 F.3d 728, 730–31 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n\\f40 No. 18-2576\\n\\n Mr. Hopper offers no explanation for his trial counsel’s\\nfailure to request disclosure of the proffer letters under Rule\\n16 or to otherwise assert Rule 16 as a basis for disclosure of\\nthe letters before the district court. Further, his counsel made\\nno request for relief based on good cause before the district\\ncourt or in this court. Absent a showing of good cause as re-\\nquired by Rule 12, his claim is not subject to further review.\\nUnited States v. Daniels, 803 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2015);\\nUnited States v. Hargrove, 508 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2007).76\\n 2.\\n Mr. Hopper further contends that “the district court\\nerred in presuming that proffer letters are never” required to\\nbe disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or\\nGiglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).77 We review the\\ndistrict court’s determination that the proffer letters need not\\nbe disclosed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jumah,\\n599 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n At the hearing on Mr. Hopper’s motion, the discussion\\ncentered on our decision in Weidenburner, where we held\\nthat proffer letters “are not Giglio material or Jencks Act[78]\\nstatements.” 550 F. App’x at 304. In that case, the defendant\\nmoved for a new trial based on the Government’s assertion\\n\\n76 We note in passing that Mr. Hopper’s counsel had the information\\ncontained in the proffer letters, even though he did not have the letters\\nthemselves. He also was permitted to cross examine the witness about\\nthe proffer process. His client therefore suffered no prejudice from the\\nabsence of the letters.\\n77 Appellant’s Br. 16.\\n78 18 U.S.C. § 3500.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 41\\n\\nthat it could not locate copies of the proffer letters for two\\ncodefendants who testified against Weidenburner. Id. Nei-\\nther witness disputed the existence of the proffer letters, and\\nWeidenburner received copies of both witnesses’ plea\\nagreements. Id. Consequently, we rejected Weidenburner’s\\nclaim of nondisclosure as frivolous. Id. Acknowledging that\\n“Giglio requires disclosure of inducements for a witness[]’s\\ntestimony,” we reasoned that “the prosecutor fulfilled that\\nobligation by producing the plea agreements, which de-\\nscribe[d] the benefits [the witnesses] would receive for coop-\\nerating.” Id. Because “[t]he proffer letters were preliminary\\nto the resulting plea agreements,” we concluded that “Giglio\\nwas satisfied by disclosure of the plea agreements.” Id. Fur-\\nther, we determined that “the Jencks Act [wa]s irrelevant”\\nbecause “[t]he proffer letters were statements of the prosecu-\\ntor who wrote them,” not “factual narrative[s] useful for im-\\npeachment.” Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).79\\n\\n\\n79 At least one of our sister circuits also has held that “the government\\nsatisfied its obligations” by disclosing a cooperating witness’s plea\\nagreement to the defense. United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 880\\n(8th Cir. 2007). In Santisteban, the defendant alleged that the Govern-\\nment’s non-disclosure of the proffer letters sent to a cooperating witness\\n“violated his due process right to receive exculpatory or impeachment\\nevidence.” Id. Because “the government had already provided [the wit-\\nness]’s plea agreement,” the district court “declined to compel the pro-\\nduction” of the proffer letters. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that there was\\nno due process violation. Id. “Regardless of any preliminary proffer\\nagreements,” the court reasoned, “the formal plea agreement governed\\n[the witness]’s cooperation, and it provided the jury with a sufficient ba-\\nsis for judging the credibility of [his] testimony at trial.” Id. The court\\nconcluded that “[t]he terms of the proffer letters were not material to the\\ndefense.” Id.\\n\\f42 No. 18-2576\\n\\n In this case, the Government disclosed the cooperating\\nwitnesses’ plea agreements, which superseded the proffer\\nletters and outlined the terms of the witnesses’ cooperation.\\nThe agreements provided a sufficient basis for Mr. Hopper’s\\ncounsel to impeach the Government’s witnesses and for the\\njury to assess the credibility of those witnesses. Therefore,\\nthe district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied\\nMr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the proffer letters.\\n C.\\n Next, Mr. Hopper challenges the district court’s finding\\nthat he was subject to a two-level sentence enhancement\\nbased on evidence that he maintained his Creal Springs resi-\\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\\nMr. Hopper preserved this challenge by filing an objection to\\nthe application of the enhancement in the district court.\\nTherefore, “we review the district court’s application of the\\nU.S. Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its underlying factual\\nfindings for clear error.” United States v. Flores-Olague, 717\\nF.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n The guidelines provide for a two-level sentence en-\\nhancement “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for the\\npurpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub-\\nstance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). This includes “storage of a\\ncontrolled substance for the purpose of distribution.” Id.\\ncmt. n.17. The application notes clarify that\\n“[m]anufacturing or distributing a controlled substance need\\nnot be the sole purpose for which the premises was main-\\ntained, but must be one of the defendant’s primary or prin-\\ncipal uses for the premises, rather than one of the defend-\\nant’s incidental or collateral uses for the premises.” Id. Be-\\ncause it is undisputed that Mr. Hopper “maintained” the\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 43\\n\\nCreal Springs house, which was his home, our review is lim-\\nited to whether distributing methamphetamine was a “pri-\\nmary or principal” use of the home.\\n “[T]o determine whether drug distribution was a prima-\\nry or incidental use, the district courts are not required to\\napply a simple balancing test that compares the frequency of\\nunlawful activity at the residence with the frequency of law-\\nful uses.” United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (per curiam). That is because “such a test would im-\\nmunize every family home that is also used for drug distri-\\nbution from being deemed an illegally maintained ‘premis-\\nes,’” since “the amount of lawful activity in a home is all but\\ncertain to exceed the amount of illegal activity.” Id. Instead,\\n“the sentencing court should focus on both the frequency\\nand significance of the illicit activities.” Id. “Neither a specif-\\nic frequency nor a particular significance automatically war-\\nrants applying the enhancement.” United States v. Sanchez,\\n710 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on other grounds,\\nSanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013). “Rather, we con-\\nsider the two in tandem and determine whether the prohib-\\nited purpose can be fairly described as a ‘primary or princi-\\npal’ use of the premises.” Id. Factors relevant to this analysis\\ninclude “quantities dealt, customer interactions, keeping\\n‘tools of the trade’ and business records, and accepting pay-\\nment.” Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284.\\n First, with respect to frequency, Mr. Hopper contends\\nthat Wright’s “vague and inconsistent testimony” at the sen-\\ntencing hearing “was not enough” to establish the frequent\\nuse of his home to distribute drugs.80 He further asserts that\\n\\n80 Appellant’s Br. 45.\\n\\f44 No. 18-2576\\n\\n“the district court failed to account for [his] affirmative deci-\\nsion to stop using his home for drug distribution several\\nmonths before the end of the charged conspiracy.”81 We con-\\nclude that these contentions are without merit.\\n Testimony introduced at Mr. Hopper’s trial and at the\\nsentencing hearing highlighted that he distributed metham-\\nphetamine from his home on approximately a weekly basis\\nfor the duration of the conspiracy. Wright testified that she\\nhad lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home from\\nabout October 2015 until May 2017. During this time, meth-\\namphetamine “was always there” and she saw drugs in the\\nhome “[p]retty much every day.”82 Wright estimated that,\\nwhile she lived with him, Mr. Hopper distributed metham-\\nphetamine from his residence approximately “[w]eekly.”83\\nShe added, however, that toward the end of their time living\\ntogether, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling diminished and he was\\n“just using.”84\\n Similarly, Shuman testified that Mr. Hopper distributed\\nmethamphetamine to him while Shuman was living at the\\n\\n\\n81 Id.\\n82 R.125 at 8.\\n83 Id. at 10.\\n84 Id. at 24:8–15 (“Q. Ms. Wright, did you also add that most of the meth\\ntransactions that you were aware of occurred at Hopper’s brother’s\\nhouse, Mark Hopper? A. I’ve never—I didn’t say that like that. That’s\\nbeen taken out of context. I said that happened there, but everything was\\ndone in Creal in the very beginning, and then he slacked off, and to-\\nwards the end of the relationship he was just using, he wasn’t selling\\nit.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 45\\n\\nCreal Springs home in December 2015 and January 2016. Af-\\nter Shuman returned from jail in early 2016, the two had an\\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\\nand left the money he owed Mr. Hopper in their place. Mul-\\ntiple witnesses, including Craig, Holland, and Peyton, also\\ntestified that they observed Mr. Hopper sell methampheta-\\nmine to other individuals at his home.\\n This evidence that Mr. Hopper stored drugs at his house\\nand regularly distributed methamphetamine to customers\\nthere for the better part of 2016 confirms that he used the\\nhouse for the purpose of drug distribution with sufficient\\nfrequency.85 That Mr. Hopper conducted distribution activi-\\nties with less frequency toward the end of the conspiracy\\ndoes not undermine this conclusion.\\n Turning to the significance of the distribution activities,\\nMr. Hopper submits that “[t]he scope of drug activity at [his]\\n\\n\\n85 See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(concluding that “evidence of eight transactions, most within a\\ntwo-month period, support[ed] the courts’ findings that significant deals\\nwere occurring frequently enough for the home to be deemed, in es-\\nsence, a drug den for the purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(12)”); United States v.\\nWinfield, 846 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (upholding appli-\\ncation of enhancement based on evidence that “in the twelve weeks be-\\nfore the raid, [an] informant bought drugs from Winfield at his apart-\\nment four times and spotted additional drugs and drug paraphernalia\\nduring each transaction”); United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 533\\n(7th Cir. 2013) (holding that enhancement applied based on evidence that\\nthe defendant “sold and stored drugs at his home” and “did so ‘on a dai-\\nly basis’ over a three-year period”).\\n\\f46 No. 18-2576\\n\\nhome was not significant enough to warrant the enhance-\\nment.”86 Again, the testimony adduced at trial and at sen-\\ntencing amply demonstrated that Mr. Hopper carried on\\nsignificant aspects of his distribution business from his\\nhome.\\n We have already observed that there was substantial tes-\\ntimony that Mr. Hopper stored and distributed metham-\\nphetamine at his house.87 In this respect, Wright testified\\nthat Mr. Hopper had drug scales at the Creal Springs home,\\nwhich he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”88 Further, we\\nconsider evidence of financial transactions in the home to be\\nsignificant activity for the purpose of distributing drugs.89\\nHere, Williams testified that, when customers owed\\nMr. Hopper money, Williams occasionally brought these in-\\n\\n86 Appellant’s Br. 47.\\n87 See, e.g., Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284 (upholding application of enhance-\\nment based on “evidence that drugs were shipped to and stored at Con-\\ntreras’s home” and that “Contreras accepted payment for drugs at his\\nhome”). We have also recognized that keeping “tools of the trade” on the\\npremises may indicate “that drug trafficking was the principal use of the\\npremises.” United States v. Thomas, 845 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 2017) (in-\\nternal quotation marks omitted) (upholding application of enhancement\\nwhere a “search of the home yielded a digital scale, a cutting agent, and\\nplastic sandwich baggies with the corners cut out”).\\n88 R.125 at 9.\\n89 See United States v. Sanchez, 710 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on\\nother grounds, Sanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013) (noting that “in\\nconducting this large drug trade, Sanchez used his residence not only for\\nthe drop-off, storage, and pick-up of drugs, but also as a secure place to\\nsettle the financials”), vacated on other grounds, Sanchez v. United States,\\n571 U.S. 801 (2013) .\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 47\\n\\ndividuals to the house to settle their debt with Mr. Hopper.\\nWright also acknowledged that Mr. Hopper collected money\\nfrom individuals who bought methamphetamine at his\\nhome. Finally, testimony that the defendant’s “only regular\\nand reliable source of income stemmed from proceeds of\\ndrug trafficking activities” is evidence that the distribution\\nof drugs from his home was significant to his livelihood.90\\nFor this reason, it is meaningful that Wright testified that\\nMr. Hopper had received money from a settlement and had\\na “side business” buying and selling cars, but that he did not\\n“officially work.”91\\n In sum, we conclude that there was evidence of frequent,\\nsignificant drug distribution activities at Mr. Hopper’s\\nhome. Therefore, the district court properly determined that\\nMr. Hopper was subject to the sentence enhancement for\\nmaintaining a drug premises.\\n D.\\n Finally, we turn to Mr. Hopper’s claim that the district\\ncourt erred in determining his guidelines range because it\\nadopted an incorrectly calculated relevant conduct finding\\nfrom the PSR. He contends that most of the relevant conduct\\nwas based on drug amounts identified in interviews the\\n\\n\\n90 Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 533; see also Winfield, 846 F.3d at 243 (noting\\nthat “Winfield at the time of his arrest was ‘primarily living off proceeds\\nfrom drug sales’”); Sanchez, 710 F.3d at 732 (reasoning that because\\n“Sanchez had no legitimate job and no source of income beyond his drug\\nsales,” “the illicit transactions occurring at the premises were signifi-\\ncant—in quantity, in scope, and in importance to Sanchez’s livelihood”).\\n91 R.125 at 32.\\n\\f48 No. 18-2576\\n\\nprobation office conducted with Holland and Riley. Accord-\\ning to Mr. Hopper, in their separate interviews, Holland and\\nRiley were actually referring to the same transactions. Thus,\\nby including the drug amounts described in both Holland\\nand Riley’s interviews in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s rel-\\nevant conduct, the district court double-counted the same set\\nof drugs.\\n Mr. Hopper did not challenge the relevant conduct calcu-\\nlation in his objection to the initial PSR, his objection to the\\nsecond revised PSR, or at the sentencing hearing. Therefore,\\nwe review his claim for plain error only. Fed. R. Crim. P.\\n52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be\\nconsidered even though it was not brought to the [district]\\ncourt’s attention.”). We have discretion to remedy the for-\\nfeited error provided that Mr. Hopper has satisfied the fol-\\nlowing conditions: (1) there is an error “that has not been in-\\ntentionally relinquished or abandoned”; (2) the error is\\n“plain—that is to say, clear or obvious”; (3) the error “affect-\\ned the defendant’s substantial rights”; and (4) the error “se-\\nriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of\\njudicial proceedings.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136\\nS. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 736 (1993), superseded on other grounds by rule, Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 24(c) (1999)); see also United States v. Pierson, 925\\nF.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence has clarified\\nthe application of the third and fourth prongs in the context\\nof sentencing errors. To demonstrate that the error affected\\nhis substantial rights, “in the ordinary case,” the defendant\\nmust “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,\\nthe outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 49\\n\\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). According to the Court, “[w]hen a defendant is\\nsentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or\\nnot the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct\\nrange—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient\\nto show a reasonable probability of a different outcome ab-\\nsent the error.” Id. at 1345. “That probability is all that is\\nneeded to establish an effect on substantial rights for pur-\\nposes of obtaining relief under Rule 52(b).” Id. at 1349. Fur-\\nther, “[i]n the ordinary case, … the failure to correct a plain\\nGuidelines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights\\nwill seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputa-\\ntion of judicial proceedings.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States,\\n138 S. Ct. 1897, 1911 (2018). In other words, “[a] plain Guide-\\nlines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights is pre-\\ncisely the type of error that ordinarily warrants relief under\\nRule 52(b).” Id. at 1907.\\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy.92 In particu-\\nlar:\\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\\n\\n92 Though the probation office revised Mr. Hopper’s PSR twice before\\nsentencing, the relevant conduct calculations did not change. For pur-\\nposes of this discussion, we reference the most recent version of the re-\\nport, the second revised PSR.\\n\\f50 No. 18-2576\\n\\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\\n es = 850 grams)[93]\\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\\n that from January through March, he sold one\\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\\n grams)[94]\\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\\n ice).[95]\\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\\n grams = 42 grams)[96]\\n\\n\\n93 R.94 ¶ 12.\\n94 Id. ¶ 14.\\n95 Id. ¶ 19.\\n96 Id. ¶ 20.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 51\\n\\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”97\\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\\ning.”98 As demonstrated by the following chart, adding the\\ndrug amounts described above, the PSR totaled Mr. Hop-\\nper’s relevant conduct to be 1.9685 kilograms of ice meth-\\namphetamine.\\n Interviewee Drug Amount\\n Holland 850 grams\\n Riley 793 grams\\n Wright 283.5 grams\\n Wright 42 grams\\n 1,968.5 grams\\n Total\\n (1.9685 kilograms)\\n We agree with Mr. Hopper that the district court plainly\\nerred in adopting the PSR’s relevant conduct calculation.\\nFirst, we conclude that Mr. Hopper did not “intentionally\\nrelinquish[] or abandon[]” this challenge. Molina-Martinez,\\n136 S. Ct. at 1343. Neither party objected to the relevant con-\\nduct calculation prior to or during the sentencing hearing.\\nAt sentencing, the district court adopted the findings of the\\nPSR, including the relevant conduct calculation, without fur-\\n\\n\\n97 Id. ¶ 21.\\n98 Id.\\n\\f52 No. 18-2576\\n\\nther comment. “Given the complexity” of calculating a de-\\nfendant’s guidelines range, “district courts sometimes make\\nmistakes.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904. Accordingly,\\n“when a district court’s sentencing of a defendant within the\\nframework of an incorrect Guidelines range goes unnoticed\\nby the parties as well,” a defendant is “not entirely without\\nrecourse.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Second, the error here was plain. At trial, Holland, Riley,\\nand Weir all testified that, together with Mr. Hopper, they\\npooled their money over approximately a month-long peri-\\nod sometime between late 2015 and early 2016 to purchase\\nmethamphetamine from a source in Cape Girardeau, Mis-\\nsouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the money to Ri-\\nley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland and Riley\\ndrove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they returned,\\nthe group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hopper’s home\\nto divide up the drugs. Holland, Riley, and Weir all de-\\nscribed how the group pooled their money to purchase four\\nounces of methamphetamine at a time, which they divided\\ninto equal, one-ounce shares.\\n In context of the testimony presented at trial, it is clear\\nthat Holland and Riley were describing the same pooling\\narrangement during their separate interviews with the pro-\\nbation office. The amounts attributed to Holland and Riley\\nin the PSR differ only because Riley’s more specific state-\\nments prompted the Government to use a 28-day month in-\\nstead of a 30-day month to calculate the total amount of\\nmethamphetamine described. Regardless, the trial testimony\\nconsistently showed that Mr. Hopper, Holland, Riley, and\\nWeir participated in a pooling arrangement and that follow-\\ning each purchase, each member of the group obtained one\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 53\\n\\nounce of methamphetamine. Because Holland and Riley\\nwere describing the same set of transactions, it was plainly\\nerroneous to include the drug amounts described in both in-\\nterviews in calculating Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\\n Third, we hold that this plain error affected Mr. Hopper’s\\nsubstantial rights because it increased his base offense level\\nand his corresponding guidelines imprisonment range. Mo-\\nlina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346 (“In most cases a defendant\\nwho has shown that the district court mistakenly deemed\\napplicable an incorrect, higher Guidelines range has demon-\\nstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome.”). At\\nsentencing, the district court adopted the PSR’s relevant\\nconduct calculation of 1.968 grams of ice methamphetamine,\\nwhich resulted in a base offense level of 36. Applying the\\ntwo-level enhancement for maintaining a residence for the\\npurpose of distributing methamphetamine, the court calcu-\\nlated a total offense level of 38. With a criminal history cate-\\ngory of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\\nwas 235 to 293 months. The court sentenced Mr. Hopper to\\n235 months’ imprisonment, which is “conspicuous for its po-\\nsition as the lowest sentence within what the [d]istrict\\n[c]ourt believed to be the applicable range.” Id. at 1347.\\n If we count the drugs described by Holland and Riley on-\\nly once, Mr. Hopper’s base offense level falls to 34. Assum-\\ning for purposes of this calculation that the relevant month\\nwas 30 days and, consistent with the testimony at trial, that\\nMr. Hopper received one ounce of methamphetamine ice per\\ntransaction, the resulting drug quantity is 850 grams. Add-\\ning these 850 grams to the drug amounts described by\\nWright, the total quantity is only 1,175.5 grams, or 1.1755\\nkilograms, as shown in the following chart:\\n\\f54 No. 18-2576\\n\\n Interviewee Drug Amount\\n Holland/Riley 850 grams\\n Wright 283.5 grams\\n Wright 42 grams\\n 1,175.5 grams\\n Total\\n (1.1755 kilograms)\\n This amount is significantly below the 1.5-kilogram\\nthreshold that would trigger a base offense level of 36. See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2). At a base offense level of 34, applying\\nthe two-level drug premises enhancement, Mr. Hopper’s to-\\ntal offense level would be 36. With a criminal history catego-\\nry of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\\nwould be 188 to 235 months. At sentencing, the district court\\n“said nothing to suggest that it would have imposed” a sen-\\ntence of 235 months “regardless of the Guidelines range.”\\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1348. Consequently, “there is at\\nleast a reasonable probability that the [d]istrict [c]ourt would\\nhave imposed a different sentence had it known that” a low-\\ner sentence was appropriate. Id.; United States v. Adams, 746\\nF.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2014) (“When a district court incor-\\nrectly calculates the guideline range, we normally presume\\nthe improperly calculated guideline range influenced the\\njudge’s choice of sentence, unless he says otherwise.”).\\n Fourth, we conclude that Mr. Hopper satisfied the last\\nprong of the plain-error analysis. “The risk of unnecessary\\ndeprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness,\\nintegrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings in the\\ncontext of a plain Guidelines error because of the role the\\ndistrict court plays in calculating the range and the relative\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 55\\n\\nease of correcting the error.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at\\n1908. This conclusion is especially forceful where, as here,\\nthe error “was based on a mistake made in the presentence\\ninvestigation report by the Probation Office, which works on\\nbehalf of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” Id. Therefore, we conclude\\nthat resentencing based on recalculation of Mr. Hopper’s\\nrelevant conduct is required.99\\n The Government insists that any error in calculating\\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct was harmless because the\\ndistrict court actually “severely undercounted” the amount\\nof drugs attributable to Mr. Hopper.100 According to the\\nGovernment, the district court should have attributed to\\nMr. Hopper the entire amount purchased by Mr. Hopper,\\nHolland, Riley, and Weir each time they pooled their money\\ntogether because “[t]he entire four ounces was foreseeable\\nrelevant conduct” to Mr. Hopper.101 The Government con-\\ncedes that it failed to challenge the relevant conduct calcula-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n99See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (hold-\\ning that plain error in calculating the defendant’s criminal history points,\\nwhich resulted in a higher guidelines range, required resentencing be-\\ncause we had “no reason to believe” that the district court’s error “did\\nnot affect its selection of the particular sentence”).\\n100 Appellee’s Br. 49.\\n101 Id. at 50; see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (providing that, “in the case of a\\njointly undertaken criminal activity,” a defendant’s base offense level\\nshall be determined based on “all acts and omissions of others” that were\\n“(i) within the scope” of the conspiracy; “(ii) in furtherance of” the con-\\nspiracy; and “(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with” the con-\\nspiracy).\\n\\f56 No. 18-2576\\n\\ntion before the district court but explains that “it most likely\\nwould not have affected the advisory guideline range.”102\\n We have recognized that “an appellate court can affirm\\nthe determination of a sentencing range ‘on any ground\\nsupported by the record even if that ground was not relied\\nupon by the district court.’” United States v. Benitez, 92 F.3d\\n528, 538 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 6 F.3d\\n431, 447 (7th Cir. 1993)). But the Government has not offered,\\nnor have we located, any authority to suggest that we can\\nrely on a relevant conduct calculation not presented to the\\ndistrict court to affirm a defendant’s sentence. Indeed, our\\ndecision in United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir.\\n1995), suggests quite the opposite.\\n In that case, a jury found Henderson guilty of conspiracy\\nto distribute cocaine base and distributing cocaine base. Id.\\nat 1147. At sentencing, the district court attributed to Hen-\\nderson the 18 grams of cocaine he was convicted of selling.\\nId. at 1151. The court also attributed ten percent of the\\namounts of cocaine described by Henderson’s\\nco-conspirator. Id. The court explained that it did not accept\\nthe full amount claimed by his co-conspirator because of\\n“the ‘vagueness and generalized’ nature” of the co-\\nconspirator’s testimony “and the lack of money to support\\nhis contentions that he sold such large amounts of drugs.”\\nId. Henderson challenged the amount of drugs the district\\ncourt attributed to him, arguing that “by accepting only 10%\\nof [the co-conspirator’s] testimony, the court did not simply\\nact conservatively, but instead indicated its belief that [the\\n\\n\\n102 Appellee’s Br. 50 n.6.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 57\\n\\nco-conspirator’s] information was not sufficiently reliable to\\nsupport any amounts above the 18 grams.” Id. We agreed\\nthat the court clearly erred because it “did not have suffi-\\ncient faith” in the co-conspirator’s testimony “to use it as the\\nbasis for attributing further amounts to Henderson.” Id. at\\n1152.\\n The Government submitted, however, that remand was\\nnot required because other calculations would result in drug\\namounts within the range applied by the district court. Id.\\nFor instance, the Government contended that we could cal-\\nculate the drug quantity by multiplying the number of used\\nplastic baggies by the amount of cocaine typically packaged\\nin each baggie. Id. at 1153. Although we were “fairly certain\\nthat this calculation … would adequately sustain the court’s\\ndetermination,” we declined to “embrace it ourselves.” Id.\\nWe explained that “[t]he government first presented this cal-\\nculation on appeal,” such that “the district court, which has\\nsentencing responsibility, [] had no opportunity to consider\\nit.” Id. The Government also proposed that we could deter-\\nmine the drug quantity based on the amount of money\\nseized from Henderson and from a drug location on the day\\nof his arrest. Id. We declined this suggestion, reasoning that\\n“while the government introduced this evidence at trial, it\\ndid not present the calculations at sentencing.” Id. Conse-\\nquently, we left “the initial consideration of these sentencing\\nissues to the district court on remand.” Id.\\n For the same reasons, we decline to affirm Mr. Hopper’s\\nsentence based on relevant conduct calculations that the\\nGovernment presented for the first time on appeal. Because\\nneither party challenged the relevant conduct calculations\\nbelow, “the district court, which has sentencing responsibil-\\n\\f58 No. 18-2576\\n\\nity,” id., had no opportunity to consider any arguments re-\\ngarding the proper calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant\\nconduct. The parties must present their drug quantity calcu-\\nlations to the district court to consider in the first instance on\\nremand.\\n Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and\\naffirm the district court’s determination that he was subject\\nto a sentence enhancement for maintaining a residence for\\nthe purpose of distributing methamphetamine. We vacate\\nhis sentence and remand his case to the district court for re-\\nsentencing based on our conclusion that there was plain er-\\nror in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\\n AFFIRMED IN PART,\\n VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431412/\", \"author_raw\": \"Kenneth Francis Ripple\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RIPPLE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HAMILTON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ST EVE"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"RIPPLE\": \", Circuit\", \"HAMILTON\": \", Circuit\", \"ST EVE\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654159/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Rex A. Hopper\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2576\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nREX A. HOPPER,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Southern District of Illinois.\n No. 4:17-cr-40034-JPG-1 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. In June 2017, a federal grand jury\nindicted Rex Hopper on one count of conspiracy to distrib-\nute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),\n841(b)(1)(B), 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Hopper was part of a\ncommunity of methamphetamine users and sellers in south-\nern Illinois. Several of these individuals signed proffer letters\nwith the Government, agreeing to provide testimony against\nMr. Hopper in exchange for leniency. Most of these witness-\n\f2 No. 18-2576\n\nes subsequently entered plea agreements.1 Mr. Hopper,\nhowever, pleaded not guilty to the single count in the in-\ndictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late Febru-\nary 2018.\n Over the course of three days, the Government presented\nthe testimony of approximately twenty witnesses against\nMr. Hopper. The district court denied Mr. Hopper’s motion\nfor disclosure of the proffer letters given to these witnesses.\nFollowing deliberations, the jury found Mr. Hopper guilty of\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, as charged in\nthe indictment, and returned a special verdict form finding\nthat the conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\n Based on interviews with other participants in the con-\nspiracy, the probation office determined that Mr. Hopper’s\nrelevant conduct involved 1.968 kilograms of ice metham-\nphetamine. This drug amount corresponded to a base of-\nfense level of 36. At sentencing, the district court determined\nthat Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sentence en-\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\ndistributing methamphetamine. Based on a total offense lev-\nel of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the court calcu-\nlated a guidelines imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months.\nThe district court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the\nguidelines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by\nfour years of supervised release.2\n\n\n\n1One witness entered an “open” guilty plea, for which there was no\nwritten plea agreement.\n2 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\n\fNo. 18-2576 3\n\n Mr. Hopper now challenges both his conviction and his\nsentence. First, we conclude that the Government presented\nsufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Hopper engaged in a\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in southern Illi-\nnois, and that there was no material variance between the\nconspiracy charged in the indictment and the Government’s\nproof at trial. Second, the district court did not err when it\ndenied Mr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the cooperat-\ning witnesses’ proffer letters. Third, the district court proper-\nly concluded that Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sen-\ntence enhancement for maintaining his Creal Springs resi-\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\nHowever, we conclude that the district court plainly erred\nwhen it calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct and corre-\nsponding guidelines range. In context, it is clear that, in their\nseparate interviews, Lucas Holland and Randall Riley were\ndescribing the same transactions. By including the amounts\ndescribed by both Holland and Riley in the calculation of\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the presentence report\n(“PSR”), adopted by the district court, erroneously dou-\nble-counted those drug quantities.\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. We\nalso affirm the district court’s determination that he was\nsubject to a sentence enhancement for maintaining a drug\npremises. Because the court plainly erred in calculating his\nrelevant conduct, however, we vacate Mr. Hopper’s sentence\nand remand his case to the district court for resentencing.3\n\n3We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18\nU.S.C. § 3742.\n\f4 No. 18-2576\n\n I.\n BACKGROUND\n A.\n In April 2017, law enforcement officers executed a search\nwarrant at Mr. Hopper’s residence. They sought to recover\nitems involved in a burglary. Officers observed drug para-\nphernalia and methamphetamine in plain view. According-\nly, the officers obtained and executed a second search war-\nrant for the residence. Upon finding additional drug para-\nphernalia and methamphetamine in his home, officers took\nMr. Hopper into custody. A federal grand jury later returned\nan indictment charging Mr. Hopper with one count of con-\nspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 18\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, in\nthe Southern District of Illinois.\n B.\n Mr. Hopper was part of a community of methampheta-\nmine users and sellers in southern Illinois. Around the time\nof his indictment, the Government also charged other mem-\nbers of this group with conspiracy to distribute metham-\nphetamine. Several of these individuals received proffer let-\nters from the Government and subsequently agreed to pro-\nvide testimony against Mr. Hopper in exchange for leniency.\nMost of these witnesses later entered plea agreements.\nMr. Hopper, however, pleaded not guilty to the single count\nin the indictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late\nFebruary 2018.\n Before the trial began, counsel for Mr. Hopper renewed a\nprevious motion for disclosure of the proffer letters given to\nthe witnesses who would testify against Mr. Hopper. Refer-\n\fNo. 18-2576 5\n\nencing our decision in United States v. Weidenburner, 550\nF. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (unpublished), counsel recog-\nnized that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has ruled that” proffer let-\nters “are not materials that have to be provided.”4 Neverthe-\nless, counsel wanted “the record to be clear” that he thought\nhe “ought to be provided a copy” of the proffer letters.5\n Counsel for Mr. Hopper explained that the proffer letter\n“is an agreement that sets forth the ground rules” for what\ntestimony “may or may not lead to a plea agreement.”6 He\nsubmitted that “this is a very important aspect of the de-\nfense” because “no plea agreements are offered until you\nproffer.”7 In other words, the proffer letters are “part of the\nprocess by which men and women ultimately find their way\non to the stand to give testimony against a defendant.”8 As a\nresult, counsel asserted, “if the[] jurors don’t have some un-\nderstanding of this process,” the defense would be “really\nhampered in terms of our constitutional right[s] to put on a\ndefense and … to confront the witnesses through cross ex-\namination that are here to accuse Rex Hopper of various\ncrimes.”9\n Relying on our decision in Weidenburner, the Government\nresponded that “the Seventh Circuit is clear that the proffer\n\n4 R.118 (Trial Tr. Day 1) at 8.\n5 Id. at 5.\n6 Id. at 6.\n7 Id.\n8 Id.\n9 Id. at 7.\n\f6 No. 18-2576\n\nletters don’t come in,” nor does “any information about the\nproffer,” “because it is a preliminary step in the plea agree-\nment, and then the plea agreement supersedes all that.”10\nTurning to defense counsel, the court stated, “I think it is\npretty clear that, you know, you are not going to get the\ndocuments.”11\n The Government further noted its objection to defense\ncounsel asking any questions about the process of entering a\nplea agreement. The court asked defense counsel what kind\nof questions he intended to ask the cooperating witnesses.\nCounsel explained that he wanted the jury to know that be-\nfore entering a plea agreement, a witness had to meet with\nfederal agents and “understood that agents would decide\nand the prosecutors would decide whether you told the\ntruth, and if they didn’t think you told the truth that a plea\nagreement would not be tendered.”12 Counsel acknowl-\nedged that he planned to review the terms of the plea\nagreements with each witness, but argued that the jury\nwould be “missing a big part of this process” without the\nproffer letters.13 Based on our decision in Weidenburner, the\nGovernment reiterated that the plea agreement “super-\nsede[s] the proffer letter” and is “the document which the\ndefendant is entitled to and entitled to question witnesses\nabout.”14 The court denied the motion for disclosure of the\n\n10 Id. at 8.\n11 Id.\n12 Id. at 10.\n13 Id. at 11.\n14 Id. at 14.\n\fNo. 18-2576 7\n\nproffer letters and ruled that counsel could ask the witnesses\n“whether they’ve entered into a proffer agreement, but go-\ning into the terms of it that are super[s]eded by the plea\nagreement, I’m not going to let you do.”15\n C.\n Mr. Hopper proceeded to trial before a jury on February\n26, 2018. Over the course of three days, the Government pre-\nsented the testimony of approximately twenty witnesses\nagainst Mr. Hopper. Set forth below is a summary of the\nwitnesses and testimony relevant to this appeal.\n Dameon Williams testified that he met Mr. Hopper some-\ntime in 2015 when they were “messing with drugs.”16 He ob-\ntained ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]ff and\non” for about one year.17 On these occasions, he received\nabout one to two ounces of methamphetamine at a cost of\n$900 to $1200 per ounce. Williams stated that sometimes, he\nbought the drugs outright, while other times Mr. Hopper\nprovided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a “front.”18 He\nexplained that, in this fronting arrangement, Mr. Hopper\nprovided Williams a quantity of drugs, some of which Wil-\nliams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back. He\nfurther testified that Mr. Hopper called Williams occasional-\nly and asked him to visit the homes of customers who owed\nMr. Hopper money and bring them to Mr. Hopper’s house\n\n15 Id. at 15–16.\n16 Id. at 59.\n17 Id.\n18 Id. at 61.\n\f8 No. 18-2576\n\nto settle the debt. He explained that he helped Mr. Hopper\ncollect money from his customers because Williams “was\nselling drugs for him” and “to help him out in his drug\nbusiness.”19\n Brooke Peyton testified that she met Mr. Hopper in 2016\nwhen she was dating William, also known as “Andy,”\nKarnes. With Karnes, she had visited Mr. Hopper’s resi-\ndence in Creal Springs, where Mr. Hopper provided ice\nmethamphetamine to Karnes. She stated that during the\nsummer of 2016, Mr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five\n“8-balls,” or 3.5 gram quantities of ice methamphetamine,\nseveral times a week.20 Karnes obtained the methampheta-\nmine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a front,” in which he would sell\ndrugs to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back for the\ndrugs he had obtained previously.21 Peyton further testified\nthat sometimes, Mr. Hopper came to her home to drop off\nmethamphetamine for Karnes. On other occasions, he sent\nWilliams to deliver the drugs.\n Robert Weir, also known as “Boog,” testified that he and\nMr. Hopper reconnected around April or May 2015. At some\npoint, he, Mr. Hopper, Lucas Holland, and Randall Riley be-\ngan an arrangement in which the four of them pooled their\nmoney together to purchase methamphetamine from a\nsource in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Sometimes, Weir gave\nMr. Hopper his money, and Mr. Hopper drove to Murphys-\nboro, where he gave Weir’s and his money to Riley to pur-\n\n19 Id. at 64.\n20 Id. at 89.\n21 Id. at 90.\n\fNo. 18-2576 9\n\nchase the drugs. Other times, Mr. Hopper gave Weir his\nmoney, and Weir delivered the money to Riley. Still other\ntimes, Weir and Mr. Hopper visited Riley together. After Ri-\nley obtained the drugs from Cape Girardeau, the group di-\nvided the methamphetamine into equal, one-ounce shares.\nWeir stated that he paid about $800 to $900 per ounce of\nmethamphetamine. This arrangement lasted about a month,\nduring which the group obtained methamphetamine two to\nthree times per week.\n In March 2016, police arrested Riley. Weir and Mr. Hop-\nper then arranged to pool their money with Holland to pur-\nchase methamphetamine. Holland took their money and ran,\nand they never got their drugs. Additionally, Weir acknowl-\nedged that he had personally observed Mr. Hopper distrib-\nute methamphetamine to other individuals.\n Lucas Holland testified that, at the beginning of 2016, he\nhad been living at Riley’s house for about four or five\nmonths. Holland confirmed the details of the pooling ar-\nrangement he engaged in with Mr. Hopper, Riley, and Weir\nto purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\nGirardeau. He reiterated that Mr. Hopper or Weir, or some-\ntimes the two together, came to Riley’s house to deliver their\nmoney. Holland and Riley then drove to Cape Girardeau to\nobtain the methamphetamine. When Holland and Riley re-\nturned to Illinois, the group of four split up the drugs. Ac-\ncording to Holland, this arrangement lasted from about De-\ncember 2015 to February 2016.\n Holland testified that, on one occasion, he traveled to\nCape Girardeau with Riley, Mr. Hopper, and Erin Wright,\nMr. Hopper’s girlfriend, for a drug deal that Mr. Hopper\nhad arranged. The group pooled their money, and Mr. Hop-\n\f10 No. 18-2576\n\nper gave it to an individual in Cape Girardeau. In addition,\nHolland confirmed that a few days after police arrested Ri-\nley, Mr. Hopper and Weir gave him money to purchase\ndrugs. He acknowledged that he “ran off with it.”22 Holland\nalso testified that he had observed Mr. Hopper sell metham-\nphetamine to individuals, including Kevin Shuman, at his\nhome in Creal Springs.\n Randall Riley testified that he met Mr. Hopper around\nthe end of 2015 or early 2016 through a mutual acquaintance\nwhen Mr. Hopper was seeking methamphetamine. Riley\nconfirmed that eventually, he, Mr. Hopper, Holland, and\nWeir began a pooling arrangement in which they combined\ntheir money to purchase methamphetamine from a source in\nCape Girardeau. According to Riley, the group bought four\nounces of methamphetamine every day and split the drugs\nbetween the four of them. Either Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both\ncame to Riley’s home with $2,200 for Mr. Hopper and Weir’s\nshares. Riley and Holland drove to Missouri to obtain the\ndrugs. When they returned, they met either at Riley’s home\nor at Mr. Hopper’s residence in Creal Springs to divide up\nthe drugs.\n Riley confirmed that on one occasion, his source was un-\navailable, so Mr. Hopper arranged a transaction with his\nown source. He, Riley, Holland, and Wright drove to Cape\nGirardeau, where Mr. Hopper gave the source the money\nthey had pooled together.\n Blake Gordon testified that he met Mr. Hopper through\nWeir. According to Gordon, he sold methamphetamine to\n\n22 R.122 (Trial Tr. Day 2) at 54.\n\fNo. 18-2576 11\n\nMr. Hopper “more than ten times.”23 On such occasions, he\nprovided Mr. Hopper methamphetamine in amounts rang-\ning from one to fourteen grams. He also stated that “on nu-\nmerous occasions,” he drove Mr. Hopper around the south-\nern Illinois area to deliver drugs to his customers.24 Gordon\ndescribed one occasion in which he, Mr. Hopper, and Weir\npooled their money together. Weir drove to Cape Girardeau\nto obtain the methamphetamine, which they divided among\nthe three of them when he returned to Illinois.\n Crystal Boulton testified that in March 2016, she and her\nchildren were living at Riley’s home with Riley, her boy-\nfriend, as well as Holland and his girlfriend. She stated that\nshe personally observed Mr. Hopper obtain methampheta-\nmine from Riley at Riley’s residence about four or five times.\nOn such occasions, Mr. Hopper paid Riley for the metham-\nphetamine and Riley gave Boulton the money to count. She\ncounted about $1,000 to $1,200 per ounce of methampheta-\nmine. Boulton also overheard discussions between Riley and\nMr. Hopper about pooling their money together and making\ntrips to Cape Girardeau to obtain methamphetamine.\n Erin Wright testified that she met Mr. Hopper in Sep-\ntember 2015 and moved in with him at his home in Creal\nSprings soon after. She confirmed that Mr. Hopper and Weir\nwent to Riley’s house to get drugs. Usually, Mr. Hopper re-\nturned with an ounce of methamphetamine. She stated that\nMr. Hopper had scales at his Creal Springs home, which he\nused to weigh drugs. She further testified that, sometimes,\n\n23 Id. at 123.\n24 Id.\n\f12 No. 18-2576\n\nRiley and Holland came to the Creal Springs home to do\nbusiness with Mr. Hopper. She described one occasion on\nwhich she and Mr. Hopper went to Kansas City, Missouri,\nwhere Mr. Hopper and an individual named Jason Clapp\nobtained methamphetamine. Wright stated that there were\nalso a few times when Clapp came to the Creal Springs resi-\ndence to provide Mr. Hopper with methamphetamine.\n William Craig testified that he knew Mr. Hopper through\nWeir. He bought methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper about\nten or fifteen times. On such occasions, he obtained meth-\namphetamine in quantities up to eight ounces. When Craig\nobtained the methamphetamine for himself, Mr. Hopper\nwould not charge him. When Craig purchased the metham-\nphetamine to deliver to others, he paid Mr. Hopper in cash.\nCraig stated that on one occasion, after Mr. Hopper and\nWeir pooled their money together, Craig drove with Weir to\nCharleston, Missouri, to purchase methamphetamine. They\nreturned to Mr. Hopper’s home, where Mr. Hopper and\nWeir divided the drugs. Craig also confirmed that he had\nseen Mr. Hopper sell methamphetamine at his home to Kev-\nin Page and to Andy Karnes on multiple occasions.\n Kevin Shuman testified that he had known Mr. Hopper\nfor years. He moved in with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs\nhome and lived there in December 2015 and January 2016.\nInitially, he obtained “small amounts” of methamphetamine,\nranging from “seven grams to an 8-ball,” from Mr. Hopper.25\nShuman bought the drugs “on a front,” explaining that he\nsold drugs in order to repay Mr. Hopper for previously pur-\n\n\n25 R.123 (Trial Tr. Day 3) at 26.\n\fNo. 18-2576 13\n\nchased quantities of methamphetamine.26 He recalled two\noccasions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Mis-\nsouri, to obtain methamphetamine. When they returned\nhome, Mr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\n After a brief term in jail in early 2016, Shuman returned,\nand the quantities he bought from Mr. Hopper increased\nfrom grams to ounces of methamphetamine. The two had an\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\nand left in their place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for\npreviously fronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testi-\nfied that he drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\ndeliver methamphetamine to his customers.\n D.\n At the close of the Government’s case in chief, counsel for\nMr. Hopper moved for a judgment of acquittal under Feder-\nal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which the court denied.\nMr. Hopper elected not to testify, and the defense rested its\ncase. Following jury instructions and closing arguments, the\njury retired to deliberate. Approximately an hour later, the\ncourt received a note from the jury stating, “Pages 17 + 21\nare confusing us as to the definition of ‘conspiracy.’”27 Page\n17 of the jury instructions stated that:\n A conspiracy is an express or implied\n agreement between two or more persons to\n\n\n26 Id.\n27 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\n\f14 No. 18-2576\n\n commit a crime. A conspiracy may be proven\n even if its goal was not accomplished.\n In deciding whether the charged conspiracy\n existed, you may consider all of the circum-\n stances, including the words and acts of each\n of the alleged participants.[28]\n Page 21 of the jury instructions stated that:\n A conspiracy requires more than just a\n buyer-seller relationship between the defend-\n ant and another person. In addition, a buyer\n and seller of a mixture and substance contain-\n ing methamphetamine do not enter into a con-\n spiracy to distribute a mixture and substance\n containing methamphetamine simply because\n the buyer resells the [] mixture and substance\n containing methamphetamine to others, even if\n the seller knows that the buyer intends to resell\n the [] mixture and substance containing meth-\n amphetamine.\n To establish that a seller knowingly became\n a member of a conspiracy with a buyer to dis-\n tribute a mixture and substance containing\n methamphetamine, the government must\n prove that the buyer and seller had the joint\n criminal objective of distributing a mixture and\n\n\n\n\n28 R.74 at 17.\n\fNo. 18-2576 15\n\n substance containing methamphetamine to\n others.[29]\n After conferring with the parties, the court responded to\nthe jury, “All instructions should be read together. I cannot\ngive you any more instruction other than what you have\nbeen given.”30 Following further deliberations, the jury\nreached a verdict, finding Mr. Hopper guilty of conspiracy\nto distribute methamphetamine, as charged in the indict-\nment. The jury returned a special verdict form finding that\nthe conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\n E.\n Prior to Mr. Hopper’s sentencing, the probation office\nprepared a PSR. To determine the scope of his relevant con-\nduct, the probation office interviewed several witnesses with\nknowledge of the conspiracy. Based on these interviews, the\ninitial PSR determined that Mr. Hopper had a base offense\nlevel of 36, which corresponds to offenses involving “at least\n1.5 kilograms but less than 4.5 kilograms of ice.”31 Specifical-\nly, according to the PSR, the conspiracy involved 1.968 kilo-\ngrams of ice methamphetamine.\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy. In particu-\nlar:\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\n\n29 Id. at 21.\n30 R.72 at 1.\n31 R.81 ¶ 28.\n\f16 No. 18-2576\n\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\n es = 850 grams)[32]\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\n that from January through March, he sold one\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\n grams) [33]\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\n ice). [34]\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\n\n\n32 Id. ¶ 12.\n33 Id. ¶ 14.\n34 Id. ¶ 19.\n\fNo. 18-2576 17\n\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\n grams = 42 grams)[35]\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”36\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\ning.”37 Adding the drug amounts described above, the PSR\ntotaled Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct to be 1.968 kilograms\nof ice methamphetamine.\n The initial PSR awarded Mr. Hopper a two-level sentence\nreduction for acceptance of responsibility. Based on a total\noffense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, the\nPSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range of 151 to\n188 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the initial PSR,\nchallenging the sentence reduction for acceptance of respon-\nsibility.38 He asserted that he had “neither denied, nor ad-\nmitted, any … involvement” in the conspiracy.39 He also\n\n35 Id. ¶ 20.\n36 Id. ¶ 21.\n37 Id.\n38 Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel acknowledged that this objection was high-\nly unusual. See R.82 at 1 (“This marks the first instance in Undersigned\nCounsel’s career in which he levels an objection on behalf of a client that\noperates to raise the applicable advisory guidelines range. Thus, it\nshould be noted that this objection is filed with Defendant Rex Hopper’s\nconsent and at his direction.”).\n39 Id.\n\f18 No. 18-2576\n\nstated that he “underst[ood] that this objection [would]\ndoom any opportunity he might have at the two-level [ac-\nceptance of responsibility] reduction.”40 He submitted that,\nas a result, his total offense level was 36 and the proper\nguidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.\n Consequently, the probation office filed a revised PSR,\nwhich removed the acceptance of responsibility reduction.\nBased on a total offense level of 36 and a criminal history\ncategory of I, the revised PSR calculated a guidelines impris-\nonment range of 188 to 235 months. The Government filed\nan objection to the revised PSR, contending that Mr. Hopper\nwas subject to a two-level sentence enhancement for main-\ntaining a residence for the purpose of distributing metham-\nphetamine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).\n Accordingly, the probation office filed a second revised\nPSR, adopting the Government’s recommendation that\nMr. Hopper was subject to the two-level sentence enhance-\nment for maintaining a drug premises. Based on a total of-\nfense level of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the sec-\nond revised PSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range\nof 235 to 293 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the\nsecond revised PSR, challenging the application of the drug\npremises enhancement. He maintained that, consistent with\nthe first revised PSR, his total offense level was 36 and his\nguidelines imprisonment range was 188 to 235 months.\n The district court conducted a hearing to impose its sen-\ntence. At the outset, the court asked whether there were any\nobjections to the PSR other than Mr. Hopper’s challenge to\n\n40 Id.\n\fNo. 18-2576 19\n\nthe application of the drug premises enhancement. Both sets\nof counsel stated that there were not. The court then turned\nto the sentence enhancement.\n The Government introduced additional testimony from\nWright, Mr. Hopper’s former girlfriend. She testified that\nshe had lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home\nfrom about October 2015 until May 2017. She acknowledged\nthat, during this time, she saw methamphetamine at the res-\nidence. She elaborated that “[i]t was always there” and that\nshe saw drugs in the home “[p]retty much every day.”41\nWright testified that after Mr. Hopper obtained metham-\nphetamine from others, he brought it back to the Creal\nSprings house. She further stated that she saw Mr. Hopper\ndistribute methamphetamine from the residence. She said\nthat this occurred “[t]hroughout the week” and that “each\nweek there was some sort of activity going on” involving\nmethamphetamine.42 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper\ncollected money from individuals who bought methamphet-\namine at his home. She testified that he had drug scales at\nthe house, which he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”43 She\nestimated that, while she lived with him, Mr. Hopper dis-\ntributed methamphetamine from his residence approximate-\nly “[w]eekly.”44 She added, however, that toward the end of\n\n\n\n\n41 R.125 at 8.\n42 Id. at 9.\n43 Id.\n44 Id. at 10.\n\f20 No. 18-2576\n\ntheir time living together, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling dimin-\nished and he was “just using.”45\n The court inquired what Mr. Hopper did for a living.\nWright explained that Mr. Hopper had received a monetary\nsettlement after working in the coal mines. Subsequently, he\nhad a “side business” buying and selling cars, and he dealt\ndrugs.46 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper did not “of-\nficially work.”47\n Based on the testimony introduced at trial and at sentenc-\ning, the court concluded that Mr. Hopper stored metham-\nphetamine at and distributed it from the Creal Springs resi-\ndence. Given Wright’s testimony that this occurred weekly\nover an extended period of time, the court determined that\nthe distribution was “more than just incidental or collat-\neral.”48 Accordingly, the court overruled Mr. Hopper’s objec-\ntion and concluded that he was subject to the two-level en-\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\ndistributing methamphetamine.\n Noting that there were no other objections, the court\nadopted the findings of the PSR as the findings of the court.\nThis included the finding that the conspiracy involved be-\ntween 1.5 and 4.5 kilograms of ice methamphetamine, specif-\nically 1.968 kilograms, which corresponded to a base offense\nlevel of 36. Given its conclusion regarding the two-level\n\n45 Id. at 24.\n46 Id. at 32.\n47 Id.\n48 Id. at 41.\n\fNo. 18-2576 21\n\ndrug premises enhancement, the court determined that\nMr. Hopper had a total offense level of 38. With a criminal\nhistory category of I, the court concluded that his corre-\nsponding guidelines imprisonment range was 235 to 293\nmonths.\n Neither party objected to the court’s guideline range\nfindings. The Government recommended a sentence near or\nat the top of the guidelines range, while counsel for\nMr. Hopper recommended a sentence of 188 months. Based\non the information in the PSR, the factors set forth in 18\nU.S.C. § 3553(a), and the arguments of Mr. Hopper’s counsel,\nthe court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the guide-\nlines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by four\nyears of supervised release. At the conclusion of the hearing,\nthe court asked defense counsel, “Are there any other argu-\nments I have not considered?”49 Counsel for Mr. Hopper re-\nsponded that there were not. Following the entry of final\njudgment, Mr. Hopper filed a timely notice of appeal.\n II.\n DISCUSSION\n Mr. Hopper raises four arguments on appeal. First, he as-\nserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to\nsupport his conviction for conspiracy to distribute metham-\nphetamine and that, even if the Government established the\nexistence of multiple, smaller conspiracies, there was a fatal\nvariance between the single, overarching conspiracy alleged\nin the indictment and the Government’s proof at trial. Sec-\n\n\n49 Id. at 59.\n\f22 No. 18-2576\n\nond, he contends that the district court erred when it denied\nhis motion for disclosure of the cooperating witnesses’ prof-\nfer letters. Third, he challenges the district court’s applica-\ntion of a two-level sentence enhancement for maintaining a\ndrug premises. Finally, he submits that the district court\nerred in calculating his guidelines range because, in deter-\nmining Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, it double-counted\nthe drug transactions described by Holland and Riley.\n A.\n 1.\n We begin with Mr. Hopper’s attack on the sufficiency of\nthe evidence. United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1150\n(7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.\nDurrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990).50 He contends that\nthere was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine because the\nGovernment proved only a series of buyer-seller relation-\nships. He preserved this argument by moving for a judg-\nment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, so we review\n\n\n\n50 In United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on\nother grounds by United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990), we\nadopted a “policy” of “routinely addressing evidentiary sufficiency in\ncriminal cases when a defendant presents the issue on appeal.” Id. at\n1150. We reasoned that “[i]f in fact insufficient evidence is presented at a\nfirst trial, a retrial, on any basis, ordinarily may be a wasted endeavor.”\nId. By contrast, if we find “that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a con-\nviction, but reverse based on trial error, a retrial” is proper. Id. Accord-\ningly, to conserve the “scarce and costly resources” of the courts and the\nparties, we address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence first. Id.\n\fNo. 18-2576 23\n\nhis claim de novo. United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699,\n704 (7th Cir. 2013).\n A defendant’s burden in showing the evidence was in-\nsufficient to support a conviction is indeed a high one. See\nUnited States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 835 (7th Cir. 2008). In\nattempting to describe that burden, we often have said that\nthe burden is a direct function of the strength of the Gov-\nernment’s case. See United States v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489, 496–\n97 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th\nCir. 2013). Because “[w]e accord great deference to jury ver-\ndicts,” United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1004–05 (7th Cir.\n2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[w]e will over-\nturn a conviction on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds on-\nly if no rational jury could have found the essential elements\nof the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v.\nJohnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). “In making this de-\ntermination, we view all evidence and draw all reasonable\ninferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id.\nSee Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), superseded on\nother grounds by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death\nPenalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (stat-\ning standard of proof in criminal cases). Cf. Anderson v. Liber-\nty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–53 (1986) (comparing meth-\nodology in adjudicating a motion for judgment of acquittal\nin a criminal case with a motion for summary judgment in a\ncivil case).\n “To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the government\nmust prove that (1) two or more people agreed to commit an\nunlawful act, and (2) the defendant knowingly and inten-\ntionally joined in the agreement.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 754.\n“For a drug-distribution conspiracy, the government must\n\f24 No. 18-2576\n\nprove that the defendant knowingly agreed—either implicit-\nly or explicitly—with someone else to distribute drugs.”\nClaybrooks, 729 F.3d at 704 (internal quotation marks omit-\nted).\n Our cases “have underscored that ordinary drug transac-\ntions do not entail or reflect a conspiracy, for the buyer’s on-\nly purpose is to buy and the seller’s only purpose is to sell:\nthe buyer and seller lack a shared criminal goal.” United\nStates v. Neal, 907 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).\nIn other words, “evidence of a buyer-seller relationship,\nstanding alone, is insufficient to support a conspiracy con-\nviction.” United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th\nCir. 1991). Instead, we require “[e]vidence of an agreement\nto advance further distribution—beyond the initial transac-\ntion.” United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2015).\n“The government may prove the existence of this agreement\nthrough circumstantial evidence.” Claybrooks, 729 F.3d at\n704–05.\n A “nonexhaustive list of characteristics that strongly dis-\ntinguish a conspiracy from a buyer-seller relationship” in-\ncludes:\n “sales on credit or consignment, an agreement\n to look for other customers, a payment of\n commission on sales, an indication that one\n party advised the other on the conduct of the\n other’s business, or an agreement to warn of\n future threats to each other’s business stem-\n ming from competitors or law enforcement au-\n thorities.”\n\fNo. 18-2576 25\n\nUnited States v. Pereira, 783 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2015)\n(quoting Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755–56). “We employ a totali-\nty-of-the-circumstances approach in these cases,” “‘tak[ing]\ninto account all the evidence surrounding the alleged con-\nspiracy and mak[ing] a holistic assessment of whether the\njury reached a reasonable verdict.’” Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 813\n(quoting Brown, 726 F.3d at 1002).\n In this case, the Government presented sufficient evi-\ndence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Hopper en-\ntered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\nsouthern Illinois. Our conclusion is supported by evidence\nthat Mr. Hopper sold methamphetamine on credit, or\n“fronted” it, to his co-conspirators and that he engaged in\npooling arrangements with other co-conspirators to pur-\nchase large quantities of methamphetamine for further dis-\ntribution.\n Evidence of repeated, “fronted” transactions can be com-\npelling circumstantial evidence of an agreement to distribute\ndrugs because it demonstrates that the defendant “had\nknowingly thrown his lot in” with other members of the\nconspiracy. United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1070 (7th Cir.\n1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a fronting ar-\nrangement, “the seller becomes the buyer’s creditor, adding\na dimension to the relationship that goes beyond a spot sale\nfor cash.” United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir.\n2008). Such a relationship indicates that the defendant “had\na keen interest” in his co-conspirators’ “success at reselling”\nthe drugs. Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070. Although “not all credit\nsales can support an inference that there was an agreement\nto distribute,” “when a credit sale is coupled with certain\ncharacteristics inherent in an ongoing wholesale buyer-seller\n\f26 No. 18-2576\n\nrelationship—i.e., large quantities of drugs, repeat purchas-\nes[,] or some other enduring arrangement—the credit sale\nbecomes sufficient evidence to distinguish a conspiracy from\na nonconspiratorial buyer-seller relationship.” Johnson, 592\nF.3d at 756 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).\n At Mr. Hopper’s trial, the Government presented evi-\ndence that he fronted methamphetamine to Williams, Shu-\nman, and Karnes. Williams testified that he obtained about\none to two ounces of ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hop-\nper “[o]ff and on” for about one year.51 He stated that some-\ntimes, he bought the drugs outright, while other times,\nMr. Hopper provided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a\n“front.”52 Williams explained that, in this fronting arrange-\nment, Mr. Hopper provided him a quantity of drugs, some\nof which Williams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper\nback for previously fronted drugs. Williams further testified\nthat occasionally, Mr. Hopper called Williams and asked\nhim to bring customers who owed Mr. Hopper money to\nMr. Hopper’s house to settle their debt. Williams explained\nthat he helped Mr. Hopper collect money from his customers\nbecause Williams “was selling drugs for him” and “to help\nhim out in his drug business.”53\n Shuman also testified that he bought drugs from\nMr. Hopper “on a front.”54 In early 2016, the quantities he\n\n\n51 R.118 at 59.\n52 Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).\n53 Id. at 64.\n54 R.123 at 26.\n\fNo. 18-2576 27\n\npurchased increased from grams to ounces of methamphet-\namine. The two had an arrangement in which Mr. Hopper\nplaced methamphetamine for Shuman in Mr. Hopper’s gar-\nage. Shuman retrieved the drugs from the garage and left in\ntheir place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for previously\nfronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testified that he\ndrove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to deliver meth-\namphetamine to his customers. He also described two occa-\nsions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Missouri, to\nobtain methamphetamine. When they returned home,\nMr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\n Similarly, Peyton testified that Karnes, her former boy-\nfriend, obtained methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a\nfront,” in which he would sell drugs to others in order to\npay Mr. Hopper back for the drugs he had previously ob-\ntained.55 She stated that during the summer of 2016,\nMr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five “8-balls,” or 3.5\ngram quantities of ice methamphetamine, several times a\nweek.56 She added that on occasion, Mr. Hopper sent Wil-\nliams to deliver drugs to Karnes.\n These fronting arrangements are “substantial evidence”\nthat Mr. Hopper “expected and encouraged” Williams,\nShuman, and Karnes “to redistribute the drugs he had pro-\nvided.” United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir.\n2009). Because Mr. Hopper expected to be repaid based on\nsales of previously fronted methamphetamine, “he was de-\npendent upon the further resale of the drugs to make a prof-\n\n55 R.118 at 90.\n56 Id. at 89.\n\f28 No. 18-2576\n\nit.” Id.; see also United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 808–09\n(7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that evidence that co-conspirator\nsold cocaine to the defendant “on credit” indicated that he\n“took a stake in her business—he received payment after,\nand as a result of, her resale”). Mr. Hopper also “demon-\nstrated a high level of trust and confidence in” Shuman, Wil-\nliams, and Karnes, given that he provided them “with large\nquantities of drugs without requiring any payment until the\ndrugs were resold.” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816.57\n That Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes repeatedly, in large quantities,\nover an extended period of time makes clear that these activ-\nities were more than mere buyer-seller relationships. See\nBrown, 726 F.3d at 1006 (permitting “an inference of conspir-\nacy” based on evidence of “repeated transactions, in whole-\nsale quantities, on credit”). These “factors suggest standard-\nized transactions and lower transaction costs in the business\nas well as a continuing relationship.” Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 809;\nsee also Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070 (reasoning that evidence of\n“multiple transactions over a prolonged period of time”\nsuggested “that transaction costs … were quite low, which\ncounsels a finding of conspiracy”). Evidence that Williams\nand Shuman drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\ndeliver drugs to his customers and that Mr. Hopper sent\nWilliams to deliver drugs on his own or to pick up custom-\ners who owed Mr. Hopper money reinforces that these rela-\n\n\n57Cf. United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting “[t]he\nmutual trust in this case was less than it would have been had [a\nco-conspirator] ‘fronted’ cocaine to the defendant (a factor mentioned in\nalmost all the cases) rather than being paid in cash at the time of sale”).\n\fNo. 18-2576 29\n\ntionships were in furtherance of Mr. Hopper’s distribution of\ndrugs. Based on this evidence, a jury could rationally con-\nclude that Mr. Hopper conspired to distribute methamphet-\namine. See Pereira, 783 F.3d at 704–05.\n The Government also presented considerable testimony\nestablishing that Mr. Hopper pooled his resources with other\nmembers of the conspiracy to obtain methamphetamine at a\nreduced cost from out-of-state sources. This is circumstantial\nevidence of an agreement to distribute drugs because, by\n“put[ting] their money and transportation resources together\nfor an extended period of time,” the co-conspirators “there-\nby ha[d] a stake in each other’s success, and kn[ew] that the\nothers intended to resell” the drugs. United States v. Harris,\n567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also\nUnited States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 475 (7th Cir. 2016) (hold-\ning that “[a] reasonable jury could have found that the\nshared supplier, funds, and product indicated an agree-\nment” to sell drugs). Based on such evidence, we upheld the\ndefendant’s conspiracy conviction in United States v. Hay-\nwood, 324 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2003), reasoning that:\n [I]n driving to Chicago together, then bringing\n the drugs back … and splitting them up upon\n their return, Haywood and Jackson had a\n standardized way of doing business; they had\n a continuing relationship, making three trips\n together to Chicago and talking about making\n one to Oklahoma; and they both knew that the\n cocaine would be resold.\nId. at 517. Similarly, in Harris, we held that there was suffi-\ncient evidence of a conspiracy to distribute drugs where the\ndefendant “pooled his money with that of … the other al-\n\f30 No. 18-2576\n\nleged co-conspirators to buy larger amounts of crack cocaine\nfrom outside the state for resale.” 567 F.3d at 851.\n In this case, Holland, Riley, and Weir testified that, to-\ngether with Mr. Hopper, they pooled their money and\ntransportation resources over approximately a month-long\nperiod to purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\nGirardeau, Missouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the\nmoney to Riley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland\nand Riley drove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they\nreturned, the group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hop-\nper’s home to divide up the drugs. The group pooled their\nmoney multiple times per week to purchase four ounces of\nmethamphetamine at a time, which they divided into equal,\none-ounce shares upon return to Illinois.\n Evidence that Mr. Hopper pooled funds, shared suppli-\ners, and coordinated transport out of state with Holland, Ri-\nley, and Weir, underscored a common goal between them to\ndistribute methamphetamine.58 That this pooling arrange-\nment involved multiple transactions per week over an ex-\n\n58 United States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 474 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding\nconspiracy conviction based on testimony that Lomax and his\nco-conspirator “shared customers, a supplier, and heroin, and pooled\nfunds”); United States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (reason-\ning that evidence that the co-conspirators “pooled their money and\nshared rides to buy cheaper crack” from outside the state “mean[t] that\neach could earn more if the others succeeded”); United States v. Haywood,\n324 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming conspiracy conviction where\nHaywood and his co-conspirator “pooled their money and shared rides\nto Chicago in order to buy inexpensive crack, meaning that each could\nrun a cheaper operation—and earn higher profits—if the other succeed-\ned”).\n\fNo. 18-2576 31\n\ntended period of time reinforces the conclusion that\nMr. Hopper had entered an agreement to distribute drugs in\nsouthern Illinois. Thus, the jury had ample evidence, based\non the “fronted” transactions and the pooling arrangement,\nto convict Mr. Hopper of conspiring to distribute metham-\nphetamine.\n 2.\n Mr. Hopper also submits that even if the Government\npresented some evidence of conspiracy, we must vacate his\nconviction “because of the variance between the indictment\n(alleging a single, overarching conspiracy) and the proof at\ntrial (showing, at most, smaller sub-conspiracies), which\nprejudiced Mr. Hopper.”59 We conclude that there was no\nfatal variance in this case.\n At the close of all evidence, Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel\nmoved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of\nCriminal Procedure 29. Rule 29 requires the court to “enter a\njudgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence\nis insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Mr. Hopper’s counsel\ndid not articulate the grounds for his motion and, in denying\nthe motion, the district court ruled only that the Government\nhad presented sufficient evidence of the charge against\nMr. Hopper.60 Because Mr. Hopper’s counsel did not raise\nthe possibility of a fatal variance in the district court, that\ncourt did not have the opportunity to address this claim.\n\n\n\n\n59 Appellant’s Br. 17–18.\n60 See R.123 at 55.\n\f32 No. 18-2576\n\nTherefore, we review his variance claim for plain error only.\nUnited States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2007).61\n “A variance arises when the facts proved by the govern-\nment at trial differ from those alleged in the indictment.”\nAvila, 557 F.3d at 815 (quoting United States v. Stigler, 413\nF.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2005)). We treat a conspiracy variance\nclaim “as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence.” Unit-\ned States v. Handlin, 366 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2004). Alt-\nhough we treat the question of variance as an attack on the\nsufficiency of the evidence, a party must raise with specifici-\nty the issue of variance. A timely objection affords the dis-\ntrict court the opportunity to address the issue and under-\ntake curative steps. See United States v Pierson, 925 F.3d 913,\n921–22 (7th Cir. 2019). To prevail on his claim, Mr. Hopper\nmust show both that (1) “no rational trier of fact could have\nfound that the evidence at trial proved a single conspiracy”\nand (2) “the variance was prejudicial.” United States v.\nDeKelaita, 875 F.3d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 2017). “Even if the evi-\ndence arguably established multiple conspiracies, there is no\nmaterial variance from an indictment charging a single con-\nspiracy if a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond\na reasonable doubt the existence of the single conspiracy\ncharged in the indictment.” United States v. Williams, 272\nF.3d 845, 862 (7th Cir. 2001).\n Mr. Hopper contends that there was a variance between\nthe Government’s proof at trial and the conspiracy alleged in\n\n\n61Like the defendant in United States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 795 (7th\nCir. 2007), Mr. Holmes did not ask for a jury instruction on multiple con-\nspiracies.\n\fNo. 18-2576 33\n\nthe indictment because the Government “failed to tie togeth-\ner the disparate purposes of Mr. Hopper’s alleged\nco-conspirators” to demonstrate a single conspiracy.62 He\nsubmits that this variance prejudiced him at trial and at sen-\ntencing.\n To evaluate Mr. Hopper’s variance claim, “we turn to the\nindictment first and then to the proof at trial.” Id. at 863. The\nindictment alleged that from about January 2015 through\nMay 31, 2017, in Williamson and Franklin Counties, in the\nSouthern District of Illinois, “and elsewhere,” Mr. Hopper\nconspired “with other persons known and unknown” to dis-\ntribute methamphetamine.63 As detailed above, at trial, the\nGovernment presented substantial evidence that Mr. Hop-\nper entered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\nsouthern Illinois. It is sufficient that the purpose of the con-\nspiracy “was simply to distribute narcotics,” and that “each\nco-conspirator agreed to advance” that goal. United States v.\nMartin, 618 F.3d 705, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2010). Based on the ev-\nidence that Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes for further distribution and that\nhe engaged in a pooling arrangement with Holland, Riley,\nand Weir to obtain methamphetamine at a low cost for re-\nsale, a rational jury could have found that Mr. Hopper joined\nthe single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Because\n“[t]he key to proving a conspiracy is that the defendant\njoined [an] agreement, not [a] group,” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816,\nany failure to identify the connection between Mr. Hopper’s\n\n\n62 Appellant’s Br. 34.\n63 R.32 at 1.\n\f34 No. 18-2576\n\nco-conspirators did not amount to a material variance. See,\ne.g., Williams, 272 F.3d at 863 (concluding there was no mate-\nrial variance where there was sufficient evidence “for the ju-\nry to conclude that a number of people had an agreement to\ndistribute drugs in East St. Louis, and that Williams joined\nthat agreement”).\n In any event, Mr. Hopper suffered no prejudice as a re-\nsult of the alleged variance. First, he contends that the vari-\nance prejudiced him at trial because his counsel “was unable\nto adequately prepare his defense because the government\ndid not define the scope of the alleged conspiracy until clos-\ning arguments.”64 But “[i]t is the grand jury’s statement of\nthe existence of the conspiracy agreement rather than the\nidentity of those who agree which places the defendant on\nnotice of the charge he must be prepared to meet.” Townsend,\n924 F.2d at 1389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The\nGovernment’s evidence at trial demonstrated that Mr. Hop-\nper joined others in an agreement to distribute methamphet-\namine in southern Illinois. Mr. Hopper had sufficient notice\nof the charged conspiracy and the evidence presented at tri-\nal.65\n Next, Mr. Hopper submits that “[t]he indictment and the\ngovernment’s arguments at trial were so broad as to make it\n\n64 Appellant’s Br. 36.\n65 See,e.g., United States v. Hardimon, 329 F. App’x 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2009)\n(unpublished) (determining that there was no variance and explaining\nthat “the indictment’s allegation of a conspiracy agreement alone was\nsufficient notice of the charge that Hardimon needed to be prepared to\nmeet, and the indictment was not required to name all those who partic-\nipated in the conspiracy”).\n\fNo. 18-2576 35\n\nimpossible for Mr. Hopper to invoke his Fifth Amendment\nright against double jeopardy” in a subsequent prosecu-\ntion.66 He stresses that the record does not reveal the scope\nof the conspiracy, his role in it, or “with whom the jury con-\nvicted him of conspiring.”67 If we uphold his conviction “on\nthe basis that some sub-conspiracy existed,” he posits, the\nGovernment could indict him “for any other act within that\ntime frame even though he had already been found guilty by\nthe jury on the charged indictment.”68\n We have held that, despite a variance between the in-\ndictment and the proof at trial, we had “no difficulty in\njudging the scope of the conviction for double jeopardy pur-\nposes” where the indictment alleged a specific crime, “dur-\ning a finite interval,” “involved a particular perpetrator,”\nand “alleged specific misconduct by the perpetrator.” United\nStates v. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 822, 824 (7th Cir. 2007)\n(upholding defendant’s mail fraud conviction because de-\nfendant was not prejudiced by the variance between the in-\ndictment, “which pinpointed a particular step in the pay-\nment process” of her alleged fraud, “and the proof at trial,\nwhich established another”). In the same way, here, the in-\ndictment alleged a specific crime (conspiracy to distribute\nmethamphetamine), during a finite interval (about January\n2015 through about May 31, 2017), involving a particular\nperpetrator (Mr. Hopper and “other persons known and un-\nknown”), and specific misconduct by the perpetrator (know-\n\n\n66 Appellant’s Br. 38.\n67 Id.\n68 Id. at 38–39.\n\f36 No. 18-2576\n\ningly conspiring to distribute a mixture and substance con-\ntaining methamphetamine).69 The scope of Mr. Hopper’s\nconviction is sufficiently specific to avoid a future double\njeopardy problem.\n He further contends that the alleged variance prejudiced\nhim at trial because the jury was confused about the instruc-\ntions regarding the scope of the conspiracy. Evidence of\nmultiple conspiracies may pose “a danger of ‘spillover’ prej-\nudice” where multiple defendants are tried together and the\njury hears incriminating evidence relevant against only\nsome, but not all, of the defendants. Townsend, 924 F.2d at\n1411. Because Mr. Hopper was tried alone, however, this\nconcern was not implicated. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis,\n37 F.3d 301, 306 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “there could be\nno prejudice” where “Curtis was the only person on trial,\nthus eliminating the customary concern with jury confusion\nresulting from the ‘spillover’ effect associated with simulta-\nneously trying multiple defendants with various connec-\ntions to the purported scheme”).\n Additionally, Mr. Hopper asserts that the variance preju-\ndiced him at sentencing because it “improperly increased the\nquantity of drugs attributed to him.”70 As we have stated,\nhowever, there was ample evidence to support Mr. Hopper’s\nconspiracy conviction, including but not limited to the pool-\ning arrangement he participated in with Holland, Riley, and\nWeir. Moreover, the PSR calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant\nconduct based on “the amounts obtained by the defendant,\n\n69 R.32 at 1.\n70 Appellant’s Br. 39.\n\fNo. 18-2576 37\n\nwhich he then distributed to others.”71 Because the district\ncourt did not sentence Mr. Hopper based on drug transac-\ntions not related to the conspiracy in which he participated,\nsee Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1412 (determining there was no\nprejudice where “none of the defendants [could] claim that\ntheir sentences were increased on the basis of drug transac-\ntions that were not attributable to the limited conspiracies in\nwhich they participated”), or based on drug quantities sold\nby his co-conspirators that were within the scope of the con-\nspiracy, see Avila, 557 F.3d at 819 (concluding there was no\nprejudice where the defendant’s sentence was based on\ndrugs he supplied to others, not “the quantities of drugs that\nwere seized from the entire drug organization”), he did not\nsuffer prejudice at sentencing.\n B.\n 1.\n Mr. Hopper next submits that the district court erred\nwhen it ruled that the Government was not required to dis-\nclose the proffer letters of its cooperating witnesses. He as-\nserts that the court erroneously “based its decision solely on\nBrady[72] and Giglio,[73] and thus did not recognize” that Fed-\neral Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 “is an independent and\nmore expansive basis for disclosure of proffer letters.”74\nMr. Hopper’s trial counsel never filed a request under Rule\n\n\n71 R.94 ¶ 21.\n72 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\n73 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\n74 Appellant’s Br. 14.\n\f38 No. 18-2576\n\n16 for disclosure of the proffer letters. Nor did counsel sug-\ngest to the district court, during the hearing on his motion or\notherwise, that Rule 16 might be a basis for disclosure. That\ncounsel moved for disclosure of the proffer letters and ar-\ngued that the court should disregard our decision in United\nStates v. Weidenburner, 550 F. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (un-\npublished), was not sufficient to preserve the instant argu-\nment under Rule 16.75 Because there is no evidence in the\nrecord that Mr. Hopper intended to relinquish this argu-\nment, however, we conclude that he has forfeited, not\nwaived, his request for disclosure under Rule 16. United\nStates v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining\nthat “[f]orfeiture occurs when a defendant negligently fails\nto assert a right in a timely fashion”).\n Rule 16, which governs discovery and inspection, pro-\nvides in relevant part that:\n Upon a defendant’s request, the government\n must permit the defendant to inspect and to\n\n\n75 Cf. United States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015) (defend-\nant forfeited argument that his arrest was unlawful because his motion\nto suppress challenged only the protective sweep of his home, not his\narrest); United States v. Kelly, 772 F.3d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 2014) (defend-\nant forfeited argument that the warrant application failed to establish\nprobable cause because his motion to suppress argued only that the war-\nrant lacked sufficient particularity in the description of the place to be\nsearched); United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007) (de-\nfendant forfeited argument that his waiver of his Fifth Amendment\nrights and subsequent confession were involuntary due to the coercive\nconditions of his confinement because, in the district court, he argued\nonly that his confession was involuntary because the police did not ad-\nminister Miranda warnings).\n\fNo. 18-2576 39\n\n copy or photograph books, papers, documents,\n data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings\n or places, or copies or portions of any of these\n items, if the item is within the government’s\n possession, custody, or control and … the item\n is material to preparing the defense.\nFed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E).\n Relatedly, Rule 12 provides that certain motions, includ-\ning a request for “discovery under Rule 16,” “must be raised\nby pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reason-\nably available and the motion can be determined without a\ntrial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). Under this\nRule, “[t]he court may … set a deadline for the parties to\nmake pretrial motions,” and if no deadline is set, then “the\ndeadline is the start of trial.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1). “If a\nparty does not meet the deadline for making a Rule 12(b)(3)\nmotion, the motion is untimely.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).\n“But a court may consider the defense, objection, or request\nif the party shows good cause.” Id.\n Rule 12 thus “imposes an antecedent good-cause re-\nquirement when a defendant fails to file a timely motion.”\nUnited States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015). In\nother words, “if a defendant fails to raise a[n] … argument\nbelow—even if he does so under circumstances that suggest\na forfeiture—we cannot proceed directly to a review of the\ndistrict court’s actions for plain error.” United States v. Kelly,\n772 F.3d 1072, 1079 (7th Cir. 2014). Instead, we first must ask\nwhether there was good cause for the failure. United States v.\nJohnson, 415 F.3d 728, 730–31 (7th Cir. 2005).\n\f40 No. 18-2576\n\n Mr. Hopper offers no explanation for his trial counsel’s\nfailure to request disclosure of the proffer letters under Rule\n16 or to otherwise assert Rule 16 as a basis for disclosure of\nthe letters before the district court. Further, his counsel made\nno request for relief based on good cause before the district\ncourt or in this court. Absent a showing of good cause as re-\nquired by Rule 12, his claim is not subject to further review.\nUnited States v. Daniels, 803 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2015);\nUnited States v. Hargrove, 508 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2007).76\n 2.\n Mr. Hopper further contends that “the district court\nerred in presuming that proffer letters are never” required to\nbe disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or\nGiglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).77 We review the\ndistrict court’s determination that the proffer letters need not\nbe disclosed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jumah,\n599 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 2010).\n At the hearing on Mr. Hopper’s motion, the discussion\ncentered on our decision in Weidenburner, where we held\nthat proffer letters “are not Giglio material or Jencks Act[78]\nstatements.” 550 F. App’x at 304. In that case, the defendant\nmoved for a new trial based on the Government’s assertion\n\n76 We note in passing that Mr. Hopper’s counsel had the information\ncontained in the proffer letters, even though he did not have the letters\nthemselves. He also was permitted to cross examine the witness about\nthe proffer process. His client therefore suffered no prejudice from the\nabsence of the letters.\n77 Appellant’s Br. 16.\n78 18 U.S.C. § 3500.\n\fNo. 18-2576 41\n\nthat it could not locate copies of the proffer letters for two\ncodefendants who testified against Weidenburner. Id. Nei-\nther witness disputed the existence of the proffer letters, and\nWeidenburner received copies of both witnesses’ plea\nagreements. Id. Consequently, we rejected Weidenburner’s\nclaim of nondisclosure as frivolous. Id. Acknowledging that\n“Giglio requires disclosure of inducements for a witness[]’s\ntestimony,” we reasoned that “the prosecutor fulfilled that\nobligation by producing the plea agreements, which de-\nscribe[d] the benefits [the witnesses] would receive for coop-\nerating.” Id. Because “[t]he proffer letters were preliminary\nto the resulting plea agreements,” we concluded that “Giglio\nwas satisfied by disclosure of the plea agreements.” Id. Fur-\nther, we determined that “the Jencks Act [wa]s irrelevant”\nbecause “[t]he proffer letters were statements of the prosecu-\ntor who wrote them,” not “factual narrative[s] useful for im-\npeachment.” Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).79\n\n\n79 At least one of our sister circuits also has held that “the government\nsatisfied its obligations” by disclosing a cooperating witness’s plea\nagreement to the defense. United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 880\n(8th Cir. 2007). In Santisteban, the defendant alleged that the Govern-\nment’s non-disclosure of the proffer letters sent to a cooperating witness\n“violated his due process right to receive exculpatory or impeachment\nevidence.” Id. Because “the government had already provided [the wit-\nness]’s plea agreement,” the district court “declined to compel the pro-\nduction” of the proffer letters. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that there was\nno due process violation. Id. “Regardless of any preliminary proffer\nagreements,” the court reasoned, “the formal plea agreement governed\n[the witness]’s cooperation, and it provided the jury with a sufficient ba-\nsis for judging the credibility of [his] testimony at trial.” Id. The court\nconcluded that “[t]he terms of the proffer letters were not material to the\ndefense.” Id.\n\f42 No. 18-2576\n\n In this case, the Government disclosed the cooperating\nwitnesses’ plea agreements, which superseded the proffer\nletters and outlined the terms of the witnesses’ cooperation.\nThe agreements provided a sufficient basis for Mr. Hopper’s\ncounsel to impeach the Government’s witnesses and for the\njury to assess the credibility of those witnesses. Therefore,\nthe district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied\nMr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the proffer letters.\n C.\n Next, Mr. Hopper challenges the district court’s finding\nthat he was subject to a two-level sentence enhancement\nbased on evidence that he maintained his Creal Springs resi-\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\nMr. Hopper preserved this challenge by filing an objection to\nthe application of the enhancement in the district court.\nTherefore, “we review the district court’s application of the\nU.S. Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its underlying factual\nfindings for clear error.” United States v. Flores-Olague, 717\nF.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 2013).\n The guidelines provide for a two-level sentence en-\nhancement “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for the\npurpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub-\nstance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). This includes “storage of a\ncontrolled substance for the purpose of distribution.” Id.\ncmt. n.17. The application notes clarify that\n“[m]anufacturing or distributing a controlled substance need\nnot be the sole purpose for which the premises was main-\ntained, but must be one of the defendant’s primary or prin-\ncipal uses for the premises, rather than one of the defend-\nant’s incidental or collateral uses for the premises.” Id. Be-\ncause it is undisputed that Mr. Hopper “maintained” the\n\fNo. 18-2576 43\n\nCreal Springs house, which was his home, our review is lim-\nited to whether distributing methamphetamine was a “pri-\nmary or principal” use of the home.\n “[T]o determine whether drug distribution was a prima-\nry or incidental use, the district courts are not required to\napply a simple balancing test that compares the frequency of\nunlawful activity at the residence with the frequency of law-\nful uses.” United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir.\n2017) (per curiam). That is because “such a test would im-\nmunize every family home that is also used for drug distri-\nbution from being deemed an illegally maintained ‘premis-\nes,’” since “the amount of lawful activity in a home is all but\ncertain to exceed the amount of illegal activity.” Id. Instead,\n“the sentencing court should focus on both the frequency\nand significance of the illicit activities.” Id. “Neither a specif-\nic frequency nor a particular significance automatically war-\nrants applying the enhancement.” United States v. Sanchez,\n710 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on other grounds,\nSanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013). “Rather, we con-\nsider the two in tandem and determine whether the prohib-\nited purpose can be fairly described as a ‘primary or princi-\npal’ use of the premises.” Id. Factors relevant to this analysis\ninclude “quantities dealt, customer interactions, keeping\n‘tools of the trade’ and business records, and accepting pay-\nment.” Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284.\n First, with respect to frequency, Mr. Hopper contends\nthat Wright’s “vague and inconsistent testimony” at the sen-\ntencing hearing “was not enough” to establish the frequent\nuse of his home to distribute drugs.80 He further asserts that\n\n80 Appellant’s Br. 45.\n\f44 No. 18-2576\n\n“the district court failed to account for [his] affirmative deci-\nsion to stop using his home for drug distribution several\nmonths before the end of the charged conspiracy.”81 We con-\nclude that these contentions are without merit.\n Testimony introduced at Mr. Hopper’s trial and at the\nsentencing hearing highlighted that he distributed metham-\nphetamine from his home on approximately a weekly basis\nfor the duration of the conspiracy. Wright testified that she\nhad lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home from\nabout October 2015 until May 2017. During this time, meth-\namphetamine “was always there” and she saw drugs in the\nhome “[p]retty much every day.”82 Wright estimated that,\nwhile she lived with him, Mr. Hopper distributed metham-\nphetamine from his residence approximately “[w]eekly.”83\nShe added, however, that toward the end of their time living\ntogether, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling diminished and he was\n“just using.”84\n Similarly, Shuman testified that Mr. Hopper distributed\nmethamphetamine to him while Shuman was living at the\n\n\n81 Id.\n82 R.125 at 8.\n83 Id. at 10.\n84 Id. at 24:8–15 (“Q. Ms. Wright, did you also add that most of the meth\ntransactions that you were aware of occurred at Hopper’s brother’s\nhouse, Mark Hopper? A. I’ve never—I didn’t say that like that. That’s\nbeen taken out of context. I said that happened there, but everything was\ndone in Creal in the very beginning, and then he slacked off, and to-\nwards the end of the relationship he was just using, he wasn’t selling\nit.”).\n\fNo. 18-2576 45\n\nCreal Springs home in December 2015 and January 2016. Af-\nter Shuman returned from jail in early 2016, the two had an\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\nand left the money he owed Mr. Hopper in their place. Mul-\ntiple witnesses, including Craig, Holland, and Peyton, also\ntestified that they observed Mr. Hopper sell methampheta-\nmine to other individuals at his home.\n This evidence that Mr. Hopper stored drugs at his house\nand regularly distributed methamphetamine to customers\nthere for the better part of 2016 confirms that he used the\nhouse for the purpose of drug distribution with sufficient\nfrequency.85 That Mr. Hopper conducted distribution activi-\nties with less frequency toward the end of the conspiracy\ndoes not undermine this conclusion.\n Turning to the significance of the distribution activities,\nMr. Hopper submits that “[t]he scope of drug activity at [his]\n\n\n85 See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 2017)\n(concluding that “evidence of eight transactions, most within a\ntwo-month period, support[ed] the courts’ findings that significant deals\nwere occurring frequently enough for the home to be deemed, in es-\nsence, a drug den for the purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(12)”); United States v.\nWinfield, 846 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (upholding appli-\ncation of enhancement based on evidence that “in the twelve weeks be-\nfore the raid, [an] informant bought drugs from Winfield at his apart-\nment four times and spotted additional drugs and drug paraphernalia\nduring each transaction”); United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 533\n(7th Cir. 2013) (holding that enhancement applied based on evidence that\nthe defendant “sold and stored drugs at his home” and “did so ‘on a dai-\nly basis’ over a three-year period”).\n\f46 No. 18-2576\n\nhome was not significant enough to warrant the enhance-\nment.”86 Again, the testimony adduced at trial and at sen-\ntencing amply demonstrated that Mr. Hopper carried on\nsignificant aspects of his distribution business from his\nhome.\n We have already observed that there was substantial tes-\ntimony that Mr. Hopper stored and distributed metham-\nphetamine at his house.87 In this respect, Wright testified\nthat Mr. Hopper had drug scales at the Creal Springs home,\nwhich he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”88 Further, we\nconsider evidence of financial transactions in the home to be\nsignificant activity for the purpose of distributing drugs.89\nHere, Williams testified that, when customers owed\nMr. Hopper money, Williams occasionally brought these in-\n\n86 Appellant’s Br. 47.\n87 See, e.g., Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284 (upholding application of enhance-\nment based on “evidence that drugs were shipped to and stored at Con-\ntreras’s home” and that “Contreras accepted payment for drugs at his\nhome”). We have also recognized that keeping “tools of the trade” on the\npremises may indicate “that drug trafficking was the principal use of the\npremises.” United States v. Thomas, 845 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 2017) (in-\nternal quotation marks omitted) (upholding application of enhancement\nwhere a “search of the home yielded a digital scale, a cutting agent, and\nplastic sandwich baggies with the corners cut out”).\n88 R.125 at 9.\n89 See United States v. Sanchez, 710 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on\nother grounds, Sanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013) (noting that “in\nconducting this large drug trade, Sanchez used his residence not only for\nthe drop-off, storage, and pick-up of drugs, but also as a secure place to\nsettle the financials”), vacated on other grounds, Sanchez v. United States,\n571 U.S. 801 (2013) .\n\fNo. 18-2576 47\n\ndividuals to the house to settle their debt with Mr. Hopper.\nWright also acknowledged that Mr. Hopper collected money\nfrom individuals who bought methamphetamine at his\nhome. Finally, testimony that the defendant’s “only regular\nand reliable source of income stemmed from proceeds of\ndrug trafficking activities” is evidence that the distribution\nof drugs from his home was significant to his livelihood.90\nFor this reason, it is meaningful that Wright testified that\nMr. Hopper had received money from a settlement and had\na “side business” buying and selling cars, but that he did not\n“officially work.”91\n In sum, we conclude that there was evidence of frequent,\nsignificant drug distribution activities at Mr. Hopper’s\nhome. Therefore, the district court properly determined that\nMr. Hopper was subject to the sentence enhancement for\nmaintaining a drug premises.\n D.\n Finally, we turn to Mr. Hopper’s claim that the district\ncourt erred in determining his guidelines range because it\nadopted an incorrectly calculated relevant conduct finding\nfrom the PSR. He contends that most of the relevant conduct\nwas based on drug amounts identified in interviews the\n\n\n90 Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 533; see also Winfield, 846 F.3d at 243 (noting\nthat “Winfield at the time of his arrest was ‘primarily living off proceeds\nfrom drug sales’”); Sanchez, 710 F.3d at 732 (reasoning that because\n“Sanchez had no legitimate job and no source of income beyond his drug\nsales,” “the illicit transactions occurring at the premises were signifi-\ncant—in quantity, in scope, and in importance to Sanchez’s livelihood”).\n91 R.125 at 32.\n\f48 No. 18-2576\n\nprobation office conducted with Holland and Riley. Accord-\ning to Mr. Hopper, in their separate interviews, Holland and\nRiley were actually referring to the same transactions. Thus,\nby including the drug amounts described in both Holland\nand Riley’s interviews in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s rel-\nevant conduct, the district court double-counted the same set\nof drugs.\n Mr. Hopper did not challenge the relevant conduct calcu-\nlation in his objection to the initial PSR, his objection to the\nsecond revised PSR, or at the sentencing hearing. Therefore,\nwe review his claim for plain error only. Fed. R. Crim. P.\n52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be\nconsidered even though it was not brought to the [district]\ncourt’s attention.”). We have discretion to remedy the for-\nfeited error provided that Mr. Hopper has satisfied the fol-\nlowing conditions: (1) there is an error “that has not been in-\ntentionally relinquished or abandoned”; (2) the error is\n“plain—that is to say, clear or obvious”; (3) the error “affect-\ned the defendant’s substantial rights”; and (4) the error “se-\nriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of\njudicial proceedings.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136\nS. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507\nU.S. 725, 736 (1993), superseded on other grounds by rule, Fed.\nR. Crim. P. 24(c) (1999)); see also United States v. Pierson, 925\nF.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\n The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence has clarified\nthe application of the third and fourth prongs in the context\nof sentencing errors. To demonstrate that the error affected\nhis substantial rights, “in the ordinary case,” the defendant\nmust “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,\nthe outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”\n\fNo. 18-2576 49\n\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (internal quotation marks\nomitted). According to the Court, “[w]hen a defendant is\nsentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or\nnot the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct\nrange—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient\nto show a reasonable probability of a different outcome ab-\nsent the error.” Id. at 1345. “That probability is all that is\nneeded to establish an effect on substantial rights for pur-\nposes of obtaining relief under Rule 52(b).” Id. at 1349. Fur-\nther, “[i]n the ordinary case, … the failure to correct a plain\nGuidelines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights\nwill seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputa-\ntion of judicial proceedings.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States,\n138 S. Ct. 1897, 1911 (2018). In other words, “[a] plain Guide-\nlines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights is pre-\ncisely the type of error that ordinarily warrants relief under\nRule 52(b).” Id. at 1907.\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy.92 In particu-\nlar:\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\n\n92 Though the probation office revised Mr. Hopper’s PSR twice before\nsentencing, the relevant conduct calculations did not change. For pur-\nposes of this discussion, we reference the most recent version of the re-\nport, the second revised PSR.\n\f50 No. 18-2576\n\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\n es = 850 grams)[93]\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\n that from January through March, he sold one\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\n grams)[94]\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\n ice).[95]\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\n grams = 42 grams)[96]\n\n\n93 R.94 ¶ 12.\n94 Id. ¶ 14.\n95 Id. ¶ 19.\n96 Id. ¶ 20.\n\fNo. 18-2576 51\n\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”97\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\ning.”98 As demonstrated by the following chart, adding the\ndrug amounts described above, the PSR totaled Mr. Hop-\nper’s relevant conduct to be 1.9685 kilograms of ice meth-\namphetamine.\n Interviewee Drug Amount\n Holland 850 grams\n Riley 793 grams\n Wright 283.5 grams\n Wright 42 grams\n 1,968.5 grams\n Total\n (1.9685 kilograms)\n We agree with Mr. Hopper that the district court plainly\nerred in adopting the PSR’s relevant conduct calculation.\nFirst, we conclude that Mr. Hopper did not “intentionally\nrelinquish[] or abandon[]” this challenge. Molina-Martinez,\n136 S. Ct. at 1343. Neither party objected to the relevant con-\nduct calculation prior to or during the sentencing hearing.\nAt sentencing, the district court adopted the findings of the\nPSR, including the relevant conduct calculation, without fur-\n\n\n97 Id. ¶ 21.\n98 Id.\n\f52 No. 18-2576\n\nther comment. “Given the complexity” of calculating a de-\nfendant’s guidelines range, “district courts sometimes make\nmistakes.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904. Accordingly,\n“when a district court’s sentencing of a defendant within the\nframework of an incorrect Guidelines range goes unnoticed\nby the parties as well,” a defendant is “not entirely without\nrecourse.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\n Second, the error here was plain. At trial, Holland, Riley,\nand Weir all testified that, together with Mr. Hopper, they\npooled their money over approximately a month-long peri-\nod sometime between late 2015 and early 2016 to purchase\nmethamphetamine from a source in Cape Girardeau, Mis-\nsouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the money to Ri-\nley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland and Riley\ndrove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they returned,\nthe group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hopper’s home\nto divide up the drugs. Holland, Riley, and Weir all de-\nscribed how the group pooled their money to purchase four\nounces of methamphetamine at a time, which they divided\ninto equal, one-ounce shares.\n In context of the testimony presented at trial, it is clear\nthat Holland and Riley were describing the same pooling\narrangement during their separate interviews with the pro-\nbation office. The amounts attributed to Holland and Riley\nin the PSR differ only because Riley’s more specific state-\nments prompted the Government to use a 28-day month in-\nstead of a 30-day month to calculate the total amount of\nmethamphetamine described. Regardless, the trial testimony\nconsistently showed that Mr. Hopper, Holland, Riley, and\nWeir participated in a pooling arrangement and that follow-\ning each purchase, each member of the group obtained one\n\fNo. 18-2576 53\n\nounce of methamphetamine. Because Holland and Riley\nwere describing the same set of transactions, it was plainly\nerroneous to include the drug amounts described in both in-\nterviews in calculating Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\n Third, we hold that this plain error affected Mr. Hopper’s\nsubstantial rights because it increased his base offense level\nand his corresponding guidelines imprisonment range. Mo-\nlina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346 (“In most cases a defendant\nwho has shown that the district court mistakenly deemed\napplicable an incorrect, higher Guidelines range has demon-\nstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome.”). At\nsentencing, the district court adopted the PSR’s relevant\nconduct calculation of 1.968 grams of ice methamphetamine,\nwhich resulted in a base offense level of 36. Applying the\ntwo-level enhancement for maintaining a residence for the\npurpose of distributing methamphetamine, the court calcu-\nlated a total offense level of 38. With a criminal history cate-\ngory of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\nwas 235 to 293 months. The court sentenced Mr. Hopper to\n235 months’ imprisonment, which is “conspicuous for its po-\nsition as the lowest sentence within what the [d]istrict\n[c]ourt believed to be the applicable range.” Id. at 1347.\n If we count the drugs described by Holland and Riley on-\nly once, Mr. Hopper’s base offense level falls to 34. Assum-\ning for purposes of this calculation that the relevant month\nwas 30 days and, consistent with the testimony at trial, that\nMr. Hopper received one ounce of methamphetamine ice per\ntransaction, the resulting drug quantity is 850 grams. Add-\ning these 850 grams to the drug amounts described by\nWright, the total quantity is only 1,175.5 grams, or 1.1755\nkilograms, as shown in the following chart:\n\f54 No. 18-2576\n\n Interviewee Drug Amount\n Holland/Riley 850 grams\n Wright 283.5 grams\n Wright 42 grams\n 1,175.5 grams\n Total\n (1.1755 kilograms)\n This amount is significantly below the 1.5-kilogram\nthreshold that would trigger a base offense level of 36. See\nU.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2). At a base offense level of 34, applying\nthe two-level drug premises enhancement, Mr. Hopper’s to-\ntal offense level would be 36. With a criminal history catego-\nry of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\nwould be 188 to 235 months. At sentencing, the district court\n“said nothing to suggest that it would have imposed” a sen-\ntence of 235 months “regardless of the Guidelines range.”\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1348. Consequently, “there is at\nleast a reasonable probability that the [d]istrict [c]ourt would\nhave imposed a different sentence had it known that” a low-\ner sentence was appropriate. Id.; United States v. Adams, 746\nF.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2014) (“When a district court incor-\nrectly calculates the guideline range, we normally presume\nthe improperly calculated guideline range influenced the\njudge’s choice of sentence, unless he says otherwise.”).\n Fourth, we conclude that Mr. Hopper satisfied the last\nprong of the plain-error analysis. “The risk of unnecessary\ndeprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness,\nintegrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings in the\ncontext of a plain Guidelines error because of the role the\ndistrict court plays in calculating the range and the relative\n\fNo. 18-2576 55\n\nease of correcting the error.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at\n1908. This conclusion is especially forceful where, as here,\nthe error “was based on a mistake made in the presentence\ninvestigation report by the Probation Office, which works on\nbehalf of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” Id. Therefore, we conclude\nthat resentencing based on recalculation of Mr. Hopper’s\nrelevant conduct is required.99\n The Government insists that any error in calculating\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct was harmless because the\ndistrict court actually “severely undercounted” the amount\nof drugs attributable to Mr. Hopper.100 According to the\nGovernment, the district court should have attributed to\nMr. Hopper the entire amount purchased by Mr. Hopper,\nHolland, Riley, and Weir each time they pooled their money\ntogether because “[t]he entire four ounces was foreseeable\nrelevant conduct” to Mr. Hopper.101 The Government con-\ncedes that it failed to challenge the relevant conduct calcula-\n\n\n\n\n99See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (hold-\ning that plain error in calculating the defendant’s criminal history points,\nwhich resulted in a higher guidelines range, required resentencing be-\ncause we had “no reason to believe” that the district court’s error “did\nnot affect its selection of the particular sentence”).\n100 Appellee’s Br. 49.\n101 Id. at 50; see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (providing that, “in the case of a\njointly undertaken criminal activity,” a defendant’s base offense level\nshall be determined based on “all acts and omissions of others” that were\n“(i) within the scope” of the conspiracy; “(ii) in furtherance of” the con-\nspiracy; and “(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with” the con-\nspiracy).\n\f56 No. 18-2576\n\ntion before the district court but explains that “it most likely\nwould not have affected the advisory guideline range.”102\n We have recognized that “an appellate court can affirm\nthe determination of a sentencing range ‘on any ground\nsupported by the record even if that ground was not relied\nupon by the district court.’” United States v. Benitez, 92 F.3d\n528, 538 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 6 F.3d\n431, 447 (7th Cir. 1993)). But the Government has not offered,\nnor have we located, any authority to suggest that we can\nrely on a relevant conduct calculation not presented to the\ndistrict court to affirm a defendant’s sentence. Indeed, our\ndecision in United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir.\n1995), suggests quite the opposite.\n In that case, a jury found Henderson guilty of conspiracy\nto distribute cocaine base and distributing cocaine base. Id.\nat 1147. At sentencing, the district court attributed to Hen-\nderson the 18 grams of cocaine he was convicted of selling.\nId. at 1151. The court also attributed ten percent of the\namounts of cocaine described by Henderson’s\nco-conspirator. Id. The court explained that it did not accept\nthe full amount claimed by his co-conspirator because of\n“the ‘vagueness and generalized’ nature” of the co-\nconspirator’s testimony “and the lack of money to support\nhis contentions that he sold such large amounts of drugs.”\nId. Henderson challenged the amount of drugs the district\ncourt attributed to him, arguing that “by accepting only 10%\nof [the co-conspirator’s] testimony, the court did not simply\nact conservatively, but instead indicated its belief that [the\n\n\n102 Appellee’s Br. 50 n.6.\n\fNo. 18-2576 57\n\nco-conspirator’s] information was not sufficiently reliable to\nsupport any amounts above the 18 grams.” Id. We agreed\nthat the court clearly erred because it “did not have suffi-\ncient faith” in the co-conspirator’s testimony “to use it as the\nbasis for attributing further amounts to Henderson.” Id. at\n1152.\n The Government submitted, however, that remand was\nnot required because other calculations would result in drug\namounts within the range applied by the district court. Id.\nFor instance, the Government contended that we could cal-\nculate the drug quantity by multiplying the number of used\nplastic baggies by the amount of cocaine typically packaged\nin each baggie. Id. at 1153. Although we were “fairly certain\nthat this calculation … would adequately sustain the court’s\ndetermination,” we declined to “embrace it ourselves.” Id.\nWe explained that “[t]he government first presented this cal-\nculation on appeal,” such that “the district court, which has\nsentencing responsibility, [] had no opportunity to consider\nit.” Id. The Government also proposed that we could deter-\nmine the drug quantity based on the amount of money\nseized from Henderson and from a drug location on the day\nof his arrest. Id. We declined this suggestion, reasoning that\n“while the government introduced this evidence at trial, it\ndid not present the calculations at sentencing.” Id. Conse-\nquently, we left “the initial consideration of these sentencing\nissues to the district court on remand.” Id.\n For the same reasons, we decline to affirm Mr. Hopper’s\nsentence based on relevant conduct calculations that the\nGovernment presented for the first time on appeal. Because\nneither party challenged the relevant conduct calculations\nbelow, “the district court, which has sentencing responsibil-\n\f58 No. 18-2576\n\nity,” id., had no opportunity to consider any arguments re-\ngarding the proper calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant\nconduct. The parties must present their drug quantity calcu-\nlations to the district court to consider in the first instance on\nremand.\n Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and\naffirm the district court’s determination that he was subject\nto a sentence enhancement for maintaining a residence for\nthe purpose of distributing methamphetamine. We vacate\nhis sentence and remand his case to the district court for re-\nsentencing based on our conclusion that there was plain er-\nror in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\n AFFIRMED IN PART,\n VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Rex A. Hopper\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2576\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nREX A. HOPPER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Southern District of Illinois.\\n No. 4:17-cr-40034-JPG-1 — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 4, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.\\n RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. In June 2017, a federal grand jury\\nindicted Rex Hopper on one count of conspiracy to distrib-\\nute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),\\n841(b)(1)(B), 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Hopper was part of a\\ncommunity of methamphetamine users and sellers in south-\\nern Illinois. Several of these individuals signed proffer letters\\nwith the Government, agreeing to provide testimony against\\nMr. Hopper in exchange for leniency. Most of these witness-\\n\\f2 No. 18-2576\\n\\nes subsequently entered plea agreements.1 Mr. Hopper,\\nhowever, pleaded not guilty to the single count in the in-\\ndictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late Febru-\\nary 2018.\\n Over the course of three days, the Government presented\\nthe testimony of approximately twenty witnesses against\\nMr. Hopper. The district court denied Mr. Hopper’s motion\\nfor disclosure of the proffer letters given to these witnesses.\\nFollowing deliberations, the jury found Mr. Hopper guilty of\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, as charged in\\nthe indictment, and returned a special verdict form finding\\nthat the conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\\n Based on interviews with other participants in the con-\\nspiracy, the probation office determined that Mr. Hopper’s\\nrelevant conduct involved 1.968 kilograms of ice metham-\\nphetamine. This drug amount corresponded to a base of-\\nfense level of 36. At sentencing, the district court determined\\nthat Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sentence en-\\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\\ndistributing methamphetamine. Based on a total offense lev-\\nel of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the court calcu-\\nlated a guidelines imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months.\\nThe district court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the\\nguidelines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by\\nfour years of supervised release.2\\n\\n\\n\\n1One witness entered an “open” guilty plea, for which there was no\\nwritten plea agreement.\\n2 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 3\\n\\n Mr. Hopper now challenges both his conviction and his\\nsentence. First, we conclude that the Government presented\\nsufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Hopper engaged in a\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in southern Illi-\\nnois, and that there was no material variance between the\\nconspiracy charged in the indictment and the Government’s\\nproof at trial. Second, the district court did not err when it\\ndenied Mr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the cooperat-\\ning witnesses’ proffer letters. Third, the district court proper-\\nly concluded that Mr. Hopper was subject to a two-level sen-\\ntence enhancement for maintaining his Creal Springs resi-\\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\\nHowever, we conclude that the district court plainly erred\\nwhen it calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct and corre-\\nsponding guidelines range. In context, it is clear that, in their\\nseparate interviews, Lucas Holland and Randall Riley were\\ndescribing the same transactions. By including the amounts\\ndescribed by both Holland and Riley in the calculation of\\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the presentence report\\n(“PSR”), adopted by the district court, erroneously dou-\\nble-counted those drug quantities.\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. We\\nalso affirm the district court’s determination that he was\\nsubject to a sentence enhancement for maintaining a drug\\npremises. Because the court plainly erred in calculating his\\nrelevant conduct, however, we vacate Mr. Hopper’s sentence\\nand remand his case to the district court for resentencing.3\\n\\n3We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18\\nU.S.C. § 3742.\\n\\f4 No. 18-2576\\n\\n I.\\n BACKGROUND\\n A.\\n In April 2017, law enforcement officers executed a search\\nwarrant at Mr. Hopper’s residence. They sought to recover\\nitems involved in a burglary. Officers observed drug para-\\nphernalia and methamphetamine in plain view. According-\\nly, the officers obtained and executed a second search war-\\nrant for the residence. Upon finding additional drug para-\\nphernalia and methamphetamine in his home, officers took\\nMr. Hopper into custody. A federal grand jury later returned\\nan indictment charging Mr. Hopper with one count of con-\\nspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 18\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, in\\nthe Southern District of Illinois.\\n B.\\n Mr. Hopper was part of a community of methampheta-\\nmine users and sellers in southern Illinois. Around the time\\nof his indictment, the Government also charged other mem-\\nbers of this group with conspiracy to distribute metham-\\nphetamine. Several of these individuals received proffer let-\\nters from the Government and subsequently agreed to pro-\\nvide testimony against Mr. Hopper in exchange for leniency.\\nMost of these witnesses later entered plea agreements.\\nMr. Hopper, however, pleaded not guilty to the single count\\nin the indictment and proceeded to trial before a jury in late\\nFebruary 2018.\\n Before the trial began, counsel for Mr. Hopper renewed a\\nprevious motion for disclosure of the proffer letters given to\\nthe witnesses who would testify against Mr. Hopper. Refer-\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 5\\n\\nencing our decision in United States v. Weidenburner, 550\\nF. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (unpublished), counsel recog-\\nnized that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has ruled that” proffer let-\\nters “are not materials that have to be provided.”4 Neverthe-\\nless, counsel wanted “the record to be clear” that he thought\\nhe “ought to be provided a copy” of the proffer letters.5\\n Counsel for Mr. Hopper explained that the proffer letter\\n“is an agreement that sets forth the ground rules” for what\\ntestimony “may or may not lead to a plea agreement.”6 He\\nsubmitted that “this is a very important aspect of the de-\\nfense” because “no plea agreements are offered until you\\nproffer.”7 In other words, the proffer letters are “part of the\\nprocess by which men and women ultimately find their way\\non to the stand to give testimony against a defendant.”8 As a\\nresult, counsel asserted, “if the[] jurors don’t have some un-\\nderstanding of this process,” the defense would be “really\\nhampered in terms of our constitutional right[s] to put on a\\ndefense and … to confront the witnesses through cross ex-\\namination that are here to accuse Rex Hopper of various\\ncrimes.”9\\n Relying on our decision in Weidenburner, the Government\\nresponded that “the Seventh Circuit is clear that the proffer\\n\\n4 R.118 (Trial Tr. Day 1) at 8.\\n5 Id. at 5.\\n6 Id. at 6.\\n7 Id.\\n8 Id.\\n9 Id. at 7.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2576\\n\\nletters don’t come in,” nor does “any information about the\\nproffer,” “because it is a preliminary step in the plea agree-\\nment, and then the plea agreement supersedes all that.”10\\nTurning to defense counsel, the court stated, “I think it is\\npretty clear that, you know, you are not going to get the\\ndocuments.”11\\n The Government further noted its objection to defense\\ncounsel asking any questions about the process of entering a\\nplea agreement. The court asked defense counsel what kind\\nof questions he intended to ask the cooperating witnesses.\\nCounsel explained that he wanted the jury to know that be-\\nfore entering a plea agreement, a witness had to meet with\\nfederal agents and “understood that agents would decide\\nand the prosecutors would decide whether you told the\\ntruth, and if they didn’t think you told the truth that a plea\\nagreement would not be tendered.”12 Counsel acknowl-\\nedged that he planned to review the terms of the plea\\nagreements with each witness, but argued that the jury\\nwould be “missing a big part of this process” without the\\nproffer letters.13 Based on our decision in Weidenburner, the\\nGovernment reiterated that the plea agreement “super-\\nsede[s] the proffer letter” and is “the document which the\\ndefendant is entitled to and entitled to question witnesses\\nabout.”14 The court denied the motion for disclosure of the\\n\\n10 Id. at 8.\\n11 Id.\\n12 Id. at 10.\\n13 Id. at 11.\\n14 Id. at 14.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 7\\n\\nproffer letters and ruled that counsel could ask the witnesses\\n“whether they’ve entered into a proffer agreement, but go-\\ning into the terms of it that are super[s]eded by the plea\\nagreement, I’m not going to let you do.”15\\n C.\\n Mr. Hopper proceeded to trial before a jury on February\\n26, 2018. Over the course of three days, the Government pre-\\nsented the testimony of approximately twenty witnesses\\nagainst Mr. Hopper. Set forth below is a summary of the\\nwitnesses and testimony relevant to this appeal.\\n Dameon Williams testified that he met Mr. Hopper some-\\ntime in 2015 when they were “messing with drugs.”16 He ob-\\ntained ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]ff and\\non” for about one year.17 On these occasions, he received\\nabout one to two ounces of methamphetamine at a cost of\\n$900 to $1200 per ounce. Williams stated that sometimes, he\\nbought the drugs outright, while other times Mr. Hopper\\nprovided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a “front.”18 He\\nexplained that, in this fronting arrangement, Mr. Hopper\\nprovided Williams a quantity of drugs, some of which Wil-\\nliams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back. He\\nfurther testified that Mr. Hopper called Williams occasional-\\nly and asked him to visit the homes of customers who owed\\nMr. Hopper money and bring them to Mr. Hopper’s house\\n\\n15 Id. at 15–16.\\n16 Id. at 59.\\n17 Id.\\n18 Id. at 61.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2576\\n\\nto settle the debt. He explained that he helped Mr. Hopper\\ncollect money from his customers because Williams “was\\nselling drugs for him” and “to help him out in his drug\\nbusiness.”19\\n Brooke Peyton testified that she met Mr. Hopper in 2016\\nwhen she was dating William, also known as “Andy,”\\nKarnes. With Karnes, she had visited Mr. Hopper’s resi-\\ndence in Creal Springs, where Mr. Hopper provided ice\\nmethamphetamine to Karnes. She stated that during the\\nsummer of 2016, Mr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five\\n“8-balls,” or 3.5 gram quantities of ice methamphetamine,\\nseveral times a week.20 Karnes obtained the methampheta-\\nmine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a front,” in which he would sell\\ndrugs to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper back for the\\ndrugs he had obtained previously.21 Peyton further testified\\nthat sometimes, Mr. Hopper came to her home to drop off\\nmethamphetamine for Karnes. On other occasions, he sent\\nWilliams to deliver the drugs.\\n Robert Weir, also known as “Boog,” testified that he and\\nMr. Hopper reconnected around April or May 2015. At some\\npoint, he, Mr. Hopper, Lucas Holland, and Randall Riley be-\\ngan an arrangement in which the four of them pooled their\\nmoney together to purchase methamphetamine from a\\nsource in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Sometimes, Weir gave\\nMr. Hopper his money, and Mr. Hopper drove to Murphys-\\nboro, where he gave Weir’s and his money to Riley to pur-\\n\\n19 Id. at 64.\\n20 Id. at 89.\\n21 Id. at 90.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 9\\n\\nchase the drugs. Other times, Mr. Hopper gave Weir his\\nmoney, and Weir delivered the money to Riley. Still other\\ntimes, Weir and Mr. Hopper visited Riley together. After Ri-\\nley obtained the drugs from Cape Girardeau, the group di-\\nvided the methamphetamine into equal, one-ounce shares.\\nWeir stated that he paid about $800 to $900 per ounce of\\nmethamphetamine. This arrangement lasted about a month,\\nduring which the group obtained methamphetamine two to\\nthree times per week.\\n In March 2016, police arrested Riley. Weir and Mr. Hop-\\nper then arranged to pool their money with Holland to pur-\\nchase methamphetamine. Holland took their money and ran,\\nand they never got their drugs. Additionally, Weir acknowl-\\nedged that he had personally observed Mr. Hopper distrib-\\nute methamphetamine to other individuals.\\n Lucas Holland testified that, at the beginning of 2016, he\\nhad been living at Riley’s house for about four or five\\nmonths. Holland confirmed the details of the pooling ar-\\nrangement he engaged in with Mr. Hopper, Riley, and Weir\\nto purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\\nGirardeau. He reiterated that Mr. Hopper or Weir, or some-\\ntimes the two together, came to Riley’s house to deliver their\\nmoney. Holland and Riley then drove to Cape Girardeau to\\nobtain the methamphetamine. When Holland and Riley re-\\nturned to Illinois, the group of four split up the drugs. Ac-\\ncording to Holland, this arrangement lasted from about De-\\ncember 2015 to February 2016.\\n Holland testified that, on one occasion, he traveled to\\nCape Girardeau with Riley, Mr. Hopper, and Erin Wright,\\nMr. Hopper’s girlfriend, for a drug deal that Mr. Hopper\\nhad arranged. The group pooled their money, and Mr. Hop-\\n\\f10 No. 18-2576\\n\\nper gave it to an individual in Cape Girardeau. In addition,\\nHolland confirmed that a few days after police arrested Ri-\\nley, Mr. Hopper and Weir gave him money to purchase\\ndrugs. He acknowledged that he “ran off with it.”22 Holland\\nalso testified that he had observed Mr. Hopper sell metham-\\nphetamine to individuals, including Kevin Shuman, at his\\nhome in Creal Springs.\\n Randall Riley testified that he met Mr. Hopper around\\nthe end of 2015 or early 2016 through a mutual acquaintance\\nwhen Mr. Hopper was seeking methamphetamine. Riley\\nconfirmed that eventually, he, Mr. Hopper, Holland, and\\nWeir began a pooling arrangement in which they combined\\ntheir money to purchase methamphetamine from a source in\\nCape Girardeau. According to Riley, the group bought four\\nounces of methamphetamine every day and split the drugs\\nbetween the four of them. Either Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both\\ncame to Riley’s home with $2,200 for Mr. Hopper and Weir’s\\nshares. Riley and Holland drove to Missouri to obtain the\\ndrugs. When they returned, they met either at Riley’s home\\nor at Mr. Hopper’s residence in Creal Springs to divide up\\nthe drugs.\\n Riley confirmed that on one occasion, his source was un-\\navailable, so Mr. Hopper arranged a transaction with his\\nown source. He, Riley, Holland, and Wright drove to Cape\\nGirardeau, where Mr. Hopper gave the source the money\\nthey had pooled together.\\n Blake Gordon testified that he met Mr. Hopper through\\nWeir. According to Gordon, he sold methamphetamine to\\n\\n22 R.122 (Trial Tr. Day 2) at 54.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 11\\n\\nMr. Hopper “more than ten times.”23 On such occasions, he\\nprovided Mr. Hopper methamphetamine in amounts rang-\\ning from one to fourteen grams. He also stated that “on nu-\\nmerous occasions,” he drove Mr. Hopper around the south-\\nern Illinois area to deliver drugs to his customers.24 Gordon\\ndescribed one occasion in which he, Mr. Hopper, and Weir\\npooled their money together. Weir drove to Cape Girardeau\\nto obtain the methamphetamine, which they divided among\\nthe three of them when he returned to Illinois.\\n Crystal Boulton testified that in March 2016, she and her\\nchildren were living at Riley’s home with Riley, her boy-\\nfriend, as well as Holland and his girlfriend. She stated that\\nshe personally observed Mr. Hopper obtain methampheta-\\nmine from Riley at Riley’s residence about four or five times.\\nOn such occasions, Mr. Hopper paid Riley for the metham-\\nphetamine and Riley gave Boulton the money to count. She\\ncounted about $1,000 to $1,200 per ounce of methampheta-\\nmine. Boulton also overheard discussions between Riley and\\nMr. Hopper about pooling their money together and making\\ntrips to Cape Girardeau to obtain methamphetamine.\\n Erin Wright testified that she met Mr. Hopper in Sep-\\ntember 2015 and moved in with him at his home in Creal\\nSprings soon after. She confirmed that Mr. Hopper and Weir\\nwent to Riley’s house to get drugs. Usually, Mr. Hopper re-\\nturned with an ounce of methamphetamine. She stated that\\nMr. Hopper had scales at his Creal Springs home, which he\\nused to weigh drugs. She further testified that, sometimes,\\n\\n23 Id. at 123.\\n24 Id.\\n\\f12 No. 18-2576\\n\\nRiley and Holland came to the Creal Springs home to do\\nbusiness with Mr. Hopper. She described one occasion on\\nwhich she and Mr. Hopper went to Kansas City, Missouri,\\nwhere Mr. Hopper and an individual named Jason Clapp\\nobtained methamphetamine. Wright stated that there were\\nalso a few times when Clapp came to the Creal Springs resi-\\ndence to provide Mr. Hopper with methamphetamine.\\n William Craig testified that he knew Mr. Hopper through\\nWeir. He bought methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper about\\nten or fifteen times. On such occasions, he obtained meth-\\namphetamine in quantities up to eight ounces. When Craig\\nobtained the methamphetamine for himself, Mr. Hopper\\nwould not charge him. When Craig purchased the metham-\\nphetamine to deliver to others, he paid Mr. Hopper in cash.\\nCraig stated that on one occasion, after Mr. Hopper and\\nWeir pooled their money together, Craig drove with Weir to\\nCharleston, Missouri, to purchase methamphetamine. They\\nreturned to Mr. Hopper’s home, where Mr. Hopper and\\nWeir divided the drugs. Craig also confirmed that he had\\nseen Mr. Hopper sell methamphetamine at his home to Kev-\\nin Page and to Andy Karnes on multiple occasions.\\n Kevin Shuman testified that he had known Mr. Hopper\\nfor years. He moved in with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs\\nhome and lived there in December 2015 and January 2016.\\nInitially, he obtained “small amounts” of methamphetamine,\\nranging from “seven grams to an 8-ball,” from Mr. Hopper.25\\nShuman bought the drugs “on a front,” explaining that he\\nsold drugs in order to repay Mr. Hopper for previously pur-\\n\\n\\n25 R.123 (Trial Tr. Day 3) at 26.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 13\\n\\nchased quantities of methamphetamine.26 He recalled two\\noccasions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Mis-\\nsouri, to obtain methamphetamine. When they returned\\nhome, Mr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\\n After a brief term in jail in early 2016, Shuman returned,\\nand the quantities he bought from Mr. Hopper increased\\nfrom grams to ounces of methamphetamine. The two had an\\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\\nand left in their place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for\\npreviously fronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testi-\\nfied that he drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\\ndeliver methamphetamine to his customers.\\n D.\\n At the close of the Government’s case in chief, counsel for\\nMr. Hopper moved for a judgment of acquittal under Feder-\\nal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which the court denied.\\nMr. Hopper elected not to testify, and the defense rested its\\ncase. Following jury instructions and closing arguments, the\\njury retired to deliberate. Approximately an hour later, the\\ncourt received a note from the jury stating, “Pages 17 + 21\\nare confusing us as to the definition of ‘conspiracy.’”27 Page\\n17 of the jury instructions stated that:\\n A conspiracy is an express or implied\\n agreement between two or more persons to\\n\\n\\n26 Id.\\n27 R.72 at 1 (capitalization omitted).\\n\\f14 No. 18-2576\\n\\n commit a crime. A conspiracy may be proven\\n even if its goal was not accomplished.\\n In deciding whether the charged conspiracy\\n existed, you may consider all of the circum-\\n stances, including the words and acts of each\\n of the alleged participants.[28]\\n Page 21 of the jury instructions stated that:\\n A conspiracy requires more than just a\\n buyer-seller relationship between the defend-\\n ant and another person. In addition, a buyer\\n and seller of a mixture and substance contain-\\n ing methamphetamine do not enter into a con-\\n spiracy to distribute a mixture and substance\\n containing methamphetamine simply because\\n the buyer resells the [] mixture and substance\\n containing methamphetamine to others, even if\\n the seller knows that the buyer intends to resell\\n the [] mixture and substance containing meth-\\n amphetamine.\\n To establish that a seller knowingly became\\n a member of a conspiracy with a buyer to dis-\\n tribute a mixture and substance containing\\n methamphetamine, the government must\\n prove that the buyer and seller had the joint\\n criminal objective of distributing a mixture and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n28 R.74 at 17.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 15\\n\\n substance containing methamphetamine to\\n others.[29]\\n After conferring with the parties, the court responded to\\nthe jury, “All instructions should be read together. I cannot\\ngive you any more instruction other than what you have\\nbeen given.”30 Following further deliberations, the jury\\nreached a verdict, finding Mr. Hopper guilty of conspiracy\\nto distribute methamphetamine, as charged in the indict-\\nment. The jury returned a special verdict form finding that\\nthe conspiracy involved an amount of 50 grams or more.\\n E.\\n Prior to Mr. Hopper’s sentencing, the probation office\\nprepared a PSR. To determine the scope of his relevant con-\\nduct, the probation office interviewed several witnesses with\\nknowledge of the conspiracy. Based on these interviews, the\\ninitial PSR determined that Mr. Hopper had a base offense\\nlevel of 36, which corresponds to offenses involving “at least\\n1.5 kilograms but less than 4.5 kilograms of ice.”31 Specifical-\\nly, according to the PSR, the conspiracy involved 1.968 kilo-\\ngrams of ice methamphetamine.\\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy. In particu-\\nlar:\\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\\n\\n29 Id. at 21.\\n30 R.72 at 1.\\n31 R.81 ¶ 28.\\n\\f16 No. 18-2576\\n\\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\\n es = 850 grams)[32]\\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\\n that from January through March, he sold one\\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\\n grams) [33]\\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\\n ice). [34]\\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\\n\\n\\n32 Id. ¶ 12.\\n33 Id. ¶ 14.\\n34 Id. ¶ 19.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 17\\n\\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\\n grams = 42 grams)[35]\\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”36\\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\\ning.”37 Adding the drug amounts described above, the PSR\\ntotaled Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct to be 1.968 kilograms\\nof ice methamphetamine.\\n The initial PSR awarded Mr. Hopper a two-level sentence\\nreduction for acceptance of responsibility. Based on a total\\noffense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, the\\nPSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range of 151 to\\n188 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the initial PSR,\\nchallenging the sentence reduction for acceptance of respon-\\nsibility.38 He asserted that he had “neither denied, nor ad-\\nmitted, any … involvement” in the conspiracy.39 He also\\n\\n35 Id. ¶ 20.\\n36 Id. ¶ 21.\\n37 Id.\\n38 Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel acknowledged that this objection was high-\\nly unusual. See R.82 at 1 (“This marks the first instance in Undersigned\\nCounsel’s career in which he levels an objection on behalf of a client that\\noperates to raise the applicable advisory guidelines range. Thus, it\\nshould be noted that this objection is filed with Defendant Rex Hopper’s\\nconsent and at his direction.”).\\n39 Id.\\n\\f18 No. 18-2576\\n\\nstated that he “underst[ood] that this objection [would]\\ndoom any opportunity he might have at the two-level [ac-\\nceptance of responsibility] reduction.”40 He submitted that,\\nas a result, his total offense level was 36 and the proper\\nguidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.\\n Consequently, the probation office filed a revised PSR,\\nwhich removed the acceptance of responsibility reduction.\\nBased on a total offense level of 36 and a criminal history\\ncategory of I, the revised PSR calculated a guidelines impris-\\nonment range of 188 to 235 months. The Government filed\\nan objection to the revised PSR, contending that Mr. Hopper\\nwas subject to a two-level sentence enhancement for main-\\ntaining a residence for the purpose of distributing metham-\\nphetamine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).\\n Accordingly, the probation office filed a second revised\\nPSR, adopting the Government’s recommendation that\\nMr. Hopper was subject to the two-level sentence enhance-\\nment for maintaining a drug premises. Based on a total of-\\nfense level of 38 and a criminal history category of I, the sec-\\nond revised PSR calculated a guidelines imprisonment range\\nof 235 to 293 months. Mr. Hopper filed an objection to the\\nsecond revised PSR, challenging the application of the drug\\npremises enhancement. He maintained that, consistent with\\nthe first revised PSR, his total offense level was 36 and his\\nguidelines imprisonment range was 188 to 235 months.\\n The district court conducted a hearing to impose its sen-\\ntence. At the outset, the court asked whether there were any\\nobjections to the PSR other than Mr. Hopper’s challenge to\\n\\n40 Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 19\\n\\nthe application of the drug premises enhancement. Both sets\\nof counsel stated that there were not. The court then turned\\nto the sentence enhancement.\\n The Government introduced additional testimony from\\nWright, Mr. Hopper’s former girlfriend. She testified that\\nshe had lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home\\nfrom about October 2015 until May 2017. She acknowledged\\nthat, during this time, she saw methamphetamine at the res-\\nidence. She elaborated that “[i]t was always there” and that\\nshe saw drugs in the home “[p]retty much every day.”41\\nWright testified that after Mr. Hopper obtained metham-\\nphetamine from others, he brought it back to the Creal\\nSprings house. She further stated that she saw Mr. Hopper\\ndistribute methamphetamine from the residence. She said\\nthat this occurred “[t]hroughout the week” and that “each\\nweek there was some sort of activity going on” involving\\nmethamphetamine.42 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper\\ncollected money from individuals who bought methamphet-\\namine at his home. She testified that he had drug scales at\\nthe house, which he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”43 She\\nestimated that, while she lived with him, Mr. Hopper dis-\\ntributed methamphetamine from his residence approximate-\\nly “[w]eekly.”44 She added, however, that toward the end of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n41 R.125 at 8.\\n42 Id. at 9.\\n43 Id.\\n44 Id. at 10.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2576\\n\\ntheir time living together, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling dimin-\\nished and he was “just using.”45\\n The court inquired what Mr. Hopper did for a living.\\nWright explained that Mr. Hopper had received a monetary\\nsettlement after working in the coal mines. Subsequently, he\\nhad a “side business” buying and selling cars, and he dealt\\ndrugs.46 Wright acknowledged that Mr. Hopper did not “of-\\nficially work.”47\\n Based on the testimony introduced at trial and at sentenc-\\ning, the court concluded that Mr. Hopper stored metham-\\nphetamine at and distributed it from the Creal Springs resi-\\ndence. Given Wright’s testimony that this occurred weekly\\nover an extended period of time, the court determined that\\nthe distribution was “more than just incidental or collat-\\neral.”48 Accordingly, the court overruled Mr. Hopper’s objec-\\ntion and concluded that he was subject to the two-level en-\\nhancement for maintaining a residence for the purpose of\\ndistributing methamphetamine.\\n Noting that there were no other objections, the court\\nadopted the findings of the PSR as the findings of the court.\\nThis included the finding that the conspiracy involved be-\\ntween 1.5 and 4.5 kilograms of ice methamphetamine, specif-\\nically 1.968 kilograms, which corresponded to a base offense\\nlevel of 36. Given its conclusion regarding the two-level\\n\\n45 Id. at 24.\\n46 Id. at 32.\\n47 Id.\\n48 Id. at 41.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 21\\n\\ndrug premises enhancement, the court determined that\\nMr. Hopper had a total offense level of 38. With a criminal\\nhistory category of I, the court concluded that his corre-\\nsponding guidelines imprisonment range was 235 to 293\\nmonths.\\n Neither party objected to the court’s guideline range\\nfindings. The Government recommended a sentence near or\\nat the top of the guidelines range, while counsel for\\nMr. Hopper recommended a sentence of 188 months. Based\\non the information in the PSR, the factors set forth in 18\\nU.S.C. § 3553(a), and the arguments of Mr. Hopper’s counsel,\\nthe court sentenced Mr. Hopper at the bottom of the guide-\\nlines range to 235 months’ imprisonment, followed by four\\nyears of supervised release. At the conclusion of the hearing,\\nthe court asked defense counsel, “Are there any other argu-\\nments I have not considered?”49 Counsel for Mr. Hopper re-\\nsponded that there were not. Following the entry of final\\njudgment, Mr. Hopper filed a timely notice of appeal.\\n II.\\n DISCUSSION\\n Mr. Hopper raises four arguments on appeal. First, he as-\\nserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to\\nsupport his conviction for conspiracy to distribute metham-\\nphetamine and that, even if the Government established the\\nexistence of multiple, smaller conspiracies, there was a fatal\\nvariance between the single, overarching conspiracy alleged\\nin the indictment and the Government’s proof at trial. Sec-\\n\\n\\n49 Id. at 59.\\n\\f22 No. 18-2576\\n\\nond, he contends that the district court erred when it denied\\nhis motion for disclosure of the cooperating witnesses’ prof-\\nfer letters. Third, he challenges the district court’s applica-\\ntion of a two-level sentence enhancement for maintaining a\\ndrug premises. Finally, he submits that the district court\\nerred in calculating his guidelines range because, in deter-\\nmining Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, it double-counted\\nthe drug transactions described by Holland and Riley.\\n A.\\n 1.\\n We begin with Mr. Hopper’s attack on the sufficiency of\\nthe evidence. United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1150\\n(7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.\\nDurrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990).50 He contends that\\nthere was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for\\nconspiracy to distribute methamphetamine because the\\nGovernment proved only a series of buyer-seller relation-\\nships. He preserved this argument by moving for a judg-\\nment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, so we review\\n\\n\\n\\n50 In United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on\\nother grounds by United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990), we\\nadopted a “policy” of “routinely addressing evidentiary sufficiency in\\ncriminal cases when a defendant presents the issue on appeal.” Id. at\\n1150. We reasoned that “[i]f in fact insufficient evidence is presented at a\\nfirst trial, a retrial, on any basis, ordinarily may be a wasted endeavor.”\\nId. By contrast, if we find “that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a con-\\nviction, but reverse based on trial error, a retrial” is proper. Id. Accord-\\ningly, to conserve the “scarce and costly resources” of the courts and the\\nparties, we address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence first. Id.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 23\\n\\nhis claim de novo. United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699,\\n704 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n A defendant’s burden in showing the evidence was in-\\nsufficient to support a conviction is indeed a high one. See\\nUnited States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 835 (7th Cir. 2008). In\\nattempting to describe that burden, we often have said that\\nthe burden is a direct function of the strength of the Gov-\\nernment’s case. See United States v. Garcia, 919 F.3d 489, 496–\\n97 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jones, 713 F.3d 336, 339 (7th\\nCir. 2013). Because “[w]e accord great deference to jury ver-\\ndicts,” United States v. Brown, 726 F.3d 993, 1004–05 (7th Cir.\\n2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[w]e will over-\\nturn a conviction on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds on-\\nly if no rational jury could have found the essential elements\\nof the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” United States v.\\nJohnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). “In making this de-\\ntermination, we view all evidence and draw all reasonable\\ninferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id.\\nSee Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), superseded on\\nother grounds by statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death\\nPenalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (stat-\\ning standard of proof in criminal cases). Cf. Anderson v. Liber-\\nty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–53 (1986) (comparing meth-\\nodology in adjudicating a motion for judgment of acquittal\\nin a criminal case with a motion for summary judgment in a\\ncivil case).\\n “To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the government\\nmust prove that (1) two or more people agreed to commit an\\nunlawful act, and (2) the defendant knowingly and inten-\\ntionally joined in the agreement.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 754.\\n“For a drug-distribution conspiracy, the government must\\n\\f24 No. 18-2576\\n\\nprove that the defendant knowingly agreed—either implicit-\\nly or explicitly—with someone else to distribute drugs.”\\nClaybrooks, 729 F.3d at 704 (internal quotation marks omit-\\nted).\\n Our cases “have underscored that ordinary drug transac-\\ntions do not entail or reflect a conspiracy, for the buyer’s on-\\nly purpose is to buy and the seller’s only purpose is to sell:\\nthe buyer and seller lack a shared criminal goal.” United\\nStates v. Neal, 907 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).\\nIn other words, “evidence of a buyer-seller relationship,\\nstanding alone, is insufficient to support a conspiracy con-\\nviction.” United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th\\nCir. 1991). Instead, we require “[e]vidence of an agreement\\nto advance further distribution—beyond the initial transac-\\ntion.” United States v. Pulgar, 789 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n“The government may prove the existence of this agreement\\nthrough circumstantial evidence.” Claybrooks, 729 F.3d at\\n704–05.\\n A “nonexhaustive list of characteristics that strongly dis-\\ntinguish a conspiracy from a buyer-seller relationship” in-\\ncludes:\\n “sales on credit or consignment, an agreement\\n to look for other customers, a payment of\\n commission on sales, an indication that one\\n party advised the other on the conduct of the\\n other’s business, or an agreement to warn of\\n future threats to each other’s business stem-\\n ming from competitors or law enforcement au-\\n thorities.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 25\\n\\nUnited States v. Pereira, 783 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2015)\\n(quoting Johnson, 592 F.3d at 755–56). “We employ a totali-\\nty-of-the-circumstances approach in these cases,” “‘tak[ing]\\ninto account all the evidence surrounding the alleged con-\\nspiracy and mak[ing] a holistic assessment of whether the\\njury reached a reasonable verdict.’” Pulgar, 789 F.3d at 813\\n(quoting Brown, 726 F.3d at 1002).\\n In this case, the Government presented sufficient evi-\\ndence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Hopper en-\\ntered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\\nsouthern Illinois. Our conclusion is supported by evidence\\nthat Mr. Hopper sold methamphetamine on credit, or\\n“fronted” it, to his co-conspirators and that he engaged in\\npooling arrangements with other co-conspirators to pur-\\nchase large quantities of methamphetamine for further dis-\\ntribution.\\n Evidence of repeated, “fronted” transactions can be com-\\npelling circumstantial evidence of an agreement to distribute\\ndrugs because it demonstrates that the defendant “had\\nknowingly thrown his lot in” with other members of the\\nconspiracy. United States v. Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1070 (7th Cir.\\n1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a fronting ar-\\nrangement, “the seller becomes the buyer’s creditor, adding\\na dimension to the relationship that goes beyond a spot sale\\nfor cash.” United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir.\\n2008). Such a relationship indicates that the defendant “had\\na keen interest” in his co-conspirators’ “success at reselling”\\nthe drugs. Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070. Although “not all credit\\nsales can support an inference that there was an agreement\\nto distribute,” “when a credit sale is coupled with certain\\ncharacteristics inherent in an ongoing wholesale buyer-seller\\n\\f26 No. 18-2576\\n\\nrelationship—i.e., large quantities of drugs, repeat purchas-\\nes[,] or some other enduring arrangement—the credit sale\\nbecomes sufficient evidence to distinguish a conspiracy from\\na nonconspiratorial buyer-seller relationship.” Johnson, 592\\nF.3d at 756 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n At Mr. Hopper’s trial, the Government presented evi-\\ndence that he fronted methamphetamine to Williams, Shu-\\nman, and Karnes. Williams testified that he obtained about\\none to two ounces of ice methamphetamine from Mr. Hop-\\nper “[o]ff and on” for about one year.51 He stated that some-\\ntimes, he bought the drugs outright, while other times,\\nMr. Hopper provided the drugs to him “on credit,” or on a\\n“front.”52 Williams explained that, in this fronting arrange-\\nment, Mr. Hopper provided him a quantity of drugs, some\\nof which Williams sold to others in order to pay Mr. Hopper\\nback for previously fronted drugs. Williams further testified\\nthat occasionally, Mr. Hopper called Williams and asked\\nhim to bring customers who owed Mr. Hopper money to\\nMr. Hopper’s house to settle their debt. Williams explained\\nthat he helped Mr. Hopper collect money from his customers\\nbecause Williams “was selling drugs for him” and “to help\\nhim out in his drug business.”53\\n Shuman also testified that he bought drugs from\\nMr. Hopper “on a front.”54 In early 2016, the quantities he\\n\\n\\n51 R.118 at 59.\\n52 Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n53 Id. at 64.\\n54 R.123 at 26.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 27\\n\\npurchased increased from grams to ounces of methamphet-\\namine. The two had an arrangement in which Mr. Hopper\\nplaced methamphetamine for Shuman in Mr. Hopper’s gar-\\nage. Shuman retrieved the drugs from the garage and left in\\ntheir place the money he owed Mr. Hopper for previously\\nfronted methamphetamine. Shuman further testified that he\\ndrove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to deliver meth-\\namphetamine to his customers. He also described two occa-\\nsions on which he drove Mr. Hopper to Jackson, Missouri, to\\nobtain methamphetamine. When they returned home,\\nMr. Hopper gave Shuman drugs in return for driving.\\n Similarly, Peyton testified that Karnes, her former boy-\\nfriend, obtained methamphetamine from Mr. Hopper “[o]n a\\nfront,” in which he would sell drugs to others in order to\\npay Mr. Hopper back for the drugs he had previously ob-\\ntained.55 She stated that during the summer of 2016,\\nMr. Hopper provided Karnes three to five “8-balls,” or 3.5\\ngram quantities of ice methamphetamine, several times a\\nweek.56 She added that on occasion, Mr. Hopper sent Wil-\\nliams to deliver drugs to Karnes.\\n These fronting arrangements are “substantial evidence”\\nthat Mr. Hopper “expected and encouraged” Williams,\\nShuman, and Karnes “to redistribute the drugs he had pro-\\nvided.” United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir.\\n2009). Because Mr. Hopper expected to be repaid based on\\nsales of previously fronted methamphetamine, “he was de-\\npendent upon the further resale of the drugs to make a prof-\\n\\n55 R.118 at 90.\\n56 Id. at 89.\\n\\f28 No. 18-2576\\n\\nit.” Id.; see also United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 808–09\\n(7th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that evidence that co-conspirator\\nsold cocaine to the defendant “on credit” indicated that he\\n“took a stake in her business—he received payment after,\\nand as a result of, her resale”). Mr. Hopper also “demon-\\nstrated a high level of trust and confidence in” Shuman, Wil-\\nliams, and Karnes, given that he provided them “with large\\nquantities of drugs without requiring any payment until the\\ndrugs were resold.” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816.57\\n That Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes repeatedly, in large quantities,\\nover an extended period of time makes clear that these activ-\\nities were more than mere buyer-seller relationships. See\\nBrown, 726 F.3d at 1006 (permitting “an inference of conspir-\\nacy” based on evidence of “repeated transactions, in whole-\\nsale quantities, on credit”). These “factors suggest standard-\\nized transactions and lower transaction costs in the business\\nas well as a continuing relationship.” Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 809;\\nsee also Dortch, 5 F.3d at 1070 (reasoning that evidence of\\n“multiple transactions over a prolonged period of time”\\nsuggested “that transaction costs … were quite low, which\\ncounsels a finding of conspiracy”). Evidence that Williams\\nand Shuman drove Mr. Hopper around southern Illinois to\\ndeliver drugs to his customers and that Mr. Hopper sent\\nWilliams to deliver drugs on his own or to pick up custom-\\ners who owed Mr. Hopper money reinforces that these rela-\\n\\n\\n57Cf. United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting “[t]he\\nmutual trust in this case was less than it would have been had [a\\nco-conspirator] ‘fronted’ cocaine to the defendant (a factor mentioned in\\nalmost all the cases) rather than being paid in cash at the time of sale”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 29\\n\\ntionships were in furtherance of Mr. Hopper’s distribution of\\ndrugs. Based on this evidence, a jury could rationally con-\\nclude that Mr. Hopper conspired to distribute methamphet-\\namine. See Pereira, 783 F.3d at 704–05.\\n The Government also presented considerable testimony\\nestablishing that Mr. Hopper pooled his resources with other\\nmembers of the conspiracy to obtain methamphetamine at a\\nreduced cost from out-of-state sources. This is circumstantial\\nevidence of an agreement to distribute drugs because, by\\n“put[ting] their money and transportation resources together\\nfor an extended period of time,” the co-conspirators “there-\\nby ha[d] a stake in each other’s success, and kn[ew] that the\\nothers intended to resell” the drugs. United States v. Harris,\\n567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also\\nUnited States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 475 (7th Cir. 2016) (hold-\\ning that “[a] reasonable jury could have found that the\\nshared supplier, funds, and product indicated an agree-\\nment” to sell drugs). Based on such evidence, we upheld the\\ndefendant’s conspiracy conviction in United States v. Hay-\\nwood, 324 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2003), reasoning that:\\n [I]n driving to Chicago together, then bringing\\n the drugs back … and splitting them up upon\\n their return, Haywood and Jackson had a\\n standardized way of doing business; they had\\n a continuing relationship, making three trips\\n together to Chicago and talking about making\\n one to Oklahoma; and they both knew that the\\n cocaine would be resold.\\nId. at 517. Similarly, in Harris, we held that there was suffi-\\ncient evidence of a conspiracy to distribute drugs where the\\ndefendant “pooled his money with that of … the other al-\\n\\f30 No. 18-2576\\n\\nleged co-conspirators to buy larger amounts of crack cocaine\\nfrom outside the state for resale.” 567 F.3d at 851.\\n In this case, Holland, Riley, and Weir testified that, to-\\ngether with Mr. Hopper, they pooled their money and\\ntransportation resources over approximately a month-long\\nperiod to purchase methamphetamine from a source in Cape\\nGirardeau, Missouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the\\nmoney to Riley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland\\nand Riley drove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they\\nreturned, the group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hop-\\nper’s home to divide up the drugs. The group pooled their\\nmoney multiple times per week to purchase four ounces of\\nmethamphetamine at a time, which they divided into equal,\\none-ounce shares upon return to Illinois.\\n Evidence that Mr. Hopper pooled funds, shared suppli-\\ners, and coordinated transport out of state with Holland, Ri-\\nley, and Weir, underscored a common goal between them to\\ndistribute methamphetamine.58 That this pooling arrange-\\nment involved multiple transactions per week over an ex-\\n\\n58 United States v. Lomax, 816 F.3d 468, 474 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding\\nconspiracy conviction based on testimony that Lomax and his\\nco-conspirator “shared customers, a supplier, and heroin, and pooled\\nfunds”); United States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 2009) (reason-\\ning that evidence that the co-conspirators “pooled their money and\\nshared rides to buy cheaper crack” from outside the state “mean[t] that\\neach could earn more if the others succeeded”); United States v. Haywood,\\n324 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming conspiracy conviction where\\nHaywood and his co-conspirator “pooled their money and shared rides\\nto Chicago in order to buy inexpensive crack, meaning that each could\\nrun a cheaper operation—and earn higher profits—if the other succeed-\\ned”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 31\\n\\ntended period of time reinforces the conclusion that\\nMr. Hopper had entered an agreement to distribute drugs in\\nsouthern Illinois. Thus, the jury had ample evidence, based\\non the “fronted” transactions and the pooling arrangement,\\nto convict Mr. Hopper of conspiring to distribute metham-\\nphetamine.\\n 2.\\n Mr. Hopper also submits that even if the Government\\npresented some evidence of conspiracy, we must vacate his\\nconviction “because of the variance between the indictment\\n(alleging a single, overarching conspiracy) and the proof at\\ntrial (showing, at most, smaller sub-conspiracies), which\\nprejudiced Mr. Hopper.”59 We conclude that there was no\\nfatal variance in this case.\\n At the close of all evidence, Mr. Hopper’s trial counsel\\nmoved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of\\nCriminal Procedure 29. Rule 29 requires the court to “enter a\\njudgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence\\nis insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Mr. Hopper’s counsel\\ndid not articulate the grounds for his motion and, in denying\\nthe motion, the district court ruled only that the Government\\nhad presented sufficient evidence of the charge against\\nMr. Hopper.60 Because Mr. Hopper’s counsel did not raise\\nthe possibility of a fatal variance in the district court, that\\ncourt did not have the opportunity to address this claim.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n59 Appellant’s Br. 17–18.\\n60 See R.123 at 55.\\n\\f32 No. 18-2576\\n\\nTherefore, we review his variance claim for plain error only.\\nUnited States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2007).61\\n “A variance arises when the facts proved by the govern-\\nment at trial differ from those alleged in the indictment.”\\nAvila, 557 F.3d at 815 (quoting United States v. Stigler, 413\\nF.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2005)). We treat a conspiracy variance\\nclaim “as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence.” Unit-\\ned States v. Handlin, 366 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2004). Alt-\\nhough we treat the question of variance as an attack on the\\nsufficiency of the evidence, a party must raise with specifici-\\nty the issue of variance. A timely objection affords the dis-\\ntrict court the opportunity to address the issue and under-\\ntake curative steps. See United States v Pierson, 925 F.3d 913,\\n921–22 (7th Cir. 2019). To prevail on his claim, Mr. Hopper\\nmust show both that (1) “no rational trier of fact could have\\nfound that the evidence at trial proved a single conspiracy”\\nand (2) “the variance was prejudicial.” United States v.\\nDeKelaita, 875 F.3d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 2017). “Even if the evi-\\ndence arguably established multiple conspiracies, there is no\\nmaterial variance from an indictment charging a single con-\\nspiracy if a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond\\na reasonable doubt the existence of the single conspiracy\\ncharged in the indictment.” United States v. Williams, 272\\nF.3d 845, 862 (7th Cir. 2001).\\n Mr. Hopper contends that there was a variance between\\nthe Government’s proof at trial and the conspiracy alleged in\\n\\n\\n61Like the defendant in United States v. Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 795 (7th\\nCir. 2007), Mr. Holmes did not ask for a jury instruction on multiple con-\\nspiracies.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 33\\n\\nthe indictment because the Government “failed to tie togeth-\\ner the disparate purposes of Mr. Hopper’s alleged\\nco-conspirators” to demonstrate a single conspiracy.62 He\\nsubmits that this variance prejudiced him at trial and at sen-\\ntencing.\\n To evaluate Mr. Hopper’s variance claim, “we turn to the\\nindictment first and then to the proof at trial.” Id. at 863. The\\nindictment alleged that from about January 2015 through\\nMay 31, 2017, in Williamson and Franklin Counties, in the\\nSouthern District of Illinois, “and elsewhere,” Mr. Hopper\\nconspired “with other persons known and unknown” to dis-\\ntribute methamphetamine.63 As detailed above, at trial, the\\nGovernment presented substantial evidence that Mr. Hop-\\nper entered an agreement to distribute methamphetamine in\\nsouthern Illinois. It is sufficient that the purpose of the con-\\nspiracy “was simply to distribute narcotics,” and that “each\\nco-conspirator agreed to advance” that goal. United States v.\\nMartin, 618 F.3d 705, 736–37 (7th Cir. 2010). Based on the ev-\\nidence that Mr. Hopper “fronted” methamphetamine to Wil-\\nliams, Shuman, and Karnes for further distribution and that\\nhe engaged in a pooling arrangement with Holland, Riley,\\nand Weir to obtain methamphetamine at a low cost for re-\\nsale, a rational jury could have found that Mr. Hopper joined\\nthe single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Because\\n“[t]he key to proving a conspiracy is that the defendant\\njoined [an] agreement, not [a] group,” Avila, 557 F.3d at 816,\\nany failure to identify the connection between Mr. Hopper’s\\n\\n\\n62 Appellant’s Br. 34.\\n63 R.32 at 1.\\n\\f34 No. 18-2576\\n\\nco-conspirators did not amount to a material variance. See,\\ne.g., Williams, 272 F.3d at 863 (concluding there was no mate-\\nrial variance where there was sufficient evidence “for the ju-\\nry to conclude that a number of people had an agreement to\\ndistribute drugs in East St. Louis, and that Williams joined\\nthat agreement”).\\n In any event, Mr. Hopper suffered no prejudice as a re-\\nsult of the alleged variance. First, he contends that the vari-\\nance prejudiced him at trial because his counsel “was unable\\nto adequately prepare his defense because the government\\ndid not define the scope of the alleged conspiracy until clos-\\ning arguments.”64 But “[i]t is the grand jury’s statement of\\nthe existence of the conspiracy agreement rather than the\\nidentity of those who agree which places the defendant on\\nnotice of the charge he must be prepared to meet.” Townsend,\\n924 F.2d at 1389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The\\nGovernment’s evidence at trial demonstrated that Mr. Hop-\\nper joined others in an agreement to distribute methamphet-\\namine in southern Illinois. Mr. Hopper had sufficient notice\\nof the charged conspiracy and the evidence presented at tri-\\nal.65\\n Next, Mr. Hopper submits that “[t]he indictment and the\\ngovernment’s arguments at trial were so broad as to make it\\n\\n64 Appellant’s Br. 36.\\n65 See,e.g., United States v. Hardimon, 329 F. App’x 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2009)\\n(unpublished) (determining that there was no variance and explaining\\nthat “the indictment’s allegation of a conspiracy agreement alone was\\nsufficient notice of the charge that Hardimon needed to be prepared to\\nmeet, and the indictment was not required to name all those who partic-\\nipated in the conspiracy”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 35\\n\\nimpossible for Mr. Hopper to invoke his Fifth Amendment\\nright against double jeopardy” in a subsequent prosecu-\\ntion.66 He stresses that the record does not reveal the scope\\nof the conspiracy, his role in it, or “with whom the jury con-\\nvicted him of conspiring.”67 If we uphold his conviction “on\\nthe basis that some sub-conspiracy existed,” he posits, the\\nGovernment could indict him “for any other act within that\\ntime frame even though he had already been found guilty by\\nthe jury on the charged indictment.”68\\n We have held that, despite a variance between the in-\\ndictment and the proof at trial, we had “no difficulty in\\njudging the scope of the conviction for double jeopardy pur-\\nposes” where the indictment alleged a specific crime, “dur-\\ning a finite interval,” “involved a particular perpetrator,”\\nand “alleged specific misconduct by the perpetrator.” United\\nStates v. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 822, 824 (7th Cir. 2007)\\n(upholding defendant’s mail fraud conviction because de-\\nfendant was not prejudiced by the variance between the in-\\ndictment, “which pinpointed a particular step in the pay-\\nment process” of her alleged fraud, “and the proof at trial,\\nwhich established another”). In the same way, here, the in-\\ndictment alleged a specific crime (conspiracy to distribute\\nmethamphetamine), during a finite interval (about January\\n2015 through about May 31, 2017), involving a particular\\nperpetrator (Mr. Hopper and “other persons known and un-\\nknown”), and specific misconduct by the perpetrator (know-\\n\\n\\n66 Appellant’s Br. 38.\\n67 Id.\\n68 Id. at 38–39.\\n\\f36 No. 18-2576\\n\\ningly conspiring to distribute a mixture and substance con-\\ntaining methamphetamine).69 The scope of Mr. Hopper’s\\nconviction is sufficiently specific to avoid a future double\\njeopardy problem.\\n He further contends that the alleged variance prejudiced\\nhim at trial because the jury was confused about the instruc-\\ntions regarding the scope of the conspiracy. Evidence of\\nmultiple conspiracies may pose “a danger of ‘spillover’ prej-\\nudice” where multiple defendants are tried together and the\\njury hears incriminating evidence relevant against only\\nsome, but not all, of the defendants. Townsend, 924 F.2d at\\n1411. Because Mr. Hopper was tried alone, however, this\\nconcern was not implicated. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis,\\n37 F.3d 301, 306 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “there could be\\nno prejudice” where “Curtis was the only person on trial,\\nthus eliminating the customary concern with jury confusion\\nresulting from the ‘spillover’ effect associated with simulta-\\nneously trying multiple defendants with various connec-\\ntions to the purported scheme”).\\n Additionally, Mr. Hopper asserts that the variance preju-\\ndiced him at sentencing because it “improperly increased the\\nquantity of drugs attributed to him.”70 As we have stated,\\nhowever, there was ample evidence to support Mr. Hopper’s\\nconspiracy conviction, including but not limited to the pool-\\ning arrangement he participated in with Holland, Riley, and\\nWeir. Moreover, the PSR calculated Mr. Hopper’s relevant\\nconduct based on “the amounts obtained by the defendant,\\n\\n69 R.32 at 1.\\n70 Appellant’s Br. 39.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 37\\n\\nwhich he then distributed to others.”71 Because the district\\ncourt did not sentence Mr. Hopper based on drug transac-\\ntions not related to the conspiracy in which he participated,\\nsee Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1412 (determining there was no\\nprejudice where “none of the defendants [could] claim that\\ntheir sentences were increased on the basis of drug transac-\\ntions that were not attributable to the limited conspiracies in\\nwhich they participated”), or based on drug quantities sold\\nby his co-conspirators that were within the scope of the con-\\nspiracy, see Avila, 557 F.3d at 819 (concluding there was no\\nprejudice where the defendant’s sentence was based on\\ndrugs he supplied to others, not “the quantities of drugs that\\nwere seized from the entire drug organization”), he did not\\nsuffer prejudice at sentencing.\\n B.\\n 1.\\n Mr. Hopper next submits that the district court erred\\nwhen it ruled that the Government was not required to dis-\\nclose the proffer letters of its cooperating witnesses. He as-\\nserts that the court erroneously “based its decision solely on\\nBrady[72] and Giglio,[73] and thus did not recognize” that Fed-\\neral Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 “is an independent and\\nmore expansive basis for disclosure of proffer letters.”74\\nMr. Hopper’s trial counsel never filed a request under Rule\\n\\n\\n71 R.94 ¶ 21.\\n72 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\\n73 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).\\n74 Appellant’s Br. 14.\\n\\f38 No. 18-2576\\n\\n16 for disclosure of the proffer letters. Nor did counsel sug-\\ngest to the district court, during the hearing on his motion or\\notherwise, that Rule 16 might be a basis for disclosure. That\\ncounsel moved for disclosure of the proffer letters and ar-\\ngued that the court should disregard our decision in United\\nStates v. Weidenburner, 550 F. App’x 298 (7th Cir. 2013) (un-\\npublished), was not sufficient to preserve the instant argu-\\nment under Rule 16.75 Because there is no evidence in the\\nrecord that Mr. Hopper intended to relinquish this argu-\\nment, however, we conclude that he has forfeited, not\\nwaived, his request for disclosure under Rule 16. United\\nStates v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining\\nthat “[f]orfeiture occurs when a defendant negligently fails\\nto assert a right in a timely fashion”).\\n Rule 16, which governs discovery and inspection, pro-\\nvides in relevant part that:\\n Upon a defendant’s request, the government\\n must permit the defendant to inspect and to\\n\\n\\n75 Cf. United States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015) (defend-\\nant forfeited argument that his arrest was unlawful because his motion\\nto suppress challenged only the protective sweep of his home, not his\\narrest); United States v. Kelly, 772 F.3d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 2014) (defend-\\nant forfeited argument that the warrant application failed to establish\\nprobable cause because his motion to suppress argued only that the war-\\nrant lacked sufficient particularity in the description of the place to be\\nsearched); United States v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 2007) (de-\\nfendant forfeited argument that his waiver of his Fifth Amendment\\nrights and subsequent confession were involuntary due to the coercive\\nconditions of his confinement because, in the district court, he argued\\nonly that his confession was involuntary because the police did not ad-\\nminister Miranda warnings).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 39\\n\\n copy or photograph books, papers, documents,\\n data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings\\n or places, or copies or portions of any of these\\n items, if the item is within the government’s\\n possession, custody, or control and … the item\\n is material to preparing the defense.\\nFed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E).\\n Relatedly, Rule 12 provides that certain motions, includ-\\ning a request for “discovery under Rule 16,” “must be raised\\nby pretrial motion if the basis for the motion is then reason-\\nably available and the motion can be determined without a\\ntrial on the merits.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). Under this\\nRule, “[t]he court may … set a deadline for the parties to\\nmake pretrial motions,” and if no deadline is set, then “the\\ndeadline is the start of trial.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1). “If a\\nparty does not meet the deadline for making a Rule 12(b)(3)\\nmotion, the motion is untimely.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).\\n“But a court may consider the defense, objection, or request\\nif the party shows good cause.” Id.\\n Rule 12 thus “imposes an antecedent good-cause re-\\nquirement when a defendant fails to file a timely motion.”\\nUnited States v. McMillian, 786 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015). In\\nother words, “if a defendant fails to raise a[n] … argument\\nbelow—even if he does so under circumstances that suggest\\na forfeiture—we cannot proceed directly to a review of the\\ndistrict court’s actions for plain error.” United States v. Kelly,\\n772 F.3d 1072, 1079 (7th Cir. 2014). Instead, we first must ask\\nwhether there was good cause for the failure. United States v.\\nJohnson, 415 F.3d 728, 730–31 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n\\f40 No. 18-2576\\n\\n Mr. Hopper offers no explanation for his trial counsel’s\\nfailure to request disclosure of the proffer letters under Rule\\n16 or to otherwise assert Rule 16 as a basis for disclosure of\\nthe letters before the district court. Further, his counsel made\\nno request for relief based on good cause before the district\\ncourt or in this court. Absent a showing of good cause as re-\\nquired by Rule 12, his claim is not subject to further review.\\nUnited States v. Daniels, 803 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2015);\\nUnited States v. Hargrove, 508 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2007).76\\n 2.\\n Mr. Hopper further contends that “the district court\\nerred in presuming that proffer letters are never” required to\\nbe disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or\\nGiglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).77 We review the\\ndistrict court’s determination that the proffer letters need not\\nbe disclosed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jumah,\\n599 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n At the hearing on Mr. Hopper’s motion, the discussion\\ncentered on our decision in Weidenburner, where we held\\nthat proffer letters “are not Giglio material or Jencks Act[78]\\nstatements.” 550 F. App’x at 304. In that case, the defendant\\nmoved for a new trial based on the Government’s assertion\\n\\n76 We note in passing that Mr. Hopper’s counsel had the information\\ncontained in the proffer letters, even though he did not have the letters\\nthemselves. He also was permitted to cross examine the witness about\\nthe proffer process. His client therefore suffered no prejudice from the\\nabsence of the letters.\\n77 Appellant’s Br. 16.\\n78 18 U.S.C. § 3500.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 41\\n\\nthat it could not locate copies of the proffer letters for two\\ncodefendants who testified against Weidenburner. Id. Nei-\\nther witness disputed the existence of the proffer letters, and\\nWeidenburner received copies of both witnesses’ plea\\nagreements. Id. Consequently, we rejected Weidenburner’s\\nclaim of nondisclosure as frivolous. Id. Acknowledging that\\n“Giglio requires disclosure of inducements for a witness[]’s\\ntestimony,” we reasoned that “the prosecutor fulfilled that\\nobligation by producing the plea agreements, which de-\\nscribe[d] the benefits [the witnesses] would receive for coop-\\nerating.” Id. Because “[t]he proffer letters were preliminary\\nto the resulting plea agreements,” we concluded that “Giglio\\nwas satisfied by disclosure of the plea agreements.” Id. Fur-\\nther, we determined that “the Jencks Act [wa]s irrelevant”\\nbecause “[t]he proffer letters were statements of the prosecu-\\ntor who wrote them,” not “factual narrative[s] useful for im-\\npeachment.” Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).79\\n\\n\\n79 At least one of our sister circuits also has held that “the government\\nsatisfied its obligations” by disclosing a cooperating witness’s plea\\nagreement to the defense. United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 880\\n(8th Cir. 2007). In Santisteban, the defendant alleged that the Govern-\\nment’s non-disclosure of the proffer letters sent to a cooperating witness\\n“violated his due process right to receive exculpatory or impeachment\\nevidence.” Id. Because “the government had already provided [the wit-\\nness]’s plea agreement,” the district court “declined to compel the pro-\\nduction” of the proffer letters. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that there was\\nno due process violation. Id. “Regardless of any preliminary proffer\\nagreements,” the court reasoned, “the formal plea agreement governed\\n[the witness]’s cooperation, and it provided the jury with a sufficient ba-\\nsis for judging the credibility of [his] testimony at trial.” Id. The court\\nconcluded that “[t]he terms of the proffer letters were not material to the\\ndefense.” Id.\\n\\f42 No. 18-2576\\n\\n In this case, the Government disclosed the cooperating\\nwitnesses’ plea agreements, which superseded the proffer\\nletters and outlined the terms of the witnesses’ cooperation.\\nThe agreements provided a sufficient basis for Mr. Hopper’s\\ncounsel to impeach the Government’s witnesses and for the\\njury to assess the credibility of those witnesses. Therefore,\\nthe district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied\\nMr. Hopper’s motion for disclosure of the proffer letters.\\n C.\\n Next, Mr. Hopper challenges the district court’s finding\\nthat he was subject to a two-level sentence enhancement\\nbased on evidence that he maintained his Creal Springs resi-\\ndence for the purpose of distributing methamphetamine.\\nMr. Hopper preserved this challenge by filing an objection to\\nthe application of the enhancement in the district court.\\nTherefore, “we review the district court’s application of the\\nU.S. Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its underlying factual\\nfindings for clear error.” United States v. Flores-Olague, 717\\nF.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 2013).\\n The guidelines provide for a two-level sentence en-\\nhancement “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for the\\npurpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled sub-\\nstance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). This includes “storage of a\\ncontrolled substance for the purpose of distribution.” Id.\\ncmt. n.17. The application notes clarify that\\n“[m]anufacturing or distributing a controlled substance need\\nnot be the sole purpose for which the premises was main-\\ntained, but must be one of the defendant’s primary or prin-\\ncipal uses for the premises, rather than one of the defend-\\nant’s incidental or collateral uses for the premises.” Id. Be-\\ncause it is undisputed that Mr. Hopper “maintained” the\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 43\\n\\nCreal Springs house, which was his home, our review is lim-\\nited to whether distributing methamphetamine was a “pri-\\nmary or principal” use of the home.\\n “[T]o determine whether drug distribution was a prima-\\nry or incidental use, the district courts are not required to\\napply a simple balancing test that compares the frequency of\\nunlawful activity at the residence with the frequency of law-\\nful uses.” United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir.\\n2017) (per curiam). That is because “such a test would im-\\nmunize every family home that is also used for drug distri-\\nbution from being deemed an illegally maintained ‘premis-\\nes,’” since “the amount of lawful activity in a home is all but\\ncertain to exceed the amount of illegal activity.” Id. Instead,\\n“the sentencing court should focus on both the frequency\\nand significance of the illicit activities.” Id. “Neither a specif-\\nic frequency nor a particular significance automatically war-\\nrants applying the enhancement.” United States v. Sanchez,\\n710 F.3d 724, 731 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on other grounds,\\nSanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013). “Rather, we con-\\nsider the two in tandem and determine whether the prohib-\\nited purpose can be fairly described as a ‘primary or princi-\\npal’ use of the premises.” Id. Factors relevant to this analysis\\ninclude “quantities dealt, customer interactions, keeping\\n‘tools of the trade’ and business records, and accepting pay-\\nment.” Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284.\\n First, with respect to frequency, Mr. Hopper contends\\nthat Wright’s “vague and inconsistent testimony” at the sen-\\ntencing hearing “was not enough” to establish the frequent\\nuse of his home to distribute drugs.80 He further asserts that\\n\\n80 Appellant’s Br. 45.\\n\\f44 No. 18-2576\\n\\n“the district court failed to account for [his] affirmative deci-\\nsion to stop using his home for drug distribution several\\nmonths before the end of the charged conspiracy.”81 We con-\\nclude that these contentions are without merit.\\n Testimony introduced at Mr. Hopper’s trial and at the\\nsentencing hearing highlighted that he distributed metham-\\nphetamine from his home on approximately a weekly basis\\nfor the duration of the conspiracy. Wright testified that she\\nhad lived with Mr. Hopper at his Creal Springs home from\\nabout October 2015 until May 2017. During this time, meth-\\namphetamine “was always there” and she saw drugs in the\\nhome “[p]retty much every day.”82 Wright estimated that,\\nwhile she lived with him, Mr. Hopper distributed metham-\\nphetamine from his residence approximately “[w]eekly.”83\\nShe added, however, that toward the end of their time living\\ntogether, Mr. Hopper’s drug selling diminished and he was\\n“just using.”84\\n Similarly, Shuman testified that Mr. Hopper distributed\\nmethamphetamine to him while Shuman was living at the\\n\\n\\n81 Id.\\n82 R.125 at 8.\\n83 Id. at 10.\\n84 Id. at 24:8–15 (“Q. Ms. Wright, did you also add that most of the meth\\ntransactions that you were aware of occurred at Hopper’s brother’s\\nhouse, Mark Hopper? A. I’ve never—I didn’t say that like that. That’s\\nbeen taken out of context. I said that happened there, but everything was\\ndone in Creal in the very beginning, and then he slacked off, and to-\\nwards the end of the relationship he was just using, he wasn’t selling\\nit.”).\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 45\\n\\nCreal Springs home in December 2015 and January 2016. Af-\\nter Shuman returned from jail in early 2016, the two had an\\narrangement in which Mr. Hopper placed methampheta-\\nmine for Shuman in the garage. Shuman, who was no longer\\nliving with Mr. Hopper, retrieved the drugs from the garage\\nand left the money he owed Mr. Hopper in their place. Mul-\\ntiple witnesses, including Craig, Holland, and Peyton, also\\ntestified that they observed Mr. Hopper sell methampheta-\\nmine to other individuals at his home.\\n This evidence that Mr. Hopper stored drugs at his house\\nand regularly distributed methamphetamine to customers\\nthere for the better part of 2016 confirms that he used the\\nhouse for the purpose of drug distribution with sufficient\\nfrequency.85 That Mr. Hopper conducted distribution activi-\\nties with less frequency toward the end of the conspiracy\\ndoes not undermine this conclusion.\\n Turning to the significance of the distribution activities,\\nMr. Hopper submits that “[t]he scope of drug activity at [his]\\n\\n\\n85 See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 874 F.3d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 2017)\\n(concluding that “evidence of eight transactions, most within a\\ntwo-month period, support[ed] the courts’ findings that significant deals\\nwere occurring frequently enough for the home to be deemed, in es-\\nsence, a drug den for the purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(12)”); United States v.\\nWinfield, 846 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (upholding appli-\\ncation of enhancement based on evidence that “in the twelve weeks be-\\nfore the raid, [an] informant bought drugs from Winfield at his apart-\\nment four times and spotted additional drugs and drug paraphernalia\\nduring each transaction”); United States v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 533\\n(7th Cir. 2013) (holding that enhancement applied based on evidence that\\nthe defendant “sold and stored drugs at his home” and “did so ‘on a dai-\\nly basis’ over a three-year period”).\\n\\f46 No. 18-2576\\n\\nhome was not significant enough to warrant the enhance-\\nment.”86 Again, the testimony adduced at trial and at sen-\\ntencing amply demonstrated that Mr. Hopper carried on\\nsignificant aspects of his distribution business from his\\nhome.\\n We have already observed that there was substantial tes-\\ntimony that Mr. Hopper stored and distributed metham-\\nphetamine at his house.87 In this respect, Wright testified\\nthat Mr. Hopper had drug scales at the Creal Springs home,\\nwhich he used “[t]o weigh out the product.”88 Further, we\\nconsider evidence of financial transactions in the home to be\\nsignificant activity for the purpose of distributing drugs.89\\nHere, Williams testified that, when customers owed\\nMr. Hopper money, Williams occasionally brought these in-\\n\\n86 Appellant’s Br. 47.\\n87 See, e.g., Contreras, 874 F.3d at 284 (upholding application of enhance-\\nment based on “evidence that drugs were shipped to and stored at Con-\\ntreras’s home” and that “Contreras accepted payment for drugs at his\\nhome”). We have also recognized that keeping “tools of the trade” on the\\npremises may indicate “that drug trafficking was the principal use of the\\npremises.” United States v. Thomas, 845 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 2017) (in-\\nternal quotation marks omitted) (upholding application of enhancement\\nwhere a “search of the home yielded a digital scale, a cutting agent, and\\nplastic sandwich baggies with the corners cut out”).\\n88 R.125 at 9.\\n89 See United States v. Sanchez, 710 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2013), vacated on\\nother grounds, Sanchez v. United States, 571 U.S. 801 (2013) (noting that “in\\nconducting this large drug trade, Sanchez used his residence not only for\\nthe drop-off, storage, and pick-up of drugs, but also as a secure place to\\nsettle the financials”), vacated on other grounds, Sanchez v. United States,\\n571 U.S. 801 (2013) .\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 47\\n\\ndividuals to the house to settle their debt with Mr. Hopper.\\nWright also acknowledged that Mr. Hopper collected money\\nfrom individuals who bought methamphetamine at his\\nhome. Finally, testimony that the defendant’s “only regular\\nand reliable source of income stemmed from proceeds of\\ndrug trafficking activities” is evidence that the distribution\\nof drugs from his home was significant to his livelihood.90\\nFor this reason, it is meaningful that Wright testified that\\nMr. Hopper had received money from a settlement and had\\na “side business” buying and selling cars, but that he did not\\n“officially work.”91\\n In sum, we conclude that there was evidence of frequent,\\nsignificant drug distribution activities at Mr. Hopper’s\\nhome. Therefore, the district court properly determined that\\nMr. Hopper was subject to the sentence enhancement for\\nmaintaining a drug premises.\\n D.\\n Finally, we turn to Mr. Hopper’s claim that the district\\ncourt erred in determining his guidelines range because it\\nadopted an incorrectly calculated relevant conduct finding\\nfrom the PSR. He contends that most of the relevant conduct\\nwas based on drug amounts identified in interviews the\\n\\n\\n90 Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d at 533; see also Winfield, 846 F.3d at 243 (noting\\nthat “Winfield at the time of his arrest was ‘primarily living off proceeds\\nfrom drug sales’”); Sanchez, 710 F.3d at 732 (reasoning that because\\n“Sanchez had no legitimate job and no source of income beyond his drug\\nsales,” “the illicit transactions occurring at the premises were signifi-\\ncant—in quantity, in scope, and in importance to Sanchez’s livelihood”).\\n91 R.125 at 32.\\n\\f48 No. 18-2576\\n\\nprobation office conducted with Holland and Riley. Accord-\\ning to Mr. Hopper, in their separate interviews, Holland and\\nRiley were actually referring to the same transactions. Thus,\\nby including the drug amounts described in both Holland\\nand Riley’s interviews in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s rel-\\nevant conduct, the district court double-counted the same set\\nof drugs.\\n Mr. Hopper did not challenge the relevant conduct calcu-\\nlation in his objection to the initial PSR, his objection to the\\nsecond revised PSR, or at the sentencing hearing. Therefore,\\nwe review his claim for plain error only. Fed. R. Crim. P.\\n52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be\\nconsidered even though it was not brought to the [district]\\ncourt’s attention.”). We have discretion to remedy the for-\\nfeited error provided that Mr. Hopper has satisfied the fol-\\nlowing conditions: (1) there is an error “that has not been in-\\ntentionally relinquished or abandoned”; (2) the error is\\n“plain—that is to say, clear or obvious”; (3) the error “affect-\\ned the defendant’s substantial rights”; and (4) the error “se-\\nriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of\\njudicial proceedings.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136\\nS. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507\\nU.S. 725, 736 (1993), superseded on other grounds by rule, Fed.\\nR. Crim. P. 24(c) (1999)); see also United States v. Pierson, 925\\nF.3d 913, 919 (7th Cir. 2019).\\n The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence has clarified\\nthe application of the third and fourth prongs in the context\\nof sentencing errors. To demonstrate that the error affected\\nhis substantial rights, “in the ordinary case,” the defendant\\nmust “show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,\\nthe outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 49\\n\\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343 (internal quotation marks\\nomitted). According to the Court, “[w]hen a defendant is\\nsentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—whether or\\nnot the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct\\nrange—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient\\nto show a reasonable probability of a different outcome ab-\\nsent the error.” Id. at 1345. “That probability is all that is\\nneeded to establish an effect on substantial rights for pur-\\nposes of obtaining relief under Rule 52(b).” Id. at 1349. Fur-\\nther, “[i]n the ordinary case, … the failure to correct a plain\\nGuidelines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights\\nwill seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputa-\\ntion of judicial proceedings.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States,\\n138 S. Ct. 1897, 1911 (2018). In other words, “[a] plain Guide-\\nlines error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights is pre-\\ncisely the type of error that ordinarily warrants relief under\\nRule 52(b).” Id. at 1907.\\n To calculate Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct, the PSR to-\\ntaled the drug amounts described in four separate inter-\\nviews with other participants in the conspiracy.92 In particu-\\nlar:\\n On August 24, 2016, Lucas Holland participat-\\n ed in an interview with investigating agents.\\n Holland divulged that he received four ounces\\n of ice every day for a month from Randall Ri-\\n ley; of the four ounces, he would give the de-\\n\\n92 Though the probation office revised Mr. Hopper’s PSR twice before\\nsentencing, the relevant conduct calculations did not change. For pur-\\nposes of this discussion, we reference the most recent version of the re-\\nport, the second revised PSR.\\n\\f50 No. 18-2576\\n\\n fendant one ounce on each occasion. (30 ounc-\\n es = 850 grams)[93]\\n On February 14, 2017, Randall Riley was inter-\\n viewed by investigating agents. Riley stated\\n that from January through March, he sold one\\n ounce of ice every day to the defendant for\\n $1,100. (28 days [February] x 28.35 grams = 793\\n grams)[94]\\n On May 4, 2017, Erin Wright participated in an\\n interview with agents. … Wright stated she\\n traveled with Hopper on ten occasions to pick\\n up ice from Gary Mims in Cape Girardeau. She\\n stated on average, they would obtain an ounce\\n of ice per visit (10 ounces or 283.5 grams of\\n ice).[95]\\n On July 19, 2017, Erin Wright was inter-\\n view[ed] by investigating agents. According to\\n Wright, the defendant purchased ice from\\n Robert Weir from October or November 2015\\n until Weir was arrested in March 2016. Wright\\n estimated that the defendant would purchase\\n 3.5 grams to 28 grams per week, conservative-\\n ly. (12 weeks [December—February] x 3.5\\n grams = 42 grams)[96]\\n\\n\\n93 R.94 ¶ 12.\\n94 Id. ¶ 14.\\n95 Id. ¶ 19.\\n96 Id. ¶ 20.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 51\\n\\nThe PSR explained that Mr. Hopper’s “relevant conduct is\\noutlined in bold above and involves the amounts obtained\\nby the defendant, which he then distributed to others.”97\\nFurther, the PSR noted that “[t]he amount of ice that the de-\\nfendant distributed was not counted to avoid double count-\\ning.”98 As demonstrated by the following chart, adding the\\ndrug amounts described above, the PSR totaled Mr. Hop-\\nper’s relevant conduct to be 1.9685 kilograms of ice meth-\\namphetamine.\\n Interviewee Drug Amount\\n Holland 850 grams\\n Riley 793 grams\\n Wright 283.5 grams\\n Wright 42 grams\\n 1,968.5 grams\\n Total\\n (1.9685 kilograms)\\n We agree with Mr. Hopper that the district court plainly\\nerred in adopting the PSR’s relevant conduct calculation.\\nFirst, we conclude that Mr. Hopper did not “intentionally\\nrelinquish[] or abandon[]” this challenge. Molina-Martinez,\\n136 S. Ct. at 1343. Neither party objected to the relevant con-\\nduct calculation prior to or during the sentencing hearing.\\nAt sentencing, the district court adopted the findings of the\\nPSR, including the relevant conduct calculation, without fur-\\n\\n\\n97 Id. ¶ 21.\\n98 Id.\\n\\f52 No. 18-2576\\n\\nther comment. “Given the complexity” of calculating a de-\\nfendant’s guidelines range, “district courts sometimes make\\nmistakes.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904. Accordingly,\\n“when a district court’s sentencing of a defendant within the\\nframework of an incorrect Guidelines range goes unnoticed\\nby the parties as well,” a defendant is “not entirely without\\nrecourse.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Second, the error here was plain. At trial, Holland, Riley,\\nand Weir all testified that, together with Mr. Hopper, they\\npooled their money over approximately a month-long peri-\\nod sometime between late 2015 and early 2016 to purchase\\nmethamphetamine from a source in Cape Girardeau, Mis-\\nsouri. Mr. Hopper, Weir, or both brought the money to Ri-\\nley’s home, where Holland also lived. Holland and Riley\\ndrove to Missouri to obtain the drugs. When they returned,\\nthe group met at either Riley’s home or Mr. Hopper’s home\\nto divide up the drugs. Holland, Riley, and Weir all de-\\nscribed how the group pooled their money to purchase four\\nounces of methamphetamine at a time, which they divided\\ninto equal, one-ounce shares.\\n In context of the testimony presented at trial, it is clear\\nthat Holland and Riley were describing the same pooling\\narrangement during their separate interviews with the pro-\\nbation office. The amounts attributed to Holland and Riley\\nin the PSR differ only because Riley’s more specific state-\\nments prompted the Government to use a 28-day month in-\\nstead of a 30-day month to calculate the total amount of\\nmethamphetamine described. Regardless, the trial testimony\\nconsistently showed that Mr. Hopper, Holland, Riley, and\\nWeir participated in a pooling arrangement and that follow-\\ning each purchase, each member of the group obtained one\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 53\\n\\nounce of methamphetamine. Because Holland and Riley\\nwere describing the same set of transactions, it was plainly\\nerroneous to include the drug amounts described in both in-\\nterviews in calculating Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\\n Third, we hold that this plain error affected Mr. Hopper’s\\nsubstantial rights because it increased his base offense level\\nand his corresponding guidelines imprisonment range. Mo-\\nlina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346 (“In most cases a defendant\\nwho has shown that the district court mistakenly deemed\\napplicable an incorrect, higher Guidelines range has demon-\\nstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome.”). At\\nsentencing, the district court adopted the PSR’s relevant\\nconduct calculation of 1.968 grams of ice methamphetamine,\\nwhich resulted in a base offense level of 36. Applying the\\ntwo-level enhancement for maintaining a residence for the\\npurpose of distributing methamphetamine, the court calcu-\\nlated a total offense level of 38. With a criminal history cate-\\ngory of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\\nwas 235 to 293 months. The court sentenced Mr. Hopper to\\n235 months’ imprisonment, which is “conspicuous for its po-\\nsition as the lowest sentence within what the [d]istrict\\n[c]ourt believed to be the applicable range.” Id. at 1347.\\n If we count the drugs described by Holland and Riley on-\\nly once, Mr. Hopper’s base offense level falls to 34. Assum-\\ning for purposes of this calculation that the relevant month\\nwas 30 days and, consistent with the testimony at trial, that\\nMr. Hopper received one ounce of methamphetamine ice per\\ntransaction, the resulting drug quantity is 850 grams. Add-\\ning these 850 grams to the drug amounts described by\\nWright, the total quantity is only 1,175.5 grams, or 1.1755\\nkilograms, as shown in the following chart:\\n\\f54 No. 18-2576\\n\\n Interviewee Drug Amount\\n Holland/Riley 850 grams\\n Wright 283.5 grams\\n Wright 42 grams\\n 1,175.5 grams\\n Total\\n (1.1755 kilograms)\\n This amount is significantly below the 1.5-kilogram\\nthreshold that would trigger a base offense level of 36. See\\nU.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2). At a base offense level of 34, applying\\nthe two-level drug premises enhancement, Mr. Hopper’s to-\\ntal offense level would be 36. With a criminal history catego-\\nry of I, the corresponding guidelines imprisonment range\\nwould be 188 to 235 months. At sentencing, the district court\\n“said nothing to suggest that it would have imposed” a sen-\\ntence of 235 months “regardless of the Guidelines range.”\\nMolina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1348. Consequently, “there is at\\nleast a reasonable probability that the [d]istrict [c]ourt would\\nhave imposed a different sentence had it known that” a low-\\ner sentence was appropriate. Id.; United States v. Adams, 746\\nF.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2014) (“When a district court incor-\\nrectly calculates the guideline range, we normally presume\\nthe improperly calculated guideline range influenced the\\njudge’s choice of sentence, unless he says otherwise.”).\\n Fourth, we conclude that Mr. Hopper satisfied the last\\nprong of the plain-error analysis. “The risk of unnecessary\\ndeprivation of liberty particularly undermines the fairness,\\nintegrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings in the\\ncontext of a plain Guidelines error because of the role the\\ndistrict court plays in calculating the range and the relative\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 55\\n\\nease of correcting the error.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at\\n1908. This conclusion is especially forceful where, as here,\\nthe error “was based on a mistake made in the presentence\\ninvestigation report by the Probation Office, which works on\\nbehalf of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” Id. Therefore, we conclude\\nthat resentencing based on recalculation of Mr. Hopper’s\\nrelevant conduct is required.99\\n The Government insists that any error in calculating\\nMr. Hopper’s relevant conduct was harmless because the\\ndistrict court actually “severely undercounted” the amount\\nof drugs attributable to Mr. Hopper.100 According to the\\nGovernment, the district court should have attributed to\\nMr. Hopper the entire amount purchased by Mr. Hopper,\\nHolland, Riley, and Weir each time they pooled their money\\ntogether because “[t]he entire four ounces was foreseeable\\nrelevant conduct” to Mr. Hopper.101 The Government con-\\ncedes that it failed to challenge the relevant conduct calcula-\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n99See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (hold-\\ning that plain error in calculating the defendant’s criminal history points,\\nwhich resulted in a higher guidelines range, required resentencing be-\\ncause we had “no reason to believe” that the district court’s error “did\\nnot affect its selection of the particular sentence”).\\n100 Appellee’s Br. 49.\\n101 Id. at 50; see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (providing that, “in the case of a\\njointly undertaken criminal activity,” a defendant’s base offense level\\nshall be determined based on “all acts and omissions of others” that were\\n“(i) within the scope” of the conspiracy; “(ii) in furtherance of” the con-\\nspiracy; and “(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with” the con-\\nspiracy).\\n\\f56 No. 18-2576\\n\\ntion before the district court but explains that “it most likely\\nwould not have affected the advisory guideline range.”102\\n We have recognized that “an appellate court can affirm\\nthe determination of a sentencing range ‘on any ground\\nsupported by the record even if that ground was not relied\\nupon by the district court.’” United States v. Benitez, 92 F.3d\\n528, 538 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 6 F.3d\\n431, 447 (7th Cir. 1993)). But the Government has not offered,\\nnor have we located, any authority to suggest that we can\\nrely on a relevant conduct calculation not presented to the\\ndistrict court to affirm a defendant’s sentence. Indeed, our\\ndecision in United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir.\\n1995), suggests quite the opposite.\\n In that case, a jury found Henderson guilty of conspiracy\\nto distribute cocaine base and distributing cocaine base. Id.\\nat 1147. At sentencing, the district court attributed to Hen-\\nderson the 18 grams of cocaine he was convicted of selling.\\nId. at 1151. The court also attributed ten percent of the\\namounts of cocaine described by Henderson’s\\nco-conspirator. Id. The court explained that it did not accept\\nthe full amount claimed by his co-conspirator because of\\n“the ‘vagueness and generalized’ nature” of the co-\\nconspirator’s testimony “and the lack of money to support\\nhis contentions that he sold such large amounts of drugs.”\\nId. Henderson challenged the amount of drugs the district\\ncourt attributed to him, arguing that “by accepting only 10%\\nof [the co-conspirator’s] testimony, the court did not simply\\nact conservatively, but instead indicated its belief that [the\\n\\n\\n102 Appellee’s Br. 50 n.6.\\n\\fNo. 18-2576 57\\n\\nco-conspirator’s] information was not sufficiently reliable to\\nsupport any amounts above the 18 grams.” Id. We agreed\\nthat the court clearly erred because it “did not have suffi-\\ncient faith” in the co-conspirator’s testimony “to use it as the\\nbasis for attributing further amounts to Henderson.” Id. at\\n1152.\\n The Government submitted, however, that remand was\\nnot required because other calculations would result in drug\\namounts within the range applied by the district court. Id.\\nFor instance, the Government contended that we could cal-\\nculate the drug quantity by multiplying the number of used\\nplastic baggies by the amount of cocaine typically packaged\\nin each baggie. Id. at 1153. Although we were “fairly certain\\nthat this calculation … would adequately sustain the court’s\\ndetermination,” we declined to “embrace it ourselves.” Id.\\nWe explained that “[t]he government first presented this cal-\\nculation on appeal,” such that “the district court, which has\\nsentencing responsibility, [] had no opportunity to consider\\nit.” Id. The Government also proposed that we could deter-\\nmine the drug quantity based on the amount of money\\nseized from Henderson and from a drug location on the day\\nof his arrest. Id. We declined this suggestion, reasoning that\\n“while the government introduced this evidence at trial, it\\ndid not present the calculations at sentencing.” Id. Conse-\\nquently, we left “the initial consideration of these sentencing\\nissues to the district court on remand.” Id.\\n For the same reasons, we decline to affirm Mr. Hopper’s\\nsentence based on relevant conduct calculations that the\\nGovernment presented for the first time on appeal. Because\\nneither party challenged the relevant conduct calculations\\nbelow, “the district court, which has sentencing responsibil-\\n\\f58 No. 18-2576\\n\\nity,” id., had no opportunity to consider any arguments re-\\ngarding the proper calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant\\nconduct. The parties must present their drug quantity calcu-\\nlations to the district court to consider in the first instance on\\nremand.\\n Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Hopper’s con-\\nviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and\\naffirm the district court’s determination that he was subject\\nto a sentence enhancement for maintaining a residence for\\nthe purpose of distributing methamphetamine. We vacate\\nhis sentence and remand his case to the district court for re-\\nsentencing based on our conclusion that there was plain er-\\nror in the calculation of Mr. Hopper’s relevant conduct.\\n AFFIRMED IN PART,\\n VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3889,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654161,"string":"4,654,161"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Holly Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Incorpo"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-3633"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3633\\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\\nDANA LAND, on behalf of themselves\\nand all others similarly situated,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nHILL’S PET NUTRITION, INC., and\\nPETSMART, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17-cv-2535 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Holly Vanzant and Dana Land own\\ncats with health problems. Their veterinarians prescribed cat\\nfood manufactured by Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., and sold\\nunder Hill’s “Prescription Diet” brand. For several years\\nVanzant and Land purchased this higher-priced cat food\\n\\f2 No. 17-3633\\n\\nfrom their local PetSmart stores using their veterinarian’s\\nprescriptions. They eventually learned, however, that the\\nPrescription Diet cat food is not materially different from\\nnonprescription cat food. And the prescription requirement\\nis illusory; no prescription is necessary. Feeling deceived,\\nVanzant and Land filed a class-action lawsuit against Hill’s\\nand PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Con-\\nsumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq., and for unjust enrichment.\\n The district judge dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim for two reasons: (1) the complaint lacked the specificity\\nrequired for a fraud claim; and (2) the claim is barred by a\\nstatutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by a\\nregulatory body—here, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-\\ntion (“FDA”). The judge dismissed the unjust-enrichment\\nclaim because it was premised on the same conduct as the\\nstatutory claim.\\n We reverse. First, the safe-harbor provision does not\\napply. Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., pet food intended to treat or prevent disease\\nand marketed as such is considered a drug and requires\\napproval of a new animal drug application. Without FDA\\napproval, the manufacturer may not sell it in interstate\\ncommerce and the product is deemed adulterated and\\nmisbranded. The FDA issued guidance recognizing that\\nmost pet-food products in this category do not have the\\nrequired approval; the guidance states that the agency is less\\nlikely to initiate an enforcement action if consumers\\npurchase the food through or under the direction of a\\nveterinarian (among other factors guiding the agency’s\\nenforcement discretion). But the guidance does not\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 3\\n\\nspecifically authorize the conduct alleged here, so the safe\\nharbor does not apply.\\n And the plaintiffs pleaded the fraud claim with the par-\\nticularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil\\nProcedure. So the statutory claim may proceed. The unjust-\\nenrichment claim is more appropriately construed as a\\nrequest for relief in the form of restitution based on the\\nalleged fraud. In Illinois unjust enrichment is not a separate\\ncause of action but is a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d\\n725, 741 (7th Cir. 2017). The request for restitution based on\\nunjust enrichment therefore rests entirely on the consumer-\\nfraud claim, and it too may move forward.\\n I. Background\\n The case comes to us from a dismissal at the pleadings\\nstage, so we recount the facts as alleged in the amended\\ncomplaint. Hill’s Pet Nutrition manufactures a variety of pet\\nfood, and this case concerns its Prescription Diet brand.\\nHill’s sells its Prescription Diet pet food through veterinari-\\nans and pet-food retailers, though consumers may purchase\\nit from a retailer only with a veterinarian’s prescription.\\nPetSmart sells pet supplies and pet food, including Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet brand. Consumers need a veterinarian’s\\nprescription to purchase Hill’s Prescription Diet food at\\nPetSmart.\\n In January 2013 Holly Vanzant’s cat Tarik underwent\\nemergency surgery for bladder stones. At a follow-up\\nappointment, Tarik’s veterinarian prescribed Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet c/d Multicare Feline Bladder Health cat\\nfood. That same day Vanzant purchased the food at a\\n\\f4 No. 17-3633\\n\\nPetSmart store. Inside she saw marketing materials\\nindicating that the cat food is “prescription only,” and the\\nlabel on the bag read “Hill’s Prescription Diet.” PetSmart\\nprovided her with a pet prescription card listing Tarik’s\\nname, prescription number, and prescription date. For three\\nyears Vanzant purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food\\nfrom PetSmart, paying a higher price than for\\nnonprescription food. She showed the prescription card to\\nthe cashier each time.\\n Land had a similar experience. In October 2013 a veteri-\\nnarian diagnosed her cat Chief with diabetes and prescribed\\nHill’s Prescription Diet m/d Feline Glucose/Weight Man-\\nagement cat food. Within a few weeks, Land purchased\\nHill’s Prescription Diet cat food at a PetSmart store. She too\\nsaw marketing materials inside the store indicating that the\\nfood is meant to treat or control diabetes. PetSmart provided\\nLand with a pet prescription card listing Chief’s name,\\nprescription number, and prescription date. For two years\\nLand purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart, paying a higher price than for nonprescription\\nfood. She too showed the prescription card each time.\\n Vanzant and Land eventually learned they were not re-\\nceiving what they expected. They thought prescription pet\\nfood was medically necessary for the health of their pets,\\nhad been approved by the FDA, and could not be sold\\nlegally without a prescription. But the FDA had not ap-\\nproved it, and nothing required that it be sold with a pre-\\nscription. They filed a proposed class action in state court\\nagainst Hill’s and PetSmart alleging claims for violation of\\nthe Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and unjust enrichment. The\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 5\\n\\ndefendants removed the case to federal court and moved to\\ndismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6).\\n The judge granted the motion. He held that the\\nConsumer Fraud Act claim is foreclosed by the statute’s safe-\\nharbor provision, which shields actions authorized by laws\\nadministered by a regulatory body. Specifically, the judge\\nrelied on an FDA Compliance Policy Guide, which he\\nconstrued as regulatory authorization for “the gate-keeping\\nrole of veterinarians in ensuring that pet owners purchase\\nonly appropriate therapeutic foods.” The judge also\\nconcluded that Vanzant and Land failed to plead the\\nconsumer-fraud claim with the particularity required by\\nRule 9(b). With no underlying fraud claim remaining, the\\njudge likewise dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim.\\nVanzant and Land appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review the dismissal order de novo. Camasta v. Jos. A.\\nBank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain\\n“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable\\ninference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct\\nalleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At a\\nminimum it “must give enough details about the subject\\nmatter of the case to present a story that holds together.”\\nSwanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s]\\nconsumers … against fraud, unfair methods of competition,\\nand other unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson\\nv. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002).\\nDeceptive or unfair practices include any “misrepresentation\\n\\f6 No. 17-3633\\n\\nor the concealment, suppression or omission of any material\\nfact.” 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2. To recover on a claim under\\nthe Act, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant\\ncommitted a deceptive or unfair act with the intent that\\nothers rely on the deception, that the act occurred in the\\ncourse of trade or commerce, and that it caused actual\\ndamages. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 934–35 (7th Cir.\\n2010). We begin, however, with the Act’s safe-harbor\\nprovision.\\nA. Safe-Harbor Provision\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act exempts some acts and\\npractices from liability under a safe-harbor provision. See\\n815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b(1). One component of that safe\\nharbor covers actions “specifically authorized by laws\\nadministered by any regulatory body or officer acting under\\nstatutory authority of this State or the United States.” Id.\\nThis provision allows regulated actors to “rely on the direc-\\ntions received from [regulatory] agencies without risk that\\nsuch reliance might expose them to … liability.” Price v.\\nPhilip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 38 (Ill. 2005).\\n To trigger the safe harbor, the regulatory body must be\\noperating within its statutory authority and the challenged\\nconduct must be “specifically authorized by laws adminis-\\ntered by” that regulatory body. § 10b(1). Formal rulemaking\\nis not necessary; “informal regulatory activity” is enough.\\nPrice, 848 N.E.2d at 46. The FDA’s statutory authority in-\\ncludes regulation of pet food, so the dispute centers on\\nwhether the agency’s guidance qualifies as informal regula-\\ntory activity and specifically authorizes the relevant conduct.\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 7\\n\\n The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., regulates pet food. Because Hill’s Prescription\\nDiet cat food is intended to treat or prevent disease and is\\nmarketed as such, the products are considered “drugs”\\nunder the FDCA. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B). Without FDA approval, a\\nnew animal drug cannot be sold in interstate commerce, id.\\n§ 331(a), and the product is deemed misbranded and adul-\\nterated, id. §§ 352(o), 351(a)(5).\\n Manufacturers face two additional requirements, regard-\\nless of whether the animal drug at issue has been approved.\\nAll drug manufacturers must list their drugs and register\\ntheir facilities or else the drugs are misbranded. Id. § 352(o).\\nAnd animal drug products must be manufactured in com-\\npliance with current good-manufacturing practices applica-\\nble to drugs, otherwise the drugs are adulterated. Id.\\n§ 351(a)(2)(B).\\n Most pet-food products claiming to treat or prevent dis-\\nease lack FDA approval and do not comply with the FDCA’s\\ndrug registration and listing requirements. Nor do the\\nmanufacturers of these products follow the appropriate\\nmanufacturing practices for animal drugs. The FDA issued\\nguidance acknowledging this longstanding noncompliance\\nand identifying circumstances in which the agency may\\nexercise its discretion against initiating an enforcement\\naction.\\n The 2016 FDA Compliance Policy Guide offers the FDA’s\\ncurrent thinking on the likelihood of an enforcement action.\\nThe guide lists factors for agency staff to consider—\\nincluding, for example, whether the product presents a\\nknown safety risk when used as labeled, whether the prod-\\nuct label represents that it can be used to treat disease, and\\n\\f8 No. 17-3633\\n\\nwhether the product is marketed as an alternative to ap-\\nproved new drugs. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.\\nFOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE SEC.\\n690.150 LABELING & MARKETING OF DOG & CAT FOOD DIETS\\nINTENDED TO DIAGNOSE, CURE, MITIGATE, TREAT, OR PREVENT\\nDISEASES: GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF 6 (Apr. 2016),\\nhttps://www.fda.gov/media/83998/download. The guide\\ngoes on to list 11 factors that make an enforcement action\\n“less likely”—but only if all 11 are present. Id. at 7.\\n Hill’s and PetSmart characterize the Compliance Policy\\nGuide as informal regulatory activity specifically authoriz-\\ning the prescription requirement and prescription label for\\nHill’s Prescription Diet pet food. They are mistaken. The\\nFDA classifies the guide as a “Level 1 guidance document[]”\\nthat “[s]et[s] forth initial interpretations of statutory or\\nregulatory requirements” and details “changes in interpreta-\\ntion or policy that are of more than a minor nature.”\\n21 C.F.R. § 10.115(c)(1)(i)-(ii); Draft Compliance Policy Guide\\nSec. 690.150 on Labeling and Marketing of Nutritional\\nProducts Intended for Use in Dogs and Cats, 77 Fed. Reg.\\n55,480, 55,480 (Sept. 10, 2012). But the guide does not estab-\\nlish any legally enforceable responsibilities, and it is not\\nbinding on either the FDA or the public.\\n Contrast the Compliance Policy Guide with the\\nregulatory action in Price v. Philip Morris, where the Illinois\\nSupreme Court held that a consent order between the\\nFederal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and a cigarette\\nmanufacturer triggered the Consumer Fraud Act’s safe\\nharbor because the consent order could be understood as\\n“provid[ing] guidance” about cigarette labeling to the entire\\nindustry. 848 N.E.2d at 46. Even though the consent order\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 9\\n\\ndid not bind other industry actors, the safe harbor applied\\nbecause the order “announce[d] to an entire industry what\\nbehavior is and is not authorized.” Id. at 43. Hill’s and\\nPetSmart cite Price for support, but the case cuts against\\nthem. The FDA Compliance Policy Guide does not establish\\nindustry-wide standards for labeling and marketing of pet\\nfood intended to treat or prevent disease. Rather, the\\ndocument helps FDA staff allocate enforcement resources. It\\ndoes not qualify as informal regulatory activity.\\n Nor does the guide specifically authorize the prescription\\nrequirement and label. To determine whether conduct has\\nbeen specifically authorized by a regulatory body, Illinois\\ncourts look to the “affirmative acts or expressions of authori-\\nzation” by the relevant agency. Id. at 36. For an authorization\\nto be “specific,” it must be “related to a particular thing,” but\\n“it need not be express.” Id. at 42 (emphases added). In Price,\\nfor example, the defendant cigarette company’s use of the\\nterm “lights” in its marketing was held to be specifically\\nauthorized by FTC consent orders with other manufactur-\\ners—even though those orders authorized the use of the\\nterms “low,” “lower,” “reduced,” or “like qualifying terms”\\nto describe tar and nicotine content but did not expressly\\ninclude the term “lights.” Id. at 43.\\n In contrast, of the 11 factors listed in the Compliance Pol-\\nicy Guide as making an enforcement action less likely, only\\none is relevant here: whether “[t]he product is made availa-\\nble to the public only through licensed veterinarians or\\nthrough retail or internet sales to individuals purchasing the\\nproduct under the direction of a veterinarian.” U.S. FDA\\nCOMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 7. The defendants rely on this\\nfactor as evidence that the FDA specifically authorizes the\\n\\f10 No. 17-3633\\n\\nprescription requirement. But this argument wrongly\\nequates regulatory forbearance with regulatory authoriza-\\ntion.\\n To be sure, if pet food intended to treat or prevent dis-\\nease is purchased from or under the direction of a licensed\\nveterinarian, the FDA is less likely to initiate an enforcement\\naction based on the lack of an approved new animal drug\\napplication—provided, however, that the other 10 factors are\\nalso present. And “less likely” does not mean “will not”; it\\ncertainly doesn’t signal authorization. Because the Compli-\\nance Policy Guide doesn’t specifically authorize the Hill’s\\nprescription requirement, prescription label, and related\\nmarketing representations, the safe harbor does not apply.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Allegations\\n With the safe harbor off the table, our next question is\\nwhether the complaint adequately alleges that Hill’s and\\nPetSmart committed a deceptive or unfair practice. These are\\nseparate categories; deceptive conduct is distinct from unfair\\nconduct. A claim under the Consumer Fraud Act may be\\npremised on either (or both), but the two categories have\\ndifferent pleading standards. If the claim rests on allegations\\nof deceptive conduct, then Rule 9(b) applies and the plaintiff\\nmust plead with particularity the circumstances constituting\\nfraud. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 737. Specifically, the complaint\\nmust identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the\\nalleged fraud. Id. (quotation marks omitted).\\n On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff may allege that conduct\\nis unfair … without alleging that the conduct is deceptive.”\\nSiegel, 612 F.3d at 935. To determine whether a practice is\\nunfair, Illinois courts consider three factors: whether it\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 11\\n\\n“offends public policy”; is “immoral, unethical, oppressive,\\nor unscrupulous”; or “causes substantial injury to consum-\\ners.” Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th\\nCir. 2014). A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; “[a]\\npractice may be unfair because of the degree to which it\\nmeets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets\\nall three.” Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks\\nomitted). And because fraud is not a required element,\\nRule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard does not apply. See\\nWindy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin.\\nServs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, under\\neither theory of the case, the plaintiff must adequately plead\\ncausation—more specifically, he must allege that but for the\\ndefendant’s deceptive or unfair conduct, he “would not have\\nbeen damaged.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935 (quotation marks\\nomitted).\\n The complaint alleges that the defendants’ marketing\\npractices are both deceptive and unfair. Taking the first\\ncategory first, the complaint alleges that the prescription\\nrequirement, prescription label, and related marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet pet food are deceptive\\nbecause no prescription is necessary and there is no material\\ndifference between the “prescription” food and nonprescrip-\\ntion food. Hill’s and PetSmart respond that the complaint is\\ndeficient because it does not allege that Vanzant and Land\\nrelied on the deceptive representations when purchasing\\nHill’s Prescription Diet food. This argument misconstrues\\nIllinois law. “[R]eliance is not an element of statutory con-\\nsumer fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584,\\n593 (Ill. 1996). Rather, it’s the plaintiff’s “damage,” not his\\npurchase, that must occur “as a result of” the deceptive act\\nor practice. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160. Indeed, it was enough\\n\\f12 No. 17-3633\\n\\nin Connick that the plaintiffs’ purchases “occurred after the\\nallegedly fraudulent statements.” 675 N.E.2d at 595.\\n Here, the complaint alleges that the prescription re-\\nquirement, prescription label, and associated marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet were deceptive; that\\nVanzant and Land saw the specific “prescription” language\\nand symbols when they made their purchases; that the\\nprescription pet food was something less than they expected;\\nand that they suffered damages because they paid a higher\\nprice. These allegations detail the “who,” “what,” and\\n“how” of the fraud claim with particularity. Camasta,\\n761 F.3d at 737.\\n The complaint also alleges the “when” and “where” of\\nthe fraud. Vanzant saw marketing materials for Prescription\\nDiet pet food before purchasing the cat food at PetSmart in\\nFebruary 2013 and thereafter. Land saw similar marketing\\nmaterials before purchasing Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart in November 2013 and thereafter. Nothing more is\\nneeded.\\n In short, the complaint pleads a deceptive-practices claim\\nto the degree of particularity required by Rule 9(b). That’s\\nenough to reverse the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim, so it’s not necessary to address the adequacy of the\\nallegations under the unfair-practices theory of the case. As\\nwe’ve noted, an unfair-practices claim has no fraud element\\nand therefore is not subject to a heightened pleading stand-\\nard.\\nC. Unjust Enrichment\\n The complaint also seeks restitution for unjust\\nenrichment. “Under Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 13\\n\\nseparate cause of action.” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree\\nMed. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir.\\n2011). Rather, it’s a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon, 877 F.3d at 741. Accordingly,\\nthe request for relief based on unjust enrichment is tied to\\nthe fate of the claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Cleary v.\\nPhilip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2011). The\\nstatutory claim may move forward, and that revives the\\nrequest for restitution based on unjust enrichment.\\n REVERSED\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431414/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654161/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Holly Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Incorpo\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3633\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\nDANA LAND, on behalf of themselves\nand all others similarly situated,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nHILL’S PET NUTRITION, INC., and\nPETSMART, INC.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17-cv-2535 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Holly Vanzant and Dana Land own\ncats with health problems. Their veterinarians prescribed cat\nfood manufactured by Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., and sold\nunder Hill’s “Prescription Diet” brand. For several years\nVanzant and Land purchased this higher-priced cat food\n\f2 No. 17-3633\n\nfrom their local PetSmart stores using their veterinarian’s\nprescriptions. They eventually learned, however, that the\nPrescription Diet cat food is not materially different from\nnonprescription cat food. And the prescription requirement\nis illusory; no prescription is necessary. Feeling deceived,\nVanzant and Land filed a class-action lawsuit against Hill’s\nand PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Con-\nsumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL.\nCOMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq., and for unjust enrichment.\n The district judge dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act\nclaim for two reasons: (1) the complaint lacked the specificity\nrequired for a fraud claim; and (2) the claim is barred by a\nstatutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by a\nregulatory body—here, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-\ntion (“FDA”). The judge dismissed the unjust-enrichment\nclaim because it was premised on the same conduct as the\nstatutory claim.\n We reverse. First, the safe-harbor provision does not\napply. Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.\n§§ 301 et seq., pet food intended to treat or prevent disease\nand marketed as such is considered a drug and requires\napproval of a new animal drug application. Without FDA\napproval, the manufacturer may not sell it in interstate\ncommerce and the product is deemed adulterated and\nmisbranded. The FDA issued guidance recognizing that\nmost pet-food products in this category do not have the\nrequired approval; the guidance states that the agency is less\nlikely to initiate an enforcement action if consumers\npurchase the food through or under the direction of a\nveterinarian (among other factors guiding the agency’s\nenforcement discretion). But the guidance does not\n\fNo. 17-3633 3\n\nspecifically authorize the conduct alleged here, so the safe\nharbor does not apply.\n And the plaintiffs pleaded the fraud claim with the par-\nticularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil\nProcedure. So the statutory claim may proceed. The unjust-\nenrichment claim is more appropriately construed as a\nrequest for relief in the form of restitution based on the\nalleged fraud. In Illinois unjust enrichment is not a separate\ncause of action but is a condition brought about by fraud or\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d\n725, 741 (7th Cir. 2017). The request for restitution based on\nunjust enrichment therefore rests entirely on the consumer-\nfraud claim, and it too may move forward.\n I. Background\n The case comes to us from a dismissal at the pleadings\nstage, so we recount the facts as alleged in the amended\ncomplaint. Hill’s Pet Nutrition manufactures a variety of pet\nfood, and this case concerns its Prescription Diet brand.\nHill’s sells its Prescription Diet pet food through veterinari-\nans and pet-food retailers, though consumers may purchase\nit from a retailer only with a veterinarian’s prescription.\nPetSmart sells pet supplies and pet food, including Hill’s\nPrescription Diet brand. Consumers need a veterinarian’s\nprescription to purchase Hill’s Prescription Diet food at\nPetSmart.\n In January 2013 Holly Vanzant’s cat Tarik underwent\nemergency surgery for bladder stones. At a follow-up\nappointment, Tarik’s veterinarian prescribed Hill’s\nPrescription Diet c/d Multicare Feline Bladder Health cat\nfood. That same day Vanzant purchased the food at a\n\f4 No. 17-3633\n\nPetSmart store. Inside she saw marketing materials\nindicating that the cat food is “prescription only,” and the\nlabel on the bag read “Hill’s Prescription Diet.” PetSmart\nprovided her with a pet prescription card listing Tarik’s\nname, prescription number, and prescription date. For three\nyears Vanzant purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food\nfrom PetSmart, paying a higher price than for\nnonprescription food. She showed the prescription card to\nthe cashier each time.\n Land had a similar experience. In October 2013 a veteri-\nnarian diagnosed her cat Chief with diabetes and prescribed\nHill’s Prescription Diet m/d Feline Glucose/Weight Man-\nagement cat food. Within a few weeks, Land purchased\nHill’s Prescription Diet cat food at a PetSmart store. She too\nsaw marketing materials inside the store indicating that the\nfood is meant to treat or control diabetes. PetSmart provided\nLand with a pet prescription card listing Chief’s name,\nprescription number, and prescription date. For two years\nLand purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food from\nPetSmart, paying a higher price than for nonprescription\nfood. She too showed the prescription card each time.\n Vanzant and Land eventually learned they were not re-\nceiving what they expected. They thought prescription pet\nfood was medically necessary for the health of their pets,\nhad been approved by the FDA, and could not be sold\nlegally without a prescription. But the FDA had not ap-\nproved it, and nothing required that it be sold with a pre-\nscription. They filed a proposed class action in state court\nagainst Hill’s and PetSmart alleging claims for violation of\nthe Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and unjust enrichment. The\n\fNo. 17-3633 5\n\ndefendants removed the case to federal court and moved to\ndismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6).\n The judge granted the motion. He held that the\nConsumer Fraud Act claim is foreclosed by the statute’s safe-\nharbor provision, which shields actions authorized by laws\nadministered by a regulatory body. Specifically, the judge\nrelied on an FDA Compliance Policy Guide, which he\nconstrued as regulatory authorization for “the gate-keeping\nrole of veterinarians in ensuring that pet owners purchase\nonly appropriate therapeutic foods.” The judge also\nconcluded that Vanzant and Land failed to plead the\nconsumer-fraud claim with the particularity required by\nRule 9(b). With no underlying fraud claim remaining, the\njudge likewise dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim.\nVanzant and Land appealed.\n II. Discussion\n We review the dismissal order de novo. Camasta v. Jos. A.\nBank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). To\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain\n“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable\ninference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct\nalleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At a\nminimum it “must give enough details about the subject\nmatter of the case to present a story that holds together.”\nSwanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s]\nconsumers … against fraud, unfair methods of competition,\nand other unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson\nv. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002).\nDeceptive or unfair practices include any “misrepresentation\n\f6 No. 17-3633\n\nor the concealment, suppression or omission of any material\nfact.” 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2. To recover on a claim under\nthe Act, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant\ncommitted a deceptive or unfair act with the intent that\nothers rely on the deception, that the act occurred in the\ncourse of trade or commerce, and that it caused actual\ndamages. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 934–35 (7th Cir.\n2010). We begin, however, with the Act’s safe-harbor\nprovision.\nA. Safe-Harbor Provision\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act exempts some acts and\npractices from liability under a safe-harbor provision. See\n815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b(1). One component of that safe\nharbor covers actions “specifically authorized by laws\nadministered by any regulatory body or officer acting under\nstatutory authority of this State or the United States.” Id.\nThis provision allows regulated actors to “rely on the direc-\ntions received from [regulatory] agencies without risk that\nsuch reliance might expose them to … liability.” Price v.\nPhilip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 38 (Ill. 2005).\n To trigger the safe harbor, the regulatory body must be\noperating within its statutory authority and the challenged\nconduct must be “specifically authorized by laws adminis-\ntered by” that regulatory body. § 10b(1). Formal rulemaking\nis not necessary; “informal regulatory activity” is enough.\nPrice, 848 N.E.2d at 46. The FDA’s statutory authority in-\ncludes regulation of pet food, so the dispute centers on\nwhether the agency’s guidance qualifies as informal regula-\ntory activity and specifically authorizes the relevant conduct.\n\fNo. 17-3633 7\n\n The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C.\n§§ 301 et seq., regulates pet food. Because Hill’s Prescription\nDiet cat food is intended to treat or prevent disease and is\nmarketed as such, the products are considered “drugs”\nunder the FDCA. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B). Without FDA approval, a\nnew animal drug cannot be sold in interstate commerce, id.\n§ 331(a), and the product is deemed misbranded and adul-\nterated, id. §§ 352(o), 351(a)(5).\n Manufacturers face two additional requirements, regard-\nless of whether the animal drug at issue has been approved.\nAll drug manufacturers must list their drugs and register\ntheir facilities or else the drugs are misbranded. Id. § 352(o).\nAnd animal drug products must be manufactured in com-\npliance with current good-manufacturing practices applica-\nble to drugs, otherwise the drugs are adulterated. Id.\n§ 351(a)(2)(B).\n Most pet-food products claiming to treat or prevent dis-\nease lack FDA approval and do not comply with the FDCA’s\ndrug registration and listing requirements. Nor do the\nmanufacturers of these products follow the appropriate\nmanufacturing practices for animal drugs. The FDA issued\nguidance acknowledging this longstanding noncompliance\nand identifying circumstances in which the agency may\nexercise its discretion against initiating an enforcement\naction.\n The 2016 FDA Compliance Policy Guide offers the FDA’s\ncurrent thinking on the likelihood of an enforcement action.\nThe guide lists factors for agency staff to consider—\nincluding, for example, whether the product presents a\nknown safety risk when used as labeled, whether the prod-\nuct label represents that it can be used to treat disease, and\n\f8 No. 17-3633\n\nwhether the product is marketed as an alternative to ap-\nproved new drugs. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.\nFOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE SEC.\n690.150 LABELING & MARKETING OF DOG & CAT FOOD DIETS\nINTENDED TO DIAGNOSE, CURE, MITIGATE, TREAT, OR PREVENT\nDISEASES: GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF 6 (Apr. 2016),\nhttps://www.fda.gov/media/83998/download. The guide\ngoes on to list 11 factors that make an enforcement action\n“less likely”—but only if all 11 are present. Id. at 7.\n Hill’s and PetSmart characterize the Compliance Policy\nGuide as informal regulatory activity specifically authoriz-\ning the prescription requirement and prescription label for\nHill’s Prescription Diet pet food. They are mistaken. The\nFDA classifies the guide as a “Level 1 guidance document[]”\nthat “[s]et[s] forth initial interpretations of statutory or\nregulatory requirements” and details “changes in interpreta-\ntion or policy that are of more than a minor nature.”\n21 C.F.R. § 10.115(c)(1)(i)-(ii); Draft Compliance Policy Guide\nSec. 690.150 on Labeling and Marketing of Nutritional\nProducts Intended for Use in Dogs and Cats, 77 Fed. Reg.\n55,480, 55,480 (Sept. 10, 2012). But the guide does not estab-\nlish any legally enforceable responsibilities, and it is not\nbinding on either the FDA or the public.\n Contrast the Compliance Policy Guide with the\nregulatory action in Price v. Philip Morris, where the Illinois\nSupreme Court held that a consent order between the\nFederal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and a cigarette\nmanufacturer triggered the Consumer Fraud Act’s safe\nharbor because the consent order could be understood as\n“provid[ing] guidance” about cigarette labeling to the entire\nindustry. 848 N.E.2d at 46. Even though the consent order\n\fNo. 17-3633 9\n\ndid not bind other industry actors, the safe harbor applied\nbecause the order “announce[d] to an entire industry what\nbehavior is and is not authorized.” Id. at 43. Hill’s and\nPetSmart cite Price for support, but the case cuts against\nthem. The FDA Compliance Policy Guide does not establish\nindustry-wide standards for labeling and marketing of pet\nfood intended to treat or prevent disease. Rather, the\ndocument helps FDA staff allocate enforcement resources. It\ndoes not qualify as informal regulatory activity.\n Nor does the guide specifically authorize the prescription\nrequirement and label. To determine whether conduct has\nbeen specifically authorized by a regulatory body, Illinois\ncourts look to the “affirmative acts or expressions of authori-\nzation” by the relevant agency. Id. at 36. For an authorization\nto be “specific,” it must be “related to a particular thing,” but\n“it need not be express.” Id. at 42 (emphases added). In Price,\nfor example, the defendant cigarette company’s use of the\nterm “lights” in its marketing was held to be specifically\nauthorized by FTC consent orders with other manufactur-\ners—even though those orders authorized the use of the\nterms “low,” “lower,” “reduced,” or “like qualifying terms”\nto describe tar and nicotine content but did not expressly\ninclude the term “lights.” Id. at 43.\n In contrast, of the 11 factors listed in the Compliance Pol-\nicy Guide as making an enforcement action less likely, only\none is relevant here: whether “[t]he product is made availa-\nble to the public only through licensed veterinarians or\nthrough retail or internet sales to individuals purchasing the\nproduct under the direction of a veterinarian.” U.S. FDA\nCOMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 7. The defendants rely on this\nfactor as evidence that the FDA specifically authorizes the\n\f10 No. 17-3633\n\nprescription requirement. But this argument wrongly\nequates regulatory forbearance with regulatory authoriza-\ntion.\n To be sure, if pet food intended to treat or prevent dis-\nease is purchased from or under the direction of a licensed\nveterinarian, the FDA is less likely to initiate an enforcement\naction based on the lack of an approved new animal drug\napplication—provided, however, that the other 10 factors are\nalso present. And “less likely” does not mean “will not”; it\ncertainly doesn’t signal authorization. Because the Compli-\nance Policy Guide doesn’t specifically authorize the Hill’s\nprescription requirement, prescription label, and related\nmarketing representations, the safe harbor does not apply.\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Allegations\n With the safe harbor off the table, our next question is\nwhether the complaint adequately alleges that Hill’s and\nPetSmart committed a deceptive or unfair practice. These are\nseparate categories; deceptive conduct is distinct from unfair\nconduct. A claim under the Consumer Fraud Act may be\npremised on either (or both), but the two categories have\ndifferent pleading standards. If the claim rests on allegations\nof deceptive conduct, then Rule 9(b) applies and the plaintiff\nmust plead with particularity the circumstances constituting\nfraud. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 737. Specifically, the complaint\nmust identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the\nalleged fraud. Id. (quotation marks omitted).\n On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff may allege that conduct\nis unfair … without alleging that the conduct is deceptive.”\nSiegel, 612 F.3d at 935. To determine whether a practice is\nunfair, Illinois courts consider three factors: whether it\n\fNo. 17-3633 11\n\n“offends public policy”; is “immoral, unethical, oppressive,\nor unscrupulous”; or “causes substantial injury to consum-\ners.” Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th\nCir. 2014). A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; “[a]\npractice may be unfair because of the degree to which it\nmeets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets\nall three.” Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks\nomitted). And because fraud is not a required element,\nRule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard does not apply. See\nWindy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin.\nServs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, under\neither theory of the case, the plaintiff must adequately plead\ncausation—more specifically, he must allege that but for the\ndefendant’s deceptive or unfair conduct, he “would not have\nbeen damaged.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935 (quotation marks\nomitted).\n The complaint alleges that the defendants’ marketing\npractices are both deceptive and unfair. Taking the first\ncategory first, the complaint alleges that the prescription\nrequirement, prescription label, and related marketing\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet pet food are deceptive\nbecause no prescription is necessary and there is no material\ndifference between the “prescription” food and nonprescrip-\ntion food. Hill’s and PetSmart respond that the complaint is\ndeficient because it does not allege that Vanzant and Land\nrelied on the deceptive representations when purchasing\nHill’s Prescription Diet food. This argument misconstrues\nIllinois law. “[R]eliance is not an element of statutory con-\nsumer fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584,\n593 (Ill. 1996). Rather, it’s the plaintiff’s “damage,” not his\npurchase, that must occur “as a result of” the deceptive act\nor practice. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160. Indeed, it was enough\n\f12 No. 17-3633\n\nin Connick that the plaintiffs’ purchases “occurred after the\nallegedly fraudulent statements.” 675 N.E.2d at 595.\n Here, the complaint alleges that the prescription re-\nquirement, prescription label, and associated marketing\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet were deceptive; that\nVanzant and Land saw the specific “prescription” language\nand symbols when they made their purchases; that the\nprescription pet food was something less than they expected;\nand that they suffered damages because they paid a higher\nprice. These allegations detail the “who,” “what,” and\n“how” of the fraud claim with particularity. Camasta,\n761 F.3d at 737.\n The complaint also alleges the “when” and “where” of\nthe fraud. Vanzant saw marketing materials for Prescription\nDiet pet food before purchasing the cat food at PetSmart in\nFebruary 2013 and thereafter. Land saw similar marketing\nmaterials before purchasing Prescription Diet cat food from\nPetSmart in November 2013 and thereafter. Nothing more is\nneeded.\n In short, the complaint pleads a deceptive-practices claim\nto the degree of particularity required by Rule 9(b). That’s\nenough to reverse the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act\nclaim, so it’s not necessary to address the adequacy of the\nallegations under the unfair-practices theory of the case. As\nwe’ve noted, an unfair-practices claim has no fraud element\nand therefore is not subject to a heightened pleading stand-\nard.\nC. Unjust Enrichment\n The complaint also seeks restitution for unjust\nenrichment. “Under Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a\n\fNo. 17-3633 13\n\nseparate cause of action.” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree\nMed. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir.\n2011). Rather, it’s a condition brought about by fraud or\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon, 877 F.3d at 741. Accordingly,\nthe request for relief based on unjust enrichment is tied to\nthe fate of the claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Cleary v.\nPhilip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2011). The\nstatutory claim may move forward, and that revives the\nrequest for restitution based on unjust enrichment.\n REVERSED\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Holly Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Incorpo\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 17-3633\\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\\nDANA LAND, on behalf of themselves\\nand all others similarly situated,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nHILL’S PET NUTRITION, INC., and\\nPETSMART, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17-cv-2535 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED SEPTEMBER 27, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 20, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Holly Vanzant and Dana Land own\\ncats with health problems. Their veterinarians prescribed cat\\nfood manufactured by Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., and sold\\nunder Hill’s “Prescription Diet” brand. For several years\\nVanzant and Land purchased this higher-priced cat food\\n\\f2 No. 17-3633\\n\\nfrom their local PetSmart stores using their veterinarian’s\\nprescriptions. They eventually learned, however, that the\\nPrescription Diet cat food is not materially different from\\nnonprescription cat food. And the prescription requirement\\nis illusory; no prescription is necessary. Feeling deceived,\\nVanzant and Land filed a class-action lawsuit against Hill’s\\nand PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Con-\\nsumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL.\\nCOMP. STAT. 505/1 et seq., and for unjust enrichment.\\n The district judge dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim for two reasons: (1) the complaint lacked the specificity\\nrequired for a fraud claim; and (2) the claim is barred by a\\nstatutory safe harbor for conduct specifically authorized by a\\nregulatory body—here, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-\\ntion (“FDA”). The judge dismissed the unjust-enrichment\\nclaim because it was premised on the same conduct as the\\nstatutory claim.\\n We reverse. First, the safe-harbor provision does not\\napply. Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., pet food intended to treat or prevent disease\\nand marketed as such is considered a drug and requires\\napproval of a new animal drug application. Without FDA\\napproval, the manufacturer may not sell it in interstate\\ncommerce and the product is deemed adulterated and\\nmisbranded. The FDA issued guidance recognizing that\\nmost pet-food products in this category do not have the\\nrequired approval; the guidance states that the agency is less\\nlikely to initiate an enforcement action if consumers\\npurchase the food through or under the direction of a\\nveterinarian (among other factors guiding the agency’s\\nenforcement discretion). But the guidance does not\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 3\\n\\nspecifically authorize the conduct alleged here, so the safe\\nharbor does not apply.\\n And the plaintiffs pleaded the fraud claim with the par-\\nticularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil\\nProcedure. So the statutory claim may proceed. The unjust-\\nenrichment claim is more appropriately construed as a\\nrequest for relief in the form of restitution based on the\\nalleged fraud. In Illinois unjust enrichment is not a separate\\ncause of action but is a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 877 F.3d\\n725, 741 (7th Cir. 2017). The request for restitution based on\\nunjust enrichment therefore rests entirely on the consumer-\\nfraud claim, and it too may move forward.\\n I. Background\\n The case comes to us from a dismissal at the pleadings\\nstage, so we recount the facts as alleged in the amended\\ncomplaint. Hill’s Pet Nutrition manufactures a variety of pet\\nfood, and this case concerns its Prescription Diet brand.\\nHill’s sells its Prescription Diet pet food through veterinari-\\nans and pet-food retailers, though consumers may purchase\\nit from a retailer only with a veterinarian’s prescription.\\nPetSmart sells pet supplies and pet food, including Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet brand. Consumers need a veterinarian’s\\nprescription to purchase Hill’s Prescription Diet food at\\nPetSmart.\\n In January 2013 Holly Vanzant’s cat Tarik underwent\\nemergency surgery for bladder stones. At a follow-up\\nappointment, Tarik’s veterinarian prescribed Hill’s\\nPrescription Diet c/d Multicare Feline Bladder Health cat\\nfood. That same day Vanzant purchased the food at a\\n\\f4 No. 17-3633\\n\\nPetSmart store. Inside she saw marketing materials\\nindicating that the cat food is “prescription only,” and the\\nlabel on the bag read “Hill’s Prescription Diet.” PetSmart\\nprovided her with a pet prescription card listing Tarik’s\\nname, prescription number, and prescription date. For three\\nyears Vanzant purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food\\nfrom PetSmart, paying a higher price than for\\nnonprescription food. She showed the prescription card to\\nthe cashier each time.\\n Land had a similar experience. In October 2013 a veteri-\\nnarian diagnosed her cat Chief with diabetes and prescribed\\nHill’s Prescription Diet m/d Feline Glucose/Weight Man-\\nagement cat food. Within a few weeks, Land purchased\\nHill’s Prescription Diet cat food at a PetSmart store. She too\\nsaw marketing materials inside the store indicating that the\\nfood is meant to treat or control diabetes. PetSmart provided\\nLand with a pet prescription card listing Chief’s name,\\nprescription number, and prescription date. For two years\\nLand purchased Hill’s Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart, paying a higher price than for nonprescription\\nfood. She too showed the prescription card each time.\\n Vanzant and Land eventually learned they were not re-\\nceiving what they expected. They thought prescription pet\\nfood was medically necessary for the health of their pets,\\nhad been approved by the FDA, and could not be sold\\nlegally without a prescription. But the FDA had not ap-\\nproved it, and nothing required that it be sold with a pre-\\nscription. They filed a proposed class action in state court\\nagainst Hill’s and PetSmart alleging claims for violation of\\nthe Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and unjust enrichment. The\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 5\\n\\ndefendants removed the case to federal court and moved to\\ndismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6).\\n The judge granted the motion. He held that the\\nConsumer Fraud Act claim is foreclosed by the statute’s safe-\\nharbor provision, which shields actions authorized by laws\\nadministered by a regulatory body. Specifically, the judge\\nrelied on an FDA Compliance Policy Guide, which he\\nconstrued as regulatory authorization for “the gate-keeping\\nrole of veterinarians in ensuring that pet owners purchase\\nonly appropriate therapeutic foods.” The judge also\\nconcluded that Vanzant and Land failed to plead the\\nconsumer-fraud claim with the particularity required by\\nRule 9(b). With no underlying fraud claim remaining, the\\njudge likewise dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim.\\nVanzant and Land appealed.\\n II. Discussion\\n We review the dismissal order de novo. Camasta v. Jos. A.\\nBank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014). To\\nsurvive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain\\n“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable\\ninference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct\\nalleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). At a\\nminimum it “must give enough details about the subject\\nmatter of the case to present a story that holds together.”\\nSwanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act “protect[s]\\nconsumers … against fraud, unfair methods of competition,\\nand other unfair and deceptive business practices.” Robinson\\nv. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002).\\nDeceptive or unfair practices include any “misrepresentation\\n\\f6 No. 17-3633\\n\\nor the concealment, suppression or omission of any material\\nfact.” 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2. To recover on a claim under\\nthe Act, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant\\ncommitted a deceptive or unfair act with the intent that\\nothers rely on the deception, that the act occurred in the\\ncourse of trade or commerce, and that it caused actual\\ndamages. Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 934–35 (7th Cir.\\n2010). We begin, however, with the Act’s safe-harbor\\nprovision.\\nA. Safe-Harbor Provision\\n The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act exempts some acts and\\npractices from liability under a safe-harbor provision. See\\n815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b(1). One component of that safe\\nharbor covers actions “specifically authorized by laws\\nadministered by any regulatory body or officer acting under\\nstatutory authority of this State or the United States.” Id.\\nThis provision allows regulated actors to “rely on the direc-\\ntions received from [regulatory] agencies without risk that\\nsuch reliance might expose them to … liability.” Price v.\\nPhilip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 38 (Ill. 2005).\\n To trigger the safe harbor, the regulatory body must be\\noperating within its statutory authority and the challenged\\nconduct must be “specifically authorized by laws adminis-\\ntered by” that regulatory body. § 10b(1). Formal rulemaking\\nis not necessary; “informal regulatory activity” is enough.\\nPrice, 848 N.E.2d at 46. The FDA’s statutory authority in-\\ncludes regulation of pet food, so the dispute centers on\\nwhether the agency’s guidance qualifies as informal regula-\\ntory activity and specifically authorizes the relevant conduct.\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 7\\n\\n The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C.\\n§§ 301 et seq., regulates pet food. Because Hill’s Prescription\\nDiet cat food is intended to treat or prevent disease and is\\nmarketed as such, the products are considered “drugs”\\nunder the FDCA. Id. § 321(g)(1)(B). Without FDA approval, a\\nnew animal drug cannot be sold in interstate commerce, id.\\n§ 331(a), and the product is deemed misbranded and adul-\\nterated, id. §§ 352(o), 351(a)(5).\\n Manufacturers face two additional requirements, regard-\\nless of whether the animal drug at issue has been approved.\\nAll drug manufacturers must list their drugs and register\\ntheir facilities or else the drugs are misbranded. Id. § 352(o).\\nAnd animal drug products must be manufactured in com-\\npliance with current good-manufacturing practices applica-\\nble to drugs, otherwise the drugs are adulterated. Id.\\n§ 351(a)(2)(B).\\n Most pet-food products claiming to treat or prevent dis-\\nease lack FDA approval and do not comply with the FDCA’s\\ndrug registration and listing requirements. Nor do the\\nmanufacturers of these products follow the appropriate\\nmanufacturing practices for animal drugs. The FDA issued\\nguidance acknowledging this longstanding noncompliance\\nand identifying circumstances in which the agency may\\nexercise its discretion against initiating an enforcement\\naction.\\n The 2016 FDA Compliance Policy Guide offers the FDA’s\\ncurrent thinking on the likelihood of an enforcement action.\\nThe guide lists factors for agency staff to consider—\\nincluding, for example, whether the product presents a\\nknown safety risk when used as labeled, whether the prod-\\nuct label represents that it can be used to treat disease, and\\n\\f8 No. 17-3633\\n\\nwhether the product is marketed as an alternative to ap-\\nproved new drugs. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.\\nFOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE SEC.\\n690.150 LABELING & MARKETING OF DOG & CAT FOOD DIETS\\nINTENDED TO DIAGNOSE, CURE, MITIGATE, TREAT, OR PREVENT\\nDISEASES: GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF 6 (Apr. 2016),\\nhttps://www.fda.gov/media/83998/download. The guide\\ngoes on to list 11 factors that make an enforcement action\\n“less likely”—but only if all 11 are present. Id. at 7.\\n Hill’s and PetSmart characterize the Compliance Policy\\nGuide as informal regulatory activity specifically authoriz-\\ning the prescription requirement and prescription label for\\nHill’s Prescription Diet pet food. They are mistaken. The\\nFDA classifies the guide as a “Level 1 guidance document[]”\\nthat “[s]et[s] forth initial interpretations of statutory or\\nregulatory requirements” and details “changes in interpreta-\\ntion or policy that are of more than a minor nature.”\\n21 C.F.R. § 10.115(c)(1)(i)-(ii); Draft Compliance Policy Guide\\nSec. 690.150 on Labeling and Marketing of Nutritional\\nProducts Intended for Use in Dogs and Cats, 77 Fed. Reg.\\n55,480, 55,480 (Sept. 10, 2012). But the guide does not estab-\\nlish any legally enforceable responsibilities, and it is not\\nbinding on either the FDA or the public.\\n Contrast the Compliance Policy Guide with the\\nregulatory action in Price v. Philip Morris, where the Illinois\\nSupreme Court held that a consent order between the\\nFederal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and a cigarette\\nmanufacturer triggered the Consumer Fraud Act’s safe\\nharbor because the consent order could be understood as\\n“provid[ing] guidance” about cigarette labeling to the entire\\nindustry. 848 N.E.2d at 46. Even though the consent order\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 9\\n\\ndid not bind other industry actors, the safe harbor applied\\nbecause the order “announce[d] to an entire industry what\\nbehavior is and is not authorized.” Id. at 43. Hill’s and\\nPetSmart cite Price for support, but the case cuts against\\nthem. The FDA Compliance Policy Guide does not establish\\nindustry-wide standards for labeling and marketing of pet\\nfood intended to treat or prevent disease. Rather, the\\ndocument helps FDA staff allocate enforcement resources. It\\ndoes not qualify as informal regulatory activity.\\n Nor does the guide specifically authorize the prescription\\nrequirement and label. To determine whether conduct has\\nbeen specifically authorized by a regulatory body, Illinois\\ncourts look to the “affirmative acts or expressions of authori-\\nzation” by the relevant agency. Id. at 36. For an authorization\\nto be “specific,” it must be “related to a particular thing,” but\\n“it need not be express.” Id. at 42 (emphases added). In Price,\\nfor example, the defendant cigarette company’s use of the\\nterm “lights” in its marketing was held to be specifically\\nauthorized by FTC consent orders with other manufactur-\\ners—even though those orders authorized the use of the\\nterms “low,” “lower,” “reduced,” or “like qualifying terms”\\nto describe tar and nicotine content but did not expressly\\ninclude the term “lights.” Id. at 43.\\n In contrast, of the 11 factors listed in the Compliance Pol-\\nicy Guide as making an enforcement action less likely, only\\none is relevant here: whether “[t]he product is made availa-\\nble to the public only through licensed veterinarians or\\nthrough retail or internet sales to individuals purchasing the\\nproduct under the direction of a veterinarian.” U.S. FDA\\nCOMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 7. The defendants rely on this\\nfactor as evidence that the FDA specifically authorizes the\\n\\f10 No. 17-3633\\n\\nprescription requirement. But this argument wrongly\\nequates regulatory forbearance with regulatory authoriza-\\ntion.\\n To be sure, if pet food intended to treat or prevent dis-\\nease is purchased from or under the direction of a licensed\\nveterinarian, the FDA is less likely to initiate an enforcement\\naction based on the lack of an approved new animal drug\\napplication—provided, however, that the other 10 factors are\\nalso present. And “less likely” does not mean “will not”; it\\ncertainly doesn’t signal authorization. Because the Compli-\\nance Policy Guide doesn’t specifically authorize the Hill’s\\nprescription requirement, prescription label, and related\\nmarketing representations, the safe harbor does not apply.\\nB. Consumer Fraud Act Allegations\\n With the safe harbor off the table, our next question is\\nwhether the complaint adequately alleges that Hill’s and\\nPetSmart committed a deceptive or unfair practice. These are\\nseparate categories; deceptive conduct is distinct from unfair\\nconduct. A claim under the Consumer Fraud Act may be\\npremised on either (or both), but the two categories have\\ndifferent pleading standards. If the claim rests on allegations\\nof deceptive conduct, then Rule 9(b) applies and the plaintiff\\nmust plead with particularity the circumstances constituting\\nfraud. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 737. Specifically, the complaint\\nmust identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the\\nalleged fraud. Id. (quotation marks omitted).\\n On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff may allege that conduct\\nis unfair … without alleging that the conduct is deceptive.”\\nSiegel, 612 F.3d at 935. To determine whether a practice is\\nunfair, Illinois courts consider three factors: whether it\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 11\\n\\n“offends public policy”; is “immoral, unethical, oppressive,\\nor unscrupulous”; or “causes substantial injury to consum-\\ners.” Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th\\nCir. 2014). A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; “[a]\\npractice may be unfair because of the degree to which it\\nmeets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets\\nall three.” Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks\\nomitted). And because fraud is not a required element,\\nRule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard does not apply. See\\nWindy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin.\\nServs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, under\\neither theory of the case, the plaintiff must adequately plead\\ncausation—more specifically, he must allege that but for the\\ndefendant’s deceptive or unfair conduct, he “would not have\\nbeen damaged.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935 (quotation marks\\nomitted).\\n The complaint alleges that the defendants’ marketing\\npractices are both deceptive and unfair. Taking the first\\ncategory first, the complaint alleges that the prescription\\nrequirement, prescription label, and related marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet pet food are deceptive\\nbecause no prescription is necessary and there is no material\\ndifference between the “prescription” food and nonprescrip-\\ntion food. Hill’s and PetSmart respond that the complaint is\\ndeficient because it does not allege that Vanzant and Land\\nrelied on the deceptive representations when purchasing\\nHill’s Prescription Diet food. This argument misconstrues\\nIllinois law. “[R]eliance is not an element of statutory con-\\nsumer fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584,\\n593 (Ill. 1996). Rather, it’s the plaintiff’s “damage,” not his\\npurchase, that must occur “as a result of” the deceptive act\\nor practice. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160. Indeed, it was enough\\n\\f12 No. 17-3633\\n\\nin Connick that the plaintiffs’ purchases “occurred after the\\nallegedly fraudulent statements.” 675 N.E.2d at 595.\\n Here, the complaint alleges that the prescription re-\\nquirement, prescription label, and associated marketing\\nmaterials for Hill’s Prescription Diet were deceptive; that\\nVanzant and Land saw the specific “prescription” language\\nand symbols when they made their purchases; that the\\nprescription pet food was something less than they expected;\\nand that they suffered damages because they paid a higher\\nprice. These allegations detail the “who,” “what,” and\\n“how” of the fraud claim with particularity. Camasta,\\n761 F.3d at 737.\\n The complaint also alleges the “when” and “where” of\\nthe fraud. Vanzant saw marketing materials for Prescription\\nDiet pet food before purchasing the cat food at PetSmart in\\nFebruary 2013 and thereafter. Land saw similar marketing\\nmaterials before purchasing Prescription Diet cat food from\\nPetSmart in November 2013 and thereafter. Nothing more is\\nneeded.\\n In short, the complaint pleads a deceptive-practices claim\\nto the degree of particularity required by Rule 9(b). That’s\\nenough to reverse the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act\\nclaim, so it’s not necessary to address the adequacy of the\\nallegations under the unfair-practices theory of the case. As\\nwe’ve noted, an unfair-practices claim has no fraud element\\nand therefore is not subject to a heightened pleading stand-\\nard.\\nC. Unjust Enrichment\\n The complaint also seeks restitution for unjust\\nenrichment. “Under Illinois law, unjust enrichment is not a\\n\\fNo. 17-3633 13\\n\\nseparate cause of action.” Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree\\nMed. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 447 (7th Cir.\\n2011). Rather, it’s a condition brought about by fraud or\\nother unlawful conduct. Toulon, 877 F.3d at 741. Accordingly,\\nthe request for relief based on unjust enrichment is tied to\\nthe fate of the claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. Cleary v.\\nPhilip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2011). The\\nstatutory claim may move forward, and that revives the\\nrequest for restitution based on unjust enrichment.\\n REVERSED\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3890,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654374,"string":"4,654,374"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Terry Smith v. Illinois Department of Transp"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2948"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2948\\nTERRY L. SMITH,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-02061 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. After a rocky probationary period,\\nthe Illinois Department of Transportation discharged its em-\\nployee Terry Smith. Smith sued the Department under Title\\nVII, arguing that it had subjected him to a hostile work envi-\\nronment and fired him in retaliation for his complaints about\\nracial discrimination. The district court granted summary\\njudgment to the Department on both claims, and Smith insists\\nthat it was wrong to do so. He contends that the district court\\n\\f2 No. 18-2948\\n\\nmistakenly concluded that testimony from two of his wit-\\nnesses was inadmissible and that he has enough evidence to\\nmake it to a jury in any event. We disagree and affirm the dis-\\ntrict court.\\n I.\\n Smith began working as an Emergency Traffic Patrol Min-\\nuteman with the Department late in 2013. Minutemen per-\\nform various duties related to traffic and roadways. Smith’s\\nemployment began with a probationary period starting Au-\\ngust 1. To be certified, he had to successfully complete three\\nstages of training over the course of six months. His proba-\\ntionary period did not go well.\\n According to the Department, Smith was far from a model\\nemployee. Early in his training, one of his supervisors re-\\nported that he challenged the instructions that he was given,\\nwhich created a “serious issue” for his training and develop-\\nment. Another supervisor said that Smith regularly “fail[ed]\\nto remember info” and “ha[d] a very hard time following\\nbasic instructions.” Particularly troubling, however, was\\nSmith’s record of unsafe conduct. Once, while driving in an\\nexpress lane with Marcello Valle, one of his supervisors,\\nSmith approached a place where the lanes divided. Valle told\\nhim to pick a lane; instead, Smith stopped short in traffic—\\nonly thirty feet from the concrete pillar dividing the lanes. On\\nanother occasion, Smith drove away from a gas pump with\\nthe nozzle still inserted in the truck. Smith also “almost hit a\\ntrooper police car” on a drive with a supervisor. Most danger-\\nous of all, Smith ignored instructions to put his truck in neu-\\ntral and pull the brake—nearly causing a supervisor to be\\npinned between the tow truck and another vehicle. Incidents\\nlike these led one of his supervisors, Lloyd Colbert, to send an\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 3\\n\\nemail to some of his coworkers warning that if Smith contin-\\nued to work on the road, “someone else will pay the ultimate\\nprice.”\\n The Department gave Smith negative reviews from the be-\\nginning, and its assessments of his performance became pro-\\ngressively worse. In a performance evaluation in mid-Sep-\\ntember, Smith received two marks of “unsatisfactory.” In Oc-\\ntober, one of Smith’s supervisors emailed another saying that\\nSmith was “not getting any better and cannot get it.” By the\\nend of November, Smith was described as “very behind”\\nwhere he ought to have been at his stage of training. The prob-\\nlems continued into December: emails between the Depart-\\nment employees described him as being argumentative, un-\\nstable, reckless, unsafe, and “in no way ready to go on his\\nown.” In January, Smith received another performance eval-\\nuation, this one giving him unsatisfactory marks in five dif-\\nferent categories.\\n From Smith’s perspective, however, the Department was\\nthe problem. On August 22, 2013, he filed an internal com-\\nplaint with the Department asserting that Valle had used\\n“abusive language” toward him and that another supervisor,\\nZen McHugh, had threatened to fire him for being confronta-\\ntional. That same day, Smith also wrote a memorandum to his\\nunion representative in which he claimed that the Depart-\\nment had discriminated against him because he was black\\nand had subjected him to a hostile work environment. In Oc-\\ntober, Smith sent another memorandum to the Department.\\nThe subject line was “Illegally docked hours from my pay.\\nDiscrimination/harassment.” The memorandum claimed that\\non October 13, Colbert had told him to sign out two hours be-\\nfore he had stopped working, which had the effect of\\n\\f4 No. 18-2948\\n\\nwithholding two hours of pay from his paycheck. (He was\\neventually compensated for those hours.)\\n In December, Smith wrote more memoranda to the De-\\npartment complaining about his treatment. Two of them,\\ndated December 5 and 6, complained that Colbert had denied\\nSmith overtime pay after he responded to a call for assistance\\nwith a disabled vehicle late in his shift. He attributed the re-\\nfusal to racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. He\\nsubmitted two more memoranda in late December. He ad-\\ndressed the first—which had the subject line “discrimination\\nretaliation”—to a supervisor at the Department. In it, he\\nclaimed that he was being treated differently than a fellow\\nemployee who had been allowed to work only four hours on\\na certain day while Smith had been required to work a full\\nday. The second was also addressed to the Department, and\\nit requested a shift change due to “discrimination, harass-\\nment, retaliation.”\\n On December 31, 2013, Smith filed another complaint, this\\ntime with the Department’s internal Equal Employment Op-\\nportunity office. He listed three dates on which the Depart-\\nment had allegedly discriminated and retaliated against him:\\nOctober 13, December 5, and December 28. From the record,\\nwe know that each of those dates corresponds to a specific in-\\ncident. On the first date, Colbert had allegedly docked hours\\nfrom his paycheck. On the second, Colbert had allegedly de-\\nnied Smith overtime pay. On the third, Roman McGhee, a su-\\npervisor, had supposedly yelled and sworn at Smith for say-\\ning that he was going to back two cars that had been in an\\naccident down a highway ramp. Smith’s complaint did not\\noffer his side of those events; it simply stated that he had been\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 5\\n\\ntreated differently than another coworker and denied over-\\ntime pay.\\n On January 3, 2014, the Department sent Smith a “State-\\nment of Charges,” which sought to fire him on the ground of\\nhis unsatisfactory work performance. On January 16, Smith\\nhad a run-in with Colbert, who had recently learned that\\nSmith had charged him, along with other supervisors, of ra-\\ncial discrimination and retaliation. According to Smith, Col-\\nbert, who was also black, was “very angry” and made several\\nconfrontational remarks: that there would be “eighty-one of\\nus against one of you when we go to trial”; that Smith was\\ngoing to lose everything that he owned, including his house\\nand car; and that he was a “stupid ass ni[].”\\n The Department terminated Smith on January 30, 2014. In\\nMarch, Smith sued the Department under Title VII, alleging\\nthat it had subjected him to a hostile work environment and\\nfired him in retaliation for his complaints about racial dis-\\ncrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to\\nthe Department, concluding that Smith had not introduced\\nenough evidence to permit a jury to decide in his favor on ei-\\nther claim.1\\n Smith insists that the district court took several wrong\\nturns. To begin with, he contends that the court erroneously\\nexcluded the testimony of two of his witnesses—Maria Ve-\\nronico, an expert, and Marvin Harrison, a former\\n\\n\\n 1 We note that Smith’s counsel failed to include the district court’s\\nopinion in the appendix as required by Circuit Rule 30(a)—notwithstand-\\ning his certification that he had done so. We do not take either the omis-\\nsion or the misrepresentation lightly, and counsel is admonished to ob-\\nserve our rules in the future.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2948\\n\\nsupervisor—as inadmissible. But even if we disagree with\\nhim about that, Smith says, he still has enough evidence to\\nmake it to a jury on both his retaliation and hostile work en-\\nvironment claims. We discuss each of his arguments below.\\n II.\\n We begin with the admissibility of Veronico’s expert testi-\\nmony, on which Smith relied in his opposition to the Depart-\\nment’s motion for summary judgment. Veronico, an expert in\\nindustrial relations, testified at her deposition that Smith’s\\ntrainers had created a hostile work environment based on his\\nrace when they “scolded, ridiculed, and threatened” him; she\\nalso opined that the Department had fired Smith for com-\\nplaining about racial discrimination. The district court de-\\nclined to consider Veronico’s opinion, explaining that it was\\nnot based on “sufficient facts or data” as required by Federal\\nRule of Evidence 702(b). That decision was well within the\\ndistrict court’s discretion.\\n Veronico concluded that Smith had been subjected to a\\nhostile work environment after reading Smith’s evaluations\\nand portions of the Department’s training manual and Em-\\nployee Policies Manual. She admitted that even though it was\\nher usual practice to interview actors on both sides of a dis-\\ncrimination claim, she did not talk to either Smith or his su-\\npervisors. Indeed, she did not even bother to review any\\nsworn deposition testimony. By Veronico’s own admission,\\nher conclusion was based on an incomplete picture—as the\\ndistrict court put it, she “omitted a substantial set of facts from\\nher analysis, and instead relied only on what appears to be\\nplaintiff-curated records.” Veronico’s reliance on an anemic\\nand one-sided set of facts casts significant doubt on the\\nsoundness of her opinion, and the court did not abuse its\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 7\\n\\ndiscretion by excluding it. See Huey v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,\\n165 F.3d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1999) (excluding an expert who\\n“did not attempt to reconstruct the underlying facts to deter-\\nmine whether [the opposing party] had a good explanation …\\n[and] did not do anything except talk to [the plaintiff], read\\ndocuments [plaintiff's] counsel sent, and write a letter”).\\n Veronico’s opinion that the Department retaliated against\\nSmith for registering complaints of racial discrimination rests\\non even shakier ground. That conclusion was drawn from the\\nsame incomplete information that formed the basis of her\\nopinion about Smith’s hostile work environment. But the\\nopinion about retaliation was undermined still further by Ve-\\nronico’s inability to connect the conclusion that she drew to\\nthe facts that she had. We have explained before that “[i]t is\\ncritical under Rule 702 that there be a link between the facts\\nor data the expert has worked with and the conclusion the ex-\\npert’s testimony is intended to support.” United States v.\\nMamah, 332 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2003). Veronico’s testimony\\nlacked that link. She maintains that Smith’s evaluations be-\\ncame more negative after he filed his complaints—which\\nmight suggest a retaliatory motive that could have inspired\\nhis dismissal. But she admitted that she had no information\\nabout whether any of these supervisors even knew about\\nSmith’s complaints at the time that they submitted negative\\nevaluations of his performance. And if the supervisors were\\nunaware of the complaints, there would be no reason to sus-\\npect that their negative evaluations demonstrated any kind of\\nretaliatory motive. In short, Veronico’s opinion was funda-\\nmentally flawed, and we affirm the district court’s decision\\nthat it was inadmissible.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2948\\n\\n III.\\n We now turn to the admissibility of an affidavit sworn by\\none of Smith’s supervisors, Marvin Harrison, who said sev-\\neral things that were helpful to Smith. The district court ruled\\nthat Harrison’s affidavit was inadmissible because it lacked a\\nproper foundation and was “replete with generalized asser-\\ntions.” For instance, the affidavit states that Harrison “wit-\\nnessed [Smith] being discriminated against on many different\\noccasions by the department and its agents.” But without\\nknowing who discriminated, what they did, and when they\\ndid it, the court had no way of knowing what to make of this\\nevidence. The same problem plagues the affidavit’s assertion\\nthat Colbert called Smith the n-word “frequently.” Harrison\\ndid not specify whether he heard these slurs himself, nor did\\nhe offer any detail about the contexts in which they were ut-\\ntered. Without that information, the court could not evaluate\\nwhether Harrison was describing events of which he had per-\\nsonal knowledge or simply relaying inadmissible hearsay. See\\nFED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4) (requiring that affidavits used to sup-\\nport or oppose a motion for summary judgment be “made on\\npersonal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in\\nevidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent\\nto testify on the matters stated”). Indeed, the affidavit was so\\nvague that even Smith himself concedes that it is at least “par-\\ntially true” that it “lacked a proper evidentiary foundation.”\\nThe district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to\\nconsider Harrison’s affidavit.\\n IV.\\n To survive summary judgment on his Title VII retaliation\\nclaim, Smith must show that a reasonable jury could find that\\nhe engaged in a protected activity, that he suffered an adverse\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 9\\n\\nemployment action, and that the adverse action was moti-\\nvated by a protected activity. Lord v. High Voltage Software,\\nInc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). The Department con-\\ncedes that Smith engaged in protected activity and that the\\ntermination of his employment was an adverse employment\\naction. The only dispute is whether the Department termi-\\nnated Smith because he complained about racial discrimina-\\ntion. We agree with the district court that a reasonable jury\\ncould not find in Smith’s favor on this issue.\\n To raise an inference that he was fired because of his com-\\nplaints rather than because of his performance, Smith main-\\ntains that he was fired even though he was meeting the De-\\npartment’s legitimate expectations. See Vaughn v. Vilsack, 715\\nF.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2013). Yet as we recounted above,\\nSmith’s tenure at the Department was distinguished in all the\\nwrong ways. He received multiple ratings of “unsatisfactory”\\nin two different formal performance reviews. His failings as\\nan employee were chronicled in conversations and emails\\nfrom a number of different supervisors and coworkers, who\\nconsidered him unsafe, argumentative, and unable to follow\\ninstructions.\\n Smith does not dispute the Department’s long list of griev-\\nances against him. But he argues that the district court “cherry\\npicked” negative evidence about his employment record to\\ncreate a misleading narrative. He points out that in addition\\nto bad reviews, he also received some positive feedback from\\nsome of his supervisors at the Department. But a smattering\\nof decent reviews doesn’t overcome the overwhelming num-\\nber of documented problems—including serious safety is-\\nsues—that the Department had with Smith’s performance. See\\nAnderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2948\\n\\n1994) (“The mere submission of materials from a co-worker\\nor supervisor indicating that an employee’s performance is\\nsatisfactory … does not create a material issue of fact.”). Given\\nthe extensive evidence that Smith was not meeting his em-\\nployer’s legitimate expectations, a reasonable jury could not\\nfind that the Department fired him because of his protected\\nactivity rather than for his poor performance.\\n V.\\n Finally, we address Smith’s hostile work environment\\nclaim. A hostile work environment claim contains four ele-\\nments: (1) the employee was subject to unwelcome harass-\\nment; (2) the harassment was based on a reason forbidden by\\nTitle VII—here, race; (3) the harassment was so severe or per-\\nvasive that it altered the conditions of employment and cre-\\nated a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there\\nis a basis for employer liability. Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge\\nof the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 804 F.3d 826, 834 (7th Cir.\\n2015).\\n Smith’s case largely founders on the second prong, be-\\ncause the majority of the harassment he identifies was uncon-\\nnected to his race. Smith says that Valle, McGhee, and a\\ntrainer identified only as “Washington” created a hostile\\nwork environment by directing profanity at him. Valle con-\\nfronted him and used the f-word several times, in contexts\\nlike “shut the f[] up.” McGhee called Smith a “stupid dumb\\nmotherf[]” and told him he was going to “kick [his] ass.”\\nWashington used the f-word once. As the district court\\npointed out, however, Smith fails to connect any of these epi-\\nthets to his race. Smith himself acknowledged that Valle was\\n“equal opportunity” when it came to dishing out profanity.\\nMcGhee’s outburst was connected to a dangerous traffic\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 11\\n\\nsituation for which Smith was responsible. And Washington’s\\nlone use of the f-word is presented without any context at all.\\nWhile the epithets may have made for a crude or unpleasant\\nworkplace, “Title VII imposes no ‘general civility code.’”\\nVance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 452, (2013) (quoting On-\\ncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).\\nBecause Smith introduced no evidence that his supervisors\\nswore at him because he was black, the profanity that he de-\\nscribes does not establish a hostile work environment under\\nTitle VII.\\n Smith describes one incident, however, that plainly consti-\\ntutes race-based harassment: Colbert, one of his former super-\\nvisors, called Smith a “stupid ass ni[]” after finding out that\\nSmith had filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-\\nportunity office. The n-word is an egregious racial epithet.\\nNichols v. Mich. City Plant Planning Dep’t, 755 F.3d 594, 601 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (“[W]hile there is no ‘magic number of slurs’ that\\nindicates a hostile work environment, an ‘unambiguously ra-\\ncial epithet falls on the more severe end of the spectrum.’” (ci-\\ntation omitted)). That said, Smith can’t win simply by proving\\nthat the word was uttered. He must also demonstrate that\\nColbert’s use of this word altered the conditions of his em-\\nployment and created a hostile or abusive working environ-\\nment. Huri, 804 F.3d at 834. And he must make this showing\\n“from both a subjective and an objective point of view.” EEOC\\nv. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d 618, 625 (7th Cir. 2018). In\\nother words, he must show not only that a reasonable person\\nwould find the workplace hostile or abusive as a result of Col-\\nbert’s slur, but also that he himself perceived it that way. Fa-\\nragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).\\n\\f12 No. 18-2948\\n\\n We need not address the objective prong of the analysis,\\nbecause Smith falters on the subjective prong. He introduced\\nno evidence that Colbert’s use of the n-word changed his sub-\\njective experience of the workplace. To be sure, Smith testified\\nthat his time at the Department caused him psychological dis-\\ntress. But that was for reasons that predated his run-in with\\nColbert and had nothing to do with his race. His tenure at the\\nDepartment was rocky from the outset because of his poor\\ntrack record. He clashed with his supervisors over pay, and\\nthey confronted him with foul language. As early as August—\\nthe first month of his employment—he sent memoranda to\\nthe Department complaining of a “hostile work environ-\\nment.” On Smith’s own account, his supervisors made him\\nmiserable throughout his employment at the Department. But\\nas we have already discussed, he has no evidence that his su-\\npervisors were lashing out at him because he was black.\\n The first incident in which race played a part was his Jan-\\nuary 16th run-in with Colbert. By then, things were already at\\na breaking point. The Department had initiated termination\\nproceedings against Smith two weeks before, so he knew that\\nhe was about to be fired. And while things certainly could\\nhave gotten worse for Smith after the racially charged con-\\nfrontation with Colbert, he offers no evidence that they did.\\nInstead, Smith presents the confrontation as yet another in-\\nstance of the same ill treatment that he had been receiving all\\nalong.\\n That won’t do under Title VII. Because the statute does not\\ngive employees a remedy for workplace abuse unrelated to a\\nprotected characteristic, Smith needs to point to evidence—\\neven if in his own testimony—that he suffered harm from Col-\\nbert’s race-based harassment that was distinct from the\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 13\\n\\ndistress that non-race-based harassment was already causing\\nhim. Put differently, Smith has to be able to persuade a jury\\nthat Colbert’s race-based harassment was severe enough “to\\nalter the conditions of [his] employment.” Huri, 804 F.3d at 834\\n(emphasis added). Smith did not even try to make that show-\\ning—he points to no evidence that Colbert’s slur caused him\\neither additional or different distress. Without evidence that\\nColbert’s outburst changed Smith’s subjective experience\\nduring his last two weeks at the Department, a reasonable\\njury could not resolve the hostile work environment claim in\\nSmith’s favor.\\n ***\\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment to the De-\\npartment is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431627/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654374/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Terry Smith v. Illinois Department of Transp\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2948\nTERRY L. SMITH,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:15-cv-02061 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. After a rocky probationary period,\nthe Illinois Department of Transportation discharged its em-\nployee Terry Smith. Smith sued the Department under Title\nVII, arguing that it had subjected him to a hostile work envi-\nronment and fired him in retaliation for his complaints about\nracial discrimination. The district court granted summary\njudgment to the Department on both claims, and Smith insists\nthat it was wrong to do so. He contends that the district court\n\f2 No. 18-2948\n\nmistakenly concluded that testimony from two of his wit-\nnesses was inadmissible and that he has enough evidence to\nmake it to a jury in any event. We disagree and affirm the dis-\ntrict court.\n I.\n Smith began working as an Emergency Traffic Patrol Min-\nuteman with the Department late in 2013. Minutemen per-\nform various duties related to traffic and roadways. Smith’s\nemployment began with a probationary period starting Au-\ngust 1. To be certified, he had to successfully complete three\nstages of training over the course of six months. His proba-\ntionary period did not go well.\n According to the Department, Smith was far from a model\nemployee. Early in his training, one of his supervisors re-\nported that he challenged the instructions that he was given,\nwhich created a “serious issue” for his training and develop-\nment. Another supervisor said that Smith regularly “fail[ed]\nto remember info” and “ha[d] a very hard time following\nbasic instructions.” Particularly troubling, however, was\nSmith’s record of unsafe conduct. Once, while driving in an\nexpress lane with Marcello Valle, one of his supervisors,\nSmith approached a place where the lanes divided. Valle told\nhim to pick a lane; instead, Smith stopped short in traffic—\nonly thirty feet from the concrete pillar dividing the lanes. On\nanother occasion, Smith drove away from a gas pump with\nthe nozzle still inserted in the truck. Smith also “almost hit a\ntrooper police car” on a drive with a supervisor. Most danger-\nous of all, Smith ignored instructions to put his truck in neu-\ntral and pull the brake—nearly causing a supervisor to be\npinned between the tow truck and another vehicle. Incidents\nlike these led one of his supervisors, Lloyd Colbert, to send an\n\fNo. 18-2948 3\n\nemail to some of his coworkers warning that if Smith contin-\nued to work on the road, “someone else will pay the ultimate\nprice.”\n The Department gave Smith negative reviews from the be-\nginning, and its assessments of his performance became pro-\ngressively worse. In a performance evaluation in mid-Sep-\ntember, Smith received two marks of “unsatisfactory.” In Oc-\ntober, one of Smith’s supervisors emailed another saying that\nSmith was “not getting any better and cannot get it.” By the\nend of November, Smith was described as “very behind”\nwhere he ought to have been at his stage of training. The prob-\nlems continued into December: emails between the Depart-\nment employees described him as being argumentative, un-\nstable, reckless, unsafe, and “in no way ready to go on his\nown.” In January, Smith received another performance eval-\nuation, this one giving him unsatisfactory marks in five dif-\nferent categories.\n From Smith’s perspective, however, the Department was\nthe problem. On August 22, 2013, he filed an internal com-\nplaint with the Department asserting that Valle had used\n“abusive language” toward him and that another supervisor,\nZen McHugh, had threatened to fire him for being confronta-\ntional. That same day, Smith also wrote a memorandum to his\nunion representative in which he claimed that the Depart-\nment had discriminated against him because he was black\nand had subjected him to a hostile work environment. In Oc-\ntober, Smith sent another memorandum to the Department.\nThe subject line was “Illegally docked hours from my pay.\nDiscrimination/harassment.” The memorandum claimed that\non October 13, Colbert had told him to sign out two hours be-\nfore he had stopped working, which had the effect of\n\f4 No. 18-2948\n\nwithholding two hours of pay from his paycheck. (He was\neventually compensated for those hours.)\n In December, Smith wrote more memoranda to the De-\npartment complaining about his treatment. Two of them,\ndated December 5 and 6, complained that Colbert had denied\nSmith overtime pay after he responded to a call for assistance\nwith a disabled vehicle late in his shift. He attributed the re-\nfusal to racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. He\nsubmitted two more memoranda in late December. He ad-\ndressed the first—which had the subject line “discrimination\nretaliation”—to a supervisor at the Department. In it, he\nclaimed that he was being treated differently than a fellow\nemployee who had been allowed to work only four hours on\na certain day while Smith had been required to work a full\nday. The second was also addressed to the Department, and\nit requested a shift change due to “discrimination, harass-\nment, retaliation.”\n On December 31, 2013, Smith filed another complaint, this\ntime with the Department’s internal Equal Employment Op-\nportunity office. He listed three dates on which the Depart-\nment had allegedly discriminated and retaliated against him:\nOctober 13, December 5, and December 28. From the record,\nwe know that each of those dates corresponds to a specific in-\ncident. On the first date, Colbert had allegedly docked hours\nfrom his paycheck. On the second, Colbert had allegedly de-\nnied Smith overtime pay. On the third, Roman McGhee, a su-\npervisor, had supposedly yelled and sworn at Smith for say-\ning that he was going to back two cars that had been in an\naccident down a highway ramp. Smith’s complaint did not\noffer his side of those events; it simply stated that he had been\n\fNo. 18-2948 5\n\ntreated differently than another coworker and denied over-\ntime pay.\n On January 3, 2014, the Department sent Smith a “State-\nment of Charges,” which sought to fire him on the ground of\nhis unsatisfactory work performance. On January 16, Smith\nhad a run-in with Colbert, who had recently learned that\nSmith had charged him, along with other supervisors, of ra-\ncial discrimination and retaliation. According to Smith, Col-\nbert, who was also black, was “very angry” and made several\nconfrontational remarks: that there would be “eighty-one of\nus against one of you when we go to trial”; that Smith was\ngoing to lose everything that he owned, including his house\nand car; and that he was a “stupid ass ni[].”\n The Department terminated Smith on January 30, 2014. In\nMarch, Smith sued the Department under Title VII, alleging\nthat it had subjected him to a hostile work environment and\nfired him in retaliation for his complaints about racial dis-\ncrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to\nthe Department, concluding that Smith had not introduced\nenough evidence to permit a jury to decide in his favor on ei-\nther claim.1\n Smith insists that the district court took several wrong\nturns. To begin with, he contends that the court erroneously\nexcluded the testimony of two of his witnesses—Maria Ve-\nronico, an expert, and Marvin Harrison, a former\n\n\n 1 We note that Smith’s counsel failed to include the district court’s\nopinion in the appendix as required by Circuit Rule 30(a)—notwithstand-\ning his certification that he had done so. We do not take either the omis-\nsion or the misrepresentation lightly, and counsel is admonished to ob-\nserve our rules in the future.\n\f6 No. 18-2948\n\nsupervisor—as inadmissible. But even if we disagree with\nhim about that, Smith says, he still has enough evidence to\nmake it to a jury on both his retaliation and hostile work en-\nvironment claims. We discuss each of his arguments below.\n II.\n We begin with the admissibility of Veronico’s expert testi-\nmony, on which Smith relied in his opposition to the Depart-\nment’s motion for summary judgment. Veronico, an expert in\nindustrial relations, testified at her deposition that Smith’s\ntrainers had created a hostile work environment based on his\nrace when they “scolded, ridiculed, and threatened” him; she\nalso opined that the Department had fired Smith for com-\nplaining about racial discrimination. The district court de-\nclined to consider Veronico’s opinion, explaining that it was\nnot based on “sufficient facts or data” as required by Federal\nRule of Evidence 702(b). That decision was well within the\ndistrict court’s discretion.\n Veronico concluded that Smith had been subjected to a\nhostile work environment after reading Smith’s evaluations\nand portions of the Department’s training manual and Em-\nployee Policies Manual. She admitted that even though it was\nher usual practice to interview actors on both sides of a dis-\ncrimination claim, she did not talk to either Smith or his su-\npervisors. Indeed, she did not even bother to review any\nsworn deposition testimony. By Veronico’s own admission,\nher conclusion was based on an incomplete picture—as the\ndistrict court put it, she “omitted a substantial set of facts from\nher analysis, and instead relied only on what appears to be\nplaintiff-curated records.” Veronico’s reliance on an anemic\nand one-sided set of facts casts significant doubt on the\nsoundness of her opinion, and the court did not abuse its\n\fNo. 18-2948 7\n\ndiscretion by excluding it. See Huey v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,\n165 F.3d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1999) (excluding an expert who\n“did not attempt to reconstruct the underlying facts to deter-\nmine whether [the opposing party] had a good explanation …\n[and] did not do anything except talk to [the plaintiff], read\ndocuments [plaintiff's] counsel sent, and write a letter”).\n Veronico’s opinion that the Department retaliated against\nSmith for registering complaints of racial discrimination rests\non even shakier ground. That conclusion was drawn from the\nsame incomplete information that formed the basis of her\nopinion about Smith’s hostile work environment. But the\nopinion about retaliation was undermined still further by Ve-\nronico’s inability to connect the conclusion that she drew to\nthe facts that she had. We have explained before that “[i]t is\ncritical under Rule 702 that there be a link between the facts\nor data the expert has worked with and the conclusion the ex-\npert’s testimony is intended to support.” United States v.\nMamah, 332 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2003). Veronico’s testimony\nlacked that link. She maintains that Smith’s evaluations be-\ncame more negative after he filed his complaints—which\nmight suggest a retaliatory motive that could have inspired\nhis dismissal. But she admitted that she had no information\nabout whether any of these supervisors even knew about\nSmith’s complaints at the time that they submitted negative\nevaluations of his performance. And if the supervisors were\nunaware of the complaints, there would be no reason to sus-\npect that their negative evaluations demonstrated any kind of\nretaliatory motive. In short, Veronico’s opinion was funda-\nmentally flawed, and we affirm the district court’s decision\nthat it was inadmissible.\n\f8 No. 18-2948\n\n III.\n We now turn to the admissibility of an affidavit sworn by\none of Smith’s supervisors, Marvin Harrison, who said sev-\neral things that were helpful to Smith. The district court ruled\nthat Harrison’s affidavit was inadmissible because it lacked a\nproper foundation and was “replete with generalized asser-\ntions.” For instance, the affidavit states that Harrison “wit-\nnessed [Smith] being discriminated against on many different\noccasions by the department and its agents.” But without\nknowing who discriminated, what they did, and when they\ndid it, the court had no way of knowing what to make of this\nevidence. The same problem plagues the affidavit’s assertion\nthat Colbert called Smith the n-word “frequently.” Harrison\ndid not specify whether he heard these slurs himself, nor did\nhe offer any detail about the contexts in which they were ut-\ntered. Without that information, the court could not evaluate\nwhether Harrison was describing events of which he had per-\nsonal knowledge or simply relaying inadmissible hearsay. See\nFED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4) (requiring that affidavits used to sup-\nport or oppose a motion for summary judgment be “made on\npersonal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in\nevidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent\nto testify on the matters stated”). Indeed, the affidavit was so\nvague that even Smith himself concedes that it is at least “par-\ntially true” that it “lacked a proper evidentiary foundation.”\nThe district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to\nconsider Harrison’s affidavit.\n IV.\n To survive summary judgment on his Title VII retaliation\nclaim, Smith must show that a reasonable jury could find that\nhe engaged in a protected activity, that he suffered an adverse\n\fNo. 18-2948 9\n\nemployment action, and that the adverse action was moti-\nvated by a protected activity. Lord v. High Voltage Software,\nInc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). The Department con-\ncedes that Smith engaged in protected activity and that the\ntermination of his employment was an adverse employment\naction. The only dispute is whether the Department termi-\nnated Smith because he complained about racial discrimina-\ntion. We agree with the district court that a reasonable jury\ncould not find in Smith’s favor on this issue.\n To raise an inference that he was fired because of his com-\nplaints rather than because of his performance, Smith main-\ntains that he was fired even though he was meeting the De-\npartment’s legitimate expectations. See Vaughn v. Vilsack, 715\nF.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2013). Yet as we recounted above,\nSmith’s tenure at the Department was distinguished in all the\nwrong ways. He received multiple ratings of “unsatisfactory”\nin two different formal performance reviews. His failings as\nan employee were chronicled in conversations and emails\nfrom a number of different supervisors and coworkers, who\nconsidered him unsafe, argumentative, and unable to follow\ninstructions.\n Smith does not dispute the Department’s long list of griev-\nances against him. But he argues that the district court “cherry\npicked” negative evidence about his employment record to\ncreate a misleading narrative. He points out that in addition\nto bad reviews, he also received some positive feedback from\nsome of his supervisors at the Department. But a smattering\nof decent reviews doesn’t overcome the overwhelming num-\nber of documented problems—including serious safety is-\nsues—that the Department had with Smith’s performance. See\nAnderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir.\n\f10 No. 18-2948\n\n1994) (“The mere submission of materials from a co-worker\nor supervisor indicating that an employee’s performance is\nsatisfactory … does not create a material issue of fact.”). Given\nthe extensive evidence that Smith was not meeting his em-\nployer’s legitimate expectations, a reasonable jury could not\nfind that the Department fired him because of his protected\nactivity rather than for his poor performance.\n V.\n Finally, we address Smith’s hostile work environment\nclaim. A hostile work environment claim contains four ele-\nments: (1) the employee was subject to unwelcome harass-\nment; (2) the harassment was based on a reason forbidden by\nTitle VII—here, race; (3) the harassment was so severe or per-\nvasive that it altered the conditions of employment and cre-\nated a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there\nis a basis for employer liability. Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge\nof the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 804 F.3d 826, 834 (7th Cir.\n2015).\n Smith’s case largely founders on the second prong, be-\ncause the majority of the harassment he identifies was uncon-\nnected to his race. Smith says that Valle, McGhee, and a\ntrainer identified only as “Washington” created a hostile\nwork environment by directing profanity at him. Valle con-\nfronted him and used the f-word several times, in contexts\nlike “shut the f[] up.” McGhee called Smith a “stupid dumb\nmotherf[]” and told him he was going to “kick [his] ass.”\nWashington used the f-word once. As the district court\npointed out, however, Smith fails to connect any of these epi-\nthets to his race. Smith himself acknowledged that Valle was\n“equal opportunity” when it came to dishing out profanity.\nMcGhee’s outburst was connected to a dangerous traffic\n\fNo. 18-2948 11\n\nsituation for which Smith was responsible. And Washington’s\nlone use of the f-word is presented without any context at all.\nWhile the epithets may have made for a crude or unpleasant\nworkplace, “Title VII imposes no ‘general civility code.’”\nVance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 452, (2013) (quoting On-\ncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).\nBecause Smith introduced no evidence that his supervisors\nswore at him because he was black, the profanity that he de-\nscribes does not establish a hostile work environment under\nTitle VII.\n Smith describes one incident, however, that plainly consti-\ntutes race-based harassment: Colbert, one of his former super-\nvisors, called Smith a “stupid ass ni[]” after finding out that\nSmith had filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-\nportunity office. The n-word is an egregious racial epithet.\nNichols v. Mich. City Plant Planning Dep’t, 755 F.3d 594, 601 (7th\nCir. 2014) (“[W]hile there is no ‘magic number of slurs’ that\nindicates a hostile work environment, an ‘unambiguously ra-\ncial epithet falls on the more severe end of the spectrum.’” (ci-\ntation omitted)). That said, Smith can’t win simply by proving\nthat the word was uttered. He must also demonstrate that\nColbert’s use of this word altered the conditions of his em-\nployment and created a hostile or abusive working environ-\nment. Huri, 804 F.3d at 834. And he must make this showing\n“from both a subjective and an objective point of view.” EEOC\nv. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d 618, 625 (7th Cir. 2018). In\nother words, he must show not only that a reasonable person\nwould find the workplace hostile or abusive as a result of Col-\nbert’s slur, but also that he himself perceived it that way. Fa-\nragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).\n\f12 No. 18-2948\n\n We need not address the objective prong of the analysis,\nbecause Smith falters on the subjective prong. He introduced\nno evidence that Colbert’s use of the n-word changed his sub-\njective experience of the workplace. To be sure, Smith testified\nthat his time at the Department caused him psychological dis-\ntress. But that was for reasons that predated his run-in with\nColbert and had nothing to do with his race. His tenure at the\nDepartment was rocky from the outset because of his poor\ntrack record. He clashed with his supervisors over pay, and\nthey confronted him with foul language. As early as August—\nthe first month of his employment—he sent memoranda to\nthe Department complaining of a “hostile work environ-\nment.” On Smith’s own account, his supervisors made him\nmiserable throughout his employment at the Department. But\nas we have already discussed, he has no evidence that his su-\npervisors were lashing out at him because he was black.\n The first incident in which race played a part was his Jan-\nuary 16th run-in with Colbert. By then, things were already at\na breaking point. The Department had initiated termination\nproceedings against Smith two weeks before, so he knew that\nhe was about to be fired. And while things certainly could\nhave gotten worse for Smith after the racially charged con-\nfrontation with Colbert, he offers no evidence that they did.\nInstead, Smith presents the confrontation as yet another in-\nstance of the same ill treatment that he had been receiving all\nalong.\n That won’t do under Title VII. Because the statute does not\ngive employees a remedy for workplace abuse unrelated to a\nprotected characteristic, Smith needs to point to evidence—\neven if in his own testimony—that he suffered harm from Col-\nbert’s race-based harassment that was distinct from the\n\fNo. 18-2948 13\n\ndistress that non-race-based harassment was already causing\nhim. Put differently, Smith has to be able to persuade a jury\nthat Colbert’s race-based harassment was severe enough “to\nalter the conditions of [his] employment.” Huri, 804 F.3d at 834\n(emphasis added). Smith did not even try to make that show-\ning—he points to no evidence that Colbert’s slur caused him\neither additional or different distress. Without evidence that\nColbert’s outburst changed Smith’s subjective experience\nduring his last two weeks at the Department, a reasonable\njury could not resolve the hostile work environment claim in\nSmith’s favor.\n ***\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment to the De-\npartment is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Terry Smith v. Illinois Department of Transp\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2948\\nTERRY L. SMITH,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-02061 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. After a rocky probationary period,\\nthe Illinois Department of Transportation discharged its em-\\nployee Terry Smith. Smith sued the Department under Title\\nVII, arguing that it had subjected him to a hostile work envi-\\nronment and fired him in retaliation for his complaints about\\nracial discrimination. The district court granted summary\\njudgment to the Department on both claims, and Smith insists\\nthat it was wrong to do so. He contends that the district court\\n\\f2 No. 18-2948\\n\\nmistakenly concluded that testimony from two of his wit-\\nnesses was inadmissible and that he has enough evidence to\\nmake it to a jury in any event. We disagree and affirm the dis-\\ntrict court.\\n I.\\n Smith began working as an Emergency Traffic Patrol Min-\\nuteman with the Department late in 2013. Minutemen per-\\nform various duties related to traffic and roadways. Smith’s\\nemployment began with a probationary period starting Au-\\ngust 1. To be certified, he had to successfully complete three\\nstages of training over the course of six months. His proba-\\ntionary period did not go well.\\n According to the Department, Smith was far from a model\\nemployee. Early in his training, one of his supervisors re-\\nported that he challenged the instructions that he was given,\\nwhich created a “serious issue” for his training and develop-\\nment. Another supervisor said that Smith regularly “fail[ed]\\nto remember info” and “ha[d] a very hard time following\\nbasic instructions.” Particularly troubling, however, was\\nSmith’s record of unsafe conduct. Once, while driving in an\\nexpress lane with Marcello Valle, one of his supervisors,\\nSmith approached a place where the lanes divided. Valle told\\nhim to pick a lane; instead, Smith stopped short in traffic—\\nonly thirty feet from the concrete pillar dividing the lanes. On\\nanother occasion, Smith drove away from a gas pump with\\nthe nozzle still inserted in the truck. Smith also “almost hit a\\ntrooper police car” on a drive with a supervisor. Most danger-\\nous of all, Smith ignored instructions to put his truck in neu-\\ntral and pull the brake—nearly causing a supervisor to be\\npinned between the tow truck and another vehicle. Incidents\\nlike these led one of his supervisors, Lloyd Colbert, to send an\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 3\\n\\nemail to some of his coworkers warning that if Smith contin-\\nued to work on the road, “someone else will pay the ultimate\\nprice.”\\n The Department gave Smith negative reviews from the be-\\nginning, and its assessments of his performance became pro-\\ngressively worse. In a performance evaluation in mid-Sep-\\ntember, Smith received two marks of “unsatisfactory.” In Oc-\\ntober, one of Smith’s supervisors emailed another saying that\\nSmith was “not getting any better and cannot get it.” By the\\nend of November, Smith was described as “very behind”\\nwhere he ought to have been at his stage of training. The prob-\\nlems continued into December: emails between the Depart-\\nment employees described him as being argumentative, un-\\nstable, reckless, unsafe, and “in no way ready to go on his\\nown.” In January, Smith received another performance eval-\\nuation, this one giving him unsatisfactory marks in five dif-\\nferent categories.\\n From Smith’s perspective, however, the Department was\\nthe problem. On August 22, 2013, he filed an internal com-\\nplaint with the Department asserting that Valle had used\\n“abusive language” toward him and that another supervisor,\\nZen McHugh, had threatened to fire him for being confronta-\\ntional. That same day, Smith also wrote a memorandum to his\\nunion representative in which he claimed that the Depart-\\nment had discriminated against him because he was black\\nand had subjected him to a hostile work environment. In Oc-\\ntober, Smith sent another memorandum to the Department.\\nThe subject line was “Illegally docked hours from my pay.\\nDiscrimination/harassment.” The memorandum claimed that\\non October 13, Colbert had told him to sign out two hours be-\\nfore he had stopped working, which had the effect of\\n\\f4 No. 18-2948\\n\\nwithholding two hours of pay from his paycheck. (He was\\neventually compensated for those hours.)\\n In December, Smith wrote more memoranda to the De-\\npartment complaining about his treatment. Two of them,\\ndated December 5 and 6, complained that Colbert had denied\\nSmith overtime pay after he responded to a call for assistance\\nwith a disabled vehicle late in his shift. He attributed the re-\\nfusal to racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. He\\nsubmitted two more memoranda in late December. He ad-\\ndressed the first—which had the subject line “discrimination\\nretaliation”—to a supervisor at the Department. In it, he\\nclaimed that he was being treated differently than a fellow\\nemployee who had been allowed to work only four hours on\\na certain day while Smith had been required to work a full\\nday. The second was also addressed to the Department, and\\nit requested a shift change due to “discrimination, harass-\\nment, retaliation.”\\n On December 31, 2013, Smith filed another complaint, this\\ntime with the Department’s internal Equal Employment Op-\\nportunity office. He listed three dates on which the Depart-\\nment had allegedly discriminated and retaliated against him:\\nOctober 13, December 5, and December 28. From the record,\\nwe know that each of those dates corresponds to a specific in-\\ncident. On the first date, Colbert had allegedly docked hours\\nfrom his paycheck. On the second, Colbert had allegedly de-\\nnied Smith overtime pay. On the third, Roman McGhee, a su-\\npervisor, had supposedly yelled and sworn at Smith for say-\\ning that he was going to back two cars that had been in an\\naccident down a highway ramp. Smith’s complaint did not\\noffer his side of those events; it simply stated that he had been\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 5\\n\\ntreated differently than another coworker and denied over-\\ntime pay.\\n On January 3, 2014, the Department sent Smith a “State-\\nment of Charges,” which sought to fire him on the ground of\\nhis unsatisfactory work performance. On January 16, Smith\\nhad a run-in with Colbert, who had recently learned that\\nSmith had charged him, along with other supervisors, of ra-\\ncial discrimination and retaliation. According to Smith, Col-\\nbert, who was also black, was “very angry” and made several\\nconfrontational remarks: that there would be “eighty-one of\\nus against one of you when we go to trial”; that Smith was\\ngoing to lose everything that he owned, including his house\\nand car; and that he was a “stupid ass ni[].”\\n The Department terminated Smith on January 30, 2014. In\\nMarch, Smith sued the Department under Title VII, alleging\\nthat it had subjected him to a hostile work environment and\\nfired him in retaliation for his complaints about racial dis-\\ncrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to\\nthe Department, concluding that Smith had not introduced\\nenough evidence to permit a jury to decide in his favor on ei-\\nther claim.1\\n Smith insists that the district court took several wrong\\nturns. To begin with, he contends that the court erroneously\\nexcluded the testimony of two of his witnesses—Maria Ve-\\nronico, an expert, and Marvin Harrison, a former\\n\\n\\n 1 We note that Smith’s counsel failed to include the district court’s\\nopinion in the appendix as required by Circuit Rule 30(a)—notwithstand-\\ning his certification that he had done so. We do not take either the omis-\\nsion or the misrepresentation lightly, and counsel is admonished to ob-\\nserve our rules in the future.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2948\\n\\nsupervisor—as inadmissible. But even if we disagree with\\nhim about that, Smith says, he still has enough evidence to\\nmake it to a jury on both his retaliation and hostile work en-\\nvironment claims. We discuss each of his arguments below.\\n II.\\n We begin with the admissibility of Veronico’s expert testi-\\nmony, on which Smith relied in his opposition to the Depart-\\nment’s motion for summary judgment. Veronico, an expert in\\nindustrial relations, testified at her deposition that Smith’s\\ntrainers had created a hostile work environment based on his\\nrace when they “scolded, ridiculed, and threatened” him; she\\nalso opined that the Department had fired Smith for com-\\nplaining about racial discrimination. The district court de-\\nclined to consider Veronico’s opinion, explaining that it was\\nnot based on “sufficient facts or data” as required by Federal\\nRule of Evidence 702(b). That decision was well within the\\ndistrict court’s discretion.\\n Veronico concluded that Smith had been subjected to a\\nhostile work environment after reading Smith’s evaluations\\nand portions of the Department’s training manual and Em-\\nployee Policies Manual. She admitted that even though it was\\nher usual practice to interview actors on both sides of a dis-\\ncrimination claim, she did not talk to either Smith or his su-\\npervisors. Indeed, she did not even bother to review any\\nsworn deposition testimony. By Veronico’s own admission,\\nher conclusion was based on an incomplete picture—as the\\ndistrict court put it, she “omitted a substantial set of facts from\\nher analysis, and instead relied only on what appears to be\\nplaintiff-curated records.” Veronico’s reliance on an anemic\\nand one-sided set of facts casts significant doubt on the\\nsoundness of her opinion, and the court did not abuse its\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 7\\n\\ndiscretion by excluding it. See Huey v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,\\n165 F.3d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1999) (excluding an expert who\\n“did not attempt to reconstruct the underlying facts to deter-\\nmine whether [the opposing party] had a good explanation …\\n[and] did not do anything except talk to [the plaintiff], read\\ndocuments [plaintiff's] counsel sent, and write a letter”).\\n Veronico’s opinion that the Department retaliated against\\nSmith for registering complaints of racial discrimination rests\\non even shakier ground. That conclusion was drawn from the\\nsame incomplete information that formed the basis of her\\nopinion about Smith’s hostile work environment. But the\\nopinion about retaliation was undermined still further by Ve-\\nronico’s inability to connect the conclusion that she drew to\\nthe facts that she had. We have explained before that “[i]t is\\ncritical under Rule 702 that there be a link between the facts\\nor data the expert has worked with and the conclusion the ex-\\npert’s testimony is intended to support.” United States v.\\nMamah, 332 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2003). Veronico’s testimony\\nlacked that link. She maintains that Smith’s evaluations be-\\ncame more negative after he filed his complaints—which\\nmight suggest a retaliatory motive that could have inspired\\nhis dismissal. But she admitted that she had no information\\nabout whether any of these supervisors even knew about\\nSmith’s complaints at the time that they submitted negative\\nevaluations of his performance. And if the supervisors were\\nunaware of the complaints, there would be no reason to sus-\\npect that their negative evaluations demonstrated any kind of\\nretaliatory motive. In short, Veronico’s opinion was funda-\\nmentally flawed, and we affirm the district court’s decision\\nthat it was inadmissible.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2948\\n\\n III.\\n We now turn to the admissibility of an affidavit sworn by\\none of Smith’s supervisors, Marvin Harrison, who said sev-\\neral things that were helpful to Smith. The district court ruled\\nthat Harrison’s affidavit was inadmissible because it lacked a\\nproper foundation and was “replete with generalized asser-\\ntions.” For instance, the affidavit states that Harrison “wit-\\nnessed [Smith] being discriminated against on many different\\noccasions by the department and its agents.” But without\\nknowing who discriminated, what they did, and when they\\ndid it, the court had no way of knowing what to make of this\\nevidence. The same problem plagues the affidavit’s assertion\\nthat Colbert called Smith the n-word “frequently.” Harrison\\ndid not specify whether he heard these slurs himself, nor did\\nhe offer any detail about the contexts in which they were ut-\\ntered. Without that information, the court could not evaluate\\nwhether Harrison was describing events of which he had per-\\nsonal knowledge or simply relaying inadmissible hearsay. See\\nFED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4) (requiring that affidavits used to sup-\\nport or oppose a motion for summary judgment be “made on\\npersonal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in\\nevidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent\\nto testify on the matters stated”). Indeed, the affidavit was so\\nvague that even Smith himself concedes that it is at least “par-\\ntially true” that it “lacked a proper evidentiary foundation.”\\nThe district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to\\nconsider Harrison’s affidavit.\\n IV.\\n To survive summary judgment on his Title VII retaliation\\nclaim, Smith must show that a reasonable jury could find that\\nhe engaged in a protected activity, that he suffered an adverse\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 9\\n\\nemployment action, and that the adverse action was moti-\\nvated by a protected activity. Lord v. High Voltage Software,\\nInc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). The Department con-\\ncedes that Smith engaged in protected activity and that the\\ntermination of his employment was an adverse employment\\naction. The only dispute is whether the Department termi-\\nnated Smith because he complained about racial discrimina-\\ntion. We agree with the district court that a reasonable jury\\ncould not find in Smith’s favor on this issue.\\n To raise an inference that he was fired because of his com-\\nplaints rather than because of his performance, Smith main-\\ntains that he was fired even though he was meeting the De-\\npartment’s legitimate expectations. See Vaughn v. Vilsack, 715\\nF.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2013). Yet as we recounted above,\\nSmith’s tenure at the Department was distinguished in all the\\nwrong ways. He received multiple ratings of “unsatisfactory”\\nin two different formal performance reviews. His failings as\\nan employee were chronicled in conversations and emails\\nfrom a number of different supervisors and coworkers, who\\nconsidered him unsafe, argumentative, and unable to follow\\ninstructions.\\n Smith does not dispute the Department’s long list of griev-\\nances against him. But he argues that the district court “cherry\\npicked” negative evidence about his employment record to\\ncreate a misleading narrative. He points out that in addition\\nto bad reviews, he also received some positive feedback from\\nsome of his supervisors at the Department. But a smattering\\nof decent reviews doesn’t overcome the overwhelming num-\\nber of documented problems—including serious safety is-\\nsues—that the Department had with Smith’s performance. See\\nAnderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2948\\n\\n1994) (“The mere submission of materials from a co-worker\\nor supervisor indicating that an employee’s performance is\\nsatisfactory … does not create a material issue of fact.”). Given\\nthe extensive evidence that Smith was not meeting his em-\\nployer’s legitimate expectations, a reasonable jury could not\\nfind that the Department fired him because of his protected\\nactivity rather than for his poor performance.\\n V.\\n Finally, we address Smith’s hostile work environment\\nclaim. A hostile work environment claim contains four ele-\\nments: (1) the employee was subject to unwelcome harass-\\nment; (2) the harassment was based on a reason forbidden by\\nTitle VII—here, race; (3) the harassment was so severe or per-\\nvasive that it altered the conditions of employment and cre-\\nated a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there\\nis a basis for employer liability. Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge\\nof the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 804 F.3d 826, 834 (7th Cir.\\n2015).\\n Smith’s case largely founders on the second prong, be-\\ncause the majority of the harassment he identifies was uncon-\\nnected to his race. Smith says that Valle, McGhee, and a\\ntrainer identified only as “Washington” created a hostile\\nwork environment by directing profanity at him. Valle con-\\nfronted him and used the f-word several times, in contexts\\nlike “shut the f[] up.” McGhee called Smith a “stupid dumb\\nmotherf[]” and told him he was going to “kick [his] ass.”\\nWashington used the f-word once. As the district court\\npointed out, however, Smith fails to connect any of these epi-\\nthets to his race. Smith himself acknowledged that Valle was\\n“equal opportunity” when it came to dishing out profanity.\\nMcGhee’s outburst was connected to a dangerous traffic\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 11\\n\\nsituation for which Smith was responsible. And Washington’s\\nlone use of the f-word is presented without any context at all.\\nWhile the epithets may have made for a crude or unpleasant\\nworkplace, “Title VII imposes no ‘general civility code.’”\\nVance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 452, (2013) (quoting On-\\ncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).\\nBecause Smith introduced no evidence that his supervisors\\nswore at him because he was black, the profanity that he de-\\nscribes does not establish a hostile work environment under\\nTitle VII.\\n Smith describes one incident, however, that plainly consti-\\ntutes race-based harassment: Colbert, one of his former super-\\nvisors, called Smith a “stupid ass ni[]” after finding out that\\nSmith had filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-\\nportunity office. The n-word is an egregious racial epithet.\\nNichols v. Mich. City Plant Planning Dep’t, 755 F.3d 594, 601 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (“[W]hile there is no ‘magic number of slurs’ that\\nindicates a hostile work environment, an ‘unambiguously ra-\\ncial epithet falls on the more severe end of the spectrum.’” (ci-\\ntation omitted)). That said, Smith can’t win simply by proving\\nthat the word was uttered. He must also demonstrate that\\nColbert’s use of this word altered the conditions of his em-\\nployment and created a hostile or abusive working environ-\\nment. Huri, 804 F.3d at 834. And he must make this showing\\n“from both a subjective and an objective point of view.” EEOC\\nv. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d 618, 625 (7th Cir. 2018). In\\nother words, he must show not only that a reasonable person\\nwould find the workplace hostile or abusive as a result of Col-\\nbert’s slur, but also that he himself perceived it that way. Fa-\\nragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).\\n\\f12 No. 18-2948\\n\\n We need not address the objective prong of the analysis,\\nbecause Smith falters on the subjective prong. He introduced\\nno evidence that Colbert’s use of the n-word changed his sub-\\njective experience of the workplace. To be sure, Smith testified\\nthat his time at the Department caused him psychological dis-\\ntress. But that was for reasons that predated his run-in with\\nColbert and had nothing to do with his race. His tenure at the\\nDepartment was rocky from the outset because of his poor\\ntrack record. He clashed with his supervisors over pay, and\\nthey confronted him with foul language. As early as August—\\nthe first month of his employment—he sent memoranda to\\nthe Department complaining of a “hostile work environ-\\nment.” On Smith’s own account, his supervisors made him\\nmiserable throughout his employment at the Department. But\\nas we have already discussed, he has no evidence that his su-\\npervisors were lashing out at him because he was black.\\n The first incident in which race played a part was his Jan-\\nuary 16th run-in with Colbert. By then, things were already at\\na breaking point. The Department had initiated termination\\nproceedings against Smith two weeks before, so he knew that\\nhe was about to be fired. And while things certainly could\\nhave gotten worse for Smith after the racially charged con-\\nfrontation with Colbert, he offers no evidence that they did.\\nInstead, Smith presents the confrontation as yet another in-\\nstance of the same ill treatment that he had been receiving all\\nalong.\\n That won’t do under Title VII. Because the statute does not\\ngive employees a remedy for workplace abuse unrelated to a\\nprotected characteristic, Smith needs to point to evidence—\\neven if in his own testimony—that he suffered harm from Col-\\nbert’s race-based harassment that was distinct from the\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 13\\n\\ndistress that non-race-based harassment was already causing\\nhim. Put differently, Smith has to be able to persuade a jury\\nthat Colbert’s race-based harassment was severe enough “to\\nalter the conditions of [his] employment.” Huri, 804 F.3d at 834\\n(emphasis added). Smith did not even try to make that show-\\ning—he points to no evidence that Colbert’s slur caused him\\neither additional or different distress. Without evidence that\\nColbert’s outburst changed Smith’s subjective experience\\nduring his last two weeks at the Department, a reasonable\\njury could not resolve the hostile work environment claim in\\nSmith’s favor.\\n ***\\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment to the De-\\npartment is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3891,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654606,"string":"4,654,606"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Marshon Simon"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2442"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2442\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMARSHON SIMON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 16-CR-20077 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Police officers pulled Marshon Si-\\nmon over for failing to signal sufficiently ahead of turning. A\\ndrug-sniffing dog alerted on Simon’s car so officers searched\\nit. They did not find drugs, but they found a gun. The govern-\\nment charged Simon with being a felon-in-possession. The\\ndistrict judge denied Simon’s motions for recusal, suppres-\\nsion, and supplementation. Simon entered a conditional\\nguilty plea and received a sentence of 15 years. He raises a\\n\\f2 No. 18-2442\\n\\nlitany of issues on appeal. He argues the judge should have\\nrecused himself because before he was a judge he supervised\\na prior prosecution of Simon. He argues the judge should\\nhave suppressed the gun because the officers lacked probable\\ncause to initiate the traffic stop and because they prolonged\\nthe stop to allow for the dog sniff. He argues the dog’s alert\\nwas false and the dog was unreliable because he was improp-\\nerly trained. He argues the judge should have allowed him to\\nsupplement the evidence after denial of suppression. Finally,\\nhe argues one of his prior felonies should not have counted as\\na predicate for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\nConcluding the judge committed no reversible error in deny-\\ning Simon’s motions, we affirm.\\n I. Facts\\n On the night of August 21, 2016, three police officers in a\\n“bike patrol unit” surveyed a particular section of Decatur, Il-\\nlinois. Officers Jason Danner and Jamie Hagemeyer rode bi-\\ncycles. They sat behind a propane tank 145 yards from the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets. Officer Robert\\nHoecker drove a squad car nearby.\\n The bicycle officers saw a vehicle driven by Marshon Si-\\nmon leave the 1100 block of North College Street (five blocks\\naway) and drive toward them. As Simon approached the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets, he failed to signal at\\nleast 100 feet before turning left from College onto Green. This\\nwas according to the bicyclists’ testimony at the suppression\\nhearing, which the district judge credited. At the bicyclists’ re-\\nquest, Hoecker pulled Simon over at 10:26 p.m.\\n Hoecker approached Simon’s car and made contact.\\nHoecker introduced himself and told Simon the basic reason\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 3\\n\\nfor the stop. Hoecker explained bicycle officers would arrive\\nand provide details. Simon questioned the basis for the stop.\\nSimon gave his driver’s license and proof of insurance to\\nHoecker. According to Hoecker, Simon was cooperative and\\npolite, behaved normally, and was no more nervous than the\\nnormal level of traffic-stop nervousness. Hoecker ran Simon\\nthrough the LEADS computer system and found he was val-\\nidly licensed and insured. Hoecker finished this check in less\\nthan 2 minutes, before Danner and Hagemeyer arrived on\\nscene at about 10:29 p.m.\\n Once Danner and Hagemeyer arrived they took over “pro-\\ncessing the ticket,” including some double-checking.\\nHoecker’s role was to assist. Hoecker told Danner that Simon\\nhad insurance and a valid license. Hoecker said he “didn’t\\nknow if [Danner] wanted the dog or not.” (Appellant Br. at 8,\\nquoting Hoecker’s dashcam video.) Danner asked if Simon\\nhad any criminal history. Hoecker then ran a criminal-history\\ncheck and found Simon had prior drug and weapon charges.\\n Danner made contact with Simon. Danner testified Simon\\nappeared abnormally nervous. Danner testified Simon asked\\nabout the violation and insisted he used his turn signal. Dan-\\nner testified, “I observed him to pull his hand away from his\\nlap, and he was shaking pretty good, indicating to me that he\\nappeared nervous.” But Danner did not note this in the police\\nreport and he did not mention this when discussing whether\\nto call a dog.\\n Hagemeyer testified that while speaking briefly with\\nHoecker he handed her Simon’s materials. She then went to\\nanother squad car that had arrived on scene “to begin the\\nwritten warning.” Both Danner and Hagemeyer testified\\nabout the various steps and processes a bike patrol unit\\n\\f4 No. 18-2442\\n\\ncompletes as part of the mission instigated by a traffic viola-\\ntion, including monitoring and securing the scene, making\\ncontacts with the driver, running computer checks, and writ-\\ning out the warning or ticket.\\n Danner decided to call a dog. He testified he decided to\\ncall a dog at about 22:30:38 (10:30:38 p.m.) on the clock of\\nHoecker’s dashcam, about 1 minute after Danner and Hage-\\nmeyer arrived at the traffic stop. An officer called for the ca-\\nnine unit less than 4 minutes into the stop, when the ticket\\nwas still being processed, according to the officers’ testimony.\\n Canine handler Snyder arrived with Rex at the scene at\\nabout 10:33 p.m. At that time, the traffic violation was still be-\\ning processed, according to the officers’ testimony.1 Within a\\n\\n 1 Here are excerpts on point from the bicycle patrol unit’s testimony:\\nQ: And when Officer Snyder arrived, was the traffic violation still being\\nprocessed?\\nHoecker: Yes.\\n(Tr. Continuation of Suppression Hr’g, July 12, 2017, DE 44 at 19:1–19:3.)\\n\\nQ: And do you recall approximately how long into the traffic stop it would\\nhave been that [Officer Snyder, with Rex] arrived?\\nDanner: I believe it was around six or seven minutes.\\nQ: And were you still processing the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: That’s correct.\\n(Id. at 50:19–50:24.)\\n\\nHagemeyer: From the time we arrived to the time Officer Snyder arrived\\nwas three or four minutes.\\nQ: So a very short period of time?\\nA: Very short period of time.\\nQ: Were you still working on the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: Yes.\\nQ: And still working on it diligently, correct?\\nA: [Nodding head up and down.]\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 5\\n\\nfew seconds of walking around Simon’s car, Rex alerted.\\nSnyder took less than 20 seconds to prepare Rex, begin the\\nsearch, and confirm the alert. The time period from the begin-\\nning of the stop to the alert was about 7 minutes. Hagemeyer\\ntestified she had no part in conducting the actual dog sniff.\\nShe testified she “was writing the warning.” She confirmed on\\ncross-examination that she filled out the traffic warning, and\\nthat Danner issued it to Simon. Defense counsel asked, “So\\nyou were the one who filled out the date, time, name, address,\\nand birth date?” Hagemeyer answered, “I filled out the ma-\\njority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”\\n After the alert, Simon became angry and insisted there\\nwere no drugs in his car. Danner asked Simon to step out of\\nhis car. The police searched it. They did not find drugs, but\\nthey found a gun. An officer drove Simon to the police station.\\nDanner handed Simon a traffic citation as he was released\\nfrom the station. Danner testified he filled out the citation.\\n II. Procedural posture\\n Since Simon was a felon, the government charged him\\nwith being a felon in possession of a firearm. The case was\\nassigned to Judge Bruce. Simon moved Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself because he had served as the First Assistant United\\nStates Attorney for the Central District of Illinois with super-\\nvisory authority over a prior case against Simon culminating\\nin conviction. Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion.\\n Simon moved to suppress the gun, arguing there was no\\nprobable cause to stop his car, the police impermissibly ex-\\ntended the stop to get a dog on scene, and the dog was unre-\\nliable and improperly trained. Judge Bruce held an\\n\\n(Id. at 87:24–88:7.)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2442\\n\\nevidentiary hearing over parts of three days and heard testi-\\nmony from seven witnesses. He found the officers credible,\\neven if at times confused. He found the officers had probable\\ncause to think Simon committed a traffic violation, the officers\\ndid not unreasonably prolong the stop, and Rex was a\\nproperly trained and certified canine whose alert can lead to\\nprobable cause. The judge denied the motion to suppress.\\n Simon moved to supplement the record with additional,\\nunrelated traffic citations issued by Danner (to show the dif-\\nferences in the officers’ handwriting to address the issue of\\nwhich officer wrote Simon’s citation) and a video made by a\\ndefense investigator (to contradict the officers’ version of\\nevents leading up to the traffic stop). The judge denied this\\nmotion.\\n Simon pleaded guilty conditioned on preserving his right\\nto appeal. He received an enhancement as an Armed Career\\nCriminal. The judge sentenced him to 15 years in prison, the\\nmandatory minimum.\\n Simon appeals the denials of his motions to recuse, sup-\\npress, and supplement. He also appeals his qualification as an\\nArmed Career Criminal, arguing his prior conviction for at-\\ntempted armed robbery in Illinois in 2000 did not qualify as a\\nviolent felony.\\n III. Analysis\\nA. Recusal\\n Simon seeks remand because he claims Judge Bruce’s han-\\ndling of this case conveys the appearance of impropriety. Si-\\nmon does not claim Judge Bruce actually had or acted on any\\nunfair bias against Simon.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 7\\n\\n Simon argues Judge Bruce should have recused himself\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): “Any justice, judge, or magistrate\\njudge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-\\nceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-\\ntioned.” Below, Simon also sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. §\\n455(b)(3), but he no longer presses that on appeal.\\n As the government agrees, we review a preserved § 455(a)\\nclaim de novo. Cf. Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (holding § 455(a) can be vindicated on appeal); United\\nStates v. Dorsey, 829 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (a preserved\\n§ 455(b) claim is reviewed de novo).\\n To win recusal under § 455(a), a party must show a rea-\\nsonable, well-informed observer might question the judge’s\\nimpartiality. United States v. Herrera-Valdez, 826 F.3d 912, 917\\n(7th Cir. 2016). In other words, the party must show an objec-\\ntive, disinterested observer fully informed of the reasons for\\nseeking recusal would “entertain a significant doubt that jus-\\ntice would be done in the case.” Id.\\n Simon sought recusal early in the case on the ground that\\nBruce served as First Assistant United States Attorney for the\\nCentral District of Illinois from 2010 through 2013. During\\nthat time, the government charged Simon with violating 21\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Bruce supervised the AUSA\\nassigned to that case. Simon pleaded guilty and was sen-\\ntenced in 2012 and again (after a successful appeal) in March\\n2013. This prior criminal case involved occurrence facts sepa-\\nrate from those in the present case. But the prior case is di-\\nrectly relevant to this case because the conviction in the prior\\ncase enhanced Simon’s sentence in this case as an Armed Ca-\\nreer Criminal.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion. He noted he could\\nnot remember any participation in past prosecutions of Si-\\nmon. Judge Bruce observed that even if he did participate in\\na past prosecution, he did not participate in the current pros-\\necution, “which consists of new charges, wholly unrelated to\\nthose brought against [Simon] in the past.” (Text Order, Dec.\\n6, 2016.)\\n Simon likens this case to United States v. Herrera-Valdez.\\nThere, the government prosecuted a defendant for illegal\\nreentry after deportation. Before trial on the illegal-reentry\\ncharge, defendant moved to disqualify Judge Der-Yeghiayan\\nbecause he had served as the District Counsel for the Immi-\\ngration and Naturalization Service when defendant was de-\\nported. District Counsel Der-Yeghiayan’s name was listed in\\nseveral places in INS’s briefing supporting deporting. Judge\\nDer-Yeghiayan denied the motion to disqualify and defend-\\nant appealed. We observed that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a\\njudge to “‘disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his\\nimpartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrera-Valdez,\\n826 F.3d at 917. We reversed the denial of disqualification,\\nconcluding “a reasonable, disinterested observer could as-\\nsume bias from the fact that the judge presiding over the de-\\nfendant’s prosecution for illegal reentry was the same person\\nwho ran the office that pursued, and succeeded in obtaining,\\nthe removal order that is the source of his current prosecu-\\ntion.” Id. at 919. We noted this was particularly true given that\\nthe linchpin of defendant’s case against the illegal-reentry\\ncharge was a collateral attack against the removal order. The\\njudge need not have been actually involved in the prior case\\nor be actually biased in the subsequent case to trigger the re-\\nquirement to recuse under § 455(a).\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 9\\n\\n But here, the prior case does not directly give rise to or un-\\nderly the present case. And here, Simon attempts no collateral\\nattack against the prior conviction. Simon’s 2011 conviction\\nwas not, and could not have been, the linchpin to his defense\\nin this subsequent case. A defendant in a federal sentencing\\nproceeding may not collaterally attack a prior conviction used\\nto enhance his sentence, with an exception not relevant here.\\nSee Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382–83 (2001); Custis\\nv. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). Any collateral attack\\nagainst the prior conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would\\nhave been time-barred. So there was no possibility of Judge\\nBruce adjudicating the merits of a collateral attack against Si-\\nmon’s 2011 conviction here. And consequently there was no\\nreason to think Simon might have declined to launch a collat-\\neral attack against the 2011 conviction because he feared\\nJudge Bruce would not be receptive to such an attack, or\\nwould punish him in the present case for making such an at-\\ntack.\\n The prior and subsequent cases at issue in Herrera-Valdez\\nare directly related in a way the prior and subsequent cases at\\nissue here are not. A closer analogy to Herrera-Valdez is Si-\\nmon’s prior conviction under the supervision of First AUSA\\nBruce and the proceedings for revocation of supervised re-\\nlease involving that prior conviction and the gun possession\\non August 21, 2016. Simon’s prior conviction directly gives\\nrise to and underlies the revocation proceedings. So Judge\\nBruce recused himself from them.2 As this relationship is not\\n\\n 2Simon asserts Judge Bruce recused himself from the revocation pro-\\nceedings (2:11-cr-20002). The government does not contest this assertion.\\nThe docket for that case neither confirms nor denies the recusal. We take\\nSimon’s word for it.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2442\\n\\npresent between Simon’s prior case and the current felon-in-\\npossession case, there was no need for Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself here.\\n True, the prior conviction enhanced the sentence for the\\npresent conviction under the ACCA. But this is mere happen-\\nstance. It is not the same kind of direct connection we found\\nproblematic in Herrera-Valdez. Another distinction between\\nHerrera-Valdez and this case is that there, the future judge’s\\nname was on the briefs against the defendant, but here the\\nfuture judge’s name was not on the briefs. This is a relevant\\nconsideration because it bears on public perception. We do\\nnot consider this to be a controlling factor by itself, but it is\\nrelevant.\\n Judge Bruce did not err in refusing to recuse.\\nB. Suppression\\n Simon raises a series of potential errors regarding the de-\\nnial of suppression. He argues there was no probable cause to\\nbelieve a traffic violation occurred, and therefore initiating the\\nstop was unconstitutional. He argues the officers unconstitu-\\ntionally prolonged the traffic stop. And he argues Rex’s alert\\nwas false and Rex was improperly trained. “We employ a\\nmixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing\\nthe district court’s factual determinations for clear error and\\nde novo its ultimate determination about whether the police\\nhad sufficient grounds to stop or search the individual.”\\nUnited States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n1. Initiating the stop\\n Simon argues the officers lacked probable cause to believe\\nhe committed a traffic violation, so they had no probable\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 11\\n\\ncause to stop him. If Simon were right, then the court should\\nhave suppressed the gun as fruit of the poisonous tree. The\\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches\\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a\\ncar, the stop must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasona-\\nbleness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663\\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,\\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States\\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n Simon goes so far as to assert he did not commit a traffic\\nviolation. He argues the government did not meet its burden\\nof proof to establish he actually committed a traffic violation.\\nBut the government had no such burden. Whether Simon\\ncommitted a traffic violation is irrelevant for Fourth Amend-\\nment purposes so long as the officers had probable cause to\\nthink he did. United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (“The officer is not the judge. Whether the driver actu-\\nally committed a traffic infraction is irrelevant for Fourth\\nAmendment purposes so long as there was an objective basis\\nfor a reasonable belief he did.”).\\n Generally, the decision to stop a car is reasonable, and\\ncomports with the Fourth Amendment, “where the police\\nhave probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has oc-\\ncurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Prob-\\nable cause exists when “the circumstances confronting a po-\\nlice officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has com-\\nmitted even a minor traffic offense.” United States v. Cashman,\\n216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). Probable cause is an objective\\nstandard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Lewis, 920\\nF.3d at 489. If an officer reasonably thinks he sees a driver\\ncommit a traffic infraction, that is a sufficient basis to pull him\\n\\f12 No. 18-2442\\n\\nover without violating the Constitution. United States v.\\nMuriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n Here, Simon acknowledges the probable cause determina-\\ntion depends entirely on the credibility of the two officers on\\nbicycles who testified they saw him turn without signaling at\\nleast 100 feet ahead. Simon levies many attacks on their cred-\\nibility, urging us to reverse under the clear error standard. Si-\\nmon admits the clear error standard is very demanding. Un-\\nder this standard, we only reverse when, after reviewing the\\nrecord as a whole, we have a “definite and firm conviction” a\\nmistake has been made. United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614,\\n621 (7th Cir. 2001). The district judge, after all, listened to the\\ntestimony directly and observed the demeanor of the wit-\\nnesses. United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nThe district judge is in a much better position to evaluate cred-\\nibility than we are. His credibility determinations are entitled\\nto special deference. We take Simon’s credibility attacks in\\nturn.\\ni. Phantom stop sign\\n First, Simon argues Hagemeyer swore at the suppression\\nhearing that there was a stop sign at the corner of College and\\nGreen, but she was demonstrably and indisputably wrong. Si-\\nmon argues this impugns her claim she saw the traffic viola-\\ntion.\\n The judge directly confronted Hagemeyer’s mistake. He\\nnoted Hagemeyer “was wrong about that detail.” (Order, DE\\n21 at 4.) The judge said he would take the mistake into account\\nin assessing Hagemeyer’s credibility. But the judge concluded\\nthe mistake does not weigh heavily against her credibility be-\\ncause the detail “is not greatly important regarding the traffic\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 13\\n\\noffense for which Defendant was pulled over” and because\\n“[i]t would not have factored in to [sic] determining whether\\nor not to issue Defendant a ticket for failing to signal his turn\\nwithin not less than 100 feet of the intersection.” (Id.) Hage-\\nmeyer’s determination at the scene that Simon failed to signal\\nat least 100 feet before the turn was not informed by the pres-\\nence or absence of a stop sign at the corner. In other words,\\nthere were other reasons independent of the presence or ab-\\nsence of a stop sign for Hagemeyer to think Simon failed to\\nsignal at least 100 feet ahead of turning. Indeed, the presence\\nor absence of a stop sign is irrelevant to estimating distances\\nor to the requirement to signal. The judge simply did not find\\nthis mistake about a stop sign to be very important. So the\\nmistake did not significantly undermine the reliability of\\nHagemeyer to perceive other facts that night. Moreover, her\\nmistake about the stop sign has no bearing on Danner’s testi-\\nmony that he saw Simon fail to signal sufficiently ahead of\\nturning.\\n And as for the possibilities Hagemeyer lied about the stop\\nsign, and this lie undermines her credibility about everything\\nelse, Simon does not go quite so far. In his opening appellate\\nbrief, he does not directly, unequivocally accuse Hagemeyer\\nof intentionally lying about the stop sign. And Simon offers\\nno explanation for why Hagemeyer would have had any rea-\\nson to lie about it. We see no clear error here.\\nii. Distances\\n Second, Simon argues Hagemeyer and Danner were\\nwrong about the distance between their location and the in-\\ntersection of College and Green. They both testified the dis-\\ntance was 75 yards. But the distance was actually 145 yards.\\nThe officers’ testimony was demonstrably and indisputably\\n\\f14 No. 18-2442\\n\\nwrong by a wide margin. Simon argues the officers’ ability to\\njudge distance was the key to their claim Simon committed a\\ntraffic violation. He argues their failure to estimate the dis-\\ntance between their location and the intersection correctly\\nmakes their claims about the distance between the location of\\nSimon’s car when he activated his turn signal and the inter-\\nsection wholly incredible.\\n Again, the judge directly confronted the mistaken testi-\\nmony. The judge decided the miscalculation was “of little im-\\nport when it comes to credibility.” (Order, DE 21 at 3.) The\\njudge reasoned that the fact that both officers estimated the\\ndistance at 75 yards does not indicate collusion because if they\\nwanted to connive it is much more likely they would have\\nused a number closer to the actual distance. They were too\\nwrong to be conspiring to lie.\\n And as for the argument that the officers’ mistake about\\nthis distance undermines the credibility of their estimate\\nabout Simon’s signaling distance, the officers had other, spe-\\ncific indicia of the signaling distance beyond a raw estimate\\nof the distance from A to B. The time between signaling and\\nturning, the car lengths between signaling and turning, and\\nthe lengths of the headlight beams bolstered the probable\\ncause to think Simon signaled too late and too close. The judge\\nconcluded the mistake about the distance between the bicy-\\nclists’ location and the intersection shows nothing more than\\nthat both bicyclists were wrong about that distance. We see no\\nclear error here.\\niii. Photographs\\n Third, Simon argues photographs introduced into evi-\\ndence show the unbelievability of the officers’ claims. Danner\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 15\\n\\nand Hagemeyer both testified they saw Simon’s car leave the\\n1100 block of North College, five blocks from their position.\\nBut, Simon argues, the photographs speak for themselves,\\nand there is no way someone could see the make, model, or\\ncolor of a vehicle at that distance.\\n The judge simply disagreed. He examined the photo-\\ngraphs and listened to the testimony and concluded “it is pos-\\nsible for an average person, with good vision who is used to\\nworking at night, such as Danner and Hagemeyer, to see a car,\\nin the dark, turn onto a street with its headlights on.” (Order,\\nDE 21 at 4.) We also examined the photographs and read the\\ntestimony, and we do not have anything close to a definite\\nand firm conviction the judge made a mistake in this regard.\\nSometimes a photograph is not worth a thousand words.\\niv. Ghost writer\\n Fourth, Simon argues the judge ignored the officers’ mis-\\nstatements about who prepared the traffic ticket. Hagemeyer\\ntestified “I was writing the warning.” She answered “yes” to\\nthe question: “[Y]ou said that you filled out the traffic warn-\\ning in this case?” When asked if she was the one who filled\\nout the date, time, name, address, and birth date, she testified\\nshe “filled out the majority of” the ticket herself, but she be-\\nlieved Danner signed it. But other evidence showed she filled\\nout none of it. Danner filled out both the traffic citation (later\\nvoided) and the warning (Simon received hours later).\\n Simon accuses the judge of tying himself “into a pretzel to\\navoid finding that the police officers could possibly have lied\\nor misrepresented facts … .” (Appellant Br. at 33.) But the\\njudge committed no such contortions. Rather, he addressed\\nthe discrepancies directly. He combed through the testimony\\n\\f16 No. 18-2442\\n\\nabout the various steps in the process leading to handing a\\ndriver a written ticket or warning. He noted there appeared\\nto be confusion and possibly contradiction between the offic-\\ners about who actually wrote the ticket. One source of confu-\\nsion seemed to be the word “processing.” The judge observed\\nHagemeyer, Snyder, and Hoecker all testified Hagemeyer be-\\ngan “processing” the ticket, but “processing” a ticket involves\\nmuch more than just physically writing the ticket. The judge\\nalso observed Hagemeyer’s testimony on this issue was more\\nspecific. She testified, “I was writing the warning.” When\\nasked, “So you were the one who filled out the date, time,\\nname, address, and birth date?” she responded, “I filled out\\nthe majority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”3\\n The judge compared the warning Simon received—pur-\\nportedly filled out by Hagemeyer and signed by Danner—to\\na different warning definitely filled out and signed by Hage-\\nmeyer on a different date. The judge concluded the handwrit-\\ning on the two warnings is different and they likely were not\\nfilled in by the same officer.\\n But the judge noted Simon did not show the exemplar\\nwarning to Danner or Hagemeyer during the hearing to cross-\\nexamine them on who wrote Simon’s warning. The judge also\\n\\n\\n 3 In his order denying suppression, the judge characterized Hage-\\nmeyer’s testimony on this point slightly incorrectly, and in favor of Si-\\nmon’s arguments. The judge wrote “Hagemeyer answered ‘yes’ to\\nwhether she filled in the name, date, etc., but she stated that Danner signed\\nit.” (Order, DE 21 at 10.) Actually (according to the transcript) she did not\\nsay “yes” in response to this question. She said, “I filled out the majority\\nof it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.” But even giving Simon the ben-\\nefit of this characterization, the judge still did not find a significant credi-\\nbility problem.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 17\\n\\nnoted the testimony indicated Danner or Hagemeyer would\\noften start writing a ticket the other would finish. The judge\\nobserved: “There are numerous possibilities as to why the dis-\\ncrepancy exists, and without the officers being given the\\nchance to explain the discrepancy, the court cannot impute\\nimproper conduct on their part.” (Order, DE 21 at 11.) The\\njudge considered the totality of the officers’ testimony, and\\ntheir demeanor and appearance. He concluded any discrep-\\nancy on this issue was due to mere confusion on the part of\\nthe officers, and not to fabrication. And he concluded the of-\\nficers were credible.\\n We see no clear error regarding the judge’s decisions on\\nany of these issues, nor regarding his decision to find the of-\\nficers credible. Given the two bicycle officers testified they\\nsaw Simon commit a traffic infraction, and given the judge be-\\nlieved them, we see no reason to reverse the decision that\\nprobable cause justified starting the stop.\\n2. Conducting the stop\\n Simon argues even if the officers did not violate the Con-\\nstitution by initiating the stop, they violated it by impermissi-\\nbly prolonging the stop. An officer who reasonably starts a\\ntraffic stop might violate the Constitution if he exceeds the\\nscope of the stop or unreasonably prolongs it. Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491. A traffic stop “‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged\\nbeyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mis-\\nsion’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez v. United States,\\n135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543\\nU.S. 405, 407 (2005)).\\n A dog sniff of a car’s exterior only for illegal drugs during\\na lawful stop for a traffic violation does not violate the Fourth\\n\\f18 No. 18-2442\\n\\nAmendment, even absent reasonable suspicion of drugs. Ca-\\nballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But a stop justified only by a traffic vio-\\nlation becomes unconstitutional if the officers prolong it be-\\nyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s\\noriginal mission. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. “An officer may\\nconduct certain unrelated checks—including a dog sniff—\\nduring a lawful traffic stop, but he may not do so in a way that\\nprolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily\\ndemanded to justify detaining an individual.” Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Simon concedes,\\n“calling a K-9 unit does not unlawfully extend a traffic stop as\\nlong as the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is on-\\ngoing.” (Appellant Br. at 36.)\\n Without independent reasonable suspicion to justify the\\nsniff, the critical question is not whether the dog sniffed be-\\nfore or after the officer issued the warning, “but whether con-\\nducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.”\\nLewis, 920 F.3d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nWith independent reasonable suspicion, however, the officer\\nmay constitutionally detain the suspect for the sniff even if it\\nadds time to the total stop. Id.\\n Here, the judge continued to credit the officers’ testimony.\\nBased on that testimony, the judge concluded the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff. The judge noted\\nthe time period from the beginning of the stop to the canine\\nalert was about 7 minutes, as Simon conceded. The judge de-\\ntermined the officers acted quickly. Hoecker made the stop,\\nexited his car, told Simon the reason for the stop, and gathered\\nhis information. The bicyclists arrived at the stop only a cou-\\nple minutes after Hoecker pulled Simon over. The bicyclists\\n“diligently began processing the ticket.” (Order, DE 21 at 15.)\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 19\\n\\nCrucially, the judge found no indication the officers engaged\\nin any activity other than securing the scene and processing\\nthe warning during the time between the bicyclists’ arrival\\nand Rex’s arrival. Specifically, the officers surveyed the scene,\\nDanner spoke with Simon, and Hagemeyer testified she went\\nto the squad car to begin processing the written warning. The\\nvideo indicated that about 2.5 minutes into the stop, Danner\\nwas speaking to Hoecker about the traffic violation. About 3\\nminutes into the stop, Danner left the squad car to speak with\\nSimon. Danner told Simon the reasons for the stop and gath-\\nered information. Hoecker returned to Simon’s car at about\\nthe 5-minute mark to speak with him about the traffic infrac-\\ntion. Less than 7 minutes into the stop, Rex arrived and very\\nquickly alerted. At that time, the bicycle officers were still pro-\\ncessing the ticket.\\n In sum, the judge concluded the officers were processing\\nthe ticket when Rex arrived and alerted, so they had not yet\\ncompleted the initial mission of the stop, and the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff.\\n Simon argues the police report and testimony contain the\\n“misrepresentation” Hagemeyer was writing the warning\\nwhile the officers waited for Rex because the officers knew\\ncalling a canine unit does not unlawfully extend a stop so long\\nas the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is ongoing.\\nSimon continues to challenge the credibility of the officers. He\\nargues that at no point did any officer on the scene begin ef-\\nfectuating the purpose of the stop by dutifully and diligently\\nfilling out a warning or ticket. He claims Danner filled out\\nboth the traffic citation and the warning Simon received hours\\nafter the stop. But again we see no reversible error in the\\njudge’s conclusions on this point.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Simon presses that even if the judge’s credibility determi-\\nnations here are correct, his ruling is still flawed. First, Simon\\nargues the judge improperly allowed a de minimis delay to be\\nconstitutional, even though any delay to allow a dog to sniff\\nis unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion.\\nWe disagree with Simon about what the judge did. He specif-\\nically found there was no improper delay. (Order, DE 21 at 14\\n(“the stop was not purposefully prolonged to allow for the ca-\\nnine unit’s arrival”).) True, the judge added in a footnote that\\neven if he found the ticket-writing process had not begun\\nwhen Rex arrived, still the sequence of events was so short\\nand condensed that the stop was not prolonged in any “mean-\\ningful” way. But we need not review this dictum.\\n Second, Simon argues that instead of effectuating the pur-\\npose of the traffic stop, the officers decided to run a criminal-\\nhistory check. Simon argues this was unrelated to the mission\\nof the stop and delayed processing the traffic violation. Simon\\ncites no supporting Seventh Circuit case. We said last year that\\nwhen police conduct a stop, “they are entitled to demand the\\ndriver’s identification, of course, and it is routine to check the\\ndriver’s record for active warrants, driving history, and crim-\\ninal history. Those checks are done for important reasons, in-\\ncluding officer safety.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d\\n577, 586 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Sanford, 806\\nF.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The trooper checked the occu-\\npants’ criminal histories on the computer in his car—a proce-\\ndure permissible even without reasonable suspicion … .”).\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments, but we see no rea-\\nson to reverse the judge’s conclusions that the officers were in\\nthe process of completing the traffic warning when Rex\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 21\\n\\narrived, and the officers did not improperly prolong the traffic\\nstop to allow the sniff to occur.\\n3. Bona Fido?\\n Simon argues even if the officers had probable cause to\\npull him over, and even if they did not prolong the traffic stop\\nto wait for Rex, still the judge should have suppressed the gun\\nbecause Rex’s alert was false, Rex was improperly trained,\\nand the alert did not provide probable cause to justify search-\\ning Simon’s car.\\n Probable cause to conduct a search is not among the high-\\nest standards. “A police officer has probable cause to conduct\\na search when the facts available to him would warrant a per-\\nson of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evi-\\ndence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050,\\n1055 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).\\nProbable cause is less than preponderance of the evidence. Id.\\n“All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which\\nreasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id.\\n(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Probable\\ncause is a practical, common-sense standard, involving the to-\\ntality of the circumstances. Id.\\n A dog’s alert on a car can give probable cause to search the\\nentire car. Indeed, a good dog’s alert can provide a rebuttable\\npresumption of probable cause to search:\\n If a bona fide organization has certified a dog\\n after testing his reliability in a controlled setting,\\n a court can presume (subject to any conflicting\\n evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides\\n probable cause to search. The same is true, even\\n in the absence of formal certification, if the dog\\n\\f22 No. 18-2442\\n\\n has recently and successfully completed a train-\\n ing program that evaluated his proficiency in lo-\\n cating drugs.\\nId. at 1057. The ultimate question is “whether all the facts sur-\\nrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common\\nsense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a\\nsearch would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A\\nsniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.” Id. at 1058.\\n Simon concedes Rex passed certification tests. But Simon\\nchallenges the alert itself and the adequacy of Rex’s training.\\n “First and foremost,” Simon argues Rex did not alert on\\nSimon’s car. (Appellant Br. at 42.) This perplexes. Simon cites\\nnothing to support this claim. The record belies it. Given the\\ncontext of this claim, Simon seems simply to mean the alert\\nwas false.4 It is true that following the alert the officers\\nsearched the car and found no evidence of drugs in it. But Si-\\nmon does not explain why that, in itself, matters here. Proba-\\nble cause is not a retrospective, outcome-based standard.\\n\\n 4 Defense expert Dr. Mary Cablk said in her report she could not de-\\ntermine if Rex alerted or what Rex alerted to. She confirmed this on cross-\\nexamination at the suppression hearing. During direct examination she\\nwatched videos from Hoecker’s and Snyder’s dashcams. She testified she\\ncould not see the alert, could not tell exactly where on the car the dog\\nalerted, and did not know whether the alert was barking or something\\nelse. But in her testimony she seems to accept Rex alerted. She character-\\nized it as a false alert because no drugs were found, and she criticized\\nSnyder for rewarding Rex for falsely alerting: “In this instance, there’s no\\ndrugs found; so he’s reinforcing the dog for false alerting here.” In any\\nevent, Snyder testified that Rex alerted and that Snyder confirmed the\\nalert. And the judge throughout his order accepted Rex alerted. He found\\nthe officers’ testimony, in its totality, credible. We see no reason to upend\\nthe determination Rex alerted.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 23\\n\\nBridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). If an officer\\nrandomly breaks into a house on only a wild hunch and stum-\\nbles into a meth lab, the discovery does not provide probable\\ncause for the search. And if 20 reliable informants tell an of-\\nficer a particular house contains a meth lab, so he stands in\\nthe street outside the house and sees through an open win-\\ndow the apparent apparatus and accoutrements of a meth lab,\\nso he obtains a warrant to search the house based on probable\\ncause to think it contains a meth lab, but he finds only an in-\\nnocent and intricate chemistry set, still probable cause sup-\\nported the warrant. So the mere absence of drugs in Simon’s\\ncar does not undermine the probable cause to search it for\\ndrugs, provided there was probable cause in the first place.\\n Simon’s other argument is the officers did not have prob-\\nable cause to search his vehicle in the first place because Rex\\nwas unreliable. This argument proceeds in two waves.\\n The first wave is quickly quelled. Simon argues Rex was\\nunreliable because he was not trained properly under Illinois\\nlaw, which requires police dogs be trained according to cer-\\ntain guidelines. Simon argues Detective Larner (the Macon\\nCounty canine-training director) admitted he did not always\\nfollow these guidelines. But we need not address what Illinois\\nlaw requires or whether Rex satisfies it because Illinois law\\ndoes not control the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore,\\n553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s mean-\\ning [does] not change with local law enforcement practices—\\neven practices set by rule.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.\\n35, 43 (1988) (“We have never intimated … that whether or not\\na search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment depends on the law of the particular State in\\nwhich the search occurs.”).\\n\\f24 No. 18-2442\\n\\n The second wave holds out longer, but ultimately suc-\\ncumbs. Simon argues, apart from Illinois law, if a dog is\\ntrained to alert when no evidence of criminal activity exists,\\nthis violates the Fourth Amendment. The problem, as Simon\\nsees it, is Rex was trained with scented cotton balls to alert to\\nresidual odors. But to search a car, there must be probable\\ncause to think it presently contains evidence of criminal activ-\\nity. So if Rex is trained to alert to mere residue even when no\\ndrugs are present, then his alert is not a reliable indicator\\ndrugs are present, and therefore his alert does not provide\\nprobable cause to justify a search.\\n The main problem with this argument is the Supreme\\nCourt already rejected its premise. In Florida v. Harris, a dog\\nnamed Aldo alerted on a truck. A subsequent search did not\\nreveal any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, but it did\\ndiscover meth ingredients. The defendant moved to suppress\\nthe ingredients on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given\\nprobable cause to search. The defendant “principally con-\\ntended” in the trial court that because the officer did not find\\nany of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, Aldo’s alerts\\nmust have been false. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058. But the Su-\\npreme Court patted Aldo on the head and called him a good\\nboy: “A well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to [resid-\\nual] odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but\\nin fact is not.” Id. at 1059; see also Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels,\\nInc., 600 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (Plaintiff’s “only de-\\nveloped legal theory is untenable. [His] premise—that an alert\\nby a drug-sniffing dog trained to detect residual odors does\\nnot establish probable cause to search—was rejected in Harris\\n… .”). If a well-trained dog, trained to alert even to residual\\nodors, alerts, there is generally a fair probability that drugs or\\nevidence of drugs will be found, absent contradictory factors.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 25\\n\\nAnd that is all the Fourth Amendment requires. If somehow\\na dog were trained to alert only to residual odors, then we\\nmight have a problem. But that is not this case.\\n Our review of the record and the order denying suppres-\\nsion satisfies us the judge conducted the proper Harris evalu-\\nation and committed no error in concluding Rex’s satisfactory\\ncertification and training provide sufficient reason to trust his\\nalert or in concluding Rex’s training on residual odors is ac-\\nceptable. The judge heard testimony from Simon’s expert Dr.\\nCablk challenging Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself, tes-\\ntimony from Officer Snyder supporting Rex’s qualifications\\nand the sniff itself, and testimony from Detective Larner sup-\\nporting Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself. The judge also\\nentertained arguments from both sides in the form of the mo-\\ntion to suppress, supporting memorandum, the government’s\\nresponse, and post-hearing briefs filed by both sides. The\\njudge considered the totality of the circumstances, addressed\\nHarris’s ultimate question, and found Rex’s sniff up to snuff.\\nC. Supplementation\\n After the judge denied the motion to suppress, Simon\\nmoved to supplement the record and for leave to seek recon-\\nsideration. He wanted to reopen the evidence to introduce\\nfurther, unrelated citations prepared by Danner in August\\n2016 “which further emphasize the differences in the officers’\\nhandwriting … .” (Mot. Supp., DE 23 at 4.) Simon also wanted\\nto introduce a video he5 took when he returned to the scene\\none night. The video shows a vehicle leaving the 1100 block\\nof College Street and approaching the intersection of College\\n\\n 5 The motion says Simon created the video. On appeal, Simon asserts\\nhis investigator took the video. This nuance is immaterial here.\\n\\f26 No. 18-2442\\n\\nand Green. The judge denied this motion. On appeal, Simon\\nonly presses the video. He does not mention the additional\\nhandwriting exemplars in his opening appellate brief. Simon\\nacknowledges we review the denial of supplementation for\\nabuse of discretion.\\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. He explained there\\nwas no reason Simon could not have taken a nighttime video\\nand presented it during the suppression hearing. The judge\\ndiscussed the danger of allowing supplementation here and\\nsetting a bad precedent leading to a never-ending cycle of par-\\nties waiting for rulings and then coming up with “new” evi-\\ndence to challenge them. Most importantly, the judge ex-\\nplained that even with the proposed evidence, his ruling\\nwould not change. The nighttime video would not capture the\\nactual visual capabilities of the officers, who credibly testified\\nabout how close Simon was to the intersection when he sig-\\nnaled. The judge reasoned a video of the scene taken months\\nlater, when conditions might differ, would not impact their\\ncredibility. Besides, the judge noted, the probable cause\\nstandard does not need evidence to support a conviction be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt. He did not abuse his discretion.\\nD. ACCA\\n Simon argues his prior conviction under Illinois law for\\nattempted armed robbery should not have counted as a pred-\\nicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He recog-\\nnizes our decisions foreclose his argument on this point, but\\nhe wants to preserve it for the Supreme Court.\\n IV. Conclusion\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments. Finding no reversi-\\nble error, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431859/\", \"author_raw\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654606/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Marshon Simon\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2442\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMARSHON SIMON,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 16-CR-20077 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Police officers pulled Marshon Si-\nmon over for failing to signal sufficiently ahead of turning. A\ndrug-sniffing dog alerted on Simon’s car so officers searched\nit. They did not find drugs, but they found a gun. The govern-\nment charged Simon with being a felon-in-possession. The\ndistrict judge denied Simon’s motions for recusal, suppres-\nsion, and supplementation. Simon entered a conditional\nguilty plea and received a sentence of 15 years. He raises a\n\f2 No. 18-2442\n\nlitany of issues on appeal. He argues the judge should have\nrecused himself because before he was a judge he supervised\na prior prosecution of Simon. He argues the judge should\nhave suppressed the gun because the officers lacked probable\ncause to initiate the traffic stop and because they prolonged\nthe stop to allow for the dog sniff. He argues the dog’s alert\nwas false and the dog was unreliable because he was improp-\nerly trained. He argues the judge should have allowed him to\nsupplement the evidence after denial of suppression. Finally,\nhe argues one of his prior felonies should not have counted as\na predicate for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.\nConcluding the judge committed no reversible error in deny-\ning Simon’s motions, we affirm.\n I. Facts\n On the night of August 21, 2016, three police officers in a\n“bike patrol unit” surveyed a particular section of Decatur, Il-\nlinois. Officers Jason Danner and Jamie Hagemeyer rode bi-\ncycles. They sat behind a propane tank 145 yards from the in-\ntersection of College and Green Streets. Officer Robert\nHoecker drove a squad car nearby.\n The bicycle officers saw a vehicle driven by Marshon Si-\nmon leave the 1100 block of North College Street (five blocks\naway) and drive toward them. As Simon approached the in-\ntersection of College and Green Streets, he failed to signal at\nleast 100 feet before turning left from College onto Green. This\nwas according to the bicyclists’ testimony at the suppression\nhearing, which the district judge credited. At the bicyclists’ re-\nquest, Hoecker pulled Simon over at 10:26 p.m.\n Hoecker approached Simon’s car and made contact.\nHoecker introduced himself and told Simon the basic reason\n\fNo. 18-2442 3\n\nfor the stop. Hoecker explained bicycle officers would arrive\nand provide details. Simon questioned the basis for the stop.\nSimon gave his driver’s license and proof of insurance to\nHoecker. According to Hoecker, Simon was cooperative and\npolite, behaved normally, and was no more nervous than the\nnormal level of traffic-stop nervousness. Hoecker ran Simon\nthrough the LEADS computer system and found he was val-\nidly licensed and insured. Hoecker finished this check in less\nthan 2 minutes, before Danner and Hagemeyer arrived on\nscene at about 10:29 p.m.\n Once Danner and Hagemeyer arrived they took over “pro-\ncessing the ticket,” including some double-checking.\nHoecker’s role was to assist. Hoecker told Danner that Simon\nhad insurance and a valid license. Hoecker said he “didn’t\nknow if [Danner] wanted the dog or not.” (Appellant Br. at 8,\nquoting Hoecker’s dashcam video.) Danner asked if Simon\nhad any criminal history. Hoecker then ran a criminal-history\ncheck and found Simon had prior drug and weapon charges.\n Danner made contact with Simon. Danner testified Simon\nappeared abnormally nervous. Danner testified Simon asked\nabout the violation and insisted he used his turn signal. Dan-\nner testified, “I observed him to pull his hand away from his\nlap, and he was shaking pretty good, indicating to me that he\nappeared nervous.” But Danner did not note this in the police\nreport and he did not mention this when discussing whether\nto call a dog.\n Hagemeyer testified that while speaking briefly with\nHoecker he handed her Simon’s materials. She then went to\nanother squad car that had arrived on scene “to begin the\nwritten warning.” Both Danner and Hagemeyer testified\nabout the various steps and processes a bike patrol unit\n\f4 No. 18-2442\n\ncompletes as part of the mission instigated by a traffic viola-\ntion, including monitoring and securing the scene, making\ncontacts with the driver, running computer checks, and writ-\ning out the warning or ticket.\n Danner decided to call a dog. He testified he decided to\ncall a dog at about 22:30:38 (10:30:38 p.m.) on the clock of\nHoecker’s dashcam, about 1 minute after Danner and Hage-\nmeyer arrived at the traffic stop. An officer called for the ca-\nnine unit less than 4 minutes into the stop, when the ticket\nwas still being processed, according to the officers’ testimony.\n Canine handler Snyder arrived with Rex at the scene at\nabout 10:33 p.m. At that time, the traffic violation was still be-\ning processed, according to the officers’ testimony.1 Within a\n\n 1 Here are excerpts on point from the bicycle patrol unit’s testimony:\nQ: And when Officer Snyder arrived, was the traffic violation still being\nprocessed?\nHoecker: Yes.\n(Tr. Continuation of Suppression Hr’g, July 12, 2017, DE 44 at 19:1–19:3.)\n\nQ: And do you recall approximately how long into the traffic stop it would\nhave been that [Officer Snyder, with Rex] arrived?\nDanner: I believe it was around six or seven minutes.\nQ: And were you still processing the traffic ticket at that time?\nA: That’s correct.\n(Id. at 50:19–50:24.)\n\nHagemeyer: From the time we arrived to the time Officer Snyder arrived\nwas three or four minutes.\nQ: So a very short period of time?\nA: Very short period of time.\nQ: Were you still working on the traffic ticket at that time?\nA: Yes.\nQ: And still working on it diligently, correct?\nA: [Nodding head up and down.]\n\fNo. 18-2442 5\n\nfew seconds of walking around Simon’s car, Rex alerted.\nSnyder took less than 20 seconds to prepare Rex, begin the\nsearch, and confirm the alert. The time period from the begin-\nning of the stop to the alert was about 7 minutes. Hagemeyer\ntestified she had no part in conducting the actual dog sniff.\nShe testified she “was writing the warning.” She confirmed on\ncross-examination that she filled out the traffic warning, and\nthat Danner issued it to Simon. Defense counsel asked, “So\nyou were the one who filled out the date, time, name, address,\nand birth date?” Hagemeyer answered, “I filled out the ma-\njority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”\n After the alert, Simon became angry and insisted there\nwere no drugs in his car. Danner asked Simon to step out of\nhis car. The police searched it. They did not find drugs, but\nthey found a gun. An officer drove Simon to the police station.\nDanner handed Simon a traffic citation as he was released\nfrom the station. Danner testified he filled out the citation.\n II. Procedural posture\n Since Simon was a felon, the government charged him\nwith being a felon in possession of a firearm. The case was\nassigned to Judge Bruce. Simon moved Judge Bruce to recuse\nhimself because he had served as the First Assistant United\nStates Attorney for the Central District of Illinois with super-\nvisory authority over a prior case against Simon culminating\nin conviction. Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion.\n Simon moved to suppress the gun, arguing there was no\nprobable cause to stop his car, the police impermissibly ex-\ntended the stop to get a dog on scene, and the dog was unre-\nliable and improperly trained. Judge Bruce held an\n\n(Id. at 87:24–88:7.)\n\f6 No. 18-2442\n\nevidentiary hearing over parts of three days and heard testi-\nmony from seven witnesses. He found the officers credible,\neven if at times confused. He found the officers had probable\ncause to think Simon committed a traffic violation, the officers\ndid not unreasonably prolong the stop, and Rex was a\nproperly trained and certified canine whose alert can lead to\nprobable cause. The judge denied the motion to suppress.\n Simon moved to supplement the record with additional,\nunrelated traffic citations issued by Danner (to show the dif-\nferences in the officers’ handwriting to address the issue of\nwhich officer wrote Simon’s citation) and a video made by a\ndefense investigator (to contradict the officers’ version of\nevents leading up to the traffic stop). The judge denied this\nmotion.\n Simon pleaded guilty conditioned on preserving his right\nto appeal. He received an enhancement as an Armed Career\nCriminal. The judge sentenced him to 15 years in prison, the\nmandatory minimum.\n Simon appeals the denials of his motions to recuse, sup-\npress, and supplement. He also appeals his qualification as an\nArmed Career Criminal, arguing his prior conviction for at-\ntempted armed robbery in Illinois in 2000 did not qualify as a\nviolent felony.\n III. Analysis\nA. Recusal\n Simon seeks remand because he claims Judge Bruce’s han-\ndling of this case conveys the appearance of impropriety. Si-\nmon does not claim Judge Bruce actually had or acted on any\nunfair bias against Simon.\n\fNo. 18-2442 7\n\n Simon argues Judge Bruce should have recused himself\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): “Any justice, judge, or magistrate\njudge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-\nceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-\ntioned.” Below, Simon also sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. §\n455(b)(3), but he no longer presses that on appeal.\n As the government agrees, we review a preserved § 455(a)\nclaim de novo. Cf. Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir.\n2016) (holding § 455(a) can be vindicated on appeal); United\nStates v. Dorsey, 829 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (a preserved\n§ 455(b) claim is reviewed de novo).\n To win recusal under § 455(a), a party must show a rea-\nsonable, well-informed observer might question the judge’s\nimpartiality. United States v. Herrera-Valdez, 826 F.3d 912, 917\n(7th Cir. 2016). In other words, the party must show an objec-\ntive, disinterested observer fully informed of the reasons for\nseeking recusal would “entertain a significant doubt that jus-\ntice would be done in the case.” Id.\n Simon sought recusal early in the case on the ground that\nBruce served as First Assistant United States Attorney for the\nCentral District of Illinois from 2010 through 2013. During\nthat time, the government charged Simon with violating 21\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Bruce supervised the AUSA\nassigned to that case. Simon pleaded guilty and was sen-\ntenced in 2012 and again (after a successful appeal) in March\n2013. This prior criminal case involved occurrence facts sepa-\nrate from those in the present case. But the prior case is di-\nrectly relevant to this case because the conviction in the prior\ncase enhanced Simon’s sentence in this case as an Armed Ca-\nreer Criminal.\n\f8 No. 18-2442\n\n Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion. He noted he could\nnot remember any participation in past prosecutions of Si-\nmon. Judge Bruce observed that even if he did participate in\na past prosecution, he did not participate in the current pros-\necution, “which consists of new charges, wholly unrelated to\nthose brought against [Simon] in the past.” (Text Order, Dec.\n6, 2016.)\n Simon likens this case to United States v. Herrera-Valdez.\nThere, the government prosecuted a defendant for illegal\nreentry after deportation. Before trial on the illegal-reentry\ncharge, defendant moved to disqualify Judge Der-Yeghiayan\nbecause he had served as the District Counsel for the Immi-\ngration and Naturalization Service when defendant was de-\nported. District Counsel Der-Yeghiayan’s name was listed in\nseveral places in INS’s briefing supporting deporting. Judge\nDer-Yeghiayan denied the motion to disqualify and defend-\nant appealed. We observed that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a\njudge to “‘disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his\nimpartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrera-Valdez,\n826 F.3d at 917. We reversed the denial of disqualification,\nconcluding “a reasonable, disinterested observer could as-\nsume bias from the fact that the judge presiding over the de-\nfendant’s prosecution for illegal reentry was the same person\nwho ran the office that pursued, and succeeded in obtaining,\nthe removal order that is the source of his current prosecu-\ntion.” Id. at 919. We noted this was particularly true given that\nthe linchpin of defendant’s case against the illegal-reentry\ncharge was a collateral attack against the removal order. The\njudge need not have been actually involved in the prior case\nor be actually biased in the subsequent case to trigger the re-\nquirement to recuse under § 455(a).\n\fNo. 18-2442 9\n\n But here, the prior case does not directly give rise to or un-\nderly the present case. And here, Simon attempts no collateral\nattack against the prior conviction. Simon’s 2011 conviction\nwas not, and could not have been, the linchpin to his defense\nin this subsequent case. A defendant in a federal sentencing\nproceeding may not collaterally attack a prior conviction used\nto enhance his sentence, with an exception not relevant here.\nSee Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382–83 (2001); Custis\nv. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). Any collateral attack\nagainst the prior conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would\nhave been time-barred. So there was no possibility of Judge\nBruce adjudicating the merits of a collateral attack against Si-\nmon’s 2011 conviction here. And consequently there was no\nreason to think Simon might have declined to launch a collat-\neral attack against the 2011 conviction because he feared\nJudge Bruce would not be receptive to such an attack, or\nwould punish him in the present case for making such an at-\ntack.\n The prior and subsequent cases at issue in Herrera-Valdez\nare directly related in a way the prior and subsequent cases at\nissue here are not. A closer analogy to Herrera-Valdez is Si-\nmon’s prior conviction under the supervision of First AUSA\nBruce and the proceedings for revocation of supervised re-\nlease involving that prior conviction and the gun possession\non August 21, 2016. Simon’s prior conviction directly gives\nrise to and underlies the revocation proceedings. So Judge\nBruce recused himself from them.2 As this relationship is not\n\n 2Simon asserts Judge Bruce recused himself from the revocation pro-\nceedings (2:11-cr-20002). The government does not contest this assertion.\nThe docket for that case neither confirms nor denies the recusal. We take\nSimon’s word for it.\n\f10 No. 18-2442\n\npresent between Simon’s prior case and the current felon-in-\npossession case, there was no need for Judge Bruce to recuse\nhimself here.\n True, the prior conviction enhanced the sentence for the\npresent conviction under the ACCA. But this is mere happen-\nstance. It is not the same kind of direct connection we found\nproblematic in Herrera-Valdez. Another distinction between\nHerrera-Valdez and this case is that there, the future judge’s\nname was on the briefs against the defendant, but here the\nfuture judge’s name was not on the briefs. This is a relevant\nconsideration because it bears on public perception. We do\nnot consider this to be a controlling factor by itself, but it is\nrelevant.\n Judge Bruce did not err in refusing to recuse.\nB. Suppression\n Simon raises a series of potential errors regarding the de-\nnial of suppression. He argues there was no probable cause to\nbelieve a traffic violation occurred, and therefore initiating the\nstop was unconstitutional. He argues the officers unconstitu-\ntionally prolonged the traffic stop. And he argues Rex’s alert\nwas false and Rex was improperly trained. “We employ a\nmixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing\nthe district court’s factual determinations for clear error and\nde novo its ultimate determination about whether the police\nhad sufficient grounds to stop or search the individual.”\nUnited States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir.\n2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).\n1. Initiating the stop\n Simon argues the officers lacked probable cause to believe\nhe committed a traffic violation, so they had no probable\n\fNo. 18-2442 11\n\ncause to stop him. If Simon were right, then the court should\nhave suppressed the gun as fruit of the poisonous tree. The\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a\ncar, the stop must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasona-\nbleness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015).\n Simon goes so far as to assert he did not commit a traffic\nviolation. He argues the government did not meet its burden\nof proof to establish he actually committed a traffic violation.\nBut the government had no such burden. Whether Simon\ncommitted a traffic violation is irrelevant for Fourth Amend-\nment purposes so long as the officers had probable cause to\nthink he did. United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir.\n2019) (“The officer is not the judge. Whether the driver actu-\nally committed a traffic infraction is irrelevant for Fourth\nAmendment purposes so long as there was an objective basis\nfor a reasonable belief he did.”).\n Generally, the decision to stop a car is reasonable, and\ncomports with the Fourth Amendment, “where the police\nhave probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has oc-\ncurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Prob-\nable cause exists when “the circumstances confronting a po-\nlice officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has com-\nmitted even a minor traffic offense.” United States v. Cashman,\n216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). Probable cause is an objective\nstandard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Lewis, 920\nF.3d at 489. If an officer reasonably thinks he sees a driver\ncommit a traffic infraction, that is a sufficient basis to pull him\n\f12 No. 18-2442\n\nover without violating the Constitution. United States v.\nMuriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005).\n Here, Simon acknowledges the probable cause determina-\ntion depends entirely on the credibility of the two officers on\nbicycles who testified they saw him turn without signaling at\nleast 100 feet ahead. Simon levies many attacks on their cred-\nibility, urging us to reverse under the clear error standard. Si-\nmon admits the clear error standard is very demanding. Un-\nder this standard, we only reverse when, after reviewing the\nrecord as a whole, we have a “definite and firm conviction” a\nmistake has been made. United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614,\n621 (7th Cir. 2001). The district judge, after all, listened to the\ntestimony directly and observed the demeanor of the wit-\nnesses. United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2014).\nThe district judge is in a much better position to evaluate cred-\nibility than we are. His credibility determinations are entitled\nto special deference. We take Simon’s credibility attacks in\nturn.\ni. Phantom stop sign\n First, Simon argues Hagemeyer swore at the suppression\nhearing that there was a stop sign at the corner of College and\nGreen, but she was demonstrably and indisputably wrong. Si-\nmon argues this impugns her claim she saw the traffic viola-\ntion.\n The judge directly confronted Hagemeyer’s mistake. He\nnoted Hagemeyer “was wrong about that detail.” (Order, DE\n21 at 4.) The judge said he would take the mistake into account\nin assessing Hagemeyer’s credibility. But the judge concluded\nthe mistake does not weigh heavily against her credibility be-\ncause the detail “is not greatly important regarding the traffic\n\fNo. 18-2442 13\n\noffense for which Defendant was pulled over” and because\n“[i]t would not have factored in to [sic] determining whether\nor not to issue Defendant a ticket for failing to signal his turn\nwithin not less than 100 feet of the intersection.” (Id.) Hage-\nmeyer’s determination at the scene that Simon failed to signal\nat least 100 feet before the turn was not informed by the pres-\nence or absence of a stop sign at the corner. In other words,\nthere were other reasons independent of the presence or ab-\nsence of a stop sign for Hagemeyer to think Simon failed to\nsignal at least 100 feet ahead of turning. Indeed, the presence\nor absence of a stop sign is irrelevant to estimating distances\nor to the requirement to signal. The judge simply did not find\nthis mistake about a stop sign to be very important. So the\nmistake did not significantly undermine the reliability of\nHagemeyer to perceive other facts that night. Moreover, her\nmistake about the stop sign has no bearing on Danner’s testi-\nmony that he saw Simon fail to signal sufficiently ahead of\nturning.\n And as for the possibilities Hagemeyer lied about the stop\nsign, and this lie undermines her credibility about everything\nelse, Simon does not go quite so far. In his opening appellate\nbrief, he does not directly, unequivocally accuse Hagemeyer\nof intentionally lying about the stop sign. And Simon offers\nno explanation for why Hagemeyer would have had any rea-\nson to lie about it. We see no clear error here.\nii. Distances\n Second, Simon argues Hagemeyer and Danner were\nwrong about the distance between their location and the in-\ntersection of College and Green. They both testified the dis-\ntance was 75 yards. But the distance was actually 145 yards.\nThe officers’ testimony was demonstrably and indisputably\n\f14 No. 18-2442\n\nwrong by a wide margin. Simon argues the officers’ ability to\njudge distance was the key to their claim Simon committed a\ntraffic violation. He argues their failure to estimate the dis-\ntance between their location and the intersection correctly\nmakes their claims about the distance between the location of\nSimon’s car when he activated his turn signal and the inter-\nsection wholly incredible.\n Again, the judge directly confronted the mistaken testi-\nmony. The judge decided the miscalculation was “of little im-\nport when it comes to credibility.” (Order, DE 21 at 3.) The\njudge reasoned that the fact that both officers estimated the\ndistance at 75 yards does not indicate collusion because if they\nwanted to connive it is much more likely they would have\nused a number closer to the actual distance. They were too\nwrong to be conspiring to lie.\n And as for the argument that the officers’ mistake about\nthis distance undermines the credibility of their estimate\nabout Simon’s signaling distance, the officers had other, spe-\ncific indicia of the signaling distance beyond a raw estimate\nof the distance from A to B. The time between signaling and\nturning, the car lengths between signaling and turning, and\nthe lengths of the headlight beams bolstered the probable\ncause to think Simon signaled too late and too close. The judge\nconcluded the mistake about the distance between the bicy-\nclists’ location and the intersection shows nothing more than\nthat both bicyclists were wrong about that distance. We see no\nclear error here.\niii. Photographs\n Third, Simon argues photographs introduced into evi-\ndence show the unbelievability of the officers’ claims. Danner\n\fNo. 18-2442 15\n\nand Hagemeyer both testified they saw Simon’s car leave the\n1100 block of North College, five blocks from their position.\nBut, Simon argues, the photographs speak for themselves,\nand there is no way someone could see the make, model, or\ncolor of a vehicle at that distance.\n The judge simply disagreed. He examined the photo-\ngraphs and listened to the testimony and concluded “it is pos-\nsible for an average person, with good vision who is used to\nworking at night, such as Danner and Hagemeyer, to see a car,\nin the dark, turn onto a street with its headlights on.” (Order,\nDE 21 at 4.) We also examined the photographs and read the\ntestimony, and we do not have anything close to a definite\nand firm conviction the judge made a mistake in this regard.\nSometimes a photograph is not worth a thousand words.\niv. Ghost writer\n Fourth, Simon argues the judge ignored the officers’ mis-\nstatements about who prepared the traffic ticket. Hagemeyer\ntestified “I was writing the warning.” She answered “yes” to\nthe question: “[Y]ou said that you filled out the traffic warn-\ning in this case?” When asked if she was the one who filled\nout the date, time, name, address, and birth date, she testified\nshe “filled out the majority of” the ticket herself, but she be-\nlieved Danner signed it. But other evidence showed she filled\nout none of it. Danner filled out both the traffic citation (later\nvoided) and the warning (Simon received hours later).\n Simon accuses the judge of tying himself “into a pretzel to\navoid finding that the police officers could possibly have lied\nor misrepresented facts … .” (Appellant Br. at 33.) But the\njudge committed no such contortions. Rather, he addressed\nthe discrepancies directly. He combed through the testimony\n\f16 No. 18-2442\n\nabout the various steps in the process leading to handing a\ndriver a written ticket or warning. He noted there appeared\nto be confusion and possibly contradiction between the offic-\ners about who actually wrote the ticket. One source of confu-\nsion seemed to be the word “processing.” The judge observed\nHagemeyer, Snyder, and Hoecker all testified Hagemeyer be-\ngan “processing” the ticket, but “processing” a ticket involves\nmuch more than just physically writing the ticket. The judge\nalso observed Hagemeyer’s testimony on this issue was more\nspecific. She testified, “I was writing the warning.” When\nasked, “So you were the one who filled out the date, time,\nname, address, and birth date?” she responded, “I filled out\nthe majority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”3\n The judge compared the warning Simon received—pur-\nportedly filled out by Hagemeyer and signed by Danner—to\na different warning definitely filled out and signed by Hage-\nmeyer on a different date. The judge concluded the handwrit-\ning on the two warnings is different and they likely were not\nfilled in by the same officer.\n But the judge noted Simon did not show the exemplar\nwarning to Danner or Hagemeyer during the hearing to cross-\nexamine them on who wrote Simon’s warning. The judge also\n\n\n 3 In his order denying suppression, the judge characterized Hage-\nmeyer’s testimony on this point slightly incorrectly, and in favor of Si-\nmon’s arguments. The judge wrote “Hagemeyer answered ‘yes’ to\nwhether she filled in the name, date, etc., but she stated that Danner signed\nit.” (Order, DE 21 at 10.) Actually (according to the transcript) she did not\nsay “yes” in response to this question. She said, “I filled out the majority\nof it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.” But even giving Simon the ben-\nefit of this characterization, the judge still did not find a significant credi-\nbility problem.\n\fNo. 18-2442 17\n\nnoted the testimony indicated Danner or Hagemeyer would\noften start writing a ticket the other would finish. The judge\nobserved: “There are numerous possibilities as to why the dis-\ncrepancy exists, and without the officers being given the\nchance to explain the discrepancy, the court cannot impute\nimproper conduct on their part.” (Order, DE 21 at 11.) The\njudge considered the totality of the officers’ testimony, and\ntheir demeanor and appearance. He concluded any discrep-\nancy on this issue was due to mere confusion on the part of\nthe officers, and not to fabrication. And he concluded the of-\nficers were credible.\n We see no clear error regarding the judge’s decisions on\nany of these issues, nor regarding his decision to find the of-\nficers credible. Given the two bicycle officers testified they\nsaw Simon commit a traffic infraction, and given the judge be-\nlieved them, we see no reason to reverse the decision that\nprobable cause justified starting the stop.\n2. Conducting the stop\n Simon argues even if the officers did not violate the Con-\nstitution by initiating the stop, they violated it by impermissi-\nbly prolonging the stop. An officer who reasonably starts a\ntraffic stop might violate the Constitution if he exceeds the\nscope of the stop or unreasonably prolongs it. Lewis, 920 F.3d\nat 491. A traffic stop “‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged\nbeyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mis-\nsion’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez v. United States,\n135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543\nU.S. 405, 407 (2005)).\n A dog sniff of a car’s exterior only for illegal drugs during\na lawful stop for a traffic violation does not violate the Fourth\n\f18 No. 18-2442\n\nAmendment, even absent reasonable suspicion of drugs. Ca-\nballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But a stop justified only by a traffic vio-\nlation becomes unconstitutional if the officers prolong it be-\nyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s\noriginal mission. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. “An officer may\nconduct certain unrelated checks—including a dog sniff—\nduring a lawful traffic stop, but he may not do so in a way that\nprolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily\ndemanded to justify detaining an individual.” Lewis, 920 F.3d\nat 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Simon concedes,\n“calling a K-9 unit does not unlawfully extend a traffic stop as\nlong as the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is on-\ngoing.” (Appellant Br. at 36.)\n Without independent reasonable suspicion to justify the\nsniff, the critical question is not whether the dog sniffed be-\nfore or after the officer issued the warning, “but whether con-\nducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.”\nLewis, 920 F.3d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nWith independent reasonable suspicion, however, the officer\nmay constitutionally detain the suspect for the sniff even if it\nadds time to the total stop. Id.\n Here, the judge continued to credit the officers’ testimony.\nBased on that testimony, the judge concluded the stop was not\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff. The judge noted\nthe time period from the beginning of the stop to the canine\nalert was about 7 minutes, as Simon conceded. The judge de-\ntermined the officers acted quickly. Hoecker made the stop,\nexited his car, told Simon the reason for the stop, and gathered\nhis information. The bicyclists arrived at the stop only a cou-\nple minutes after Hoecker pulled Simon over. The bicyclists\n“diligently began processing the ticket.” (Order, DE 21 at 15.)\n\fNo. 18-2442 19\n\nCrucially, the judge found no indication the officers engaged\nin any activity other than securing the scene and processing\nthe warning during the time between the bicyclists’ arrival\nand Rex’s arrival. Specifically, the officers surveyed the scene,\nDanner spoke with Simon, and Hagemeyer testified she went\nto the squad car to begin processing the written warning. The\nvideo indicated that about 2.5 minutes into the stop, Danner\nwas speaking to Hoecker about the traffic violation. About 3\nminutes into the stop, Danner left the squad car to speak with\nSimon. Danner told Simon the reasons for the stop and gath-\nered information. Hoecker returned to Simon’s car at about\nthe 5-minute mark to speak with him about the traffic infrac-\ntion. Less than 7 minutes into the stop, Rex arrived and very\nquickly alerted. At that time, the bicycle officers were still pro-\ncessing the ticket.\n In sum, the judge concluded the officers were processing\nthe ticket when Rex arrived and alerted, so they had not yet\ncompleted the initial mission of the stop, and the stop was not\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff.\n Simon argues the police report and testimony contain the\n“misrepresentation” Hagemeyer was writing the warning\nwhile the officers waited for Rex because the officers knew\ncalling a canine unit does not unlawfully extend a stop so long\nas the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is ongoing.\nSimon continues to challenge the credibility of the officers. He\nargues that at no point did any officer on the scene begin ef-\nfectuating the purpose of the stop by dutifully and diligently\nfilling out a warning or ticket. He claims Danner filled out\nboth the traffic citation and the warning Simon received hours\nafter the stop. But again we see no reversible error in the\njudge’s conclusions on this point.\n\f20 No. 18-2442\n\n Simon presses that even if the judge’s credibility determi-\nnations here are correct, his ruling is still flawed. First, Simon\nargues the judge improperly allowed a de minimis delay to be\nconstitutional, even though any delay to allow a dog to sniff\nis unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion.\nWe disagree with Simon about what the judge did. He specif-\nically found there was no improper delay. (Order, DE 21 at 14\n(“the stop was not purposefully prolonged to allow for the ca-\nnine unit’s arrival”).) True, the judge added in a footnote that\neven if he found the ticket-writing process had not begun\nwhen Rex arrived, still the sequence of events was so short\nand condensed that the stop was not prolonged in any “mean-\ningful” way. But we need not review this dictum.\n Second, Simon argues that instead of effectuating the pur-\npose of the traffic stop, the officers decided to run a criminal-\nhistory check. Simon argues this was unrelated to the mission\nof the stop and delayed processing the traffic violation. Simon\ncites no supporting Seventh Circuit case. We said last year that\nwhen police conduct a stop, “they are entitled to demand the\ndriver’s identification, of course, and it is routine to check the\ndriver’s record for active warrants, driving history, and crim-\ninal history. Those checks are done for important reasons, in-\ncluding officer safety.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d\n577, 586 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Sanford, 806\nF.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The trooper checked the occu-\npants’ criminal histories on the computer in his car—a proce-\ndure permissible even without reasonable suspicion … .”).\n We considered all Simon’s arguments, but we see no rea-\nson to reverse the judge’s conclusions that the officers were in\nthe process of completing the traffic warning when Rex\n\fNo. 18-2442 21\n\narrived, and the officers did not improperly prolong the traffic\nstop to allow the sniff to occur.\n3. Bona Fido?\n Simon argues even if the officers had probable cause to\npull him over, and even if they did not prolong the traffic stop\nto wait for Rex, still the judge should have suppressed the gun\nbecause Rex’s alert was false, Rex was improperly trained,\nand the alert did not provide probable cause to justify search-\ning Simon’s car.\n Probable cause to conduct a search is not among the high-\nest standards. “A police officer has probable cause to conduct\na search when the facts available to him would warrant a per-\nson of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evi-\ndence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050,\n1055 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).\nProbable cause is less than preponderance of the evidence. Id.\n“All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which\nreasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id.\n(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Probable\ncause is a practical, common-sense standard, involving the to-\ntality of the circumstances. Id.\n A dog’s alert on a car can give probable cause to search the\nentire car. Indeed, a good dog’s alert can provide a rebuttable\npresumption of probable cause to search:\n If a bona fide organization has certified a dog\n after testing his reliability in a controlled setting,\n a court can presume (subject to any conflicting\n evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides\n probable cause to search. The same is true, even\n in the absence of formal certification, if the dog\n\f22 No. 18-2442\n\n has recently and successfully completed a train-\n ing program that evaluated his proficiency in lo-\n cating drugs.\nId. at 1057. The ultimate question is “whether all the facts sur-\nrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common\nsense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a\nsearch would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A\nsniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.” Id. at 1058.\n Simon concedes Rex passed certification tests. But Simon\nchallenges the alert itself and the adequacy of Rex’s training.\n “First and foremost,” Simon argues Rex did not alert on\nSimon’s car. (Appellant Br. at 42.) This perplexes. Simon cites\nnothing to support this claim. The record belies it. Given the\ncontext of this claim, Simon seems simply to mean the alert\nwas false.4 It is true that following the alert the officers\nsearched the car and found no evidence of drugs in it. But Si-\nmon does not explain why that, in itself, matters here. Proba-\nble cause is not a retrospective, outcome-based standard.\n\n 4 Defense expert Dr. Mary Cablk said in her report she could not de-\ntermine if Rex alerted or what Rex alerted to. She confirmed this on cross-\nexamination at the suppression hearing. During direct examination she\nwatched videos from Hoecker’s and Snyder’s dashcams. She testified she\ncould not see the alert, could not tell exactly where on the car the dog\nalerted, and did not know whether the alert was barking or something\nelse. But in her testimony she seems to accept Rex alerted. She character-\nized it as a false alert because no drugs were found, and she criticized\nSnyder for rewarding Rex for falsely alerting: “In this instance, there’s no\ndrugs found; so he’s reinforcing the dog for false alerting here.” In any\nevent, Snyder testified that Rex alerted and that Snyder confirmed the\nalert. And the judge throughout his order accepted Rex alerted. He found\nthe officers’ testimony, in its totality, credible. We see no reason to upend\nthe determination Rex alerted.\n\fNo. 18-2442 23\n\nBridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). If an officer\nrandomly breaks into a house on only a wild hunch and stum-\nbles into a meth lab, the discovery does not provide probable\ncause for the search. And if 20 reliable informants tell an of-\nficer a particular house contains a meth lab, so he stands in\nthe street outside the house and sees through an open win-\ndow the apparent apparatus and accoutrements of a meth lab,\nso he obtains a warrant to search the house based on probable\ncause to think it contains a meth lab, but he finds only an in-\nnocent and intricate chemistry set, still probable cause sup-\nported the warrant. So the mere absence of drugs in Simon’s\ncar does not undermine the probable cause to search it for\ndrugs, provided there was probable cause in the first place.\n Simon’s other argument is the officers did not have prob-\nable cause to search his vehicle in the first place because Rex\nwas unreliable. This argument proceeds in two waves.\n The first wave is quickly quelled. Simon argues Rex was\nunreliable because he was not trained properly under Illinois\nlaw, which requires police dogs be trained according to cer-\ntain guidelines. Simon argues Detective Larner (the Macon\nCounty canine-training director) admitted he did not always\nfollow these guidelines. But we need not address what Illinois\nlaw requires or whether Rex satisfies it because Illinois law\ndoes not control the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore,\n553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s mean-\ning [does] not change with local law enforcement practices—\neven practices set by rule.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.\n35, 43 (1988) (“We have never intimated … that whether or not\na search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth\nAmendment depends on the law of the particular State in\nwhich the search occurs.”).\n\f24 No. 18-2442\n\n The second wave holds out longer, but ultimately suc-\ncumbs. Simon argues, apart from Illinois law, if a dog is\ntrained to alert when no evidence of criminal activity exists,\nthis violates the Fourth Amendment. The problem, as Simon\nsees it, is Rex was trained with scented cotton balls to alert to\nresidual odors. But to search a car, there must be probable\ncause to think it presently contains evidence of criminal activ-\nity. So if Rex is trained to alert to mere residue even when no\ndrugs are present, then his alert is not a reliable indicator\ndrugs are present, and therefore his alert does not provide\nprobable cause to justify a search.\n The main problem with this argument is the Supreme\nCourt already rejected its premise. In Florida v. Harris, a dog\nnamed Aldo alerted on a truck. A subsequent search did not\nreveal any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, but it did\ndiscover meth ingredients. The defendant moved to suppress\nthe ingredients on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given\nprobable cause to search. The defendant “principally con-\ntended” in the trial court that because the officer did not find\nany of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, Aldo’s alerts\nmust have been false. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058. But the Su-\npreme Court patted Aldo on the head and called him a good\nboy: “A well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to [resid-\nual] odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but\nin fact is not.” Id. at 1059; see also Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels,\nInc., 600 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (Plaintiff’s “only de-\nveloped legal theory is untenable. [His] premise—that an alert\nby a drug-sniffing dog trained to detect residual odors does\nnot establish probable cause to search—was rejected in Harris\n… .”). If a well-trained dog, trained to alert even to residual\nodors, alerts, there is generally a fair probability that drugs or\nevidence of drugs will be found, absent contradictory factors.\n\fNo. 18-2442 25\n\nAnd that is all the Fourth Amendment requires. If somehow\na dog were trained to alert only to residual odors, then we\nmight have a problem. But that is not this case.\n Our review of the record and the order denying suppres-\nsion satisfies us the judge conducted the proper Harris evalu-\nation and committed no error in concluding Rex’s satisfactory\ncertification and training provide sufficient reason to trust his\nalert or in concluding Rex’s training on residual odors is ac-\nceptable. The judge heard testimony from Simon’s expert Dr.\nCablk challenging Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself, tes-\ntimony from Officer Snyder supporting Rex’s qualifications\nand the sniff itself, and testimony from Detective Larner sup-\nporting Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself. The judge also\nentertained arguments from both sides in the form of the mo-\ntion to suppress, supporting memorandum, the government’s\nresponse, and post-hearing briefs filed by both sides. The\njudge considered the totality of the circumstances, addressed\nHarris’s ultimate question, and found Rex’s sniff up to snuff.\nC. Supplementation\n After the judge denied the motion to suppress, Simon\nmoved to supplement the record and for leave to seek recon-\nsideration. He wanted to reopen the evidence to introduce\nfurther, unrelated citations prepared by Danner in August\n2016 “which further emphasize the differences in the officers’\nhandwriting … .” (Mot. Supp., DE 23 at 4.) Simon also wanted\nto introduce a video he5 took when he returned to the scene\none night. The video shows a vehicle leaving the 1100 block\nof College Street and approaching the intersection of College\n\n 5 The motion says Simon created the video. On appeal, Simon asserts\nhis investigator took the video. This nuance is immaterial here.\n\f26 No. 18-2442\n\nand Green. The judge denied this motion. On appeal, Simon\nonly presses the video. He does not mention the additional\nhandwriting exemplars in his opening appellate brief. Simon\nacknowledges we review the denial of supplementation for\nabuse of discretion.\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. He explained there\nwas no reason Simon could not have taken a nighttime video\nand presented it during the suppression hearing. The judge\ndiscussed the danger of allowing supplementation here and\nsetting a bad precedent leading to a never-ending cycle of par-\nties waiting for rulings and then coming up with “new” evi-\ndence to challenge them. Most importantly, the judge ex-\nplained that even with the proposed evidence, his ruling\nwould not change. The nighttime video would not capture the\nactual visual capabilities of the officers, who credibly testified\nabout how close Simon was to the intersection when he sig-\nnaled. The judge reasoned a video of the scene taken months\nlater, when conditions might differ, would not impact their\ncredibility. Besides, the judge noted, the probable cause\nstandard does not need evidence to support a conviction be-\nyond a reasonable doubt. He did not abuse his discretion.\nD. ACCA\n Simon argues his prior conviction under Illinois law for\nattempted armed robbery should not have counted as a pred-\nicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He recog-\nnizes our decisions foreclose his argument on this point, but\nhe wants to preserve it for the Supreme Court.\n IV. Conclusion\n We considered all Simon’s arguments. Finding no reversi-\nble error, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Marshon Simon\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2442\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMARSHON SIMON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 16-CR-20077 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Police officers pulled Marshon Si-\\nmon over for failing to signal sufficiently ahead of turning. A\\ndrug-sniffing dog alerted on Simon’s car so officers searched\\nit. They did not find drugs, but they found a gun. The govern-\\nment charged Simon with being a felon-in-possession. The\\ndistrict judge denied Simon’s motions for recusal, suppres-\\nsion, and supplementation. Simon entered a conditional\\nguilty plea and received a sentence of 15 years. He raises a\\n\\f2 No. 18-2442\\n\\nlitany of issues on appeal. He argues the judge should have\\nrecused himself because before he was a judge he supervised\\na prior prosecution of Simon. He argues the judge should\\nhave suppressed the gun because the officers lacked probable\\ncause to initiate the traffic stop and because they prolonged\\nthe stop to allow for the dog sniff. He argues the dog’s alert\\nwas false and the dog was unreliable because he was improp-\\nerly trained. He argues the judge should have allowed him to\\nsupplement the evidence after denial of suppression. Finally,\\nhe argues one of his prior felonies should not have counted as\\na predicate for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\nConcluding the judge committed no reversible error in deny-\\ning Simon’s motions, we affirm.\\n I. Facts\\n On the night of August 21, 2016, three police officers in a\\n“bike patrol unit” surveyed a particular section of Decatur, Il-\\nlinois. Officers Jason Danner and Jamie Hagemeyer rode bi-\\ncycles. They sat behind a propane tank 145 yards from the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets. Officer Robert\\nHoecker drove a squad car nearby.\\n The bicycle officers saw a vehicle driven by Marshon Si-\\nmon leave the 1100 block of North College Street (five blocks\\naway) and drive toward them. As Simon approached the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets, he failed to signal at\\nleast 100 feet before turning left from College onto Green. This\\nwas according to the bicyclists’ testimony at the suppression\\nhearing, which the district judge credited. At the bicyclists’ re-\\nquest, Hoecker pulled Simon over at 10:26 p.m.\\n Hoecker approached Simon’s car and made contact.\\nHoecker introduced himself and told Simon the basic reason\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 3\\n\\nfor the stop. Hoecker explained bicycle officers would arrive\\nand provide details. Simon questioned the basis for the stop.\\nSimon gave his driver’s license and proof of insurance to\\nHoecker. According to Hoecker, Simon was cooperative and\\npolite, behaved normally, and was no more nervous than the\\nnormal level of traffic-stop nervousness. Hoecker ran Simon\\nthrough the LEADS computer system and found he was val-\\nidly licensed and insured. Hoecker finished this check in less\\nthan 2 minutes, before Danner and Hagemeyer arrived on\\nscene at about 10:29 p.m.\\n Once Danner and Hagemeyer arrived they took over “pro-\\ncessing the ticket,” including some double-checking.\\nHoecker’s role was to assist. Hoecker told Danner that Simon\\nhad insurance and a valid license. Hoecker said he “didn’t\\nknow if [Danner] wanted the dog or not.” (Appellant Br. at 8,\\nquoting Hoecker’s dashcam video.) Danner asked if Simon\\nhad any criminal history. Hoecker then ran a criminal-history\\ncheck and found Simon had prior drug and weapon charges.\\n Danner made contact with Simon. Danner testified Simon\\nappeared abnormally nervous. Danner testified Simon asked\\nabout the violation and insisted he used his turn signal. Dan-\\nner testified, “I observed him to pull his hand away from his\\nlap, and he was shaking pretty good, indicating to me that he\\nappeared nervous.” But Danner did not note this in the police\\nreport and he did not mention this when discussing whether\\nto call a dog.\\n Hagemeyer testified that while speaking briefly with\\nHoecker he handed her Simon’s materials. She then went to\\nanother squad car that had arrived on scene “to begin the\\nwritten warning.” Both Danner and Hagemeyer testified\\nabout the various steps and processes a bike patrol unit\\n\\f4 No. 18-2442\\n\\ncompletes as part of the mission instigated by a traffic viola-\\ntion, including monitoring and securing the scene, making\\ncontacts with the driver, running computer checks, and writ-\\ning out the warning or ticket.\\n Danner decided to call a dog. He testified he decided to\\ncall a dog at about 22:30:38 (10:30:38 p.m.) on the clock of\\nHoecker’s dashcam, about 1 minute after Danner and Hage-\\nmeyer arrived at the traffic stop. An officer called for the ca-\\nnine unit less than 4 minutes into the stop, when the ticket\\nwas still being processed, according to the officers’ testimony.\\n Canine handler Snyder arrived with Rex at the scene at\\nabout 10:33 p.m. At that time, the traffic violation was still be-\\ning processed, according to the officers’ testimony.1 Within a\\n\\n 1 Here are excerpts on point from the bicycle patrol unit’s testimony:\\nQ: And when Officer Snyder arrived, was the traffic violation still being\\nprocessed?\\nHoecker: Yes.\\n(Tr. Continuation of Suppression Hr’g, July 12, 2017, DE 44 at 19:1–19:3.)\\n\\nQ: And do you recall approximately how long into the traffic stop it would\\nhave been that [Officer Snyder, with Rex] arrived?\\nDanner: I believe it was around six or seven minutes.\\nQ: And were you still processing the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: That’s correct.\\n(Id. at 50:19–50:24.)\\n\\nHagemeyer: From the time we arrived to the time Officer Snyder arrived\\nwas three or four minutes.\\nQ: So a very short period of time?\\nA: Very short period of time.\\nQ: Were you still working on the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: Yes.\\nQ: And still working on it diligently, correct?\\nA: [Nodding head up and down.]\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 5\\n\\nfew seconds of walking around Simon’s car, Rex alerted.\\nSnyder took less than 20 seconds to prepare Rex, begin the\\nsearch, and confirm the alert. The time period from the begin-\\nning of the stop to the alert was about 7 minutes. Hagemeyer\\ntestified she had no part in conducting the actual dog sniff.\\nShe testified she “was writing the warning.” She confirmed on\\ncross-examination that she filled out the traffic warning, and\\nthat Danner issued it to Simon. Defense counsel asked, “So\\nyou were the one who filled out the date, time, name, address,\\nand birth date?” Hagemeyer answered, “I filled out the ma-\\njority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”\\n After the alert, Simon became angry and insisted there\\nwere no drugs in his car. Danner asked Simon to step out of\\nhis car. The police searched it. They did not find drugs, but\\nthey found a gun. An officer drove Simon to the police station.\\nDanner handed Simon a traffic citation as he was released\\nfrom the station. Danner testified he filled out the citation.\\n II. Procedural posture\\n Since Simon was a felon, the government charged him\\nwith being a felon in possession of a firearm. The case was\\nassigned to Judge Bruce. Simon moved Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself because he had served as the First Assistant United\\nStates Attorney for the Central District of Illinois with super-\\nvisory authority over a prior case against Simon culminating\\nin conviction. Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion.\\n Simon moved to suppress the gun, arguing there was no\\nprobable cause to stop his car, the police impermissibly ex-\\ntended the stop to get a dog on scene, and the dog was unre-\\nliable and improperly trained. Judge Bruce held an\\n\\n(Id. at 87:24–88:7.)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2442\\n\\nevidentiary hearing over parts of three days and heard testi-\\nmony from seven witnesses. He found the officers credible,\\neven if at times confused. He found the officers had probable\\ncause to think Simon committed a traffic violation, the officers\\ndid not unreasonably prolong the stop, and Rex was a\\nproperly trained and certified canine whose alert can lead to\\nprobable cause. The judge denied the motion to suppress.\\n Simon moved to supplement the record with additional,\\nunrelated traffic citations issued by Danner (to show the dif-\\nferences in the officers’ handwriting to address the issue of\\nwhich officer wrote Simon’s citation) and a video made by a\\ndefense investigator (to contradict the officers’ version of\\nevents leading up to the traffic stop). The judge denied this\\nmotion.\\n Simon pleaded guilty conditioned on preserving his right\\nto appeal. He received an enhancement as an Armed Career\\nCriminal. The judge sentenced him to 15 years in prison, the\\nmandatory minimum.\\n Simon appeals the denials of his motions to recuse, sup-\\npress, and supplement. He also appeals his qualification as an\\nArmed Career Criminal, arguing his prior conviction for at-\\ntempted armed robbery in Illinois in 2000 did not qualify as a\\nviolent felony.\\n III. Analysis\\nA. Recusal\\n Simon seeks remand because he claims Judge Bruce’s han-\\ndling of this case conveys the appearance of impropriety. Si-\\nmon does not claim Judge Bruce actually had or acted on any\\nunfair bias against Simon.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 7\\n\\n Simon argues Judge Bruce should have recused himself\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): “Any justice, judge, or magistrate\\njudge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-\\nceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-\\ntioned.” Below, Simon also sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. §\\n455(b)(3), but he no longer presses that on appeal.\\n As the government agrees, we review a preserved § 455(a)\\nclaim de novo. Cf. Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (holding § 455(a) can be vindicated on appeal); United\\nStates v. Dorsey, 829 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (a preserved\\n§ 455(b) claim is reviewed de novo).\\n To win recusal under § 455(a), a party must show a rea-\\nsonable, well-informed observer might question the judge’s\\nimpartiality. United States v. Herrera-Valdez, 826 F.3d 912, 917\\n(7th Cir. 2016). In other words, the party must show an objec-\\ntive, disinterested observer fully informed of the reasons for\\nseeking recusal would “entertain a significant doubt that jus-\\ntice would be done in the case.” Id.\\n Simon sought recusal early in the case on the ground that\\nBruce served as First Assistant United States Attorney for the\\nCentral District of Illinois from 2010 through 2013. During\\nthat time, the government charged Simon with violating 21\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Bruce supervised the AUSA\\nassigned to that case. Simon pleaded guilty and was sen-\\ntenced in 2012 and again (after a successful appeal) in March\\n2013. This prior criminal case involved occurrence facts sepa-\\nrate from those in the present case. But the prior case is di-\\nrectly relevant to this case because the conviction in the prior\\ncase enhanced Simon’s sentence in this case as an Armed Ca-\\nreer Criminal.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion. He noted he could\\nnot remember any participation in past prosecutions of Si-\\nmon. Judge Bruce observed that even if he did participate in\\na past prosecution, he did not participate in the current pros-\\necution, “which consists of new charges, wholly unrelated to\\nthose brought against [Simon] in the past.” (Text Order, Dec.\\n6, 2016.)\\n Simon likens this case to United States v. Herrera-Valdez.\\nThere, the government prosecuted a defendant for illegal\\nreentry after deportation. Before trial on the illegal-reentry\\ncharge, defendant moved to disqualify Judge Der-Yeghiayan\\nbecause he had served as the District Counsel for the Immi-\\ngration and Naturalization Service when defendant was de-\\nported. District Counsel Der-Yeghiayan’s name was listed in\\nseveral places in INS’s briefing supporting deporting. Judge\\nDer-Yeghiayan denied the motion to disqualify and defend-\\nant appealed. We observed that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a\\njudge to “‘disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his\\nimpartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrera-Valdez,\\n826 F.3d at 917. We reversed the denial of disqualification,\\nconcluding “a reasonable, disinterested observer could as-\\nsume bias from the fact that the judge presiding over the de-\\nfendant’s prosecution for illegal reentry was the same person\\nwho ran the office that pursued, and succeeded in obtaining,\\nthe removal order that is the source of his current prosecu-\\ntion.” Id. at 919. We noted this was particularly true given that\\nthe linchpin of defendant’s case against the illegal-reentry\\ncharge was a collateral attack against the removal order. The\\njudge need not have been actually involved in the prior case\\nor be actually biased in the subsequent case to trigger the re-\\nquirement to recuse under § 455(a).\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 9\\n\\n But here, the prior case does not directly give rise to or un-\\nderly the present case. And here, Simon attempts no collateral\\nattack against the prior conviction. Simon’s 2011 conviction\\nwas not, and could not have been, the linchpin to his defense\\nin this subsequent case. A defendant in a federal sentencing\\nproceeding may not collaterally attack a prior conviction used\\nto enhance his sentence, with an exception not relevant here.\\nSee Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382–83 (2001); Custis\\nv. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). Any collateral attack\\nagainst the prior conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would\\nhave been time-barred. So there was no possibility of Judge\\nBruce adjudicating the merits of a collateral attack against Si-\\nmon’s 2011 conviction here. And consequently there was no\\nreason to think Simon might have declined to launch a collat-\\neral attack against the 2011 conviction because he feared\\nJudge Bruce would not be receptive to such an attack, or\\nwould punish him in the present case for making such an at-\\ntack.\\n The prior and subsequent cases at issue in Herrera-Valdez\\nare directly related in a way the prior and subsequent cases at\\nissue here are not. A closer analogy to Herrera-Valdez is Si-\\nmon’s prior conviction under the supervision of First AUSA\\nBruce and the proceedings for revocation of supervised re-\\nlease involving that prior conviction and the gun possession\\non August 21, 2016. Simon’s prior conviction directly gives\\nrise to and underlies the revocation proceedings. So Judge\\nBruce recused himself from them.2 As this relationship is not\\n\\n 2Simon asserts Judge Bruce recused himself from the revocation pro-\\nceedings (2:11-cr-20002). The government does not contest this assertion.\\nThe docket for that case neither confirms nor denies the recusal. We take\\nSimon’s word for it.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2442\\n\\npresent between Simon’s prior case and the current felon-in-\\npossession case, there was no need for Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself here.\\n True, the prior conviction enhanced the sentence for the\\npresent conviction under the ACCA. But this is mere happen-\\nstance. It is not the same kind of direct connection we found\\nproblematic in Herrera-Valdez. Another distinction between\\nHerrera-Valdez and this case is that there, the future judge’s\\nname was on the briefs against the defendant, but here the\\nfuture judge’s name was not on the briefs. This is a relevant\\nconsideration because it bears on public perception. We do\\nnot consider this to be a controlling factor by itself, but it is\\nrelevant.\\n Judge Bruce did not err in refusing to recuse.\\nB. Suppression\\n Simon raises a series of potential errors regarding the de-\\nnial of suppression. He argues there was no probable cause to\\nbelieve a traffic violation occurred, and therefore initiating the\\nstop was unconstitutional. He argues the officers unconstitu-\\ntionally prolonged the traffic stop. And he argues Rex’s alert\\nwas false and Rex was improperly trained. “We employ a\\nmixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing\\nthe district court’s factual determinations for clear error and\\nde novo its ultimate determination about whether the police\\nhad sufficient grounds to stop or search the individual.”\\nUnited States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n1. Initiating the stop\\n Simon argues the officers lacked probable cause to believe\\nhe committed a traffic violation, so they had no probable\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 11\\n\\ncause to stop him. If Simon were right, then the court should\\nhave suppressed the gun as fruit of the poisonous tree. The\\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches\\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a\\ncar, the stop must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasona-\\nbleness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663\\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,\\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States\\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n Simon goes so far as to assert he did not commit a traffic\\nviolation. He argues the government did not meet its burden\\nof proof to establish he actually committed a traffic violation.\\nBut the government had no such burden. Whether Simon\\ncommitted a traffic violation is irrelevant for Fourth Amend-\\nment purposes so long as the officers had probable cause to\\nthink he did. United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (“The officer is not the judge. Whether the driver actu-\\nally committed a traffic infraction is irrelevant for Fourth\\nAmendment purposes so long as there was an objective basis\\nfor a reasonable belief he did.”).\\n Generally, the decision to stop a car is reasonable, and\\ncomports with the Fourth Amendment, “where the police\\nhave probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has oc-\\ncurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Prob-\\nable cause exists when “the circumstances confronting a po-\\nlice officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has com-\\nmitted even a minor traffic offense.” United States v. Cashman,\\n216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). Probable cause is an objective\\nstandard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Lewis, 920\\nF.3d at 489. If an officer reasonably thinks he sees a driver\\ncommit a traffic infraction, that is a sufficient basis to pull him\\n\\f12 No. 18-2442\\n\\nover without violating the Constitution. United States v.\\nMuriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n Here, Simon acknowledges the probable cause determina-\\ntion depends entirely on the credibility of the two officers on\\nbicycles who testified they saw him turn without signaling at\\nleast 100 feet ahead. Simon levies many attacks on their cred-\\nibility, urging us to reverse under the clear error standard. Si-\\nmon admits the clear error standard is very demanding. Un-\\nder this standard, we only reverse when, after reviewing the\\nrecord as a whole, we have a “definite and firm conviction” a\\nmistake has been made. United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614,\\n621 (7th Cir. 2001). The district judge, after all, listened to the\\ntestimony directly and observed the demeanor of the wit-\\nnesses. United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nThe district judge is in a much better position to evaluate cred-\\nibility than we are. His credibility determinations are entitled\\nto special deference. We take Simon’s credibility attacks in\\nturn.\\ni. Phantom stop sign\\n First, Simon argues Hagemeyer swore at the suppression\\nhearing that there was a stop sign at the corner of College and\\nGreen, but she was demonstrably and indisputably wrong. Si-\\nmon argues this impugns her claim she saw the traffic viola-\\ntion.\\n The judge directly confronted Hagemeyer’s mistake. He\\nnoted Hagemeyer “was wrong about that detail.” (Order, DE\\n21 at 4.) The judge said he would take the mistake into account\\nin assessing Hagemeyer’s credibility. But the judge concluded\\nthe mistake does not weigh heavily against her credibility be-\\ncause the detail “is not greatly important regarding the traffic\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 13\\n\\noffense for which Defendant was pulled over” and because\\n“[i]t would not have factored in to [sic] determining whether\\nor not to issue Defendant a ticket for failing to signal his turn\\nwithin not less than 100 feet of the intersection.” (Id.) Hage-\\nmeyer’s determination at the scene that Simon failed to signal\\nat least 100 feet before the turn was not informed by the pres-\\nence or absence of a stop sign at the corner. In other words,\\nthere were other reasons independent of the presence or ab-\\nsence of a stop sign for Hagemeyer to think Simon failed to\\nsignal at least 100 feet ahead of turning. Indeed, the presence\\nor absence of a stop sign is irrelevant to estimating distances\\nor to the requirement to signal. The judge simply did not find\\nthis mistake about a stop sign to be very important. So the\\nmistake did not significantly undermine the reliability of\\nHagemeyer to perceive other facts that night. Moreover, her\\nmistake about the stop sign has no bearing on Danner’s testi-\\nmony that he saw Simon fail to signal sufficiently ahead of\\nturning.\\n And as for the possibilities Hagemeyer lied about the stop\\nsign, and this lie undermines her credibility about everything\\nelse, Simon does not go quite so far. In his opening appellate\\nbrief, he does not directly, unequivocally accuse Hagemeyer\\nof intentionally lying about the stop sign. And Simon offers\\nno explanation for why Hagemeyer would have had any rea-\\nson to lie about it. We see no clear error here.\\nii. Distances\\n Second, Simon argues Hagemeyer and Danner were\\nwrong about the distance between their location and the in-\\ntersection of College and Green. They both testified the dis-\\ntance was 75 yards. But the distance was actually 145 yards.\\nThe officers’ testimony was demonstrably and indisputably\\n\\f14 No. 18-2442\\n\\nwrong by a wide margin. Simon argues the officers’ ability to\\njudge distance was the key to their claim Simon committed a\\ntraffic violation. He argues their failure to estimate the dis-\\ntance between their location and the intersection correctly\\nmakes their claims about the distance between the location of\\nSimon’s car when he activated his turn signal and the inter-\\nsection wholly incredible.\\n Again, the judge directly confronted the mistaken testi-\\nmony. The judge decided the miscalculation was “of little im-\\nport when it comes to credibility.” (Order, DE 21 at 3.) The\\njudge reasoned that the fact that both officers estimated the\\ndistance at 75 yards does not indicate collusion because if they\\nwanted to connive it is much more likely they would have\\nused a number closer to the actual distance. They were too\\nwrong to be conspiring to lie.\\n And as for the argument that the officers’ mistake about\\nthis distance undermines the credibility of their estimate\\nabout Simon’s signaling distance, the officers had other, spe-\\ncific indicia of the signaling distance beyond a raw estimate\\nof the distance from A to B. The time between signaling and\\nturning, the car lengths between signaling and turning, and\\nthe lengths of the headlight beams bolstered the probable\\ncause to think Simon signaled too late and too close. The judge\\nconcluded the mistake about the distance between the bicy-\\nclists’ location and the intersection shows nothing more than\\nthat both bicyclists were wrong about that distance. We see no\\nclear error here.\\niii. Photographs\\n Third, Simon argues photographs introduced into evi-\\ndence show the unbelievability of the officers’ claims. Danner\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 15\\n\\nand Hagemeyer both testified they saw Simon’s car leave the\\n1100 block of North College, five blocks from their position.\\nBut, Simon argues, the photographs speak for themselves,\\nand there is no way someone could see the make, model, or\\ncolor of a vehicle at that distance.\\n The judge simply disagreed. He examined the photo-\\ngraphs and listened to the testimony and concluded “it is pos-\\nsible for an average person, with good vision who is used to\\nworking at night, such as Danner and Hagemeyer, to see a car,\\nin the dark, turn onto a street with its headlights on.” (Order,\\nDE 21 at 4.) We also examined the photographs and read the\\ntestimony, and we do not have anything close to a definite\\nand firm conviction the judge made a mistake in this regard.\\nSometimes a photograph is not worth a thousand words.\\niv. Ghost writer\\n Fourth, Simon argues the judge ignored the officers’ mis-\\nstatements about who prepared the traffic ticket. Hagemeyer\\ntestified “I was writing the warning.” She answered “yes” to\\nthe question: “[Y]ou said that you filled out the traffic warn-\\ning in this case?” When asked if she was the one who filled\\nout the date, time, name, address, and birth date, she testified\\nshe “filled out the majority of” the ticket herself, but she be-\\nlieved Danner signed it. But other evidence showed she filled\\nout none of it. Danner filled out both the traffic citation (later\\nvoided) and the warning (Simon received hours later).\\n Simon accuses the judge of tying himself “into a pretzel to\\navoid finding that the police officers could possibly have lied\\nor misrepresented facts … .” (Appellant Br. at 33.) But the\\njudge committed no such contortions. Rather, he addressed\\nthe discrepancies directly. He combed through the testimony\\n\\f16 No. 18-2442\\n\\nabout the various steps in the process leading to handing a\\ndriver a written ticket or warning. He noted there appeared\\nto be confusion and possibly contradiction between the offic-\\ners about who actually wrote the ticket. One source of confu-\\nsion seemed to be the word “processing.” The judge observed\\nHagemeyer, Snyder, and Hoecker all testified Hagemeyer be-\\ngan “processing” the ticket, but “processing” a ticket involves\\nmuch more than just physically writing the ticket. The judge\\nalso observed Hagemeyer’s testimony on this issue was more\\nspecific. She testified, “I was writing the warning.” When\\nasked, “So you were the one who filled out the date, time,\\nname, address, and birth date?” she responded, “I filled out\\nthe majority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”3\\n The judge compared the warning Simon received—pur-\\nportedly filled out by Hagemeyer and signed by Danner—to\\na different warning definitely filled out and signed by Hage-\\nmeyer on a different date. The judge concluded the handwrit-\\ning on the two warnings is different and they likely were not\\nfilled in by the same officer.\\n But the judge noted Simon did not show the exemplar\\nwarning to Danner or Hagemeyer during the hearing to cross-\\nexamine them on who wrote Simon’s warning. The judge also\\n\\n\\n 3 In his order denying suppression, the judge characterized Hage-\\nmeyer’s testimony on this point slightly incorrectly, and in favor of Si-\\nmon’s arguments. The judge wrote “Hagemeyer answered ‘yes’ to\\nwhether she filled in the name, date, etc., but she stated that Danner signed\\nit.” (Order, DE 21 at 10.) Actually (according to the transcript) she did not\\nsay “yes” in response to this question. She said, “I filled out the majority\\nof it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.” But even giving Simon the ben-\\nefit of this characterization, the judge still did not find a significant credi-\\nbility problem.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 17\\n\\nnoted the testimony indicated Danner or Hagemeyer would\\noften start writing a ticket the other would finish. The judge\\nobserved: “There are numerous possibilities as to why the dis-\\ncrepancy exists, and without the officers being given the\\nchance to explain the discrepancy, the court cannot impute\\nimproper conduct on their part.” (Order, DE 21 at 11.) The\\njudge considered the totality of the officers’ testimony, and\\ntheir demeanor and appearance. He concluded any discrep-\\nancy on this issue was due to mere confusion on the part of\\nthe officers, and not to fabrication. And he concluded the of-\\nficers were credible.\\n We see no clear error regarding the judge’s decisions on\\nany of these issues, nor regarding his decision to find the of-\\nficers credible. Given the two bicycle officers testified they\\nsaw Simon commit a traffic infraction, and given the judge be-\\nlieved them, we see no reason to reverse the decision that\\nprobable cause justified starting the stop.\\n2. Conducting the stop\\n Simon argues even if the officers did not violate the Con-\\nstitution by initiating the stop, they violated it by impermissi-\\nbly prolonging the stop. An officer who reasonably starts a\\ntraffic stop might violate the Constitution if he exceeds the\\nscope of the stop or unreasonably prolongs it. Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491. A traffic stop “‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged\\nbeyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mis-\\nsion’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez v. United States,\\n135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543\\nU.S. 405, 407 (2005)).\\n A dog sniff of a car’s exterior only for illegal drugs during\\na lawful stop for a traffic violation does not violate the Fourth\\n\\f18 No. 18-2442\\n\\nAmendment, even absent reasonable suspicion of drugs. Ca-\\nballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But a stop justified only by a traffic vio-\\nlation becomes unconstitutional if the officers prolong it be-\\nyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s\\noriginal mission. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. “An officer may\\nconduct certain unrelated checks—including a dog sniff—\\nduring a lawful traffic stop, but he may not do so in a way that\\nprolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily\\ndemanded to justify detaining an individual.” Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Simon concedes,\\n“calling a K-9 unit does not unlawfully extend a traffic stop as\\nlong as the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is on-\\ngoing.” (Appellant Br. at 36.)\\n Without independent reasonable suspicion to justify the\\nsniff, the critical question is not whether the dog sniffed be-\\nfore or after the officer issued the warning, “but whether con-\\nducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.”\\nLewis, 920 F.3d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nWith independent reasonable suspicion, however, the officer\\nmay constitutionally detain the suspect for the sniff even if it\\nadds time to the total stop. Id.\\n Here, the judge continued to credit the officers’ testimony.\\nBased on that testimony, the judge concluded the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff. The judge noted\\nthe time period from the beginning of the stop to the canine\\nalert was about 7 minutes, as Simon conceded. The judge de-\\ntermined the officers acted quickly. Hoecker made the stop,\\nexited his car, told Simon the reason for the stop, and gathered\\nhis information. The bicyclists arrived at the stop only a cou-\\nple minutes after Hoecker pulled Simon over. The bicyclists\\n“diligently began processing the ticket.” (Order, DE 21 at 15.)\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 19\\n\\nCrucially, the judge found no indication the officers engaged\\nin any activity other than securing the scene and processing\\nthe warning during the time between the bicyclists’ arrival\\nand Rex’s arrival. Specifically, the officers surveyed the scene,\\nDanner spoke with Simon, and Hagemeyer testified she went\\nto the squad car to begin processing the written warning. The\\nvideo indicated that about 2.5 minutes into the stop, Danner\\nwas speaking to Hoecker about the traffic violation. About 3\\nminutes into the stop, Danner left the squad car to speak with\\nSimon. Danner told Simon the reasons for the stop and gath-\\nered information. Hoecker returned to Simon’s car at about\\nthe 5-minute mark to speak with him about the traffic infrac-\\ntion. Less than 7 minutes into the stop, Rex arrived and very\\nquickly alerted. At that time, the bicycle officers were still pro-\\ncessing the ticket.\\n In sum, the judge concluded the officers were processing\\nthe ticket when Rex arrived and alerted, so they had not yet\\ncompleted the initial mission of the stop, and the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff.\\n Simon argues the police report and testimony contain the\\n“misrepresentation” Hagemeyer was writing the warning\\nwhile the officers waited for Rex because the officers knew\\ncalling a canine unit does not unlawfully extend a stop so long\\nas the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is ongoing.\\nSimon continues to challenge the credibility of the officers. He\\nargues that at no point did any officer on the scene begin ef-\\nfectuating the purpose of the stop by dutifully and diligently\\nfilling out a warning or ticket. He claims Danner filled out\\nboth the traffic citation and the warning Simon received hours\\nafter the stop. But again we see no reversible error in the\\njudge’s conclusions on this point.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Simon presses that even if the judge’s credibility determi-\\nnations here are correct, his ruling is still flawed. First, Simon\\nargues the judge improperly allowed a de minimis delay to be\\nconstitutional, even though any delay to allow a dog to sniff\\nis unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion.\\nWe disagree with Simon about what the judge did. He specif-\\nically found there was no improper delay. (Order, DE 21 at 14\\n(“the stop was not purposefully prolonged to allow for the ca-\\nnine unit’s arrival”).) True, the judge added in a footnote that\\neven if he found the ticket-writing process had not begun\\nwhen Rex arrived, still the sequence of events was so short\\nand condensed that the stop was not prolonged in any “mean-\\ningful” way. But we need not review this dictum.\\n Second, Simon argues that instead of effectuating the pur-\\npose of the traffic stop, the officers decided to run a criminal-\\nhistory check. Simon argues this was unrelated to the mission\\nof the stop and delayed processing the traffic violation. Simon\\ncites no supporting Seventh Circuit case. We said last year that\\nwhen police conduct a stop, “they are entitled to demand the\\ndriver’s identification, of course, and it is routine to check the\\ndriver’s record for active warrants, driving history, and crim-\\ninal history. Those checks are done for important reasons, in-\\ncluding officer safety.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d\\n577, 586 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Sanford, 806\\nF.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The trooper checked the occu-\\npants’ criminal histories on the computer in his car—a proce-\\ndure permissible even without reasonable suspicion … .”).\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments, but we see no rea-\\nson to reverse the judge’s conclusions that the officers were in\\nthe process of completing the traffic warning when Rex\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 21\\n\\narrived, and the officers did not improperly prolong the traffic\\nstop to allow the sniff to occur.\\n3. Bona Fido?\\n Simon argues even if the officers had probable cause to\\npull him over, and even if they did not prolong the traffic stop\\nto wait for Rex, still the judge should have suppressed the gun\\nbecause Rex’s alert was false, Rex was improperly trained,\\nand the alert did not provide probable cause to justify search-\\ning Simon’s car.\\n Probable cause to conduct a search is not among the high-\\nest standards. “A police officer has probable cause to conduct\\na search when the facts available to him would warrant a per-\\nson of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evi-\\ndence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050,\\n1055 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).\\nProbable cause is less than preponderance of the evidence. Id.\\n“All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which\\nreasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id.\\n(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Probable\\ncause is a practical, common-sense standard, involving the to-\\ntality of the circumstances. Id.\\n A dog’s alert on a car can give probable cause to search the\\nentire car. Indeed, a good dog’s alert can provide a rebuttable\\npresumption of probable cause to search:\\n If a bona fide organization has certified a dog\\n after testing his reliability in a controlled setting,\\n a court can presume (subject to any conflicting\\n evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides\\n probable cause to search. The same is true, even\\n in the absence of formal certification, if the dog\\n\\f22 No. 18-2442\\n\\n has recently and successfully completed a train-\\n ing program that evaluated his proficiency in lo-\\n cating drugs.\\nId. at 1057. The ultimate question is “whether all the facts sur-\\nrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common\\nsense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a\\nsearch would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A\\nsniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.” Id. at 1058.\\n Simon concedes Rex passed certification tests. But Simon\\nchallenges the alert itself and the adequacy of Rex’s training.\\n “First and foremost,” Simon argues Rex did not alert on\\nSimon’s car. (Appellant Br. at 42.) This perplexes. Simon cites\\nnothing to support this claim. The record belies it. Given the\\ncontext of this claim, Simon seems simply to mean the alert\\nwas false.4 It is true that following the alert the officers\\nsearched the car and found no evidence of drugs in it. But Si-\\nmon does not explain why that, in itself, matters here. Proba-\\nble cause is not a retrospective, outcome-based standard.\\n\\n 4 Defense expert Dr. Mary Cablk said in her report she could not de-\\ntermine if Rex alerted or what Rex alerted to. She confirmed this on cross-\\nexamination at the suppression hearing. During direct examination she\\nwatched videos from Hoecker’s and Snyder’s dashcams. She testified she\\ncould not see the alert, could not tell exactly where on the car the dog\\nalerted, and did not know whether the alert was barking or something\\nelse. But in her testimony she seems to accept Rex alerted. She character-\\nized it as a false alert because no drugs were found, and she criticized\\nSnyder for rewarding Rex for falsely alerting: “In this instance, there’s no\\ndrugs found; so he’s reinforcing the dog for false alerting here.” In any\\nevent, Snyder testified that Rex alerted and that Snyder confirmed the\\nalert. And the judge throughout his order accepted Rex alerted. He found\\nthe officers’ testimony, in its totality, credible. We see no reason to upend\\nthe determination Rex alerted.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 23\\n\\nBridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). If an officer\\nrandomly breaks into a house on only a wild hunch and stum-\\nbles into a meth lab, the discovery does not provide probable\\ncause for the search. And if 20 reliable informants tell an of-\\nficer a particular house contains a meth lab, so he stands in\\nthe street outside the house and sees through an open win-\\ndow the apparent apparatus and accoutrements of a meth lab,\\nso he obtains a warrant to search the house based on probable\\ncause to think it contains a meth lab, but he finds only an in-\\nnocent and intricate chemistry set, still probable cause sup-\\nported the warrant. So the mere absence of drugs in Simon’s\\ncar does not undermine the probable cause to search it for\\ndrugs, provided there was probable cause in the first place.\\n Simon’s other argument is the officers did not have prob-\\nable cause to search his vehicle in the first place because Rex\\nwas unreliable. This argument proceeds in two waves.\\n The first wave is quickly quelled. Simon argues Rex was\\nunreliable because he was not trained properly under Illinois\\nlaw, which requires police dogs be trained according to cer-\\ntain guidelines. Simon argues Detective Larner (the Macon\\nCounty canine-training director) admitted he did not always\\nfollow these guidelines. But we need not address what Illinois\\nlaw requires or whether Rex satisfies it because Illinois law\\ndoes not control the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore,\\n553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s mean-\\ning [does] not change with local law enforcement practices—\\neven practices set by rule.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.\\n35, 43 (1988) (“We have never intimated … that whether or not\\na search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment depends on the law of the particular State in\\nwhich the search occurs.”).\\n\\f24 No. 18-2442\\n\\n The second wave holds out longer, but ultimately suc-\\ncumbs. Simon argues, apart from Illinois law, if a dog is\\ntrained to alert when no evidence of criminal activity exists,\\nthis violates the Fourth Amendment. The problem, as Simon\\nsees it, is Rex was trained with scented cotton balls to alert to\\nresidual odors. But to search a car, there must be probable\\ncause to think it presently contains evidence of criminal activ-\\nity. So if Rex is trained to alert to mere residue even when no\\ndrugs are present, then his alert is not a reliable indicator\\ndrugs are present, and therefore his alert does not provide\\nprobable cause to justify a search.\\n The main problem with this argument is the Supreme\\nCourt already rejected its premise. In Florida v. Harris, a dog\\nnamed Aldo alerted on a truck. A subsequent search did not\\nreveal any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, but it did\\ndiscover meth ingredients. The defendant moved to suppress\\nthe ingredients on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given\\nprobable cause to search. The defendant “principally con-\\ntended” in the trial court that because the officer did not find\\nany of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, Aldo’s alerts\\nmust have been false. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058. But the Su-\\npreme Court patted Aldo on the head and called him a good\\nboy: “A well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to [resid-\\nual] odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but\\nin fact is not.” Id. at 1059; see also Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels,\\nInc., 600 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (Plaintiff’s “only de-\\nveloped legal theory is untenable. [His] premise—that an alert\\nby a drug-sniffing dog trained to detect residual odors does\\nnot establish probable cause to search—was rejected in Harris\\n… .”). If a well-trained dog, trained to alert even to residual\\nodors, alerts, there is generally a fair probability that drugs or\\nevidence of drugs will be found, absent contradictory factors.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 25\\n\\nAnd that is all the Fourth Amendment requires. If somehow\\na dog were trained to alert only to residual odors, then we\\nmight have a problem. But that is not this case.\\n Our review of the record and the order denying suppres-\\nsion satisfies us the judge conducted the proper Harris evalu-\\nation and committed no error in concluding Rex’s satisfactory\\ncertification and training provide sufficient reason to trust his\\nalert or in concluding Rex’s training on residual odors is ac-\\nceptable. The judge heard testimony from Simon’s expert Dr.\\nCablk challenging Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself, tes-\\ntimony from Officer Snyder supporting Rex’s qualifications\\nand the sniff itself, and testimony from Detective Larner sup-\\nporting Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself. The judge also\\nentertained arguments from both sides in the form of the mo-\\ntion to suppress, supporting memorandum, the government’s\\nresponse, and post-hearing briefs filed by both sides. The\\njudge considered the totality of the circumstances, addressed\\nHarris’s ultimate question, and found Rex’s sniff up to snuff.\\nC. Supplementation\\n After the judge denied the motion to suppress, Simon\\nmoved to supplement the record and for leave to seek recon-\\nsideration. He wanted to reopen the evidence to introduce\\nfurther, unrelated citations prepared by Danner in August\\n2016 “which further emphasize the differences in the officers’\\nhandwriting … .” (Mot. Supp., DE 23 at 4.) Simon also wanted\\nto introduce a video he5 took when he returned to the scene\\none night. The video shows a vehicle leaving the 1100 block\\nof College Street and approaching the intersection of College\\n\\n 5 The motion says Simon created the video. On appeal, Simon asserts\\nhis investigator took the video. This nuance is immaterial here.\\n\\f26 No. 18-2442\\n\\nand Green. The judge denied this motion. On appeal, Simon\\nonly presses the video. He does not mention the additional\\nhandwriting exemplars in his opening appellate brief. Simon\\nacknowledges we review the denial of supplementation for\\nabuse of discretion.\\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. He explained there\\nwas no reason Simon could not have taken a nighttime video\\nand presented it during the suppression hearing. The judge\\ndiscussed the danger of allowing supplementation here and\\nsetting a bad precedent leading to a never-ending cycle of par-\\nties waiting for rulings and then coming up with “new” evi-\\ndence to challenge them. Most importantly, the judge ex-\\nplained that even with the proposed evidence, his ruling\\nwould not change. The nighttime video would not capture the\\nactual visual capabilities of the officers, who credibly testified\\nabout how close Simon was to the intersection when he sig-\\nnaled. The judge reasoned a video of the scene taken months\\nlater, when conditions might differ, would not impact their\\ncredibility. Besides, the judge noted, the probable cause\\nstandard does not need evidence to support a conviction be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt. He did not abuse his discretion.\\nD. ACCA\\n Simon argues his prior conviction under Illinois law for\\nattempted armed robbery should not have counted as a pred-\\nicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He recog-\\nnizes our decisions foreclose his argument on this point, but\\nhe wants to preserve it for the Supreme Court.\\n IV. Conclusion\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments. Finding no reversi-\\nble error, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3892,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654607,"string":"4,654,607"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Terry Smith v. Illinois Department of Transp"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2948"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2948\\nTERRY L. SMITH,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-02061 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. After a rocky probationary period,\\nthe Illinois Department of Transportation discharged its em-\\nployee Terry Smith. Smith sued the Department under Title\\nVII, arguing that it had subjected him to a hostile work envi-\\nronment and fired him in retaliation for his complaints about\\nracial discrimination. The district court granted summary\\njudgment to the Department on both claims, and Smith insists\\nthat it was wrong to do so. He contends that the district court\\n\\f2 No. 18-2948\\n\\nmistakenly concluded that testimony from two of his wit-\\nnesses was inadmissible and that he has enough evidence to\\nmake it to a jury in any event. We disagree and affirm the dis-\\ntrict court.\\n I.\\n Smith began working as an Emergency Traffic Patrol Min-\\nuteman with the Department late in 2013. Minutemen per-\\nform various duties related to traffic and roadways. Smith’s\\nemployment began with a probationary period starting Au-\\ngust 1. To be certified, he had to successfully complete three\\nstages of training over the course of six months. His proba-\\ntionary period did not go well.\\n According to the Department, Smith was far from a model\\nemployee. Early in his training, one of his supervisors re-\\nported that he challenged the instructions that he was given,\\nwhich created a “serious issue” for his training and develop-\\nment. Another supervisor said that Smith regularly “fail[ed]\\nto remember info” and “ha[d] a very hard time following\\nbasic instructions.” Particularly troubling, however, was\\nSmith’s record of unsafe conduct. Once, while driving in an\\nexpress lane with Marcello Valle, one of his supervisors,\\nSmith approached a place where the lanes divided. Valle told\\nhim to pick a lane; instead, Smith stopped short in traffic—\\nonly thirty feet from the concrete pillar dividing the lanes. On\\nanother occasion, Smith drove away from a gas pump with\\nthe nozzle still inserted in the truck. Smith also “almost hit a\\ntrooper police car” on a drive with a supervisor. Most danger-\\nous of all, Smith ignored instructions to put his truck in neu-\\ntral and pull the brake—nearly causing a supervisor to be\\npinned between the tow truck and another vehicle. Incidents\\nlike these led one of his supervisors, Lloyd Colbert, to send an\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 3\\n\\nemail to some of his coworkers warning that if Smith contin-\\nued to work on the road, “someone else will pay the ultimate\\nprice.”\\n The Department gave Smith negative reviews from the be-\\nginning, and its assessments of his performance became pro-\\ngressively worse. In a performance evaluation in mid-Sep-\\ntember, Smith received two marks of “unsatisfactory.” In Oc-\\ntober, one of Smith’s supervisors emailed another saying that\\nSmith was “not getting any better and cannot get it.” By the\\nend of November, Smith was described as “very behind”\\nwhere he ought to have been at his stage of training. The prob-\\nlems continued into December: emails between the Depart-\\nment employees described him as being argumentative, un-\\nstable, reckless, unsafe, and “in no way ready to go on his\\nown.” In January, Smith received another performance eval-\\nuation, this one giving him unsatisfactory marks in five dif-\\nferent categories.\\n From Smith’s perspective, however, the Department was\\nthe problem. On August 22, 2013, he filed an internal com-\\nplaint with the Department asserting that Valle had used\\n“abusive language” toward him and that another supervisor,\\nZen McHugh, had threatened to fire him for being confronta-\\ntional. That same day, Smith also wrote a memorandum to his\\nunion representative in which he claimed that the Depart-\\nment had discriminated against him because he was black\\nand had subjected him to a hostile work environment. In Oc-\\ntober, Smith sent another memorandum to the Department.\\nThe subject line was “Illegally docked hours from my pay.\\nDiscrimination/harassment.” The memorandum claimed that\\non October 13, Colbert had told him to sign out two hours be-\\nfore he had stopped working, which had the effect of\\n\\f4 No. 18-2948\\n\\nwithholding two hours of pay from his paycheck. (He was\\neventually compensated for those hours.)\\n In December, Smith wrote more memoranda to the De-\\npartment complaining about his treatment. Two of them,\\ndated December 5 and 6, complained that Colbert had denied\\nSmith overtime pay after he responded to a call for assistance\\nwith a disabled vehicle late in his shift. He attributed the re-\\nfusal to racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. He\\nsubmitted two more memoranda in late December. He ad-\\ndressed the first—which had the subject line “discrimination\\nretaliation”—to a supervisor at the Department. In it, he\\nclaimed that he was being treated differently than a fellow\\nemployee who had been allowed to work only four hours on\\na certain day while Smith had been required to work a full\\nday. The second was also addressed to the Department, and\\nit requested a shift change due to “discrimination, harass-\\nment, retaliation.”\\n On December 31, 2013, Smith filed another complaint, this\\ntime with the Department’s internal Equal Employment Op-\\nportunity office. He listed three dates on which the Depart-\\nment had allegedly discriminated and retaliated against him:\\nOctober 13, December 5, and December 28. From the record,\\nwe know that each of those dates corresponds to a specific in-\\ncident. On the first date, Colbert had allegedly docked hours\\nfrom his paycheck. On the second, Colbert had allegedly de-\\nnied Smith overtime pay. On the third, Roman McGhee, a su-\\npervisor, had supposedly yelled and sworn at Smith for say-\\ning that he was going to back two cars that had been in an\\naccident down a highway ramp. Smith’s complaint did not\\noffer his side of those events; it simply stated that he had been\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 5\\n\\ntreated differently than another coworker and denied over-\\ntime pay.\\n On January 3, 2014, the Department sent Smith a “State-\\nment of Charges,” which sought to fire him on the ground of\\nhis unsatisfactory work performance. On January 16, Smith\\nhad a run-in with Colbert, who had recently learned that\\nSmith had charged him, along with other supervisors, of ra-\\ncial discrimination and retaliation. According to Smith, Col-\\nbert, who was also black, was “very angry” and made several\\nconfrontational remarks: that there would be “eighty-one of\\nus against one of you when we go to trial”; that Smith was\\ngoing to lose everything that he owned, including his house\\nand car; and that he was a “stupid ass ni[].”\\n The Department terminated Smith on January 30, 2014. In\\nMarch, Smith sued the Department under Title VII, alleging\\nthat it had subjected him to a hostile work environment and\\nfired him in retaliation for his complaints about racial dis-\\ncrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to\\nthe Department, concluding that Smith had not introduced\\nenough evidence to permit a jury to decide in his favor on ei-\\nther claim.1\\n Smith insists that the district court took several wrong\\nturns. To begin with, he contends that the court erroneously\\nexcluded the testimony of two of his witnesses—Maria Ve-\\nronico, an expert, and Marvin Harrison, a former\\n\\n\\n 1 We note that Smith’s counsel failed to include the district court’s\\nopinion in the appendix as required by Circuit Rule 30(a)—notwithstand-\\ning his certification that he had done so. We do not take either the omis-\\nsion or the misrepresentation lightly, and counsel is admonished to ob-\\nserve our rules in the future.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2948\\n\\nsupervisor—as inadmissible. But even if we disagree with\\nhim about that, Smith says, he still has enough evidence to\\nmake it to a jury on both his retaliation and hostile work en-\\nvironment claims. We discuss each of his arguments below.\\n II.\\n We begin with the admissibility of Veronico’s expert testi-\\nmony, on which Smith relied in his opposition to the Depart-\\nment’s motion for summary judgment. Veronico, an expert in\\nindustrial relations, testified at her deposition that Smith’s\\ntrainers had created a hostile work environment based on his\\nrace when they “scolded, ridiculed, and threatened” him; she\\nalso opined that the Department had fired Smith for com-\\nplaining about racial discrimination. The district court de-\\nclined to consider Veronico’s opinion, explaining that it was\\nnot based on “sufficient facts or data” as required by Federal\\nRule of Evidence 702(b). That decision was well within the\\ndistrict court’s discretion.\\n Veronico concluded that Smith had been subjected to a\\nhostile work environment after reading Smith’s evaluations\\nand portions of the Department’s training manual and Em-\\nployee Policies Manual. She admitted that even though it was\\nher usual practice to interview actors on both sides of a dis-\\ncrimination claim, she did not talk to either Smith or his su-\\npervisors. Indeed, she did not even bother to review any\\nsworn deposition testimony. By Veronico’s own admission,\\nher conclusion was based on an incomplete picture—as the\\ndistrict court put it, she “omitted a substantial set of facts from\\nher analysis, and instead relied only on what appears to be\\nplaintiff-curated records.” Veronico’s reliance on an anemic\\nand one-sided set of facts casts significant doubt on the\\nsoundness of her opinion, and the court did not abuse its\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 7\\n\\ndiscretion by excluding it. See Huey v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,\\n165 F.3d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1999) (excluding an expert who\\n“did not attempt to reconstruct the underlying facts to deter-\\nmine whether [the opposing party] had a good explanation …\\n[and] did not do anything except talk to [the plaintiff], read\\ndocuments [plaintiff's] counsel sent, and write a letter”).\\n Veronico’s opinion that the Department retaliated against\\nSmith for registering complaints of racial discrimination rests\\non even shakier ground. That conclusion was drawn from the\\nsame incomplete information that formed the basis of her\\nopinion about Smith’s hostile work environment. But the\\nopinion about retaliation was undermined still further by Ve-\\nronico’s inability to connect the conclusion that she drew to\\nthe facts that she had. We have explained before that “[i]t is\\ncritical under Rule 702 that there be a link between the facts\\nor data the expert has worked with and the conclusion the ex-\\npert’s testimony is intended to support.” United States v.\\nMamah, 332 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2003). Veronico’s testimony\\nlacked that link. She maintains that Smith’s evaluations be-\\ncame more negative after he filed his complaints—which\\nmight suggest a retaliatory motive that could have inspired\\nhis dismissal. But she admitted that she had no information\\nabout whether any of these supervisors even knew about\\nSmith’s complaints at the time that they submitted negative\\nevaluations of his performance. And if the supervisors were\\nunaware of the complaints, there would be no reason to sus-\\npect that their negative evaluations demonstrated any kind of\\nretaliatory motive. In short, Veronico’s opinion was funda-\\nmentally flawed, and we affirm the district court’s decision\\nthat it was inadmissible.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2948\\n\\n III.\\n We now turn to the admissibility of an affidavit sworn by\\none of Smith’s supervisors, Marvin Harrison, who said sev-\\neral things that were helpful to Smith. The district court ruled\\nthat Harrison’s affidavit was inadmissible because it lacked a\\nproper foundation and was “replete with generalized asser-\\ntions.” For instance, the affidavit states that Harrison “wit-\\nnessed [Smith] being discriminated against on many different\\noccasions by the department and its agents.” But without\\nknowing who discriminated, what they did, and when they\\ndid it, the court had no way of knowing what to make of this\\nevidence. The same problem plagues the affidavit’s assertion\\nthat Colbert called Smith the n-word “frequently.” Harrison\\ndid not specify whether he heard these slurs himself, nor did\\nhe offer any detail about the contexts in which they were ut-\\ntered. Without that information, the court could not evaluate\\nwhether Harrison was describing events of which he had per-\\nsonal knowledge or simply relaying inadmissible hearsay. See\\nFED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4) (requiring that affidavits used to sup-\\nport or oppose a motion for summary judgment be “made on\\npersonal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in\\nevidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent\\nto testify on the matters stated”). Indeed, the affidavit was so\\nvague that even Smith himself concedes that it is at least “par-\\ntially true” that it “lacked a proper evidentiary foundation.”\\nThe district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to\\nconsider Harrison’s affidavit.\\n IV.\\n To survive summary judgment on his Title VII retaliation\\nclaim, Smith must show that a reasonable jury could find that\\nhe engaged in a protected activity, that he suffered an adverse\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 9\\n\\nemployment action, and that the adverse action was moti-\\nvated by a protected activity. Lord v. High Voltage Software,\\nInc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). The Department con-\\ncedes that Smith engaged in protected activity and that the\\ntermination of his employment was an adverse employment\\naction. The only dispute is whether the Department termi-\\nnated Smith because he complained about racial discrimina-\\ntion. We agree with the district court that a reasonable jury\\ncould not find in Smith’s favor on this issue.\\n To raise an inference that he was fired because of his com-\\nplaints rather than because of his performance, Smith main-\\ntains that he was fired even though he was meeting the De-\\npartment’s legitimate expectations. See Vaughn v. Vilsack, 715\\nF.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2013). Yet as we recounted above,\\nSmith’s tenure at the Department was distinguished in all the\\nwrong ways. He received multiple ratings of “unsatisfactory”\\nin two different formal performance reviews. His failings as\\nan employee were chronicled in conversations and emails\\nfrom a number of different supervisors and coworkers, who\\nconsidered him unsafe, argumentative, and unable to follow\\ninstructions.\\n Smith does not dispute the Department’s long list of griev-\\nances against him. But he argues that the district court “cherry\\npicked” negative evidence about his employment record to\\ncreate a misleading narrative. He points out that in addition\\nto bad reviews, he also received some positive feedback from\\nsome of his supervisors at the Department. But a smattering\\nof decent reviews doesn’t overcome the overwhelming num-\\nber of documented problems—including serious safety is-\\nsues—that the Department had with Smith’s performance. See\\nAnderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2948\\n\\n1994) (“The mere submission of materials from a co-worker\\nor supervisor indicating that an employee’s performance is\\nsatisfactory … does not create a material issue of fact.”). Given\\nthe extensive evidence that Smith was not meeting his em-\\nployer’s legitimate expectations, a reasonable jury could not\\nfind that the Department fired him because of his protected\\nactivity rather than for his poor performance.\\n V.\\n Finally, we address Smith’s hostile work environment\\nclaim. A hostile work environment claim contains four ele-\\nments: (1) the employee was subject to unwelcome harass-\\nment; (2) the harassment was based on a reason forbidden by\\nTitle VII—here, race; (3) the harassment was so severe or per-\\nvasive that it altered the conditions of employment and cre-\\nated a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there\\nis a basis for employer liability. Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge\\nof the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 804 F.3d 826, 834 (7th Cir.\\n2015).\\n Smith’s case largely founders on the second prong, be-\\ncause the majority of the harassment he identifies was uncon-\\nnected to his race. Smith says that Valle, McGhee, and a\\ntrainer identified only as “Washington” created a hostile\\nwork environment by directing profanity at him. Valle con-\\nfronted him and used the f-word several times, in contexts\\nlike “shut the f[] up.” McGhee called Smith a “stupid dumb\\nmotherf[]” and told him he was going to “kick [his] ass.”\\nWashington used the f-word once. As the district court\\npointed out, however, Smith fails to connect any of these epi-\\nthets to his race. Smith himself acknowledged that Valle was\\n“equal opportunity” when it came to dishing out profanity.\\nMcGhee’s outburst was connected to a dangerous traffic\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 11\\n\\nsituation for which Smith was responsible. And Washington’s\\nlone use of the f-word is presented without any context at all.\\nWhile the epithets may have made for a crude or unpleasant\\nworkplace, “Title VII imposes no ‘general civility code.’”\\nVance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 452, (2013) (quoting On-\\ncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).\\nBecause Smith introduced no evidence that his supervisors\\nswore at him because he was black, the profanity that he de-\\nscribes does not establish a hostile work environment under\\nTitle VII.\\n Smith describes one incident, however, that plainly consti-\\ntutes race-based harassment: Colbert, one of his former super-\\nvisors, called Smith a “stupid ass ni[]” after finding out that\\nSmith had filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-\\nportunity office. The n-word is an egregious racial epithet.\\nNichols v. Mich. City Plant Planning Dep’t, 755 F.3d 594, 601 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (“[W]hile there is no ‘magic number of slurs’ that\\nindicates a hostile work environment, an ‘unambiguously ra-\\ncial epithet falls on the more severe end of the spectrum.’” (ci-\\ntation omitted)). That said, Smith can’t win simply by proving\\nthat the word was uttered. He must also demonstrate that\\nColbert’s use of this word altered the conditions of his em-\\nployment and created a hostile or abusive working environ-\\nment. Huri, 804 F.3d at 834. And he must make this showing\\n“from both a subjective and an objective point of view.” EEOC\\nv. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d 618, 625 (7th Cir. 2018). In\\nother words, he must show not only that a reasonable person\\nwould find the workplace hostile or abusive as a result of Col-\\nbert’s slur, but also that he himself perceived it that way. Fa-\\nragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).\\n\\f12 No. 18-2948\\n\\n We need not address the objective prong of the analysis,\\nbecause Smith falters on the subjective prong. He introduced\\nno evidence that Colbert’s use of the n-word changed his sub-\\njective experience of the workplace. To be sure, Smith testified\\nthat his time at the Department caused him psychological dis-\\ntress. But that was for reasons that predated his run-in with\\nColbert and had nothing to do with his race. His tenure at the\\nDepartment was rocky from the outset because of his poor\\ntrack record. He clashed with his supervisors over pay, and\\nthey confronted him with foul language. As early as August—\\nthe first month of his employment—he sent memoranda to\\nthe Department complaining of a “hostile work environ-\\nment.” On Smith’s own account, his supervisors made him\\nmiserable throughout his employment at the Department. But\\nas we have already discussed, he has no evidence that his su-\\npervisors were lashing out at him because he was black.\\n The first incident in which race played a part was his Jan-\\nuary 16th run-in with Colbert. By then, things were already at\\na breaking point. The Department had initiated termination\\nproceedings against Smith two weeks before, so he knew that\\nhe was about to be fired. And while things certainly could\\nhave gotten worse for Smith after the racially charged con-\\nfrontation with Colbert, he offers no evidence that they did.\\nInstead, Smith presents the confrontation as yet another in-\\nstance of the same ill treatment that he had been receiving all\\nalong.\\n That won’t do under Title VII. Because the statute does not\\ngive employees a remedy for workplace abuse unrelated to a\\nprotected characteristic, Smith needs to point to evidence—\\neven if in his own testimony—that he suffered harm from Col-\\nbert’s race-based harassment that was distinct from the\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 13\\n\\ndistress that non-race-based harassment was already causing\\nhim. Put differently, Smith has to be able to persuade a jury\\nthat Colbert’s race-based harassment was severe enough “to\\nalter the conditions of [his] employment.” Huri, 804 F.3d at 834\\n(emphasis added). Smith did not even try to make that show-\\ning—he points to no evidence that Colbert’s slur caused him\\neither additional or different distress. Without evidence that\\nColbert’s outburst changed Smith’s subjective experience\\nduring his last two weeks at the Department, a reasonable\\njury could not resolve the hostile work environment claim in\\nSmith’s favor.\\n ***\\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment to the De-\\npartment is AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431860/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARRETT, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654607/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Terry Smith v. Illinois Department of Transp\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2948\nTERRY L. SMITH,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\n\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:15-cv-02061 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. After a rocky probationary period,\nthe Illinois Department of Transportation discharged its em-\nployee Terry Smith. Smith sued the Department under Title\nVII, arguing that it had subjected him to a hostile work envi-\nronment and fired him in retaliation for his complaints about\nracial discrimination. The district court granted summary\njudgment to the Department on both claims, and Smith insists\nthat it was wrong to do so. He contends that the district court\n\f2 No. 18-2948\n\nmistakenly concluded that testimony from two of his wit-\nnesses was inadmissible and that he has enough evidence to\nmake it to a jury in any event. We disagree and affirm the dis-\ntrict court.\n I.\n Smith began working as an Emergency Traffic Patrol Min-\nuteman with the Department late in 2013. Minutemen per-\nform various duties related to traffic and roadways. Smith’s\nemployment began with a probationary period starting Au-\ngust 1. To be certified, he had to successfully complete three\nstages of training over the course of six months. His proba-\ntionary period did not go well.\n According to the Department, Smith was far from a model\nemployee. Early in his training, one of his supervisors re-\nported that he challenged the instructions that he was given,\nwhich created a “serious issue” for his training and develop-\nment. Another supervisor said that Smith regularly “fail[ed]\nto remember info” and “ha[d] a very hard time following\nbasic instructions.” Particularly troubling, however, was\nSmith’s record of unsafe conduct. Once, while driving in an\nexpress lane with Marcello Valle, one of his supervisors,\nSmith approached a place where the lanes divided. Valle told\nhim to pick a lane; instead, Smith stopped short in traffic—\nonly thirty feet from the concrete pillar dividing the lanes. On\nanother occasion, Smith drove away from a gas pump with\nthe nozzle still inserted in the truck. Smith also “almost hit a\ntrooper police car” on a drive with a supervisor. Most danger-\nous of all, Smith ignored instructions to put his truck in neu-\ntral and pull the brake—nearly causing a supervisor to be\npinned between the tow truck and another vehicle. Incidents\nlike these led one of his supervisors, Lloyd Colbert, to send an\n\fNo. 18-2948 3\n\nemail to some of his coworkers warning that if Smith contin-\nued to work on the road, “someone else will pay the ultimate\nprice.”\n The Department gave Smith negative reviews from the be-\nginning, and its assessments of his performance became pro-\ngressively worse. In a performance evaluation in mid-Sep-\ntember, Smith received two marks of “unsatisfactory.” In Oc-\ntober, one of Smith’s supervisors emailed another saying that\nSmith was “not getting any better and cannot get it.” By the\nend of November, Smith was described as “very behind”\nwhere he ought to have been at his stage of training. The prob-\nlems continued into December: emails between the Depart-\nment employees described him as being argumentative, un-\nstable, reckless, unsafe, and “in no way ready to go on his\nown.” In January, Smith received another performance eval-\nuation, this one giving him unsatisfactory marks in five dif-\nferent categories.\n From Smith’s perspective, however, the Department was\nthe problem. On August 22, 2013, he filed an internal com-\nplaint with the Department asserting that Valle had used\n“abusive language” toward him and that another supervisor,\nZen McHugh, had threatened to fire him for being confronta-\ntional. That same day, Smith also wrote a memorandum to his\nunion representative in which he claimed that the Depart-\nment had discriminated against him because he was black\nand had subjected him to a hostile work environment. In Oc-\ntober, Smith sent another memorandum to the Department.\nThe subject line was “Illegally docked hours from my pay.\nDiscrimination/harassment.” The memorandum claimed that\non October 13, Colbert had told him to sign out two hours be-\nfore he had stopped working, which had the effect of\n\f4 No. 18-2948\n\nwithholding two hours of pay from his paycheck. (He was\neventually compensated for those hours.)\n In December, Smith wrote more memoranda to the De-\npartment complaining about his treatment. Two of them,\ndated December 5 and 6, complained that Colbert had denied\nSmith overtime pay after he responded to a call for assistance\nwith a disabled vehicle late in his shift. He attributed the re-\nfusal to racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. He\nsubmitted two more memoranda in late December. He ad-\ndressed the first—which had the subject line “discrimination\nretaliation”—to a supervisor at the Department. In it, he\nclaimed that he was being treated differently than a fellow\nemployee who had been allowed to work only four hours on\na certain day while Smith had been required to work a full\nday. The second was also addressed to the Department, and\nit requested a shift change due to “discrimination, harass-\nment, retaliation.”\n On December 31, 2013, Smith filed another complaint, this\ntime with the Department’s internal Equal Employment Op-\nportunity office. He listed three dates on which the Depart-\nment had allegedly discriminated and retaliated against him:\nOctober 13, December 5, and December 28. From the record,\nwe know that each of those dates corresponds to a specific in-\ncident. On the first date, Colbert had allegedly docked hours\nfrom his paycheck. On the second, Colbert had allegedly de-\nnied Smith overtime pay. On the third, Roman McGhee, a su-\npervisor, had supposedly yelled and sworn at Smith for say-\ning that he was going to back two cars that had been in an\naccident down a highway ramp. Smith’s complaint did not\noffer his side of those events; it simply stated that he had been\n\fNo. 18-2948 5\n\ntreated differently than another coworker and denied over-\ntime pay.\n On January 3, 2014, the Department sent Smith a “State-\nment of Charges,” which sought to fire him on the ground of\nhis unsatisfactory work performance. On January 16, Smith\nhad a run-in with Colbert, who had recently learned that\nSmith had charged him, along with other supervisors, of ra-\ncial discrimination and retaliation. According to Smith, Col-\nbert, who was also black, was “very angry” and made several\nconfrontational remarks: that there would be “eighty-one of\nus against one of you when we go to trial”; that Smith was\ngoing to lose everything that he owned, including his house\nand car; and that he was a “stupid ass ni[].”\n The Department terminated Smith on January 30, 2014. In\nMarch, Smith sued the Department under Title VII, alleging\nthat it had subjected him to a hostile work environment and\nfired him in retaliation for his complaints about racial dis-\ncrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to\nthe Department, concluding that Smith had not introduced\nenough evidence to permit a jury to decide in his favor on ei-\nther claim.1\n Smith insists that the district court took several wrong\nturns. To begin with, he contends that the court erroneously\nexcluded the testimony of two of his witnesses—Maria Ve-\nronico, an expert, and Marvin Harrison, a former\n\n\n 1 We note that Smith’s counsel failed to include the district court’s\nopinion in the appendix as required by Circuit Rule 30(a)—notwithstand-\ning his certification that he had done so. We do not take either the omis-\nsion or the misrepresentation lightly, and counsel is admonished to ob-\nserve our rules in the future.\n\f6 No. 18-2948\n\nsupervisor—as inadmissible. But even if we disagree with\nhim about that, Smith says, he still has enough evidence to\nmake it to a jury on both his retaliation and hostile work en-\nvironment claims. We discuss each of his arguments below.\n II.\n We begin with the admissibility of Veronico’s expert testi-\nmony, on which Smith relied in his opposition to the Depart-\nment’s motion for summary judgment. Veronico, an expert in\nindustrial relations, testified at her deposition that Smith’s\ntrainers had created a hostile work environment based on his\nrace when they “scolded, ridiculed, and threatened” him; she\nalso opined that the Department had fired Smith for com-\nplaining about racial discrimination. The district court de-\nclined to consider Veronico’s opinion, explaining that it was\nnot based on “sufficient facts or data” as required by Federal\nRule of Evidence 702(b). That decision was well within the\ndistrict court’s discretion.\n Veronico concluded that Smith had been subjected to a\nhostile work environment after reading Smith’s evaluations\nand portions of the Department’s training manual and Em-\nployee Policies Manual. She admitted that even though it was\nher usual practice to interview actors on both sides of a dis-\ncrimination claim, she did not talk to either Smith or his su-\npervisors. Indeed, she did not even bother to review any\nsworn deposition testimony. By Veronico’s own admission,\nher conclusion was based on an incomplete picture—as the\ndistrict court put it, she “omitted a substantial set of facts from\nher analysis, and instead relied only on what appears to be\nplaintiff-curated records.” Veronico’s reliance on an anemic\nand one-sided set of facts casts significant doubt on the\nsoundness of her opinion, and the court did not abuse its\n\fNo. 18-2948 7\n\ndiscretion by excluding it. See Huey v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,\n165 F.3d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1999) (excluding an expert who\n“did not attempt to reconstruct the underlying facts to deter-\nmine whether [the opposing party] had a good explanation …\n[and] did not do anything except talk to [the plaintiff], read\ndocuments [plaintiff's] counsel sent, and write a letter”).\n Veronico’s opinion that the Department retaliated against\nSmith for registering complaints of racial discrimination rests\non even shakier ground. That conclusion was drawn from the\nsame incomplete information that formed the basis of her\nopinion about Smith’s hostile work environment. But the\nopinion about retaliation was undermined still further by Ve-\nronico’s inability to connect the conclusion that she drew to\nthe facts that she had. We have explained before that “[i]t is\ncritical under Rule 702 that there be a link between the facts\nor data the expert has worked with and the conclusion the ex-\npert’s testimony is intended to support.” United States v.\nMamah, 332 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2003). Veronico’s testimony\nlacked that link. She maintains that Smith’s evaluations be-\ncame more negative after he filed his complaints—which\nmight suggest a retaliatory motive that could have inspired\nhis dismissal. But she admitted that she had no information\nabout whether any of these supervisors even knew about\nSmith’s complaints at the time that they submitted negative\nevaluations of his performance. And if the supervisors were\nunaware of the complaints, there would be no reason to sus-\npect that their negative evaluations demonstrated any kind of\nretaliatory motive. In short, Veronico’s opinion was funda-\nmentally flawed, and we affirm the district court’s decision\nthat it was inadmissible.\n\f8 No. 18-2948\n\n III.\n We now turn to the admissibility of an affidavit sworn by\none of Smith’s supervisors, Marvin Harrison, who said sev-\neral things that were helpful to Smith. The district court ruled\nthat Harrison’s affidavit was inadmissible because it lacked a\nproper foundation and was “replete with generalized asser-\ntions.” For instance, the affidavit states that Harrison “wit-\nnessed [Smith] being discriminated against on many different\noccasions by the department and its agents.” But without\nknowing who discriminated, what they did, and when they\ndid it, the court had no way of knowing what to make of this\nevidence. The same problem plagues the affidavit’s assertion\nthat Colbert called Smith the n-word “frequently.” Harrison\ndid not specify whether he heard these slurs himself, nor did\nhe offer any detail about the contexts in which they were ut-\ntered. Without that information, the court could not evaluate\nwhether Harrison was describing events of which he had per-\nsonal knowledge or simply relaying inadmissible hearsay. See\nFED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4) (requiring that affidavits used to sup-\nport or oppose a motion for summary judgment be “made on\npersonal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in\nevidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent\nto testify on the matters stated”). Indeed, the affidavit was so\nvague that even Smith himself concedes that it is at least “par-\ntially true” that it “lacked a proper evidentiary foundation.”\nThe district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to\nconsider Harrison’s affidavit.\n IV.\n To survive summary judgment on his Title VII retaliation\nclaim, Smith must show that a reasonable jury could find that\nhe engaged in a protected activity, that he suffered an adverse\n\fNo. 18-2948 9\n\nemployment action, and that the adverse action was moti-\nvated by a protected activity. Lord v. High Voltage Software,\nInc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). The Department con-\ncedes that Smith engaged in protected activity and that the\ntermination of his employment was an adverse employment\naction. The only dispute is whether the Department termi-\nnated Smith because he complained about racial discrimina-\ntion. We agree with the district court that a reasonable jury\ncould not find in Smith’s favor on this issue.\n To raise an inference that he was fired because of his com-\nplaints rather than because of his performance, Smith main-\ntains that he was fired even though he was meeting the De-\npartment’s legitimate expectations. See Vaughn v. Vilsack, 715\nF.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2013). Yet as we recounted above,\nSmith’s tenure at the Department was distinguished in all the\nwrong ways. He received multiple ratings of “unsatisfactory”\nin two different formal performance reviews. His failings as\nan employee were chronicled in conversations and emails\nfrom a number of different supervisors and coworkers, who\nconsidered him unsafe, argumentative, and unable to follow\ninstructions.\n Smith does not dispute the Department’s long list of griev-\nances against him. But he argues that the district court “cherry\npicked” negative evidence about his employment record to\ncreate a misleading narrative. He points out that in addition\nto bad reviews, he also received some positive feedback from\nsome of his supervisors at the Department. But a smattering\nof decent reviews doesn’t overcome the overwhelming num-\nber of documented problems—including serious safety is-\nsues—that the Department had with Smith’s performance. See\nAnderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir.\n\f10 No. 18-2948\n\n1994) (“The mere submission of materials from a co-worker\nor supervisor indicating that an employee’s performance is\nsatisfactory … does not create a material issue of fact.”). Given\nthe extensive evidence that Smith was not meeting his em-\nployer’s legitimate expectations, a reasonable jury could not\nfind that the Department fired him because of his protected\nactivity rather than for his poor performance.\n V.\n Finally, we address Smith’s hostile work environment\nclaim. A hostile work environment claim contains four ele-\nments: (1) the employee was subject to unwelcome harass-\nment; (2) the harassment was based on a reason forbidden by\nTitle VII—here, race; (3) the harassment was so severe or per-\nvasive that it altered the conditions of employment and cre-\nated a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there\nis a basis for employer liability. Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge\nof the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 804 F.3d 826, 834 (7th Cir.\n2015).\n Smith’s case largely founders on the second prong, be-\ncause the majority of the harassment he identifies was uncon-\nnected to his race. Smith says that Valle, McGhee, and a\ntrainer identified only as “Washington” created a hostile\nwork environment by directing profanity at him. Valle con-\nfronted him and used the f-word several times, in contexts\nlike “shut the f[] up.” McGhee called Smith a “stupid dumb\nmotherf[]” and told him he was going to “kick [his] ass.”\nWashington used the f-word once. As the district court\npointed out, however, Smith fails to connect any of these epi-\nthets to his race. Smith himself acknowledged that Valle was\n“equal opportunity” when it came to dishing out profanity.\nMcGhee’s outburst was connected to a dangerous traffic\n\fNo. 18-2948 11\n\nsituation for which Smith was responsible. And Washington’s\nlone use of the f-word is presented without any context at all.\nWhile the epithets may have made for a crude or unpleasant\nworkplace, “Title VII imposes no ‘general civility code.’”\nVance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 452, (2013) (quoting On-\ncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).\nBecause Smith introduced no evidence that his supervisors\nswore at him because he was black, the profanity that he de-\nscribes does not establish a hostile work environment under\nTitle VII.\n Smith describes one incident, however, that plainly consti-\ntutes race-based harassment: Colbert, one of his former super-\nvisors, called Smith a “stupid ass ni[]” after finding out that\nSmith had filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-\nportunity office. The n-word is an egregious racial epithet.\nNichols v. Mich. City Plant Planning Dep’t, 755 F.3d 594, 601 (7th\nCir. 2014) (“[W]hile there is no ‘magic number of slurs’ that\nindicates a hostile work environment, an ‘unambiguously ra-\ncial epithet falls on the more severe end of the spectrum.’” (ci-\ntation omitted)). That said, Smith can’t win simply by proving\nthat the word was uttered. He must also demonstrate that\nColbert’s use of this word altered the conditions of his em-\nployment and created a hostile or abusive working environ-\nment. Huri, 804 F.3d at 834. And he must make this showing\n“from both a subjective and an objective point of view.” EEOC\nv. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d 618, 625 (7th Cir. 2018). In\nother words, he must show not only that a reasonable person\nwould find the workplace hostile or abusive as a result of Col-\nbert’s slur, but also that he himself perceived it that way. Fa-\nragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).\n\f12 No. 18-2948\n\n We need not address the objective prong of the analysis,\nbecause Smith falters on the subjective prong. He introduced\nno evidence that Colbert’s use of the n-word changed his sub-\njective experience of the workplace. To be sure, Smith testified\nthat his time at the Department caused him psychological dis-\ntress. But that was for reasons that predated his run-in with\nColbert and had nothing to do with his race. His tenure at the\nDepartment was rocky from the outset because of his poor\ntrack record. He clashed with his supervisors over pay, and\nthey confronted him with foul language. As early as August—\nthe first month of his employment—he sent memoranda to\nthe Department complaining of a “hostile work environ-\nment.” On Smith’s own account, his supervisors made him\nmiserable throughout his employment at the Department. But\nas we have already discussed, he has no evidence that his su-\npervisors were lashing out at him because he was black.\n The first incident in which race played a part was his Jan-\nuary 16th run-in with Colbert. By then, things were already at\na breaking point. The Department had initiated termination\nproceedings against Smith two weeks before, so he knew that\nhe was about to be fired. And while things certainly could\nhave gotten worse for Smith after the racially charged con-\nfrontation with Colbert, he offers no evidence that they did.\nInstead, Smith presents the confrontation as yet another in-\nstance of the same ill treatment that he had been receiving all\nalong.\n That won’t do under Title VII. Because the statute does not\ngive employees a remedy for workplace abuse unrelated to a\nprotected characteristic, Smith needs to point to evidence—\neven if in his own testimony—that he suffered harm from Col-\nbert’s race-based harassment that was distinct from the\n\fNo. 18-2948 13\n\ndistress that non-race-based harassment was already causing\nhim. Put differently, Smith has to be able to persuade a jury\nthat Colbert’s race-based harassment was severe enough “to\nalter the conditions of [his] employment.” Huri, 804 F.3d at 834\n(emphasis added). Smith did not even try to make that show-\ning—he points to no evidence that Colbert’s slur caused him\neither additional or different distress. Without evidence that\nColbert’s outburst changed Smith’s subjective experience\nduring his last two weeks at the Department, a reasonable\njury could not resolve the hostile work environment claim in\nSmith’s favor.\n ***\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment to the De-\npartment is AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Terry Smith v. Illinois Department of Transp\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2948\\nTERRY L. SMITH,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:15-cv-02061 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n BARRETT, Circuit Judge. After a rocky probationary period,\\nthe Illinois Department of Transportation discharged its em-\\nployee Terry Smith. Smith sued the Department under Title\\nVII, arguing that it had subjected him to a hostile work envi-\\nronment and fired him in retaliation for his complaints about\\nracial discrimination. The district court granted summary\\njudgment to the Department on both claims, and Smith insists\\nthat it was wrong to do so. He contends that the district court\\n\\f2 No. 18-2948\\n\\nmistakenly concluded that testimony from two of his wit-\\nnesses was inadmissible and that he has enough evidence to\\nmake it to a jury in any event. We disagree and affirm the dis-\\ntrict court.\\n I.\\n Smith began working as an Emergency Traffic Patrol Min-\\nuteman with the Department late in 2013. Minutemen per-\\nform various duties related to traffic and roadways. Smith’s\\nemployment began with a probationary period starting Au-\\ngust 1. To be certified, he had to successfully complete three\\nstages of training over the course of six months. His proba-\\ntionary period did not go well.\\n According to the Department, Smith was far from a model\\nemployee. Early in his training, one of his supervisors re-\\nported that he challenged the instructions that he was given,\\nwhich created a “serious issue” for his training and develop-\\nment. Another supervisor said that Smith regularly “fail[ed]\\nto remember info” and “ha[d] a very hard time following\\nbasic instructions.” Particularly troubling, however, was\\nSmith’s record of unsafe conduct. Once, while driving in an\\nexpress lane with Marcello Valle, one of his supervisors,\\nSmith approached a place where the lanes divided. Valle told\\nhim to pick a lane; instead, Smith stopped short in traffic—\\nonly thirty feet from the concrete pillar dividing the lanes. On\\nanother occasion, Smith drove away from a gas pump with\\nthe nozzle still inserted in the truck. Smith also “almost hit a\\ntrooper police car” on a drive with a supervisor. Most danger-\\nous of all, Smith ignored instructions to put his truck in neu-\\ntral and pull the brake—nearly causing a supervisor to be\\npinned between the tow truck and another vehicle. Incidents\\nlike these led one of his supervisors, Lloyd Colbert, to send an\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 3\\n\\nemail to some of his coworkers warning that if Smith contin-\\nued to work on the road, “someone else will pay the ultimate\\nprice.”\\n The Department gave Smith negative reviews from the be-\\nginning, and its assessments of his performance became pro-\\ngressively worse. In a performance evaluation in mid-Sep-\\ntember, Smith received two marks of “unsatisfactory.” In Oc-\\ntober, one of Smith’s supervisors emailed another saying that\\nSmith was “not getting any better and cannot get it.” By the\\nend of November, Smith was described as “very behind”\\nwhere he ought to have been at his stage of training. The prob-\\nlems continued into December: emails between the Depart-\\nment employees described him as being argumentative, un-\\nstable, reckless, unsafe, and “in no way ready to go on his\\nown.” In January, Smith received another performance eval-\\nuation, this one giving him unsatisfactory marks in five dif-\\nferent categories.\\n From Smith’s perspective, however, the Department was\\nthe problem. On August 22, 2013, he filed an internal com-\\nplaint with the Department asserting that Valle had used\\n“abusive language” toward him and that another supervisor,\\nZen McHugh, had threatened to fire him for being confronta-\\ntional. That same day, Smith also wrote a memorandum to his\\nunion representative in which he claimed that the Depart-\\nment had discriminated against him because he was black\\nand had subjected him to a hostile work environment. In Oc-\\ntober, Smith sent another memorandum to the Department.\\nThe subject line was “Illegally docked hours from my pay.\\nDiscrimination/harassment.” The memorandum claimed that\\non October 13, Colbert had told him to sign out two hours be-\\nfore he had stopped working, which had the effect of\\n\\f4 No. 18-2948\\n\\nwithholding two hours of pay from his paycheck. (He was\\neventually compensated for those hours.)\\n In December, Smith wrote more memoranda to the De-\\npartment complaining about his treatment. Two of them,\\ndated December 5 and 6, complained that Colbert had denied\\nSmith overtime pay after he responded to a call for assistance\\nwith a disabled vehicle late in his shift. He attributed the re-\\nfusal to racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. He\\nsubmitted two more memoranda in late December. He ad-\\ndressed the first—which had the subject line “discrimination\\nretaliation”—to a supervisor at the Department. In it, he\\nclaimed that he was being treated differently than a fellow\\nemployee who had been allowed to work only four hours on\\na certain day while Smith had been required to work a full\\nday. The second was also addressed to the Department, and\\nit requested a shift change due to “discrimination, harass-\\nment, retaliation.”\\n On December 31, 2013, Smith filed another complaint, this\\ntime with the Department’s internal Equal Employment Op-\\nportunity office. He listed three dates on which the Depart-\\nment had allegedly discriminated and retaliated against him:\\nOctober 13, December 5, and December 28. From the record,\\nwe know that each of those dates corresponds to a specific in-\\ncident. On the first date, Colbert had allegedly docked hours\\nfrom his paycheck. On the second, Colbert had allegedly de-\\nnied Smith overtime pay. On the third, Roman McGhee, a su-\\npervisor, had supposedly yelled and sworn at Smith for say-\\ning that he was going to back two cars that had been in an\\naccident down a highway ramp. Smith’s complaint did not\\noffer his side of those events; it simply stated that he had been\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 5\\n\\ntreated differently than another coworker and denied over-\\ntime pay.\\n On January 3, 2014, the Department sent Smith a “State-\\nment of Charges,” which sought to fire him on the ground of\\nhis unsatisfactory work performance. On January 16, Smith\\nhad a run-in with Colbert, who had recently learned that\\nSmith had charged him, along with other supervisors, of ra-\\ncial discrimination and retaliation. According to Smith, Col-\\nbert, who was also black, was “very angry” and made several\\nconfrontational remarks: that there would be “eighty-one of\\nus against one of you when we go to trial”; that Smith was\\ngoing to lose everything that he owned, including his house\\nand car; and that he was a “stupid ass ni[].”\\n The Department terminated Smith on January 30, 2014. In\\nMarch, Smith sued the Department under Title VII, alleging\\nthat it had subjected him to a hostile work environment and\\nfired him in retaliation for his complaints about racial dis-\\ncrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to\\nthe Department, concluding that Smith had not introduced\\nenough evidence to permit a jury to decide in his favor on ei-\\nther claim.1\\n Smith insists that the district court took several wrong\\nturns. To begin with, he contends that the court erroneously\\nexcluded the testimony of two of his witnesses—Maria Ve-\\nronico, an expert, and Marvin Harrison, a former\\n\\n\\n 1 We note that Smith’s counsel failed to include the district court’s\\nopinion in the appendix as required by Circuit Rule 30(a)—notwithstand-\\ning his certification that he had done so. We do not take either the omis-\\nsion or the misrepresentation lightly, and counsel is admonished to ob-\\nserve our rules in the future.\\n\\f6 No. 18-2948\\n\\nsupervisor—as inadmissible. But even if we disagree with\\nhim about that, Smith says, he still has enough evidence to\\nmake it to a jury on both his retaliation and hostile work en-\\nvironment claims. We discuss each of his arguments below.\\n II.\\n We begin with the admissibility of Veronico’s expert testi-\\nmony, on which Smith relied in his opposition to the Depart-\\nment’s motion for summary judgment. Veronico, an expert in\\nindustrial relations, testified at her deposition that Smith’s\\ntrainers had created a hostile work environment based on his\\nrace when they “scolded, ridiculed, and threatened” him; she\\nalso opined that the Department had fired Smith for com-\\nplaining about racial discrimination. The district court de-\\nclined to consider Veronico’s opinion, explaining that it was\\nnot based on “sufficient facts or data” as required by Federal\\nRule of Evidence 702(b). That decision was well within the\\ndistrict court’s discretion.\\n Veronico concluded that Smith had been subjected to a\\nhostile work environment after reading Smith’s evaluations\\nand portions of the Department’s training manual and Em-\\nployee Policies Manual. She admitted that even though it was\\nher usual practice to interview actors on both sides of a dis-\\ncrimination claim, she did not talk to either Smith or his su-\\npervisors. Indeed, she did not even bother to review any\\nsworn deposition testimony. By Veronico’s own admission,\\nher conclusion was based on an incomplete picture—as the\\ndistrict court put it, she “omitted a substantial set of facts from\\nher analysis, and instead relied only on what appears to be\\nplaintiff-curated records.” Veronico’s reliance on an anemic\\nand one-sided set of facts casts significant doubt on the\\nsoundness of her opinion, and the court did not abuse its\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 7\\n\\ndiscretion by excluding it. See Huey v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,\\n165 F.3d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1999) (excluding an expert who\\n“did not attempt to reconstruct the underlying facts to deter-\\nmine whether [the opposing party] had a good explanation …\\n[and] did not do anything except talk to [the plaintiff], read\\ndocuments [plaintiff's] counsel sent, and write a letter”).\\n Veronico’s opinion that the Department retaliated against\\nSmith for registering complaints of racial discrimination rests\\non even shakier ground. That conclusion was drawn from the\\nsame incomplete information that formed the basis of her\\nopinion about Smith’s hostile work environment. But the\\nopinion about retaliation was undermined still further by Ve-\\nronico’s inability to connect the conclusion that she drew to\\nthe facts that she had. We have explained before that “[i]t is\\ncritical under Rule 702 that there be a link between the facts\\nor data the expert has worked with and the conclusion the ex-\\npert’s testimony is intended to support.” United States v.\\nMamah, 332 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2003). Veronico’s testimony\\nlacked that link. She maintains that Smith’s evaluations be-\\ncame more negative after he filed his complaints—which\\nmight suggest a retaliatory motive that could have inspired\\nhis dismissal. But she admitted that she had no information\\nabout whether any of these supervisors even knew about\\nSmith’s complaints at the time that they submitted negative\\nevaluations of his performance. And if the supervisors were\\nunaware of the complaints, there would be no reason to sus-\\npect that their negative evaluations demonstrated any kind of\\nretaliatory motive. In short, Veronico’s opinion was funda-\\nmentally flawed, and we affirm the district court’s decision\\nthat it was inadmissible.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2948\\n\\n III.\\n We now turn to the admissibility of an affidavit sworn by\\none of Smith’s supervisors, Marvin Harrison, who said sev-\\neral things that were helpful to Smith. The district court ruled\\nthat Harrison’s affidavit was inadmissible because it lacked a\\nproper foundation and was “replete with generalized asser-\\ntions.” For instance, the affidavit states that Harrison “wit-\\nnessed [Smith] being discriminated against on many different\\noccasions by the department and its agents.” But without\\nknowing who discriminated, what they did, and when they\\ndid it, the court had no way of knowing what to make of this\\nevidence. The same problem plagues the affidavit’s assertion\\nthat Colbert called Smith the n-word “frequently.” Harrison\\ndid not specify whether he heard these slurs himself, nor did\\nhe offer any detail about the contexts in which they were ut-\\ntered. Without that information, the court could not evaluate\\nwhether Harrison was describing events of which he had per-\\nsonal knowledge or simply relaying inadmissible hearsay. See\\nFED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4) (requiring that affidavits used to sup-\\nport or oppose a motion for summary judgment be “made on\\npersonal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in\\nevidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent\\nto testify on the matters stated”). Indeed, the affidavit was so\\nvague that even Smith himself concedes that it is at least “par-\\ntially true” that it “lacked a proper evidentiary foundation.”\\nThe district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to\\nconsider Harrison’s affidavit.\\n IV.\\n To survive summary judgment on his Title VII retaliation\\nclaim, Smith must show that a reasonable jury could find that\\nhe engaged in a protected activity, that he suffered an adverse\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 9\\n\\nemployment action, and that the adverse action was moti-\\nvated by a protected activity. Lord v. High Voltage Software,\\nInc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). The Department con-\\ncedes that Smith engaged in protected activity and that the\\ntermination of his employment was an adverse employment\\naction. The only dispute is whether the Department termi-\\nnated Smith because he complained about racial discrimina-\\ntion. We agree with the district court that a reasonable jury\\ncould not find in Smith’s favor on this issue.\\n To raise an inference that he was fired because of his com-\\nplaints rather than because of his performance, Smith main-\\ntains that he was fired even though he was meeting the De-\\npartment’s legitimate expectations. See Vaughn v. Vilsack, 715\\nF.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2013). Yet as we recounted above,\\nSmith’s tenure at the Department was distinguished in all the\\nwrong ways. He received multiple ratings of “unsatisfactory”\\nin two different formal performance reviews. His failings as\\nan employee were chronicled in conversations and emails\\nfrom a number of different supervisors and coworkers, who\\nconsidered him unsafe, argumentative, and unable to follow\\ninstructions.\\n Smith does not dispute the Department’s long list of griev-\\nances against him. But he argues that the district court “cherry\\npicked” negative evidence about his employment record to\\ncreate a misleading narrative. He points out that in addition\\nto bad reviews, he also received some positive feedback from\\nsome of his supervisors at the Department. But a smattering\\nof decent reviews doesn’t overcome the overwhelming num-\\nber of documented problems—including serious safety is-\\nsues—that the Department had with Smith’s performance. See\\nAnderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2948\\n\\n1994) (“The mere submission of materials from a co-worker\\nor supervisor indicating that an employee’s performance is\\nsatisfactory … does not create a material issue of fact.”). Given\\nthe extensive evidence that Smith was not meeting his em-\\nployer’s legitimate expectations, a reasonable jury could not\\nfind that the Department fired him because of his protected\\nactivity rather than for his poor performance.\\n V.\\n Finally, we address Smith’s hostile work environment\\nclaim. A hostile work environment claim contains four ele-\\nments: (1) the employee was subject to unwelcome harass-\\nment; (2) the harassment was based on a reason forbidden by\\nTitle VII—here, race; (3) the harassment was so severe or per-\\nvasive that it altered the conditions of employment and cre-\\nated a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there\\nis a basis for employer liability. Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge\\nof the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 804 F.3d 826, 834 (7th Cir.\\n2015).\\n Smith’s case largely founders on the second prong, be-\\ncause the majority of the harassment he identifies was uncon-\\nnected to his race. Smith says that Valle, McGhee, and a\\ntrainer identified only as “Washington” created a hostile\\nwork environment by directing profanity at him. Valle con-\\nfronted him and used the f-word several times, in contexts\\nlike “shut the f[] up.” McGhee called Smith a “stupid dumb\\nmotherf[]” and told him he was going to “kick [his] ass.”\\nWashington used the f-word once. As the district court\\npointed out, however, Smith fails to connect any of these epi-\\nthets to his race. Smith himself acknowledged that Valle was\\n“equal opportunity” when it came to dishing out profanity.\\nMcGhee’s outburst was connected to a dangerous traffic\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 11\\n\\nsituation for which Smith was responsible. And Washington’s\\nlone use of the f-word is presented without any context at all.\\nWhile the epithets may have made for a crude or unpleasant\\nworkplace, “Title VII imposes no ‘general civility code.’”\\nVance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 452, (2013) (quoting On-\\ncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).\\nBecause Smith introduced no evidence that his supervisors\\nswore at him because he was black, the profanity that he de-\\nscribes does not establish a hostile work environment under\\nTitle VII.\\n Smith describes one incident, however, that plainly consti-\\ntutes race-based harassment: Colbert, one of his former super-\\nvisors, called Smith a “stupid ass ni[]” after finding out that\\nSmith had filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-\\nportunity office. The n-word is an egregious racial epithet.\\nNichols v. Mich. City Plant Planning Dep’t, 755 F.3d 594, 601 (7th\\nCir. 2014) (“[W]hile there is no ‘magic number of slurs’ that\\nindicates a hostile work environment, an ‘unambiguously ra-\\ncial epithet falls on the more severe end of the spectrum.’” (ci-\\ntation omitted)). That said, Smith can’t win simply by proving\\nthat the word was uttered. He must also demonstrate that\\nColbert’s use of this word altered the conditions of his em-\\nployment and created a hostile or abusive working environ-\\nment. Huri, 804 F.3d at 834. And he must make this showing\\n“from both a subjective and an objective point of view.” EEOC\\nv. Costco Wholesale Corp., 903 F.3d 618, 625 (7th Cir. 2018). In\\nother words, he must show not only that a reasonable person\\nwould find the workplace hostile or abusive as a result of Col-\\nbert’s slur, but also that he himself perceived it that way. Fa-\\nragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).\\n\\f12 No. 18-2948\\n\\n We need not address the objective prong of the analysis,\\nbecause Smith falters on the subjective prong. He introduced\\nno evidence that Colbert’s use of the n-word changed his sub-\\njective experience of the workplace. To be sure, Smith testified\\nthat his time at the Department caused him psychological dis-\\ntress. But that was for reasons that predated his run-in with\\nColbert and had nothing to do with his race. His tenure at the\\nDepartment was rocky from the outset because of his poor\\ntrack record. He clashed with his supervisors over pay, and\\nthey confronted him with foul language. As early as August—\\nthe first month of his employment—he sent memoranda to\\nthe Department complaining of a “hostile work environ-\\nment.” On Smith’s own account, his supervisors made him\\nmiserable throughout his employment at the Department. But\\nas we have already discussed, he has no evidence that his su-\\npervisors were lashing out at him because he was black.\\n The first incident in which race played a part was his Jan-\\nuary 16th run-in with Colbert. By then, things were already at\\na breaking point. The Department had initiated termination\\nproceedings against Smith two weeks before, so he knew that\\nhe was about to be fired. And while things certainly could\\nhave gotten worse for Smith after the racially charged con-\\nfrontation with Colbert, he offers no evidence that they did.\\nInstead, Smith presents the confrontation as yet another in-\\nstance of the same ill treatment that he had been receiving all\\nalong.\\n That won’t do under Title VII. Because the statute does not\\ngive employees a remedy for workplace abuse unrelated to a\\nprotected characteristic, Smith needs to point to evidence—\\neven if in his own testimony—that he suffered harm from Col-\\nbert’s race-based harassment that was distinct from the\\n\\fNo. 18-2948 13\\n\\ndistress that non-race-based harassment was already causing\\nhim. Put differently, Smith has to be able to persuade a jury\\nthat Colbert’s race-based harassment was severe enough “to\\nalter the conditions of [his] employment.” Huri, 804 F.3d at 834\\n(emphasis added). Smith did not even try to make that show-\\ning—he points to no evidence that Colbert’s slur caused him\\neither additional or different distress. Without evidence that\\nColbert’s outburst changed Smith’s subjective experience\\nduring his last two weeks at the Department, a reasonable\\njury could not resolve the hostile work environment claim in\\nSmith’s favor.\\n ***\\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment to the De-\\npartment is AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3893,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654608,"string":"4,654,608"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Amy Sullivan v. Flora, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2534"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\nAMY LEE SULLIVAN, d/b/a DESIGN KIT,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nFLORA, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellant,\\n Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:15-cv-298 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\\nfirst impression for us on the scope of statutory damages re-\\ncoverable under the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 504(c)(1)\\nof the Act permits a copyright holder “to recover, instead of\\nactual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages\\nfor all infringements involved in the action, with respect to\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nany one work,” with Congress separately instructing that, in\\ndetermining statutory damages, “all the parts of a compila-\\ntion or derivative work constitute one work.” This case re-\\nquires us to determine what constitutes “one work” in a fact\\npattern where a jury found infringement on multiple works\\nregistered in a single copyright application.\\n Amy Sullivan, a graphic design artist, produced a series of\\n33 illustrations for Flora, Inc., an herbal supplement company,\\nto use in two advertising campaigns. Upon noticing that Flora\\nwas using the illustrations in other ads, Sullivan brought suit\\nfor copyright infringement and opted to pursue statutory\\ndamages. She did so to maximize her potential payout by clas-\\nsifying each of her 33 illustrations as “one work” within the\\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act. Flora disagreed,\\ncontending that the illustrations were part of two broader\\ncompilations and thus, if Sullivan prevailed, § 504(c)(1) lim-\\nited her to just two statutory damage awards—one award for\\ninfringement on the illustrations used in each of the two ad-\\nvertising campaigns. The district court agreed with Sullivan,\\nand instructed the jury that she could recover separate awards\\nof statutory damages for 33 acts of infringement on 33 sepa-\\nrate illustrations. The jury found infringement on each of the\\n33 illustrations and returned a statutory damages award of\\n$3.6 million.\\n On appeal Flora challenges the district court’s ruling on\\nstatutory damages and separate rulings on two additional de-\\nfenses to liability asserted at trial. While procedural shortcom-\\nings defeat these latter two challenges, Flora is right that the\\ndistrict court committed error in permitting separate awards\\nof statutory damages unaccompanied by any finding that\\neach or any of the 33 illustrations constituted “one work”\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 3\\n\\nwithin the meaning and protection of § 504(c)(1) of the Copy-\\nright Act. It is neither appropriate nor possible for us to make\\nthat finding on the record before us. So we vacate the judg-\\nment in Sullivan’s favor and remand for further proceedings.\\n I\\n Flora, Inc. manufactures herbal supplement and health\\nproducts. In 2013, looking to produce advertisements for two\\nnew products, “7-Sources” and “Flor-Essence,” the company\\ncontacted freelance production specialist Joseph Silver to de-\\nvelop two animated videos. Unbeknownst to Flora, Silver\\nthen contacted Amy Sullivan, a Wisconsin-based graphic de-\\nsign artist, to develop illustrations that would then be ani-\\nmated for use in the advertisements. In Sullivan’s written\\nagreement with Silver, she granted Flora exclusive rights to\\nher illustrations in the two specified advertising campaigns.\\n Over the following months, Silver and Sullivan corre-\\nsponded to develop the illustrations. Silver made suggestions\\non color, style, and text, while also offering rough outlines\\nand sketches to guide Sullivan’s work. For her part, Sullivan\\nused digital design software to create the ultimate illustra-\\ntions, sometimes incorporating Silver’s suggestions and other\\ntimes not. Flora used Sullivan’s illustrations in its final adver-\\ntisements for the two product lines.\\n At some point in the summer or fall of 2013, Sullivan no-\\nticed that Flora was using her illustrations to promote other\\nproduct lines. Exactly when the unauthorized use occurred is\\nunclear. What the record shows for certain is that, on October\\n16, 2013, Sullivan sent Flora a letter complaining of copyright\\ninfringement. At that time, however, Sullivan had not (yet)\\nregistered her illustrations with the Copyright Office.\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n Sullivan subsequently did so in two copyright applica-\\ntions approved by the U.S. Copyright Office. Registration “VA\\n1-888-930” had an effective date of November 6, 2013 and cov-\\nered the “7 Sources Illustration Collection.” It listed 17 sepa-\\nrate illustrations with names like “Frame7” and “7S-Bottle Il-\\nlustration.” Registration “VA 1-893-717” had an effective date\\nof December 12, 2013 and covered the “FEV Illustration Col-\\nlection,” short for Flor-Essence. It listed 16 separate illustra-\\ntions with names like “Frame-3,” “Herbs,” and “Amy Tex\\nBubble.”\\n When settlement negotiations failed, Sullivan sued Flora\\nfor copyright infringement in the Western District of Wiscon-\\nsin. The Copyright Act allows a plaintiff to choose to recover\\neither statutory damages or actual damages. See 17 U.S.C.\\n§ 504(a). The choice must come before the entry of final judg-\\nment. See id. § 504(c)(1). As the litigation progressed, Sullivan\\nchose to pursue statutory damages, with the parties then stak-\\ning out opposing positions on the scope of a permissible\\naward under § 504(c)(1). These competing positions frame the\\nprimary issue before us on appeal.\\n Flora contended that Sullivan’s 33 illustrations fell into\\none of two compilations (corresponding with the company’s\\ntwo advertising campaigns in which the illustrations ap-\\npeared and also aligning with the two copyright registrations)\\nand thus § 504(c)(1) precluded Sullivan from receiving more\\nthan two separate awards of statutory damages—one for each\\ncompilation infringed. Sullivan begged to differ. She urged\\nthe district court to treat each of the 33 illustrations as 33 sep-\\narate works entitled to 33 separate awards of statutory dam-\\nages upon a showing that Flora infringed each work.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 5\\n\\n Who was right very much mattered, for Congress author-\\nized an award of between $750 and $30,000 in statutory dam-\\nages for each work infringed, and up to $150,000 per work if\\na jury found willful infringement. See id. § 504(c)(2). Put most\\nsimply, Sullivan wanted the copyrighted work multiplier to\\nbe 33 and not two.\\n The district court addressed the issue pretrial. It did so by\\nfocusing on Sullivan’s copyright applications. The certificates\\nfrom the U.S. Copyright Office showed that Sullivan had reg-\\nistered each of the 33 illustrations in two applications, with\\nthe illustrations grouped to correspond with Flora’s two ad-\\nvertised product lines. The Copyright Act and its implement-\\ning regulations allow the registration of multiple works this\\nway. See id. § 408(c)(1) (authorizing the extension of copyright\\nprotection from a single registration to multiple works listed\\nin the registration application); 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4) (same).\\nRelying on these provisions and drawing upon the statute’s\\ndefinition of “collective works,” the district court determined\\nthat “[Sullivan’s] copyrighted works are collective works, in\\nwhich contributions, constituting separate and individual\\nworks in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.”\\nSee 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “collective works” this way).\\nFrom there the district court concluded that “the [33] individ-\\nual illustrations are individual works, entitling Sullivan to\\nseparate statutory damages awards.” The case advanced to\\ntrial against the backdrop of this ruling.\\n Trial proceeded in three phases. In phase one, the court\\ntasked the jury with determining whether Sullivan was the\\nsole author of the copyrighted works, or instead whether Sil-\\nver was a joint author capable of granting his own rights to\\nFlora. In phase two, the jury considered whether Flora copied\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nand used Sullivan’s illustrations without authorization. In\\nphase three, the jury determined what statutory damages re-\\nsulted from the infringement.\\n The jury ruled in Sullivan’s favor at each phase. In phases\\none and two, the jury determined that Flora had copied and\\nused Sullivan’s illustrations willfully and without authoriza-\\ntion and furthermore that the works were not joint works but\\ninstead belonged to Sullivan alone. At phase three, the jury\\nawarded $3,600,000 in statutory damages, finding that Flora\\nwillfully infringed on each of Sullivan’s 33 individual illustra-\\ntions. The jury also found $143,500 in actual damages, which\\nSullivan declined in favor of the larger statutory award.\\n II\\n Flora’s main contention on appeal is that the district court\\ncommitted legal error in determining that Sullivan could col-\\nlect statutory damages for infringement on each of the 33 il-\\nlustrations as separate works. Sullivan urges us to avoid the\\nissue on the basis that Flora waived any challenge to the dam-\\nages award by not expressly objecting to the district court’s\\njury instruction. We cannot agree. While Flora could have ob-\\njected, the fairest reading of the record is that the company—\\nthroughout the litigation—had made its position on statutory\\ndamages abundantly clear, including by briefing the issue\\nduring the pretrial proceeding that resulted in the district\\ncourt’s determinative ruling. The law required no more in this\\ncircumstance. See Dresser Industries, Inc., Waukesha Engine Div.\\nv. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1450 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining\\nthat the failure to object to a jury instruction embodying a le-\\ngal determination “may be disregarded if the party’s position\\nhad previously been clearly made to the court and it is plain\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 7\\n\\nthat a further objection would be unavailing”). So we proceed\\nto the merits.\\n A\\n The scope of statutory damages available to Sullivan turns\\non § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act:\\n [T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time be-\\n fore final judgment is rendered, to recover, in-\\n stead of actual damages and profits, an award\\n of statutory damages for all infringements in-\\n volved in the action, with respect to any one work,\\n for which any one infringer is liable individu-\\n ally, or for which any two or more infringers are\\n liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less\\n than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court con-\\n siders just. For the purposes of this subsection, all\\n the parts of a compilation or derivative work consti-\\n tute one work.\\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (emphasis added).\\n By its terms, § 504(c)(1) limits a plaintiff’s recovery to one\\naward of statutory damages for each work infringed. Put an-\\nother way, Congress focused the inquiry on the number of\\nprotected works infringed, not the number of infringements.\\nSee Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int’l Ltd., 996 F.2d\\n1366, 1381 (2d Cir. 1993). In doing so, Congress imposed the\\nadditional limitation that, in awarding statutory damages,\\neach part of a compilation shall be considered “one work.”\\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). In construing § 504(c)(1), it is therefore\\nessential to determine not only what constitutes “one\\nwork”—a term Congress left undefined in the Copyright\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nAct—but also when multiple works combine to form a “com-\\npilation,” a term Congress did define in the statute.\\n In copyright law, a “work”—as its name implies—reflects\\nan original expression, whether in the form of art, literature,\\nmusic, or another tangible medium of expression, that may be\\nentitled to protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). An artist seeking\\ncopyright protection for multiple works can do so in a single\\nregistration application. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1) (allowing for\\na single registration for a group of related works); 37 C.F.R.\\n§ 202.3(b)(4) (same); see also 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David\\nNimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.18(c) (Rev. Ed. 2019) (dis-\\ncussing the Copyright Act’s flexible approach in allowing a\\nsingle registration for multiple works). The Copyright Office’s\\ngranting such a single application results in each registered\\nwork receiving copyright protection. See Wildlife Express Corp.\\nv. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 507, 508 (7th Cir. 1994)\\n(explaining that “[a] certificate of registration from the U.S.\\nRegister of Copyrights constitutes prima facie evidence of the\\nvalidity of a copyright” and “[a]n owner of a copyright is pro-\\ntected against unauthorized copying”). Sullivan charted this\\nexact course here, applying to protect what she called “illus-\\ntration collections” and receiving two certificates of registra-\\ntion from the Copyright Office. These certificates resulted in\\nSullivan’s 33 illustrations being registered and therefore hav-\\ning copyright protection.\\n The district court began and ended its analysis of the stat-\\nutory damages question with this same observation. It put its\\nruling on the scope of statutory damages this way:\\n Based on the undisputed fact that plaintiff reg-\\n istered her two illustration collections as a col-\\n lective or group work under 17 U.S.C.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 9\\n\\n § 408(c)(1) and 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)(i), and that\\n that identification appears appropriate—or, at\\n least, defendant [Flora] has failed to explain\\n why the copyrighted works do not appropri-\\n ately fall within that designation—the court\\n conclude[s] that the copyrighted works are col-\\n lective works, in which contributions, constitut-\\n ing separate and individual works in themselves, are\\n assembled into a collective whole.\\n(Dkt. 240 at 1) (emphasis in the original). The court reinforced\\nits ruling when instructing the jury on the scope of statutory\\ndamages it could award Sullivan upon findings of infringe-\\nment by Flora, explaining that “for purposes of considering a\\nstatutory damages award, you may consider each illustration\\nin the 7 Sources illustration collection and the Flor-Essence il-\\nlustration collection as an independent, copyrighted work.”\\n The district court drifted off course in seeing the 33 illus-\\ntrations as “collective works” without first asking, as\\n§ 504(c)(1) requires, whether each illustration constituted\\n“one work” or instead combined to form a “compilation.” The\\nmisstep becomes apparent upon recognizing that Congress,\\nin defining “compilation” in § 101 of the Copyright Act, made\\nclear that the term “includes collective works.” So the conse-\\nquence of the district court characterizing the 33 illustrations\\nas “collective works” was that the illustrations then also con-\\nstituted a “compilation” and thus, by operation of § 504(c)(1),\\n“all the parts of a compilation”—each of Sullivan’s 33 illustra-\\ntions—“constitute one work.” But that conclusion is at odds\\nwith the district court also determining that the Copyright Act\\nauthorized the jury to return 33 separate awards of statutory\\ndamages for infringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n The knot untangles by returning to the language of\\n§ 504(c)(1). The key distinction in § 504(c)(1) is not between a\\ncompilation and a collective work—indeed, § 101’s definition\\nmakes plain that the former includes the latter—but instead\\nbetween “one work” and a “compilation.” Or, stated another\\nway, the proper inquiry under § 504(c)(1) asks whether Sulli-\\nvan’s 33 illustrations constitute 33 individual works or in-\\nstead are parts of two compilations (corresponding with the\\ntwo advertising campaigns in which Flora used the illustra-\\ntions). The district court stopped short of asking this question\\n(or putting it to the jury) by giving controlling weight to the\\nfact that Sullivan registered her illustrations as a group and\\ntherefore protected each of the 33 illustrations. That observa-\\ntion, while reflecting an accurate understanding of the regis-\\ntration process, does not resolve the scope of statutory dam-\\nages available to Sullivan. That answer, we conclude, must\\ncome by parsing § 504(c)(1) and distinguishing between a\\nwork and a compilation.\\n Identifying the right question is easier than knowing the\\nright answer, though. And this is where we benefit from not\\nbeing the first court to consider the scope of statutory dam-\\nages available under § 504(c)(1)—and, more specifically, the\\nmeaning of “one work.”\\n B\\n Other circuits seem to follow one of two approaches in an-\\nswering the question presented, though the dividing lines are\\nfar from absolute. Start with the Second Circuit and its deci-\\nsion in Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.\\n2010). The case entailed allegations of infringement on two\\ncopyrighted music albums, each with ten songs, and the par-\\nties disputing whether statutory damages should be\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 11\\n\\nmeasured on a per-album or per-song basis. The court ob-\\nserved that each song had separate copyright protection and,\\nin addition to being sold as part of an album, could be pur-\\nchased individually through retailers like iTunes. See id. at\\n138. Even when bought individually, however, the songs re-\\nmained part of and indeed were produced and marketed as\\nan album. That fact resolved the statutory damages question\\nbecause, as the court saw it, “[a]n album falls within the Act’s\\nexpansive definition of compilation.” Id. at 140. “Based on a\\nplain reading of the statute,” the reasoning followed, “in-\\nfringement of an album should result in only one statutory\\ndamage award.” Id. at 141. More to it, the court emphasized,\\nthe “[Copyright] Act [in § 504(c)(1)] specifically states that all\\nparts of a compilation must be treated as one work for pur-\\nposes of calculating statutory damages.” Id. at 142. And,\\ndrawing reinforcement from the Copyright Act’s definition of\\ncompilation, the Second Circuit added that “[t]he fact that\\neach song may have received a separate copyright is irrele-\\nvant to this analysis.” Id. at 141.\\n In so holding, the Second Circuit distinguished its prior\\ndecision in Twin Peaks Productions v. Publications International,\\nwhere the court held that eight distinct statutory damages\\nawards were available for infringement on the copyrighted\\nscripts of eight television episodes that the defendant later\\ncombined into a single book. 996 F.2d 1366, 1381 (2d Cir.\\n1993). Separate awards of statutory damages were appropri-\\nate in Twin Peaks, the Bryant court subsequently explained, be-\\ncause “the plaintiff had issued the works separately, as inde-\\npendent television episodes,” and it was “the defendant [who]\\nprinted eight teleplays from the series in one book.” 603 F.3d\\nat 141. Even though each episode of Twin Peaks contributed\\nto the drama’s broader plot, which unfolded over the course\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nof a season, the fact remained that the episodes aired at sepa-\\nrate times and, in this way, stood on their own enough to\\navoid being grouped with the other episodes and thus con-\\nsidered a compilation within the meaning of the Copyright\\nAct. The upshot, then, was that the plaintiff in Twin Peaks was\\nentitled to eight separate statutory damage awards for each\\ninfringed episode. See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1381; see also\\nWB Music Corp. v. RTC Communication Grp., Inc., 445 F.3d 538,\\n540–41 (2d Cir. 2006) (following the same approach and re-\\nversing the district court’s limitation of a plaintiff’s statutory\\ndamages on a per-album basis).\\n The Second Circuit’s approach—embodied, as we see it, in\\nits most recent decision in Bryant—gives controlling weight to\\nthe last sentence of § 504(c)(1), where Congress directed that,\\nfor purposes of assessing statutory damages, “all the parts of\\na compilation or derivative work constitute one work.” The\\napproach has a limiting effect. Take, for instance, the song-\\nwriter who produces an album, registers the album under the\\ngroup registration process made available by 17 U.S.C.\\n§ 408(c)(1), only then to learn someone infringed multiple\\ntracks. The artist would be entitled to one and only one award\\nof statutory damages because “it is the copyright holders who\\nissued their works as ‘compilations’; they chose to issue Al-\\nbums,” instead of producing each song as independent sin-\\ngles. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141. The Second Circuit’s approach,\\nin short, places dispositive weight on the songwriter’s bun-\\ndling of songs—protected though they may be at the individ-\\nual level—into an album. It is the production and publication\\nof each song as part of an album that limits the songwriter’s\\nrecovery to one award of statutory damages no matter the in-\\nfringement that may have occurred at the level of any indi-\\nvidual song.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 13\\n\\n Recognizing this limitation, most other circuits have inter-\\npreted § 504(c)(1) a different way. A good illustration comes\\nfrom the First Circuit’s decision in Gamma Audio & Video, Inc.\\nv. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1118 (1st Cir. 1993). The court there\\nconsidered how to award statutory damages for infringement\\non four episodes of the television series Jade Fox, where the\\nepisodes had been registered together on one copyright cer-\\ntificate and later rented or sold in sets containing multiple ep-\\nisodes. Construing § 504(c)(1), the court adopted what it\\ncalled an “independent economic value test” to determine if\\neach episode of Jade Fox had copyright value unto itself and\\nwas therefore an independent work—in statutory terms, “one\\nwork”—for purposes of awarding statutory damages. Id. at\\n1116–17.\\n The First Circuit explained that such a substantive eco-\\nnomic inquiry better reflected the value of each episode and\\ngave effect to not only the language Congress used in\\n§ 504(c)(1), but also the absence on a broader level of anything\\nin “either the statute or the corresponding regulations that\\nprecludes a copyright owner from registering the copyrights\\nin multiple works on a single registration form while still col-\\nlecting an award of statutory damages for the infringement\\non each work’s copyright.” Id. at 1117. Applying the test, the\\nFirst Circuit determined that the evidence before it supported\\na finding that each episode of Jade Fox, although plainly part\\nof a television series, constituted an independent work enti-\\ntled to its own award of statutory damages. See id. at 1117–18.\\n The Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits follow the First Cir-\\ncuit’s approach. See, e.g., VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d\\n723, 747 (9th Cir. 2019) (adhering to its discussion in Columbia\\nPictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Bd. of Birmingham, Inc.,\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n259 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) and explaining that “the question\\nof whether something—like a photo, television episode, or so\\nforth—has ‘independent economic value’ informs our analy-\\nsis of whether the photo or episode is a work” within the\\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1)); MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d\\n766, 769 (11th Cir. 1996) (employing the same test to deter-\\nmine “whether each expression has an independent economic\\nvalue and is, in itself, viable”); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell,\\n897 F.2d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (asking whether certain cop-\\nyrighted materials are “distinct, viable works with separate\\neconomic value and copyright lives” to determine the scope\\nof available statutory damages under § 504(c)(1)).\\n The Fourth Circuit is the only other circuit to have consid-\\nered the question presented. Its answer came with mixed sig-\\nnals, following the Second Circuit’s approach in Bryant but\\nsuggesting different facts may fit with a different construction\\nof § 504(c)(1). See Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., 323 F.3d 279, 285\\n(4th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier,\\nInc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). In Xoom, the court deter-\\nmined that two collections of numerous digital images, pro-\\ntected under two copyright registrations, were compilations\\nand thus only subject to two statutory damages awards under\\n§ 504(c)(1). See id. at 285 n.8 (explaining that “Imageline is en-\\ntitled to one award of statutory damages per work infringed\\nbecause SuperBundle and Master Gallery are compilations or\\nderivative works in which Imageline holds copyrights”). At an-\\nother point in its opinion, however, the Fourth Circuit ap-\\npeared to agree that “the Copyright Act does not bar multiple\\nawards for statutory damages when one registration includes\\nmultiple works.” Id. at 285. This qualification is substantial\\nand seems to suggest the Fourth Circuit may chart a different\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 15\\n\\ncourse—perhaps the one followed by most other circuits—on\\ndifferent facts.\\n C\\n Section 504(c)(1) is hardly a model of clarity, especially\\nwhen considering, as we are here, infringement of multiple\\nprotected works and a plaintiff seeking multiple, separate\\nawards of statutory damages. It is not at all surprising that\\ntwo approaches find recognition in the caselaw of other cir-\\ncuits. In the end, we conclude, in closer keeping with the ap-\\nproach of the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, that\\n§ 504(c)(1) requires courts confronted with circumstances\\nwith multiple works and multiple infringements to deter-\\nmine, or to charge a jury with fact finding tailored to answer-\\ning, whether the protected works have value only in and\\nthrough their composite whole (and thus meet the definition\\nof a “compilation” in § 101) or instead have standalone value\\nat the level of “one work.” A protected work has standalone\\nvalue if the evidence shows that work has distinct and dis-\\ncernable value to the copyright holder. See Gamma Audio,\\n11 F.3d at 1116 (explaining that “separate copyrights are not\\ndistinct ‘works’ unless they can live their own copyright\\nlife”—a viability determination that turns on whether the\\nwork in question has independent economic value); see also\\nFeltner, 89 F.3d at 769; Walt Disney Co., 897 F.2d at 569.\\n The question at the heart of the Second Circuit’s more lim-\\nited approach in Bryant—which focuses on whether the cop-\\nyright holder marketed and distributed the multiple pro-\\ntected works as individual works or as a compendium of\\nworks (like, for example, an album)—is certainly relevant to\\nthe inquiry we believe Congress has required in § 504(c)(1).\\nBut we also believe the inquiry needs to extend further to\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\ndiscern and give more fulsome effect to the distinction Con-\\ngress drew in the text of § 504(c)(1) between “one work” and\\na “compilation.” See Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP,\\n795 F.3d 1255, 1281 (11th Cir. 2015) (employing a similar ap-\\nproach to discerning whether multiple photos constituted a\\ncompilation or individual works). To stop at the Second Cir-\\ncuit’s inquiry does not allow a possibility Congress made\\navailable in § 504(c)(1)—a situation where a copyright holder\\nencounters infringement on multiple works available in the\\nmarket as a group but where discernable value lies at the level\\nof a particular individual work—for example, at the level of a\\nparticular photo or song which, although released as part of\\nan album, is likewise marketed and available at the individual\\nlevel. Sellers regularly allow buyers to acquire a part of a\\nwhole and the market assigns value accordingly.\\n The inquiry and fact finding demanded by § 504(c)(1) is\\nmore functional than formal, taking account of the economic\\nvalue, if any, of a protected work more than the fact that the\\nprotection came about by an artist registering multiple works\\nin a single application. The necessary finding requires a focus\\non where the market assigns value. By way of an analogy, im-\\nperfect though it may be, think in the first instance of the mul-\\ntiple protected works as a quilt and then ask whether any one\\nindividual patch has discernable, independent economic\\nvalue—whether once separated from the quilt a particular\\npatch lives its own copyright life (as “one work”)—or instead\\nwhether the value lies in the patches’ combined assembly into\\nthe quilt as a whole (as a “compilation”).\\n Our analysis must end here, though, as the record as it\\npresently stands does not allow us to resolve as a factual mat-\\nter whether all or part of Sullivan’s 33 illustrations are\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 17\\n\\nseparate works with distinct and discernable value or part of\\ntwo broader compilations. The district court did not ask (or\\nput to the jury) the questions we see as necessary for resolving\\nthe statutory damages question. See VHT, Inc., 918 F.3d at 748\\n(remanding on similar reasoning for additional fact finding).\\n This error requires us to vacate the judgment in Sullivan’s\\nfavor. Our doing so in no way calls the jury’s findings of in-\\nfringement into question. On remand the district court will\\nhave ample flexibility to structure the proceedings to enable\\nthe requisite findings pertinent to statutory damages.\\n III\\n Invoking an altogether different provision of the Copy-\\nright Act, Flora advances a separate and independent chal-\\nlenge to the jury’s statutory damages award based on the tim-\\ning of the company’s infringement on Sullivan’s copyrighted\\nworks. The district court determined that Flora waived this\\nchallenge by raising it much too late at trial. We agree.\\n Section 412 of the Copyright Act prohibits an award of\\nstatutory damages for “any infringement of a copyright in an\\nunpublished work commenced before the effective dates of\\nregistration.” 17 U.S.C. § 412(1). By its terms, § 412 imposes a\\nbar to recovering statutory damages if a defendant can show\\nthat any infringement began before the registration of the\\nworks in question.\\n Neither the district court nor jury ever considered the tim-\\ning bar imposed by § 412. The reason is because Flora raised\\nthe § 412 limitation for the first time during the third and final\\nphase of trial—the damages phase—and even then, only at a\\nside bar on an unrelated issue. Flora’s doing so surprised the\\ndistrict judge, as the position marked a substantial shift in the\\n\\f18 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\ncompany’s trial strategy. All along Flora had sought to avoid\\nliability based on the defense of joint authorship—by arguing\\nthat Silver and Sullivan jointly created each of the 33 illustra-\\ntions—and thus that the company (through Silver’s joint own-\\nership) could not possibly be liable for infringement. By in-\\nvoking § 412 and advancing a timing defense, Flora changed\\ncourse, recognizing (undoubtedly in response to the jury’s\\nverdict in phase two) that it had infringed on Sullivan’s works\\nbut arguing that the infringement began before she had regis-\\ntered the illustrations. In Flora’s view, the timing of the in-\\nfringement—before Sullivan’s registration—triggered the ap-\\nplication of § 412 to bar any award of statutory damages.\\n The district judge reacted to Flora’s raising this § 412 ar-\\ngument when it did with meaningful frustration. The court\\nrightly underscored that Flora made no mention of any § 412\\ndefense in its answer, motion to dismiss, or request for sum-\\nmary judgment. Nor, the district court added, did Flora ever\\nsay a word about any possible § 412 bar at the jury charge\\nconference—at a time when the court and parties could have\\nconsidered how to put the infringement-timing question to\\nthe jury. Indeed, when asked directly whether either party\\nhad concerns with the jury instruction on statutory damages,\\ncounsel for Flora responded, “None, Your Honor.”\\n As the district court saw it, then, Flora waited to pursue\\nand raise its newfound § 412 defense until the close of evi-\\ndence and thus well after either party could have structured\\nits presentation of evidence—as to liability and defenses\\nalike—to address the timing predicate on which application\\nof the damages bar hinges. Or, as the district judge put the\\npoint, “by sitting on its challenge until the end of the evi-\\ndence, defendant left plaintiff and the court to believe that it\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 19\\n\\nhad conceded this requirement for an award of statutory\\ndamages.” Accordingly, the district court concluded that\\nFlora had waived any § 412 timing defense.\\n We see no error in the district court’s conclusion, in no\\nsmall part because § 412 operates akin to an affirmative\\ndefense that Flora should have raised far earlier in the\\nproceedings. Waiting this long resulted in waiver. See Carr v.\\nO’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1126 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a\\nparty’s unreasonable delay in advancing an argument “is\\nnormally a compelling ground for deeming even a good\\nground waived”). Our cases are clear that waiver, not\\nforfeiture, occurs when a defendant waits until the eleventh\\nhour or beyond to raise an affirmative defense and in doing\\nso prejudices the opposing party. See Reed v. Columbia St.\\nMary’s Hosp., 915 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 2019). “Allowing a\\nlast-minute defense that introduces new factual and legal\\nissues after discovery has closed,” we have emphasized,\\n“raises the costs of litigation and allows the party that was at\\nleast negligent in failing to plead its defense to take unfair\\nadvantage of its opposing party.” Id.\\n It is hard to see what happened here any other way than\\nthe district judge put it: for whatever reason, strategic or in-\\nadvertent, Flora waited to raise its timing-of-infringement de-\\nfense until the jury had already found infringement, leaving\\nthe trial record altogether missing evidence on precisely when\\nthe infringement began—the lynchpin inquiry under § 412.\\nWithout any notice that this change of course was coming,\\nSullivan had no reason to believe her infringement claim may\\nrise or fall on evidence pinpointing the timing of Flora’s in-\\nfringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\\n\\f20 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n In these circumstances, we cannot say the district court\\nwas wrong to conclude that “Flora, at minimum, needed to put\\nthe timing requirement of § 412 in issue by timely challenging\\nit” and its failure to do so constituted waiver.\\n IV\\n Flora’s final effort on appeal to avoid liability comes in its\\ncontention that the district court erred in not setting aside the\\njury’s verdict on the basis that the trial evidence showed be-\\nyond dispute that Silver and Sullivan were joint authors of the\\n33 illustrations. Here too, though, Flora runs into waiver, as\\nthe company failed to present this challenge to the district\\ncourt in response to the jury’s adverse verdict. The pathway\\nto that conclusion is straightforward.\\n Joint authorship is a defense to copyright infringement.\\nSee Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau,\\n576 F.3d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 2009). The defense, as its name im-\\nplies, turns on whether two or more authors jointly created\\nthe work in question. If so, they hold undivided interests in\\nthe work and the underlying rights are shared and not exclu-\\nsive to one or the other authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); Janky,\\n576 F.3d at 361 (“The benefits of co-authorship are therefore\\nsignificant: each author may use or license the joint work.”).\\n Throughout the pretrial proceedings, Flora sought to\\nshow that Joseph Silver’s contributions to Sullivan’s illustra-\\ntions resulted in joint authorship, which in turn would have\\nallowed Silver to authorize Flora’s use of the illustrations,\\neliminating the basis for infringement. A copyright owner\\ncannot infringe its own work. Flora continued to advance the\\njoint authorship defense at trial, moving, for example, on day\\ntwo for judgment as a matter of law on the issue. See Fed. R.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 21\\n\\nCiv. P. 50(a). The district court denied the motion, and the\\ncase went to the jury. In finding infringement, the jury ex-\\npressly found (and so answered on the verdict form) that\\nFlora had not carried its burden of showing that the illustra-\\ntions were the result of a joint effort by Silver and Sullivan.\\n But Flora never renewed its challenge at any point after\\nthe jury returned its verdict in Sullivan’s favor. And therein\\nlies the problem. Flora insists on appeal that the district court\\nerred in not keeping the joint authorship question from the\\njury and failing to grant its Rule 50(a) motion on the issue. Yet\\nthis contention runs headlong into the well-settled precept\\nthat “a court of appeals may not award judgment due to in-\\nsufficiency of the evidence where no Rule 50(b) motion was\\nfiled after the verdict.” Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 448 F.3d 936,\\n938 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann\\nIns. Co., 861 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 2017) (making clear that for\\na party to seek judgment on appeal, “the requesting party\\nmust not only have filed a motion under Rule 50(a), but must\\nalso have renewed that motion under Rule 50(b)”).\\n The demands of Rule 50(b) serve a sound purpose. As the\\nSupreme Court has emphasized, the “determination of\\nwhether a new trial should be granted or a judgment entered\\nunder Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of\\nthe judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel\\nof the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.”\\nUnitherm v. Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394,\\n401 (2006). This explains why our caselaw is unyielding in\\nrequiring a party who believes a jury’s verdict lacks a\\nsufficient evidentiary basis to raise that challenge in the\\ndistrict court. It is not enough to rest on having made a pre-\\nverdict sufficiency-of-evidence challenge under Rule 50(a).\\n\\f22 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n To excuse its failure to move under Rule 50(b) following\\nthe jury’s adverse verdict, Flora argues that we have discre-\\ntion on appeal to consider pure questions of law. But the ques-\\ntion of joint authorship is not a pure question of law: answer-\\ning whether two or more individuals or entities contributed\\nenough to a work to result in joint authorship requires con-\\nsideration of facts. And this is precisely why other courts have\\nrecognized, properly in our view, that the question is one for\\na jury to consider guided by an instruction from the district\\ncourt. See Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, 290\\nF.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that in a copyright case,\\n“[a]uthorship is generally a question of fact for the jury”).\\nHaving failed to lodge a post-verdict challenge under Rule\\n50(b), Flora waived the very issue it now wants us to review.\\nWe cannot do so.\\n Even if Flora had not waived its joint authorship chal-\\nlenge, we would be quick to conclude that the jury reasonably\\nfound Sullivan was the sole author of the 33 illustrations in\\nquestion. The jury received evidence of the contributions of\\nboth Silver and Sullivan and viewed both of the copyright reg-\\nistrations submitted solely in Sullivan’s name. The district\\ncourt also properly instructed the jury that “[a] ‘joint work’ is\\na work that two or more persons prepared with the intention\\nthat their contributions be merged into inseparable elements\\nof a single work.” This instruction mirrored the Copyright\\nAct’s definition of a “joint work.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. It also\\naligns precisely with what we have described as the attributes\\nof a joint work. See Janky, 576 F.3d at 362 (explaining that a\\njoint work requires “(1) intent to create a joint work; and (2)\\ncontribution of independently copyrightable material”).\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 23\\n\\n Asked whether a preponderance of the evidence demon-\\nstrated that the copyrighted illustrations were joint works, the\\njury answered in the negative, finding that Sullivan was the\\nsole author. We cannot say this was an unreasonable result in\\nlight of the evidence presented. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d\\n331, 335 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that we will “overturn a\\njury verdict for the plaintiff only if we conclude that no ra-\\ntional jury could have found for the plaintiff”).\\n V\\n We conclude with a brief word in response to Sullivan’s\\ncross appeal challenging the district court’s refusal to award\\nattorneys’ fees. Our review is limited to whether the district\\ncourt’s ruling reflected an abuse of discretion. See Gastineau v.\\nWright, 592 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The Copyright Act affords a district court discretion in\\nawarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an infringe-\\nment case. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (explaining that “the court in its\\ndiscretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any\\nparty” in an infringement case) (emphasis added). The Su-\\npreme Court offered further guidance in Fogerty v. Fantasy,\\nInc., outlining a series of factors for courts to consider when\\nawarding fees. 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) (setting out a se-\\nries of nonexclusive factors, including frivolousness, motiva-\\ntion, objective unreasonableness of factual or legal positions,\\nand considerations of compensation and deterrence).\\n In denying Sullivan’s fee application, the district court rea-\\nsoned well within the discretion afforded by Congress. Con-\\nsidering the factors outlined in Fogerty, the court saw the case\\nas close on the merits and hard fought by the parties. From\\nthere the district court underscored that Sullivan had won a\\n\\f24 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nsubstantial verdict that would be costly for Flora to satisfy\\nand that, when balancing the totality of what occurred in the\\nlitigation, an additional award of fees was neither required\\nnor appropriate, especially in light of the reasonableness of\\nthe joint authorship defense Flora pressed at trial. Or, in the\\ndistrict court’s own words, “no further compensation or de-\\nterrence in the form of an attorneys’ fee award [was] neces-\\nsary.” We cannot call the district court’s reasoning an abuse\\nof discretion and therefore affirm its denial of Sullivan’s fee\\napplication.\\n * * *\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM in part and otherwise\\nVACATE the judgment in Sullivan’s favor and REMAND to\\nthe district court for further proceedings consistent with this\\nopinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431861/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654608/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Amy Sullivan v. Flora, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\nAMY LEE SULLIVAN, d/b/a DESIGN KIT,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n Cross-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nFLORA, INC.,\n Defendant-Appellant,\n Cross-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:15-cv-298 — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\nfirst impression for us on the scope of statutory damages re-\ncoverable under the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 504(c)(1)\nof the Act permits a copyright holder “to recover, instead of\nactual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages\nfor all infringements involved in the action, with respect to\n\f2 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\nany one work,” with Congress separately instructing that, in\ndetermining statutory damages, “all the parts of a compila-\ntion or derivative work constitute one work.” This case re-\nquires us to determine what constitutes “one work” in a fact\npattern where a jury found infringement on multiple works\nregistered in a single copyright application.\n Amy Sullivan, a graphic design artist, produced a series of\n33 illustrations for Flora, Inc., an herbal supplement company,\nto use in two advertising campaigns. Upon noticing that Flora\nwas using the illustrations in other ads, Sullivan brought suit\nfor copyright infringement and opted to pursue statutory\ndamages. She did so to maximize her potential payout by clas-\nsifying each of her 33 illustrations as “one work” within the\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act. Flora disagreed,\ncontending that the illustrations were part of two broader\ncompilations and thus, if Sullivan prevailed, § 504(c)(1) lim-\nited her to just two statutory damage awards—one award for\ninfringement on the illustrations used in each of the two ad-\nvertising campaigns. The district court agreed with Sullivan,\nand instructed the jury that she could recover separate awards\nof statutory damages for 33 acts of infringement on 33 sepa-\nrate illustrations. The jury found infringement on each of the\n33 illustrations and returned a statutory damages award of\n$3.6 million.\n On appeal Flora challenges the district court’s ruling on\nstatutory damages and separate rulings on two additional de-\nfenses to liability asserted at trial. While procedural shortcom-\nings defeat these latter two challenges, Flora is right that the\ndistrict court committed error in permitting separate awards\nof statutory damages unaccompanied by any finding that\neach or any of the 33 illustrations constituted “one work”\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 3\n\nwithin the meaning and protection of § 504(c)(1) of the Copy-\nright Act. It is neither appropriate nor possible for us to make\nthat finding on the record before us. So we vacate the judg-\nment in Sullivan’s favor and remand for further proceedings.\n I\n Flora, Inc. manufactures herbal supplement and health\nproducts. In 2013, looking to produce advertisements for two\nnew products, “7-Sources” and “Flor-Essence,” the company\ncontacted freelance production specialist Joseph Silver to de-\nvelop two animated videos. Unbeknownst to Flora, Silver\nthen contacted Amy Sullivan, a Wisconsin-based graphic de-\nsign artist, to develop illustrations that would then be ani-\nmated for use in the advertisements. In Sullivan’s written\nagreement with Silver, she granted Flora exclusive rights to\nher illustrations in the two specified advertising campaigns.\n Over the following months, Silver and Sullivan corre-\nsponded to develop the illustrations. Silver made suggestions\non color, style, and text, while also offering rough outlines\nand sketches to guide Sullivan’s work. For her part, Sullivan\nused digital design software to create the ultimate illustra-\ntions, sometimes incorporating Silver’s suggestions and other\ntimes not. Flora used Sullivan’s illustrations in its final adver-\ntisements for the two product lines.\n At some point in the summer or fall of 2013, Sullivan no-\nticed that Flora was using her illustrations to promote other\nproduct lines. Exactly when the unauthorized use occurred is\nunclear. What the record shows for certain is that, on October\n16, 2013, Sullivan sent Flora a letter complaining of copyright\ninfringement. At that time, however, Sullivan had not (yet)\nregistered her illustrations with the Copyright Office.\n\f4 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\n Sullivan subsequently did so in two copyright applica-\ntions approved by the U.S. Copyright Office. Registration “VA\n1-888-930” had an effective date of November 6, 2013 and cov-\nered the “7 Sources Illustration Collection.” It listed 17 sepa-\nrate illustrations with names like “Frame7” and “7S-Bottle Il-\nlustration.” Registration “VA 1-893-717” had an effective date\nof December 12, 2013 and covered the “FEV Illustration Col-\nlection,” short for Flor-Essence. It listed 16 separate illustra-\ntions with names like “Frame-3,” “Herbs,” and “Amy Tex\nBubble.”\n When settlement negotiations failed, Sullivan sued Flora\nfor copyright infringement in the Western District of Wiscon-\nsin. The Copyright Act allows a plaintiff to choose to recover\neither statutory damages or actual damages. See 17 U.S.C.\n§ 504(a). The choice must come before the entry of final judg-\nment. See id. § 504(c)(1). As the litigation progressed, Sullivan\nchose to pursue statutory damages, with the parties then stak-\ning out opposing positions on the scope of a permissible\naward under § 504(c)(1). These competing positions frame the\nprimary issue before us on appeal.\n Flora contended that Sullivan’s 33 illustrations fell into\none of two compilations (corresponding with the company’s\ntwo advertising campaigns in which the illustrations ap-\npeared and also aligning with the two copyright registrations)\nand thus § 504(c)(1) precluded Sullivan from receiving more\nthan two separate awards of statutory damages—one for each\ncompilation infringed. Sullivan begged to differ. She urged\nthe district court to treat each of the 33 illustrations as 33 sep-\narate works entitled to 33 separate awards of statutory dam-\nages upon a showing that Flora infringed each work.\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 5\n\n Who was right very much mattered, for Congress author-\nized an award of between $750 and $30,000 in statutory dam-\nages for each work infringed, and up to $150,000 per work if\na jury found willful infringement. See id. § 504(c)(2). Put most\nsimply, Sullivan wanted the copyrighted work multiplier to\nbe 33 and not two.\n The district court addressed the issue pretrial. It did so by\nfocusing on Sullivan’s copyright applications. The certificates\nfrom the U.S. Copyright Office showed that Sullivan had reg-\nistered each of the 33 illustrations in two applications, with\nthe illustrations grouped to correspond with Flora’s two ad-\nvertised product lines. The Copyright Act and its implement-\ning regulations allow the registration of multiple works this\nway. See id. § 408(c)(1) (authorizing the extension of copyright\nprotection from a single registration to multiple works listed\nin the registration application); 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4) (same).\nRelying on these provisions and drawing upon the statute’s\ndefinition of “collective works,” the district court determined\nthat “[Sullivan’s] copyrighted works are collective works, in\nwhich contributions, constituting separate and individual\nworks in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.”\nSee 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “collective works” this way).\nFrom there the district court concluded that “the [33] individ-\nual illustrations are individual works, entitling Sullivan to\nseparate statutory damages awards.” The case advanced to\ntrial against the backdrop of this ruling.\n Trial proceeded in three phases. In phase one, the court\ntasked the jury with determining whether Sullivan was the\nsole author of the copyrighted works, or instead whether Sil-\nver was a joint author capable of granting his own rights to\nFlora. In phase two, the jury considered whether Flora copied\n\f6 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\nand used Sullivan’s illustrations without authorization. In\nphase three, the jury determined what statutory damages re-\nsulted from the infringement.\n The jury ruled in Sullivan’s favor at each phase. In phases\none and two, the jury determined that Flora had copied and\nused Sullivan’s illustrations willfully and without authoriza-\ntion and furthermore that the works were not joint works but\ninstead belonged to Sullivan alone. At phase three, the jury\nawarded $3,600,000 in statutory damages, finding that Flora\nwillfully infringed on each of Sullivan’s 33 individual illustra-\ntions. The jury also found $143,500 in actual damages, which\nSullivan declined in favor of the larger statutory award.\n II\n Flora’s main contention on appeal is that the district court\ncommitted legal error in determining that Sullivan could col-\nlect statutory damages for infringement on each of the 33 il-\nlustrations as separate works. Sullivan urges us to avoid the\nissue on the basis that Flora waived any challenge to the dam-\nages award by not expressly objecting to the district court’s\njury instruction. We cannot agree. While Flora could have ob-\njected, the fairest reading of the record is that the company—\nthroughout the litigation—had made its position on statutory\ndamages abundantly clear, including by briefing the issue\nduring the pretrial proceeding that resulted in the district\ncourt’s determinative ruling. The law required no more in this\ncircumstance. See Dresser Industries, Inc., Waukesha Engine Div.\nv. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1450 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining\nthat the failure to object to a jury instruction embodying a le-\ngal determination “may be disregarded if the party’s position\nhad previously been clearly made to the court and it is plain\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 7\n\nthat a further objection would be unavailing”). So we proceed\nto the merits.\n A\n The scope of statutory damages available to Sullivan turns\non § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act:\n [T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time be-\n fore final judgment is rendered, to recover, in-\n stead of actual damages and profits, an award\n of statutory damages for all infringements in-\n volved in the action, with respect to any one work,\n for which any one infringer is liable individu-\n ally, or for which any two or more infringers are\n liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less\n than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court con-\n siders just. For the purposes of this subsection, all\n the parts of a compilation or derivative work consti-\n tute one work.\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (emphasis added).\n By its terms, § 504(c)(1) limits a plaintiff’s recovery to one\naward of statutory damages for each work infringed. Put an-\nother way, Congress focused the inquiry on the number of\nprotected works infringed, not the number of infringements.\nSee Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int’l Ltd., 996 F.2d\n1366, 1381 (2d Cir. 1993). In doing so, Congress imposed the\nadditional limitation that, in awarding statutory damages,\neach part of a compilation shall be considered “one work.”\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). In construing § 504(c)(1), it is therefore\nessential to determine not only what constitutes “one\nwork”—a term Congress left undefined in the Copyright\n\f8 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\nAct—but also when multiple works combine to form a “com-\npilation,” a term Congress did define in the statute.\n In copyright law, a “work”—as its name implies—reflects\nan original expression, whether in the form of art, literature,\nmusic, or another tangible medium of expression, that may be\nentitled to protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). An artist seeking\ncopyright protection for multiple works can do so in a single\nregistration application. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1) (allowing for\na single registration for a group of related works); 37 C.F.R.\n§ 202.3(b)(4) (same); see also 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David\nNimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.18(c) (Rev. Ed. 2019) (dis-\ncussing the Copyright Act’s flexible approach in allowing a\nsingle registration for multiple works). The Copyright Office’s\ngranting such a single application results in each registered\nwork receiving copyright protection. See Wildlife Express Corp.\nv. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 507, 508 (7th Cir. 1994)\n(explaining that “[a] certificate of registration from the U.S.\nRegister of Copyrights constitutes prima facie evidence of the\nvalidity of a copyright” and “[a]n owner of a copyright is pro-\ntected against unauthorized copying”). Sullivan charted this\nexact course here, applying to protect what she called “illus-\ntration collections” and receiving two certificates of registra-\ntion from the Copyright Office. These certificates resulted in\nSullivan’s 33 illustrations being registered and therefore hav-\ning copyright protection.\n The district court began and ended its analysis of the stat-\nutory damages question with this same observation. It put its\nruling on the scope of statutory damages this way:\n Based on the undisputed fact that plaintiff reg-\n istered her two illustration collections as a col-\n lective or group work under 17 U.S.C.\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 9\n\n § 408(c)(1) and 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)(i), and that\n that identification appears appropriate—or, at\n least, defendant [Flora] has failed to explain\n why the copyrighted works do not appropri-\n ately fall within that designation—the court\n conclude[s] that the copyrighted works are col-\n lective works, in which contributions, constitut-\n ing separate and individual works in themselves, are\n assembled into a collective whole.\n(Dkt. 240 at 1) (emphasis in the original). The court reinforced\nits ruling when instructing the jury on the scope of statutory\ndamages it could award Sullivan upon findings of infringe-\nment by Flora, explaining that “for purposes of considering a\nstatutory damages award, you may consider each illustration\nin the 7 Sources illustration collection and the Flor-Essence il-\nlustration collection as an independent, copyrighted work.”\n The district court drifted off course in seeing the 33 illus-\ntrations as “collective works” without first asking, as\n§ 504(c)(1) requires, whether each illustration constituted\n“one work” or instead combined to form a “compilation.” The\nmisstep becomes apparent upon recognizing that Congress,\nin defining “compilation” in § 101 of the Copyright Act, made\nclear that the term “includes collective works.” So the conse-\nquence of the district court characterizing the 33 illustrations\nas “collective works” was that the illustrations then also con-\nstituted a “compilation” and thus, by operation of § 504(c)(1),\n“all the parts of a compilation”—each of Sullivan’s 33 illustra-\ntions—“constitute one work.” But that conclusion is at odds\nwith the district court also determining that the Copyright Act\nauthorized the jury to return 33 separate awards of statutory\ndamages for infringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\n\f10 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\n The knot untangles by returning to the language of\n§ 504(c)(1). The key distinction in § 504(c)(1) is not between a\ncompilation and a collective work—indeed, § 101’s definition\nmakes plain that the former includes the latter—but instead\nbetween “one work” and a “compilation.” Or, stated another\nway, the proper inquiry under § 504(c)(1) asks whether Sulli-\nvan’s 33 illustrations constitute 33 individual works or in-\nstead are parts of two compilations (corresponding with the\ntwo advertising campaigns in which Flora used the illustra-\ntions). The district court stopped short of asking this question\n(or putting it to the jury) by giving controlling weight to the\nfact that Sullivan registered her illustrations as a group and\ntherefore protected each of the 33 illustrations. That observa-\ntion, while reflecting an accurate understanding of the regis-\ntration process, does not resolve the scope of statutory dam-\nages available to Sullivan. That answer, we conclude, must\ncome by parsing § 504(c)(1) and distinguishing between a\nwork and a compilation.\n Identifying the right question is easier than knowing the\nright answer, though. And this is where we benefit from not\nbeing the first court to consider the scope of statutory dam-\nages available under § 504(c)(1)—and, more specifically, the\nmeaning of “one work.”\n B\n Other circuits seem to follow one of two approaches in an-\nswering the question presented, though the dividing lines are\nfar from absolute. Start with the Second Circuit and its deci-\nsion in Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.\n2010). The case entailed allegations of infringement on two\ncopyrighted music albums, each with ten songs, and the par-\nties disputing whether statutory damages should be\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 11\n\nmeasured on a per-album or per-song basis. The court ob-\nserved that each song had separate copyright protection and,\nin addition to being sold as part of an album, could be pur-\nchased individually through retailers like iTunes. See id. at\n138. Even when bought individually, however, the songs re-\nmained part of and indeed were produced and marketed as\nan album. That fact resolved the statutory damages question\nbecause, as the court saw it, “[a]n album falls within the Act’s\nexpansive definition of compilation.” Id. at 140. “Based on a\nplain reading of the statute,” the reasoning followed, “in-\nfringement of an album should result in only one statutory\ndamage award.” Id. at 141. More to it, the court emphasized,\nthe “[Copyright] Act [in § 504(c)(1)] specifically states that all\nparts of a compilation must be treated as one work for pur-\nposes of calculating statutory damages.” Id. at 142. And,\ndrawing reinforcement from the Copyright Act’s definition of\ncompilation, the Second Circuit added that “[t]he fact that\neach song may have received a separate copyright is irrele-\nvant to this analysis.” Id. at 141.\n In so holding, the Second Circuit distinguished its prior\ndecision in Twin Peaks Productions v. Publications International,\nwhere the court held that eight distinct statutory damages\nawards were available for infringement on the copyrighted\nscripts of eight television episodes that the defendant later\ncombined into a single book. 996 F.2d 1366, 1381 (2d Cir.\n1993). Separate awards of statutory damages were appropri-\nate in Twin Peaks, the Bryant court subsequently explained, be-\ncause “the plaintiff had issued the works separately, as inde-\npendent television episodes,” and it was “the defendant [who]\nprinted eight teleplays from the series in one book.” 603 F.3d\nat 141. Even though each episode of Twin Peaks contributed\nto the drama’s broader plot, which unfolded over the course\n\f12 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\nof a season, the fact remained that the episodes aired at sepa-\nrate times and, in this way, stood on their own enough to\navoid being grouped with the other episodes and thus con-\nsidered a compilation within the meaning of the Copyright\nAct. The upshot, then, was that the plaintiff in Twin Peaks was\nentitled to eight separate statutory damage awards for each\ninfringed episode. See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1381; see also\nWB Music Corp. v. RTC Communication Grp., Inc., 445 F.3d 538,\n540–41 (2d Cir. 2006) (following the same approach and re-\nversing the district court’s limitation of a plaintiff’s statutory\ndamages on a per-album basis).\n The Second Circuit’s approach—embodied, as we see it, in\nits most recent decision in Bryant—gives controlling weight to\nthe last sentence of § 504(c)(1), where Congress directed that,\nfor purposes of assessing statutory damages, “all the parts of\na compilation or derivative work constitute one work.” The\napproach has a limiting effect. Take, for instance, the song-\nwriter who produces an album, registers the album under the\ngroup registration process made available by 17 U.S.C.\n§ 408(c)(1), only then to learn someone infringed multiple\ntracks. The artist would be entitled to one and only one award\nof statutory damages because “it is the copyright holders who\nissued their works as ‘compilations’; they chose to issue Al-\nbums,” instead of producing each song as independent sin-\ngles. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141. The Second Circuit’s approach,\nin short, places dispositive weight on the songwriter’s bun-\ndling of songs—protected though they may be at the individ-\nual level—into an album. It is the production and publication\nof each song as part of an album that limits the songwriter’s\nrecovery to one award of statutory damages no matter the in-\nfringement that may have occurred at the level of any indi-\nvidual song.\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 13\n\n Recognizing this limitation, most other circuits have inter-\npreted § 504(c)(1) a different way. A good illustration comes\nfrom the First Circuit’s decision in Gamma Audio & Video, Inc.\nv. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1118 (1st Cir. 1993). The court there\nconsidered how to award statutory damages for infringement\non four episodes of the television series Jade Fox, where the\nepisodes had been registered together on one copyright cer-\ntificate and later rented or sold in sets containing multiple ep-\nisodes. Construing § 504(c)(1), the court adopted what it\ncalled an “independent economic value test” to determine if\neach episode of Jade Fox had copyright value unto itself and\nwas therefore an independent work—in statutory terms, “one\nwork”—for purposes of awarding statutory damages. Id. at\n1116–17.\n The First Circuit explained that such a substantive eco-\nnomic inquiry better reflected the value of each episode and\ngave effect to not only the language Congress used in\n§ 504(c)(1), but also the absence on a broader level of anything\nin “either the statute or the corresponding regulations that\nprecludes a copyright owner from registering the copyrights\nin multiple works on a single registration form while still col-\nlecting an award of statutory damages for the infringement\non each work’s copyright.” Id. at 1117. Applying the test, the\nFirst Circuit determined that the evidence before it supported\na finding that each episode of Jade Fox, although plainly part\nof a television series, constituted an independent work enti-\ntled to its own award of statutory damages. See id. at 1117–18.\n The Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits follow the First Cir-\ncuit’s approach. See, e.g., VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d\n723, 747 (9th Cir. 2019) (adhering to its discussion in Columbia\nPictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Bd. of Birmingham, Inc.,\n\f14 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\n259 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) and explaining that “the question\nof whether something—like a photo, television episode, or so\nforth—has ‘independent economic value’ informs our analy-\nsis of whether the photo or episode is a work” within the\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1)); MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d\n766, 769 (11th Cir. 1996) (employing the same test to deter-\nmine “whether each expression has an independent economic\nvalue and is, in itself, viable”); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell,\n897 F.2d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (asking whether certain cop-\nyrighted materials are “distinct, viable works with separate\neconomic value and copyright lives” to determine the scope\nof available statutory damages under § 504(c)(1)).\n The Fourth Circuit is the only other circuit to have consid-\nered the question presented. Its answer came with mixed sig-\nnals, following the Second Circuit’s approach in Bryant but\nsuggesting different facts may fit with a different construction\nof § 504(c)(1). See Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., 323 F.3d 279, 285\n(4th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier,\nInc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). In Xoom, the court deter-\nmined that two collections of numerous digital images, pro-\ntected under two copyright registrations, were compilations\nand thus only subject to two statutory damages awards under\n§ 504(c)(1). See id. at 285 n.8 (explaining that “Imageline is en-\ntitled to one award of statutory damages per work infringed\nbecause SuperBundle and Master Gallery are compilations or\nderivative works in which Imageline holds copyrights”). At an-\nother point in its opinion, however, the Fourth Circuit ap-\npeared to agree that “the Copyright Act does not bar multiple\nawards for statutory damages when one registration includes\nmultiple works.” Id. at 285. This qualification is substantial\nand seems to suggest the Fourth Circuit may chart a different\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 15\n\ncourse—perhaps the one followed by most other circuits—on\ndifferent facts.\n C\n Section 504(c)(1) is hardly a model of clarity, especially\nwhen considering, as we are here, infringement of multiple\nprotected works and a plaintiff seeking multiple, separate\nawards of statutory damages. It is not at all surprising that\ntwo approaches find recognition in the caselaw of other cir-\ncuits. In the end, we conclude, in closer keeping with the ap-\nproach of the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, that\n§ 504(c)(1) requires courts confronted with circumstances\nwith multiple works and multiple infringements to deter-\nmine, or to charge a jury with fact finding tailored to answer-\ning, whether the protected works have value only in and\nthrough their composite whole (and thus meet the definition\nof a “compilation” in § 101) or instead have standalone value\nat the level of “one work.” A protected work has standalone\nvalue if the evidence shows that work has distinct and dis-\ncernable value to the copyright holder. See Gamma Audio,\n11 F.3d at 1116 (explaining that “separate copyrights are not\ndistinct ‘works’ unless they can live their own copyright\nlife”—a viability determination that turns on whether the\nwork in question has independent economic value); see also\nFeltner, 89 F.3d at 769; Walt Disney Co., 897 F.2d at 569.\n The question at the heart of the Second Circuit’s more lim-\nited approach in Bryant—which focuses on whether the cop-\nyright holder marketed and distributed the multiple pro-\ntected works as individual works or as a compendium of\nworks (like, for example, an album)—is certainly relevant to\nthe inquiry we believe Congress has required in § 504(c)(1).\nBut we also believe the inquiry needs to extend further to\n\f16 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\ndiscern and give more fulsome effect to the distinction Con-\ngress drew in the text of § 504(c)(1) between “one work” and\na “compilation.” See Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP,\n795 F.3d 1255, 1281 (11th Cir. 2015) (employing a similar ap-\nproach to discerning whether multiple photos constituted a\ncompilation or individual works). To stop at the Second Cir-\ncuit’s inquiry does not allow a possibility Congress made\navailable in § 504(c)(1)—a situation where a copyright holder\nencounters infringement on multiple works available in the\nmarket as a group but where discernable value lies at the level\nof a particular individual work—for example, at the level of a\nparticular photo or song which, although released as part of\nan album, is likewise marketed and available at the individual\nlevel. Sellers regularly allow buyers to acquire a part of a\nwhole and the market assigns value accordingly.\n The inquiry and fact finding demanded by § 504(c)(1) is\nmore functional than formal, taking account of the economic\nvalue, if any, of a protected work more than the fact that the\nprotection came about by an artist registering multiple works\nin a single application. The necessary finding requires a focus\non where the market assigns value. By way of an analogy, im-\nperfect though it may be, think in the first instance of the mul-\ntiple protected works as a quilt and then ask whether any one\nindividual patch has discernable, independent economic\nvalue—whether once separated from the quilt a particular\npatch lives its own copyright life (as “one work”)—or instead\nwhether the value lies in the patches’ combined assembly into\nthe quilt as a whole (as a “compilation”).\n Our analysis must end here, though, as the record as it\npresently stands does not allow us to resolve as a factual mat-\nter whether all or part of Sullivan’s 33 illustrations are\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 17\n\nseparate works with distinct and discernable value or part of\ntwo broader compilations. The district court did not ask (or\nput to the jury) the questions we see as necessary for resolving\nthe statutory damages question. See VHT, Inc., 918 F.3d at 748\n(remanding on similar reasoning for additional fact finding).\n This error requires us to vacate the judgment in Sullivan’s\nfavor. Our doing so in no way calls the jury’s findings of in-\nfringement into question. On remand the district court will\nhave ample flexibility to structure the proceedings to enable\nthe requisite findings pertinent to statutory damages.\n III\n Invoking an altogether different provision of the Copy-\nright Act, Flora advances a separate and independent chal-\nlenge to the jury’s statutory damages award based on the tim-\ning of the company’s infringement on Sullivan’s copyrighted\nworks. The district court determined that Flora waived this\nchallenge by raising it much too late at trial. We agree.\n Section 412 of the Copyright Act prohibits an award of\nstatutory damages for “any infringement of a copyright in an\nunpublished work commenced before the effective dates of\nregistration.” 17 U.S.C. § 412(1). By its terms, § 412 imposes a\nbar to recovering statutory damages if a defendant can show\nthat any infringement began before the registration of the\nworks in question.\n Neither the district court nor jury ever considered the tim-\ning bar imposed by § 412. The reason is because Flora raised\nthe § 412 limitation for the first time during the third and final\nphase of trial—the damages phase—and even then, only at a\nside bar on an unrelated issue. Flora’s doing so surprised the\ndistrict judge, as the position marked a substantial shift in the\n\f18 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\ncompany’s trial strategy. All along Flora had sought to avoid\nliability based on the defense of joint authorship—by arguing\nthat Silver and Sullivan jointly created each of the 33 illustra-\ntions—and thus that the company (through Silver’s joint own-\nership) could not possibly be liable for infringement. By in-\nvoking § 412 and advancing a timing defense, Flora changed\ncourse, recognizing (undoubtedly in response to the jury’s\nverdict in phase two) that it had infringed on Sullivan’s works\nbut arguing that the infringement began before she had regis-\ntered the illustrations. In Flora’s view, the timing of the in-\nfringement—before Sullivan’s registration—triggered the ap-\nplication of § 412 to bar any award of statutory damages.\n The district judge reacted to Flora’s raising this § 412 ar-\ngument when it did with meaningful frustration. The court\nrightly underscored that Flora made no mention of any § 412\ndefense in its answer, motion to dismiss, or request for sum-\nmary judgment. Nor, the district court added, did Flora ever\nsay a word about any possible § 412 bar at the jury charge\nconference—at a time when the court and parties could have\nconsidered how to put the infringement-timing question to\nthe jury. Indeed, when asked directly whether either party\nhad concerns with the jury instruction on statutory damages,\ncounsel for Flora responded, “None, Your Honor.”\n As the district court saw it, then, Flora waited to pursue\nand raise its newfound § 412 defense until the close of evi-\ndence and thus well after either party could have structured\nits presentation of evidence—as to liability and defenses\nalike—to address the timing predicate on which application\nof the damages bar hinges. Or, as the district judge put the\npoint, “by sitting on its challenge until the end of the evi-\ndence, defendant left plaintiff and the court to believe that it\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 19\n\nhad conceded this requirement for an award of statutory\ndamages.” Accordingly, the district court concluded that\nFlora had waived any § 412 timing defense.\n We see no error in the district court’s conclusion, in no\nsmall part because § 412 operates akin to an affirmative\ndefense that Flora should have raised far earlier in the\nproceedings. Waiting this long resulted in waiver. See Carr v.\nO’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1126 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a\nparty’s unreasonable delay in advancing an argument “is\nnormally a compelling ground for deeming even a good\nground waived”). Our cases are clear that waiver, not\nforfeiture, occurs when a defendant waits until the eleventh\nhour or beyond to raise an affirmative defense and in doing\nso prejudices the opposing party. See Reed v. Columbia St.\nMary’s Hosp., 915 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 2019). “Allowing a\nlast-minute defense that introduces new factual and legal\nissues after discovery has closed,” we have emphasized,\n“raises the costs of litigation and allows the party that was at\nleast negligent in failing to plead its defense to take unfair\nadvantage of its opposing party.” Id.\n It is hard to see what happened here any other way than\nthe district judge put it: for whatever reason, strategic or in-\nadvertent, Flora waited to raise its timing-of-infringement de-\nfense until the jury had already found infringement, leaving\nthe trial record altogether missing evidence on precisely when\nthe infringement began—the lynchpin inquiry under § 412.\nWithout any notice that this change of course was coming,\nSullivan had no reason to believe her infringement claim may\nrise or fall on evidence pinpointing the timing of Flora’s in-\nfringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\n\f20 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\n In these circumstances, we cannot say the district court\nwas wrong to conclude that “Flora, at minimum, needed to put\nthe timing requirement of § 412 in issue by timely challenging\nit” and its failure to do so constituted waiver.\n IV\n Flora’s final effort on appeal to avoid liability comes in its\ncontention that the district court erred in not setting aside the\njury’s verdict on the basis that the trial evidence showed be-\nyond dispute that Silver and Sullivan were joint authors of the\n33 illustrations. Here too, though, Flora runs into waiver, as\nthe company failed to present this challenge to the district\ncourt in response to the jury’s adverse verdict. The pathway\nto that conclusion is straightforward.\n Joint authorship is a defense to copyright infringement.\nSee Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau,\n576 F.3d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 2009). The defense, as its name im-\nplies, turns on whether two or more authors jointly created\nthe work in question. If so, they hold undivided interests in\nthe work and the underlying rights are shared and not exclu-\nsive to one or the other authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); Janky,\n576 F.3d at 361 (“The benefits of co-authorship are therefore\nsignificant: each author may use or license the joint work.”).\n Throughout the pretrial proceedings, Flora sought to\nshow that Joseph Silver’s contributions to Sullivan’s illustra-\ntions resulted in joint authorship, which in turn would have\nallowed Silver to authorize Flora’s use of the illustrations,\neliminating the basis for infringement. A copyright owner\ncannot infringe its own work. Flora continued to advance the\njoint authorship defense at trial, moving, for example, on day\ntwo for judgment as a matter of law on the issue. See Fed. R.\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 21\n\nCiv. P. 50(a). The district court denied the motion, and the\ncase went to the jury. In finding infringement, the jury ex-\npressly found (and so answered on the verdict form) that\nFlora had not carried its burden of showing that the illustra-\ntions were the result of a joint effort by Silver and Sullivan.\n But Flora never renewed its challenge at any point after\nthe jury returned its verdict in Sullivan’s favor. And therein\nlies the problem. Flora insists on appeal that the district court\nerred in not keeping the joint authorship question from the\njury and failing to grant its Rule 50(a) motion on the issue. Yet\nthis contention runs headlong into the well-settled precept\nthat “a court of appeals may not award judgment due to in-\nsufficiency of the evidence where no Rule 50(b) motion was\nfiled after the verdict.” Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 448 F.3d 936,\n938 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann\nIns. Co., 861 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 2017) (making clear that for\na party to seek judgment on appeal, “the requesting party\nmust not only have filed a motion under Rule 50(a), but must\nalso have renewed that motion under Rule 50(b)”).\n The demands of Rule 50(b) serve a sound purpose. As the\nSupreme Court has emphasized, the “determination of\nwhether a new trial should be granted or a judgment entered\nunder Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of\nthe judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel\nof the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.”\nUnitherm v. Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394,\n401 (2006). This explains why our caselaw is unyielding in\nrequiring a party who believes a jury’s verdict lacks a\nsufficient evidentiary basis to raise that challenge in the\ndistrict court. It is not enough to rest on having made a pre-\nverdict sufficiency-of-evidence challenge under Rule 50(a).\n\f22 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\n To excuse its failure to move under Rule 50(b) following\nthe jury’s adverse verdict, Flora argues that we have discre-\ntion on appeal to consider pure questions of law. But the ques-\ntion of joint authorship is not a pure question of law: answer-\ning whether two or more individuals or entities contributed\nenough to a work to result in joint authorship requires con-\nsideration of facts. And this is precisely why other courts have\nrecognized, properly in our view, that the question is one for\na jury to consider guided by an instruction from the district\ncourt. See Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, 290\nF.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that in a copyright case,\n“[a]uthorship is generally a question of fact for the jury”).\nHaving failed to lodge a post-verdict challenge under Rule\n50(b), Flora waived the very issue it now wants us to review.\nWe cannot do so.\n Even if Flora had not waived its joint authorship chal-\nlenge, we would be quick to conclude that the jury reasonably\nfound Sullivan was the sole author of the 33 illustrations in\nquestion. The jury received evidence of the contributions of\nboth Silver and Sullivan and viewed both of the copyright reg-\nistrations submitted solely in Sullivan’s name. The district\ncourt also properly instructed the jury that “[a] ‘joint work’ is\na work that two or more persons prepared with the intention\nthat their contributions be merged into inseparable elements\nof a single work.” This instruction mirrored the Copyright\nAct’s definition of a “joint work.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. It also\naligns precisely with what we have described as the attributes\nof a joint work. See Janky, 576 F.3d at 362 (explaining that a\njoint work requires “(1) intent to create a joint work; and (2)\ncontribution of independently copyrightable material”).\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 23\n\n Asked whether a preponderance of the evidence demon-\nstrated that the copyrighted illustrations were joint works, the\njury answered in the negative, finding that Sullivan was the\nsole author. We cannot say this was an unreasonable result in\nlight of the evidence presented. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d\n331, 335 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that we will “overturn a\njury verdict for the plaintiff only if we conclude that no ra-\ntional jury could have found for the plaintiff”).\n V\n We conclude with a brief word in response to Sullivan’s\ncross appeal challenging the district court’s refusal to award\nattorneys’ fees. Our review is limited to whether the district\ncourt’s ruling reflected an abuse of discretion. See Gastineau v.\nWright, 592 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 2010).\n The Copyright Act affords a district court discretion in\nawarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an infringe-\nment case. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (explaining that “the court in its\ndiscretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any\nparty” in an infringement case) (emphasis added). The Su-\npreme Court offered further guidance in Fogerty v. Fantasy,\nInc., outlining a series of factors for courts to consider when\nawarding fees. 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) (setting out a se-\nries of nonexclusive factors, including frivolousness, motiva-\ntion, objective unreasonableness of factual or legal positions,\nand considerations of compensation and deterrence).\n In denying Sullivan’s fee application, the district court rea-\nsoned well within the discretion afforded by Congress. Con-\nsidering the factors outlined in Fogerty, the court saw the case\nas close on the merits and hard fought by the parties. From\nthere the district court underscored that Sullivan had won a\n\f24 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\nsubstantial verdict that would be costly for Flora to satisfy\nand that, when balancing the totality of what occurred in the\nlitigation, an additional award of fees was neither required\nnor appropriate, especially in light of the reasonableness of\nthe joint authorship defense Flora pressed at trial. Or, in the\ndistrict court’s own words, “no further compensation or de-\nterrence in the form of an attorneys’ fee award [was] neces-\nsary.” We cannot call the district court’s reasoning an abuse\nof discretion and therefore affirm its denial of Sullivan’s fee\napplication.\n * * *\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM in part and otherwise\nVACATE the judgment in Sullivan’s favor and REMAND to\nthe district court for further proceedings consistent with this\nopinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Amy Sullivan v. Flora, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\nAMY LEE SULLIVAN, d/b/a DESIGN KIT,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nFLORA, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellant,\\n Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:15-cv-298 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\\nfirst impression for us on the scope of statutory damages re-\\ncoverable under the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 504(c)(1)\\nof the Act permits a copyright holder “to recover, instead of\\nactual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages\\nfor all infringements involved in the action, with respect to\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nany one work,” with Congress separately instructing that, in\\ndetermining statutory damages, “all the parts of a compila-\\ntion or derivative work constitute one work.” This case re-\\nquires us to determine what constitutes “one work” in a fact\\npattern where a jury found infringement on multiple works\\nregistered in a single copyright application.\\n Amy Sullivan, a graphic design artist, produced a series of\\n33 illustrations for Flora, Inc., an herbal supplement company,\\nto use in two advertising campaigns. Upon noticing that Flora\\nwas using the illustrations in other ads, Sullivan brought suit\\nfor copyright infringement and opted to pursue statutory\\ndamages. She did so to maximize her potential payout by clas-\\nsifying each of her 33 illustrations as “one work” within the\\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act. Flora disagreed,\\ncontending that the illustrations were part of two broader\\ncompilations and thus, if Sullivan prevailed, § 504(c)(1) lim-\\nited her to just two statutory damage awards—one award for\\ninfringement on the illustrations used in each of the two ad-\\nvertising campaigns. The district court agreed with Sullivan,\\nand instructed the jury that she could recover separate awards\\nof statutory damages for 33 acts of infringement on 33 sepa-\\nrate illustrations. The jury found infringement on each of the\\n33 illustrations and returned a statutory damages award of\\n$3.6 million.\\n On appeal Flora challenges the district court’s ruling on\\nstatutory damages and separate rulings on two additional de-\\nfenses to liability asserted at trial. While procedural shortcom-\\nings defeat these latter two challenges, Flora is right that the\\ndistrict court committed error in permitting separate awards\\nof statutory damages unaccompanied by any finding that\\neach or any of the 33 illustrations constituted “one work”\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 3\\n\\nwithin the meaning and protection of § 504(c)(1) of the Copy-\\nright Act. It is neither appropriate nor possible for us to make\\nthat finding on the record before us. So we vacate the judg-\\nment in Sullivan’s favor and remand for further proceedings.\\n I\\n Flora, Inc. manufactures herbal supplement and health\\nproducts. In 2013, looking to produce advertisements for two\\nnew products, “7-Sources” and “Flor-Essence,” the company\\ncontacted freelance production specialist Joseph Silver to de-\\nvelop two animated videos. Unbeknownst to Flora, Silver\\nthen contacted Amy Sullivan, a Wisconsin-based graphic de-\\nsign artist, to develop illustrations that would then be ani-\\nmated for use in the advertisements. In Sullivan’s written\\nagreement with Silver, she granted Flora exclusive rights to\\nher illustrations in the two specified advertising campaigns.\\n Over the following months, Silver and Sullivan corre-\\nsponded to develop the illustrations. Silver made suggestions\\non color, style, and text, while also offering rough outlines\\nand sketches to guide Sullivan’s work. For her part, Sullivan\\nused digital design software to create the ultimate illustra-\\ntions, sometimes incorporating Silver’s suggestions and other\\ntimes not. Flora used Sullivan’s illustrations in its final adver-\\ntisements for the two product lines.\\n At some point in the summer or fall of 2013, Sullivan no-\\nticed that Flora was using her illustrations to promote other\\nproduct lines. Exactly when the unauthorized use occurred is\\nunclear. What the record shows for certain is that, on October\\n16, 2013, Sullivan sent Flora a letter complaining of copyright\\ninfringement. At that time, however, Sullivan had not (yet)\\nregistered her illustrations with the Copyright Office.\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n Sullivan subsequently did so in two copyright applica-\\ntions approved by the U.S. Copyright Office. Registration “VA\\n1-888-930” had an effective date of November 6, 2013 and cov-\\nered the “7 Sources Illustration Collection.” It listed 17 sepa-\\nrate illustrations with names like “Frame7” and “7S-Bottle Il-\\nlustration.” Registration “VA 1-893-717” had an effective date\\nof December 12, 2013 and covered the “FEV Illustration Col-\\nlection,” short for Flor-Essence. It listed 16 separate illustra-\\ntions with names like “Frame-3,” “Herbs,” and “Amy Tex\\nBubble.”\\n When settlement negotiations failed, Sullivan sued Flora\\nfor copyright infringement in the Western District of Wiscon-\\nsin. The Copyright Act allows a plaintiff to choose to recover\\neither statutory damages or actual damages. See 17 U.S.C.\\n§ 504(a). The choice must come before the entry of final judg-\\nment. See id. § 504(c)(1). As the litigation progressed, Sullivan\\nchose to pursue statutory damages, with the parties then stak-\\ning out opposing positions on the scope of a permissible\\naward under § 504(c)(1). These competing positions frame the\\nprimary issue before us on appeal.\\n Flora contended that Sullivan’s 33 illustrations fell into\\none of two compilations (corresponding with the company’s\\ntwo advertising campaigns in which the illustrations ap-\\npeared and also aligning with the two copyright registrations)\\nand thus § 504(c)(1) precluded Sullivan from receiving more\\nthan two separate awards of statutory damages—one for each\\ncompilation infringed. Sullivan begged to differ. She urged\\nthe district court to treat each of the 33 illustrations as 33 sep-\\narate works entitled to 33 separate awards of statutory dam-\\nages upon a showing that Flora infringed each work.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 5\\n\\n Who was right very much mattered, for Congress author-\\nized an award of between $750 and $30,000 in statutory dam-\\nages for each work infringed, and up to $150,000 per work if\\na jury found willful infringement. See id. § 504(c)(2). Put most\\nsimply, Sullivan wanted the copyrighted work multiplier to\\nbe 33 and not two.\\n The district court addressed the issue pretrial. It did so by\\nfocusing on Sullivan’s copyright applications. The certificates\\nfrom the U.S. Copyright Office showed that Sullivan had reg-\\nistered each of the 33 illustrations in two applications, with\\nthe illustrations grouped to correspond with Flora’s two ad-\\nvertised product lines. The Copyright Act and its implement-\\ning regulations allow the registration of multiple works this\\nway. See id. § 408(c)(1) (authorizing the extension of copyright\\nprotection from a single registration to multiple works listed\\nin the registration application); 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4) (same).\\nRelying on these provisions and drawing upon the statute’s\\ndefinition of “collective works,” the district court determined\\nthat “[Sullivan’s] copyrighted works are collective works, in\\nwhich contributions, constituting separate and individual\\nworks in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.”\\nSee 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “collective works” this way).\\nFrom there the district court concluded that “the [33] individ-\\nual illustrations are individual works, entitling Sullivan to\\nseparate statutory damages awards.” The case advanced to\\ntrial against the backdrop of this ruling.\\n Trial proceeded in three phases. In phase one, the court\\ntasked the jury with determining whether Sullivan was the\\nsole author of the copyrighted works, or instead whether Sil-\\nver was a joint author capable of granting his own rights to\\nFlora. In phase two, the jury considered whether Flora copied\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nand used Sullivan’s illustrations without authorization. In\\nphase three, the jury determined what statutory damages re-\\nsulted from the infringement.\\n The jury ruled in Sullivan’s favor at each phase. In phases\\none and two, the jury determined that Flora had copied and\\nused Sullivan’s illustrations willfully and without authoriza-\\ntion and furthermore that the works were not joint works but\\ninstead belonged to Sullivan alone. At phase three, the jury\\nawarded $3,600,000 in statutory damages, finding that Flora\\nwillfully infringed on each of Sullivan’s 33 individual illustra-\\ntions. The jury also found $143,500 in actual damages, which\\nSullivan declined in favor of the larger statutory award.\\n II\\n Flora’s main contention on appeal is that the district court\\ncommitted legal error in determining that Sullivan could col-\\nlect statutory damages for infringement on each of the 33 il-\\nlustrations as separate works. Sullivan urges us to avoid the\\nissue on the basis that Flora waived any challenge to the dam-\\nages award by not expressly objecting to the district court’s\\njury instruction. We cannot agree. While Flora could have ob-\\njected, the fairest reading of the record is that the company—\\nthroughout the litigation—had made its position on statutory\\ndamages abundantly clear, including by briefing the issue\\nduring the pretrial proceeding that resulted in the district\\ncourt’s determinative ruling. The law required no more in this\\ncircumstance. See Dresser Industries, Inc., Waukesha Engine Div.\\nv. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1450 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining\\nthat the failure to object to a jury instruction embodying a le-\\ngal determination “may be disregarded if the party’s position\\nhad previously been clearly made to the court and it is plain\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 7\\n\\nthat a further objection would be unavailing”). So we proceed\\nto the merits.\\n A\\n The scope of statutory damages available to Sullivan turns\\non § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act:\\n [T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time be-\\n fore final judgment is rendered, to recover, in-\\n stead of actual damages and profits, an award\\n of statutory damages for all infringements in-\\n volved in the action, with respect to any one work,\\n for which any one infringer is liable individu-\\n ally, or for which any two or more infringers are\\n liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less\\n than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court con-\\n siders just. For the purposes of this subsection, all\\n the parts of a compilation or derivative work consti-\\n tute one work.\\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (emphasis added).\\n By its terms, § 504(c)(1) limits a plaintiff’s recovery to one\\naward of statutory damages for each work infringed. Put an-\\nother way, Congress focused the inquiry on the number of\\nprotected works infringed, not the number of infringements.\\nSee Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int’l Ltd., 996 F.2d\\n1366, 1381 (2d Cir. 1993). In doing so, Congress imposed the\\nadditional limitation that, in awarding statutory damages,\\neach part of a compilation shall be considered “one work.”\\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). In construing § 504(c)(1), it is therefore\\nessential to determine not only what constitutes “one\\nwork”—a term Congress left undefined in the Copyright\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nAct—but also when multiple works combine to form a “com-\\npilation,” a term Congress did define in the statute.\\n In copyright law, a “work”—as its name implies—reflects\\nan original expression, whether in the form of art, literature,\\nmusic, or another tangible medium of expression, that may be\\nentitled to protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). An artist seeking\\ncopyright protection for multiple works can do so in a single\\nregistration application. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1) (allowing for\\na single registration for a group of related works); 37 C.F.R.\\n§ 202.3(b)(4) (same); see also 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David\\nNimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.18(c) (Rev. Ed. 2019) (dis-\\ncussing the Copyright Act’s flexible approach in allowing a\\nsingle registration for multiple works). The Copyright Office’s\\ngranting such a single application results in each registered\\nwork receiving copyright protection. See Wildlife Express Corp.\\nv. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 507, 508 (7th Cir. 1994)\\n(explaining that “[a] certificate of registration from the U.S.\\nRegister of Copyrights constitutes prima facie evidence of the\\nvalidity of a copyright” and “[a]n owner of a copyright is pro-\\ntected against unauthorized copying”). Sullivan charted this\\nexact course here, applying to protect what she called “illus-\\ntration collections” and receiving two certificates of registra-\\ntion from the Copyright Office. These certificates resulted in\\nSullivan’s 33 illustrations being registered and therefore hav-\\ning copyright protection.\\n The district court began and ended its analysis of the stat-\\nutory damages question with this same observation. It put its\\nruling on the scope of statutory damages this way:\\n Based on the undisputed fact that plaintiff reg-\\n istered her two illustration collections as a col-\\n lective or group work under 17 U.S.C.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 9\\n\\n § 408(c)(1) and 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)(i), and that\\n that identification appears appropriate—or, at\\n least, defendant [Flora] has failed to explain\\n why the copyrighted works do not appropri-\\n ately fall within that designation—the court\\n conclude[s] that the copyrighted works are col-\\n lective works, in which contributions, constitut-\\n ing separate and individual works in themselves, are\\n assembled into a collective whole.\\n(Dkt. 240 at 1) (emphasis in the original). The court reinforced\\nits ruling when instructing the jury on the scope of statutory\\ndamages it could award Sullivan upon findings of infringe-\\nment by Flora, explaining that “for purposes of considering a\\nstatutory damages award, you may consider each illustration\\nin the 7 Sources illustration collection and the Flor-Essence il-\\nlustration collection as an independent, copyrighted work.”\\n The district court drifted off course in seeing the 33 illus-\\ntrations as “collective works” without first asking, as\\n§ 504(c)(1) requires, whether each illustration constituted\\n“one work” or instead combined to form a “compilation.” The\\nmisstep becomes apparent upon recognizing that Congress,\\nin defining “compilation” in § 101 of the Copyright Act, made\\nclear that the term “includes collective works.” So the conse-\\nquence of the district court characterizing the 33 illustrations\\nas “collective works” was that the illustrations then also con-\\nstituted a “compilation” and thus, by operation of § 504(c)(1),\\n“all the parts of a compilation”—each of Sullivan’s 33 illustra-\\ntions—“constitute one work.” But that conclusion is at odds\\nwith the district court also determining that the Copyright Act\\nauthorized the jury to return 33 separate awards of statutory\\ndamages for infringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n The knot untangles by returning to the language of\\n§ 504(c)(1). The key distinction in § 504(c)(1) is not between a\\ncompilation and a collective work—indeed, § 101’s definition\\nmakes plain that the former includes the latter—but instead\\nbetween “one work” and a “compilation.” Or, stated another\\nway, the proper inquiry under § 504(c)(1) asks whether Sulli-\\nvan’s 33 illustrations constitute 33 individual works or in-\\nstead are parts of two compilations (corresponding with the\\ntwo advertising campaigns in which Flora used the illustra-\\ntions). The district court stopped short of asking this question\\n(or putting it to the jury) by giving controlling weight to the\\nfact that Sullivan registered her illustrations as a group and\\ntherefore protected each of the 33 illustrations. That observa-\\ntion, while reflecting an accurate understanding of the regis-\\ntration process, does not resolve the scope of statutory dam-\\nages available to Sullivan. That answer, we conclude, must\\ncome by parsing § 504(c)(1) and distinguishing between a\\nwork and a compilation.\\n Identifying the right question is easier than knowing the\\nright answer, though. And this is where we benefit from not\\nbeing the first court to consider the scope of statutory dam-\\nages available under § 504(c)(1)—and, more specifically, the\\nmeaning of “one work.”\\n B\\n Other circuits seem to follow one of two approaches in an-\\nswering the question presented, though the dividing lines are\\nfar from absolute. Start with the Second Circuit and its deci-\\nsion in Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.\\n2010). The case entailed allegations of infringement on two\\ncopyrighted music albums, each with ten songs, and the par-\\nties disputing whether statutory damages should be\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 11\\n\\nmeasured on a per-album or per-song basis. The court ob-\\nserved that each song had separate copyright protection and,\\nin addition to being sold as part of an album, could be pur-\\nchased individually through retailers like iTunes. See id. at\\n138. Even when bought individually, however, the songs re-\\nmained part of and indeed were produced and marketed as\\nan album. That fact resolved the statutory damages question\\nbecause, as the court saw it, “[a]n album falls within the Act’s\\nexpansive definition of compilation.” Id. at 140. “Based on a\\nplain reading of the statute,” the reasoning followed, “in-\\nfringement of an album should result in only one statutory\\ndamage award.” Id. at 141. More to it, the court emphasized,\\nthe “[Copyright] Act [in § 504(c)(1)] specifically states that all\\nparts of a compilation must be treated as one work for pur-\\nposes of calculating statutory damages.” Id. at 142. And,\\ndrawing reinforcement from the Copyright Act’s definition of\\ncompilation, the Second Circuit added that “[t]he fact that\\neach song may have received a separate copyright is irrele-\\nvant to this analysis.” Id. at 141.\\n In so holding, the Second Circuit distinguished its prior\\ndecision in Twin Peaks Productions v. Publications International,\\nwhere the court held that eight distinct statutory damages\\nawards were available for infringement on the copyrighted\\nscripts of eight television episodes that the defendant later\\ncombined into a single book. 996 F.2d 1366, 1381 (2d Cir.\\n1993). Separate awards of statutory damages were appropri-\\nate in Twin Peaks, the Bryant court subsequently explained, be-\\ncause “the plaintiff had issued the works separately, as inde-\\npendent television episodes,” and it was “the defendant [who]\\nprinted eight teleplays from the series in one book.” 603 F.3d\\nat 141. Even though each episode of Twin Peaks contributed\\nto the drama’s broader plot, which unfolded over the course\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nof a season, the fact remained that the episodes aired at sepa-\\nrate times and, in this way, stood on their own enough to\\navoid being grouped with the other episodes and thus con-\\nsidered a compilation within the meaning of the Copyright\\nAct. The upshot, then, was that the plaintiff in Twin Peaks was\\nentitled to eight separate statutory damage awards for each\\ninfringed episode. See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1381; see also\\nWB Music Corp. v. RTC Communication Grp., Inc., 445 F.3d 538,\\n540–41 (2d Cir. 2006) (following the same approach and re-\\nversing the district court’s limitation of a plaintiff’s statutory\\ndamages on a per-album basis).\\n The Second Circuit’s approach—embodied, as we see it, in\\nits most recent decision in Bryant—gives controlling weight to\\nthe last sentence of § 504(c)(1), where Congress directed that,\\nfor purposes of assessing statutory damages, “all the parts of\\na compilation or derivative work constitute one work.” The\\napproach has a limiting effect. Take, for instance, the song-\\nwriter who produces an album, registers the album under the\\ngroup registration process made available by 17 U.S.C.\\n§ 408(c)(1), only then to learn someone infringed multiple\\ntracks. The artist would be entitled to one and only one award\\nof statutory damages because “it is the copyright holders who\\nissued their works as ‘compilations’; they chose to issue Al-\\nbums,” instead of producing each song as independent sin-\\ngles. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141. The Second Circuit’s approach,\\nin short, places dispositive weight on the songwriter’s bun-\\ndling of songs—protected though they may be at the individ-\\nual level—into an album. It is the production and publication\\nof each song as part of an album that limits the songwriter’s\\nrecovery to one award of statutory damages no matter the in-\\nfringement that may have occurred at the level of any indi-\\nvidual song.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 13\\n\\n Recognizing this limitation, most other circuits have inter-\\npreted § 504(c)(1) a different way. A good illustration comes\\nfrom the First Circuit’s decision in Gamma Audio & Video, Inc.\\nv. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1118 (1st Cir. 1993). The court there\\nconsidered how to award statutory damages for infringement\\non four episodes of the television series Jade Fox, where the\\nepisodes had been registered together on one copyright cer-\\ntificate and later rented or sold in sets containing multiple ep-\\nisodes. Construing § 504(c)(1), the court adopted what it\\ncalled an “independent economic value test” to determine if\\neach episode of Jade Fox had copyright value unto itself and\\nwas therefore an independent work—in statutory terms, “one\\nwork”—for purposes of awarding statutory damages. Id. at\\n1116–17.\\n The First Circuit explained that such a substantive eco-\\nnomic inquiry better reflected the value of each episode and\\ngave effect to not only the language Congress used in\\n§ 504(c)(1), but also the absence on a broader level of anything\\nin “either the statute or the corresponding regulations that\\nprecludes a copyright owner from registering the copyrights\\nin multiple works on a single registration form while still col-\\nlecting an award of statutory damages for the infringement\\non each work’s copyright.” Id. at 1117. Applying the test, the\\nFirst Circuit determined that the evidence before it supported\\na finding that each episode of Jade Fox, although plainly part\\nof a television series, constituted an independent work enti-\\ntled to its own award of statutory damages. See id. at 1117–18.\\n The Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits follow the First Cir-\\ncuit’s approach. See, e.g., VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d\\n723, 747 (9th Cir. 2019) (adhering to its discussion in Columbia\\nPictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Bd. of Birmingham, Inc.,\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n259 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) and explaining that “the question\\nof whether something—like a photo, television episode, or so\\nforth—has ‘independent economic value’ informs our analy-\\nsis of whether the photo or episode is a work” within the\\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1)); MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d\\n766, 769 (11th Cir. 1996) (employing the same test to deter-\\nmine “whether each expression has an independent economic\\nvalue and is, in itself, viable”); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell,\\n897 F.2d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (asking whether certain cop-\\nyrighted materials are “distinct, viable works with separate\\neconomic value and copyright lives” to determine the scope\\nof available statutory damages under § 504(c)(1)).\\n The Fourth Circuit is the only other circuit to have consid-\\nered the question presented. Its answer came with mixed sig-\\nnals, following the Second Circuit’s approach in Bryant but\\nsuggesting different facts may fit with a different construction\\nof § 504(c)(1). See Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., 323 F.3d 279, 285\\n(4th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier,\\nInc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). In Xoom, the court deter-\\nmined that two collections of numerous digital images, pro-\\ntected under two copyright registrations, were compilations\\nand thus only subject to two statutory damages awards under\\n§ 504(c)(1). See id. at 285 n.8 (explaining that “Imageline is en-\\ntitled to one award of statutory damages per work infringed\\nbecause SuperBundle and Master Gallery are compilations or\\nderivative works in which Imageline holds copyrights”). At an-\\nother point in its opinion, however, the Fourth Circuit ap-\\npeared to agree that “the Copyright Act does not bar multiple\\nawards for statutory damages when one registration includes\\nmultiple works.” Id. at 285. This qualification is substantial\\nand seems to suggest the Fourth Circuit may chart a different\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 15\\n\\ncourse—perhaps the one followed by most other circuits—on\\ndifferent facts.\\n C\\n Section 504(c)(1) is hardly a model of clarity, especially\\nwhen considering, as we are here, infringement of multiple\\nprotected works and a plaintiff seeking multiple, separate\\nawards of statutory damages. It is not at all surprising that\\ntwo approaches find recognition in the caselaw of other cir-\\ncuits. In the end, we conclude, in closer keeping with the ap-\\nproach of the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, that\\n§ 504(c)(1) requires courts confronted with circumstances\\nwith multiple works and multiple infringements to deter-\\nmine, or to charge a jury with fact finding tailored to answer-\\ning, whether the protected works have value only in and\\nthrough their composite whole (and thus meet the definition\\nof a “compilation” in § 101) or instead have standalone value\\nat the level of “one work.” A protected work has standalone\\nvalue if the evidence shows that work has distinct and dis-\\ncernable value to the copyright holder. See Gamma Audio,\\n11 F.3d at 1116 (explaining that “separate copyrights are not\\ndistinct ‘works’ unless they can live their own copyright\\nlife”—a viability determination that turns on whether the\\nwork in question has independent economic value); see also\\nFeltner, 89 F.3d at 769; Walt Disney Co., 897 F.2d at 569.\\n The question at the heart of the Second Circuit’s more lim-\\nited approach in Bryant—which focuses on whether the cop-\\nyright holder marketed and distributed the multiple pro-\\ntected works as individual works or as a compendium of\\nworks (like, for example, an album)—is certainly relevant to\\nthe inquiry we believe Congress has required in § 504(c)(1).\\nBut we also believe the inquiry needs to extend further to\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\ndiscern and give more fulsome effect to the distinction Con-\\ngress drew in the text of § 504(c)(1) between “one work” and\\na “compilation.” See Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP,\\n795 F.3d 1255, 1281 (11th Cir. 2015) (employing a similar ap-\\nproach to discerning whether multiple photos constituted a\\ncompilation or individual works). To stop at the Second Cir-\\ncuit’s inquiry does not allow a possibility Congress made\\navailable in § 504(c)(1)—a situation where a copyright holder\\nencounters infringement on multiple works available in the\\nmarket as a group but where discernable value lies at the level\\nof a particular individual work—for example, at the level of a\\nparticular photo or song which, although released as part of\\nan album, is likewise marketed and available at the individual\\nlevel. Sellers regularly allow buyers to acquire a part of a\\nwhole and the market assigns value accordingly.\\n The inquiry and fact finding demanded by § 504(c)(1) is\\nmore functional than formal, taking account of the economic\\nvalue, if any, of a protected work more than the fact that the\\nprotection came about by an artist registering multiple works\\nin a single application. The necessary finding requires a focus\\non where the market assigns value. By way of an analogy, im-\\nperfect though it may be, think in the first instance of the mul-\\ntiple protected works as a quilt and then ask whether any one\\nindividual patch has discernable, independent economic\\nvalue—whether once separated from the quilt a particular\\npatch lives its own copyright life (as “one work”)—or instead\\nwhether the value lies in the patches’ combined assembly into\\nthe quilt as a whole (as a “compilation”).\\n Our analysis must end here, though, as the record as it\\npresently stands does not allow us to resolve as a factual mat-\\nter whether all or part of Sullivan’s 33 illustrations are\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 17\\n\\nseparate works with distinct and discernable value or part of\\ntwo broader compilations. The district court did not ask (or\\nput to the jury) the questions we see as necessary for resolving\\nthe statutory damages question. See VHT, Inc., 918 F.3d at 748\\n(remanding on similar reasoning for additional fact finding).\\n This error requires us to vacate the judgment in Sullivan’s\\nfavor. Our doing so in no way calls the jury’s findings of in-\\nfringement into question. On remand the district court will\\nhave ample flexibility to structure the proceedings to enable\\nthe requisite findings pertinent to statutory damages.\\n III\\n Invoking an altogether different provision of the Copy-\\nright Act, Flora advances a separate and independent chal-\\nlenge to the jury’s statutory damages award based on the tim-\\ning of the company’s infringement on Sullivan’s copyrighted\\nworks. The district court determined that Flora waived this\\nchallenge by raising it much too late at trial. We agree.\\n Section 412 of the Copyright Act prohibits an award of\\nstatutory damages for “any infringement of a copyright in an\\nunpublished work commenced before the effective dates of\\nregistration.” 17 U.S.C. § 412(1). By its terms, § 412 imposes a\\nbar to recovering statutory damages if a defendant can show\\nthat any infringement began before the registration of the\\nworks in question.\\n Neither the district court nor jury ever considered the tim-\\ning bar imposed by § 412. The reason is because Flora raised\\nthe § 412 limitation for the first time during the third and final\\nphase of trial—the damages phase—and even then, only at a\\nside bar on an unrelated issue. Flora’s doing so surprised the\\ndistrict judge, as the position marked a substantial shift in the\\n\\f18 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\ncompany’s trial strategy. All along Flora had sought to avoid\\nliability based on the defense of joint authorship—by arguing\\nthat Silver and Sullivan jointly created each of the 33 illustra-\\ntions—and thus that the company (through Silver’s joint own-\\nership) could not possibly be liable for infringement. By in-\\nvoking § 412 and advancing a timing defense, Flora changed\\ncourse, recognizing (undoubtedly in response to the jury’s\\nverdict in phase two) that it had infringed on Sullivan’s works\\nbut arguing that the infringement began before she had regis-\\ntered the illustrations. In Flora’s view, the timing of the in-\\nfringement—before Sullivan’s registration—triggered the ap-\\nplication of § 412 to bar any award of statutory damages.\\n The district judge reacted to Flora’s raising this § 412 ar-\\ngument when it did with meaningful frustration. The court\\nrightly underscored that Flora made no mention of any § 412\\ndefense in its answer, motion to dismiss, or request for sum-\\nmary judgment. Nor, the district court added, did Flora ever\\nsay a word about any possible § 412 bar at the jury charge\\nconference—at a time when the court and parties could have\\nconsidered how to put the infringement-timing question to\\nthe jury. Indeed, when asked directly whether either party\\nhad concerns with the jury instruction on statutory damages,\\ncounsel for Flora responded, “None, Your Honor.”\\n As the district court saw it, then, Flora waited to pursue\\nand raise its newfound § 412 defense until the close of evi-\\ndence and thus well after either party could have structured\\nits presentation of evidence—as to liability and defenses\\nalike—to address the timing predicate on which application\\nof the damages bar hinges. Or, as the district judge put the\\npoint, “by sitting on its challenge until the end of the evi-\\ndence, defendant left plaintiff and the court to believe that it\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 19\\n\\nhad conceded this requirement for an award of statutory\\ndamages.” Accordingly, the district court concluded that\\nFlora had waived any § 412 timing defense.\\n We see no error in the district court’s conclusion, in no\\nsmall part because § 412 operates akin to an affirmative\\ndefense that Flora should have raised far earlier in the\\nproceedings. Waiting this long resulted in waiver. See Carr v.\\nO’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1126 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a\\nparty’s unreasonable delay in advancing an argument “is\\nnormally a compelling ground for deeming even a good\\nground waived”). Our cases are clear that waiver, not\\nforfeiture, occurs when a defendant waits until the eleventh\\nhour or beyond to raise an affirmative defense and in doing\\nso prejudices the opposing party. See Reed v. Columbia St.\\nMary’s Hosp., 915 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 2019). “Allowing a\\nlast-minute defense that introduces new factual and legal\\nissues after discovery has closed,” we have emphasized,\\n“raises the costs of litigation and allows the party that was at\\nleast negligent in failing to plead its defense to take unfair\\nadvantage of its opposing party.” Id.\\n It is hard to see what happened here any other way than\\nthe district judge put it: for whatever reason, strategic or in-\\nadvertent, Flora waited to raise its timing-of-infringement de-\\nfense until the jury had already found infringement, leaving\\nthe trial record altogether missing evidence on precisely when\\nthe infringement began—the lynchpin inquiry under § 412.\\nWithout any notice that this change of course was coming,\\nSullivan had no reason to believe her infringement claim may\\nrise or fall on evidence pinpointing the timing of Flora’s in-\\nfringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\\n\\f20 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n In these circumstances, we cannot say the district court\\nwas wrong to conclude that “Flora, at minimum, needed to put\\nthe timing requirement of § 412 in issue by timely challenging\\nit” and its failure to do so constituted waiver.\\n IV\\n Flora’s final effort on appeal to avoid liability comes in its\\ncontention that the district court erred in not setting aside the\\njury’s verdict on the basis that the trial evidence showed be-\\nyond dispute that Silver and Sullivan were joint authors of the\\n33 illustrations. Here too, though, Flora runs into waiver, as\\nthe company failed to present this challenge to the district\\ncourt in response to the jury’s adverse verdict. The pathway\\nto that conclusion is straightforward.\\n Joint authorship is a defense to copyright infringement.\\nSee Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau,\\n576 F.3d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 2009). The defense, as its name im-\\nplies, turns on whether two or more authors jointly created\\nthe work in question. If so, they hold undivided interests in\\nthe work and the underlying rights are shared and not exclu-\\nsive to one or the other authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); Janky,\\n576 F.3d at 361 (“The benefits of co-authorship are therefore\\nsignificant: each author may use or license the joint work.”).\\n Throughout the pretrial proceedings, Flora sought to\\nshow that Joseph Silver’s contributions to Sullivan’s illustra-\\ntions resulted in joint authorship, which in turn would have\\nallowed Silver to authorize Flora’s use of the illustrations,\\neliminating the basis for infringement. A copyright owner\\ncannot infringe its own work. Flora continued to advance the\\njoint authorship defense at trial, moving, for example, on day\\ntwo for judgment as a matter of law on the issue. See Fed. R.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 21\\n\\nCiv. P. 50(a). The district court denied the motion, and the\\ncase went to the jury. In finding infringement, the jury ex-\\npressly found (and so answered on the verdict form) that\\nFlora had not carried its burden of showing that the illustra-\\ntions were the result of a joint effort by Silver and Sullivan.\\n But Flora never renewed its challenge at any point after\\nthe jury returned its verdict in Sullivan’s favor. And therein\\nlies the problem. Flora insists on appeal that the district court\\nerred in not keeping the joint authorship question from the\\njury and failing to grant its Rule 50(a) motion on the issue. Yet\\nthis contention runs headlong into the well-settled precept\\nthat “a court of appeals may not award judgment due to in-\\nsufficiency of the evidence where no Rule 50(b) motion was\\nfiled after the verdict.” Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 448 F.3d 936,\\n938 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann\\nIns. Co., 861 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 2017) (making clear that for\\na party to seek judgment on appeal, “the requesting party\\nmust not only have filed a motion under Rule 50(a), but must\\nalso have renewed that motion under Rule 50(b)”).\\n The demands of Rule 50(b) serve a sound purpose. As the\\nSupreme Court has emphasized, the “determination of\\nwhether a new trial should be granted or a judgment entered\\nunder Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of\\nthe judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel\\nof the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.”\\nUnitherm v. Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394,\\n401 (2006). This explains why our caselaw is unyielding in\\nrequiring a party who believes a jury’s verdict lacks a\\nsufficient evidentiary basis to raise that challenge in the\\ndistrict court. It is not enough to rest on having made a pre-\\nverdict sufficiency-of-evidence challenge under Rule 50(a).\\n\\f22 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n To excuse its failure to move under Rule 50(b) following\\nthe jury’s adverse verdict, Flora argues that we have discre-\\ntion on appeal to consider pure questions of law. But the ques-\\ntion of joint authorship is not a pure question of law: answer-\\ning whether two or more individuals or entities contributed\\nenough to a work to result in joint authorship requires con-\\nsideration of facts. And this is precisely why other courts have\\nrecognized, properly in our view, that the question is one for\\na jury to consider guided by an instruction from the district\\ncourt. See Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, 290\\nF.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that in a copyright case,\\n“[a]uthorship is generally a question of fact for the jury”).\\nHaving failed to lodge a post-verdict challenge under Rule\\n50(b), Flora waived the very issue it now wants us to review.\\nWe cannot do so.\\n Even if Flora had not waived its joint authorship chal-\\nlenge, we would be quick to conclude that the jury reasonably\\nfound Sullivan was the sole author of the 33 illustrations in\\nquestion. The jury received evidence of the contributions of\\nboth Silver and Sullivan and viewed both of the copyright reg-\\nistrations submitted solely in Sullivan’s name. The district\\ncourt also properly instructed the jury that “[a] ‘joint work’ is\\na work that two or more persons prepared with the intention\\nthat their contributions be merged into inseparable elements\\nof a single work.” This instruction mirrored the Copyright\\nAct’s definition of a “joint work.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. It also\\naligns precisely with what we have described as the attributes\\nof a joint work. See Janky, 576 F.3d at 362 (explaining that a\\njoint work requires “(1) intent to create a joint work; and (2)\\ncontribution of independently copyrightable material”).\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 23\\n\\n Asked whether a preponderance of the evidence demon-\\nstrated that the copyrighted illustrations were joint works, the\\njury answered in the negative, finding that Sullivan was the\\nsole author. We cannot say this was an unreasonable result in\\nlight of the evidence presented. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d\\n331, 335 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that we will “overturn a\\njury verdict for the plaintiff only if we conclude that no ra-\\ntional jury could have found for the plaintiff”).\\n V\\n We conclude with a brief word in response to Sullivan’s\\ncross appeal challenging the district court’s refusal to award\\nattorneys’ fees. Our review is limited to whether the district\\ncourt’s ruling reflected an abuse of discretion. See Gastineau v.\\nWright, 592 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The Copyright Act affords a district court discretion in\\nawarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an infringe-\\nment case. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (explaining that “the court in its\\ndiscretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any\\nparty” in an infringement case) (emphasis added). The Su-\\npreme Court offered further guidance in Fogerty v. Fantasy,\\nInc., outlining a series of factors for courts to consider when\\nawarding fees. 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) (setting out a se-\\nries of nonexclusive factors, including frivolousness, motiva-\\ntion, objective unreasonableness of factual or legal positions,\\nand considerations of compensation and deterrence).\\n In denying Sullivan’s fee application, the district court rea-\\nsoned well within the discretion afforded by Congress. Con-\\nsidering the factors outlined in Fogerty, the court saw the case\\nas close on the merits and hard fought by the parties. From\\nthere the district court underscored that Sullivan had won a\\n\\f24 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nsubstantial verdict that would be costly for Flora to satisfy\\nand that, when balancing the totality of what occurred in the\\nlitigation, an additional award of fees was neither required\\nnor appropriate, especially in light of the reasonableness of\\nthe joint authorship defense Flora pressed at trial. Or, in the\\ndistrict court’s own words, “no further compensation or de-\\nterrence in the form of an attorneys’ fee award [was] neces-\\nsary.” We cannot call the district court’s reasoning an abuse\\nof discretion and therefore affirm its denial of Sullivan’s fee\\napplication.\\n * * *\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM in part and otherwise\\nVACATE the judgment in Sullivan’s favor and REMAND to\\nthe district court for further proceedings consistent with this\\nopinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3894,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654619,"string":"4,654,619"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Marshon Simon"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2442"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2442\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMARSHON SIMON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 16-CR-20077 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Police officers pulled Marshon Si-\\nmon over for failing to signal sufficiently ahead of turning. A\\ndrug-sniffing dog alerted on Simon’s car so officers searched\\nit. They did not find drugs, but they found a gun. The govern-\\nment charged Simon with being a felon-in-possession. The\\ndistrict judge denied Simon’s motions for recusal, suppres-\\nsion, and supplementation. Simon entered a conditional\\nguilty plea and received a sentence of 15 years. He raises a\\n\\f2 No. 18-2442\\n\\nlitany of issues on appeal. He argues the judge should have\\nrecused himself because before he was a judge he supervised\\na prior prosecution of Simon. He argues the judge should\\nhave suppressed the gun because the officers lacked probable\\ncause to initiate the traffic stop and because they prolonged\\nthe stop to allow for the dog sniff. He argues the dog’s alert\\nwas false and the dog was unreliable because he was improp-\\nerly trained. He argues the judge should have allowed him to\\nsupplement the evidence after denial of suppression. Finally,\\nhe argues one of his prior felonies should not have counted as\\na predicate for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\nConcluding the judge committed no reversible error in deny-\\ning Simon’s motions, we affirm.\\n I. Facts\\n On the night of August 21, 2016, three police officers in a\\n“bike patrol unit” surveyed a particular section of Decatur, Il-\\nlinois. Officers Jason Danner and Jamie Hagemeyer rode bi-\\ncycles. They sat behind a propane tank 145 yards from the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets. Officer Robert\\nHoecker drove a squad car nearby.\\n The bicycle officers saw a vehicle driven by Marshon Si-\\nmon leave the 1100 block of North College Street (five blocks\\naway) and drive toward them. As Simon approached the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets, he failed to signal at\\nleast 100 feet before turning left from College onto Green. This\\nwas according to the bicyclists’ testimony at the suppression\\nhearing, which the district judge credited. At the bicyclists’ re-\\nquest, Hoecker pulled Simon over at 10:26 p.m.\\n Hoecker approached Simon’s car and made contact.\\nHoecker introduced himself and told Simon the basic reason\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 3\\n\\nfor the stop. Hoecker explained bicycle officers would arrive\\nand provide details. Simon questioned the basis for the stop.\\nSimon gave his driver’s license and proof of insurance to\\nHoecker. According to Hoecker, Simon was cooperative and\\npolite, behaved normally, and was no more nervous than the\\nnormal level of traffic-stop nervousness. Hoecker ran Simon\\nthrough the LEADS computer system and found he was val-\\nidly licensed and insured. Hoecker finished this check in less\\nthan 2 minutes, before Danner and Hagemeyer arrived on\\nscene at about 10:29 p.m.\\n Once Danner and Hagemeyer arrived they took over “pro-\\ncessing the ticket,” including some double-checking.\\nHoecker’s role was to assist. Hoecker told Danner that Simon\\nhad insurance and a valid license. Hoecker said he “didn’t\\nknow if [Danner] wanted the dog or not.” (Appellant Br. at 8,\\nquoting Hoecker’s dashcam video.) Danner asked if Simon\\nhad any criminal history. Hoecker then ran a criminal-history\\ncheck and found Simon had prior drug and weapon charges.\\n Danner made contact with Simon. Danner testified Simon\\nappeared abnormally nervous. Danner testified Simon asked\\nabout the violation and insisted he used his turn signal. Dan-\\nner testified, “I observed him to pull his hand away from his\\nlap, and he was shaking pretty good, indicating to me that he\\nappeared nervous.” But Danner did not note this in the police\\nreport and he did not mention this when discussing whether\\nto call a dog.\\n Hagemeyer testified that while speaking briefly with\\nHoecker he handed her Simon’s materials. She then went to\\nanother squad car that had arrived on scene “to begin the\\nwritten warning.” Both Danner and Hagemeyer testified\\nabout the various steps and processes a bike patrol unit\\n\\f4 No. 18-2442\\n\\ncompletes as part of the mission instigated by a traffic viola-\\ntion, including monitoring and securing the scene, making\\ncontacts with the driver, running computer checks, and writ-\\ning out the warning or ticket.\\n Danner decided to call a dog. He testified he decided to\\ncall a dog at about 22:30:38 (10:30:38 p.m.) on the clock of\\nHoecker’s dashcam, about 1 minute after Danner and Hage-\\nmeyer arrived at the traffic stop. An officer called for the ca-\\nnine unit less than 4 minutes into the stop, when the ticket\\nwas still being processed, according to the officers’ testimony.\\n Canine handler Snyder arrived with Rex at the scene at\\nabout 10:33 p.m. At that time, the traffic violation was still be-\\ning processed, according to the officers’ testimony.1 Within a\\n\\n 1 Here are excerpts on point from the bicycle patrol unit’s testimony:\\nQ: And when Officer Snyder arrived, was the traffic violation still being\\nprocessed?\\nHoecker: Yes.\\n(Tr. Continuation of Suppression Hr’g, July 12, 2017, DE 44 at 19:1–19:3.)\\n\\nQ: And do you recall approximately how long into the traffic stop it would\\nhave been that [Officer Snyder, with Rex] arrived?\\nDanner: I believe it was around six or seven minutes.\\nQ: And were you still processing the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: That’s correct.\\n(Id. at 50:19–50:24.)\\n\\nHagemeyer: From the time we arrived to the time Officer Snyder arrived\\nwas three or four minutes.\\nQ: So a very short period of time?\\nA: Very short period of time.\\nQ: Were you still working on the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: Yes.\\nQ: And still working on it diligently, correct?\\nA: [Nodding head up and down.]\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 5\\n\\nfew seconds of walking around Simon’s car, Rex alerted.\\nSnyder took less than 20 seconds to prepare Rex, begin the\\nsearch, and confirm the alert. The time period from the begin-\\nning of the stop to the alert was about 7 minutes. Hagemeyer\\ntestified she had no part in conducting the actual dog sniff.\\nShe testified she “was writing the warning.” She confirmed on\\ncross-examination that she filled out the traffic warning, and\\nthat Danner issued it to Simon. Defense counsel asked, “So\\nyou were the one who filled out the date, time, name, address,\\nand birth date?” Hagemeyer answered, “I filled out the ma-\\njority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”\\n After the alert, Simon became angry and insisted there\\nwere no drugs in his car. Danner asked Simon to step out of\\nhis car. The police searched it. They did not find drugs, but\\nthey found a gun. An officer drove Simon to the police station.\\nDanner handed Simon a traffic citation as he was released\\nfrom the station. Danner testified he filled out the citation.\\n II. Procedural posture\\n Since Simon was a felon, the government charged him\\nwith being a felon in possession of a firearm. The case was\\nassigned to Judge Bruce. Simon moved Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself because he had served as the First Assistant United\\nStates Attorney for the Central District of Illinois with super-\\nvisory authority over a prior case against Simon culminating\\nin conviction. Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion.\\n Simon moved to suppress the gun, arguing there was no\\nprobable cause to stop his car, the police impermissibly ex-\\ntended the stop to get a dog on scene, and the dog was unre-\\nliable and improperly trained. Judge Bruce held an\\n\\n(Id. at 87:24–88:7.)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2442\\n\\nevidentiary hearing over parts of three days and heard testi-\\nmony from seven witnesses. He found the officers credible,\\neven if at times confused. He found the officers had probable\\ncause to think Simon committed a traffic violation, the officers\\ndid not unreasonably prolong the stop, and Rex was a\\nproperly trained and certified canine whose alert can lead to\\nprobable cause. The judge denied the motion to suppress.\\n Simon moved to supplement the record with additional,\\nunrelated traffic citations issued by Danner (to show the dif-\\nferences in the officers’ handwriting to address the issue of\\nwhich officer wrote Simon’s citation) and a video made by a\\ndefense investigator (to contradict the officers’ version of\\nevents leading up to the traffic stop). The judge denied this\\nmotion.\\n Simon pleaded guilty conditioned on preserving his right\\nto appeal. He received an enhancement as an Armed Career\\nCriminal. The judge sentenced him to 15 years in prison, the\\nmandatory minimum.\\n Simon appeals the denials of his motions to recuse, sup-\\npress, and supplement. He also appeals his qualification as an\\nArmed Career Criminal, arguing his prior conviction for at-\\ntempted armed robbery in Illinois in 2000 did not qualify as a\\nviolent felony.\\n III. Analysis\\nA. Recusal\\n Simon seeks remand because he claims Judge Bruce’s han-\\ndling of this case conveys the appearance of impropriety. Si-\\nmon does not claim Judge Bruce actually had or acted on any\\nunfair bias against Simon.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 7\\n\\n Simon argues Judge Bruce should have recused himself\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): “Any justice, judge, or magistrate\\njudge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-\\nceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-\\ntioned.” Below, Simon also sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. §\\n455(b)(3), but he no longer presses that on appeal.\\n As the government agrees, we review a preserved § 455(a)\\nclaim de novo. Cf. Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (holding § 455(a) can be vindicated on appeal); United\\nStates v. Dorsey, 829 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (a preserved\\n§ 455(b) claim is reviewed de novo).\\n To win recusal under § 455(a), a party must show a rea-\\nsonable, well-informed observer might question the judge’s\\nimpartiality. United States v. Herrera-Valdez, 826 F.3d 912, 917\\n(7th Cir. 2016). In other words, the party must show an objec-\\ntive, disinterested observer fully informed of the reasons for\\nseeking recusal would “entertain a significant doubt that jus-\\ntice would be done in the case.” Id.\\n Simon sought recusal early in the case on the ground that\\nBruce served as First Assistant United States Attorney for the\\nCentral District of Illinois from 2010 through 2013. During\\nthat time, the government charged Simon with violating 21\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Bruce supervised the AUSA\\nassigned to that case. Simon pleaded guilty and was sen-\\ntenced in 2012 and again (after a successful appeal) in March\\n2013. This prior criminal case involved occurrence facts sepa-\\nrate from those in the present case. But the prior case is di-\\nrectly relevant to this case because the conviction in the prior\\ncase enhanced Simon’s sentence in this case as an Armed Ca-\\nreer Criminal.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion. He noted he could\\nnot remember any participation in past prosecutions of Si-\\nmon. Judge Bruce observed that even if he did participate in\\na past prosecution, he did not participate in the current pros-\\necution, “which consists of new charges, wholly unrelated to\\nthose brought against [Simon] in the past.” (Text Order, Dec.\\n6, 2016.)\\n Simon likens this case to United States v. Herrera-Valdez.\\nThere, the government prosecuted a defendant for illegal\\nreentry after deportation. Before trial on the illegal-reentry\\ncharge, defendant moved to disqualify Judge Der-Yeghiayan\\nbecause he had served as the District Counsel for the Immi-\\ngration and Naturalization Service when defendant was de-\\nported. District Counsel Der-Yeghiayan’s name was listed in\\nseveral places in INS’s briefing supporting deporting. Judge\\nDer-Yeghiayan denied the motion to disqualify and defend-\\nant appealed. We observed that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a\\njudge to “‘disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his\\nimpartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrera-Valdez,\\n826 F.3d at 917. We reversed the denial of disqualification,\\nconcluding “a reasonable, disinterested observer could as-\\nsume bias from the fact that the judge presiding over the de-\\nfendant’s prosecution for illegal reentry was the same person\\nwho ran the office that pursued, and succeeded in obtaining,\\nthe removal order that is the source of his current prosecu-\\ntion.” Id. at 919. We noted this was particularly true given that\\nthe linchpin of defendant’s case against the illegal-reentry\\ncharge was a collateral attack against the removal order. The\\njudge need not have been actually involved in the prior case\\nor be actually biased in the subsequent case to trigger the re-\\nquirement to recuse under § 455(a).\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 9\\n\\n But here, the prior case does not directly give rise to or un-\\nderly the present case. And here, Simon attempts no collateral\\nattack against the prior conviction. Simon’s 2011 conviction\\nwas not, and could not have been, the linchpin to his defense\\nin this subsequent case. A defendant in a federal sentencing\\nproceeding may not collaterally attack a prior conviction used\\nto enhance his sentence, with an exception not relevant here.\\nSee Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382–83 (2001); Custis\\nv. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). Any collateral attack\\nagainst the prior conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would\\nhave been time-barred. So there was no possibility of Judge\\nBruce adjudicating the merits of a collateral attack against Si-\\nmon’s 2011 conviction here. And consequently there was no\\nreason to think Simon might have declined to launch a collat-\\neral attack against the 2011 conviction because he feared\\nJudge Bruce would not be receptive to such an attack, or\\nwould punish him in the present case for making such an at-\\ntack.\\n The prior and subsequent cases at issue in Herrera-Valdez\\nare directly related in a way the prior and subsequent cases at\\nissue here are not. A closer analogy to Herrera-Valdez is Si-\\nmon’s prior conviction under the supervision of First AUSA\\nBruce and the proceedings for revocation of supervised re-\\nlease involving that prior conviction and the gun possession\\non August 21, 2016. Simon’s prior conviction directly gives\\nrise to and underlies the revocation proceedings. So Judge\\nBruce recused himself from them.2 As this relationship is not\\n\\n 2Simon asserts Judge Bruce recused himself from the revocation pro-\\nceedings (2:11-cr-20002). The government does not contest this assertion.\\nThe docket for that case neither confirms nor denies the recusal. We take\\nSimon’s word for it.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2442\\n\\npresent between Simon’s prior case and the current felon-in-\\npossession case, there was no need for Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself here.\\n True, the prior conviction enhanced the sentence for the\\npresent conviction under the ACCA. But this is mere happen-\\nstance. It is not the same kind of direct connection we found\\nproblematic in Herrera-Valdez. Another distinction between\\nHerrera-Valdez and this case is that there, the future judge’s\\nname was on the briefs against the defendant, but here the\\nfuture judge’s name was not on the briefs. This is a relevant\\nconsideration because it bears on public perception. We do\\nnot consider this to be a controlling factor by itself, but it is\\nrelevant.\\n Judge Bruce did not err in refusing to recuse.\\nB. Suppression\\n Simon raises a series of potential errors regarding the de-\\nnial of suppression. He argues there was no probable cause to\\nbelieve a traffic violation occurred, and therefore initiating the\\nstop was unconstitutional. He argues the officers unconstitu-\\ntionally prolonged the traffic stop. And he argues Rex’s alert\\nwas false and Rex was improperly trained. “We employ a\\nmixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing\\nthe district court’s factual determinations for clear error and\\nde novo its ultimate determination about whether the police\\nhad sufficient grounds to stop or search the individual.”\\nUnited States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n1. Initiating the stop\\n Simon argues the officers lacked probable cause to believe\\nhe committed a traffic violation, so they had no probable\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 11\\n\\ncause to stop him. If Simon were right, then the court should\\nhave suppressed the gun as fruit of the poisonous tree. The\\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches\\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a\\ncar, the stop must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasona-\\nbleness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663\\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,\\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States\\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n Simon goes so far as to assert he did not commit a traffic\\nviolation. He argues the government did not meet its burden\\nof proof to establish he actually committed a traffic violation.\\nBut the government had no such burden. Whether Simon\\ncommitted a traffic violation is irrelevant for Fourth Amend-\\nment purposes so long as the officers had probable cause to\\nthink he did. United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (“The officer is not the judge. Whether the driver actu-\\nally committed a traffic infraction is irrelevant for Fourth\\nAmendment purposes so long as there was an objective basis\\nfor a reasonable belief he did.”).\\n Generally, the decision to stop a car is reasonable, and\\ncomports with the Fourth Amendment, “where the police\\nhave probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has oc-\\ncurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Prob-\\nable cause exists when “the circumstances confronting a po-\\nlice officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has com-\\nmitted even a minor traffic offense.” United States v. Cashman,\\n216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). Probable cause is an objective\\nstandard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Lewis, 920\\nF.3d at 489. If an officer reasonably thinks he sees a driver\\ncommit a traffic infraction, that is a sufficient basis to pull him\\n\\f12 No. 18-2442\\n\\nover without violating the Constitution. United States v.\\nMuriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n Here, Simon acknowledges the probable cause determina-\\ntion depends entirely on the credibility of the two officers on\\nbicycles who testified they saw him turn without signaling at\\nleast 100 feet ahead. Simon levies many attacks on their cred-\\nibility, urging us to reverse under the clear error standard. Si-\\nmon admits the clear error standard is very demanding. Un-\\nder this standard, we only reverse when, after reviewing the\\nrecord as a whole, we have a “definite and firm conviction” a\\nmistake has been made. United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614,\\n621 (7th Cir. 2001). The district judge, after all, listened to the\\ntestimony directly and observed the demeanor of the wit-\\nnesses. United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nThe district judge is in a much better position to evaluate cred-\\nibility than we are. His credibility determinations are entitled\\nto special deference. We take Simon’s credibility attacks in\\nturn.\\ni. Phantom stop sign\\n First, Simon argues Hagemeyer swore at the suppression\\nhearing that there was a stop sign at the corner of College and\\nGreen, but she was demonstrably and indisputably wrong. Si-\\nmon argues this impugns her claim she saw the traffic viola-\\ntion.\\n The judge directly confronted Hagemeyer’s mistake. He\\nnoted Hagemeyer “was wrong about that detail.” (Order, DE\\n21 at 4.) The judge said he would take the mistake into account\\nin assessing Hagemeyer’s credibility. But the judge concluded\\nthe mistake does not weigh heavily against her credibility be-\\ncause the detail “is not greatly important regarding the traffic\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 13\\n\\noffense for which Defendant was pulled over” and because\\n“[i]t would not have factored in to [sic] determining whether\\nor not to issue Defendant a ticket for failing to signal his turn\\nwithin not less than 100 feet of the intersection.” (Id.) Hage-\\nmeyer’s determination at the scene that Simon failed to signal\\nat least 100 feet before the turn was not informed by the pres-\\nence or absence of a stop sign at the corner. In other words,\\nthere were other reasons independent of the presence or ab-\\nsence of a stop sign for Hagemeyer to think Simon failed to\\nsignal at least 100 feet ahead of turning. Indeed, the presence\\nor absence of a stop sign is irrelevant to estimating distances\\nor to the requirement to signal. The judge simply did not find\\nthis mistake about a stop sign to be very important. So the\\nmistake did not significantly undermine the reliability of\\nHagemeyer to perceive other facts that night. Moreover, her\\nmistake about the stop sign has no bearing on Danner’s testi-\\nmony that he saw Simon fail to signal sufficiently ahead of\\nturning.\\n And as for the possibilities Hagemeyer lied about the stop\\nsign, and this lie undermines her credibility about everything\\nelse, Simon does not go quite so far. In his opening appellate\\nbrief, he does not directly, unequivocally accuse Hagemeyer\\nof intentionally lying about the stop sign. And Simon offers\\nno explanation for why Hagemeyer would have had any rea-\\nson to lie about it. We see no clear error here.\\nii. Distances\\n Second, Simon argues Hagemeyer and Danner were\\nwrong about the distance between their location and the in-\\ntersection of College and Green. They both testified the dis-\\ntance was 75 yards. But the distance was actually 145 yards.\\nThe officers’ testimony was demonstrably and indisputably\\n\\f14 No. 18-2442\\n\\nwrong by a wide margin. Simon argues the officers’ ability to\\njudge distance was the key to their claim Simon committed a\\ntraffic violation. He argues their failure to estimate the dis-\\ntance between their location and the intersection correctly\\nmakes their claims about the distance between the location of\\nSimon’s car when he activated his turn signal and the inter-\\nsection wholly incredible.\\n Again, the judge directly confronted the mistaken testi-\\nmony. The judge decided the miscalculation was “of little im-\\nport when it comes to credibility.” (Order, DE 21 at 3.) The\\njudge reasoned that the fact that both officers estimated the\\ndistance at 75 yards does not indicate collusion because if they\\nwanted to connive it is much more likely they would have\\nused a number closer to the actual distance. They were too\\nwrong to be conspiring to lie.\\n And as for the argument that the officers’ mistake about\\nthis distance undermines the credibility of their estimate\\nabout Simon’s signaling distance, the officers had other, spe-\\ncific indicia of the signaling distance beyond a raw estimate\\nof the distance from A to B. The time between signaling and\\nturning, the car lengths between signaling and turning, and\\nthe lengths of the headlight beams bolstered the probable\\ncause to think Simon signaled too late and too close. The judge\\nconcluded the mistake about the distance between the bicy-\\nclists’ location and the intersection shows nothing more than\\nthat both bicyclists were wrong about that distance. We see no\\nclear error here.\\niii. Photographs\\n Third, Simon argues photographs introduced into evi-\\ndence show the unbelievability of the officers’ claims. Danner\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 15\\n\\nand Hagemeyer both testified they saw Simon’s car leave the\\n1100 block of North College, five blocks from their position.\\nBut, Simon argues, the photographs speak for themselves,\\nand there is no way someone could see the make, model, or\\ncolor of a vehicle at that distance.\\n The judge simply disagreed. He examined the photo-\\ngraphs and listened to the testimony and concluded “it is pos-\\nsible for an average person, with good vision who is used to\\nworking at night, such as Danner and Hagemeyer, to see a car,\\nin the dark, turn onto a street with its headlights on.” (Order,\\nDE 21 at 4.) We also examined the photographs and read the\\ntestimony, and we do not have anything close to a definite\\nand firm conviction the judge made a mistake in this regard.\\nSometimes a photograph is not worth a thousand words.\\niv. Ghost writer\\n Fourth, Simon argues the judge ignored the officers’ mis-\\nstatements about who prepared the traffic ticket. Hagemeyer\\ntestified “I was writing the warning.” She answered “yes” to\\nthe question: “[Y]ou said that you filled out the traffic warn-\\ning in this case?” When asked if she was the one who filled\\nout the date, time, name, address, and birth date, she testified\\nshe “filled out the majority of” the ticket herself, but she be-\\nlieved Danner signed it. But other evidence showed she filled\\nout none of it. Danner filled out both the traffic citation (later\\nvoided) and the warning (Simon received hours later).\\n Simon accuses the judge of tying himself “into a pretzel to\\navoid finding that the police officers could possibly have lied\\nor misrepresented facts … .” (Appellant Br. at 33.) But the\\njudge committed no such contortions. Rather, he addressed\\nthe discrepancies directly. He combed through the testimony\\n\\f16 No. 18-2442\\n\\nabout the various steps in the process leading to handing a\\ndriver a written ticket or warning. He noted there appeared\\nto be confusion and possibly contradiction between the offic-\\ners about who actually wrote the ticket. One source of confu-\\nsion seemed to be the word “processing.” The judge observed\\nHagemeyer, Snyder, and Hoecker all testified Hagemeyer be-\\ngan “processing” the ticket, but “processing” a ticket involves\\nmuch more than just physically writing the ticket. The judge\\nalso observed Hagemeyer’s testimony on this issue was more\\nspecific. She testified, “I was writing the warning.” When\\nasked, “So you were the one who filled out the date, time,\\nname, address, and birth date?” she responded, “I filled out\\nthe majority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”3\\n The judge compared the warning Simon received—pur-\\nportedly filled out by Hagemeyer and signed by Danner—to\\na different warning definitely filled out and signed by Hage-\\nmeyer on a different date. The judge concluded the handwrit-\\ning on the two warnings is different and they likely were not\\nfilled in by the same officer.\\n But the judge noted Simon did not show the exemplar\\nwarning to Danner or Hagemeyer during the hearing to cross-\\nexamine them on who wrote Simon’s warning. The judge also\\n\\n\\n 3 In his order denying suppression, the judge characterized Hage-\\nmeyer’s testimony on this point slightly incorrectly, and in favor of Si-\\nmon’s arguments. The judge wrote “Hagemeyer answered ‘yes’ to\\nwhether she filled in the name, date, etc., but she stated that Danner signed\\nit.” (Order, DE 21 at 10.) Actually (according to the transcript) she did not\\nsay “yes” in response to this question. She said, “I filled out the majority\\nof it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.” But even giving Simon the ben-\\nefit of this characterization, the judge still did not find a significant credi-\\nbility problem.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 17\\n\\nnoted the testimony indicated Danner or Hagemeyer would\\noften start writing a ticket the other would finish. The judge\\nobserved: “There are numerous possibilities as to why the dis-\\ncrepancy exists, and without the officers being given the\\nchance to explain the discrepancy, the court cannot impute\\nimproper conduct on their part.” (Order, DE 21 at 11.) The\\njudge considered the totality of the officers’ testimony, and\\ntheir demeanor and appearance. He concluded any discrep-\\nancy on this issue was due to mere confusion on the part of\\nthe officers, and not to fabrication. And he concluded the of-\\nficers were credible.\\n We see no clear error regarding the judge’s decisions on\\nany of these issues, nor regarding his decision to find the of-\\nficers credible. Given the two bicycle officers testified they\\nsaw Simon commit a traffic infraction, and given the judge be-\\nlieved them, we see no reason to reverse the decision that\\nprobable cause justified starting the stop.\\n2. Conducting the stop\\n Simon argues even if the officers did not violate the Con-\\nstitution by initiating the stop, they violated it by impermissi-\\nbly prolonging the stop. An officer who reasonably starts a\\ntraffic stop might violate the Constitution if he exceeds the\\nscope of the stop or unreasonably prolongs it. Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491. A traffic stop “‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged\\nbeyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mis-\\nsion’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez v. United States,\\n135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543\\nU.S. 405, 407 (2005)).\\n A dog sniff of a car’s exterior only for illegal drugs during\\na lawful stop for a traffic violation does not violate the Fourth\\n\\f18 No. 18-2442\\n\\nAmendment, even absent reasonable suspicion of drugs. Ca-\\nballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But a stop justified only by a traffic vio-\\nlation becomes unconstitutional if the officers prolong it be-\\nyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s\\noriginal mission. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. “An officer may\\nconduct certain unrelated checks—including a dog sniff—\\nduring a lawful traffic stop, but he may not do so in a way that\\nprolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily\\ndemanded to justify detaining an individual.” Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Simon concedes,\\n“calling a K-9 unit does not unlawfully extend a traffic stop as\\nlong as the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is on-\\ngoing.” (Appellant Br. at 36.)\\n Without independent reasonable suspicion to justify the\\nsniff, the critical question is not whether the dog sniffed be-\\nfore or after the officer issued the warning, “but whether con-\\nducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.”\\nLewis, 920 F.3d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nWith independent reasonable suspicion, however, the officer\\nmay constitutionally detain the suspect for the sniff even if it\\nadds time to the total stop. Id.\\n Here, the judge continued to credit the officers’ testimony.\\nBased on that testimony, the judge concluded the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff. The judge noted\\nthe time period from the beginning of the stop to the canine\\nalert was about 7 minutes, as Simon conceded. The judge de-\\ntermined the officers acted quickly. Hoecker made the stop,\\nexited his car, told Simon the reason for the stop, and gathered\\nhis information. The bicyclists arrived at the stop only a cou-\\nple minutes after Hoecker pulled Simon over. The bicyclists\\n“diligently began processing the ticket.” (Order, DE 21 at 15.)\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 19\\n\\nCrucially, the judge found no indication the officers engaged\\nin any activity other than securing the scene and processing\\nthe warning during the time between the bicyclists’ arrival\\nand Rex’s arrival. Specifically, the officers surveyed the scene,\\nDanner spoke with Simon, and Hagemeyer testified she went\\nto the squad car to begin processing the written warning. The\\nvideo indicated that about 2.5 minutes into the stop, Danner\\nwas speaking to Hoecker about the traffic violation. About 3\\nminutes into the stop, Danner left the squad car to speak with\\nSimon. Danner told Simon the reasons for the stop and gath-\\nered information. Hoecker returned to Simon’s car at about\\nthe 5-minute mark to speak with him about the traffic infrac-\\ntion. Less than 7 minutes into the stop, Rex arrived and very\\nquickly alerted. At that time, the bicycle officers were still pro-\\ncessing the ticket.\\n In sum, the judge concluded the officers were processing\\nthe ticket when Rex arrived and alerted, so they had not yet\\ncompleted the initial mission of the stop, and the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff.\\n Simon argues the police report and testimony contain the\\n“misrepresentation” Hagemeyer was writing the warning\\nwhile the officers waited for Rex because the officers knew\\ncalling a canine unit does not unlawfully extend a stop so long\\nas the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is ongoing.\\nSimon continues to challenge the credibility of the officers. He\\nargues that at no point did any officer on the scene begin ef-\\nfectuating the purpose of the stop by dutifully and diligently\\nfilling out a warning or ticket. He claims Danner filled out\\nboth the traffic citation and the warning Simon received hours\\nafter the stop. But again we see no reversible error in the\\njudge’s conclusions on this point.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Simon presses that even if the judge’s credibility determi-\\nnations here are correct, his ruling is still flawed. First, Simon\\nargues the judge improperly allowed a de minimis delay to be\\nconstitutional, even though any delay to allow a dog to sniff\\nis unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion.\\nWe disagree with Simon about what the judge did. He specif-\\nically found there was no improper delay. (Order, DE 21 at 14\\n(“the stop was not purposefully prolonged to allow for the ca-\\nnine unit’s arrival”).) True, the judge added in a footnote that\\neven if he found the ticket-writing process had not begun\\nwhen Rex arrived, still the sequence of events was so short\\nand condensed that the stop was not prolonged in any “mean-\\ningful” way. But we need not review this dictum.\\n Second, Simon argues that instead of effectuating the pur-\\npose of the traffic stop, the officers decided to run a criminal-\\nhistory check. Simon argues this was unrelated to the mission\\nof the stop and delayed processing the traffic violation. Simon\\ncites no supporting Seventh Circuit case. We said last year that\\nwhen police conduct a stop, “they are entitled to demand the\\ndriver’s identification, of course, and it is routine to check the\\ndriver’s record for active warrants, driving history, and crim-\\ninal history. Those checks are done for important reasons, in-\\ncluding officer safety.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d\\n577, 586 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Sanford, 806\\nF.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The trooper checked the occu-\\npants’ criminal histories on the computer in his car—a proce-\\ndure permissible even without reasonable suspicion … .”).\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments, but we see no rea-\\nson to reverse the judge’s conclusions that the officers were in\\nthe process of completing the traffic warning when Rex\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 21\\n\\narrived, and the officers did not improperly prolong the traffic\\nstop to allow the sniff to occur.\\n3. Bona Fido?\\n Simon argues even if the officers had probable cause to\\npull him over, and even if they did not prolong the traffic stop\\nto wait for Rex, still the judge should have suppressed the gun\\nbecause Rex’s alert was false, Rex was improperly trained,\\nand the alert did not provide probable cause to justify search-\\ning Simon’s car.\\n Probable cause to conduct a search is not among the high-\\nest standards. “A police officer has probable cause to conduct\\na search when the facts available to him would warrant a per-\\nson of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evi-\\ndence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050,\\n1055 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).\\nProbable cause is less than preponderance of the evidence. Id.\\n“All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which\\nreasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id.\\n(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Probable\\ncause is a practical, common-sense standard, involving the to-\\ntality of the circumstances. Id.\\n A dog’s alert on a car can give probable cause to search the\\nentire car. Indeed, a good dog’s alert can provide a rebuttable\\npresumption of probable cause to search:\\n If a bona fide organization has certified a dog\\n after testing his reliability in a controlled setting,\\n a court can presume (subject to any conflicting\\n evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides\\n probable cause to search. The same is true, even\\n in the absence of formal certification, if the dog\\n\\f22 No. 18-2442\\n\\n has recently and successfully completed a train-\\n ing program that evaluated his proficiency in lo-\\n cating drugs.\\nId. at 1057. The ultimate question is “whether all the facts sur-\\nrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common\\nsense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a\\nsearch would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A\\nsniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.” Id. at 1058.\\n Simon concedes Rex passed certification tests. But Simon\\nchallenges the alert itself and the adequacy of Rex’s training.\\n “First and foremost,” Simon argues Rex did not alert on\\nSimon’s car. (Appellant Br. at 42.) This perplexes. Simon cites\\nnothing to support this claim. The record belies it. Given the\\ncontext of this claim, Simon seems simply to mean the alert\\nwas false.4 It is true that following the alert the officers\\nsearched the car and found no evidence of drugs in it. But Si-\\nmon does not explain why that, in itself, matters here. Proba-\\nble cause is not a retrospective, outcome-based standard.\\n\\n 4 Defense expert Dr. Mary Cablk said in her report she could not de-\\ntermine if Rex alerted or what Rex alerted to. She confirmed this on cross-\\nexamination at the suppression hearing. During direct examination she\\nwatched videos from Hoecker’s and Snyder’s dashcams. She testified she\\ncould not see the alert, could not tell exactly where on the car the dog\\nalerted, and did not know whether the alert was barking or something\\nelse. But in her testimony she seems to accept Rex alerted. She character-\\nized it as a false alert because no drugs were found, and she criticized\\nSnyder for rewarding Rex for falsely alerting: “In this instance, there’s no\\ndrugs found; so he’s reinforcing the dog for false alerting here.” In any\\nevent, Snyder testified that Rex alerted and that Snyder confirmed the\\nalert. And the judge throughout his order accepted Rex alerted. He found\\nthe officers’ testimony, in its totality, credible. We see no reason to upend\\nthe determination Rex alerted.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 23\\n\\nBridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). If an officer\\nrandomly breaks into a house on only a wild hunch and stum-\\nbles into a meth lab, the discovery does not provide probable\\ncause for the search. And if 20 reliable informants tell an of-\\nficer a particular house contains a meth lab, so he stands in\\nthe street outside the house and sees through an open win-\\ndow the apparent apparatus and accoutrements of a meth lab,\\nso he obtains a warrant to search the house based on probable\\ncause to think it contains a meth lab, but he finds only an in-\\nnocent and intricate chemistry set, still probable cause sup-\\nported the warrant. So the mere absence of drugs in Simon’s\\ncar does not undermine the probable cause to search it for\\ndrugs, provided there was probable cause in the first place.\\n Simon’s other argument is the officers did not have prob-\\nable cause to search his vehicle in the first place because Rex\\nwas unreliable. This argument proceeds in two waves.\\n The first wave is quickly quelled. Simon argues Rex was\\nunreliable because he was not trained properly under Illinois\\nlaw, which requires police dogs be trained according to cer-\\ntain guidelines. Simon argues Detective Larner (the Macon\\nCounty canine-training director) admitted he did not always\\nfollow these guidelines. But we need not address what Illinois\\nlaw requires or whether Rex satisfies it because Illinois law\\ndoes not control the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore,\\n553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s mean-\\ning [does] not change with local law enforcement practices—\\neven practices set by rule.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.\\n35, 43 (1988) (“We have never intimated … that whether or not\\na search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment depends on the law of the particular State in\\nwhich the search occurs.”).\\n\\f24 No. 18-2442\\n\\n The second wave holds out longer, but ultimately suc-\\ncumbs. Simon argues, apart from Illinois law, if a dog is\\ntrained to alert when no evidence of criminal activity exists,\\nthis violates the Fourth Amendment. The problem, as Simon\\nsees it, is Rex was trained with scented cotton balls to alert to\\nresidual odors. But to search a car, there must be probable\\ncause to think it presently contains evidence of criminal activ-\\nity. So if Rex is trained to alert to mere residue even when no\\ndrugs are present, then his alert is not a reliable indicator\\ndrugs are present, and therefore his alert does not provide\\nprobable cause to justify a search.\\n The main problem with this argument is the Supreme\\nCourt already rejected its premise. In Florida v. Harris, a dog\\nnamed Aldo alerted on a truck. A subsequent search did not\\nreveal any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, but it did\\ndiscover meth ingredients. The defendant moved to suppress\\nthe ingredients on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given\\nprobable cause to search. The defendant “principally con-\\ntended” in the trial court that because the officer did not find\\nany of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, Aldo’s alerts\\nmust have been false. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058. But the Su-\\npreme Court patted Aldo on the head and called him a good\\nboy: “A well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to [resid-\\nual] odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but\\nin fact is not.” Id. at 1059; see also Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels,\\nInc., 600 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (Plaintiff’s “only de-\\nveloped legal theory is untenable. [His] premise—that an alert\\nby a drug-sniffing dog trained to detect residual odors does\\nnot establish probable cause to search—was rejected in Harris\\n… .”). If a well-trained dog, trained to alert even to residual\\nodors, alerts, there is generally a fair probability that drugs or\\nevidence of drugs will be found, absent contradictory factors.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 25\\n\\nAnd that is all the Fourth Amendment requires. If somehow\\na dog were trained to alert only to residual odors, then we\\nmight have a problem. But that is not this case.\\n Our review of the record and the order denying suppres-\\nsion satisfies us the judge conducted the proper Harris evalu-\\nation and committed no error in concluding Rex’s satisfactory\\ncertification and training provide sufficient reason to trust his\\nalert or in concluding Rex’s training on residual odors is ac-\\nceptable. The judge heard testimony from Simon’s expert Dr.\\nCablk challenging Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself, tes-\\ntimony from Officer Snyder supporting Rex’s qualifications\\nand the sniff itself, and testimony from Detective Larner sup-\\nporting Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself. The judge also\\nentertained arguments from both sides in the form of the mo-\\ntion to suppress, supporting memorandum, the government’s\\nresponse, and post-hearing briefs filed by both sides. The\\njudge considered the totality of the circumstances, addressed\\nHarris’s ultimate question, and found Rex’s sniff up to snuff.\\nC. Supplementation\\n After the judge denied the motion to suppress, Simon\\nmoved to supplement the record and for leave to seek recon-\\nsideration. He wanted to reopen the evidence to introduce\\nfurther, unrelated citations prepared by Danner in August\\n2016 “which further emphasize the differences in the officers’\\nhandwriting … .” (Mot. Supp., DE 23 at 4.) Simon also wanted\\nto introduce a video he5 took when he returned to the scene\\none night. The video shows a vehicle leaving the 1100 block\\nof College Street and approaching the intersection of College\\n\\n 5 The motion says Simon created the video. On appeal, Simon asserts\\nhis investigator took the video. This nuance is immaterial here.\\n\\f26 No. 18-2442\\n\\nand Green. The judge denied this motion. On appeal, Simon\\nonly presses the video. He does not mention the additional\\nhandwriting exemplars in his opening appellate brief. Simon\\nacknowledges we review the denial of supplementation for\\nabuse of discretion.\\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. He explained there\\nwas no reason Simon could not have taken a nighttime video\\nand presented it during the suppression hearing. The judge\\ndiscussed the danger of allowing supplementation here and\\nsetting a bad precedent leading to a never-ending cycle of par-\\nties waiting for rulings and then coming up with “new” evi-\\ndence to challenge them. Most importantly, the judge ex-\\nplained that even with the proposed evidence, his ruling\\nwould not change. The nighttime video would not capture the\\nactual visual capabilities of the officers, who credibly testified\\nabout how close Simon was to the intersection when he sig-\\nnaled. The judge reasoned a video of the scene taken months\\nlater, when conditions might differ, would not impact their\\ncredibility. Besides, the judge noted, the probable cause\\nstandard does not need evidence to support a conviction be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt. He did not abuse his discretion.\\nD. ACCA\\n Simon argues his prior conviction under Illinois law for\\nattempted armed robbery should not have counted as a pred-\\nicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He recog-\\nnizes our decisions foreclose his argument on this point, but\\nhe wants to preserve it for the Supreme Court.\\n IV. Conclusion\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments. Finding no reversi-\\nble error, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431872/\", \"author_raw\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654619/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Marshon Simon\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2442\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMARSHON SIMON,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 16-CR-20077 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Police officers pulled Marshon Si-\nmon over for failing to signal sufficiently ahead of turning. A\ndrug-sniffing dog alerted on Simon’s car so officers searched\nit. They did not find drugs, but they found a gun. The govern-\nment charged Simon with being a felon-in-possession. The\ndistrict judge denied Simon’s motions for recusal, suppres-\nsion, and supplementation. Simon entered a conditional\nguilty plea and received a sentence of 15 years. He raises a\n\f2 No. 18-2442\n\nlitany of issues on appeal. He argues the judge should have\nrecused himself because before he was a judge he supervised\na prior prosecution of Simon. He argues the judge should\nhave suppressed the gun because the officers lacked probable\ncause to initiate the traffic stop and because they prolonged\nthe stop to allow for the dog sniff. He argues the dog’s alert\nwas false and the dog was unreliable because he was improp-\nerly trained. He argues the judge should have allowed him to\nsupplement the evidence after denial of suppression. Finally,\nhe argues one of his prior felonies should not have counted as\na predicate for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.\nConcluding the judge committed no reversible error in deny-\ning Simon’s motions, we affirm.\n I. Facts\n On the night of August 21, 2016, three police officers in a\n“bike patrol unit” surveyed a particular section of Decatur, Il-\nlinois. Officers Jason Danner and Jamie Hagemeyer rode bi-\ncycles. They sat behind a propane tank 145 yards from the in-\ntersection of College and Green Streets. Officer Robert\nHoecker drove a squad car nearby.\n The bicycle officers saw a vehicle driven by Marshon Si-\nmon leave the 1100 block of North College Street (five blocks\naway) and drive toward them. As Simon approached the in-\ntersection of College and Green Streets, he failed to signal at\nleast 100 feet before turning left from College onto Green. This\nwas according to the bicyclists’ testimony at the suppression\nhearing, which the district judge credited. At the bicyclists’ re-\nquest, Hoecker pulled Simon over at 10:26 p.m.\n Hoecker approached Simon’s car and made contact.\nHoecker introduced himself and told Simon the basic reason\n\fNo. 18-2442 3\n\nfor the stop. Hoecker explained bicycle officers would arrive\nand provide details. Simon questioned the basis for the stop.\nSimon gave his driver’s license and proof of insurance to\nHoecker. According to Hoecker, Simon was cooperative and\npolite, behaved normally, and was no more nervous than the\nnormal level of traffic-stop nervousness. Hoecker ran Simon\nthrough the LEADS computer system and found he was val-\nidly licensed and insured. Hoecker finished this check in less\nthan 2 minutes, before Danner and Hagemeyer arrived on\nscene at about 10:29 p.m.\n Once Danner and Hagemeyer arrived they took over “pro-\ncessing the ticket,” including some double-checking.\nHoecker’s role was to assist. Hoecker told Danner that Simon\nhad insurance and a valid license. Hoecker said he “didn’t\nknow if [Danner] wanted the dog or not.” (Appellant Br. at 8,\nquoting Hoecker’s dashcam video.) Danner asked if Simon\nhad any criminal history. Hoecker then ran a criminal-history\ncheck and found Simon had prior drug and weapon charges.\n Danner made contact with Simon. Danner testified Simon\nappeared abnormally nervous. Danner testified Simon asked\nabout the violation and insisted he used his turn signal. Dan-\nner testified, “I observed him to pull his hand away from his\nlap, and he was shaking pretty good, indicating to me that he\nappeared nervous.” But Danner did not note this in the police\nreport and he did not mention this when discussing whether\nto call a dog.\n Hagemeyer testified that while speaking briefly with\nHoecker he handed her Simon’s materials. She then went to\nanother squad car that had arrived on scene “to begin the\nwritten warning.” Both Danner and Hagemeyer testified\nabout the various steps and processes a bike patrol unit\n\f4 No. 18-2442\n\ncompletes as part of the mission instigated by a traffic viola-\ntion, including monitoring and securing the scene, making\ncontacts with the driver, running computer checks, and writ-\ning out the warning or ticket.\n Danner decided to call a dog. He testified he decided to\ncall a dog at about 22:30:38 (10:30:38 p.m.) on the clock of\nHoecker’s dashcam, about 1 minute after Danner and Hage-\nmeyer arrived at the traffic stop. An officer called for the ca-\nnine unit less than 4 minutes into the stop, when the ticket\nwas still being processed, according to the officers’ testimony.\n Canine handler Snyder arrived with Rex at the scene at\nabout 10:33 p.m. At that time, the traffic violation was still be-\ning processed, according to the officers’ testimony.1 Within a\n\n 1 Here are excerpts on point from the bicycle patrol unit’s testimony:\nQ: And when Officer Snyder arrived, was the traffic violation still being\nprocessed?\nHoecker: Yes.\n(Tr. Continuation of Suppression Hr’g, July 12, 2017, DE 44 at 19:1–19:3.)\n\nQ: And do you recall approximately how long into the traffic stop it would\nhave been that [Officer Snyder, with Rex] arrived?\nDanner: I believe it was around six or seven minutes.\nQ: And were you still processing the traffic ticket at that time?\nA: That’s correct.\n(Id. at 50:19–50:24.)\n\nHagemeyer: From the time we arrived to the time Officer Snyder arrived\nwas three or four minutes.\nQ: So a very short period of time?\nA: Very short period of time.\nQ: Were you still working on the traffic ticket at that time?\nA: Yes.\nQ: And still working on it diligently, correct?\nA: [Nodding head up and down.]\n\fNo. 18-2442 5\n\nfew seconds of walking around Simon’s car, Rex alerted.\nSnyder took less than 20 seconds to prepare Rex, begin the\nsearch, and confirm the alert. The time period from the begin-\nning of the stop to the alert was about 7 minutes. Hagemeyer\ntestified she had no part in conducting the actual dog sniff.\nShe testified she “was writing the warning.” She confirmed on\ncross-examination that she filled out the traffic warning, and\nthat Danner issued it to Simon. Defense counsel asked, “So\nyou were the one who filled out the date, time, name, address,\nand birth date?” Hagemeyer answered, “I filled out the ma-\njority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”\n After the alert, Simon became angry and insisted there\nwere no drugs in his car. Danner asked Simon to step out of\nhis car. The police searched it. They did not find drugs, but\nthey found a gun. An officer drove Simon to the police station.\nDanner handed Simon a traffic citation as he was released\nfrom the station. Danner testified he filled out the citation.\n II. Procedural posture\n Since Simon was a felon, the government charged him\nwith being a felon in possession of a firearm. The case was\nassigned to Judge Bruce. Simon moved Judge Bruce to recuse\nhimself because he had served as the First Assistant United\nStates Attorney for the Central District of Illinois with super-\nvisory authority over a prior case against Simon culminating\nin conviction. Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion.\n Simon moved to suppress the gun, arguing there was no\nprobable cause to stop his car, the police impermissibly ex-\ntended the stop to get a dog on scene, and the dog was unre-\nliable and improperly trained. Judge Bruce held an\n\n(Id. at 87:24–88:7.)\n\f6 No. 18-2442\n\nevidentiary hearing over parts of three days and heard testi-\nmony from seven witnesses. He found the officers credible,\neven if at times confused. He found the officers had probable\ncause to think Simon committed a traffic violation, the officers\ndid not unreasonably prolong the stop, and Rex was a\nproperly trained and certified canine whose alert can lead to\nprobable cause. The judge denied the motion to suppress.\n Simon moved to supplement the record with additional,\nunrelated traffic citations issued by Danner (to show the dif-\nferences in the officers’ handwriting to address the issue of\nwhich officer wrote Simon’s citation) and a video made by a\ndefense investigator (to contradict the officers’ version of\nevents leading up to the traffic stop). The judge denied this\nmotion.\n Simon pleaded guilty conditioned on preserving his right\nto appeal. He received an enhancement as an Armed Career\nCriminal. The judge sentenced him to 15 years in prison, the\nmandatory minimum.\n Simon appeals the denials of his motions to recuse, sup-\npress, and supplement. He also appeals his qualification as an\nArmed Career Criminal, arguing his prior conviction for at-\ntempted armed robbery in Illinois in 2000 did not qualify as a\nviolent felony.\n III. Analysis\nA. Recusal\n Simon seeks remand because he claims Judge Bruce’s han-\ndling of this case conveys the appearance of impropriety. Si-\nmon does not claim Judge Bruce actually had or acted on any\nunfair bias against Simon.\n\fNo. 18-2442 7\n\n Simon argues Judge Bruce should have recused himself\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): “Any justice, judge, or magistrate\njudge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-\nceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-\ntioned.” Below, Simon also sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. §\n455(b)(3), but he no longer presses that on appeal.\n As the government agrees, we review a preserved § 455(a)\nclaim de novo. Cf. Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir.\n2016) (holding § 455(a) can be vindicated on appeal); United\nStates v. Dorsey, 829 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (a preserved\n§ 455(b) claim is reviewed de novo).\n To win recusal under § 455(a), a party must show a rea-\nsonable, well-informed observer might question the judge’s\nimpartiality. United States v. Herrera-Valdez, 826 F.3d 912, 917\n(7th Cir. 2016). In other words, the party must show an objec-\ntive, disinterested observer fully informed of the reasons for\nseeking recusal would “entertain a significant doubt that jus-\ntice would be done in the case.” Id.\n Simon sought recusal early in the case on the ground that\nBruce served as First Assistant United States Attorney for the\nCentral District of Illinois from 2010 through 2013. During\nthat time, the government charged Simon with violating 21\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Bruce supervised the AUSA\nassigned to that case. Simon pleaded guilty and was sen-\ntenced in 2012 and again (after a successful appeal) in March\n2013. This prior criminal case involved occurrence facts sepa-\nrate from those in the present case. But the prior case is di-\nrectly relevant to this case because the conviction in the prior\ncase enhanced Simon’s sentence in this case as an Armed Ca-\nreer Criminal.\n\f8 No. 18-2442\n\n Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion. He noted he could\nnot remember any participation in past prosecutions of Si-\nmon. Judge Bruce observed that even if he did participate in\na past prosecution, he did not participate in the current pros-\necution, “which consists of new charges, wholly unrelated to\nthose brought against [Simon] in the past.” (Text Order, Dec.\n6, 2016.)\n Simon likens this case to United States v. Herrera-Valdez.\nThere, the government prosecuted a defendant for illegal\nreentry after deportation. Before trial on the illegal-reentry\ncharge, defendant moved to disqualify Judge Der-Yeghiayan\nbecause he had served as the District Counsel for the Immi-\ngration and Naturalization Service when defendant was de-\nported. District Counsel Der-Yeghiayan’s name was listed in\nseveral places in INS’s briefing supporting deporting. Judge\nDer-Yeghiayan denied the motion to disqualify and defend-\nant appealed. We observed that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a\njudge to “‘disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his\nimpartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrera-Valdez,\n826 F.3d at 917. We reversed the denial of disqualification,\nconcluding “a reasonable, disinterested observer could as-\nsume bias from the fact that the judge presiding over the de-\nfendant’s prosecution for illegal reentry was the same person\nwho ran the office that pursued, and succeeded in obtaining,\nthe removal order that is the source of his current prosecu-\ntion.” Id. at 919. We noted this was particularly true given that\nthe linchpin of defendant’s case against the illegal-reentry\ncharge was a collateral attack against the removal order. The\njudge need not have been actually involved in the prior case\nor be actually biased in the subsequent case to trigger the re-\nquirement to recuse under § 455(a).\n\fNo. 18-2442 9\n\n But here, the prior case does not directly give rise to or un-\nderly the present case. And here, Simon attempts no collateral\nattack against the prior conviction. Simon’s 2011 conviction\nwas not, and could not have been, the linchpin to his defense\nin this subsequent case. A defendant in a federal sentencing\nproceeding may not collaterally attack a prior conviction used\nto enhance his sentence, with an exception not relevant here.\nSee Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382–83 (2001); Custis\nv. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). Any collateral attack\nagainst the prior conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would\nhave been time-barred. So there was no possibility of Judge\nBruce adjudicating the merits of a collateral attack against Si-\nmon’s 2011 conviction here. And consequently there was no\nreason to think Simon might have declined to launch a collat-\neral attack against the 2011 conviction because he feared\nJudge Bruce would not be receptive to such an attack, or\nwould punish him in the present case for making such an at-\ntack.\n The prior and subsequent cases at issue in Herrera-Valdez\nare directly related in a way the prior and subsequent cases at\nissue here are not. A closer analogy to Herrera-Valdez is Si-\nmon’s prior conviction under the supervision of First AUSA\nBruce and the proceedings for revocation of supervised re-\nlease involving that prior conviction and the gun possession\non August 21, 2016. Simon’s prior conviction directly gives\nrise to and underlies the revocation proceedings. So Judge\nBruce recused himself from them.2 As this relationship is not\n\n 2Simon asserts Judge Bruce recused himself from the revocation pro-\nceedings (2:11-cr-20002). The government does not contest this assertion.\nThe docket for that case neither confirms nor denies the recusal. We take\nSimon’s word for it.\n\f10 No. 18-2442\n\npresent between Simon’s prior case and the current felon-in-\npossession case, there was no need for Judge Bruce to recuse\nhimself here.\n True, the prior conviction enhanced the sentence for the\npresent conviction under the ACCA. But this is mere happen-\nstance. It is not the same kind of direct connection we found\nproblematic in Herrera-Valdez. Another distinction between\nHerrera-Valdez and this case is that there, the future judge’s\nname was on the briefs against the defendant, but here the\nfuture judge’s name was not on the briefs. This is a relevant\nconsideration because it bears on public perception. We do\nnot consider this to be a controlling factor by itself, but it is\nrelevant.\n Judge Bruce did not err in refusing to recuse.\nB. Suppression\n Simon raises a series of potential errors regarding the de-\nnial of suppression. He argues there was no probable cause to\nbelieve a traffic violation occurred, and therefore initiating the\nstop was unconstitutional. He argues the officers unconstitu-\ntionally prolonged the traffic stop. And he argues Rex’s alert\nwas false and Rex was improperly trained. “We employ a\nmixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing\nthe district court’s factual determinations for clear error and\nde novo its ultimate determination about whether the police\nhad sufficient grounds to stop or search the individual.”\nUnited States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir.\n2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).\n1. Initiating the stop\n Simon argues the officers lacked probable cause to believe\nhe committed a traffic violation, so they had no probable\n\fNo. 18-2442 11\n\ncause to stop him. If Simon were right, then the court should\nhave suppressed the gun as fruit of the poisonous tree. The\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a\ncar, the stop must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasona-\nbleness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015).\n Simon goes so far as to assert he did not commit a traffic\nviolation. He argues the government did not meet its burden\nof proof to establish he actually committed a traffic violation.\nBut the government had no such burden. Whether Simon\ncommitted a traffic violation is irrelevant for Fourth Amend-\nment purposes so long as the officers had probable cause to\nthink he did. United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir.\n2019) (“The officer is not the judge. Whether the driver actu-\nally committed a traffic infraction is irrelevant for Fourth\nAmendment purposes so long as there was an objective basis\nfor a reasonable belief he did.”).\n Generally, the decision to stop a car is reasonable, and\ncomports with the Fourth Amendment, “where the police\nhave probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has oc-\ncurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Prob-\nable cause exists when “the circumstances confronting a po-\nlice officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has com-\nmitted even a minor traffic offense.” United States v. Cashman,\n216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). Probable cause is an objective\nstandard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Lewis, 920\nF.3d at 489. If an officer reasonably thinks he sees a driver\ncommit a traffic infraction, that is a sufficient basis to pull him\n\f12 No. 18-2442\n\nover without violating the Constitution. United States v.\nMuriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005).\n Here, Simon acknowledges the probable cause determina-\ntion depends entirely on the credibility of the two officers on\nbicycles who testified they saw him turn without signaling at\nleast 100 feet ahead. Simon levies many attacks on their cred-\nibility, urging us to reverse under the clear error standard. Si-\nmon admits the clear error standard is very demanding. Un-\nder this standard, we only reverse when, after reviewing the\nrecord as a whole, we have a “definite and firm conviction” a\nmistake has been made. United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614,\n621 (7th Cir. 2001). The district judge, after all, listened to the\ntestimony directly and observed the demeanor of the wit-\nnesses. United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2014).\nThe district judge is in a much better position to evaluate cred-\nibility than we are. His credibility determinations are entitled\nto special deference. We take Simon’s credibility attacks in\nturn.\ni. Phantom stop sign\n First, Simon argues Hagemeyer swore at the suppression\nhearing that there was a stop sign at the corner of College and\nGreen, but she was demonstrably and indisputably wrong. Si-\nmon argues this impugns her claim she saw the traffic viola-\ntion.\n The judge directly confronted Hagemeyer’s mistake. He\nnoted Hagemeyer “was wrong about that detail.” (Order, DE\n21 at 4.) The judge said he would take the mistake into account\nin assessing Hagemeyer’s credibility. But the judge concluded\nthe mistake does not weigh heavily against her credibility be-\ncause the detail “is not greatly important regarding the traffic\n\fNo. 18-2442 13\n\noffense for which Defendant was pulled over” and because\n“[i]t would not have factored in to [sic] determining whether\nor not to issue Defendant a ticket for failing to signal his turn\nwithin not less than 100 feet of the intersection.” (Id.) Hage-\nmeyer’s determination at the scene that Simon failed to signal\nat least 100 feet before the turn was not informed by the pres-\nence or absence of a stop sign at the corner. In other words,\nthere were other reasons independent of the presence or ab-\nsence of a stop sign for Hagemeyer to think Simon failed to\nsignal at least 100 feet ahead of turning. Indeed, the presence\nor absence of a stop sign is irrelevant to estimating distances\nor to the requirement to signal. The judge simply did not find\nthis mistake about a stop sign to be very important. So the\nmistake did not significantly undermine the reliability of\nHagemeyer to perceive other facts that night. Moreover, her\nmistake about the stop sign has no bearing on Danner’s testi-\nmony that he saw Simon fail to signal sufficiently ahead of\nturning.\n And as for the possibilities Hagemeyer lied about the stop\nsign, and this lie undermines her credibility about everything\nelse, Simon does not go quite so far. In his opening appellate\nbrief, he does not directly, unequivocally accuse Hagemeyer\nof intentionally lying about the stop sign. And Simon offers\nno explanation for why Hagemeyer would have had any rea-\nson to lie about it. We see no clear error here.\nii. Distances\n Second, Simon argues Hagemeyer and Danner were\nwrong about the distance between their location and the in-\ntersection of College and Green. They both testified the dis-\ntance was 75 yards. But the distance was actually 145 yards.\nThe officers’ testimony was demonstrably and indisputably\n\f14 No. 18-2442\n\nwrong by a wide margin. Simon argues the officers’ ability to\njudge distance was the key to their claim Simon committed a\ntraffic violation. He argues their failure to estimate the dis-\ntance between their location and the intersection correctly\nmakes their claims about the distance between the location of\nSimon’s car when he activated his turn signal and the inter-\nsection wholly incredible.\n Again, the judge directly confronted the mistaken testi-\nmony. The judge decided the miscalculation was “of little im-\nport when it comes to credibility.” (Order, DE 21 at 3.) The\njudge reasoned that the fact that both officers estimated the\ndistance at 75 yards does not indicate collusion because if they\nwanted to connive it is much more likely they would have\nused a number closer to the actual distance. They were too\nwrong to be conspiring to lie.\n And as for the argument that the officers’ mistake about\nthis distance undermines the credibility of their estimate\nabout Simon’s signaling distance, the officers had other, spe-\ncific indicia of the signaling distance beyond a raw estimate\nof the distance from A to B. The time between signaling and\nturning, the car lengths between signaling and turning, and\nthe lengths of the headlight beams bolstered the probable\ncause to think Simon signaled too late and too close. The judge\nconcluded the mistake about the distance between the bicy-\nclists’ location and the intersection shows nothing more than\nthat both bicyclists were wrong about that distance. We see no\nclear error here.\niii. Photographs\n Third, Simon argues photographs introduced into evi-\ndence show the unbelievability of the officers’ claims. Danner\n\fNo. 18-2442 15\n\nand Hagemeyer both testified they saw Simon’s car leave the\n1100 block of North College, five blocks from their position.\nBut, Simon argues, the photographs speak for themselves,\nand there is no way someone could see the make, model, or\ncolor of a vehicle at that distance.\n The judge simply disagreed. He examined the photo-\ngraphs and listened to the testimony and concluded “it is pos-\nsible for an average person, with good vision who is used to\nworking at night, such as Danner and Hagemeyer, to see a car,\nin the dark, turn onto a street with its headlights on.” (Order,\nDE 21 at 4.) We also examined the photographs and read the\ntestimony, and we do not have anything close to a definite\nand firm conviction the judge made a mistake in this regard.\nSometimes a photograph is not worth a thousand words.\niv. Ghost writer\n Fourth, Simon argues the judge ignored the officers’ mis-\nstatements about who prepared the traffic ticket. Hagemeyer\ntestified “I was writing the warning.” She answered “yes” to\nthe question: “[Y]ou said that you filled out the traffic warn-\ning in this case?” When asked if she was the one who filled\nout the date, time, name, address, and birth date, she testified\nshe “filled out the majority of” the ticket herself, but she be-\nlieved Danner signed it. But other evidence showed she filled\nout none of it. Danner filled out both the traffic citation (later\nvoided) and the warning (Simon received hours later).\n Simon accuses the judge of tying himself “into a pretzel to\navoid finding that the police officers could possibly have lied\nor misrepresented facts … .” (Appellant Br. at 33.) But the\njudge committed no such contortions. Rather, he addressed\nthe discrepancies directly. He combed through the testimony\n\f16 No. 18-2442\n\nabout the various steps in the process leading to handing a\ndriver a written ticket or warning. He noted there appeared\nto be confusion and possibly contradiction between the offic-\ners about who actually wrote the ticket. One source of confu-\nsion seemed to be the word “processing.” The judge observed\nHagemeyer, Snyder, and Hoecker all testified Hagemeyer be-\ngan “processing” the ticket, but “processing” a ticket involves\nmuch more than just physically writing the ticket. The judge\nalso observed Hagemeyer’s testimony on this issue was more\nspecific. She testified, “I was writing the warning.” When\nasked, “So you were the one who filled out the date, time,\nname, address, and birth date?” she responded, “I filled out\nthe majority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”3\n The judge compared the warning Simon received—pur-\nportedly filled out by Hagemeyer and signed by Danner—to\na different warning definitely filled out and signed by Hage-\nmeyer on a different date. The judge concluded the handwrit-\ning on the two warnings is different and they likely were not\nfilled in by the same officer.\n But the judge noted Simon did not show the exemplar\nwarning to Danner or Hagemeyer during the hearing to cross-\nexamine them on who wrote Simon’s warning. The judge also\n\n\n 3 In his order denying suppression, the judge characterized Hage-\nmeyer’s testimony on this point slightly incorrectly, and in favor of Si-\nmon’s arguments. The judge wrote “Hagemeyer answered ‘yes’ to\nwhether she filled in the name, date, etc., but she stated that Danner signed\nit.” (Order, DE 21 at 10.) Actually (according to the transcript) she did not\nsay “yes” in response to this question. She said, “I filled out the majority\nof it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.” But even giving Simon the ben-\nefit of this characterization, the judge still did not find a significant credi-\nbility problem.\n\fNo. 18-2442 17\n\nnoted the testimony indicated Danner or Hagemeyer would\noften start writing a ticket the other would finish. The judge\nobserved: “There are numerous possibilities as to why the dis-\ncrepancy exists, and without the officers being given the\nchance to explain the discrepancy, the court cannot impute\nimproper conduct on their part.” (Order, DE 21 at 11.) The\njudge considered the totality of the officers’ testimony, and\ntheir demeanor and appearance. He concluded any discrep-\nancy on this issue was due to mere confusion on the part of\nthe officers, and not to fabrication. And he concluded the of-\nficers were credible.\n We see no clear error regarding the judge’s decisions on\nany of these issues, nor regarding his decision to find the of-\nficers credible. Given the two bicycle officers testified they\nsaw Simon commit a traffic infraction, and given the judge be-\nlieved them, we see no reason to reverse the decision that\nprobable cause justified starting the stop.\n2. Conducting the stop\n Simon argues even if the officers did not violate the Con-\nstitution by initiating the stop, they violated it by impermissi-\nbly prolonging the stop. An officer who reasonably starts a\ntraffic stop might violate the Constitution if he exceeds the\nscope of the stop or unreasonably prolongs it. Lewis, 920 F.3d\nat 491. A traffic stop “‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged\nbeyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mis-\nsion’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez v. United States,\n135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543\nU.S. 405, 407 (2005)).\n A dog sniff of a car’s exterior only for illegal drugs during\na lawful stop for a traffic violation does not violate the Fourth\n\f18 No. 18-2442\n\nAmendment, even absent reasonable suspicion of drugs. Ca-\nballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But a stop justified only by a traffic vio-\nlation becomes unconstitutional if the officers prolong it be-\nyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s\noriginal mission. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. “An officer may\nconduct certain unrelated checks—including a dog sniff—\nduring a lawful traffic stop, but he may not do so in a way that\nprolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily\ndemanded to justify detaining an individual.” Lewis, 920 F.3d\nat 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Simon concedes,\n“calling a K-9 unit does not unlawfully extend a traffic stop as\nlong as the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is on-\ngoing.” (Appellant Br. at 36.)\n Without independent reasonable suspicion to justify the\nsniff, the critical question is not whether the dog sniffed be-\nfore or after the officer issued the warning, “but whether con-\nducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.”\nLewis, 920 F.3d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nWith independent reasonable suspicion, however, the officer\nmay constitutionally detain the suspect for the sniff even if it\nadds time to the total stop. Id.\n Here, the judge continued to credit the officers’ testimony.\nBased on that testimony, the judge concluded the stop was not\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff. The judge noted\nthe time period from the beginning of the stop to the canine\nalert was about 7 minutes, as Simon conceded. The judge de-\ntermined the officers acted quickly. Hoecker made the stop,\nexited his car, told Simon the reason for the stop, and gathered\nhis information. The bicyclists arrived at the stop only a cou-\nple minutes after Hoecker pulled Simon over. The bicyclists\n“diligently began processing the ticket.” (Order, DE 21 at 15.)\n\fNo. 18-2442 19\n\nCrucially, the judge found no indication the officers engaged\nin any activity other than securing the scene and processing\nthe warning during the time between the bicyclists’ arrival\nand Rex’s arrival. Specifically, the officers surveyed the scene,\nDanner spoke with Simon, and Hagemeyer testified she went\nto the squad car to begin processing the written warning. The\nvideo indicated that about 2.5 minutes into the stop, Danner\nwas speaking to Hoecker about the traffic violation. About 3\nminutes into the stop, Danner left the squad car to speak with\nSimon. Danner told Simon the reasons for the stop and gath-\nered information. Hoecker returned to Simon’s car at about\nthe 5-minute mark to speak with him about the traffic infrac-\ntion. Less than 7 minutes into the stop, Rex arrived and very\nquickly alerted. At that time, the bicycle officers were still pro-\ncessing the ticket.\n In sum, the judge concluded the officers were processing\nthe ticket when Rex arrived and alerted, so they had not yet\ncompleted the initial mission of the stop, and the stop was not\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff.\n Simon argues the police report and testimony contain the\n“misrepresentation” Hagemeyer was writing the warning\nwhile the officers waited for Rex because the officers knew\ncalling a canine unit does not unlawfully extend a stop so long\nas the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is ongoing.\nSimon continues to challenge the credibility of the officers. He\nargues that at no point did any officer on the scene begin ef-\nfectuating the purpose of the stop by dutifully and diligently\nfilling out a warning or ticket. He claims Danner filled out\nboth the traffic citation and the warning Simon received hours\nafter the stop. But again we see no reversible error in the\njudge’s conclusions on this point.\n\f20 No. 18-2442\n\n Simon presses that even if the judge’s credibility determi-\nnations here are correct, his ruling is still flawed. First, Simon\nargues the judge improperly allowed a de minimis delay to be\nconstitutional, even though any delay to allow a dog to sniff\nis unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion.\nWe disagree with Simon about what the judge did. He specif-\nically found there was no improper delay. (Order, DE 21 at 14\n(“the stop was not purposefully prolonged to allow for the ca-\nnine unit’s arrival”).) True, the judge added in a footnote that\neven if he found the ticket-writing process had not begun\nwhen Rex arrived, still the sequence of events was so short\nand condensed that the stop was not prolonged in any “mean-\ningful” way. But we need not review this dictum.\n Second, Simon argues that instead of effectuating the pur-\npose of the traffic stop, the officers decided to run a criminal-\nhistory check. Simon argues this was unrelated to the mission\nof the stop and delayed processing the traffic violation. Simon\ncites no supporting Seventh Circuit case. We said last year that\nwhen police conduct a stop, “they are entitled to demand the\ndriver’s identification, of course, and it is routine to check the\ndriver’s record for active warrants, driving history, and crim-\ninal history. Those checks are done for important reasons, in-\ncluding officer safety.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d\n577, 586 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Sanford, 806\nF.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The trooper checked the occu-\npants’ criminal histories on the computer in his car—a proce-\ndure permissible even without reasonable suspicion … .”).\n We considered all Simon’s arguments, but we see no rea-\nson to reverse the judge’s conclusions that the officers were in\nthe process of completing the traffic warning when Rex\n\fNo. 18-2442 21\n\narrived, and the officers did not improperly prolong the traffic\nstop to allow the sniff to occur.\n3. Bona Fido?\n Simon argues even if the officers had probable cause to\npull him over, and even if they did not prolong the traffic stop\nto wait for Rex, still the judge should have suppressed the gun\nbecause Rex’s alert was false, Rex was improperly trained,\nand the alert did not provide probable cause to justify search-\ning Simon’s car.\n Probable cause to conduct a search is not among the high-\nest standards. “A police officer has probable cause to conduct\na search when the facts available to him would warrant a per-\nson of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evi-\ndence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050,\n1055 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).\nProbable cause is less than preponderance of the evidence. Id.\n“All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which\nreasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id.\n(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Probable\ncause is a practical, common-sense standard, involving the to-\ntality of the circumstances. Id.\n A dog’s alert on a car can give probable cause to search the\nentire car. Indeed, a good dog’s alert can provide a rebuttable\npresumption of probable cause to search:\n If a bona fide organization has certified a dog\n after testing his reliability in a controlled setting,\n a court can presume (subject to any conflicting\n evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides\n probable cause to search. The same is true, even\n in the absence of formal certification, if the dog\n\f22 No. 18-2442\n\n has recently and successfully completed a train-\n ing program that evaluated his proficiency in lo-\n cating drugs.\nId. at 1057. The ultimate question is “whether all the facts sur-\nrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common\nsense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a\nsearch would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A\nsniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.” Id. at 1058.\n Simon concedes Rex passed certification tests. But Simon\nchallenges the alert itself and the adequacy of Rex’s training.\n “First and foremost,” Simon argues Rex did not alert on\nSimon’s car. (Appellant Br. at 42.) This perplexes. Simon cites\nnothing to support this claim. The record belies it. Given the\ncontext of this claim, Simon seems simply to mean the alert\nwas false.4 It is true that following the alert the officers\nsearched the car and found no evidence of drugs in it. But Si-\nmon does not explain why that, in itself, matters here. Proba-\nble cause is not a retrospective, outcome-based standard.\n\n 4 Defense expert Dr. Mary Cablk said in her report she could not de-\ntermine if Rex alerted or what Rex alerted to. She confirmed this on cross-\nexamination at the suppression hearing. During direct examination she\nwatched videos from Hoecker’s and Snyder’s dashcams. She testified she\ncould not see the alert, could not tell exactly where on the car the dog\nalerted, and did not know whether the alert was barking or something\nelse. But in her testimony she seems to accept Rex alerted. She character-\nized it as a false alert because no drugs were found, and she criticized\nSnyder for rewarding Rex for falsely alerting: “In this instance, there’s no\ndrugs found; so he’s reinforcing the dog for false alerting here.” In any\nevent, Snyder testified that Rex alerted and that Snyder confirmed the\nalert. And the judge throughout his order accepted Rex alerted. He found\nthe officers’ testimony, in its totality, credible. We see no reason to upend\nthe determination Rex alerted.\n\fNo. 18-2442 23\n\nBridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). If an officer\nrandomly breaks into a house on only a wild hunch and stum-\nbles into a meth lab, the discovery does not provide probable\ncause for the search. And if 20 reliable informants tell an of-\nficer a particular house contains a meth lab, so he stands in\nthe street outside the house and sees through an open win-\ndow the apparent apparatus and accoutrements of a meth lab,\nso he obtains a warrant to search the house based on probable\ncause to think it contains a meth lab, but he finds only an in-\nnocent and intricate chemistry set, still probable cause sup-\nported the warrant. So the mere absence of drugs in Simon’s\ncar does not undermine the probable cause to search it for\ndrugs, provided there was probable cause in the first place.\n Simon’s other argument is the officers did not have prob-\nable cause to search his vehicle in the first place because Rex\nwas unreliable. This argument proceeds in two waves.\n The first wave is quickly quelled. Simon argues Rex was\nunreliable because he was not trained properly under Illinois\nlaw, which requires police dogs be trained according to cer-\ntain guidelines. Simon argues Detective Larner (the Macon\nCounty canine-training director) admitted he did not always\nfollow these guidelines. But we need not address what Illinois\nlaw requires or whether Rex satisfies it because Illinois law\ndoes not control the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore,\n553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s mean-\ning [does] not change with local law enforcement practices—\neven practices set by rule.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.\n35, 43 (1988) (“We have never intimated … that whether or not\na search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth\nAmendment depends on the law of the particular State in\nwhich the search occurs.”).\n\f24 No. 18-2442\n\n The second wave holds out longer, but ultimately suc-\ncumbs. Simon argues, apart from Illinois law, if a dog is\ntrained to alert when no evidence of criminal activity exists,\nthis violates the Fourth Amendment. The problem, as Simon\nsees it, is Rex was trained with scented cotton balls to alert to\nresidual odors. But to search a car, there must be probable\ncause to think it presently contains evidence of criminal activ-\nity. So if Rex is trained to alert to mere residue even when no\ndrugs are present, then his alert is not a reliable indicator\ndrugs are present, and therefore his alert does not provide\nprobable cause to justify a search.\n The main problem with this argument is the Supreme\nCourt already rejected its premise. In Florida v. Harris, a dog\nnamed Aldo alerted on a truck. A subsequent search did not\nreveal any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, but it did\ndiscover meth ingredients. The defendant moved to suppress\nthe ingredients on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given\nprobable cause to search. The defendant “principally con-\ntended” in the trial court that because the officer did not find\nany of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, Aldo’s alerts\nmust have been false. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058. But the Su-\npreme Court patted Aldo on the head and called him a good\nboy: “A well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to [resid-\nual] odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but\nin fact is not.” Id. at 1059; see also Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels,\nInc., 600 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (Plaintiff’s “only de-\nveloped legal theory is untenable. [His] premise—that an alert\nby a drug-sniffing dog trained to detect residual odors does\nnot establish probable cause to search—was rejected in Harris\n… .”). If a well-trained dog, trained to alert even to residual\nodors, alerts, there is generally a fair probability that drugs or\nevidence of drugs will be found, absent contradictory factors.\n\fNo. 18-2442 25\n\nAnd that is all the Fourth Amendment requires. If somehow\na dog were trained to alert only to residual odors, then we\nmight have a problem. But that is not this case.\n Our review of the record and the order denying suppres-\nsion satisfies us the judge conducted the proper Harris evalu-\nation and committed no error in concluding Rex’s satisfactory\ncertification and training provide sufficient reason to trust his\nalert or in concluding Rex’s training on residual odors is ac-\nceptable. The judge heard testimony from Simon’s expert Dr.\nCablk challenging Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself, tes-\ntimony from Officer Snyder supporting Rex’s qualifications\nand the sniff itself, and testimony from Detective Larner sup-\nporting Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself. The judge also\nentertained arguments from both sides in the form of the mo-\ntion to suppress, supporting memorandum, the government’s\nresponse, and post-hearing briefs filed by both sides. The\njudge considered the totality of the circumstances, addressed\nHarris’s ultimate question, and found Rex’s sniff up to snuff.\nC. Supplementation\n After the judge denied the motion to suppress, Simon\nmoved to supplement the record and for leave to seek recon-\nsideration. He wanted to reopen the evidence to introduce\nfurther, unrelated citations prepared by Danner in August\n2016 “which further emphasize the differences in the officers’\nhandwriting … .” (Mot. Supp., DE 23 at 4.) Simon also wanted\nto introduce a video he5 took when he returned to the scene\none night. The video shows a vehicle leaving the 1100 block\nof College Street and approaching the intersection of College\n\n 5 The motion says Simon created the video. On appeal, Simon asserts\nhis investigator took the video. This nuance is immaterial here.\n\f26 No. 18-2442\n\nand Green. The judge denied this motion. On appeal, Simon\nonly presses the video. He does not mention the additional\nhandwriting exemplars in his opening appellate brief. Simon\nacknowledges we review the denial of supplementation for\nabuse of discretion.\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. He explained there\nwas no reason Simon could not have taken a nighttime video\nand presented it during the suppression hearing. The judge\ndiscussed the danger of allowing supplementation here and\nsetting a bad precedent leading to a never-ending cycle of par-\nties waiting for rulings and then coming up with “new” evi-\ndence to challenge them. Most importantly, the judge ex-\nplained that even with the proposed evidence, his ruling\nwould not change. The nighttime video would not capture the\nactual visual capabilities of the officers, who credibly testified\nabout how close Simon was to the intersection when he sig-\nnaled. The judge reasoned a video of the scene taken months\nlater, when conditions might differ, would not impact their\ncredibility. Besides, the judge noted, the probable cause\nstandard does not need evidence to support a conviction be-\nyond a reasonable doubt. He did not abuse his discretion.\nD. ACCA\n Simon argues his prior conviction under Illinois law for\nattempted armed robbery should not have counted as a pred-\nicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He recog-\nnizes our decisions foreclose his argument on this point, but\nhe wants to preserve it for the Supreme Court.\n IV. Conclusion\n We considered all Simon’s arguments. Finding no reversi-\nble error, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Marshon Simon\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2442\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMARSHON SIMON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 16-CR-20077 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Police officers pulled Marshon Si-\\nmon over for failing to signal sufficiently ahead of turning. A\\ndrug-sniffing dog alerted on Simon’s car so officers searched\\nit. They did not find drugs, but they found a gun. The govern-\\nment charged Simon with being a felon-in-possession. The\\ndistrict judge denied Simon’s motions for recusal, suppres-\\nsion, and supplementation. Simon entered a conditional\\nguilty plea and received a sentence of 15 years. He raises a\\n\\f2 No. 18-2442\\n\\nlitany of issues on appeal. He argues the judge should have\\nrecused himself because before he was a judge he supervised\\na prior prosecution of Simon. He argues the judge should\\nhave suppressed the gun because the officers lacked probable\\ncause to initiate the traffic stop and because they prolonged\\nthe stop to allow for the dog sniff. He argues the dog’s alert\\nwas false and the dog was unreliable because he was improp-\\nerly trained. He argues the judge should have allowed him to\\nsupplement the evidence after denial of suppression. Finally,\\nhe argues one of his prior felonies should not have counted as\\na predicate for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\nConcluding the judge committed no reversible error in deny-\\ning Simon’s motions, we affirm.\\n I. Facts\\n On the night of August 21, 2016, three police officers in a\\n“bike patrol unit” surveyed a particular section of Decatur, Il-\\nlinois. Officers Jason Danner and Jamie Hagemeyer rode bi-\\ncycles. They sat behind a propane tank 145 yards from the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets. Officer Robert\\nHoecker drove a squad car nearby.\\n The bicycle officers saw a vehicle driven by Marshon Si-\\nmon leave the 1100 block of North College Street (five blocks\\naway) and drive toward them. As Simon approached the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets, he failed to signal at\\nleast 100 feet before turning left from College onto Green. This\\nwas according to the bicyclists’ testimony at the suppression\\nhearing, which the district judge credited. At the bicyclists’ re-\\nquest, Hoecker pulled Simon over at 10:26 p.m.\\n Hoecker approached Simon’s car and made contact.\\nHoecker introduced himself and told Simon the basic reason\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 3\\n\\nfor the stop. Hoecker explained bicycle officers would arrive\\nand provide details. Simon questioned the basis for the stop.\\nSimon gave his driver’s license and proof of insurance to\\nHoecker. According to Hoecker, Simon was cooperative and\\npolite, behaved normally, and was no more nervous than the\\nnormal level of traffic-stop nervousness. Hoecker ran Simon\\nthrough the LEADS computer system and found he was val-\\nidly licensed and insured. Hoecker finished this check in less\\nthan 2 minutes, before Danner and Hagemeyer arrived on\\nscene at about 10:29 p.m.\\n Once Danner and Hagemeyer arrived they took over “pro-\\ncessing the ticket,” including some double-checking.\\nHoecker’s role was to assist. Hoecker told Danner that Simon\\nhad insurance and a valid license. Hoecker said he “didn’t\\nknow if [Danner] wanted the dog or not.” (Appellant Br. at 8,\\nquoting Hoecker’s dashcam video.) Danner asked if Simon\\nhad any criminal history. Hoecker then ran a criminal-history\\ncheck and found Simon had prior drug and weapon charges.\\n Danner made contact with Simon. Danner testified Simon\\nappeared abnormally nervous. Danner testified Simon asked\\nabout the violation and insisted he used his turn signal. Dan-\\nner testified, “I observed him to pull his hand away from his\\nlap, and he was shaking pretty good, indicating to me that he\\nappeared nervous.” But Danner did not note this in the police\\nreport and he did not mention this when discussing whether\\nto call a dog.\\n Hagemeyer testified that while speaking briefly with\\nHoecker he handed her Simon’s materials. She then went to\\nanother squad car that had arrived on scene “to begin the\\nwritten warning.” Both Danner and Hagemeyer testified\\nabout the various steps and processes a bike patrol unit\\n\\f4 No. 18-2442\\n\\ncompletes as part of the mission instigated by a traffic viola-\\ntion, including monitoring and securing the scene, making\\ncontacts with the driver, running computer checks, and writ-\\ning out the warning or ticket.\\n Danner decided to call a dog. He testified he decided to\\ncall a dog at about 22:30:38 (10:30:38 p.m.) on the clock of\\nHoecker’s dashcam, about 1 minute after Danner and Hage-\\nmeyer arrived at the traffic stop. An officer called for the ca-\\nnine unit less than 4 minutes into the stop, when the ticket\\nwas still being processed, according to the officers’ testimony.\\n Canine handler Snyder arrived with Rex at the scene at\\nabout 10:33 p.m. At that time, the traffic violation was still be-\\ning processed, according to the officers’ testimony.1 Within a\\n\\n 1 Here are excerpts on point from the bicycle patrol unit’s testimony:\\nQ: And when Officer Snyder arrived, was the traffic violation still being\\nprocessed?\\nHoecker: Yes.\\n(Tr. Continuation of Suppression Hr’g, July 12, 2017, DE 44 at 19:1–19:3.)\\n\\nQ: And do you recall approximately how long into the traffic stop it would\\nhave been that [Officer Snyder, with Rex] arrived?\\nDanner: I believe it was around six or seven minutes.\\nQ: And were you still processing the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: That’s correct.\\n(Id. at 50:19–50:24.)\\n\\nHagemeyer: From the time we arrived to the time Officer Snyder arrived\\nwas three or four minutes.\\nQ: So a very short period of time?\\nA: Very short period of time.\\nQ: Were you still working on the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: Yes.\\nQ: And still working on it diligently, correct?\\nA: [Nodding head up and down.]\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 5\\n\\nfew seconds of walking around Simon’s car, Rex alerted.\\nSnyder took less than 20 seconds to prepare Rex, begin the\\nsearch, and confirm the alert. The time period from the begin-\\nning of the stop to the alert was about 7 minutes. Hagemeyer\\ntestified she had no part in conducting the actual dog sniff.\\nShe testified she “was writing the warning.” She confirmed on\\ncross-examination that she filled out the traffic warning, and\\nthat Danner issued it to Simon. Defense counsel asked, “So\\nyou were the one who filled out the date, time, name, address,\\nand birth date?” Hagemeyer answered, “I filled out the ma-\\njority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”\\n After the alert, Simon became angry and insisted there\\nwere no drugs in his car. Danner asked Simon to step out of\\nhis car. The police searched it. They did not find drugs, but\\nthey found a gun. An officer drove Simon to the police station.\\nDanner handed Simon a traffic citation as he was released\\nfrom the station. Danner testified he filled out the citation.\\n II. Procedural posture\\n Since Simon was a felon, the government charged him\\nwith being a felon in possession of a firearm. The case was\\nassigned to Judge Bruce. Simon moved Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself because he had served as the First Assistant United\\nStates Attorney for the Central District of Illinois with super-\\nvisory authority over a prior case against Simon culminating\\nin conviction. Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion.\\n Simon moved to suppress the gun, arguing there was no\\nprobable cause to stop his car, the police impermissibly ex-\\ntended the stop to get a dog on scene, and the dog was unre-\\nliable and improperly trained. Judge Bruce held an\\n\\n(Id. at 87:24–88:7.)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2442\\n\\nevidentiary hearing over parts of three days and heard testi-\\nmony from seven witnesses. He found the officers credible,\\neven if at times confused. He found the officers had probable\\ncause to think Simon committed a traffic violation, the officers\\ndid not unreasonably prolong the stop, and Rex was a\\nproperly trained and certified canine whose alert can lead to\\nprobable cause. The judge denied the motion to suppress.\\n Simon moved to supplement the record with additional,\\nunrelated traffic citations issued by Danner (to show the dif-\\nferences in the officers’ handwriting to address the issue of\\nwhich officer wrote Simon’s citation) and a video made by a\\ndefense investigator (to contradict the officers’ version of\\nevents leading up to the traffic stop). The judge denied this\\nmotion.\\n Simon pleaded guilty conditioned on preserving his right\\nto appeal. He received an enhancement as an Armed Career\\nCriminal. The judge sentenced him to 15 years in prison, the\\nmandatory minimum.\\n Simon appeals the denials of his motions to recuse, sup-\\npress, and supplement. He also appeals his qualification as an\\nArmed Career Criminal, arguing his prior conviction for at-\\ntempted armed robbery in Illinois in 2000 did not qualify as a\\nviolent felony.\\n III. Analysis\\nA. Recusal\\n Simon seeks remand because he claims Judge Bruce’s han-\\ndling of this case conveys the appearance of impropriety. Si-\\nmon does not claim Judge Bruce actually had or acted on any\\nunfair bias against Simon.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 7\\n\\n Simon argues Judge Bruce should have recused himself\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): “Any justice, judge, or magistrate\\njudge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-\\nceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-\\ntioned.” Below, Simon also sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. §\\n455(b)(3), but he no longer presses that on appeal.\\n As the government agrees, we review a preserved § 455(a)\\nclaim de novo. Cf. Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (holding § 455(a) can be vindicated on appeal); United\\nStates v. Dorsey, 829 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (a preserved\\n§ 455(b) claim is reviewed de novo).\\n To win recusal under § 455(a), a party must show a rea-\\nsonable, well-informed observer might question the judge’s\\nimpartiality. United States v. Herrera-Valdez, 826 F.3d 912, 917\\n(7th Cir. 2016). In other words, the party must show an objec-\\ntive, disinterested observer fully informed of the reasons for\\nseeking recusal would “entertain a significant doubt that jus-\\ntice would be done in the case.” Id.\\n Simon sought recusal early in the case on the ground that\\nBruce served as First Assistant United States Attorney for the\\nCentral District of Illinois from 2010 through 2013. During\\nthat time, the government charged Simon with violating 21\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Bruce supervised the AUSA\\nassigned to that case. Simon pleaded guilty and was sen-\\ntenced in 2012 and again (after a successful appeal) in March\\n2013. This prior criminal case involved occurrence facts sepa-\\nrate from those in the present case. But the prior case is di-\\nrectly relevant to this case because the conviction in the prior\\ncase enhanced Simon’s sentence in this case as an Armed Ca-\\nreer Criminal.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion. He noted he could\\nnot remember any participation in past prosecutions of Si-\\nmon. Judge Bruce observed that even if he did participate in\\na past prosecution, he did not participate in the current pros-\\necution, “which consists of new charges, wholly unrelated to\\nthose brought against [Simon] in the past.” (Text Order, Dec.\\n6, 2016.)\\n Simon likens this case to United States v. Herrera-Valdez.\\nThere, the government prosecuted a defendant for illegal\\nreentry after deportation. Before trial on the illegal-reentry\\ncharge, defendant moved to disqualify Judge Der-Yeghiayan\\nbecause he had served as the District Counsel for the Immi-\\ngration and Naturalization Service when defendant was de-\\nported. District Counsel Der-Yeghiayan’s name was listed in\\nseveral places in INS’s briefing supporting deporting. Judge\\nDer-Yeghiayan denied the motion to disqualify and defend-\\nant appealed. We observed that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a\\njudge to “‘disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his\\nimpartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrera-Valdez,\\n826 F.3d at 917. We reversed the denial of disqualification,\\nconcluding “a reasonable, disinterested observer could as-\\nsume bias from the fact that the judge presiding over the de-\\nfendant’s prosecution for illegal reentry was the same person\\nwho ran the office that pursued, and succeeded in obtaining,\\nthe removal order that is the source of his current prosecu-\\ntion.” Id. at 919. We noted this was particularly true given that\\nthe linchpin of defendant’s case against the illegal-reentry\\ncharge was a collateral attack against the removal order. The\\njudge need not have been actually involved in the prior case\\nor be actually biased in the subsequent case to trigger the re-\\nquirement to recuse under § 455(a).\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 9\\n\\n But here, the prior case does not directly give rise to or un-\\nderly the present case. And here, Simon attempts no collateral\\nattack against the prior conviction. Simon’s 2011 conviction\\nwas not, and could not have been, the linchpin to his defense\\nin this subsequent case. A defendant in a federal sentencing\\nproceeding may not collaterally attack a prior conviction used\\nto enhance his sentence, with an exception not relevant here.\\nSee Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382–83 (2001); Custis\\nv. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). Any collateral attack\\nagainst the prior conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would\\nhave been time-barred. So there was no possibility of Judge\\nBruce adjudicating the merits of a collateral attack against Si-\\nmon’s 2011 conviction here. And consequently there was no\\nreason to think Simon might have declined to launch a collat-\\neral attack against the 2011 conviction because he feared\\nJudge Bruce would not be receptive to such an attack, or\\nwould punish him in the present case for making such an at-\\ntack.\\n The prior and subsequent cases at issue in Herrera-Valdez\\nare directly related in a way the prior and subsequent cases at\\nissue here are not. A closer analogy to Herrera-Valdez is Si-\\nmon’s prior conviction under the supervision of First AUSA\\nBruce and the proceedings for revocation of supervised re-\\nlease involving that prior conviction and the gun possession\\non August 21, 2016. Simon’s prior conviction directly gives\\nrise to and underlies the revocation proceedings. So Judge\\nBruce recused himself from them.2 As this relationship is not\\n\\n 2Simon asserts Judge Bruce recused himself from the revocation pro-\\nceedings (2:11-cr-20002). The government does not contest this assertion.\\nThe docket for that case neither confirms nor denies the recusal. We take\\nSimon’s word for it.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2442\\n\\npresent between Simon’s prior case and the current felon-in-\\npossession case, there was no need for Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself here.\\n True, the prior conviction enhanced the sentence for the\\npresent conviction under the ACCA. But this is mere happen-\\nstance. It is not the same kind of direct connection we found\\nproblematic in Herrera-Valdez. Another distinction between\\nHerrera-Valdez and this case is that there, the future judge’s\\nname was on the briefs against the defendant, but here the\\nfuture judge’s name was not on the briefs. This is a relevant\\nconsideration because it bears on public perception. We do\\nnot consider this to be a controlling factor by itself, but it is\\nrelevant.\\n Judge Bruce did not err in refusing to recuse.\\nB. Suppression\\n Simon raises a series of potential errors regarding the de-\\nnial of suppression. He argues there was no probable cause to\\nbelieve a traffic violation occurred, and therefore initiating the\\nstop was unconstitutional. He argues the officers unconstitu-\\ntionally prolonged the traffic stop. And he argues Rex’s alert\\nwas false and Rex was improperly trained. “We employ a\\nmixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing\\nthe district court’s factual determinations for clear error and\\nde novo its ultimate determination about whether the police\\nhad sufficient grounds to stop or search the individual.”\\nUnited States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n1. Initiating the stop\\n Simon argues the officers lacked probable cause to believe\\nhe committed a traffic violation, so they had no probable\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 11\\n\\ncause to stop him. If Simon were right, then the court should\\nhave suppressed the gun as fruit of the poisonous tree. The\\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches\\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a\\ncar, the stop must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasona-\\nbleness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663\\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,\\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States\\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n Simon goes so far as to assert he did not commit a traffic\\nviolation. He argues the government did not meet its burden\\nof proof to establish he actually committed a traffic violation.\\nBut the government had no such burden. Whether Simon\\ncommitted a traffic violation is irrelevant for Fourth Amend-\\nment purposes so long as the officers had probable cause to\\nthink he did. United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (“The officer is not the judge. Whether the driver actu-\\nally committed a traffic infraction is irrelevant for Fourth\\nAmendment purposes so long as there was an objective basis\\nfor a reasonable belief he did.”).\\n Generally, the decision to stop a car is reasonable, and\\ncomports with the Fourth Amendment, “where the police\\nhave probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has oc-\\ncurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Prob-\\nable cause exists when “the circumstances confronting a po-\\nlice officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has com-\\nmitted even a minor traffic offense.” United States v. Cashman,\\n216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). Probable cause is an objective\\nstandard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Lewis, 920\\nF.3d at 489. If an officer reasonably thinks he sees a driver\\ncommit a traffic infraction, that is a sufficient basis to pull him\\n\\f12 No. 18-2442\\n\\nover without violating the Constitution. United States v.\\nMuriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n Here, Simon acknowledges the probable cause determina-\\ntion depends entirely on the credibility of the two officers on\\nbicycles who testified they saw him turn without signaling at\\nleast 100 feet ahead. Simon levies many attacks on their cred-\\nibility, urging us to reverse under the clear error standard. Si-\\nmon admits the clear error standard is very demanding. Un-\\nder this standard, we only reverse when, after reviewing the\\nrecord as a whole, we have a “definite and firm conviction” a\\nmistake has been made. United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614,\\n621 (7th Cir. 2001). The district judge, after all, listened to the\\ntestimony directly and observed the demeanor of the wit-\\nnesses. United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nThe district judge is in a much better position to evaluate cred-\\nibility than we are. His credibility determinations are entitled\\nto special deference. We take Simon’s credibility attacks in\\nturn.\\ni. Phantom stop sign\\n First, Simon argues Hagemeyer swore at the suppression\\nhearing that there was a stop sign at the corner of College and\\nGreen, but she was demonstrably and indisputably wrong. Si-\\nmon argues this impugns her claim she saw the traffic viola-\\ntion.\\n The judge directly confronted Hagemeyer’s mistake. He\\nnoted Hagemeyer “was wrong about that detail.” (Order, DE\\n21 at 4.) The judge said he would take the mistake into account\\nin assessing Hagemeyer’s credibility. But the judge concluded\\nthe mistake does not weigh heavily against her credibility be-\\ncause the detail “is not greatly important regarding the traffic\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 13\\n\\noffense for which Defendant was pulled over” and because\\n“[i]t would not have factored in to [sic] determining whether\\nor not to issue Defendant a ticket for failing to signal his turn\\nwithin not less than 100 feet of the intersection.” (Id.) Hage-\\nmeyer’s determination at the scene that Simon failed to signal\\nat least 100 feet before the turn was not informed by the pres-\\nence or absence of a stop sign at the corner. In other words,\\nthere were other reasons independent of the presence or ab-\\nsence of a stop sign for Hagemeyer to think Simon failed to\\nsignal at least 100 feet ahead of turning. Indeed, the presence\\nor absence of a stop sign is irrelevant to estimating distances\\nor to the requirement to signal. The judge simply did not find\\nthis mistake about a stop sign to be very important. So the\\nmistake did not significantly undermine the reliability of\\nHagemeyer to perceive other facts that night. Moreover, her\\nmistake about the stop sign has no bearing on Danner’s testi-\\nmony that he saw Simon fail to signal sufficiently ahead of\\nturning.\\n And as for the possibilities Hagemeyer lied about the stop\\nsign, and this lie undermines her credibility about everything\\nelse, Simon does not go quite so far. In his opening appellate\\nbrief, he does not directly, unequivocally accuse Hagemeyer\\nof intentionally lying about the stop sign. And Simon offers\\nno explanation for why Hagemeyer would have had any rea-\\nson to lie about it. We see no clear error here.\\nii. Distances\\n Second, Simon argues Hagemeyer and Danner were\\nwrong about the distance between their location and the in-\\ntersection of College and Green. They both testified the dis-\\ntance was 75 yards. But the distance was actually 145 yards.\\nThe officers’ testimony was demonstrably and indisputably\\n\\f14 No. 18-2442\\n\\nwrong by a wide margin. Simon argues the officers’ ability to\\njudge distance was the key to their claim Simon committed a\\ntraffic violation. He argues their failure to estimate the dis-\\ntance between their location and the intersection correctly\\nmakes their claims about the distance between the location of\\nSimon’s car when he activated his turn signal and the inter-\\nsection wholly incredible.\\n Again, the judge directly confronted the mistaken testi-\\nmony. The judge decided the miscalculation was “of little im-\\nport when it comes to credibility.” (Order, DE 21 at 3.) The\\njudge reasoned that the fact that both officers estimated the\\ndistance at 75 yards does not indicate collusion because if they\\nwanted to connive it is much more likely they would have\\nused a number closer to the actual distance. They were too\\nwrong to be conspiring to lie.\\n And as for the argument that the officers’ mistake about\\nthis distance undermines the credibility of their estimate\\nabout Simon’s signaling distance, the officers had other, spe-\\ncific indicia of the signaling distance beyond a raw estimate\\nof the distance from A to B. The time between signaling and\\nturning, the car lengths between signaling and turning, and\\nthe lengths of the headlight beams bolstered the probable\\ncause to think Simon signaled too late and too close. The judge\\nconcluded the mistake about the distance between the bicy-\\nclists’ location and the intersection shows nothing more than\\nthat both bicyclists were wrong about that distance. We see no\\nclear error here.\\niii. Photographs\\n Third, Simon argues photographs introduced into evi-\\ndence show the unbelievability of the officers’ claims. Danner\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 15\\n\\nand Hagemeyer both testified they saw Simon’s car leave the\\n1100 block of North College, five blocks from their position.\\nBut, Simon argues, the photographs speak for themselves,\\nand there is no way someone could see the make, model, or\\ncolor of a vehicle at that distance.\\n The judge simply disagreed. He examined the photo-\\ngraphs and listened to the testimony and concluded “it is pos-\\nsible for an average person, with good vision who is used to\\nworking at night, such as Danner and Hagemeyer, to see a car,\\nin the dark, turn onto a street with its headlights on.” (Order,\\nDE 21 at 4.) We also examined the photographs and read the\\ntestimony, and we do not have anything close to a definite\\nand firm conviction the judge made a mistake in this regard.\\nSometimes a photograph is not worth a thousand words.\\niv. Ghost writer\\n Fourth, Simon argues the judge ignored the officers’ mis-\\nstatements about who prepared the traffic ticket. Hagemeyer\\ntestified “I was writing the warning.” She answered “yes” to\\nthe question: “[Y]ou said that you filled out the traffic warn-\\ning in this case?” When asked if she was the one who filled\\nout the date, time, name, address, and birth date, she testified\\nshe “filled out the majority of” the ticket herself, but she be-\\nlieved Danner signed it. But other evidence showed she filled\\nout none of it. Danner filled out both the traffic citation (later\\nvoided) and the warning (Simon received hours later).\\n Simon accuses the judge of tying himself “into a pretzel to\\navoid finding that the police officers could possibly have lied\\nor misrepresented facts … .” (Appellant Br. at 33.) But the\\njudge committed no such contortions. Rather, he addressed\\nthe discrepancies directly. He combed through the testimony\\n\\f16 No. 18-2442\\n\\nabout the various steps in the process leading to handing a\\ndriver a written ticket or warning. He noted there appeared\\nto be confusion and possibly contradiction between the offic-\\ners about who actually wrote the ticket. One source of confu-\\nsion seemed to be the word “processing.” The judge observed\\nHagemeyer, Snyder, and Hoecker all testified Hagemeyer be-\\ngan “processing” the ticket, but “processing” a ticket involves\\nmuch more than just physically writing the ticket. The judge\\nalso observed Hagemeyer’s testimony on this issue was more\\nspecific. She testified, “I was writing the warning.” When\\nasked, “So you were the one who filled out the date, time,\\nname, address, and birth date?” she responded, “I filled out\\nthe majority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”3\\n The judge compared the warning Simon received—pur-\\nportedly filled out by Hagemeyer and signed by Danner—to\\na different warning definitely filled out and signed by Hage-\\nmeyer on a different date. The judge concluded the handwrit-\\ning on the two warnings is different and they likely were not\\nfilled in by the same officer.\\n But the judge noted Simon did not show the exemplar\\nwarning to Danner or Hagemeyer during the hearing to cross-\\nexamine them on who wrote Simon’s warning. The judge also\\n\\n\\n 3 In his order denying suppression, the judge characterized Hage-\\nmeyer’s testimony on this point slightly incorrectly, and in favor of Si-\\nmon’s arguments. The judge wrote “Hagemeyer answered ‘yes’ to\\nwhether she filled in the name, date, etc., but she stated that Danner signed\\nit.” (Order, DE 21 at 10.) Actually (according to the transcript) she did not\\nsay “yes” in response to this question. She said, “I filled out the majority\\nof it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.” But even giving Simon the ben-\\nefit of this characterization, the judge still did not find a significant credi-\\nbility problem.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 17\\n\\nnoted the testimony indicated Danner or Hagemeyer would\\noften start writing a ticket the other would finish. The judge\\nobserved: “There are numerous possibilities as to why the dis-\\ncrepancy exists, and without the officers being given the\\nchance to explain the discrepancy, the court cannot impute\\nimproper conduct on their part.” (Order, DE 21 at 11.) The\\njudge considered the totality of the officers’ testimony, and\\ntheir demeanor and appearance. He concluded any discrep-\\nancy on this issue was due to mere confusion on the part of\\nthe officers, and not to fabrication. And he concluded the of-\\nficers were credible.\\n We see no clear error regarding the judge’s decisions on\\nany of these issues, nor regarding his decision to find the of-\\nficers credible. Given the two bicycle officers testified they\\nsaw Simon commit a traffic infraction, and given the judge be-\\nlieved them, we see no reason to reverse the decision that\\nprobable cause justified starting the stop.\\n2. Conducting the stop\\n Simon argues even if the officers did not violate the Con-\\nstitution by initiating the stop, they violated it by impermissi-\\nbly prolonging the stop. An officer who reasonably starts a\\ntraffic stop might violate the Constitution if he exceeds the\\nscope of the stop or unreasonably prolongs it. Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491. A traffic stop “‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged\\nbeyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mis-\\nsion’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez v. United States,\\n135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543\\nU.S. 405, 407 (2005)).\\n A dog sniff of a car’s exterior only for illegal drugs during\\na lawful stop for a traffic violation does not violate the Fourth\\n\\f18 No. 18-2442\\n\\nAmendment, even absent reasonable suspicion of drugs. Ca-\\nballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But a stop justified only by a traffic vio-\\nlation becomes unconstitutional if the officers prolong it be-\\nyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s\\noriginal mission. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. “An officer may\\nconduct certain unrelated checks—including a dog sniff—\\nduring a lawful traffic stop, but he may not do so in a way that\\nprolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily\\ndemanded to justify detaining an individual.” Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Simon concedes,\\n“calling a K-9 unit does not unlawfully extend a traffic stop as\\nlong as the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is on-\\ngoing.” (Appellant Br. at 36.)\\n Without independent reasonable suspicion to justify the\\nsniff, the critical question is not whether the dog sniffed be-\\nfore or after the officer issued the warning, “but whether con-\\nducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.”\\nLewis, 920 F.3d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nWith independent reasonable suspicion, however, the officer\\nmay constitutionally detain the suspect for the sniff even if it\\nadds time to the total stop. Id.\\n Here, the judge continued to credit the officers’ testimony.\\nBased on that testimony, the judge concluded the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff. The judge noted\\nthe time period from the beginning of the stop to the canine\\nalert was about 7 minutes, as Simon conceded. The judge de-\\ntermined the officers acted quickly. Hoecker made the stop,\\nexited his car, told Simon the reason for the stop, and gathered\\nhis information. The bicyclists arrived at the stop only a cou-\\nple minutes after Hoecker pulled Simon over. The bicyclists\\n“diligently began processing the ticket.” (Order, DE 21 at 15.)\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 19\\n\\nCrucially, the judge found no indication the officers engaged\\nin any activity other than securing the scene and processing\\nthe warning during the time between the bicyclists’ arrival\\nand Rex’s arrival. Specifically, the officers surveyed the scene,\\nDanner spoke with Simon, and Hagemeyer testified she went\\nto the squad car to begin processing the written warning. The\\nvideo indicated that about 2.5 minutes into the stop, Danner\\nwas speaking to Hoecker about the traffic violation. About 3\\nminutes into the stop, Danner left the squad car to speak with\\nSimon. Danner told Simon the reasons for the stop and gath-\\nered information. Hoecker returned to Simon’s car at about\\nthe 5-minute mark to speak with him about the traffic infrac-\\ntion. Less than 7 minutes into the stop, Rex arrived and very\\nquickly alerted. At that time, the bicycle officers were still pro-\\ncessing the ticket.\\n In sum, the judge concluded the officers were processing\\nthe ticket when Rex arrived and alerted, so they had not yet\\ncompleted the initial mission of the stop, and the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff.\\n Simon argues the police report and testimony contain the\\n“misrepresentation” Hagemeyer was writing the warning\\nwhile the officers waited for Rex because the officers knew\\ncalling a canine unit does not unlawfully extend a stop so long\\nas the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is ongoing.\\nSimon continues to challenge the credibility of the officers. He\\nargues that at no point did any officer on the scene begin ef-\\nfectuating the purpose of the stop by dutifully and diligently\\nfilling out a warning or ticket. He claims Danner filled out\\nboth the traffic citation and the warning Simon received hours\\nafter the stop. But again we see no reversible error in the\\njudge’s conclusions on this point.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Simon presses that even if the judge’s credibility determi-\\nnations here are correct, his ruling is still flawed. First, Simon\\nargues the judge improperly allowed a de minimis delay to be\\nconstitutional, even though any delay to allow a dog to sniff\\nis unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion.\\nWe disagree with Simon about what the judge did. He specif-\\nically found there was no improper delay. (Order, DE 21 at 14\\n(“the stop was not purposefully prolonged to allow for the ca-\\nnine unit’s arrival”).) True, the judge added in a footnote that\\neven if he found the ticket-writing process had not begun\\nwhen Rex arrived, still the sequence of events was so short\\nand condensed that the stop was not prolonged in any “mean-\\ningful” way. But we need not review this dictum.\\n Second, Simon argues that instead of effectuating the pur-\\npose of the traffic stop, the officers decided to run a criminal-\\nhistory check. Simon argues this was unrelated to the mission\\nof the stop and delayed processing the traffic violation. Simon\\ncites no supporting Seventh Circuit case. We said last year that\\nwhen police conduct a stop, “they are entitled to demand the\\ndriver’s identification, of course, and it is routine to check the\\ndriver’s record for active warrants, driving history, and crim-\\ninal history. Those checks are done for important reasons, in-\\ncluding officer safety.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d\\n577, 586 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Sanford, 806\\nF.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The trooper checked the occu-\\npants’ criminal histories on the computer in his car—a proce-\\ndure permissible even without reasonable suspicion … .”).\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments, but we see no rea-\\nson to reverse the judge’s conclusions that the officers were in\\nthe process of completing the traffic warning when Rex\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 21\\n\\narrived, and the officers did not improperly prolong the traffic\\nstop to allow the sniff to occur.\\n3. Bona Fido?\\n Simon argues even if the officers had probable cause to\\npull him over, and even if they did not prolong the traffic stop\\nto wait for Rex, still the judge should have suppressed the gun\\nbecause Rex’s alert was false, Rex was improperly trained,\\nand the alert did not provide probable cause to justify search-\\ning Simon’s car.\\n Probable cause to conduct a search is not among the high-\\nest standards. “A police officer has probable cause to conduct\\na search when the facts available to him would warrant a per-\\nson of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evi-\\ndence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050,\\n1055 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).\\nProbable cause is less than preponderance of the evidence. Id.\\n“All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which\\nreasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id.\\n(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Probable\\ncause is a practical, common-sense standard, involving the to-\\ntality of the circumstances. Id.\\n A dog’s alert on a car can give probable cause to search the\\nentire car. Indeed, a good dog’s alert can provide a rebuttable\\npresumption of probable cause to search:\\n If a bona fide organization has certified a dog\\n after testing his reliability in a controlled setting,\\n a court can presume (subject to any conflicting\\n evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides\\n probable cause to search. The same is true, even\\n in the absence of formal certification, if the dog\\n\\f22 No. 18-2442\\n\\n has recently and successfully completed a train-\\n ing program that evaluated his proficiency in lo-\\n cating drugs.\\nId. at 1057. The ultimate question is “whether all the facts sur-\\nrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common\\nsense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a\\nsearch would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A\\nsniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.” Id. at 1058.\\n Simon concedes Rex passed certification tests. But Simon\\nchallenges the alert itself and the adequacy of Rex’s training.\\n “First and foremost,” Simon argues Rex did not alert on\\nSimon’s car. (Appellant Br. at 42.) This perplexes. Simon cites\\nnothing to support this claim. The record belies it. Given the\\ncontext of this claim, Simon seems simply to mean the alert\\nwas false.4 It is true that following the alert the officers\\nsearched the car and found no evidence of drugs in it. But Si-\\nmon does not explain why that, in itself, matters here. Proba-\\nble cause is not a retrospective, outcome-based standard.\\n\\n 4 Defense expert Dr. Mary Cablk said in her report she could not de-\\ntermine if Rex alerted or what Rex alerted to. She confirmed this on cross-\\nexamination at the suppression hearing. During direct examination she\\nwatched videos from Hoecker’s and Snyder’s dashcams. She testified she\\ncould not see the alert, could not tell exactly where on the car the dog\\nalerted, and did not know whether the alert was barking or something\\nelse. But in her testimony she seems to accept Rex alerted. She character-\\nized it as a false alert because no drugs were found, and she criticized\\nSnyder for rewarding Rex for falsely alerting: “In this instance, there’s no\\ndrugs found; so he’s reinforcing the dog for false alerting here.” In any\\nevent, Snyder testified that Rex alerted and that Snyder confirmed the\\nalert. And the judge throughout his order accepted Rex alerted. He found\\nthe officers’ testimony, in its totality, credible. We see no reason to upend\\nthe determination Rex alerted.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 23\\n\\nBridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). If an officer\\nrandomly breaks into a house on only a wild hunch and stum-\\nbles into a meth lab, the discovery does not provide probable\\ncause for the search. And if 20 reliable informants tell an of-\\nficer a particular house contains a meth lab, so he stands in\\nthe street outside the house and sees through an open win-\\ndow the apparent apparatus and accoutrements of a meth lab,\\nso he obtains a warrant to search the house based on probable\\ncause to think it contains a meth lab, but he finds only an in-\\nnocent and intricate chemistry set, still probable cause sup-\\nported the warrant. So the mere absence of drugs in Simon’s\\ncar does not undermine the probable cause to search it for\\ndrugs, provided there was probable cause in the first place.\\n Simon’s other argument is the officers did not have prob-\\nable cause to search his vehicle in the first place because Rex\\nwas unreliable. This argument proceeds in two waves.\\n The first wave is quickly quelled. Simon argues Rex was\\nunreliable because he was not trained properly under Illinois\\nlaw, which requires police dogs be trained according to cer-\\ntain guidelines. Simon argues Detective Larner (the Macon\\nCounty canine-training director) admitted he did not always\\nfollow these guidelines. But we need not address what Illinois\\nlaw requires or whether Rex satisfies it because Illinois law\\ndoes not control the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore,\\n553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s mean-\\ning [does] not change with local law enforcement practices—\\neven practices set by rule.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.\\n35, 43 (1988) (“We have never intimated … that whether or not\\na search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment depends on the law of the particular State in\\nwhich the search occurs.”).\\n\\f24 No. 18-2442\\n\\n The second wave holds out longer, but ultimately suc-\\ncumbs. Simon argues, apart from Illinois law, if a dog is\\ntrained to alert when no evidence of criminal activity exists,\\nthis violates the Fourth Amendment. The problem, as Simon\\nsees it, is Rex was trained with scented cotton balls to alert to\\nresidual odors. But to search a car, there must be probable\\ncause to think it presently contains evidence of criminal activ-\\nity. So if Rex is trained to alert to mere residue even when no\\ndrugs are present, then his alert is not a reliable indicator\\ndrugs are present, and therefore his alert does not provide\\nprobable cause to justify a search.\\n The main problem with this argument is the Supreme\\nCourt already rejected its premise. In Florida v. Harris, a dog\\nnamed Aldo alerted on a truck. A subsequent search did not\\nreveal any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, but it did\\ndiscover meth ingredients. The defendant moved to suppress\\nthe ingredients on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given\\nprobable cause to search. The defendant “principally con-\\ntended” in the trial court that because the officer did not find\\nany of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, Aldo’s alerts\\nmust have been false. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058. But the Su-\\npreme Court patted Aldo on the head and called him a good\\nboy: “A well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to [resid-\\nual] odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but\\nin fact is not.” Id. at 1059; see also Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels,\\nInc., 600 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (Plaintiff’s “only de-\\nveloped legal theory is untenable. [His] premise—that an alert\\nby a drug-sniffing dog trained to detect residual odors does\\nnot establish probable cause to search—was rejected in Harris\\n… .”). If a well-trained dog, trained to alert even to residual\\nodors, alerts, there is generally a fair probability that drugs or\\nevidence of drugs will be found, absent contradictory factors.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 25\\n\\nAnd that is all the Fourth Amendment requires. If somehow\\na dog were trained to alert only to residual odors, then we\\nmight have a problem. But that is not this case.\\n Our review of the record and the order denying suppres-\\nsion satisfies us the judge conducted the proper Harris evalu-\\nation and committed no error in concluding Rex’s satisfactory\\ncertification and training provide sufficient reason to trust his\\nalert or in concluding Rex’s training on residual odors is ac-\\nceptable. The judge heard testimony from Simon’s expert Dr.\\nCablk challenging Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself, tes-\\ntimony from Officer Snyder supporting Rex’s qualifications\\nand the sniff itself, and testimony from Detective Larner sup-\\nporting Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself. The judge also\\nentertained arguments from both sides in the form of the mo-\\ntion to suppress, supporting memorandum, the government’s\\nresponse, and post-hearing briefs filed by both sides. The\\njudge considered the totality of the circumstances, addressed\\nHarris’s ultimate question, and found Rex’s sniff up to snuff.\\nC. Supplementation\\n After the judge denied the motion to suppress, Simon\\nmoved to supplement the record and for leave to seek recon-\\nsideration. He wanted to reopen the evidence to introduce\\nfurther, unrelated citations prepared by Danner in August\\n2016 “which further emphasize the differences in the officers’\\nhandwriting … .” (Mot. Supp., DE 23 at 4.) Simon also wanted\\nto introduce a video he5 took when he returned to the scene\\none night. The video shows a vehicle leaving the 1100 block\\nof College Street and approaching the intersection of College\\n\\n 5 The motion says Simon created the video. On appeal, Simon asserts\\nhis investigator took the video. This nuance is immaterial here.\\n\\f26 No. 18-2442\\n\\nand Green. The judge denied this motion. On appeal, Simon\\nonly presses the video. He does not mention the additional\\nhandwriting exemplars in his opening appellate brief. Simon\\nacknowledges we review the denial of supplementation for\\nabuse of discretion.\\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. He explained there\\nwas no reason Simon could not have taken a nighttime video\\nand presented it during the suppression hearing. The judge\\ndiscussed the danger of allowing supplementation here and\\nsetting a bad precedent leading to a never-ending cycle of par-\\nties waiting for rulings and then coming up with “new” evi-\\ndence to challenge them. Most importantly, the judge ex-\\nplained that even with the proposed evidence, his ruling\\nwould not change. The nighttime video would not capture the\\nactual visual capabilities of the officers, who credibly testified\\nabout how close Simon was to the intersection when he sig-\\nnaled. The judge reasoned a video of the scene taken months\\nlater, when conditions might differ, would not impact their\\ncredibility. Besides, the judge noted, the probable cause\\nstandard does not need evidence to support a conviction be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt. He did not abuse his discretion.\\nD. ACCA\\n Simon argues his prior conviction under Illinois law for\\nattempted armed robbery should not have counted as a pred-\\nicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He recog-\\nnizes our decisions foreclose his argument on this point, but\\nhe wants to preserve it for the Supreme Court.\\n IV. Conclusion\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments. Finding no reversi-\\nble error, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3895,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654620,"string":"4,654,620"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Heon Seok Lee"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1950"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee/\\n Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nHEON SEOK LEE,\\n Defendant-Appellant/\\n Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:12-cr-00109-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Crowbar in hand, U.S. Customs\\nOfficer Jorge Parra spent December 8, 2010 “cracking open\\ncontainers” at a warehouse near the Los Angeles seaport.\\nParra pried open one from South Korea to inspect its freight.\\nInside he found a fully assembled, five-foot tall industrial fan\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\ncalled a turbo blower. A placard riveted to the side read, “As-\\nsembled in USA.”\\n Presented with a fully assembled machine fresh off the\\nboat from South Korea, which brazenly advertised its assem-\\nbly in the United States, little sleuthing was required to deter-\\nmine something was amiss. Parra’s discovery kicked off a\\nfederal investigation that traced back to the defendant in this\\ncase, Heon Seok Lee. Prosecutors eventually charged Lee with\\nexecuting a scheme to defraud local governments by falsely\\nrepresenting that his company manufactured its turbo blow-\\ners in the United States.\\n A grand jury indicted Lee on five counts of wire fraud and\\nthree counts of smuggling. After a trial, the jury found Lee\\nguilty on all counts. Lee now appeals his convictions and the\\nrestitution ordered, and the government cross-appeals Lee’s\\nprison sentence. We find no fault in the trial or the sentence.\\n I. Background\\n A. The Recovery Act\\n This criminal case has an atypical origin: an economic\\nstimulus package. Congress passed the American Recovery\\nand Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115\\n(2009)—which we will simply call the “Recovery Act”—to\\njumpstart the flagging domestic economy during the Great\\nRecession. See Kameron Hillstrom, The American Recovery and\\nReinvestment Act: A Fitting Future for Recovery Legislation, 44\\nPUB. CONTRACT L. J. 285, 288 (2015). The Recovery Act ear-\\nmarked billions to fund public infrastructure projects. Id. at\\n289 (noting the Recovery Act made $261.2 billion available for\\nsuch projects).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 3\\n\\n Relevant to this case, Congress allocated $6.4 billion to the\\nEPA for water-infrastructure improvements. The EPA did not\\nspend the money directly; instead it awarded grants to “re-\\nvolving funds” administered by the States. After receiving\\nEPA grants, the revolving funds then issued low-interest\\nloans to local municipalities or agencies sponsoring specific\\nprojects. Those local governments were then responsible for\\nhiring contractors to perform the work.\\n To achieve Congress’s objective of bolstering the Ameri-\\ncan economy, the Recovery Act included the following do-\\nmestic purchasing requirement, commonly known as the\\n“Buy American” provision:\\n None of the funds appropriated or otherwise\\n made available by this Act may be used for a\\n project for the construction, alteration, mainte-\\n nance, or repair of a public building or public\\n work unless all of the iron, steel, and manufac-\\n tured goods used in the project are produced in\\n the United States.\\nRecovery Act § 1605(a), 123 Stat. 303.1\\n At first glance, this requirement seems straightforward.\\nBut federal agencies struggled to pin down what it means for\\na product to have been “produced in the United States.” Dif-\\nferent agencies used different tests. See Thomas D. Blanford,\\nNavigating the Recovery Act’s Buy American Rule in State and\\nLocal Government Construction, 46 PROCUREMENT LAWYER 3, 4\\n(Fall 2010) (listing five tests used by different agencies). The\\n\\n1 The Recovery Act’s Buy American provision should not be confused\\nwith the separate, much older, Buy American Act of 1933,\\n41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nEPA adopted the “substantial transformation” standard to\\nadminister the Recovery Act, and it developed a three-part\\ntest to assess whether a manufacturer substantially trans-\\nformed a product within the United States.\\n As a condition to receiving Recovery Act funding, local\\ngovernments and their contractors were required to abide by\\nthe Buy American provision. Federal agencies like the EPA\\naudited projects to ensure compliance. Local governments re-\\nquired their suppliers to complete “Buy American certifica-\\ntions” representing that their products complied with the stat-\\nute.\\n B. KTurbo’s Initial Plan\\n Heon Seok Lee founded KTurbo Inc. in his homeland of\\nSouth Korea. KTurbo manufactures centrifugal turbo blow-\\ners—large industrial fans used to provide oxygen for biologi-\\ncal water treatments in wastewater facilities. Turbo blowers\\nare sophisticated and expensive pieces of equipment, requir-\\ning on-site programming, testing, and calibration.\\n Lee saw the Recovery Act as a growth opportunity for\\nKTurbo, whose penetration into the United States market was\\nlimited at the time. The Recovery Act earmarked billions for\\nproducts like KTurbo’s turbo blowers. But KTurbo would be\\nunable to tap into those funds unless it demonstrated compli-\\nance with the Buy American provision. So, Lee and his sister,\\nTrinity Lee,2 developed a Recovery Act plan. They researched\\nregulatory guidance from the EPA and monitored larger com-\\npetitors’ responses. KTurbo leadership discussed Buy\\n\\n2We refer to the defendant, Heon Seok Lee, as “Lee” and Trinity Lee by\\nher full name. Trinity Lee served as KTurbo’s general manager for North\\nAmerica.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 5\\n\\nAmerican compliance for months, with several in-depth\\nmeetings that lasted hours.\\n KTurbo enlisted independent sales representatives around\\nthe country to market its turbo blowers to local governments\\npursuing Recovery Act projects. KTurbo also consulted with\\nseveral sales representatives in the early stages of its Buy\\nAmerican planning. One sales representative, Dick Koch, dis-\\ncouraged KTurbo from pursuing a plan to make turbo blow-\\ners in South Korea, ship them to the United States, take them\\napart, and then reassemble stateside. Koch warned Lee and\\nKTurbo in an email that such evasive practices could be\\ndeemed criminal:\\n The [EPA] webcast specifically excludes Heon\\n Seok’s idea of sending the equipment to the US\\n and taking it apart and putting it back together.\\n In fact the webcast says that if you say that is\\n [Buy American] you are committing criminal\\n fraud.\\nTrinity Lee reassured Koch that KTurbo would use compo-\\nnents from both South Korea and the United States and as-\\nsemble the turbo blowers in greater Chicago. Other sales rep-\\nresentatives who inquired about KTurbo’s Buy American\\ncompliance plan were told the same thing, including by Lee\\nhimself.\\n At that point, KTurbo formed an Illinois subsidiary,\\nKTurbo USA Inc.,3 leased a warehouse in Batavia, Illinois, and\\nhired three American technicians. KTurbo’s sales\\n\\n3 The legal distinction between KTurbo Inc. and KTurbo USA Inc. does\\nnot matter for purposes of this opinion, so we refer to the two companies\\ncollectively as “KTurbo.”\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nrepresentatives landed several contracts for Recovery Act\\nprojects. In its bids, KTurbo highlighted its domestic presence\\nand promised Buy American compliance. For example,\\nKTurbo submitted a bid to South Burlington, Vermont in the\\nsummer of 2009, which included the following Buy American\\ncertification:\\n By this letter, KTurbo USA certifies that it will\\n manufacture and deliver KTurbo brand blower\\n packages and equipment in compliance with\\n the final requirements of the 2009 U.S. economic\\n stimulus law, The American Recovery and Re-\\n investment Act of 2009.\\nKTurbo sent nearly identical compliance letters for projects in\\nCalifornia, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Oregon.\\n These representations—a South Korean company certify-\\ning its product was “produced in the United States”—did not\\ngo unnoticed. A competitor that lost a bid to KTurbo filed a\\ncomplaint with the EPA in the fall of 2009. In response, EPA\\nofficials visited KTurbo’s Batavia facility on October 30, 2009.\\nDuring that visit, Lee gave a PowerPoint presentation\\ndetailing KTurbo’s plans to comply with the Buy American\\nprovision. He represented that KTurbo would assemble its\\nturbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Slides in Lee’s presenta-\\ntion indicated fifty percent of the total input costs would be\\nattributable to American components, assembly, and testing.\\nTrinity Lee sent the EPA a letter confirming these details a few\\nweeks later.\\n KTurbo manufactured its first turbo blower at the Batavia\\nfacility in January 2010. It built nine more there over the next\\nthree months, at a rate of one to two weeks per blower.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 7\\n\\n C. The Revised Plan\\n It did not take long for Lee to abandon that original plan\\nto produce turbo blowers in Batavia. By April 2010, Lee con-\\ncluded production costs in the United States were prohibi-\\ntively expensive, and he decided to go back to importing\\nturbo blowers from South Korea. Employees pushed back\\nwith concerns about KTurbo’s Recovery Act compliance, but\\nLee forged ahead. At trial, one of KTurbo’s technicians ex-\\nplained how the component parts from South Korea began\\narriving more and more fully assembled, until completely as-\\nsembled blowers started showing up. No new components\\nwere added to the turbo blowers once they reached Batavia.\\nTechnicians simply plugged them in and ran performance ef-\\nficiency tests.\\n Lee’s revised plan depended on its secrecy. He instructed\\nKTurbo employees not to disclose to customers the fact that\\ntheir turbo blowers were made in South Korea. To evade de-\\ntection, KTurbo (with Lee’s knowledge) went out of its way to\\navoid shipping the machines from South Korea directly to\\ncustomers. When municipalities questioned KTurbo about\\nRecovery Act compliance, KTurbo simply lied. Take KTurbo’s\\nMay 20, 2010 response to Lowell, Massachusetts: “The blower\\nwill be assembled and tested at KTurbo’s Chicago location.”\\nLee himself participated, emailing a sales representative sim-\\nilar misrepresentations in September 2010: “We assemble and\\ntest in Chicago. Only motor and VFD comes from Korea. It is\\nalmost Made In USA.”\\n But this scheme unraveled quickly. Jorge Parra’s shipyard\\ndiscovery in December 2010 was the beginning of the end.\\nWhen U.S. Customs detained KTurbo’s products at the bor-\\nder, the company fell behind on its deliveries. This required\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nmore lies to hide that the turbo blowers were coming from\\noverseas and needed to clear U.S. Customs. When a Lowell,\\nMassachusetts general contractor contacted KTurbo about the\\ndelays, Joel Schomo (a KTurbo engineer) told him the Batavia\\nfacility was waiting for parts to begin final assembly, even\\nthough KTurbo had discontinued all assembly operations in\\nBatavia months earlier. At trial, Schomo testified he told this\\nlie because the Recovery Act funded Lowell’s project and he\\ndid not want to raise any “red flags” that KTurbo “might not\\nbe complying with the Recovery Act requirements.”\\n Within two months, federal investigators executed a\\nsearch warrant at the Batavia facility. Lee was present. During\\nthe search, Lee admitted he was aware that the turbo blowers\\nwere for Recovery Act projects, that KTurbo shipped them\\nfully assembled from South Korea, and that it was “wrong”\\nto do so.\\n D. Lee’s Prosecution\\n About a year later, a grand jury returned an indictment\\nagainst Lee. It alleged he falsely represented that KTurbo’s\\nturbo blowers complied with the Buy American provision\\nwhen Lee knew KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities re-\\nceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” The indictment also\\ncharged Lee “knew that turbo blowers were substantially as-\\nsembled before their arrival in the United States and did not\\nrequire meaningful assembly or manufacturing in the United\\nStates.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 9\\n\\n By this point, Lee had fled the country. It took three years\\nto extradite him from South Korea. When the government fi-\\nnally brought Lee back to appear, he responded to the indict-\\nment with a series of motions to dismiss, each of which the\\ndistrict court denied.\\n During an eight-day trial, the government presented doz-\\nens of witnesses: U.S. Customs officers, federal agents,\\nKTurbo employees, sales representatives, general contractors,\\nand employees of municipal customers. Lee elected to take\\nthe stand, and he adamantly denied any knowledge that\\nKTurbo imported fully assembled blowers into the United\\nStates. On cross-examination, the government battered Lee’s\\ncredibility, impeaching him with documentary evidence and\\nother witnesses’ testimony. The jury ultimately convicted Lee\\non all counts.\\n E. Post-Trial Proceedings\\n Lee filed a series of post-trial motions seeking to vacate the\\njury’s verdict; the district court denied each. The district court\\nheld three sentencing hearings over several months, which\\ncentered on the parties’ dispute about how to calculate Lee’s\\nguideline range. For wire fraud convictions, the Sentencing\\nGuidelines instruct district courts to begin with a base offense\\nlevel of seven and then to add levels based on the amount of\\nthe “loss” caused by the defendant. U.S. SENTENCING\\nGUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a)–(b) (U.S. SENTENCING\\nCOMM’N Nov. 2018). In this case, the parties disputed whether\\nLee should receive credit in the loss calculation for the market\\nvalue of KTurbo blowers sold to customers.\\n The district court initially ruled that the loss equaled the\\ntotal amount KTurbo received from defrauded municipalities\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n(about $180,000), putting Lee’s guideline range at 46–57\\nmonths. But the court gave Lee a below-guidelines prison sen-\\ntence of 20 months, plus restitution. Two weeks later, Lee filed\\na notice of appeal and a motion asking the district court to\\ncorrect its judgment under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). The district\\ncourt held a hearing on Lee’s Rule 35(a) motion, where it\\nagreed with Lee’s argument on the guideline calculation and\\nresentenced Lee to 12 months. After the district court entered\\nits final judgment on March 14, 2018, Lee filed a second notice\\nof appeal on March 28, 2018. Thirty days later, the govern-\\nment cross-appealed Lee’s sentence.\\n II. Discussion\\n A. Wire Fraud Convictions\\n We begin with Lee’s wire fraud convictions. He asks us to\\nvacate them because the government’s trial evidence con-\\nstructively amended the indictment and failed to prove all the\\nelements of the crime.\\n 1. Did the government’s case at trial impermissibly\\n deviate from the indictment?\\n “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-\\nwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment\\nof a Grand Jury … .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Founders\\nadopted this grand jury requirement from English tradition,\\nin which lay grand jurors considered whether a crime should\\nbe charged while also protecting the accused from prosecuto-\\nrial overreach. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); see\\nalso Andrew D. Leipold, Grand Jury Requirement, in THE\\nHERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 431 (David F. Forte &\\nMatthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014). The Supreme Court has\\nexplained “that a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 11\\n\\non charges that are not made in the indictment against him.”\\nStirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960).\\n Two related doctrines arise out of this Fifth Amendment\\nrequirement: constructive amendment and variance. Both\\nexplain differences between the government’s case in the in-\\ndictment and the government’s case at trial. Constructive\\namendment occurs where the trial evidence supports (or the\\ncourt’s jury instructions charge) an offense not alleged in the\\nindictment. United States v. Burge, 711 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir.\\n2013). Variance refers to situations where the government’s\\ntrial evidence “proves facts materially different from those al-\\nleged in the indictment.” United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113,\\n1125 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The distinction\\nbetween the two doctrines is subtle, but significant. Where a\\ndifferent crime has been proved (constructive amendment), it\\nis error per se and the verdict must be vacated. United States\\nv. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 820 (7th Cir. 2007).4 But where\\nthe same crime is proved, only through evidence different\\nthan the factual allegations in the indictment (variance), the\\ndefendant must demonstrate prejudice to his substantial\\nrights. Id.\\n Lee contends the government constructively amended the\\nindictment by presenting evidence of misrepresentations be-\\nyond KTurbo’s Buy American certifications. He claims the in-\\ndictment confined itself to the falsity of the certifications,\\nwhile the government’s trial evidence focused on other lies,\\n\\n4 This assumes the defendant properly preserved the error in the district\\ncourt. If the issue was waived or forfeited, we review only for plain error.\\nUnited States v. Remsza, 77 F.3d 1039, 1043–44 (7th Cir. 1996) (assessing de-\\nfendant’s constructive amendment argument under a plain error standard\\ndue to defendant’s failure to raise it in the district court).\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nsuch as false statements in sales presentations, misrepresen-\\ntations to sales representatives, and misleading emails to\\ngeneral contractors.\\n Even if we accept as true Lee’s interpretation of the indict-\\nment and his characterization of the trial evidence, it would\\nnot rise to the level of a constructive amendment. The govern-\\nment did not attempt to prove a crime different from the one\\nalleged. See United States v. Khilchenko, 324 F.3d 917, 920 (7th\\nCir. 2003) (“To effect a constructive amendment, the evidence\\nat trial must establish offenses different from or in addition to\\nthose charged by the grand jury.”). Prosecutors did not argue\\nLee committed mail fraud when the indictment charged wire\\nfraud. The government’s case at trial did not attempt to prove\\na fraud in the air compressor market after alleging a scheme\\nin the turbo blower market. Constructive amendments arise\\n“where there is a ‘complex of facts distinctly different from\\nthose set forth in the charging instrument and not where there\\nis a single set of facts.’” United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306,\\n314 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d\\n584, 586 (9th Cir. 1984)). Here, the government consistently\\nmaintained that Lee committed wire fraud by selling turbo\\nblowers made in South Korea as if they were made in the\\nUnited States.\\n Lee’s argument is more aptly characterized as one of vari-\\nance, although he does not frame it that way. Even if the crime\\ncharged remains consistent, it is a problem if the government\\nmaterially alters the factual underpinnings of that charge. See\\nUnited States v. Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 1983)\\n(defendant may establish reversible error where the variance\\naltered an essential or material element of the charge). But\\nvariance claims are subject to harmless error review—we will\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 13\\n\\nnot disturb a conviction on account of “a technical deficiency\\nof no prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Russell v. United\\nStates, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962)). No prejudice exists in this\\ncase.\\n First, despite Lee’s characterization, the indictment did\\ntailor its fraud allegations to KTurbo’s failure to manufacture\\nits turbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Paragraph 3 of the in-\\ndictment alleged KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities\\nreceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” It also expressly al-\\nleged that Lee knew the turbo blowers were already assem-\\nbled before arriving in the United States. The government\\nproved those allegations at trial with evidence that Lee knew\\nKTurbo made its turbo blowers in South Korea and lied about\\nthat fact. Such evidence matches the indictment’s fraud alle-\\ngations.\\n Second, even if these misrepresentations were not ex-\\npressly covered by the indictment’s text, they were “part and\\nparcel” of the same scheme described by the indictment. Nye\\n& Nissen, Corp. v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 617 (1949) (no\\nvariance where indictment alleged a single scheme to defraud\\nexecuted in various ways). Additional evidence regarding\\ntechnical details about how a defendant executed an alleged\\nscheme does not constitute an impermissible variance. Ajayi,\\n808 F.3d at 1125 (presentation of “more detailed” facts at trial\\nnot an impermissible variance). Lee cannot demonstrate his\\nFifth Amendment rights were violated because the govern-\\nment’s trial evidence concerned “the same elaborate scheme\\nto defraud … as was described in the indictment.”\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRatliff-White, 493 F.3d at 821 (quoting United States v. Dupre,\\n462 F.3d 131, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2006)).\\n Two concerns underlie the constructive amendment and\\nvariance doctrines: ensuring criminal defendants have ade-\\nquate notice of the charges against them and avoiding the risk\\nof double jeopardy. Neither is present here. The indictment\\nnotified Lee of the allegations against him: that he committed\\nwire fraud by importing turbo blowers from South Korea\\nwhile representing they were made in Batavia. See United\\nStates v. Corrigan, 912 F.3d 422, 428 (7th Cir. 2019) (indictment\\nprovided valid notice despite listing wrong name of victim);\\nUnited States v. Kuna, 760 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1985) (alleged\\nvariance in mail fraud prosecution was harmless because the\\ndefendant “was able to identify with great certainty the acts\\nfor which he was placed in jeopardy”).\\n The indictment also included specific details about the\\nscheme alleged, alleviating any double jeopardy concerns. See\\nUnited States v. Moore, 563 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (hold-\\ning specificity in the indictment would “avoid any later dou-\\nble jeopardy concerns”). It described the Recovery Act’s Buy\\nAmerican provision, how KTurbo leased a warehouse in\\nBatavia, KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts, the fact KTurbo\\nfailed “to perform substantial transformation of the turbo\\nblowers at the KTURBO facility in Batavia,” Lee’s knowledge\\n“that turbo blowers were substantially assembled before their\\narrival in the United States and did not require meaningful\\nassembly or manufacturing in the United States,” and Lee’s\\nmisrepresentations and concealment of KTurbo’s true opera-\\ntions. Such detail in the indictment protected Lee from expo-\\nsure to double jeopardy. See United States v. Scheuneman, 712\\nF.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2013) (indictment sufficient where it\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 15\\n\\n“presented enough detail to allow [the defendant] to plead\\ndouble jeopardy to avoid future prosecution based on the\\nsame conduct alleged”).\\n Because the indictment afforded Lee ample notice of the\\ncase the government presented at trial and included specific\\ndetails of the crimes alleged to avoid double jeopardy risk, no\\nimpermissible constructive amendment or variance occurred\\nin this case.5\\n 2. Did the government present enough evidence to\\n convict Lee of wire fraud?\\n Lee appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for ac-\\nquittal under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. We review such decisions de\\nnovo, asking if the evidence—viewed in the light most favor-\\nable to the prosecution—could support a rational finding of\\nall the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt. United States v. Mohamed, 759 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir.\\n2014). Put differently, we reverse only if the trial record “is\\ndevoid of evidence from which a jury could conclude guilt\\nbeyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d\\n605, 613 (7th Cir. 2006). Given this deference to the jury ver-\\ndict, Lee’s hurdle on appeal is high, as “we rarely reverse a\\nconviction for mail or wire fraud due to insufficient evi-\\ndence.” United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 354 (7th Cir.\\n2016).\\n\\n\\n5Lee’s concerns are also mitigated because the district court gave the jury\\na copy of the indictment and instructed jurors to convict only if the gov-\\nernment had proved the crimes it alleged. See United States v. Cusimano,\\n148 F.3d 824, 830–31 (7th Cir. 1998) (district court’s provision of the indict-\\nment to the jury and proper instruction on it “establish[ed] that there was\\nno constructive amendment to the indictment”).\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n To convict a defendant of wire fraud, the government\\nmust prove three elements: (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) the\\ndefendant’s intent to defraud, and (3) the defendant’s use of\\ninterstate wires in furtherance of the scheme. United States v.\\nJackson, 860 F.3d 438, 446 (7th Cir. 2017). Lee challenges the\\ngovernment’s proof on the first element, the scheme to de-\\nfraud. The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, reaches “any\\nscheme to deprive another of money or property by means of\\nfalse or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”\\nCarpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987).\\n On appeal, Lee argues that KTurbo’s Buy American certi-\\nfications were not false. He claims KTurbo’s turbo blowers\\ncomplied with the Buy American provision because they were\\nmade in South Korea. That claim is not as self-contradictory\\nas it first sounds, given the text of Recovery Act § 1605(d),\\nwhich requires the statute to be “applied in a manner con-\\nsistent with United States obligations under international\\nagreements.” Both the United States and South Korea have\\njoined the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Gov-\\nernment Procurement (WTO-GPA), which requires all signa-\\ntories to provide all other signatories’ exports “treatment no\\nless favourable than the treatment the Party, including its pro-\\ncuring entities, accords to: (a) domestic goods, services and\\nsuppliers; and (b) goods, services and suppliers of any other\\nParty.” WTO-GPA art. 4 § 1, Apr. 6, 2014, 3008 U.N.T.S. Reg.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 17\\n\\nNo. A-31874.6 In other words, the WTO-GPA is a multi-lateral\\n“most favored nation” clause for government purchasing. Lee\\ninterprets Recovery Act § 1605(d) to mean the WTO-GPA’s\\nmost favored nation clause supersedes the Buy American\\nprovision, such that South Korean products must be given the\\nsame treatment as American products for purposes of the\\nRecovery Act.7\\n Critically however, when the Recovery Act was enacted\\nthe EPA publicly rejected the interpretation Lee now offers.\\nAn April 2009 EPA memorandum explained that the agency\\ninterpreted Recovery Act § 1605(d) to apply to direct pur-\\nchases by the federal government and the specific state and\\nlocal agencies expressly listed in the WTO-GPA’s appendices,\\nbut not “to procurement initiated by local entities ([state re-\\nvolving fund] assistance recipients), unless they are listed in\\nthe appendix.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Memorandum on\\n\\n6 By its terms, the WTO-GPA covers purchases made by the EPA above\\ncertain dollar thresholds. WTO-GPA, Coverage Schedules, United States\\nann. 1. Coverage of purchases made by States themselves, state agencies,\\nand local municipalities is more complicated, varying from State to State\\nand from agency to agency within a State. WTO-GPA, Coverage Sched-\\nules, United States ann. 2–3; see also Hong-Sik Chung, Government Procure-\\nment in the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement: Great Opportunities for\\nBoth Sides?, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 303 (2014). But the WTO-GPA\\nprovides that where a covered entity “requires persons not covered under\\na Party’s annexes to Appendix I to procure in accordance with particular\\nrequirements, Article IV shall apply mutatis mutandis to such require-\\nments.” WTO-GPA art. 2 § 5.\\n7 Federal purchasing regulations provide that where an international\\nagreement applies, the “restrictions of section 1605 of the Recovery Act do\\nnot apply to designated country iron, steel, and/or other manufactured\\ngoods.” 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(b)(ii). South Korea is listed as a “designated\\ncountry” based on its membership in the WTO-GPA. 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(a).\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nImplementation of Buy American provisions of P.L. 111-5\\n(Apr. 28, 2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2\\n014-12/documents/buy_am.pdf (last visited August 13, 2019).\\nIn the nature of a “smoking gun,” federal agents found a copy\\nof this EPA memorandum in KTurbo’s Batavia facility, with\\nthe relevant paragraph flagged by handwritten markings.\\nReasonable jurors could thus conclude Lee was aware that the\\nEPA did not consider South Korean products Buy American\\ncompliant.\\n As a result, even if one accepts Lee’s interpretation of Re-\\ncovery Act § 1605(d), the EPA’s express rejection of it makes\\nKTurbo’s South Korean manufacturing a “material” fact for\\nwire fraud purposes. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16\\n(1999) (holding a statement is “material” if it has “a natural\\ntendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the deci-\\nsion of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed”)\\n(quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)).\\nKTurbo could not legitimately certify its Buy American com-\\npliance, at least not without disclosing to customers that the\\nturbo blowers were made in South Korea. Federal fraud stat-\\nutes reach such misleading omissions of material information.\\nUnited States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n A reasonable purchaser in this scenario—one who re-\\nceived funds from the EPA pursuant to the Recovery Act and\\nwas bound to comply with the Buy American provision—\\nwould deem it highly relevant whether a supplier based its\\nBuy American certification on an interpretation of the statute\\nexpressly rejected by the EPA. A series of trial witnesses con-\\nsistently testified that Recovery Act compliance was “abso-\\nlutely vital,” given it was a legal requirement of the project\\nfunding. Without Buy American compliance, municipalities\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 19\\n\\njeopardized losing all Recovery Act funding from the EPA. As\\none customer testified, his municipality considered KTurbo’s\\nrepresentations that the turbo blowers were “Assembled in\\nUSA” to be “extremely important” because “it bolstered\\n[their] belief that [the turbo blower] was substantially\\ntransformed in the United States.” Municipal employees also\\ntestified they would not have purchased KTurbo’s blowers\\nwithout KTurbo’s Recovery Act assurances.\\n Where the fraud alleged deals with a half truth or material\\nomission, we generally require proof of an act of concealment\\non the part of the defendant. See Stephens, 421 F.3d at 507. The\\nrecord in this case unmistakably reflects such concealment.\\nTrial evidence showed KTurbo’s repeated misrepresentations\\nto its customers about where KTurbo made its turbo blowers.\\nFor example, KTurbo sent the City of Pendleton, Oregon a\\nBuy American certification in April 2010—shortly after Lee\\ndecided to stop all domestic manufacturing operations—rep-\\nresenting that KTurbo had “established an assembly facility\\nin Batavia, Illinois, where partial manufacturing and assem-\\nbly of all units sold in North America will be complete[d].”\\nNo one at KTurbo ever corrected that misrepresentation. At\\nthe beginning of 2011, KTurbo sent the City of Ottawa, Illinois\\na similar Buy American certification, signed by Trinity Lee,\\nwhich stated: “All assembly of the completed unit will be ex-\\necuted domestically. The assembly process includes wiring\\nand panel assembly, riveted frame assembly, total assembly\\nincluding all internal connections and power wiring, tubing\\nand final calibration will be perofrmaned [sic] at KTurbo USA\\nin Batavia, IL.” None of that certification was truthful, but it\\nwas emblematic of KTurbo’s fraudulent scheme. United States\\nv. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 2017) (jurors are per-\\nmitted to infer fraudulent methodologies from evidence of\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nsimilar fraudulent transactions). KTurbo repeatedly assured\\nmunicipalities and their general contractors of its Recovery\\nAct compliance. Several customers testified at trial about their\\nbelief that KTurbo made its turbo blowers in the United\\nStates.\\n KTurbo also misled its own sales representatives into\\nthinking KTurbo manufactured turbo blowers in Batavia, not\\nSouth Korea. These sales representatives testified they told\\ncustomers—based on KTurbo’s representations to them—that\\nKTurbo complied with the Buy American provision because\\nit manufactured and assembled its blowers in Batavia. Lee\\nmasterminded these material misrepresentations, even if he\\nused sales representatives to pass them on to the ultimate cus-\\ntomers. See United States v. Seidling, 737 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (“Nothing in the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. § 1341\\nrequires a scheme to defraud to involve deception of the same\\nperson or entity whose money or property is the intended ob-\\nject of the scheme.”). He is responsible for misrepresentations\\nhe commanded or willfully caused others to make as\\nKTurbo’s chief executive. 18 U.S.C. § 2; see also United States v.\\nGunning, 984 F.2d 1476, 1483 (7th Cir. 1993) (“One who coun-\\nsels or commands another to commit a crime, and knowingly\\nand actively contributes toward its success, is guilty of that\\ncrime under 18 U.S.C. § 2.”).\\n But Lee himself also actively participated in the cover up.\\nDuring his trial cross-examination, Lee acknowledged he\\nknew that KTurbo’s customers and the EPA cared about Buy\\nAmerican compliance. But he admitted he told customers that\\nKTurbo blowers were manufactured and assembled in the\\nUnited States. When a sales representative asked Lee about\\nBuy American compliance in a September 2010 email, Lee\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 21\\n\\nresponded: “We assemble and test in Chicago. Only motor\\nand VFD comes from Korea. It is almost Made In USA.” Lee\\nmade that statement months after KTurbo stopped assembly\\nin the United States. Even as the scheme began to unravel in\\nearly 2011, Lee persisted in his lies. On January 28, 2011, a\\nsales representative directly asked Lee about a rumor that fed-\\neral agents were investigating KTurbo. Lee responded by en-\\nsuring him that KTurbo faced no Recovery Act issues: “Most\\nimportant parts is [sic] final assembly and testing. We are do-\\ning those, so we are compliant.” Then, on February 8, 2011,\\nwhen representatives of Pendleton, Oregon, asked KTurbo\\nwhere its turbo blowers would be assembled, Lee wrote: “In\\nChicago the blowers will be finalized and tested and\\nshipped.”\\n Lee also challenges the government’s proof of his intent to\\ndefraud. A defendant acts with an intent to defraud where he\\nacts “willfully and with specific intent to deceive or cheat,\\nusually for the purpose of getting financial gain for himself or\\ncausing financial loss to another.” United States v. Pust, 798\\nF.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Paneras,\\n222 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2000)). Lee claims the government\\nfailed to prove he intended to defraud anyone because the\\ntrial evidence showed KTurbo took concrete steps toward\\nmanufacturing turbo blowers in the United States.\\n Lee’s intent argument ignores that his misrepresentations\\ncontinued well beyond April 2010, when he decided to stop\\nKTurbo’s American manufacturing operations. That Lee kept\\ntelling people KTurbo assembled its turbo blowers in Batavia\\nmonths after KTurbo ceased doing so is strong circumstantial\\nevidence of Lee’s intent to defraud. Pust, 798 F.3d at 600–01\\n(specific intent to defraud may be established by\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\ncircumstantial evidence and examination of the scheme it-\\nself). Agents’ discovery of copies of the EPA’s guidance mem-\\noranda on the Buy American provision, as well as testimony\\nfrom other KTurbo employees about the extent of KTurbo’s\\nRecovery Act meetings and planning, support the conclusion\\nthat Lee willfully attempted to circumvent the law.\\n A jury also could reasonably conclude that Lee never in-\\ntended to make turbo blowers in Batavia long term, but rather\\nset up the facility as part of his scheme to mislead the EPA,\\nsales representatives, and customers. Cf. United States v. Freed,\\n921 F.3d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding a promise made\\nwithout a present intention to keep it can be fraudulent). After\\nall, Lee did not wait even a full three months before putting\\nthe kibosh on the entire operation. Viewing the evidence in\\nthe light most favorable to the prosecution, there is more than\\nenough to conclude Lee intended to deceive and defraud\\nKTurbo’s customers.\\n The trial evidence presented over the course of eight days\\nadequately supports Lee’s participation in a scheme to de-\\nfraud and his intent to do so. Lee does not challenge his use\\nof interstate wires as a part of that scheme. With all three ele-\\nments of wire fraud adequately established in the trial record,\\nwe affirm the jury’s verdict.\\n B. Smuggling Convictions\\n We turn now from Lee’s wire fraud convictions to his three\\nsmuggling convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 545. The statute pro-\\nvides, in part:\\n Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or\\n brings into the United States, any merchandise\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 23\\n\\n contrary to law … Shall be fined under this title\\n or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.\\n Over a century ago, when dealing with the predecessor to\\n§ 545, the Supreme Court held the words “contrary to law”\\nrefer to legal provisions outside the statute itself. Keck v.\\nUnited States, 172 U.S. 434, 437 (1899). A violation of § 545 re-\\nquires a violation of another law—the predicate offense if you\\nwill—done with a fraudulent or knowing mindset. In this\\ncase, the government claimed Lee violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a):\\n [E]very article of foreign origin … imported into\\n the United States shall be marked in a conspic-\\n uous place as legibly, indelibly, and perma-\\n nently as the nature of the article (or container)\\n will permit in such manner as to indicate to an\\n ultimate purchaser in the United States the Eng-\\n lish name of the country of origin of the article.\\n Lee asserts that a violation of § 1304(a) cannot serve as a\\npredicate offense for a § 545 conviction. According to Lee, the\\nwords “imports … merchandise contrary to law” in § 545\\nmean that the merchandise itself is per se illegal to import, not\\nmerely that the merchandise was imported in a condition\\nnoncompliant with some federal law or regulation some-\\nwhere.\\n In making this argument, Lee stresses the title of § 545:\\n“Smuggling goods into the United States.” He contends the\\nword “smuggling” refers exclusively to bringing on shore\\ngoods whose importation is categorically prohibited. Lee ef-\\nfectively says he could not have “smuggled” the turbo blow-\\ners into the United States because turbo blowers are allowed\\nin the United States.\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n Even accepting Lee’s narrow interpretation of the word\\n“smuggling,”8 the text of the statute is not so cabined when\\nexamined in its entirety. Section 545 contains two separate\\nprohibitions; we must consider both when assessing the stat-\\nute’s meaning. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805)\\n(Marshall, C.J.) (“It is undoubtedly a well established\\nprinciple in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be\\nconsidered, and the intent of the legislature to be extracted\\nfrom the whole.”). Section 545’s first paragraph, which is not\\nat issue, criminalizes “knowingly and willfully …\\nsmuggl[ing], or clandestinely introduc[ing] … into the United\\nStates any merchandise which should have been in-\\nvoiced … .” That language criminalizes smuggling goods into\\nthe United States, and the statute’s title summarizes that pro-\\nhibition. But § 545’s second paragraph—the one that is at is-\\nsue—is broader. It criminalizes “fraudulently or knowingly\\nimport[ing] … any merchandise contrary to law … .” The text\\nof the second paragraph of § 545 makes no mention of the\\nword “smuggling.”\\n A statute’s title or heading is a permissible indicator of the\\nmeaning of its text. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083\\n(2015); see also ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER,\\n\\n8 We have some doubt that the term is quite so limited. Cf. Smuggling,\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The crime of importing or ex-\\nporting illegal articles or articles on which duties have not been paid.”);\\nSmuggling, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“The criminal of-\\nfense of knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States,\\nclandestinely introducing into the United States any merchandise which\\nshould have been declared for customs duty.”); Smuggle, AMERICAN\\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2019) (“To\\nbring into a country (a prohibited item) secretively and intentionally in\\nviolation of the law.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 25\\n\\nREADING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 221 (2012).\\nBut a title cannot override the statutory text itself. Bhd. of R.R.\\nTrainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29\\n(1947). Although § 545—true to its title—outlaws smuggling\\ngoods into the United States, the statute also criminalizes the\\nfraudulent or knowing importation of “merchandise contrary\\nto law.” Lee’s construction of that language as equating with\\n“smuggling” renders the two provisions of § 545 duplicative,\\na heavily disfavored result. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.\\n759, 778 (1988) (discussing the “cardinal rule of statutory in-\\nterpretation that no provision should be construed to be en-\\ntirely redundant”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 175.\\nThe better reading of the second paragraph of § 545 is that it\\nmakes it a crime to fraudulently or knowingly import mer-\\nchandise in any manner contrary to law. Section 545’s title\\ncannot save Lee from its text.\\n Lee next argues the case law is on his side. He claims the\\ncases only address scenarios where the defendant imported\\ngoods that are illegal per se—barred entirely from importa-\\ntion into the United States. That might be true, but it would\\nnot change the meaning of § 545. The scope of a statute cannot\\nbe altered based on the fact patterns of cases that happen to\\nbe charged and end up in the Federal Reporter. In any event,\\nLee’s assertions about the state of the case law are inaccurate.\\nHis cited authorities, Babb v. United States, 218 F.2d 538 (5th\\nCir. 1955) and Steiner v. United States, 229 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.\\n1956), dealt with indictments that failed to identify an under-\\nlying violation to serve as the predicate for § 545 liability. The\\nindictments simply lacked any predicate offense undergird-\\ning the § 545 charge. We do not have that here: the govern-\\nment’s indictment specifically accused Lee of violating\\n§ 1304(a).\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n And despite Lee’s attempts, we do not see how this case is\\ndistinguishable from United States v. Kuipers, 49 F.3d 1254 (7th\\nCir. 1995).9 In Kuipers, we affirmed the defendant’s § 545 con-\\nviction for attempting to import the horns of a protected spe-\\ncies under false paperwork. Id. at 1256. It was legal to import\\nthe horns into the United States with the proper paperwork,\\nbut the defendant used forged documentation to circumvent\\nthe law. Here, Lee essentially did the same thing. Nothing\\nprohibited Lee from importing turbo blowers into the United\\nStates, but he needed to do so with a proper country-of-origin\\ndesignation under § 1304(a). Lee circumvented that require-\\nment in a fraudulent fashion, similar to the defendant in\\nKuipers.\\n Lee also claims he could not have violated § 545 because\\nU.S. Customs detained the turbo blowers at the border, such\\nthat the machines were never imported into the country. But\\nLee fails to provide any reason to exclude domestic U.S. Cus-\\ntoms facilities from the definition of the “United States,” as\\nused in § 545. If anything, the text supports the opposite con-\\nclusion, specifically excluding other areas but not U.S.\\nCustoms offices. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (“The term ‘United States’, as\\nused in this section, shall not include the Virgin Island, Amer-\\nican Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef,\\nJohnston Island, or Guam.”); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1304(j) (refer-\\nring to merchandise held by U.S. Customs for inspection as\\nan “imported article”).\\n\\n\\n9 Lee’s claim that Kuipers dealt with only the first paragraph of § 545, and\\nnot the second, is not correct. 49 F.3d at 1256 (“Kuipers was indicted on\\nMarch 1, 1994 for … (2) fraudulently and knowingly importing the Desert\\nBighorn Sheep into the United States contrary to law\\n(18 U.S.C. § 545) … .”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 27\\n\\n Lee notes that federal law allows mismarked goods, after\\ntheir markings are corrected, to be imported. 19 U.S.C.\\n§ 1304(j); see also 19 C.F.R. § 134.51. He emphasizes that § 1304\\ndoes not itself purport to criminalize mismarking a product’s\\ncountry of origin, despite providing criminal sanctions for\\nother violations. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(l) (penalizing anyone who\\n“defaces, destroys, removes, alters, covers, obscures, or oblit-\\nerates” a country-of-origin mark with intent to conceal that\\ninformation). Yet one federal statute does not preempt\\nanother. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2004).\\nSection 1304(l)’s silence cannot override the text of § 545. The\\nfact § 1304(l) does not separately criminalize conduct already\\noutlawed under § 545 is not a basis for limiting the scope of\\n§ 545. Cf. United States v. Hassanzadeh, 271 F.3d 574, 576–79\\n(4th Cir. 2001) (affirming § 545 conviction based on underly-\\ning § 1304 labeling violation).10\\n Finally, Lee claims treating § 1304 violations as predicate\\noffenses for § 545 liability will criminalize a vast array of in-\\nnocent behavior in international commerce. This policy argu-\\nment fails to account for § 545’s high scienter bar—fraudulent\\nor knowing misbehavior. Such a scienter requirement ensures\\n\\n\\n10 Lee’s invocation of United States ex rel. Huangyan Import v. Nature’s Farm\\n\\nProds., 370 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Cal. 2005), is not well received, particu-\\nlarly his selective and misleading quotation. Although the opinion states\\nfederal regulations “permit the importation of mismarked goods,” Lee\\nleaves out the important qualifying language about the monetary penal-\\nties imposed in such circumstances. Id. at 1001. And, as the underlying\\nstatute makes clear, goods originally mismarked upon arrival may be\\nwithheld until their country-of-origin markings are corrected. 19 U.S.C.\\n§ 1304(i)–(j). Nothing in the Huangyan Import opinion suggests that at-\\ntempting to import merchandise with false country-of-origin designations\\nis anything but “contrary to law.”\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nthe statute does not criminalize innocent commercial mis-\\ntakes. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2019)\\n(“The cases in which we have emphasized scienter’s\\nimportance in separating wrongful from innocent acts are le-\\ngion.”). And this case involves no mere administrative over-\\nsight. KTurbo’s mislabeling served an important function in\\nLee’s broader scheme to deceive KTurbo customers about the\\norigin of the turbo blowers.\\n For all these reasons, we affirm Lee’s three smuggling con-\\nvictions.\\n Having affirmed all Lee’s convictions, we now proceed to\\nthe sentencing issues presented by the parties. We first ad-\\ndress the government’s cross-appeal regarding Lee’s prison\\nsentence, before resolving Lee’s challenge to the restitution\\nordered by the district court.\\n C. The Government’s Cross-Appeal\\n The government asks us to reinstate the 20-month\\nsentence the district court originally imposed. It claims the\\ndistrict court lacked authority under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) to\\nreduce Lee’s sentence to 12 months. But before we reach the\\nmerits of the government’s cross-appeal, we must resolve two\\njurisdictional questions.\\n 1. Is there statutory jurisdiction for the government’s\\n cross-appeal?\\n The government may appeal an adverse decision in a\\ncriminal case only if expressly authorized by statute. United\\nStates v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977). Here,\\nthe government cites 18 U.S.C. § 3731. But that provision does\\nnot apply—the government is not appealing a dismissal of its\\nindictment, a new trial order, or any of the other issues listed\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 29\\n\\nin § 3731. See United States v. Spilotro, 884 F.2d 1003, 1005–06\\n(7th Cir. 1989) (holding § 3731 does not provide jurisdiction\\nfor appeals challenging “a district court order reducing a sen-\\ntence”); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., 15B FED. PRAC.\\n& PROC. § 3919.8 (2d ed. April 2019 supp.) (“Ordinarily the\\ngovernment cannot rely upon either § 1291 or § 3731 to sup-\\nport appeal from a criminal sentence … .”).\\n The relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), which author-\\nizes the government to appeal a defendant’s sentence on spe-\\ncific grounds. A district court’s modification of a sentence\\nwithout authority to do so, as the government argues here, is\\none such ground. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(1) (providing the gov-\\nernment the ability to appeal sentences “imposed in violation\\nof law”). The government’s errant citation is not insignificant,\\ngiven that timeliness is an issue for its cross-appeal (as dis-\\ncussed below). Section 3731 contains a 30-day deadline for fil-\\ning a notice of appeal that § 3742(b) lacks. See CHARLES ALAN\\nWRIGHT, ET AL., 16A FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3950.8 (4th ed. April\\n2019 supp.); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186,\\n1195–99 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing the interplay between\\n§ 3731 and FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)). Nevertheless, where the rec-\\nord provides enough information to establish appellate juris-\\ndiction, we may exercise such jurisdiction despite the parties’\\nfailure to direct us to its proper statutory source. See NewPage\\nWis. Sys. Inc. v. United Steel Workers Int’l Union, 651 F.3d 775,\\n778 (7th Cir. 2011) (if the jurisdictional statute cited by a party\\nis inaccurate, the “court still must inquire whether another\\nstatute supplies jurisdiction”); see also In re Sealed Case, 449\\nF.3d 118, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding the appellant’s failure\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nto cite § 3742, “while bothersome to a court, is not necessarily\\nfatal”).\\n One issue remains: Section 3742(b) requires the govern-\\nment to obtain “the personal approval of the Attorney\\nGeneral, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general\\ndesignated by the Solicitor General” in order to appeal. Be-\\ncause the government did not rely on § 3742(b) in its briefing,\\nit has not provided proof of its compliance with that statutory\\nrequirement. But our circuit precedent does not treat\\n§ 3742(b)’s approval requirement as jurisdictional. United\\nStates v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170, 172 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994).11\\nNothing in the record suggests the government lacks author-\\nization to pursue its cross-appeal, and Lee never raised the\\nissue.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n11 See also United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 2008)\\n(personal approval requirement in § 3742(b) is non-jurisdictional), abro-\\ngated on different grounds by United States v. DiFalco, 837 F.3d 1207, 1216\\n(11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ruiz-Alonso, 397 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir.\\n2005) (same); United States v. Zamudio, 314 F.3d 517, 520 (10th Cir. 2002)\\n(same); United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1102 (2d Cir. 1992) (same);\\nbut see United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000) (per\\ncuriam) (dismissing the government’s sentencing appeal for failure to es-\\ntablish the requisite approval); United States v. Smith, 910 F.2d 326, 328 (6th\\nCir. 1990) (holding the approval is not jurisdictional but requiring proof\\nthat it has been obtained as part of the court’s “exercise of its supervisory\\nauthority”); cf. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 246 (2008) (explain-\\ning that an appellate court may not increase a defendant’s sentence absent\\na cross-appeal because “Congress … entrusted to named high-ranking of-\\nficials within the Department of Justice responsibility for determining\\nwhether the Government, on behalf of the public, should seek a sentence\\nhigher than the one imposed”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 31\\n\\n 2. Did the government file its notice of appeal in time?\\n The next jurisdictional question concerns the timeliness of\\nthe government’s notice of appeal. In a criminal case like this,\\nFED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B) provides the government’s deadline:\\n When the government is entitled to appeal, its\\n notice of appeal must be filed in the district\\n court within 30 days of the later of:\\n (i) the entry of the judgment or order be-\\n ing appealed; or\\n (ii) the filing of a notice of appeal by any\\n defendant.\\nThe government must file its own notice of appeal to pursue\\na sentencing increase following a conviction; it cannot piggy-\\nback on the defendant’s notice. Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 252–53.\\n Here, the relevant timeline looks like this:\\n February 28, 2018: The district court orally sen-\\n tenced Lee to 20 months in prison.\\n March 11, 2018: Lee filed his first notice of appeal\\n and a Rule 35(a) motion to correct his sentence.\\n March 14, 2018: The district court modified Lee’s\\n sentence to 12 months in prison and entered its\\n written judgment.\\n March 28, 2018: Lee filed his second notice of ap-\\n peal.\\n April 27, 2018: The government cross-appealed.\\n The government does not rely on the date of judgment un-\\nder Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(i). It cannot, as it filed its notice of appeal\\n45 days after the district court’s judgment. But what about\\n\\f32 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii)? The government’s notice of appeal came\\n30 days after Lee’s second notice of appeal, but 48 days after\\nLee’s first notice. Which of Lee’s notices triggered the govern-\\nment’s deadline clock?\\n As with any matter of statutory interpretation, the text\\ncontrols. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt,\\n139 S. Ct. 1507, 1512–13 (2019); see also SCALIA & GARNER,\\nsupra, at 56 (“The words of a governing text are of paramount\\nconcern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the\\ntext means.”). Notably, Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii) refers to “a notice of\\nappeal by any defendant” rather than “the first notice of ap-\\npeal by any defendant.” That is important because the analo-\\ngous rule for civil cases triggers a party’s deadline to initiate\\na cross-appeal on “the date when the first notice [of appeal]\\nwas filed … .” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) (emphasis added). The\\ndrafters could have used the same language for the criminal\\nrule, but they chose different words. We must respect that de-\\ncision and give such variations effect. Murphy v. Smith, 138 S.\\nCt. 784, 787–88 (2018); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 170\\n(“[A] material variation in terms suggests a variation in mean-\\ning.”).\\n Lee offers no persuasive reason to interpret “a notice of\\nappeal by any defendant” to mean “the first notice of appeal\\nby any defendant.” The text of the rule already contemplates\\nthere may be multiple notices of appeal, and it allows the gov-\\nernment to file its cross-appeal within thirty days of the “later\\nof” such notices. The only authority Lee offers, Cyrak v. Lemon,\\n919 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1990), is a civil case addressing Rule 4(a),\\nwhich expressly refers to the “first notice.” Rather than\\nsimply analogize criminal cases to civil cases, as Lee asks us\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 33\\n\\nto do, we give effect to the different text of the different pro-\\nvisions and apply the rules as written.\\n Rule 4(b) permits the government to file its notice of ap-\\npeal within thirty days of “a notice of appeal by any defend-\\nant.” Lee timely filed “a notice of appeal” on March 28, 2018.\\nAnd the government filed its notice exactly thirty days later,\\non April 27, 2018, so the government’s appeal is timely under\\nthe plain meaning of FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B)(ii).\\n 3. In reducing Lee’s sentence, did the district court ex-\\n ceed its authority?\\n Now we arrive at the substance of the government’s cross-\\nappeal. The government claims district courts lack authority\\nto revisit advisory guideline calculations on a motion brought\\nunder FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). It does not challenge the merits\\nof the district court’s ruling, only the court’s authority to\\nmake it. Rule 35(a) states: “Within 14 days after sentencing,\\nthe court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmet-\\nical, technical, or other clear error.”\\n In sentencing Lee, the district court struggled with how to\\ncalculate the “loss” caused by Lee’s crimes for purposes of\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Where the loss cannot be determined, the\\nGuidelines permit courts to look at the defendant’s gain as an\\nalternative. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n. 3(B). The district court\\noriginally found Lee’s gain to be the $180,392 in Recovery Act\\nfunds paid to KTurbo by municipalities. That put Lee’s guide-\\nline range at 46–57 months, although the district court de-\\nparted down from that range and sentenced Lee to 20 months.\\n The district court abandoned that math on Lee’s Rule 35(a)\\nmotion. Based on United States v. Giovenco, 773 F.3d 866, 871\\n(7th Cir. 2014), the court determined it needed to assess net\\n\\f34 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nprofit, rather than KTurbo’s gross revenue, and that it lacked\\nthe evidentiary record to do so. It therefore decided not to ap-\\nply any sentencing enhancement based on Lee’s gain under\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Using a guideline range of 12–18 months, the\\ncourt sentenced Lee to 12 months plus one day.\\n The government emphasizes that a district court’s author-\\nity on a Rule 35(a) motion is “narrow.” As we have said, the\\n“Rule does not give the district court a second chance to exer-\\ncise its ‘discretion with regard to the application of the sen-\\ntencing guidelines,’ nor does it allow for changes to a sentence\\nbased on the court’s change of mind.” United States v. Clark,\\n538 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 35\\nadvisory committee’s note to 1991 amendments). Still, Rule\\n35(a) is not the straitjacket the government suggests. It does\\nallow district courts to correct “clear errors” and avoid waste-\\nful appeals by fixing obvious sentencing issues. United States\\nv. Schenian, 847 F.3d 422, 424 (7th Cir. 2017). This extends to\\nclear errors that produce mistakenly high sentences. Id. If the\\njudge identifies an aspect of the sentence that is objectively\\nerroneous—whether on a factual matter or a point of law—\\nthe judge may use Rule 35(a) to address the problem.\\n Here, the district court realized that its gain calculation\\nneeded to assess net profit, not gross revenue, see Giovenco,\\n773 F.3d at 871, and that it lacked an evidentiary basis to do\\nso. It also determined nothing in the record showed how\\nmuch Lee personally gained from KTurbo’s sales. The govern-\\nment bore the burden to establish a “loss” or “gain” under\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. United States v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438, 454 (7th\\nCir. 2012). Sentencing Lee without a supporting evidentiary\\nrecord would have constituted clear error. Id. at 456–57. Rule\\n35(a)’s entire purpose is to correct errors otherwise destined\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 35\\n\\nto be reversed. Schenian, 847 F.3d at 424; Clark, 538 F.3d at 809.\\nThe district court was thus well within its authority to modify\\nLee’s sentence on his Rule 35(a) motion.\\n D. Restitution\\n Finally, we return to Lee’s appeal, specifically his chal-\\nlenge to the restitution ordered by the district court.\\n Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, courts must\\norder restitution to any victim of “an offense against property\\nunder this title, … including any offense committed by fraud\\nor deceit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). The statute sets the\\nrestitution amount at the value of the victim’s lost property\\non the date of loss or the date of sentencing (whichever is\\ngreater) minus the value of any returned property. 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3663A(b)(1)(B); see also United States v. Malone, 747 F.3d 481,\\n485 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n On appeal, Lee objects to paying any restitution, denying\\nthat any municipality sustained a loss. He acknowledges that\\ntwo municipalities, Mishawaka, Indiana and Redmond,\\nOregon, paid KTurbo a total of $180,392 for turbo blowers\\nmanufactured in South Korea. But Lee points out that the EPA\\nsubsequently authorized Mishawaka and Redmond to con-\\ntinue using the KTurbo blowers without returning the Recov-\\nery Act funds. So Lee argues neither municipality sustained\\nany loss: each paid for turbo blowers to use on its project, and\\neach received turbo blowers that it is using on its project.\\n But Lee waived this argument in the district court. The\\nprobation office recommended the court order $180,392 in\\nrestitution based on the sums paid by Mishawaka and\\n\\f36 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRedmond.12 The government agreed with probation’s recom-\\nmendation. Despite the fact the district court held three\\nsentencing hearings, Lee failed to raise the issue of restitution,\\neven once. Lee failed to object in his written sentencing mem-\\norandum, and he failed to raise the issue in his Rule 35(a) mo-\\ntion. Indeed, Lee’s entire argument regarding restitution in\\nthe district court comprised two sentences in a supplemental\\nbrief requested by the court on a different topic, with no cita-\\ntions to any statutory authority or case law supporting his po-\\nsition.13 That is insufficient to preserve an objection.\\n The closer question is whether Lee affirmatively waived\\nthe restitution arguments he now pursues on appeal, or\\nwhether he only forfeited them. Waiver requires the inten-\\ntional relinquishment of a known right, while forfeiture is a\\nmere accidental or neglectful failure to assert a right. United\\nStates v. Hathaway, 882 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2018). The dis-\\ntinction is important, as waiver precludes appellate review al-\\ntogether, while forfeited rights may be vindicated on appeal\\nthrough plain-error review. Id. In making this determination,\\n\\n12 Neither of these municipal contracts served as a basis for any of the five\\n\\ncounts of wire fraud in the indictment. Ordinarily restitution is limited to\\nthe losses caused by the specific conduct underlying the defendant’s con-\\nvictions. United States v. Locke, 759 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2014). But where\\nthe offense “involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of\\ncriminal activity,” such as the scheme to defraud necessary for a wire\\nfraud conviction, the applicable statute permits courts to award restitution\\nto “any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the\\ncourse of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2).\\n13 In the district court Lee argued: “Since the loss amount is zero, the res-\\ntitution amount is also zero. And the government’s motion to use Heon\\nSeok Lee’s bond deposit to pay restitution (Dkt # 239) should therefore be\\ndenied.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 37\\n\\nwe look to whether the defendant “chose, as a matter of strat-\\negy, not to present the argument.” Id. (quoting United States v.\\nGarcia, 580 F.3d 528, 541 (7th Cir. 2009)).\\n After reviewing the extensive sentencing transcripts in\\nthis case, we conclude Lee and his counsel made a strategic\\ndecision to not press objections to restitution in the district\\ncourt, and thus waived the issue. The main event during the\\nsentencing was the loss calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Yet\\nrestitution did come up. At the first hearing, Lee’s counsel in-\\nterjected, “I would also just note since restitution is brought\\nup—been brought up, that the restitution amount I don’t\\nthink needs to be above 180.” Rather than argue the district\\ncourt should not order restitution because there was no loss,\\nas he does now, Lee asked the district court to not go above\\nthe $180,392 figure recommended by the probation office.14\\nAlthough Lee did include a two-sentence objection to restitu-\\ntion in his supplemental memorandum before the second\\nhearing, he never raised the issue at the second hearing itself,\\ndespite the prosecution addressing the topic. Lee never men-\\ntioned restitution in his Rule 35(a) motion. And, at the third\\nsentencing hearing, when the district court noted its intention\\nto enter the same $180,392 in restitution (despite reducing\\nLee’s prison term on account of the government’s failure to\\nprove the loss amount), Lee’s counsel represented, “I think\\nthat’s correct as to what should—what would be in the judg-\\nment.” These repeated decisions to press other arguments,\\nand not address restitution, evinced a “tactical choice” on\\n\\n14 Lee made this point in the context of a debate about whether the loss\\nfigure under the Sentencing Guidelines should be the $1.6 million face\\nvalue of KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts. Lee’s incentive to push the dis-\\ntrict court toward a figure substantially lower than that was clear.\\n\\f38 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nLee’s part, constituting waiver. United States v. Jin Hua Dong,\\n675 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n We realize there is some logical tension between the dis-\\ntrict court’s restitution award, and its conclusion that it lacked\\na sufficient evidentiary basis to determine victims’ “loss” for\\npurposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.15 But the appropriate forum for\\naddressing that issue was the district court in the first in-\\nstance. Calculating restitution in an atypical fraud case such\\nas this one is difficult, as the losses caused by a scheme to cir-\\ncumvent governmental purchasing preferences are “inher-\\nently difficult to quantify.” United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773,\\n794 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court was entitled to the bene-\\nfit of the parties’ best arguments on how restitution should be\\ncalculated. By strategically choosing to forego his challenge to\\nthe restitution figure in the district court, Lee waived the is-\\nsue: “A defendant cannot squirrel away objections, revealing\\nthem only upon successive appeals.” Kuipers, 49 F.3d at 1258.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Heon Seok Lee repeatedly lied about where his company\\nmanufactured its products in order to profit off a federal stim-\\nulus package. Such a fraudulent scheme is wire fraud and\\nprohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1343. To execute his scheme, Lee di-\\nrected his company to mislabel the country of origin for its\\n\\n15 Although the restitution amount typically tracks the loss amount under\\n\\nthe Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. McGee, 612 F.3d 627, 635 (7th\\nCir. 2010), courts must be careful not to confuse the two given the differ-\\nences between the definitions of “loss” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and restitu-\\ntion under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B). United States v. Hussein, 664 F.3d\\n155, 161 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The amount of restitution does not always\\ncorrespond to guidelines loss because the rules for calculating each dif-\\nfer.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 39\\n\\nproducts and attempt to import them with those incorrect\\ndesignations. This violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) and the federal\\nprohibition against smuggling, 18 U.S.C. § 545, and evidence\\nsupported the jury’s verdict on those counts. As to Lee’s sen-\\ntence, although the government timely appealed, the district\\ncourt did not exceed its authority when it revisited Lee’s sen-\\ntencing guidelines range and modified Lee’s prison sentence\\naccordingly. Finally, Lee waived any objection to how the dis-\\ntrict court calculated restitution. We therefore AFFIRM the\\njudgment of the district court in full.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431873/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654620/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Heon Seok Lee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee/\n Cross-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nHEON SEOK LEE,\n Defendant-Appellant/\n Cross-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:12-cr-00109-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Crowbar in hand, U.S. Customs\nOfficer Jorge Parra spent December 8, 2010 “cracking open\ncontainers” at a warehouse near the Los Angeles seaport.\nParra pried open one from South Korea to inspect its freight.\nInside he found a fully assembled, five-foot tall industrial fan\n\f2 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\ncalled a turbo blower. A placard riveted to the side read, “As-\nsembled in USA.”\n Presented with a fully assembled machine fresh off the\nboat from South Korea, which brazenly advertised its assem-\nbly in the United States, little sleuthing was required to deter-\nmine something was amiss. Parra’s discovery kicked off a\nfederal investigation that traced back to the defendant in this\ncase, Heon Seok Lee. Prosecutors eventually charged Lee with\nexecuting a scheme to defraud local governments by falsely\nrepresenting that his company manufactured its turbo blow-\ners in the United States.\n A grand jury indicted Lee on five counts of wire fraud and\nthree counts of smuggling. After a trial, the jury found Lee\nguilty on all counts. Lee now appeals his convictions and the\nrestitution ordered, and the government cross-appeals Lee’s\nprison sentence. We find no fault in the trial or the sentence.\n I. Background\n A. The Recovery Act\n This criminal case has an atypical origin: an economic\nstimulus package. Congress passed the American Recovery\nand Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115\n(2009)—which we will simply call the “Recovery Act”—to\njumpstart the flagging domestic economy during the Great\nRecession. See Kameron Hillstrom, The American Recovery and\nReinvestment Act: A Fitting Future for Recovery Legislation, 44\nPUB. CONTRACT L. J. 285, 288 (2015). The Recovery Act ear-\nmarked billions to fund public infrastructure projects. Id. at\n289 (noting the Recovery Act made $261.2 billion available for\nsuch projects).\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 3\n\n Relevant to this case, Congress allocated $6.4 billion to the\nEPA for water-infrastructure improvements. The EPA did not\nspend the money directly; instead it awarded grants to “re-\nvolving funds” administered by the States. After receiving\nEPA grants, the revolving funds then issued low-interest\nloans to local municipalities or agencies sponsoring specific\nprojects. Those local governments were then responsible for\nhiring contractors to perform the work.\n To achieve Congress’s objective of bolstering the Ameri-\ncan economy, the Recovery Act included the following do-\nmestic purchasing requirement, commonly known as the\n“Buy American” provision:\n None of the funds appropriated or otherwise\n made available by this Act may be used for a\n project for the construction, alteration, mainte-\n nance, or repair of a public building or public\n work unless all of the iron, steel, and manufac-\n tured goods used in the project are produced in\n the United States.\nRecovery Act § 1605(a), 123 Stat. 303.1\n At first glance, this requirement seems straightforward.\nBut federal agencies struggled to pin down what it means for\na product to have been “produced in the United States.” Dif-\nferent agencies used different tests. See Thomas D. Blanford,\nNavigating the Recovery Act’s Buy American Rule in State and\nLocal Government Construction, 46 PROCUREMENT LAWYER 3, 4\n(Fall 2010) (listing five tests used by different agencies). The\n\n1 The Recovery Act’s Buy American provision should not be confused\nwith the separate, much older, Buy American Act of 1933,\n41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305.\n\f4 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nEPA adopted the “substantial transformation” standard to\nadminister the Recovery Act, and it developed a three-part\ntest to assess whether a manufacturer substantially trans-\nformed a product within the United States.\n As a condition to receiving Recovery Act funding, local\ngovernments and their contractors were required to abide by\nthe Buy American provision. Federal agencies like the EPA\naudited projects to ensure compliance. Local governments re-\nquired their suppliers to complete “Buy American certifica-\ntions” representing that their products complied with the stat-\nute.\n B. KTurbo’s Initial Plan\n Heon Seok Lee founded KTurbo Inc. in his homeland of\nSouth Korea. KTurbo manufactures centrifugal turbo blow-\ners—large industrial fans used to provide oxygen for biologi-\ncal water treatments in wastewater facilities. Turbo blowers\nare sophisticated and expensive pieces of equipment, requir-\ning on-site programming, testing, and calibration.\n Lee saw the Recovery Act as a growth opportunity for\nKTurbo, whose penetration into the United States market was\nlimited at the time. The Recovery Act earmarked billions for\nproducts like KTurbo’s turbo blowers. But KTurbo would be\nunable to tap into those funds unless it demonstrated compli-\nance with the Buy American provision. So, Lee and his sister,\nTrinity Lee,2 developed a Recovery Act plan. They researched\nregulatory guidance from the EPA and monitored larger com-\npetitors’ responses. KTurbo leadership discussed Buy\n\n2We refer to the defendant, Heon Seok Lee, as “Lee” and Trinity Lee by\nher full name. Trinity Lee served as KTurbo’s general manager for North\nAmerica.\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 5\n\nAmerican compliance for months, with several in-depth\nmeetings that lasted hours.\n KTurbo enlisted independent sales representatives around\nthe country to market its turbo blowers to local governments\npursuing Recovery Act projects. KTurbo also consulted with\nseveral sales representatives in the early stages of its Buy\nAmerican planning. One sales representative, Dick Koch, dis-\ncouraged KTurbo from pursuing a plan to make turbo blow-\ners in South Korea, ship them to the United States, take them\napart, and then reassemble stateside. Koch warned Lee and\nKTurbo in an email that such evasive practices could be\ndeemed criminal:\n The [EPA] webcast specifically excludes Heon\n Seok’s idea of sending the equipment to the US\n and taking it apart and putting it back together.\n In fact the webcast says that if you say that is\n [Buy American] you are committing criminal\n fraud.\nTrinity Lee reassured Koch that KTurbo would use compo-\nnents from both South Korea and the United States and as-\nsemble the turbo blowers in greater Chicago. Other sales rep-\nresentatives who inquired about KTurbo’s Buy American\ncompliance plan were told the same thing, including by Lee\nhimself.\n At that point, KTurbo formed an Illinois subsidiary,\nKTurbo USA Inc.,3 leased a warehouse in Batavia, Illinois, and\nhired three American technicians. KTurbo’s sales\n\n3 The legal distinction between KTurbo Inc. and KTurbo USA Inc. does\nnot matter for purposes of this opinion, so we refer to the two companies\ncollectively as “KTurbo.”\n\f6 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nrepresentatives landed several contracts for Recovery Act\nprojects. In its bids, KTurbo highlighted its domestic presence\nand promised Buy American compliance. For example,\nKTurbo submitted a bid to South Burlington, Vermont in the\nsummer of 2009, which included the following Buy American\ncertification:\n By this letter, KTurbo USA certifies that it will\n manufacture and deliver KTurbo brand blower\n packages and equipment in compliance with\n the final requirements of the 2009 U.S. economic\n stimulus law, The American Recovery and Re-\n investment Act of 2009.\nKTurbo sent nearly identical compliance letters for projects in\nCalifornia, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Oregon.\n These representations—a South Korean company certify-\ning its product was “produced in the United States”—did not\ngo unnoticed. A competitor that lost a bid to KTurbo filed a\ncomplaint with the EPA in the fall of 2009. In response, EPA\nofficials visited KTurbo’s Batavia facility on October 30, 2009.\nDuring that visit, Lee gave a PowerPoint presentation\ndetailing KTurbo’s plans to comply with the Buy American\nprovision. He represented that KTurbo would assemble its\nturbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Slides in Lee’s presenta-\ntion indicated fifty percent of the total input costs would be\nattributable to American components, assembly, and testing.\nTrinity Lee sent the EPA a letter confirming these details a few\nweeks later.\n KTurbo manufactured its first turbo blower at the Batavia\nfacility in January 2010. It built nine more there over the next\nthree months, at a rate of one to two weeks per blower.\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 7\n\n C. The Revised Plan\n It did not take long for Lee to abandon that original plan\nto produce turbo blowers in Batavia. By April 2010, Lee con-\ncluded production costs in the United States were prohibi-\ntively expensive, and he decided to go back to importing\nturbo blowers from South Korea. Employees pushed back\nwith concerns about KTurbo’s Recovery Act compliance, but\nLee forged ahead. At trial, one of KTurbo’s technicians ex-\nplained how the component parts from South Korea began\narriving more and more fully assembled, until completely as-\nsembled blowers started showing up. No new components\nwere added to the turbo blowers once they reached Batavia.\nTechnicians simply plugged them in and ran performance ef-\nficiency tests.\n Lee’s revised plan depended on its secrecy. He instructed\nKTurbo employees not to disclose to customers the fact that\ntheir turbo blowers were made in South Korea. To evade de-\ntection, KTurbo (with Lee’s knowledge) went out of its way to\navoid shipping the machines from South Korea directly to\ncustomers. When municipalities questioned KTurbo about\nRecovery Act compliance, KTurbo simply lied. Take KTurbo’s\nMay 20, 2010 response to Lowell, Massachusetts: “The blower\nwill be assembled and tested at KTurbo’s Chicago location.”\nLee himself participated, emailing a sales representative sim-\nilar misrepresentations in September 2010: “We assemble and\ntest in Chicago. Only motor and VFD comes from Korea. It is\nalmost Made In USA.”\n But this scheme unraveled quickly. Jorge Parra’s shipyard\ndiscovery in December 2010 was the beginning of the end.\nWhen U.S. Customs detained KTurbo’s products at the bor-\nder, the company fell behind on its deliveries. This required\n\f8 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nmore lies to hide that the turbo blowers were coming from\noverseas and needed to clear U.S. Customs. When a Lowell,\nMassachusetts general contractor contacted KTurbo about the\ndelays, Joel Schomo (a KTurbo engineer) told him the Batavia\nfacility was waiting for parts to begin final assembly, even\nthough KTurbo had discontinued all assembly operations in\nBatavia months earlier. At trial, Schomo testified he told this\nlie because the Recovery Act funded Lowell’s project and he\ndid not want to raise any “red flags” that KTurbo “might not\nbe complying with the Recovery Act requirements.”\n Within two months, federal investigators executed a\nsearch warrant at the Batavia facility. Lee was present. During\nthe search, Lee admitted he was aware that the turbo blowers\nwere for Recovery Act projects, that KTurbo shipped them\nfully assembled from South Korea, and that it was “wrong”\nto do so.\n D. Lee’s Prosecution\n About a year later, a grand jury returned an indictment\nagainst Lee. It alleged he falsely represented that KTurbo’s\nturbo blowers complied with the Buy American provision\nwhen Lee knew KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities re-\nceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” The indictment also\ncharged Lee “knew that turbo blowers were substantially as-\nsembled before their arrival in the United States and did not\nrequire meaningful assembly or manufacturing in the United\nStates.”\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 9\n\n By this point, Lee had fled the country. It took three years\nto extradite him from South Korea. When the government fi-\nnally brought Lee back to appear, he responded to the indict-\nment with a series of motions to dismiss, each of which the\ndistrict court denied.\n During an eight-day trial, the government presented doz-\nens of witnesses: U.S. Customs officers, federal agents,\nKTurbo employees, sales representatives, general contractors,\nand employees of municipal customers. Lee elected to take\nthe stand, and he adamantly denied any knowledge that\nKTurbo imported fully assembled blowers into the United\nStates. On cross-examination, the government battered Lee’s\ncredibility, impeaching him with documentary evidence and\nother witnesses’ testimony. The jury ultimately convicted Lee\non all counts.\n E. Post-Trial Proceedings\n Lee filed a series of post-trial motions seeking to vacate the\njury’s verdict; the district court denied each. The district court\nheld three sentencing hearings over several months, which\ncentered on the parties’ dispute about how to calculate Lee’s\nguideline range. For wire fraud convictions, the Sentencing\nGuidelines instruct district courts to begin with a base offense\nlevel of seven and then to add levels based on the amount of\nthe “loss” caused by the defendant. U.S. SENTENCING\nGUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a)–(b) (U.S. SENTENCING\nCOMM’N Nov. 2018). In this case, the parties disputed whether\nLee should receive credit in the loss calculation for the market\nvalue of KTurbo blowers sold to customers.\n The district court initially ruled that the loss equaled the\ntotal amount KTurbo received from defrauded municipalities\n\f10 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\n(about $180,000), putting Lee’s guideline range at 46–57\nmonths. But the court gave Lee a below-guidelines prison sen-\ntence of 20 months, plus restitution. Two weeks later, Lee filed\na notice of appeal and a motion asking the district court to\ncorrect its judgment under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). The district\ncourt held a hearing on Lee’s Rule 35(a) motion, where it\nagreed with Lee’s argument on the guideline calculation and\nresentenced Lee to 12 months. After the district court entered\nits final judgment on March 14, 2018, Lee filed a second notice\nof appeal on March 28, 2018. Thirty days later, the govern-\nment cross-appealed Lee’s sentence.\n II. Discussion\n A. Wire Fraud Convictions\n We begin with Lee’s wire fraud convictions. He asks us to\nvacate them because the government’s trial evidence con-\nstructively amended the indictment and failed to prove all the\nelements of the crime.\n 1. Did the government’s case at trial impermissibly\n deviate from the indictment?\n “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-\nwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment\nof a Grand Jury … .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Founders\nadopted this grand jury requirement from English tradition,\nin which lay grand jurors considered whether a crime should\nbe charged while also protecting the accused from prosecuto-\nrial overreach. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); see\nalso Andrew D. Leipold, Grand Jury Requirement, in THE\nHERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 431 (David F. Forte &\nMatthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014). The Supreme Court has\nexplained “that a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 11\n\non charges that are not made in the indictment against him.”\nStirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960).\n Two related doctrines arise out of this Fifth Amendment\nrequirement: constructive amendment and variance. Both\nexplain differences between the government’s case in the in-\ndictment and the government’s case at trial. Constructive\namendment occurs where the trial evidence supports (or the\ncourt’s jury instructions charge) an offense not alleged in the\nindictment. United States v. Burge, 711 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir.\n2013). Variance refers to situations where the government’s\ntrial evidence “proves facts materially different from those al-\nleged in the indictment.” United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113,\n1125 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The distinction\nbetween the two doctrines is subtle, but significant. Where a\ndifferent crime has been proved (constructive amendment), it\nis error per se and the verdict must be vacated. United States\nv. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 820 (7th Cir. 2007).4 But where\nthe same crime is proved, only through evidence different\nthan the factual allegations in the indictment (variance), the\ndefendant must demonstrate prejudice to his substantial\nrights. Id.\n Lee contends the government constructively amended the\nindictment by presenting evidence of misrepresentations be-\nyond KTurbo’s Buy American certifications. He claims the in-\ndictment confined itself to the falsity of the certifications,\nwhile the government’s trial evidence focused on other lies,\n\n4 This assumes the defendant properly preserved the error in the district\ncourt. If the issue was waived or forfeited, we review only for plain error.\nUnited States v. Remsza, 77 F.3d 1039, 1043–44 (7th Cir. 1996) (assessing de-\nfendant’s constructive amendment argument under a plain error standard\ndue to defendant’s failure to raise it in the district court).\n\f12 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nsuch as false statements in sales presentations, misrepresen-\ntations to sales representatives, and misleading emails to\ngeneral contractors.\n Even if we accept as true Lee’s interpretation of the indict-\nment and his characterization of the trial evidence, it would\nnot rise to the level of a constructive amendment. The govern-\nment did not attempt to prove a crime different from the one\nalleged. See United States v. Khilchenko, 324 F.3d 917, 920 (7th\nCir. 2003) (“To effect a constructive amendment, the evidence\nat trial must establish offenses different from or in addition to\nthose charged by the grand jury.”). Prosecutors did not argue\nLee committed mail fraud when the indictment charged wire\nfraud. The government’s case at trial did not attempt to prove\na fraud in the air compressor market after alleging a scheme\nin the turbo blower market. Constructive amendments arise\n“where there is a ‘complex of facts distinctly different from\nthose set forth in the charging instrument and not where there\nis a single set of facts.’” United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306,\n314 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d\n584, 586 (9th Cir. 1984)). Here, the government consistently\nmaintained that Lee committed wire fraud by selling turbo\nblowers made in South Korea as if they were made in the\nUnited States.\n Lee’s argument is more aptly characterized as one of vari-\nance, although he does not frame it that way. Even if the crime\ncharged remains consistent, it is a problem if the government\nmaterially alters the factual underpinnings of that charge. See\nUnited States v. Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 1983)\n(defendant may establish reversible error where the variance\naltered an essential or material element of the charge). But\nvariance claims are subject to harmless error review—we will\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 13\n\nnot disturb a conviction on account of “a technical deficiency\nof no prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Russell v. United\nStates, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962)). No prejudice exists in this\ncase.\n First, despite Lee’s characterization, the indictment did\ntailor its fraud allegations to KTurbo’s failure to manufacture\nits turbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Paragraph 3 of the in-\ndictment alleged KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities\nreceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” It also expressly al-\nleged that Lee knew the turbo blowers were already assem-\nbled before arriving in the United States. The government\nproved those allegations at trial with evidence that Lee knew\nKTurbo made its turbo blowers in South Korea and lied about\nthat fact. Such evidence matches the indictment’s fraud alle-\ngations.\n Second, even if these misrepresentations were not ex-\npressly covered by the indictment’s text, they were “part and\nparcel” of the same scheme described by the indictment. Nye\n& Nissen, Corp. v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 617 (1949) (no\nvariance where indictment alleged a single scheme to defraud\nexecuted in various ways). Additional evidence regarding\ntechnical details about how a defendant executed an alleged\nscheme does not constitute an impermissible variance. Ajayi,\n808 F.3d at 1125 (presentation of “more detailed” facts at trial\nnot an impermissible variance). Lee cannot demonstrate his\nFifth Amendment rights were violated because the govern-\nment’s trial evidence concerned “the same elaborate scheme\nto defraud … as was described in the indictment.”\n\f14 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nRatliff-White, 493 F.3d at 821 (quoting United States v. Dupre,\n462 F.3d 131, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2006)).\n Two concerns underlie the constructive amendment and\nvariance doctrines: ensuring criminal defendants have ade-\nquate notice of the charges against them and avoiding the risk\nof double jeopardy. Neither is present here. The indictment\nnotified Lee of the allegations against him: that he committed\nwire fraud by importing turbo blowers from South Korea\nwhile representing they were made in Batavia. See United\nStates v. Corrigan, 912 F.3d 422, 428 (7th Cir. 2019) (indictment\nprovided valid notice despite listing wrong name of victim);\nUnited States v. Kuna, 760 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1985) (alleged\nvariance in mail fraud prosecution was harmless because the\ndefendant “was able to identify with great certainty the acts\nfor which he was placed in jeopardy”).\n The indictment also included specific details about the\nscheme alleged, alleviating any double jeopardy concerns. See\nUnited States v. Moore, 563 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (hold-\ning specificity in the indictment would “avoid any later dou-\nble jeopardy concerns”). It described the Recovery Act’s Buy\nAmerican provision, how KTurbo leased a warehouse in\nBatavia, KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts, the fact KTurbo\nfailed “to perform substantial transformation of the turbo\nblowers at the KTURBO facility in Batavia,” Lee’s knowledge\n“that turbo blowers were substantially assembled before their\narrival in the United States and did not require meaningful\nassembly or manufacturing in the United States,” and Lee’s\nmisrepresentations and concealment of KTurbo’s true opera-\ntions. Such detail in the indictment protected Lee from expo-\nsure to double jeopardy. See United States v. Scheuneman, 712\nF.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2013) (indictment sufficient where it\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 15\n\n“presented enough detail to allow [the defendant] to plead\ndouble jeopardy to avoid future prosecution based on the\nsame conduct alleged”).\n Because the indictment afforded Lee ample notice of the\ncase the government presented at trial and included specific\ndetails of the crimes alleged to avoid double jeopardy risk, no\nimpermissible constructive amendment or variance occurred\nin this case.5\n 2. Did the government present enough evidence to\n convict Lee of wire fraud?\n Lee appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for ac-\nquittal under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. We review such decisions de\nnovo, asking if the evidence—viewed in the light most favor-\nable to the prosecution—could support a rational finding of\nall the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable\ndoubt. United States v. Mohamed, 759 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir.\n2014). Put differently, we reverse only if the trial record “is\ndevoid of evidence from which a jury could conclude guilt\nbeyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d\n605, 613 (7th Cir. 2006). Given this deference to the jury ver-\ndict, Lee’s hurdle on appeal is high, as “we rarely reverse a\nconviction for mail or wire fraud due to insufficient evi-\ndence.” United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 354 (7th Cir.\n2016).\n\n\n5Lee’s concerns are also mitigated because the district court gave the jury\na copy of the indictment and instructed jurors to convict only if the gov-\nernment had proved the crimes it alleged. See United States v. Cusimano,\n148 F.3d 824, 830–31 (7th Cir. 1998) (district court’s provision of the indict-\nment to the jury and proper instruction on it “establish[ed] that there was\nno constructive amendment to the indictment”).\n\f16 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\n To convict a defendant of wire fraud, the government\nmust prove three elements: (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) the\ndefendant’s intent to defraud, and (3) the defendant’s use of\ninterstate wires in furtherance of the scheme. United States v.\nJackson, 860 F.3d 438, 446 (7th Cir. 2017). Lee challenges the\ngovernment’s proof on the first element, the scheme to de-\nfraud. The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, reaches “any\nscheme to deprive another of money or property by means of\nfalse or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”\nCarpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987).\n On appeal, Lee argues that KTurbo’s Buy American certi-\nfications were not false. He claims KTurbo’s turbo blowers\ncomplied with the Buy American provision because they were\nmade in South Korea. That claim is not as self-contradictory\nas it first sounds, given the text of Recovery Act § 1605(d),\nwhich requires the statute to be “applied in a manner con-\nsistent with United States obligations under international\nagreements.” Both the United States and South Korea have\njoined the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Gov-\nernment Procurement (WTO-GPA), which requires all signa-\ntories to provide all other signatories’ exports “treatment no\nless favourable than the treatment the Party, including its pro-\ncuring entities, accords to: (a) domestic goods, services and\nsuppliers; and (b) goods, services and suppliers of any other\nParty.” WTO-GPA art. 4 § 1, Apr. 6, 2014, 3008 U.N.T.S. Reg.\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 17\n\nNo. A-31874.6 In other words, the WTO-GPA is a multi-lateral\n“most favored nation” clause for government purchasing. Lee\ninterprets Recovery Act § 1605(d) to mean the WTO-GPA’s\nmost favored nation clause supersedes the Buy American\nprovision, such that South Korean products must be given the\nsame treatment as American products for purposes of the\nRecovery Act.7\n Critically however, when the Recovery Act was enacted\nthe EPA publicly rejected the interpretation Lee now offers.\nAn April 2009 EPA memorandum explained that the agency\ninterpreted Recovery Act § 1605(d) to apply to direct pur-\nchases by the federal government and the specific state and\nlocal agencies expressly listed in the WTO-GPA’s appendices,\nbut not “to procurement initiated by local entities ([state re-\nvolving fund] assistance recipients), unless they are listed in\nthe appendix.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Memorandum on\n\n6 By its terms, the WTO-GPA covers purchases made by the EPA above\ncertain dollar thresholds. WTO-GPA, Coverage Schedules, United States\nann. 1. Coverage of purchases made by States themselves, state agencies,\nand local municipalities is more complicated, varying from State to State\nand from agency to agency within a State. WTO-GPA, Coverage Sched-\nules, United States ann. 2–3; see also Hong-Sik Chung, Government Procure-\nment in the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement: Great Opportunities for\nBoth Sides?, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 303 (2014). But the WTO-GPA\nprovides that where a covered entity “requires persons not covered under\na Party’s annexes to Appendix I to procure in accordance with particular\nrequirements, Article IV shall apply mutatis mutandis to such require-\nments.” WTO-GPA art. 2 § 5.\n7 Federal purchasing regulations provide that where an international\nagreement applies, the “restrictions of section 1605 of the Recovery Act do\nnot apply to designated country iron, steel, and/or other manufactured\ngoods.” 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(b)(ii). South Korea is listed as a “designated\ncountry” based on its membership in the WTO-GPA. 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(a).\n\f18 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nImplementation of Buy American provisions of P.L. 111-5\n(Apr. 28, 2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2\n014-12/documents/buy_am.pdf (last visited August 13, 2019).\nIn the nature of a “smoking gun,” federal agents found a copy\nof this EPA memorandum in KTurbo’s Batavia facility, with\nthe relevant paragraph flagged by handwritten markings.\nReasonable jurors could thus conclude Lee was aware that the\nEPA did not consider South Korean products Buy American\ncompliant.\n As a result, even if one accepts Lee’s interpretation of Re-\ncovery Act § 1605(d), the EPA’s express rejection of it makes\nKTurbo’s South Korean manufacturing a “material” fact for\nwire fraud purposes. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16\n(1999) (holding a statement is “material” if it has “a natural\ntendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the deci-\nsion of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed”)\n(quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)).\nKTurbo could not legitimately certify its Buy American com-\npliance, at least not without disclosing to customers that the\nturbo blowers were made in South Korea. Federal fraud stat-\nutes reach such misleading omissions of material information.\nUnited States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005).\n A reasonable purchaser in this scenario—one who re-\nceived funds from the EPA pursuant to the Recovery Act and\nwas bound to comply with the Buy American provision—\nwould deem it highly relevant whether a supplier based its\nBuy American certification on an interpretation of the statute\nexpressly rejected by the EPA. A series of trial witnesses con-\nsistently testified that Recovery Act compliance was “abso-\nlutely vital,” given it was a legal requirement of the project\nfunding. Without Buy American compliance, municipalities\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 19\n\njeopardized losing all Recovery Act funding from the EPA. As\none customer testified, his municipality considered KTurbo’s\nrepresentations that the turbo blowers were “Assembled in\nUSA” to be “extremely important” because “it bolstered\n[their] belief that [the turbo blower] was substantially\ntransformed in the United States.” Municipal employees also\ntestified they would not have purchased KTurbo’s blowers\nwithout KTurbo’s Recovery Act assurances.\n Where the fraud alleged deals with a half truth or material\nomission, we generally require proof of an act of concealment\non the part of the defendant. See Stephens, 421 F.3d at 507. The\nrecord in this case unmistakably reflects such concealment.\nTrial evidence showed KTurbo’s repeated misrepresentations\nto its customers about where KTurbo made its turbo blowers.\nFor example, KTurbo sent the City of Pendleton, Oregon a\nBuy American certification in April 2010—shortly after Lee\ndecided to stop all domestic manufacturing operations—rep-\nresenting that KTurbo had “established an assembly facility\nin Batavia, Illinois, where partial manufacturing and assem-\nbly of all units sold in North America will be complete[d].”\nNo one at KTurbo ever corrected that misrepresentation. At\nthe beginning of 2011, KTurbo sent the City of Ottawa, Illinois\na similar Buy American certification, signed by Trinity Lee,\nwhich stated: “All assembly of the completed unit will be ex-\necuted domestically. The assembly process includes wiring\nand panel assembly, riveted frame assembly, total assembly\nincluding all internal connections and power wiring, tubing\nand final calibration will be perofrmaned [sic] at KTurbo USA\nin Batavia, IL.” None of that certification was truthful, but it\nwas emblematic of KTurbo’s fraudulent scheme. United States\nv. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 2017) (jurors are per-\nmitted to infer fraudulent methodologies from evidence of\n\f20 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nsimilar fraudulent transactions). KTurbo repeatedly assured\nmunicipalities and their general contractors of its Recovery\nAct compliance. Several customers testified at trial about their\nbelief that KTurbo made its turbo blowers in the United\nStates.\n KTurbo also misled its own sales representatives into\nthinking KTurbo manufactured turbo blowers in Batavia, not\nSouth Korea. These sales representatives testified they told\ncustomers—based on KTurbo’s representations to them—that\nKTurbo complied with the Buy American provision because\nit manufactured and assembled its blowers in Batavia. Lee\nmasterminded these material misrepresentations, even if he\nused sales representatives to pass them on to the ultimate cus-\ntomers. See United States v. Seidling, 737 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th\nCir. 2013) (“Nothing in the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. § 1341\nrequires a scheme to defraud to involve deception of the same\nperson or entity whose money or property is the intended ob-\nject of the scheme.”). He is responsible for misrepresentations\nhe commanded or willfully caused others to make as\nKTurbo’s chief executive. 18 U.S.C. § 2; see also United States v.\nGunning, 984 F.2d 1476, 1483 (7th Cir. 1993) (“One who coun-\nsels or commands another to commit a crime, and knowingly\nand actively contributes toward its success, is guilty of that\ncrime under 18 U.S.C. § 2.”).\n But Lee himself also actively participated in the cover up.\nDuring his trial cross-examination, Lee acknowledged he\nknew that KTurbo’s customers and the EPA cared about Buy\nAmerican compliance. But he admitted he told customers that\nKTurbo blowers were manufactured and assembled in the\nUnited States. When a sales representative asked Lee about\nBuy American compliance in a September 2010 email, Lee\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 21\n\nresponded: “We assemble and test in Chicago. Only motor\nand VFD comes from Korea. It is almost Made In USA.” Lee\nmade that statement months after KTurbo stopped assembly\nin the United States. Even as the scheme began to unravel in\nearly 2011, Lee persisted in his lies. On January 28, 2011, a\nsales representative directly asked Lee about a rumor that fed-\neral agents were investigating KTurbo. Lee responded by en-\nsuring him that KTurbo faced no Recovery Act issues: “Most\nimportant parts is [sic] final assembly and testing. We are do-\ning those, so we are compliant.” Then, on February 8, 2011,\nwhen representatives of Pendleton, Oregon, asked KTurbo\nwhere its turbo blowers would be assembled, Lee wrote: “In\nChicago the blowers will be finalized and tested and\nshipped.”\n Lee also challenges the government’s proof of his intent to\ndefraud. A defendant acts with an intent to defraud where he\nacts “willfully and with specific intent to deceive or cheat,\nusually for the purpose of getting financial gain for himself or\ncausing financial loss to another.” United States v. Pust, 798\nF.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Paneras,\n222 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2000)). Lee claims the government\nfailed to prove he intended to defraud anyone because the\ntrial evidence showed KTurbo took concrete steps toward\nmanufacturing turbo blowers in the United States.\n Lee’s intent argument ignores that his misrepresentations\ncontinued well beyond April 2010, when he decided to stop\nKTurbo’s American manufacturing operations. That Lee kept\ntelling people KTurbo assembled its turbo blowers in Batavia\nmonths after KTurbo ceased doing so is strong circumstantial\nevidence of Lee’s intent to defraud. Pust, 798 F.3d at 600–01\n(specific intent to defraud may be established by\n\f22 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\ncircumstantial evidence and examination of the scheme it-\nself). Agents’ discovery of copies of the EPA’s guidance mem-\noranda on the Buy American provision, as well as testimony\nfrom other KTurbo employees about the extent of KTurbo’s\nRecovery Act meetings and planning, support the conclusion\nthat Lee willfully attempted to circumvent the law.\n A jury also could reasonably conclude that Lee never in-\ntended to make turbo blowers in Batavia long term, but rather\nset up the facility as part of his scheme to mislead the EPA,\nsales representatives, and customers. Cf. United States v. Freed,\n921 F.3d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding a promise made\nwithout a present intention to keep it can be fraudulent). After\nall, Lee did not wait even a full three months before putting\nthe kibosh on the entire operation. Viewing the evidence in\nthe light most favorable to the prosecution, there is more than\nenough to conclude Lee intended to deceive and defraud\nKTurbo’s customers.\n The trial evidence presented over the course of eight days\nadequately supports Lee’s participation in a scheme to de-\nfraud and his intent to do so. Lee does not challenge his use\nof interstate wires as a part of that scheme. With all three ele-\nments of wire fraud adequately established in the trial record,\nwe affirm the jury’s verdict.\n B. Smuggling Convictions\n We turn now from Lee’s wire fraud convictions to his three\nsmuggling convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 545. The statute pro-\nvides, in part:\n Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or\n brings into the United States, any merchandise\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 23\n\n contrary to law … Shall be fined under this title\n or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.\n Over a century ago, when dealing with the predecessor to\n§ 545, the Supreme Court held the words “contrary to law”\nrefer to legal provisions outside the statute itself. Keck v.\nUnited States, 172 U.S. 434, 437 (1899). A violation of § 545 re-\nquires a violation of another law—the predicate offense if you\nwill—done with a fraudulent or knowing mindset. In this\ncase, the government claimed Lee violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a):\n [E]very article of foreign origin … imported into\n the United States shall be marked in a conspic-\n uous place as legibly, indelibly, and perma-\n nently as the nature of the article (or container)\n will permit in such manner as to indicate to an\n ultimate purchaser in the United States the Eng-\n lish name of the country of origin of the article.\n Lee asserts that a violation of § 1304(a) cannot serve as a\npredicate offense for a § 545 conviction. According to Lee, the\nwords “imports … merchandise contrary to law” in § 545\nmean that the merchandise itself is per se illegal to import, not\nmerely that the merchandise was imported in a condition\nnoncompliant with some federal law or regulation some-\nwhere.\n In making this argument, Lee stresses the title of § 545:\n“Smuggling goods into the United States.” He contends the\nword “smuggling” refers exclusively to bringing on shore\ngoods whose importation is categorically prohibited. Lee ef-\nfectively says he could not have “smuggled” the turbo blow-\ners into the United States because turbo blowers are allowed\nin the United States.\n\f24 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\n Even accepting Lee’s narrow interpretation of the word\n“smuggling,”8 the text of the statute is not so cabined when\nexamined in its entirety. Section 545 contains two separate\nprohibitions; we must consider both when assessing the stat-\nute’s meaning. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805)\n(Marshall, C.J.) (“It is undoubtedly a well established\nprinciple in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be\nconsidered, and the intent of the legislature to be extracted\nfrom the whole.”). Section 545’s first paragraph, which is not\nat issue, criminalizes “knowingly and willfully …\nsmuggl[ing], or clandestinely introduc[ing] … into the United\nStates any merchandise which should have been in-\nvoiced … .” That language criminalizes smuggling goods into\nthe United States, and the statute’s title summarizes that pro-\nhibition. But § 545’s second paragraph—the one that is at is-\nsue—is broader. It criminalizes “fraudulently or knowingly\nimport[ing] … any merchandise contrary to law … .” The text\nof the second paragraph of § 545 makes no mention of the\nword “smuggling.”\n A statute’s title or heading is a permissible indicator of the\nmeaning of its text. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083\n(2015); see also ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER,\n\n8 We have some doubt that the term is quite so limited. Cf. Smuggling,\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The crime of importing or ex-\nporting illegal articles or articles on which duties have not been paid.”);\nSmuggling, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“The criminal of-\nfense of knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States,\nclandestinely introducing into the United States any merchandise which\nshould have been declared for customs duty.”); Smuggle, AMERICAN\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2019) (“To\nbring into a country (a prohibited item) secretively and intentionally in\nviolation of the law.”).\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 25\n\nREADING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 221 (2012).\nBut a title cannot override the statutory text itself. Bhd. of R.R.\nTrainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29\n(1947). Although § 545—true to its title—outlaws smuggling\ngoods into the United States, the statute also criminalizes the\nfraudulent or knowing importation of “merchandise contrary\nto law.” Lee’s construction of that language as equating with\n“smuggling” renders the two provisions of § 545 duplicative,\na heavily disfavored result. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.\n759, 778 (1988) (discussing the “cardinal rule of statutory in-\nterpretation that no provision should be construed to be en-\ntirely redundant”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 175.\nThe better reading of the second paragraph of § 545 is that it\nmakes it a crime to fraudulently or knowingly import mer-\nchandise in any manner contrary to law. Section 545’s title\ncannot save Lee from its text.\n Lee next argues the case law is on his side. He claims the\ncases only address scenarios where the defendant imported\ngoods that are illegal per se—barred entirely from importa-\ntion into the United States. That might be true, but it would\nnot change the meaning of § 545. The scope of a statute cannot\nbe altered based on the fact patterns of cases that happen to\nbe charged and end up in the Federal Reporter. In any event,\nLee’s assertions about the state of the case law are inaccurate.\nHis cited authorities, Babb v. United States, 218 F.2d 538 (5th\nCir. 1955) and Steiner v. United States, 229 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.\n1956), dealt with indictments that failed to identify an under-\nlying violation to serve as the predicate for § 545 liability. The\nindictments simply lacked any predicate offense undergird-\ning the § 545 charge. We do not have that here: the govern-\nment’s indictment specifically accused Lee of violating\n§ 1304(a).\n\f26 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\n And despite Lee’s attempts, we do not see how this case is\ndistinguishable from United States v. Kuipers, 49 F.3d 1254 (7th\nCir. 1995).9 In Kuipers, we affirmed the defendant’s § 545 con-\nviction for attempting to import the horns of a protected spe-\ncies under false paperwork. Id. at 1256. It was legal to import\nthe horns into the United States with the proper paperwork,\nbut the defendant used forged documentation to circumvent\nthe law. Here, Lee essentially did the same thing. Nothing\nprohibited Lee from importing turbo blowers into the United\nStates, but he needed to do so with a proper country-of-origin\ndesignation under § 1304(a). Lee circumvented that require-\nment in a fraudulent fashion, similar to the defendant in\nKuipers.\n Lee also claims he could not have violated § 545 because\nU.S. Customs detained the turbo blowers at the border, such\nthat the machines were never imported into the country. But\nLee fails to provide any reason to exclude domestic U.S. Cus-\ntoms facilities from the definition of the “United States,” as\nused in § 545. If anything, the text supports the opposite con-\nclusion, specifically excluding other areas but not U.S.\nCustoms offices. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (“The term ‘United States’, as\nused in this section, shall not include the Virgin Island, Amer-\nican Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef,\nJohnston Island, or Guam.”); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1304(j) (refer-\nring to merchandise held by U.S. Customs for inspection as\nan “imported article”).\n\n\n9 Lee’s claim that Kuipers dealt with only the first paragraph of § 545, and\nnot the second, is not correct. 49 F.3d at 1256 (“Kuipers was indicted on\nMarch 1, 1994 for … (2) fraudulently and knowingly importing the Desert\nBighorn Sheep into the United States contrary to law\n(18 U.S.C. § 545) … .”).\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 27\n\n Lee notes that federal law allows mismarked goods, after\ntheir markings are corrected, to be imported. 19 U.S.C.\n§ 1304(j); see also 19 C.F.R. § 134.51. He emphasizes that § 1304\ndoes not itself purport to criminalize mismarking a product’s\ncountry of origin, despite providing criminal sanctions for\nother violations. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(l) (penalizing anyone who\n“defaces, destroys, removes, alters, covers, obscures, or oblit-\nerates” a country-of-origin mark with intent to conceal that\ninformation). Yet one federal statute does not preempt\nanother. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2004).\nSection 1304(l)’s silence cannot override the text of § 545. The\nfact § 1304(l) does not separately criminalize conduct already\noutlawed under § 545 is not a basis for limiting the scope of\n§ 545. Cf. United States v. Hassanzadeh, 271 F.3d 574, 576–79\n(4th Cir. 2001) (affirming § 545 conviction based on underly-\ning § 1304 labeling violation).10\n Finally, Lee claims treating § 1304 violations as predicate\noffenses for § 545 liability will criminalize a vast array of in-\nnocent behavior in international commerce. This policy argu-\nment fails to account for § 545’s high scienter bar—fraudulent\nor knowing misbehavior. Such a scienter requirement ensures\n\n\n10 Lee’s invocation of United States ex rel. Huangyan Import v. Nature’s Farm\n\nProds., 370 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Cal. 2005), is not well received, particu-\nlarly his selective and misleading quotation. Although the opinion states\nfederal regulations “permit the importation of mismarked goods,” Lee\nleaves out the important qualifying language about the monetary penal-\nties imposed in such circumstances. Id. at 1001. And, as the underlying\nstatute makes clear, goods originally mismarked upon arrival may be\nwithheld until their country-of-origin markings are corrected. 19 U.S.C.\n§ 1304(i)–(j). Nothing in the Huangyan Import opinion suggests that at-\ntempting to import merchandise with false country-of-origin designations\nis anything but “contrary to law.”\n\f28 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nthe statute does not criminalize innocent commercial mis-\ntakes. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2019)\n(“The cases in which we have emphasized scienter’s\nimportance in separating wrongful from innocent acts are le-\ngion.”). And this case involves no mere administrative over-\nsight. KTurbo’s mislabeling served an important function in\nLee’s broader scheme to deceive KTurbo customers about the\norigin of the turbo blowers.\n For all these reasons, we affirm Lee’s three smuggling con-\nvictions.\n Having affirmed all Lee’s convictions, we now proceed to\nthe sentencing issues presented by the parties. We first ad-\ndress the government’s cross-appeal regarding Lee’s prison\nsentence, before resolving Lee’s challenge to the restitution\nordered by the district court.\n C. The Government’s Cross-Appeal\n The government asks us to reinstate the 20-month\nsentence the district court originally imposed. It claims the\ndistrict court lacked authority under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) to\nreduce Lee’s sentence to 12 months. But before we reach the\nmerits of the government’s cross-appeal, we must resolve two\njurisdictional questions.\n 1. Is there statutory jurisdiction for the government’s\n cross-appeal?\n The government may appeal an adverse decision in a\ncriminal case only if expressly authorized by statute. United\nStates v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977). Here,\nthe government cites 18 U.S.C. § 3731. But that provision does\nnot apply—the government is not appealing a dismissal of its\nindictment, a new trial order, or any of the other issues listed\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 29\n\nin § 3731. See United States v. Spilotro, 884 F.2d 1003, 1005–06\n(7th Cir. 1989) (holding § 3731 does not provide jurisdiction\nfor appeals challenging “a district court order reducing a sen-\ntence”); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., 15B FED. PRAC.\n& PROC. § 3919.8 (2d ed. April 2019 supp.) (“Ordinarily the\ngovernment cannot rely upon either § 1291 or § 3731 to sup-\nport appeal from a criminal sentence … .”).\n The relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), which author-\nizes the government to appeal a defendant’s sentence on spe-\ncific grounds. A district court’s modification of a sentence\nwithout authority to do so, as the government argues here, is\none such ground. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(1) (providing the gov-\nernment the ability to appeal sentences “imposed in violation\nof law”). The government’s errant citation is not insignificant,\ngiven that timeliness is an issue for its cross-appeal (as dis-\ncussed below). Section 3731 contains a 30-day deadline for fil-\ning a notice of appeal that § 3742(b) lacks. See CHARLES ALAN\nWRIGHT, ET AL., 16A FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3950.8 (4th ed. April\n2019 supp.); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186,\n1195–99 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing the interplay between\n§ 3731 and FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)). Nevertheless, where the rec-\nord provides enough information to establish appellate juris-\ndiction, we may exercise such jurisdiction despite the parties’\nfailure to direct us to its proper statutory source. See NewPage\nWis. Sys. Inc. v. United Steel Workers Int’l Union, 651 F.3d 775,\n778 (7th Cir. 2011) (if the jurisdictional statute cited by a party\nis inaccurate, the “court still must inquire whether another\nstatute supplies jurisdiction”); see also In re Sealed Case, 449\nF.3d 118, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding the appellant’s failure\n\f30 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nto cite § 3742, “while bothersome to a court, is not necessarily\nfatal”).\n One issue remains: Section 3742(b) requires the govern-\nment to obtain “the personal approval of the Attorney\nGeneral, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general\ndesignated by the Solicitor General” in order to appeal. Be-\ncause the government did not rely on § 3742(b) in its briefing,\nit has not provided proof of its compliance with that statutory\nrequirement. But our circuit precedent does not treat\n§ 3742(b)’s approval requirement as jurisdictional. United\nStates v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170, 172 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994).11\nNothing in the record suggests the government lacks author-\nization to pursue its cross-appeal, and Lee never raised the\nissue.\n\n\n\n\n11 See also United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 2008)\n(personal approval requirement in § 3742(b) is non-jurisdictional), abro-\ngated on different grounds by United States v. DiFalco, 837 F.3d 1207, 1216\n(11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ruiz-Alonso, 397 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir.\n2005) (same); United States v. Zamudio, 314 F.3d 517, 520 (10th Cir. 2002)\n(same); United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1102 (2d Cir. 1992) (same);\nbut see United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000) (per\ncuriam) (dismissing the government’s sentencing appeal for failure to es-\ntablish the requisite approval); United States v. Smith, 910 F.2d 326, 328 (6th\nCir. 1990) (holding the approval is not jurisdictional but requiring proof\nthat it has been obtained as part of the court’s “exercise of its supervisory\nauthority”); cf. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 246 (2008) (explain-\ning that an appellate court may not increase a defendant’s sentence absent\na cross-appeal because “Congress … entrusted to named high-ranking of-\nficials within the Department of Justice responsibility for determining\nwhether the Government, on behalf of the public, should seek a sentence\nhigher than the one imposed”).\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 31\n\n 2. Did the government file its notice of appeal in time?\n The next jurisdictional question concerns the timeliness of\nthe government’s notice of appeal. In a criminal case like this,\nFED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B) provides the government’s deadline:\n When the government is entitled to appeal, its\n notice of appeal must be filed in the district\n court within 30 days of the later of:\n (i) the entry of the judgment or order be-\n ing appealed; or\n (ii) the filing of a notice of appeal by any\n defendant.\nThe government must file its own notice of appeal to pursue\na sentencing increase following a conviction; it cannot piggy-\nback on the defendant’s notice. Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 252–53.\n Here, the relevant timeline looks like this:\n February 28, 2018: The district court orally sen-\n tenced Lee to 20 months in prison.\n March 11, 2018: Lee filed his first notice of appeal\n and a Rule 35(a) motion to correct his sentence.\n March 14, 2018: The district court modified Lee’s\n sentence to 12 months in prison and entered its\n written judgment.\n March 28, 2018: Lee filed his second notice of ap-\n peal.\n April 27, 2018: The government cross-appealed.\n The government does not rely on the date of judgment un-\nder Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(i). It cannot, as it filed its notice of appeal\n45 days after the district court’s judgment. But what about\n\f32 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nRule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii)? The government’s notice of appeal came\n30 days after Lee’s second notice of appeal, but 48 days after\nLee’s first notice. Which of Lee’s notices triggered the govern-\nment’s deadline clock?\n As with any matter of statutory interpretation, the text\ncontrols. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt,\n139 S. Ct. 1507, 1512–13 (2019); see also SCALIA & GARNER,\nsupra, at 56 (“The words of a governing text are of paramount\nconcern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the\ntext means.”). Notably, Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii) refers to “a notice of\nappeal by any defendant” rather than “the first notice of ap-\npeal by any defendant.” That is important because the analo-\ngous rule for civil cases triggers a party’s deadline to initiate\na cross-appeal on “the date when the first notice [of appeal]\nwas filed … .” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) (emphasis added). The\ndrafters could have used the same language for the criminal\nrule, but they chose different words. We must respect that de-\ncision and give such variations effect. Murphy v. Smith, 138 S.\nCt. 784, 787–88 (2018); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 170\n(“[A] material variation in terms suggests a variation in mean-\ning.”).\n Lee offers no persuasive reason to interpret “a notice of\nappeal by any defendant” to mean “the first notice of appeal\nby any defendant.” The text of the rule already contemplates\nthere may be multiple notices of appeal, and it allows the gov-\nernment to file its cross-appeal within thirty days of the “later\nof” such notices. The only authority Lee offers, Cyrak v. Lemon,\n919 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1990), is a civil case addressing Rule 4(a),\nwhich expressly refers to the “first notice.” Rather than\nsimply analogize criminal cases to civil cases, as Lee asks us\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 33\n\nto do, we give effect to the different text of the different pro-\nvisions and apply the rules as written.\n Rule 4(b) permits the government to file its notice of ap-\npeal within thirty days of “a notice of appeal by any defend-\nant.” Lee timely filed “a notice of appeal” on March 28, 2018.\nAnd the government filed its notice exactly thirty days later,\non April 27, 2018, so the government’s appeal is timely under\nthe plain meaning of FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B)(ii).\n 3. In reducing Lee’s sentence, did the district court ex-\n ceed its authority?\n Now we arrive at the substance of the government’s cross-\nappeal. The government claims district courts lack authority\nto revisit advisory guideline calculations on a motion brought\nunder FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). It does not challenge the merits\nof the district court’s ruling, only the court’s authority to\nmake it. Rule 35(a) states: “Within 14 days after sentencing,\nthe court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmet-\nical, technical, or other clear error.”\n In sentencing Lee, the district court struggled with how to\ncalculate the “loss” caused by Lee’s crimes for purposes of\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Where the loss cannot be determined, the\nGuidelines permit courts to look at the defendant’s gain as an\nalternative. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n. 3(B). The district court\noriginally found Lee’s gain to be the $180,392 in Recovery Act\nfunds paid to KTurbo by municipalities. That put Lee’s guide-\nline range at 46–57 months, although the district court de-\nparted down from that range and sentenced Lee to 20 months.\n The district court abandoned that math on Lee’s Rule 35(a)\nmotion. Based on United States v. Giovenco, 773 F.3d 866, 871\n(7th Cir. 2014), the court determined it needed to assess net\n\f34 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nprofit, rather than KTurbo’s gross revenue, and that it lacked\nthe evidentiary record to do so. It therefore decided not to ap-\nply any sentencing enhancement based on Lee’s gain under\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Using a guideline range of 12–18 months, the\ncourt sentenced Lee to 12 months plus one day.\n The government emphasizes that a district court’s author-\nity on a Rule 35(a) motion is “narrow.” As we have said, the\n“Rule does not give the district court a second chance to exer-\ncise its ‘discretion with regard to the application of the sen-\ntencing guidelines,’ nor does it allow for changes to a sentence\nbased on the court’s change of mind.” United States v. Clark,\n538 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 35\nadvisory committee’s note to 1991 amendments). Still, Rule\n35(a) is not the straitjacket the government suggests. It does\nallow district courts to correct “clear errors” and avoid waste-\nful appeals by fixing obvious sentencing issues. United States\nv. Schenian, 847 F.3d 422, 424 (7th Cir. 2017). This extends to\nclear errors that produce mistakenly high sentences. Id. If the\njudge identifies an aspect of the sentence that is objectively\nerroneous—whether on a factual matter or a point of law—\nthe judge may use Rule 35(a) to address the problem.\n Here, the district court realized that its gain calculation\nneeded to assess net profit, not gross revenue, see Giovenco,\n773 F.3d at 871, and that it lacked an evidentiary basis to do\nso. It also determined nothing in the record showed how\nmuch Lee personally gained from KTurbo’s sales. The govern-\nment bore the burden to establish a “loss” or “gain” under\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. United States v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438, 454 (7th\nCir. 2012). Sentencing Lee without a supporting evidentiary\nrecord would have constituted clear error. Id. at 456–57. Rule\n35(a)’s entire purpose is to correct errors otherwise destined\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 35\n\nto be reversed. Schenian, 847 F.3d at 424; Clark, 538 F.3d at 809.\nThe district court was thus well within its authority to modify\nLee’s sentence on his Rule 35(a) motion.\n D. Restitution\n Finally, we return to Lee’s appeal, specifically his chal-\nlenge to the restitution ordered by the district court.\n Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, courts must\norder restitution to any victim of “an offense against property\nunder this title, … including any offense committed by fraud\nor deceit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). The statute sets the\nrestitution amount at the value of the victim’s lost property\non the date of loss or the date of sentencing (whichever is\ngreater) minus the value of any returned property. 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3663A(b)(1)(B); see also United States v. Malone, 747 F.3d 481,\n485 (7th Cir. 2014).\n On appeal, Lee objects to paying any restitution, denying\nthat any municipality sustained a loss. He acknowledges that\ntwo municipalities, Mishawaka, Indiana and Redmond,\nOregon, paid KTurbo a total of $180,392 for turbo blowers\nmanufactured in South Korea. But Lee points out that the EPA\nsubsequently authorized Mishawaka and Redmond to con-\ntinue using the KTurbo blowers without returning the Recov-\nery Act funds. So Lee argues neither municipality sustained\nany loss: each paid for turbo blowers to use on its project, and\neach received turbo blowers that it is using on its project.\n But Lee waived this argument in the district court. The\nprobation office recommended the court order $180,392 in\nrestitution based on the sums paid by Mishawaka and\n\f36 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nRedmond.12 The government agreed with probation’s recom-\nmendation. Despite the fact the district court held three\nsentencing hearings, Lee failed to raise the issue of restitution,\neven once. Lee failed to object in his written sentencing mem-\norandum, and he failed to raise the issue in his Rule 35(a) mo-\ntion. Indeed, Lee’s entire argument regarding restitution in\nthe district court comprised two sentences in a supplemental\nbrief requested by the court on a different topic, with no cita-\ntions to any statutory authority or case law supporting his po-\nsition.13 That is insufficient to preserve an objection.\n The closer question is whether Lee affirmatively waived\nthe restitution arguments he now pursues on appeal, or\nwhether he only forfeited them. Waiver requires the inten-\ntional relinquishment of a known right, while forfeiture is a\nmere accidental or neglectful failure to assert a right. United\nStates v. Hathaway, 882 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2018). The dis-\ntinction is important, as waiver precludes appellate review al-\ntogether, while forfeited rights may be vindicated on appeal\nthrough plain-error review. Id. In making this determination,\n\n12 Neither of these municipal contracts served as a basis for any of the five\n\ncounts of wire fraud in the indictment. Ordinarily restitution is limited to\nthe losses caused by the specific conduct underlying the defendant’s con-\nvictions. United States v. Locke, 759 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2014). But where\nthe offense “involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of\ncriminal activity,” such as the scheme to defraud necessary for a wire\nfraud conviction, the applicable statute permits courts to award restitution\nto “any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the\ncourse of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2).\n13 In the district court Lee argued: “Since the loss amount is zero, the res-\ntitution amount is also zero. And the government’s motion to use Heon\nSeok Lee’s bond deposit to pay restitution (Dkt # 239) should therefore be\ndenied.”\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 37\n\nwe look to whether the defendant “chose, as a matter of strat-\negy, not to present the argument.” Id. (quoting United States v.\nGarcia, 580 F.3d 528, 541 (7th Cir. 2009)).\n After reviewing the extensive sentencing transcripts in\nthis case, we conclude Lee and his counsel made a strategic\ndecision to not press objections to restitution in the district\ncourt, and thus waived the issue. The main event during the\nsentencing was the loss calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Yet\nrestitution did come up. At the first hearing, Lee’s counsel in-\nterjected, “I would also just note since restitution is brought\nup—been brought up, that the restitution amount I don’t\nthink needs to be above 180.” Rather than argue the district\ncourt should not order restitution because there was no loss,\nas he does now, Lee asked the district court to not go above\nthe $180,392 figure recommended by the probation office.14\nAlthough Lee did include a two-sentence objection to restitu-\ntion in his supplemental memorandum before the second\nhearing, he never raised the issue at the second hearing itself,\ndespite the prosecution addressing the topic. Lee never men-\ntioned restitution in his Rule 35(a) motion. And, at the third\nsentencing hearing, when the district court noted its intention\nto enter the same $180,392 in restitution (despite reducing\nLee’s prison term on account of the government’s failure to\nprove the loss amount), Lee’s counsel represented, “I think\nthat’s correct as to what should—what would be in the judg-\nment.” These repeated decisions to press other arguments,\nand not address restitution, evinced a “tactical choice” on\n\n14 Lee made this point in the context of a debate about whether the loss\nfigure under the Sentencing Guidelines should be the $1.6 million face\nvalue of KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts. Lee’s incentive to push the dis-\ntrict court toward a figure substantially lower than that was clear.\n\f38 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nLee’s part, constituting waiver. United States v. Jin Hua Dong,\n675 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2012).\n We realize there is some logical tension between the dis-\ntrict court’s restitution award, and its conclusion that it lacked\na sufficient evidentiary basis to determine victims’ “loss” for\npurposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.15 But the appropriate forum for\naddressing that issue was the district court in the first in-\nstance. Calculating restitution in an atypical fraud case such\nas this one is difficult, as the losses caused by a scheme to cir-\ncumvent governmental purchasing preferences are “inher-\nently difficult to quantify.” United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773,\n794 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court was entitled to the bene-\nfit of the parties’ best arguments on how restitution should be\ncalculated. By strategically choosing to forego his challenge to\nthe restitution figure in the district court, Lee waived the is-\nsue: “A defendant cannot squirrel away objections, revealing\nthem only upon successive appeals.” Kuipers, 49 F.3d at 1258.\n III. Conclusion\n Heon Seok Lee repeatedly lied about where his company\nmanufactured its products in order to profit off a federal stim-\nulus package. Such a fraudulent scheme is wire fraud and\nprohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1343. To execute his scheme, Lee di-\nrected his company to mislabel the country of origin for its\n\n15 Although the restitution amount typically tracks the loss amount under\n\nthe Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. McGee, 612 F.3d 627, 635 (7th\nCir. 2010), courts must be careful not to confuse the two given the differ-\nences between the definitions of “loss” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and restitu-\ntion under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B). United States v. Hussein, 664 F.3d\n155, 161 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The amount of restitution does not always\ncorrespond to guidelines loss because the rules for calculating each dif-\nfer.”).\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 39\n\nproducts and attempt to import them with those incorrect\ndesignations. This violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) and the federal\nprohibition against smuggling, 18 U.S.C. § 545, and evidence\nsupported the jury’s verdict on those counts. As to Lee’s sen-\ntence, although the government timely appealed, the district\ncourt did not exceed its authority when it revisited Lee’s sen-\ntencing guidelines range and modified Lee’s prison sentence\naccordingly. Finally, Lee waived any objection to how the dis-\ntrict court calculated restitution. We therefore AFFIRM the\njudgment of the district court in full.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Heon Seok Lee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee/\\n Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nHEON SEOK LEE,\\n Defendant-Appellant/\\n Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:12-cr-00109-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Crowbar in hand, U.S. Customs\\nOfficer Jorge Parra spent December 8, 2010 “cracking open\\ncontainers” at a warehouse near the Los Angeles seaport.\\nParra pried open one from South Korea to inspect its freight.\\nInside he found a fully assembled, five-foot tall industrial fan\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\ncalled a turbo blower. A placard riveted to the side read, “As-\\nsembled in USA.”\\n Presented with a fully assembled machine fresh off the\\nboat from South Korea, which brazenly advertised its assem-\\nbly in the United States, little sleuthing was required to deter-\\nmine something was amiss. Parra’s discovery kicked off a\\nfederal investigation that traced back to the defendant in this\\ncase, Heon Seok Lee. Prosecutors eventually charged Lee with\\nexecuting a scheme to defraud local governments by falsely\\nrepresenting that his company manufactured its turbo blow-\\ners in the United States.\\n A grand jury indicted Lee on five counts of wire fraud and\\nthree counts of smuggling. After a trial, the jury found Lee\\nguilty on all counts. Lee now appeals his convictions and the\\nrestitution ordered, and the government cross-appeals Lee’s\\nprison sentence. We find no fault in the trial or the sentence.\\n I. Background\\n A. The Recovery Act\\n This criminal case has an atypical origin: an economic\\nstimulus package. Congress passed the American Recovery\\nand Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115\\n(2009)—which we will simply call the “Recovery Act”—to\\njumpstart the flagging domestic economy during the Great\\nRecession. See Kameron Hillstrom, The American Recovery and\\nReinvestment Act: A Fitting Future for Recovery Legislation, 44\\nPUB. CONTRACT L. J. 285, 288 (2015). The Recovery Act ear-\\nmarked billions to fund public infrastructure projects. Id. at\\n289 (noting the Recovery Act made $261.2 billion available for\\nsuch projects).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 3\\n\\n Relevant to this case, Congress allocated $6.4 billion to the\\nEPA for water-infrastructure improvements. The EPA did not\\nspend the money directly; instead it awarded grants to “re-\\nvolving funds” administered by the States. After receiving\\nEPA grants, the revolving funds then issued low-interest\\nloans to local municipalities or agencies sponsoring specific\\nprojects. Those local governments were then responsible for\\nhiring contractors to perform the work.\\n To achieve Congress’s objective of bolstering the Ameri-\\ncan economy, the Recovery Act included the following do-\\nmestic purchasing requirement, commonly known as the\\n“Buy American” provision:\\n None of the funds appropriated or otherwise\\n made available by this Act may be used for a\\n project for the construction, alteration, mainte-\\n nance, or repair of a public building or public\\n work unless all of the iron, steel, and manufac-\\n tured goods used in the project are produced in\\n the United States.\\nRecovery Act § 1605(a), 123 Stat. 303.1\\n At first glance, this requirement seems straightforward.\\nBut federal agencies struggled to pin down what it means for\\na product to have been “produced in the United States.” Dif-\\nferent agencies used different tests. See Thomas D. Blanford,\\nNavigating the Recovery Act’s Buy American Rule in State and\\nLocal Government Construction, 46 PROCUREMENT LAWYER 3, 4\\n(Fall 2010) (listing five tests used by different agencies). The\\n\\n1 The Recovery Act’s Buy American provision should not be confused\\nwith the separate, much older, Buy American Act of 1933,\\n41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nEPA adopted the “substantial transformation” standard to\\nadminister the Recovery Act, and it developed a three-part\\ntest to assess whether a manufacturer substantially trans-\\nformed a product within the United States.\\n As a condition to receiving Recovery Act funding, local\\ngovernments and their contractors were required to abide by\\nthe Buy American provision. Federal agencies like the EPA\\naudited projects to ensure compliance. Local governments re-\\nquired their suppliers to complete “Buy American certifica-\\ntions” representing that their products complied with the stat-\\nute.\\n B. KTurbo’s Initial Plan\\n Heon Seok Lee founded KTurbo Inc. in his homeland of\\nSouth Korea. KTurbo manufactures centrifugal turbo blow-\\ners—large industrial fans used to provide oxygen for biologi-\\ncal water treatments in wastewater facilities. Turbo blowers\\nare sophisticated and expensive pieces of equipment, requir-\\ning on-site programming, testing, and calibration.\\n Lee saw the Recovery Act as a growth opportunity for\\nKTurbo, whose penetration into the United States market was\\nlimited at the time. The Recovery Act earmarked billions for\\nproducts like KTurbo’s turbo blowers. But KTurbo would be\\nunable to tap into those funds unless it demonstrated compli-\\nance with the Buy American provision. So, Lee and his sister,\\nTrinity Lee,2 developed a Recovery Act plan. They researched\\nregulatory guidance from the EPA and monitored larger com-\\npetitors’ responses. KTurbo leadership discussed Buy\\n\\n2We refer to the defendant, Heon Seok Lee, as “Lee” and Trinity Lee by\\nher full name. Trinity Lee served as KTurbo’s general manager for North\\nAmerica.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 5\\n\\nAmerican compliance for months, with several in-depth\\nmeetings that lasted hours.\\n KTurbo enlisted independent sales representatives around\\nthe country to market its turbo blowers to local governments\\npursuing Recovery Act projects. KTurbo also consulted with\\nseveral sales representatives in the early stages of its Buy\\nAmerican planning. One sales representative, Dick Koch, dis-\\ncouraged KTurbo from pursuing a plan to make turbo blow-\\ners in South Korea, ship them to the United States, take them\\napart, and then reassemble stateside. Koch warned Lee and\\nKTurbo in an email that such evasive practices could be\\ndeemed criminal:\\n The [EPA] webcast specifically excludes Heon\\n Seok’s idea of sending the equipment to the US\\n and taking it apart and putting it back together.\\n In fact the webcast says that if you say that is\\n [Buy American] you are committing criminal\\n fraud.\\nTrinity Lee reassured Koch that KTurbo would use compo-\\nnents from both South Korea and the United States and as-\\nsemble the turbo blowers in greater Chicago. Other sales rep-\\nresentatives who inquired about KTurbo’s Buy American\\ncompliance plan were told the same thing, including by Lee\\nhimself.\\n At that point, KTurbo formed an Illinois subsidiary,\\nKTurbo USA Inc.,3 leased a warehouse in Batavia, Illinois, and\\nhired three American technicians. KTurbo’s sales\\n\\n3 The legal distinction between KTurbo Inc. and KTurbo USA Inc. does\\nnot matter for purposes of this opinion, so we refer to the two companies\\ncollectively as “KTurbo.”\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nrepresentatives landed several contracts for Recovery Act\\nprojects. In its bids, KTurbo highlighted its domestic presence\\nand promised Buy American compliance. For example,\\nKTurbo submitted a bid to South Burlington, Vermont in the\\nsummer of 2009, which included the following Buy American\\ncertification:\\n By this letter, KTurbo USA certifies that it will\\n manufacture and deliver KTurbo brand blower\\n packages and equipment in compliance with\\n the final requirements of the 2009 U.S. economic\\n stimulus law, The American Recovery and Re-\\n investment Act of 2009.\\nKTurbo sent nearly identical compliance letters for projects in\\nCalifornia, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Oregon.\\n These representations—a South Korean company certify-\\ning its product was “produced in the United States”—did not\\ngo unnoticed. A competitor that lost a bid to KTurbo filed a\\ncomplaint with the EPA in the fall of 2009. In response, EPA\\nofficials visited KTurbo’s Batavia facility on October 30, 2009.\\nDuring that visit, Lee gave a PowerPoint presentation\\ndetailing KTurbo’s plans to comply with the Buy American\\nprovision. He represented that KTurbo would assemble its\\nturbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Slides in Lee’s presenta-\\ntion indicated fifty percent of the total input costs would be\\nattributable to American components, assembly, and testing.\\nTrinity Lee sent the EPA a letter confirming these details a few\\nweeks later.\\n KTurbo manufactured its first turbo blower at the Batavia\\nfacility in January 2010. It built nine more there over the next\\nthree months, at a rate of one to two weeks per blower.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 7\\n\\n C. The Revised Plan\\n It did not take long for Lee to abandon that original plan\\nto produce turbo blowers in Batavia. By April 2010, Lee con-\\ncluded production costs in the United States were prohibi-\\ntively expensive, and he decided to go back to importing\\nturbo blowers from South Korea. Employees pushed back\\nwith concerns about KTurbo’s Recovery Act compliance, but\\nLee forged ahead. At trial, one of KTurbo’s technicians ex-\\nplained how the component parts from South Korea began\\narriving more and more fully assembled, until completely as-\\nsembled blowers started showing up. No new components\\nwere added to the turbo blowers once they reached Batavia.\\nTechnicians simply plugged them in and ran performance ef-\\nficiency tests.\\n Lee’s revised plan depended on its secrecy. He instructed\\nKTurbo employees not to disclose to customers the fact that\\ntheir turbo blowers were made in South Korea. To evade de-\\ntection, KTurbo (with Lee’s knowledge) went out of its way to\\navoid shipping the machines from South Korea directly to\\ncustomers. When municipalities questioned KTurbo about\\nRecovery Act compliance, KTurbo simply lied. Take KTurbo’s\\nMay 20, 2010 response to Lowell, Massachusetts: “The blower\\nwill be assembled and tested at KTurbo’s Chicago location.”\\nLee himself participated, emailing a sales representative sim-\\nilar misrepresentations in September 2010: “We assemble and\\ntest in Chicago. Only motor and VFD comes from Korea. It is\\nalmost Made In USA.”\\n But this scheme unraveled quickly. Jorge Parra’s shipyard\\ndiscovery in December 2010 was the beginning of the end.\\nWhen U.S. Customs detained KTurbo’s products at the bor-\\nder, the company fell behind on its deliveries. This required\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nmore lies to hide that the turbo blowers were coming from\\noverseas and needed to clear U.S. Customs. When a Lowell,\\nMassachusetts general contractor contacted KTurbo about the\\ndelays, Joel Schomo (a KTurbo engineer) told him the Batavia\\nfacility was waiting for parts to begin final assembly, even\\nthough KTurbo had discontinued all assembly operations in\\nBatavia months earlier. At trial, Schomo testified he told this\\nlie because the Recovery Act funded Lowell’s project and he\\ndid not want to raise any “red flags” that KTurbo “might not\\nbe complying with the Recovery Act requirements.”\\n Within two months, federal investigators executed a\\nsearch warrant at the Batavia facility. Lee was present. During\\nthe search, Lee admitted he was aware that the turbo blowers\\nwere for Recovery Act projects, that KTurbo shipped them\\nfully assembled from South Korea, and that it was “wrong”\\nto do so.\\n D. Lee’s Prosecution\\n About a year later, a grand jury returned an indictment\\nagainst Lee. It alleged he falsely represented that KTurbo’s\\nturbo blowers complied with the Buy American provision\\nwhen Lee knew KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities re-\\nceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” The indictment also\\ncharged Lee “knew that turbo blowers were substantially as-\\nsembled before their arrival in the United States and did not\\nrequire meaningful assembly or manufacturing in the United\\nStates.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 9\\n\\n By this point, Lee had fled the country. It took three years\\nto extradite him from South Korea. When the government fi-\\nnally brought Lee back to appear, he responded to the indict-\\nment with a series of motions to dismiss, each of which the\\ndistrict court denied.\\n During an eight-day trial, the government presented doz-\\nens of witnesses: U.S. Customs officers, federal agents,\\nKTurbo employees, sales representatives, general contractors,\\nand employees of municipal customers. Lee elected to take\\nthe stand, and he adamantly denied any knowledge that\\nKTurbo imported fully assembled blowers into the United\\nStates. On cross-examination, the government battered Lee’s\\ncredibility, impeaching him with documentary evidence and\\nother witnesses’ testimony. The jury ultimately convicted Lee\\non all counts.\\n E. Post-Trial Proceedings\\n Lee filed a series of post-trial motions seeking to vacate the\\njury’s verdict; the district court denied each. The district court\\nheld three sentencing hearings over several months, which\\ncentered on the parties’ dispute about how to calculate Lee’s\\nguideline range. For wire fraud convictions, the Sentencing\\nGuidelines instruct district courts to begin with a base offense\\nlevel of seven and then to add levels based on the amount of\\nthe “loss” caused by the defendant. U.S. SENTENCING\\nGUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a)–(b) (U.S. SENTENCING\\nCOMM’N Nov. 2018). In this case, the parties disputed whether\\nLee should receive credit in the loss calculation for the market\\nvalue of KTurbo blowers sold to customers.\\n The district court initially ruled that the loss equaled the\\ntotal amount KTurbo received from defrauded municipalities\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n(about $180,000), putting Lee’s guideline range at 46–57\\nmonths. But the court gave Lee a below-guidelines prison sen-\\ntence of 20 months, plus restitution. Two weeks later, Lee filed\\na notice of appeal and a motion asking the district court to\\ncorrect its judgment under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). The district\\ncourt held a hearing on Lee’s Rule 35(a) motion, where it\\nagreed with Lee’s argument on the guideline calculation and\\nresentenced Lee to 12 months. After the district court entered\\nits final judgment on March 14, 2018, Lee filed a second notice\\nof appeal on March 28, 2018. Thirty days later, the govern-\\nment cross-appealed Lee’s sentence.\\n II. Discussion\\n A. Wire Fraud Convictions\\n We begin with Lee’s wire fraud convictions. He asks us to\\nvacate them because the government’s trial evidence con-\\nstructively amended the indictment and failed to prove all the\\nelements of the crime.\\n 1. Did the government’s case at trial impermissibly\\n deviate from the indictment?\\n “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-\\nwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment\\nof a Grand Jury … .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Founders\\nadopted this grand jury requirement from English tradition,\\nin which lay grand jurors considered whether a crime should\\nbe charged while also protecting the accused from prosecuto-\\nrial overreach. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); see\\nalso Andrew D. Leipold, Grand Jury Requirement, in THE\\nHERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 431 (David F. Forte &\\nMatthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014). The Supreme Court has\\nexplained “that a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 11\\n\\non charges that are not made in the indictment against him.”\\nStirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960).\\n Two related doctrines arise out of this Fifth Amendment\\nrequirement: constructive amendment and variance. Both\\nexplain differences between the government’s case in the in-\\ndictment and the government’s case at trial. Constructive\\namendment occurs where the trial evidence supports (or the\\ncourt’s jury instructions charge) an offense not alleged in the\\nindictment. United States v. Burge, 711 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir.\\n2013). Variance refers to situations where the government’s\\ntrial evidence “proves facts materially different from those al-\\nleged in the indictment.” United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113,\\n1125 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The distinction\\nbetween the two doctrines is subtle, but significant. Where a\\ndifferent crime has been proved (constructive amendment), it\\nis error per se and the verdict must be vacated. United States\\nv. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 820 (7th Cir. 2007).4 But where\\nthe same crime is proved, only through evidence different\\nthan the factual allegations in the indictment (variance), the\\ndefendant must demonstrate prejudice to his substantial\\nrights. Id.\\n Lee contends the government constructively amended the\\nindictment by presenting evidence of misrepresentations be-\\nyond KTurbo’s Buy American certifications. He claims the in-\\ndictment confined itself to the falsity of the certifications,\\nwhile the government’s trial evidence focused on other lies,\\n\\n4 This assumes the defendant properly preserved the error in the district\\ncourt. If the issue was waived or forfeited, we review only for plain error.\\nUnited States v. Remsza, 77 F.3d 1039, 1043–44 (7th Cir. 1996) (assessing de-\\nfendant’s constructive amendment argument under a plain error standard\\ndue to defendant’s failure to raise it in the district court).\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nsuch as false statements in sales presentations, misrepresen-\\ntations to sales representatives, and misleading emails to\\ngeneral contractors.\\n Even if we accept as true Lee’s interpretation of the indict-\\nment and his characterization of the trial evidence, it would\\nnot rise to the level of a constructive amendment. The govern-\\nment did not attempt to prove a crime different from the one\\nalleged. See United States v. Khilchenko, 324 F.3d 917, 920 (7th\\nCir. 2003) (“To effect a constructive amendment, the evidence\\nat trial must establish offenses different from or in addition to\\nthose charged by the grand jury.”). Prosecutors did not argue\\nLee committed mail fraud when the indictment charged wire\\nfraud. The government’s case at trial did not attempt to prove\\na fraud in the air compressor market after alleging a scheme\\nin the turbo blower market. Constructive amendments arise\\n“where there is a ‘complex of facts distinctly different from\\nthose set forth in the charging instrument and not where there\\nis a single set of facts.’” United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306,\\n314 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d\\n584, 586 (9th Cir. 1984)). Here, the government consistently\\nmaintained that Lee committed wire fraud by selling turbo\\nblowers made in South Korea as if they were made in the\\nUnited States.\\n Lee’s argument is more aptly characterized as one of vari-\\nance, although he does not frame it that way. Even if the crime\\ncharged remains consistent, it is a problem if the government\\nmaterially alters the factual underpinnings of that charge. See\\nUnited States v. Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 1983)\\n(defendant may establish reversible error where the variance\\naltered an essential or material element of the charge). But\\nvariance claims are subject to harmless error review—we will\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 13\\n\\nnot disturb a conviction on account of “a technical deficiency\\nof no prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Russell v. United\\nStates, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962)). No prejudice exists in this\\ncase.\\n First, despite Lee’s characterization, the indictment did\\ntailor its fraud allegations to KTurbo’s failure to manufacture\\nits turbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Paragraph 3 of the in-\\ndictment alleged KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities\\nreceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” It also expressly al-\\nleged that Lee knew the turbo blowers were already assem-\\nbled before arriving in the United States. The government\\nproved those allegations at trial with evidence that Lee knew\\nKTurbo made its turbo blowers in South Korea and lied about\\nthat fact. Such evidence matches the indictment’s fraud alle-\\ngations.\\n Second, even if these misrepresentations were not ex-\\npressly covered by the indictment’s text, they were “part and\\nparcel” of the same scheme described by the indictment. Nye\\n& Nissen, Corp. v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 617 (1949) (no\\nvariance where indictment alleged a single scheme to defraud\\nexecuted in various ways). Additional evidence regarding\\ntechnical details about how a defendant executed an alleged\\nscheme does not constitute an impermissible variance. Ajayi,\\n808 F.3d at 1125 (presentation of “more detailed” facts at trial\\nnot an impermissible variance). Lee cannot demonstrate his\\nFifth Amendment rights were violated because the govern-\\nment’s trial evidence concerned “the same elaborate scheme\\nto defraud … as was described in the indictment.”\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRatliff-White, 493 F.3d at 821 (quoting United States v. Dupre,\\n462 F.3d 131, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2006)).\\n Two concerns underlie the constructive amendment and\\nvariance doctrines: ensuring criminal defendants have ade-\\nquate notice of the charges against them and avoiding the risk\\nof double jeopardy. Neither is present here. The indictment\\nnotified Lee of the allegations against him: that he committed\\nwire fraud by importing turbo blowers from South Korea\\nwhile representing they were made in Batavia. See United\\nStates v. Corrigan, 912 F.3d 422, 428 (7th Cir. 2019) (indictment\\nprovided valid notice despite listing wrong name of victim);\\nUnited States v. Kuna, 760 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1985) (alleged\\nvariance in mail fraud prosecution was harmless because the\\ndefendant “was able to identify with great certainty the acts\\nfor which he was placed in jeopardy”).\\n The indictment also included specific details about the\\nscheme alleged, alleviating any double jeopardy concerns. See\\nUnited States v. Moore, 563 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (hold-\\ning specificity in the indictment would “avoid any later dou-\\nble jeopardy concerns”). It described the Recovery Act’s Buy\\nAmerican provision, how KTurbo leased a warehouse in\\nBatavia, KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts, the fact KTurbo\\nfailed “to perform substantial transformation of the turbo\\nblowers at the KTURBO facility in Batavia,” Lee’s knowledge\\n“that turbo blowers were substantially assembled before their\\narrival in the United States and did not require meaningful\\nassembly or manufacturing in the United States,” and Lee’s\\nmisrepresentations and concealment of KTurbo’s true opera-\\ntions. Such detail in the indictment protected Lee from expo-\\nsure to double jeopardy. See United States v. Scheuneman, 712\\nF.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2013) (indictment sufficient where it\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 15\\n\\n“presented enough detail to allow [the defendant] to plead\\ndouble jeopardy to avoid future prosecution based on the\\nsame conduct alleged”).\\n Because the indictment afforded Lee ample notice of the\\ncase the government presented at trial and included specific\\ndetails of the crimes alleged to avoid double jeopardy risk, no\\nimpermissible constructive amendment or variance occurred\\nin this case.5\\n 2. Did the government present enough evidence to\\n convict Lee of wire fraud?\\n Lee appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for ac-\\nquittal under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. We review such decisions de\\nnovo, asking if the evidence—viewed in the light most favor-\\nable to the prosecution—could support a rational finding of\\nall the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt. United States v. Mohamed, 759 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir.\\n2014). Put differently, we reverse only if the trial record “is\\ndevoid of evidence from which a jury could conclude guilt\\nbeyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d\\n605, 613 (7th Cir. 2006). Given this deference to the jury ver-\\ndict, Lee’s hurdle on appeal is high, as “we rarely reverse a\\nconviction for mail or wire fraud due to insufficient evi-\\ndence.” United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 354 (7th Cir.\\n2016).\\n\\n\\n5Lee’s concerns are also mitigated because the district court gave the jury\\na copy of the indictment and instructed jurors to convict only if the gov-\\nernment had proved the crimes it alleged. See United States v. Cusimano,\\n148 F.3d 824, 830–31 (7th Cir. 1998) (district court’s provision of the indict-\\nment to the jury and proper instruction on it “establish[ed] that there was\\nno constructive amendment to the indictment”).\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n To convict a defendant of wire fraud, the government\\nmust prove three elements: (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) the\\ndefendant’s intent to defraud, and (3) the defendant’s use of\\ninterstate wires in furtherance of the scheme. United States v.\\nJackson, 860 F.3d 438, 446 (7th Cir. 2017). Lee challenges the\\ngovernment’s proof on the first element, the scheme to de-\\nfraud. The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, reaches “any\\nscheme to deprive another of money or property by means of\\nfalse or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”\\nCarpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987).\\n On appeal, Lee argues that KTurbo’s Buy American certi-\\nfications were not false. He claims KTurbo’s turbo blowers\\ncomplied with the Buy American provision because they were\\nmade in South Korea. That claim is not as self-contradictory\\nas it first sounds, given the text of Recovery Act § 1605(d),\\nwhich requires the statute to be “applied in a manner con-\\nsistent with United States obligations under international\\nagreements.” Both the United States and South Korea have\\njoined the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Gov-\\nernment Procurement (WTO-GPA), which requires all signa-\\ntories to provide all other signatories’ exports “treatment no\\nless favourable than the treatment the Party, including its pro-\\ncuring entities, accords to: (a) domestic goods, services and\\nsuppliers; and (b) goods, services and suppliers of any other\\nParty.” WTO-GPA art. 4 § 1, Apr. 6, 2014, 3008 U.N.T.S. Reg.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 17\\n\\nNo. A-31874.6 In other words, the WTO-GPA is a multi-lateral\\n“most favored nation” clause for government purchasing. Lee\\ninterprets Recovery Act § 1605(d) to mean the WTO-GPA’s\\nmost favored nation clause supersedes the Buy American\\nprovision, such that South Korean products must be given the\\nsame treatment as American products for purposes of the\\nRecovery Act.7\\n Critically however, when the Recovery Act was enacted\\nthe EPA publicly rejected the interpretation Lee now offers.\\nAn April 2009 EPA memorandum explained that the agency\\ninterpreted Recovery Act § 1605(d) to apply to direct pur-\\nchases by the federal government and the specific state and\\nlocal agencies expressly listed in the WTO-GPA’s appendices,\\nbut not “to procurement initiated by local entities ([state re-\\nvolving fund] assistance recipients), unless they are listed in\\nthe appendix.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Memorandum on\\n\\n6 By its terms, the WTO-GPA covers purchases made by the EPA above\\ncertain dollar thresholds. WTO-GPA, Coverage Schedules, United States\\nann. 1. Coverage of purchases made by States themselves, state agencies,\\nand local municipalities is more complicated, varying from State to State\\nand from agency to agency within a State. WTO-GPA, Coverage Sched-\\nules, United States ann. 2–3; see also Hong-Sik Chung, Government Procure-\\nment in the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement: Great Opportunities for\\nBoth Sides?, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 303 (2014). But the WTO-GPA\\nprovides that where a covered entity “requires persons not covered under\\na Party’s annexes to Appendix I to procure in accordance with particular\\nrequirements, Article IV shall apply mutatis mutandis to such require-\\nments.” WTO-GPA art. 2 § 5.\\n7 Federal purchasing regulations provide that where an international\\nagreement applies, the “restrictions of section 1605 of the Recovery Act do\\nnot apply to designated country iron, steel, and/or other manufactured\\ngoods.” 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(b)(ii). South Korea is listed as a “designated\\ncountry” based on its membership in the WTO-GPA. 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(a).\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nImplementation of Buy American provisions of P.L. 111-5\\n(Apr. 28, 2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2\\n014-12/documents/buy_am.pdf (last visited August 13, 2019).\\nIn the nature of a “smoking gun,” federal agents found a copy\\nof this EPA memorandum in KTurbo’s Batavia facility, with\\nthe relevant paragraph flagged by handwritten markings.\\nReasonable jurors could thus conclude Lee was aware that the\\nEPA did not consider South Korean products Buy American\\ncompliant.\\n As a result, even if one accepts Lee’s interpretation of Re-\\ncovery Act § 1605(d), the EPA’s express rejection of it makes\\nKTurbo’s South Korean manufacturing a “material” fact for\\nwire fraud purposes. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16\\n(1999) (holding a statement is “material” if it has “a natural\\ntendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the deci-\\nsion of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed”)\\n(quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)).\\nKTurbo could not legitimately certify its Buy American com-\\npliance, at least not without disclosing to customers that the\\nturbo blowers were made in South Korea. Federal fraud stat-\\nutes reach such misleading omissions of material information.\\nUnited States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n A reasonable purchaser in this scenario—one who re-\\nceived funds from the EPA pursuant to the Recovery Act and\\nwas bound to comply with the Buy American provision—\\nwould deem it highly relevant whether a supplier based its\\nBuy American certification on an interpretation of the statute\\nexpressly rejected by the EPA. A series of trial witnesses con-\\nsistently testified that Recovery Act compliance was “abso-\\nlutely vital,” given it was a legal requirement of the project\\nfunding. Without Buy American compliance, municipalities\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 19\\n\\njeopardized losing all Recovery Act funding from the EPA. As\\none customer testified, his municipality considered KTurbo’s\\nrepresentations that the turbo blowers were “Assembled in\\nUSA” to be “extremely important” because “it bolstered\\n[their] belief that [the turbo blower] was substantially\\ntransformed in the United States.” Municipal employees also\\ntestified they would not have purchased KTurbo’s blowers\\nwithout KTurbo’s Recovery Act assurances.\\n Where the fraud alleged deals with a half truth or material\\nomission, we generally require proof of an act of concealment\\non the part of the defendant. See Stephens, 421 F.3d at 507. The\\nrecord in this case unmistakably reflects such concealment.\\nTrial evidence showed KTurbo’s repeated misrepresentations\\nto its customers about where KTurbo made its turbo blowers.\\nFor example, KTurbo sent the City of Pendleton, Oregon a\\nBuy American certification in April 2010—shortly after Lee\\ndecided to stop all domestic manufacturing operations—rep-\\nresenting that KTurbo had “established an assembly facility\\nin Batavia, Illinois, where partial manufacturing and assem-\\nbly of all units sold in North America will be complete[d].”\\nNo one at KTurbo ever corrected that misrepresentation. At\\nthe beginning of 2011, KTurbo sent the City of Ottawa, Illinois\\na similar Buy American certification, signed by Trinity Lee,\\nwhich stated: “All assembly of the completed unit will be ex-\\necuted domestically. The assembly process includes wiring\\nand panel assembly, riveted frame assembly, total assembly\\nincluding all internal connections and power wiring, tubing\\nand final calibration will be perofrmaned [sic] at KTurbo USA\\nin Batavia, IL.” None of that certification was truthful, but it\\nwas emblematic of KTurbo’s fraudulent scheme. United States\\nv. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 2017) (jurors are per-\\nmitted to infer fraudulent methodologies from evidence of\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nsimilar fraudulent transactions). KTurbo repeatedly assured\\nmunicipalities and their general contractors of its Recovery\\nAct compliance. Several customers testified at trial about their\\nbelief that KTurbo made its turbo blowers in the United\\nStates.\\n KTurbo also misled its own sales representatives into\\nthinking KTurbo manufactured turbo blowers in Batavia, not\\nSouth Korea. These sales representatives testified they told\\ncustomers—based on KTurbo’s representations to them—that\\nKTurbo complied with the Buy American provision because\\nit manufactured and assembled its blowers in Batavia. Lee\\nmasterminded these material misrepresentations, even if he\\nused sales representatives to pass them on to the ultimate cus-\\ntomers. See United States v. Seidling, 737 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (“Nothing in the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. § 1341\\nrequires a scheme to defraud to involve deception of the same\\nperson or entity whose money or property is the intended ob-\\nject of the scheme.”). He is responsible for misrepresentations\\nhe commanded or willfully caused others to make as\\nKTurbo’s chief executive. 18 U.S.C. § 2; see also United States v.\\nGunning, 984 F.2d 1476, 1483 (7th Cir. 1993) (“One who coun-\\nsels or commands another to commit a crime, and knowingly\\nand actively contributes toward its success, is guilty of that\\ncrime under 18 U.S.C. § 2.”).\\n But Lee himself also actively participated in the cover up.\\nDuring his trial cross-examination, Lee acknowledged he\\nknew that KTurbo’s customers and the EPA cared about Buy\\nAmerican compliance. But he admitted he told customers that\\nKTurbo blowers were manufactured and assembled in the\\nUnited States. When a sales representative asked Lee about\\nBuy American compliance in a September 2010 email, Lee\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 21\\n\\nresponded: “We assemble and test in Chicago. Only motor\\nand VFD comes from Korea. It is almost Made In USA.” Lee\\nmade that statement months after KTurbo stopped assembly\\nin the United States. Even as the scheme began to unravel in\\nearly 2011, Lee persisted in his lies. On January 28, 2011, a\\nsales representative directly asked Lee about a rumor that fed-\\neral agents were investigating KTurbo. Lee responded by en-\\nsuring him that KTurbo faced no Recovery Act issues: “Most\\nimportant parts is [sic] final assembly and testing. We are do-\\ning those, so we are compliant.” Then, on February 8, 2011,\\nwhen representatives of Pendleton, Oregon, asked KTurbo\\nwhere its turbo blowers would be assembled, Lee wrote: “In\\nChicago the blowers will be finalized and tested and\\nshipped.”\\n Lee also challenges the government’s proof of his intent to\\ndefraud. A defendant acts with an intent to defraud where he\\nacts “willfully and with specific intent to deceive or cheat,\\nusually for the purpose of getting financial gain for himself or\\ncausing financial loss to another.” United States v. Pust, 798\\nF.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Paneras,\\n222 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2000)). Lee claims the government\\nfailed to prove he intended to defraud anyone because the\\ntrial evidence showed KTurbo took concrete steps toward\\nmanufacturing turbo blowers in the United States.\\n Lee’s intent argument ignores that his misrepresentations\\ncontinued well beyond April 2010, when he decided to stop\\nKTurbo’s American manufacturing operations. That Lee kept\\ntelling people KTurbo assembled its turbo blowers in Batavia\\nmonths after KTurbo ceased doing so is strong circumstantial\\nevidence of Lee’s intent to defraud. Pust, 798 F.3d at 600–01\\n(specific intent to defraud may be established by\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\ncircumstantial evidence and examination of the scheme it-\\nself). Agents’ discovery of copies of the EPA’s guidance mem-\\noranda on the Buy American provision, as well as testimony\\nfrom other KTurbo employees about the extent of KTurbo’s\\nRecovery Act meetings and planning, support the conclusion\\nthat Lee willfully attempted to circumvent the law.\\n A jury also could reasonably conclude that Lee never in-\\ntended to make turbo blowers in Batavia long term, but rather\\nset up the facility as part of his scheme to mislead the EPA,\\nsales representatives, and customers. Cf. United States v. Freed,\\n921 F.3d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding a promise made\\nwithout a present intention to keep it can be fraudulent). After\\nall, Lee did not wait even a full three months before putting\\nthe kibosh on the entire operation. Viewing the evidence in\\nthe light most favorable to the prosecution, there is more than\\nenough to conclude Lee intended to deceive and defraud\\nKTurbo’s customers.\\n The trial evidence presented over the course of eight days\\nadequately supports Lee’s participation in a scheme to de-\\nfraud and his intent to do so. Lee does not challenge his use\\nof interstate wires as a part of that scheme. With all three ele-\\nments of wire fraud adequately established in the trial record,\\nwe affirm the jury’s verdict.\\n B. Smuggling Convictions\\n We turn now from Lee’s wire fraud convictions to his three\\nsmuggling convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 545. The statute pro-\\nvides, in part:\\n Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or\\n brings into the United States, any merchandise\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 23\\n\\n contrary to law … Shall be fined under this title\\n or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.\\n Over a century ago, when dealing with the predecessor to\\n§ 545, the Supreme Court held the words “contrary to law”\\nrefer to legal provisions outside the statute itself. Keck v.\\nUnited States, 172 U.S. 434, 437 (1899). A violation of § 545 re-\\nquires a violation of another law—the predicate offense if you\\nwill—done with a fraudulent or knowing mindset. In this\\ncase, the government claimed Lee violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a):\\n [E]very article of foreign origin … imported into\\n the United States shall be marked in a conspic-\\n uous place as legibly, indelibly, and perma-\\n nently as the nature of the article (or container)\\n will permit in such manner as to indicate to an\\n ultimate purchaser in the United States the Eng-\\n lish name of the country of origin of the article.\\n Lee asserts that a violation of § 1304(a) cannot serve as a\\npredicate offense for a § 545 conviction. According to Lee, the\\nwords “imports … merchandise contrary to law” in § 545\\nmean that the merchandise itself is per se illegal to import, not\\nmerely that the merchandise was imported in a condition\\nnoncompliant with some federal law or regulation some-\\nwhere.\\n In making this argument, Lee stresses the title of § 545:\\n“Smuggling goods into the United States.” He contends the\\nword “smuggling” refers exclusively to bringing on shore\\ngoods whose importation is categorically prohibited. Lee ef-\\nfectively says he could not have “smuggled” the turbo blow-\\ners into the United States because turbo blowers are allowed\\nin the United States.\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n Even accepting Lee’s narrow interpretation of the word\\n“smuggling,”8 the text of the statute is not so cabined when\\nexamined in its entirety. Section 545 contains two separate\\nprohibitions; we must consider both when assessing the stat-\\nute’s meaning. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805)\\n(Marshall, C.J.) (“It is undoubtedly a well established\\nprinciple in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be\\nconsidered, and the intent of the legislature to be extracted\\nfrom the whole.”). Section 545’s first paragraph, which is not\\nat issue, criminalizes “knowingly and willfully …\\nsmuggl[ing], or clandestinely introduc[ing] … into the United\\nStates any merchandise which should have been in-\\nvoiced … .” That language criminalizes smuggling goods into\\nthe United States, and the statute’s title summarizes that pro-\\nhibition. But § 545’s second paragraph—the one that is at is-\\nsue—is broader. It criminalizes “fraudulently or knowingly\\nimport[ing] … any merchandise contrary to law … .” The text\\nof the second paragraph of § 545 makes no mention of the\\nword “smuggling.”\\n A statute’s title or heading is a permissible indicator of the\\nmeaning of its text. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083\\n(2015); see also ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER,\\n\\n8 We have some doubt that the term is quite so limited. Cf. Smuggling,\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The crime of importing or ex-\\nporting illegal articles or articles on which duties have not been paid.”);\\nSmuggling, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“The criminal of-\\nfense of knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States,\\nclandestinely introducing into the United States any merchandise which\\nshould have been declared for customs duty.”); Smuggle, AMERICAN\\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2019) (“To\\nbring into a country (a prohibited item) secretively and intentionally in\\nviolation of the law.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 25\\n\\nREADING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 221 (2012).\\nBut a title cannot override the statutory text itself. Bhd. of R.R.\\nTrainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29\\n(1947). Although § 545—true to its title—outlaws smuggling\\ngoods into the United States, the statute also criminalizes the\\nfraudulent or knowing importation of “merchandise contrary\\nto law.” Lee’s construction of that language as equating with\\n“smuggling” renders the two provisions of § 545 duplicative,\\na heavily disfavored result. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.\\n759, 778 (1988) (discussing the “cardinal rule of statutory in-\\nterpretation that no provision should be construed to be en-\\ntirely redundant”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 175.\\nThe better reading of the second paragraph of § 545 is that it\\nmakes it a crime to fraudulently or knowingly import mer-\\nchandise in any manner contrary to law. Section 545’s title\\ncannot save Lee from its text.\\n Lee next argues the case law is on his side. He claims the\\ncases only address scenarios where the defendant imported\\ngoods that are illegal per se—barred entirely from importa-\\ntion into the United States. That might be true, but it would\\nnot change the meaning of § 545. The scope of a statute cannot\\nbe altered based on the fact patterns of cases that happen to\\nbe charged and end up in the Federal Reporter. In any event,\\nLee’s assertions about the state of the case law are inaccurate.\\nHis cited authorities, Babb v. United States, 218 F.2d 538 (5th\\nCir. 1955) and Steiner v. United States, 229 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.\\n1956), dealt with indictments that failed to identify an under-\\nlying violation to serve as the predicate for § 545 liability. The\\nindictments simply lacked any predicate offense undergird-\\ning the § 545 charge. We do not have that here: the govern-\\nment’s indictment specifically accused Lee of violating\\n§ 1304(a).\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n And despite Lee’s attempts, we do not see how this case is\\ndistinguishable from United States v. Kuipers, 49 F.3d 1254 (7th\\nCir. 1995).9 In Kuipers, we affirmed the defendant’s § 545 con-\\nviction for attempting to import the horns of a protected spe-\\ncies under false paperwork. Id. at 1256. It was legal to import\\nthe horns into the United States with the proper paperwork,\\nbut the defendant used forged documentation to circumvent\\nthe law. Here, Lee essentially did the same thing. Nothing\\nprohibited Lee from importing turbo blowers into the United\\nStates, but he needed to do so with a proper country-of-origin\\ndesignation under § 1304(a). Lee circumvented that require-\\nment in a fraudulent fashion, similar to the defendant in\\nKuipers.\\n Lee also claims he could not have violated § 545 because\\nU.S. Customs detained the turbo blowers at the border, such\\nthat the machines were never imported into the country. But\\nLee fails to provide any reason to exclude domestic U.S. Cus-\\ntoms facilities from the definition of the “United States,” as\\nused in § 545. If anything, the text supports the opposite con-\\nclusion, specifically excluding other areas but not U.S.\\nCustoms offices. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (“The term ‘United States’, as\\nused in this section, shall not include the Virgin Island, Amer-\\nican Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef,\\nJohnston Island, or Guam.”); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1304(j) (refer-\\nring to merchandise held by U.S. Customs for inspection as\\nan “imported article”).\\n\\n\\n9 Lee’s claim that Kuipers dealt with only the first paragraph of § 545, and\\nnot the second, is not correct. 49 F.3d at 1256 (“Kuipers was indicted on\\nMarch 1, 1994 for … (2) fraudulently and knowingly importing the Desert\\nBighorn Sheep into the United States contrary to law\\n(18 U.S.C. § 545) … .”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 27\\n\\n Lee notes that federal law allows mismarked goods, after\\ntheir markings are corrected, to be imported. 19 U.S.C.\\n§ 1304(j); see also 19 C.F.R. § 134.51. He emphasizes that § 1304\\ndoes not itself purport to criminalize mismarking a product’s\\ncountry of origin, despite providing criminal sanctions for\\nother violations. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(l) (penalizing anyone who\\n“defaces, destroys, removes, alters, covers, obscures, or oblit-\\nerates” a country-of-origin mark with intent to conceal that\\ninformation). Yet one federal statute does not preempt\\nanother. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2004).\\nSection 1304(l)’s silence cannot override the text of § 545. The\\nfact § 1304(l) does not separately criminalize conduct already\\noutlawed under § 545 is not a basis for limiting the scope of\\n§ 545. Cf. United States v. Hassanzadeh, 271 F.3d 574, 576–79\\n(4th Cir. 2001) (affirming § 545 conviction based on underly-\\ning § 1304 labeling violation).10\\n Finally, Lee claims treating § 1304 violations as predicate\\noffenses for § 545 liability will criminalize a vast array of in-\\nnocent behavior in international commerce. This policy argu-\\nment fails to account for § 545’s high scienter bar—fraudulent\\nor knowing misbehavior. Such a scienter requirement ensures\\n\\n\\n10 Lee’s invocation of United States ex rel. Huangyan Import v. Nature’s Farm\\n\\nProds., 370 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Cal. 2005), is not well received, particu-\\nlarly his selective and misleading quotation. Although the opinion states\\nfederal regulations “permit the importation of mismarked goods,” Lee\\nleaves out the important qualifying language about the monetary penal-\\nties imposed in such circumstances. Id. at 1001. And, as the underlying\\nstatute makes clear, goods originally mismarked upon arrival may be\\nwithheld until their country-of-origin markings are corrected. 19 U.S.C.\\n§ 1304(i)–(j). Nothing in the Huangyan Import opinion suggests that at-\\ntempting to import merchandise with false country-of-origin designations\\nis anything but “contrary to law.”\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nthe statute does not criminalize innocent commercial mis-\\ntakes. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2019)\\n(“The cases in which we have emphasized scienter’s\\nimportance in separating wrongful from innocent acts are le-\\ngion.”). And this case involves no mere administrative over-\\nsight. KTurbo’s mislabeling served an important function in\\nLee’s broader scheme to deceive KTurbo customers about the\\norigin of the turbo blowers.\\n For all these reasons, we affirm Lee’s three smuggling con-\\nvictions.\\n Having affirmed all Lee’s convictions, we now proceed to\\nthe sentencing issues presented by the parties. We first ad-\\ndress the government’s cross-appeal regarding Lee’s prison\\nsentence, before resolving Lee’s challenge to the restitution\\nordered by the district court.\\n C. The Government’s Cross-Appeal\\n The government asks us to reinstate the 20-month\\nsentence the district court originally imposed. It claims the\\ndistrict court lacked authority under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) to\\nreduce Lee’s sentence to 12 months. But before we reach the\\nmerits of the government’s cross-appeal, we must resolve two\\njurisdictional questions.\\n 1. Is there statutory jurisdiction for the government’s\\n cross-appeal?\\n The government may appeal an adverse decision in a\\ncriminal case only if expressly authorized by statute. United\\nStates v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977). Here,\\nthe government cites 18 U.S.C. § 3731. But that provision does\\nnot apply—the government is not appealing a dismissal of its\\nindictment, a new trial order, or any of the other issues listed\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 29\\n\\nin § 3731. See United States v. Spilotro, 884 F.2d 1003, 1005–06\\n(7th Cir. 1989) (holding § 3731 does not provide jurisdiction\\nfor appeals challenging “a district court order reducing a sen-\\ntence”); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., 15B FED. PRAC.\\n& PROC. § 3919.8 (2d ed. April 2019 supp.) (“Ordinarily the\\ngovernment cannot rely upon either § 1291 or § 3731 to sup-\\nport appeal from a criminal sentence … .”).\\n The relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), which author-\\nizes the government to appeal a defendant’s sentence on spe-\\ncific grounds. A district court’s modification of a sentence\\nwithout authority to do so, as the government argues here, is\\none such ground. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(1) (providing the gov-\\nernment the ability to appeal sentences “imposed in violation\\nof law”). The government’s errant citation is not insignificant,\\ngiven that timeliness is an issue for its cross-appeal (as dis-\\ncussed below). Section 3731 contains a 30-day deadline for fil-\\ning a notice of appeal that § 3742(b) lacks. See CHARLES ALAN\\nWRIGHT, ET AL., 16A FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3950.8 (4th ed. April\\n2019 supp.); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186,\\n1195–99 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing the interplay between\\n§ 3731 and FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)). Nevertheless, where the rec-\\nord provides enough information to establish appellate juris-\\ndiction, we may exercise such jurisdiction despite the parties’\\nfailure to direct us to its proper statutory source. See NewPage\\nWis. Sys. Inc. v. United Steel Workers Int’l Union, 651 F.3d 775,\\n778 (7th Cir. 2011) (if the jurisdictional statute cited by a party\\nis inaccurate, the “court still must inquire whether another\\nstatute supplies jurisdiction”); see also In re Sealed Case, 449\\nF.3d 118, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding the appellant’s failure\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nto cite § 3742, “while bothersome to a court, is not necessarily\\nfatal”).\\n One issue remains: Section 3742(b) requires the govern-\\nment to obtain “the personal approval of the Attorney\\nGeneral, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general\\ndesignated by the Solicitor General” in order to appeal. Be-\\ncause the government did not rely on § 3742(b) in its briefing,\\nit has not provided proof of its compliance with that statutory\\nrequirement. But our circuit precedent does not treat\\n§ 3742(b)’s approval requirement as jurisdictional. United\\nStates v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170, 172 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994).11\\nNothing in the record suggests the government lacks author-\\nization to pursue its cross-appeal, and Lee never raised the\\nissue.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n11 See also United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 2008)\\n(personal approval requirement in § 3742(b) is non-jurisdictional), abro-\\ngated on different grounds by United States v. DiFalco, 837 F.3d 1207, 1216\\n(11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ruiz-Alonso, 397 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir.\\n2005) (same); United States v. Zamudio, 314 F.3d 517, 520 (10th Cir. 2002)\\n(same); United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1102 (2d Cir. 1992) (same);\\nbut see United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000) (per\\ncuriam) (dismissing the government’s sentencing appeal for failure to es-\\ntablish the requisite approval); United States v. Smith, 910 F.2d 326, 328 (6th\\nCir. 1990) (holding the approval is not jurisdictional but requiring proof\\nthat it has been obtained as part of the court’s “exercise of its supervisory\\nauthority”); cf. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 246 (2008) (explain-\\ning that an appellate court may not increase a defendant’s sentence absent\\na cross-appeal because “Congress … entrusted to named high-ranking of-\\nficials within the Department of Justice responsibility for determining\\nwhether the Government, on behalf of the public, should seek a sentence\\nhigher than the one imposed”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 31\\n\\n 2. Did the government file its notice of appeal in time?\\n The next jurisdictional question concerns the timeliness of\\nthe government’s notice of appeal. In a criminal case like this,\\nFED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B) provides the government’s deadline:\\n When the government is entitled to appeal, its\\n notice of appeal must be filed in the district\\n court within 30 days of the later of:\\n (i) the entry of the judgment or order be-\\n ing appealed; or\\n (ii) the filing of a notice of appeal by any\\n defendant.\\nThe government must file its own notice of appeal to pursue\\na sentencing increase following a conviction; it cannot piggy-\\nback on the defendant’s notice. Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 252–53.\\n Here, the relevant timeline looks like this:\\n February 28, 2018: The district court orally sen-\\n tenced Lee to 20 months in prison.\\n March 11, 2018: Lee filed his first notice of appeal\\n and a Rule 35(a) motion to correct his sentence.\\n March 14, 2018: The district court modified Lee’s\\n sentence to 12 months in prison and entered its\\n written judgment.\\n March 28, 2018: Lee filed his second notice of ap-\\n peal.\\n April 27, 2018: The government cross-appealed.\\n The government does not rely on the date of judgment un-\\nder Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(i). It cannot, as it filed its notice of appeal\\n45 days after the district court’s judgment. But what about\\n\\f32 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii)? The government’s notice of appeal came\\n30 days after Lee’s second notice of appeal, but 48 days after\\nLee’s first notice. Which of Lee’s notices triggered the govern-\\nment’s deadline clock?\\n As with any matter of statutory interpretation, the text\\ncontrols. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt,\\n139 S. Ct. 1507, 1512–13 (2019); see also SCALIA & GARNER,\\nsupra, at 56 (“The words of a governing text are of paramount\\nconcern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the\\ntext means.”). Notably, Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii) refers to “a notice of\\nappeal by any defendant” rather than “the first notice of ap-\\npeal by any defendant.” That is important because the analo-\\ngous rule for civil cases triggers a party’s deadline to initiate\\na cross-appeal on “the date when the first notice [of appeal]\\nwas filed … .” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) (emphasis added). The\\ndrafters could have used the same language for the criminal\\nrule, but they chose different words. We must respect that de-\\ncision and give such variations effect. Murphy v. Smith, 138 S.\\nCt. 784, 787–88 (2018); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 170\\n(“[A] material variation in terms suggests a variation in mean-\\ning.”).\\n Lee offers no persuasive reason to interpret “a notice of\\nappeal by any defendant” to mean “the first notice of appeal\\nby any defendant.” The text of the rule already contemplates\\nthere may be multiple notices of appeal, and it allows the gov-\\nernment to file its cross-appeal within thirty days of the “later\\nof” such notices. The only authority Lee offers, Cyrak v. Lemon,\\n919 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1990), is a civil case addressing Rule 4(a),\\nwhich expressly refers to the “first notice.” Rather than\\nsimply analogize criminal cases to civil cases, as Lee asks us\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 33\\n\\nto do, we give effect to the different text of the different pro-\\nvisions and apply the rules as written.\\n Rule 4(b) permits the government to file its notice of ap-\\npeal within thirty days of “a notice of appeal by any defend-\\nant.” Lee timely filed “a notice of appeal” on March 28, 2018.\\nAnd the government filed its notice exactly thirty days later,\\non April 27, 2018, so the government’s appeal is timely under\\nthe plain meaning of FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B)(ii).\\n 3. In reducing Lee’s sentence, did the district court ex-\\n ceed its authority?\\n Now we arrive at the substance of the government’s cross-\\nappeal. The government claims district courts lack authority\\nto revisit advisory guideline calculations on a motion brought\\nunder FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). It does not challenge the merits\\nof the district court’s ruling, only the court’s authority to\\nmake it. Rule 35(a) states: “Within 14 days after sentencing,\\nthe court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmet-\\nical, technical, or other clear error.”\\n In sentencing Lee, the district court struggled with how to\\ncalculate the “loss” caused by Lee’s crimes for purposes of\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Where the loss cannot be determined, the\\nGuidelines permit courts to look at the defendant’s gain as an\\nalternative. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n. 3(B). The district court\\noriginally found Lee’s gain to be the $180,392 in Recovery Act\\nfunds paid to KTurbo by municipalities. That put Lee’s guide-\\nline range at 46–57 months, although the district court de-\\nparted down from that range and sentenced Lee to 20 months.\\n The district court abandoned that math on Lee’s Rule 35(a)\\nmotion. Based on United States v. Giovenco, 773 F.3d 866, 871\\n(7th Cir. 2014), the court determined it needed to assess net\\n\\f34 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nprofit, rather than KTurbo’s gross revenue, and that it lacked\\nthe evidentiary record to do so. It therefore decided not to ap-\\nply any sentencing enhancement based on Lee’s gain under\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Using a guideline range of 12–18 months, the\\ncourt sentenced Lee to 12 months plus one day.\\n The government emphasizes that a district court’s author-\\nity on a Rule 35(a) motion is “narrow.” As we have said, the\\n“Rule does not give the district court a second chance to exer-\\ncise its ‘discretion with regard to the application of the sen-\\ntencing guidelines,’ nor does it allow for changes to a sentence\\nbased on the court’s change of mind.” United States v. Clark,\\n538 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 35\\nadvisory committee’s note to 1991 amendments). Still, Rule\\n35(a) is not the straitjacket the government suggests. It does\\nallow district courts to correct “clear errors” and avoid waste-\\nful appeals by fixing obvious sentencing issues. United States\\nv. Schenian, 847 F.3d 422, 424 (7th Cir. 2017). This extends to\\nclear errors that produce mistakenly high sentences. Id. If the\\njudge identifies an aspect of the sentence that is objectively\\nerroneous—whether on a factual matter or a point of law—\\nthe judge may use Rule 35(a) to address the problem.\\n Here, the district court realized that its gain calculation\\nneeded to assess net profit, not gross revenue, see Giovenco,\\n773 F.3d at 871, and that it lacked an evidentiary basis to do\\nso. It also determined nothing in the record showed how\\nmuch Lee personally gained from KTurbo’s sales. The govern-\\nment bore the burden to establish a “loss” or “gain” under\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. United States v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438, 454 (7th\\nCir. 2012). Sentencing Lee without a supporting evidentiary\\nrecord would have constituted clear error. Id. at 456–57. Rule\\n35(a)’s entire purpose is to correct errors otherwise destined\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 35\\n\\nto be reversed. Schenian, 847 F.3d at 424; Clark, 538 F.3d at 809.\\nThe district court was thus well within its authority to modify\\nLee’s sentence on his Rule 35(a) motion.\\n D. Restitution\\n Finally, we return to Lee’s appeal, specifically his chal-\\nlenge to the restitution ordered by the district court.\\n Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, courts must\\norder restitution to any victim of “an offense against property\\nunder this title, … including any offense committed by fraud\\nor deceit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). The statute sets the\\nrestitution amount at the value of the victim’s lost property\\non the date of loss or the date of sentencing (whichever is\\ngreater) minus the value of any returned property. 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3663A(b)(1)(B); see also United States v. Malone, 747 F.3d 481,\\n485 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n On appeal, Lee objects to paying any restitution, denying\\nthat any municipality sustained a loss. He acknowledges that\\ntwo municipalities, Mishawaka, Indiana and Redmond,\\nOregon, paid KTurbo a total of $180,392 for turbo blowers\\nmanufactured in South Korea. But Lee points out that the EPA\\nsubsequently authorized Mishawaka and Redmond to con-\\ntinue using the KTurbo blowers without returning the Recov-\\nery Act funds. So Lee argues neither municipality sustained\\nany loss: each paid for turbo blowers to use on its project, and\\neach received turbo blowers that it is using on its project.\\n But Lee waived this argument in the district court. The\\nprobation office recommended the court order $180,392 in\\nrestitution based on the sums paid by Mishawaka and\\n\\f36 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRedmond.12 The government agreed with probation’s recom-\\nmendation. Despite the fact the district court held three\\nsentencing hearings, Lee failed to raise the issue of restitution,\\neven once. Lee failed to object in his written sentencing mem-\\norandum, and he failed to raise the issue in his Rule 35(a) mo-\\ntion. Indeed, Lee’s entire argument regarding restitution in\\nthe district court comprised two sentences in a supplemental\\nbrief requested by the court on a different topic, with no cita-\\ntions to any statutory authority or case law supporting his po-\\nsition.13 That is insufficient to preserve an objection.\\n The closer question is whether Lee affirmatively waived\\nthe restitution arguments he now pursues on appeal, or\\nwhether he only forfeited them. Waiver requires the inten-\\ntional relinquishment of a known right, while forfeiture is a\\nmere accidental or neglectful failure to assert a right. United\\nStates v. Hathaway, 882 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2018). The dis-\\ntinction is important, as waiver precludes appellate review al-\\ntogether, while forfeited rights may be vindicated on appeal\\nthrough plain-error review. Id. In making this determination,\\n\\n12 Neither of these municipal contracts served as a basis for any of the five\\n\\ncounts of wire fraud in the indictment. Ordinarily restitution is limited to\\nthe losses caused by the specific conduct underlying the defendant’s con-\\nvictions. United States v. Locke, 759 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2014). But where\\nthe offense “involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of\\ncriminal activity,” such as the scheme to defraud necessary for a wire\\nfraud conviction, the applicable statute permits courts to award restitution\\nto “any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the\\ncourse of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2).\\n13 In the district court Lee argued: “Since the loss amount is zero, the res-\\ntitution amount is also zero. And the government’s motion to use Heon\\nSeok Lee’s bond deposit to pay restitution (Dkt # 239) should therefore be\\ndenied.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 37\\n\\nwe look to whether the defendant “chose, as a matter of strat-\\negy, not to present the argument.” Id. (quoting United States v.\\nGarcia, 580 F.3d 528, 541 (7th Cir. 2009)).\\n After reviewing the extensive sentencing transcripts in\\nthis case, we conclude Lee and his counsel made a strategic\\ndecision to not press objections to restitution in the district\\ncourt, and thus waived the issue. The main event during the\\nsentencing was the loss calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Yet\\nrestitution did come up. At the first hearing, Lee’s counsel in-\\nterjected, “I would also just note since restitution is brought\\nup—been brought up, that the restitution amount I don’t\\nthink needs to be above 180.” Rather than argue the district\\ncourt should not order restitution because there was no loss,\\nas he does now, Lee asked the district court to not go above\\nthe $180,392 figure recommended by the probation office.14\\nAlthough Lee did include a two-sentence objection to restitu-\\ntion in his supplemental memorandum before the second\\nhearing, he never raised the issue at the second hearing itself,\\ndespite the prosecution addressing the topic. Lee never men-\\ntioned restitution in his Rule 35(a) motion. And, at the third\\nsentencing hearing, when the district court noted its intention\\nto enter the same $180,392 in restitution (despite reducing\\nLee’s prison term on account of the government’s failure to\\nprove the loss amount), Lee’s counsel represented, “I think\\nthat’s correct as to what should—what would be in the judg-\\nment.” These repeated decisions to press other arguments,\\nand not address restitution, evinced a “tactical choice” on\\n\\n14 Lee made this point in the context of a debate about whether the loss\\nfigure under the Sentencing Guidelines should be the $1.6 million face\\nvalue of KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts. Lee’s incentive to push the dis-\\ntrict court toward a figure substantially lower than that was clear.\\n\\f38 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nLee’s part, constituting waiver. United States v. Jin Hua Dong,\\n675 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n We realize there is some logical tension between the dis-\\ntrict court’s restitution award, and its conclusion that it lacked\\na sufficient evidentiary basis to determine victims’ “loss” for\\npurposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.15 But the appropriate forum for\\naddressing that issue was the district court in the first in-\\nstance. Calculating restitution in an atypical fraud case such\\nas this one is difficult, as the losses caused by a scheme to cir-\\ncumvent governmental purchasing preferences are “inher-\\nently difficult to quantify.” United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773,\\n794 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court was entitled to the bene-\\nfit of the parties’ best arguments on how restitution should be\\ncalculated. By strategically choosing to forego his challenge to\\nthe restitution figure in the district court, Lee waived the is-\\nsue: “A defendant cannot squirrel away objections, revealing\\nthem only upon successive appeals.” Kuipers, 49 F.3d at 1258.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Heon Seok Lee repeatedly lied about where his company\\nmanufactured its products in order to profit off a federal stim-\\nulus package. Such a fraudulent scheme is wire fraud and\\nprohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1343. To execute his scheme, Lee di-\\nrected his company to mislabel the country of origin for its\\n\\n15 Although the restitution amount typically tracks the loss amount under\\n\\nthe Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. McGee, 612 F.3d 627, 635 (7th\\nCir. 2010), courts must be careful not to confuse the two given the differ-\\nences between the definitions of “loss” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and restitu-\\ntion under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B). United States v. Hussein, 664 F.3d\\n155, 161 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The amount of restitution does not always\\ncorrespond to guidelines loss because the rules for calculating each dif-\\nfer.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 39\\n\\nproducts and attempt to import them with those incorrect\\ndesignations. This violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) and the federal\\nprohibition against smuggling, 18 U.S.C. § 545, and evidence\\nsupported the jury’s verdict on those counts. As to Lee’s sen-\\ntence, although the government timely appealed, the district\\ncourt did not exceed its authority when it revisited Lee’s sen-\\ntencing guidelines range and modified Lee’s prison sentence\\naccordingly. Finally, Lee waived any objection to how the dis-\\ntrict court calculated restitution. We therefore AFFIRM the\\njudgment of the district court in full.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3896,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654621,"string":"4,654,621"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-3310"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Diane S. Sykes\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\nFEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCREDIT BUREAU CENTER, LLC,\\nand MICHAEL BROWN,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 194 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Michael Brown is the sole owner and\\noperator of Credit Bureau Center, a credit-monitoring ser-\\nvice. (We refer to both collectively as “Brown.”) Brown’s\\nwebsites used what’s known as a “negative option feature”\\nto attract customers. The websites offered a “free credit\\nreport and score” while obscuring a key detail in much\\nsmaller text: that applying for this “free” information auto-\\n\\n2 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nmatically enrolled customers in an unspecified $29.94\\nmonthly “membership” subscription. The subscription was\\nfor Brown’s credit-monitoring service, but customers learned\\nthis information only when he sent them a letter after they\\nwere automatically enrolled. Brown’s most successful con-\\ntractor capitalized on the confusion by posting Craigslist\\nadvertisements for fake rental properties and telling appli-\\ncants to get a “free” credit score from Brown’s websites.\\n The Federal Trade Commission eventually took notice. It\\nsued Brown under section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Com-\\nmission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), alleging that the\\nwebsites and referral system violated several consumer-\\nprotection statutes. The Commission sought a permanent\\ninjunction and restitution. Relevant here, the district judge\\nfound that Brown was a principal for his contractor’s fraudu-\\nlent scheme and that the websites failed to meet certain\\ndisclosure requirements in the Restore Online Shopper\\nConfidence Act (“ROSCA”). Id. § 8403. The judge entered a\\npermanent injunction and ordered Brown to pay more than\\n$5 million in restitution to the Commission.\\n Brown now concedes liability as a principal for his con-\\ntractor’s Craigslist scam. And he doesn’t dispute that his\\nown websites failed to meet some of ROSCA’s disclosure\\nrequirements. So we have no trouble affirming the judge’s\\ndecision to hold him liable for both. We also affirm the\\nissuance of a permanent injunction. Brown’s argument there\\nrests on an erroneous understanding of the Eighth Amend-\\nment’s Excessive Fines Clause.\\n But the restitution award is a different matter. By its\\nterms, section 13(b) authorizes only restraining orders and\\ninjunctions. But the Commission has long viewed it as also\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 3\\n\\nauthorizing awards of restitution. We endorsed that starkly\\natextual interpretation three decades ago in FTC v. Amy\\nTravel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1989). Since\\nAmy Travel, the Supreme Court has clarified that courts must\\nconsider whether an implied equitable remedy is compatible\\nwith a statute’s express remedial scheme. See Meghrig v. KFC\\nW., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 487–88 (1996). And it has specifically\\ninstructed us not to assume that a statute with “elaborate\\nenforcement provisions” implicitly authorizes other reme-\\ndies. Id. at 487.\\n Applying Meghrig’s instructions, we conclude that section\\n13(b)’s grant of authority to order injunctive relief does not\\nimplicitly authorize an award of restitution. Every reason\\nMeghrig gave for not finding an implied monetary remedy\\napplies here. Most notably, the FTCA has two detailed\\nremedial provisions that expressly authorize restitution if the\\nCommission follows certain procedures. Our current read-\\ning of section 13(b) allows the Commission to circumvent\\nthese elaborate enforcement provisions and seek restitution\\ndirectly through an implied remedy.\\n Stare decisis cannot justify adherence to an approach that\\nSupreme Court precedent forecloses. Accordingly, we over-\\nrule Amy Travel and hold that section 13(b) does not author-\\nize restitutionary relief.1 Because the Commission brought\\nthis case under section 13(b), we vacate the restitution\\naward.\\n\\n\\n\\n1 Because this opinion overrules circuit precedent and creates a circuit\\nsplit, we circulated it under Circuit Rule 40(e) to all judges in active\\nservice. A majority did not favor rehearing en banc.\\n\\n4 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n I. Background\\n In January 2014 Brown contracted with Danny Pierce to\\ndirect customers to his credit-monitoring service. Brown\\ngave Pierce several functionally identical websites with\\nnames like “eFreeScore.com” and “FreeCreditNation.com”\\nto use for referrals. As their names suggest, these websites\\ninvited people to sign up for a “free credit report and score.”\\nBut signing up for the free score also automatically enrolled\\napplicants in Brown’s credit-monitoring service, which\\ncharged a monthly subscription fee.\\n Brown didn’t tell prospective customers about the credit-\\nmonitoring service. His websites almost entirely focused on\\nthe free credit score and report. Three disclaimers, buried in\\nmuch smaller font, told consumers that applying for the free\\noffer also enrolled them in an unspecified “membership”\\nsubscription that cost $29.94 each month. Customers later\\nlearned that this subscription was for credit monitoring\\nwhen Brown sent them a letter after the automatic enroll-\\nment.\\n Pierce did nothing to clear up this confusion. Indeed, it’s\\nundisputed that his method for drumming up referrals was\\nfraudulent. He subcontracted with Andrew Lloyd, who\\nposted Craigslist advertisements for nonexistent rental\\nproperties at bargain prices. Lloyd invited prospective\\ntenants to email the landlord. Posing as the “landlord,” he\\nthen responded and instructed them to obtain a credit report\\nand score through one of Brown’s websites. But once appli-\\ncants got this “free” information—and were automatically\\nenrolled in the credit-monitoring service—Lloyd stopped\\nreplying to emails.\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 5\\n\\n The plan was effective. Pierce quickly became Brown’s\\nmost successful recruiter. Over the course of their relation-\\nship, Pierce referred more than 2.7 million customers to\\nBrown, generating just over $6.8 million in revenue. Unsus-\\npecting customers were understandably upset. They flooded\\nBrown’s customer-service operators, questioning the month-\\nly subscription charge. They complained that the Craigslist\\nadvertisements were scams. And many were blindsided by\\nthe fact that requesting a free credit score automatically\\nenrolled them in a costly credit-monitoring service. Brown\\ntold his customer-service team to deny any involvement\\nwith Pierce’s operation. And although Brown typically\\nagreed to cancel future charges, he often refused to issue\\nrefunds. He also instructed his representatives to offer\\nreduced prices to retain customers. Some customers accept-\\ned the offer, but others told their credit-card companies to\\ncancel Brown’s charges. Credit-card companies cancelled\\nmore than 10,000 of Brown’s charges.\\n Consumers complained to the Commission, which\\nopened an investigation. In January 2017 it sued Brown\\nunder section 13(b) of the FTCA seeking an injunction and\\nrestitution. The Commission alleged that the Craigslist\\nadvertisements violated the FTCA’s prohibition on “unfair or\\ndeceptive acts or practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). The suit also\\nalleged that Brown’s websites violated the same provision of\\nthe FTCA, as well as ROSCA, id. § 8403; the Fair Credit\\nReporting Act (“FCRA”), id. § 1681j(g); and the Free Credit\\nReports Rule, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1022.130–.138.\\n On the Commission’s motion, the judge issued a tempo-\\nrary injunction, froze Brown’s assets, and appointed a re-\\nceiver to manage his company. Brown and the Commission\\n\\n6 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nlater filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In addition\\nto contesting liability, Brown argued that section 13(b)\\ndoesn’t authorize an award of restitution and, alternatively,\\nthat it doesn’t authorize penalties or legal restitution (as\\nopposed to equitable restitution, which requires tracing a\\nplaintiff’s entitlement to a particular account or fund).\\n The judge ruled for the Commission across the board,\\nholding that Brown violated the FTCA as a principal for the\\nCraigslist scheme and that the websites violated the FTCA,\\nROSCA, the FCRA, and the Free Credit Reports Rule. The\\njudge issued a permanent injunction that imposed extensive\\nconditions on Brown’s continued involvement in the credit-\\nmonitoring industry and ordered Brown to pay $5,260,671.36\\nin restitution. He also denied Brown’s motion to unfreeze\\nfunds to pay his attorneys.\\n II. Discussion\\n Brown contests his liability, the permanent injunction,\\nand the restitution award. Different standards of review\\napply. For liability, we review the summary judgment de\\nnovo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to\\nBrown and drawing reasonable inferences in his favor.\\nHolloway v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 916 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2019).\\nWe review the judge’s decision to enter a permanent injunc-\\ntion for abuse of discretion. SEC v. Yang, 795 F.3d 674, 681\\n(7th Cir. 2015). Finally, Brown’s challenge to the restitution\\naward raises legal questions, which we review de novo.\\nBreneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 656 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2011).\\nA. Liability Issues\\n The Commission sued under section 13(b) of the FTCA,\\nwhich by its terms authorizes temporary restraining orders\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 7\\n\\nand permanent injunctions to enjoin violations of federal\\ntrade law. § 53(b)(1). To impose individual liability on the\\nbasis of a corporate practice, the Commission must prove\\n(1) that the practice violated the FTCA; (2) that the individu-\\nal “either participated directly in the deceptive acts or\\npractices or had authority to control them”; and (3) that the\\nindividual “knew or should have known about the deceptive\\npractices.” FTC v. World Media Brokers, 415 F.3d 758, 764 (7th\\nCir. 2005).\\n Based on the summary-judgment record, the judge held\\nthat Brown violated the FTCA as a principal for the\\nCraigslist marketing scheme contrived by Pierce and Lloyd.\\nHe also held that Brown’s websites violated the FTCA,\\nROSCA, the FCRA, and the Free Credit Reports Rule. Final-\\nly, the judge concluded that Brown was individually liable\\nfor the violations because he owned and operated all aspects\\nof his company.\\n While Brown concedes liability for the Craigslist scheme,\\nhe challenges his liability for the website violations. He\\nasserts that his websites contained no misrepresentations in\\nviolation of the FTCA and satisfied ROSCA’s disclosure\\nrequirements. He also argues that the Commission must\\nenforce the FCRA and the Free Credit Reports Rule through\\nan internal adjudication. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1) (stating\\nthat FCRA violations “shall be subject to enforcement by the\\nFederal Trade Commission under section 5(b) of the Federal\\nTrade Commission Act”).\\n It’s unnecessary to consider every theory of liability.\\nBrown’s challenges to the injunction and restitution award\\ndo not turn on which statute his websites violated. And\\nsection 13(b) permits the Commission to seek relief against\\n\\n8 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nBrown for violating “any provision of law” it enforces.\\n§ 53(b).\\n So we start and end with ROSCA, which restricts the use\\nof a “negative option feature” to sell goods or services on the\\nInternet. § 8403. A negative-option feature is “a provision [in\\nan offer] under which the customer’s silence or failure to\\ntake an affirmative action to reject goods or services or to\\ncancel the agreement is interpreted by the seller as ac-\\nceptance of the offer.” 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(w); see also § 8403\\n(incorporating this definition by reference). ROSCA prohib-\\nits this feature unless the seller “(1) provides text that clearly\\nand conspicuously discloses all material terms of the trans-\\naction before obtaining the consumer’s billing information;\\n(2) obtains a consumer’s express informed consent before\\ncharging the consumer … ; and (3) provides simple mecha-\\nnisms for a consumer to stop recurring charges.” § 8403.\\nROSCA violations are “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”\\nunder the FTCA, so the Commission can use the FTCA’s\\nenforcement regime against violators. Id. § 8404.\\n There’s no dispute that Brown used a negative-option\\nfeature to enroll customers in his credit-monitoring service.\\nThe only question is whether he complied with ROSCA’s\\ndisclosure requirements. In the apt words of the district\\njudge, Brown’s websites were “virtually devoid of any\\nmention of the [credit-monitoring] service aside from the\\nstatement that the customer is to be billed for it.” Moreover,\\nBrown concealed this incomplete disclosure behind more\\nprominent language offering a free credit score and report.\\nThe judge determined that these partial and obscure disclo-\\nsures did not “clearly and conspicuously disclose[] all\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 9\\n\\nmaterial terms of the transaction” or ensure that customers\\ngave “express informed consent.” § 8403(1)–(2).\\n Brown focuses on the conclusion that the disclosures\\nweren’t conspicuous. He parses font sizes, details his web-\\nsites’ color schemes, and takes a microscope to the Commis-\\nsion’s affidavits in an effort to highlight evidence that\\nconsumers read and understood the disclosures. But he\\ngives only passing attention to the decisive point: His web-\\nsites didn’t provide certain information that ROSCA re-\\nquires—namely, that the subscription was for a credit-\\nmonitoring service.\\n This oversight is fatal to Brown’s defense. Setting aside\\nwhether his disclosures satisfied the “clear and conspicu-\\nous” standard (and on that point we see nothing unsound in\\nthe judge’s ruling that they did not), Brown violated ROSCA\\nif the disclosures failed to provide “all material terms of the\\ntransaction.” § 8403(1). The service Brown provided in\\nexchange for the subscription is clearly a material term. See\\nMaterial Term, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A\\ncontractual provision dealing with a significant issue such as\\nsubject matter … or the work to be done.”). And the websites\\ndid not tell consumers that they were enrolling in a credit-\\nmonitoring service. Brown seeks refuge in the form letter\\nthat he delivered to new subscribers, which did provide this\\ninformation. But ROSCA required Brown to disclose the\\nmaterial terms “before obtaining the consumer’s billing\\ninformation.” § 8403. Brown protests that he sent the letter\\n“almost instantaneously” upon subscription. But almost\\ninstantaneously is still too late under ROSCA.\\n Brown next contends that even if corporate liability is es-\\ntablished, he should not be held personally liable. But it’s\\n\\n10 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nundisputed that he controlled the websites and was aware of\\ntheir content. That’s enough to establish personal liability for\\nthe ROSCA violations.\\nB. The Permanent Injunction\\n The judge held that Brown’s conduct warranted a per-\\nmanent injunction, applying our standard under the Securi-\\nties and Exchange Act. See Yang, 795 F.3d at 681 (asking\\nwhether “there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations\\nin order to obtain [injunctive] relief”) (quotation marks\\nomitted). The ensuing injunction imposes extensive re-\\nquirements on Brown if he ever operates a credit-monitoring\\nbusiness again.\\n We don’t need to decide whether our standard for an in-\\njunction under the Securities and Exchange Act also applies\\nto section 13(b) because Brown’s challenge doesn’t turn on\\nthat question. His attack on the injunction rests largely on\\nthe Excessive Fines Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. He\\ncontends that the injunction is unconstitutionally harsh and\\ndisproportionate. But he skips a necessary step in the analy-\\nsis—whether the injunction is a “fine” at all. It’s not. The\\nSupreme Court has limited “fines” to “cash [or] in-kind\\npayment[s] imposed by and payable to the government.”\\nDep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 n.6\\n(2002) (quotation marks omitted); see also Zamora-Mallari v.\\nMukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 695 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The Board’s\\nremoval order … is not a ‘fine,’ and thus the Excessive Fine\\nClause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply.”). Because\\nan injunction isn’t a fine, the permanent injunction doesn’t\\nimplicate the Excessive Fines Clause.\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 11\\n\\n Brown also offers an assortment of drive-by arguments,\\nall of which are too undeveloped to establish an abuse of\\ndiscretion. See Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Serv., Inc. v. Lake Coun-\\nty, 424 F.3d 659, 664 n.2 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It is the parties’ duty\\nto package, present, and support their arguments … .”). We\\naffirm the permanent injunction.\\nC. The Restitution Award\\n The bulk of Brown’s appeal challenges the restitution or-\\nder. His primary argument is that section 13(b) does not\\nauthorize an award of restitution. This is fundamentally a\\nquestion of statutory interpretation, but it’s obscured by\\nlayers of caselaw, so bear with us while we untangle the\\nknot. A brief overview of the FTCA’s remedial structure is\\nhelpful to a proper understanding of section 13(b), so we\\nbegin there.\\n The FTCA gives the Commission several tools to enforce\\nthe Act’s prohibition on unfair or deceptive trade practices.\\nUnder its “cease and desist” power, the Commission adjudi-\\ncates a case before an administrative law judge, who can\\nissue an order prohibiting the respondent from engaging in\\nthe illegal conduct at issue. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). This order\\nbecomes final if it survives administrative appeal and judi-\\ncial review. Id. § 45(g).\\n A final cease-and-desist order empowers the Commission\\nto sue the violator for legal and equitable relief, but only if “a\\nreasonable man would have known under the circumstances\\n[that the conduct] was dishonest or fraudulent.” Id.\\n§ 57b(a)(2), (b). After it becomes final, the order also draws a\\nline in the sand for both the respondent and anyone else\\nwho engages in the prohibited conduct. If the respondent\\n\\n12 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nlater violates the order, the Commission can sue for civil\\npenalties and any equitable relief “the court finds neces-\\nsary.” Id. § 45(l). If anyone else engages in the prohibited\\nconduct after the order becomes final, the Commission can\\nseek civil penalties if it can prove that the violator acted with\\n“actual knowledge” that his conduct was unlawful. Id.\\n§ 45(m)(1)(B).\\n The Commission has two other enforcement mechanisms\\nat its disposal. First, it can promulgate rules that “define\\nwith specificity acts or practices which are unfair or decep-\\ntive.” Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B). By preemptively resolving whether\\ncertain conduct violates the FTCA, rulemaking permits the\\nCommission to pursue “quick enforcement” actions against\\nviolators. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and\\nthe Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and Indus-\\ntries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 225–26 (2019). Once the\\nCommission promulgates a rule, it can seek legal and equi-\\ntable remedies, including restitution, from violators. See\\n15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(1), (b). And if it establishes that a violator\\nhad “actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the\\nbasis of objective circumstances” that his conduct violated a\\nrule, the Commission can also pursue civil penalties. Id.\\n§ 45(m)(1)(A).\\n The Commission’s remaining enforcement mechanism is\\ndifferent. Under section 13(b) of the FTCA, the Commission\\ncan forego any administrative adjudication or rulemaking\\nand directly pursue a temporary restraining order and a\\npreliminary or permanent injunction in federal court.\\n§ 53(b). As noted, the Commission sued Brown under this\\nprovision.\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 13\\n\\n 1. Section 13(b)\\n The restitution order against Brown rests on section\\n13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision, which states that “in\\nproper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper\\nproof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.” Id.\\nBrown’s straightforward argument is that section 13(b)\\ndoesn’t authorize restitution because it doesn’t mention\\nrestitution.\\n We start with the obvious: Restitution isn’t an injunction.\\n“Injunction” is of course a broad term. See Injunction,\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A court order\\ncommanding or preventing an action.”). But statutory\\nauthorizations for injunctions don’t encompass other dis-\\ncrete forms of equitable relief like restitution. See, e.g.,\\nMeghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“[N]either [a mandatory or prohibi-\\ntory injunction] contemplates … equitable restitution.”)\\n(quotation marks omitted); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers\\nAss’n v. Landstar Sys., Inc., 622 F.3d 1307, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010)\\n(“Injunctive relief constitutes a distinct type of equitable\\nrelief; it is not an umbrella term that encompasses restitution\\nor disgorgement.”); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,\\n564 U.S. 338, 365 (2011) (holding that an equitable order for\\nbackpay isn’t an injunction); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 430\\n(2009) (“Whether [a deportation stay] might technically be\\ncalled an injunction is beside the point; that is not the label\\nby which it is generally known.”).\\n The Commission doesn’t seriously argue otherwise. It in-\\nstead contends that section 13(b) implicitly authorizes restitu-\\ntion. We endorsed that reading in Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 571,\\nwhich Brown asks us to overturn. We’ll discuss Amy Travel\\nin a moment, but we begin with a closer look at the FTCA\\n\\n14 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nitself. If the Commission’s reading is correct, there’s no need\\nto reconsider our precedent.\\n Section 13(b) provides:\\n Whenever the Commission has reason to be-\\n lieve--\\n (1) that any person, partnership, or corpora-\\n tion is violating, or is about to violate, any pro-\\n vision of law enforced by the Federal Trade\\n Commission, and\\n (2) that the enjoining thereof pending the\\n issuance of a complaint by the Commission\\n and until such complaint is dismissed by the\\n Commission or set aside by the court on re-\\n view, or until the order of the Commission\\n made thereon has become final, would be in\\n the interest of the public--\\n the Commission … may bring suit in a district\\n court of the United States to enjoin any such\\n act or practice. Upon a proper showing that,\\n weighing the equities and considering the\\n Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success,\\n such action would be in the public interest, and\\n after notice to the defendant, a temporary re-\\n straining order or a preliminary injunction may\\n be granted without bond: Provided, however,\\n That if a complaint is not filed within such pe-\\n riod (not exceeding 20 days) as may be speci-\\n fied by the court after issuance of the\\n temporary restraining order or preliminary in-\\n junction, the order or injunction shall be dis-\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 15\\n\\n solved by the court and be of no further force\\n and effect: Provided further, That in proper cases\\n the Commission may seek, and after proper\\n proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunc-\\n tion. …\\n An implied restitution remedy doesn’t sit comfortably\\nwith the text of section 13(b). Consider its requirement that\\nthe defendant must be “violating” or “about to violate” the\\nlaw. Requiring ongoing or imminent harm matches the\\nforward-facing nature of injunctions. See 11A CHARLES ALAN\\nWRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942, at\\n47 (3d ed. 2013) (“[I]njunctive relief looks to the future and is\\ndesigned to deter … .”). Conversely, restitution is a remedy\\nfor past actions. See 1 DAN. B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES\\n§ 4.1(1), at 551 (2d ed. 1993) (“Restitution is a return or\\nrestoration of what the defendant has gained in a transac-\\ntion.”). Beyond the conceptual tension, this requirement\\nraises an illogical implication: It would condition the\\nCommission’s ability to secure restitution for past conduct\\non the existence of ongoing or imminent unlawful conduct.\\n Section 13(b)’s second requirement—that the Commis-\\nsion must reasonably believe that enjoining an ongoing or\\nimminent violation would be in the public interest—raises a\\nsimilar problem. The public interest in stopping or prevent-\\ning a violation is distinct from the public interest in remedy-\\ning a past harm. And yet the Commission’s reading ties\\nrestitution to this inapposite inquiry.\\n The rest of section 13(b) is likewise keyed to injunctions,\\nnot other forms of equitable relief. For example, the statute\\nconditions the district court’s authority to issue a temporary\\nrestraining order or preliminary injunction on injunction-\\n\\n16 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nspecific requirements—such as “weighing the equities and\\nconsidering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate suc-\\ncess”—and dissolves the order or injunction within 20 days\\nif the Commission doesn’t issue an administrative complaint.\\n§ 53(b). These demands don’t apply to equitable restitution,\\nwhich has its own preconditions. See Great-West Life &\\nAnnuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212–15 (2002).\\n True, this appeal concerns section 13(b)’s permanent-\\ninjunction provision, not the provision governing temporary\\nrestraining orders and preliminary injunctions, which is tied\\nto the subsequent initiation of an administrative proceeding.\\nAnd we have held that at least some of section 13(b)’s re-\\nquirements don’t apply to permanent injunctions. See United\\nStates v. JS & A Grp., 716 F.2d 451, 456–57 (7th Cir. 1983)\\n(holding that the Commission can seek a permanent injunc-\\ntion without initiating an internal adjudication). But see FTC\\nv. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2019)\\n(requiring the Commission to allege an ongoing or imminent\\nviolation to receive a permanent injunction). But that’s\\nbeside the point. Even if some of section 13(b)’s requirements\\ndo not apply to permanent injunctions, they inform the\\nmeaning of “injunction.” We see no contextual support for\\ngiving vastly different meanings to section 13(b)’s two uses\\nof the word “injunction.” See Hall v. United States, 566 U.S.\\n506, 519 (2012) (“At bottom, identical words and phrases\\nwithin the same statute should normally be given the same\\nmeaning.”) (quotation marks omitted). And in any event, we\\nhaven’t drawn an interpretive distinction in the past. See FTC\\nv. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding\\nthat section 13(b)’s preliminary-injunction provision also\\nauthorizes implied equitable relief).\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 17\\n\\n The FTCA’s two other enforcement provisions amplify\\nthe poor fit between section 13(b) and restitution. Both use\\nmore than the word “injunction” to authorize other forms of\\nequitable relief. As discussed, when a person violates a final\\ncease-and-desist order, the district courts are empowered to\\n“grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further\\nequitable relief as they deem appropriate.” § 45(l) (emphasis\\nadded). And when someone engages in conduct prohibited\\nby a rule, the FTCA authorizes “such relief as the court finds\\nnecessary … , [including] the refund of money or return of\\nproperty.” § 57b(b) (emphasis added).\\n The absence of similar language in section 13(b) is con-\\nspicuous. “[W]here Congress includes particular language in\\none section of a statute but omits it in another section of the\\nsame Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts inten-\\ntionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclu-\\nsion.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 430 (quotation marks omitted). This\\ninstruction applies with particular force here, where Con-\\ngress simultaneously expanded § 45(l) to allow for “other\\nand further equitable relief” and enacted section 13(b)\\nwithout this language. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-\\ntion Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576, 591 (1973).\\nMoreover, Congress expressly approved restitution as a\\nremedy under § 57b(b) two years after enacting section 13(b).\\nSee Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 206,\\n88 Stat. 2183, 2202 (1975). If section 13(b) permitted restitu-\\ntion as a general matter, Congress would have had no reason\\nto enact § 57b, which authorizes restitution under narrower\\ncircumstances.\\n Remedial scope isn’t the only difference between section\\n13(b) and the FTCA’s other enforcement mechanisms. The\\n\\n18 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nlatter procedures also impose a detailed framework that the\\nCommission must follow before obtaining a restitution\\norder. This framework counterbalances the FTCA’s amor-\\nphous “unfair or deceptive practices” standard by requiring\\nthe Commission to give defendants fair notice, either\\nthrough cease-and-desist orders or rules that “define with\\nspecificity” prohibited acts. §§ 45(b); 57a(a)(1). The Commis-\\nsion can bypass these notice requirements only if it obtains a\\ncease-and-desist order against a violator, brings a suit in\\ncourt, and then establishes that the prohibited practice “is\\none which a reasonable man would have known under the\\ncircumstances was dishonest or fraudulent.” § 57b(a)(2).\\nFinally, the FTCA imposes a three-year statute of limitations\\non bringing actions against most violators. § 57b(d).\\n Section 13(b) doesn’t offer any of these protections. And\\nyet the Commission contends that it provides an unqualified\\nright to the very remedies that the FTCA’s other enforcement\\nprovisions give with heavy qualification. Reading an im-\\nplied restitution remedy into section 13(b) makes these other\\nprovisions largely pointless. Without a clear textual signal,\\nwe cannot presume that Congress implicitly made such a\\nconsequential shift in policy. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking\\nAss’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress … does not\\nalter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in\\nvague terms or ancillary provisions … .”).\\n The tensions we’ve just discussed dissipate if we read\\nsection 13(b) to mean what it says: The remedy is limited to\\ninjunctive relief. In fact, giving section 13(b) its plain mean-\\ning harmonizes the three enforcement mechanisms. The\\nFTCA gives the Commission a pair of backward-facing\\nmethods to obtain monetary relief for past injury. Its cease-\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 19\\n\\nand-desist power targets individual violations. See § 45(b).\\nAnd its rule-enforcement authority under § 57b(a)(1) allows\\nit to more efficiently address widespread unfair or deceptive\\npractices. See Parrillo, supra, at 225–26.\\n Section 13(b) serves a different, forward-facing role: en-\\njoining ongoing and imminent future violations. This au-\\nthority aligns with the predicate requirements it imposes—\\nnotably, a reasonable belief that a violation is ongoing or\\nimminent and that stopping the violation is in the public\\ninterest. § 53(b). It also explains the lack of procedural\\nprotections. As Congress reported when enacting section\\n13(b), the Commission’s existing enforcement processes\\ncouldn’t quickly address ongoing or imminent violations. See\\n§ 408(a)(1), 87 Stat. 576, 591 (finding that the Commission\\nhad “been restricted and hampered because of inadequate\\nlegal authority … to seek preliminary injunctive relief to\\navoid unfair competitive practices”) (emphasis added).\\nSection 13(b) corrected this problem, providing an expedited\\npathway to injunctive relief. See id. § 408(b) (noting that the\\n“purpose of [the] act” was to give the Commission “the\\nrequisite authority to insure prompt enforcement of the laws\\n[it] administers by granting statutory authority … to seek\\npreliminary injunctive relief”) (emphasis added).\\n The Commission’s argument to the contrary rests almost\\nentirely on the saving clause in § 57b(e): “Remedies provid-\\ned in this section are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any\\nother remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal\\nlaw. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any\\nauthority of the Commission under any other provision of\\nlaw.” According to the Commission, § 57b(e) explains away\\n\\n20 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nthe tensions that its reading of section 13(b) otherwise\\ncreates.\\n We disagree for two reasons. To start, the Commission’s\\nunderstanding of the saving clause runs against more than a\\ncentury of interpretive practice. The Supreme Court has long\\ninstructed that acts “cannot be held to destroy [themselves]”\\nthrough saving clauses. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton\\nOil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907); accord Adams Express Co. v.\\nCroninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507 (1913); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,\\nInc., 426 U.S. 290, 299 (1976); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office\\nTel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 228 (1998). Put differently, we cannot\\nread a saving clause to “allow specific provisions of the\\nstatute that contains it to be nullified.” PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-\\nWilliams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir. 1998). This principle\\nextends to claims that a particular statutory provision im-\\nplicitly authorizes new remedies. See Middlesex Cty. Sewerage\\nAuth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1981) (“It\\nis doubtful that the phrase ‘any statute’ [in a saving clause]\\nincludes the very statute in which this statement was con-\\ntained.”). As we’ve explained, the Commission’s reading of\\nsection 13(b) effectively nullifies § 57b. We cannot read\\n§ 57b(e) to authorize that self-defeating effect.\\n And even if the Commission’s reading of the saving\\nclause were correct, we couldn’t infer a right to restitution in\\nsection 13(b). The saving clause preserves only those reme-\\ndies that exist. It does not inform the question whether\\nsection 13(b) contains an implied power to award restitution.\\n The Commission also suggests that Congress “ratified”\\nan implied section 13(b) restitution remedy in its 1993 and\\n2006 amendments to the FTCA. We disagree. The 1993\\namendment reworked section 13(b)’s venue and service-of-\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 21\\n\\nprocess provisions but didn’t alter its remedial scope. The\\n2006 amendment fares no better as a prop for the Commis-\\nsion’s argument. It simply empowered the Commission to\\nuse “[a]ll remedies available to [it] with respect to unfair and\\ndeceptive acts or practices … , including restitution,” when\\nprosecuting certain violations in foreign commerce.\\n§ 45(a)(4)(B). The Commission contends that the use of\\n“restitution” in this provision refers to an implied restitution\\nremedy in section 13(b). But the FTCA expressly authorizes\\nrestitution through § 45(l) and § 57b(b). So the 2006 amend-\\nment says nothing about the Commission’s authority to seek\\nthat remedy under section 13(b).\\n In short, nothing in the text or structure of the FTCA\\nsupports an implied right to restitution in section 13(b),\\nwhich by its terms authorizes only injunctions. Unsurpris-\\ningly, the Commission wagers nearly all of its case on stare\\ndecisis rather than the plain meaning of section 13(b). So we\\nturn to that question.\\n 2. The Road to Amy Travel\\n The Commission correctly observes that we addressed a\\nmaterially identical challenge to the scope of section 13(b) in\\nAmy Travel, 875 F.2d 564. Brown in turn invites us to revisit\\nthat decision in light of intervening Supreme Court deci-\\nsions. We of course can do so. “Although we must give\\nconsiderable weight to our prior decisions, we are not bound\\nby them absolutely and may overturn circuit precedent for\\ncompelling reasons.” Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir.\\n2005). An intervening Supreme Court decision that displaces\\nthe rationale of our precedent is one such reason. See Glaser\\nv. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir.\\n2009).\\n\\n22 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n Brown’s invitation implicates a line of Supreme Court\\nprecedents long predating Amy Travel. The prevailing inter-\\npretation of section 13(b) developed in the shadow of two\\ndecisions that took a capacious view of implied remedies:\\nPorter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), and Mitchell\\nv. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960). To under-\\nstand Amy Travel, we must begin with them.\\n Porter considered section 205(a) of the Emergency Price\\nControl Act of 1942, which limited the rent that certain\\nlandlords could collect from their tenants. The act empow-\\nered district courts to issue a “permanent or temporary\\ninjunction, restraining order, or other order” against persons\\nwho collect rents above its limits. Porter, 328 U.S. at 397. The\\nCourt held that section 205(a) authorizes restitution, offering\\nthis reasoning:\\n Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the\\n inherent equitable powers of the District Court\\n are available for the proper and complete exer-\\n cise of [its equitable] jurisdiction. … Unless a\\n statute in so many words, or by a necessary\\n and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s\\n jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that ju-\\n risdiction is to be recognized and applied. The\\n great principles of equity, securing complete\\n justice, should not be yielded to light infer-\\n ences, or doubtful construction.\\nId. at 398 (citations and quotation marks omitted).\\n Porter later clarified that implied remedies must be “con-\\nsistent with the statutory language and policy, the legislative\\nbackground and the public interest.” Id. at 403; see also id. at\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 23\\n\\n400 (“In framing such remedies under § 205(a), courts must\\nact primarily to effectuate the policy of the Emergency Price\\nControl Act and to protect the public interest while giving\\nnecessary respect to the private interests involved.”). In\\nshort, Porter adopted a presumption in favor of implying\\nequitable remedies that accord with statutory purpose. But it\\nalso recognized that an express statement or a “necessary\\nand inescapable inference” to the contrary could rebut this\\npresumption. Id. at 398.\\n Returning to the Price Control Act, the Court held that\\nrestitution was a proper “other order” under section 205(a).\\nId. at 399. It offered two justifications. First, restitution could\\nbe an “equitable adjunct to an injunction.” Id. Second, resti-\\ntution advanced the purpose of the statute. See id. at 400\\n(“[T]he statutory policy of preventing inflation is plainly\\nadvanced if prices or rents which have been collected in the\\npast are reduced to their legal maximums.”). Still, the Court\\nfound that an “inescapable inference” foreclosed one partic-\\nular remedy. The statute’s separate right of action for dam-\\nages “provide[d] an exclusive remedy relative to damages.”\\nId. at 401. But “save [this] one aspect,” the statute invoked\\n“the broad equitable jurisdiction that inheres in courts.” Id.\\nat 403.\\n In Mitchell the Court applied Porter to section 17 of the\\nFair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), which gave district\\ncourts the jurisdiction to “restrain violations” of the statuto-\\nry prohibition on firing employees for reporting workplace\\nviolations. 361 U.S. at 289. After quoting Porter’s broad\\nlanguage about equitable remedies, Mitchell reiterated that\\nimplied remedies must fit with the statutory purpose:\\n“When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement\\n\\n24 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nof prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must\\nbe taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of\\nequity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory\\npurposes.” Id. at 291–92.\\n Applying Porter’s presumption, the Court drew on its\\nunderstanding of the FLSA’s purpose, which was to achieve\\n“minimum labor standards” by using worker complaints as\\na private enforcement mechanism. Id. at 292. The Court\\nreasoned that restitution furthered that purpose. Without it,\\nthe “fear of economic retaliation” would stifle worker com-\\nplaints. Id.\\n Mitchell then assessed whether anything in the FLSA pre-\\ncluded restitution as an implied remedy. The defendants\\npointed to the statute’s ban on awarding unpaid minimum\\nwages and overtime compensation as one such provision,\\nbut the Court disagreed. It found “no indication in the\\nlanguage of the [ban], or in the legislative history, that\\nCongress intended [it] to have a wider effect.” Id. at 294.\\n Porter and Mitchell were typical of their era: The Court\\nwould resolve ambiguities by identifying a statute’s purpose\\nand “deducing the result most consonant with that pur-\\npose.” William N. Eskridge Jr., Politics Without Romance:\\nImplications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,\\n74 VA. L. REV. 275, 282 (1988); see also John F. Manning,\\nForeword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV.\\n1, 16–17 (2014) (“However clearly Congress framed its\\nstatutes, the Court could rework them to fit with the back-\\nground policies that inspired them.”). Using this interpretive\\napproach, the Court assumed that the judiciary could freely\\ncraft remedies to fully enforce whatever rights Congress had\\nrecognized. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 25\\n\\nand the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 45–51 (1983). As\\nthe Court would proclaim four years after Mitchell, “it is the\\nduty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are\\nnecessary to make effective the congressional purpose.”\\nJ. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).\\n * * *\\n Lower-court interpretations of section 13(b) built on\\nPorter and Mitchell. The trail starts with FTC v. H. N. Singer,\\nInc., 668 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1982). There the Ninth Circuit\\nheld that section 13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision\\nimplicitly authorizes preliminary injunctions and asset\\nfreezes.2 Id. at 1113. While its analysis was cursory, Singer\\nchanneled Porter and Mitchell. The court held that prelimi-\\nnary injunctions and asset freezes advanced section 13(b)’s\\npurpose by ensuring that assets were available at the end of\\nthe enforcement process. Singer also rejected the defendant’s\\nclaim that the express equitable remedies in § 57b foreclosed\\nimplied remedies in section 13(b), pointing to the saving\\nclause in § 57b(e).\\n Singer sparked a line of appellate cases holding that sec-\\ntion 13(b) is a broad grant of equitable authority. The Elev-\\n\\n\\n2 Shortly before Singer, the Fifth Circuit held that section 13(b)’s\\npreliminary-injunction provision implicitly authorizes asset freezes. See\\nFTC v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 718 (5th Cir. 1982). But its holding\\nappeared to preclude the possibility of restitution in section 13(b),\\npointing instead to § 57b for monetary remedies. Id. at 719 (“[T]he\\nexhortation in [Mitchell] to preserve the possibility of complete relief …\\nmakes it appropriate to consider that the final, complete relief in this case\\nmay entail consumer redress through a [§ 57b] proceeding.”). Predicta-\\nbly, no circuit has materially relied on Southwest Sunsites to support an\\nimplied restitution award.\\n\\n26 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nenth Circuit followed Singer’s lead two years later. After\\nquoting Porter’s language on implied remedies, the court\\nconcluded that it “agree[d] with Singer’s interpretation of\\n[section] 13(b)” and without further discussion held that\\nsection 13(b) authorizes asset freezes. FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas\\nCorp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).\\n Our decision in FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc.,\\n861 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1988), was next. There, the defendant\\npassingly suggested that section 13(b)’s permanent-\\ninjunction provision does not implicitly authorize prelimi-\\nnary injunctions. (Recall that the statute’s express authoriza-\\ntion for temporary restraining orders and preliminary\\ninjunctions is tied to the eventual initiation of an administra-\\ntive proceeding.) We held that the defendant waived the\\nargument, but we discussed the issue anyway “in order to\\nsatisfactorily explain our disposition of … other issues.” Id.\\nat 1026. Because it was dicta, our reasoning was understand-\\nably brief. We simply quoted language from Singer and\\nnoted that we had “no reason to disagree with the conclu-\\nsion of our colleagues of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits\\nthat the authority to grant permanent injunctive relief also\\nincludes the authority to grant interlocutory relief.” Id. Other\\nthan distinguishing a prior decision, we did not discuss the\\nmatter further.\\n Two months after World Travel, we concluded in Elders\\nGrain that section 13(b)’s preliminary-injunction provision\\nimplicitly authorizes rescission. 868 F.2d at 907. Perhaps\\nbecause the parties didn’t dispute the issue, our analysis was\\nagain cursory. But it was highly consequential. We articulat-\\ned a new standard for inferring equitable remedies: “[T]he\\nstatutory grant of the power to issue a preliminary injunc-\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 27\\n\\ntion carries with it the power to issue whatever ancillary\\nequitable relief is necessary to the effective exercise of the\\ngranted power.” Id. Notably absent was any inquiry into\\nwhether an implied remedy was compatible with the statu-\\ntory text and structure or whether Congress precluded the\\nimplied remedy. We instead would permit whatever implied\\nremedies furthered the exercise of the express remedy.\\n The effect of this reasoning was evident in our justifica-\\ntion for inferring the power to order rescission. We simply\\nrestated the facts of the case, which involved a transaction\\ntimed to avoid the Commission’s review, and observed that\\n“[t]o reward these tactics by holding that a district court has\\nno power under section 13(b) to rescind a consummated\\ntransaction would go far toward rendering the statute a dead\\nletter.” Id.\\n We extended Elders Grain to the permanent-injunction\\nprovision three months later in Amy Travel. The district court\\nhad ordered the defendants to pay more than $6 million in\\nrestitution to the Commission. Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 570.\\nThe defendants argued on appeal that nothing in section\\n13(b) authorized monetary relief. We disagreed, explaining\\nthat our then-recent decisions in World Travel and Elders\\nGrain “thwarted” the defendants’ arguments. Id. at 571. In\\nparticular, we said that the reasoning in Elders Grain applied\\n“with equal force” to the permanent-injunction provision.\\nWe adopted that expansive formulation, holding that section\\n13(b)’s “statutory grant of authority to the district court to\\nissue permanent injunctions includes the power to order any\\nancillary equitable relief necessary to effectuate the exercise\\nof the granted powers.” Id. at 572. But unlike Elders Grain, we\\nnever addressed how an award of restitution was “necessary\\n\\n28 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nto effectuate the exercise” of the power to issue an injunc-\\ntion. We simply noted that restitution was a “proper form[]\\nof ancillary relief.” Id. at 571.\\n Our approach in Amy Travel became the standard. Some\\ncircuits held, on a similarly brief analysis, that section 13(b)\\ncategorically authorizes the court’s “full equitable powers,”\\nincluding restitution. See FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d\\n466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); FTC v. Sec. Rare\\nCoin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314–15 (8th Cir. 1991).\\nOthers simply cited Amy Travel or other decisions to reach\\nthe same conclusion. See FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC,\\n654 F.3d 359, 365 (2d Cir. 2011); FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns,\\nInc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005); FTC v. Pantron I.\\nCorp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994); see also FTC v. Ross,\\n743 F.3d 886, 891 (4th Cir. 2014) (conceding that “arguments\\nabout how the structure, history, and purpose of the [FTCA]\\nweigh against the conclusion that district courts have the\\nauthority to award consumer redress … are not entirely\\nunpersuasive” but allowing restitution because of Porter,\\nMitchell, and uniform circuit practice).\\n To be sure, these decisions have attracted some judicial\\nskepticism. See Shire ViroPharma, 917 F.3d at 156, 161 n.19\\n(declining to decide whether section 13(b) authorizes mone-\\ntary relief but concluding that it wasn’t “meant to duplicate\\n[§ 45(b)], which already prohibits past conduct”); FTC v.\\nAMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 2018)\\n(O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the prevailing\\ninterpretation). But the view that section 13(b) implicitly\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 29\\n\\nauthorizes restitution has largely escaped critical examina-\\ntion.3\\n We have affirmed restitution awards under section 13(b)\\nthree times since Amy Travel. See United States v. Tankersley,\\n96 F. App’x 419, 422 (7th Cir. 2004); FTC v. Think Achievement\\nCorp., 312 F.3d 259, 262 (7th Cir. 2002); FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d\\n530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997). But Brown is the first litigant to\\nquestion our precedent.\\n 3. Modern Implied-Remedies Jurisprudence\\n The Supreme Court’s understanding of implied remedies\\nevolved after Porter and Mitchell. Though the Court contin-\\nued to presume that courts could “use any available remedy\\nto afford full relief” when a party had a general statutory\\ncause of action, over time it began to emphasize that this\\npresumption “yields where necessary to carry out the intent\\nof Congress or to avoid frustrating the purposes of the\\nstatute involved.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,\\n524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998) (quoting Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.\\nComm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (White, J., op.)); see also\\nCalifornia v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981) (“The federal\\n\\n\\n3 Chief Judge Wood’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc relies\\nheavily on FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011), but\\nthere the Second Circuit summarily followed the lead of other circuits in\\nreading section 13(b) to include an implied power to order restitution. Id.\\nat 365. The court quickly moved on to, and thoroughly considered, a\\nwholly different question: whether the implied restitution remedy is\\nequitable or legal. The lengthy passages quoted in the chief judge’s\\ndissent relate to that second-order question. Moreover, Bronson rejected\\nthe view that the plain meaning of “injunction” encompasses restitution.\\nId. at 367 (approving restitution because “section 13(b) does not limit the\\ndistrict court to awarding only injunctions”) (emphasis added).\\n\\n30 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\njudiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter\\nhow salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide.”). In\\nparticular, the Court now recognizes the importance of\\nCongress’s choice to specify forms of relief. See, e.g., Franklin\\nv. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 69 n.6 (1992) (noting\\nthat the presumption in favor of relief doesn’t apply “under\\na statute that expressly enumerated the remedies available to\\nplaintiffs”); see also Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps.,\\n489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989) (“It is … an elemental canon of\\nstatutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-\\nvides a remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to pro-\\nvide additional remedies.”) (quotation marks omitted).\\n A prominent example is ERISA. Because Congress has\\nestablished a comprehensive remedial scheme for plaintiffs\\nto enforce their rights under an employee-benefits plan, the\\nCourt has refused to infer additional extracontractual dam-\\nages remedies. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.\\n134, 146 (1985) (“The presumption that a remedy was delib-\\nerately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress\\nhas enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including\\nan integrated system of procedures for enforcement.”)\\n(quotation marks omitted). And where two environmental-\\nprotection statutes provide private rights of action for in-\\njunctive relief but require plaintiffs to notify defendants 60\\ndays before suing, the Court has refused to infer a damages\\nremedy or allow plaintiffs to obtain an injunction without\\nthe requisite notice. See Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. at\\n15 (“In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congres-\\nsional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress\\nprovided precisely the remedies it considered appropri-\\nate.”).\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 31\\n\\n These decisions collided with Porter and Mitchell in\\nMeghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996). Because\\nBrown’s challenge centers on Meghrig, it warrants close\\nreview. There the Court addressed the Resource Conserva-\\ntion and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”), which permits\\nprivate parties to sue handlers of “solid or hazardous waste\\nwhich may present an imminent and substantial endanger-\\nment to health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B). The statute authorizes district courts “to\\nrestrain” any person who contributes to handling the waste,\\n“to order such person to take such other action as may be\\nnecessary, or both.” § 6972(a). The question in Meghrig was\\nwhether § 6972(a) also allowed plaintiffs to recover waste-\\ncleanup costs as restitution.\\n The Supreme Court refused to find an implied restitu-\\ntionary remedy. “Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme,” the Court explained, plaintiffs could receive “a\\nmandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\n[the] RCRA.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. But neither of these\\nforward-facing remedies “contemplates the award of past\\ncleanup costs, whether these are denominated ‘damages’ or\\n‘equitable restitution.’” Id.\\n The Court reinforced its holding by comparing the RCRA\\nto the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-\\ntion, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C.\\n§§ 9601 et seq., which addresses similar toxic-waste issues.\\nMeghrig, 516 U.S. at 485. Unlike the RCRA, CERCLA express-\\nly authorizes monetary relief. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). “Con-\\n\\n32 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\ngress thus demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to\\nprovide for the recovery of cleanup costs[] and that the\\nlanguage used to define the remedies under [the] RCRA\\ndoes not provide that remedy.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485.\\n The Court also pointed to the statute’s threshold re-\\nquirement that a party can sue only when the waste “may\\npresent an imminent and substantial endangerment to\\nhealth or the environment.” § 6972(a)(1)(B). “The meaning of\\nthis timing restriction [was] plain” to the Court:\\n“[S]ection 6972(a) was designed to provide a remedy that\\nameliorates present or obviates the risk of future ‘imminent’\\nharms, not a remedy that compensates for past cleanup\\nefforts.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485–86.\\n Finally, the Court looked to “[o]ther aspects of [the]\\nRCRA’s enforcement scheme.” Id. at 486. Unlike CERCLA,\\nthe RCRA’s citizen-suit provision lacks a statute of limita-\\ntions or a requirement that any recovered costs must be\\nreasonable. The Court reasoned that “[i]f Congress had\\nintended § 6972(a) to function as a cost-recovery mechanism,\\nthe absence of these provisions would be striking.” Id. The\\nRCRA also halts citizen suits when the EPA or a state pur-\\nsues an enforcement action, and it requires plaintiffs to give\\n90-days’ notice to potential defendants before suing. See id.\\nThese two requirements made § 6972(a) a “wholly irrational\\nmechanism” for remedying past harms. Id.\\n The Court then acknowledged the “line of cases holding\\nthat district courts retain inherent authority to award any\\nequitable remedy that is not expressly taken away from\\nthem by Congress.” Id. at 487 (citing Porter, 328 U.S. 395). But\\nthese cases couldn’t support an implied restitution remedy.\\nAs the Court put it:\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 33\\n\\n [T]he limited remedies described in § 6972(a),\\n along with the stark differences between the\\n language of that section and the cost-recovery\\n provisions of CERCLA, amply demonstrate\\n that Congress did not intend for a private citi-\\n zen to be able to undertake a cleanup and then\\n proceed to recover its costs under [the]\\n RCRA. … [W]here Congress has provided\\n elaborate enforcement provisions for remedy-\\n ing the violation of a federal statute, as Con-\\n gress has done with [the] RCRA and CERCLA,\\n it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to\\n authorize by implication additional judicial\\n remedies for private citizens suing under the\\n statute. It is an elemental canon of statutory\\n construction that where a statute expressly\\n provides a particular remedy or remedies, a\\n court must be chary of reading others into it.\\nId. at 487–88 (quotation marks omitted). Notwithstanding\\nPorter, the Court held that § 6972(a) does not “contemplate\\nthe award of past cleanup costs.” Id. at 488.\\n Since Meghrig, the Court has adhered to this more limited\\nunderstanding of judicially implied remedies. See, e.g., Great-\\nWest, 534 U.S. at 209 (“We have therefore been especially\\nreluctant to tamper with the enforcement scheme embodied\\nin [ERISA] by extending remedies not specifically author-\\nized by its text.”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted);\\nMiller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000) (concluding that the\\nplain meaning of a provision expressed the congressional\\nintent to displace equitable authority); see also Armstrong v.\\nExceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1385 (2015) (hold-\\n\\n34 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\ning that the Medicaid Act’s provision of a specific remedy\\nand the judicially unadministrable nature of the relevant\\nstatutory provision “preclude[d] the availability of equitable\\nrelief” in section 30(A) of the statute); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284\\n(holding that courts cannot enlarge the “scope of available\\nremedies” under an implied right of action “in a manner at\\nodds with the statutory structure and purpose”). Rather than\\npresuming that Congress authorizes the judiciary to sup-\\nplement express statutory remedies, the Court now recog-\\nnizes that “the express provision of one method of enforcing\\na substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to pre-\\nclude others.” Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385.\\n 4. Revisiting Amy Travel\\n As this perhaps drawn-out discussion shows, an explora-\\ntion of statutory purpose is no longer the Supreme Court’s\\npolestar in cases raising interpretive questions about the\\nscope of statutory remedies, and that shift has unsettled\\nPorter’s and Mitchell’s instruction to “provide complete relief\\nin light of the statutory purposes.” Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292;\\nsee also Singer, 668 F.2d at 1113 (grounding its reading of\\nsection 13(b) on this premise). See generally Manning, supra,\\nat 23 (“[W]here ‘the statutory language is clear,’ the Court\\nhas disclaimed the need even ‘to reach arguments based on\\nstatutory purpose[] [or] legislative history.’” (quoting Boyle v.\\nUnited States, 556 U.S. 938, 950 (2009))); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE\\nJR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES\\nAND THE CONSTITUTION 81 (2016) (“We are all textualists.\\nThat means that a judge must relate all sources of and\\narguments about statutory interpretation to a text the legisla-\\nture has enacted.”). Indeed, the Court has “abandoned” its\\nprior understanding that judges must “be alert to provide\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 35\\n\\nsuch remedies as are necessary to make effective the con-\\ngressional purpose expressed by a statute.” Alexander v.\\nSandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (quotation marks omitted);\\naccord Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017). It is now\\nwell settled that Congress, not the judiciary, controls the\\nscope of remedial relief when a statute provides a cause of\\naction. See Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385 (“Courts of equity\\ncan no more disregard statutory and constitutional require-\\nments and provisions than can courts of law.”) (quotation\\nmarks omitted); Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of\\nthe Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 465–66 (2010).\\n Whatever strength Porter and Mitchell retain, Meghrig\\nclarifies that they cannot be used as Amy Travel saw them—a\\nlicense to categorically recognize all ancillary forms of\\nequitable relief without a close analysis of statutory text and\\nstructure. To be sure, the Court still presumes that courts\\nretain their “traditional equitable authority.” Miller, 530 U.S.\\nat 340. But even under Porter and Mitchell, this authority\\ncomes with an important qualifier: “unless otherwise pro-\\nvided by statute.” Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at\\n291. Unsurprisingly, every appellate court to consider the\\nrelationship between Meghrig, Porter, and Mitchell recognizes\\nthat Meghrig reinforced and clarified this qualifier.\\n Some circuits have concluded that a statute displaces eq-\\nuitable authority when it specifies a particular remedy. See\\nOwner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Swift Transp. Co.,\\n632 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that a statutory\\nprovision allowing a person to seek “injunctive relief” acted\\n“to the exclusion of other equitable remedies”); Landstar Sys.,\\n622 F.3d at 1324 (noting that the statute at issue authorized\\nonly injunctions and concluding that if it “allowed for\\n\\n36 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nrestitution or disgorgement, it would have so stated”).\\nOthers more narrowly construe Meghrig as a command that\\n“courts must consider a statute’s remedial scheme” when\\ndetermining whether a statute displaces equitable authority.\\nSee United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 235 (3d\\nCir. 2005); see also United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d\\n1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 2006) (reading Meghrig as showing that\\n“a statute’s particular characteristics” can displace equitable\\nauthority).\\n The D.C. Circuit thoroughly examined the effect of\\nMeghrig in United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d\\n1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Harmonizing Meghrig and Porter, it\\nheld that a statute’s “comprehensive and reticulated scheme,\\nalong with the plain meaning of the words themselves,\\nserves to raise a necessary and inescapable inference, suffi-\\ncient under Porter, that Congress intended to limit relief.” Id.\\nat 1200 (quotation marks and citation omitted).\\n We don’t need to plant ourselves firmly along this doctri-\\nnal spectrum to decide this case. It’s inescapable that Meghrig\\nnot only displaced Amy Travel’s categorical approach to\\njudicially implied remedies but also its interpretation of\\nsection 13(b). Every one of Meghrig’s reasons for refusing to\\nfind restitutionary authority in the RCRA applies with equal\\nforce to section 13(b).\\n Like the RCRA, section 13(b)’s plain text doesn’t contem-\\nplate an award of restitution. See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. It\\nauthorizes only temporary restraining orders and injunc-\\ntions. And like the relationship between the RCRA and\\nCERCLA, the relationship between section 13(b), § 45(l), and\\n§ 57b(b) “is telling.” Id. at 485. Both § 45(l) and § 57b(b)\\nexpressly authorize additional equitable remedies. § 45(l)\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 37\\n\\n(“mandatory injunctions and such other and further equita-\\nble relief as [courts] deem appropriate”); § 57b(b) (“such\\nrelief as the court finds necessary … , [including] the refund\\nof money or return of property”). Section 13(b) lacks compa-\\nrable language.\\n Meghrig also instructs us to interpret remedial language\\nwith reference to “the harm at which it is directed.” 516 U.S.\\nat 485. While the FTCA’s express restitution provisions\\nauthorize the Commission to sue for past conduct, to pro-\\nceed under section 13(b), the Commission must reasonably\\nbelieve that a person “is violating” or “about to violate” the\\nlaw. § 53(b)(1); cf. § 45(b) (empowering the Commission to\\nbring a cease-and-desist action when it reasonably believes\\nsomeone “has been or is” violating the act). As with the\\nRCRA, “[t]he meaning of this timing restriction is plain.”\\nMeghrig, 516 U.S. at 485. Section 13(b) “was designed to\\nprovide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates the\\nrisk of future ‘imminent’ harms, not a remedy that compen-\\nsates” for past violations. Id. at 486.\\n Further, as we’ve explained, section 13(b) is procedurally\\nincompatible with restitution. For example, before invoking\\nsection 13(b), the Commission must reasonably believe that\\nstopping an ongoing or imminent violation is in the public\\ninterest. § 53(b)(2). And the statute dissolves a preliminary\\ninjunction if the Commission doesn’t begin an administrative\\nproceeding before a court-set deadline. § 53(b). But the\\nCommission would have no need for an administrative\\nproceeding if it can get complete restitutionary relief\\nthrough section 13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision. In\\nshort, section 13(b)’s prerequisites, like those in the RCRA,\\n\\n38 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nmake it a “wholly irrational mechanism” for remedying past\\nharms. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486.\\n Relatedly, unlike § 57b(b), section 13(b) has no statute of\\nlimitations. The absence of a limitations period in the RCRA\\nwas “striking” to the Meghrig Court and provided strong\\nevidence that the RCRA’s injunction provision did not\\nimplicitly authorize restitution. Id. The same is true here.\\n Section 13(b) also lacks a central feature of the FTCA pro-\\nvisions that expressly permit monetary relief: a notice re-\\nquirement. When the Commission brings an administrative\\ncease-and-desist action, it can secure restitution only by\\nproving that the violation occurred after its order became\\nfinal or that “a reasonable man” would have known that the\\nconduct was fraudulent. §§ 45(l); 57b(a)(2). And notice is also\\nbaked into the Commission’s power to promulgate and\\nenforce rules. The Commission must follow detailed proce-\\ndures before promulgating a final rule. See id. § 57a(b)(1)\\n(requiring publication of notice and an informal hearing for\\nrulemaking). Moreover, final rules must “define with speci-\\nficity” the prohibited acts. § 57a(a)(1)(B).\\n The Supreme Court has held that similar provisions are\\ncrucial to determining the remedial scope of implied rights\\nof action, a closely related context: “It would be unsound …\\nfor a statute’s express system of enforcement to require notice\\nto the recipient and an opportunity to come into voluntary\\ncompliance while a judicially implied system of enforcement\\npermits substantial liability without regard to the recipient’s\\nknowledge or its corrective actions upon receiving notice.”\\nGebser, 524 U.S. at 289. We face the same unsound result\\nhere: Reading an implied restitution remedy into section\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 39\\n\\n13(b) allows the Commission to circumvent the FTCA’s\\ndetailed notice requirements.\\n Finally, we note that the difference in plaintiffs—private\\ncitizens in Meghrig and a federal agency here—isn’t material.\\nTo be sure, when “the public interest is involved in a pro-\\nceeding,” a court’s “equitable powers assume an even\\nbroader and more flexible character than when only a pri-\\nvate controversy is at stake.” Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; accord\\nKansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1053 (2015). But the public\\ninterest doesn’t turn on the identity of the parties involved.\\n Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S.\\n515, 552 (1937), the authority Porter cited to invoke the\\n“public interest,” is instructive on this point. Even though\\nthe suit was between a railroad company and a union, the\\nCourt determined that “[m]ore [was] involved than the\\nsettlement of a private controversy.” Id. “The peaceable\\nsettlement of labor controversies … is a matter of public\\nconcern.” Id.; see also id. (“The fact that Congress has indicat-\\ned its purpose to make negotiation obligatory is in itself a\\ndeclaration of public interest and policy … .”). Presaging\\nPorter, the Court observed that “[c]ourts of equity may, and\\nfrequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold\\nrelief in furtherance of the public interest than they are\\naccustomed to go when only private interests are involved.”\\nId.; cf. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326\\n& n.8 (1980) (“When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of\\nand for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to\\nvindicate the public interest in preventing employment\\ndiscrimination.” (citing Porter, 328 U.S. at 397–98)).\\n Under Virginian Railway Co., both Meghrig and this case\\nimplicate the public interest. Both involve enforcing federal\\n\\n40 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nstatutory obligations, and both involve matters of “public\\nconcern”—environmental cleanup and consumer protection.\\nEven so, Meghrig did not find an implied right to restitution\\nin the RCRA. So the fact that the government is the plaintiff\\nhere does not affect the analysis. Consider United States v.\\nApex Oil Co., in which we examined Meghrig’s impact on\\n42 U.S.C. § 6973(a), the RCRA’s government-suit provision.\\n579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009). We did not draw a distinction\\nbetween the RCRA’s government and citizen-suit provisions.\\nObserving that the provisions use “identical language,” we\\nconcluded that the RCRA “entitles the government only to\\nrequire the defendant to clean up the contaminated site at\\nthe defendant’s expense.” Id. at 737. We then announced that\\nour “[e]arlier cases, … which allowed an award of clean-up\\ncosts on the basis of general equitable principles set forth in\\nsuch cases as Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., and\\nPorter v. Warner Holding Co., are dead after Meghrig.” Id.\\n(citations omitted).\\n Although section 13(b) doesn’t use identical language as\\nthe RCRA’s citizen-suit provision, Meghrig remains material-\\nly indistinguishable. So we must pay close attention to its\\nbottom line: “[W]here Congress has provided elaborate\\nenforcement provisions for remedying the violation of a\\nfederal statute, … it cannot be assumed that Congress in-\\ntended to authorize by implication additional judicial reme-\\ndies … .” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487–88 (emphasis added)\\n(quotation marks omitted); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290\\n(“Where a statute’s express enforcement scheme hinges its\\nmost severe sanction on notice and unsuccessful efforts to\\nobtain compliance, we cannot attribute to Congress the\\nintention to have implied an enforcement scheme that allows\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 41\\n\\nimposition of greater liability without comparable condi-\\ntions.”) (emphasis added).\\n Our limited analysis in Amy Travel doesn’t offer a way to\\ndistinguish Meghrig. It instead requires us to ignore section\\n13(b)’s text and disregard the FTCA’s “elaborate enforcement\\nprovisions.” In light of the Court’s commands in Meghrig,\\nour holding in Amy Travel is no longer viable. Conversely,\\nreading section 13(b) as authorizing only injunctive relief—\\nthat is, reading it to mean what it plainly says—harmonizes\\nMeghrig with Porter and Mitchell, which also called for a\\nstatute-specific and remedy-specific inquiry before authoriz-\\ning an implied form of relief. See, e.g., Porter, 328 U.S. at 403\\n(holding that a separate cause of action for damages was\\nenough to preclude courts from inferring that remedy\\nelsewhere).\\n We recognize that this conclusion departs from the con-\\nsensus view of our sister circuits. But when deciding wheth-\\ner we should overturn precedent, “[w]e are not merely to\\ncount noses. The parties are entitled to our independent\\njudgment.” United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228, 232 (7th Cir.\\n1995). And we must break from our colleagues. As noted,\\nmost circuits adopted their position by uncritically accepting\\nour holding in Amy Travel, which expanded on Elders Grain,\\nwhich expanded on Singer, which expanded on Porter and\\nMitchell. No circuit has examined whether reading a restitu-\\ntion remedy into section 13(b) comports with the FTCA’s text\\nand structure. Nor has anyone determined whether § 45\\nforecloses this remedy. And although some have briefly\\ndiscussed § 57b, they have done so only to find refuge in the\\nsaving clause in § 57b(e). Perhaps most importantly, no\\n\\n42 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\ncircuit has ever considered the effect of Meghrig in a section\\n13(b) case.\\n We are well aware that we need a compelling reason to\\noverturn circuit precedent. “However, important as stare\\ndecisis is, it is equally important for us to respect the statutes\\nthat Congress has passed and to correct any problems we see\\nin our prior interpretations of those statutes.” Ahng v. All-\\nsteel, 96 F.3d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir. 1996); see also S. Ill. Power\\nCoop. v. EPA, 863 F.3d 666, 673 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that\\nstatutory stare decisis “is not without limits”). Even in the\\nrealm of statutory interpretation, a Supreme Court decision\\n“on an analogous issue that compels us to reconsider our\\nposition” counts as a compelling reason to overturn prece-\\ndent. Glaser, 570 F.3d at 915. We cannot favor our own\\ndecisions over those of the Supreme Court.\\n Stare decisis alone cannot overcome Amy Travel’s clear\\nincompatibilities with the FTCA’s text and structure,\\nMeghrig, and the Supreme Court’s broader refinement of its\\nimplied remedies jurisprudence. We therefore hold that\\nsection 13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision does not\\nauthorize monetary relief.4\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n4 Because we hold that section 13(b) doesn’t authorize monetary relief,\\nwe have no need to consider Brown’s alternative arguments that the\\nCommission can’t pursue penalties or legal—as distinct from equitable—\\nrestitution under section 13(b). See FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC,\\n910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 2018) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (discussing\\nthese arguments). We also don’t need to consider the district court’s\\nasset-freeze determinations.\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 43\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the restitution\\naward. In all other respects, we AFFIRM the judgment.\\n\\n44 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n WOOD, Chief Judge, with whom ROVNER and HAMILTON,\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431874/\", \"author_raw\": \"Diane S. Sykes\"}, {\"author\": \"Circuit Judges, join, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en\\nbanc. For decades, this court has successfully used a local rule,\\nCircuit Rule 40(e), for two important purposes: to highlight a\\ndecision to create a conflict in the circuits, and to clean up ear-\\nlier decisions whose soundness has been undermined by later\\nlegislation, Supreme Court activity, or a consensus among our\\nsister circuits. Yet we have taken care not to use Rule 40(e) in\\na way that defeats our profound commitment to oral argu-\\nment—a commitment that sets us apart from most of the other\\ncircuits, and one that consistently improves the quality of our\\ndecisionmaking. The opportunity to ask questions of counsel,\\nto hear the questions of fellow judges, and to have a full de-\\nbate after argument regularly reveals aspects of a case that\\neven the most thorough reading of the briefs on one judge’s\\npart cannot provide.\\n The majority, however, has chosen to use Rule 40(e) in the\\ncase now before us. It is a singularly inappropriate case for\\nthat treatment: it overrules not only a long-standing decision\\nfrom this court, FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564 (7th\\nCir. 1989), but it also pays no heed to the fact that eight other\\ncircuits agree with the Amy Travel approach. See Brief of the\\nFederal Trade Commission at 28 n. 12. Perhaps if a recent Su-\\npreme Court decision demanded that sea change, the major-\\nity’s opinion would be defensible. But there is no such deci-\\nsion. Instead, the majority extrapolates from the line of cases\\naddressing whether a private party has an implied right of ac-\\ntion to the issue presented here: whether a government\\nagency, the Federal Trade Commission, which enjoys an ex-\\npress right of action under a statute for injunctive relief, is en-\\ntitled to a restitutionary remedy that is ancillary to, or part of,\\nthe injunction.\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 45\\n\\n To my knowledge, no court has ever tied the hands of a\\ngovernment agency in the way that the majority has done\\nhere, and the majority cites none. It has taken this step with-\\nout the careful consideration that plenary en banc review\\nwould have provided. I am reminded of the words spoken by\\nGaius Julius Caesar in 49 B.C.E., as he approached the Rubi-\\ncon river at the head of his army. He knew that the Roman\\nSenate forbade any armed force to enter Rome. But he decided\\nto flout that command, and as he marched with his troops\\nacross the river, he is said to have proclaimed “alea iacta est”\\n– the die is cast. And indeed it was. Caesar’s act led to civil\\nwar and eventually the end of the Roman Republic; he be-\\ncame dictator for life and inaugurated the Roman Empire.\\nSee, e.g., Meaning Behind the Phrase to Cross the Rubicon,\\nhttps://www.thoughtco.com/meaning-cross-the-rubicon-\\n117548. I devoutly hope that the majority here has not cast the\\ndie in a way that will transform Rule 40(e) from an efficiency-\\npromoting rule for relatively routine updates to our circuit\\nlaw into something that erodes our commitment to plenary\\nconsideration, along with oral argument, of every fully coun-\\nseled case. Time will tell. But the Rule is surely being misused\\nin this case. Perhaps that would not matter if no reasonable\\nperson could question the correctness of the majority’s rea-\\nsoning. Regrettably, that is not the case. From the materials\\nnow before us, I believe that the court is making a mistake,\\nand it is doing so in a procedurally inappropriate way.\\n The central issue in the case relates to the proper interpre-\\ntation of section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), which\\nauthorizes the Commission to sue for injunctive relief. Injunc-\\ntions come in all shapes and sizes: some are prohibitory, some\\nare mandatory, some include submission to an equitable mas-\\nter, some include reporting requirements, and many include\\n\\n46 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nancillary measures that are designed to ensure that the injunc-\\ntion is effective. At least since our decision in Amy Travel, the\\nFederal Trade Commission has understood that its authority\\nto seek an injunction from the court includes the authority to\\nseek a measure commanding the defendant to disgorge un-\\nlawfully acquired money or property. In other words, the in-\\njunction may include an order from the court for the disgorge-\\nment type of restitution.\\n Obviously the restitution itself is not an “injunction,” any\\nmore than the master is an “injunction,” or the reporting re-\\nquirements are an “injunction.” The injunction is the order\\nfrom the court either to do something or to refrain from doing\\nsomething. Black’s Law Dictionary lists 25 different types of\\ninjunctions under that general heading. See entry for “injunc-\\ntion,” Black’s Law Dictionary at 904–05 (10th ed. 2014). The\\nterm “injunction” itself is defined simply as “A court order\\ncommanding or preventing an action.” Id. A “mandatory in-\\njunction” is one “that orders an affirmative act or mandates a\\nspecified course of conduct.” Id. Nothing whatever in section\\n13(b) deletes from the list of possible affirmative acts that an\\ninjunction may include an order requiring the enjoined party\\nto return ill-gotten gains, or to pay money into a court escrow\\naccount, or otherwise to turn over property. That should be\\nenough by itself to show the error in the path the majority has\\ntaken.\\n The majority rejects this straightforward reading of the\\nstatute and argues to the contrary that “the textual case in the\\nFTCA against implying restitution in section 13(b) is over-\\nwhelming.” But more than rhetoric is needed to establish that\\npoint. From my standpoint, if the text is overwhelming at all,\\nI find it overwhelmingly to support the power of the FTC to\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 47\\n\\nuse any of the tools that Congress gave it, including the one it\\nused here, which entitles it to seek injunctive relief from a\\ncourt.\\n The Supreme Court supported the approach I would take\\nin California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990). There\\nthe question was whether “divestiture is a form of injunctive\\nrelief within the meaning of” section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15\\nU.S.C. § 26. 495 U.S. at 275. After the FTC had decided not to\\nchallenge a merger of certain grocery stores in California, the\\nmerger was consummated. The next day, however, the State\\nof California filed an action in federal court alleging that the\\nmerger violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1,\\nand seeking “an injunction requiring American to divest itself\\nof all of [the acquired firm’s] assets and businesses in the State\\nof California.” 495 U.S. at 276. The district court had granted\\na preliminary injunction along those lines, but the Ninth Cir-\\ncuit reversed on the ground that the injunctive relief author-\\nized by the statute did not include divestiture. The Supreme\\nCourt reversed the court of appeals, finding that “the statu-\\ntory language [of section 16] indicates Congress’ intention\\nthat traditional principles of equity govern the grant of injunc-\\ntive relief.” Id. at 281. An order of divestiture is almost identi-\\ncal to an order requiring equitable restitution: both require the\\nwrongdoer to turn over property that was unlawfully ob-\\ntained. Similarly, the language of section 16 of the Clayton Act\\nis not materially different from the language of section 13(b)\\nof the FTC Act. In my view, the majority’s approach conflicts\\nwith the most closely applicable Supreme Court decision.\\n This is especially troubling because the majority has not\\npointed to any case in which the Supreme Court has said that\\na federal agency must avoid one type of remedial authority it\\n\\n48 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nholds and instead use a different type. That, effectively, is\\nwhat the majority has done here, in its discussion of the vari-\\nous tools the FTC Act provides for enforcement of the prohi-\\nbition against unfair or deceptive trade practices. Ante at 11.\\nThe Commission may use its “cease and desist” power in an\\nadministrative proceeding, see FTC Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 45(b); it may, after providing notice to the Attorney General\\nunder section 16 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 56, sue someone\\nwho violates a cease-and-desist order, see FTC Act § 5(l)–(m),\\n15 U.S.C. § 45(l)–(m); it may promulgate rules that define un-\\nfair or deceptive practices, FTC Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 57a; or it\\nmay (as it did here) file a suit in federal court for an injunction,\\nFTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).\\n The Supreme Court recognizes that agencies have broad\\ndiscretion in their choice of which of several authorized pro-\\ncedural tools they wish to use as they carry out their mission.\\nThe best-known example of this practice comes from the field\\nof labor law. The National Labor Relations Board has both\\nrulemaking power, see 29 U.S.C. § 156, and adjudicatory pow-\\ners, see 29 U.S.C. § 160. The Board does not, however, follow\\nthe practice of using its rulemaking powers when it an-\\nnounces new rules; it prefers to proceed on a case-by-case ba-\\nsis through the adjudicative process. See, e.g., Mark H.\\nGrunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Prag-\\nmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 273 (1991). Over the years people have\\nchallenged this choice on the ground that the Board is evading\\nthe detailed protections for rulemaking that Congress has\\nprovided in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553,\\nbut the Supreme Court has always rejected those arguments.\\nSee, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S.\\n267 (1974), confirming the rule from NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon\\nCo., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), to this effect. As the Bell Aerospace\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 49\\n\\nopinion put it, “[t]he views expressed in Chenery II and Wy-\\nman-Gordon make plain that the Board is not precluded from\\nannouncing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and\\nthat the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in\\nthe first instance within the Board’s discretion. Although\\nthere may be situations where the Board’s reliance on adjudi-\\ncation would amount to an abuse of discretion or a violation\\nof the Act, nothing in the present case would justify such a\\nconclusion.” 416 U.S. at 294.\\n I can think of no principled reason why the Labor Board\\nshould have that discretion, but the FTC should not. The ma-\\njority argues to the contrary from a line of cases that is inap-\\nposite. It conflates decisions about which plaintiffs are author-\\nized to bring a suit (the implied-right-of-action line) with the\\ndistinct question about what remedies are available to a party\\nthat is expressly authorized by statute to sue, as the FTC\\nsurely is here. The cases on which the panel relies all involve\\nprivate enforcement, where the Court has warned us to en-\\nsure that we should not permit a facile work-around to a com-\\nplex enforcement system. See, e.g., Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage\\nAuth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981). A case\\ninvolving public enforcement is quite different. If the agency\\nbelieves that Path A has certain advantages and downsides,\\nwhile Path B has different plusses and minuses, neither ap-\\nproach should be read out of the statute. Both are available to\\nthe agency, and each one will serve its intended functions,\\nconstrained by its safeguards.\\n The majority thinks that it would be “wholly irrational”\\nfor Congress to write a statute that provides for restitution as\\npart of a 13(b) temporary restraining order, preliminary in-\\njunction, or permanent injunction, while also spelling out\\n\\n50 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nless-streamlined options for the Commission to pursue. But\\nthis ignores real differences among its options. Perhaps, be-\\ncause of the risk of dissipation of ill-gotten gains, the Com-\\nmission might want restitution to begin right away while the\\ncase is pending, e.g., through payment into a court-operated\\nescrow account; in order to do that, it can seek a preliminary\\ninjunction for the turn-over of funds. In another case, the\\nCommission might prefer to use the cease-and-desist route\\nand develop the factual record through its own administra-\\ntive processes—ensuring judicial deference to its fact-finding\\ndown the road—rather than operate under the thumb of a\\ncourt.\\n Branding such a scheme as “wholly irrational” is unwar-\\nranted without a more focused examination of why the Com-\\nmission might choose one route or another—a choice, I reiter-\\nate, that we usually allow agencies to make. Cf. Bell Aerospace,\\n416 U.S. at 294–95 (concluding that agency has power to\\nchoose adjudication or rulemaking as a means to announce\\nnew principles while examining agency’s legitimate reasons\\nfor pursuing one or the other method of proceeding). Such an\\ninquiry requires a deferential look at why Congress gave the\\nagency a menu of options. That is just what Congress did in\\nthe FTC Act. The statute gives the Commission the ability to\\nmove unilaterally when it uses its rulemaking or cease-and-\\ndesist powers, and to act as a party before the court if it wants\\na preliminary or permanent injunction. It is not up to us to\\ntake away that which Congress gave.\\n Another inapposite line of cases on which the majority re-\\nlies addresses implied private rights of action—a problem we\\nsurely do not have here. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532\\nU.S. 275 (2001). Rather than a private party, we have a\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 51\\n\\ngovernment agency, and rather than an implied right of ac-\\ntion, we have an express statutory provision authorizing the\\nagency to seek injunctive relief. That makes a difference. In-\\ndeed, in a number of areas—antitrust, securities regulation,\\nRICO—the Supreme Court has begun drawing a distinction\\nbetween the breadth of a private right of action and the\\ngreater breadth appropriate for public enforcement. Thus, in\\nRJR Nabisco Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016),\\nthe Court found that private parties (including for this pur-\\npose the European Community, which had no special govern-\\nmental status under the applicable law) cannot enforce RICO\\nextraterritorially, but that the U.S. government stands in a dif-\\nferent position. The Court made the same point in F. Hoffman-\\nLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004):\\n In all three cases [on which the Empagran plain-\\n tiffs relied], however, the plaintiff was the Gov-\\n ernment of the United States. A Government\\n plaintiff, unlike a private plaintiff, must seek to\\n obtain the relief necessary to protect the public\\n from further anticompetitive conduct and to re-\\n dress anticompetitive harm. And a Government\\n plaintiff has legal authority broad enough to al-\\n low it to carry out this mission. 15 U.S.C. § 25 …\\n . Private plaintiffs, by way of contrast, are far\\n less likely to be able to secure broad relief.\\n See California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S.\\n 271, 295 (1990) (“Our conclusion that a district\\n court has the power to order divestiture in ap-\\n propriate cases brought [by private plaintiffs]\\n does not, of course, mean that such power\\n should be exercised in every situation in which\\n the Government would be entitled to such\\n\\n52 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n relief... .”); 2 P. Areeda, Hovenkamp & R. Blair,\\n Antitrust Law ¶¶ 303d–303e, pp. 40–45 (2d ed.\\n 2000) (distinguishing between private and gov-\\n ernment suits in terms of availability, public in-\\n terest motives, and remedial scope) … . This dif-\\n ference means that the Government’s ability, in\\n these three cases, to obtain relief helpful to those\\n injured abroad tells us little or nothing about\\n whether this Court would have awarded similar\\n relief at the request of private plaintiffs.\\nId. at 170–71.\\n The panel’s effort to explain why injunctive relief cannot\\ninclude an order to disgorge money by reference to Wal-Mart\\nStores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), is no more successful.\\nWal-Mart was a class action case, through and through. Most\\nof it deals with the inappropriateness of a money-damages ac-\\ntion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) for the\\nsprawling and unmanageable class that the plaintiffs had pro-\\nposed. But the Court also addressed the plaintiffs’ back-up\\nposition, which was their effort to certify a class for backpay\\nclaims under Rule 23(b)(2). Subpart (b)(2) of the rule allows a\\nclass if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to\\nact on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final\\ninjunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appro-\\npriate respecting the class as a whole.” Note the emphasis in\\nthis language on general grounds, and relief that works for the\\nclass as a whole. As the Court pointed out, that unity of inter-\\nests is especially critical in a (b)(2) class, because the unnamed\\nclass members have no right to notice and the chance to opt\\nout of such a class, yet they would be bound by the outcome\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 53\\n\\nof the lawsuit. Those concerns are miles away from what we\\nhave in this case.\\n What the Court said in Wal-Mart is that claims for mone-\\ntary relief cannot be certified “at least where (as here) the\\nmonetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or declara-\\ntory relief.” 564 U.S. at 360. It went on to explain itself as fol-\\nlows:\\n One possible reading of [Rule 23(b)(2)] is that it\\n applies only to requests for such injunctive or\\n declaratory relief and does not authorize the\\n class certification of monetary claims at all. We\\n need not reach that broader question in this\\n case, because we think that, at a minimum,\\n claims for individualized relief (like the backpay\\n at issue here) do not satisfy the Rule. The key to\\n the (b)(2) class is “the indivisible nature of the\\n injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—\\n the notion that the conduct is such that it can be\\n enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of\\n the class members or as to none of them.” Na-\\n gareda, 84 N.Y.U.L.Rev., at 132. In other\\n words, Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single\\n injunction or declaratory judgment would pro-\\n vide relief to each member of the class. It does\\n not authorize class certification when each indi-\\n vidual class member would be entitled to a dif-\\n ferent injunction or declaratory judgment\\n against the defendant. Similarly, it does not au-\\n thorize class certification when each class mem-\\n ber would be entitled to an individualized\\n award of monetary damages. …\\n\\n54 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n Given that structure, we think it clear that indi-\\n vidualized monetary claims belong in Rule\\n 23(b)(3). The procedural protections attending\\n the (b)(3) class—predominance, superiority,\\n mandatory notice, and the right to opt out—are\\n missing from (b)(2) not because the Rule consid-\\n ers them unnecessary, but because it considers\\n them unnecessary to a (b)(2) class. When a class\\n seeks an indivisible injunction benefitting all its\\n members at once, there is no reason to under-\\n take a case-specific inquiry into whether class is-\\n sues predominate or whether class action is a\\n superior method of adjudicating the dispute.\\n Predominance and superiority are self-evident.\\n But with respect to each class member’s individ-\\n ualized claim for money, that is not so—which\\n is precisely why (b)(3) requires the judge to\\n make findings about predominance and superi-\\n ority before allowing the class.”\\nId. at 360–63.\\n One cannot read this excerpt—lengthy in order to ensure\\nthat the full context comes through—without seeing that the\\nCourt was concerned solely about which type of class action\\nshould be used where money is concerned. No such problem\\nis possible in the case before us. First, since there is only one\\nplaintiff—the Commission—we have no unnamed class\\nmembers to worry about. Second, the court in our case does\\nnot need to worry about individualized relief. The FTC is it-\\nself entitled to seek relief on behalf of those injured by Credit\\nBureau’s misdeeds. Cf. EEOC v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of\\nWis. Sys., 288 F.3d 296, 300 (7th Cir. 2002) (EEOC may pursue\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 55\\n\\nage-discrimination case against a state entity on behalf of in-\\ndividual employees, even though individual cases would be\\nbarred by the state’s sovereign immunity).\\n Credit Bureau must merely turn over to the FTC a single\\nlump sum representing the total restitution due. This is the\\nend of the court’s involvement with the equitable relief in this\\ncase. As the district court wrote, “[j]udgment in the amount\\nof Five Million, Two Hundred Sixty Thousand, Six Hundred\\nSeventy-One and Thirty-Six Cents (“5,260,671.36”) is entered\\nin favor of the Commission against Defendants, jointly and\\nseverally, as equitable monetary relief. Defendants are or-\\ndered to pay to the Commission [$5,260,671.36]. Such payment\\nmust be made within 7 days of entry of this Order …” Final\\nJudgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Eq-\\nuitable Relief Against Defendants Credit Bureau Center, LLC\\nand Michael Brown (Kennelly, J.) (June 26, 2018) (emphasis\\nadded). It then falls to the Commission to craft a plan to return\\nthe ill-gotten gains to each person who was harmed, where\\npossible, and then turn over the remaining money to the\\nTreasury. See FTC Office of Claims and Refunds Annual Re-\\nport 2017, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/re-\\nports/bureau-consumer-protection-office-claims-refunds-an-\\nnual-report-2017-consumer-refunds-effectedjuly/redressre-\\nportformatedforweb122117.pdf. There is no risk that an un-\\nnamed class member’s claim would be lost through the oper-\\nation of the law of preclusion. There is no risk, as in Wal-Mart,\\nthat the court would need to “reevaluate the roster of class\\nmembers continually,” id. at 364. Nor, in contrast to Wal-Mart,\\ndoes this case present the problem of internal conflict within\\na class. Id. at 365. Instead, the restitution issue can be resolved\\nin “one stroke.” Id. at 350. In sum, nothing in Wal-Mart says\\nthat an injunction to turn over wrongfully acquired property\\n\\n56 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n(here, in the form of money) to a government agency is in any\\nway objectionable.\\n\\n I next turn to the Supreme Court’s decision in Meghrig v.\\nKFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996), on which the majority\\nrelies so heavily. The issue in Meghrig was “whether § 7002 of\\nthe Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),\\n42 U.S.C. § 6972, authorizes a private cause of action to re-\\ncover the prior cost of cleaning up toxic waste that does not,\\nat the time of suit, continue to pose an endangerment to health\\nor the environment.” 516 U.S. at 481. In order to answer that\\nquestion, the Court had to construe the citizen-suit provision\\nof RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). It held that two requirements of\\nsection 6972 defeated plaintiff KFC’s suit: first, the citizen-suit\\nprovision reaches only imminent and substantial harms, not\\npast problems that have been addressed; and second, the re-\\nmedial language focuses only on the restraint of ongoing\\nclean-up and disposal problems, not on past clean-up costs\\n(“whether [those] are denominated ‘damages’ or ‘equitable\\nrestitution’”). 516 U.S. at 484.\\n This was a pure question of statutory interpretation. The\\nrelevant part of RCRA authorized a citizen suit “against any\\nperson … who has contributed or who is contributing to the\\npast or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation,\\nor disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present\\nan imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the envi-\\nronment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The\\nCourt gave that provision its natural reading—that is, as\\nsomething that did not include a remedy for past cleanup\\ncosts. Id. at 485. It emphasized in that connection the im-\\nportance of the imminence requirement, which entirely ruled\\nout any form of relief, however labeled, for a fixed sum\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 57\\n\\nrepresenting past expenditures. Only in that context did the\\nCourt reject the argument that a plaintiff “could seek equita-\\nble restitution of money previously spent on cleanup efforts.”\\nId. at 487. General rules about equitable powers were of no\\nimportance for a statute that drew the temporal line at prob-\\nlems that are “imminent and substantial.” Id. Interestingly,\\nthe Court declined to rule on the question “whether a private\\nparty could seek to obtain an injunction requiring another\\nparty to pay cleanup costs which arise after a RCRA citizen\\nsuit has been properly commenced … .” Id. at 488. That reser-\\nvation proves that the Court was not ruling out equitable\\nturn-over of funds, period. It was simply saying that past ex-\\npenditures were not covered by the statute in front of it.\\n So even Meghrig itself, a case involving private plaintiffs,\\ndid not purport categorically to exclude from injunctive relief\\nan order to make payments. It is thus all the more remarkable\\nthat the majority interprets Meghrig to impose such a limita-\\ntion on the relief that a government plaintiff can seek. As the\\nmajority acknowledges, “when ‘the public interest is involved\\nin a proceeding,’ a court’s ‘equitable powers assume an even\\nbroader and more flexible character than when only a private\\ncontroversy is at stake,’” ante at 38, quoting Porter v. Warner\\nHolding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). But it then goes on to\\npostulate that “the public interest doesn’t turn on the identity\\nof the parties involved.” Id. That is not accurate. One factor\\ninforming the public interest is whether it is the government\\nthat is seeking relief. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Defense Coun-\\ncil, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (attaching great weight to Navy’s in-\\nterest in realistic training of sailors). The FTC’s assessment of\\nthe public interest here informs the scope of any injunctive re-\\nlief it is seeking.\\n\\n58 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n The presence of the government as a litigant is especially\\nimportant to the public-interest component of the analysis\\nwhen the government seeks remedies that (1) lie uniquely\\nwithin its toolbox and (2) are aimed squarely at undoing pub-\\nlic harms and preventing future ones through deterrence. As\\nthe Second Circuit has noted in a section 13(b) case of its own\\n(discussed in further detail below), this is precisely what the\\nCommission seeks here by way of an injunction ordering eq-\\nuitable restitution in the form of disgorgement. “[D]isgorge-\\nment is a distinctly public-regarding remedy, available only\\nto government entities seeking to enforce explicit statutory\\nprovisions.” FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 372\\n(2d Cir. 2011) (affirming an injunction ordering “restitution”\\nunder 13(b) authority and discussing the theory underlying\\nwhat the court understood to be equitable disgorgement).\\n The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized this feature\\nof disgorgement in the SEC context. “SEC disgorgement is im-\\nposed by the courts as a consequence for violating what we\\ndescribed in Meeker as public laws. The violation for which\\nthe remedy is sought is committed against the United States\\nrather than an aggrieved individual—this is why, for exam-\\nple, a securities-enforcement action may proceed even if vic-\\ntims do not support or are not parties to the prosecution.”\\nKokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). As the Court acknowl-\\nedged in Kokesh, this understanding of disgorgement perme-\\nates the case law of our sister circuits as well. See SEC v. Teo,\\n746 F.3d 90, 102 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he SEC pursues [disgorge-\\nment] independent of the claims of individual investors in or-\\nder to promot[e] economic and social policies”) (cleaned up);\\nSEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[D]isgorge-\\nment actions further the Commission’s public policy mission\\nof protecting investors and safeguarding the integrity of the\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 59\\n\\nmarkets”). Here, the FTC is seeking to vindicate the public in-\\nterest through a public-facing remedy aimed at an ongoing\\nharm. That was not the case in Meghrig, which was certainly\\nabout “environmental cleanup” but which rejected a back-\\nward-looking remedy that in economic substance sought\\ndamages.\\n The majority also asserts that cases decided since Meghrig\\ndemonstrate that it represented a sweeping rejection of im-\\nplied remedies. Ante at 33. It cites Great-West Life & Annuity\\nIns. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); Miller v. French, 530\\nU.S. 327 (2000); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S.\\nCt. 1378 (2015), and Gebser v. Lago Vista Ind. Schl. Dist., 524 U.S.\\n274 (1998), for this proposition. None of those cases, however,\\naddresses the situation before us: a governmental plaintiff\\nwith an express right of action, and an agency that seeks an\\ninjunction (also expressly authorized) ordering a wrongdoer\\nto disgorge ill-gotten gains.\\n Great-West was brought by a private party under the Em-\\nployment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to compel\\na plan beneficiary to pay over money recovered from a third-\\nparty tortfeasor to the plan. The Supreme Court held that the\\npetitioners essentially wanted “to impose personal liability on\\nrespondents for a contractual obligation to pay money—relief\\nthat was not typically available in equity.” Id. at 210. That took\\ntheir request beyond the bounds of equitable relief; as the\\nCourt put it, “an injunction to compel the payment of money\\npast due under a contract was not typically available in eq-\\nuity.” Id. There is not a hint of contract law in our case, and so\\nGreat-West is not applicable. Miller is equally beside the point.\\nThere, Congress had acted explicitly to limit the equitable\\npower of the district courts to enjoin the automatic stay\\n\\n60 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nprovided by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 530 U.S. at 331.\\nThe Supreme Court held that the statute did not permit dis-\\ntrict courts to override that provision with a “stay of the stay,”\\nwhich is what the private litigants sought. No such effort to\\nundo a congressional prohibition exists in our case. Armstrong\\nand Gebser are even further afield. Armstrong holds only that\\nneither the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, cl. 2 of the Constitu-\\ntion) nor the Medicaid Act confers a private right of action on\\nproviders of rehabilitation services, whether for injunctive re-\\nlief or anything else. Gebser actually does recognize a limited\\nimplied private right of action for sexual harassment of\\nschoolchildren. In short, nothing in Meghrig, and nothing in\\nthe cases following Meghrig, comes close to holding that a\\ngovernment agency acting pursuant to express authority to\\nseek injunctive relief cannot ask for a mandatory injunction\\nrequiring turn-over of money.\\n Given our decision to cast off a precedent that has guided\\nboth this court and other courts of appeals for decades, I add\\na word about our now-abandoned decision in Amy Travel,\\nwhich held that the FTC is authorized to obtain restitution as\\npart of the injunctive relief covered by section 13(b). I already\\nhave explained why I believe that ruling to be correct. My\\ncomments here address the majority’s effort to trivialize the\\nfact that eight of our sister circuits agree with Amy Travel’s\\nholding. They brush off this consensus with the accusation\\nthat these courts have done so unthinkingly.\\n I find that charge quite unwarranted. In the interest of\\nspace, I focus on only one of those other cases: the Second Cir-\\ncuit’s opinion in Bronson, 654 F.3d 359 (Lynch, J.). There, the\\nFTC brought suit for an injunction against Bronson for engag-\\ning in deceptive advertising of weight-loss products. The\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 61\\n\\ndistrict court “entered a permanent injunction against Bron-\\nson and ordered it to pay $1,942,325 in monetary equitable re-\\nlief plus statutory interest.” Id. at 362. Bronson argued, just as\\nBrown and Credit Bureau have here, that section 13(b) did not\\npermit a court to order monetary relief. The Second Circuit\\nrejected that argument, along with the narrower point that\\ntraceability of the ill-gotten gains was essential. But it did so\\nonly after a thorough and thoughtful consideration of Bron-\\nson’s argument.\\n After first noting that section 13(b) of the FTC Act permits\\nthe FTC to seek permanent injunctive relief, the Second Cir-\\ncuit noted that “courts have consistently held that ‘the un-\\nqualified grant of statutory authority to issue an injunction\\nunder [S]ection 13(b) carries with it the full range of equitable\\nremedies, including the power to grant consumer redress and\\ncompel disgorgement of profits.’” 654 F.3d at 365. The Second\\nCircuit explicitly joined that consensus, holding that section\\n13(b) of the FTC Act permits courts to grant ancillary equita-\\nble relief, including equitable monetary relief. Id.\\n The court then turned to the argument that any kind of\\nmonetary award would be “an impermissible legal, rather\\nthan equitable, award, because the [district] court failed to\\nidentify particular funds in the defendants’ hands that were\\nspecifically traceable to the fraudulently marketed products.”\\nId. at 369. After a lengthy and scholarly discussion of the law\\nof restitution, the Second Circuit concluded that the disgorge-\\nment ordered in the case before it was a permissible adjunct\\nto the injunctive relief authorized by section 13(b). This was\\nso because “the district court’s award satisfies the require-\\nments of equitable disgorgement … .” Id. at 370.\\n\\n62 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n The court went on to confirm that “disgorgement is a well-\\nestablished remedy in the Second Circuit,” often used in ac-\\ntions under section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of\\n1934. That statute, which “authorizes an action to enjoin vio-\\nlations of the securities laws, also permits the district court to\\naward disgorgement as an equitable adjunct to its injunctive\\ndecree.” Id. at 372. Importantly, “disgorgement—at least\\nwhen sought by public agencies such as the SEC and the\\nFTC—has several features that make it distinct from the rem-\\nedies available to private litigants seeking to press common\\nlaw claims.” Id. That is because “disgorgement is a distinctly\\npublic-regarding remedy, available only to government enti-\\nties seeking to enforce explicit statutory provisions.” Id. That\\nfeature also plays a significant role in the case before us.\\n The Second Circuit also took note of another distinction\\nthat I, too have stressed: “public entities [are not] required to\\nmake any particular effort to compensate the victims that they\\ncan identify,” because the victim is the government, not the\\nindividual persons. Id. at 373. It added, “While agencies may,\\nas a matter of grace, attempt to return as much of the dis-\\ngorgement proceeds as possible, the remedy is not, strictly\\nspeaking, restitutionary at all, in that the award runs in favor\\nof the Treasury, not of the victims.” Id. In my view, this point\\nunderscores why the restitutionary payment bears no resem-\\nblance to individual money damages to the injured parties.\\n Whatever else one might want to say about the Second Cir-\\ncuit’s analysis in Bronson, it is surely impossible to character-\\nize it as a drive-by ruling or one that was not carefully consid-\\nered and thoroughly explained. I find it quite persuasive. It\\ndemonstrates to me why both we and our sister circuits up\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 63\\n\\nuntil this time have understood that the injunctions author-\\nized by section 13(b) can include a restitutionary component.\\n Finally, I want to emphasize that even if we were interpret-\\ning this statute on a blank slate, rather than upending decades\\nof precedent and creating a split with eight other circuits, the\\nmajority’s reading of section 13(b) is still not persuasive. The\\nmajority grounds its argument in the contrast between the in-\\njunctive relief explicitly authorized in section 13(b) and the\\nremedies available to the agency if it opts to use its cease-and-\\ndesist powers under section 5 of the FTC Act or to punish vi-\\nolators of promulgated rules under section 19. (Section 5 of\\nthe Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45, while section 19 is codified\\nat 15 U.S.C. § 57b. The majority uses the U.S. Code cites for\\nsections other than 13(b); my analysis below uses the same\\nscheme for ease of cross-reference with the majority’s opin-\\nion.)\\n As the majority sees things, we must read 13(b)’s grant of\\ninjunctive authority extremely narrowly given that section\\n57b(b) specifically mentions “the refund of money or return\\nof property” as a form of relief the court can order, and 45(l)\\nallows courts to “grant mandatory injunctions and such other\\nand further equitable relief as they deem appropriate.” I do\\nnot quibble with the overarching principle that “it is generally\\npresumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in\\nthe disparate inclusion or exclusion [of words in different sec-\\ntions of the same Act].” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 430 (2009)\\n(quotation marks omitted). But a close look at the two con-\\ntrasting sections reveals that this is not a straightforward case\\nof a list comprised of “A, B, and C” and another consisting of\\nonly “A and B.”\\n\\n64 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n I begin with section 57b(b), which lays out remedies for\\nviolations of final rules. Our first clue that this subsection\\nshould not be read to limit the scope of injunctive relief in a\\n13(b) action is that courts are directed in 57b(b) to “grant such\\nrelief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consum-\\ners or other persons, partnerships, and corporations…” (em-\\nphasis added). These are largely backward-facing remedies.\\nAs discussed above, courts have long recognized that dis-\\ngorgement of ill-gotten gains—the sort of equitable restitution\\nat issue here—is a forward-looking remedy aimed at deter-\\nrence. Making consumers whole is a possible, but not inevita-\\nble, consequence of a disgorgement order. “[T]he primary\\npurpose of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the []\\nlaws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains.” Bronson,\\n654 F.3d at 737, quoting SEC v. Fishbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170,\\n175 (2d Cir. 1997). (Notably, section 57b(b) actually prohibits\\ncourts from imposing “any exemplary or punitive damages.”)\\nSecond, while section 57b(b) lists some more forward-looking\\nremedies, such as “public notification respecting the rule vio-\\nlation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice,” this language\\nonly highlights how strained it is to read section 57b(b) as a\\nlimitation on courts’ 13(b) injunctive authority. Would a court\\nissuing a 13(b) injunction be powerless to order a violator to\\npost “public notification respecting the … unfair or deceptive\\nact or practice,” simply because this remedy is listed in an-\\nother subsection? Surely not.\\n It is also important to recall that the list in 57b(b) is merely\\nillustrative: courts are authorized to order relief that “may in-\\nclude, but shall not be limited to,” the listed remedies. This\\nsubsection is thus a poor candidate (at best) for the expressio\\nunius canon. (Compare “Visitors may bring pets into the park\\non weekdays” with “Animals that visitors are permitted to\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 65\\n\\nbring into the park on weekends may include, but shall not be\\nlimited to, dogs, cats, snakes, monkeys, and alligators.” Could\\nweekday visitors not bring dogs?) The savings clause in the\\nsame section is the coup de grâce for the majority’s reasoning.\\nIt cautions that “Remedies provided in this section are in addi-\\ntion to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action\\nprovided by State or Federal law. Nothing in this section shall be\\nconstrued to affect any authority of the Commission under any other\\nprovision of law.” Id. § 57b(e) (emphasis added). That says it all:\\nthe non-exhaustive examples of relief Congress chose to men-\\ntion in one section do not limit what a court may or may not\\ninclude pursuant to another section—for instance, a 13(b) in-\\njunction.\\n The list of remedies available to the FTC in a cease-and-\\ndesist action, spelled out in section 45(l), also provides little\\nhelp for the majority. True, this section authorizes the FTC to\\n“grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further eq-\\nuitable relief as they deem appropriate …” But so what? Some\\nforms of equitable relief make sense as standalone remedies,\\ninjunction or no injunction. In contrast, equitable remedies are\\navailable under 13(b) only if (1) a plaintiff satisfies the de-\\nmanding burden of demonstrating why an injunction should\\nissue, see eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006);\\nand (2) the court is able to justify the relief it is ordering as a\\nproper adjunct to the injunctive decree. By allowing courts to\\nissue “such other and further equitable relief,” section 45(l)\\nclarifies that courts have a wide range of equitable relief avail-\\nable to them, no matter whether plaintiffs managed to obtain\\nan injunction or, if an injunction has issued, whether the rem-\\nedies are appropriate means of enforcing the decree. Under\\n45(l), a court could order an accounting or some sort of\\n\\n66 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nspecific performance whether or not the requirements for a\\nmandatory injunction had been satisfied.\\n There are further weaknesses in the majority’s reading of\\nthe statute, but I have said enough to show that its approach\\nis far from the most straightforward even if we did not have\\ndecades of precedent, eight other circuits, and American Stores\\non the other side. The FTC Act spells out a finely crafted sys-\\ntem of enforcement powers and remedies. The majority’s in-\\nterpretation upends what the agency and Congress have un-\\nderstood to be the status quo for thirty years, and in so doing\\ngrants a needless measure of impunity to brazen scammers\\nlike the defendant in this case.\\n I end where I began: This is an important case, and it de-\\nserves plenary consideration, not the truncated process that\\nRule 40(e) provides for appropriate cases. The court’s refusal\\nto rehear this case en banc has, I fear, led us into error. I there-\\nfore dissent from the decision not to give this case plenary en\\nbanc consideration.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431874/\", \"author_raw\": \"Circuit Judges, join, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"SYKES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"SYKES\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654621/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\nFEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nCREDIT BUREAU CENTER, LLC,\nand MICHAEL BROWN,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 17 C 194 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Michael Brown is the sole owner and\noperator of Credit Bureau Center, a credit-monitoring ser-\nvice. (We refer to both collectively as “Brown.”) Brown’s\nwebsites used what’s known as a “negative option feature”\nto attract customers. The websites offered a “free credit\nreport and score” while obscuring a key detail in much\nsmaller text: that applying for this “free” information auto-\n\n2 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nmatically enrolled customers in an unspecified $29.94\nmonthly “membership” subscription. The subscription was\nfor Brown’s credit-monitoring service, but customers learned\nthis information only when he sent them a letter after they\nwere automatically enrolled. Brown’s most successful con-\ntractor capitalized on the confusion by posting Craigslist\nadvertisements for fake rental properties and telling appli-\ncants to get a “free” credit score from Brown’s websites.\n The Federal Trade Commission eventually took notice. It\nsued Brown under section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Com-\nmission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), alleging that the\nwebsites and referral system violated several consumer-\nprotection statutes. The Commission sought a permanent\ninjunction and restitution. Relevant here, the district judge\nfound that Brown was a principal for his contractor’s fraudu-\nlent scheme and that the websites failed to meet certain\ndisclosure requirements in the Restore Online Shopper\nConfidence Act (“ROSCA”). Id. § 8403. The judge entered a\npermanent injunction and ordered Brown to pay more than\n$5 million in restitution to the Commission.\n Brown now concedes liability as a principal for his con-\ntractor’s Craigslist scam. And he doesn’t dispute that his\nown websites failed to meet some of ROSCA’s disclosure\nrequirements. So we have no trouble affirming the judge’s\ndecision to hold him liable for both. We also affirm the\nissuance of a permanent injunction. Brown’s argument there\nrests on an erroneous understanding of the Eighth Amend-\nment’s Excessive Fines Clause.\n But the restitution award is a different matter. By its\nterms, section 13(b) authorizes only restraining orders and\ninjunctions. But the Commission has long viewed it as also\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 3\n\nauthorizing awards of restitution. We endorsed that starkly\natextual interpretation three decades ago in FTC v. Amy\nTravel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1989). Since\nAmy Travel, the Supreme Court has clarified that courts must\nconsider whether an implied equitable remedy is compatible\nwith a statute’s express remedial scheme. See Meghrig v. KFC\nW., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 487–88 (1996). And it has specifically\ninstructed us not to assume that a statute with “elaborate\nenforcement provisions” implicitly authorizes other reme-\ndies. Id. at 487.\n Applying Meghrig’s instructions, we conclude that section\n13(b)’s grant of authority to order injunctive relief does not\nimplicitly authorize an award of restitution. Every reason\nMeghrig gave for not finding an implied monetary remedy\napplies here. Most notably, the FTCA has two detailed\nremedial provisions that expressly authorize restitution if the\nCommission follows certain procedures. Our current read-\ning of section 13(b) allows the Commission to circumvent\nthese elaborate enforcement provisions and seek restitution\ndirectly through an implied remedy.\n Stare decisis cannot justify adherence to an approach that\nSupreme Court precedent forecloses. Accordingly, we over-\nrule Amy Travel and hold that section 13(b) does not author-\nize restitutionary relief.1 Because the Commission brought\nthis case under section 13(b), we vacate the restitution\naward.\n\n\n\n1 Because this opinion overrules circuit precedent and creates a circuit\nsplit, we circulated it under Circuit Rule 40(e) to all judges in active\nservice. A majority did not favor rehearing en banc.\n\n4 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\n I. Background\n In January 2014 Brown contracted with Danny Pierce to\ndirect customers to his credit-monitoring service. Brown\ngave Pierce several functionally identical websites with\nnames like “eFreeScore.com” and “FreeCreditNation.com”\nto use for referrals. As their names suggest, these websites\ninvited people to sign up for a “free credit report and score.”\nBut signing up for the free score also automatically enrolled\napplicants in Brown’s credit-monitoring service, which\ncharged a monthly subscription fee.\n Brown didn’t tell prospective customers about the credit-\nmonitoring service. His websites almost entirely focused on\nthe free credit score and report. Three disclaimers, buried in\nmuch smaller font, told consumers that applying for the free\noffer also enrolled them in an unspecified “membership”\nsubscription that cost $29.94 each month. Customers later\nlearned that this subscription was for credit monitoring\nwhen Brown sent them a letter after the automatic enroll-\nment.\n Pierce did nothing to clear up this confusion. Indeed, it’s\nundisputed that his method for drumming up referrals was\nfraudulent. He subcontracted with Andrew Lloyd, who\nposted Craigslist advertisements for nonexistent rental\nproperties at bargain prices. Lloyd invited prospective\ntenants to email the landlord. Posing as the “landlord,” he\nthen responded and instructed them to obtain a credit report\nand score through one of Brown’s websites. But once appli-\ncants got this “free” information—and were automatically\nenrolled in the credit-monitoring service—Lloyd stopped\nreplying to emails.\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 5\n\n The plan was effective. Pierce quickly became Brown’s\nmost successful recruiter. Over the course of their relation-\nship, Pierce referred more than 2.7 million customers to\nBrown, generating just over $6.8 million in revenue. Unsus-\npecting customers were understandably upset. They flooded\nBrown’s customer-service operators, questioning the month-\nly subscription charge. They complained that the Craigslist\nadvertisements were scams. And many were blindsided by\nthe fact that requesting a free credit score automatically\nenrolled them in a costly credit-monitoring service. Brown\ntold his customer-service team to deny any involvement\nwith Pierce’s operation. And although Brown typically\nagreed to cancel future charges, he often refused to issue\nrefunds. He also instructed his representatives to offer\nreduced prices to retain customers. Some customers accept-\ned the offer, but others told their credit-card companies to\ncancel Brown’s charges. Credit-card companies cancelled\nmore than 10,000 of Brown’s charges.\n Consumers complained to the Commission, which\nopened an investigation. In January 2017 it sued Brown\nunder section 13(b) of the FTCA seeking an injunction and\nrestitution. The Commission alleged that the Craigslist\nadvertisements violated the FTCA’s prohibition on “unfair or\ndeceptive acts or practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). The suit also\nalleged that Brown’s websites violated the same provision of\nthe FTCA, as well as ROSCA, id. § 8403; the Fair Credit\nReporting Act (“FCRA”), id. § 1681j(g); and the Free Credit\nReports Rule, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1022.130–.138.\n On the Commission’s motion, the judge issued a tempo-\nrary injunction, froze Brown’s assets, and appointed a re-\nceiver to manage his company. Brown and the Commission\n\n6 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nlater filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In addition\nto contesting liability, Brown argued that section 13(b)\ndoesn’t authorize an award of restitution and, alternatively,\nthat it doesn’t authorize penalties or legal restitution (as\nopposed to equitable restitution, which requires tracing a\nplaintiff’s entitlement to a particular account or fund).\n The judge ruled for the Commission across the board,\nholding that Brown violated the FTCA as a principal for the\nCraigslist scheme and that the websites violated the FTCA,\nROSCA, the FCRA, and the Free Credit Reports Rule. The\njudge issued a permanent injunction that imposed extensive\nconditions on Brown’s continued involvement in the credit-\nmonitoring industry and ordered Brown to pay $5,260,671.36\nin restitution. He also denied Brown’s motion to unfreeze\nfunds to pay his attorneys.\n II. Discussion\n Brown contests his liability, the permanent injunction,\nand the restitution award. Different standards of review\napply. For liability, we review the summary judgment de\nnovo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to\nBrown and drawing reasonable inferences in his favor.\nHolloway v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 916 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2019).\nWe review the judge’s decision to enter a permanent injunc-\ntion for abuse of discretion. SEC v. Yang, 795 F.3d 674, 681\n(7th Cir. 2015). Finally, Brown’s challenge to the restitution\naward raises legal questions, which we review de novo.\nBreneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 656 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2011).\nA. Liability Issues\n The Commission sued under section 13(b) of the FTCA,\nwhich by its terms authorizes temporary restraining orders\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 7\n\nand permanent injunctions to enjoin violations of federal\ntrade law. § 53(b)(1). To impose individual liability on the\nbasis of a corporate practice, the Commission must prove\n(1) that the practice violated the FTCA; (2) that the individu-\nal “either participated directly in the deceptive acts or\npractices or had authority to control them”; and (3) that the\nindividual “knew or should have known about the deceptive\npractices.” FTC v. World Media Brokers, 415 F.3d 758, 764 (7th\nCir. 2005).\n Based on the summary-judgment record, the judge held\nthat Brown violated the FTCA as a principal for the\nCraigslist marketing scheme contrived by Pierce and Lloyd.\nHe also held that Brown’s websites violated the FTCA,\nROSCA, the FCRA, and the Free Credit Reports Rule. Final-\nly, the judge concluded that Brown was individually liable\nfor the violations because he owned and operated all aspects\nof his company.\n While Brown concedes liability for the Craigslist scheme,\nhe challenges his liability for the website violations. He\nasserts that his websites contained no misrepresentations in\nviolation of the FTCA and satisfied ROSCA’s disclosure\nrequirements. He also argues that the Commission must\nenforce the FCRA and the Free Credit Reports Rule through\nan internal adjudication. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1) (stating\nthat FCRA violations “shall be subject to enforcement by the\nFederal Trade Commission under section 5(b) of the Federal\nTrade Commission Act”).\n It’s unnecessary to consider every theory of liability.\nBrown’s challenges to the injunction and restitution award\ndo not turn on which statute his websites violated. And\nsection 13(b) permits the Commission to seek relief against\n\n8 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nBrown for violating “any provision of law” it enforces.\n§ 53(b).\n So we start and end with ROSCA, which restricts the use\nof a “negative option feature” to sell goods or services on the\nInternet. § 8403. A negative-option feature is “a provision [in\nan offer] under which the customer’s silence or failure to\ntake an affirmative action to reject goods or services or to\ncancel the agreement is interpreted by the seller as ac-\nceptance of the offer.” 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(w); see also § 8403\n(incorporating this definition by reference). ROSCA prohib-\nits this feature unless the seller “(1) provides text that clearly\nand conspicuously discloses all material terms of the trans-\naction before obtaining the consumer’s billing information;\n(2) obtains a consumer’s express informed consent before\ncharging the consumer … ; and (3) provides simple mecha-\nnisms for a consumer to stop recurring charges.” § 8403.\nROSCA violations are “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”\nunder the FTCA, so the Commission can use the FTCA’s\nenforcement regime against violators. Id. § 8404.\n There’s no dispute that Brown used a negative-option\nfeature to enroll customers in his credit-monitoring service.\nThe only question is whether he complied with ROSCA’s\ndisclosure requirements. In the apt words of the district\njudge, Brown’s websites were “virtually devoid of any\nmention of the [credit-monitoring] service aside from the\nstatement that the customer is to be billed for it.” Moreover,\nBrown concealed this incomplete disclosure behind more\nprominent language offering a free credit score and report.\nThe judge determined that these partial and obscure disclo-\nsures did not “clearly and conspicuously disclose[] all\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 9\n\nmaterial terms of the transaction” or ensure that customers\ngave “express informed consent.” § 8403(1)–(2).\n Brown focuses on the conclusion that the disclosures\nweren’t conspicuous. He parses font sizes, details his web-\nsites’ color schemes, and takes a microscope to the Commis-\nsion’s affidavits in an effort to highlight evidence that\nconsumers read and understood the disclosures. But he\ngives only passing attention to the decisive point: His web-\nsites didn’t provide certain information that ROSCA re-\nquires—namely, that the subscription was for a credit-\nmonitoring service.\n This oversight is fatal to Brown’s defense. Setting aside\nwhether his disclosures satisfied the “clear and conspicu-\nous” standard (and on that point we see nothing unsound in\nthe judge’s ruling that they did not), Brown violated ROSCA\nif the disclosures failed to provide “all material terms of the\ntransaction.” § 8403(1). The service Brown provided in\nexchange for the subscription is clearly a material term. See\nMaterial Term, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A\ncontractual provision dealing with a significant issue such as\nsubject matter … or the work to be done.”). And the websites\ndid not tell consumers that they were enrolling in a credit-\nmonitoring service. Brown seeks refuge in the form letter\nthat he delivered to new subscribers, which did provide this\ninformation. But ROSCA required Brown to disclose the\nmaterial terms “before obtaining the consumer’s billing\ninformation.” § 8403. Brown protests that he sent the letter\n“almost instantaneously” upon subscription. But almost\ninstantaneously is still too late under ROSCA.\n Brown next contends that even if corporate liability is es-\ntablished, he should not be held personally liable. But it’s\n\n10 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nundisputed that he controlled the websites and was aware of\ntheir content. That’s enough to establish personal liability for\nthe ROSCA violations.\nB. The Permanent Injunction\n The judge held that Brown’s conduct warranted a per-\nmanent injunction, applying our standard under the Securi-\nties and Exchange Act. See Yang, 795 F.3d at 681 (asking\nwhether “there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations\nin order to obtain [injunctive] relief”) (quotation marks\nomitted). The ensuing injunction imposes extensive re-\nquirements on Brown if he ever operates a credit-monitoring\nbusiness again.\n We don’t need to decide whether our standard for an in-\njunction under the Securities and Exchange Act also applies\nto section 13(b) because Brown’s challenge doesn’t turn on\nthat question. His attack on the injunction rests largely on\nthe Excessive Fines Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. He\ncontends that the injunction is unconstitutionally harsh and\ndisproportionate. But he skips a necessary step in the analy-\nsis—whether the injunction is a “fine” at all. It’s not. The\nSupreme Court has limited “fines” to “cash [or] in-kind\npayment[s] imposed by and payable to the government.”\nDep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 n.6\n(2002) (quotation marks omitted); see also Zamora-Mallari v.\nMukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 695 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The Board’s\nremoval order … is not a ‘fine,’ and thus the Excessive Fine\nClause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply.”). Because\nan injunction isn’t a fine, the permanent injunction doesn’t\nimplicate the Excessive Fines Clause.\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 11\n\n Brown also offers an assortment of drive-by arguments,\nall of which are too undeveloped to establish an abuse of\ndiscretion. See Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Serv., Inc. v. Lake Coun-\nty, 424 F.3d 659, 664 n.2 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It is the parties’ duty\nto package, present, and support their arguments … .”). We\naffirm the permanent injunction.\nC. The Restitution Award\n The bulk of Brown’s appeal challenges the restitution or-\nder. His primary argument is that section 13(b) does not\nauthorize an award of restitution. This is fundamentally a\nquestion of statutory interpretation, but it’s obscured by\nlayers of caselaw, so bear with us while we untangle the\nknot. A brief overview of the FTCA’s remedial structure is\nhelpful to a proper understanding of section 13(b), so we\nbegin there.\n The FTCA gives the Commission several tools to enforce\nthe Act’s prohibition on unfair or deceptive trade practices.\nUnder its “cease and desist” power, the Commission adjudi-\ncates a case before an administrative law judge, who can\nissue an order prohibiting the respondent from engaging in\nthe illegal conduct at issue. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). This order\nbecomes final if it survives administrative appeal and judi-\ncial review. Id. § 45(g).\n A final cease-and-desist order empowers the Commission\nto sue the violator for legal and equitable relief, but only if “a\nreasonable man would have known under the circumstances\n[that the conduct] was dishonest or fraudulent.” Id.\n§ 57b(a)(2), (b). After it becomes final, the order also draws a\nline in the sand for both the respondent and anyone else\nwho engages in the prohibited conduct. If the respondent\n\n12 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nlater violates the order, the Commission can sue for civil\npenalties and any equitable relief “the court finds neces-\nsary.” Id. § 45(l). If anyone else engages in the prohibited\nconduct after the order becomes final, the Commission can\nseek civil penalties if it can prove that the violator acted with\n“actual knowledge” that his conduct was unlawful. Id.\n§ 45(m)(1)(B).\n The Commission has two other enforcement mechanisms\nat its disposal. First, it can promulgate rules that “define\nwith specificity acts or practices which are unfair or decep-\ntive.” Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B). By preemptively resolving whether\ncertain conduct violates the FTCA, rulemaking permits the\nCommission to pursue “quick enforcement” actions against\nviolators. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and\nthe Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and Indus-\ntries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 225–26 (2019). Once the\nCommission promulgates a rule, it can seek legal and equi-\ntable remedies, including restitution, from violators. See\n15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(1), (b). And if it establishes that a violator\nhad “actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the\nbasis of objective circumstances” that his conduct violated a\nrule, the Commission can also pursue civil penalties. Id.\n§ 45(m)(1)(A).\n The Commission’s remaining enforcement mechanism is\ndifferent. Under section 13(b) of the FTCA, the Commission\ncan forego any administrative adjudication or rulemaking\nand directly pursue a temporary restraining order and a\npreliminary or permanent injunction in federal court.\n§ 53(b). As noted, the Commission sued Brown under this\nprovision.\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 13\n\n 1. Section 13(b)\n The restitution order against Brown rests on section\n13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision, which states that “in\nproper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper\nproof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.” Id.\nBrown’s straightforward argument is that section 13(b)\ndoesn’t authorize restitution because it doesn’t mention\nrestitution.\n We start with the obvious: Restitution isn’t an injunction.\n“Injunction” is of course a broad term. See Injunction,\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A court order\ncommanding or preventing an action.”). But statutory\nauthorizations for injunctions don’t encompass other dis-\ncrete forms of equitable relief like restitution. See, e.g.,\nMeghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“[N]either [a mandatory or prohibi-\ntory injunction] contemplates … equitable restitution.”)\n(quotation marks omitted); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers\nAss’n v. Landstar Sys., Inc., 622 F.3d 1307, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010)\n(“Injunctive relief constitutes a distinct type of equitable\nrelief; it is not an umbrella term that encompasses restitution\nor disgorgement.”); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,\n564 U.S. 338, 365 (2011) (holding that an equitable order for\nbackpay isn’t an injunction); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 430\n(2009) (“Whether [a deportation stay] might technically be\ncalled an injunction is beside the point; that is not the label\nby which it is generally known.”).\n The Commission doesn’t seriously argue otherwise. It in-\nstead contends that section 13(b) implicitly authorizes restitu-\ntion. We endorsed that reading in Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 571,\nwhich Brown asks us to overturn. We’ll discuss Amy Travel\nin a moment, but we begin with a closer look at the FTCA\n\n14 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nitself. If the Commission’s reading is correct, there’s no need\nto reconsider our precedent.\n Section 13(b) provides:\n Whenever the Commission has reason to be-\n lieve--\n (1) that any person, partnership, or corpora-\n tion is violating, or is about to violate, any pro-\n vision of law enforced by the Federal Trade\n Commission, and\n (2) that the enjoining thereof pending the\n issuance of a complaint by the Commission\n and until such complaint is dismissed by the\n Commission or set aside by the court on re-\n view, or until the order of the Commission\n made thereon has become final, would be in\n the interest of the public--\n the Commission … may bring suit in a district\n court of the United States to enjoin any such\n act or practice. Upon a proper showing that,\n weighing the equities and considering the\n Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success,\n such action would be in the public interest, and\n after notice to the defendant, a temporary re-\n straining order or a preliminary injunction may\n be granted without bond: Provided, however,\n That if a complaint is not filed within such pe-\n riod (not exceeding 20 days) as may be speci-\n fied by the court after issuance of the\n temporary restraining order or preliminary in-\n junction, the order or injunction shall be dis-\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 15\n\n solved by the court and be of no further force\n and effect: Provided further, That in proper cases\n the Commission may seek, and after proper\n proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunc-\n tion. …\n An implied restitution remedy doesn’t sit comfortably\nwith the text of section 13(b). Consider its requirement that\nthe defendant must be “violating” or “about to violate” the\nlaw. Requiring ongoing or imminent harm matches the\nforward-facing nature of injunctions. See 11A CHARLES ALAN\nWRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942, at\n47 (3d ed. 2013) (“[I]njunctive relief looks to the future and is\ndesigned to deter … .”). Conversely, restitution is a remedy\nfor past actions. See 1 DAN. B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES\n§ 4.1(1), at 551 (2d ed. 1993) (“Restitution is a return or\nrestoration of what the defendant has gained in a transac-\ntion.”). Beyond the conceptual tension, this requirement\nraises an illogical implication: It would condition the\nCommission’s ability to secure restitution for past conduct\non the existence of ongoing or imminent unlawful conduct.\n Section 13(b)’s second requirement—that the Commis-\nsion must reasonably believe that enjoining an ongoing or\nimminent violation would be in the public interest—raises a\nsimilar problem. The public interest in stopping or prevent-\ning a violation is distinct from the public interest in remedy-\ning a past harm. And yet the Commission’s reading ties\nrestitution to this inapposite inquiry.\n The rest of section 13(b) is likewise keyed to injunctions,\nnot other forms of equitable relief. For example, the statute\nconditions the district court’s authority to issue a temporary\nrestraining order or preliminary injunction on injunction-\n\n16 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nspecific requirements—such as “weighing the equities and\nconsidering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate suc-\ncess”—and dissolves the order or injunction within 20 days\nif the Commission doesn’t issue an administrative complaint.\n§ 53(b). These demands don’t apply to equitable restitution,\nwhich has its own preconditions. See Great-West Life &\nAnnuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212–15 (2002).\n True, this appeal concerns section 13(b)’s permanent-\ninjunction provision, not the provision governing temporary\nrestraining orders and preliminary injunctions, which is tied\nto the subsequent initiation of an administrative proceeding.\nAnd we have held that at least some of section 13(b)’s re-\nquirements don’t apply to permanent injunctions. See United\nStates v. JS & A Grp., 716 F.2d 451, 456–57 (7th Cir. 1983)\n(holding that the Commission can seek a permanent injunc-\ntion without initiating an internal adjudication). But see FTC\nv. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2019)\n(requiring the Commission to allege an ongoing or imminent\nviolation to receive a permanent injunction). But that’s\nbeside the point. Even if some of section 13(b)’s requirements\ndo not apply to permanent injunctions, they inform the\nmeaning of “injunction.” We see no contextual support for\ngiving vastly different meanings to section 13(b)’s two uses\nof the word “injunction.” See Hall v. United States, 566 U.S.\n506, 519 (2012) (“At bottom, identical words and phrases\nwithin the same statute should normally be given the same\nmeaning.”) (quotation marks omitted). And in any event, we\nhaven’t drawn an interpretive distinction in the past. See FTC\nv. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding\nthat section 13(b)’s preliminary-injunction provision also\nauthorizes implied equitable relief).\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 17\n\n The FTCA’s two other enforcement provisions amplify\nthe poor fit between section 13(b) and restitution. Both use\nmore than the word “injunction” to authorize other forms of\nequitable relief. As discussed, when a person violates a final\ncease-and-desist order, the district courts are empowered to\n“grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further\nequitable relief as they deem appropriate.” § 45(l) (emphasis\nadded). And when someone engages in conduct prohibited\nby a rule, the FTCA authorizes “such relief as the court finds\nnecessary … , [including] the refund of money or return of\nproperty.” § 57b(b) (emphasis added).\n The absence of similar language in section 13(b) is con-\nspicuous. “[W]here Congress includes particular language in\none section of a statute but omits it in another section of the\nsame Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts inten-\ntionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclu-\nsion.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 430 (quotation marks omitted). This\ninstruction applies with particular force here, where Con-\ngress simultaneously expanded § 45(l) to allow for “other\nand further equitable relief” and enacted section 13(b)\nwithout this language. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-\ntion Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576, 591 (1973).\nMoreover, Congress expressly approved restitution as a\nremedy under § 57b(b) two years after enacting section 13(b).\nSee Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 206,\n88 Stat. 2183, 2202 (1975). If section 13(b) permitted restitu-\ntion as a general matter, Congress would have had no reason\nto enact § 57b, which authorizes restitution under narrower\ncircumstances.\n Remedial scope isn’t the only difference between section\n13(b) and the FTCA’s other enforcement mechanisms. The\n\n18 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nlatter procedures also impose a detailed framework that the\nCommission must follow before obtaining a restitution\norder. This framework counterbalances the FTCA’s amor-\nphous “unfair or deceptive practices” standard by requiring\nthe Commission to give defendants fair notice, either\nthrough cease-and-desist orders or rules that “define with\nspecificity” prohibited acts. §§ 45(b); 57a(a)(1). The Commis-\nsion can bypass these notice requirements only if it obtains a\ncease-and-desist order against a violator, brings a suit in\ncourt, and then establishes that the prohibited practice “is\none which a reasonable man would have known under the\ncircumstances was dishonest or fraudulent.” § 57b(a)(2).\nFinally, the FTCA imposes a three-year statute of limitations\non bringing actions against most violators. § 57b(d).\n Section 13(b) doesn’t offer any of these protections. And\nyet the Commission contends that it provides an unqualified\nright to the very remedies that the FTCA’s other enforcement\nprovisions give with heavy qualification. Reading an im-\nplied restitution remedy into section 13(b) makes these other\nprovisions largely pointless. Without a clear textual signal,\nwe cannot presume that Congress implicitly made such a\nconsequential shift in policy. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking\nAss’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress … does not\nalter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in\nvague terms or ancillary provisions … .”).\n The tensions we’ve just discussed dissipate if we read\nsection 13(b) to mean what it says: The remedy is limited to\ninjunctive relief. In fact, giving section 13(b) its plain mean-\ning harmonizes the three enforcement mechanisms. The\nFTCA gives the Commission a pair of backward-facing\nmethods to obtain monetary relief for past injury. Its cease-\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 19\n\nand-desist power targets individual violations. See § 45(b).\nAnd its rule-enforcement authority under § 57b(a)(1) allows\nit to more efficiently address widespread unfair or deceptive\npractices. See Parrillo, supra, at 225–26.\n Section 13(b) serves a different, forward-facing role: en-\njoining ongoing and imminent future violations. This au-\nthority aligns with the predicate requirements it imposes—\nnotably, a reasonable belief that a violation is ongoing or\nimminent and that stopping the violation is in the public\ninterest. § 53(b). It also explains the lack of procedural\nprotections. As Congress reported when enacting section\n13(b), the Commission’s existing enforcement processes\ncouldn’t quickly address ongoing or imminent violations. See\n§ 408(a)(1), 87 Stat. 576, 591 (finding that the Commission\nhad “been restricted and hampered because of inadequate\nlegal authority … to seek preliminary injunctive relief to\navoid unfair competitive practices”) (emphasis added).\nSection 13(b) corrected this problem, providing an expedited\npathway to injunctive relief. See id. § 408(b) (noting that the\n“purpose of [the] act” was to give the Commission “the\nrequisite authority to insure prompt enforcement of the laws\n[it] administers by granting statutory authority … to seek\npreliminary injunctive relief”) (emphasis added).\n The Commission’s argument to the contrary rests almost\nentirely on the saving clause in § 57b(e): “Remedies provid-\ned in this section are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any\nother remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal\nlaw. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any\nauthority of the Commission under any other provision of\nlaw.” According to the Commission, § 57b(e) explains away\n\n20 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nthe tensions that its reading of section 13(b) otherwise\ncreates.\n We disagree for two reasons. To start, the Commission’s\nunderstanding of the saving clause runs against more than a\ncentury of interpretive practice. The Supreme Court has long\ninstructed that acts “cannot be held to destroy [themselves]”\nthrough saving clauses. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton\nOil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907); accord Adams Express Co. v.\nCroninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507 (1913); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,\nInc., 426 U.S. 290, 299 (1976); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office\nTel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 228 (1998). Put differently, we cannot\nread a saving clause to “allow specific provisions of the\nstatute that contains it to be nullified.” PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-\nWilliams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir. 1998). This principle\nextends to claims that a particular statutory provision im-\nplicitly authorizes new remedies. See Middlesex Cty. Sewerage\nAuth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1981) (“It\nis doubtful that the phrase ‘any statute’ [in a saving clause]\nincludes the very statute in which this statement was con-\ntained.”). As we’ve explained, the Commission’s reading of\nsection 13(b) effectively nullifies § 57b. We cannot read\n§ 57b(e) to authorize that self-defeating effect.\n And even if the Commission’s reading of the saving\nclause were correct, we couldn’t infer a right to restitution in\nsection 13(b). The saving clause preserves only those reme-\ndies that exist. It does not inform the question whether\nsection 13(b) contains an implied power to award restitution.\n The Commission also suggests that Congress “ratified”\nan implied section 13(b) restitution remedy in its 1993 and\n2006 amendments to the FTCA. We disagree. The 1993\namendment reworked section 13(b)’s venue and service-of-\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 21\n\nprocess provisions but didn’t alter its remedial scope. The\n2006 amendment fares no better as a prop for the Commis-\nsion’s argument. It simply empowered the Commission to\nuse “[a]ll remedies available to [it] with respect to unfair and\ndeceptive acts or practices … , including restitution,” when\nprosecuting certain violations in foreign commerce.\n§ 45(a)(4)(B). The Commission contends that the use of\n“restitution” in this provision refers to an implied restitution\nremedy in section 13(b). But the FTCA expressly authorizes\nrestitution through § 45(l) and § 57b(b). So the 2006 amend-\nment says nothing about the Commission’s authority to seek\nthat remedy under section 13(b).\n In short, nothing in the text or structure of the FTCA\nsupports an implied right to restitution in section 13(b),\nwhich by its terms authorizes only injunctions. Unsurpris-\ningly, the Commission wagers nearly all of its case on stare\ndecisis rather than the plain meaning of section 13(b). So we\nturn to that question.\n 2. The Road to Amy Travel\n The Commission correctly observes that we addressed a\nmaterially identical challenge to the scope of section 13(b) in\nAmy Travel, 875 F.2d 564. Brown in turn invites us to revisit\nthat decision in light of intervening Supreme Court deci-\nsions. We of course can do so. “Although we must give\nconsiderable weight to our prior decisions, we are not bound\nby them absolutely and may overturn circuit precedent for\ncompelling reasons.” Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir.\n2005). An intervening Supreme Court decision that displaces\nthe rationale of our precedent is one such reason. See Glaser\nv. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir.\n2009).\n\n22 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\n Brown’s invitation implicates a line of Supreme Court\nprecedents long predating Amy Travel. The prevailing inter-\npretation of section 13(b) developed in the shadow of two\ndecisions that took a capacious view of implied remedies:\nPorter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), and Mitchell\nv. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960). To under-\nstand Amy Travel, we must begin with them.\n Porter considered section 205(a) of the Emergency Price\nControl Act of 1942, which limited the rent that certain\nlandlords could collect from their tenants. The act empow-\nered district courts to issue a “permanent or temporary\ninjunction, restraining order, or other order” against persons\nwho collect rents above its limits. Porter, 328 U.S. at 397. The\nCourt held that section 205(a) authorizes restitution, offering\nthis reasoning:\n Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the\n inherent equitable powers of the District Court\n are available for the proper and complete exer-\n cise of [its equitable] jurisdiction. … Unless a\n statute in so many words, or by a necessary\n and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s\n jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that ju-\n risdiction is to be recognized and applied. The\n great principles of equity, securing complete\n justice, should not be yielded to light infer-\n ences, or doubtful construction.\nId. at 398 (citations and quotation marks omitted).\n Porter later clarified that implied remedies must be “con-\nsistent with the statutory language and policy, the legislative\nbackground and the public interest.” Id. at 403; see also id. at\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 23\n\n400 (“In framing such remedies under § 205(a), courts must\nact primarily to effectuate the policy of the Emergency Price\nControl Act and to protect the public interest while giving\nnecessary respect to the private interests involved.”). In\nshort, Porter adopted a presumption in favor of implying\nequitable remedies that accord with statutory purpose. But it\nalso recognized that an express statement or a “necessary\nand inescapable inference” to the contrary could rebut this\npresumption. Id. at 398.\n Returning to the Price Control Act, the Court held that\nrestitution was a proper “other order” under section 205(a).\nId. at 399. It offered two justifications. First, restitution could\nbe an “equitable adjunct to an injunction.” Id. Second, resti-\ntution advanced the purpose of the statute. See id. at 400\n(“[T]he statutory policy of preventing inflation is plainly\nadvanced if prices or rents which have been collected in the\npast are reduced to their legal maximums.”). Still, the Court\nfound that an “inescapable inference” foreclosed one partic-\nular remedy. The statute’s separate right of action for dam-\nages “provide[d] an exclusive remedy relative to damages.”\nId. at 401. But “save [this] one aspect,” the statute invoked\n“the broad equitable jurisdiction that inheres in courts.” Id.\nat 403.\n In Mitchell the Court applied Porter to section 17 of the\nFair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), which gave district\ncourts the jurisdiction to “restrain violations” of the statuto-\nry prohibition on firing employees for reporting workplace\nviolations. 361 U.S. at 289. After quoting Porter’s broad\nlanguage about equitable remedies, Mitchell reiterated that\nimplied remedies must fit with the statutory purpose:\n“When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement\n\n24 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nof prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must\nbe taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of\nequity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory\npurposes.” Id. at 291–92.\n Applying Porter’s presumption, the Court drew on its\nunderstanding of the FLSA’s purpose, which was to achieve\n“minimum labor standards” by using worker complaints as\na private enforcement mechanism. Id. at 292. The Court\nreasoned that restitution furthered that purpose. Without it,\nthe “fear of economic retaliation” would stifle worker com-\nplaints. Id.\n Mitchell then assessed whether anything in the FLSA pre-\ncluded restitution as an implied remedy. The defendants\npointed to the statute’s ban on awarding unpaid minimum\nwages and overtime compensation as one such provision,\nbut the Court disagreed. It found “no indication in the\nlanguage of the [ban], or in the legislative history, that\nCongress intended [it] to have a wider effect.” Id. at 294.\n Porter and Mitchell were typical of their era: The Court\nwould resolve ambiguities by identifying a statute’s purpose\nand “deducing the result most consonant with that pur-\npose.” William N. Eskridge Jr., Politics Without Romance:\nImplications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,\n74 VA. L. REV. 275, 282 (1988); see also John F. Manning,\nForeword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV.\n1, 16–17 (2014) (“However clearly Congress framed its\nstatutes, the Court could rework them to fit with the back-\nground policies that inspired them.”). Using this interpretive\napproach, the Court assumed that the judiciary could freely\ncraft remedies to fully enforce whatever rights Congress had\nrecognized. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 25\n\nand the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 45–51 (1983). As\nthe Court would proclaim four years after Mitchell, “it is the\nduty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are\nnecessary to make effective the congressional purpose.”\nJ. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).\n * * *\n Lower-court interpretations of section 13(b) built on\nPorter and Mitchell. The trail starts with FTC v. H. N. Singer,\nInc., 668 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1982). There the Ninth Circuit\nheld that section 13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision\nimplicitly authorizes preliminary injunctions and asset\nfreezes.2 Id. at 1113. While its analysis was cursory, Singer\nchanneled Porter and Mitchell. The court held that prelimi-\nnary injunctions and asset freezes advanced section 13(b)’s\npurpose by ensuring that assets were available at the end of\nthe enforcement process. Singer also rejected the defendant’s\nclaim that the express equitable remedies in § 57b foreclosed\nimplied remedies in section 13(b), pointing to the saving\nclause in § 57b(e).\n Singer sparked a line of appellate cases holding that sec-\ntion 13(b) is a broad grant of equitable authority. The Elev-\n\n\n2 Shortly before Singer, the Fifth Circuit held that section 13(b)’s\npreliminary-injunction provision implicitly authorizes asset freezes. See\nFTC v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 718 (5th Cir. 1982). But its holding\nappeared to preclude the possibility of restitution in section 13(b),\npointing instead to § 57b for monetary remedies. Id. at 719 (“[T]he\nexhortation in [Mitchell] to preserve the possibility of complete relief …\nmakes it appropriate to consider that the final, complete relief in this case\nmay entail consumer redress through a [§ 57b] proceeding.”). Predicta-\nbly, no circuit has materially relied on Southwest Sunsites to support an\nimplied restitution award.\n\n26 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nenth Circuit followed Singer’s lead two years later. After\nquoting Porter’s language on implied remedies, the court\nconcluded that it “agree[d] with Singer’s interpretation of\n[section] 13(b)” and without further discussion held that\nsection 13(b) authorizes asset freezes. FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas\nCorp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).\n Our decision in FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc.,\n861 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1988), was next. There, the defendant\npassingly suggested that section 13(b)’s permanent-\ninjunction provision does not implicitly authorize prelimi-\nnary injunctions. (Recall that the statute’s express authoriza-\ntion for temporary restraining orders and preliminary\ninjunctions is tied to the eventual initiation of an administra-\ntive proceeding.) We held that the defendant waived the\nargument, but we discussed the issue anyway “in order to\nsatisfactorily explain our disposition of … other issues.” Id.\nat 1026. Because it was dicta, our reasoning was understand-\nably brief. We simply quoted language from Singer and\nnoted that we had “no reason to disagree with the conclu-\nsion of our colleagues of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits\nthat the authority to grant permanent injunctive relief also\nincludes the authority to grant interlocutory relief.” Id. Other\nthan distinguishing a prior decision, we did not discuss the\nmatter further.\n Two months after World Travel, we concluded in Elders\nGrain that section 13(b)’s preliminary-injunction provision\nimplicitly authorizes rescission. 868 F.2d at 907. Perhaps\nbecause the parties didn’t dispute the issue, our analysis was\nagain cursory. But it was highly consequential. We articulat-\ned a new standard for inferring equitable remedies: “[T]he\nstatutory grant of the power to issue a preliminary injunc-\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 27\n\ntion carries with it the power to issue whatever ancillary\nequitable relief is necessary to the effective exercise of the\ngranted power.” Id. Notably absent was any inquiry into\nwhether an implied remedy was compatible with the statu-\ntory text and structure or whether Congress precluded the\nimplied remedy. We instead would permit whatever implied\nremedies furthered the exercise of the express remedy.\n The effect of this reasoning was evident in our justifica-\ntion for inferring the power to order rescission. We simply\nrestated the facts of the case, which involved a transaction\ntimed to avoid the Commission’s review, and observed that\n“[t]o reward these tactics by holding that a district court has\nno power under section 13(b) to rescind a consummated\ntransaction would go far toward rendering the statute a dead\nletter.” Id.\n We extended Elders Grain to the permanent-injunction\nprovision three months later in Amy Travel. The district court\nhad ordered the defendants to pay more than $6 million in\nrestitution to the Commission. Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 570.\nThe defendants argued on appeal that nothing in section\n13(b) authorized monetary relief. We disagreed, explaining\nthat our then-recent decisions in World Travel and Elders\nGrain “thwarted” the defendants’ arguments. Id. at 571. In\nparticular, we said that the reasoning in Elders Grain applied\n“with equal force” to the permanent-injunction provision.\nWe adopted that expansive formulation, holding that section\n13(b)’s “statutory grant of authority to the district court to\nissue permanent injunctions includes the power to order any\nancillary equitable relief necessary to effectuate the exercise\nof the granted powers.” Id. at 572. But unlike Elders Grain, we\nnever addressed how an award of restitution was “necessary\n\n28 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nto effectuate the exercise” of the power to issue an injunc-\ntion. We simply noted that restitution was a “proper form[]\nof ancillary relief.” Id. at 571.\n Our approach in Amy Travel became the standard. Some\ncircuits held, on a similarly brief analysis, that section 13(b)\ncategorically authorizes the court’s “full equitable powers,”\nincluding restitution. See FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d\n466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); FTC v. Sec. Rare\nCoin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314–15 (8th Cir. 1991).\nOthers simply cited Amy Travel or other decisions to reach\nthe same conclusion. See FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC,\n654 F.3d 359, 365 (2d Cir. 2011); FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns,\nInc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005); FTC v. Pantron I.\nCorp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994); see also FTC v. Ross,\n743 F.3d 886, 891 (4th Cir. 2014) (conceding that “arguments\nabout how the structure, history, and purpose of the [FTCA]\nweigh against the conclusion that district courts have the\nauthority to award consumer redress … are not entirely\nunpersuasive” but allowing restitution because of Porter,\nMitchell, and uniform circuit practice).\n To be sure, these decisions have attracted some judicial\nskepticism. See Shire ViroPharma, 917 F.3d at 156, 161 n.19\n(declining to decide whether section 13(b) authorizes mone-\ntary relief but concluding that it wasn’t “meant to duplicate\n[§ 45(b)], which already prohibits past conduct”); FTC v.\nAMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 2018)\n(O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the prevailing\ninterpretation). But the view that section 13(b) implicitly\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 29\n\nauthorizes restitution has largely escaped critical examina-\ntion.3\n We have affirmed restitution awards under section 13(b)\nthree times since Amy Travel. See United States v. Tankersley,\n96 F. App’x 419, 422 (7th Cir. 2004); FTC v. Think Achievement\nCorp., 312 F.3d 259, 262 (7th Cir. 2002); FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d\n530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997). But Brown is the first litigant to\nquestion our precedent.\n 3. Modern Implied-Remedies Jurisprudence\n The Supreme Court’s understanding of implied remedies\nevolved after Porter and Mitchell. Though the Court contin-\nued to presume that courts could “use any available remedy\nto afford full relief” when a party had a general statutory\ncause of action, over time it began to emphasize that this\npresumption “yields where necessary to carry out the intent\nof Congress or to avoid frustrating the purposes of the\nstatute involved.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,\n524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998) (quoting Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.\nComm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (White, J., op.)); see also\nCalifornia v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981) (“The federal\n\n\n3 Chief Judge Wood’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc relies\nheavily on FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011), but\nthere the Second Circuit summarily followed the lead of other circuits in\nreading section 13(b) to include an implied power to order restitution. Id.\nat 365. The court quickly moved on to, and thoroughly considered, a\nwholly different question: whether the implied restitution remedy is\nequitable or legal. The lengthy passages quoted in the chief judge’s\ndissent relate to that second-order question. Moreover, Bronson rejected\nthe view that the plain meaning of “injunction” encompasses restitution.\nId. at 367 (approving restitution because “section 13(b) does not limit the\ndistrict court to awarding only injunctions”) (emphasis added).\n\n30 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\njudiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter\nhow salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide.”). In\nparticular, the Court now recognizes the importance of\nCongress’s choice to specify forms of relief. See, e.g., Franklin\nv. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 69 n.6 (1992) (noting\nthat the presumption in favor of relief doesn’t apply “under\na statute that expressly enumerated the remedies available to\nplaintiffs”); see also Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps.,\n489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989) (“It is … an elemental canon of\nstatutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-\nvides a remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to pro-\nvide additional remedies.”) (quotation marks omitted).\n A prominent example is ERISA. Because Congress has\nestablished a comprehensive remedial scheme for plaintiffs\nto enforce their rights under an employee-benefits plan, the\nCourt has refused to infer additional extracontractual dam-\nages remedies. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.\n134, 146 (1985) (“The presumption that a remedy was delib-\nerately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress\nhas enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including\nan integrated system of procedures for enforcement.”)\n(quotation marks omitted). And where two environmental-\nprotection statutes provide private rights of action for in-\njunctive relief but require plaintiffs to notify defendants 60\ndays before suing, the Court has refused to infer a damages\nremedy or allow plaintiffs to obtain an injunction without\nthe requisite notice. See Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. at\n15 (“In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congres-\nsional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress\nprovided precisely the remedies it considered appropri-\nate.”).\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 31\n\n These decisions collided with Porter and Mitchell in\nMeghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996). Because\nBrown’s challenge centers on Meghrig, it warrants close\nreview. There the Court addressed the Resource Conserva-\ntion and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”), which permits\nprivate parties to sue handlers of “solid or hazardous waste\nwhich may present an imminent and substantial endanger-\nment to health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C.\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B). The statute authorizes district courts “to\nrestrain” any person who contributes to handling the waste,\n“to order such person to take such other action as may be\nnecessary, or both.” § 6972(a). The question in Meghrig was\nwhether § 6972(a) also allowed plaintiffs to recover waste-\ncleanup costs as restitution.\n The Supreme Court refused to find an implied restitu-\ntionary remedy. “Under a plain reading of this remedial\nscheme,” the Court explained, plaintiffs could receive “a\nmandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\n[the] RCRA.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. But neither of these\nforward-facing remedies “contemplates the award of past\ncleanup costs, whether these are denominated ‘damages’ or\n‘equitable restitution.’” Id.\n The Court reinforced its holding by comparing the RCRA\nto the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-\ntion, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C.\n§§ 9601 et seq., which addresses similar toxic-waste issues.\nMeghrig, 516 U.S. at 485. Unlike the RCRA, CERCLA express-\nly authorizes monetary relief. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). “Con-\n\n32 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\ngress thus demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to\nprovide for the recovery of cleanup costs[] and that the\nlanguage used to define the remedies under [the] RCRA\ndoes not provide that remedy.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485.\n The Court also pointed to the statute’s threshold re-\nquirement that a party can sue only when the waste “may\npresent an imminent and substantial endangerment to\nhealth or the environment.” § 6972(a)(1)(B). “The meaning of\nthis timing restriction [was] plain” to the Court:\n“[S]ection 6972(a) was designed to provide a remedy that\nameliorates present or obviates the risk of future ‘imminent’\nharms, not a remedy that compensates for past cleanup\nefforts.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485–86.\n Finally, the Court looked to “[o]ther aspects of [the]\nRCRA’s enforcement scheme.” Id. at 486. Unlike CERCLA,\nthe RCRA’s citizen-suit provision lacks a statute of limita-\ntions or a requirement that any recovered costs must be\nreasonable. The Court reasoned that “[i]f Congress had\nintended § 6972(a) to function as a cost-recovery mechanism,\nthe absence of these provisions would be striking.” Id. The\nRCRA also halts citizen suits when the EPA or a state pur-\nsues an enforcement action, and it requires plaintiffs to give\n90-days’ notice to potential defendants before suing. See id.\nThese two requirements made § 6972(a) a “wholly irrational\nmechanism” for remedying past harms. Id.\n The Court then acknowledged the “line of cases holding\nthat district courts retain inherent authority to award any\nequitable remedy that is not expressly taken away from\nthem by Congress.” Id. at 487 (citing Porter, 328 U.S. 395). But\nthese cases couldn’t support an implied restitution remedy.\nAs the Court put it:\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 33\n\n [T]he limited remedies described in § 6972(a),\n along with the stark differences between the\n language of that section and the cost-recovery\n provisions of CERCLA, amply demonstrate\n that Congress did not intend for a private citi-\n zen to be able to undertake a cleanup and then\n proceed to recover its costs under [the]\n RCRA. … [W]here Congress has provided\n elaborate enforcement provisions for remedy-\n ing the violation of a federal statute, as Con-\n gress has done with [the] RCRA and CERCLA,\n it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to\n authorize by implication additional judicial\n remedies for private citizens suing under the\n statute. It is an elemental canon of statutory\n construction that where a statute expressly\n provides a particular remedy or remedies, a\n court must be chary of reading others into it.\nId. at 487–88 (quotation marks omitted). Notwithstanding\nPorter, the Court held that § 6972(a) does not “contemplate\nthe award of past cleanup costs.” Id. at 488.\n Since Meghrig, the Court has adhered to this more limited\nunderstanding of judicially implied remedies. See, e.g., Great-\nWest, 534 U.S. at 209 (“We have therefore been especially\nreluctant to tamper with the enforcement scheme embodied\nin [ERISA] by extending remedies not specifically author-\nized by its text.”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted);\nMiller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000) (concluding that the\nplain meaning of a provision expressed the congressional\nintent to displace equitable authority); see also Armstrong v.\nExceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1385 (2015) (hold-\n\n34 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\ning that the Medicaid Act’s provision of a specific remedy\nand the judicially unadministrable nature of the relevant\nstatutory provision “preclude[d] the availability of equitable\nrelief” in section 30(A) of the statute); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284\n(holding that courts cannot enlarge the “scope of available\nremedies” under an implied right of action “in a manner at\nodds with the statutory structure and purpose”). Rather than\npresuming that Congress authorizes the judiciary to sup-\nplement express statutory remedies, the Court now recog-\nnizes that “the express provision of one method of enforcing\na substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to pre-\nclude others.” Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385.\n 4. Revisiting Amy Travel\n As this perhaps drawn-out discussion shows, an explora-\ntion of statutory purpose is no longer the Supreme Court’s\npolestar in cases raising interpretive questions about the\nscope of statutory remedies, and that shift has unsettled\nPorter’s and Mitchell’s instruction to “provide complete relief\nin light of the statutory purposes.” Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292;\nsee also Singer, 668 F.2d at 1113 (grounding its reading of\nsection 13(b) on this premise). See generally Manning, supra,\nat 23 (“[W]here ‘the statutory language is clear,’ the Court\nhas disclaimed the need even ‘to reach arguments based on\nstatutory purpose[] [or] legislative history.’” (quoting Boyle v.\nUnited States, 556 U.S. 938, 950 (2009))); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE\nJR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES\nAND THE CONSTITUTION 81 (2016) (“We are all textualists.\nThat means that a judge must relate all sources of and\narguments about statutory interpretation to a text the legisla-\nture has enacted.”). Indeed, the Court has “abandoned” its\nprior understanding that judges must “be alert to provide\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 35\n\nsuch remedies as are necessary to make effective the con-\ngressional purpose expressed by a statute.” Alexander v.\nSandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (quotation marks omitted);\naccord Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017). It is now\nwell settled that Congress, not the judiciary, controls the\nscope of remedial relief when a statute provides a cause of\naction. See Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385 (“Courts of equity\ncan no more disregard statutory and constitutional require-\nments and provisions than can courts of law.”) (quotation\nmarks omitted); Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of\nthe Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 465–66 (2010).\n Whatever strength Porter and Mitchell retain, Meghrig\nclarifies that they cannot be used as Amy Travel saw them—a\nlicense to categorically recognize all ancillary forms of\nequitable relief without a close analysis of statutory text and\nstructure. To be sure, the Court still presumes that courts\nretain their “traditional equitable authority.” Miller, 530 U.S.\nat 340. But even under Porter and Mitchell, this authority\ncomes with an important qualifier: “unless otherwise pro-\nvided by statute.” Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at\n291. Unsurprisingly, every appellate court to consider the\nrelationship between Meghrig, Porter, and Mitchell recognizes\nthat Meghrig reinforced and clarified this qualifier.\n Some circuits have concluded that a statute displaces eq-\nuitable authority when it specifies a particular remedy. See\nOwner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Swift Transp. Co.,\n632 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that a statutory\nprovision allowing a person to seek “injunctive relief” acted\n“to the exclusion of other equitable remedies”); Landstar Sys.,\n622 F.3d at 1324 (noting that the statute at issue authorized\nonly injunctions and concluding that if it “allowed for\n\n36 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nrestitution or disgorgement, it would have so stated”).\nOthers more narrowly construe Meghrig as a command that\n“courts must consider a statute’s remedial scheme” when\ndetermining whether a statute displaces equitable authority.\nSee United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 235 (3d\nCir. 2005); see also United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d\n1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 2006) (reading Meghrig as showing that\n“a statute’s particular characteristics” can displace equitable\nauthority).\n The D.C. Circuit thoroughly examined the effect of\nMeghrig in United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d\n1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Harmonizing Meghrig and Porter, it\nheld that a statute’s “comprehensive and reticulated scheme,\nalong with the plain meaning of the words themselves,\nserves to raise a necessary and inescapable inference, suffi-\ncient under Porter, that Congress intended to limit relief.” Id.\nat 1200 (quotation marks and citation omitted).\n We don’t need to plant ourselves firmly along this doctri-\nnal spectrum to decide this case. It’s inescapable that Meghrig\nnot only displaced Amy Travel’s categorical approach to\njudicially implied remedies but also its interpretation of\nsection 13(b). Every one of Meghrig’s reasons for refusing to\nfind restitutionary authority in the RCRA applies with equal\nforce to section 13(b).\n Like the RCRA, section 13(b)’s plain text doesn’t contem-\nplate an award of restitution. See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. It\nauthorizes only temporary restraining orders and injunc-\ntions. And like the relationship between the RCRA and\nCERCLA, the relationship between section 13(b), § 45(l), and\n§ 57b(b) “is telling.” Id. at 485. Both § 45(l) and § 57b(b)\nexpressly authorize additional equitable remedies. § 45(l)\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 37\n\n(“mandatory injunctions and such other and further equita-\nble relief as [courts] deem appropriate”); § 57b(b) (“such\nrelief as the court finds necessary … , [including] the refund\nof money or return of property”). Section 13(b) lacks compa-\nrable language.\n Meghrig also instructs us to interpret remedial language\nwith reference to “the harm at which it is directed.” 516 U.S.\nat 485. While the FTCA’s express restitution provisions\nauthorize the Commission to sue for past conduct, to pro-\nceed under section 13(b), the Commission must reasonably\nbelieve that a person “is violating” or “about to violate” the\nlaw. § 53(b)(1); cf. § 45(b) (empowering the Commission to\nbring a cease-and-desist action when it reasonably believes\nsomeone “has been or is” violating the act). As with the\nRCRA, “[t]he meaning of this timing restriction is plain.”\nMeghrig, 516 U.S. at 485. Section 13(b) “was designed to\nprovide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates the\nrisk of future ‘imminent’ harms, not a remedy that compen-\nsates” for past violations. Id. at 486.\n Further, as we’ve explained, section 13(b) is procedurally\nincompatible with restitution. For example, before invoking\nsection 13(b), the Commission must reasonably believe that\nstopping an ongoing or imminent violation is in the public\ninterest. § 53(b)(2). And the statute dissolves a preliminary\ninjunction if the Commission doesn’t begin an administrative\nproceeding before a court-set deadline. § 53(b). But the\nCommission would have no need for an administrative\nproceeding if it can get complete restitutionary relief\nthrough section 13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision. In\nshort, section 13(b)’s prerequisites, like those in the RCRA,\n\n38 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nmake it a “wholly irrational mechanism” for remedying past\nharms. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486.\n Relatedly, unlike § 57b(b), section 13(b) has no statute of\nlimitations. The absence of a limitations period in the RCRA\nwas “striking” to the Meghrig Court and provided strong\nevidence that the RCRA’s injunction provision did not\nimplicitly authorize restitution. Id. The same is true here.\n Section 13(b) also lacks a central feature of the FTCA pro-\nvisions that expressly permit monetary relief: a notice re-\nquirement. When the Commission brings an administrative\ncease-and-desist action, it can secure restitution only by\nproving that the violation occurred after its order became\nfinal or that “a reasonable man” would have known that the\nconduct was fraudulent. §§ 45(l); 57b(a)(2). And notice is also\nbaked into the Commission’s power to promulgate and\nenforce rules. The Commission must follow detailed proce-\ndures before promulgating a final rule. See id. § 57a(b)(1)\n(requiring publication of notice and an informal hearing for\nrulemaking). Moreover, final rules must “define with speci-\nficity” the prohibited acts. § 57a(a)(1)(B).\n The Supreme Court has held that similar provisions are\ncrucial to determining the remedial scope of implied rights\nof action, a closely related context: “It would be unsound …\nfor a statute’s express system of enforcement to require notice\nto the recipient and an opportunity to come into voluntary\ncompliance while a judicially implied system of enforcement\npermits substantial liability without regard to the recipient’s\nknowledge or its corrective actions upon receiving notice.”\nGebser, 524 U.S. at 289. We face the same unsound result\nhere: Reading an implied restitution remedy into section\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 39\n\n13(b) allows the Commission to circumvent the FTCA’s\ndetailed notice requirements.\n Finally, we note that the difference in plaintiffs—private\ncitizens in Meghrig and a federal agency here—isn’t material.\nTo be sure, when “the public interest is involved in a pro-\nceeding,” a court’s “equitable powers assume an even\nbroader and more flexible character than when only a pri-\nvate controversy is at stake.” Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; accord\nKansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1053 (2015). But the public\ninterest doesn’t turn on the identity of the parties involved.\n Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S.\n515, 552 (1937), the authority Porter cited to invoke the\n“public interest,” is instructive on this point. Even though\nthe suit was between a railroad company and a union, the\nCourt determined that “[m]ore [was] involved than the\nsettlement of a private controversy.” Id. “The peaceable\nsettlement of labor controversies … is a matter of public\nconcern.” Id.; see also id. (“The fact that Congress has indicat-\ned its purpose to make negotiation obligatory is in itself a\ndeclaration of public interest and policy … .”). Presaging\nPorter, the Court observed that “[c]ourts of equity may, and\nfrequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold\nrelief in furtherance of the public interest than they are\naccustomed to go when only private interests are involved.”\nId.; cf. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326\n& n.8 (1980) (“When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of\nand for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to\nvindicate the public interest in preventing employment\ndiscrimination.” (citing Porter, 328 U.S. at 397–98)).\n Under Virginian Railway Co., both Meghrig and this case\nimplicate the public interest. Both involve enforcing federal\n\n40 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\nstatutory obligations, and both involve matters of “public\nconcern”—environmental cleanup and consumer protection.\nEven so, Meghrig did not find an implied right to restitution\nin the RCRA. So the fact that the government is the plaintiff\nhere does not affect the analysis. Consider United States v.\nApex Oil Co., in which we examined Meghrig’s impact on\n42 U.S.C. § 6973(a), the RCRA’s government-suit provision.\n579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009). We did not draw a distinction\nbetween the RCRA’s government and citizen-suit provisions.\nObserving that the provisions use “identical language,” we\nconcluded that the RCRA “entitles the government only to\nrequire the defendant to clean up the contaminated site at\nthe defendant’s expense.” Id. at 737. We then announced that\nour “[e]arlier cases, … which allowed an award of clean-up\ncosts on the basis of general equitable principles set forth in\nsuch cases as Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., and\nPorter v. Warner Holding Co., are dead after Meghrig.” Id.\n(citations omitted).\n Although section 13(b) doesn’t use identical language as\nthe RCRA’s citizen-suit provision, Meghrig remains material-\nly indistinguishable. So we must pay close attention to its\nbottom line: “[W]here Congress has provided elaborate\nenforcement provisions for remedying the violation of a\nfederal statute, … it cannot be assumed that Congress in-\ntended to authorize by implication additional judicial reme-\ndies … .” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487–88 (emphasis added)\n(quotation marks omitted); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290\n(“Where a statute’s express enforcement scheme hinges its\nmost severe sanction on notice and unsuccessful efforts to\nobtain compliance, we cannot attribute to Congress the\nintention to have implied an enforcement scheme that allows\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 41\n\nimposition of greater liability without comparable condi-\ntions.”) (emphasis added).\n Our limited analysis in Amy Travel doesn’t offer a way to\ndistinguish Meghrig. It instead requires us to ignore section\n13(b)’s text and disregard the FTCA’s “elaborate enforcement\nprovisions.” In light of the Court’s commands in Meghrig,\nour holding in Amy Travel is no longer viable. Conversely,\nreading section 13(b) as authorizing only injunctive relief—\nthat is, reading it to mean what it plainly says—harmonizes\nMeghrig with Porter and Mitchell, which also called for a\nstatute-specific and remedy-specific inquiry before authoriz-\ning an implied form of relief. See, e.g., Porter, 328 U.S. at 403\n(holding that a separate cause of action for damages was\nenough to preclude courts from inferring that remedy\nelsewhere).\n We recognize that this conclusion departs from the con-\nsensus view of our sister circuits. But when deciding wheth-\ner we should overturn precedent, “[w]e are not merely to\ncount noses. The parties are entitled to our independent\njudgment.” United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228, 232 (7th Cir.\n1995). And we must break from our colleagues. As noted,\nmost circuits adopted their position by uncritically accepting\nour holding in Amy Travel, which expanded on Elders Grain,\nwhich expanded on Singer, which expanded on Porter and\nMitchell. No circuit has examined whether reading a restitu-\ntion remedy into section 13(b) comports with the FTCA’s text\nand structure. Nor has anyone determined whether § 45\nforecloses this remedy. And although some have briefly\ndiscussed § 57b, they have done so only to find refuge in the\nsaving clause in § 57b(e). Perhaps most importantly, no\n\n42 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\ncircuit has ever considered the effect of Meghrig in a section\n13(b) case.\n We are well aware that we need a compelling reason to\noverturn circuit precedent. “However, important as stare\ndecisis is, it is equally important for us to respect the statutes\nthat Congress has passed and to correct any problems we see\nin our prior interpretations of those statutes.” Ahng v. All-\nsteel, 96 F.3d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir. 1996); see also S. Ill. Power\nCoop. v. EPA, 863 F.3d 666, 673 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that\nstatutory stare decisis “is not without limits”). Even in the\nrealm of statutory interpretation, a Supreme Court decision\n“on an analogous issue that compels us to reconsider our\nposition” counts as a compelling reason to overturn prece-\ndent. Glaser, 570 F.3d at 915. We cannot favor our own\ndecisions over those of the Supreme Court.\n Stare decisis alone cannot overcome Amy Travel’s clear\nincompatibilities with the FTCA’s text and structure,\nMeghrig, and the Supreme Court’s broader refinement of its\nimplied remedies jurisprudence. We therefore hold that\nsection 13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision does not\nauthorize monetary relief.4\n\n\n\n\n4 Because we hold that section 13(b) doesn’t authorize monetary relief,\nwe have no need to consider Brown’s alternative arguments that the\nCommission can’t pursue penalties or legal—as distinct from equitable—\nrestitution under section 13(b). See FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC,\n910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 2018) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (discussing\nthese arguments). We also don’t need to consider the district court’s\nasset-freeze determinations.\n\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 43\n\n III. Conclusion\n For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the restitution\naward. In all other respects, we AFFIRM the judgment.\n\n44 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\n\n WOOD, Chief Judge, with whom ROVNER and HAMILTON,\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\nFEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nCREDIT BUREAU CENTER, LLC,\\nand MICHAEL BROWN,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 17 C 194 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 17, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n SYKES, Circuit Judge. Michael Brown is the sole owner and\\noperator of Credit Bureau Center, a credit-monitoring ser-\\nvice. (We refer to both collectively as “Brown.”) Brown’s\\nwebsites used what’s known as a “negative option feature”\\nto attract customers. The websites offered a “free credit\\nreport and score” while obscuring a key detail in much\\nsmaller text: that applying for this “free” information auto-\\n\\n2 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nmatically enrolled customers in an unspecified $29.94\\nmonthly “membership” subscription. The subscription was\\nfor Brown’s credit-monitoring service, but customers learned\\nthis information only when he sent them a letter after they\\nwere automatically enrolled. Brown’s most successful con-\\ntractor capitalized on the confusion by posting Craigslist\\nadvertisements for fake rental properties and telling appli-\\ncants to get a “free” credit score from Brown’s websites.\\n The Federal Trade Commission eventually took notice. It\\nsued Brown under section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Com-\\nmission Act (“FTCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), alleging that the\\nwebsites and referral system violated several consumer-\\nprotection statutes. The Commission sought a permanent\\ninjunction and restitution. Relevant here, the district judge\\nfound that Brown was a principal for his contractor’s fraudu-\\nlent scheme and that the websites failed to meet certain\\ndisclosure requirements in the Restore Online Shopper\\nConfidence Act (“ROSCA”). Id. § 8403. The judge entered a\\npermanent injunction and ordered Brown to pay more than\\n$5 million in restitution to the Commission.\\n Brown now concedes liability as a principal for his con-\\ntractor’s Craigslist scam. And he doesn’t dispute that his\\nown websites failed to meet some of ROSCA’s disclosure\\nrequirements. So we have no trouble affirming the judge’s\\ndecision to hold him liable for both. We also affirm the\\nissuance of a permanent injunction. Brown’s argument there\\nrests on an erroneous understanding of the Eighth Amend-\\nment’s Excessive Fines Clause.\\n But the restitution award is a different matter. By its\\nterms, section 13(b) authorizes only restraining orders and\\ninjunctions. But the Commission has long viewed it as also\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 3\\n\\nauthorizing awards of restitution. We endorsed that starkly\\natextual interpretation three decades ago in FTC v. Amy\\nTravel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1989). Since\\nAmy Travel, the Supreme Court has clarified that courts must\\nconsider whether an implied equitable remedy is compatible\\nwith a statute’s express remedial scheme. See Meghrig v. KFC\\nW., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 487–88 (1996). And it has specifically\\ninstructed us not to assume that a statute with “elaborate\\nenforcement provisions” implicitly authorizes other reme-\\ndies. Id. at 487.\\n Applying Meghrig’s instructions, we conclude that section\\n13(b)’s grant of authority to order injunctive relief does not\\nimplicitly authorize an award of restitution. Every reason\\nMeghrig gave for not finding an implied monetary remedy\\napplies here. Most notably, the FTCA has two detailed\\nremedial provisions that expressly authorize restitution if the\\nCommission follows certain procedures. Our current read-\\ning of section 13(b) allows the Commission to circumvent\\nthese elaborate enforcement provisions and seek restitution\\ndirectly through an implied remedy.\\n Stare decisis cannot justify adherence to an approach that\\nSupreme Court precedent forecloses. Accordingly, we over-\\nrule Amy Travel and hold that section 13(b) does not author-\\nize restitutionary relief.1 Because the Commission brought\\nthis case under section 13(b), we vacate the restitution\\naward.\\n\\n\\n\\n1 Because this opinion overrules circuit precedent and creates a circuit\\nsplit, we circulated it under Circuit Rule 40(e) to all judges in active\\nservice. A majority did not favor rehearing en banc.\\n\\n4 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n I. Background\\n In January 2014 Brown contracted with Danny Pierce to\\ndirect customers to his credit-monitoring service. Brown\\ngave Pierce several functionally identical websites with\\nnames like “eFreeScore.com” and “FreeCreditNation.com”\\nto use for referrals. As their names suggest, these websites\\ninvited people to sign up for a “free credit report and score.”\\nBut signing up for the free score also automatically enrolled\\napplicants in Brown’s credit-monitoring service, which\\ncharged a monthly subscription fee.\\n Brown didn’t tell prospective customers about the credit-\\nmonitoring service. His websites almost entirely focused on\\nthe free credit score and report. Three disclaimers, buried in\\nmuch smaller font, told consumers that applying for the free\\noffer also enrolled them in an unspecified “membership”\\nsubscription that cost $29.94 each month. Customers later\\nlearned that this subscription was for credit monitoring\\nwhen Brown sent them a letter after the automatic enroll-\\nment.\\n Pierce did nothing to clear up this confusion. Indeed, it’s\\nundisputed that his method for drumming up referrals was\\nfraudulent. He subcontracted with Andrew Lloyd, who\\nposted Craigslist advertisements for nonexistent rental\\nproperties at bargain prices. Lloyd invited prospective\\ntenants to email the landlord. Posing as the “landlord,” he\\nthen responded and instructed them to obtain a credit report\\nand score through one of Brown’s websites. But once appli-\\ncants got this “free” information—and were automatically\\nenrolled in the credit-monitoring service—Lloyd stopped\\nreplying to emails.\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 5\\n\\n The plan was effective. Pierce quickly became Brown’s\\nmost successful recruiter. Over the course of their relation-\\nship, Pierce referred more than 2.7 million customers to\\nBrown, generating just over $6.8 million in revenue. Unsus-\\npecting customers were understandably upset. They flooded\\nBrown’s customer-service operators, questioning the month-\\nly subscription charge. They complained that the Craigslist\\nadvertisements were scams. And many were blindsided by\\nthe fact that requesting a free credit score automatically\\nenrolled them in a costly credit-monitoring service. Brown\\ntold his customer-service team to deny any involvement\\nwith Pierce’s operation. And although Brown typically\\nagreed to cancel future charges, he often refused to issue\\nrefunds. He also instructed his representatives to offer\\nreduced prices to retain customers. Some customers accept-\\ned the offer, but others told their credit-card companies to\\ncancel Brown’s charges. Credit-card companies cancelled\\nmore than 10,000 of Brown’s charges.\\n Consumers complained to the Commission, which\\nopened an investigation. In January 2017 it sued Brown\\nunder section 13(b) of the FTCA seeking an injunction and\\nrestitution. The Commission alleged that the Craigslist\\nadvertisements violated the FTCA’s prohibition on “unfair or\\ndeceptive acts or practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). The suit also\\nalleged that Brown’s websites violated the same provision of\\nthe FTCA, as well as ROSCA, id. § 8403; the Fair Credit\\nReporting Act (“FCRA”), id. § 1681j(g); and the Free Credit\\nReports Rule, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1022.130–.138.\\n On the Commission’s motion, the judge issued a tempo-\\nrary injunction, froze Brown’s assets, and appointed a re-\\nceiver to manage his company. Brown and the Commission\\n\\n6 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nlater filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In addition\\nto contesting liability, Brown argued that section 13(b)\\ndoesn’t authorize an award of restitution and, alternatively,\\nthat it doesn’t authorize penalties or legal restitution (as\\nopposed to equitable restitution, which requires tracing a\\nplaintiff’s entitlement to a particular account or fund).\\n The judge ruled for the Commission across the board,\\nholding that Brown violated the FTCA as a principal for the\\nCraigslist scheme and that the websites violated the FTCA,\\nROSCA, the FCRA, and the Free Credit Reports Rule. The\\njudge issued a permanent injunction that imposed extensive\\nconditions on Brown’s continued involvement in the credit-\\nmonitoring industry and ordered Brown to pay $5,260,671.36\\nin restitution. He also denied Brown’s motion to unfreeze\\nfunds to pay his attorneys.\\n II. Discussion\\n Brown contests his liability, the permanent injunction,\\nand the restitution award. Different standards of review\\napply. For liability, we review the summary judgment de\\nnovo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to\\nBrown and drawing reasonable inferences in his favor.\\nHolloway v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 916 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2019).\\nWe review the judge’s decision to enter a permanent injunc-\\ntion for abuse of discretion. SEC v. Yang, 795 F.3d 674, 681\\n(7th Cir. 2015). Finally, Brown’s challenge to the restitution\\naward raises legal questions, which we review de novo.\\nBreneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 656 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2011).\\nA. Liability Issues\\n The Commission sued under section 13(b) of the FTCA,\\nwhich by its terms authorizes temporary restraining orders\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 7\\n\\nand permanent injunctions to enjoin violations of federal\\ntrade law. § 53(b)(1). To impose individual liability on the\\nbasis of a corporate practice, the Commission must prove\\n(1) that the practice violated the FTCA; (2) that the individu-\\nal “either participated directly in the deceptive acts or\\npractices or had authority to control them”; and (3) that the\\nindividual “knew or should have known about the deceptive\\npractices.” FTC v. World Media Brokers, 415 F.3d 758, 764 (7th\\nCir. 2005).\\n Based on the summary-judgment record, the judge held\\nthat Brown violated the FTCA as a principal for the\\nCraigslist marketing scheme contrived by Pierce and Lloyd.\\nHe also held that Brown’s websites violated the FTCA,\\nROSCA, the FCRA, and the Free Credit Reports Rule. Final-\\nly, the judge concluded that Brown was individually liable\\nfor the violations because he owned and operated all aspects\\nof his company.\\n While Brown concedes liability for the Craigslist scheme,\\nhe challenges his liability for the website violations. He\\nasserts that his websites contained no misrepresentations in\\nviolation of the FTCA and satisfied ROSCA’s disclosure\\nrequirements. He also argues that the Commission must\\nenforce the FCRA and the Free Credit Reports Rule through\\nan internal adjudication. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1) (stating\\nthat FCRA violations “shall be subject to enforcement by the\\nFederal Trade Commission under section 5(b) of the Federal\\nTrade Commission Act”).\\n It’s unnecessary to consider every theory of liability.\\nBrown’s challenges to the injunction and restitution award\\ndo not turn on which statute his websites violated. And\\nsection 13(b) permits the Commission to seek relief against\\n\\n8 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nBrown for violating “any provision of law” it enforces.\\n§ 53(b).\\n So we start and end with ROSCA, which restricts the use\\nof a “negative option feature” to sell goods or services on the\\nInternet. § 8403. A negative-option feature is “a provision [in\\nan offer] under which the customer’s silence or failure to\\ntake an affirmative action to reject goods or services or to\\ncancel the agreement is interpreted by the seller as ac-\\nceptance of the offer.” 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(w); see also § 8403\\n(incorporating this definition by reference). ROSCA prohib-\\nits this feature unless the seller “(1) provides text that clearly\\nand conspicuously discloses all material terms of the trans-\\naction before obtaining the consumer’s billing information;\\n(2) obtains a consumer’s express informed consent before\\ncharging the consumer … ; and (3) provides simple mecha-\\nnisms for a consumer to stop recurring charges.” § 8403.\\nROSCA violations are “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”\\nunder the FTCA, so the Commission can use the FTCA’s\\nenforcement regime against violators. Id. § 8404.\\n There’s no dispute that Brown used a negative-option\\nfeature to enroll customers in his credit-monitoring service.\\nThe only question is whether he complied with ROSCA’s\\ndisclosure requirements. In the apt words of the district\\njudge, Brown’s websites were “virtually devoid of any\\nmention of the [credit-monitoring] service aside from the\\nstatement that the customer is to be billed for it.” Moreover,\\nBrown concealed this incomplete disclosure behind more\\nprominent language offering a free credit score and report.\\nThe judge determined that these partial and obscure disclo-\\nsures did not “clearly and conspicuously disclose[] all\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 9\\n\\nmaterial terms of the transaction” or ensure that customers\\ngave “express informed consent.” § 8403(1)–(2).\\n Brown focuses on the conclusion that the disclosures\\nweren’t conspicuous. He parses font sizes, details his web-\\nsites’ color schemes, and takes a microscope to the Commis-\\nsion’s affidavits in an effort to highlight evidence that\\nconsumers read and understood the disclosures. But he\\ngives only passing attention to the decisive point: His web-\\nsites didn’t provide certain information that ROSCA re-\\nquires—namely, that the subscription was for a credit-\\nmonitoring service.\\n This oversight is fatal to Brown’s defense. Setting aside\\nwhether his disclosures satisfied the “clear and conspicu-\\nous” standard (and on that point we see nothing unsound in\\nthe judge’s ruling that they did not), Brown violated ROSCA\\nif the disclosures failed to provide “all material terms of the\\ntransaction.” § 8403(1). The service Brown provided in\\nexchange for the subscription is clearly a material term. See\\nMaterial Term, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A\\ncontractual provision dealing with a significant issue such as\\nsubject matter … or the work to be done.”). And the websites\\ndid not tell consumers that they were enrolling in a credit-\\nmonitoring service. Brown seeks refuge in the form letter\\nthat he delivered to new subscribers, which did provide this\\ninformation. But ROSCA required Brown to disclose the\\nmaterial terms “before obtaining the consumer’s billing\\ninformation.” § 8403. Brown protests that he sent the letter\\n“almost instantaneously” upon subscription. But almost\\ninstantaneously is still too late under ROSCA.\\n Brown next contends that even if corporate liability is es-\\ntablished, he should not be held personally liable. But it’s\\n\\n10 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nundisputed that he controlled the websites and was aware of\\ntheir content. That’s enough to establish personal liability for\\nthe ROSCA violations.\\nB. The Permanent Injunction\\n The judge held that Brown’s conduct warranted a per-\\nmanent injunction, applying our standard under the Securi-\\nties and Exchange Act. See Yang, 795 F.3d at 681 (asking\\nwhether “there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations\\nin order to obtain [injunctive] relief”) (quotation marks\\nomitted). The ensuing injunction imposes extensive re-\\nquirements on Brown if he ever operates a credit-monitoring\\nbusiness again.\\n We don’t need to decide whether our standard for an in-\\njunction under the Securities and Exchange Act also applies\\nto section 13(b) because Brown’s challenge doesn’t turn on\\nthat question. His attack on the injunction rests largely on\\nthe Excessive Fines Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. He\\ncontends that the injunction is unconstitutionally harsh and\\ndisproportionate. But he skips a necessary step in the analy-\\nsis—whether the injunction is a “fine” at all. It’s not. The\\nSupreme Court has limited “fines” to “cash [or] in-kind\\npayment[s] imposed by and payable to the government.”\\nDep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 n.6\\n(2002) (quotation marks omitted); see also Zamora-Mallari v.\\nMukasey, 514 F.3d 679, 695 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The Board’s\\nremoval order … is not a ‘fine,’ and thus the Excessive Fine\\nClause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply.”). Because\\nan injunction isn’t a fine, the permanent injunction doesn’t\\nimplicate the Excessive Fines Clause.\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 11\\n\\n Brown also offers an assortment of drive-by arguments,\\nall of which are too undeveloped to establish an abuse of\\ndiscretion. See Roger Whitmore’s Auto. Serv., Inc. v. Lake Coun-\\nty, 424 F.3d 659, 664 n.2 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It is the parties’ duty\\nto package, present, and support their arguments … .”). We\\naffirm the permanent injunction.\\nC. The Restitution Award\\n The bulk of Brown’s appeal challenges the restitution or-\\nder. His primary argument is that section 13(b) does not\\nauthorize an award of restitution. This is fundamentally a\\nquestion of statutory interpretation, but it’s obscured by\\nlayers of caselaw, so bear with us while we untangle the\\nknot. A brief overview of the FTCA’s remedial structure is\\nhelpful to a proper understanding of section 13(b), so we\\nbegin there.\\n The FTCA gives the Commission several tools to enforce\\nthe Act’s prohibition on unfair or deceptive trade practices.\\nUnder its “cease and desist” power, the Commission adjudi-\\ncates a case before an administrative law judge, who can\\nissue an order prohibiting the respondent from engaging in\\nthe illegal conduct at issue. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). This order\\nbecomes final if it survives administrative appeal and judi-\\ncial review. Id. § 45(g).\\n A final cease-and-desist order empowers the Commission\\nto sue the violator for legal and equitable relief, but only if “a\\nreasonable man would have known under the circumstances\\n[that the conduct] was dishonest or fraudulent.” Id.\\n§ 57b(a)(2), (b). After it becomes final, the order also draws a\\nline in the sand for both the respondent and anyone else\\nwho engages in the prohibited conduct. If the respondent\\n\\n12 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nlater violates the order, the Commission can sue for civil\\npenalties and any equitable relief “the court finds neces-\\nsary.” Id. § 45(l). If anyone else engages in the prohibited\\nconduct after the order becomes final, the Commission can\\nseek civil penalties if it can prove that the violator acted with\\n“actual knowledge” that his conduct was unlawful. Id.\\n§ 45(m)(1)(B).\\n The Commission has two other enforcement mechanisms\\nat its disposal. First, it can promulgate rules that “define\\nwith specificity acts or practices which are unfair or decep-\\ntive.” Id. § 57a(a)(1)(B). By preemptively resolving whether\\ncertain conduct violates the FTCA, rulemaking permits the\\nCommission to pursue “quick enforcement” actions against\\nviolators. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and\\nthe Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and Indus-\\ntries, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 225–26 (2019). Once the\\nCommission promulgates a rule, it can seek legal and equi-\\ntable remedies, including restitution, from violators. See\\n15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(1), (b). And if it establishes that a violator\\nhad “actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the\\nbasis of objective circumstances” that his conduct violated a\\nrule, the Commission can also pursue civil penalties. Id.\\n§ 45(m)(1)(A).\\n The Commission’s remaining enforcement mechanism is\\ndifferent. Under section 13(b) of the FTCA, the Commission\\ncan forego any administrative adjudication or rulemaking\\nand directly pursue a temporary restraining order and a\\npreliminary or permanent injunction in federal court.\\n§ 53(b). As noted, the Commission sued Brown under this\\nprovision.\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 13\\n\\n 1. Section 13(b)\\n The restitution order against Brown rests on section\\n13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision, which states that “in\\nproper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper\\nproof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.” Id.\\nBrown’s straightforward argument is that section 13(b)\\ndoesn’t authorize restitution because it doesn’t mention\\nrestitution.\\n We start with the obvious: Restitution isn’t an injunction.\\n“Injunction” is of course a broad term. See Injunction,\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A court order\\ncommanding or preventing an action.”). But statutory\\nauthorizations for injunctions don’t encompass other dis-\\ncrete forms of equitable relief like restitution. See, e.g.,\\nMeghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (“[N]either [a mandatory or prohibi-\\ntory injunction] contemplates … equitable restitution.”)\\n(quotation marks omitted); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers\\nAss’n v. Landstar Sys., Inc., 622 F.3d 1307, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010)\\n(“Injunctive relief constitutes a distinct type of equitable\\nrelief; it is not an umbrella term that encompasses restitution\\nor disgorgement.”); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,\\n564 U.S. 338, 365 (2011) (holding that an equitable order for\\nbackpay isn’t an injunction); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 430\\n(2009) (“Whether [a deportation stay] might technically be\\ncalled an injunction is beside the point; that is not the label\\nby which it is generally known.”).\\n The Commission doesn’t seriously argue otherwise. It in-\\nstead contends that section 13(b) implicitly authorizes restitu-\\ntion. We endorsed that reading in Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 571,\\nwhich Brown asks us to overturn. We’ll discuss Amy Travel\\nin a moment, but we begin with a closer look at the FTCA\\n\\n14 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nitself. If the Commission’s reading is correct, there’s no need\\nto reconsider our precedent.\\n Section 13(b) provides:\\n Whenever the Commission has reason to be-\\n lieve--\\n (1) that any person, partnership, or corpora-\\n tion is violating, or is about to violate, any pro-\\n vision of law enforced by the Federal Trade\\n Commission, and\\n (2) that the enjoining thereof pending the\\n issuance of a complaint by the Commission\\n and until such complaint is dismissed by the\\n Commission or set aside by the court on re-\\n view, or until the order of the Commission\\n made thereon has become final, would be in\\n the interest of the public--\\n the Commission … may bring suit in a district\\n court of the United States to enjoin any such\\n act or practice. Upon a proper showing that,\\n weighing the equities and considering the\\n Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success,\\n such action would be in the public interest, and\\n after notice to the defendant, a temporary re-\\n straining order or a preliminary injunction may\\n be granted without bond: Provided, however,\\n That if a complaint is not filed within such pe-\\n riod (not exceeding 20 days) as may be speci-\\n fied by the court after issuance of the\\n temporary restraining order or preliminary in-\\n junction, the order or injunction shall be dis-\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 15\\n\\n solved by the court and be of no further force\\n and effect: Provided further, That in proper cases\\n the Commission may seek, and after proper\\n proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunc-\\n tion. …\\n An implied restitution remedy doesn’t sit comfortably\\nwith the text of section 13(b). Consider its requirement that\\nthe defendant must be “violating” or “about to violate” the\\nlaw. Requiring ongoing or imminent harm matches the\\nforward-facing nature of injunctions. See 11A CHARLES ALAN\\nWRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942, at\\n47 (3d ed. 2013) (“[I]njunctive relief looks to the future and is\\ndesigned to deter … .”). Conversely, restitution is a remedy\\nfor past actions. See 1 DAN. B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES\\n§ 4.1(1), at 551 (2d ed. 1993) (“Restitution is a return or\\nrestoration of what the defendant has gained in a transac-\\ntion.”). Beyond the conceptual tension, this requirement\\nraises an illogical implication: It would condition the\\nCommission’s ability to secure restitution for past conduct\\non the existence of ongoing or imminent unlawful conduct.\\n Section 13(b)’s second requirement—that the Commis-\\nsion must reasonably believe that enjoining an ongoing or\\nimminent violation would be in the public interest—raises a\\nsimilar problem. The public interest in stopping or prevent-\\ning a violation is distinct from the public interest in remedy-\\ning a past harm. And yet the Commission’s reading ties\\nrestitution to this inapposite inquiry.\\n The rest of section 13(b) is likewise keyed to injunctions,\\nnot other forms of equitable relief. For example, the statute\\nconditions the district court’s authority to issue a temporary\\nrestraining order or preliminary injunction on injunction-\\n\\n16 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nspecific requirements—such as “weighing the equities and\\nconsidering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate suc-\\ncess”—and dissolves the order or injunction within 20 days\\nif the Commission doesn’t issue an administrative complaint.\\n§ 53(b). These demands don’t apply to equitable restitution,\\nwhich has its own preconditions. See Great-West Life &\\nAnnuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212–15 (2002).\\n True, this appeal concerns section 13(b)’s permanent-\\ninjunction provision, not the provision governing temporary\\nrestraining orders and preliminary injunctions, which is tied\\nto the subsequent initiation of an administrative proceeding.\\nAnd we have held that at least some of section 13(b)’s re-\\nquirements don’t apply to permanent injunctions. See United\\nStates v. JS & A Grp., 716 F.2d 451, 456–57 (7th Cir. 1983)\\n(holding that the Commission can seek a permanent injunc-\\ntion without initiating an internal adjudication). But see FTC\\nv. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2019)\\n(requiring the Commission to allege an ongoing or imminent\\nviolation to receive a permanent injunction). But that’s\\nbeside the point. Even if some of section 13(b)’s requirements\\ndo not apply to permanent injunctions, they inform the\\nmeaning of “injunction.” We see no contextual support for\\ngiving vastly different meanings to section 13(b)’s two uses\\nof the word “injunction.” See Hall v. United States, 566 U.S.\\n506, 519 (2012) (“At bottom, identical words and phrases\\nwithin the same statute should normally be given the same\\nmeaning.”) (quotation marks omitted). And in any event, we\\nhaven’t drawn an interpretive distinction in the past. See FTC\\nv. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding\\nthat section 13(b)’s preliminary-injunction provision also\\nauthorizes implied equitable relief).\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 17\\n\\n The FTCA’s two other enforcement provisions amplify\\nthe poor fit between section 13(b) and restitution. Both use\\nmore than the word “injunction” to authorize other forms of\\nequitable relief. As discussed, when a person violates a final\\ncease-and-desist order, the district courts are empowered to\\n“grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further\\nequitable relief as they deem appropriate.” § 45(l) (emphasis\\nadded). And when someone engages in conduct prohibited\\nby a rule, the FTCA authorizes “such relief as the court finds\\nnecessary … , [including] the refund of money or return of\\nproperty.” § 57b(b) (emphasis added).\\n The absence of similar language in section 13(b) is con-\\nspicuous. “[W]here Congress includes particular language in\\none section of a statute but omits it in another section of the\\nsame Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts inten-\\ntionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclu-\\nsion.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 430 (quotation marks omitted). This\\ninstruction applies with particular force here, where Con-\\ngress simultaneously expanded § 45(l) to allow for “other\\nand further equitable relief” and enacted section 13(b)\\nwithout this language. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-\\ntion Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576, 591 (1973).\\nMoreover, Congress expressly approved restitution as a\\nremedy under § 57b(b) two years after enacting section 13(b).\\nSee Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 206,\\n88 Stat. 2183, 2202 (1975). If section 13(b) permitted restitu-\\ntion as a general matter, Congress would have had no reason\\nto enact § 57b, which authorizes restitution under narrower\\ncircumstances.\\n Remedial scope isn’t the only difference between section\\n13(b) and the FTCA’s other enforcement mechanisms. The\\n\\n18 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nlatter procedures also impose a detailed framework that the\\nCommission must follow before obtaining a restitution\\norder. This framework counterbalances the FTCA’s amor-\\nphous “unfair or deceptive practices” standard by requiring\\nthe Commission to give defendants fair notice, either\\nthrough cease-and-desist orders or rules that “define with\\nspecificity” prohibited acts. §§ 45(b); 57a(a)(1). The Commis-\\nsion can bypass these notice requirements only if it obtains a\\ncease-and-desist order against a violator, brings a suit in\\ncourt, and then establishes that the prohibited practice “is\\none which a reasonable man would have known under the\\ncircumstances was dishonest or fraudulent.” § 57b(a)(2).\\nFinally, the FTCA imposes a three-year statute of limitations\\non bringing actions against most violators. § 57b(d).\\n Section 13(b) doesn’t offer any of these protections. And\\nyet the Commission contends that it provides an unqualified\\nright to the very remedies that the FTCA’s other enforcement\\nprovisions give with heavy qualification. Reading an im-\\nplied restitution remedy into section 13(b) makes these other\\nprovisions largely pointless. Without a clear textual signal,\\nwe cannot presume that Congress implicitly made such a\\nconsequential shift in policy. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking\\nAss’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress … does not\\nalter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in\\nvague terms or ancillary provisions … .”).\\n The tensions we’ve just discussed dissipate if we read\\nsection 13(b) to mean what it says: The remedy is limited to\\ninjunctive relief. In fact, giving section 13(b) its plain mean-\\ning harmonizes the three enforcement mechanisms. The\\nFTCA gives the Commission a pair of backward-facing\\nmethods to obtain monetary relief for past injury. Its cease-\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 19\\n\\nand-desist power targets individual violations. See § 45(b).\\nAnd its rule-enforcement authority under § 57b(a)(1) allows\\nit to more efficiently address widespread unfair or deceptive\\npractices. See Parrillo, supra, at 225–26.\\n Section 13(b) serves a different, forward-facing role: en-\\njoining ongoing and imminent future violations. This au-\\nthority aligns with the predicate requirements it imposes—\\nnotably, a reasonable belief that a violation is ongoing or\\nimminent and that stopping the violation is in the public\\ninterest. § 53(b). It also explains the lack of procedural\\nprotections. As Congress reported when enacting section\\n13(b), the Commission’s existing enforcement processes\\ncouldn’t quickly address ongoing or imminent violations. See\\n§ 408(a)(1), 87 Stat. 576, 591 (finding that the Commission\\nhad “been restricted and hampered because of inadequate\\nlegal authority … to seek preliminary injunctive relief to\\navoid unfair competitive practices”) (emphasis added).\\nSection 13(b) corrected this problem, providing an expedited\\npathway to injunctive relief. See id. § 408(b) (noting that the\\n“purpose of [the] act” was to give the Commission “the\\nrequisite authority to insure prompt enforcement of the laws\\n[it] administers by granting statutory authority … to seek\\npreliminary injunctive relief”) (emphasis added).\\n The Commission’s argument to the contrary rests almost\\nentirely on the saving clause in § 57b(e): “Remedies provid-\\ned in this section are in addition to, and not in lieu of, any\\nother remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal\\nlaw. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any\\nauthority of the Commission under any other provision of\\nlaw.” According to the Commission, § 57b(e) explains away\\n\\n20 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nthe tensions that its reading of section 13(b) otherwise\\ncreates.\\n We disagree for two reasons. To start, the Commission’s\\nunderstanding of the saving clause runs against more than a\\ncentury of interpretive practice. The Supreme Court has long\\ninstructed that acts “cannot be held to destroy [themselves]”\\nthrough saving clauses. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton\\nOil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446 (1907); accord Adams Express Co. v.\\nCroninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507 (1913); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,\\nInc., 426 U.S. 290, 299 (1976); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office\\nTel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 228 (1998). Put differently, we cannot\\nread a saving clause to “allow specific provisions of the\\nstatute that contains it to be nullified.” PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-\\nWilliams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir. 1998). This principle\\nextends to claims that a particular statutory provision im-\\nplicitly authorizes new remedies. See Middlesex Cty. Sewerage\\nAuth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1981) (“It\\nis doubtful that the phrase ‘any statute’ [in a saving clause]\\nincludes the very statute in which this statement was con-\\ntained.”). As we’ve explained, the Commission’s reading of\\nsection 13(b) effectively nullifies § 57b. We cannot read\\n§ 57b(e) to authorize that self-defeating effect.\\n And even if the Commission’s reading of the saving\\nclause were correct, we couldn’t infer a right to restitution in\\nsection 13(b). The saving clause preserves only those reme-\\ndies that exist. It does not inform the question whether\\nsection 13(b) contains an implied power to award restitution.\\n The Commission also suggests that Congress “ratified”\\nan implied section 13(b) restitution remedy in its 1993 and\\n2006 amendments to the FTCA. We disagree. The 1993\\namendment reworked section 13(b)’s venue and service-of-\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 21\\n\\nprocess provisions but didn’t alter its remedial scope. The\\n2006 amendment fares no better as a prop for the Commis-\\nsion’s argument. It simply empowered the Commission to\\nuse “[a]ll remedies available to [it] with respect to unfair and\\ndeceptive acts or practices … , including restitution,” when\\nprosecuting certain violations in foreign commerce.\\n§ 45(a)(4)(B). The Commission contends that the use of\\n“restitution” in this provision refers to an implied restitution\\nremedy in section 13(b). But the FTCA expressly authorizes\\nrestitution through § 45(l) and § 57b(b). So the 2006 amend-\\nment says nothing about the Commission’s authority to seek\\nthat remedy under section 13(b).\\n In short, nothing in the text or structure of the FTCA\\nsupports an implied right to restitution in section 13(b),\\nwhich by its terms authorizes only injunctions. Unsurpris-\\ningly, the Commission wagers nearly all of its case on stare\\ndecisis rather than the plain meaning of section 13(b). So we\\nturn to that question.\\n 2. The Road to Amy Travel\\n The Commission correctly observes that we addressed a\\nmaterially identical challenge to the scope of section 13(b) in\\nAmy Travel, 875 F.2d 564. Brown in turn invites us to revisit\\nthat decision in light of intervening Supreme Court deci-\\nsions. We of course can do so. “Although we must give\\nconsiderable weight to our prior decisions, we are not bound\\nby them absolutely and may overturn circuit precedent for\\ncompelling reasons.” Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir.\\n2005). An intervening Supreme Court decision that displaces\\nthe rationale of our precedent is one such reason. See Glaser\\nv. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir.\\n2009).\\n\\n22 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n Brown’s invitation implicates a line of Supreme Court\\nprecedents long predating Amy Travel. The prevailing inter-\\npretation of section 13(b) developed in the shadow of two\\ndecisions that took a capacious view of implied remedies:\\nPorter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), and Mitchell\\nv. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960). To under-\\nstand Amy Travel, we must begin with them.\\n Porter considered section 205(a) of the Emergency Price\\nControl Act of 1942, which limited the rent that certain\\nlandlords could collect from their tenants. The act empow-\\nered district courts to issue a “permanent or temporary\\ninjunction, restraining order, or other order” against persons\\nwho collect rents above its limits. Porter, 328 U.S. at 397. The\\nCourt held that section 205(a) authorizes restitution, offering\\nthis reasoning:\\n Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the\\n inherent equitable powers of the District Court\\n are available for the proper and complete exer-\\n cise of [its equitable] jurisdiction. … Unless a\\n statute in so many words, or by a necessary\\n and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s\\n jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that ju-\\n risdiction is to be recognized and applied. The\\n great principles of equity, securing complete\\n justice, should not be yielded to light infer-\\n ences, or doubtful construction.\\nId. at 398 (citations and quotation marks omitted).\\n Porter later clarified that implied remedies must be “con-\\nsistent with the statutory language and policy, the legislative\\nbackground and the public interest.” Id. at 403; see also id. at\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 23\\n\\n400 (“In framing such remedies under § 205(a), courts must\\nact primarily to effectuate the policy of the Emergency Price\\nControl Act and to protect the public interest while giving\\nnecessary respect to the private interests involved.”). In\\nshort, Porter adopted a presumption in favor of implying\\nequitable remedies that accord with statutory purpose. But it\\nalso recognized that an express statement or a “necessary\\nand inescapable inference” to the contrary could rebut this\\npresumption. Id. at 398.\\n Returning to the Price Control Act, the Court held that\\nrestitution was a proper “other order” under section 205(a).\\nId. at 399. It offered two justifications. First, restitution could\\nbe an “equitable adjunct to an injunction.” Id. Second, resti-\\ntution advanced the purpose of the statute. See id. at 400\\n(“[T]he statutory policy of preventing inflation is plainly\\nadvanced if prices or rents which have been collected in the\\npast are reduced to their legal maximums.”). Still, the Court\\nfound that an “inescapable inference” foreclosed one partic-\\nular remedy. The statute’s separate right of action for dam-\\nages “provide[d] an exclusive remedy relative to damages.”\\nId. at 401. But “save [this] one aspect,” the statute invoked\\n“the broad equitable jurisdiction that inheres in courts.” Id.\\nat 403.\\n In Mitchell the Court applied Porter to section 17 of the\\nFair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), which gave district\\ncourts the jurisdiction to “restrain violations” of the statuto-\\nry prohibition on firing employees for reporting workplace\\nviolations. 361 U.S. at 289. After quoting Porter’s broad\\nlanguage about equitable remedies, Mitchell reiterated that\\nimplied remedies must fit with the statutory purpose:\\n“When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement\\n\\n24 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nof prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must\\nbe taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of\\nequity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory\\npurposes.” Id. at 291–92.\\n Applying Porter’s presumption, the Court drew on its\\nunderstanding of the FLSA’s purpose, which was to achieve\\n“minimum labor standards” by using worker complaints as\\na private enforcement mechanism. Id. at 292. The Court\\nreasoned that restitution furthered that purpose. Without it,\\nthe “fear of economic retaliation” would stifle worker com-\\nplaints. Id.\\n Mitchell then assessed whether anything in the FLSA pre-\\ncluded restitution as an implied remedy. The defendants\\npointed to the statute’s ban on awarding unpaid minimum\\nwages and overtime compensation as one such provision,\\nbut the Court disagreed. It found “no indication in the\\nlanguage of the [ban], or in the legislative history, that\\nCongress intended [it] to have a wider effect.” Id. at 294.\\n Porter and Mitchell were typical of their era: The Court\\nwould resolve ambiguities by identifying a statute’s purpose\\nand “deducing the result most consonant with that pur-\\npose.” William N. Eskridge Jr., Politics Without Romance:\\nImplications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,\\n74 VA. L. REV. 275, 282 (1988); see also John F. Manning,\\nForeword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV.\\n1, 16–17 (2014) (“However clearly Congress framed its\\nstatutes, the Court could rework them to fit with the back-\\nground policies that inspired them.”). Using this interpretive\\napproach, the Court assumed that the judiciary could freely\\ncraft remedies to fully enforce whatever rights Congress had\\nrecognized. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 25\\n\\nand the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 45–51 (1983). As\\nthe Court would proclaim four years after Mitchell, “it is the\\nduty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are\\nnecessary to make effective the congressional purpose.”\\nJ. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).\\n * * *\\n Lower-court interpretations of section 13(b) built on\\nPorter and Mitchell. The trail starts with FTC v. H. N. Singer,\\nInc., 668 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1982). There the Ninth Circuit\\nheld that section 13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision\\nimplicitly authorizes preliminary injunctions and asset\\nfreezes.2 Id. at 1113. While its analysis was cursory, Singer\\nchanneled Porter and Mitchell. The court held that prelimi-\\nnary injunctions and asset freezes advanced section 13(b)’s\\npurpose by ensuring that assets were available at the end of\\nthe enforcement process. Singer also rejected the defendant’s\\nclaim that the express equitable remedies in § 57b foreclosed\\nimplied remedies in section 13(b), pointing to the saving\\nclause in § 57b(e).\\n Singer sparked a line of appellate cases holding that sec-\\ntion 13(b) is a broad grant of equitable authority. The Elev-\\n\\n\\n2 Shortly before Singer, the Fifth Circuit held that section 13(b)’s\\npreliminary-injunction provision implicitly authorizes asset freezes. See\\nFTC v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 718 (5th Cir. 1982). But its holding\\nappeared to preclude the possibility of restitution in section 13(b),\\npointing instead to § 57b for monetary remedies. Id. at 719 (“[T]he\\nexhortation in [Mitchell] to preserve the possibility of complete relief …\\nmakes it appropriate to consider that the final, complete relief in this case\\nmay entail consumer redress through a [§ 57b] proceeding.”). Predicta-\\nbly, no circuit has materially relied on Southwest Sunsites to support an\\nimplied restitution award.\\n\\n26 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nenth Circuit followed Singer’s lead two years later. After\\nquoting Porter’s language on implied remedies, the court\\nconcluded that it “agree[d] with Singer’s interpretation of\\n[section] 13(b)” and without further discussion held that\\nsection 13(b) authorizes asset freezes. FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas\\nCorp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).\\n Our decision in FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc.,\\n861 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1988), was next. There, the defendant\\npassingly suggested that section 13(b)’s permanent-\\ninjunction provision does not implicitly authorize prelimi-\\nnary injunctions. (Recall that the statute’s express authoriza-\\ntion for temporary restraining orders and preliminary\\ninjunctions is tied to the eventual initiation of an administra-\\ntive proceeding.) We held that the defendant waived the\\nargument, but we discussed the issue anyway “in order to\\nsatisfactorily explain our disposition of … other issues.” Id.\\nat 1026. Because it was dicta, our reasoning was understand-\\nably brief. We simply quoted language from Singer and\\nnoted that we had “no reason to disagree with the conclu-\\nsion of our colleagues of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits\\nthat the authority to grant permanent injunctive relief also\\nincludes the authority to grant interlocutory relief.” Id. Other\\nthan distinguishing a prior decision, we did not discuss the\\nmatter further.\\n Two months after World Travel, we concluded in Elders\\nGrain that section 13(b)’s preliminary-injunction provision\\nimplicitly authorizes rescission. 868 F.2d at 907. Perhaps\\nbecause the parties didn’t dispute the issue, our analysis was\\nagain cursory. But it was highly consequential. We articulat-\\ned a new standard for inferring equitable remedies: “[T]he\\nstatutory grant of the power to issue a preliminary injunc-\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 27\\n\\ntion carries with it the power to issue whatever ancillary\\nequitable relief is necessary to the effective exercise of the\\ngranted power.” Id. Notably absent was any inquiry into\\nwhether an implied remedy was compatible with the statu-\\ntory text and structure or whether Congress precluded the\\nimplied remedy. We instead would permit whatever implied\\nremedies furthered the exercise of the express remedy.\\n The effect of this reasoning was evident in our justifica-\\ntion for inferring the power to order rescission. We simply\\nrestated the facts of the case, which involved a transaction\\ntimed to avoid the Commission’s review, and observed that\\n“[t]o reward these tactics by holding that a district court has\\nno power under section 13(b) to rescind a consummated\\ntransaction would go far toward rendering the statute a dead\\nletter.” Id.\\n We extended Elders Grain to the permanent-injunction\\nprovision three months later in Amy Travel. The district court\\nhad ordered the defendants to pay more than $6 million in\\nrestitution to the Commission. Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 570.\\nThe defendants argued on appeal that nothing in section\\n13(b) authorized monetary relief. We disagreed, explaining\\nthat our then-recent decisions in World Travel and Elders\\nGrain “thwarted” the defendants’ arguments. Id. at 571. In\\nparticular, we said that the reasoning in Elders Grain applied\\n“with equal force” to the permanent-injunction provision.\\nWe adopted that expansive formulation, holding that section\\n13(b)’s “statutory grant of authority to the district court to\\nissue permanent injunctions includes the power to order any\\nancillary equitable relief necessary to effectuate the exercise\\nof the granted powers.” Id. at 572. But unlike Elders Grain, we\\nnever addressed how an award of restitution was “necessary\\n\\n28 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nto effectuate the exercise” of the power to issue an injunc-\\ntion. We simply noted that restitution was a “proper form[]\\nof ancillary relief.” Id. at 571.\\n Our approach in Amy Travel became the standard. Some\\ncircuits held, on a similarly brief analysis, that section 13(b)\\ncategorically authorizes the court’s “full equitable powers,”\\nincluding restitution. See FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d\\n466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added); FTC v. Sec. Rare\\nCoin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314–15 (8th Cir. 1991).\\nOthers simply cited Amy Travel or other decisions to reach\\nthe same conclusion. See FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC,\\n654 F.3d 359, 365 (2d Cir. 2011); FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns,\\nInc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005); FTC v. Pantron I.\\nCorp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994); see also FTC v. Ross,\\n743 F.3d 886, 891 (4th Cir. 2014) (conceding that “arguments\\nabout how the structure, history, and purpose of the [FTCA]\\nweigh against the conclusion that district courts have the\\nauthority to award consumer redress … are not entirely\\nunpersuasive” but allowing restitution because of Porter,\\nMitchell, and uniform circuit practice).\\n To be sure, these decisions have attracted some judicial\\nskepticism. See Shire ViroPharma, 917 F.3d at 156, 161 n.19\\n(declining to decide whether section 13(b) authorizes mone-\\ntary relief but concluding that it wasn’t “meant to duplicate\\n[§ 45(b)], which already prohibits past conduct”); FTC v.\\nAMG Capital Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 2018)\\n(O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the prevailing\\ninterpretation). But the view that section 13(b) implicitly\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 29\\n\\nauthorizes restitution has largely escaped critical examina-\\ntion.3\\n We have affirmed restitution awards under section 13(b)\\nthree times since Amy Travel. See United States v. Tankersley,\\n96 F. App’x 419, 422 (7th Cir. 2004); FTC v. Think Achievement\\nCorp., 312 F.3d 259, 262 (7th Cir. 2002); FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d\\n530, 534 (7th Cir. 1997). But Brown is the first litigant to\\nquestion our precedent.\\n 3. Modern Implied-Remedies Jurisprudence\\n The Supreme Court’s understanding of implied remedies\\nevolved after Porter and Mitchell. Though the Court contin-\\nued to presume that courts could “use any available remedy\\nto afford full relief” when a party had a general statutory\\ncause of action, over time it began to emphasize that this\\npresumption “yields where necessary to carry out the intent\\nof Congress or to avoid frustrating the purposes of the\\nstatute involved.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,\\n524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998) (quoting Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.\\nComm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (White, J., op.)); see also\\nCalifornia v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981) (“The federal\\n\\n\\n3 Chief Judge Wood’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc relies\\nheavily on FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011), but\\nthere the Second Circuit summarily followed the lead of other circuits in\\nreading section 13(b) to include an implied power to order restitution. Id.\\nat 365. The court quickly moved on to, and thoroughly considered, a\\nwholly different question: whether the implied restitution remedy is\\nequitable or legal. The lengthy passages quoted in the chief judge’s\\ndissent relate to that second-order question. Moreover, Bronson rejected\\nthe view that the plain meaning of “injunction” encompasses restitution.\\nId. at 367 (approving restitution because “section 13(b) does not limit the\\ndistrict court to awarding only injunctions”) (emphasis added).\\n\\n30 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\njudiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter\\nhow salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide.”). In\\nparticular, the Court now recognizes the importance of\\nCongress’s choice to specify forms of relief. See, e.g., Franklin\\nv. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 69 n.6 (1992) (noting\\nthat the presumption in favor of relief doesn’t apply “under\\na statute that expressly enumerated the remedies available to\\nplaintiffs”); see also Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps.,\\n489 U.S. 527, 533 (1989) (“It is … an elemental canon of\\nstatutory construction that where a statute expressly pro-\\nvides a remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to pro-\\nvide additional remedies.”) (quotation marks omitted).\\n A prominent example is ERISA. Because Congress has\\nestablished a comprehensive remedial scheme for plaintiffs\\nto enforce their rights under an employee-benefits plan, the\\nCourt has refused to infer additional extracontractual dam-\\nages remedies. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.\\n134, 146 (1985) (“The presumption that a remedy was delib-\\nerately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress\\nhas enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including\\nan integrated system of procedures for enforcement.”)\\n(quotation marks omitted). And where two environmental-\\nprotection statutes provide private rights of action for in-\\njunctive relief but require plaintiffs to notify defendants 60\\ndays before suing, the Court has refused to infer a damages\\nremedy or allow plaintiffs to obtain an injunction without\\nthe requisite notice. See Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. at\\n15 (“In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congres-\\nsional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress\\nprovided precisely the remedies it considered appropri-\\nate.”).\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 31\\n\\n These decisions collided with Porter and Mitchell in\\nMeghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996). Because\\nBrown’s challenge centers on Meghrig, it warrants close\\nreview. There the Court addressed the Resource Conserva-\\ntion and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”), which permits\\nprivate parties to sue handlers of “solid or hazardous waste\\nwhich may present an imminent and substantial endanger-\\nment to health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C.\\n§ 6972(a)(1)(B). The statute authorizes district courts “to\\nrestrain” any person who contributes to handling the waste,\\n“to order such person to take such other action as may be\\nnecessary, or both.” § 6972(a). The question in Meghrig was\\nwhether § 6972(a) also allowed plaintiffs to recover waste-\\ncleanup costs as restitution.\\n The Supreme Court refused to find an implied restitu-\\ntionary remedy. “Under a plain reading of this remedial\\nscheme,” the Court explained, plaintiffs could receive “a\\nmandatory injunction, i.e., one that orders a responsible\\nparty to ‘take action’ by attending to the cleanup and proper\\ndisposal of toxic waste, or a prohibitory injunction, i.e., one\\nthat ‘restrains’ a responsible party from further violating\\n[the] RCRA.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. But neither of these\\nforward-facing remedies “contemplates the award of past\\ncleanup costs, whether these are denominated ‘damages’ or\\n‘equitable restitution.’” Id.\\n The Court reinforced its holding by comparing the RCRA\\nto the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-\\ntion, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C.\\n§§ 9601 et seq., which addresses similar toxic-waste issues.\\nMeghrig, 516 U.S. at 485. Unlike the RCRA, CERCLA express-\\nly authorizes monetary relief. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). “Con-\\n\\n32 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\ngress thus demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to\\nprovide for the recovery of cleanup costs[] and that the\\nlanguage used to define the remedies under [the] RCRA\\ndoes not provide that remedy.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485.\\n The Court also pointed to the statute’s threshold re-\\nquirement that a party can sue only when the waste “may\\npresent an imminent and substantial endangerment to\\nhealth or the environment.” § 6972(a)(1)(B). “The meaning of\\nthis timing restriction [was] plain” to the Court:\\n“[S]ection 6972(a) was designed to provide a remedy that\\nameliorates present or obviates the risk of future ‘imminent’\\nharms, not a remedy that compensates for past cleanup\\nefforts.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485–86.\\n Finally, the Court looked to “[o]ther aspects of [the]\\nRCRA’s enforcement scheme.” Id. at 486. Unlike CERCLA,\\nthe RCRA’s citizen-suit provision lacks a statute of limita-\\ntions or a requirement that any recovered costs must be\\nreasonable. The Court reasoned that “[i]f Congress had\\nintended § 6972(a) to function as a cost-recovery mechanism,\\nthe absence of these provisions would be striking.” Id. The\\nRCRA also halts citizen suits when the EPA or a state pur-\\nsues an enforcement action, and it requires plaintiffs to give\\n90-days’ notice to potential defendants before suing. See id.\\nThese two requirements made § 6972(a) a “wholly irrational\\nmechanism” for remedying past harms. Id.\\n The Court then acknowledged the “line of cases holding\\nthat district courts retain inherent authority to award any\\nequitable remedy that is not expressly taken away from\\nthem by Congress.” Id. at 487 (citing Porter, 328 U.S. 395). But\\nthese cases couldn’t support an implied restitution remedy.\\nAs the Court put it:\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 33\\n\\n [T]he limited remedies described in § 6972(a),\\n along with the stark differences between the\\n language of that section and the cost-recovery\\n provisions of CERCLA, amply demonstrate\\n that Congress did not intend for a private citi-\\n zen to be able to undertake a cleanup and then\\n proceed to recover its costs under [the]\\n RCRA. … [W]here Congress has provided\\n elaborate enforcement provisions for remedy-\\n ing the violation of a federal statute, as Con-\\n gress has done with [the] RCRA and CERCLA,\\n it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to\\n authorize by implication additional judicial\\n remedies for private citizens suing under the\\n statute. It is an elemental canon of statutory\\n construction that where a statute expressly\\n provides a particular remedy or remedies, a\\n court must be chary of reading others into it.\\nId. at 487–88 (quotation marks omitted). Notwithstanding\\nPorter, the Court held that § 6972(a) does not “contemplate\\nthe award of past cleanup costs.” Id. at 488.\\n Since Meghrig, the Court has adhered to this more limited\\nunderstanding of judicially implied remedies. See, e.g., Great-\\nWest, 534 U.S. at 209 (“We have therefore been especially\\nreluctant to tamper with the enforcement scheme embodied\\nin [ERISA] by extending remedies not specifically author-\\nized by its text.”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted);\\nMiller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000) (concluding that the\\nplain meaning of a provision expressed the congressional\\nintent to displace equitable authority); see also Armstrong v.\\nExceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1385 (2015) (hold-\\n\\n34 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\ning that the Medicaid Act’s provision of a specific remedy\\nand the judicially unadministrable nature of the relevant\\nstatutory provision “preclude[d] the availability of equitable\\nrelief” in section 30(A) of the statute); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284\\n(holding that courts cannot enlarge the “scope of available\\nremedies” under an implied right of action “in a manner at\\nodds with the statutory structure and purpose”). Rather than\\npresuming that Congress authorizes the judiciary to sup-\\nplement express statutory remedies, the Court now recog-\\nnizes that “the express provision of one method of enforcing\\na substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to pre-\\nclude others.” Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385.\\n 4. Revisiting Amy Travel\\n As this perhaps drawn-out discussion shows, an explora-\\ntion of statutory purpose is no longer the Supreme Court’s\\npolestar in cases raising interpretive questions about the\\nscope of statutory remedies, and that shift has unsettled\\nPorter’s and Mitchell’s instruction to “provide complete relief\\nin light of the statutory purposes.” Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292;\\nsee also Singer, 668 F.2d at 1113 (grounding its reading of\\nsection 13(b) on this premise). See generally Manning, supra,\\nat 23 (“[W]here ‘the statutory language is clear,’ the Court\\nhas disclaimed the need even ‘to reach arguments based on\\nstatutory purpose[] [or] legislative history.’” (quoting Boyle v.\\nUnited States, 556 U.S. 938, 950 (2009))); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE\\nJR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES\\nAND THE CONSTITUTION 81 (2016) (“We are all textualists.\\nThat means that a judge must relate all sources of and\\narguments about statutory interpretation to a text the legisla-\\nture has enacted.”). Indeed, the Court has “abandoned” its\\nprior understanding that judges must “be alert to provide\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 35\\n\\nsuch remedies as are necessary to make effective the con-\\ngressional purpose expressed by a statute.” Alexander v.\\nSandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (quotation marks omitted);\\naccord Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017). It is now\\nwell settled that Congress, not the judiciary, controls the\\nscope of remedial relief when a statute provides a cause of\\naction. See Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1385 (“Courts of equity\\ncan no more disregard statutory and constitutional require-\\nments and provisions than can courts of law.”) (quotation\\nmarks omitted); Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of\\nthe Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 465–66 (2010).\\n Whatever strength Porter and Mitchell retain, Meghrig\\nclarifies that they cannot be used as Amy Travel saw them—a\\nlicense to categorically recognize all ancillary forms of\\nequitable relief without a close analysis of statutory text and\\nstructure. To be sure, the Court still presumes that courts\\nretain their “traditional equitable authority.” Miller, 530 U.S.\\nat 340. But even under Porter and Mitchell, this authority\\ncomes with an important qualifier: “unless otherwise pro-\\nvided by statute.” Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at\\n291. Unsurprisingly, every appellate court to consider the\\nrelationship between Meghrig, Porter, and Mitchell recognizes\\nthat Meghrig reinforced and clarified this qualifier.\\n Some circuits have concluded that a statute displaces eq-\\nuitable authority when it specifies a particular remedy. See\\nOwner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Swift Transp. Co.,\\n632 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that a statutory\\nprovision allowing a person to seek “injunctive relief” acted\\n“to the exclusion of other equitable remedies”); Landstar Sys.,\\n622 F.3d at 1324 (noting that the statute at issue authorized\\nonly injunctions and concluding that if it “allowed for\\n\\n36 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nrestitution or disgorgement, it would have so stated”).\\nOthers more narrowly construe Meghrig as a command that\\n“courts must consider a statute’s remedial scheme” when\\ndetermining whether a statute displaces equitable authority.\\nSee United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 235 (3d\\nCir. 2005); see also United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d\\n1052, 1057 (10th Cir. 2006) (reading Meghrig as showing that\\n“a statute’s particular characteristics” can displace equitable\\nauthority).\\n The D.C. Circuit thoroughly examined the effect of\\nMeghrig in United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d\\n1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Harmonizing Meghrig and Porter, it\\nheld that a statute’s “comprehensive and reticulated scheme,\\nalong with the plain meaning of the words themselves,\\nserves to raise a necessary and inescapable inference, suffi-\\ncient under Porter, that Congress intended to limit relief.” Id.\\nat 1200 (quotation marks and citation omitted).\\n We don’t need to plant ourselves firmly along this doctri-\\nnal spectrum to decide this case. It’s inescapable that Meghrig\\nnot only displaced Amy Travel’s categorical approach to\\njudicially implied remedies but also its interpretation of\\nsection 13(b). Every one of Meghrig’s reasons for refusing to\\nfind restitutionary authority in the RCRA applies with equal\\nforce to section 13(b).\\n Like the RCRA, section 13(b)’s plain text doesn’t contem-\\nplate an award of restitution. See Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484. It\\nauthorizes only temporary restraining orders and injunc-\\ntions. And like the relationship between the RCRA and\\nCERCLA, the relationship between section 13(b), § 45(l), and\\n§ 57b(b) “is telling.” Id. at 485. Both § 45(l) and § 57b(b)\\nexpressly authorize additional equitable remedies. § 45(l)\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 37\\n\\n(“mandatory injunctions and such other and further equita-\\nble relief as [courts] deem appropriate”); § 57b(b) (“such\\nrelief as the court finds necessary … , [including] the refund\\nof money or return of property”). Section 13(b) lacks compa-\\nrable language.\\n Meghrig also instructs us to interpret remedial language\\nwith reference to “the harm at which it is directed.” 516 U.S.\\nat 485. While the FTCA’s express restitution provisions\\nauthorize the Commission to sue for past conduct, to pro-\\nceed under section 13(b), the Commission must reasonably\\nbelieve that a person “is violating” or “about to violate” the\\nlaw. § 53(b)(1); cf. § 45(b) (empowering the Commission to\\nbring a cease-and-desist action when it reasonably believes\\nsomeone “has been or is” violating the act). As with the\\nRCRA, “[t]he meaning of this timing restriction is plain.”\\nMeghrig, 516 U.S. at 485. Section 13(b) “was designed to\\nprovide a remedy that ameliorates present or obviates the\\nrisk of future ‘imminent’ harms, not a remedy that compen-\\nsates” for past violations. Id. at 486.\\n Further, as we’ve explained, section 13(b) is procedurally\\nincompatible with restitution. For example, before invoking\\nsection 13(b), the Commission must reasonably believe that\\nstopping an ongoing or imminent violation is in the public\\ninterest. § 53(b)(2). And the statute dissolves a preliminary\\ninjunction if the Commission doesn’t begin an administrative\\nproceeding before a court-set deadline. § 53(b). But the\\nCommission would have no need for an administrative\\nproceeding if it can get complete restitutionary relief\\nthrough section 13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision. In\\nshort, section 13(b)’s prerequisites, like those in the RCRA,\\n\\n38 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nmake it a “wholly irrational mechanism” for remedying past\\nharms. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486.\\n Relatedly, unlike § 57b(b), section 13(b) has no statute of\\nlimitations. The absence of a limitations period in the RCRA\\nwas “striking” to the Meghrig Court and provided strong\\nevidence that the RCRA’s injunction provision did not\\nimplicitly authorize restitution. Id. The same is true here.\\n Section 13(b) also lacks a central feature of the FTCA pro-\\nvisions that expressly permit monetary relief: a notice re-\\nquirement. When the Commission brings an administrative\\ncease-and-desist action, it can secure restitution only by\\nproving that the violation occurred after its order became\\nfinal or that “a reasonable man” would have known that the\\nconduct was fraudulent. §§ 45(l); 57b(a)(2). And notice is also\\nbaked into the Commission’s power to promulgate and\\nenforce rules. The Commission must follow detailed proce-\\ndures before promulgating a final rule. See id. § 57a(b)(1)\\n(requiring publication of notice and an informal hearing for\\nrulemaking). Moreover, final rules must “define with speci-\\nficity” the prohibited acts. § 57a(a)(1)(B).\\n The Supreme Court has held that similar provisions are\\ncrucial to determining the remedial scope of implied rights\\nof action, a closely related context: “It would be unsound …\\nfor a statute’s express system of enforcement to require notice\\nto the recipient and an opportunity to come into voluntary\\ncompliance while a judicially implied system of enforcement\\npermits substantial liability without regard to the recipient’s\\nknowledge or its corrective actions upon receiving notice.”\\nGebser, 524 U.S. at 289. We face the same unsound result\\nhere: Reading an implied restitution remedy into section\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 39\\n\\n13(b) allows the Commission to circumvent the FTCA’s\\ndetailed notice requirements.\\n Finally, we note that the difference in plaintiffs—private\\ncitizens in Meghrig and a federal agency here—isn’t material.\\nTo be sure, when “the public interest is involved in a pro-\\nceeding,” a court’s “equitable powers assume an even\\nbroader and more flexible character than when only a pri-\\nvate controversy is at stake.” Porter, 328 U.S. at 398; accord\\nKansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1053 (2015). But the public\\ninterest doesn’t turn on the identity of the parties involved.\\n Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S.\\n515, 552 (1937), the authority Porter cited to invoke the\\n“public interest,” is instructive on this point. Even though\\nthe suit was between a railroad company and a union, the\\nCourt determined that “[m]ore [was] involved than the\\nsettlement of a private controversy.” Id. “The peaceable\\nsettlement of labor controversies … is a matter of public\\nconcern.” Id.; see also id. (“The fact that Congress has indicat-\\ned its purpose to make negotiation obligatory is in itself a\\ndeclaration of public interest and policy … .”). Presaging\\nPorter, the Court observed that “[c]ourts of equity may, and\\nfrequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold\\nrelief in furtherance of the public interest than they are\\naccustomed to go when only private interests are involved.”\\nId.; cf. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326\\n& n.8 (1980) (“When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of\\nand for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to\\nvindicate the public interest in preventing employment\\ndiscrimination.” (citing Porter, 328 U.S. at 397–98)).\\n Under Virginian Railway Co., both Meghrig and this case\\nimplicate the public interest. Both involve enforcing federal\\n\\n40 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\nstatutory obligations, and both involve matters of “public\\nconcern”—environmental cleanup and consumer protection.\\nEven so, Meghrig did not find an implied right to restitution\\nin the RCRA. So the fact that the government is the plaintiff\\nhere does not affect the analysis. Consider United States v.\\nApex Oil Co., in which we examined Meghrig’s impact on\\n42 U.S.C. § 6973(a), the RCRA’s government-suit provision.\\n579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009). We did not draw a distinction\\nbetween the RCRA’s government and citizen-suit provisions.\\nObserving that the provisions use “identical language,” we\\nconcluded that the RCRA “entitles the government only to\\nrequire the defendant to clean up the contaminated site at\\nthe defendant’s expense.” Id. at 737. We then announced that\\nour “[e]arlier cases, … which allowed an award of clean-up\\ncosts on the basis of general equitable principles set forth in\\nsuch cases as Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., and\\nPorter v. Warner Holding Co., are dead after Meghrig.” Id.\\n(citations omitted).\\n Although section 13(b) doesn’t use identical language as\\nthe RCRA’s citizen-suit provision, Meghrig remains material-\\nly indistinguishable. So we must pay close attention to its\\nbottom line: “[W]here Congress has provided elaborate\\nenforcement provisions for remedying the violation of a\\nfederal statute, … it cannot be assumed that Congress in-\\ntended to authorize by implication additional judicial reme-\\ndies … .” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487–88 (emphasis added)\\n(quotation marks omitted); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290\\n(“Where a statute’s express enforcement scheme hinges its\\nmost severe sanction on notice and unsuccessful efforts to\\nobtain compliance, we cannot attribute to Congress the\\nintention to have implied an enforcement scheme that allows\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 41\\n\\nimposition of greater liability without comparable condi-\\ntions.”) (emphasis added).\\n Our limited analysis in Amy Travel doesn’t offer a way to\\ndistinguish Meghrig. It instead requires us to ignore section\\n13(b)’s text and disregard the FTCA’s “elaborate enforcement\\nprovisions.” In light of the Court’s commands in Meghrig,\\nour holding in Amy Travel is no longer viable. Conversely,\\nreading section 13(b) as authorizing only injunctive relief—\\nthat is, reading it to mean what it plainly says—harmonizes\\nMeghrig with Porter and Mitchell, which also called for a\\nstatute-specific and remedy-specific inquiry before authoriz-\\ning an implied form of relief. See, e.g., Porter, 328 U.S. at 403\\n(holding that a separate cause of action for damages was\\nenough to preclude courts from inferring that remedy\\nelsewhere).\\n We recognize that this conclusion departs from the con-\\nsensus view of our sister circuits. But when deciding wheth-\\ner we should overturn precedent, “[w]e are not merely to\\ncount noses. The parties are entitled to our independent\\njudgment.” United States v. Hill, 48 F.3d 228, 232 (7th Cir.\\n1995). And we must break from our colleagues. As noted,\\nmost circuits adopted their position by uncritically accepting\\nour holding in Amy Travel, which expanded on Elders Grain,\\nwhich expanded on Singer, which expanded on Porter and\\nMitchell. No circuit has examined whether reading a restitu-\\ntion remedy into section 13(b) comports with the FTCA’s text\\nand structure. Nor has anyone determined whether § 45\\nforecloses this remedy. And although some have briefly\\ndiscussed § 57b, they have done so only to find refuge in the\\nsaving clause in § 57b(e). Perhaps most importantly, no\\n\\n42 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\ncircuit has ever considered the effect of Meghrig in a section\\n13(b) case.\\n We are well aware that we need a compelling reason to\\noverturn circuit precedent. “However, important as stare\\ndecisis is, it is equally important for us to respect the statutes\\nthat Congress has passed and to correct any problems we see\\nin our prior interpretations of those statutes.” Ahng v. All-\\nsteel, 96 F.3d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir. 1996); see also S. Ill. Power\\nCoop. v. EPA, 863 F.3d 666, 673 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that\\nstatutory stare decisis “is not without limits”). Even in the\\nrealm of statutory interpretation, a Supreme Court decision\\n“on an analogous issue that compels us to reconsider our\\nposition” counts as a compelling reason to overturn prece-\\ndent. Glaser, 570 F.3d at 915. We cannot favor our own\\ndecisions over those of the Supreme Court.\\n Stare decisis alone cannot overcome Amy Travel’s clear\\nincompatibilities with the FTCA’s text and structure,\\nMeghrig, and the Supreme Court’s broader refinement of its\\nimplied remedies jurisprudence. We therefore hold that\\nsection 13(b)’s permanent-injunction provision does not\\nauthorize monetary relief.4\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n4 Because we hold that section 13(b) doesn’t authorize monetary relief,\\nwe have no need to consider Brown’s alternative arguments that the\\nCommission can’t pursue penalties or legal—as distinct from equitable—\\nrestitution under section 13(b). See FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., LLC,\\n910 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 2018) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (discussing\\nthese arguments). We also don’t need to consider the district court’s\\nasset-freeze determinations.\\n\\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310 43\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the restitution\\naward. In all other respects, we AFFIRM the judgment.\\n\\n44 Nos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\\n\\n WOOD, Chief Judge, with whom ROVNER and HAMILTON,\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3897,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654624,"string":"4,654,624"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Amy Sullivan v. Flora, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2534"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\nAMY LEE SULLIVAN, d/b/a DESIGN KIT,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nFLORA, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellant,\\n Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:15-cv-298 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\\nfirst impression for us on the scope of statutory damages re-\\ncoverable under the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 504(c)(1)\\nof the Act permits a copyright holder “to recover, instead of\\nactual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages\\nfor all infringements involved in the action, with respect to\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nany one work,” with Congress separately instructing that, in\\ndetermining statutory damages, “all the parts of a compila-\\ntion or derivative work constitute one work.” This case re-\\nquires us to determine what constitutes “one work” in a fact\\npattern where a jury found infringement on multiple works\\nregistered in a single copyright application.\\n Amy Sullivan, a graphic design artist, produced a series of\\n33 illustrations for Flora, Inc., an herbal supplement company,\\nto use in two advertising campaigns. Upon noticing that Flora\\nwas using the illustrations in other ads, Sullivan brought suit\\nfor copyright infringement and opted to pursue statutory\\ndamages. She did so to maximize her potential payout by clas-\\nsifying each of her 33 illustrations as “one work” within the\\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act. Flora disagreed,\\ncontending that the illustrations were part of two broader\\ncompilations and thus, if Sullivan prevailed, § 504(c)(1) lim-\\nited her to just two statutory damage awards—one award for\\ninfringement on the illustrations used in each of the two ad-\\nvertising campaigns. The district court agreed with Sullivan,\\nand instructed the jury that she could recover separate awards\\nof statutory damages for 33 acts of infringement on 33 sepa-\\nrate illustrations. The jury found infringement on each of the\\n33 illustrations and returned a statutory damages award of\\n$3.6 million.\\n On appeal Flora challenges the district court’s ruling on\\nstatutory damages and separate rulings on two additional de-\\nfenses to liability asserted at trial. While procedural shortcom-\\nings defeat these latter two challenges, Flora is right that the\\ndistrict court committed error in permitting separate awards\\nof statutory damages unaccompanied by any finding that\\neach or any of the 33 illustrations constituted “one work”\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 3\\n\\nwithin the meaning and protection of § 504(c)(1) of the Copy-\\nright Act. It is neither appropriate nor possible for us to make\\nthat finding on the record before us. So we vacate the judg-\\nment in Sullivan’s favor and remand for further proceedings.\\n I\\n Flora, Inc. manufactures herbal supplement and health\\nproducts. In 2013, looking to produce advertisements for two\\nnew products, “7-Sources” and “Flor-Essence,” the company\\ncontacted freelance production specialist Joseph Silver to de-\\nvelop two animated videos. Unbeknownst to Flora, Silver\\nthen contacted Amy Sullivan, a Wisconsin-based graphic de-\\nsign artist, to develop illustrations that would then be ani-\\nmated for use in the advertisements. In Sullivan’s written\\nagreement with Silver, she granted Flora exclusive rights to\\nher illustrations in the two specified advertising campaigns.\\n Over the following months, Silver and Sullivan corre-\\nsponded to develop the illustrations. Silver made suggestions\\non color, style, and text, while also offering rough outlines\\nand sketches to guide Sullivan’s work. For her part, Sullivan\\nused digital design software to create the ultimate illustra-\\ntions, sometimes incorporating Silver’s suggestions and other\\ntimes not. Flora used Sullivan’s illustrations in its final adver-\\ntisements for the two product lines.\\n At some point in the summer or fall of 2013, Sullivan no-\\nticed that Flora was using her illustrations to promote other\\nproduct lines. Exactly when the unauthorized use occurred is\\nunclear. What the record shows for certain is that, on October\\n16, 2013, Sullivan sent Flora a letter complaining of copyright\\ninfringement. At that time, however, Sullivan had not (yet)\\nregistered her illustrations with the Copyright Office.\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n Sullivan subsequently did so in two copyright applica-\\ntions approved by the U.S. Copyright Office. Registration “VA\\n1-888-930” had an effective date of November 6, 2013 and cov-\\nered the “7 Sources Illustration Collection.” It listed 17 sepa-\\nrate illustrations with names like “Frame7” and “7S-Bottle Il-\\nlustration.” Registration “VA 1-893-717” had an effective date\\nof December 12, 2013 and covered the “FEV Illustration Col-\\nlection,” short for Flor-Essence. It listed 16 separate illustra-\\ntions with names like “Frame-3,” “Herbs,” and “Amy Tex\\nBubble.”\\n When settlement negotiations failed, Sullivan sued Flora\\nfor copyright infringement in the Western District of Wiscon-\\nsin. The Copyright Act allows a plaintiff to choose to recover\\neither statutory damages or actual damages. See 17 U.S.C.\\n§ 504(a). The choice must come before the entry of final judg-\\nment. See id. § 504(c)(1). As the litigation progressed, Sullivan\\nchose to pursue statutory damages, with the parties then stak-\\ning out opposing positions on the scope of a permissible\\naward under § 504(c)(1). These competing positions frame the\\nprimary issue before us on appeal.\\n Flora contended that Sullivan’s 33 illustrations fell into\\none of two compilations (corresponding with the company’s\\ntwo advertising campaigns in which the illustrations ap-\\npeared and also aligning with the two copyright registrations)\\nand thus § 504(c)(1) precluded Sullivan from receiving more\\nthan two separate awards of statutory damages—one for each\\ncompilation infringed. Sullivan begged to differ. She urged\\nthe district court to treat each of the 33 illustrations as 33 sep-\\narate works entitled to 33 separate awards of statutory dam-\\nages upon a showing that Flora infringed each work.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 5\\n\\n Who was right very much mattered, for Congress author-\\nized an award of between $750 and $30,000 in statutory dam-\\nages for each work infringed, and up to $150,000 per work if\\na jury found willful infringement. See id. § 504(c)(2). Put most\\nsimply, Sullivan wanted the copyrighted work multiplier to\\nbe 33 and not two.\\n The district court addressed the issue pretrial. It did so by\\nfocusing on Sullivan’s copyright applications. The certificates\\nfrom the U.S. Copyright Office showed that Sullivan had reg-\\nistered each of the 33 illustrations in two applications, with\\nthe illustrations grouped to correspond with Flora’s two ad-\\nvertised product lines. The Copyright Act and its implement-\\ning regulations allow the registration of multiple works this\\nway. See id. § 408(c)(1) (authorizing the extension of copyright\\nprotection from a single registration to multiple works listed\\nin the registration application); 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4) (same).\\nRelying on these provisions and drawing upon the statute’s\\ndefinition of “collective works,” the district court determined\\nthat “[Sullivan’s] copyrighted works are collective works, in\\nwhich contributions, constituting separate and individual\\nworks in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.”\\nSee 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “collective works” this way).\\nFrom there the district court concluded that “the [33] individ-\\nual illustrations are individual works, entitling Sullivan to\\nseparate statutory damages awards.” The case advanced to\\ntrial against the backdrop of this ruling.\\n Trial proceeded in three phases. In phase one, the court\\ntasked the jury with determining whether Sullivan was the\\nsole author of the copyrighted works, or instead whether Sil-\\nver was a joint author capable of granting his own rights to\\nFlora. In phase two, the jury considered whether Flora copied\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nand used Sullivan’s illustrations without authorization. In\\nphase three, the jury determined what statutory damages re-\\nsulted from the infringement.\\n The jury ruled in Sullivan’s favor at each phase. In phases\\none and two, the jury determined that Flora had copied and\\nused Sullivan’s illustrations willfully and without authoriza-\\ntion and furthermore that the works were not joint works but\\ninstead belonged to Sullivan alone. At phase three, the jury\\nawarded $3,600,000 in statutory damages, finding that Flora\\nwillfully infringed on each of Sullivan’s 33 individual illustra-\\ntions. The jury also found $143,500 in actual damages, which\\nSullivan declined in favor of the larger statutory award.\\n II\\n Flora’s main contention on appeal is that the district court\\ncommitted legal error in determining that Sullivan could col-\\nlect statutory damages for infringement on each of the 33 il-\\nlustrations as separate works. Sullivan urges us to avoid the\\nissue on the basis that Flora waived any challenge to the dam-\\nages award by not expressly objecting to the district court’s\\njury instruction. We cannot agree. While Flora could have ob-\\njected, the fairest reading of the record is that the company—\\nthroughout the litigation—had made its position on statutory\\ndamages abundantly clear, including by briefing the issue\\nduring the pretrial proceeding that resulted in the district\\ncourt’s determinative ruling. The law required no more in this\\ncircumstance. See Dresser Industries, Inc., Waukesha Engine Div.\\nv. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1450 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining\\nthat the failure to object to a jury instruction embodying a le-\\ngal determination “may be disregarded if the party’s position\\nhad previously been clearly made to the court and it is plain\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 7\\n\\nthat a further objection would be unavailing”). So we proceed\\nto the merits.\\n A\\n The scope of statutory damages available to Sullivan turns\\non § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act:\\n [T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time be-\\n fore final judgment is rendered, to recover, in-\\n stead of actual damages and profits, an award\\n of statutory damages for all infringements in-\\n volved in the action, with respect to any one work,\\n for which any one infringer is liable individu-\\n ally, or for which any two or more infringers are\\n liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less\\n than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court con-\\n siders just. For the purposes of this subsection, all\\n the parts of a compilation or derivative work consti-\\n tute one work.\\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (emphasis added).\\n By its terms, § 504(c)(1) limits a plaintiff’s recovery to one\\naward of statutory damages for each work infringed. Put an-\\nother way, Congress focused the inquiry on the number of\\nprotected works infringed, not the number of infringements.\\nSee Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int’l Ltd., 996 F.2d\\n1366, 1381 (2d Cir. 1993). In doing so, Congress imposed the\\nadditional limitation that, in awarding statutory damages,\\neach part of a compilation shall be considered “one work.”\\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). In construing § 504(c)(1), it is therefore\\nessential to determine not only what constitutes “one\\nwork”—a term Congress left undefined in the Copyright\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nAct—but also when multiple works combine to form a “com-\\npilation,” a term Congress did define in the statute.\\n In copyright law, a “work”—as its name implies—reflects\\nan original expression, whether in the form of art, literature,\\nmusic, or another tangible medium of expression, that may be\\nentitled to protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). An artist seeking\\ncopyright protection for multiple works can do so in a single\\nregistration application. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1) (allowing for\\na single registration for a group of related works); 37 C.F.R.\\n§ 202.3(b)(4) (same); see also 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David\\nNimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.18(c) (Rev. Ed. 2019) (dis-\\ncussing the Copyright Act’s flexible approach in allowing a\\nsingle registration for multiple works). The Copyright Office’s\\ngranting such a single application results in each registered\\nwork receiving copyright protection. See Wildlife Express Corp.\\nv. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 507, 508 (7th Cir. 1994)\\n(explaining that “[a] certificate of registration from the U.S.\\nRegister of Copyrights constitutes prima facie evidence of the\\nvalidity of a copyright” and “[a]n owner of a copyright is pro-\\ntected against unauthorized copying”). Sullivan charted this\\nexact course here, applying to protect what she called “illus-\\ntration collections” and receiving two certificates of registra-\\ntion from the Copyright Office. These certificates resulted in\\nSullivan’s 33 illustrations being registered and therefore hav-\\ning copyright protection.\\n The district court began and ended its analysis of the stat-\\nutory damages question with this same observation. It put its\\nruling on the scope of statutory damages this way:\\n Based on the undisputed fact that plaintiff reg-\\n istered her two illustration collections as a col-\\n lective or group work under 17 U.S.C.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 9\\n\\n § 408(c)(1) and 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)(i), and that\\n that identification appears appropriate—or, at\\n least, defendant [Flora] has failed to explain\\n why the copyrighted works do not appropri-\\n ately fall within that designation—the court\\n conclude[s] that the copyrighted works are col-\\n lective works, in which contributions, constitut-\\n ing separate and individual works in themselves, are\\n assembled into a collective whole.\\n(Dkt. 240 at 1) (emphasis in the original). The court reinforced\\nits ruling when instructing the jury on the scope of statutory\\ndamages it could award Sullivan upon findings of infringe-\\nment by Flora, explaining that “for purposes of considering a\\nstatutory damages award, you may consider each illustration\\nin the 7 Sources illustration collection and the Flor-Essence il-\\nlustration collection as an independent, copyrighted work.”\\n The district court drifted off course in seeing the 33 illus-\\ntrations as “collective works” without first asking, as\\n§ 504(c)(1) requires, whether each illustration constituted\\n“one work” or instead combined to form a “compilation.” The\\nmisstep becomes apparent upon recognizing that Congress,\\nin defining “compilation” in § 101 of the Copyright Act, made\\nclear that the term “includes collective works.” So the conse-\\nquence of the district court characterizing the 33 illustrations\\nas “collective works” was that the illustrations then also con-\\nstituted a “compilation” and thus, by operation of § 504(c)(1),\\n“all the parts of a compilation”—each of Sullivan’s 33 illustra-\\ntions—“constitute one work.” But that conclusion is at odds\\nwith the district court also determining that the Copyright Act\\nauthorized the jury to return 33 separate awards of statutory\\ndamages for infringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n The knot untangles by returning to the language of\\n§ 504(c)(1). The key distinction in § 504(c)(1) is not between a\\ncompilation and a collective work—indeed, § 101’s definition\\nmakes plain that the former includes the latter—but instead\\nbetween “one work” and a “compilation.” Or, stated another\\nway, the proper inquiry under § 504(c)(1) asks whether Sulli-\\nvan’s 33 illustrations constitute 33 individual works or in-\\nstead are parts of two compilations (corresponding with the\\ntwo advertising campaigns in which Flora used the illustra-\\ntions). The district court stopped short of asking this question\\n(or putting it to the jury) by giving controlling weight to the\\nfact that Sullivan registered her illustrations as a group and\\ntherefore protected each of the 33 illustrations. That observa-\\ntion, while reflecting an accurate understanding of the regis-\\ntration process, does not resolve the scope of statutory dam-\\nages available to Sullivan. That answer, we conclude, must\\ncome by parsing § 504(c)(1) and distinguishing between a\\nwork and a compilation.\\n Identifying the right question is easier than knowing the\\nright answer, though. And this is where we benefit from not\\nbeing the first court to consider the scope of statutory dam-\\nages available under § 504(c)(1)—and, more specifically, the\\nmeaning of “one work.”\\n B\\n Other circuits seem to follow one of two approaches in an-\\nswering the question presented, though the dividing lines are\\nfar from absolute. Start with the Second Circuit and its deci-\\nsion in Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.\\n2010). The case entailed allegations of infringement on two\\ncopyrighted music albums, each with ten songs, and the par-\\nties disputing whether statutory damages should be\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 11\\n\\nmeasured on a per-album or per-song basis. The court ob-\\nserved that each song had separate copyright protection and,\\nin addition to being sold as part of an album, could be pur-\\nchased individually through retailers like iTunes. See id. at\\n138. Even when bought individually, however, the songs re-\\nmained part of and indeed were produced and marketed as\\nan album. That fact resolved the statutory damages question\\nbecause, as the court saw it, “[a]n album falls within the Act’s\\nexpansive definition of compilation.” Id. at 140. “Based on a\\nplain reading of the statute,” the reasoning followed, “in-\\nfringement of an album should result in only one statutory\\ndamage award.” Id. at 141. More to it, the court emphasized,\\nthe “[Copyright] Act [in § 504(c)(1)] specifically states that all\\nparts of a compilation must be treated as one work for pur-\\nposes of calculating statutory damages.” Id. at 142. And,\\ndrawing reinforcement from the Copyright Act’s definition of\\ncompilation, the Second Circuit added that “[t]he fact that\\neach song may have received a separate copyright is irrele-\\nvant to this analysis.” Id. at 141.\\n In so holding, the Second Circuit distinguished its prior\\ndecision in Twin Peaks Productions v. Publications International,\\nwhere the court held that eight distinct statutory damages\\nawards were available for infringement on the copyrighted\\nscripts of eight television episodes that the defendant later\\ncombined into a single book. 996 F.2d 1366, 1381 (2d Cir.\\n1993). Separate awards of statutory damages were appropri-\\nate in Twin Peaks, the Bryant court subsequently explained, be-\\ncause “the plaintiff had issued the works separately, as inde-\\npendent television episodes,” and it was “the defendant [who]\\nprinted eight teleplays from the series in one book.” 603 F.3d\\nat 141. Even though each episode of Twin Peaks contributed\\nto the drama’s broader plot, which unfolded over the course\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nof a season, the fact remained that the episodes aired at sepa-\\nrate times and, in this way, stood on their own enough to\\navoid being grouped with the other episodes and thus con-\\nsidered a compilation within the meaning of the Copyright\\nAct. The upshot, then, was that the plaintiff in Twin Peaks was\\nentitled to eight separate statutory damage awards for each\\ninfringed episode. See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1381; see also\\nWB Music Corp. v. RTC Communication Grp., Inc., 445 F.3d 538,\\n540–41 (2d Cir. 2006) (following the same approach and re-\\nversing the district court’s limitation of a plaintiff’s statutory\\ndamages on a per-album basis).\\n The Second Circuit’s approach—embodied, as we see it, in\\nits most recent decision in Bryant—gives controlling weight to\\nthe last sentence of § 504(c)(1), where Congress directed that,\\nfor purposes of assessing statutory damages, “all the parts of\\na compilation or derivative work constitute one work.” The\\napproach has a limiting effect. Take, for instance, the song-\\nwriter who produces an album, registers the album under the\\ngroup registration process made available by 17 U.S.C.\\n§ 408(c)(1), only then to learn someone infringed multiple\\ntracks. The artist would be entitled to one and only one award\\nof statutory damages because “it is the copyright holders who\\nissued their works as ‘compilations’; they chose to issue Al-\\nbums,” instead of producing each song as independent sin-\\ngles. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141. The Second Circuit’s approach,\\nin short, places dispositive weight on the songwriter’s bun-\\ndling of songs—protected though they may be at the individ-\\nual level—into an album. It is the production and publication\\nof each song as part of an album that limits the songwriter’s\\nrecovery to one award of statutory damages no matter the in-\\nfringement that may have occurred at the level of any indi-\\nvidual song.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 13\\n\\n Recognizing this limitation, most other circuits have inter-\\npreted § 504(c)(1) a different way. A good illustration comes\\nfrom the First Circuit’s decision in Gamma Audio & Video, Inc.\\nv. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1118 (1st Cir. 1993). The court there\\nconsidered how to award statutory damages for infringement\\non four episodes of the television series Jade Fox, where the\\nepisodes had been registered together on one copyright cer-\\ntificate and later rented or sold in sets containing multiple ep-\\nisodes. Construing § 504(c)(1), the court adopted what it\\ncalled an “independent economic value test” to determine if\\neach episode of Jade Fox had copyright value unto itself and\\nwas therefore an independent work—in statutory terms, “one\\nwork”—for purposes of awarding statutory damages. Id. at\\n1116–17.\\n The First Circuit explained that such a substantive eco-\\nnomic inquiry better reflected the value of each episode and\\ngave effect to not only the language Congress used in\\n§ 504(c)(1), but also the absence on a broader level of anything\\nin “either the statute or the corresponding regulations that\\nprecludes a copyright owner from registering the copyrights\\nin multiple works on a single registration form while still col-\\nlecting an award of statutory damages for the infringement\\non each work’s copyright.” Id. at 1117. Applying the test, the\\nFirst Circuit determined that the evidence before it supported\\na finding that each episode of Jade Fox, although plainly part\\nof a television series, constituted an independent work enti-\\ntled to its own award of statutory damages. See id. at 1117–18.\\n The Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits follow the First Cir-\\ncuit’s approach. See, e.g., VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d\\n723, 747 (9th Cir. 2019) (adhering to its discussion in Columbia\\nPictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Bd. of Birmingham, Inc.,\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n259 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) and explaining that “the question\\nof whether something—like a photo, television episode, or so\\nforth—has ‘independent economic value’ informs our analy-\\nsis of whether the photo or episode is a work” within the\\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1)); MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d\\n766, 769 (11th Cir. 1996) (employing the same test to deter-\\nmine “whether each expression has an independent economic\\nvalue and is, in itself, viable”); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell,\\n897 F.2d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (asking whether certain cop-\\nyrighted materials are “distinct, viable works with separate\\neconomic value and copyright lives” to determine the scope\\nof available statutory damages under § 504(c)(1)).\\n The Fourth Circuit is the only other circuit to have consid-\\nered the question presented. Its answer came with mixed sig-\\nnals, following the Second Circuit’s approach in Bryant but\\nsuggesting different facts may fit with a different construction\\nof § 504(c)(1). See Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., 323 F.3d 279, 285\\n(4th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier,\\nInc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). In Xoom, the court deter-\\nmined that two collections of numerous digital images, pro-\\ntected under two copyright registrations, were compilations\\nand thus only subject to two statutory damages awards under\\n§ 504(c)(1). See id. at 285 n.8 (explaining that “Imageline is en-\\ntitled to one award of statutory damages per work infringed\\nbecause SuperBundle and Master Gallery are compilations or\\nderivative works in which Imageline holds copyrights”). At an-\\nother point in its opinion, however, the Fourth Circuit ap-\\npeared to agree that “the Copyright Act does not bar multiple\\nawards for statutory damages when one registration includes\\nmultiple works.” Id. at 285. This qualification is substantial\\nand seems to suggest the Fourth Circuit may chart a different\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 15\\n\\ncourse—perhaps the one followed by most other circuits—on\\ndifferent facts.\\n C\\n Section 504(c)(1) is hardly a model of clarity, especially\\nwhen considering, as we are here, infringement of multiple\\nprotected works and a plaintiff seeking multiple, separate\\nawards of statutory damages. It is not at all surprising that\\ntwo approaches find recognition in the caselaw of other cir-\\ncuits. In the end, we conclude, in closer keeping with the ap-\\nproach of the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, that\\n§ 504(c)(1) requires courts confronted with circumstances\\nwith multiple works and multiple infringements to deter-\\nmine, or to charge a jury with fact finding tailored to answer-\\ning, whether the protected works have value only in and\\nthrough their composite whole (and thus meet the definition\\nof a “compilation” in § 101) or instead have standalone value\\nat the level of “one work.” A protected work has standalone\\nvalue if the evidence shows that work has distinct and dis-\\ncernable value to the copyright holder. See Gamma Audio,\\n11 F.3d at 1116 (explaining that “separate copyrights are not\\ndistinct ‘works’ unless they can live their own copyright\\nlife”—a viability determination that turns on whether the\\nwork in question has independent economic value); see also\\nFeltner, 89 F.3d at 769; Walt Disney Co., 897 F.2d at 569.\\n The question at the heart of the Second Circuit’s more lim-\\nited approach in Bryant—which focuses on whether the cop-\\nyright holder marketed and distributed the multiple pro-\\ntected works as individual works or as a compendium of\\nworks (like, for example, an album)—is certainly relevant to\\nthe inquiry we believe Congress has required in § 504(c)(1).\\nBut we also believe the inquiry needs to extend further to\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\ndiscern and give more fulsome effect to the distinction Con-\\ngress drew in the text of § 504(c)(1) between “one work” and\\na “compilation.” See Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP,\\n795 F.3d 1255, 1281 (11th Cir. 2015) (employing a similar ap-\\nproach to discerning whether multiple photos constituted a\\ncompilation or individual works). To stop at the Second Cir-\\ncuit’s inquiry does not allow a possibility Congress made\\navailable in § 504(c)(1)—a situation where a copyright holder\\nencounters infringement on multiple works available in the\\nmarket as a group but where discernable value lies at the level\\nof a particular individual work—for example, at the level of a\\nparticular photo or song which, although released as part of\\nan album, is likewise marketed and available at the individual\\nlevel. Sellers regularly allow buyers to acquire a part of a\\nwhole and the market assigns value accordingly.\\n The inquiry and fact finding demanded by § 504(c)(1) is\\nmore functional than formal, taking account of the economic\\nvalue, if any, of a protected work more than the fact that the\\nprotection came about by an artist registering multiple works\\nin a single application. The necessary finding requires a focus\\non where the market assigns value. By way of an analogy, im-\\nperfect though it may be, think in the first instance of the mul-\\ntiple protected works as a quilt and then ask whether any one\\nindividual patch has discernable, independent economic\\nvalue—whether once separated from the quilt a particular\\npatch lives its own copyright life (as “one work”)—or instead\\nwhether the value lies in the patches’ combined assembly into\\nthe quilt as a whole (as a “compilation”).\\n Our analysis must end here, though, as the record as it\\npresently stands does not allow us to resolve as a factual mat-\\nter whether all or part of Sullivan’s 33 illustrations are\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 17\\n\\nseparate works with distinct and discernable value or part of\\ntwo broader compilations. The district court did not ask (or\\nput to the jury) the questions we see as necessary for resolving\\nthe statutory damages question. See VHT, Inc., 918 F.3d at 748\\n(remanding on similar reasoning for additional fact finding).\\n This error requires us to vacate the judgment in Sullivan’s\\nfavor. Our doing so in no way calls the jury’s findings of in-\\nfringement into question. On remand the district court will\\nhave ample flexibility to structure the proceedings to enable\\nthe requisite findings pertinent to statutory damages.\\n III\\n Invoking an altogether different provision of the Copy-\\nright Act, Flora advances a separate and independent chal-\\nlenge to the jury’s statutory damages award based on the tim-\\ning of the company’s infringement on Sullivan’s copyrighted\\nworks. The district court determined that Flora waived this\\nchallenge by raising it much too late at trial. We agree.\\n Section 412 of the Copyright Act prohibits an award of\\nstatutory damages for “any infringement of a copyright in an\\nunpublished work commenced before the effective dates of\\nregistration.” 17 U.S.C. § 412(1). By its terms, § 412 imposes a\\nbar to recovering statutory damages if a defendant can show\\nthat any infringement began before the registration of the\\nworks in question.\\n Neither the district court nor jury ever considered the tim-\\ning bar imposed by § 412. The reason is because Flora raised\\nthe § 412 limitation for the first time during the third and final\\nphase of trial—the damages phase—and even then, only at a\\nside bar on an unrelated issue. Flora’s doing so surprised the\\ndistrict judge, as the position marked a substantial shift in the\\n\\f18 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\ncompany’s trial strategy. All along Flora had sought to avoid\\nliability based on the defense of joint authorship—by arguing\\nthat Silver and Sullivan jointly created each of the 33 illustra-\\ntions—and thus that the company (through Silver’s joint own-\\nership) could not possibly be liable for infringement. By in-\\nvoking § 412 and advancing a timing defense, Flora changed\\ncourse, recognizing (undoubtedly in response to the jury’s\\nverdict in phase two) that it had infringed on Sullivan’s works\\nbut arguing that the infringement began before she had regis-\\ntered the illustrations. In Flora’s view, the timing of the in-\\nfringement—before Sullivan’s registration—triggered the ap-\\nplication of § 412 to bar any award of statutory damages.\\n The district judge reacted to Flora’s raising this § 412 ar-\\ngument when it did with meaningful frustration. The court\\nrightly underscored that Flora made no mention of any § 412\\ndefense in its answer, motion to dismiss, or request for sum-\\nmary judgment. Nor, the district court added, did Flora ever\\nsay a word about any possible § 412 bar at the jury charge\\nconference—at a time when the court and parties could have\\nconsidered how to put the infringement-timing question to\\nthe jury. Indeed, when asked directly whether either party\\nhad concerns with the jury instruction on statutory damages,\\ncounsel for Flora responded, “None, Your Honor.”\\n As the district court saw it, then, Flora waited to pursue\\nand raise its newfound § 412 defense until the close of evi-\\ndence and thus well after either party could have structured\\nits presentation of evidence—as to liability and defenses\\nalike—to address the timing predicate on which application\\nof the damages bar hinges. Or, as the district judge put the\\npoint, “by sitting on its challenge until the end of the evi-\\ndence, defendant left plaintiff and the court to believe that it\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 19\\n\\nhad conceded this requirement for an award of statutory\\ndamages.” Accordingly, the district court concluded that\\nFlora had waived any § 412 timing defense.\\n We see no error in the district court’s conclusion, in no\\nsmall part because § 412 operates akin to an affirmative\\ndefense that Flora should have raised far earlier in the\\nproceedings. Waiting this long resulted in waiver. See Carr v.\\nO’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1126 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a\\nparty’s unreasonable delay in advancing an argument “is\\nnormally a compelling ground for deeming even a good\\nground waived”). Our cases are clear that waiver, not\\nforfeiture, occurs when a defendant waits until the eleventh\\nhour or beyond to raise an affirmative defense and in doing\\nso prejudices the opposing party. See Reed v. Columbia St.\\nMary’s Hosp., 915 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 2019). “Allowing a\\nlast-minute defense that introduces new factual and legal\\nissues after discovery has closed,” we have emphasized,\\n“raises the costs of litigation and allows the party that was at\\nleast negligent in failing to plead its defense to take unfair\\nadvantage of its opposing party.” Id.\\n It is hard to see what happened here any other way than\\nthe district judge put it: for whatever reason, strategic or in-\\nadvertent, Flora waited to raise its timing-of-infringement de-\\nfense until the jury had already found infringement, leaving\\nthe trial record altogether missing evidence on precisely when\\nthe infringement began—the lynchpin inquiry under § 412.\\nWithout any notice that this change of course was coming,\\nSullivan had no reason to believe her infringement claim may\\nrise or fall on evidence pinpointing the timing of Flora’s in-\\nfringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\\n\\f20 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n In these circumstances, we cannot say the district court\\nwas wrong to conclude that “Flora, at minimum, needed to put\\nthe timing requirement of § 412 in issue by timely challenging\\nit” and its failure to do so constituted waiver.\\n IV\\n Flora’s final effort on appeal to avoid liability comes in its\\ncontention that the district court erred in not setting aside the\\njury’s verdict on the basis that the trial evidence showed be-\\nyond dispute that Silver and Sullivan were joint authors of the\\n33 illustrations. Here too, though, Flora runs into waiver, as\\nthe company failed to present this challenge to the district\\ncourt in response to the jury’s adverse verdict. The pathway\\nto that conclusion is straightforward.\\n Joint authorship is a defense to copyright infringement.\\nSee Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau,\\n576 F.3d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 2009). The defense, as its name im-\\nplies, turns on whether two or more authors jointly created\\nthe work in question. If so, they hold undivided interests in\\nthe work and the underlying rights are shared and not exclu-\\nsive to one or the other authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); Janky,\\n576 F.3d at 361 (“The benefits of co-authorship are therefore\\nsignificant: each author may use or license the joint work.”).\\n Throughout the pretrial proceedings, Flora sought to\\nshow that Joseph Silver’s contributions to Sullivan’s illustra-\\ntions resulted in joint authorship, which in turn would have\\nallowed Silver to authorize Flora’s use of the illustrations,\\neliminating the basis for infringement. A copyright owner\\ncannot infringe its own work. Flora continued to advance the\\njoint authorship defense at trial, moving, for example, on day\\ntwo for judgment as a matter of law on the issue. See Fed. R.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 21\\n\\nCiv. P. 50(a). The district court denied the motion, and the\\ncase went to the jury. In finding infringement, the jury ex-\\npressly found (and so answered on the verdict form) that\\nFlora had not carried its burden of showing that the illustra-\\ntions were the result of a joint effort by Silver and Sullivan.\\n But Flora never renewed its challenge at any point after\\nthe jury returned its verdict in Sullivan’s favor. And therein\\nlies the problem. Flora insists on appeal that the district court\\nerred in not keeping the joint authorship question from the\\njury and failing to grant its Rule 50(a) motion on the issue. Yet\\nthis contention runs headlong into the well-settled precept\\nthat “a court of appeals may not award judgment due to in-\\nsufficiency of the evidence where no Rule 50(b) motion was\\nfiled after the verdict.” Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 448 F.3d 936,\\n938 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann\\nIns. Co., 861 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 2017) (making clear that for\\na party to seek judgment on appeal, “the requesting party\\nmust not only have filed a motion under Rule 50(a), but must\\nalso have renewed that motion under Rule 50(b)”).\\n The demands of Rule 50(b) serve a sound purpose. As the\\nSupreme Court has emphasized, the “determination of\\nwhether a new trial should be granted or a judgment entered\\nunder Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of\\nthe judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel\\nof the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.”\\nUnitherm v. Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394,\\n401 (2006). This explains why our caselaw is unyielding in\\nrequiring a party who believes a jury’s verdict lacks a\\nsufficient evidentiary basis to raise that challenge in the\\ndistrict court. It is not enough to rest on having made a pre-\\nverdict sufficiency-of-evidence challenge under Rule 50(a).\\n\\f22 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n To excuse its failure to move under Rule 50(b) following\\nthe jury’s adverse verdict, Flora argues that we have discre-\\ntion on appeal to consider pure questions of law. But the ques-\\ntion of joint authorship is not a pure question of law: answer-\\ning whether two or more individuals or entities contributed\\nenough to a work to result in joint authorship requires con-\\nsideration of facts. And this is precisely why other courts have\\nrecognized, properly in our view, that the question is one for\\na jury to consider guided by an instruction from the district\\ncourt. See Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, 290\\nF.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that in a copyright case,\\n“[a]uthorship is generally a question of fact for the jury”).\\nHaving failed to lodge a post-verdict challenge under Rule\\n50(b), Flora waived the very issue it now wants us to review.\\nWe cannot do so.\\n Even if Flora had not waived its joint authorship chal-\\nlenge, we would be quick to conclude that the jury reasonably\\nfound Sullivan was the sole author of the 33 illustrations in\\nquestion. The jury received evidence of the contributions of\\nboth Silver and Sullivan and viewed both of the copyright reg-\\nistrations submitted solely in Sullivan’s name. The district\\ncourt also properly instructed the jury that “[a] ‘joint work’ is\\na work that two or more persons prepared with the intention\\nthat their contributions be merged into inseparable elements\\nof a single work.” This instruction mirrored the Copyright\\nAct’s definition of a “joint work.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. It also\\naligns precisely with what we have described as the attributes\\nof a joint work. See Janky, 576 F.3d at 362 (explaining that a\\njoint work requires “(1) intent to create a joint work; and (2)\\ncontribution of independently copyrightable material”).\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 23\\n\\n Asked whether a preponderance of the evidence demon-\\nstrated that the copyrighted illustrations were joint works, the\\njury answered in the negative, finding that Sullivan was the\\nsole author. We cannot say this was an unreasonable result in\\nlight of the evidence presented. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d\\n331, 335 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that we will “overturn a\\njury verdict for the plaintiff only if we conclude that no ra-\\ntional jury could have found for the plaintiff”).\\n V\\n We conclude with a brief word in response to Sullivan’s\\ncross appeal challenging the district court’s refusal to award\\nattorneys’ fees. Our review is limited to whether the district\\ncourt’s ruling reflected an abuse of discretion. See Gastineau v.\\nWright, 592 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The Copyright Act affords a district court discretion in\\nawarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an infringe-\\nment case. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (explaining that “the court in its\\ndiscretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any\\nparty” in an infringement case) (emphasis added). The Su-\\npreme Court offered further guidance in Fogerty v. Fantasy,\\nInc., outlining a series of factors for courts to consider when\\nawarding fees. 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) (setting out a se-\\nries of nonexclusive factors, including frivolousness, motiva-\\ntion, objective unreasonableness of factual or legal positions,\\nand considerations of compensation and deterrence).\\n In denying Sullivan’s fee application, the district court rea-\\nsoned well within the discretion afforded by Congress. Con-\\nsidering the factors outlined in Fogerty, the court saw the case\\nas close on the merits and hard fought by the parties. From\\nthere the district court underscored that Sullivan had won a\\n\\f24 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nsubstantial verdict that would be costly for Flora to satisfy\\nand that, when balancing the totality of what occurred in the\\nlitigation, an additional award of fees was neither required\\nnor appropriate, especially in light of the reasonableness of\\nthe joint authorship defense Flora pressed at trial. Or, in the\\ndistrict court’s own words, “no further compensation or de-\\nterrence in the form of an attorneys’ fee award [was] neces-\\nsary.” We cannot call the district court’s reasoning an abuse\\nof discretion and therefore affirm its denial of Sullivan’s fee\\napplication.\\n * * *\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM in part and otherwise\\nVACATE the judgment in Sullivan’s favor and REMAND to\\nthe district court for further proceedings consistent with this\\nopinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431877/\", \"author_raw\": \"SCUDDER, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SCUDDER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"SCUDDER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654624/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Amy Sullivan v. Flora, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\nAMY LEE SULLIVAN, d/b/a DESIGN KIT,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n Cross-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nFLORA, INC.,\n Defendant-Appellant,\n Cross-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Wisconsin.\n No. 3:15-cv-298 — William M. Conley, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\nfirst impression for us on the scope of statutory damages re-\ncoverable under the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 504(c)(1)\nof the Act permits a copyright holder “to recover, instead of\nactual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages\nfor all infringements involved in the action, with respect to\n\f2 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\nany one work,” with Congress separately instructing that, in\ndetermining statutory damages, “all the parts of a compila-\ntion or derivative work constitute one work.” This case re-\nquires us to determine what constitutes “one work” in a fact\npattern where a jury found infringement on multiple works\nregistered in a single copyright application.\n Amy Sullivan, a graphic design artist, produced a series of\n33 illustrations for Flora, Inc., an herbal supplement company,\nto use in two advertising campaigns. Upon noticing that Flora\nwas using the illustrations in other ads, Sullivan brought suit\nfor copyright infringement and opted to pursue statutory\ndamages. She did so to maximize her potential payout by clas-\nsifying each of her 33 illustrations as “one work” within the\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act. Flora disagreed,\ncontending that the illustrations were part of two broader\ncompilations and thus, if Sullivan prevailed, § 504(c)(1) lim-\nited her to just two statutory damage awards—one award for\ninfringement on the illustrations used in each of the two ad-\nvertising campaigns. The district court agreed with Sullivan,\nand instructed the jury that she could recover separate awards\nof statutory damages for 33 acts of infringement on 33 sepa-\nrate illustrations. The jury found infringement on each of the\n33 illustrations and returned a statutory damages award of\n$3.6 million.\n On appeal Flora challenges the district court’s ruling on\nstatutory damages and separate rulings on two additional de-\nfenses to liability asserted at trial. While procedural shortcom-\nings defeat these latter two challenges, Flora is right that the\ndistrict court committed error in permitting separate awards\nof statutory damages unaccompanied by any finding that\neach or any of the 33 illustrations constituted “one work”\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 3\n\nwithin the meaning and protection of § 504(c)(1) of the Copy-\nright Act. It is neither appropriate nor possible for us to make\nthat finding on the record before us. So we vacate the judg-\nment in Sullivan’s favor and remand for further proceedings.\n I\n Flora, Inc. manufactures herbal supplement and health\nproducts. In 2013, looking to produce advertisements for two\nnew products, “7-Sources” and “Flor-Essence,” the company\ncontacted freelance production specialist Joseph Silver to de-\nvelop two animated videos. Unbeknownst to Flora, Silver\nthen contacted Amy Sullivan, a Wisconsin-based graphic de-\nsign artist, to develop illustrations that would then be ani-\nmated for use in the advertisements. In Sullivan’s written\nagreement with Silver, she granted Flora exclusive rights to\nher illustrations in the two specified advertising campaigns.\n Over the following months, Silver and Sullivan corre-\nsponded to develop the illustrations. Silver made suggestions\non color, style, and text, while also offering rough outlines\nand sketches to guide Sullivan’s work. For her part, Sullivan\nused digital design software to create the ultimate illustra-\ntions, sometimes incorporating Silver’s suggestions and other\ntimes not. Flora used Sullivan’s illustrations in its final adver-\ntisements for the two product lines.\n At some point in the summer or fall of 2013, Sullivan no-\nticed that Flora was using her illustrations to promote other\nproduct lines. Exactly when the unauthorized use occurred is\nunclear. What the record shows for certain is that, on October\n16, 2013, Sullivan sent Flora a letter complaining of copyright\ninfringement. At that time, however, Sullivan had not (yet)\nregistered her illustrations with the Copyright Office.\n\f4 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\n Sullivan subsequently did so in two copyright applica-\ntions approved by the U.S. Copyright Office. Registration “VA\n1-888-930” had an effective date of November 6, 2013 and cov-\nered the “7 Sources Illustration Collection.” It listed 17 sepa-\nrate illustrations with names like “Frame7” and “7S-Bottle Il-\nlustration.” Registration “VA 1-893-717” had an effective date\nof December 12, 2013 and covered the “FEV Illustration Col-\nlection,” short for Flor-Essence. It listed 16 separate illustra-\ntions with names like “Frame-3,” “Herbs,” and “Amy Tex\nBubble.”\n When settlement negotiations failed, Sullivan sued Flora\nfor copyright infringement in the Western District of Wiscon-\nsin. The Copyright Act allows a plaintiff to choose to recover\neither statutory damages or actual damages. See 17 U.S.C.\n§ 504(a). The choice must come before the entry of final judg-\nment. See id. § 504(c)(1). As the litigation progressed, Sullivan\nchose to pursue statutory damages, with the parties then stak-\ning out opposing positions on the scope of a permissible\naward under § 504(c)(1). These competing positions frame the\nprimary issue before us on appeal.\n Flora contended that Sullivan’s 33 illustrations fell into\none of two compilations (corresponding with the company’s\ntwo advertising campaigns in which the illustrations ap-\npeared and also aligning with the two copyright registrations)\nand thus § 504(c)(1) precluded Sullivan from receiving more\nthan two separate awards of statutory damages—one for each\ncompilation infringed. Sullivan begged to differ. She urged\nthe district court to treat each of the 33 illustrations as 33 sep-\narate works entitled to 33 separate awards of statutory dam-\nages upon a showing that Flora infringed each work.\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 5\n\n Who was right very much mattered, for Congress author-\nized an award of between $750 and $30,000 in statutory dam-\nages for each work infringed, and up to $150,000 per work if\na jury found willful infringement. See id. § 504(c)(2). Put most\nsimply, Sullivan wanted the copyrighted work multiplier to\nbe 33 and not two.\n The district court addressed the issue pretrial. It did so by\nfocusing on Sullivan’s copyright applications. The certificates\nfrom the U.S. Copyright Office showed that Sullivan had reg-\nistered each of the 33 illustrations in two applications, with\nthe illustrations grouped to correspond with Flora’s two ad-\nvertised product lines. The Copyright Act and its implement-\ning regulations allow the registration of multiple works this\nway. See id. § 408(c)(1) (authorizing the extension of copyright\nprotection from a single registration to multiple works listed\nin the registration application); 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4) (same).\nRelying on these provisions and drawing upon the statute’s\ndefinition of “collective works,” the district court determined\nthat “[Sullivan’s] copyrighted works are collective works, in\nwhich contributions, constituting separate and individual\nworks in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.”\nSee 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “collective works” this way).\nFrom there the district court concluded that “the [33] individ-\nual illustrations are individual works, entitling Sullivan to\nseparate statutory damages awards.” The case advanced to\ntrial against the backdrop of this ruling.\n Trial proceeded in three phases. In phase one, the court\ntasked the jury with determining whether Sullivan was the\nsole author of the copyrighted works, or instead whether Sil-\nver was a joint author capable of granting his own rights to\nFlora. In phase two, the jury considered whether Flora copied\n\f6 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\nand used Sullivan’s illustrations without authorization. In\nphase three, the jury determined what statutory damages re-\nsulted from the infringement.\n The jury ruled in Sullivan’s favor at each phase. In phases\none and two, the jury determined that Flora had copied and\nused Sullivan’s illustrations willfully and without authoriza-\ntion and furthermore that the works were not joint works but\ninstead belonged to Sullivan alone. At phase three, the jury\nawarded $3,600,000 in statutory damages, finding that Flora\nwillfully infringed on each of Sullivan’s 33 individual illustra-\ntions. The jury also found $143,500 in actual damages, which\nSullivan declined in favor of the larger statutory award.\n II\n Flora’s main contention on appeal is that the district court\ncommitted legal error in determining that Sullivan could col-\nlect statutory damages for infringement on each of the 33 il-\nlustrations as separate works. Sullivan urges us to avoid the\nissue on the basis that Flora waived any challenge to the dam-\nages award by not expressly objecting to the district court’s\njury instruction. We cannot agree. While Flora could have ob-\njected, the fairest reading of the record is that the company—\nthroughout the litigation—had made its position on statutory\ndamages abundantly clear, including by briefing the issue\nduring the pretrial proceeding that resulted in the district\ncourt’s determinative ruling. The law required no more in this\ncircumstance. See Dresser Industries, Inc., Waukesha Engine Div.\nv. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1450 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining\nthat the failure to object to a jury instruction embodying a le-\ngal determination “may be disregarded if the party’s position\nhad previously been clearly made to the court and it is plain\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 7\n\nthat a further objection would be unavailing”). So we proceed\nto the merits.\n A\n The scope of statutory damages available to Sullivan turns\non § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act:\n [T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time be-\n fore final judgment is rendered, to recover, in-\n stead of actual damages and profits, an award\n of statutory damages for all infringements in-\n volved in the action, with respect to any one work,\n for which any one infringer is liable individu-\n ally, or for which any two or more infringers are\n liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less\n than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court con-\n siders just. For the purposes of this subsection, all\n the parts of a compilation or derivative work consti-\n tute one work.\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (emphasis added).\n By its terms, § 504(c)(1) limits a plaintiff’s recovery to one\naward of statutory damages for each work infringed. Put an-\nother way, Congress focused the inquiry on the number of\nprotected works infringed, not the number of infringements.\nSee Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int’l Ltd., 996 F.2d\n1366, 1381 (2d Cir. 1993). In doing so, Congress imposed the\nadditional limitation that, in awarding statutory damages,\neach part of a compilation shall be considered “one work.”\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). In construing § 504(c)(1), it is therefore\nessential to determine not only what constitutes “one\nwork”—a term Congress left undefined in the Copyright\n\f8 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\nAct—but also when multiple works combine to form a “com-\npilation,” a term Congress did define in the statute.\n In copyright law, a “work”—as its name implies—reflects\nan original expression, whether in the form of art, literature,\nmusic, or another tangible medium of expression, that may be\nentitled to protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). An artist seeking\ncopyright protection for multiple works can do so in a single\nregistration application. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1) (allowing for\na single registration for a group of related works); 37 C.F.R.\n§ 202.3(b)(4) (same); see also 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David\nNimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.18(c) (Rev. Ed. 2019) (dis-\ncussing the Copyright Act’s flexible approach in allowing a\nsingle registration for multiple works). The Copyright Office’s\ngranting such a single application results in each registered\nwork receiving copyright protection. See Wildlife Express Corp.\nv. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 507, 508 (7th Cir. 1994)\n(explaining that “[a] certificate of registration from the U.S.\nRegister of Copyrights constitutes prima facie evidence of the\nvalidity of a copyright” and “[a]n owner of a copyright is pro-\ntected against unauthorized copying”). Sullivan charted this\nexact course here, applying to protect what she called “illus-\ntration collections” and receiving two certificates of registra-\ntion from the Copyright Office. These certificates resulted in\nSullivan’s 33 illustrations being registered and therefore hav-\ning copyright protection.\n The district court began and ended its analysis of the stat-\nutory damages question with this same observation. It put its\nruling on the scope of statutory damages this way:\n Based on the undisputed fact that plaintiff reg-\n istered her two illustration collections as a col-\n lective or group work under 17 U.S.C.\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 9\n\n § 408(c)(1) and 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)(i), and that\n that identification appears appropriate—or, at\n least, defendant [Flora] has failed to explain\n why the copyrighted works do not appropri-\n ately fall within that designation—the court\n conclude[s] that the copyrighted works are col-\n lective works, in which contributions, constitut-\n ing separate and individual works in themselves, are\n assembled into a collective whole.\n(Dkt. 240 at 1) (emphasis in the original). The court reinforced\nits ruling when instructing the jury on the scope of statutory\ndamages it could award Sullivan upon findings of infringe-\nment by Flora, explaining that “for purposes of considering a\nstatutory damages award, you may consider each illustration\nin the 7 Sources illustration collection and the Flor-Essence il-\nlustration collection as an independent, copyrighted work.”\n The district court drifted off course in seeing the 33 illus-\ntrations as “collective works” without first asking, as\n§ 504(c)(1) requires, whether each illustration constituted\n“one work” or instead combined to form a “compilation.” The\nmisstep becomes apparent upon recognizing that Congress,\nin defining “compilation” in § 101 of the Copyright Act, made\nclear that the term “includes collective works.” So the conse-\nquence of the district court characterizing the 33 illustrations\nas “collective works” was that the illustrations then also con-\nstituted a “compilation” and thus, by operation of § 504(c)(1),\n“all the parts of a compilation”—each of Sullivan’s 33 illustra-\ntions—“constitute one work.” But that conclusion is at odds\nwith the district court also determining that the Copyright Act\nauthorized the jury to return 33 separate awards of statutory\ndamages for infringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\n\f10 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\n The knot untangles by returning to the language of\n§ 504(c)(1). The key distinction in § 504(c)(1) is not between a\ncompilation and a collective work—indeed, § 101’s definition\nmakes plain that the former includes the latter—but instead\nbetween “one work” and a “compilation.” Or, stated another\nway, the proper inquiry under § 504(c)(1) asks whether Sulli-\nvan’s 33 illustrations constitute 33 individual works or in-\nstead are parts of two compilations (corresponding with the\ntwo advertising campaigns in which Flora used the illustra-\ntions). The district court stopped short of asking this question\n(or putting it to the jury) by giving controlling weight to the\nfact that Sullivan registered her illustrations as a group and\ntherefore protected each of the 33 illustrations. That observa-\ntion, while reflecting an accurate understanding of the regis-\ntration process, does not resolve the scope of statutory dam-\nages available to Sullivan. That answer, we conclude, must\ncome by parsing § 504(c)(1) and distinguishing between a\nwork and a compilation.\n Identifying the right question is easier than knowing the\nright answer, though. And this is where we benefit from not\nbeing the first court to consider the scope of statutory dam-\nages available under § 504(c)(1)—and, more specifically, the\nmeaning of “one work.”\n B\n Other circuits seem to follow one of two approaches in an-\nswering the question presented, though the dividing lines are\nfar from absolute. Start with the Second Circuit and its deci-\nsion in Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.\n2010). The case entailed allegations of infringement on two\ncopyrighted music albums, each with ten songs, and the par-\nties disputing whether statutory damages should be\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 11\n\nmeasured on a per-album or per-song basis. The court ob-\nserved that each song had separate copyright protection and,\nin addition to being sold as part of an album, could be pur-\nchased individually through retailers like iTunes. See id. at\n138. Even when bought individually, however, the songs re-\nmained part of and indeed were produced and marketed as\nan album. That fact resolved the statutory damages question\nbecause, as the court saw it, “[a]n album falls within the Act’s\nexpansive definition of compilation.” Id. at 140. “Based on a\nplain reading of the statute,” the reasoning followed, “in-\nfringement of an album should result in only one statutory\ndamage award.” Id. at 141. More to it, the court emphasized,\nthe “[Copyright] Act [in § 504(c)(1)] specifically states that all\nparts of a compilation must be treated as one work for pur-\nposes of calculating statutory damages.” Id. at 142. And,\ndrawing reinforcement from the Copyright Act’s definition of\ncompilation, the Second Circuit added that “[t]he fact that\neach song may have received a separate copyright is irrele-\nvant to this analysis.” Id. at 141.\n In so holding, the Second Circuit distinguished its prior\ndecision in Twin Peaks Productions v. Publications International,\nwhere the court held that eight distinct statutory damages\nawards were available for infringement on the copyrighted\nscripts of eight television episodes that the defendant later\ncombined into a single book. 996 F.2d 1366, 1381 (2d Cir.\n1993). Separate awards of statutory damages were appropri-\nate in Twin Peaks, the Bryant court subsequently explained, be-\ncause “the plaintiff had issued the works separately, as inde-\npendent television episodes,” and it was “the defendant [who]\nprinted eight teleplays from the series in one book.” 603 F.3d\nat 141. Even though each episode of Twin Peaks contributed\nto the drama’s broader plot, which unfolded over the course\n\f12 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\nof a season, the fact remained that the episodes aired at sepa-\nrate times and, in this way, stood on their own enough to\navoid being grouped with the other episodes and thus con-\nsidered a compilation within the meaning of the Copyright\nAct. The upshot, then, was that the plaintiff in Twin Peaks was\nentitled to eight separate statutory damage awards for each\ninfringed episode. See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1381; see also\nWB Music Corp. v. RTC Communication Grp., Inc., 445 F.3d 538,\n540–41 (2d Cir. 2006) (following the same approach and re-\nversing the district court’s limitation of a plaintiff’s statutory\ndamages on a per-album basis).\n The Second Circuit’s approach—embodied, as we see it, in\nits most recent decision in Bryant—gives controlling weight to\nthe last sentence of § 504(c)(1), where Congress directed that,\nfor purposes of assessing statutory damages, “all the parts of\na compilation or derivative work constitute one work.” The\napproach has a limiting effect. Take, for instance, the song-\nwriter who produces an album, registers the album under the\ngroup registration process made available by 17 U.S.C.\n§ 408(c)(1), only then to learn someone infringed multiple\ntracks. The artist would be entitled to one and only one award\nof statutory damages because “it is the copyright holders who\nissued their works as ‘compilations’; they chose to issue Al-\nbums,” instead of producing each song as independent sin-\ngles. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141. The Second Circuit’s approach,\nin short, places dispositive weight on the songwriter’s bun-\ndling of songs—protected though they may be at the individ-\nual level—into an album. It is the production and publication\nof each song as part of an album that limits the songwriter’s\nrecovery to one award of statutory damages no matter the in-\nfringement that may have occurred at the level of any indi-\nvidual song.\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 13\n\n Recognizing this limitation, most other circuits have inter-\npreted § 504(c)(1) a different way. A good illustration comes\nfrom the First Circuit’s decision in Gamma Audio & Video, Inc.\nv. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1118 (1st Cir. 1993). The court there\nconsidered how to award statutory damages for infringement\non four episodes of the television series Jade Fox, where the\nepisodes had been registered together on one copyright cer-\ntificate and later rented or sold in sets containing multiple ep-\nisodes. Construing § 504(c)(1), the court adopted what it\ncalled an “independent economic value test” to determine if\neach episode of Jade Fox had copyright value unto itself and\nwas therefore an independent work—in statutory terms, “one\nwork”—for purposes of awarding statutory damages. Id. at\n1116–17.\n The First Circuit explained that such a substantive eco-\nnomic inquiry better reflected the value of each episode and\ngave effect to not only the language Congress used in\n§ 504(c)(1), but also the absence on a broader level of anything\nin “either the statute or the corresponding regulations that\nprecludes a copyright owner from registering the copyrights\nin multiple works on a single registration form while still col-\nlecting an award of statutory damages for the infringement\non each work’s copyright.” Id. at 1117. Applying the test, the\nFirst Circuit determined that the evidence before it supported\na finding that each episode of Jade Fox, although plainly part\nof a television series, constituted an independent work enti-\ntled to its own award of statutory damages. See id. at 1117–18.\n The Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits follow the First Cir-\ncuit’s approach. See, e.g., VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d\n723, 747 (9th Cir. 2019) (adhering to its discussion in Columbia\nPictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Bd. of Birmingham, Inc.,\n\f14 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\n259 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) and explaining that “the question\nof whether something—like a photo, television episode, or so\nforth—has ‘independent economic value’ informs our analy-\nsis of whether the photo or episode is a work” within the\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1)); MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d\n766, 769 (11th Cir. 1996) (employing the same test to deter-\nmine “whether each expression has an independent economic\nvalue and is, in itself, viable”); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell,\n897 F.2d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (asking whether certain cop-\nyrighted materials are “distinct, viable works with separate\neconomic value and copyright lives” to determine the scope\nof available statutory damages under § 504(c)(1)).\n The Fourth Circuit is the only other circuit to have consid-\nered the question presented. Its answer came with mixed sig-\nnals, following the Second Circuit’s approach in Bryant but\nsuggesting different facts may fit with a different construction\nof § 504(c)(1). See Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., 323 F.3d 279, 285\n(4th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier,\nInc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). In Xoom, the court deter-\nmined that two collections of numerous digital images, pro-\ntected under two copyright registrations, were compilations\nand thus only subject to two statutory damages awards under\n§ 504(c)(1). See id. at 285 n.8 (explaining that “Imageline is en-\ntitled to one award of statutory damages per work infringed\nbecause SuperBundle and Master Gallery are compilations or\nderivative works in which Imageline holds copyrights”). At an-\nother point in its opinion, however, the Fourth Circuit ap-\npeared to agree that “the Copyright Act does not bar multiple\nawards for statutory damages when one registration includes\nmultiple works.” Id. at 285. This qualification is substantial\nand seems to suggest the Fourth Circuit may chart a different\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 15\n\ncourse—perhaps the one followed by most other circuits—on\ndifferent facts.\n C\n Section 504(c)(1) is hardly a model of clarity, especially\nwhen considering, as we are here, infringement of multiple\nprotected works and a plaintiff seeking multiple, separate\nawards of statutory damages. It is not at all surprising that\ntwo approaches find recognition in the caselaw of other cir-\ncuits. In the end, we conclude, in closer keeping with the ap-\nproach of the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, that\n§ 504(c)(1) requires courts confronted with circumstances\nwith multiple works and multiple infringements to deter-\nmine, or to charge a jury with fact finding tailored to answer-\ning, whether the protected works have value only in and\nthrough their composite whole (and thus meet the definition\nof a “compilation” in § 101) or instead have standalone value\nat the level of “one work.” A protected work has standalone\nvalue if the evidence shows that work has distinct and dis-\ncernable value to the copyright holder. See Gamma Audio,\n11 F.3d at 1116 (explaining that “separate copyrights are not\ndistinct ‘works’ unless they can live their own copyright\nlife”—a viability determination that turns on whether the\nwork in question has independent economic value); see also\nFeltner, 89 F.3d at 769; Walt Disney Co., 897 F.2d at 569.\n The question at the heart of the Second Circuit’s more lim-\nited approach in Bryant—which focuses on whether the cop-\nyright holder marketed and distributed the multiple pro-\ntected works as individual works or as a compendium of\nworks (like, for example, an album)—is certainly relevant to\nthe inquiry we believe Congress has required in § 504(c)(1).\nBut we also believe the inquiry needs to extend further to\n\f16 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\ndiscern and give more fulsome effect to the distinction Con-\ngress drew in the text of § 504(c)(1) between “one work” and\na “compilation.” See Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP,\n795 F.3d 1255, 1281 (11th Cir. 2015) (employing a similar ap-\nproach to discerning whether multiple photos constituted a\ncompilation or individual works). To stop at the Second Cir-\ncuit’s inquiry does not allow a possibility Congress made\navailable in § 504(c)(1)—a situation where a copyright holder\nencounters infringement on multiple works available in the\nmarket as a group but where discernable value lies at the level\nof a particular individual work—for example, at the level of a\nparticular photo or song which, although released as part of\nan album, is likewise marketed and available at the individual\nlevel. Sellers regularly allow buyers to acquire a part of a\nwhole and the market assigns value accordingly.\n The inquiry and fact finding demanded by § 504(c)(1) is\nmore functional than formal, taking account of the economic\nvalue, if any, of a protected work more than the fact that the\nprotection came about by an artist registering multiple works\nin a single application. The necessary finding requires a focus\non where the market assigns value. By way of an analogy, im-\nperfect though it may be, think in the first instance of the mul-\ntiple protected works as a quilt and then ask whether any one\nindividual patch has discernable, independent economic\nvalue—whether once separated from the quilt a particular\npatch lives its own copyright life (as “one work”)—or instead\nwhether the value lies in the patches’ combined assembly into\nthe quilt as a whole (as a “compilation”).\n Our analysis must end here, though, as the record as it\npresently stands does not allow us to resolve as a factual mat-\nter whether all or part of Sullivan’s 33 illustrations are\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 17\n\nseparate works with distinct and discernable value or part of\ntwo broader compilations. The district court did not ask (or\nput to the jury) the questions we see as necessary for resolving\nthe statutory damages question. See VHT, Inc., 918 F.3d at 748\n(remanding on similar reasoning for additional fact finding).\n This error requires us to vacate the judgment in Sullivan’s\nfavor. Our doing so in no way calls the jury’s findings of in-\nfringement into question. On remand the district court will\nhave ample flexibility to structure the proceedings to enable\nthe requisite findings pertinent to statutory damages.\n III\n Invoking an altogether different provision of the Copy-\nright Act, Flora advances a separate and independent chal-\nlenge to the jury’s statutory damages award based on the tim-\ning of the company’s infringement on Sullivan’s copyrighted\nworks. The district court determined that Flora waived this\nchallenge by raising it much too late at trial. We agree.\n Section 412 of the Copyright Act prohibits an award of\nstatutory damages for “any infringement of a copyright in an\nunpublished work commenced before the effective dates of\nregistration.” 17 U.S.C. § 412(1). By its terms, § 412 imposes a\nbar to recovering statutory damages if a defendant can show\nthat any infringement began before the registration of the\nworks in question.\n Neither the district court nor jury ever considered the tim-\ning bar imposed by § 412. The reason is because Flora raised\nthe § 412 limitation for the first time during the third and final\nphase of trial—the damages phase—and even then, only at a\nside bar on an unrelated issue. Flora’s doing so surprised the\ndistrict judge, as the position marked a substantial shift in the\n\f18 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\ncompany’s trial strategy. All along Flora had sought to avoid\nliability based on the defense of joint authorship—by arguing\nthat Silver and Sullivan jointly created each of the 33 illustra-\ntions—and thus that the company (through Silver’s joint own-\nership) could not possibly be liable for infringement. By in-\nvoking § 412 and advancing a timing defense, Flora changed\ncourse, recognizing (undoubtedly in response to the jury’s\nverdict in phase two) that it had infringed on Sullivan’s works\nbut arguing that the infringement began before she had regis-\ntered the illustrations. In Flora’s view, the timing of the in-\nfringement—before Sullivan’s registration—triggered the ap-\nplication of § 412 to bar any award of statutory damages.\n The district judge reacted to Flora’s raising this § 412 ar-\ngument when it did with meaningful frustration. The court\nrightly underscored that Flora made no mention of any § 412\ndefense in its answer, motion to dismiss, or request for sum-\nmary judgment. Nor, the district court added, did Flora ever\nsay a word about any possible § 412 bar at the jury charge\nconference—at a time when the court and parties could have\nconsidered how to put the infringement-timing question to\nthe jury. Indeed, when asked directly whether either party\nhad concerns with the jury instruction on statutory damages,\ncounsel for Flora responded, “None, Your Honor.”\n As the district court saw it, then, Flora waited to pursue\nand raise its newfound § 412 defense until the close of evi-\ndence and thus well after either party could have structured\nits presentation of evidence—as to liability and defenses\nalike—to address the timing predicate on which application\nof the damages bar hinges. Or, as the district judge put the\npoint, “by sitting on its challenge until the end of the evi-\ndence, defendant left plaintiff and the court to believe that it\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 19\n\nhad conceded this requirement for an award of statutory\ndamages.” Accordingly, the district court concluded that\nFlora had waived any § 412 timing defense.\n We see no error in the district court’s conclusion, in no\nsmall part because § 412 operates akin to an affirmative\ndefense that Flora should have raised far earlier in the\nproceedings. Waiting this long resulted in waiver. See Carr v.\nO’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1126 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a\nparty’s unreasonable delay in advancing an argument “is\nnormally a compelling ground for deeming even a good\nground waived”). Our cases are clear that waiver, not\nforfeiture, occurs when a defendant waits until the eleventh\nhour or beyond to raise an affirmative defense and in doing\nso prejudices the opposing party. See Reed v. Columbia St.\nMary’s Hosp., 915 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 2019). “Allowing a\nlast-minute defense that introduces new factual and legal\nissues after discovery has closed,” we have emphasized,\n“raises the costs of litigation and allows the party that was at\nleast negligent in failing to plead its defense to take unfair\nadvantage of its opposing party.” Id.\n It is hard to see what happened here any other way than\nthe district judge put it: for whatever reason, strategic or in-\nadvertent, Flora waited to raise its timing-of-infringement de-\nfense until the jury had already found infringement, leaving\nthe trial record altogether missing evidence on precisely when\nthe infringement began—the lynchpin inquiry under § 412.\nWithout any notice that this change of course was coming,\nSullivan had no reason to believe her infringement claim may\nrise or fall on evidence pinpointing the timing of Flora’s in-\nfringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\n\f20 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\n In these circumstances, we cannot say the district court\nwas wrong to conclude that “Flora, at minimum, needed to put\nthe timing requirement of § 412 in issue by timely challenging\nit” and its failure to do so constituted waiver.\n IV\n Flora’s final effort on appeal to avoid liability comes in its\ncontention that the district court erred in not setting aside the\njury’s verdict on the basis that the trial evidence showed be-\nyond dispute that Silver and Sullivan were joint authors of the\n33 illustrations. Here too, though, Flora runs into waiver, as\nthe company failed to present this challenge to the district\ncourt in response to the jury’s adverse verdict. The pathway\nto that conclusion is straightforward.\n Joint authorship is a defense to copyright infringement.\nSee Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau,\n576 F.3d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 2009). The defense, as its name im-\nplies, turns on whether two or more authors jointly created\nthe work in question. If so, they hold undivided interests in\nthe work and the underlying rights are shared and not exclu-\nsive to one or the other authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); Janky,\n576 F.3d at 361 (“The benefits of co-authorship are therefore\nsignificant: each author may use or license the joint work.”).\n Throughout the pretrial proceedings, Flora sought to\nshow that Joseph Silver’s contributions to Sullivan’s illustra-\ntions resulted in joint authorship, which in turn would have\nallowed Silver to authorize Flora’s use of the illustrations,\neliminating the basis for infringement. A copyright owner\ncannot infringe its own work. Flora continued to advance the\njoint authorship defense at trial, moving, for example, on day\ntwo for judgment as a matter of law on the issue. See Fed. R.\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 21\n\nCiv. P. 50(a). The district court denied the motion, and the\ncase went to the jury. In finding infringement, the jury ex-\npressly found (and so answered on the verdict form) that\nFlora had not carried its burden of showing that the illustra-\ntions were the result of a joint effort by Silver and Sullivan.\n But Flora never renewed its challenge at any point after\nthe jury returned its verdict in Sullivan’s favor. And therein\nlies the problem. Flora insists on appeal that the district court\nerred in not keeping the joint authorship question from the\njury and failing to grant its Rule 50(a) motion on the issue. Yet\nthis contention runs headlong into the well-settled precept\nthat “a court of appeals may not award judgment due to in-\nsufficiency of the evidence where no Rule 50(b) motion was\nfiled after the verdict.” Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 448 F.3d 936,\n938 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann\nIns. Co., 861 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 2017) (making clear that for\na party to seek judgment on appeal, “the requesting party\nmust not only have filed a motion under Rule 50(a), but must\nalso have renewed that motion under Rule 50(b)”).\n The demands of Rule 50(b) serve a sound purpose. As the\nSupreme Court has emphasized, the “determination of\nwhether a new trial should be granted or a judgment entered\nunder Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of\nthe judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel\nof the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.”\nUnitherm v. Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394,\n401 (2006). This explains why our caselaw is unyielding in\nrequiring a party who believes a jury’s verdict lacks a\nsufficient evidentiary basis to raise that challenge in the\ndistrict court. It is not enough to rest on having made a pre-\nverdict sufficiency-of-evidence challenge under Rule 50(a).\n\f22 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\n To excuse its failure to move under Rule 50(b) following\nthe jury’s adverse verdict, Flora argues that we have discre-\ntion on appeal to consider pure questions of law. But the ques-\ntion of joint authorship is not a pure question of law: answer-\ning whether two or more individuals or entities contributed\nenough to a work to result in joint authorship requires con-\nsideration of facts. And this is precisely why other courts have\nrecognized, properly in our view, that the question is one for\na jury to consider guided by an instruction from the district\ncourt. See Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, 290\nF.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that in a copyright case,\n“[a]uthorship is generally a question of fact for the jury”).\nHaving failed to lodge a post-verdict challenge under Rule\n50(b), Flora waived the very issue it now wants us to review.\nWe cannot do so.\n Even if Flora had not waived its joint authorship chal-\nlenge, we would be quick to conclude that the jury reasonably\nfound Sullivan was the sole author of the 33 illustrations in\nquestion. The jury received evidence of the contributions of\nboth Silver and Sullivan and viewed both of the copyright reg-\nistrations submitted solely in Sullivan’s name. The district\ncourt also properly instructed the jury that “[a] ‘joint work’ is\na work that two or more persons prepared with the intention\nthat their contributions be merged into inseparable elements\nof a single work.” This instruction mirrored the Copyright\nAct’s definition of a “joint work.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. It also\naligns precisely with what we have described as the attributes\nof a joint work. See Janky, 576 F.3d at 362 (explaining that a\njoint work requires “(1) intent to create a joint work; and (2)\ncontribution of independently copyrightable material”).\n\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 23\n\n Asked whether a preponderance of the evidence demon-\nstrated that the copyrighted illustrations were joint works, the\njury answered in the negative, finding that Sullivan was the\nsole author. We cannot say this was an unreasonable result in\nlight of the evidence presented. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d\n331, 335 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that we will “overturn a\njury verdict for the plaintiff only if we conclude that no ra-\ntional jury could have found for the plaintiff”).\n V\n We conclude with a brief word in response to Sullivan’s\ncross appeal challenging the district court’s refusal to award\nattorneys’ fees. Our review is limited to whether the district\ncourt’s ruling reflected an abuse of discretion. See Gastineau v.\nWright, 592 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 2010).\n The Copyright Act affords a district court discretion in\nawarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an infringe-\nment case. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (explaining that “the court in its\ndiscretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any\nparty” in an infringement case) (emphasis added). The Su-\npreme Court offered further guidance in Fogerty v. Fantasy,\nInc., outlining a series of factors for courts to consider when\nawarding fees. 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) (setting out a se-\nries of nonexclusive factors, including frivolousness, motiva-\ntion, objective unreasonableness of factual or legal positions,\nand considerations of compensation and deterrence).\n In denying Sullivan’s fee application, the district court rea-\nsoned well within the discretion afforded by Congress. Con-\nsidering the factors outlined in Fogerty, the court saw the case\nas close on the merits and hard fought by the parties. From\nthere the district court underscored that Sullivan had won a\n\f24 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\n\nsubstantial verdict that would be costly for Flora to satisfy\nand that, when balancing the totality of what occurred in the\nlitigation, an additional award of fees was neither required\nnor appropriate, especially in light of the reasonableness of\nthe joint authorship defense Flora pressed at trial. Or, in the\ndistrict court’s own words, “no further compensation or de-\nterrence in the form of an attorneys’ fee award [was] neces-\nsary.” We cannot call the district court’s reasoning an abuse\nof discretion and therefore affirm its denial of Sullivan’s fee\napplication.\n * * *\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM in part and otherwise\nVACATE the judgment in Sullivan’s favor and REMAND to\nthe district court for further proceedings consistent with this\nopinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Amy Sullivan v. Flora, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\nAMY LEE SULLIVAN, d/b/a DESIGN KIT,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nFLORA, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellant,\\n Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Wisconsin.\\n No. 3:15-cv-298 — William M. Conley, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.\\n SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of\\nfirst impression for us on the scope of statutory damages re-\\ncoverable under the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 504(c)(1)\\nof the Act permits a copyright holder “to recover, instead of\\nactual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages\\nfor all infringements involved in the action, with respect to\\n\\f2 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nany one work,” with Congress separately instructing that, in\\ndetermining statutory damages, “all the parts of a compila-\\ntion or derivative work constitute one work.” This case re-\\nquires us to determine what constitutes “one work” in a fact\\npattern where a jury found infringement on multiple works\\nregistered in a single copyright application.\\n Amy Sullivan, a graphic design artist, produced a series of\\n33 illustrations for Flora, Inc., an herbal supplement company,\\nto use in two advertising campaigns. Upon noticing that Flora\\nwas using the illustrations in other ads, Sullivan brought suit\\nfor copyright infringement and opted to pursue statutory\\ndamages. She did so to maximize her potential payout by clas-\\nsifying each of her 33 illustrations as “one work” within the\\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act. Flora disagreed,\\ncontending that the illustrations were part of two broader\\ncompilations and thus, if Sullivan prevailed, § 504(c)(1) lim-\\nited her to just two statutory damage awards—one award for\\ninfringement on the illustrations used in each of the two ad-\\nvertising campaigns. The district court agreed with Sullivan,\\nand instructed the jury that she could recover separate awards\\nof statutory damages for 33 acts of infringement on 33 sepa-\\nrate illustrations. The jury found infringement on each of the\\n33 illustrations and returned a statutory damages award of\\n$3.6 million.\\n On appeal Flora challenges the district court’s ruling on\\nstatutory damages and separate rulings on two additional de-\\nfenses to liability asserted at trial. While procedural shortcom-\\nings defeat these latter two challenges, Flora is right that the\\ndistrict court committed error in permitting separate awards\\nof statutory damages unaccompanied by any finding that\\neach or any of the 33 illustrations constituted “one work”\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 3\\n\\nwithin the meaning and protection of § 504(c)(1) of the Copy-\\nright Act. It is neither appropriate nor possible for us to make\\nthat finding on the record before us. So we vacate the judg-\\nment in Sullivan’s favor and remand for further proceedings.\\n I\\n Flora, Inc. manufactures herbal supplement and health\\nproducts. In 2013, looking to produce advertisements for two\\nnew products, “7-Sources” and “Flor-Essence,” the company\\ncontacted freelance production specialist Joseph Silver to de-\\nvelop two animated videos. Unbeknownst to Flora, Silver\\nthen contacted Amy Sullivan, a Wisconsin-based graphic de-\\nsign artist, to develop illustrations that would then be ani-\\nmated for use in the advertisements. In Sullivan’s written\\nagreement with Silver, she granted Flora exclusive rights to\\nher illustrations in the two specified advertising campaigns.\\n Over the following months, Silver and Sullivan corre-\\nsponded to develop the illustrations. Silver made suggestions\\non color, style, and text, while also offering rough outlines\\nand sketches to guide Sullivan’s work. For her part, Sullivan\\nused digital design software to create the ultimate illustra-\\ntions, sometimes incorporating Silver’s suggestions and other\\ntimes not. Flora used Sullivan’s illustrations in its final adver-\\ntisements for the two product lines.\\n At some point in the summer or fall of 2013, Sullivan no-\\nticed that Flora was using her illustrations to promote other\\nproduct lines. Exactly when the unauthorized use occurred is\\nunclear. What the record shows for certain is that, on October\\n16, 2013, Sullivan sent Flora a letter complaining of copyright\\ninfringement. At that time, however, Sullivan had not (yet)\\nregistered her illustrations with the Copyright Office.\\n\\f4 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n Sullivan subsequently did so in two copyright applica-\\ntions approved by the U.S. Copyright Office. Registration “VA\\n1-888-930” had an effective date of November 6, 2013 and cov-\\nered the “7 Sources Illustration Collection.” It listed 17 sepa-\\nrate illustrations with names like “Frame7” and “7S-Bottle Il-\\nlustration.” Registration “VA 1-893-717” had an effective date\\nof December 12, 2013 and covered the “FEV Illustration Col-\\nlection,” short for Flor-Essence. It listed 16 separate illustra-\\ntions with names like “Frame-3,” “Herbs,” and “Amy Tex\\nBubble.”\\n When settlement negotiations failed, Sullivan sued Flora\\nfor copyright infringement in the Western District of Wiscon-\\nsin. The Copyright Act allows a plaintiff to choose to recover\\neither statutory damages or actual damages. See 17 U.S.C.\\n§ 504(a). The choice must come before the entry of final judg-\\nment. See id. § 504(c)(1). As the litigation progressed, Sullivan\\nchose to pursue statutory damages, with the parties then stak-\\ning out opposing positions on the scope of a permissible\\naward under § 504(c)(1). These competing positions frame the\\nprimary issue before us on appeal.\\n Flora contended that Sullivan’s 33 illustrations fell into\\none of two compilations (corresponding with the company’s\\ntwo advertising campaigns in which the illustrations ap-\\npeared and also aligning with the two copyright registrations)\\nand thus § 504(c)(1) precluded Sullivan from receiving more\\nthan two separate awards of statutory damages—one for each\\ncompilation infringed. Sullivan begged to differ. She urged\\nthe district court to treat each of the 33 illustrations as 33 sep-\\narate works entitled to 33 separate awards of statutory dam-\\nages upon a showing that Flora infringed each work.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 5\\n\\n Who was right very much mattered, for Congress author-\\nized an award of between $750 and $30,000 in statutory dam-\\nages for each work infringed, and up to $150,000 per work if\\na jury found willful infringement. See id. § 504(c)(2). Put most\\nsimply, Sullivan wanted the copyrighted work multiplier to\\nbe 33 and not two.\\n The district court addressed the issue pretrial. It did so by\\nfocusing on Sullivan’s copyright applications. The certificates\\nfrom the U.S. Copyright Office showed that Sullivan had reg-\\nistered each of the 33 illustrations in two applications, with\\nthe illustrations grouped to correspond with Flora’s two ad-\\nvertised product lines. The Copyright Act and its implement-\\ning regulations allow the registration of multiple works this\\nway. See id. § 408(c)(1) (authorizing the extension of copyright\\nprotection from a single registration to multiple works listed\\nin the registration application); 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4) (same).\\nRelying on these provisions and drawing upon the statute’s\\ndefinition of “collective works,” the district court determined\\nthat “[Sullivan’s] copyrighted works are collective works, in\\nwhich contributions, constituting separate and individual\\nworks in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.”\\nSee 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “collective works” this way).\\nFrom there the district court concluded that “the [33] individ-\\nual illustrations are individual works, entitling Sullivan to\\nseparate statutory damages awards.” The case advanced to\\ntrial against the backdrop of this ruling.\\n Trial proceeded in three phases. In phase one, the court\\ntasked the jury with determining whether Sullivan was the\\nsole author of the copyrighted works, or instead whether Sil-\\nver was a joint author capable of granting his own rights to\\nFlora. In phase two, the jury considered whether Flora copied\\n\\f6 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nand used Sullivan’s illustrations without authorization. In\\nphase three, the jury determined what statutory damages re-\\nsulted from the infringement.\\n The jury ruled in Sullivan’s favor at each phase. In phases\\none and two, the jury determined that Flora had copied and\\nused Sullivan’s illustrations willfully and without authoriza-\\ntion and furthermore that the works were not joint works but\\ninstead belonged to Sullivan alone. At phase three, the jury\\nawarded $3,600,000 in statutory damages, finding that Flora\\nwillfully infringed on each of Sullivan’s 33 individual illustra-\\ntions. The jury also found $143,500 in actual damages, which\\nSullivan declined in favor of the larger statutory award.\\n II\\n Flora’s main contention on appeal is that the district court\\ncommitted legal error in determining that Sullivan could col-\\nlect statutory damages for infringement on each of the 33 il-\\nlustrations as separate works. Sullivan urges us to avoid the\\nissue on the basis that Flora waived any challenge to the dam-\\nages award by not expressly objecting to the district court’s\\njury instruction. We cannot agree. While Flora could have ob-\\njected, the fairest reading of the record is that the company—\\nthroughout the litigation—had made its position on statutory\\ndamages abundantly clear, including by briefing the issue\\nduring the pretrial proceeding that resulted in the district\\ncourt’s determinative ruling. The law required no more in this\\ncircumstance. See Dresser Industries, Inc., Waukesha Engine Div.\\nv. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1450 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining\\nthat the failure to object to a jury instruction embodying a le-\\ngal determination “may be disregarded if the party’s position\\nhad previously been clearly made to the court and it is plain\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 7\\n\\nthat a further objection would be unavailing”). So we proceed\\nto the merits.\\n A\\n The scope of statutory damages available to Sullivan turns\\non § 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act:\\n [T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time be-\\n fore final judgment is rendered, to recover, in-\\n stead of actual damages and profits, an award\\n of statutory damages for all infringements in-\\n volved in the action, with respect to any one work,\\n for which any one infringer is liable individu-\\n ally, or for which any two or more infringers are\\n liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less\\n than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court con-\\n siders just. For the purposes of this subsection, all\\n the parts of a compilation or derivative work consti-\\n tute one work.\\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (emphasis added).\\n By its terms, § 504(c)(1) limits a plaintiff’s recovery to one\\naward of statutory damages for each work infringed. Put an-\\nother way, Congress focused the inquiry on the number of\\nprotected works infringed, not the number of infringements.\\nSee Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int’l Ltd., 996 F.2d\\n1366, 1381 (2d Cir. 1993). In doing so, Congress imposed the\\nadditional limitation that, in awarding statutory damages,\\neach part of a compilation shall be considered “one work.”\\n17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). In construing § 504(c)(1), it is therefore\\nessential to determine not only what constitutes “one\\nwork”—a term Congress left undefined in the Copyright\\n\\f8 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nAct—but also when multiple works combine to form a “com-\\npilation,” a term Congress did define in the statute.\\n In copyright law, a “work”—as its name implies—reflects\\nan original expression, whether in the form of art, literature,\\nmusic, or another tangible medium of expression, that may be\\nentitled to protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). An artist seeking\\ncopyright protection for multiple works can do so in a single\\nregistration application. See 17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1) (allowing for\\na single registration for a group of related works); 37 C.F.R.\\n§ 202.3(b)(4) (same); see also 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David\\nNimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.18(c) (Rev. Ed. 2019) (dis-\\ncussing the Copyright Act’s flexible approach in allowing a\\nsingle registration for multiple works). The Copyright Office’s\\ngranting such a single application results in each registered\\nwork receiving copyright protection. See Wildlife Express Corp.\\nv. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 507, 508 (7th Cir. 1994)\\n(explaining that “[a] certificate of registration from the U.S.\\nRegister of Copyrights constitutes prima facie evidence of the\\nvalidity of a copyright” and “[a]n owner of a copyright is pro-\\ntected against unauthorized copying”). Sullivan charted this\\nexact course here, applying to protect what she called “illus-\\ntration collections” and receiving two certificates of registra-\\ntion from the Copyright Office. These certificates resulted in\\nSullivan’s 33 illustrations being registered and therefore hav-\\ning copyright protection.\\n The district court began and ended its analysis of the stat-\\nutory damages question with this same observation. It put its\\nruling on the scope of statutory damages this way:\\n Based on the undisputed fact that plaintiff reg-\\n istered her two illustration collections as a col-\\n lective or group work under 17 U.S.C.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 9\\n\\n § 408(c)(1) and 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4)(i), and that\\n that identification appears appropriate—or, at\\n least, defendant [Flora] has failed to explain\\n why the copyrighted works do not appropri-\\n ately fall within that designation—the court\\n conclude[s] that the copyrighted works are col-\\n lective works, in which contributions, constitut-\\n ing separate and individual works in themselves, are\\n assembled into a collective whole.\\n(Dkt. 240 at 1) (emphasis in the original). The court reinforced\\nits ruling when instructing the jury on the scope of statutory\\ndamages it could award Sullivan upon findings of infringe-\\nment by Flora, explaining that “for purposes of considering a\\nstatutory damages award, you may consider each illustration\\nin the 7 Sources illustration collection and the Flor-Essence il-\\nlustration collection as an independent, copyrighted work.”\\n The district court drifted off course in seeing the 33 illus-\\ntrations as “collective works” without first asking, as\\n§ 504(c)(1) requires, whether each illustration constituted\\n“one work” or instead combined to form a “compilation.” The\\nmisstep becomes apparent upon recognizing that Congress,\\nin defining “compilation” in § 101 of the Copyright Act, made\\nclear that the term “includes collective works.” So the conse-\\nquence of the district court characterizing the 33 illustrations\\nas “collective works” was that the illustrations then also con-\\nstituted a “compilation” and thus, by operation of § 504(c)(1),\\n“all the parts of a compilation”—each of Sullivan’s 33 illustra-\\ntions—“constitute one work.” But that conclusion is at odds\\nwith the district court also determining that the Copyright Act\\nauthorized the jury to return 33 separate awards of statutory\\ndamages for infringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\\n\\f10 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n The knot untangles by returning to the language of\\n§ 504(c)(1). The key distinction in § 504(c)(1) is not between a\\ncompilation and a collective work—indeed, § 101’s definition\\nmakes plain that the former includes the latter—but instead\\nbetween “one work” and a “compilation.” Or, stated another\\nway, the proper inquiry under § 504(c)(1) asks whether Sulli-\\nvan’s 33 illustrations constitute 33 individual works or in-\\nstead are parts of two compilations (corresponding with the\\ntwo advertising campaigns in which Flora used the illustra-\\ntions). The district court stopped short of asking this question\\n(or putting it to the jury) by giving controlling weight to the\\nfact that Sullivan registered her illustrations as a group and\\ntherefore protected each of the 33 illustrations. That observa-\\ntion, while reflecting an accurate understanding of the regis-\\ntration process, does not resolve the scope of statutory dam-\\nages available to Sullivan. That answer, we conclude, must\\ncome by parsing § 504(c)(1) and distinguishing between a\\nwork and a compilation.\\n Identifying the right question is easier than knowing the\\nright answer, though. And this is where we benefit from not\\nbeing the first court to consider the scope of statutory dam-\\nages available under § 504(c)(1)—and, more specifically, the\\nmeaning of “one work.”\\n B\\n Other circuits seem to follow one of two approaches in an-\\nswering the question presented, though the dividing lines are\\nfar from absolute. Start with the Second Circuit and its deci-\\nsion in Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.\\n2010). The case entailed allegations of infringement on two\\ncopyrighted music albums, each with ten songs, and the par-\\nties disputing whether statutory damages should be\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 11\\n\\nmeasured on a per-album or per-song basis. The court ob-\\nserved that each song had separate copyright protection and,\\nin addition to being sold as part of an album, could be pur-\\nchased individually through retailers like iTunes. See id. at\\n138. Even when bought individually, however, the songs re-\\nmained part of and indeed were produced and marketed as\\nan album. That fact resolved the statutory damages question\\nbecause, as the court saw it, “[a]n album falls within the Act’s\\nexpansive definition of compilation.” Id. at 140. “Based on a\\nplain reading of the statute,” the reasoning followed, “in-\\nfringement of an album should result in only one statutory\\ndamage award.” Id. at 141. More to it, the court emphasized,\\nthe “[Copyright] Act [in § 504(c)(1)] specifically states that all\\nparts of a compilation must be treated as one work for pur-\\nposes of calculating statutory damages.” Id. at 142. And,\\ndrawing reinforcement from the Copyright Act’s definition of\\ncompilation, the Second Circuit added that “[t]he fact that\\neach song may have received a separate copyright is irrele-\\nvant to this analysis.” Id. at 141.\\n In so holding, the Second Circuit distinguished its prior\\ndecision in Twin Peaks Productions v. Publications International,\\nwhere the court held that eight distinct statutory damages\\nawards were available for infringement on the copyrighted\\nscripts of eight television episodes that the defendant later\\ncombined into a single book. 996 F.2d 1366, 1381 (2d Cir.\\n1993). Separate awards of statutory damages were appropri-\\nate in Twin Peaks, the Bryant court subsequently explained, be-\\ncause “the plaintiff had issued the works separately, as inde-\\npendent television episodes,” and it was “the defendant [who]\\nprinted eight teleplays from the series in one book.” 603 F.3d\\nat 141. Even though each episode of Twin Peaks contributed\\nto the drama’s broader plot, which unfolded over the course\\n\\f12 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nof a season, the fact remained that the episodes aired at sepa-\\nrate times and, in this way, stood on their own enough to\\navoid being grouped with the other episodes and thus con-\\nsidered a compilation within the meaning of the Copyright\\nAct. The upshot, then, was that the plaintiff in Twin Peaks was\\nentitled to eight separate statutory damage awards for each\\ninfringed episode. See Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1381; see also\\nWB Music Corp. v. RTC Communication Grp., Inc., 445 F.3d 538,\\n540–41 (2d Cir. 2006) (following the same approach and re-\\nversing the district court’s limitation of a plaintiff’s statutory\\ndamages on a per-album basis).\\n The Second Circuit’s approach—embodied, as we see it, in\\nits most recent decision in Bryant—gives controlling weight to\\nthe last sentence of § 504(c)(1), where Congress directed that,\\nfor purposes of assessing statutory damages, “all the parts of\\na compilation or derivative work constitute one work.” The\\napproach has a limiting effect. Take, for instance, the song-\\nwriter who produces an album, registers the album under the\\ngroup registration process made available by 17 U.S.C.\\n§ 408(c)(1), only then to learn someone infringed multiple\\ntracks. The artist would be entitled to one and only one award\\nof statutory damages because “it is the copyright holders who\\nissued their works as ‘compilations’; they chose to issue Al-\\nbums,” instead of producing each song as independent sin-\\ngles. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 141. The Second Circuit’s approach,\\nin short, places dispositive weight on the songwriter’s bun-\\ndling of songs—protected though they may be at the individ-\\nual level—into an album. It is the production and publication\\nof each song as part of an album that limits the songwriter’s\\nrecovery to one award of statutory damages no matter the in-\\nfringement that may have occurred at the level of any indi-\\nvidual song.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 13\\n\\n Recognizing this limitation, most other circuits have inter-\\npreted § 504(c)(1) a different way. A good illustration comes\\nfrom the First Circuit’s decision in Gamma Audio & Video, Inc.\\nv. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1118 (1st Cir. 1993). The court there\\nconsidered how to award statutory damages for infringement\\non four episodes of the television series Jade Fox, where the\\nepisodes had been registered together on one copyright cer-\\ntificate and later rented or sold in sets containing multiple ep-\\nisodes. Construing § 504(c)(1), the court adopted what it\\ncalled an “independent economic value test” to determine if\\neach episode of Jade Fox had copyright value unto itself and\\nwas therefore an independent work—in statutory terms, “one\\nwork”—for purposes of awarding statutory damages. Id. at\\n1116–17.\\n The First Circuit explained that such a substantive eco-\\nnomic inquiry better reflected the value of each episode and\\ngave effect to not only the language Congress used in\\n§ 504(c)(1), but also the absence on a broader level of anything\\nin “either the statute or the corresponding regulations that\\nprecludes a copyright owner from registering the copyrights\\nin multiple works on a single registration form while still col-\\nlecting an award of statutory damages for the infringement\\non each work’s copyright.” Id. at 1117. Applying the test, the\\nFirst Circuit determined that the evidence before it supported\\na finding that each episode of Jade Fox, although plainly part\\nof a television series, constituted an independent work enti-\\ntled to its own award of statutory damages. See id. at 1117–18.\\n The Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits follow the First Cir-\\ncuit’s approach. See, e.g., VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d\\n723, 747 (9th Cir. 2019) (adhering to its discussion in Columbia\\nPictures Television, Inc. v. Krypton Bd. of Birmingham, Inc.,\\n\\f14 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n259 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) and explaining that “the question\\nof whether something—like a photo, television episode, or so\\nforth—has ‘independent economic value’ informs our analy-\\nsis of whether the photo or episode is a work” within the\\nmeaning of § 504(c)(1)); MCA Television Ltd. v. Feltner, 89 F.3d\\n766, 769 (11th Cir. 1996) (employing the same test to deter-\\nmine “whether each expression has an independent economic\\nvalue and is, in itself, viable”); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell,\\n897 F.2d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (asking whether certain cop-\\nyrighted materials are “distinct, viable works with separate\\neconomic value and copyright lives” to determine the scope\\nof available statutory damages under § 504(c)(1)).\\n The Fourth Circuit is the only other circuit to have consid-\\nered the question presented. Its answer came with mixed sig-\\nnals, following the Second Circuit’s approach in Bryant but\\nsuggesting different facts may fit with a different construction\\nof § 504(c)(1). See Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., 323 F.3d 279, 285\\n(4th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier,\\nInc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). In Xoom, the court deter-\\nmined that two collections of numerous digital images, pro-\\ntected under two copyright registrations, were compilations\\nand thus only subject to two statutory damages awards under\\n§ 504(c)(1). See id. at 285 n.8 (explaining that “Imageline is en-\\ntitled to one award of statutory damages per work infringed\\nbecause SuperBundle and Master Gallery are compilations or\\nderivative works in which Imageline holds copyrights”). At an-\\nother point in its opinion, however, the Fourth Circuit ap-\\npeared to agree that “the Copyright Act does not bar multiple\\nawards for statutory damages when one registration includes\\nmultiple works.” Id. at 285. This qualification is substantial\\nand seems to suggest the Fourth Circuit may chart a different\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 15\\n\\ncourse—perhaps the one followed by most other circuits—on\\ndifferent facts.\\n C\\n Section 504(c)(1) is hardly a model of clarity, especially\\nwhen considering, as we are here, infringement of multiple\\nprotected works and a plaintiff seeking multiple, separate\\nawards of statutory damages. It is not at all surprising that\\ntwo approaches find recognition in the caselaw of other cir-\\ncuits. In the end, we conclude, in closer keeping with the ap-\\nproach of the First, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, that\\n§ 504(c)(1) requires courts confronted with circumstances\\nwith multiple works and multiple infringements to deter-\\nmine, or to charge a jury with fact finding tailored to answer-\\ning, whether the protected works have value only in and\\nthrough their composite whole (and thus meet the definition\\nof a “compilation” in § 101) or instead have standalone value\\nat the level of “one work.” A protected work has standalone\\nvalue if the evidence shows that work has distinct and dis-\\ncernable value to the copyright holder. See Gamma Audio,\\n11 F.3d at 1116 (explaining that “separate copyrights are not\\ndistinct ‘works’ unless they can live their own copyright\\nlife”—a viability determination that turns on whether the\\nwork in question has independent economic value); see also\\nFeltner, 89 F.3d at 769; Walt Disney Co., 897 F.2d at 569.\\n The question at the heart of the Second Circuit’s more lim-\\nited approach in Bryant—which focuses on whether the cop-\\nyright holder marketed and distributed the multiple pro-\\ntected works as individual works or as a compendium of\\nworks (like, for example, an album)—is certainly relevant to\\nthe inquiry we believe Congress has required in § 504(c)(1).\\nBut we also believe the inquiry needs to extend further to\\n\\f16 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\ndiscern and give more fulsome effect to the distinction Con-\\ngress drew in the text of § 504(c)(1) between “one work” and\\na “compilation.” See Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP,\\n795 F.3d 1255, 1281 (11th Cir. 2015) (employing a similar ap-\\nproach to discerning whether multiple photos constituted a\\ncompilation or individual works). To stop at the Second Cir-\\ncuit’s inquiry does not allow a possibility Congress made\\navailable in § 504(c)(1)—a situation where a copyright holder\\nencounters infringement on multiple works available in the\\nmarket as a group but where discernable value lies at the level\\nof a particular individual work—for example, at the level of a\\nparticular photo or song which, although released as part of\\nan album, is likewise marketed and available at the individual\\nlevel. Sellers regularly allow buyers to acquire a part of a\\nwhole and the market assigns value accordingly.\\n The inquiry and fact finding demanded by § 504(c)(1) is\\nmore functional than formal, taking account of the economic\\nvalue, if any, of a protected work more than the fact that the\\nprotection came about by an artist registering multiple works\\nin a single application. The necessary finding requires a focus\\non where the market assigns value. By way of an analogy, im-\\nperfect though it may be, think in the first instance of the mul-\\ntiple protected works as a quilt and then ask whether any one\\nindividual patch has discernable, independent economic\\nvalue—whether once separated from the quilt a particular\\npatch lives its own copyright life (as “one work”)—or instead\\nwhether the value lies in the patches’ combined assembly into\\nthe quilt as a whole (as a “compilation”).\\n Our analysis must end here, though, as the record as it\\npresently stands does not allow us to resolve as a factual mat-\\nter whether all or part of Sullivan’s 33 illustrations are\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 17\\n\\nseparate works with distinct and discernable value or part of\\ntwo broader compilations. The district court did not ask (or\\nput to the jury) the questions we see as necessary for resolving\\nthe statutory damages question. See VHT, Inc., 918 F.3d at 748\\n(remanding on similar reasoning for additional fact finding).\\n This error requires us to vacate the judgment in Sullivan’s\\nfavor. Our doing so in no way calls the jury’s findings of in-\\nfringement into question. On remand the district court will\\nhave ample flexibility to structure the proceedings to enable\\nthe requisite findings pertinent to statutory damages.\\n III\\n Invoking an altogether different provision of the Copy-\\nright Act, Flora advances a separate and independent chal-\\nlenge to the jury’s statutory damages award based on the tim-\\ning of the company’s infringement on Sullivan’s copyrighted\\nworks. The district court determined that Flora waived this\\nchallenge by raising it much too late at trial. We agree.\\n Section 412 of the Copyright Act prohibits an award of\\nstatutory damages for “any infringement of a copyright in an\\nunpublished work commenced before the effective dates of\\nregistration.” 17 U.S.C. § 412(1). By its terms, § 412 imposes a\\nbar to recovering statutory damages if a defendant can show\\nthat any infringement began before the registration of the\\nworks in question.\\n Neither the district court nor jury ever considered the tim-\\ning bar imposed by § 412. The reason is because Flora raised\\nthe § 412 limitation for the first time during the third and final\\nphase of trial—the damages phase—and even then, only at a\\nside bar on an unrelated issue. Flora’s doing so surprised the\\ndistrict judge, as the position marked a substantial shift in the\\n\\f18 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\ncompany’s trial strategy. All along Flora had sought to avoid\\nliability based on the defense of joint authorship—by arguing\\nthat Silver and Sullivan jointly created each of the 33 illustra-\\ntions—and thus that the company (through Silver’s joint own-\\nership) could not possibly be liable for infringement. By in-\\nvoking § 412 and advancing a timing defense, Flora changed\\ncourse, recognizing (undoubtedly in response to the jury’s\\nverdict in phase two) that it had infringed on Sullivan’s works\\nbut arguing that the infringement began before she had regis-\\ntered the illustrations. In Flora’s view, the timing of the in-\\nfringement—before Sullivan’s registration—triggered the ap-\\nplication of § 412 to bar any award of statutory damages.\\n The district judge reacted to Flora’s raising this § 412 ar-\\ngument when it did with meaningful frustration. The court\\nrightly underscored that Flora made no mention of any § 412\\ndefense in its answer, motion to dismiss, or request for sum-\\nmary judgment. Nor, the district court added, did Flora ever\\nsay a word about any possible § 412 bar at the jury charge\\nconference—at a time when the court and parties could have\\nconsidered how to put the infringement-timing question to\\nthe jury. Indeed, when asked directly whether either party\\nhad concerns with the jury instruction on statutory damages,\\ncounsel for Flora responded, “None, Your Honor.”\\n As the district court saw it, then, Flora waited to pursue\\nand raise its newfound § 412 defense until the close of evi-\\ndence and thus well after either party could have structured\\nits presentation of evidence—as to liability and defenses\\nalike—to address the timing predicate on which application\\nof the damages bar hinges. Or, as the district judge put the\\npoint, “by sitting on its challenge until the end of the evi-\\ndence, defendant left plaintiff and the court to believe that it\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 19\\n\\nhad conceded this requirement for an award of statutory\\ndamages.” Accordingly, the district court concluded that\\nFlora had waived any § 412 timing defense.\\n We see no error in the district court’s conclusion, in no\\nsmall part because § 412 operates akin to an affirmative\\ndefense that Flora should have raised far earlier in the\\nproceedings. Waiting this long resulted in waiver. See Carr v.\\nO’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1126 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a\\nparty’s unreasonable delay in advancing an argument “is\\nnormally a compelling ground for deeming even a good\\nground waived”). Our cases are clear that waiver, not\\nforfeiture, occurs when a defendant waits until the eleventh\\nhour or beyond to raise an affirmative defense and in doing\\nso prejudices the opposing party. See Reed v. Columbia St.\\nMary’s Hosp., 915 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 2019). “Allowing a\\nlast-minute defense that introduces new factual and legal\\nissues after discovery has closed,” we have emphasized,\\n“raises the costs of litigation and allows the party that was at\\nleast negligent in failing to plead its defense to take unfair\\nadvantage of its opposing party.” Id.\\n It is hard to see what happened here any other way than\\nthe district judge put it: for whatever reason, strategic or in-\\nadvertent, Flora waited to raise its timing-of-infringement de-\\nfense until the jury had already found infringement, leaving\\nthe trial record altogether missing evidence on precisely when\\nthe infringement began—the lynchpin inquiry under § 412.\\nWithout any notice that this change of course was coming,\\nSullivan had no reason to believe her infringement claim may\\nrise or fall on evidence pinpointing the timing of Flora’s in-\\nfringement on each of the 33 illustrations.\\n\\f20 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n In these circumstances, we cannot say the district court\\nwas wrong to conclude that “Flora, at minimum, needed to put\\nthe timing requirement of § 412 in issue by timely challenging\\nit” and its failure to do so constituted waiver.\\n IV\\n Flora’s final effort on appeal to avoid liability comes in its\\ncontention that the district court erred in not setting aside the\\njury’s verdict on the basis that the trial evidence showed be-\\nyond dispute that Silver and Sullivan were joint authors of the\\n33 illustrations. Here too, though, Flora runs into waiver, as\\nthe company failed to present this challenge to the district\\ncourt in response to the jury’s adverse verdict. The pathway\\nto that conclusion is straightforward.\\n Joint authorship is a defense to copyright infringement.\\nSee Janky v. Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau,\\n576 F.3d 356, 361 (7th Cir. 2009). The defense, as its name im-\\nplies, turns on whether two or more authors jointly created\\nthe work in question. If so, they hold undivided interests in\\nthe work and the underlying rights are shared and not exclu-\\nsive to one or the other authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); Janky,\\n576 F.3d at 361 (“The benefits of co-authorship are therefore\\nsignificant: each author may use or license the joint work.”).\\n Throughout the pretrial proceedings, Flora sought to\\nshow that Joseph Silver’s contributions to Sullivan’s illustra-\\ntions resulted in joint authorship, which in turn would have\\nallowed Silver to authorize Flora’s use of the illustrations,\\neliminating the basis for infringement. A copyright owner\\ncannot infringe its own work. Flora continued to advance the\\njoint authorship defense at trial, moving, for example, on day\\ntwo for judgment as a matter of law on the issue. See Fed. R.\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 21\\n\\nCiv. P. 50(a). The district court denied the motion, and the\\ncase went to the jury. In finding infringement, the jury ex-\\npressly found (and so answered on the verdict form) that\\nFlora had not carried its burden of showing that the illustra-\\ntions were the result of a joint effort by Silver and Sullivan.\\n But Flora never renewed its challenge at any point after\\nthe jury returned its verdict in Sullivan’s favor. And therein\\nlies the problem. Flora insists on appeal that the district court\\nerred in not keeping the joint authorship question from the\\njury and failing to grant its Rule 50(a) motion on the issue. Yet\\nthis contention runs headlong into the well-settled precept\\nthat “a court of appeals may not award judgment due to in-\\nsufficiency of the evidence where no Rule 50(b) motion was\\nfiled after the verdict.” Fuesting v. Zimmer, Inc., 448 F.3d 936,\\n938 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann\\nIns. Co., 861 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 2017) (making clear that for\\na party to seek judgment on appeal, “the requesting party\\nmust not only have filed a motion under Rule 50(a), but must\\nalso have renewed that motion under Rule 50(b)”).\\n The demands of Rule 50(b) serve a sound purpose. As the\\nSupreme Court has emphasized, the “determination of\\nwhether a new trial should be granted or a judgment entered\\nunder Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance of\\nthe judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel\\nof the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.”\\nUnitherm v. Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394,\\n401 (2006). This explains why our caselaw is unyielding in\\nrequiring a party who believes a jury’s verdict lacks a\\nsufficient evidentiary basis to raise that challenge in the\\ndistrict court. It is not enough to rest on having made a pre-\\nverdict sufficiency-of-evidence challenge under Rule 50(a).\\n\\f22 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\n To excuse its failure to move under Rule 50(b) following\\nthe jury’s adverse verdict, Flora argues that we have discre-\\ntion on appeal to consider pure questions of law. But the ques-\\ntion of joint authorship is not a pure question of law: answer-\\ning whether two or more individuals or entities contributed\\nenough to a work to result in joint authorship requires con-\\nsideration of facts. And this is precisely why other courts have\\nrecognized, properly in our view, that the question is one for\\na jury to consider guided by an instruction from the district\\ncourt. See Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Solutions, 290\\nF.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that in a copyright case,\\n“[a]uthorship is generally a question of fact for the jury”).\\nHaving failed to lodge a post-verdict challenge under Rule\\n50(b), Flora waived the very issue it now wants us to review.\\nWe cannot do so.\\n Even if Flora had not waived its joint authorship chal-\\nlenge, we would be quick to conclude that the jury reasonably\\nfound Sullivan was the sole author of the 33 illustrations in\\nquestion. The jury received evidence of the contributions of\\nboth Silver and Sullivan and viewed both of the copyright reg-\\nistrations submitted solely in Sullivan’s name. The district\\ncourt also properly instructed the jury that “[a] ‘joint work’ is\\na work that two or more persons prepared with the intention\\nthat their contributions be merged into inseparable elements\\nof a single work.” This instruction mirrored the Copyright\\nAct’s definition of a “joint work.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. It also\\naligns precisely with what we have described as the attributes\\nof a joint work. See Janky, 576 F.3d at 362 (explaining that a\\njoint work requires “(1) intent to create a joint work; and (2)\\ncontribution of independently copyrightable material”).\\n\\fNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534 23\\n\\n Asked whether a preponderance of the evidence demon-\\nstrated that the copyrighted illustrations were joint works, the\\njury answered in the negative, finding that Sullivan was the\\nsole author. We cannot say this was an unreasonable result in\\nlight of the evidence presented. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d\\n331, 335 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that we will “overturn a\\njury verdict for the plaintiff only if we conclude that no ra-\\ntional jury could have found for the plaintiff”).\\n V\\n We conclude with a brief word in response to Sullivan’s\\ncross appeal challenging the district court’s refusal to award\\nattorneys’ fees. Our review is limited to whether the district\\ncourt’s ruling reflected an abuse of discretion. See Gastineau v.\\nWright, 592 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 2010).\\n The Copyright Act affords a district court discretion in\\nawarding attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an infringe-\\nment case. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (explaining that “the court in its\\ndiscretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any\\nparty” in an infringement case) (emphasis added). The Su-\\npreme Court offered further guidance in Fogerty v. Fantasy,\\nInc., outlining a series of factors for courts to consider when\\nawarding fees. 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) (setting out a se-\\nries of nonexclusive factors, including frivolousness, motiva-\\ntion, objective unreasonableness of factual or legal positions,\\nand considerations of compensation and deterrence).\\n In denying Sullivan’s fee application, the district court rea-\\nsoned well within the discretion afforded by Congress. Con-\\nsidering the factors outlined in Fogerty, the court saw the case\\nas close on the merits and hard fought by the parties. From\\nthere the district court underscored that Sullivan had won a\\n\\f24 Nos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\\n\\nsubstantial verdict that would be costly for Flora to satisfy\\nand that, when balancing the totality of what occurred in the\\nlitigation, an additional award of fees was neither required\\nnor appropriate, especially in light of the reasonableness of\\nthe joint authorship defense Flora pressed at trial. Or, in the\\ndistrict court’s own words, “no further compensation or de-\\nterrence in the form of an attorneys’ fee award [was] neces-\\nsary.” We cannot call the district court’s reasoning an abuse\\nof discretion and therefore affirm its denial of Sullivan’s fee\\napplication.\\n * * *\\n For these reasons, we AFFIRM in part and otherwise\\nVACATE the judgment in Sullivan’s favor and REMAND to\\nthe district court for further proceedings consistent with this\\nopinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3898,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654632,"string":"4,654,632"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Marshon Simon"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-2442"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2442\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMARSHON SIMON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 16-CR-20077 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Police officers pulled Marshon Si-\\nmon over for failing to signal sufficiently ahead of turning. A\\ndrug-sniffing dog alerted on Simon’s car so officers searched\\nit. They did not find drugs, but they found a gun. The govern-\\nment charged Simon with being a felon-in-possession. The\\ndistrict judge denied Simon’s motions for recusal, suppres-\\nsion, and supplementation. Simon entered a conditional\\nguilty plea and received a sentence of 15 years. He raises a\\n\\f2 No. 18-2442\\n\\nlitany of issues on appeal. He argues the judge should have\\nrecused himself because before he was a judge he supervised\\na prior prosecution of Simon. He argues the judge should\\nhave suppressed the gun because the officers lacked probable\\ncause to initiate the traffic stop and because they prolonged\\nthe stop to allow for the dog sniff. He argues the dog’s alert\\nwas false and the dog was unreliable because he was improp-\\nerly trained. He argues the judge should have allowed him to\\nsupplement the evidence after denial of suppression. Finally,\\nhe argues one of his prior felonies should not have counted as\\na predicate for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\nConcluding the judge committed no reversible error in deny-\\ning Simon’s motions, we affirm.\\n I. Facts\\n On the night of August 21, 2016, three police officers in a\\n“bike patrol unit” surveyed a particular section of Decatur, Il-\\nlinois. Officers Jason Danner and Jamie Hagemeyer rode bi-\\ncycles. They sat behind a propane tank 145 yards from the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets. Officer Robert\\nHoecker drove a squad car nearby.\\n The bicycle officers saw a vehicle driven by Marshon Si-\\nmon leave the 1100 block of North College Street (five blocks\\naway) and drive toward them. As Simon approached the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets, he failed to signal at\\nleast 100 feet before turning left from College onto Green. This\\nwas according to the bicyclists’ testimony at the suppression\\nhearing, which the district judge credited. At the bicyclists’ re-\\nquest, Hoecker pulled Simon over at 10:26 p.m.\\n Hoecker approached Simon’s car and made contact.\\nHoecker introduced himself and told Simon the basic reason\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 3\\n\\nfor the stop. Hoecker explained bicycle officers would arrive\\nand provide details. Simon questioned the basis for the stop.\\nSimon gave his driver’s license and proof of insurance to\\nHoecker. According to Hoecker, Simon was cooperative and\\npolite, behaved normally, and was no more nervous than the\\nnormal level of traffic-stop nervousness. Hoecker ran Simon\\nthrough the LEADS computer system and found he was val-\\nidly licensed and insured. Hoecker finished this check in less\\nthan 2 minutes, before Danner and Hagemeyer arrived on\\nscene at about 10:29 p.m.\\n Once Danner and Hagemeyer arrived they took over “pro-\\ncessing the ticket,” including some double-checking.\\nHoecker’s role was to assist. Hoecker told Danner that Simon\\nhad insurance and a valid license. Hoecker said he “didn’t\\nknow if [Danner] wanted the dog or not.” (Appellant Br. at 8,\\nquoting Hoecker’s dashcam video.) Danner asked if Simon\\nhad any criminal history. Hoecker then ran a criminal-history\\ncheck and found Simon had prior drug and weapon charges.\\n Danner made contact with Simon. Danner testified Simon\\nappeared abnormally nervous. Danner testified Simon asked\\nabout the violation and insisted he used his turn signal. Dan-\\nner testified, “I observed him to pull his hand away from his\\nlap, and he was shaking pretty good, indicating to me that he\\nappeared nervous.” But Danner did not note this in the police\\nreport and he did not mention this when discussing whether\\nto call a dog.\\n Hagemeyer testified that while speaking briefly with\\nHoecker he handed her Simon’s materials. She then went to\\nanother squad car that had arrived on scene “to begin the\\nwritten warning.” Both Danner and Hagemeyer testified\\nabout the various steps and processes a bike patrol unit\\n\\f4 No. 18-2442\\n\\ncompletes as part of the mission instigated by a traffic viola-\\ntion, including monitoring and securing the scene, making\\ncontacts with the driver, running computer checks, and writ-\\ning out the warning or ticket.\\n Danner decided to call a dog. He testified he decided to\\ncall a dog at about 22:30:38 (10:30:38 p.m.) on the clock of\\nHoecker’s dashcam, about 1 minute after Danner and Hage-\\nmeyer arrived at the traffic stop. An officer called for the ca-\\nnine unit less than 4 minutes into the stop, when the ticket\\nwas still being processed, according to the officers’ testimony.\\n Canine handler Snyder arrived with Rex at the scene at\\nabout 10:33 p.m. At that time, the traffic violation was still be-\\ning processed, according to the officers’ testimony.1 Within a\\n\\n 1 Here are excerpts on point from the bicycle patrol unit’s testimony:\\nQ: And when Officer Snyder arrived, was the traffic violation still being\\nprocessed?\\nHoecker: Yes.\\n(Tr. Continuation of Suppression Hr’g, July 12, 2017, DE 44 at 19:1–19:3.)\\n\\nQ: And do you recall approximately how long into the traffic stop it would\\nhave been that [Officer Snyder, with Rex] arrived?\\nDanner: I believe it was around six or seven minutes.\\nQ: And were you still processing the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: That’s correct.\\n(Id. at 50:19–50:24.)\\n\\nHagemeyer: From the time we arrived to the time Officer Snyder arrived\\nwas three or four minutes.\\nQ: So a very short period of time?\\nA: Very short period of time.\\nQ: Were you still working on the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: Yes.\\nQ: And still working on it diligently, correct?\\nA: [Nodding head up and down.]\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 5\\n\\nfew seconds of walking around Simon’s car, Rex alerted.\\nSnyder took less than 20 seconds to prepare Rex, begin the\\nsearch, and confirm the alert. The time period from the begin-\\nning of the stop to the alert was about 7 minutes. Hagemeyer\\ntestified she had no part in conducting the actual dog sniff.\\nShe testified she “was writing the warning.” She confirmed on\\ncross-examination that she filled out the traffic warning, and\\nthat Danner issued it to Simon. Defense counsel asked, “So\\nyou were the one who filled out the date, time, name, address,\\nand birth date?” Hagemeyer answered, “I filled out the ma-\\njority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”\\n After the alert, Simon became angry and insisted there\\nwere no drugs in his car. Danner asked Simon to step out of\\nhis car. The police searched it. They did not find drugs, but\\nthey found a gun. An officer drove Simon to the police station.\\nDanner handed Simon a traffic citation as he was released\\nfrom the station. Danner testified he filled out the citation.\\n II. Procedural posture\\n Since Simon was a felon, the government charged him\\nwith being a felon in possession of a firearm. The case was\\nassigned to Judge Bruce. Simon moved Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself because he had served as the First Assistant United\\nStates Attorney for the Central District of Illinois with super-\\nvisory authority over a prior case against Simon culminating\\nin conviction. Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion.\\n Simon moved to suppress the gun, arguing there was no\\nprobable cause to stop his car, the police impermissibly ex-\\ntended the stop to get a dog on scene, and the dog was unre-\\nliable and improperly trained. Judge Bruce held an\\n\\n(Id. at 87:24–88:7.)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2442\\n\\nevidentiary hearing over parts of three days and heard testi-\\nmony from seven witnesses. He found the officers credible,\\neven if at times confused. He found the officers had probable\\ncause to think Simon committed a traffic violation, the officers\\ndid not unreasonably prolong the stop, and Rex was a\\nproperly trained and certified canine whose alert can lead to\\nprobable cause. The judge denied the motion to suppress.\\n Simon moved to supplement the record with additional,\\nunrelated traffic citations issued by Danner (to show the dif-\\nferences in the officers’ handwriting to address the issue of\\nwhich officer wrote Simon’s citation) and a video made by a\\ndefense investigator (to contradict the officers’ version of\\nevents leading up to the traffic stop). The judge denied this\\nmotion.\\n Simon pleaded guilty conditioned on preserving his right\\nto appeal. He received an enhancement as an Armed Career\\nCriminal. The judge sentenced him to 15 years in prison, the\\nmandatory minimum.\\n Simon appeals the denials of his motions to recuse, sup-\\npress, and supplement. He also appeals his qualification as an\\nArmed Career Criminal, arguing his prior conviction for at-\\ntempted armed robbery in Illinois in 2000 did not qualify as a\\nviolent felony.\\n III. Analysis\\nA. Recusal\\n Simon seeks remand because he claims Judge Bruce’s han-\\ndling of this case conveys the appearance of impropriety. Si-\\nmon does not claim Judge Bruce actually had or acted on any\\nunfair bias against Simon.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 7\\n\\n Simon argues Judge Bruce should have recused himself\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): “Any justice, judge, or magistrate\\njudge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-\\nceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-\\ntioned.” Below, Simon also sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. §\\n455(b)(3), but he no longer presses that on appeal.\\n As the government agrees, we review a preserved § 455(a)\\nclaim de novo. Cf. Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (holding § 455(a) can be vindicated on appeal); United\\nStates v. Dorsey, 829 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (a preserved\\n§ 455(b) claim is reviewed de novo).\\n To win recusal under § 455(a), a party must show a rea-\\nsonable, well-informed observer might question the judge’s\\nimpartiality. United States v. Herrera-Valdez, 826 F.3d 912, 917\\n(7th Cir. 2016). In other words, the party must show an objec-\\ntive, disinterested observer fully informed of the reasons for\\nseeking recusal would “entertain a significant doubt that jus-\\ntice would be done in the case.” Id.\\n Simon sought recusal early in the case on the ground that\\nBruce served as First Assistant United States Attorney for the\\nCentral District of Illinois from 2010 through 2013. During\\nthat time, the government charged Simon with violating 21\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Bruce supervised the AUSA\\nassigned to that case. Simon pleaded guilty and was sen-\\ntenced in 2012 and again (after a successful appeal) in March\\n2013. This prior criminal case involved occurrence facts sepa-\\nrate from those in the present case. But the prior case is di-\\nrectly relevant to this case because the conviction in the prior\\ncase enhanced Simon’s sentence in this case as an Armed Ca-\\nreer Criminal.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion. He noted he could\\nnot remember any participation in past prosecutions of Si-\\nmon. Judge Bruce observed that even if he did participate in\\na past prosecution, he did not participate in the current pros-\\necution, “which consists of new charges, wholly unrelated to\\nthose brought against [Simon] in the past.” (Text Order, Dec.\\n6, 2016.)\\n Simon likens this case to United States v. Herrera-Valdez.\\nThere, the government prosecuted a defendant for illegal\\nreentry after deportation. Before trial on the illegal-reentry\\ncharge, defendant moved to disqualify Judge Der-Yeghiayan\\nbecause he had served as the District Counsel for the Immi-\\ngration and Naturalization Service when defendant was de-\\nported. District Counsel Der-Yeghiayan’s name was listed in\\nseveral places in INS’s briefing supporting deporting. Judge\\nDer-Yeghiayan denied the motion to disqualify and defend-\\nant appealed. We observed that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a\\njudge to “‘disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his\\nimpartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrera-Valdez,\\n826 F.3d at 917. We reversed the denial of disqualification,\\nconcluding “a reasonable, disinterested observer could as-\\nsume bias from the fact that the judge presiding over the de-\\nfendant’s prosecution for illegal reentry was the same person\\nwho ran the office that pursued, and succeeded in obtaining,\\nthe removal order that is the source of his current prosecu-\\ntion.” Id. at 919. We noted this was particularly true given that\\nthe linchpin of defendant’s case against the illegal-reentry\\ncharge was a collateral attack against the removal order. The\\njudge need not have been actually involved in the prior case\\nor be actually biased in the subsequent case to trigger the re-\\nquirement to recuse under § 455(a).\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 9\\n\\n But here, the prior case does not directly give rise to or un-\\nderly the present case. And here, Simon attempts no collateral\\nattack against the prior conviction. Simon’s 2011 conviction\\nwas not, and could not have been, the linchpin to his defense\\nin this subsequent case. A defendant in a federal sentencing\\nproceeding may not collaterally attack a prior conviction used\\nto enhance his sentence, with an exception not relevant here.\\nSee Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382–83 (2001); Custis\\nv. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). Any collateral attack\\nagainst the prior conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would\\nhave been time-barred. So there was no possibility of Judge\\nBruce adjudicating the merits of a collateral attack against Si-\\nmon’s 2011 conviction here. And consequently there was no\\nreason to think Simon might have declined to launch a collat-\\neral attack against the 2011 conviction because he feared\\nJudge Bruce would not be receptive to such an attack, or\\nwould punish him in the present case for making such an at-\\ntack.\\n The prior and subsequent cases at issue in Herrera-Valdez\\nare directly related in a way the prior and subsequent cases at\\nissue here are not. A closer analogy to Herrera-Valdez is Si-\\nmon’s prior conviction under the supervision of First AUSA\\nBruce and the proceedings for revocation of supervised re-\\nlease involving that prior conviction and the gun possession\\non August 21, 2016. Simon’s prior conviction directly gives\\nrise to and underlies the revocation proceedings. So Judge\\nBruce recused himself from them.2 As this relationship is not\\n\\n 2Simon asserts Judge Bruce recused himself from the revocation pro-\\nceedings (2:11-cr-20002). The government does not contest this assertion.\\nThe docket for that case neither confirms nor denies the recusal. We take\\nSimon’s word for it.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2442\\n\\npresent between Simon’s prior case and the current felon-in-\\npossession case, there was no need for Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself here.\\n True, the prior conviction enhanced the sentence for the\\npresent conviction under the ACCA. But this is mere happen-\\nstance. It is not the same kind of direct connection we found\\nproblematic in Herrera-Valdez. Another distinction between\\nHerrera-Valdez and this case is that there, the future judge’s\\nname was on the briefs against the defendant, but here the\\nfuture judge’s name was not on the briefs. This is a relevant\\nconsideration because it bears on public perception. We do\\nnot consider this to be a controlling factor by itself, but it is\\nrelevant.\\n Judge Bruce did not err in refusing to recuse.\\nB. Suppression\\n Simon raises a series of potential errors regarding the de-\\nnial of suppression. He argues there was no probable cause to\\nbelieve a traffic violation occurred, and therefore initiating the\\nstop was unconstitutional. He argues the officers unconstitu-\\ntionally prolonged the traffic stop. And he argues Rex’s alert\\nwas false and Rex was improperly trained. “We employ a\\nmixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing\\nthe district court’s factual determinations for clear error and\\nde novo its ultimate determination about whether the police\\nhad sufficient grounds to stop or search the individual.”\\nUnited States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n1. Initiating the stop\\n Simon argues the officers lacked probable cause to believe\\nhe committed a traffic violation, so they had no probable\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 11\\n\\ncause to stop him. If Simon were right, then the court should\\nhave suppressed the gun as fruit of the poisonous tree. The\\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches\\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a\\ncar, the stop must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasona-\\nbleness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663\\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,\\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States\\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n Simon goes so far as to assert he did not commit a traffic\\nviolation. He argues the government did not meet its burden\\nof proof to establish he actually committed a traffic violation.\\nBut the government had no such burden. Whether Simon\\ncommitted a traffic violation is irrelevant for Fourth Amend-\\nment purposes so long as the officers had probable cause to\\nthink he did. United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (“The officer is not the judge. Whether the driver actu-\\nally committed a traffic infraction is irrelevant for Fourth\\nAmendment purposes so long as there was an objective basis\\nfor a reasonable belief he did.”).\\n Generally, the decision to stop a car is reasonable, and\\ncomports with the Fourth Amendment, “where the police\\nhave probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has oc-\\ncurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Prob-\\nable cause exists when “the circumstances confronting a po-\\nlice officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has com-\\nmitted even a minor traffic offense.” United States v. Cashman,\\n216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). Probable cause is an objective\\nstandard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Lewis, 920\\nF.3d at 489. If an officer reasonably thinks he sees a driver\\ncommit a traffic infraction, that is a sufficient basis to pull him\\n\\f12 No. 18-2442\\n\\nover without violating the Constitution. United States v.\\nMuriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n Here, Simon acknowledges the probable cause determina-\\ntion depends entirely on the credibility of the two officers on\\nbicycles who testified they saw him turn without signaling at\\nleast 100 feet ahead. Simon levies many attacks on their cred-\\nibility, urging us to reverse under the clear error standard. Si-\\nmon admits the clear error standard is very demanding. Un-\\nder this standard, we only reverse when, after reviewing the\\nrecord as a whole, we have a “definite and firm conviction” a\\nmistake has been made. United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614,\\n621 (7th Cir. 2001). The district judge, after all, listened to the\\ntestimony directly and observed the demeanor of the wit-\\nnesses. United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nThe district judge is in a much better position to evaluate cred-\\nibility than we are. His credibility determinations are entitled\\nto special deference. We take Simon’s credibility attacks in\\nturn.\\ni. Phantom stop sign\\n First, Simon argues Hagemeyer swore at the suppression\\nhearing that there was a stop sign at the corner of College and\\nGreen, but she was demonstrably and indisputably wrong. Si-\\nmon argues this impugns her claim she saw the traffic viola-\\ntion.\\n The judge directly confronted Hagemeyer’s mistake. He\\nnoted Hagemeyer “was wrong about that detail.” (Order, DE\\n21 at 4.) The judge said he would take the mistake into account\\nin assessing Hagemeyer’s credibility. But the judge concluded\\nthe mistake does not weigh heavily against her credibility be-\\ncause the detail “is not greatly important regarding the traffic\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 13\\n\\noffense for which Defendant was pulled over” and because\\n“[i]t would not have factored in to [sic] determining whether\\nor not to issue Defendant a ticket for failing to signal his turn\\nwithin not less than 100 feet of the intersection.” (Id.) Hage-\\nmeyer’s determination at the scene that Simon failed to signal\\nat least 100 feet before the turn was not informed by the pres-\\nence or absence of a stop sign at the corner. In other words,\\nthere were other reasons independent of the presence or ab-\\nsence of a stop sign for Hagemeyer to think Simon failed to\\nsignal at least 100 feet ahead of turning. Indeed, the presence\\nor absence of a stop sign is irrelevant to estimating distances\\nor to the requirement to signal. The judge simply did not find\\nthis mistake about a stop sign to be very important. So the\\nmistake did not significantly undermine the reliability of\\nHagemeyer to perceive other facts that night. Moreover, her\\nmistake about the stop sign has no bearing on Danner’s testi-\\nmony that he saw Simon fail to signal sufficiently ahead of\\nturning.\\n And as for the possibilities Hagemeyer lied about the stop\\nsign, and this lie undermines her credibility about everything\\nelse, Simon does not go quite so far. In his opening appellate\\nbrief, he does not directly, unequivocally accuse Hagemeyer\\nof intentionally lying about the stop sign. And Simon offers\\nno explanation for why Hagemeyer would have had any rea-\\nson to lie about it. We see no clear error here.\\nii. Distances\\n Second, Simon argues Hagemeyer and Danner were\\nwrong about the distance between their location and the in-\\ntersection of College and Green. They both testified the dis-\\ntance was 75 yards. But the distance was actually 145 yards.\\nThe officers’ testimony was demonstrably and indisputably\\n\\f14 No. 18-2442\\n\\nwrong by a wide margin. Simon argues the officers’ ability to\\njudge distance was the key to their claim Simon committed a\\ntraffic violation. He argues their failure to estimate the dis-\\ntance between their location and the intersection correctly\\nmakes their claims about the distance between the location of\\nSimon’s car when he activated his turn signal and the inter-\\nsection wholly incredible.\\n Again, the judge directly confronted the mistaken testi-\\nmony. The judge decided the miscalculation was “of little im-\\nport when it comes to credibility.” (Order, DE 21 at 3.) The\\njudge reasoned that the fact that both officers estimated the\\ndistance at 75 yards does not indicate collusion because if they\\nwanted to connive it is much more likely they would have\\nused a number closer to the actual distance. They were too\\nwrong to be conspiring to lie.\\n And as for the argument that the officers’ mistake about\\nthis distance undermines the credibility of their estimate\\nabout Simon’s signaling distance, the officers had other, spe-\\ncific indicia of the signaling distance beyond a raw estimate\\nof the distance from A to B. The time between signaling and\\nturning, the car lengths between signaling and turning, and\\nthe lengths of the headlight beams bolstered the probable\\ncause to think Simon signaled too late and too close. The judge\\nconcluded the mistake about the distance between the bicy-\\nclists’ location and the intersection shows nothing more than\\nthat both bicyclists were wrong about that distance. We see no\\nclear error here.\\niii. Photographs\\n Third, Simon argues photographs introduced into evi-\\ndence show the unbelievability of the officers’ claims. Danner\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 15\\n\\nand Hagemeyer both testified they saw Simon’s car leave the\\n1100 block of North College, five blocks from their position.\\nBut, Simon argues, the photographs speak for themselves,\\nand there is no way someone could see the make, model, or\\ncolor of a vehicle at that distance.\\n The judge simply disagreed. He examined the photo-\\ngraphs and listened to the testimony and concluded “it is pos-\\nsible for an average person, with good vision who is used to\\nworking at night, such as Danner and Hagemeyer, to see a car,\\nin the dark, turn onto a street with its headlights on.” (Order,\\nDE 21 at 4.) We also examined the photographs and read the\\ntestimony, and we do not have anything close to a definite\\nand firm conviction the judge made a mistake in this regard.\\nSometimes a photograph is not worth a thousand words.\\niv. Ghost writer\\n Fourth, Simon argues the judge ignored the officers’ mis-\\nstatements about who prepared the traffic ticket. Hagemeyer\\ntestified “I was writing the warning.” She answered “yes” to\\nthe question: “[Y]ou said that you filled out the traffic warn-\\ning in this case?” When asked if she was the one who filled\\nout the date, time, name, address, and birth date, she testified\\nshe “filled out the majority of” the ticket herself, but she be-\\nlieved Danner signed it. But other evidence showed she filled\\nout none of it. Danner filled out both the traffic citation (later\\nvoided) and the warning (Simon received hours later).\\n Simon accuses the judge of tying himself “into a pretzel to\\navoid finding that the police officers could possibly have lied\\nor misrepresented facts … .” (Appellant Br. at 33.) But the\\njudge committed no such contortions. Rather, he addressed\\nthe discrepancies directly. He combed through the testimony\\n\\f16 No. 18-2442\\n\\nabout the various steps in the process leading to handing a\\ndriver a written ticket or warning. He noted there appeared\\nto be confusion and possibly contradiction between the offic-\\ners about who actually wrote the ticket. One source of confu-\\nsion seemed to be the word “processing.” The judge observed\\nHagemeyer, Snyder, and Hoecker all testified Hagemeyer be-\\ngan “processing” the ticket, but “processing” a ticket involves\\nmuch more than just physically writing the ticket. The judge\\nalso observed Hagemeyer’s testimony on this issue was more\\nspecific. She testified, “I was writing the warning.” When\\nasked, “So you were the one who filled out the date, time,\\nname, address, and birth date?” she responded, “I filled out\\nthe majority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”3\\n The judge compared the warning Simon received—pur-\\nportedly filled out by Hagemeyer and signed by Danner—to\\na different warning definitely filled out and signed by Hage-\\nmeyer on a different date. The judge concluded the handwrit-\\ning on the two warnings is different and they likely were not\\nfilled in by the same officer.\\n But the judge noted Simon did not show the exemplar\\nwarning to Danner or Hagemeyer during the hearing to cross-\\nexamine them on who wrote Simon’s warning. The judge also\\n\\n\\n 3 In his order denying suppression, the judge characterized Hage-\\nmeyer’s testimony on this point slightly incorrectly, and in favor of Si-\\nmon’s arguments. The judge wrote “Hagemeyer answered ‘yes’ to\\nwhether she filled in the name, date, etc., but she stated that Danner signed\\nit.” (Order, DE 21 at 10.) Actually (according to the transcript) she did not\\nsay “yes” in response to this question. She said, “I filled out the majority\\nof it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.” But even giving Simon the ben-\\nefit of this characterization, the judge still did not find a significant credi-\\nbility problem.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 17\\n\\nnoted the testimony indicated Danner or Hagemeyer would\\noften start writing a ticket the other would finish. The judge\\nobserved: “There are numerous possibilities as to why the dis-\\ncrepancy exists, and without the officers being given the\\nchance to explain the discrepancy, the court cannot impute\\nimproper conduct on their part.” (Order, DE 21 at 11.) The\\njudge considered the totality of the officers’ testimony, and\\ntheir demeanor and appearance. He concluded any discrep-\\nancy on this issue was due to mere confusion on the part of\\nthe officers, and not to fabrication. And he concluded the of-\\nficers were credible.\\n We see no clear error regarding the judge’s decisions on\\nany of these issues, nor regarding his decision to find the of-\\nficers credible. Given the two bicycle officers testified they\\nsaw Simon commit a traffic infraction, and given the judge be-\\nlieved them, we see no reason to reverse the decision that\\nprobable cause justified starting the stop.\\n2. Conducting the stop\\n Simon argues even if the officers did not violate the Con-\\nstitution by initiating the stop, they violated it by impermissi-\\nbly prolonging the stop. An officer who reasonably starts a\\ntraffic stop might violate the Constitution if he exceeds the\\nscope of the stop or unreasonably prolongs it. Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491. A traffic stop “‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged\\nbeyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mis-\\nsion’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez v. United States,\\n135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543\\nU.S. 405, 407 (2005)).\\n A dog sniff of a car’s exterior only for illegal drugs during\\na lawful stop for a traffic violation does not violate the Fourth\\n\\f18 No. 18-2442\\n\\nAmendment, even absent reasonable suspicion of drugs. Ca-\\nballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But a stop justified only by a traffic vio-\\nlation becomes unconstitutional if the officers prolong it be-\\nyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s\\noriginal mission. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. “An officer may\\nconduct certain unrelated checks—including a dog sniff—\\nduring a lawful traffic stop, but he may not do so in a way that\\nprolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily\\ndemanded to justify detaining an individual.” Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Simon concedes,\\n“calling a K-9 unit does not unlawfully extend a traffic stop as\\nlong as the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is on-\\ngoing.” (Appellant Br. at 36.)\\n Without independent reasonable suspicion to justify the\\nsniff, the critical question is not whether the dog sniffed be-\\nfore or after the officer issued the warning, “but whether con-\\nducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.”\\nLewis, 920 F.3d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nWith independent reasonable suspicion, however, the officer\\nmay constitutionally detain the suspect for the sniff even if it\\nadds time to the total stop. Id.\\n Here, the judge continued to credit the officers’ testimony.\\nBased on that testimony, the judge concluded the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff. The judge noted\\nthe time period from the beginning of the stop to the canine\\nalert was about 7 minutes, as Simon conceded. The judge de-\\ntermined the officers acted quickly. Hoecker made the stop,\\nexited his car, told Simon the reason for the stop, and gathered\\nhis information. The bicyclists arrived at the stop only a cou-\\nple minutes after Hoecker pulled Simon over. The bicyclists\\n“diligently began processing the ticket.” (Order, DE 21 at 15.)\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 19\\n\\nCrucially, the judge found no indication the officers engaged\\nin any activity other than securing the scene and processing\\nthe warning during the time between the bicyclists’ arrival\\nand Rex’s arrival. Specifically, the officers surveyed the scene,\\nDanner spoke with Simon, and Hagemeyer testified she went\\nto the squad car to begin processing the written warning. The\\nvideo indicated that about 2.5 minutes into the stop, Danner\\nwas speaking to Hoecker about the traffic violation. About 3\\nminutes into the stop, Danner left the squad car to speak with\\nSimon. Danner told Simon the reasons for the stop and gath-\\nered information. Hoecker returned to Simon’s car at about\\nthe 5-minute mark to speak with him about the traffic infrac-\\ntion. Less than 7 minutes into the stop, Rex arrived and very\\nquickly alerted. At that time, the bicycle officers were still pro-\\ncessing the ticket.\\n In sum, the judge concluded the officers were processing\\nthe ticket when Rex arrived and alerted, so they had not yet\\ncompleted the initial mission of the stop, and the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff.\\n Simon argues the police report and testimony contain the\\n“misrepresentation” Hagemeyer was writing the warning\\nwhile the officers waited for Rex because the officers knew\\ncalling a canine unit does not unlawfully extend a stop so long\\nas the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is ongoing.\\nSimon continues to challenge the credibility of the officers. He\\nargues that at no point did any officer on the scene begin ef-\\nfectuating the purpose of the stop by dutifully and diligently\\nfilling out a warning or ticket. He claims Danner filled out\\nboth the traffic citation and the warning Simon received hours\\nafter the stop. But again we see no reversible error in the\\njudge’s conclusions on this point.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Simon presses that even if the judge’s credibility determi-\\nnations here are correct, his ruling is still flawed. First, Simon\\nargues the judge improperly allowed a de minimis delay to be\\nconstitutional, even though any delay to allow a dog to sniff\\nis unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion.\\nWe disagree with Simon about what the judge did. He specif-\\nically found there was no improper delay. (Order, DE 21 at 14\\n(“the stop was not purposefully prolonged to allow for the ca-\\nnine unit’s arrival”).) True, the judge added in a footnote that\\neven if he found the ticket-writing process had not begun\\nwhen Rex arrived, still the sequence of events was so short\\nand condensed that the stop was not prolonged in any “mean-\\ningful” way. But we need not review this dictum.\\n Second, Simon argues that instead of effectuating the pur-\\npose of the traffic stop, the officers decided to run a criminal-\\nhistory check. Simon argues this was unrelated to the mission\\nof the stop and delayed processing the traffic violation. Simon\\ncites no supporting Seventh Circuit case. We said last year that\\nwhen police conduct a stop, “they are entitled to demand the\\ndriver’s identification, of course, and it is routine to check the\\ndriver’s record for active warrants, driving history, and crim-\\ninal history. Those checks are done for important reasons, in-\\ncluding officer safety.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d\\n577, 586 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Sanford, 806\\nF.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The trooper checked the occu-\\npants’ criminal histories on the computer in his car—a proce-\\ndure permissible even without reasonable suspicion … .”).\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments, but we see no rea-\\nson to reverse the judge’s conclusions that the officers were in\\nthe process of completing the traffic warning when Rex\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 21\\n\\narrived, and the officers did not improperly prolong the traffic\\nstop to allow the sniff to occur.\\n3. Bona Fido?\\n Simon argues even if the officers had probable cause to\\npull him over, and even if they did not prolong the traffic stop\\nto wait for Rex, still the judge should have suppressed the gun\\nbecause Rex’s alert was false, Rex was improperly trained,\\nand the alert did not provide probable cause to justify search-\\ning Simon’s car.\\n Probable cause to conduct a search is not among the high-\\nest standards. “A police officer has probable cause to conduct\\na search when the facts available to him would warrant a per-\\nson of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evi-\\ndence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050,\\n1055 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).\\nProbable cause is less than preponderance of the evidence. Id.\\n“All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which\\nreasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id.\\n(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Probable\\ncause is a practical, common-sense standard, involving the to-\\ntality of the circumstances. Id.\\n A dog’s alert on a car can give probable cause to search the\\nentire car. Indeed, a good dog’s alert can provide a rebuttable\\npresumption of probable cause to search:\\n If a bona fide organization has certified a dog\\n after testing his reliability in a controlled setting,\\n a court can presume (subject to any conflicting\\n evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides\\n probable cause to search. The same is true, even\\n in the absence of formal certification, if the dog\\n\\f22 No. 18-2442\\n\\n has recently and successfully completed a train-\\n ing program that evaluated his proficiency in lo-\\n cating drugs.\\nId. at 1057. The ultimate question is “whether all the facts sur-\\nrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common\\nsense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a\\nsearch would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A\\nsniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.” Id. at 1058.\\n Simon concedes Rex passed certification tests. But Simon\\nchallenges the alert itself and the adequacy of Rex’s training.\\n “First and foremost,” Simon argues Rex did not alert on\\nSimon’s car. (Appellant Br. at 42.) This perplexes. Simon cites\\nnothing to support this claim. The record belies it. Given the\\ncontext of this claim, Simon seems simply to mean the alert\\nwas false.4 It is true that following the alert the officers\\nsearched the car and found no evidence of drugs in it. But Si-\\nmon does not explain why that, in itself, matters here. Proba-\\nble cause is not a retrospective, outcome-based standard.\\n\\n 4 Defense expert Dr. Mary Cablk said in her report she could not de-\\ntermine if Rex alerted or what Rex alerted to. She confirmed this on cross-\\nexamination at the suppression hearing. During direct examination she\\nwatched videos from Hoecker’s and Snyder’s dashcams. She testified she\\ncould not see the alert, could not tell exactly where on the car the dog\\nalerted, and did not know whether the alert was barking or something\\nelse. But in her testimony she seems to accept Rex alerted. She character-\\nized it as a false alert because no drugs were found, and she criticized\\nSnyder for rewarding Rex for falsely alerting: “In this instance, there’s no\\ndrugs found; so he’s reinforcing the dog for false alerting here.” In any\\nevent, Snyder testified that Rex alerted and that Snyder confirmed the\\nalert. And the judge throughout his order accepted Rex alerted. He found\\nthe officers’ testimony, in its totality, credible. We see no reason to upend\\nthe determination Rex alerted.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 23\\n\\nBridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). If an officer\\nrandomly breaks into a house on only a wild hunch and stum-\\nbles into a meth lab, the discovery does not provide probable\\ncause for the search. And if 20 reliable informants tell an of-\\nficer a particular house contains a meth lab, so he stands in\\nthe street outside the house and sees through an open win-\\ndow the apparent apparatus and accoutrements of a meth lab,\\nso he obtains a warrant to search the house based on probable\\ncause to think it contains a meth lab, but he finds only an in-\\nnocent and intricate chemistry set, still probable cause sup-\\nported the warrant. So the mere absence of drugs in Simon’s\\ncar does not undermine the probable cause to search it for\\ndrugs, provided there was probable cause in the first place.\\n Simon’s other argument is the officers did not have prob-\\nable cause to search his vehicle in the first place because Rex\\nwas unreliable. This argument proceeds in two waves.\\n The first wave is quickly quelled. Simon argues Rex was\\nunreliable because he was not trained properly under Illinois\\nlaw, which requires police dogs be trained according to cer-\\ntain guidelines. Simon argues Detective Larner (the Macon\\nCounty canine-training director) admitted he did not always\\nfollow these guidelines. But we need not address what Illinois\\nlaw requires or whether Rex satisfies it because Illinois law\\ndoes not control the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore,\\n553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s mean-\\ning [does] not change with local law enforcement practices—\\neven practices set by rule.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.\\n35, 43 (1988) (“We have never intimated … that whether or not\\na search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment depends on the law of the particular State in\\nwhich the search occurs.”).\\n\\f24 No. 18-2442\\n\\n The second wave holds out longer, but ultimately suc-\\ncumbs. Simon argues, apart from Illinois law, if a dog is\\ntrained to alert when no evidence of criminal activity exists,\\nthis violates the Fourth Amendment. The problem, as Simon\\nsees it, is Rex was trained with scented cotton balls to alert to\\nresidual odors. But to search a car, there must be probable\\ncause to think it presently contains evidence of criminal activ-\\nity. So if Rex is trained to alert to mere residue even when no\\ndrugs are present, then his alert is not a reliable indicator\\ndrugs are present, and therefore his alert does not provide\\nprobable cause to justify a search.\\n The main problem with this argument is the Supreme\\nCourt already rejected its premise. In Florida v. Harris, a dog\\nnamed Aldo alerted on a truck. A subsequent search did not\\nreveal any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, but it did\\ndiscover meth ingredients. The defendant moved to suppress\\nthe ingredients on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given\\nprobable cause to search. The defendant “principally con-\\ntended” in the trial court that because the officer did not find\\nany of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, Aldo’s alerts\\nmust have been false. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058. But the Su-\\npreme Court patted Aldo on the head and called him a good\\nboy: “A well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to [resid-\\nual] odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but\\nin fact is not.” Id. at 1059; see also Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels,\\nInc., 600 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (Plaintiff’s “only de-\\nveloped legal theory is untenable. [His] premise—that an alert\\nby a drug-sniffing dog trained to detect residual odors does\\nnot establish probable cause to search—was rejected in Harris\\n… .”). If a well-trained dog, trained to alert even to residual\\nodors, alerts, there is generally a fair probability that drugs or\\nevidence of drugs will be found, absent contradictory factors.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 25\\n\\nAnd that is all the Fourth Amendment requires. If somehow\\na dog were trained to alert only to residual odors, then we\\nmight have a problem. But that is not this case.\\n Our review of the record and the order denying suppres-\\nsion satisfies us the judge conducted the proper Harris evalu-\\nation and committed no error in concluding Rex’s satisfactory\\ncertification and training provide sufficient reason to trust his\\nalert or in concluding Rex’s training on residual odors is ac-\\nceptable. The judge heard testimony from Simon’s expert Dr.\\nCablk challenging Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself, tes-\\ntimony from Officer Snyder supporting Rex’s qualifications\\nand the sniff itself, and testimony from Detective Larner sup-\\nporting Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself. The judge also\\nentertained arguments from both sides in the form of the mo-\\ntion to suppress, supporting memorandum, the government’s\\nresponse, and post-hearing briefs filed by both sides. The\\njudge considered the totality of the circumstances, addressed\\nHarris’s ultimate question, and found Rex’s sniff up to snuff.\\nC. Supplementation\\n After the judge denied the motion to suppress, Simon\\nmoved to supplement the record and for leave to seek recon-\\nsideration. He wanted to reopen the evidence to introduce\\nfurther, unrelated citations prepared by Danner in August\\n2016 “which further emphasize the differences in the officers’\\nhandwriting … .” (Mot. Supp., DE 23 at 4.) Simon also wanted\\nto introduce a video he5 took when he returned to the scene\\none night. The video shows a vehicle leaving the 1100 block\\nof College Street and approaching the intersection of College\\n\\n 5 The motion says Simon created the video. On appeal, Simon asserts\\nhis investigator took the video. This nuance is immaterial here.\\n\\f26 No. 18-2442\\n\\nand Green. The judge denied this motion. On appeal, Simon\\nonly presses the video. He does not mention the additional\\nhandwriting exemplars in his opening appellate brief. Simon\\nacknowledges we review the denial of supplementation for\\nabuse of discretion.\\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. He explained there\\nwas no reason Simon could not have taken a nighttime video\\nand presented it during the suppression hearing. The judge\\ndiscussed the danger of allowing supplementation here and\\nsetting a bad precedent leading to a never-ending cycle of par-\\nties waiting for rulings and then coming up with “new” evi-\\ndence to challenge them. Most importantly, the judge ex-\\nplained that even with the proposed evidence, his ruling\\nwould not change. The nighttime video would not capture the\\nactual visual capabilities of the officers, who credibly testified\\nabout how close Simon was to the intersection when he sig-\\nnaled. The judge reasoned a video of the scene taken months\\nlater, when conditions might differ, would not impact their\\ncredibility. Besides, the judge noted, the probable cause\\nstandard does not need evidence to support a conviction be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt. He did not abuse his discretion.\\nD. ACCA\\n Simon argues his prior conviction under Illinois law for\\nattempted armed robbery should not have counted as a pred-\\nicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He recog-\\nnizes our decisions foreclose his argument on this point, but\\nhe wants to preserve it for the Supreme Court.\\n IV. Conclusion\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments. Finding no reversi-\\nble error, we AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431885/\", \"author_raw\": \"Daniel Anthony Manion\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MANION"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"MANION\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654632/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Marshon Simon\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2442\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n v.\n\nMARSHON SIMON,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Central District of Illinois.\n No. 16-CR-20077 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Police officers pulled Marshon Si-\nmon over for failing to signal sufficiently ahead of turning. A\ndrug-sniffing dog alerted on Simon’s car so officers searched\nit. They did not find drugs, but they found a gun. The govern-\nment charged Simon with being a felon-in-possession. The\ndistrict judge denied Simon’s motions for recusal, suppres-\nsion, and supplementation. Simon entered a conditional\nguilty plea and received a sentence of 15 years. He raises a\n\f2 No. 18-2442\n\nlitany of issues on appeal. He argues the judge should have\nrecused himself because before he was a judge he supervised\na prior prosecution of Simon. He argues the judge should\nhave suppressed the gun because the officers lacked probable\ncause to initiate the traffic stop and because they prolonged\nthe stop to allow for the dog sniff. He argues the dog’s alert\nwas false and the dog was unreliable because he was improp-\nerly trained. He argues the judge should have allowed him to\nsupplement the evidence after denial of suppression. Finally,\nhe argues one of his prior felonies should not have counted as\na predicate for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.\nConcluding the judge committed no reversible error in deny-\ning Simon’s motions, we affirm.\n I. Facts\n On the night of August 21, 2016, three police officers in a\n“bike patrol unit” surveyed a particular section of Decatur, Il-\nlinois. Officers Jason Danner and Jamie Hagemeyer rode bi-\ncycles. They sat behind a propane tank 145 yards from the in-\ntersection of College and Green Streets. Officer Robert\nHoecker drove a squad car nearby.\n The bicycle officers saw a vehicle driven by Marshon Si-\nmon leave the 1100 block of North College Street (five blocks\naway) and drive toward them. As Simon approached the in-\ntersection of College and Green Streets, he failed to signal at\nleast 100 feet before turning left from College onto Green. This\nwas according to the bicyclists’ testimony at the suppression\nhearing, which the district judge credited. At the bicyclists’ re-\nquest, Hoecker pulled Simon over at 10:26 p.m.\n Hoecker approached Simon’s car and made contact.\nHoecker introduced himself and told Simon the basic reason\n\fNo. 18-2442 3\n\nfor the stop. Hoecker explained bicycle officers would arrive\nand provide details. Simon questioned the basis for the stop.\nSimon gave his driver’s license and proof of insurance to\nHoecker. According to Hoecker, Simon was cooperative and\npolite, behaved normally, and was no more nervous than the\nnormal level of traffic-stop nervousness. Hoecker ran Simon\nthrough the LEADS computer system and found he was val-\nidly licensed and insured. Hoecker finished this check in less\nthan 2 minutes, before Danner and Hagemeyer arrived on\nscene at about 10:29 p.m.\n Once Danner and Hagemeyer arrived they took over “pro-\ncessing the ticket,” including some double-checking.\nHoecker’s role was to assist. Hoecker told Danner that Simon\nhad insurance and a valid license. Hoecker said he “didn’t\nknow if [Danner] wanted the dog or not.” (Appellant Br. at 8,\nquoting Hoecker’s dashcam video.) Danner asked if Simon\nhad any criminal history. Hoecker then ran a criminal-history\ncheck and found Simon had prior drug and weapon charges.\n Danner made contact with Simon. Danner testified Simon\nappeared abnormally nervous. Danner testified Simon asked\nabout the violation and insisted he used his turn signal. Dan-\nner testified, “I observed him to pull his hand away from his\nlap, and he was shaking pretty good, indicating to me that he\nappeared nervous.” But Danner did not note this in the police\nreport and he did not mention this when discussing whether\nto call a dog.\n Hagemeyer testified that while speaking briefly with\nHoecker he handed her Simon’s materials. She then went to\nanother squad car that had arrived on scene “to begin the\nwritten warning.” Both Danner and Hagemeyer testified\nabout the various steps and processes a bike patrol unit\n\f4 No. 18-2442\n\ncompletes as part of the mission instigated by a traffic viola-\ntion, including monitoring and securing the scene, making\ncontacts with the driver, running computer checks, and writ-\ning out the warning or ticket.\n Danner decided to call a dog. He testified he decided to\ncall a dog at about 22:30:38 (10:30:38 p.m.) on the clock of\nHoecker’s dashcam, about 1 minute after Danner and Hage-\nmeyer arrived at the traffic stop. An officer called for the ca-\nnine unit less than 4 minutes into the stop, when the ticket\nwas still being processed, according to the officers’ testimony.\n Canine handler Snyder arrived with Rex at the scene at\nabout 10:33 p.m. At that time, the traffic violation was still be-\ning processed, according to the officers’ testimony.1 Within a\n\n 1 Here are excerpts on point from the bicycle patrol unit’s testimony:\nQ: And when Officer Snyder arrived, was the traffic violation still being\nprocessed?\nHoecker: Yes.\n(Tr. Continuation of Suppression Hr’g, July 12, 2017, DE 44 at 19:1–19:3.)\n\nQ: And do you recall approximately how long into the traffic stop it would\nhave been that [Officer Snyder, with Rex] arrived?\nDanner: I believe it was around six or seven minutes.\nQ: And were you still processing the traffic ticket at that time?\nA: That’s correct.\n(Id. at 50:19–50:24.)\n\nHagemeyer: From the time we arrived to the time Officer Snyder arrived\nwas three or four minutes.\nQ: So a very short period of time?\nA: Very short period of time.\nQ: Were you still working on the traffic ticket at that time?\nA: Yes.\nQ: And still working on it diligently, correct?\nA: [Nodding head up and down.]\n\fNo. 18-2442 5\n\nfew seconds of walking around Simon’s car, Rex alerted.\nSnyder took less than 20 seconds to prepare Rex, begin the\nsearch, and confirm the alert. The time period from the begin-\nning of the stop to the alert was about 7 minutes. Hagemeyer\ntestified she had no part in conducting the actual dog sniff.\nShe testified she “was writing the warning.” She confirmed on\ncross-examination that she filled out the traffic warning, and\nthat Danner issued it to Simon. Defense counsel asked, “So\nyou were the one who filled out the date, time, name, address,\nand birth date?” Hagemeyer answered, “I filled out the ma-\njority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”\n After the alert, Simon became angry and insisted there\nwere no drugs in his car. Danner asked Simon to step out of\nhis car. The police searched it. They did not find drugs, but\nthey found a gun. An officer drove Simon to the police station.\nDanner handed Simon a traffic citation as he was released\nfrom the station. Danner testified he filled out the citation.\n II. Procedural posture\n Since Simon was a felon, the government charged him\nwith being a felon in possession of a firearm. The case was\nassigned to Judge Bruce. Simon moved Judge Bruce to recuse\nhimself because he had served as the First Assistant United\nStates Attorney for the Central District of Illinois with super-\nvisory authority over a prior case against Simon culminating\nin conviction. Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion.\n Simon moved to suppress the gun, arguing there was no\nprobable cause to stop his car, the police impermissibly ex-\ntended the stop to get a dog on scene, and the dog was unre-\nliable and improperly trained. Judge Bruce held an\n\n(Id. at 87:24–88:7.)\n\f6 No. 18-2442\n\nevidentiary hearing over parts of three days and heard testi-\nmony from seven witnesses. He found the officers credible,\neven if at times confused. He found the officers had probable\ncause to think Simon committed a traffic violation, the officers\ndid not unreasonably prolong the stop, and Rex was a\nproperly trained and certified canine whose alert can lead to\nprobable cause. The judge denied the motion to suppress.\n Simon moved to supplement the record with additional,\nunrelated traffic citations issued by Danner (to show the dif-\nferences in the officers’ handwriting to address the issue of\nwhich officer wrote Simon’s citation) and a video made by a\ndefense investigator (to contradict the officers’ version of\nevents leading up to the traffic stop). The judge denied this\nmotion.\n Simon pleaded guilty conditioned on preserving his right\nto appeal. He received an enhancement as an Armed Career\nCriminal. The judge sentenced him to 15 years in prison, the\nmandatory minimum.\n Simon appeals the denials of his motions to recuse, sup-\npress, and supplement. He also appeals his qualification as an\nArmed Career Criminal, arguing his prior conviction for at-\ntempted armed robbery in Illinois in 2000 did not qualify as a\nviolent felony.\n III. Analysis\nA. Recusal\n Simon seeks remand because he claims Judge Bruce’s han-\ndling of this case conveys the appearance of impropriety. Si-\nmon does not claim Judge Bruce actually had or acted on any\nunfair bias against Simon.\n\fNo. 18-2442 7\n\n Simon argues Judge Bruce should have recused himself\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): “Any justice, judge, or magistrate\njudge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-\nceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-\ntioned.” Below, Simon also sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. §\n455(b)(3), but he no longer presses that on appeal.\n As the government agrees, we review a preserved § 455(a)\nclaim de novo. Cf. Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir.\n2016) (holding § 455(a) can be vindicated on appeal); United\nStates v. Dorsey, 829 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (a preserved\n§ 455(b) claim is reviewed de novo).\n To win recusal under § 455(a), a party must show a rea-\nsonable, well-informed observer might question the judge’s\nimpartiality. United States v. Herrera-Valdez, 826 F.3d 912, 917\n(7th Cir. 2016). In other words, the party must show an objec-\ntive, disinterested observer fully informed of the reasons for\nseeking recusal would “entertain a significant doubt that jus-\ntice would be done in the case.” Id.\n Simon sought recusal early in the case on the ground that\nBruce served as First Assistant United States Attorney for the\nCentral District of Illinois from 2010 through 2013. During\nthat time, the government charged Simon with violating 21\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Bruce supervised the AUSA\nassigned to that case. Simon pleaded guilty and was sen-\ntenced in 2012 and again (after a successful appeal) in March\n2013. This prior criminal case involved occurrence facts sepa-\nrate from those in the present case. But the prior case is di-\nrectly relevant to this case because the conviction in the prior\ncase enhanced Simon’s sentence in this case as an Armed Ca-\nreer Criminal.\n\f8 No. 18-2442\n\n Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion. He noted he could\nnot remember any participation in past prosecutions of Si-\nmon. Judge Bruce observed that even if he did participate in\na past prosecution, he did not participate in the current pros-\necution, “which consists of new charges, wholly unrelated to\nthose brought against [Simon] in the past.” (Text Order, Dec.\n6, 2016.)\n Simon likens this case to United States v. Herrera-Valdez.\nThere, the government prosecuted a defendant for illegal\nreentry after deportation. Before trial on the illegal-reentry\ncharge, defendant moved to disqualify Judge Der-Yeghiayan\nbecause he had served as the District Counsel for the Immi-\ngration and Naturalization Service when defendant was de-\nported. District Counsel Der-Yeghiayan’s name was listed in\nseveral places in INS’s briefing supporting deporting. Judge\nDer-Yeghiayan denied the motion to disqualify and defend-\nant appealed. We observed that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a\njudge to “‘disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his\nimpartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrera-Valdez,\n826 F.3d at 917. We reversed the denial of disqualification,\nconcluding “a reasonable, disinterested observer could as-\nsume bias from the fact that the judge presiding over the de-\nfendant’s prosecution for illegal reentry was the same person\nwho ran the office that pursued, and succeeded in obtaining,\nthe removal order that is the source of his current prosecu-\ntion.” Id. at 919. We noted this was particularly true given that\nthe linchpin of defendant’s case against the illegal-reentry\ncharge was a collateral attack against the removal order. The\njudge need not have been actually involved in the prior case\nor be actually biased in the subsequent case to trigger the re-\nquirement to recuse under § 455(a).\n\fNo. 18-2442 9\n\n But here, the prior case does not directly give rise to or un-\nderly the present case. And here, Simon attempts no collateral\nattack against the prior conviction. Simon’s 2011 conviction\nwas not, and could not have been, the linchpin to his defense\nin this subsequent case. A defendant in a federal sentencing\nproceeding may not collaterally attack a prior conviction used\nto enhance his sentence, with an exception not relevant here.\nSee Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382–83 (2001); Custis\nv. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). Any collateral attack\nagainst the prior conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would\nhave been time-barred. So there was no possibility of Judge\nBruce adjudicating the merits of a collateral attack against Si-\nmon’s 2011 conviction here. And consequently there was no\nreason to think Simon might have declined to launch a collat-\neral attack against the 2011 conviction because he feared\nJudge Bruce would not be receptive to such an attack, or\nwould punish him in the present case for making such an at-\ntack.\n The prior and subsequent cases at issue in Herrera-Valdez\nare directly related in a way the prior and subsequent cases at\nissue here are not. A closer analogy to Herrera-Valdez is Si-\nmon’s prior conviction under the supervision of First AUSA\nBruce and the proceedings for revocation of supervised re-\nlease involving that prior conviction and the gun possession\non August 21, 2016. Simon’s prior conviction directly gives\nrise to and underlies the revocation proceedings. So Judge\nBruce recused himself from them.2 As this relationship is not\n\n 2Simon asserts Judge Bruce recused himself from the revocation pro-\nceedings (2:11-cr-20002). The government does not contest this assertion.\nThe docket for that case neither confirms nor denies the recusal. We take\nSimon’s word for it.\n\f10 No. 18-2442\n\npresent between Simon’s prior case and the current felon-in-\npossession case, there was no need for Judge Bruce to recuse\nhimself here.\n True, the prior conviction enhanced the sentence for the\npresent conviction under the ACCA. But this is mere happen-\nstance. It is not the same kind of direct connection we found\nproblematic in Herrera-Valdez. Another distinction between\nHerrera-Valdez and this case is that there, the future judge’s\nname was on the briefs against the defendant, but here the\nfuture judge’s name was not on the briefs. This is a relevant\nconsideration because it bears on public perception. We do\nnot consider this to be a controlling factor by itself, but it is\nrelevant.\n Judge Bruce did not err in refusing to recuse.\nB. Suppression\n Simon raises a series of potential errors regarding the de-\nnial of suppression. He argues there was no probable cause to\nbelieve a traffic violation occurred, and therefore initiating the\nstop was unconstitutional. He argues the officers unconstitu-\ntionally prolonged the traffic stop. And he argues Rex’s alert\nwas false and Rex was improperly trained. “We employ a\nmixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing\nthe district court’s factual determinations for clear error and\nde novo its ultimate determination about whether the police\nhad sufficient grounds to stop or search the individual.”\nUnited States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir.\n2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).\n1. Initiating the stop\n Simon argues the officers lacked probable cause to believe\nhe committed a traffic violation, so they had no probable\n\fNo. 18-2442 11\n\ncause to stop him. If Simon were right, then the court should\nhave suppressed the gun as fruit of the poisonous tree. The\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a\ncar, the stop must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasona-\nbleness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015).\n Simon goes so far as to assert he did not commit a traffic\nviolation. He argues the government did not meet its burden\nof proof to establish he actually committed a traffic violation.\nBut the government had no such burden. Whether Simon\ncommitted a traffic violation is irrelevant for Fourth Amend-\nment purposes so long as the officers had probable cause to\nthink he did. United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir.\n2019) (“The officer is not the judge. Whether the driver actu-\nally committed a traffic infraction is irrelevant for Fourth\nAmendment purposes so long as there was an objective basis\nfor a reasonable belief he did.”).\n Generally, the decision to stop a car is reasonable, and\ncomports with the Fourth Amendment, “where the police\nhave probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has oc-\ncurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Prob-\nable cause exists when “the circumstances confronting a po-\nlice officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has com-\nmitted even a minor traffic offense.” United States v. Cashman,\n216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). Probable cause is an objective\nstandard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Lewis, 920\nF.3d at 489. If an officer reasonably thinks he sees a driver\ncommit a traffic infraction, that is a sufficient basis to pull him\n\f12 No. 18-2442\n\nover without violating the Constitution. United States v.\nMuriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005).\n Here, Simon acknowledges the probable cause determina-\ntion depends entirely on the credibility of the two officers on\nbicycles who testified they saw him turn without signaling at\nleast 100 feet ahead. Simon levies many attacks on their cred-\nibility, urging us to reverse under the clear error standard. Si-\nmon admits the clear error standard is very demanding. Un-\nder this standard, we only reverse when, after reviewing the\nrecord as a whole, we have a “definite and firm conviction” a\nmistake has been made. United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614,\n621 (7th Cir. 2001). The district judge, after all, listened to the\ntestimony directly and observed the demeanor of the wit-\nnesses. United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2014).\nThe district judge is in a much better position to evaluate cred-\nibility than we are. His credibility determinations are entitled\nto special deference. We take Simon’s credibility attacks in\nturn.\ni. Phantom stop sign\n First, Simon argues Hagemeyer swore at the suppression\nhearing that there was a stop sign at the corner of College and\nGreen, but she was demonstrably and indisputably wrong. Si-\nmon argues this impugns her claim she saw the traffic viola-\ntion.\n The judge directly confronted Hagemeyer’s mistake. He\nnoted Hagemeyer “was wrong about that detail.” (Order, DE\n21 at 4.) The judge said he would take the mistake into account\nin assessing Hagemeyer’s credibility. But the judge concluded\nthe mistake does not weigh heavily against her credibility be-\ncause the detail “is not greatly important regarding the traffic\n\fNo. 18-2442 13\n\noffense for which Defendant was pulled over” and because\n“[i]t would not have factored in to [sic] determining whether\nor not to issue Defendant a ticket for failing to signal his turn\nwithin not less than 100 feet of the intersection.” (Id.) Hage-\nmeyer’s determination at the scene that Simon failed to signal\nat least 100 feet before the turn was not informed by the pres-\nence or absence of a stop sign at the corner. In other words,\nthere were other reasons independent of the presence or ab-\nsence of a stop sign for Hagemeyer to think Simon failed to\nsignal at least 100 feet ahead of turning. Indeed, the presence\nor absence of a stop sign is irrelevant to estimating distances\nor to the requirement to signal. The judge simply did not find\nthis mistake about a stop sign to be very important. So the\nmistake did not significantly undermine the reliability of\nHagemeyer to perceive other facts that night. Moreover, her\nmistake about the stop sign has no bearing on Danner’s testi-\nmony that he saw Simon fail to signal sufficiently ahead of\nturning.\n And as for the possibilities Hagemeyer lied about the stop\nsign, and this lie undermines her credibility about everything\nelse, Simon does not go quite so far. In his opening appellate\nbrief, he does not directly, unequivocally accuse Hagemeyer\nof intentionally lying about the stop sign. And Simon offers\nno explanation for why Hagemeyer would have had any rea-\nson to lie about it. We see no clear error here.\nii. Distances\n Second, Simon argues Hagemeyer and Danner were\nwrong about the distance between their location and the in-\ntersection of College and Green. They both testified the dis-\ntance was 75 yards. But the distance was actually 145 yards.\nThe officers’ testimony was demonstrably and indisputably\n\f14 No. 18-2442\n\nwrong by a wide margin. Simon argues the officers’ ability to\njudge distance was the key to their claim Simon committed a\ntraffic violation. He argues their failure to estimate the dis-\ntance between their location and the intersection correctly\nmakes their claims about the distance between the location of\nSimon’s car when he activated his turn signal and the inter-\nsection wholly incredible.\n Again, the judge directly confronted the mistaken testi-\nmony. The judge decided the miscalculation was “of little im-\nport when it comes to credibility.” (Order, DE 21 at 3.) The\njudge reasoned that the fact that both officers estimated the\ndistance at 75 yards does not indicate collusion because if they\nwanted to connive it is much more likely they would have\nused a number closer to the actual distance. They were too\nwrong to be conspiring to lie.\n And as for the argument that the officers’ mistake about\nthis distance undermines the credibility of their estimate\nabout Simon’s signaling distance, the officers had other, spe-\ncific indicia of the signaling distance beyond a raw estimate\nof the distance from A to B. The time between signaling and\nturning, the car lengths between signaling and turning, and\nthe lengths of the headlight beams bolstered the probable\ncause to think Simon signaled too late and too close. The judge\nconcluded the mistake about the distance between the bicy-\nclists’ location and the intersection shows nothing more than\nthat both bicyclists were wrong about that distance. We see no\nclear error here.\niii. Photographs\n Third, Simon argues photographs introduced into evi-\ndence show the unbelievability of the officers’ claims. Danner\n\fNo. 18-2442 15\n\nand Hagemeyer both testified they saw Simon’s car leave the\n1100 block of North College, five blocks from their position.\nBut, Simon argues, the photographs speak for themselves,\nand there is no way someone could see the make, model, or\ncolor of a vehicle at that distance.\n The judge simply disagreed. He examined the photo-\ngraphs and listened to the testimony and concluded “it is pos-\nsible for an average person, with good vision who is used to\nworking at night, such as Danner and Hagemeyer, to see a car,\nin the dark, turn onto a street with its headlights on.” (Order,\nDE 21 at 4.) We also examined the photographs and read the\ntestimony, and we do not have anything close to a definite\nand firm conviction the judge made a mistake in this regard.\nSometimes a photograph is not worth a thousand words.\niv. Ghost writer\n Fourth, Simon argues the judge ignored the officers’ mis-\nstatements about who prepared the traffic ticket. Hagemeyer\ntestified “I was writing the warning.” She answered “yes” to\nthe question: “[Y]ou said that you filled out the traffic warn-\ning in this case?” When asked if she was the one who filled\nout the date, time, name, address, and birth date, she testified\nshe “filled out the majority of” the ticket herself, but she be-\nlieved Danner signed it. But other evidence showed she filled\nout none of it. Danner filled out both the traffic citation (later\nvoided) and the warning (Simon received hours later).\n Simon accuses the judge of tying himself “into a pretzel to\navoid finding that the police officers could possibly have lied\nor misrepresented facts … .” (Appellant Br. at 33.) But the\njudge committed no such contortions. Rather, he addressed\nthe discrepancies directly. He combed through the testimony\n\f16 No. 18-2442\n\nabout the various steps in the process leading to handing a\ndriver a written ticket or warning. He noted there appeared\nto be confusion and possibly contradiction between the offic-\ners about who actually wrote the ticket. One source of confu-\nsion seemed to be the word “processing.” The judge observed\nHagemeyer, Snyder, and Hoecker all testified Hagemeyer be-\ngan “processing” the ticket, but “processing” a ticket involves\nmuch more than just physically writing the ticket. The judge\nalso observed Hagemeyer’s testimony on this issue was more\nspecific. She testified, “I was writing the warning.” When\nasked, “So you were the one who filled out the date, time,\nname, address, and birth date?” she responded, “I filled out\nthe majority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”3\n The judge compared the warning Simon received—pur-\nportedly filled out by Hagemeyer and signed by Danner—to\na different warning definitely filled out and signed by Hage-\nmeyer on a different date. The judge concluded the handwrit-\ning on the two warnings is different and they likely were not\nfilled in by the same officer.\n But the judge noted Simon did not show the exemplar\nwarning to Danner or Hagemeyer during the hearing to cross-\nexamine them on who wrote Simon’s warning. The judge also\n\n\n 3 In his order denying suppression, the judge characterized Hage-\nmeyer’s testimony on this point slightly incorrectly, and in favor of Si-\nmon’s arguments. The judge wrote “Hagemeyer answered ‘yes’ to\nwhether she filled in the name, date, etc., but she stated that Danner signed\nit.” (Order, DE 21 at 10.) Actually (according to the transcript) she did not\nsay “yes” in response to this question. She said, “I filled out the majority\nof it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.” But even giving Simon the ben-\nefit of this characterization, the judge still did not find a significant credi-\nbility problem.\n\fNo. 18-2442 17\n\nnoted the testimony indicated Danner or Hagemeyer would\noften start writing a ticket the other would finish. The judge\nobserved: “There are numerous possibilities as to why the dis-\ncrepancy exists, and without the officers being given the\nchance to explain the discrepancy, the court cannot impute\nimproper conduct on their part.” (Order, DE 21 at 11.) The\njudge considered the totality of the officers’ testimony, and\ntheir demeanor and appearance. He concluded any discrep-\nancy on this issue was due to mere confusion on the part of\nthe officers, and not to fabrication. And he concluded the of-\nficers were credible.\n We see no clear error regarding the judge’s decisions on\nany of these issues, nor regarding his decision to find the of-\nficers credible. Given the two bicycle officers testified they\nsaw Simon commit a traffic infraction, and given the judge be-\nlieved them, we see no reason to reverse the decision that\nprobable cause justified starting the stop.\n2. Conducting the stop\n Simon argues even if the officers did not violate the Con-\nstitution by initiating the stop, they violated it by impermissi-\nbly prolonging the stop. An officer who reasonably starts a\ntraffic stop might violate the Constitution if he exceeds the\nscope of the stop or unreasonably prolongs it. Lewis, 920 F.3d\nat 491. A traffic stop “‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged\nbeyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mis-\nsion’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez v. United States,\n135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543\nU.S. 405, 407 (2005)).\n A dog sniff of a car’s exterior only for illegal drugs during\na lawful stop for a traffic violation does not violate the Fourth\n\f18 No. 18-2442\n\nAmendment, even absent reasonable suspicion of drugs. Ca-\nballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But a stop justified only by a traffic vio-\nlation becomes unconstitutional if the officers prolong it be-\nyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s\noriginal mission. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. “An officer may\nconduct certain unrelated checks—including a dog sniff—\nduring a lawful traffic stop, but he may not do so in a way that\nprolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily\ndemanded to justify detaining an individual.” Lewis, 920 F.3d\nat 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Simon concedes,\n“calling a K-9 unit does not unlawfully extend a traffic stop as\nlong as the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is on-\ngoing.” (Appellant Br. at 36.)\n Without independent reasonable suspicion to justify the\nsniff, the critical question is not whether the dog sniffed be-\nfore or after the officer issued the warning, “but whether con-\nducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.”\nLewis, 920 F.3d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nWith independent reasonable suspicion, however, the officer\nmay constitutionally detain the suspect for the sniff even if it\nadds time to the total stop. Id.\n Here, the judge continued to credit the officers’ testimony.\nBased on that testimony, the judge concluded the stop was not\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff. The judge noted\nthe time period from the beginning of the stop to the canine\nalert was about 7 minutes, as Simon conceded. The judge de-\ntermined the officers acted quickly. Hoecker made the stop,\nexited his car, told Simon the reason for the stop, and gathered\nhis information. The bicyclists arrived at the stop only a cou-\nple minutes after Hoecker pulled Simon over. The bicyclists\n“diligently began processing the ticket.” (Order, DE 21 at 15.)\n\fNo. 18-2442 19\n\nCrucially, the judge found no indication the officers engaged\nin any activity other than securing the scene and processing\nthe warning during the time between the bicyclists’ arrival\nand Rex’s arrival. Specifically, the officers surveyed the scene,\nDanner spoke with Simon, and Hagemeyer testified she went\nto the squad car to begin processing the written warning. The\nvideo indicated that about 2.5 minutes into the stop, Danner\nwas speaking to Hoecker about the traffic violation. About 3\nminutes into the stop, Danner left the squad car to speak with\nSimon. Danner told Simon the reasons for the stop and gath-\nered information. Hoecker returned to Simon’s car at about\nthe 5-minute mark to speak with him about the traffic infrac-\ntion. Less than 7 minutes into the stop, Rex arrived and very\nquickly alerted. At that time, the bicycle officers were still pro-\ncessing the ticket.\n In sum, the judge concluded the officers were processing\nthe ticket when Rex arrived and alerted, so they had not yet\ncompleted the initial mission of the stop, and the stop was not\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff.\n Simon argues the police report and testimony contain the\n“misrepresentation” Hagemeyer was writing the warning\nwhile the officers waited for Rex because the officers knew\ncalling a canine unit does not unlawfully extend a stop so long\nas the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is ongoing.\nSimon continues to challenge the credibility of the officers. He\nargues that at no point did any officer on the scene begin ef-\nfectuating the purpose of the stop by dutifully and diligently\nfilling out a warning or ticket. He claims Danner filled out\nboth the traffic citation and the warning Simon received hours\nafter the stop. But again we see no reversible error in the\njudge’s conclusions on this point.\n\f20 No. 18-2442\n\n Simon presses that even if the judge’s credibility determi-\nnations here are correct, his ruling is still flawed. First, Simon\nargues the judge improperly allowed a de minimis delay to be\nconstitutional, even though any delay to allow a dog to sniff\nis unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion.\nWe disagree with Simon about what the judge did. He specif-\nically found there was no improper delay. (Order, DE 21 at 14\n(“the stop was not purposefully prolonged to allow for the ca-\nnine unit’s arrival”).) True, the judge added in a footnote that\neven if he found the ticket-writing process had not begun\nwhen Rex arrived, still the sequence of events was so short\nand condensed that the stop was not prolonged in any “mean-\ningful” way. But we need not review this dictum.\n Second, Simon argues that instead of effectuating the pur-\npose of the traffic stop, the officers decided to run a criminal-\nhistory check. Simon argues this was unrelated to the mission\nof the stop and delayed processing the traffic violation. Simon\ncites no supporting Seventh Circuit case. We said last year that\nwhen police conduct a stop, “they are entitled to demand the\ndriver’s identification, of course, and it is routine to check the\ndriver’s record for active warrants, driving history, and crim-\ninal history. Those checks are done for important reasons, in-\ncluding officer safety.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d\n577, 586 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Sanford, 806\nF.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The trooper checked the occu-\npants’ criminal histories on the computer in his car—a proce-\ndure permissible even without reasonable suspicion … .”).\n We considered all Simon’s arguments, but we see no rea-\nson to reverse the judge’s conclusions that the officers were in\nthe process of completing the traffic warning when Rex\n\fNo. 18-2442 21\n\narrived, and the officers did not improperly prolong the traffic\nstop to allow the sniff to occur.\n3. Bona Fido?\n Simon argues even if the officers had probable cause to\npull him over, and even if they did not prolong the traffic stop\nto wait for Rex, still the judge should have suppressed the gun\nbecause Rex’s alert was false, Rex was improperly trained,\nand the alert did not provide probable cause to justify search-\ning Simon’s car.\n Probable cause to conduct a search is not among the high-\nest standards. “A police officer has probable cause to conduct\na search when the facts available to him would warrant a per-\nson of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evi-\ndence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050,\n1055 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).\nProbable cause is less than preponderance of the evidence. Id.\n“All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which\nreasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id.\n(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Probable\ncause is a practical, common-sense standard, involving the to-\ntality of the circumstances. Id.\n A dog’s alert on a car can give probable cause to search the\nentire car. Indeed, a good dog’s alert can provide a rebuttable\npresumption of probable cause to search:\n If a bona fide organization has certified a dog\n after testing his reliability in a controlled setting,\n a court can presume (subject to any conflicting\n evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides\n probable cause to search. The same is true, even\n in the absence of formal certification, if the dog\n\f22 No. 18-2442\n\n has recently and successfully completed a train-\n ing program that evaluated his proficiency in lo-\n cating drugs.\nId. at 1057. The ultimate question is “whether all the facts sur-\nrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common\nsense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a\nsearch would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A\nsniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.” Id. at 1058.\n Simon concedes Rex passed certification tests. But Simon\nchallenges the alert itself and the adequacy of Rex’s training.\n “First and foremost,” Simon argues Rex did not alert on\nSimon’s car. (Appellant Br. at 42.) This perplexes. Simon cites\nnothing to support this claim. The record belies it. Given the\ncontext of this claim, Simon seems simply to mean the alert\nwas false.4 It is true that following the alert the officers\nsearched the car and found no evidence of drugs in it. But Si-\nmon does not explain why that, in itself, matters here. Proba-\nble cause is not a retrospective, outcome-based standard.\n\n 4 Defense expert Dr. Mary Cablk said in her report she could not de-\ntermine if Rex alerted or what Rex alerted to. She confirmed this on cross-\nexamination at the suppression hearing. During direct examination she\nwatched videos from Hoecker’s and Snyder’s dashcams. She testified she\ncould not see the alert, could not tell exactly where on the car the dog\nalerted, and did not know whether the alert was barking or something\nelse. But in her testimony she seems to accept Rex alerted. She character-\nized it as a false alert because no drugs were found, and she criticized\nSnyder for rewarding Rex for falsely alerting: “In this instance, there’s no\ndrugs found; so he’s reinforcing the dog for false alerting here.” In any\nevent, Snyder testified that Rex alerted and that Snyder confirmed the\nalert. And the judge throughout his order accepted Rex alerted. He found\nthe officers’ testimony, in its totality, credible. We see no reason to upend\nthe determination Rex alerted.\n\fNo. 18-2442 23\n\nBridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). If an officer\nrandomly breaks into a house on only a wild hunch and stum-\nbles into a meth lab, the discovery does not provide probable\ncause for the search. And if 20 reliable informants tell an of-\nficer a particular house contains a meth lab, so he stands in\nthe street outside the house and sees through an open win-\ndow the apparent apparatus and accoutrements of a meth lab,\nso he obtains a warrant to search the house based on probable\ncause to think it contains a meth lab, but he finds only an in-\nnocent and intricate chemistry set, still probable cause sup-\nported the warrant. So the mere absence of drugs in Simon’s\ncar does not undermine the probable cause to search it for\ndrugs, provided there was probable cause in the first place.\n Simon’s other argument is the officers did not have prob-\nable cause to search his vehicle in the first place because Rex\nwas unreliable. This argument proceeds in two waves.\n The first wave is quickly quelled. Simon argues Rex was\nunreliable because he was not trained properly under Illinois\nlaw, which requires police dogs be trained according to cer-\ntain guidelines. Simon argues Detective Larner (the Macon\nCounty canine-training director) admitted he did not always\nfollow these guidelines. But we need not address what Illinois\nlaw requires or whether Rex satisfies it because Illinois law\ndoes not control the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore,\n553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s mean-\ning [does] not change with local law enforcement practices—\neven practices set by rule.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.\n35, 43 (1988) (“We have never intimated … that whether or not\na search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth\nAmendment depends on the law of the particular State in\nwhich the search occurs.”).\n\f24 No. 18-2442\n\n The second wave holds out longer, but ultimately suc-\ncumbs. Simon argues, apart from Illinois law, if a dog is\ntrained to alert when no evidence of criminal activity exists,\nthis violates the Fourth Amendment. The problem, as Simon\nsees it, is Rex was trained with scented cotton balls to alert to\nresidual odors. But to search a car, there must be probable\ncause to think it presently contains evidence of criminal activ-\nity. So if Rex is trained to alert to mere residue even when no\ndrugs are present, then his alert is not a reliable indicator\ndrugs are present, and therefore his alert does not provide\nprobable cause to justify a search.\n The main problem with this argument is the Supreme\nCourt already rejected its premise. In Florida v. Harris, a dog\nnamed Aldo alerted on a truck. A subsequent search did not\nreveal any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, but it did\ndiscover meth ingredients. The defendant moved to suppress\nthe ingredients on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given\nprobable cause to search. The defendant “principally con-\ntended” in the trial court that because the officer did not find\nany of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, Aldo’s alerts\nmust have been false. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058. But the Su-\npreme Court patted Aldo on the head and called him a good\nboy: “A well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to [resid-\nual] odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but\nin fact is not.” Id. at 1059; see also Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels,\nInc., 600 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (Plaintiff’s “only de-\nveloped legal theory is untenable. [His] premise—that an alert\nby a drug-sniffing dog trained to detect residual odors does\nnot establish probable cause to search—was rejected in Harris\n… .”). If a well-trained dog, trained to alert even to residual\nodors, alerts, there is generally a fair probability that drugs or\nevidence of drugs will be found, absent contradictory factors.\n\fNo. 18-2442 25\n\nAnd that is all the Fourth Amendment requires. If somehow\na dog were trained to alert only to residual odors, then we\nmight have a problem. But that is not this case.\n Our review of the record and the order denying suppres-\nsion satisfies us the judge conducted the proper Harris evalu-\nation and committed no error in concluding Rex’s satisfactory\ncertification and training provide sufficient reason to trust his\nalert or in concluding Rex’s training on residual odors is ac-\nceptable. The judge heard testimony from Simon’s expert Dr.\nCablk challenging Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself, tes-\ntimony from Officer Snyder supporting Rex’s qualifications\nand the sniff itself, and testimony from Detective Larner sup-\nporting Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself. The judge also\nentertained arguments from both sides in the form of the mo-\ntion to suppress, supporting memorandum, the government’s\nresponse, and post-hearing briefs filed by both sides. The\njudge considered the totality of the circumstances, addressed\nHarris’s ultimate question, and found Rex’s sniff up to snuff.\nC. Supplementation\n After the judge denied the motion to suppress, Simon\nmoved to supplement the record and for leave to seek recon-\nsideration. He wanted to reopen the evidence to introduce\nfurther, unrelated citations prepared by Danner in August\n2016 “which further emphasize the differences in the officers’\nhandwriting … .” (Mot. Supp., DE 23 at 4.) Simon also wanted\nto introduce a video he5 took when he returned to the scene\none night. The video shows a vehicle leaving the 1100 block\nof College Street and approaching the intersection of College\n\n 5 The motion says Simon created the video. On appeal, Simon asserts\nhis investigator took the video. This nuance is immaterial here.\n\f26 No. 18-2442\n\nand Green. The judge denied this motion. On appeal, Simon\nonly presses the video. He does not mention the additional\nhandwriting exemplars in his opening appellate brief. Simon\nacknowledges we review the denial of supplementation for\nabuse of discretion.\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. He explained there\nwas no reason Simon could not have taken a nighttime video\nand presented it during the suppression hearing. The judge\ndiscussed the danger of allowing supplementation here and\nsetting a bad precedent leading to a never-ending cycle of par-\nties waiting for rulings and then coming up with “new” evi-\ndence to challenge them. Most importantly, the judge ex-\nplained that even with the proposed evidence, his ruling\nwould not change. The nighttime video would not capture the\nactual visual capabilities of the officers, who credibly testified\nabout how close Simon was to the intersection when he sig-\nnaled. The judge reasoned a video of the scene taken months\nlater, when conditions might differ, would not impact their\ncredibility. Besides, the judge noted, the probable cause\nstandard does not need evidence to support a conviction be-\nyond a reasonable doubt. He did not abuse his discretion.\nD. ACCA\n Simon argues his prior conviction under Illinois law for\nattempted armed robbery should not have counted as a pred-\nicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He recog-\nnizes our decisions foreclose his argument on this point, but\nhe wants to preserve it for the Supreme Court.\n IV. Conclusion\n We considered all Simon’s arguments. Finding no reversi-\nble error, we AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Marshon Simon\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNo. 18-2442\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n v.\\n\\nMARSHON SIMON,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Central District of Illinois.\\n No. 16-CR-20077 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED MAY 30, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.\\n MANION, Circuit Judge. Police officers pulled Marshon Si-\\nmon over for failing to signal sufficiently ahead of turning. A\\ndrug-sniffing dog alerted on Simon’s car so officers searched\\nit. They did not find drugs, but they found a gun. The govern-\\nment charged Simon with being a felon-in-possession. The\\ndistrict judge denied Simon’s motions for recusal, suppres-\\nsion, and supplementation. Simon entered a conditional\\nguilty plea and received a sentence of 15 years. He raises a\\n\\f2 No. 18-2442\\n\\nlitany of issues on appeal. He argues the judge should have\\nrecused himself because before he was a judge he supervised\\na prior prosecution of Simon. He argues the judge should\\nhave suppressed the gun because the officers lacked probable\\ncause to initiate the traffic stop and because they prolonged\\nthe stop to allow for the dog sniff. He argues the dog’s alert\\nwas false and the dog was unreliable because he was improp-\\nerly trained. He argues the judge should have allowed him to\\nsupplement the evidence after denial of suppression. Finally,\\nhe argues one of his prior felonies should not have counted as\\na predicate for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.\\nConcluding the judge committed no reversible error in deny-\\ning Simon’s motions, we affirm.\\n I. Facts\\n On the night of August 21, 2016, three police officers in a\\n“bike patrol unit” surveyed a particular section of Decatur, Il-\\nlinois. Officers Jason Danner and Jamie Hagemeyer rode bi-\\ncycles. They sat behind a propane tank 145 yards from the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets. Officer Robert\\nHoecker drove a squad car nearby.\\n The bicycle officers saw a vehicle driven by Marshon Si-\\nmon leave the 1100 block of North College Street (five blocks\\naway) and drive toward them. As Simon approached the in-\\ntersection of College and Green Streets, he failed to signal at\\nleast 100 feet before turning left from College onto Green. This\\nwas according to the bicyclists’ testimony at the suppression\\nhearing, which the district judge credited. At the bicyclists’ re-\\nquest, Hoecker pulled Simon over at 10:26 p.m.\\n Hoecker approached Simon’s car and made contact.\\nHoecker introduced himself and told Simon the basic reason\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 3\\n\\nfor the stop. Hoecker explained bicycle officers would arrive\\nand provide details. Simon questioned the basis for the stop.\\nSimon gave his driver’s license and proof of insurance to\\nHoecker. According to Hoecker, Simon was cooperative and\\npolite, behaved normally, and was no more nervous than the\\nnormal level of traffic-stop nervousness. Hoecker ran Simon\\nthrough the LEADS computer system and found he was val-\\nidly licensed and insured. Hoecker finished this check in less\\nthan 2 minutes, before Danner and Hagemeyer arrived on\\nscene at about 10:29 p.m.\\n Once Danner and Hagemeyer arrived they took over “pro-\\ncessing the ticket,” including some double-checking.\\nHoecker’s role was to assist. Hoecker told Danner that Simon\\nhad insurance and a valid license. Hoecker said he “didn’t\\nknow if [Danner] wanted the dog or not.” (Appellant Br. at 8,\\nquoting Hoecker’s dashcam video.) Danner asked if Simon\\nhad any criminal history. Hoecker then ran a criminal-history\\ncheck and found Simon had prior drug and weapon charges.\\n Danner made contact with Simon. Danner testified Simon\\nappeared abnormally nervous. Danner testified Simon asked\\nabout the violation and insisted he used his turn signal. Dan-\\nner testified, “I observed him to pull his hand away from his\\nlap, and he was shaking pretty good, indicating to me that he\\nappeared nervous.” But Danner did not note this in the police\\nreport and he did not mention this when discussing whether\\nto call a dog.\\n Hagemeyer testified that while speaking briefly with\\nHoecker he handed her Simon’s materials. She then went to\\nanother squad car that had arrived on scene “to begin the\\nwritten warning.” Both Danner and Hagemeyer testified\\nabout the various steps and processes a bike patrol unit\\n\\f4 No. 18-2442\\n\\ncompletes as part of the mission instigated by a traffic viola-\\ntion, including monitoring and securing the scene, making\\ncontacts with the driver, running computer checks, and writ-\\ning out the warning or ticket.\\n Danner decided to call a dog. He testified he decided to\\ncall a dog at about 22:30:38 (10:30:38 p.m.) on the clock of\\nHoecker’s dashcam, about 1 minute after Danner and Hage-\\nmeyer arrived at the traffic stop. An officer called for the ca-\\nnine unit less than 4 minutes into the stop, when the ticket\\nwas still being processed, according to the officers’ testimony.\\n Canine handler Snyder arrived with Rex at the scene at\\nabout 10:33 p.m. At that time, the traffic violation was still be-\\ning processed, according to the officers’ testimony.1 Within a\\n\\n 1 Here are excerpts on point from the bicycle patrol unit’s testimony:\\nQ: And when Officer Snyder arrived, was the traffic violation still being\\nprocessed?\\nHoecker: Yes.\\n(Tr. Continuation of Suppression Hr’g, July 12, 2017, DE 44 at 19:1–19:3.)\\n\\nQ: And do you recall approximately how long into the traffic stop it would\\nhave been that [Officer Snyder, with Rex] arrived?\\nDanner: I believe it was around six or seven minutes.\\nQ: And were you still processing the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: That’s correct.\\n(Id. at 50:19–50:24.)\\n\\nHagemeyer: From the time we arrived to the time Officer Snyder arrived\\nwas three or four minutes.\\nQ: So a very short period of time?\\nA: Very short period of time.\\nQ: Were you still working on the traffic ticket at that time?\\nA: Yes.\\nQ: And still working on it diligently, correct?\\nA: [Nodding head up and down.]\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 5\\n\\nfew seconds of walking around Simon’s car, Rex alerted.\\nSnyder took less than 20 seconds to prepare Rex, begin the\\nsearch, and confirm the alert. The time period from the begin-\\nning of the stop to the alert was about 7 minutes. Hagemeyer\\ntestified she had no part in conducting the actual dog sniff.\\nShe testified she “was writing the warning.” She confirmed on\\ncross-examination that she filled out the traffic warning, and\\nthat Danner issued it to Simon. Defense counsel asked, “So\\nyou were the one who filled out the date, time, name, address,\\nand birth date?” Hagemeyer answered, “I filled out the ma-\\njority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”\\n After the alert, Simon became angry and insisted there\\nwere no drugs in his car. Danner asked Simon to step out of\\nhis car. The police searched it. They did not find drugs, but\\nthey found a gun. An officer drove Simon to the police station.\\nDanner handed Simon a traffic citation as he was released\\nfrom the station. Danner testified he filled out the citation.\\n II. Procedural posture\\n Since Simon was a felon, the government charged him\\nwith being a felon in possession of a firearm. The case was\\nassigned to Judge Bruce. Simon moved Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself because he had served as the First Assistant United\\nStates Attorney for the Central District of Illinois with super-\\nvisory authority over a prior case against Simon culminating\\nin conviction. Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion.\\n Simon moved to suppress the gun, arguing there was no\\nprobable cause to stop his car, the police impermissibly ex-\\ntended the stop to get a dog on scene, and the dog was unre-\\nliable and improperly trained. Judge Bruce held an\\n\\n(Id. at 87:24–88:7.)\\n\\f6 No. 18-2442\\n\\nevidentiary hearing over parts of three days and heard testi-\\nmony from seven witnesses. He found the officers credible,\\neven if at times confused. He found the officers had probable\\ncause to think Simon committed a traffic violation, the officers\\ndid not unreasonably prolong the stop, and Rex was a\\nproperly trained and certified canine whose alert can lead to\\nprobable cause. The judge denied the motion to suppress.\\n Simon moved to supplement the record with additional,\\nunrelated traffic citations issued by Danner (to show the dif-\\nferences in the officers’ handwriting to address the issue of\\nwhich officer wrote Simon’s citation) and a video made by a\\ndefense investigator (to contradict the officers’ version of\\nevents leading up to the traffic stop). The judge denied this\\nmotion.\\n Simon pleaded guilty conditioned on preserving his right\\nto appeal. He received an enhancement as an Armed Career\\nCriminal. The judge sentenced him to 15 years in prison, the\\nmandatory minimum.\\n Simon appeals the denials of his motions to recuse, sup-\\npress, and supplement. He also appeals his qualification as an\\nArmed Career Criminal, arguing his prior conviction for at-\\ntempted armed robbery in Illinois in 2000 did not qualify as a\\nviolent felony.\\n III. Analysis\\nA. Recusal\\n Simon seeks remand because he claims Judge Bruce’s han-\\ndling of this case conveys the appearance of impropriety. Si-\\nmon does not claim Judge Bruce actually had or acted on any\\nunfair bias against Simon.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 7\\n\\n Simon argues Judge Bruce should have recused himself\\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): “Any justice, judge, or magistrate\\njudge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro-\\nceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-\\ntioned.” Below, Simon also sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. §\\n455(b)(3), but he no longer presses that on appeal.\\n As the government agrees, we review a preserved § 455(a)\\nclaim de novo. Cf. Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir.\\n2016) (holding § 455(a) can be vindicated on appeal); United\\nStates v. Dorsey, 829 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (a preserved\\n§ 455(b) claim is reviewed de novo).\\n To win recusal under § 455(a), a party must show a rea-\\nsonable, well-informed observer might question the judge’s\\nimpartiality. United States v. Herrera-Valdez, 826 F.3d 912, 917\\n(7th Cir. 2016). In other words, the party must show an objec-\\ntive, disinterested observer fully informed of the reasons for\\nseeking recusal would “entertain a significant doubt that jus-\\ntice would be done in the case.” Id.\\n Simon sought recusal early in the case on the ground that\\nBruce served as First Assistant United States Attorney for the\\nCentral District of Illinois from 2010 through 2013. During\\nthat time, the government charged Simon with violating 21\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Bruce supervised the AUSA\\nassigned to that case. Simon pleaded guilty and was sen-\\ntenced in 2012 and again (after a successful appeal) in March\\n2013. This prior criminal case involved occurrence facts sepa-\\nrate from those in the present case. But the prior case is di-\\nrectly relevant to this case because the conviction in the prior\\ncase enhanced Simon’s sentence in this case as an Armed Ca-\\nreer Criminal.\\n\\f8 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion. He noted he could\\nnot remember any participation in past prosecutions of Si-\\nmon. Judge Bruce observed that even if he did participate in\\na past prosecution, he did not participate in the current pros-\\necution, “which consists of new charges, wholly unrelated to\\nthose brought against [Simon] in the past.” (Text Order, Dec.\\n6, 2016.)\\n Simon likens this case to United States v. Herrera-Valdez.\\nThere, the government prosecuted a defendant for illegal\\nreentry after deportation. Before trial on the illegal-reentry\\ncharge, defendant moved to disqualify Judge Der-Yeghiayan\\nbecause he had served as the District Counsel for the Immi-\\ngration and Naturalization Service when defendant was de-\\nported. District Counsel Der-Yeghiayan’s name was listed in\\nseveral places in INS’s briefing supporting deporting. Judge\\nDer-Yeghiayan denied the motion to disqualify and defend-\\nant appealed. We observed that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a\\njudge to “‘disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his\\nimpartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrera-Valdez,\\n826 F.3d at 917. We reversed the denial of disqualification,\\nconcluding “a reasonable, disinterested observer could as-\\nsume bias from the fact that the judge presiding over the de-\\nfendant’s prosecution for illegal reentry was the same person\\nwho ran the office that pursued, and succeeded in obtaining,\\nthe removal order that is the source of his current prosecu-\\ntion.” Id. at 919. We noted this was particularly true given that\\nthe linchpin of defendant’s case against the illegal-reentry\\ncharge was a collateral attack against the removal order. The\\njudge need not have been actually involved in the prior case\\nor be actually biased in the subsequent case to trigger the re-\\nquirement to recuse under § 455(a).\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 9\\n\\n But here, the prior case does not directly give rise to or un-\\nderly the present case. And here, Simon attempts no collateral\\nattack against the prior conviction. Simon’s 2011 conviction\\nwas not, and could not have been, the linchpin to his defense\\nin this subsequent case. A defendant in a federal sentencing\\nproceeding may not collaterally attack a prior conviction used\\nto enhance his sentence, with an exception not relevant here.\\nSee Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382–83 (2001); Custis\\nv. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). Any collateral attack\\nagainst the prior conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would\\nhave been time-barred. So there was no possibility of Judge\\nBruce adjudicating the merits of a collateral attack against Si-\\nmon’s 2011 conviction here. And consequently there was no\\nreason to think Simon might have declined to launch a collat-\\neral attack against the 2011 conviction because he feared\\nJudge Bruce would not be receptive to such an attack, or\\nwould punish him in the present case for making such an at-\\ntack.\\n The prior and subsequent cases at issue in Herrera-Valdez\\nare directly related in a way the prior and subsequent cases at\\nissue here are not. A closer analogy to Herrera-Valdez is Si-\\nmon’s prior conviction under the supervision of First AUSA\\nBruce and the proceedings for revocation of supervised re-\\nlease involving that prior conviction and the gun possession\\non August 21, 2016. Simon’s prior conviction directly gives\\nrise to and underlies the revocation proceedings. So Judge\\nBruce recused himself from them.2 As this relationship is not\\n\\n 2Simon asserts Judge Bruce recused himself from the revocation pro-\\nceedings (2:11-cr-20002). The government does not contest this assertion.\\nThe docket for that case neither confirms nor denies the recusal. We take\\nSimon’s word for it.\\n\\f10 No. 18-2442\\n\\npresent between Simon’s prior case and the current felon-in-\\npossession case, there was no need for Judge Bruce to recuse\\nhimself here.\\n True, the prior conviction enhanced the sentence for the\\npresent conviction under the ACCA. But this is mere happen-\\nstance. It is not the same kind of direct connection we found\\nproblematic in Herrera-Valdez. Another distinction between\\nHerrera-Valdez and this case is that there, the future judge’s\\nname was on the briefs against the defendant, but here the\\nfuture judge’s name was not on the briefs. This is a relevant\\nconsideration because it bears on public perception. We do\\nnot consider this to be a controlling factor by itself, but it is\\nrelevant.\\n Judge Bruce did not err in refusing to recuse.\\nB. Suppression\\n Simon raises a series of potential errors regarding the de-\\nnial of suppression. He argues there was no probable cause to\\nbelieve a traffic violation occurred, and therefore initiating the\\nstop was unconstitutional. He argues the officers unconstitu-\\ntionally prolonged the traffic stop. And he argues Rex’s alert\\nwas false and Rex was improperly trained. “We employ a\\nmixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing\\nthe district court’s factual determinations for clear error and\\nde novo its ultimate determination about whether the police\\nhad sufficient grounds to stop or search the individual.”\\nUnited States v. Rodriguez-Escalera, 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir.\\n2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n1. Initiating the stop\\n Simon argues the officers lacked probable cause to believe\\nhe committed a traffic violation, so they had no probable\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 11\\n\\ncause to stop him. If Simon were right, then the court should\\nhave suppressed the gun as fruit of the poisonous tree. The\\nFourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches\\nand seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a\\ncar, the stop must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasona-\\nbleness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663\\n(1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,\\na court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States\\nv. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015).\\n Simon goes so far as to assert he did not commit a traffic\\nviolation. He argues the government did not meet its burden\\nof proof to establish he actually committed a traffic violation.\\nBut the government had no such burden. Whether Simon\\ncommitted a traffic violation is irrelevant for Fourth Amend-\\nment purposes so long as the officers had probable cause to\\nthink he did. United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir.\\n2019) (“The officer is not the judge. Whether the driver actu-\\nally committed a traffic infraction is irrelevant for Fourth\\nAmendment purposes so long as there was an objective basis\\nfor a reasonable belief he did.”).\\n Generally, the decision to stop a car is reasonable, and\\ncomports with the Fourth Amendment, “where the police\\nhave probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has oc-\\ncurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Prob-\\nable cause exists when “the circumstances confronting a po-\\nlice officer support the reasonable belief that a driver has com-\\nmitted even a minor traffic offense.” United States v. Cashman,\\n216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). Probable cause is an objective\\nstandard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Lewis, 920\\nF.3d at 489. If an officer reasonably thinks he sees a driver\\ncommit a traffic infraction, that is a sufficient basis to pull him\\n\\f12 No. 18-2442\\n\\nover without violating the Constitution. United States v.\\nMuriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n Here, Simon acknowledges the probable cause determina-\\ntion depends entirely on the credibility of the two officers on\\nbicycles who testified they saw him turn without signaling at\\nleast 100 feet ahead. Simon levies many attacks on their cred-\\nibility, urging us to reverse under the clear error standard. Si-\\nmon admits the clear error standard is very demanding. Un-\\nder this standard, we only reverse when, after reviewing the\\nrecord as a whole, we have a “definite and firm conviction” a\\nmistake has been made. United States v. Whitley, 249 F.3d 614,\\n621 (7th Cir. 2001). The district judge, after all, listened to the\\ntestimony directly and observed the demeanor of the wit-\\nnesses. United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2014).\\nThe district judge is in a much better position to evaluate cred-\\nibility than we are. His credibility determinations are entitled\\nto special deference. We take Simon’s credibility attacks in\\nturn.\\ni. Phantom stop sign\\n First, Simon argues Hagemeyer swore at the suppression\\nhearing that there was a stop sign at the corner of College and\\nGreen, but she was demonstrably and indisputably wrong. Si-\\nmon argues this impugns her claim she saw the traffic viola-\\ntion.\\n The judge directly confronted Hagemeyer’s mistake. He\\nnoted Hagemeyer “was wrong about that detail.” (Order, DE\\n21 at 4.) The judge said he would take the mistake into account\\nin assessing Hagemeyer’s credibility. But the judge concluded\\nthe mistake does not weigh heavily against her credibility be-\\ncause the detail “is not greatly important regarding the traffic\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 13\\n\\noffense for which Defendant was pulled over” and because\\n“[i]t would not have factored in to [sic] determining whether\\nor not to issue Defendant a ticket for failing to signal his turn\\nwithin not less than 100 feet of the intersection.” (Id.) Hage-\\nmeyer’s determination at the scene that Simon failed to signal\\nat least 100 feet before the turn was not informed by the pres-\\nence or absence of a stop sign at the corner. In other words,\\nthere were other reasons independent of the presence or ab-\\nsence of a stop sign for Hagemeyer to think Simon failed to\\nsignal at least 100 feet ahead of turning. Indeed, the presence\\nor absence of a stop sign is irrelevant to estimating distances\\nor to the requirement to signal. The judge simply did not find\\nthis mistake about a stop sign to be very important. So the\\nmistake did not significantly undermine the reliability of\\nHagemeyer to perceive other facts that night. Moreover, her\\nmistake about the stop sign has no bearing on Danner’s testi-\\nmony that he saw Simon fail to signal sufficiently ahead of\\nturning.\\n And as for the possibilities Hagemeyer lied about the stop\\nsign, and this lie undermines her credibility about everything\\nelse, Simon does not go quite so far. In his opening appellate\\nbrief, he does not directly, unequivocally accuse Hagemeyer\\nof intentionally lying about the stop sign. And Simon offers\\nno explanation for why Hagemeyer would have had any rea-\\nson to lie about it. We see no clear error here.\\nii. Distances\\n Second, Simon argues Hagemeyer and Danner were\\nwrong about the distance between their location and the in-\\ntersection of College and Green. They both testified the dis-\\ntance was 75 yards. But the distance was actually 145 yards.\\nThe officers’ testimony was demonstrably and indisputably\\n\\f14 No. 18-2442\\n\\nwrong by a wide margin. Simon argues the officers’ ability to\\njudge distance was the key to their claim Simon committed a\\ntraffic violation. He argues their failure to estimate the dis-\\ntance between their location and the intersection correctly\\nmakes their claims about the distance between the location of\\nSimon’s car when he activated his turn signal and the inter-\\nsection wholly incredible.\\n Again, the judge directly confronted the mistaken testi-\\nmony. The judge decided the miscalculation was “of little im-\\nport when it comes to credibility.” (Order, DE 21 at 3.) The\\njudge reasoned that the fact that both officers estimated the\\ndistance at 75 yards does not indicate collusion because if they\\nwanted to connive it is much more likely they would have\\nused a number closer to the actual distance. They were too\\nwrong to be conspiring to lie.\\n And as for the argument that the officers’ mistake about\\nthis distance undermines the credibility of their estimate\\nabout Simon’s signaling distance, the officers had other, spe-\\ncific indicia of the signaling distance beyond a raw estimate\\nof the distance from A to B. The time between signaling and\\nturning, the car lengths between signaling and turning, and\\nthe lengths of the headlight beams bolstered the probable\\ncause to think Simon signaled too late and too close. The judge\\nconcluded the mistake about the distance between the bicy-\\nclists’ location and the intersection shows nothing more than\\nthat both bicyclists were wrong about that distance. We see no\\nclear error here.\\niii. Photographs\\n Third, Simon argues photographs introduced into evi-\\ndence show the unbelievability of the officers’ claims. Danner\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 15\\n\\nand Hagemeyer both testified they saw Simon’s car leave the\\n1100 block of North College, five blocks from their position.\\nBut, Simon argues, the photographs speak for themselves,\\nand there is no way someone could see the make, model, or\\ncolor of a vehicle at that distance.\\n The judge simply disagreed. He examined the photo-\\ngraphs and listened to the testimony and concluded “it is pos-\\nsible for an average person, with good vision who is used to\\nworking at night, such as Danner and Hagemeyer, to see a car,\\nin the dark, turn onto a street with its headlights on.” (Order,\\nDE 21 at 4.) We also examined the photographs and read the\\ntestimony, and we do not have anything close to a definite\\nand firm conviction the judge made a mistake in this regard.\\nSometimes a photograph is not worth a thousand words.\\niv. Ghost writer\\n Fourth, Simon argues the judge ignored the officers’ mis-\\nstatements about who prepared the traffic ticket. Hagemeyer\\ntestified “I was writing the warning.” She answered “yes” to\\nthe question: “[Y]ou said that you filled out the traffic warn-\\ning in this case?” When asked if she was the one who filled\\nout the date, time, name, address, and birth date, she testified\\nshe “filled out the majority of” the ticket herself, but she be-\\nlieved Danner signed it. But other evidence showed she filled\\nout none of it. Danner filled out both the traffic citation (later\\nvoided) and the warning (Simon received hours later).\\n Simon accuses the judge of tying himself “into a pretzel to\\navoid finding that the police officers could possibly have lied\\nor misrepresented facts … .” (Appellant Br. at 33.) But the\\njudge committed no such contortions. Rather, he addressed\\nthe discrepancies directly. He combed through the testimony\\n\\f16 No. 18-2442\\n\\nabout the various steps in the process leading to handing a\\ndriver a written ticket or warning. He noted there appeared\\nto be confusion and possibly contradiction between the offic-\\ners about who actually wrote the ticket. One source of confu-\\nsion seemed to be the word “processing.” The judge observed\\nHagemeyer, Snyder, and Hoecker all testified Hagemeyer be-\\ngan “processing” the ticket, but “processing” a ticket involves\\nmuch more than just physically writing the ticket. The judge\\nalso observed Hagemeyer’s testimony on this issue was more\\nspecific. She testified, “I was writing the warning.” When\\nasked, “So you were the one who filled out the date, time,\\nname, address, and birth date?” she responded, “I filled out\\nthe majority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”3\\n The judge compared the warning Simon received—pur-\\nportedly filled out by Hagemeyer and signed by Danner—to\\na different warning definitely filled out and signed by Hage-\\nmeyer on a different date. The judge concluded the handwrit-\\ning on the two warnings is different and they likely were not\\nfilled in by the same officer.\\n But the judge noted Simon did not show the exemplar\\nwarning to Danner or Hagemeyer during the hearing to cross-\\nexamine them on who wrote Simon’s warning. The judge also\\n\\n\\n 3 In his order denying suppression, the judge characterized Hage-\\nmeyer’s testimony on this point slightly incorrectly, and in favor of Si-\\nmon’s arguments. The judge wrote “Hagemeyer answered ‘yes’ to\\nwhether she filled in the name, date, etc., but she stated that Danner signed\\nit.” (Order, DE 21 at 10.) Actually (according to the transcript) she did not\\nsay “yes” in response to this question. She said, “I filled out the majority\\nof it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.” But even giving Simon the ben-\\nefit of this characterization, the judge still did not find a significant credi-\\nbility problem.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 17\\n\\nnoted the testimony indicated Danner or Hagemeyer would\\noften start writing a ticket the other would finish. The judge\\nobserved: “There are numerous possibilities as to why the dis-\\ncrepancy exists, and without the officers being given the\\nchance to explain the discrepancy, the court cannot impute\\nimproper conduct on their part.” (Order, DE 21 at 11.) The\\njudge considered the totality of the officers’ testimony, and\\ntheir demeanor and appearance. He concluded any discrep-\\nancy on this issue was due to mere confusion on the part of\\nthe officers, and not to fabrication. And he concluded the of-\\nficers were credible.\\n We see no clear error regarding the judge’s decisions on\\nany of these issues, nor regarding his decision to find the of-\\nficers credible. Given the two bicycle officers testified they\\nsaw Simon commit a traffic infraction, and given the judge be-\\nlieved them, we see no reason to reverse the decision that\\nprobable cause justified starting the stop.\\n2. Conducting the stop\\n Simon argues even if the officers did not violate the Con-\\nstitution by initiating the stop, they violated it by impermissi-\\nbly prolonging the stop. An officer who reasonably starts a\\ntraffic stop might violate the Constitution if he exceeds the\\nscope of the stop or unreasonably prolongs it. Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491. A traffic stop “‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged\\nbeyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mis-\\nsion’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez v. United States,\\n135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543\\nU.S. 405, 407 (2005)).\\n A dog sniff of a car’s exterior only for illegal drugs during\\na lawful stop for a traffic violation does not violate the Fourth\\n\\f18 No. 18-2442\\n\\nAmendment, even absent reasonable suspicion of drugs. Ca-\\nballes, 543 U.S. at 410. But a stop justified only by a traffic vio-\\nlation becomes unconstitutional if the officers prolong it be-\\nyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s\\noriginal mission. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612. “An officer may\\nconduct certain unrelated checks—including a dog sniff—\\nduring a lawful traffic stop, but he may not do so in a way that\\nprolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily\\ndemanded to justify detaining an individual.” Lewis, 920 F.3d\\nat 491 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Simon concedes,\\n“calling a K-9 unit does not unlawfully extend a traffic stop as\\nlong as the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is on-\\ngoing.” (Appellant Br. at 36.)\\n Without independent reasonable suspicion to justify the\\nsniff, the critical question is not whether the dog sniffed be-\\nfore or after the officer issued the warning, “but whether con-\\nducting the sniff prolongs—i.e., adds time to—the stop.”\\nLewis, 920 F.3d at 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\nWith independent reasonable suspicion, however, the officer\\nmay constitutionally detain the suspect for the sniff even if it\\nadds time to the total stop. Id.\\n Here, the judge continued to credit the officers’ testimony.\\nBased on that testimony, the judge concluded the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff. The judge noted\\nthe time period from the beginning of the stop to the canine\\nalert was about 7 minutes, as Simon conceded. The judge de-\\ntermined the officers acted quickly. Hoecker made the stop,\\nexited his car, told Simon the reason for the stop, and gathered\\nhis information. The bicyclists arrived at the stop only a cou-\\nple minutes after Hoecker pulled Simon over. The bicyclists\\n“diligently began processing the ticket.” (Order, DE 21 at 15.)\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 19\\n\\nCrucially, the judge found no indication the officers engaged\\nin any activity other than securing the scene and processing\\nthe warning during the time between the bicyclists’ arrival\\nand Rex’s arrival. Specifically, the officers surveyed the scene,\\nDanner spoke with Simon, and Hagemeyer testified she went\\nto the squad car to begin processing the written warning. The\\nvideo indicated that about 2.5 minutes into the stop, Danner\\nwas speaking to Hoecker about the traffic violation. About 3\\nminutes into the stop, Danner left the squad car to speak with\\nSimon. Danner told Simon the reasons for the stop and gath-\\nered information. Hoecker returned to Simon’s car at about\\nthe 5-minute mark to speak with him about the traffic infrac-\\ntion. Less than 7 minutes into the stop, Rex arrived and very\\nquickly alerted. At that time, the bicycle officers were still pro-\\ncessing the ticket.\\n In sum, the judge concluded the officers were processing\\nthe ticket when Rex arrived and alerted, so they had not yet\\ncompleted the initial mission of the stop, and the stop was not\\nimproperly prolonged to allow Rex to sniff.\\n Simon argues the police report and testimony contain the\\n“misrepresentation” Hagemeyer was writing the warning\\nwhile the officers waited for Rex because the officers knew\\ncalling a canine unit does not unlawfully extend a stop so long\\nas the normal process for pursuing a traffic ticket is ongoing.\\nSimon continues to challenge the credibility of the officers. He\\nargues that at no point did any officer on the scene begin ef-\\nfectuating the purpose of the stop by dutifully and diligently\\nfilling out a warning or ticket. He claims Danner filled out\\nboth the traffic citation and the warning Simon received hours\\nafter the stop. But again we see no reversible error in the\\njudge’s conclusions on this point.\\n\\f20 No. 18-2442\\n\\n Simon presses that even if the judge’s credibility determi-\\nnations here are correct, his ruling is still flawed. First, Simon\\nargues the judge improperly allowed a de minimis delay to be\\nconstitutional, even though any delay to allow a dog to sniff\\nis unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion.\\nWe disagree with Simon about what the judge did. He specif-\\nically found there was no improper delay. (Order, DE 21 at 14\\n(“the stop was not purposefully prolonged to allow for the ca-\\nnine unit’s arrival”).) True, the judge added in a footnote that\\neven if he found the ticket-writing process had not begun\\nwhen Rex arrived, still the sequence of events was so short\\nand condensed that the stop was not prolonged in any “mean-\\ningful” way. But we need not review this dictum.\\n Second, Simon argues that instead of effectuating the pur-\\npose of the traffic stop, the officers decided to run a criminal-\\nhistory check. Simon argues this was unrelated to the mission\\nof the stop and delayed processing the traffic violation. Simon\\ncites no supporting Seventh Circuit case. We said last year that\\nwhen police conduct a stop, “they are entitled to demand the\\ndriver’s identification, of course, and it is routine to check the\\ndriver’s record for active warrants, driving history, and crim-\\ninal history. Those checks are done for important reasons, in-\\ncluding officer safety.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago, 881 F.3d\\n577, 586 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Sanford, 806\\nF.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The trooper checked the occu-\\npants’ criminal histories on the computer in his car—a proce-\\ndure permissible even without reasonable suspicion … .”).\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments, but we see no rea-\\nson to reverse the judge’s conclusions that the officers were in\\nthe process of completing the traffic warning when Rex\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 21\\n\\narrived, and the officers did not improperly prolong the traffic\\nstop to allow the sniff to occur.\\n3. Bona Fido?\\n Simon argues even if the officers had probable cause to\\npull him over, and even if they did not prolong the traffic stop\\nto wait for Rex, still the judge should have suppressed the gun\\nbecause Rex’s alert was false, Rex was improperly trained,\\nand the alert did not provide probable cause to justify search-\\ning Simon’s car.\\n Probable cause to conduct a search is not among the high-\\nest standards. “A police officer has probable cause to conduct\\na search when the facts available to him would warrant a per-\\nson of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evi-\\ndence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050,\\n1055 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).\\nProbable cause is less than preponderance of the evidence. Id.\\n“All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which\\nreasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id.\\n(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Probable\\ncause is a practical, common-sense standard, involving the to-\\ntality of the circumstances. Id.\\n A dog’s alert on a car can give probable cause to search the\\nentire car. Indeed, a good dog’s alert can provide a rebuttable\\npresumption of probable cause to search:\\n If a bona fide organization has certified a dog\\n after testing his reliability in a controlled setting,\\n a court can presume (subject to any conflicting\\n evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides\\n probable cause to search. The same is true, even\\n in the absence of formal certification, if the dog\\n\\f22 No. 18-2442\\n\\n has recently and successfully completed a train-\\n ing program that evaluated his proficiency in lo-\\n cating drugs.\\nId. at 1057. The ultimate question is “whether all the facts sur-\\nrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common\\nsense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a\\nsearch would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A\\nsniff is up to snuff when it meets that test.” Id. at 1058.\\n Simon concedes Rex passed certification tests. But Simon\\nchallenges the alert itself and the adequacy of Rex’s training.\\n “First and foremost,” Simon argues Rex did not alert on\\nSimon’s car. (Appellant Br. at 42.) This perplexes. Simon cites\\nnothing to support this claim. The record belies it. Given the\\ncontext of this claim, Simon seems simply to mean the alert\\nwas false.4 It is true that following the alert the officers\\nsearched the car and found no evidence of drugs in it. But Si-\\nmon does not explain why that, in itself, matters here. Proba-\\nble cause is not a retrospective, outcome-based standard.\\n\\n 4 Defense expert Dr. Mary Cablk said in her report she could not de-\\ntermine if Rex alerted or what Rex alerted to. She confirmed this on cross-\\nexamination at the suppression hearing. During direct examination she\\nwatched videos from Hoecker’s and Snyder’s dashcams. She testified she\\ncould not see the alert, could not tell exactly where on the car the dog\\nalerted, and did not know whether the alert was barking or something\\nelse. But in her testimony she seems to accept Rex alerted. She character-\\nized it as a false alert because no drugs were found, and she criticized\\nSnyder for rewarding Rex for falsely alerting: “In this instance, there’s no\\ndrugs found; so he’s reinforcing the dog for false alerting here.” In any\\nevent, Snyder testified that Rex alerted and that Snyder confirmed the\\nalert. And the judge throughout his order accepted Rex alerted. He found\\nthe officers’ testimony, in its totality, credible. We see no reason to upend\\nthe determination Rex alerted.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 23\\n\\nBridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). If an officer\\nrandomly breaks into a house on only a wild hunch and stum-\\nbles into a meth lab, the discovery does not provide probable\\ncause for the search. And if 20 reliable informants tell an of-\\nficer a particular house contains a meth lab, so he stands in\\nthe street outside the house and sees through an open win-\\ndow the apparent apparatus and accoutrements of a meth lab,\\nso he obtains a warrant to search the house based on probable\\ncause to think it contains a meth lab, but he finds only an in-\\nnocent and intricate chemistry set, still probable cause sup-\\nported the warrant. So the mere absence of drugs in Simon’s\\ncar does not undermine the probable cause to search it for\\ndrugs, provided there was probable cause in the first place.\\n Simon’s other argument is the officers did not have prob-\\nable cause to search his vehicle in the first place because Rex\\nwas unreliable. This argument proceeds in two waves.\\n The first wave is quickly quelled. Simon argues Rex was\\nunreliable because he was not trained properly under Illinois\\nlaw, which requires police dogs be trained according to cer-\\ntain guidelines. Simon argues Detective Larner (the Macon\\nCounty canine-training director) admitted he did not always\\nfollow these guidelines. But we need not address what Illinois\\nlaw requires or whether Rex satisfies it because Illinois law\\ndoes not control the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore,\\n553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s mean-\\ning [does] not change with local law enforcement practices—\\neven practices set by rule.”); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.\\n35, 43 (1988) (“We have never intimated … that whether or not\\na search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth\\nAmendment depends on the law of the particular State in\\nwhich the search occurs.”).\\n\\f24 No. 18-2442\\n\\n The second wave holds out longer, but ultimately suc-\\ncumbs. Simon argues, apart from Illinois law, if a dog is\\ntrained to alert when no evidence of criminal activity exists,\\nthis violates the Fourth Amendment. The problem, as Simon\\nsees it, is Rex was trained with scented cotton balls to alert to\\nresidual odors. But to search a car, there must be probable\\ncause to think it presently contains evidence of criminal activ-\\nity. So if Rex is trained to alert to mere residue even when no\\ndrugs are present, then his alert is not a reliable indicator\\ndrugs are present, and therefore his alert does not provide\\nprobable cause to justify a search.\\n The main problem with this argument is the Supreme\\nCourt already rejected its premise. In Florida v. Harris, a dog\\nnamed Aldo alerted on a truck. A subsequent search did not\\nreveal any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, but it did\\ndiscover meth ingredients. The defendant moved to suppress\\nthe ingredients on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given\\nprobable cause to search. The defendant “principally con-\\ntended” in the trial court that because the officer did not find\\nany of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, Aldo’s alerts\\nmust have been false. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058. But the Su-\\npreme Court patted Aldo on the head and called him a good\\nboy: “A well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to [resid-\\nual] odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but\\nin fact is not.” Id. at 1059; see also Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels,\\nInc., 600 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (Plaintiff’s “only de-\\nveloped legal theory is untenable. [His] premise—that an alert\\nby a drug-sniffing dog trained to detect residual odors does\\nnot establish probable cause to search—was rejected in Harris\\n… .”). If a well-trained dog, trained to alert even to residual\\nodors, alerts, there is generally a fair probability that drugs or\\nevidence of drugs will be found, absent contradictory factors.\\n\\fNo. 18-2442 25\\n\\nAnd that is all the Fourth Amendment requires. If somehow\\na dog were trained to alert only to residual odors, then we\\nmight have a problem. But that is not this case.\\n Our review of the record and the order denying suppres-\\nsion satisfies us the judge conducted the proper Harris evalu-\\nation and committed no error in concluding Rex’s satisfactory\\ncertification and training provide sufficient reason to trust his\\nalert or in concluding Rex’s training on residual odors is ac-\\nceptable. The judge heard testimony from Simon’s expert Dr.\\nCablk challenging Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself, tes-\\ntimony from Officer Snyder supporting Rex’s qualifications\\nand the sniff itself, and testimony from Detective Larner sup-\\nporting Rex’s qualifications and the sniff itself. The judge also\\nentertained arguments from both sides in the form of the mo-\\ntion to suppress, supporting memorandum, the government’s\\nresponse, and post-hearing briefs filed by both sides. The\\njudge considered the totality of the circumstances, addressed\\nHarris’s ultimate question, and found Rex’s sniff up to snuff.\\nC. Supplementation\\n After the judge denied the motion to suppress, Simon\\nmoved to supplement the record and for leave to seek recon-\\nsideration. He wanted to reopen the evidence to introduce\\nfurther, unrelated citations prepared by Danner in August\\n2016 “which further emphasize the differences in the officers’\\nhandwriting … .” (Mot. Supp., DE 23 at 4.) Simon also wanted\\nto introduce a video he5 took when he returned to the scene\\none night. The video shows a vehicle leaving the 1100 block\\nof College Street and approaching the intersection of College\\n\\n 5 The motion says Simon created the video. On appeal, Simon asserts\\nhis investigator took the video. This nuance is immaterial here.\\n\\f26 No. 18-2442\\n\\nand Green. The judge denied this motion. On appeal, Simon\\nonly presses the video. He does not mention the additional\\nhandwriting exemplars in his opening appellate brief. Simon\\nacknowledges we review the denial of supplementation for\\nabuse of discretion.\\n The judge did not abuse his discretion. He explained there\\nwas no reason Simon could not have taken a nighttime video\\nand presented it during the suppression hearing. The judge\\ndiscussed the danger of allowing supplementation here and\\nsetting a bad precedent leading to a never-ending cycle of par-\\nties waiting for rulings and then coming up with “new” evi-\\ndence to challenge them. Most importantly, the judge ex-\\nplained that even with the proposed evidence, his ruling\\nwould not change. The nighttime video would not capture the\\nactual visual capabilities of the officers, who credibly testified\\nabout how close Simon was to the intersection when he sig-\\nnaled. The judge reasoned a video of the scene taken months\\nlater, when conditions might differ, would not impact their\\ncredibility. Besides, the judge noted, the probable cause\\nstandard does not need evidence to support a conviction be-\\nyond a reasonable doubt. He did not abuse his discretion.\\nD. ACCA\\n Simon argues his prior conviction under Illinois law for\\nattempted armed robbery should not have counted as a pred-\\nicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He recog-\\nnizes our decisions foreclose his argument on this point, but\\nhe wants to preserve it for the Supreme Court.\\n IV. Conclusion\\n We considered all Simon’s arguments. Finding no reversi-\\nble error, we AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":3899,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4654633,"string":"4,654,633"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Heon Seok Lee"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-08-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1950"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee/\\n Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nHEON SEOK LEE,\\n Defendant-Appellant/\\n Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:12-cr-00109-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Crowbar in hand, U.S. Customs\\nOfficer Jorge Parra spent December 8, 2010 “cracking open\\ncontainers” at a warehouse near the Los Angeles seaport.\\nParra pried open one from South Korea to inspect its freight.\\nInside he found a fully assembled, five-foot tall industrial fan\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\ncalled a turbo blower. A placard riveted to the side read, “As-\\nsembled in USA.”\\n Presented with a fully assembled machine fresh off the\\nboat from South Korea, which brazenly advertised its assem-\\nbly in the United States, little sleuthing was required to deter-\\nmine something was amiss. Parra’s discovery kicked off a\\nfederal investigation that traced back to the defendant in this\\ncase, Heon Seok Lee. Prosecutors eventually charged Lee with\\nexecuting a scheme to defraud local governments by falsely\\nrepresenting that his company manufactured its turbo blow-\\ners in the United States.\\n A grand jury indicted Lee on five counts of wire fraud and\\nthree counts of smuggling. After a trial, the jury found Lee\\nguilty on all counts. Lee now appeals his convictions and the\\nrestitution ordered, and the government cross-appeals Lee’s\\nprison sentence. We find no fault in the trial or the sentence.\\n I. Background\\n A. The Recovery Act\\n This criminal case has an atypical origin: an economic\\nstimulus package. Congress passed the American Recovery\\nand Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115\\n(2009)—which we will simply call the “Recovery Act”—to\\njumpstart the flagging domestic economy during the Great\\nRecession. See Kameron Hillstrom, The American Recovery and\\nReinvestment Act: A Fitting Future for Recovery Legislation, 44\\nPUB. CONTRACT L. J. 285, 288 (2015). The Recovery Act ear-\\nmarked billions to fund public infrastructure projects. Id. at\\n289 (noting the Recovery Act made $261.2 billion available for\\nsuch projects).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 3\\n\\n Relevant to this case, Congress allocated $6.4 billion to the\\nEPA for water-infrastructure improvements. The EPA did not\\nspend the money directly; instead it awarded grants to “re-\\nvolving funds” administered by the States. After receiving\\nEPA grants, the revolving funds then issued low-interest\\nloans to local municipalities or agencies sponsoring specific\\nprojects. Those local governments were then responsible for\\nhiring contractors to perform the work.\\n To achieve Congress’s objective of bolstering the Ameri-\\ncan economy, the Recovery Act included the following do-\\nmestic purchasing requirement, commonly known as the\\n“Buy American” provision:\\n None of the funds appropriated or otherwise\\n made available by this Act may be used for a\\n project for the construction, alteration, mainte-\\n nance, or repair of a public building or public\\n work unless all of the iron, steel, and manufac-\\n tured goods used in the project are produced in\\n the United States.\\nRecovery Act § 1605(a), 123 Stat. 303.1\\n At first glance, this requirement seems straightforward.\\nBut federal agencies struggled to pin down what it means for\\na product to have been “produced in the United States.” Dif-\\nferent agencies used different tests. See Thomas D. Blanford,\\nNavigating the Recovery Act’s Buy American Rule in State and\\nLocal Government Construction, 46 PROCUREMENT LAWYER 3, 4\\n(Fall 2010) (listing five tests used by different agencies). The\\n\\n1 The Recovery Act’s Buy American provision should not be confused\\nwith the separate, much older, Buy American Act of 1933,\\n41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nEPA adopted the “substantial transformation” standard to\\nadminister the Recovery Act, and it developed a three-part\\ntest to assess whether a manufacturer substantially trans-\\nformed a product within the United States.\\n As a condition to receiving Recovery Act funding, local\\ngovernments and their contractors were required to abide by\\nthe Buy American provision. Federal agencies like the EPA\\naudited projects to ensure compliance. Local governments re-\\nquired their suppliers to complete “Buy American certifica-\\ntions” representing that their products complied with the stat-\\nute.\\n B. KTurbo’s Initial Plan\\n Heon Seok Lee founded KTurbo Inc. in his homeland of\\nSouth Korea. KTurbo manufactures centrifugal turbo blow-\\ners—large industrial fans used to provide oxygen for biologi-\\ncal water treatments in wastewater facilities. Turbo blowers\\nare sophisticated and expensive pieces of equipment, requir-\\ning on-site programming, testing, and calibration.\\n Lee saw the Recovery Act as a growth opportunity for\\nKTurbo, whose penetration into the United States market was\\nlimited at the time. The Recovery Act earmarked billions for\\nproducts like KTurbo’s turbo blowers. But KTurbo would be\\nunable to tap into those funds unless it demonstrated compli-\\nance with the Buy American provision. So, Lee and his sister,\\nTrinity Lee,2 developed a Recovery Act plan. They researched\\nregulatory guidance from the EPA and monitored larger com-\\npetitors’ responses. KTurbo leadership discussed Buy\\n\\n2We refer to the defendant, Heon Seok Lee, as “Lee” and Trinity Lee by\\nher full name. Trinity Lee served as KTurbo’s general manager for North\\nAmerica.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 5\\n\\nAmerican compliance for months, with several in-depth\\nmeetings that lasted hours.\\n KTurbo enlisted independent sales representatives around\\nthe country to market its turbo blowers to local governments\\npursuing Recovery Act projects. KTurbo also consulted with\\nseveral sales representatives in the early stages of its Buy\\nAmerican planning. One sales representative, Dick Koch, dis-\\ncouraged KTurbo from pursuing a plan to make turbo blow-\\ners in South Korea, ship them to the United States, take them\\napart, and then reassemble stateside. Koch warned Lee and\\nKTurbo in an email that such evasive practices could be\\ndeemed criminal:\\n The [EPA] webcast specifically excludes Heon\\n Seok’s idea of sending the equipment to the US\\n and taking it apart and putting it back together.\\n In fact the webcast says that if you say that is\\n [Buy American] you are committing criminal\\n fraud.\\nTrinity Lee reassured Koch that KTurbo would use compo-\\nnents from both South Korea and the United States and as-\\nsemble the turbo blowers in greater Chicago. Other sales rep-\\nresentatives who inquired about KTurbo’s Buy American\\ncompliance plan were told the same thing, including by Lee\\nhimself.\\n At that point, KTurbo formed an Illinois subsidiary,\\nKTurbo USA Inc.,3 leased a warehouse in Batavia, Illinois, and\\nhired three American technicians. KTurbo’s sales\\n\\n3 The legal distinction between KTurbo Inc. and KTurbo USA Inc. does\\nnot matter for purposes of this opinion, so we refer to the two companies\\ncollectively as “KTurbo.”\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nrepresentatives landed several contracts for Recovery Act\\nprojects. In its bids, KTurbo highlighted its domestic presence\\nand promised Buy American compliance. For example,\\nKTurbo submitted a bid to South Burlington, Vermont in the\\nsummer of 2009, which included the following Buy American\\ncertification:\\n By this letter, KTurbo USA certifies that it will\\n manufacture and deliver KTurbo brand blower\\n packages and equipment in compliance with\\n the final requirements of the 2009 U.S. economic\\n stimulus law, The American Recovery and Re-\\n investment Act of 2009.\\nKTurbo sent nearly identical compliance letters for projects in\\nCalifornia, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Oregon.\\n These representations—a South Korean company certify-\\ning its product was “produced in the United States”—did not\\ngo unnoticed. A competitor that lost a bid to KTurbo filed a\\ncomplaint with the EPA in the fall of 2009. In response, EPA\\nofficials visited KTurbo’s Batavia facility on October 30, 2009.\\nDuring that visit, Lee gave a PowerPoint presentation\\ndetailing KTurbo’s plans to comply with the Buy American\\nprovision. He represented that KTurbo would assemble its\\nturbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Slides in Lee’s presenta-\\ntion indicated fifty percent of the total input costs would be\\nattributable to American components, assembly, and testing.\\nTrinity Lee sent the EPA a letter confirming these details a few\\nweeks later.\\n KTurbo manufactured its first turbo blower at the Batavia\\nfacility in January 2010. It built nine more there over the next\\nthree months, at a rate of one to two weeks per blower.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 7\\n\\n C. The Revised Plan\\n It did not take long for Lee to abandon that original plan\\nto produce turbo blowers in Batavia. By April 2010, Lee con-\\ncluded production costs in the United States were prohibi-\\ntively expensive, and he decided to go back to importing\\nturbo blowers from South Korea. Employees pushed back\\nwith concerns about KTurbo’s Recovery Act compliance, but\\nLee forged ahead. At trial, one of KTurbo’s technicians ex-\\nplained how the component parts from South Korea began\\narriving more and more fully assembled, until completely as-\\nsembled blowers started showing up. No new components\\nwere added to the turbo blowers once they reached Batavia.\\nTechnicians simply plugged them in and ran performance ef-\\nficiency tests.\\n Lee’s revised plan depended on its secrecy. He instructed\\nKTurbo employees not to disclose to customers the fact that\\ntheir turbo blowers were made in South Korea. To evade de-\\ntection, KTurbo (with Lee’s knowledge) went out of its way to\\navoid shipping the machines from South Korea directly to\\ncustomers. When municipalities questioned KTurbo about\\nRecovery Act compliance, KTurbo simply lied. Take KTurbo’s\\nMay 20, 2010 response to Lowell, Massachusetts: “The blower\\nwill be assembled and tested at KTurbo’s Chicago location.”\\nLee himself participated, emailing a sales representative sim-\\nilar misrepresentations in September 2010: “We assemble and\\ntest in Chicago. Only motor and VFD comes from Korea. It is\\nalmost Made In USA.”\\n But this scheme unraveled quickly. Jorge Parra’s shipyard\\ndiscovery in December 2010 was the beginning of the end.\\nWhen U.S. Customs detained KTurbo’s products at the bor-\\nder, the company fell behind on its deliveries. This required\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nmore lies to hide that the turbo blowers were coming from\\noverseas and needed to clear U.S. Customs. When a Lowell,\\nMassachusetts general contractor contacted KTurbo about the\\ndelays, Joel Schomo (a KTurbo engineer) told him the Batavia\\nfacility was waiting for parts to begin final assembly, even\\nthough KTurbo had discontinued all assembly operations in\\nBatavia months earlier. At trial, Schomo testified he told this\\nlie because the Recovery Act funded Lowell’s project and he\\ndid not want to raise any “red flags” that KTurbo “might not\\nbe complying with the Recovery Act requirements.”\\n Within two months, federal investigators executed a\\nsearch warrant at the Batavia facility. Lee was present. During\\nthe search, Lee admitted he was aware that the turbo blowers\\nwere for Recovery Act projects, that KTurbo shipped them\\nfully assembled from South Korea, and that it was “wrong”\\nto do so.\\n D. Lee’s Prosecution\\n About a year later, a grand jury returned an indictment\\nagainst Lee. It alleged he falsely represented that KTurbo’s\\nturbo blowers complied with the Buy American provision\\nwhen Lee knew KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities re-\\nceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” The indictment also\\ncharged Lee “knew that turbo blowers were substantially as-\\nsembled before their arrival in the United States and did not\\nrequire meaningful assembly or manufacturing in the United\\nStates.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 9\\n\\n By this point, Lee had fled the country. It took three years\\nto extradite him from South Korea. When the government fi-\\nnally brought Lee back to appear, he responded to the indict-\\nment with a series of motions to dismiss, each of which the\\ndistrict court denied.\\n During an eight-day trial, the government presented doz-\\nens of witnesses: U.S. Customs officers, federal agents,\\nKTurbo employees, sales representatives, general contractors,\\nand employees of municipal customers. Lee elected to take\\nthe stand, and he adamantly denied any knowledge that\\nKTurbo imported fully assembled blowers into the United\\nStates. On cross-examination, the government battered Lee’s\\ncredibility, impeaching him with documentary evidence and\\nother witnesses’ testimony. The jury ultimately convicted Lee\\non all counts.\\n E. Post-Trial Proceedings\\n Lee filed a series of post-trial motions seeking to vacate the\\njury’s verdict; the district court denied each. The district court\\nheld three sentencing hearings over several months, which\\ncentered on the parties’ dispute about how to calculate Lee’s\\nguideline range. For wire fraud convictions, the Sentencing\\nGuidelines instruct district courts to begin with a base offense\\nlevel of seven and then to add levels based on the amount of\\nthe “loss” caused by the defendant. U.S. SENTENCING\\nGUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a)–(b) (U.S. SENTENCING\\nCOMM’N Nov. 2018). In this case, the parties disputed whether\\nLee should receive credit in the loss calculation for the market\\nvalue of KTurbo blowers sold to customers.\\n The district court initially ruled that the loss equaled the\\ntotal amount KTurbo received from defrauded municipalities\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n(about $180,000), putting Lee’s guideline range at 46–57\\nmonths. But the court gave Lee a below-guidelines prison sen-\\ntence of 20 months, plus restitution. Two weeks later, Lee filed\\na notice of appeal and a motion asking the district court to\\ncorrect its judgment under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). The district\\ncourt held a hearing on Lee’s Rule 35(a) motion, where it\\nagreed with Lee’s argument on the guideline calculation and\\nresentenced Lee to 12 months. After the district court entered\\nits final judgment on March 14, 2018, Lee filed a second notice\\nof appeal on March 28, 2018. Thirty days later, the govern-\\nment cross-appealed Lee’s sentence.\\n II. Discussion\\n A. Wire Fraud Convictions\\n We begin with Lee’s wire fraud convictions. He asks us to\\nvacate them because the government’s trial evidence con-\\nstructively amended the indictment and failed to prove all the\\nelements of the crime.\\n 1. Did the government’s case at trial impermissibly\\n deviate from the indictment?\\n “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-\\nwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment\\nof a Grand Jury … .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Founders\\nadopted this grand jury requirement from English tradition,\\nin which lay grand jurors considered whether a crime should\\nbe charged while also protecting the accused from prosecuto-\\nrial overreach. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); see\\nalso Andrew D. Leipold, Grand Jury Requirement, in THE\\nHERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 431 (David F. Forte &\\nMatthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014). The Supreme Court has\\nexplained “that a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 11\\n\\non charges that are not made in the indictment against him.”\\nStirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960).\\n Two related doctrines arise out of this Fifth Amendment\\nrequirement: constructive amendment and variance. Both\\nexplain differences between the government’s case in the in-\\ndictment and the government’s case at trial. Constructive\\namendment occurs where the trial evidence supports (or the\\ncourt’s jury instructions charge) an offense not alleged in the\\nindictment. United States v. Burge, 711 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir.\\n2013). Variance refers to situations where the government’s\\ntrial evidence “proves facts materially different from those al-\\nleged in the indictment.” United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113,\\n1125 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The distinction\\nbetween the two doctrines is subtle, but significant. Where a\\ndifferent crime has been proved (constructive amendment), it\\nis error per se and the verdict must be vacated. United States\\nv. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 820 (7th Cir. 2007).4 But where\\nthe same crime is proved, only through evidence different\\nthan the factual allegations in the indictment (variance), the\\ndefendant must demonstrate prejudice to his substantial\\nrights. Id.\\n Lee contends the government constructively amended the\\nindictment by presenting evidence of misrepresentations be-\\nyond KTurbo’s Buy American certifications. He claims the in-\\ndictment confined itself to the falsity of the certifications,\\nwhile the government’s trial evidence focused on other lies,\\n\\n4 This assumes the defendant properly preserved the error in the district\\ncourt. If the issue was waived or forfeited, we review only for plain error.\\nUnited States v. Remsza, 77 F.3d 1039, 1043–44 (7th Cir. 1996) (assessing de-\\nfendant’s constructive amendment argument under a plain error standard\\ndue to defendant’s failure to raise it in the district court).\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nsuch as false statements in sales presentations, misrepresen-\\ntations to sales representatives, and misleading emails to\\ngeneral contractors.\\n Even if we accept as true Lee’s interpretation of the indict-\\nment and his characterization of the trial evidence, it would\\nnot rise to the level of a constructive amendment. The govern-\\nment did not attempt to prove a crime different from the one\\nalleged. See United States v. Khilchenko, 324 F.3d 917, 920 (7th\\nCir. 2003) (“To effect a constructive amendment, the evidence\\nat trial must establish offenses different from or in addition to\\nthose charged by the grand jury.”). Prosecutors did not argue\\nLee committed mail fraud when the indictment charged wire\\nfraud. The government’s case at trial did not attempt to prove\\na fraud in the air compressor market after alleging a scheme\\nin the turbo blower market. Constructive amendments arise\\n“where there is a ‘complex of facts distinctly different from\\nthose set forth in the charging instrument and not where there\\nis a single set of facts.’” United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306,\\n314 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d\\n584, 586 (9th Cir. 1984)). Here, the government consistently\\nmaintained that Lee committed wire fraud by selling turbo\\nblowers made in South Korea as if they were made in the\\nUnited States.\\n Lee’s argument is more aptly characterized as one of vari-\\nance, although he does not frame it that way. Even if the crime\\ncharged remains consistent, it is a problem if the government\\nmaterially alters the factual underpinnings of that charge. See\\nUnited States v. Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 1983)\\n(defendant may establish reversible error where the variance\\naltered an essential or material element of the charge). But\\nvariance claims are subject to harmless error review—we will\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 13\\n\\nnot disturb a conviction on account of “a technical deficiency\\nof no prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Russell v. United\\nStates, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962)). No prejudice exists in this\\ncase.\\n First, despite Lee’s characterization, the indictment did\\ntailor its fraud allegations to KTurbo’s failure to manufacture\\nits turbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Paragraph 3 of the in-\\ndictment alleged KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities\\nreceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” It also expressly al-\\nleged that Lee knew the turbo blowers were already assem-\\nbled before arriving in the United States. The government\\nproved those allegations at trial with evidence that Lee knew\\nKTurbo made its turbo blowers in South Korea and lied about\\nthat fact. Such evidence matches the indictment’s fraud alle-\\ngations.\\n Second, even if these misrepresentations were not ex-\\npressly covered by the indictment’s text, they were “part and\\nparcel” of the same scheme described by the indictment. Nye\\n& Nissen, Corp. v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 617 (1949) (no\\nvariance where indictment alleged a single scheme to defraud\\nexecuted in various ways). Additional evidence regarding\\ntechnical details about how a defendant executed an alleged\\nscheme does not constitute an impermissible variance. Ajayi,\\n808 F.3d at 1125 (presentation of “more detailed” facts at trial\\nnot an impermissible variance). Lee cannot demonstrate his\\nFifth Amendment rights were violated because the govern-\\nment’s trial evidence concerned “the same elaborate scheme\\nto defraud … as was described in the indictment.”\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRatliff-White, 493 F.3d at 821 (quoting United States v. Dupre,\\n462 F.3d 131, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2006)).\\n Two concerns underlie the constructive amendment and\\nvariance doctrines: ensuring criminal defendants have ade-\\nquate notice of the charges against them and avoiding the risk\\nof double jeopardy. Neither is present here. The indictment\\nnotified Lee of the allegations against him: that he committed\\nwire fraud by importing turbo blowers from South Korea\\nwhile representing they were made in Batavia. See United\\nStates v. Corrigan, 912 F.3d 422, 428 (7th Cir. 2019) (indictment\\nprovided valid notice despite listing wrong name of victim);\\nUnited States v. Kuna, 760 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1985) (alleged\\nvariance in mail fraud prosecution was harmless because the\\ndefendant “was able to identify with great certainty the acts\\nfor which he was placed in jeopardy”).\\n The indictment also included specific details about the\\nscheme alleged, alleviating any double jeopardy concerns. See\\nUnited States v. Moore, 563 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (hold-\\ning specificity in the indictment would “avoid any later dou-\\nble jeopardy concerns”). It described the Recovery Act’s Buy\\nAmerican provision, how KTurbo leased a warehouse in\\nBatavia, KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts, the fact KTurbo\\nfailed “to perform substantial transformation of the turbo\\nblowers at the KTURBO facility in Batavia,” Lee’s knowledge\\n“that turbo blowers were substantially assembled before their\\narrival in the United States and did not require meaningful\\nassembly or manufacturing in the United States,” and Lee’s\\nmisrepresentations and concealment of KTurbo’s true opera-\\ntions. Such detail in the indictment protected Lee from expo-\\nsure to double jeopardy. See United States v. Scheuneman, 712\\nF.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2013) (indictment sufficient where it\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 15\\n\\n“presented enough detail to allow [the defendant] to plead\\ndouble jeopardy to avoid future prosecution based on the\\nsame conduct alleged”).\\n Because the indictment afforded Lee ample notice of the\\ncase the government presented at trial and included specific\\ndetails of the crimes alleged to avoid double jeopardy risk, no\\nimpermissible constructive amendment or variance occurred\\nin this case.5\\n 2. Did the government present enough evidence to\\n convict Lee of wire fraud?\\n Lee appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for ac-\\nquittal under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. We review such decisions de\\nnovo, asking if the evidence—viewed in the light most favor-\\nable to the prosecution—could support a rational finding of\\nall the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt. United States v. Mohamed, 759 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir.\\n2014). Put differently, we reverse only if the trial record “is\\ndevoid of evidence from which a jury could conclude guilt\\nbeyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d\\n605, 613 (7th Cir. 2006). Given this deference to the jury ver-\\ndict, Lee’s hurdle on appeal is high, as “we rarely reverse a\\nconviction for mail or wire fraud due to insufficient evi-\\ndence.” United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 354 (7th Cir.\\n2016).\\n\\n\\n5Lee’s concerns are also mitigated because the district court gave the jury\\na copy of the indictment and instructed jurors to convict only if the gov-\\nernment had proved the crimes it alleged. See United States v. Cusimano,\\n148 F.3d 824, 830–31 (7th Cir. 1998) (district court’s provision of the indict-\\nment to the jury and proper instruction on it “establish[ed] that there was\\nno constructive amendment to the indictment”).\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n To convict a defendant of wire fraud, the government\\nmust prove three elements: (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) the\\ndefendant’s intent to defraud, and (3) the defendant’s use of\\ninterstate wires in furtherance of the scheme. United States v.\\nJackson, 860 F.3d 438, 446 (7th Cir. 2017). Lee challenges the\\ngovernment’s proof on the first element, the scheme to de-\\nfraud. The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, reaches “any\\nscheme to deprive another of money or property by means of\\nfalse or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”\\nCarpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987).\\n On appeal, Lee argues that KTurbo’s Buy American certi-\\nfications were not false. He claims KTurbo’s turbo blowers\\ncomplied with the Buy American provision because they were\\nmade in South Korea. That claim is not as self-contradictory\\nas it first sounds, given the text of Recovery Act § 1605(d),\\nwhich requires the statute to be “applied in a manner con-\\nsistent with United States obligations under international\\nagreements.” Both the United States and South Korea have\\njoined the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Gov-\\nernment Procurement (WTO-GPA), which requires all signa-\\ntories to provide all other signatories’ exports “treatment no\\nless favourable than the treatment the Party, including its pro-\\ncuring entities, accords to: (a) domestic goods, services and\\nsuppliers; and (b) goods, services and suppliers of any other\\nParty.” WTO-GPA art. 4 § 1, Apr. 6, 2014, 3008 U.N.T.S. Reg.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 17\\n\\nNo. A-31874.6 In other words, the WTO-GPA is a multi-lateral\\n“most favored nation” clause for government purchasing. Lee\\ninterprets Recovery Act § 1605(d) to mean the WTO-GPA’s\\nmost favored nation clause supersedes the Buy American\\nprovision, such that South Korean products must be given the\\nsame treatment as American products for purposes of the\\nRecovery Act.7\\n Critically however, when the Recovery Act was enacted\\nthe EPA publicly rejected the interpretation Lee now offers.\\nAn April 2009 EPA memorandum explained that the agency\\ninterpreted Recovery Act § 1605(d) to apply to direct pur-\\nchases by the federal government and the specific state and\\nlocal agencies expressly listed in the WTO-GPA’s appendices,\\nbut not “to procurement initiated by local entities ([state re-\\nvolving fund] assistance recipients), unless they are listed in\\nthe appendix.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Memorandum on\\n\\n6 By its terms, the WTO-GPA covers purchases made by the EPA above\\ncertain dollar thresholds. WTO-GPA, Coverage Schedules, United States\\nann. 1. Coverage of purchases made by States themselves, state agencies,\\nand local municipalities is more complicated, varying from State to State\\nand from agency to agency within a State. WTO-GPA, Coverage Sched-\\nules, United States ann. 2–3; see also Hong-Sik Chung, Government Procure-\\nment in the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement: Great Opportunities for\\nBoth Sides?, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 303 (2014). But the WTO-GPA\\nprovides that where a covered entity “requires persons not covered under\\na Party’s annexes to Appendix I to procure in accordance with particular\\nrequirements, Article IV shall apply mutatis mutandis to such require-\\nments.” WTO-GPA art. 2 § 5.\\n7 Federal purchasing regulations provide that where an international\\nagreement applies, the “restrictions of section 1605 of the Recovery Act do\\nnot apply to designated country iron, steel, and/or other manufactured\\ngoods.” 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(b)(ii). South Korea is listed as a “designated\\ncountry” based on its membership in the WTO-GPA. 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(a).\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nImplementation of Buy American provisions of P.L. 111-5\\n(Apr. 28, 2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2\\n014-12/documents/buy_am.pdf (last visited August 13, 2019).\\nIn the nature of a “smoking gun,” federal agents found a copy\\nof this EPA memorandum in KTurbo’s Batavia facility, with\\nthe relevant paragraph flagged by handwritten markings.\\nReasonable jurors could thus conclude Lee was aware that the\\nEPA did not consider South Korean products Buy American\\ncompliant.\\n As a result, even if one accepts Lee’s interpretation of Re-\\ncovery Act § 1605(d), the EPA’s express rejection of it makes\\nKTurbo’s South Korean manufacturing a “material” fact for\\nwire fraud purposes. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16\\n(1999) (holding a statement is “material” if it has “a natural\\ntendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the deci-\\nsion of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed”)\\n(quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)).\\nKTurbo could not legitimately certify its Buy American com-\\npliance, at least not without disclosing to customers that the\\nturbo blowers were made in South Korea. Federal fraud stat-\\nutes reach such misleading omissions of material information.\\nUnited States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n A reasonable purchaser in this scenario—one who re-\\nceived funds from the EPA pursuant to the Recovery Act and\\nwas bound to comply with the Buy American provision—\\nwould deem it highly relevant whether a supplier based its\\nBuy American certification on an interpretation of the statute\\nexpressly rejected by the EPA. A series of trial witnesses con-\\nsistently testified that Recovery Act compliance was “abso-\\nlutely vital,” given it was a legal requirement of the project\\nfunding. Without Buy American compliance, municipalities\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 19\\n\\njeopardized losing all Recovery Act funding from the EPA. As\\none customer testified, his municipality considered KTurbo’s\\nrepresentations that the turbo blowers were “Assembled in\\nUSA” to be “extremely important” because “it bolstered\\n[their] belief that [the turbo blower] was substantially\\ntransformed in the United States.” Municipal employees also\\ntestified they would not have purchased KTurbo’s blowers\\nwithout KTurbo’s Recovery Act assurances.\\n Where the fraud alleged deals with a half truth or material\\nomission, we generally require proof of an act of concealment\\non the part of the defendant. See Stephens, 421 F.3d at 507. The\\nrecord in this case unmistakably reflects such concealment.\\nTrial evidence showed KTurbo’s repeated misrepresentations\\nto its customers about where KTurbo made its turbo blowers.\\nFor example, KTurbo sent the City of Pendleton, Oregon a\\nBuy American certification in April 2010—shortly after Lee\\ndecided to stop all domestic manufacturing operations—rep-\\nresenting that KTurbo had “established an assembly facility\\nin Batavia, Illinois, where partial manufacturing and assem-\\nbly of all units sold in North America will be complete[d].”\\nNo one at KTurbo ever corrected that misrepresentation. At\\nthe beginning of 2011, KTurbo sent the City of Ottawa, Illinois\\na similar Buy American certification, signed by Trinity Lee,\\nwhich stated: “All assembly of the completed unit will be ex-\\necuted domestically. The assembly process includes wiring\\nand panel assembly, riveted frame assembly, total assembly\\nincluding all internal connections and power wiring, tubing\\nand final calibration will be perofrmaned [sic] at KTurbo USA\\nin Batavia, IL.” None of that certification was truthful, but it\\nwas emblematic of KTurbo’s fraudulent scheme. United States\\nv. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 2017) (jurors are per-\\nmitted to infer fraudulent methodologies from evidence of\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nsimilar fraudulent transactions). KTurbo repeatedly assured\\nmunicipalities and their general contractors of its Recovery\\nAct compliance. Several customers testified at trial about their\\nbelief that KTurbo made its turbo blowers in the United\\nStates.\\n KTurbo also misled its own sales representatives into\\nthinking KTurbo manufactured turbo blowers in Batavia, not\\nSouth Korea. These sales representatives testified they told\\ncustomers—based on KTurbo’s representations to them—that\\nKTurbo complied with the Buy American provision because\\nit manufactured and assembled its blowers in Batavia. Lee\\nmasterminded these material misrepresentations, even if he\\nused sales representatives to pass them on to the ultimate cus-\\ntomers. See United States v. Seidling, 737 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (“Nothing in the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. § 1341\\nrequires a scheme to defraud to involve deception of the same\\nperson or entity whose money or property is the intended ob-\\nject of the scheme.”). He is responsible for misrepresentations\\nhe commanded or willfully caused others to make as\\nKTurbo’s chief executive. 18 U.S.C. § 2; see also United States v.\\nGunning, 984 F.2d 1476, 1483 (7th Cir. 1993) (“One who coun-\\nsels or commands another to commit a crime, and knowingly\\nand actively contributes toward its success, is guilty of that\\ncrime under 18 U.S.C. § 2.”).\\n But Lee himself also actively participated in the cover up.\\nDuring his trial cross-examination, Lee acknowledged he\\nknew that KTurbo’s customers and the EPA cared about Buy\\nAmerican compliance. But he admitted he told customers that\\nKTurbo blowers were manufactured and assembled in the\\nUnited States. When a sales representative asked Lee about\\nBuy American compliance in a September 2010 email, Lee\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 21\\n\\nresponded: “We assemble and test in Chicago. Only motor\\nand VFD comes from Korea. It is almost Made In USA.” Lee\\nmade that statement months after KTurbo stopped assembly\\nin the United States. Even as the scheme began to unravel in\\nearly 2011, Lee persisted in his lies. On January 28, 2011, a\\nsales representative directly asked Lee about a rumor that fed-\\neral agents were investigating KTurbo. Lee responded by en-\\nsuring him that KTurbo faced no Recovery Act issues: “Most\\nimportant parts is [sic] final assembly and testing. We are do-\\ning those, so we are compliant.” Then, on February 8, 2011,\\nwhen representatives of Pendleton, Oregon, asked KTurbo\\nwhere its turbo blowers would be assembled, Lee wrote: “In\\nChicago the blowers will be finalized and tested and\\nshipped.”\\n Lee also challenges the government’s proof of his intent to\\ndefraud. A defendant acts with an intent to defraud where he\\nacts “willfully and with specific intent to deceive or cheat,\\nusually for the purpose of getting financial gain for himself or\\ncausing financial loss to another.” United States v. Pust, 798\\nF.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Paneras,\\n222 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2000)). Lee claims the government\\nfailed to prove he intended to defraud anyone because the\\ntrial evidence showed KTurbo took concrete steps toward\\nmanufacturing turbo blowers in the United States.\\n Lee’s intent argument ignores that his misrepresentations\\ncontinued well beyond April 2010, when he decided to stop\\nKTurbo’s American manufacturing operations. That Lee kept\\ntelling people KTurbo assembled its turbo blowers in Batavia\\nmonths after KTurbo ceased doing so is strong circumstantial\\nevidence of Lee’s intent to defraud. Pust, 798 F.3d at 600–01\\n(specific intent to defraud may be established by\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\ncircumstantial evidence and examination of the scheme it-\\nself). Agents’ discovery of copies of the EPA’s guidance mem-\\noranda on the Buy American provision, as well as testimony\\nfrom other KTurbo employees about the extent of KTurbo’s\\nRecovery Act meetings and planning, support the conclusion\\nthat Lee willfully attempted to circumvent the law.\\n A jury also could reasonably conclude that Lee never in-\\ntended to make turbo blowers in Batavia long term, but rather\\nset up the facility as part of his scheme to mislead the EPA,\\nsales representatives, and customers. Cf. United States v. Freed,\\n921 F.3d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding a promise made\\nwithout a present intention to keep it can be fraudulent). After\\nall, Lee did not wait even a full three months before putting\\nthe kibosh on the entire operation. Viewing the evidence in\\nthe light most favorable to the prosecution, there is more than\\nenough to conclude Lee intended to deceive and defraud\\nKTurbo’s customers.\\n The trial evidence presented over the course of eight days\\nadequately supports Lee’s participation in a scheme to de-\\nfraud and his intent to do so. Lee does not challenge his use\\nof interstate wires as a part of that scheme. With all three ele-\\nments of wire fraud adequately established in the trial record,\\nwe affirm the jury’s verdict.\\n B. Smuggling Convictions\\n We turn now from Lee’s wire fraud convictions to his three\\nsmuggling convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 545. The statute pro-\\nvides, in part:\\n Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or\\n brings into the United States, any merchandise\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 23\\n\\n contrary to law … Shall be fined under this title\\n or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.\\n Over a century ago, when dealing with the predecessor to\\n§ 545, the Supreme Court held the words “contrary to law”\\nrefer to legal provisions outside the statute itself. Keck v.\\nUnited States, 172 U.S. 434, 437 (1899). A violation of § 545 re-\\nquires a violation of another law—the predicate offense if you\\nwill—done with a fraudulent or knowing mindset. In this\\ncase, the government claimed Lee violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a):\\n [E]very article of foreign origin … imported into\\n the United States shall be marked in a conspic-\\n uous place as legibly, indelibly, and perma-\\n nently as the nature of the article (or container)\\n will permit in such manner as to indicate to an\\n ultimate purchaser in the United States the Eng-\\n lish name of the country of origin of the article.\\n Lee asserts that a violation of § 1304(a) cannot serve as a\\npredicate offense for a § 545 conviction. According to Lee, the\\nwords “imports … merchandise contrary to law” in § 545\\nmean that the merchandise itself is per se illegal to import, not\\nmerely that the merchandise was imported in a condition\\nnoncompliant with some federal law or regulation some-\\nwhere.\\n In making this argument, Lee stresses the title of § 545:\\n“Smuggling goods into the United States.” He contends the\\nword “smuggling” refers exclusively to bringing on shore\\ngoods whose importation is categorically prohibited. Lee ef-\\nfectively says he could not have “smuggled” the turbo blow-\\ners into the United States because turbo blowers are allowed\\nin the United States.\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n Even accepting Lee’s narrow interpretation of the word\\n“smuggling,”8 the text of the statute is not so cabined when\\nexamined in its entirety. Section 545 contains two separate\\nprohibitions; we must consider both when assessing the stat-\\nute’s meaning. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805)\\n(Marshall, C.J.) (“It is undoubtedly a well established\\nprinciple in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be\\nconsidered, and the intent of the legislature to be extracted\\nfrom the whole.”). Section 545’s first paragraph, which is not\\nat issue, criminalizes “knowingly and willfully …\\nsmuggl[ing], or clandestinely introduc[ing] … into the United\\nStates any merchandise which should have been in-\\nvoiced … .” That language criminalizes smuggling goods into\\nthe United States, and the statute’s title summarizes that pro-\\nhibition. But § 545’s second paragraph—the one that is at is-\\nsue—is broader. It criminalizes “fraudulently or knowingly\\nimport[ing] … any merchandise contrary to law … .” The text\\nof the second paragraph of § 545 makes no mention of the\\nword “smuggling.”\\n A statute’s title or heading is a permissible indicator of the\\nmeaning of its text. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083\\n(2015); see also ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER,\\n\\n8 We have some doubt that the term is quite so limited. Cf. Smuggling,\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The crime of importing or ex-\\nporting illegal articles or articles on which duties have not been paid.”);\\nSmuggling, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“The criminal of-\\nfense of knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States,\\nclandestinely introducing into the United States any merchandise which\\nshould have been declared for customs duty.”); Smuggle, AMERICAN\\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2019) (“To\\nbring into a country (a prohibited item) secretively and intentionally in\\nviolation of the law.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 25\\n\\nREADING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 221 (2012).\\nBut a title cannot override the statutory text itself. Bhd. of R.R.\\nTrainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29\\n(1947). Although § 545—true to its title—outlaws smuggling\\ngoods into the United States, the statute also criminalizes the\\nfraudulent or knowing importation of “merchandise contrary\\nto law.” Lee’s construction of that language as equating with\\n“smuggling” renders the two provisions of § 545 duplicative,\\na heavily disfavored result. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.\\n759, 778 (1988) (discussing the “cardinal rule of statutory in-\\nterpretation that no provision should be construed to be en-\\ntirely redundant”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 175.\\nThe better reading of the second paragraph of § 545 is that it\\nmakes it a crime to fraudulently or knowingly import mer-\\nchandise in any manner contrary to law. Section 545’s title\\ncannot save Lee from its text.\\n Lee next argues the case law is on his side. He claims the\\ncases only address scenarios where the defendant imported\\ngoods that are illegal per se—barred entirely from importa-\\ntion into the United States. That might be true, but it would\\nnot change the meaning of § 545. The scope of a statute cannot\\nbe altered based on the fact patterns of cases that happen to\\nbe charged and end up in the Federal Reporter. In any event,\\nLee’s assertions about the state of the case law are inaccurate.\\nHis cited authorities, Babb v. United States, 218 F.2d 538 (5th\\nCir. 1955) and Steiner v. United States, 229 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.\\n1956), dealt with indictments that failed to identify an under-\\nlying violation to serve as the predicate for § 545 liability. The\\nindictments simply lacked any predicate offense undergird-\\ning the § 545 charge. We do not have that here: the govern-\\nment’s indictment specifically accused Lee of violating\\n§ 1304(a).\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n And despite Lee’s attempts, we do not see how this case is\\ndistinguishable from United States v. Kuipers, 49 F.3d 1254 (7th\\nCir. 1995).9 In Kuipers, we affirmed the defendant’s § 545 con-\\nviction for attempting to import the horns of a protected spe-\\ncies under false paperwork. Id. at 1256. It was legal to import\\nthe horns into the United States with the proper paperwork,\\nbut the defendant used forged documentation to circumvent\\nthe law. Here, Lee essentially did the same thing. Nothing\\nprohibited Lee from importing turbo blowers into the United\\nStates, but he needed to do so with a proper country-of-origin\\ndesignation under § 1304(a). Lee circumvented that require-\\nment in a fraudulent fashion, similar to the defendant in\\nKuipers.\\n Lee also claims he could not have violated § 545 because\\nU.S. Customs detained the turbo blowers at the border, such\\nthat the machines were never imported into the country. But\\nLee fails to provide any reason to exclude domestic U.S. Cus-\\ntoms facilities from the definition of the “United States,” as\\nused in § 545. If anything, the text supports the opposite con-\\nclusion, specifically excluding other areas but not U.S.\\nCustoms offices. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (“The term ‘United States’, as\\nused in this section, shall not include the Virgin Island, Amer-\\nican Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef,\\nJohnston Island, or Guam.”); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1304(j) (refer-\\nring to merchandise held by U.S. Customs for inspection as\\nan “imported article”).\\n\\n\\n9 Lee’s claim that Kuipers dealt with only the first paragraph of § 545, and\\nnot the second, is not correct. 49 F.3d at 1256 (“Kuipers was indicted on\\nMarch 1, 1994 for … (2) fraudulently and knowingly importing the Desert\\nBighorn Sheep into the United States contrary to law\\n(18 U.S.C. § 545) … .”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 27\\n\\n Lee notes that federal law allows mismarked goods, after\\ntheir markings are corrected, to be imported. 19 U.S.C.\\n§ 1304(j); see also 19 C.F.R. § 134.51. He emphasizes that § 1304\\ndoes not itself purport to criminalize mismarking a product’s\\ncountry of origin, despite providing criminal sanctions for\\nother violations. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(l) (penalizing anyone who\\n“defaces, destroys, removes, alters, covers, obscures, or oblit-\\nerates” a country-of-origin mark with intent to conceal that\\ninformation). Yet one federal statute does not preempt\\nanother. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2004).\\nSection 1304(l)’s silence cannot override the text of § 545. The\\nfact § 1304(l) does not separately criminalize conduct already\\noutlawed under § 545 is not a basis for limiting the scope of\\n§ 545. Cf. United States v. Hassanzadeh, 271 F.3d 574, 576–79\\n(4th Cir. 2001) (affirming § 545 conviction based on underly-\\ning § 1304 labeling violation).10\\n Finally, Lee claims treating § 1304 violations as predicate\\noffenses for § 545 liability will criminalize a vast array of in-\\nnocent behavior in international commerce. This policy argu-\\nment fails to account for § 545’s high scienter bar—fraudulent\\nor knowing misbehavior. Such a scienter requirement ensures\\n\\n\\n10 Lee’s invocation of United States ex rel. Huangyan Import v. Nature’s Farm\\n\\nProds., 370 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Cal. 2005), is not well received, particu-\\nlarly his selective and misleading quotation. Although the opinion states\\nfederal regulations “permit the importation of mismarked goods,” Lee\\nleaves out the important qualifying language about the monetary penal-\\nties imposed in such circumstances. Id. at 1001. And, as the underlying\\nstatute makes clear, goods originally mismarked upon arrival may be\\nwithheld until their country-of-origin markings are corrected. 19 U.S.C.\\n§ 1304(i)–(j). Nothing in the Huangyan Import opinion suggests that at-\\ntempting to import merchandise with false country-of-origin designations\\nis anything but “contrary to law.”\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nthe statute does not criminalize innocent commercial mis-\\ntakes. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2019)\\n(“The cases in which we have emphasized scienter’s\\nimportance in separating wrongful from innocent acts are le-\\ngion.”). And this case involves no mere administrative over-\\nsight. KTurbo’s mislabeling served an important function in\\nLee’s broader scheme to deceive KTurbo customers about the\\norigin of the turbo blowers.\\n For all these reasons, we affirm Lee’s three smuggling con-\\nvictions.\\n Having affirmed all Lee’s convictions, we now proceed to\\nthe sentencing issues presented by the parties. We first ad-\\ndress the government’s cross-appeal regarding Lee’s prison\\nsentence, before resolving Lee’s challenge to the restitution\\nordered by the district court.\\n C. The Government’s Cross-Appeal\\n The government asks us to reinstate the 20-month\\nsentence the district court originally imposed. It claims the\\ndistrict court lacked authority under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) to\\nreduce Lee’s sentence to 12 months. But before we reach the\\nmerits of the government’s cross-appeal, we must resolve two\\njurisdictional questions.\\n 1. Is there statutory jurisdiction for the government’s\\n cross-appeal?\\n The government may appeal an adverse decision in a\\ncriminal case only if expressly authorized by statute. United\\nStates v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977). Here,\\nthe government cites 18 U.S.C. § 3731. But that provision does\\nnot apply—the government is not appealing a dismissal of its\\nindictment, a new trial order, or any of the other issues listed\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 29\\n\\nin § 3731. See United States v. Spilotro, 884 F.2d 1003, 1005–06\\n(7th Cir. 1989) (holding § 3731 does not provide jurisdiction\\nfor appeals challenging “a district court order reducing a sen-\\ntence”); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., 15B FED. PRAC.\\n& PROC. § 3919.8 (2d ed. April 2019 supp.) (“Ordinarily the\\ngovernment cannot rely upon either § 1291 or § 3731 to sup-\\nport appeal from a criminal sentence … .”).\\n The relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), which author-\\nizes the government to appeal a defendant’s sentence on spe-\\ncific grounds. A district court’s modification of a sentence\\nwithout authority to do so, as the government argues here, is\\none such ground. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(1) (providing the gov-\\nernment the ability to appeal sentences “imposed in violation\\nof law”). The government’s errant citation is not insignificant,\\ngiven that timeliness is an issue for its cross-appeal (as dis-\\ncussed below). Section 3731 contains a 30-day deadline for fil-\\ning a notice of appeal that § 3742(b) lacks. See CHARLES ALAN\\nWRIGHT, ET AL., 16A FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3950.8 (4th ed. April\\n2019 supp.); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186,\\n1195–99 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing the interplay between\\n§ 3731 and FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)). Nevertheless, where the rec-\\nord provides enough information to establish appellate juris-\\ndiction, we may exercise such jurisdiction despite the parties’\\nfailure to direct us to its proper statutory source. See NewPage\\nWis. Sys. Inc. v. United Steel Workers Int’l Union, 651 F.3d 775,\\n778 (7th Cir. 2011) (if the jurisdictional statute cited by a party\\nis inaccurate, the “court still must inquire whether another\\nstatute supplies jurisdiction”); see also In re Sealed Case, 449\\nF.3d 118, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding the appellant’s failure\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nto cite § 3742, “while bothersome to a court, is not necessarily\\nfatal”).\\n One issue remains: Section 3742(b) requires the govern-\\nment to obtain “the personal approval of the Attorney\\nGeneral, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general\\ndesignated by the Solicitor General” in order to appeal. Be-\\ncause the government did not rely on § 3742(b) in its briefing,\\nit has not provided proof of its compliance with that statutory\\nrequirement. But our circuit precedent does not treat\\n§ 3742(b)’s approval requirement as jurisdictional. United\\nStates v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170, 172 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994).11\\nNothing in the record suggests the government lacks author-\\nization to pursue its cross-appeal, and Lee never raised the\\nissue.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n11 See also United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 2008)\\n(personal approval requirement in § 3742(b) is non-jurisdictional), abro-\\ngated on different grounds by United States v. DiFalco, 837 F.3d 1207, 1216\\n(11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ruiz-Alonso, 397 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir.\\n2005) (same); United States v. Zamudio, 314 F.3d 517, 520 (10th Cir. 2002)\\n(same); United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1102 (2d Cir. 1992) (same);\\nbut see United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000) (per\\ncuriam) (dismissing the government’s sentencing appeal for failure to es-\\ntablish the requisite approval); United States v. Smith, 910 F.2d 326, 328 (6th\\nCir. 1990) (holding the approval is not jurisdictional but requiring proof\\nthat it has been obtained as part of the court’s “exercise of its supervisory\\nauthority”); cf. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 246 (2008) (explain-\\ning that an appellate court may not increase a defendant’s sentence absent\\na cross-appeal because “Congress … entrusted to named high-ranking of-\\nficials within the Department of Justice responsibility for determining\\nwhether the Government, on behalf of the public, should seek a sentence\\nhigher than the one imposed”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 31\\n\\n 2. Did the government file its notice of appeal in time?\\n The next jurisdictional question concerns the timeliness of\\nthe government’s notice of appeal. In a criminal case like this,\\nFED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B) provides the government’s deadline:\\n When the government is entitled to appeal, its\\n notice of appeal must be filed in the district\\n court within 30 days of the later of:\\n (i) the entry of the judgment or order be-\\n ing appealed; or\\n (ii) the filing of a notice of appeal by any\\n defendant.\\nThe government must file its own notice of appeal to pursue\\na sentencing increase following a conviction; it cannot piggy-\\nback on the defendant’s notice. Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 252–53.\\n Here, the relevant timeline looks like this:\\n February 28, 2018: The district court orally sen-\\n tenced Lee to 20 months in prison.\\n March 11, 2018: Lee filed his first notice of appeal\\n and a Rule 35(a) motion to correct his sentence.\\n March 14, 2018: The district court modified Lee’s\\n sentence to 12 months in prison and entered its\\n written judgment.\\n March 28, 2018: Lee filed his second notice of ap-\\n peal.\\n April 27, 2018: The government cross-appealed.\\n The government does not rely on the date of judgment un-\\nder Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(i). It cannot, as it filed its notice of appeal\\n45 days after the district court’s judgment. But what about\\n\\f32 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii)? The government’s notice of appeal came\\n30 days after Lee’s second notice of appeal, but 48 days after\\nLee’s first notice. Which of Lee’s notices triggered the govern-\\nment’s deadline clock?\\n As with any matter of statutory interpretation, the text\\ncontrols. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt,\\n139 S. Ct. 1507, 1512–13 (2019); see also SCALIA & GARNER,\\nsupra, at 56 (“The words of a governing text are of paramount\\nconcern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the\\ntext means.”). Notably, Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii) refers to “a notice of\\nappeal by any defendant” rather than “the first notice of ap-\\npeal by any defendant.” That is important because the analo-\\ngous rule for civil cases triggers a party’s deadline to initiate\\na cross-appeal on “the date when the first notice [of appeal]\\nwas filed … .” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) (emphasis added). The\\ndrafters could have used the same language for the criminal\\nrule, but they chose different words. We must respect that de-\\ncision and give such variations effect. Murphy v. Smith, 138 S.\\nCt. 784, 787–88 (2018); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 170\\n(“[A] material variation in terms suggests a variation in mean-\\ning.”).\\n Lee offers no persuasive reason to interpret “a notice of\\nappeal by any defendant” to mean “the first notice of appeal\\nby any defendant.” The text of the rule already contemplates\\nthere may be multiple notices of appeal, and it allows the gov-\\nernment to file its cross-appeal within thirty days of the “later\\nof” such notices. The only authority Lee offers, Cyrak v. Lemon,\\n919 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1990), is a civil case addressing Rule 4(a),\\nwhich expressly refers to the “first notice.” Rather than\\nsimply analogize criminal cases to civil cases, as Lee asks us\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 33\\n\\nto do, we give effect to the different text of the different pro-\\nvisions and apply the rules as written.\\n Rule 4(b) permits the government to file its notice of ap-\\npeal within thirty days of “a notice of appeal by any defend-\\nant.” Lee timely filed “a notice of appeal” on March 28, 2018.\\nAnd the government filed its notice exactly thirty days later,\\non April 27, 2018, so the government’s appeal is timely under\\nthe plain meaning of FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B)(ii).\\n 3. In reducing Lee’s sentence, did the district court ex-\\n ceed its authority?\\n Now we arrive at the substance of the government’s cross-\\nappeal. The government claims district courts lack authority\\nto revisit advisory guideline calculations on a motion brought\\nunder FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). It does not challenge the merits\\nof the district court’s ruling, only the court’s authority to\\nmake it. Rule 35(a) states: “Within 14 days after sentencing,\\nthe court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmet-\\nical, technical, or other clear error.”\\n In sentencing Lee, the district court struggled with how to\\ncalculate the “loss” caused by Lee’s crimes for purposes of\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Where the loss cannot be determined, the\\nGuidelines permit courts to look at the defendant’s gain as an\\nalternative. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n. 3(B). The district court\\noriginally found Lee’s gain to be the $180,392 in Recovery Act\\nfunds paid to KTurbo by municipalities. That put Lee’s guide-\\nline range at 46–57 months, although the district court de-\\nparted down from that range and sentenced Lee to 20 months.\\n The district court abandoned that math on Lee’s Rule 35(a)\\nmotion. Based on United States v. Giovenco, 773 F.3d 866, 871\\n(7th Cir. 2014), the court determined it needed to assess net\\n\\f34 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nprofit, rather than KTurbo’s gross revenue, and that it lacked\\nthe evidentiary record to do so. It therefore decided not to ap-\\nply any sentencing enhancement based on Lee’s gain under\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Using a guideline range of 12–18 months, the\\ncourt sentenced Lee to 12 months plus one day.\\n The government emphasizes that a district court’s author-\\nity on a Rule 35(a) motion is “narrow.” As we have said, the\\n“Rule does not give the district court a second chance to exer-\\ncise its ‘discretion with regard to the application of the sen-\\ntencing guidelines,’ nor does it allow for changes to a sentence\\nbased on the court’s change of mind.” United States v. Clark,\\n538 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 35\\nadvisory committee’s note to 1991 amendments). Still, Rule\\n35(a) is not the straitjacket the government suggests. It does\\nallow district courts to correct “clear errors” and avoid waste-\\nful appeals by fixing obvious sentencing issues. United States\\nv. Schenian, 847 F.3d 422, 424 (7th Cir. 2017). This extends to\\nclear errors that produce mistakenly high sentences. Id. If the\\njudge identifies an aspect of the sentence that is objectively\\nerroneous—whether on a factual matter or a point of law—\\nthe judge may use Rule 35(a) to address the problem.\\n Here, the district court realized that its gain calculation\\nneeded to assess net profit, not gross revenue, see Giovenco,\\n773 F.3d at 871, and that it lacked an evidentiary basis to do\\nso. It also determined nothing in the record showed how\\nmuch Lee personally gained from KTurbo’s sales. The govern-\\nment bore the burden to establish a “loss” or “gain” under\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. United States v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438, 454 (7th\\nCir. 2012). Sentencing Lee without a supporting evidentiary\\nrecord would have constituted clear error. Id. at 456–57. Rule\\n35(a)’s entire purpose is to correct errors otherwise destined\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 35\\n\\nto be reversed. Schenian, 847 F.3d at 424; Clark, 538 F.3d at 809.\\nThe district court was thus well within its authority to modify\\nLee’s sentence on his Rule 35(a) motion.\\n D. Restitution\\n Finally, we return to Lee’s appeal, specifically his chal-\\nlenge to the restitution ordered by the district court.\\n Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, courts must\\norder restitution to any victim of “an offense against property\\nunder this title, … including any offense committed by fraud\\nor deceit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). The statute sets the\\nrestitution amount at the value of the victim’s lost property\\non the date of loss or the date of sentencing (whichever is\\ngreater) minus the value of any returned property. 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3663A(b)(1)(B); see also United States v. Malone, 747 F.3d 481,\\n485 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n On appeal, Lee objects to paying any restitution, denying\\nthat any municipality sustained a loss. He acknowledges that\\ntwo municipalities, Mishawaka, Indiana and Redmond,\\nOregon, paid KTurbo a total of $180,392 for turbo blowers\\nmanufactured in South Korea. But Lee points out that the EPA\\nsubsequently authorized Mishawaka and Redmond to con-\\ntinue using the KTurbo blowers without returning the Recov-\\nery Act funds. So Lee argues neither municipality sustained\\nany loss: each paid for turbo blowers to use on its project, and\\neach received turbo blowers that it is using on its project.\\n But Lee waived this argument in the district court. The\\nprobation office recommended the court order $180,392 in\\nrestitution based on the sums paid by Mishawaka and\\n\\f36 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRedmond.12 The government agreed with probation’s recom-\\nmendation. Despite the fact the district court held three\\nsentencing hearings, Lee failed to raise the issue of restitution,\\neven once. Lee failed to object in his written sentencing mem-\\norandum, and he failed to raise the issue in his Rule 35(a) mo-\\ntion. Indeed, Lee’s entire argument regarding restitution in\\nthe district court comprised two sentences in a supplemental\\nbrief requested by the court on a different topic, with no cita-\\ntions to any statutory authority or case law supporting his po-\\nsition.13 That is insufficient to preserve an objection.\\n The closer question is whether Lee affirmatively waived\\nthe restitution arguments he now pursues on appeal, or\\nwhether he only forfeited them. Waiver requires the inten-\\ntional relinquishment of a known right, while forfeiture is a\\nmere accidental or neglectful failure to assert a right. United\\nStates v. Hathaway, 882 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2018). The dis-\\ntinction is important, as waiver precludes appellate review al-\\ntogether, while forfeited rights may be vindicated on appeal\\nthrough plain-error review. Id. In making this determination,\\n\\n12 Neither of these municipal contracts served as a basis for any of the five\\n\\ncounts of wire fraud in the indictment. Ordinarily restitution is limited to\\nthe losses caused by the specific conduct underlying the defendant’s con-\\nvictions. United States v. Locke, 759 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2014). But where\\nthe offense “involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of\\ncriminal activity,” such as the scheme to defraud necessary for a wire\\nfraud conviction, the applicable statute permits courts to award restitution\\nto “any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the\\ncourse of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2).\\n13 In the district court Lee argued: “Since the loss amount is zero, the res-\\ntitution amount is also zero. And the government’s motion to use Heon\\nSeok Lee’s bond deposit to pay restitution (Dkt # 239) should therefore be\\ndenied.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 37\\n\\nwe look to whether the defendant “chose, as a matter of strat-\\negy, not to present the argument.” Id. (quoting United States v.\\nGarcia, 580 F.3d 528, 541 (7th Cir. 2009)).\\n After reviewing the extensive sentencing transcripts in\\nthis case, we conclude Lee and his counsel made a strategic\\ndecision to not press objections to restitution in the district\\ncourt, and thus waived the issue. The main event during the\\nsentencing was the loss calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Yet\\nrestitution did come up. At the first hearing, Lee’s counsel in-\\nterjected, “I would also just note since restitution is brought\\nup—been brought up, that the restitution amount I don’t\\nthink needs to be above 180.” Rather than argue the district\\ncourt should not order restitution because there was no loss,\\nas he does now, Lee asked the district court to not go above\\nthe $180,392 figure recommended by the probation office.14\\nAlthough Lee did include a two-sentence objection to restitu-\\ntion in his supplemental memorandum before the second\\nhearing, he never raised the issue at the second hearing itself,\\ndespite the prosecution addressing the topic. Lee never men-\\ntioned restitution in his Rule 35(a) motion. And, at the third\\nsentencing hearing, when the district court noted its intention\\nto enter the same $180,392 in restitution (despite reducing\\nLee’s prison term on account of the government’s failure to\\nprove the loss amount), Lee’s counsel represented, “I think\\nthat’s correct as to what should—what would be in the judg-\\nment.” These repeated decisions to press other arguments,\\nand not address restitution, evinced a “tactical choice” on\\n\\n14 Lee made this point in the context of a debate about whether the loss\\nfigure under the Sentencing Guidelines should be the $1.6 million face\\nvalue of KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts. Lee’s incentive to push the dis-\\ntrict court toward a figure substantially lower than that was clear.\\n\\f38 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nLee’s part, constituting waiver. United States v. Jin Hua Dong,\\n675 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n We realize there is some logical tension between the dis-\\ntrict court’s restitution award, and its conclusion that it lacked\\na sufficient evidentiary basis to determine victims’ “loss” for\\npurposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.15 But the appropriate forum for\\naddressing that issue was the district court in the first in-\\nstance. Calculating restitution in an atypical fraud case such\\nas this one is difficult, as the losses caused by a scheme to cir-\\ncumvent governmental purchasing preferences are “inher-\\nently difficult to quantify.” United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773,\\n794 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court was entitled to the bene-\\nfit of the parties’ best arguments on how restitution should be\\ncalculated. By strategically choosing to forego his challenge to\\nthe restitution figure in the district court, Lee waived the is-\\nsue: “A defendant cannot squirrel away objections, revealing\\nthem only upon successive appeals.” Kuipers, 49 F.3d at 1258.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Heon Seok Lee repeatedly lied about where his company\\nmanufactured its products in order to profit off a federal stim-\\nulus package. Such a fraudulent scheme is wire fraud and\\nprohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1343. To execute his scheme, Lee di-\\nrected his company to mislabel the country of origin for its\\n\\n15 Although the restitution amount typically tracks the loss amount under\\n\\nthe Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. McGee, 612 F.3d 627, 635 (7th\\nCir. 2010), courts must be careful not to confuse the two given the differ-\\nences between the definitions of “loss” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and restitu-\\ntion under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B). United States v. Hussein, 664 F.3d\\n155, 161 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The amount of restitution does not always\\ncorrespond to guidelines loss because the rules for calculating each dif-\\nfer.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 39\\n\\nproducts and attempt to import them with those incorrect\\ndesignations. This violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) and the federal\\nprohibition against smuggling, 18 U.S.C. § 545, and evidence\\nsupported the jury’s verdict on those counts. As to Lee’s sen-\\ntence, although the government timely appealed, the district\\ncourt did not exceed its authority when it revisited Lee’s sen-\\ntencing guidelines range and modified Lee’s prison sentence\\naccordingly. Finally, Lee waived any objection to how the dis-\\ntrict court calculated restitution. We therefore AFFIRM the\\njudgment of the district court in full.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4431886/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRENNAN, Circuit Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KANNE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BARRETT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRENNAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KANNE\": \", Circuit\", \"BARRETT\": \", Circuit\", \"BRENNAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654633/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":8,"string":"8"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Heon Seok Lee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIn the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee/\n Cross-Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nHEON SEOK LEE,\n Defendant-Appellant/\n Cross-Appellee.\n ____________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\n No. 1:12-cr-00109-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\n ____________________\n\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\n ____________________\n\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Crowbar in hand, U.S. Customs\nOfficer Jorge Parra spent December 8, 2010 “cracking open\ncontainers” at a warehouse near the Los Angeles seaport.\nParra pried open one from South Korea to inspect its freight.\nInside he found a fully assembled, five-foot tall industrial fan\n\f2 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\ncalled a turbo blower. A placard riveted to the side read, “As-\nsembled in USA.”\n Presented with a fully assembled machine fresh off the\nboat from South Korea, which brazenly advertised its assem-\nbly in the United States, little sleuthing was required to deter-\nmine something was amiss. Parra’s discovery kicked off a\nfederal investigation that traced back to the defendant in this\ncase, Heon Seok Lee. Prosecutors eventually charged Lee with\nexecuting a scheme to defraud local governments by falsely\nrepresenting that his company manufactured its turbo blow-\ners in the United States.\n A grand jury indicted Lee on five counts of wire fraud and\nthree counts of smuggling. After a trial, the jury found Lee\nguilty on all counts. Lee now appeals his convictions and the\nrestitution ordered, and the government cross-appeals Lee’s\nprison sentence. We find no fault in the trial or the sentence.\n I. Background\n A. The Recovery Act\n This criminal case has an atypical origin: an economic\nstimulus package. Congress passed the American Recovery\nand Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115\n(2009)—which we will simply call the “Recovery Act”—to\njumpstart the flagging domestic economy during the Great\nRecession. See Kameron Hillstrom, The American Recovery and\nReinvestment Act: A Fitting Future for Recovery Legislation, 44\nPUB. CONTRACT L. J. 285, 288 (2015). The Recovery Act ear-\nmarked billions to fund public infrastructure projects. Id. at\n289 (noting the Recovery Act made $261.2 billion available for\nsuch projects).\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 3\n\n Relevant to this case, Congress allocated $6.4 billion to the\nEPA for water-infrastructure improvements. The EPA did not\nspend the money directly; instead it awarded grants to “re-\nvolving funds” administered by the States. After receiving\nEPA grants, the revolving funds then issued low-interest\nloans to local municipalities or agencies sponsoring specific\nprojects. Those local governments were then responsible for\nhiring contractors to perform the work.\n To achieve Congress’s objective of bolstering the Ameri-\ncan economy, the Recovery Act included the following do-\nmestic purchasing requirement, commonly known as the\n“Buy American” provision:\n None of the funds appropriated or otherwise\n made available by this Act may be used for a\n project for the construction, alteration, mainte-\n nance, or repair of a public building or public\n work unless all of the iron, steel, and manufac-\n tured goods used in the project are produced in\n the United States.\nRecovery Act § 1605(a), 123 Stat. 303.1\n At first glance, this requirement seems straightforward.\nBut federal agencies struggled to pin down what it means for\na product to have been “produced in the United States.” Dif-\nferent agencies used different tests. See Thomas D. Blanford,\nNavigating the Recovery Act’s Buy American Rule in State and\nLocal Government Construction, 46 PROCUREMENT LAWYER 3, 4\n(Fall 2010) (listing five tests used by different agencies). The\n\n1 The Recovery Act’s Buy American provision should not be confused\nwith the separate, much older, Buy American Act of 1933,\n41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305.\n\f4 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nEPA adopted the “substantial transformation” standard to\nadminister the Recovery Act, and it developed a three-part\ntest to assess whether a manufacturer substantially trans-\nformed a product within the United States.\n As a condition to receiving Recovery Act funding, local\ngovernments and their contractors were required to abide by\nthe Buy American provision. Federal agencies like the EPA\naudited projects to ensure compliance. Local governments re-\nquired their suppliers to complete “Buy American certifica-\ntions” representing that their products complied with the stat-\nute.\n B. KTurbo’s Initial Plan\n Heon Seok Lee founded KTurbo Inc. in his homeland of\nSouth Korea. KTurbo manufactures centrifugal turbo blow-\ners—large industrial fans used to provide oxygen for biologi-\ncal water treatments in wastewater facilities. Turbo blowers\nare sophisticated and expensive pieces of equipment, requir-\ning on-site programming, testing, and calibration.\n Lee saw the Recovery Act as a growth opportunity for\nKTurbo, whose penetration into the United States market was\nlimited at the time. The Recovery Act earmarked billions for\nproducts like KTurbo’s turbo blowers. But KTurbo would be\nunable to tap into those funds unless it demonstrated compli-\nance with the Buy American provision. So, Lee and his sister,\nTrinity Lee,2 developed a Recovery Act plan. They researched\nregulatory guidance from the EPA and monitored larger com-\npetitors’ responses. KTurbo leadership discussed Buy\n\n2We refer to the defendant, Heon Seok Lee, as “Lee” and Trinity Lee by\nher full name. Trinity Lee served as KTurbo’s general manager for North\nAmerica.\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 5\n\nAmerican compliance for months, with several in-depth\nmeetings that lasted hours.\n KTurbo enlisted independent sales representatives around\nthe country to market its turbo blowers to local governments\npursuing Recovery Act projects. KTurbo also consulted with\nseveral sales representatives in the early stages of its Buy\nAmerican planning. One sales representative, Dick Koch, dis-\ncouraged KTurbo from pursuing a plan to make turbo blow-\ners in South Korea, ship them to the United States, take them\napart, and then reassemble stateside. Koch warned Lee and\nKTurbo in an email that such evasive practices could be\ndeemed criminal:\n The [EPA] webcast specifically excludes Heon\n Seok’s idea of sending the equipment to the US\n and taking it apart and putting it back together.\n In fact the webcast says that if you say that is\n [Buy American] you are committing criminal\n fraud.\nTrinity Lee reassured Koch that KTurbo would use compo-\nnents from both South Korea and the United States and as-\nsemble the turbo blowers in greater Chicago. Other sales rep-\nresentatives who inquired about KTurbo’s Buy American\ncompliance plan were told the same thing, including by Lee\nhimself.\n At that point, KTurbo formed an Illinois subsidiary,\nKTurbo USA Inc.,3 leased a warehouse in Batavia, Illinois, and\nhired three American technicians. KTurbo’s sales\n\n3 The legal distinction between KTurbo Inc. and KTurbo USA Inc. does\nnot matter for purposes of this opinion, so we refer to the two companies\ncollectively as “KTurbo.”\n\f6 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nrepresentatives landed several contracts for Recovery Act\nprojects. In its bids, KTurbo highlighted its domestic presence\nand promised Buy American compliance. For example,\nKTurbo submitted a bid to South Burlington, Vermont in the\nsummer of 2009, which included the following Buy American\ncertification:\n By this letter, KTurbo USA certifies that it will\n manufacture and deliver KTurbo brand blower\n packages and equipment in compliance with\n the final requirements of the 2009 U.S. economic\n stimulus law, The American Recovery and Re-\n investment Act of 2009.\nKTurbo sent nearly identical compliance letters for projects in\nCalifornia, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Oregon.\n These representations—a South Korean company certify-\ning its product was “produced in the United States”—did not\ngo unnoticed. A competitor that lost a bid to KTurbo filed a\ncomplaint with the EPA in the fall of 2009. In response, EPA\nofficials visited KTurbo’s Batavia facility on October 30, 2009.\nDuring that visit, Lee gave a PowerPoint presentation\ndetailing KTurbo’s plans to comply with the Buy American\nprovision. He represented that KTurbo would assemble its\nturbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Slides in Lee’s presenta-\ntion indicated fifty percent of the total input costs would be\nattributable to American components, assembly, and testing.\nTrinity Lee sent the EPA a letter confirming these details a few\nweeks later.\n KTurbo manufactured its first turbo blower at the Batavia\nfacility in January 2010. It built nine more there over the next\nthree months, at a rate of one to two weeks per blower.\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 7\n\n C. The Revised Plan\n It did not take long for Lee to abandon that original plan\nto produce turbo blowers in Batavia. By April 2010, Lee con-\ncluded production costs in the United States were prohibi-\ntively expensive, and he decided to go back to importing\nturbo blowers from South Korea. Employees pushed back\nwith concerns about KTurbo’s Recovery Act compliance, but\nLee forged ahead. At trial, one of KTurbo’s technicians ex-\nplained how the component parts from South Korea began\narriving more and more fully assembled, until completely as-\nsembled blowers started showing up. No new components\nwere added to the turbo blowers once they reached Batavia.\nTechnicians simply plugged them in and ran performance ef-\nficiency tests.\n Lee’s revised plan depended on its secrecy. He instructed\nKTurbo employees not to disclose to customers the fact that\ntheir turbo blowers were made in South Korea. To evade de-\ntection, KTurbo (with Lee’s knowledge) went out of its way to\navoid shipping the machines from South Korea directly to\ncustomers. When municipalities questioned KTurbo about\nRecovery Act compliance, KTurbo simply lied. Take KTurbo’s\nMay 20, 2010 response to Lowell, Massachusetts: “The blower\nwill be assembled and tested at KTurbo’s Chicago location.”\nLee himself participated, emailing a sales representative sim-\nilar misrepresentations in September 2010: “We assemble and\ntest in Chicago. Only motor and VFD comes from Korea. It is\nalmost Made In USA.”\n But this scheme unraveled quickly. Jorge Parra’s shipyard\ndiscovery in December 2010 was the beginning of the end.\nWhen U.S. Customs detained KTurbo’s products at the bor-\nder, the company fell behind on its deliveries. This required\n\f8 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nmore lies to hide that the turbo blowers were coming from\noverseas and needed to clear U.S. Customs. When a Lowell,\nMassachusetts general contractor contacted KTurbo about the\ndelays, Joel Schomo (a KTurbo engineer) told him the Batavia\nfacility was waiting for parts to begin final assembly, even\nthough KTurbo had discontinued all assembly operations in\nBatavia months earlier. At trial, Schomo testified he told this\nlie because the Recovery Act funded Lowell’s project and he\ndid not want to raise any “red flags” that KTurbo “might not\nbe complying with the Recovery Act requirements.”\n Within two months, federal investigators executed a\nsearch warrant at the Batavia facility. Lee was present. During\nthe search, Lee admitted he was aware that the turbo blowers\nwere for Recovery Act projects, that KTurbo shipped them\nfully assembled from South Korea, and that it was “wrong”\nto do so.\n D. Lee’s Prosecution\n About a year later, a grand jury returned an indictment\nagainst Lee. It alleged he falsely represented that KTurbo’s\nturbo blowers complied with the Buy American provision\nwhen Lee knew KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities re-\nceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” The indictment also\ncharged Lee “knew that turbo blowers were substantially as-\nsembled before their arrival in the United States and did not\nrequire meaningful assembly or manufacturing in the United\nStates.”\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 9\n\n By this point, Lee had fled the country. It took three years\nto extradite him from South Korea. When the government fi-\nnally brought Lee back to appear, he responded to the indict-\nment with a series of motions to dismiss, each of which the\ndistrict court denied.\n During an eight-day trial, the government presented doz-\nens of witnesses: U.S. Customs officers, federal agents,\nKTurbo employees, sales representatives, general contractors,\nand employees of municipal customers. Lee elected to take\nthe stand, and he adamantly denied any knowledge that\nKTurbo imported fully assembled blowers into the United\nStates. On cross-examination, the government battered Lee’s\ncredibility, impeaching him with documentary evidence and\nother witnesses’ testimony. The jury ultimately convicted Lee\non all counts.\n E. Post-Trial Proceedings\n Lee filed a series of post-trial motions seeking to vacate the\njury’s verdict; the district court denied each. The district court\nheld three sentencing hearings over several months, which\ncentered on the parties’ dispute about how to calculate Lee’s\nguideline range. For wire fraud convictions, the Sentencing\nGuidelines instruct district courts to begin with a base offense\nlevel of seven and then to add levels based on the amount of\nthe “loss” caused by the defendant. U.S. SENTENCING\nGUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a)–(b) (U.S. SENTENCING\nCOMM’N Nov. 2018). In this case, the parties disputed whether\nLee should receive credit in the loss calculation for the market\nvalue of KTurbo blowers sold to customers.\n The district court initially ruled that the loss equaled the\ntotal amount KTurbo received from defrauded municipalities\n\f10 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\n(about $180,000), putting Lee’s guideline range at 46–57\nmonths. But the court gave Lee a below-guidelines prison sen-\ntence of 20 months, plus restitution. Two weeks later, Lee filed\na notice of appeal and a motion asking the district court to\ncorrect its judgment under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). The district\ncourt held a hearing on Lee’s Rule 35(a) motion, where it\nagreed with Lee’s argument on the guideline calculation and\nresentenced Lee to 12 months. After the district court entered\nits final judgment on March 14, 2018, Lee filed a second notice\nof appeal on March 28, 2018. Thirty days later, the govern-\nment cross-appealed Lee’s sentence.\n II. Discussion\n A. Wire Fraud Convictions\n We begin with Lee’s wire fraud convictions. He asks us to\nvacate them because the government’s trial evidence con-\nstructively amended the indictment and failed to prove all the\nelements of the crime.\n 1. Did the government’s case at trial impermissibly\n deviate from the indictment?\n “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-\nwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment\nof a Grand Jury … .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Founders\nadopted this grand jury requirement from English tradition,\nin which lay grand jurors considered whether a crime should\nbe charged while also protecting the accused from prosecuto-\nrial overreach. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); see\nalso Andrew D. Leipold, Grand Jury Requirement, in THE\nHERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 431 (David F. Forte &\nMatthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014). The Supreme Court has\nexplained “that a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 11\n\non charges that are not made in the indictment against him.”\nStirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960).\n Two related doctrines arise out of this Fifth Amendment\nrequirement: constructive amendment and variance. Both\nexplain differences between the government’s case in the in-\ndictment and the government’s case at trial. Constructive\namendment occurs where the trial evidence supports (or the\ncourt’s jury instructions charge) an offense not alleged in the\nindictment. United States v. Burge, 711 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir.\n2013). Variance refers to situations where the government’s\ntrial evidence “proves facts materially different from those al-\nleged in the indictment.” United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113,\n1125 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The distinction\nbetween the two doctrines is subtle, but significant. Where a\ndifferent crime has been proved (constructive amendment), it\nis error per se and the verdict must be vacated. United States\nv. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 820 (7th Cir. 2007).4 But where\nthe same crime is proved, only through evidence different\nthan the factual allegations in the indictment (variance), the\ndefendant must demonstrate prejudice to his substantial\nrights. Id.\n Lee contends the government constructively amended the\nindictment by presenting evidence of misrepresentations be-\nyond KTurbo’s Buy American certifications. He claims the in-\ndictment confined itself to the falsity of the certifications,\nwhile the government’s trial evidence focused on other lies,\n\n4 This assumes the defendant properly preserved the error in the district\ncourt. If the issue was waived or forfeited, we review only for plain error.\nUnited States v. Remsza, 77 F.3d 1039, 1043–44 (7th Cir. 1996) (assessing de-\nfendant’s constructive amendment argument under a plain error standard\ndue to defendant’s failure to raise it in the district court).\n\f12 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nsuch as false statements in sales presentations, misrepresen-\ntations to sales representatives, and misleading emails to\ngeneral contractors.\n Even if we accept as true Lee’s interpretation of the indict-\nment and his characterization of the trial evidence, it would\nnot rise to the level of a constructive amendment. The govern-\nment did not attempt to prove a crime different from the one\nalleged. See United States v. Khilchenko, 324 F.3d 917, 920 (7th\nCir. 2003) (“To effect a constructive amendment, the evidence\nat trial must establish offenses different from or in addition to\nthose charged by the grand jury.”). Prosecutors did not argue\nLee committed mail fraud when the indictment charged wire\nfraud. The government’s case at trial did not attempt to prove\na fraud in the air compressor market after alleging a scheme\nin the turbo blower market. Constructive amendments arise\n“where there is a ‘complex of facts distinctly different from\nthose set forth in the charging instrument and not where there\nis a single set of facts.’” United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306,\n314 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d\n584, 586 (9th Cir. 1984)). Here, the government consistently\nmaintained that Lee committed wire fraud by selling turbo\nblowers made in South Korea as if they were made in the\nUnited States.\n Lee’s argument is more aptly characterized as one of vari-\nance, although he does not frame it that way. Even if the crime\ncharged remains consistent, it is a problem if the government\nmaterially alters the factual underpinnings of that charge. See\nUnited States v. Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 1983)\n(defendant may establish reversible error where the variance\naltered an essential or material element of the charge). But\nvariance claims are subject to harmless error review—we will\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 13\n\nnot disturb a conviction on account of “a technical deficiency\nof no prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Russell v. United\nStates, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962)). No prejudice exists in this\ncase.\n First, despite Lee’s characterization, the indictment did\ntailor its fraud allegations to KTurbo’s failure to manufacture\nits turbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Paragraph 3 of the in-\ndictment alleged KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities\nreceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” It also expressly al-\nleged that Lee knew the turbo blowers were already assem-\nbled before arriving in the United States. The government\nproved those allegations at trial with evidence that Lee knew\nKTurbo made its turbo blowers in South Korea and lied about\nthat fact. Such evidence matches the indictment’s fraud alle-\ngations.\n Second, even if these misrepresentations were not ex-\npressly covered by the indictment’s text, they were “part and\nparcel” of the same scheme described by the indictment. Nye\n& Nissen, Corp. v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 617 (1949) (no\nvariance where indictment alleged a single scheme to defraud\nexecuted in various ways). Additional evidence regarding\ntechnical details about how a defendant executed an alleged\nscheme does not constitute an impermissible variance. Ajayi,\n808 F.3d at 1125 (presentation of “more detailed” facts at trial\nnot an impermissible variance). Lee cannot demonstrate his\nFifth Amendment rights were violated because the govern-\nment’s trial evidence concerned “the same elaborate scheme\nto defraud … as was described in the indictment.”\n\f14 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nRatliff-White, 493 F.3d at 821 (quoting United States v. Dupre,\n462 F.3d 131, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2006)).\n Two concerns underlie the constructive amendment and\nvariance doctrines: ensuring criminal defendants have ade-\nquate notice of the charges against them and avoiding the risk\nof double jeopardy. Neither is present here. The indictment\nnotified Lee of the allegations against him: that he committed\nwire fraud by importing turbo blowers from South Korea\nwhile representing they were made in Batavia. See United\nStates v. Corrigan, 912 F.3d 422, 428 (7th Cir. 2019) (indictment\nprovided valid notice despite listing wrong name of victim);\nUnited States v. Kuna, 760 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1985) (alleged\nvariance in mail fraud prosecution was harmless because the\ndefendant “was able to identify with great certainty the acts\nfor which he was placed in jeopardy”).\n The indictment also included specific details about the\nscheme alleged, alleviating any double jeopardy concerns. See\nUnited States v. Moore, 563 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (hold-\ning specificity in the indictment would “avoid any later dou-\nble jeopardy concerns”). It described the Recovery Act’s Buy\nAmerican provision, how KTurbo leased a warehouse in\nBatavia, KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts, the fact KTurbo\nfailed “to perform substantial transformation of the turbo\nblowers at the KTURBO facility in Batavia,” Lee’s knowledge\n“that turbo blowers were substantially assembled before their\narrival in the United States and did not require meaningful\nassembly or manufacturing in the United States,” and Lee’s\nmisrepresentations and concealment of KTurbo’s true opera-\ntions. Such detail in the indictment protected Lee from expo-\nsure to double jeopardy. See United States v. Scheuneman, 712\nF.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2013) (indictment sufficient where it\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 15\n\n“presented enough detail to allow [the defendant] to plead\ndouble jeopardy to avoid future prosecution based on the\nsame conduct alleged”).\n Because the indictment afforded Lee ample notice of the\ncase the government presented at trial and included specific\ndetails of the crimes alleged to avoid double jeopardy risk, no\nimpermissible constructive amendment or variance occurred\nin this case.5\n 2. Did the government present enough evidence to\n convict Lee of wire fraud?\n Lee appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for ac-\nquittal under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. We review such decisions de\nnovo, asking if the evidence—viewed in the light most favor-\nable to the prosecution—could support a rational finding of\nall the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable\ndoubt. United States v. Mohamed, 759 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir.\n2014). Put differently, we reverse only if the trial record “is\ndevoid of evidence from which a jury could conclude guilt\nbeyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d\n605, 613 (7th Cir. 2006). Given this deference to the jury ver-\ndict, Lee’s hurdle on appeal is high, as “we rarely reverse a\nconviction for mail or wire fraud due to insufficient evi-\ndence.” United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 354 (7th Cir.\n2016).\n\n\n5Lee’s concerns are also mitigated because the district court gave the jury\na copy of the indictment and instructed jurors to convict only if the gov-\nernment had proved the crimes it alleged. See United States v. Cusimano,\n148 F.3d 824, 830–31 (7th Cir. 1998) (district court’s provision of the indict-\nment to the jury and proper instruction on it “establish[ed] that there was\nno constructive amendment to the indictment”).\n\f16 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\n To convict a defendant of wire fraud, the government\nmust prove three elements: (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) the\ndefendant’s intent to defraud, and (3) the defendant’s use of\ninterstate wires in furtherance of the scheme. United States v.\nJackson, 860 F.3d 438, 446 (7th Cir. 2017). Lee challenges the\ngovernment’s proof on the first element, the scheme to de-\nfraud. The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, reaches “any\nscheme to deprive another of money or property by means of\nfalse or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”\nCarpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987).\n On appeal, Lee argues that KTurbo’s Buy American certi-\nfications were not false. He claims KTurbo’s turbo blowers\ncomplied with the Buy American provision because they were\nmade in South Korea. That claim is not as self-contradictory\nas it first sounds, given the text of Recovery Act § 1605(d),\nwhich requires the statute to be “applied in a manner con-\nsistent with United States obligations under international\nagreements.” Both the United States and South Korea have\njoined the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Gov-\nernment Procurement (WTO-GPA), which requires all signa-\ntories to provide all other signatories’ exports “treatment no\nless favourable than the treatment the Party, including its pro-\ncuring entities, accords to: (a) domestic goods, services and\nsuppliers; and (b) goods, services and suppliers of any other\nParty.” WTO-GPA art. 4 § 1, Apr. 6, 2014, 3008 U.N.T.S. Reg.\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 17\n\nNo. A-31874.6 In other words, the WTO-GPA is a multi-lateral\n“most favored nation” clause for government purchasing. Lee\ninterprets Recovery Act § 1605(d) to mean the WTO-GPA’s\nmost favored nation clause supersedes the Buy American\nprovision, such that South Korean products must be given the\nsame treatment as American products for purposes of the\nRecovery Act.7\n Critically however, when the Recovery Act was enacted\nthe EPA publicly rejected the interpretation Lee now offers.\nAn April 2009 EPA memorandum explained that the agency\ninterpreted Recovery Act § 1605(d) to apply to direct pur-\nchases by the federal government and the specific state and\nlocal agencies expressly listed in the WTO-GPA’s appendices,\nbut not “to procurement initiated by local entities ([state re-\nvolving fund] assistance recipients), unless they are listed in\nthe appendix.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Memorandum on\n\n6 By its terms, the WTO-GPA covers purchases made by the EPA above\ncertain dollar thresholds. WTO-GPA, Coverage Schedules, United States\nann. 1. Coverage of purchases made by States themselves, state agencies,\nand local municipalities is more complicated, varying from State to State\nand from agency to agency within a State. WTO-GPA, Coverage Sched-\nules, United States ann. 2–3; see also Hong-Sik Chung, Government Procure-\nment in the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement: Great Opportunities for\nBoth Sides?, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 303 (2014). But the WTO-GPA\nprovides that where a covered entity “requires persons not covered under\na Party’s annexes to Appendix I to procure in accordance with particular\nrequirements, Article IV shall apply mutatis mutandis to such require-\nments.” WTO-GPA art. 2 § 5.\n7 Federal purchasing regulations provide that where an international\nagreement applies, the “restrictions of section 1605 of the Recovery Act do\nnot apply to designated country iron, steel, and/or other manufactured\ngoods.” 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(b)(ii). South Korea is listed as a “designated\ncountry” based on its membership in the WTO-GPA. 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(a).\n\f18 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nImplementation of Buy American provisions of P.L. 111-5\n(Apr. 28, 2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2\n014-12/documents/buy_am.pdf (last visited August 13, 2019).\nIn the nature of a “smoking gun,” federal agents found a copy\nof this EPA memorandum in KTurbo’s Batavia facility, with\nthe relevant paragraph flagged by handwritten markings.\nReasonable jurors could thus conclude Lee was aware that the\nEPA did not consider South Korean products Buy American\ncompliant.\n As a result, even if one accepts Lee’s interpretation of Re-\ncovery Act § 1605(d), the EPA’s express rejection of it makes\nKTurbo’s South Korean manufacturing a “material” fact for\nwire fraud purposes. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16\n(1999) (holding a statement is “material” if it has “a natural\ntendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the deci-\nsion of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed”)\n(quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)).\nKTurbo could not legitimately certify its Buy American com-\npliance, at least not without disclosing to customers that the\nturbo blowers were made in South Korea. Federal fraud stat-\nutes reach such misleading omissions of material information.\nUnited States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005).\n A reasonable purchaser in this scenario—one who re-\nceived funds from the EPA pursuant to the Recovery Act and\nwas bound to comply with the Buy American provision—\nwould deem it highly relevant whether a supplier based its\nBuy American certification on an interpretation of the statute\nexpressly rejected by the EPA. A series of trial witnesses con-\nsistently testified that Recovery Act compliance was “abso-\nlutely vital,” given it was a legal requirement of the project\nfunding. Without Buy American compliance, municipalities\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 19\n\njeopardized losing all Recovery Act funding from the EPA. As\none customer testified, his municipality considered KTurbo’s\nrepresentations that the turbo blowers were “Assembled in\nUSA” to be “extremely important” because “it bolstered\n[their] belief that [the turbo blower] was substantially\ntransformed in the United States.” Municipal employees also\ntestified they would not have purchased KTurbo’s blowers\nwithout KTurbo’s Recovery Act assurances.\n Where the fraud alleged deals with a half truth or material\nomission, we generally require proof of an act of concealment\non the part of the defendant. See Stephens, 421 F.3d at 507. The\nrecord in this case unmistakably reflects such concealment.\nTrial evidence showed KTurbo’s repeated misrepresentations\nto its customers about where KTurbo made its turbo blowers.\nFor example, KTurbo sent the City of Pendleton, Oregon a\nBuy American certification in April 2010—shortly after Lee\ndecided to stop all domestic manufacturing operations—rep-\nresenting that KTurbo had “established an assembly facility\nin Batavia, Illinois, where partial manufacturing and assem-\nbly of all units sold in North America will be complete[d].”\nNo one at KTurbo ever corrected that misrepresentation. At\nthe beginning of 2011, KTurbo sent the City of Ottawa, Illinois\na similar Buy American certification, signed by Trinity Lee,\nwhich stated: “All assembly of the completed unit will be ex-\necuted domestically. The assembly process includes wiring\nand panel assembly, riveted frame assembly, total assembly\nincluding all internal connections and power wiring, tubing\nand final calibration will be perofrmaned [sic] at KTurbo USA\nin Batavia, IL.” None of that certification was truthful, but it\nwas emblematic of KTurbo’s fraudulent scheme. United States\nv. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 2017) (jurors are per-\nmitted to infer fraudulent methodologies from evidence of\n\f20 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nsimilar fraudulent transactions). KTurbo repeatedly assured\nmunicipalities and their general contractors of its Recovery\nAct compliance. Several customers testified at trial about their\nbelief that KTurbo made its turbo blowers in the United\nStates.\n KTurbo also misled its own sales representatives into\nthinking KTurbo manufactured turbo blowers in Batavia, not\nSouth Korea. These sales representatives testified they told\ncustomers—based on KTurbo’s representations to them—that\nKTurbo complied with the Buy American provision because\nit manufactured and assembled its blowers in Batavia. Lee\nmasterminded these material misrepresentations, even if he\nused sales representatives to pass them on to the ultimate cus-\ntomers. See United States v. Seidling, 737 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th\nCir. 2013) (“Nothing in the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. § 1341\nrequires a scheme to defraud to involve deception of the same\nperson or entity whose money or property is the intended ob-\nject of the scheme.”). He is responsible for misrepresentations\nhe commanded or willfully caused others to make as\nKTurbo’s chief executive. 18 U.S.C. § 2; see also United States v.\nGunning, 984 F.2d 1476, 1483 (7th Cir. 1993) (“One who coun-\nsels or commands another to commit a crime, and knowingly\nand actively contributes toward its success, is guilty of that\ncrime under 18 U.S.C. § 2.”).\n But Lee himself also actively participated in the cover up.\nDuring his trial cross-examination, Lee acknowledged he\nknew that KTurbo’s customers and the EPA cared about Buy\nAmerican compliance. But he admitted he told customers that\nKTurbo blowers were manufactured and assembled in the\nUnited States. When a sales representative asked Lee about\nBuy American compliance in a September 2010 email, Lee\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 21\n\nresponded: “We assemble and test in Chicago. Only motor\nand VFD comes from Korea. It is almost Made In USA.” Lee\nmade that statement months after KTurbo stopped assembly\nin the United States. Even as the scheme began to unravel in\nearly 2011, Lee persisted in his lies. On January 28, 2011, a\nsales representative directly asked Lee about a rumor that fed-\neral agents were investigating KTurbo. Lee responded by en-\nsuring him that KTurbo faced no Recovery Act issues: “Most\nimportant parts is [sic] final assembly and testing. We are do-\ning those, so we are compliant.” Then, on February 8, 2011,\nwhen representatives of Pendleton, Oregon, asked KTurbo\nwhere its turbo blowers would be assembled, Lee wrote: “In\nChicago the blowers will be finalized and tested and\nshipped.”\n Lee also challenges the government’s proof of his intent to\ndefraud. A defendant acts with an intent to defraud where he\nacts “willfully and with specific intent to deceive or cheat,\nusually for the purpose of getting financial gain for himself or\ncausing financial loss to another.” United States v. Pust, 798\nF.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Paneras,\n222 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2000)). Lee claims the government\nfailed to prove he intended to defraud anyone because the\ntrial evidence showed KTurbo took concrete steps toward\nmanufacturing turbo blowers in the United States.\n Lee’s intent argument ignores that his misrepresentations\ncontinued well beyond April 2010, when he decided to stop\nKTurbo’s American manufacturing operations. That Lee kept\ntelling people KTurbo assembled its turbo blowers in Batavia\nmonths after KTurbo ceased doing so is strong circumstantial\nevidence of Lee’s intent to defraud. Pust, 798 F.3d at 600–01\n(specific intent to defraud may be established by\n\f22 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\ncircumstantial evidence and examination of the scheme it-\nself). Agents’ discovery of copies of the EPA’s guidance mem-\noranda on the Buy American provision, as well as testimony\nfrom other KTurbo employees about the extent of KTurbo’s\nRecovery Act meetings and planning, support the conclusion\nthat Lee willfully attempted to circumvent the law.\n A jury also could reasonably conclude that Lee never in-\ntended to make turbo blowers in Batavia long term, but rather\nset up the facility as part of his scheme to mislead the EPA,\nsales representatives, and customers. Cf. United States v. Freed,\n921 F.3d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding a promise made\nwithout a present intention to keep it can be fraudulent). After\nall, Lee did not wait even a full three months before putting\nthe kibosh on the entire operation. Viewing the evidence in\nthe light most favorable to the prosecution, there is more than\nenough to conclude Lee intended to deceive and defraud\nKTurbo’s customers.\n The trial evidence presented over the course of eight days\nadequately supports Lee’s participation in a scheme to de-\nfraud and his intent to do so. Lee does not challenge his use\nof interstate wires as a part of that scheme. With all three ele-\nments of wire fraud adequately established in the trial record,\nwe affirm the jury’s verdict.\n B. Smuggling Convictions\n We turn now from Lee’s wire fraud convictions to his three\nsmuggling convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 545. The statute pro-\nvides, in part:\n Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or\n brings into the United States, any merchandise\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 23\n\n contrary to law … Shall be fined under this title\n or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.\n Over a century ago, when dealing with the predecessor to\n§ 545, the Supreme Court held the words “contrary to law”\nrefer to legal provisions outside the statute itself. Keck v.\nUnited States, 172 U.S. 434, 437 (1899). A violation of § 545 re-\nquires a violation of another law—the predicate offense if you\nwill—done with a fraudulent or knowing mindset. In this\ncase, the government claimed Lee violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a):\n [E]very article of foreign origin … imported into\n the United States shall be marked in a conspic-\n uous place as legibly, indelibly, and perma-\n nently as the nature of the article (or container)\n will permit in such manner as to indicate to an\n ultimate purchaser in the United States the Eng-\n lish name of the country of origin of the article.\n Lee asserts that a violation of § 1304(a) cannot serve as a\npredicate offense for a § 545 conviction. According to Lee, the\nwords “imports … merchandise contrary to law” in § 545\nmean that the merchandise itself is per se illegal to import, not\nmerely that the merchandise was imported in a condition\nnoncompliant with some federal law or regulation some-\nwhere.\n In making this argument, Lee stresses the title of § 545:\n“Smuggling goods into the United States.” He contends the\nword “smuggling” refers exclusively to bringing on shore\ngoods whose importation is categorically prohibited. Lee ef-\nfectively says he could not have “smuggled” the turbo blow-\ners into the United States because turbo blowers are allowed\nin the United States.\n\f24 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\n Even accepting Lee’s narrow interpretation of the word\n“smuggling,”8 the text of the statute is not so cabined when\nexamined in its entirety. Section 545 contains two separate\nprohibitions; we must consider both when assessing the stat-\nute’s meaning. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805)\n(Marshall, C.J.) (“It is undoubtedly a well established\nprinciple in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be\nconsidered, and the intent of the legislature to be extracted\nfrom the whole.”). Section 545’s first paragraph, which is not\nat issue, criminalizes “knowingly and willfully …\nsmuggl[ing], or clandestinely introduc[ing] … into the United\nStates any merchandise which should have been in-\nvoiced … .” That language criminalizes smuggling goods into\nthe United States, and the statute’s title summarizes that pro-\nhibition. But § 545’s second paragraph—the one that is at is-\nsue—is broader. It criminalizes “fraudulently or knowingly\nimport[ing] … any merchandise contrary to law … .” The text\nof the second paragraph of § 545 makes no mention of the\nword “smuggling.”\n A statute’s title or heading is a permissible indicator of the\nmeaning of its text. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083\n(2015); see also ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER,\n\n8 We have some doubt that the term is quite so limited. Cf. Smuggling,\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The crime of importing or ex-\nporting illegal articles or articles on which duties have not been paid.”);\nSmuggling, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“The criminal of-\nfense of knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States,\nclandestinely introducing into the United States any merchandise which\nshould have been declared for customs duty.”); Smuggle, AMERICAN\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2019) (“To\nbring into a country (a prohibited item) secretively and intentionally in\nviolation of the law.”).\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 25\n\nREADING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 221 (2012).\nBut a title cannot override the statutory text itself. Bhd. of R.R.\nTrainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29\n(1947). Although § 545—true to its title—outlaws smuggling\ngoods into the United States, the statute also criminalizes the\nfraudulent or knowing importation of “merchandise contrary\nto law.” Lee’s construction of that language as equating with\n“smuggling” renders the two provisions of § 545 duplicative,\na heavily disfavored result. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.\n759, 778 (1988) (discussing the “cardinal rule of statutory in-\nterpretation that no provision should be construed to be en-\ntirely redundant”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 175.\nThe better reading of the second paragraph of § 545 is that it\nmakes it a crime to fraudulently or knowingly import mer-\nchandise in any manner contrary to law. Section 545’s title\ncannot save Lee from its text.\n Lee next argues the case law is on his side. He claims the\ncases only address scenarios where the defendant imported\ngoods that are illegal per se—barred entirely from importa-\ntion into the United States. That might be true, but it would\nnot change the meaning of § 545. The scope of a statute cannot\nbe altered based on the fact patterns of cases that happen to\nbe charged and end up in the Federal Reporter. In any event,\nLee’s assertions about the state of the case law are inaccurate.\nHis cited authorities, Babb v. United States, 218 F.2d 538 (5th\nCir. 1955) and Steiner v. United States, 229 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.\n1956), dealt with indictments that failed to identify an under-\nlying violation to serve as the predicate for § 545 liability. The\nindictments simply lacked any predicate offense undergird-\ning the § 545 charge. We do not have that here: the govern-\nment’s indictment specifically accused Lee of violating\n§ 1304(a).\n\f26 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\n And despite Lee’s attempts, we do not see how this case is\ndistinguishable from United States v. Kuipers, 49 F.3d 1254 (7th\nCir. 1995).9 In Kuipers, we affirmed the defendant’s § 545 con-\nviction for attempting to import the horns of a protected spe-\ncies under false paperwork. Id. at 1256. It was legal to import\nthe horns into the United States with the proper paperwork,\nbut the defendant used forged documentation to circumvent\nthe law. Here, Lee essentially did the same thing. Nothing\nprohibited Lee from importing turbo blowers into the United\nStates, but he needed to do so with a proper country-of-origin\ndesignation under § 1304(a). Lee circumvented that require-\nment in a fraudulent fashion, similar to the defendant in\nKuipers.\n Lee also claims he could not have violated § 545 because\nU.S. Customs detained the turbo blowers at the border, such\nthat the machines were never imported into the country. But\nLee fails to provide any reason to exclude domestic U.S. Cus-\ntoms facilities from the definition of the “United States,” as\nused in § 545. If anything, the text supports the opposite con-\nclusion, specifically excluding other areas but not U.S.\nCustoms offices. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (“The term ‘United States’, as\nused in this section, shall not include the Virgin Island, Amer-\nican Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef,\nJohnston Island, or Guam.”); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1304(j) (refer-\nring to merchandise held by U.S. Customs for inspection as\nan “imported article”).\n\n\n9 Lee’s claim that Kuipers dealt with only the first paragraph of § 545, and\nnot the second, is not correct. 49 F.3d at 1256 (“Kuipers was indicted on\nMarch 1, 1994 for … (2) fraudulently and knowingly importing the Desert\nBighorn Sheep into the United States contrary to law\n(18 U.S.C. § 545) … .”).\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 27\n\n Lee notes that federal law allows mismarked goods, after\ntheir markings are corrected, to be imported. 19 U.S.C.\n§ 1304(j); see also 19 C.F.R. § 134.51. He emphasizes that § 1304\ndoes not itself purport to criminalize mismarking a product’s\ncountry of origin, despite providing criminal sanctions for\nother violations. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(l) (penalizing anyone who\n“defaces, destroys, removes, alters, covers, obscures, or oblit-\nerates” a country-of-origin mark with intent to conceal that\ninformation). Yet one federal statute does not preempt\nanother. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2004).\nSection 1304(l)’s silence cannot override the text of § 545. The\nfact § 1304(l) does not separately criminalize conduct already\noutlawed under § 545 is not a basis for limiting the scope of\n§ 545. Cf. United States v. Hassanzadeh, 271 F.3d 574, 576–79\n(4th Cir. 2001) (affirming § 545 conviction based on underly-\ning § 1304 labeling violation).10\n Finally, Lee claims treating § 1304 violations as predicate\noffenses for § 545 liability will criminalize a vast array of in-\nnocent behavior in international commerce. This policy argu-\nment fails to account for § 545’s high scienter bar—fraudulent\nor knowing misbehavior. Such a scienter requirement ensures\n\n\n10 Lee’s invocation of United States ex rel. Huangyan Import v. Nature’s Farm\n\nProds., 370 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Cal. 2005), is not well received, particu-\nlarly his selective and misleading quotation. Although the opinion states\nfederal regulations “permit the importation of mismarked goods,” Lee\nleaves out the important qualifying language about the monetary penal-\nties imposed in such circumstances. Id. at 1001. And, as the underlying\nstatute makes clear, goods originally mismarked upon arrival may be\nwithheld until their country-of-origin markings are corrected. 19 U.S.C.\n§ 1304(i)–(j). Nothing in the Huangyan Import opinion suggests that at-\ntempting to import merchandise with false country-of-origin designations\nis anything but “contrary to law.”\n\f28 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nthe statute does not criminalize innocent commercial mis-\ntakes. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2019)\n(“The cases in which we have emphasized scienter’s\nimportance in separating wrongful from innocent acts are le-\ngion.”). And this case involves no mere administrative over-\nsight. KTurbo’s mislabeling served an important function in\nLee’s broader scheme to deceive KTurbo customers about the\norigin of the turbo blowers.\n For all these reasons, we affirm Lee’s three smuggling con-\nvictions.\n Having affirmed all Lee’s convictions, we now proceed to\nthe sentencing issues presented by the parties. We first ad-\ndress the government’s cross-appeal regarding Lee’s prison\nsentence, before resolving Lee’s challenge to the restitution\nordered by the district court.\n C. The Government’s Cross-Appeal\n The government asks us to reinstate the 20-month\nsentence the district court originally imposed. It claims the\ndistrict court lacked authority under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) to\nreduce Lee’s sentence to 12 months. But before we reach the\nmerits of the government’s cross-appeal, we must resolve two\njurisdictional questions.\n 1. Is there statutory jurisdiction for the government’s\n cross-appeal?\n The government may appeal an adverse decision in a\ncriminal case only if expressly authorized by statute. United\nStates v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977). Here,\nthe government cites 18 U.S.C. § 3731. But that provision does\nnot apply—the government is not appealing a dismissal of its\nindictment, a new trial order, or any of the other issues listed\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 29\n\nin § 3731. See United States v. Spilotro, 884 F.2d 1003, 1005–06\n(7th Cir. 1989) (holding § 3731 does not provide jurisdiction\nfor appeals challenging “a district court order reducing a sen-\ntence”); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., 15B FED. PRAC.\n& PROC. § 3919.8 (2d ed. April 2019 supp.) (“Ordinarily the\ngovernment cannot rely upon either § 1291 or § 3731 to sup-\nport appeal from a criminal sentence … .”).\n The relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), which author-\nizes the government to appeal a defendant’s sentence on spe-\ncific grounds. A district court’s modification of a sentence\nwithout authority to do so, as the government argues here, is\none such ground. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(1) (providing the gov-\nernment the ability to appeal sentences “imposed in violation\nof law”). The government’s errant citation is not insignificant,\ngiven that timeliness is an issue for its cross-appeal (as dis-\ncussed below). Section 3731 contains a 30-day deadline for fil-\ning a notice of appeal that § 3742(b) lacks. See CHARLES ALAN\nWRIGHT, ET AL., 16A FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3950.8 (4th ed. April\n2019 supp.); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186,\n1195–99 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing the interplay between\n§ 3731 and FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)). Nevertheless, where the rec-\nord provides enough information to establish appellate juris-\ndiction, we may exercise such jurisdiction despite the parties’\nfailure to direct us to its proper statutory source. See NewPage\nWis. Sys. Inc. v. United Steel Workers Int’l Union, 651 F.3d 775,\n778 (7th Cir. 2011) (if the jurisdictional statute cited by a party\nis inaccurate, the “court still must inquire whether another\nstatute supplies jurisdiction”); see also In re Sealed Case, 449\nF.3d 118, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding the appellant’s failure\n\f30 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nto cite § 3742, “while bothersome to a court, is not necessarily\nfatal”).\n One issue remains: Section 3742(b) requires the govern-\nment to obtain “the personal approval of the Attorney\nGeneral, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general\ndesignated by the Solicitor General” in order to appeal. Be-\ncause the government did not rely on § 3742(b) in its briefing,\nit has not provided proof of its compliance with that statutory\nrequirement. But our circuit precedent does not treat\n§ 3742(b)’s approval requirement as jurisdictional. United\nStates v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170, 172 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994).11\nNothing in the record suggests the government lacks author-\nization to pursue its cross-appeal, and Lee never raised the\nissue.\n\n\n\n\n11 See also United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 2008)\n(personal approval requirement in § 3742(b) is non-jurisdictional), abro-\ngated on different grounds by United States v. DiFalco, 837 F.3d 1207, 1216\n(11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ruiz-Alonso, 397 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir.\n2005) (same); United States v. Zamudio, 314 F.3d 517, 520 (10th Cir. 2002)\n(same); United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1102 (2d Cir. 1992) (same);\nbut see United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000) (per\ncuriam) (dismissing the government’s sentencing appeal for failure to es-\ntablish the requisite approval); United States v. Smith, 910 F.2d 326, 328 (6th\nCir. 1990) (holding the approval is not jurisdictional but requiring proof\nthat it has been obtained as part of the court’s “exercise of its supervisory\nauthority”); cf. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 246 (2008) (explain-\ning that an appellate court may not increase a defendant’s sentence absent\na cross-appeal because “Congress … entrusted to named high-ranking of-\nficials within the Department of Justice responsibility for determining\nwhether the Government, on behalf of the public, should seek a sentence\nhigher than the one imposed”).\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 31\n\n 2. Did the government file its notice of appeal in time?\n The next jurisdictional question concerns the timeliness of\nthe government’s notice of appeal. In a criminal case like this,\nFED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B) provides the government’s deadline:\n When the government is entitled to appeal, its\n notice of appeal must be filed in the district\n court within 30 days of the later of:\n (i) the entry of the judgment or order be-\n ing appealed; or\n (ii) the filing of a notice of appeal by any\n defendant.\nThe government must file its own notice of appeal to pursue\na sentencing increase following a conviction; it cannot piggy-\nback on the defendant’s notice. Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 252–53.\n Here, the relevant timeline looks like this:\n February 28, 2018: The district court orally sen-\n tenced Lee to 20 months in prison.\n March 11, 2018: Lee filed his first notice of appeal\n and a Rule 35(a) motion to correct his sentence.\n March 14, 2018: The district court modified Lee’s\n sentence to 12 months in prison and entered its\n written judgment.\n March 28, 2018: Lee filed his second notice of ap-\n peal.\n April 27, 2018: The government cross-appealed.\n The government does not rely on the date of judgment un-\nder Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(i). It cannot, as it filed its notice of appeal\n45 days after the district court’s judgment. But what about\n\f32 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nRule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii)? The government’s notice of appeal came\n30 days after Lee’s second notice of appeal, but 48 days after\nLee’s first notice. Which of Lee’s notices triggered the govern-\nment’s deadline clock?\n As with any matter of statutory interpretation, the text\ncontrols. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt,\n139 S. Ct. 1507, 1512–13 (2019); see also SCALIA & GARNER,\nsupra, at 56 (“The words of a governing text are of paramount\nconcern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the\ntext means.”). Notably, Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii) refers to “a notice of\nappeal by any defendant” rather than “the first notice of ap-\npeal by any defendant.” That is important because the analo-\ngous rule for civil cases triggers a party’s deadline to initiate\na cross-appeal on “the date when the first notice [of appeal]\nwas filed … .” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) (emphasis added). The\ndrafters could have used the same language for the criminal\nrule, but they chose different words. We must respect that de-\ncision and give such variations effect. Murphy v. Smith, 138 S.\nCt. 784, 787–88 (2018); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 170\n(“[A] material variation in terms suggests a variation in mean-\ning.”).\n Lee offers no persuasive reason to interpret “a notice of\nappeal by any defendant” to mean “the first notice of appeal\nby any defendant.” The text of the rule already contemplates\nthere may be multiple notices of appeal, and it allows the gov-\nernment to file its cross-appeal within thirty days of the “later\nof” such notices. The only authority Lee offers, Cyrak v. Lemon,\n919 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1990), is a civil case addressing Rule 4(a),\nwhich expressly refers to the “first notice.” Rather than\nsimply analogize criminal cases to civil cases, as Lee asks us\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 33\n\nto do, we give effect to the different text of the different pro-\nvisions and apply the rules as written.\n Rule 4(b) permits the government to file its notice of ap-\npeal within thirty days of “a notice of appeal by any defend-\nant.” Lee timely filed “a notice of appeal” on March 28, 2018.\nAnd the government filed its notice exactly thirty days later,\non April 27, 2018, so the government’s appeal is timely under\nthe plain meaning of FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B)(ii).\n 3. In reducing Lee’s sentence, did the district court ex-\n ceed its authority?\n Now we arrive at the substance of the government’s cross-\nappeal. The government claims district courts lack authority\nto revisit advisory guideline calculations on a motion brought\nunder FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). It does not challenge the merits\nof the district court’s ruling, only the court’s authority to\nmake it. Rule 35(a) states: “Within 14 days after sentencing,\nthe court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmet-\nical, technical, or other clear error.”\n In sentencing Lee, the district court struggled with how to\ncalculate the “loss” caused by Lee’s crimes for purposes of\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Where the loss cannot be determined, the\nGuidelines permit courts to look at the defendant’s gain as an\nalternative. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n. 3(B). The district court\noriginally found Lee’s gain to be the $180,392 in Recovery Act\nfunds paid to KTurbo by municipalities. That put Lee’s guide-\nline range at 46–57 months, although the district court de-\nparted down from that range and sentenced Lee to 20 months.\n The district court abandoned that math on Lee’s Rule 35(a)\nmotion. Based on United States v. Giovenco, 773 F.3d 866, 871\n(7th Cir. 2014), the court determined it needed to assess net\n\f34 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nprofit, rather than KTurbo’s gross revenue, and that it lacked\nthe evidentiary record to do so. It therefore decided not to ap-\nply any sentencing enhancement based on Lee’s gain under\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Using a guideline range of 12–18 months, the\ncourt sentenced Lee to 12 months plus one day.\n The government emphasizes that a district court’s author-\nity on a Rule 35(a) motion is “narrow.” As we have said, the\n“Rule does not give the district court a second chance to exer-\ncise its ‘discretion with regard to the application of the sen-\ntencing guidelines,’ nor does it allow for changes to a sentence\nbased on the court’s change of mind.” United States v. Clark,\n538 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 35\nadvisory committee’s note to 1991 amendments). Still, Rule\n35(a) is not the straitjacket the government suggests. It does\nallow district courts to correct “clear errors” and avoid waste-\nful appeals by fixing obvious sentencing issues. United States\nv. Schenian, 847 F.3d 422, 424 (7th Cir. 2017). This extends to\nclear errors that produce mistakenly high sentences. Id. If the\njudge identifies an aspect of the sentence that is objectively\nerroneous—whether on a factual matter or a point of law—\nthe judge may use Rule 35(a) to address the problem.\n Here, the district court realized that its gain calculation\nneeded to assess net profit, not gross revenue, see Giovenco,\n773 F.3d at 871, and that it lacked an evidentiary basis to do\nso. It also determined nothing in the record showed how\nmuch Lee personally gained from KTurbo’s sales. The govern-\nment bore the burden to establish a “loss” or “gain” under\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. United States v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438, 454 (7th\nCir. 2012). Sentencing Lee without a supporting evidentiary\nrecord would have constituted clear error. Id. at 456–57. Rule\n35(a)’s entire purpose is to correct errors otherwise destined\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 35\n\nto be reversed. Schenian, 847 F.3d at 424; Clark, 538 F.3d at 809.\nThe district court was thus well within its authority to modify\nLee’s sentence on his Rule 35(a) motion.\n D. Restitution\n Finally, we return to Lee’s appeal, specifically his chal-\nlenge to the restitution ordered by the district court.\n Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, courts must\norder restitution to any victim of “an offense against property\nunder this title, … including any offense committed by fraud\nor deceit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). The statute sets the\nrestitution amount at the value of the victim’s lost property\non the date of loss or the date of sentencing (whichever is\ngreater) minus the value of any returned property. 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3663A(b)(1)(B); see also United States v. Malone, 747 F.3d 481,\n485 (7th Cir. 2014).\n On appeal, Lee objects to paying any restitution, denying\nthat any municipality sustained a loss. He acknowledges that\ntwo municipalities, Mishawaka, Indiana and Redmond,\nOregon, paid KTurbo a total of $180,392 for turbo blowers\nmanufactured in South Korea. But Lee points out that the EPA\nsubsequently authorized Mishawaka and Redmond to con-\ntinue using the KTurbo blowers without returning the Recov-\nery Act funds. So Lee argues neither municipality sustained\nany loss: each paid for turbo blowers to use on its project, and\neach received turbo blowers that it is using on its project.\n But Lee waived this argument in the district court. The\nprobation office recommended the court order $180,392 in\nrestitution based on the sums paid by Mishawaka and\n\f36 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nRedmond.12 The government agreed with probation’s recom-\nmendation. Despite the fact the district court held three\nsentencing hearings, Lee failed to raise the issue of restitution,\neven once. Lee failed to object in his written sentencing mem-\norandum, and he failed to raise the issue in his Rule 35(a) mo-\ntion. Indeed, Lee’s entire argument regarding restitution in\nthe district court comprised two sentences in a supplemental\nbrief requested by the court on a different topic, with no cita-\ntions to any statutory authority or case law supporting his po-\nsition.13 That is insufficient to preserve an objection.\n The closer question is whether Lee affirmatively waived\nthe restitution arguments he now pursues on appeal, or\nwhether he only forfeited them. Waiver requires the inten-\ntional relinquishment of a known right, while forfeiture is a\nmere accidental or neglectful failure to assert a right. United\nStates v. Hathaway, 882 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2018). The dis-\ntinction is important, as waiver precludes appellate review al-\ntogether, while forfeited rights may be vindicated on appeal\nthrough plain-error review. Id. In making this determination,\n\n12 Neither of these municipal contracts served as a basis for any of the five\n\ncounts of wire fraud in the indictment. Ordinarily restitution is limited to\nthe losses caused by the specific conduct underlying the defendant’s con-\nvictions. United States v. Locke, 759 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2014). But where\nthe offense “involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of\ncriminal activity,” such as the scheme to defraud necessary for a wire\nfraud conviction, the applicable statute permits courts to award restitution\nto “any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the\ncourse of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2).\n13 In the district court Lee argued: “Since the loss amount is zero, the res-\ntitution amount is also zero. And the government’s motion to use Heon\nSeok Lee’s bond deposit to pay restitution (Dkt # 239) should therefore be\ndenied.”\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 37\n\nwe look to whether the defendant “chose, as a matter of strat-\negy, not to present the argument.” Id. (quoting United States v.\nGarcia, 580 F.3d 528, 541 (7th Cir. 2009)).\n After reviewing the extensive sentencing transcripts in\nthis case, we conclude Lee and his counsel made a strategic\ndecision to not press objections to restitution in the district\ncourt, and thus waived the issue. The main event during the\nsentencing was the loss calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Yet\nrestitution did come up. At the first hearing, Lee’s counsel in-\nterjected, “I would also just note since restitution is brought\nup—been brought up, that the restitution amount I don’t\nthink needs to be above 180.” Rather than argue the district\ncourt should not order restitution because there was no loss,\nas he does now, Lee asked the district court to not go above\nthe $180,392 figure recommended by the probation office.14\nAlthough Lee did include a two-sentence objection to restitu-\ntion in his supplemental memorandum before the second\nhearing, he never raised the issue at the second hearing itself,\ndespite the prosecution addressing the topic. Lee never men-\ntioned restitution in his Rule 35(a) motion. And, at the third\nsentencing hearing, when the district court noted its intention\nto enter the same $180,392 in restitution (despite reducing\nLee’s prison term on account of the government’s failure to\nprove the loss amount), Lee’s counsel represented, “I think\nthat’s correct as to what should—what would be in the judg-\nment.” These repeated decisions to press other arguments,\nand not address restitution, evinced a “tactical choice” on\n\n14 Lee made this point in the context of a debate about whether the loss\nfigure under the Sentencing Guidelines should be the $1.6 million face\nvalue of KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts. Lee’s incentive to push the dis-\ntrict court toward a figure substantially lower than that was clear.\n\f38 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\n\nLee’s part, constituting waiver. United States v. Jin Hua Dong,\n675 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2012).\n We realize there is some logical tension between the dis-\ntrict court’s restitution award, and its conclusion that it lacked\na sufficient evidentiary basis to determine victims’ “loss” for\npurposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.15 But the appropriate forum for\naddressing that issue was the district court in the first in-\nstance. Calculating restitution in an atypical fraud case such\nas this one is difficult, as the losses caused by a scheme to cir-\ncumvent governmental purchasing preferences are “inher-\nently difficult to quantify.” United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773,\n794 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court was entitled to the bene-\nfit of the parties’ best arguments on how restitution should be\ncalculated. By strategically choosing to forego his challenge to\nthe restitution figure in the district court, Lee waived the is-\nsue: “A defendant cannot squirrel away objections, revealing\nthem only upon successive appeals.” Kuipers, 49 F.3d at 1258.\n III. Conclusion\n Heon Seok Lee repeatedly lied about where his company\nmanufactured its products in order to profit off a federal stim-\nulus package. Such a fraudulent scheme is wire fraud and\nprohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1343. To execute his scheme, Lee di-\nrected his company to mislabel the country of origin for its\n\n15 Although the restitution amount typically tracks the loss amount under\n\nthe Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. McGee, 612 F.3d 627, 635 (7th\nCir. 2010), courts must be careful not to confuse the two given the differ-\nences between the definitions of “loss” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and restitu-\ntion under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B). United States v. Hussein, 664 F.3d\n155, 161 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The amount of restitution does not always\ncorrespond to guidelines loss because the rules for calculating each dif-\nfer.”).\n\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 39\n\nproducts and attempt to import them with those incorrect\ndesignations. This violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) and the federal\nprohibition against smuggling, 18 U.S.C. § 545, and evidence\nsupported the jury’s verdict on those counts. As to Lee’s sen-\ntence, although the government timely appealed, the district\ncourt did not exceed its authority when it revisited Lee’s sen-\ntencing guidelines range and modified Lee’s prison sentence\naccordingly. Finally, Lee waived any objection to how the dis-\ntrict court calculated restitution. We therefore AFFIRM the\njudgment of the district court in full.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Heon Seok Lee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-08-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIn the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Seventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\nNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee/\\n Cross-Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nHEON SEOK LEE,\\n Defendant-Appellant/\\n Cross-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court for the\\n Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.\\n No. 1:12-cr-00109-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.\\n ____________________\\n\\n ARGUED APRIL 9, 2019 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2019\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.\\n BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Crowbar in hand, U.S. Customs\\nOfficer Jorge Parra spent December 8, 2010 “cracking open\\ncontainers” at a warehouse near the Los Angeles seaport.\\nParra pried open one from South Korea to inspect its freight.\\nInside he found a fully assembled, five-foot tall industrial fan\\n\\f2 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\ncalled a turbo blower. A placard riveted to the side read, “As-\\nsembled in USA.”\\n Presented with a fully assembled machine fresh off the\\nboat from South Korea, which brazenly advertised its assem-\\nbly in the United States, little sleuthing was required to deter-\\nmine something was amiss. Parra’s discovery kicked off a\\nfederal investigation that traced back to the defendant in this\\ncase, Heon Seok Lee. Prosecutors eventually charged Lee with\\nexecuting a scheme to defraud local governments by falsely\\nrepresenting that his company manufactured its turbo blow-\\ners in the United States.\\n A grand jury indicted Lee on five counts of wire fraud and\\nthree counts of smuggling. After a trial, the jury found Lee\\nguilty on all counts. Lee now appeals his convictions and the\\nrestitution ordered, and the government cross-appeals Lee’s\\nprison sentence. We find no fault in the trial or the sentence.\\n I. Background\\n A. The Recovery Act\\n This criminal case has an atypical origin: an economic\\nstimulus package. Congress passed the American Recovery\\nand Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115\\n(2009)—which we will simply call the “Recovery Act”—to\\njumpstart the flagging domestic economy during the Great\\nRecession. See Kameron Hillstrom, The American Recovery and\\nReinvestment Act: A Fitting Future for Recovery Legislation, 44\\nPUB. CONTRACT L. J. 285, 288 (2015). The Recovery Act ear-\\nmarked billions to fund public infrastructure projects. Id. at\\n289 (noting the Recovery Act made $261.2 billion available for\\nsuch projects).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 3\\n\\n Relevant to this case, Congress allocated $6.4 billion to the\\nEPA for water-infrastructure improvements. The EPA did not\\nspend the money directly; instead it awarded grants to “re-\\nvolving funds” administered by the States. After receiving\\nEPA grants, the revolving funds then issued low-interest\\nloans to local municipalities or agencies sponsoring specific\\nprojects. Those local governments were then responsible for\\nhiring contractors to perform the work.\\n To achieve Congress’s objective of bolstering the Ameri-\\ncan economy, the Recovery Act included the following do-\\nmestic purchasing requirement, commonly known as the\\n“Buy American” provision:\\n None of the funds appropriated or otherwise\\n made available by this Act may be used for a\\n project for the construction, alteration, mainte-\\n nance, or repair of a public building or public\\n work unless all of the iron, steel, and manufac-\\n tured goods used in the project are produced in\\n the United States.\\nRecovery Act § 1605(a), 123 Stat. 303.1\\n At first glance, this requirement seems straightforward.\\nBut federal agencies struggled to pin down what it means for\\na product to have been “produced in the United States.” Dif-\\nferent agencies used different tests. See Thomas D. Blanford,\\nNavigating the Recovery Act’s Buy American Rule in State and\\nLocal Government Construction, 46 PROCUREMENT LAWYER 3, 4\\n(Fall 2010) (listing five tests used by different agencies). The\\n\\n1 The Recovery Act’s Buy American provision should not be confused\\nwith the separate, much older, Buy American Act of 1933,\\n41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305.\\n\\f4 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nEPA adopted the “substantial transformation” standard to\\nadminister the Recovery Act, and it developed a three-part\\ntest to assess whether a manufacturer substantially trans-\\nformed a product within the United States.\\n As a condition to receiving Recovery Act funding, local\\ngovernments and their contractors were required to abide by\\nthe Buy American provision. Federal agencies like the EPA\\naudited projects to ensure compliance. Local governments re-\\nquired their suppliers to complete “Buy American certifica-\\ntions” representing that their products complied with the stat-\\nute.\\n B. KTurbo’s Initial Plan\\n Heon Seok Lee founded KTurbo Inc. in his homeland of\\nSouth Korea. KTurbo manufactures centrifugal turbo blow-\\ners—large industrial fans used to provide oxygen for biologi-\\ncal water treatments in wastewater facilities. Turbo blowers\\nare sophisticated and expensive pieces of equipment, requir-\\ning on-site programming, testing, and calibration.\\n Lee saw the Recovery Act as a growth opportunity for\\nKTurbo, whose penetration into the United States market was\\nlimited at the time. The Recovery Act earmarked billions for\\nproducts like KTurbo’s turbo blowers. But KTurbo would be\\nunable to tap into those funds unless it demonstrated compli-\\nance with the Buy American provision. So, Lee and his sister,\\nTrinity Lee,2 developed a Recovery Act plan. They researched\\nregulatory guidance from the EPA and monitored larger com-\\npetitors’ responses. KTurbo leadership discussed Buy\\n\\n2We refer to the defendant, Heon Seok Lee, as “Lee” and Trinity Lee by\\nher full name. Trinity Lee served as KTurbo’s general manager for North\\nAmerica.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 5\\n\\nAmerican compliance for months, with several in-depth\\nmeetings that lasted hours.\\n KTurbo enlisted independent sales representatives around\\nthe country to market its turbo blowers to local governments\\npursuing Recovery Act projects. KTurbo also consulted with\\nseveral sales representatives in the early stages of its Buy\\nAmerican planning. One sales representative, Dick Koch, dis-\\ncouraged KTurbo from pursuing a plan to make turbo blow-\\ners in South Korea, ship them to the United States, take them\\napart, and then reassemble stateside. Koch warned Lee and\\nKTurbo in an email that such evasive practices could be\\ndeemed criminal:\\n The [EPA] webcast specifically excludes Heon\\n Seok’s idea of sending the equipment to the US\\n and taking it apart and putting it back together.\\n In fact the webcast says that if you say that is\\n [Buy American] you are committing criminal\\n fraud.\\nTrinity Lee reassured Koch that KTurbo would use compo-\\nnents from both South Korea and the United States and as-\\nsemble the turbo blowers in greater Chicago. Other sales rep-\\nresentatives who inquired about KTurbo’s Buy American\\ncompliance plan were told the same thing, including by Lee\\nhimself.\\n At that point, KTurbo formed an Illinois subsidiary,\\nKTurbo USA Inc.,3 leased a warehouse in Batavia, Illinois, and\\nhired three American technicians. KTurbo’s sales\\n\\n3 The legal distinction between KTurbo Inc. and KTurbo USA Inc. does\\nnot matter for purposes of this opinion, so we refer to the two companies\\ncollectively as “KTurbo.”\\n\\f6 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nrepresentatives landed several contracts for Recovery Act\\nprojects. In its bids, KTurbo highlighted its domestic presence\\nand promised Buy American compliance. For example,\\nKTurbo submitted a bid to South Burlington, Vermont in the\\nsummer of 2009, which included the following Buy American\\ncertification:\\n By this letter, KTurbo USA certifies that it will\\n manufacture and deliver KTurbo brand blower\\n packages and equipment in compliance with\\n the final requirements of the 2009 U.S. economic\\n stimulus law, The American Recovery and Re-\\n investment Act of 2009.\\nKTurbo sent nearly identical compliance letters for projects in\\nCalifornia, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Oregon.\\n These representations—a South Korean company certify-\\ning its product was “produced in the United States”—did not\\ngo unnoticed. A competitor that lost a bid to KTurbo filed a\\ncomplaint with the EPA in the fall of 2009. In response, EPA\\nofficials visited KTurbo’s Batavia facility on October 30, 2009.\\nDuring that visit, Lee gave a PowerPoint presentation\\ndetailing KTurbo’s plans to comply with the Buy American\\nprovision. He represented that KTurbo would assemble its\\nturbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Slides in Lee’s presenta-\\ntion indicated fifty percent of the total input costs would be\\nattributable to American components, assembly, and testing.\\nTrinity Lee sent the EPA a letter confirming these details a few\\nweeks later.\\n KTurbo manufactured its first turbo blower at the Batavia\\nfacility in January 2010. It built nine more there over the next\\nthree months, at a rate of one to two weeks per blower.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 7\\n\\n C. The Revised Plan\\n It did not take long for Lee to abandon that original plan\\nto produce turbo blowers in Batavia. By April 2010, Lee con-\\ncluded production costs in the United States were prohibi-\\ntively expensive, and he decided to go back to importing\\nturbo blowers from South Korea. Employees pushed back\\nwith concerns about KTurbo’s Recovery Act compliance, but\\nLee forged ahead. At trial, one of KTurbo’s technicians ex-\\nplained how the component parts from South Korea began\\narriving more and more fully assembled, until completely as-\\nsembled blowers started showing up. No new components\\nwere added to the turbo blowers once they reached Batavia.\\nTechnicians simply plugged them in and ran performance ef-\\nficiency tests.\\n Lee’s revised plan depended on its secrecy. He instructed\\nKTurbo employees not to disclose to customers the fact that\\ntheir turbo blowers were made in South Korea. To evade de-\\ntection, KTurbo (with Lee’s knowledge) went out of its way to\\navoid shipping the machines from South Korea directly to\\ncustomers. When municipalities questioned KTurbo about\\nRecovery Act compliance, KTurbo simply lied. Take KTurbo’s\\nMay 20, 2010 response to Lowell, Massachusetts: “The blower\\nwill be assembled and tested at KTurbo’s Chicago location.”\\nLee himself participated, emailing a sales representative sim-\\nilar misrepresentations in September 2010: “We assemble and\\ntest in Chicago. Only motor and VFD comes from Korea. It is\\nalmost Made In USA.”\\n But this scheme unraveled quickly. Jorge Parra’s shipyard\\ndiscovery in December 2010 was the beginning of the end.\\nWhen U.S. Customs detained KTurbo’s products at the bor-\\nder, the company fell behind on its deliveries. This required\\n\\f8 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nmore lies to hide that the turbo blowers were coming from\\noverseas and needed to clear U.S. Customs. When a Lowell,\\nMassachusetts general contractor contacted KTurbo about the\\ndelays, Joel Schomo (a KTurbo engineer) told him the Batavia\\nfacility was waiting for parts to begin final assembly, even\\nthough KTurbo had discontinued all assembly operations in\\nBatavia months earlier. At trial, Schomo testified he told this\\nlie because the Recovery Act funded Lowell’s project and he\\ndid not want to raise any “red flags” that KTurbo “might not\\nbe complying with the Recovery Act requirements.”\\n Within two months, federal investigators executed a\\nsearch warrant at the Batavia facility. Lee was present. During\\nthe search, Lee admitted he was aware that the turbo blowers\\nwere for Recovery Act projects, that KTurbo shipped them\\nfully assembled from South Korea, and that it was “wrong”\\nto do so.\\n D. Lee’s Prosecution\\n About a year later, a grand jury returned an indictment\\nagainst Lee. It alleged he falsely represented that KTurbo’s\\nturbo blowers complied with the Buy American provision\\nwhen Lee knew KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities re-\\nceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” The indictment also\\ncharged Lee “knew that turbo blowers were substantially as-\\nsembled before their arrival in the United States and did not\\nrequire meaningful assembly or manufacturing in the United\\nStates.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 9\\n\\n By this point, Lee had fled the country. It took three years\\nto extradite him from South Korea. When the government fi-\\nnally brought Lee back to appear, he responded to the indict-\\nment with a series of motions to dismiss, each of which the\\ndistrict court denied.\\n During an eight-day trial, the government presented doz-\\nens of witnesses: U.S. Customs officers, federal agents,\\nKTurbo employees, sales representatives, general contractors,\\nand employees of municipal customers. Lee elected to take\\nthe stand, and he adamantly denied any knowledge that\\nKTurbo imported fully assembled blowers into the United\\nStates. On cross-examination, the government battered Lee’s\\ncredibility, impeaching him with documentary evidence and\\nother witnesses’ testimony. The jury ultimately convicted Lee\\non all counts.\\n E. Post-Trial Proceedings\\n Lee filed a series of post-trial motions seeking to vacate the\\njury’s verdict; the district court denied each. The district court\\nheld three sentencing hearings over several months, which\\ncentered on the parties’ dispute about how to calculate Lee’s\\nguideline range. For wire fraud convictions, the Sentencing\\nGuidelines instruct district courts to begin with a base offense\\nlevel of seven and then to add levels based on the amount of\\nthe “loss” caused by the defendant. U.S. SENTENCING\\nGUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a)–(b) (U.S. SENTENCING\\nCOMM’N Nov. 2018). In this case, the parties disputed whether\\nLee should receive credit in the loss calculation for the market\\nvalue of KTurbo blowers sold to customers.\\n The district court initially ruled that the loss equaled the\\ntotal amount KTurbo received from defrauded municipalities\\n\\f10 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n(about $180,000), putting Lee’s guideline range at 46–57\\nmonths. But the court gave Lee a below-guidelines prison sen-\\ntence of 20 months, plus restitution. Two weeks later, Lee filed\\na notice of appeal and a motion asking the district court to\\ncorrect its judgment under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). The district\\ncourt held a hearing on Lee’s Rule 35(a) motion, where it\\nagreed with Lee’s argument on the guideline calculation and\\nresentenced Lee to 12 months. After the district court entered\\nits final judgment on March 14, 2018, Lee filed a second notice\\nof appeal on March 28, 2018. Thirty days later, the govern-\\nment cross-appealed Lee’s sentence.\\n II. Discussion\\n A. Wire Fraud Convictions\\n We begin with Lee’s wire fraud convictions. He asks us to\\nvacate them because the government’s trial evidence con-\\nstructively amended the indictment and failed to prove all the\\nelements of the crime.\\n 1. Did the government’s case at trial impermissibly\\n deviate from the indictment?\\n “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-\\nwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment\\nof a Grand Jury … .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Founders\\nadopted this grand jury requirement from English tradition,\\nin which lay grand jurors considered whether a crime should\\nbe charged while also protecting the accused from prosecuto-\\nrial overreach. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); see\\nalso Andrew D. Leipold, Grand Jury Requirement, in THE\\nHERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 431 (David F. Forte &\\nMatthew Spalding eds., 2d ed. 2014). The Supreme Court has\\nexplained “that a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 11\\n\\non charges that are not made in the indictment against him.”\\nStirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960).\\n Two related doctrines arise out of this Fifth Amendment\\nrequirement: constructive amendment and variance. Both\\nexplain differences between the government’s case in the in-\\ndictment and the government’s case at trial. Constructive\\namendment occurs where the trial evidence supports (or the\\ncourt’s jury instructions charge) an offense not alleged in the\\nindictment. United States v. Burge, 711 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir.\\n2013). Variance refers to situations where the government’s\\ntrial evidence “proves facts materially different from those al-\\nleged in the indictment.” United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113,\\n1125 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The distinction\\nbetween the two doctrines is subtle, but significant. Where a\\ndifferent crime has been proved (constructive amendment), it\\nis error per se and the verdict must be vacated. United States\\nv. Ratliff-White, 493 F.3d 812, 820 (7th Cir. 2007).4 But where\\nthe same crime is proved, only through evidence different\\nthan the factual allegations in the indictment (variance), the\\ndefendant must demonstrate prejudice to his substantial\\nrights. Id.\\n Lee contends the government constructively amended the\\nindictment by presenting evidence of misrepresentations be-\\nyond KTurbo’s Buy American certifications. He claims the in-\\ndictment confined itself to the falsity of the certifications,\\nwhile the government’s trial evidence focused on other lies,\\n\\n4 This assumes the defendant properly preserved the error in the district\\ncourt. If the issue was waived or forfeited, we review only for plain error.\\nUnited States v. Remsza, 77 F.3d 1039, 1043–44 (7th Cir. 1996) (assessing de-\\nfendant’s constructive amendment argument under a plain error standard\\ndue to defendant’s failure to raise it in the district court).\\n\\f12 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nsuch as false statements in sales presentations, misrepresen-\\ntations to sales representatives, and misleading emails to\\ngeneral contractors.\\n Even if we accept as true Lee’s interpretation of the indict-\\nment and his characterization of the trial evidence, it would\\nnot rise to the level of a constructive amendment. The govern-\\nment did not attempt to prove a crime different from the one\\nalleged. See United States v. Khilchenko, 324 F.3d 917, 920 (7th\\nCir. 2003) (“To effect a constructive amendment, the evidence\\nat trial must establish offenses different from or in addition to\\nthose charged by the grand jury.”). Prosecutors did not argue\\nLee committed mail fraud when the indictment charged wire\\nfraud. The government’s case at trial did not attempt to prove\\na fraud in the air compressor market after alleging a scheme\\nin the turbo blower market. Constructive amendments arise\\n“where there is a ‘complex of facts distinctly different from\\nthose set forth in the charging instrument and not where there\\nis a single set of facts.’” United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306,\\n314 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d\\n584, 586 (9th Cir. 1984)). Here, the government consistently\\nmaintained that Lee committed wire fraud by selling turbo\\nblowers made in South Korea as if they were made in the\\nUnited States.\\n Lee’s argument is more aptly characterized as one of vari-\\nance, although he does not frame it that way. Even if the crime\\ncharged remains consistent, it is a problem if the government\\nmaterially alters the factual underpinnings of that charge. See\\nUnited States v. Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 857–58 (7th Cir. 1983)\\n(defendant may establish reversible error where the variance\\naltered an essential or material element of the charge). But\\nvariance claims are subject to harmless error review—we will\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 13\\n\\nnot disturb a conviction on account of “a technical deficiency\\nof no prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (quoting Russell v. United\\nStates, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962)). No prejudice exists in this\\ncase.\\n First, despite Lee’s characterization, the indictment did\\ntailor its fraud allegations to KTurbo’s failure to manufacture\\nits turbo blowers at the Batavia facility. Paragraph 3 of the in-\\ndictment alleged KTurbo “did not perform and did not intend\\nto perform substantial transformation of the turbo blowers at\\nthe KTURBO facility in Batavia, Illinois, before delivery of the\\nturbo blowers to municipal wastewater treatment facilities\\nreceiving Recovery Act stimulus funds.” It also expressly al-\\nleged that Lee knew the turbo blowers were already assem-\\nbled before arriving in the United States. The government\\nproved those allegations at trial with evidence that Lee knew\\nKTurbo made its turbo blowers in South Korea and lied about\\nthat fact. Such evidence matches the indictment’s fraud alle-\\ngations.\\n Second, even if these misrepresentations were not ex-\\npressly covered by the indictment’s text, they were “part and\\nparcel” of the same scheme described by the indictment. Nye\\n& Nissen, Corp. v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 617 (1949) (no\\nvariance where indictment alleged a single scheme to defraud\\nexecuted in various ways). Additional evidence regarding\\ntechnical details about how a defendant executed an alleged\\nscheme does not constitute an impermissible variance. Ajayi,\\n808 F.3d at 1125 (presentation of “more detailed” facts at trial\\nnot an impermissible variance). Lee cannot demonstrate his\\nFifth Amendment rights were violated because the govern-\\nment’s trial evidence concerned “the same elaborate scheme\\nto defraud … as was described in the indictment.”\\n\\f14 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRatliff-White, 493 F.3d at 821 (quoting United States v. Dupre,\\n462 F.3d 131, 140–41 (2d Cir. 2006)).\\n Two concerns underlie the constructive amendment and\\nvariance doctrines: ensuring criminal defendants have ade-\\nquate notice of the charges against them and avoiding the risk\\nof double jeopardy. Neither is present here. The indictment\\nnotified Lee of the allegations against him: that he committed\\nwire fraud by importing turbo blowers from South Korea\\nwhile representing they were made in Batavia. See United\\nStates v. Corrigan, 912 F.3d 422, 428 (7th Cir. 2019) (indictment\\nprovided valid notice despite listing wrong name of victim);\\nUnited States v. Kuna, 760 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1985) (alleged\\nvariance in mail fraud prosecution was harmless because the\\ndefendant “was able to identify with great certainty the acts\\nfor which he was placed in jeopardy”).\\n The indictment also included specific details about the\\nscheme alleged, alleviating any double jeopardy concerns. See\\nUnited States v. Moore, 563 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2009) (hold-\\ning specificity in the indictment would “avoid any later dou-\\nble jeopardy concerns”). It described the Recovery Act’s Buy\\nAmerican provision, how KTurbo leased a warehouse in\\nBatavia, KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts, the fact KTurbo\\nfailed “to perform substantial transformation of the turbo\\nblowers at the KTURBO facility in Batavia,” Lee’s knowledge\\n“that turbo blowers were substantially assembled before their\\narrival in the United States and did not require meaningful\\nassembly or manufacturing in the United States,” and Lee’s\\nmisrepresentations and concealment of KTurbo’s true opera-\\ntions. Such detail in the indictment protected Lee from expo-\\nsure to double jeopardy. See United States v. Scheuneman, 712\\nF.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2013) (indictment sufficient where it\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 15\\n\\n“presented enough detail to allow [the defendant] to plead\\ndouble jeopardy to avoid future prosecution based on the\\nsame conduct alleged”).\\n Because the indictment afforded Lee ample notice of the\\ncase the government presented at trial and included specific\\ndetails of the crimes alleged to avoid double jeopardy risk, no\\nimpermissible constructive amendment or variance occurred\\nin this case.5\\n 2. Did the government present enough evidence to\\n convict Lee of wire fraud?\\n Lee appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for ac-\\nquittal under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. We review such decisions de\\nnovo, asking if the evidence—viewed in the light most favor-\\nable to the prosecution—could support a rational finding of\\nall the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable\\ndoubt. United States v. Mohamed, 759 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir.\\n2014). Put differently, we reverse only if the trial record “is\\ndevoid of evidence from which a jury could conclude guilt\\nbeyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alhalabi, 443 F.3d\\n605, 613 (7th Cir. 2006). Given this deference to the jury ver-\\ndict, Lee’s hurdle on appeal is high, as “we rarely reverse a\\nconviction for mail or wire fraud due to insufficient evi-\\ndence.” United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 354 (7th Cir.\\n2016).\\n\\n\\n5Lee’s concerns are also mitigated because the district court gave the jury\\na copy of the indictment and instructed jurors to convict only if the gov-\\nernment had proved the crimes it alleged. See United States v. Cusimano,\\n148 F.3d 824, 830–31 (7th Cir. 1998) (district court’s provision of the indict-\\nment to the jury and proper instruction on it “establish[ed] that there was\\nno constructive amendment to the indictment”).\\n\\f16 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n To convict a defendant of wire fraud, the government\\nmust prove three elements: (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) the\\ndefendant’s intent to defraud, and (3) the defendant’s use of\\ninterstate wires in furtherance of the scheme. United States v.\\nJackson, 860 F.3d 438, 446 (7th Cir. 2017). Lee challenges the\\ngovernment’s proof on the first element, the scheme to de-\\nfraud. The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, reaches “any\\nscheme to deprive another of money or property by means of\\nfalse or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”\\nCarpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987).\\n On appeal, Lee argues that KTurbo’s Buy American certi-\\nfications were not false. He claims KTurbo’s turbo blowers\\ncomplied with the Buy American provision because they were\\nmade in South Korea. That claim is not as self-contradictory\\nas it first sounds, given the text of Recovery Act § 1605(d),\\nwhich requires the statute to be “applied in a manner con-\\nsistent with United States obligations under international\\nagreements.” Both the United States and South Korea have\\njoined the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Gov-\\nernment Procurement (WTO-GPA), which requires all signa-\\ntories to provide all other signatories’ exports “treatment no\\nless favourable than the treatment the Party, including its pro-\\ncuring entities, accords to: (a) domestic goods, services and\\nsuppliers; and (b) goods, services and suppliers of any other\\nParty.” WTO-GPA art. 4 § 1, Apr. 6, 2014, 3008 U.N.T.S. Reg.\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 17\\n\\nNo. A-31874.6 In other words, the WTO-GPA is a multi-lateral\\n“most favored nation” clause for government purchasing. Lee\\ninterprets Recovery Act § 1605(d) to mean the WTO-GPA’s\\nmost favored nation clause supersedes the Buy American\\nprovision, such that South Korean products must be given the\\nsame treatment as American products for purposes of the\\nRecovery Act.7\\n Critically however, when the Recovery Act was enacted\\nthe EPA publicly rejected the interpretation Lee now offers.\\nAn April 2009 EPA memorandum explained that the agency\\ninterpreted Recovery Act § 1605(d) to apply to direct pur-\\nchases by the federal government and the specific state and\\nlocal agencies expressly listed in the WTO-GPA’s appendices,\\nbut not “to procurement initiated by local entities ([state re-\\nvolving fund] assistance recipients), unless they are listed in\\nthe appendix.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Memorandum on\\n\\n6 By its terms, the WTO-GPA covers purchases made by the EPA above\\ncertain dollar thresholds. WTO-GPA, Coverage Schedules, United States\\nann. 1. Coverage of purchases made by States themselves, state agencies,\\nand local municipalities is more complicated, varying from State to State\\nand from agency to agency within a State. WTO-GPA, Coverage Sched-\\nules, United States ann. 2–3; see also Hong-Sik Chung, Government Procure-\\nment in the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement: Great Opportunities for\\nBoth Sides?, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 303 (2014). But the WTO-GPA\\nprovides that where a covered entity “requires persons not covered under\\na Party’s annexes to Appendix I to procure in accordance with particular\\nrequirements, Article IV shall apply mutatis mutandis to such require-\\nments.” WTO-GPA art. 2 § 5.\\n7 Federal purchasing regulations provide that where an international\\nagreement applies, the “restrictions of section 1605 of the Recovery Act do\\nnot apply to designated country iron, steel, and/or other manufactured\\ngoods.” 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(b)(ii). South Korea is listed as a “designated\\ncountry” based on its membership in the WTO-GPA. 2 C.F.R. § 176.160(a).\\n\\f18 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nImplementation of Buy American provisions of P.L. 111-5\\n(Apr. 28, 2009), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2\\n014-12/documents/buy_am.pdf (last visited August 13, 2019).\\nIn the nature of a “smoking gun,” federal agents found a copy\\nof this EPA memorandum in KTurbo’s Batavia facility, with\\nthe relevant paragraph flagged by handwritten markings.\\nReasonable jurors could thus conclude Lee was aware that the\\nEPA did not consider South Korean products Buy American\\ncompliant.\\n As a result, even if one accepts Lee’s interpretation of Re-\\ncovery Act § 1605(d), the EPA’s express rejection of it makes\\nKTurbo’s South Korean manufacturing a “material” fact for\\nwire fraud purposes. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16\\n(1999) (holding a statement is “material” if it has “a natural\\ntendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the deci-\\nsion of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed”)\\n(quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)).\\nKTurbo could not legitimately certify its Buy American com-\\npliance, at least not without disclosing to customers that the\\nturbo blowers were made in South Korea. Federal fraud stat-\\nutes reach such misleading omissions of material information.\\nUnited States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2005).\\n A reasonable purchaser in this scenario—one who re-\\nceived funds from the EPA pursuant to the Recovery Act and\\nwas bound to comply with the Buy American provision—\\nwould deem it highly relevant whether a supplier based its\\nBuy American certification on an interpretation of the statute\\nexpressly rejected by the EPA. A series of trial witnesses con-\\nsistently testified that Recovery Act compliance was “abso-\\nlutely vital,” given it was a legal requirement of the project\\nfunding. Without Buy American compliance, municipalities\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 19\\n\\njeopardized losing all Recovery Act funding from the EPA. As\\none customer testified, his municipality considered KTurbo’s\\nrepresentations that the turbo blowers were “Assembled in\\nUSA” to be “extremely important” because “it bolstered\\n[their] belief that [the turbo blower] was substantially\\ntransformed in the United States.” Municipal employees also\\ntestified they would not have purchased KTurbo’s blowers\\nwithout KTurbo’s Recovery Act assurances.\\n Where the fraud alleged deals with a half truth or material\\nomission, we generally require proof of an act of concealment\\non the part of the defendant. See Stephens, 421 F.3d at 507. The\\nrecord in this case unmistakably reflects such concealment.\\nTrial evidence showed KTurbo’s repeated misrepresentations\\nto its customers about where KTurbo made its turbo blowers.\\nFor example, KTurbo sent the City of Pendleton, Oregon a\\nBuy American certification in April 2010—shortly after Lee\\ndecided to stop all domestic manufacturing operations—rep-\\nresenting that KTurbo had “established an assembly facility\\nin Batavia, Illinois, where partial manufacturing and assem-\\nbly of all units sold in North America will be complete[d].”\\nNo one at KTurbo ever corrected that misrepresentation. At\\nthe beginning of 2011, KTurbo sent the City of Ottawa, Illinois\\na similar Buy American certification, signed by Trinity Lee,\\nwhich stated: “All assembly of the completed unit will be ex-\\necuted domestically. The assembly process includes wiring\\nand panel assembly, riveted frame assembly, total assembly\\nincluding all internal connections and power wiring, tubing\\nand final calibration will be perofrmaned [sic] at KTurbo USA\\nin Batavia, IL.” None of that certification was truthful, but it\\nwas emblematic of KTurbo’s fraudulent scheme. United States\\nv. Betts-Gaston, 860 F.3d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 2017) (jurors are per-\\nmitted to infer fraudulent methodologies from evidence of\\n\\f20 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nsimilar fraudulent transactions). KTurbo repeatedly assured\\nmunicipalities and their general contractors of its Recovery\\nAct compliance. Several customers testified at trial about their\\nbelief that KTurbo made its turbo blowers in the United\\nStates.\\n KTurbo also misled its own sales representatives into\\nthinking KTurbo manufactured turbo blowers in Batavia, not\\nSouth Korea. These sales representatives testified they told\\ncustomers—based on KTurbo’s representations to them—that\\nKTurbo complied with the Buy American provision because\\nit manufactured and assembled its blowers in Batavia. Lee\\nmasterminded these material misrepresentations, even if he\\nused sales representatives to pass them on to the ultimate cus-\\ntomers. See United States v. Seidling, 737 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th\\nCir. 2013) (“Nothing in the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. § 1341\\nrequires a scheme to defraud to involve deception of the same\\nperson or entity whose money or property is the intended ob-\\nject of the scheme.”). He is responsible for misrepresentations\\nhe commanded or willfully caused others to make as\\nKTurbo’s chief executive. 18 U.S.C. § 2; see also United States v.\\nGunning, 984 F.2d 1476, 1483 (7th Cir. 1993) (“One who coun-\\nsels or commands another to commit a crime, and knowingly\\nand actively contributes toward its success, is guilty of that\\ncrime under 18 U.S.C. § 2.”).\\n But Lee himself also actively participated in the cover up.\\nDuring his trial cross-examination, Lee acknowledged he\\nknew that KTurbo’s customers and the EPA cared about Buy\\nAmerican compliance. But he admitted he told customers that\\nKTurbo blowers were manufactured and assembled in the\\nUnited States. When a sales representative asked Lee about\\nBuy American compliance in a September 2010 email, Lee\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 21\\n\\nresponded: “We assemble and test in Chicago. Only motor\\nand VFD comes from Korea. It is almost Made In USA.” Lee\\nmade that statement months after KTurbo stopped assembly\\nin the United States. Even as the scheme began to unravel in\\nearly 2011, Lee persisted in his lies. On January 28, 2011, a\\nsales representative directly asked Lee about a rumor that fed-\\neral agents were investigating KTurbo. Lee responded by en-\\nsuring him that KTurbo faced no Recovery Act issues: “Most\\nimportant parts is [sic] final assembly and testing. We are do-\\ning those, so we are compliant.” Then, on February 8, 2011,\\nwhen representatives of Pendleton, Oregon, asked KTurbo\\nwhere its turbo blowers would be assembled, Lee wrote: “In\\nChicago the blowers will be finalized and tested and\\nshipped.”\\n Lee also challenges the government’s proof of his intent to\\ndefraud. A defendant acts with an intent to defraud where he\\nacts “willfully and with specific intent to deceive or cheat,\\nusually for the purpose of getting financial gain for himself or\\ncausing financial loss to another.” United States v. Pust, 798\\nF.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Paneras,\\n222 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2000)). Lee claims the government\\nfailed to prove he intended to defraud anyone because the\\ntrial evidence showed KTurbo took concrete steps toward\\nmanufacturing turbo blowers in the United States.\\n Lee’s intent argument ignores that his misrepresentations\\ncontinued well beyond April 2010, when he decided to stop\\nKTurbo’s American manufacturing operations. That Lee kept\\ntelling people KTurbo assembled its turbo blowers in Batavia\\nmonths after KTurbo ceased doing so is strong circumstantial\\nevidence of Lee’s intent to defraud. Pust, 798 F.3d at 600–01\\n(specific intent to defraud may be established by\\n\\f22 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\ncircumstantial evidence and examination of the scheme it-\\nself). Agents’ discovery of copies of the EPA’s guidance mem-\\noranda on the Buy American provision, as well as testimony\\nfrom other KTurbo employees about the extent of KTurbo’s\\nRecovery Act meetings and planning, support the conclusion\\nthat Lee willfully attempted to circumvent the law.\\n A jury also could reasonably conclude that Lee never in-\\ntended to make turbo blowers in Batavia long term, but rather\\nset up the facility as part of his scheme to mislead the EPA,\\nsales representatives, and customers. Cf. United States v. Freed,\\n921 F.3d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding a promise made\\nwithout a present intention to keep it can be fraudulent). After\\nall, Lee did not wait even a full three months before putting\\nthe kibosh on the entire operation. Viewing the evidence in\\nthe light most favorable to the prosecution, there is more than\\nenough to conclude Lee intended to deceive and defraud\\nKTurbo’s customers.\\n The trial evidence presented over the course of eight days\\nadequately supports Lee’s participation in a scheme to de-\\nfraud and his intent to do so. Lee does not challenge his use\\nof interstate wires as a part of that scheme. With all three ele-\\nments of wire fraud adequately established in the trial record,\\nwe affirm the jury’s verdict.\\n B. Smuggling Convictions\\n We turn now from Lee’s wire fraud convictions to his three\\nsmuggling convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 545. The statute pro-\\nvides, in part:\\n Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or\\n brings into the United States, any merchandise\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 23\\n\\n contrary to law … Shall be fined under this title\\n or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.\\n Over a century ago, when dealing with the predecessor to\\n§ 545, the Supreme Court held the words “contrary to law”\\nrefer to legal provisions outside the statute itself. Keck v.\\nUnited States, 172 U.S. 434, 437 (1899). A violation of § 545 re-\\nquires a violation of another law—the predicate offense if you\\nwill—done with a fraudulent or knowing mindset. In this\\ncase, the government claimed Lee violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a):\\n [E]very article of foreign origin … imported into\\n the United States shall be marked in a conspic-\\n uous place as legibly, indelibly, and perma-\\n nently as the nature of the article (or container)\\n will permit in such manner as to indicate to an\\n ultimate purchaser in the United States the Eng-\\n lish name of the country of origin of the article.\\n Lee asserts that a violation of § 1304(a) cannot serve as a\\npredicate offense for a § 545 conviction. According to Lee, the\\nwords “imports … merchandise contrary to law” in § 545\\nmean that the merchandise itself is per se illegal to import, not\\nmerely that the merchandise was imported in a condition\\nnoncompliant with some federal law or regulation some-\\nwhere.\\n In making this argument, Lee stresses the title of § 545:\\n“Smuggling goods into the United States.” He contends the\\nword “smuggling” refers exclusively to bringing on shore\\ngoods whose importation is categorically prohibited. Lee ef-\\nfectively says he could not have “smuggled” the turbo blow-\\ners into the United States because turbo blowers are allowed\\nin the United States.\\n\\f24 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n Even accepting Lee’s narrow interpretation of the word\\n“smuggling,”8 the text of the statute is not so cabined when\\nexamined in its entirety. Section 545 contains two separate\\nprohibitions; we must consider both when assessing the stat-\\nute’s meaning. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805)\\n(Marshall, C.J.) (“It is undoubtedly a well established\\nprinciple in the exposition of statutes, that every part is to be\\nconsidered, and the intent of the legislature to be extracted\\nfrom the whole.”). Section 545’s first paragraph, which is not\\nat issue, criminalizes “knowingly and willfully …\\nsmuggl[ing], or clandestinely introduc[ing] … into the United\\nStates any merchandise which should have been in-\\nvoiced … .” That language criminalizes smuggling goods into\\nthe United States, and the statute’s title summarizes that pro-\\nhibition. But § 545’s second paragraph—the one that is at is-\\nsue—is broader. It criminalizes “fraudulently or knowingly\\nimport[ing] … any merchandise contrary to law … .” The text\\nof the second paragraph of § 545 makes no mention of the\\nword “smuggling.”\\n A statute’s title or heading is a permissible indicator of the\\nmeaning of its text. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083\\n(2015); see also ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER,\\n\\n8 We have some doubt that the term is quite so limited. Cf. Smuggling,\\nBLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The crime of importing or ex-\\nporting illegal articles or articles on which duties have not been paid.”);\\nSmuggling, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (“The criminal of-\\nfense of knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States,\\nclandestinely introducing into the United States any merchandise which\\nshould have been declared for customs duty.”); Smuggle, AMERICAN\\nHERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2019) (“To\\nbring into a country (a prohibited item) secretively and intentionally in\\nviolation of the law.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 25\\n\\nREADING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 221 (2012).\\nBut a title cannot override the statutory text itself. Bhd. of R.R.\\nTrainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29\\n(1947). Although § 545—true to its title—outlaws smuggling\\ngoods into the United States, the statute also criminalizes the\\nfraudulent or knowing importation of “merchandise contrary\\nto law.” Lee’s construction of that language as equating with\\n“smuggling” renders the two provisions of § 545 duplicative,\\na heavily disfavored result. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.\\n759, 778 (1988) (discussing the “cardinal rule of statutory in-\\nterpretation that no provision should be construed to be en-\\ntirely redundant”); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 175.\\nThe better reading of the second paragraph of § 545 is that it\\nmakes it a crime to fraudulently or knowingly import mer-\\nchandise in any manner contrary to law. Section 545’s title\\ncannot save Lee from its text.\\n Lee next argues the case law is on his side. He claims the\\ncases only address scenarios where the defendant imported\\ngoods that are illegal per se—barred entirely from importa-\\ntion into the United States. That might be true, but it would\\nnot change the meaning of § 545. The scope of a statute cannot\\nbe altered based on the fact patterns of cases that happen to\\nbe charged and end up in the Federal Reporter. In any event,\\nLee’s assertions about the state of the case law are inaccurate.\\nHis cited authorities, Babb v. United States, 218 F.2d 538 (5th\\nCir. 1955) and Steiner v. United States, 229 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.\\n1956), dealt with indictments that failed to identify an under-\\nlying violation to serve as the predicate for § 545 liability. The\\nindictments simply lacked any predicate offense undergird-\\ning the § 545 charge. We do not have that here: the govern-\\nment’s indictment specifically accused Lee of violating\\n§ 1304(a).\\n\\f26 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\n And despite Lee’s attempts, we do not see how this case is\\ndistinguishable from United States v. Kuipers, 49 F.3d 1254 (7th\\nCir. 1995).9 In Kuipers, we affirmed the defendant’s § 545 con-\\nviction for attempting to import the horns of a protected spe-\\ncies under false paperwork. Id. at 1256. It was legal to import\\nthe horns into the United States with the proper paperwork,\\nbut the defendant used forged documentation to circumvent\\nthe law. Here, Lee essentially did the same thing. Nothing\\nprohibited Lee from importing turbo blowers into the United\\nStates, but he needed to do so with a proper country-of-origin\\ndesignation under § 1304(a). Lee circumvented that require-\\nment in a fraudulent fashion, similar to the defendant in\\nKuipers.\\n Lee also claims he could not have violated § 545 because\\nU.S. Customs detained the turbo blowers at the border, such\\nthat the machines were never imported into the country. But\\nLee fails to provide any reason to exclude domestic U.S. Cus-\\ntoms facilities from the definition of the “United States,” as\\nused in § 545. If anything, the text supports the opposite con-\\nclusion, specifically excluding other areas but not U.S.\\nCustoms offices. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (“The term ‘United States’, as\\nused in this section, shall not include the Virgin Island, Amer-\\nican Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef,\\nJohnston Island, or Guam.”); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1304(j) (refer-\\nring to merchandise held by U.S. Customs for inspection as\\nan “imported article”).\\n\\n\\n9 Lee’s claim that Kuipers dealt with only the first paragraph of § 545, and\\nnot the second, is not correct. 49 F.3d at 1256 (“Kuipers was indicted on\\nMarch 1, 1994 for … (2) fraudulently and knowingly importing the Desert\\nBighorn Sheep into the United States contrary to law\\n(18 U.S.C. § 545) … .”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 27\\n\\n Lee notes that federal law allows mismarked goods, after\\ntheir markings are corrected, to be imported. 19 U.S.C.\\n§ 1304(j); see also 19 C.F.R. § 134.51. He emphasizes that § 1304\\ndoes not itself purport to criminalize mismarking a product’s\\ncountry of origin, despite providing criminal sanctions for\\nother violations. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(l) (penalizing anyone who\\n“defaces, destroys, removes, alters, covers, obscures, or oblit-\\nerates” a country-of-origin mark with intent to conceal that\\ninformation). Yet one federal statute does not preempt\\nanother. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2004).\\nSection 1304(l)’s silence cannot override the text of § 545. The\\nfact § 1304(l) does not separately criminalize conduct already\\noutlawed under § 545 is not a basis for limiting the scope of\\n§ 545. Cf. United States v. Hassanzadeh, 271 F.3d 574, 576–79\\n(4th Cir. 2001) (affirming § 545 conviction based on underly-\\ning § 1304 labeling violation).10\\n Finally, Lee claims treating § 1304 violations as predicate\\noffenses for § 545 liability will criminalize a vast array of in-\\nnocent behavior in international commerce. This policy argu-\\nment fails to account for § 545’s high scienter bar—fraudulent\\nor knowing misbehavior. Such a scienter requirement ensures\\n\\n\\n10 Lee’s invocation of United States ex rel. Huangyan Import v. Nature’s Farm\\n\\nProds., 370 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Cal. 2005), is not well received, particu-\\nlarly his selective and misleading quotation. Although the opinion states\\nfederal regulations “permit the importation of mismarked goods,” Lee\\nleaves out the important qualifying language about the monetary penal-\\nties imposed in such circumstances. Id. at 1001. And, as the underlying\\nstatute makes clear, goods originally mismarked upon arrival may be\\nwithheld until their country-of-origin markings are corrected. 19 U.S.C.\\n§ 1304(i)–(j). Nothing in the Huangyan Import opinion suggests that at-\\ntempting to import merchandise with false country-of-origin designations\\nis anything but “contrary to law.”\\n\\f28 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nthe statute does not criminalize innocent commercial mis-\\ntakes. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2019)\\n(“The cases in which we have emphasized scienter’s\\nimportance in separating wrongful from innocent acts are le-\\ngion.”). And this case involves no mere administrative over-\\nsight. KTurbo’s mislabeling served an important function in\\nLee’s broader scheme to deceive KTurbo customers about the\\norigin of the turbo blowers.\\n For all these reasons, we affirm Lee’s three smuggling con-\\nvictions.\\n Having affirmed all Lee’s convictions, we now proceed to\\nthe sentencing issues presented by the parties. We first ad-\\ndress the government’s cross-appeal regarding Lee’s prison\\nsentence, before resolving Lee’s challenge to the restitution\\nordered by the district court.\\n C. The Government’s Cross-Appeal\\n The government asks us to reinstate the 20-month\\nsentence the district court originally imposed. It claims the\\ndistrict court lacked authority under FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a) to\\nreduce Lee’s sentence to 12 months. But before we reach the\\nmerits of the government’s cross-appeal, we must resolve two\\njurisdictional questions.\\n 1. Is there statutory jurisdiction for the government’s\\n cross-appeal?\\n The government may appeal an adverse decision in a\\ncriminal case only if expressly authorized by statute. United\\nStates v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977). Here,\\nthe government cites 18 U.S.C. § 3731. But that provision does\\nnot apply—the government is not appealing a dismissal of its\\nindictment, a new trial order, or any of the other issues listed\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 29\\n\\nin § 3731. See United States v. Spilotro, 884 F.2d 1003, 1005–06\\n(7th Cir. 1989) (holding § 3731 does not provide jurisdiction\\nfor appeals challenging “a district court order reducing a sen-\\ntence”); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., 15B FED. PRAC.\\n& PROC. § 3919.8 (2d ed. April 2019 supp.) (“Ordinarily the\\ngovernment cannot rely upon either § 1291 or § 3731 to sup-\\nport appeal from a criminal sentence … .”).\\n The relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), which author-\\nizes the government to appeal a defendant’s sentence on spe-\\ncific grounds. A district court’s modification of a sentence\\nwithout authority to do so, as the government argues here, is\\none such ground. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b)(1) (providing the gov-\\nernment the ability to appeal sentences “imposed in violation\\nof law”). The government’s errant citation is not insignificant,\\ngiven that timeliness is an issue for its cross-appeal (as dis-\\ncussed below). Section 3731 contains a 30-day deadline for fil-\\ning a notice of appeal that § 3742(b) lacks. See CHARLES ALAN\\nWRIGHT, ET AL., 16A FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3950.8 (4th ed. April\\n2019 supp.); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186,\\n1195–99 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing the interplay between\\n§ 3731 and FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)). Nevertheless, where the rec-\\nord provides enough information to establish appellate juris-\\ndiction, we may exercise such jurisdiction despite the parties’\\nfailure to direct us to its proper statutory source. See NewPage\\nWis. Sys. Inc. v. United Steel Workers Int’l Union, 651 F.3d 775,\\n778 (7th Cir. 2011) (if the jurisdictional statute cited by a party\\nis inaccurate, the “court still must inquire whether another\\nstatute supplies jurisdiction”); see also In re Sealed Case, 449\\nF.3d 118, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding the appellant’s failure\\n\\f30 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nto cite § 3742, “while bothersome to a court, is not necessarily\\nfatal”).\\n One issue remains: Section 3742(b) requires the govern-\\nment to obtain “the personal approval of the Attorney\\nGeneral, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general\\ndesignated by the Solicitor General” in order to appeal. Be-\\ncause the government did not rely on § 3742(b) in its briefing,\\nit has not provided proof of its compliance with that statutory\\nrequirement. But our circuit precedent does not treat\\n§ 3742(b)’s approval requirement as jurisdictional. United\\nStates v. Hendrickson, 22 F.3d 170, 172 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994).11\\nNothing in the record suggests the government lacks author-\\nization to pursue its cross-appeal, and Lee never raised the\\nissue.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n11 See also United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 2008)\\n(personal approval requirement in § 3742(b) is non-jurisdictional), abro-\\ngated on different grounds by United States v. DiFalco, 837 F.3d 1207, 1216\\n(11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ruiz-Alonso, 397 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir.\\n2005) (same); United States v. Zamudio, 314 F.3d 517, 520 (10th Cir. 2002)\\n(same); United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1102 (2d Cir. 1992) (same);\\nbut see United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000) (per\\ncuriam) (dismissing the government’s sentencing appeal for failure to es-\\ntablish the requisite approval); United States v. Smith, 910 F.2d 326, 328 (6th\\nCir. 1990) (holding the approval is not jurisdictional but requiring proof\\nthat it has been obtained as part of the court’s “exercise of its supervisory\\nauthority”); cf. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 246 (2008) (explain-\\ning that an appellate court may not increase a defendant’s sentence absent\\na cross-appeal because “Congress … entrusted to named high-ranking of-\\nficials within the Department of Justice responsibility for determining\\nwhether the Government, on behalf of the public, should seek a sentence\\nhigher than the one imposed”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 31\\n\\n 2. Did the government file its notice of appeal in time?\\n The next jurisdictional question concerns the timeliness of\\nthe government’s notice of appeal. In a criminal case like this,\\nFED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B) provides the government’s deadline:\\n When the government is entitled to appeal, its\\n notice of appeal must be filed in the district\\n court within 30 days of the later of:\\n (i) the entry of the judgment or order be-\\n ing appealed; or\\n (ii) the filing of a notice of appeal by any\\n defendant.\\nThe government must file its own notice of appeal to pursue\\na sentencing increase following a conviction; it cannot piggy-\\nback on the defendant’s notice. Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 252–53.\\n Here, the relevant timeline looks like this:\\n February 28, 2018: The district court orally sen-\\n tenced Lee to 20 months in prison.\\n March 11, 2018: Lee filed his first notice of appeal\\n and a Rule 35(a) motion to correct his sentence.\\n March 14, 2018: The district court modified Lee’s\\n sentence to 12 months in prison and entered its\\n written judgment.\\n March 28, 2018: Lee filed his second notice of ap-\\n peal.\\n April 27, 2018: The government cross-appealed.\\n The government does not rely on the date of judgment un-\\nder Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(i). It cannot, as it filed its notice of appeal\\n45 days after the district court’s judgment. But what about\\n\\f32 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii)? The government’s notice of appeal came\\n30 days after Lee’s second notice of appeal, but 48 days after\\nLee’s first notice. Which of Lee’s notices triggered the govern-\\nment’s deadline clock?\\n As with any matter of statutory interpretation, the text\\ncontrols. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt,\\n139 S. Ct. 1507, 1512–13 (2019); see also SCALIA & GARNER,\\nsupra, at 56 (“The words of a governing text are of paramount\\nconcern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the\\ntext means.”). Notably, Rule 4(b)(1)(B)(ii) refers to “a notice of\\nappeal by any defendant” rather than “the first notice of ap-\\npeal by any defendant.” That is important because the analo-\\ngous rule for civil cases triggers a party’s deadline to initiate\\na cross-appeal on “the date when the first notice [of appeal]\\nwas filed … .” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3) (emphasis added). The\\ndrafters could have used the same language for the criminal\\nrule, but they chose different words. We must respect that de-\\ncision and give such variations effect. Murphy v. Smith, 138 S.\\nCt. 784, 787–88 (2018); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 170\\n(“[A] material variation in terms suggests a variation in mean-\\ning.”).\\n Lee offers no persuasive reason to interpret “a notice of\\nappeal by any defendant” to mean “the first notice of appeal\\nby any defendant.” The text of the rule already contemplates\\nthere may be multiple notices of appeal, and it allows the gov-\\nernment to file its cross-appeal within thirty days of the “later\\nof” such notices. The only authority Lee offers, Cyrak v. Lemon,\\n919 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1990), is a civil case addressing Rule 4(a),\\nwhich expressly refers to the “first notice.” Rather than\\nsimply analogize criminal cases to civil cases, as Lee asks us\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 33\\n\\nto do, we give effect to the different text of the different pro-\\nvisions and apply the rules as written.\\n Rule 4(b) permits the government to file its notice of ap-\\npeal within thirty days of “a notice of appeal by any defend-\\nant.” Lee timely filed “a notice of appeal” on March 28, 2018.\\nAnd the government filed its notice exactly thirty days later,\\non April 27, 2018, so the government’s appeal is timely under\\nthe plain meaning of FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B)(ii).\\n 3. In reducing Lee’s sentence, did the district court ex-\\n ceed its authority?\\n Now we arrive at the substance of the government’s cross-\\nappeal. The government claims district courts lack authority\\nto revisit advisory guideline calculations on a motion brought\\nunder FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). It does not challenge the merits\\nof the district court’s ruling, only the court’s authority to\\nmake it. Rule 35(a) states: “Within 14 days after sentencing,\\nthe court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmet-\\nical, technical, or other clear error.”\\n In sentencing Lee, the district court struggled with how to\\ncalculate the “loss” caused by Lee’s crimes for purposes of\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Where the loss cannot be determined, the\\nGuidelines permit courts to look at the defendant’s gain as an\\nalternative. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n. 3(B). The district court\\noriginally found Lee’s gain to be the $180,392 in Recovery Act\\nfunds paid to KTurbo by municipalities. That put Lee’s guide-\\nline range at 46–57 months, although the district court de-\\nparted down from that range and sentenced Lee to 20 months.\\n The district court abandoned that math on Lee’s Rule 35(a)\\nmotion. Based on United States v. Giovenco, 773 F.3d 866, 871\\n(7th Cir. 2014), the court determined it needed to assess net\\n\\f34 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nprofit, rather than KTurbo’s gross revenue, and that it lacked\\nthe evidentiary record to do so. It therefore decided not to ap-\\nply any sentencing enhancement based on Lee’s gain under\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Using a guideline range of 12–18 months, the\\ncourt sentenced Lee to 12 months plus one day.\\n The government emphasizes that a district court’s author-\\nity on a Rule 35(a) motion is “narrow.” As we have said, the\\n“Rule does not give the district court a second chance to exer-\\ncise its ‘discretion with regard to the application of the sen-\\ntencing guidelines,’ nor does it allow for changes to a sentence\\nbased on the court’s change of mind.” United States v. Clark,\\n538 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 35\\nadvisory committee’s note to 1991 amendments). Still, Rule\\n35(a) is not the straitjacket the government suggests. It does\\nallow district courts to correct “clear errors” and avoid waste-\\nful appeals by fixing obvious sentencing issues. United States\\nv. Schenian, 847 F.3d 422, 424 (7th Cir. 2017). This extends to\\nclear errors that produce mistakenly high sentences. Id. If the\\njudge identifies an aspect of the sentence that is objectively\\nerroneous—whether on a factual matter or a point of law—\\nthe judge may use Rule 35(a) to address the problem.\\n Here, the district court realized that its gain calculation\\nneeded to assess net profit, not gross revenue, see Giovenco,\\n773 F.3d at 871, and that it lacked an evidentiary basis to do\\nso. It also determined nothing in the record showed how\\nmuch Lee personally gained from KTurbo’s sales. The govern-\\nment bore the burden to establish a “loss” or “gain” under\\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. United States v. Johns, 686 F.3d 438, 454 (7th\\nCir. 2012). Sentencing Lee without a supporting evidentiary\\nrecord would have constituted clear error. Id. at 456–57. Rule\\n35(a)’s entire purpose is to correct errors otherwise destined\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 35\\n\\nto be reversed. Schenian, 847 F.3d at 424; Clark, 538 F.3d at 809.\\nThe district court was thus well within its authority to modify\\nLee’s sentence on his Rule 35(a) motion.\\n D. Restitution\\n Finally, we return to Lee’s appeal, specifically his chal-\\nlenge to the restitution ordered by the district court.\\n Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, courts must\\norder restitution to any victim of “an offense against property\\nunder this title, … including any offense committed by fraud\\nor deceit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). The statute sets the\\nrestitution amount at the value of the victim’s lost property\\non the date of loss or the date of sentencing (whichever is\\ngreater) minus the value of any returned property. 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 3663A(b)(1)(B); see also United States v. Malone, 747 F.3d 481,\\n485 (7th Cir. 2014).\\n On appeal, Lee objects to paying any restitution, denying\\nthat any municipality sustained a loss. He acknowledges that\\ntwo municipalities, Mishawaka, Indiana and Redmond,\\nOregon, paid KTurbo a total of $180,392 for turbo blowers\\nmanufactured in South Korea. But Lee points out that the EPA\\nsubsequently authorized Mishawaka and Redmond to con-\\ntinue using the KTurbo blowers without returning the Recov-\\nery Act funds. So Lee argues neither municipality sustained\\nany loss: each paid for turbo blowers to use on its project, and\\neach received turbo blowers that it is using on its project.\\n But Lee waived this argument in the district court. The\\nprobation office recommended the court order $180,392 in\\nrestitution based on the sums paid by Mishawaka and\\n\\f36 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nRedmond.12 The government agreed with probation’s recom-\\nmendation. Despite the fact the district court held three\\nsentencing hearings, Lee failed to raise the issue of restitution,\\neven once. Lee failed to object in his written sentencing mem-\\norandum, and he failed to raise the issue in his Rule 35(a) mo-\\ntion. Indeed, Lee’s entire argument regarding restitution in\\nthe district court comprised two sentences in a supplemental\\nbrief requested by the court on a different topic, with no cita-\\ntions to any statutory authority or case law supporting his po-\\nsition.13 That is insufficient to preserve an objection.\\n The closer question is whether Lee affirmatively waived\\nthe restitution arguments he now pursues on appeal, or\\nwhether he only forfeited them. Waiver requires the inten-\\ntional relinquishment of a known right, while forfeiture is a\\nmere accidental or neglectful failure to assert a right. United\\nStates v. Hathaway, 882 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2018). The dis-\\ntinction is important, as waiver precludes appellate review al-\\ntogether, while forfeited rights may be vindicated on appeal\\nthrough plain-error review. Id. In making this determination,\\n\\n12 Neither of these municipal contracts served as a basis for any of the five\\n\\ncounts of wire fraud in the indictment. Ordinarily restitution is limited to\\nthe losses caused by the specific conduct underlying the defendant’s con-\\nvictions. United States v. Locke, 759 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2014). But where\\nthe offense “involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of\\ncriminal activity,” such as the scheme to defraud necessary for a wire\\nfraud conviction, the applicable statute permits courts to award restitution\\nto “any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the\\ncourse of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2).\\n13 In the district court Lee argued: “Since the loss amount is zero, the res-\\ntitution amount is also zero. And the government’s motion to use Heon\\nSeok Lee’s bond deposit to pay restitution (Dkt # 239) should therefore be\\ndenied.”\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 37\\n\\nwe look to whether the defendant “chose, as a matter of strat-\\negy, not to present the argument.” Id. (quoting United States v.\\nGarcia, 580 F.3d 528, 541 (7th Cir. 2009)).\\n After reviewing the extensive sentencing transcripts in\\nthis case, we conclude Lee and his counsel made a strategic\\ndecision to not press objections to restitution in the district\\ncourt, and thus waived the issue. The main event during the\\nsentencing was the loss calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. Yet\\nrestitution did come up. At the first hearing, Lee’s counsel in-\\nterjected, “I would also just note since restitution is brought\\nup—been brought up, that the restitution amount I don’t\\nthink needs to be above 180.” Rather than argue the district\\ncourt should not order restitution because there was no loss,\\nas he does now, Lee asked the district court to not go above\\nthe $180,392 figure recommended by the probation office.14\\nAlthough Lee did include a two-sentence objection to restitu-\\ntion in his supplemental memorandum before the second\\nhearing, he never raised the issue at the second hearing itself,\\ndespite the prosecution addressing the topic. Lee never men-\\ntioned restitution in his Rule 35(a) motion. And, at the third\\nsentencing hearing, when the district court noted its intention\\nto enter the same $180,392 in restitution (despite reducing\\nLee’s prison term on account of the government’s failure to\\nprove the loss amount), Lee’s counsel represented, “I think\\nthat’s correct as to what should—what would be in the judg-\\nment.” These repeated decisions to press other arguments,\\nand not address restitution, evinced a “tactical choice” on\\n\\n14 Lee made this point in the context of a debate about whether the loss\\nfigure under the Sentencing Guidelines should be the $1.6 million face\\nvalue of KTurbo’s Recovery Act contracts. Lee’s incentive to push the dis-\\ntrict court toward a figure substantially lower than that was clear.\\n\\f38 Nos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\\n\\nLee’s part, constituting waiver. United States v. Jin Hua Dong,\\n675 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2012).\\n We realize there is some logical tension between the dis-\\ntrict court’s restitution award, and its conclusion that it lacked\\na sufficient evidentiary basis to determine victims’ “loss” for\\npurposes of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.15 But the appropriate forum for\\naddressing that issue was the district court in the first in-\\nstance. Calculating restitution in an atypical fraud case such\\nas this one is difficult, as the losses caused by a scheme to cir-\\ncumvent governmental purchasing preferences are “inher-\\nently difficult to quantify.” United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773,\\n794 (7th Cir. 2006). The district court was entitled to the bene-\\nfit of the parties’ best arguments on how restitution should be\\ncalculated. By strategically choosing to forego his challenge to\\nthe restitution figure in the district court, Lee waived the is-\\nsue: “A defendant cannot squirrel away objections, revealing\\nthem only upon successive appeals.” Kuipers, 49 F.3d at 1258.\\n III. Conclusion\\n Heon Seok Lee repeatedly lied about where his company\\nmanufactured its products in order to profit off a federal stim-\\nulus package. Such a fraudulent scheme is wire fraud and\\nprohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1343. To execute his scheme, Lee di-\\nrected his company to mislabel the country of origin for its\\n\\n15 Although the restitution amount typically tracks the loss amount under\\n\\nthe Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. McGee, 612 F.3d 627, 635 (7th\\nCir. 2010), courts must be careful not to confuse the two given the differ-\\nences between the definitions of “loss” under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and restitu-\\ntion under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B). United States v. Hussein, 664 F.3d\\n155, 161 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The amount of restitution does not always\\ncorrespond to guidelines loss because the rules for calculating each dif-\\nfer.”).\\n\\fNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950 39\\n\\nproducts and attempt to import them with those incorrect\\ndesignations. This violated 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) and the federal\\nprohibition against smuggling, 18 U.S.C. § 545, and evidence\\nsupported the jury’s verdict on those counts. As to Lee’s sen-\\ntence, although the government timely appealed, the district\\ncourt did not exceed its authority when it revisited Lee’s sen-\\ntencing guidelines range and modified Lee’s prison sentence\\naccordingly. Finally, Lee waived any objection to how the dis-\\ntrict court calculated restitution. 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4,645,977 | Eric Mapes v. State of Indiana | 2019-08-06 | 19-1384 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\n\nNo. 19-1384\nERIC J. MAPES,\n ... | FLAUM | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4645977/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
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4,646,036 | Louis Wozniak v. Ilesanmi Adesida | 2019-08-06 | 18-3315 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\n... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646036/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
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4,646,037 | Eric Mapes v. State of Indiana | 2019-08-06 | 19-1384 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\n\nNo. 19-1384\nERIC J. MAPES,\n ... | FLAUM | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646037/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
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4,646,145 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frankie BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marcus J. Thornton, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Marcus Thornton | 2019-08-07 | 18-2644; 18-2760 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Kanne, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2644\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646145/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
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4,646,315 | United States v. Marcus Thornton | 2019-08-07 | 18-2760 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2644\nUNITED STATE... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | SCUDDER | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646315/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
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4,646,316 | John EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Susan GRIFFIN, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | John Evans v. Susan Griffin | 2019-08-07 | 17-1957 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Easterbrook, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-1957\nJOHN EVANS,\n ... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646316/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
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4,646,317 | Bradley A. LAVITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alan J. DUNSTAN, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Bradley Lavite v. Alan Dunstan | 2019-08-07 | 18-3465 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Hamilton, Barrett, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3465\nBRADLEY A. LAVITE,\n ... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646317/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,646,355 | WINDRIDGE OF NAPERVILLE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. | Windridge of Naperville Condo v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insuran | 2019-08-07 | 18-2103 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Kanne, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2103\nWINDRIDGE OF NAPERVILLE\nCONDOMINIUM ASS... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646355/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,646,356 | John Evans v. Susan Griffin | 2019-08-07 | 17-1957 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-1957\... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646356/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,646,357 | Bradley Lavite v. Alan Dunstan | 2019-08-07 | 18-3465 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before HAMILTON, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3465\nBRADLEY A. LAV... | HAMILTON | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {"HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646357/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,646,385 | Windridge of Naperville Condo v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insuran | 2019-08-07 | 18-2103 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2103\nWINDRIDGE OF... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646385/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,646,690 | Beth LAVALLEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MED-1 SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant-Appellant. | Beth Lavallee v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC | 2019-08-08 | 17-3244 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Sykes, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3244\nBETH LAVALLEE,\n ... | WOOD | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646690/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,646,707 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Demetrise L. HARPER, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Demetrise Harper | 2019-08-08 | 18-1725 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Barrett, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1725\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | WOOD | BARRETT | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646707/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,646,708 | Beth Lavallee v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC | 2019-08-08 | 17-3244 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3244\nBETH LA... | WOOD | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646708/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,646,774 | VALBRUNA SLATER STEEL CORPORATION, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. JOSLYN MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees. | Valbruna Slater Steel Corporat v. Joslyn Manufacturing Company | 2019-08-08 | 18-2633 & 18-2738 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2633 & 18-2738\nV... | BAUER | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646774/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,646,775 | United States v. Demetrise Harper | 2019-08-08 | 18-1725 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BARRETT and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1725\nUNI... | WOOD | BARRETT | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646775/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,646,776 | Rita BOUCHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Boucher v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. | 2019-08-08 | 16-1654 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Flaum, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-1654\nRITA BOUCHER,\n ... | WOOD | FLAUM | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646776/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,646,777 | Beth Lavallee v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC | 2019-08-08 | 17-3244 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3244\nBETH LA... | WOOD | SYKES | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646777/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,646,804 | Valbruna Slater Steel Corporat v. Joslyn Manufacturing Company | 2019-08-08 | 18-2738 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2633 & 18-2738\nV... | BAUER | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646804/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,646,806 | Stanislaw STERLINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CATHOLIC BISHOP OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee. | Stanislaw Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago | 2019-08-08 | 18-2844 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Sykes, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2844\nSTANISLAW STERLINSKI,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646806/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,646,807 | Rita Boucher v. AGRI | 2019-08-08 | 16-1654 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and HAMILTON, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 16-1654\... | WOOD | FLAUM | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Cir cuit", "HAMILTON": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646807/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,646,927 | Stanislaw Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago | 2019-08-08 | 18-2844 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Frank Hoover Easterbrook", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\n\nNo. 18-2844\nSTANISL... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4646927/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,157 | John H. BURTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KOHN LAW FIRM, S.C., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | John Burton v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C. | 2019-08-09 | 18-2059 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Ripple, Manion", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2059\nJOHN H. BURTON,\n ... | FLAUM | RIPPLE | MANION | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647157/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,647,230 | John Burton v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C. | 2019-08-09 | 18-2059 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2059\nJOHN H. BURTON,\... | FLAUM | RIPPLE | MANION | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647230/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,231 | FIFTH THIRD MORTGAGE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ira KAUFMAN, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants. | Fifth Third Mortgage Company v. Ira Kaufman | 2019-08-09 | 18-3295 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18‐3295\n\nFIFTH THIRD MORTGAGE COMPANY,\n Plaintiff‐A... | WOOD | BAUER | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647231/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,237 | LOCAL 702, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, and Consolidated Communications, Doing Business as Illinois Consolidated Telephone Company, Intervening-Respondent. | Local 702, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. | 2019-08-09 | 18-3322 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Hamilton, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n\nNo. 18-3322\n\nLOCAL 702, INTERNATIONAL\nBROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL\nWORKERS, AFL-CIO,\n ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647237/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,238 | Kimberly Bilinsky v. American Airlines, Inc. | 2019-08-09 | 18-3107 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ... | FRANK H EASTERBROOK | MICHAEL S KANNE | DAVID F HAMILTON | 1 | {"FRANK H EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "MICHAEL S KANNE": ", Circuit", "DAVID F HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647238/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,239 | Kimberly Bilinsky v. American Airlines, Inc. | 2019-08-09 | 18-3107 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3107\nKIMBERLY BI... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647239/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,240 | Fifth Third Mortgage Company v. Ira Kaufman | 2019-08-09 | 18-3295 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18‐3295\n\nFIFTH THIRD MORTGAGE COMPANY,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647240/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,343 | Local 702, International Brot v. NLRB | 2019-08-09 | 18-3322 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n\nNo. 18-3322\n\nLOCAL 702, INTERNATIONAL\nBROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL\nWO... | BAUER | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647343/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,344 | Kimberly Bilinsky v. American Airlines, Inc. | 2019-08-09 | 18-3107 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge No.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ... | FRANK H EASTERBROOK | MICHAEL S KANNE | DAVID F HAMILTON | 1 | {"FRANK H EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "MICHAEL S KANNE": ", Circuit", "DAVID F HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647344/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,345 | Kimberly Bilinsky v. American Airlines, Inc. | 2019-08-09 | 18-3107 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3107\nKIMBERLY BI... | EASTERBROOK | KANNE | HAMILTON | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647345/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,496 | Local 702, International Brot v. NLRB | 2019-08-09 | 18-3322 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n\nNo. 18-3322\n\nLOCAL 702, INTERNATIONAL\nBROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL\nWO... | BAUER | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647496/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,516 | Sherard MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Davis MARINEZ, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Sherard Martin v. Davis Marinez | 2019-08-12 | 17-2667 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Kanne, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 17-2667\n\nSHERARD MARTIN,\n Plaintiff-Appe... | RIPPLE | KANNE | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647516/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,647,592 | Sherard Martin v. Davis Marinez | 2019-08-12 | 17-2667 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 17-2667\n\nSHERARD MARTIN,\n ... | RIPPLE | KANNE | ROVNER | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647592/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,623 | LANDMARK AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEERFIELD CONSTRUCTION, INC., and Shawn Graff, Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Arthur J. Gallagher Risk Management Services, Inc., Third Party Defendant-Appellee. | Landmark American Insurance Co v. Deerfield Construction, Inc. | 2019-08-12 | 18-2205 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Easterbrook", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2205\nLANDMARK AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647623/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,647,628 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ivan BRAZIER, Lindani Mzembe, and Derek Fields, Defendants-Appellants. | United States v. Lindani Mzembe | 2019-08-12 | 16-4258; 17-1060; 17-1412; 17-2268 & 17-2269 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Rovner, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 17-1412, 17-2268 & 17-2269\nU... | KANNE | ROVNER | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647628/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,647,629 | Tapanga HARDEMAN, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Sheriff Mark CURRAN, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants. | Tapanga Hardeman v. David Wathen | 2019-08-12 | 18-2672 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Flaum, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2672\nTAPANGA HARDEMAN, et al.,\n ... | WOOD | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647629/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,647,630 | Landmark American Insurance Co v. Deerfield Construction, Inc. | 2019-08-12 | 18-2205 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2205\nLAN... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647630/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,686 | United States v. Lindani Mzembe | 2019-08-12 | 17-2269 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 16-4258, 17-1060, 1... | KANNE | ROVNER | HAMILTON | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647686/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,687 | Tapanga Hardeman v. David Wathen | 2019-08-12 | 18-2672 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2672\nTAPANGA... | WOOD | FLAUM | SYKES | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "FLAUM": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647687/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,688 | Landmark American Insurance Co v. Deerfield Construction, Inc. | 2019-08-12 | 18-2205 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐2205\nLAN... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647688/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,752 | Hyung Seok KOH, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. John USTICH, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants. | Hyung Koh v. Sung Kim | 2019-08-13 | 18-1809 & 18-1821 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Ripple, Manion, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1809 & 18-1821\nHYUNG SEOK KOH, et al.,\n ... | RIPPLE | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647752/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,647,808 | Jacqueline M. Sterling v. Southlake Nautilus Health | 2019-08-13 | 18-2773 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo.... | WOOD | BAUER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647808/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,809 | Hyung Koh v. Sung Kim | 2019-08-13 | 18-1821 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1809 & 18-1821\nH... | RIPPLE | MANION | BRENNAN | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647809/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,885 | John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLUMBIA COLLEGE CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee. | John Doe v. Columbia College Chicago | 2019-08-13 | 18-1869 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Manion, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1869\n\nJOHN DOE,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n ... | BAUER | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647885/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,647,886 | Jacqueline M. Sterling v. Southlake Nautilus Health | 2019-08-13 | 18-2773 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ST. EVE, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo.... | WOOD | BAUER | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647886/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,907 | Sheilar SMITH, Et Al., on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated and on Behalf of the OSF Plans, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OSF HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees, and United States of America, Intervening-Appellee. | Sheilar Smith v. OSF Healthcare System | 2019-08-13 | 18-3325 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Easterbrook, Hamilton", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3325\nSHEILAR SMITH, et al., on behalf of the... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647907/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,647,908 | Kenneth J. BAUWENS, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. REVCON TECHNOLOGY GROUP, INC., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Kenneth J. Bauwens v. Revcon Technology Group, Inc. | 2019-08-13 | 18-3306 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Manion, Sykes, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3306\nKENNETH J. BAUWENS, et al.,\n ... | MANION | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647908/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,647,909 | John Doe v. Columbia College Chicago | 2019-08-13 | 18-1869 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1869\n\nJOHN DOE,\n ... | BAUER | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647909/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,925 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mauricio MARCHAN, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Mauricio Marchan | 2019-08-13 | 18-2758 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Hamilton, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n\nNo. 18-2758\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plainti... | BAUER | HAMILTON | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647925/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,926 | Sheilar Smith v. OSF Healthcare System | 2019-08-13 | 18-3325 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647926/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,927 | Kenneth J. Bauwens v. Revcon Technology Group, Inc. | 2019-08-13 | 18-3306 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3306\nKENNETH J. BAUWE... | MANION | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647927/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,928 | John Doe v. Columbia College Chicago | 2019-08-13 | 18-1869 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, MANION, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-1869\n\nJOHN DOE,\n ... | BAUER | MANION | ROVNER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647928/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,947 | United States v. Mauricio Marchan | 2019-08-13 | 18-2758 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n\nNo. 18-2758\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647947/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,948 | Sheilar Smith v. OSF Healthcare System | 2019-08-13 | 18-3325 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3... | WOOD | EASTERBROOK | HAMILTON | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647948/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,647,949 | Fabian GREYER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Et Al. Defendants-Appellees. Michael Johnson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jason Dalke, Et Al. Defendants-Appellees. | Michael Johnson v. Jason Dalke | 2019-08-13 | 18-1459 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1290\nFABIAN GREYER,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647949/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,647,950 | Kenneth J. Bauwens v. Revcon Technology Group, Inc. | 2019-08-13 | 18-3306 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3306\nKENNETH J. BAUWE... | MANION | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4647950/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,648,039 | Michael Johnson v. Jason Dalke | 2019-08-13 | 18-1459 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18‐1290\nFABIA... | WOOD | BAUER | ROVNER | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648039/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,444,056 | IN RE: Jacqueline M. STERLING, Debtor-Appellant. | In re Sterling | 2019-08-13 | No. 18-2773 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Eve, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415494/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BAUER | WOOD | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444056/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,444,057 | EFFEX CAPITAL, LLC v. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION | Effex Capital, LLC v. Nat'l Futures Ass'n | 2019-08-13 | No. 18-1914 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Manion, Ripple", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415495/", "author_raw": ""}]} | FLAUM | MANION | RIPPLE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444057/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,444,058 | Dustin John HIGGS, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant v. UNITED STATES PARK POLICE, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. | Higgs v. U.S. Park Police | 2019-08-13 | Nos. 18-2826; 18-2937 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Rovner, Wood", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415496/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BAUER | ROVNER | WOOD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444058/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,648,348 | Patricia O'DONNELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CAINE WEINER COMPANY, LLC, Defendant-Appellee. | Patricia O'Donnell v. Caine Weiner Company, LLC | 2019-08-14 | 18-1826 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Kanne, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1826\nPATRICIA O’DONNELL,\n ... | FLAUM | KANNE | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648348/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,648,402 | Patricia O'Donnell v. Caine Weiner Company, LLC | 2019-08-14 | 18-1826 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Michael Stephen Kanne", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-1826\nPATRICIA O’DONNELL... | FLAUM | KANNE | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "KANNE": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648402/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,648,688 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jon GILES, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Jon Giles | 2019-08-15 | 18-3126 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Easterbrook", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-3126\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plainti... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648688/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,648,755 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael CLARK, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Michael Clark | 2019-08-15 | 18-2604 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Hamilton, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HAMILTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2604\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648755/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,648,756 | United States v. Jon Giles | 2019-08-15 | 18-3126 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "William Joseph Bauer", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-3126\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | EASTERBROOK | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648756/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,648,757 | Elisa J. YOCHIM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Benjamin S. CARSON, Sr., Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Defendant-Appellee. | Elisa J. Yochim v. Benjamin S. Carson, Sr. | 2019-08-15 | 18-3670 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Kanne, Hamilton, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3670\nELISA J. YOCHIM,\n ... | KANNE | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648757/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,648,779 | United States v. Michael Clark | 2019-08-15 | 18-2604 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HAMILTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2604\nUNITED STAT... | BAUER | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648779/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,648,780 | MAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant. Appeal Of: Christopher L. Coffin, Et Al. | Mao-Mso Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. | 2019-08-15 | 18-2377; 18-2463 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Brennan, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2377 and 18-2463\nMAO-MSO RECOVERY II, LLC, et al.,\n ... | WOOD | BRENNAN | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648780/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,648,781 | Elisa J. Yochim v. Benjamin S. Carson, Sr. | 2019-08-15 | 18-3670 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3670\nELISA J. YOCHI... | KANNE | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648781/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,648,867 | United States v. Michael Clark | 2019-08-15 | 18-2604 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HAMILTON, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2604\nUNITED STAT... | BAUER | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648867/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,648,868 | MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile | 2019-08-15 | 18-2463 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2377 and 1... | WOOD | BRENNAN | ST EVE | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648868/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,648,869 | Elisa J. Yochim v. Benjamin S. Carson, Sr. | 2019-08-15 | 18-3670 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3670\nELISA J. YOCHI... | KANNE | HAMILTON | SCUDDER | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4648869/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,649,412 | Christopher REGAN and Northwest Indiana Creative Investors Association, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF HAMMOND, INDIANA, Defendant-Appellee. | Christopher Regan v. City of Hammond, Indiana | 2019-08-19 | 18-3051 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Wood, Bauer, Rovner", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-3051\n\nCHRISTOPHER REGAN and\nNORTHWEST INDIANA CREATIVE\nINVESTORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,\n ... | WOOD | BAUER | ROVNER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649412/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,649,520 | Rajesh GUPTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY, LLC, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. | Rajesh Gupta v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, L | 2019-08-19 | 18-3584 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Sykes, Brennan, Scudder", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3584\nRAJESH GUPTA,\n ... | SYKES | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649520/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,649,521 | Christopher Regan v. City of Hammond, Indiana | 2019-08-19 | 18-3051 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\nNo. 18-3051\n\nCHRISTOPHER REGAN and\nNORTHWEST INDIANA... | WOOD | BAUER | ROVNER | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "BAUER": ", Circuit", "ROVNER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649521/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,649,540 | Rajesh Gupta v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, L | 2019-08-19 | 18-3584 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before SYKES, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-3584\nRAJESH GUPTA,... | SYKES | BRENNAN | SCUDDER | 1 | {"SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649540/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,649,542 | Mark A. Campbell v. Kevin Kallas | 2019-08-19 | 18-2075 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2075\nMARK ... | WOOD | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649542/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,649,555 | Mark A. Campbell v. Kevin Kallas | 2019-08-19 | 18-2075 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane Pamela Wood", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2075\nMARK ... | WOOD | SYKES | SCUDDER | 1 | {"WOOD": ", Chief", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649555/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,649,776 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven A. ADAMS, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Steven Adams | 2019-08-20 | 18-2932 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Bauer, Hamilton, Eve", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2932\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4649776/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,650,833 | United States v. Steven Adams | 2019-08-20 | 18-2932 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2932\nUNITED STATES ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4650833/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,038 | United States v. Steven Adams | 2019-08-20 | 18-2932 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before BAUER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "David Frank Hamilton", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2932\nUNITED STATES ... | BAUER | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"BAUER": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654038/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,039 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Curtis L. JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Curtis L. Johnson | 2019-08-20 | 18-2350 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Easterbrook, Sykes, Brennan", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2350\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654039/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,654,061 | United States v. Curtis L. Johnson | 2019-08-20 | 18-2350 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before EASTERBROOK, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2350\nUNITED ST... | EASTERBROOK | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"EASTERBROOK": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654061/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,063 | Holly B. VANZANT and Dana Land, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HILL'S PET NUTRITION, INC., and PetSmart, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. | Holly Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Incorpo | 2019-08-20 | 17-3633 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Flaum, Manion, Sykes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3633\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\nDANA LAND, on behalf of themselv... | FLAUM | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654063/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,654,068 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rex A. HOPPER, Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Rex A. Hopper | 2019-08-20 | 18-2576 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Eve, Hamilton, Ripple", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2576\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n ... | HAMILTON | RIPPLE | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654068/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,070 | Holly Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Incorpo | 2019-08-20 | 17-3633 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3633\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\nDANA... | FLAUM | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654070/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,159 | United States v. Rex A. Hopper | 2019-08-20 | 18-2576 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Kenneth Francis Ripple", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2576\nUNITED STAT... | RIPPLE | HAMILTON | ST EVE | 1 | {"RIPPLE": ", Circuit", "HAMILTON": ", Circuit", "ST EVE": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654159/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,161 | Holly Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Incorpo | 2019-08-20 | 17-3633 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 17-3633\nHOLLY B. VANZANT and\nDANA... | FLAUM | MANION | SYKES | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654161/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,374 | Terry Smith v. Illinois Department of Transp | 2019-08-21 | 18-2948 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2948\nTERRY L. SMIT... | FLAUM | MANION | BARRETT | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654374/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,606 | United States v. Marshon Simon | 2019-08-21 | 18-2442 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2442\nUNITED STATES O... | FLAUM | MANION | BARRETT | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654606/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,607 | Terry Smith v. Illinois Department of Transp | 2019-08-21 | 18-2948 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRETT, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2948\nTERRY L. SMIT... | FLAUM | MANION | BARRETT | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654607/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,608 | Amy Sullivan v. Flora, Inc. | 2019-08-21 | 18-2534 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\nAMY ... | FLAUM | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654608/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,619 | United States v. Marshon Simon | 2019-08-21 | 18-2442 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2442\nUNITED STATES O... | FLAUM | MANION | BARRETT | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654619/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,620 | United States v. Heon Seok Lee | 2019-08-21 | 18-1950 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\nUNI... | KANNE | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654620/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,621 | FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC | 2019-08-21 | 18-3310 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before MANION, SYKES, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Diane S. Sykes", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-2847 & 18-3310\nFEDERAL TRADE... | MANION | SYKES | BRENNAN | 1 | {"MANION": ", Circuit", "SYKES": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654621/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,624 | Amy Sullivan v. Flora, Inc. | 2019-08-21 | 18-2534 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SCUDDER, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 17-2241 & 18-2534\nAMY ... | FLAUM | BARRETT | SCUDDER | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "SCUDDER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654624/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,632 | United States v. Marshon Simon | 2019-08-21 | 18-2442 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLAUM, MANION, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Daniel Anthony Manion", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNo. 18-2442\nUNITED STATES O... | FLAUM | MANION | BARRETT | 1 | {"FLAUM": ", Circuit", "MANION": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654632/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,654,633 | United States v. Heon Seok Lee | 2019-08-21 | 18-1950 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before KANNE, BARRETT, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRENNAN, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Seventh Circuit\n ____________________\nNos. 18-1687 & 18-1950\nUNI... | KANNE | BARRETT | BRENNAN | 1 | {"KANNE": ", Circuit", "BARRETT": ", Circuit", "BRENNAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4654633/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 8 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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